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crs_98-756 | crs_98-756_0 | Congress oversees the defense budget primarily through two yearly bills: the defense authorization and defense appropriations bills. Table 2 and Table 4 present the Department of Defense (DOD) authorization and appropriations bills from 1970 to 2018. Data in Table 1 and Table 3 are mostly from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac . Ideally, after the authorization bill is passed, the appropriations bill goes through this same process. Although conceptually a sequential process, authorization and appropriations bills can be considered at the same time or even passed in reverse order. For instance, the Senate can report out a bill, and then substitute the text of the Senate bill for the text of the bill passed by the House while retaining the House bill number. The House can also use this procedure. For more information on the components of a CR and the defense budget, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices , by James V. Saturno and Jessica Tollestrup. Methods of Voting
There are several types of votes: voice votes, teller votes, division votes, and unanimous consent votes, but only when there is a recorded vote will there be a vote number and vote tally in the Congressional Record . | The passage of the Department of Defense (DOD) authorization and appropriations bills through Congress often does not follow the course laid out in textbooks on legislative procedure. Tracking DOD authorization or appropriation bills can be confusing and time-consuming. This has been particularly true in recent years, when continuing resolutions (CRs) containing the DOD and other appropriation bills have been enacted in lieu of the 12 regular appropriations bills for the entire U.S. government.
This report is a research aid that lists the DOD authorization bills (Table 1 and Table 2) and appropriations bills (Table 3 and Table 4) for FY1961-FY2019. This report includes all the pertinent information on the passage of these bills through the legislative process: bill numbers, report numbers, dates reported and passed, recorded vote numbers and vote tallies, dates of passage of the conference reports with their numbers and votes, vetoes, substitutions, dates of final passage, and public law numbers. Significant definitions are also included. This report will be updated as legislative activity warrants.
For information on current defense authorization and appropriations, see the CRS Appropriations Status Table: FY2019. |
crs_RL32844 | crs_RL32844_0 | 3) of the United States Constitution provides that the Congress shall have the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. The plain meaning of this language might indicate a limited power to regulate commercial trade between persons in one state and persons outside of that state. However, the Commerce Clause has never been construed quite so narrowly. Rather, the clause, along with the economy of the United States, has grown and become more complex. In addition, when Congress began to address national social problems, the Commerce Clause was often cited as the constitutional basis for such legislation. As a result, the Commerce Clause has become the constitutional basis for a significant portion of the laws passed by Congress over the last 50 years, and it currently represents one of the broadest bases for the exercise of congressional powers. An examination of the United States Code shows that more than 700 statutory provisions explicitly refer to either "interstate" or "foreign" commerce, covering a significant number of issues. While these cases have resulted in the overturning of federal laws, their overall effect has so far been relatively modest in scope. A 2005 Supreme Court case, Gonzales v. Raich , seems to confirm that the effect of these previous cases will be limited. Instead, over the next several decades, the Court considered the boundaries of the "dormant Commerce Clause" doctrine—the implied limitation of the Commerce Clause on a state's ability to regulate commerce. Much of this litigation was resolved by the Supreme Court in the case of National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius . Chief Justice Roberts, in a controlling opinion, found that the Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with the authority to enact the individual mandate. | The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the Congress shall have the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. The plain meaning of this language might indicate a limited power to regulate commercial trade between persons in one state and persons outside of that state. However, the Commerce Clause has never been construed quite so narrowly. Rather, the clause, along with the economy of the United States, has grown and become more complex. In addition, when Congress began to address national social problems, the Commerce Clause was often cited as the constitutional basis for such legislation. As a result, the Commerce Clause has become the constitutional basis for a significant portion of the laws passed by Congress over the last 50 years, and it currently represents one of the broadest bases for the exercise of congressional powers.
An examination of the United States Code shows that more than 700 statutory provisions, covering a range of issues, are explicitly based on regulation of either "interstate" or "foreign" commerce. Over the last two decades, however, the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison held that a gun possession law and a law regarding sexual violence were, respectively, beyond Congress's authority to regulate commerce. The effect of these cases, however, has so far been relatively modest in scope. For instance, a later case, Gonzales v. Raich, confirmed the authority of Congress to regulate medical marijuana, suggesting that the effect of the prior cases will be limited. Yet, in the case of National Federation of Business v. Sebelius, considering a challenge to an individual mandate to buy health insurance, the Court found that the Commerce Clause did not provide authority for such mandate. In Sebelius, the Court limited the use of the Commerce Clause to instances where individuals have already chosen to engage in a commercial activity (although it did find that such mandate could be enforced under Congress's power to tax). |
crs_R42103 | crs_R42103_0 | Social Security is financed by payroll taxes, which are paid by covered workers and their employers. In the absence of a payroll tax reduction, employees and employers would each pay 6.2% of covered earnings, up to an annual limit, whereas self-employed individuals would pay 12.4% of net self-employment income, up to an annual limit. In December 2010, Congress temporarily reduced the employee and self-employed shares by two percentage points (to 4.2% for employees and 10.4% for the self-employed), with the Social Security trust funds "made whole" by a transfer of general revenue. The temporary reduction was scheduled to expire at the end of 2011, but was extended for two months as part of the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-78 ). The temporary payroll tax rate reduction was extended through the end of 2012 in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ) and subsequently allowed to expire at the end of 2012. However, the use of offsets to reduce the budgetary cost of repaying the Social Security trust funds would reduce the stimulative effect, though the choice of offsets can influence the magnitude of the reduction. This report briefly discusses economic stimulus considerations related to temporary payroll tax reductions and efforts to offset the budgetary cost of an extension. For a discussion of Social Security policy considerations concerning a temporary payroll tax reduction, see CRS Report R41648, Social Security: Temporary Payroll Tax Reduction , by [author name scrubbed]. To address long-term fiscal objectives, some proposals to extend or expand the temporary reduction in payroll taxes include one or more offsets to reduce or eliminate the net budgetary cost of the proposals. Paying for a Temporary Payroll Tax Reduction: Options and Considerations
Extending the two percentage point payroll tax reduction through the end of 2012 cost an estimated $93.2 billion. Offsets that reduce spending, or increase revenues, are contractionary. While offsets address the issue of long-term fiscal sustainability, depending on design, they can diminish the short-term stimulative effects of the tax cut. Having offsets occur after the period of economic weakness has passed could limit short-term contractionary effects while simultaneously promoting long-term fiscal sustainability. High-income taxpayer benefits from the payroll tax rate reduction are also limited. The federal employee pension provisions enacted in P.L. This option was not used to offset the payroll tax rate reduction extension as enacted in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ). | Social Security is financed by payroll taxes, which are paid by covered workers and their employers. In the absence of a payroll tax reduction, employees and employers would each pay 6.2% of covered earnings, up to an annual limit, whereas self-employed individuals would pay 12.4% of net self-employment income, up to an annual limit.
In an effort to stimulate the economy, Congress, in December 2010, temporarily reduced the employee and self-employed shares by two points (to 4.2% for employees and 10.4% for the self-employed), with the Social Security trust funds "made whole" by a transfer of general revenue. The temporary reduction was scheduled to expire at the end of 2011, but the reduction was extended for two months as part of the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-78).
The payroll tax rate reduction was extended through the end of 2012 in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96). Extending the reduction through the end of 2012 would, by itself, increase the deficit by an estimated $93.2 billion—raising concerns about the apparent incompatibility of an extension with long-term goals of fiscal sustainability.
Earlier proposals to extend the payroll tax reduction included some form of budgetary offset to reduce or eliminate the effect on the deficit and address concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability. Among the budgetary offsets mentioned in extension proposals were a surtax on high-income individuals, freezing federal employee pay, and limiting certain federal benefits to high-income individuals. Ultimately, both the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-78) and the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96) extended the payroll tax rate reduction for the remainder of 2012 without offset. The payroll tax rate reduction expired at the end of 2012.
Budgetary offsets are contractionary—as they either reduce spending or increase revenues. The degree to which they are contractionary in the short term, however, depends on design and the populations affected. For example, having offsets occur after the period of economic weakness has passed could limit short-term contractionary effects while simultaneously promoting long-term fiscal sustainability. In contrast, offsets that fall on individuals facing financial constraints would be expected to have larger contractionary effects.
This report briefly discusses economic stimulus considerations related to temporary payroll tax reductions. In addition, as the Social Security trust fund is made whole through a transfer from the general fund, select options to offset this increase in the deficit will be examined to illustrate how the choice of offsets can affect the net amount of economic stimulus provided. For a discussion of Social Security policy considerations concerning a temporary payroll tax reduction, see CRS Report R41648, Social Security: Temporary Payroll Tax Reduction, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL30759 | crs_RL30759_0 | These factors prompted the 105 th Congress to enact legislation with two primary goals: (1) to ensure that consideration of children's safety is paramount in child welfare decisions, so that children are not returned to unsafe homes; and (2) to ensure that necessary legal procedures occur expeditiously, so that children who cannot return home may be placed for adoption or another permanent arrangement quickly. 105 - 89 ) was enacted in November 1997, and is considered the most sweeping change in federal child welfare law since 1980, when the current configuration of federal child welfare programs was established. Since 1997, all states have enacted their own laws to implement parts of ASFA. In January 2000, the federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued regulations to implement certain provisions of the 1997 law and, acting on a 1994 congressional directive ( P.L. 103 - 432 ), to establish a review system to monitor state compliance with federal child welfare laws, including ASFA provisions. HHS also has issued several reports that were mandated by ASFA and has awarded six rounds of annual incentive payments, also authorized by ASFA (and subsequently reauthorized in 2003), to states that increased their numbers of foster child and special needs child adoptions. Most of the provisions in the 1997 law amended Title IV-B or IV-E of the Social Security Act, which authorize grants to states for child welfare activities. The majority of these grants are permanent authorizations and received appropriations totaling $7.6 billion for FY2004. As enacted in 1980 ( P.L. 96 - 272 ), these provisions require states to make "reasonable efforts" on behalf of abused and neglected children or children at risk of abuse and neglect, to ensure that services are provided to their families so they can remain safely at home or return home if they have been placed in foster care. States also must conduct administrative and court hearings on every child's case according to a prescribed timetable and establish a permanent placement plan for each child. Periodically during the years since P.L. 96 - 272 was enacted, there was concern that some states and judges interpreted the federal child welfare laws as requiring family preservation and reunification at all costs, including in cases where the child's health or safety was in jeopardy. The Adoption and Safe Families Act was intended to clarify federal policy to ensure safety for children who come into contact with the child welfare system. Moreover, in response to concern about the growing numbers f children in foster care, starting in the late 1980s and continuing through the 1990s, ASFA was intended to expedite permanency for foster children and to promote adoption for those children who cannot safely return home. Under P.L. Adoption Incentive Program
ASFA established a new program of incentive payments to states to increase their number of foster child adoptions, with additional incentives for the adoption of children with special needs. As reauthorized in 2003 ( P.L. 108 - 145 ). | In response to rising numbers of children in foster care and concerns about the safety of children that remain with or return to their families after placement in foster care, the 105th Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA, P.L. 105-89) with two primary goals: (1) to ensure that consideration of children's safety is paramount in child welfare decisions, so that children are not returned to unsafe homes; and (2) to ensure that necessary legal procedures occur expeditiously, so that children who cannot return home may be placed for adoption or another permanent arrangement quickly. ASFA is considered the most sweeping change in federal child welfare law in nearly 20 years.
Most provisions in the 1997 law amended Titles IV-B or IV-E of the Social Security Act, which authorize grants to states for child welfare activities, including foster care and adoption assistance. In FY2004, Titles IV-B and IV-E received appropriations totaling $7.6 billion. As enacted in 1980 (P.L. 96-272), the underlying law requires states to make "reasonable efforts" on behalf of abused and neglected children or children at risk of abuse and neglect, to ensure that services are provided to their families so they can remain safely at home or return home if they have been placed in foster care. States also must conduct administrative and court hearings on every child's case according to a prescribed timetable and establish a permanent placement plan for each child.
Periodically since P.L. 96-272 was enacted, concern arose that some states and judges interpreted the federal child welfare laws as requiring family preservation and reunification at all costs, including in cases where the child's health or safety was in jeopardy. ASFA was intended to clarify federal policy to ensure safety for children who come into contact with the child welfare system. Moreover, ASFA was intended to expedite permanency for foster children and to promote adoption for those children who cannot safely return home.
Since 1997, all states have enacted their own laws to implement parts of ASFA, and the federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has issued regulations to implement certain provisions of the 1997 law. Acting on a 1994 legislative directive (P.L. 103-432), HHS also initiated a review system in 2001 to monitor state compliance with federal child welfare laws, including the provisions of ASFA. HHS also issued several reports as mandated by ASFA.
Finally, ASFA authorized annual incentive payments to states that exceeded their highest previous number of foster child adoptions in a given year, with larger payments for adoptions of children with special needs. Congress reauthorized and revised this program in 2003 (P.L. 108-145), to create separate incentives for adoptions of older children. For adoptions in FY1998-FY2003, states "earned" a total of $178 million (of which $17.9 million were earned by 31 states and Puerto Rico for adoptions finalized in 2003). HHS data indicate approximately 52,500 children were adopted with the involvement of public child welfare agencies in 2002, for an increase of nearly 70% since 1997. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R45158 | crs_R45158_0 | Introduction
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) establishes a system of rules as to which non-U.S. nationals (aliens) may enter the United States and under what conditions. Well-known examples of such decisions include grants of deferred action, protections granted under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative, and Temporary Protected Status (TPS). The latter, TPS, is a statutory mechanism that allows immigration authorities to grant temporary protection from removal to aliens from countries experiencing upheaval or instability. Discretionary reprieves from removal do not, in other words, offer steadfast protection from removal, although they typically confer eligibility for work authorization, among other benefits. Sources of Executive Authority to Grant Discretionary Reprieves from Removal
The Executive's power to grant most of the existing forms of discretionary reprieves—including deferred action, DACA, and DED, among others—is typically attributed to its enforcement discretion: that is, its authority to determine the best method for enforcing federal immigration law. This enforcement discretion includes the authority to prioritize some cases over others to conserve resources or avoid unjust results. Finally, the INA gives DHS and immigration courts authority to grant some types of discretionary reprieves in conjunction with the removal process, including voluntary departure, stays of removal, and orders of supervision. Nature of Protections for Recipients: In General
The principal benefit of a discretionary reprieve is the temporary assurance it provides to an unlawfully present alien that he or she does not face imminent removal, even though his or her presence in the United States violates the INA. Aliens present in violation of the INA who receive discretionary reprieves remain technically removable under the inadmissibility or deportability grounds of the INA, and, except in the case of TPS recipients, do not have a statutory defense against removal based on the reprieve itself. As a consequence, time spent in the United States on deferred action, TPS, and most other types of reprieves does not count toward the accumulation of unlawful presence for purposes of the three- and ten-year bars on admission set forth in INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i) (although a reprieve does not cure, for purposes of the bars, any unlawful presence already accumulated). It is often said that discretionary reprieves do not confer lawful immigration status. For example, aliens who receive discretionary reprieves generally cannot work legally unless DHS, in its discretion, authorizes them to do so (unlike LPRs, refugees, asylees, and some nonimmigrants); they have no statutorily established prospects of remaining permanently in the United States (unlike LPRs, asylees, and refugees); they are generally subject to removal by virtue of their presence within the United States alone (unlike all aliens with LPR, refugee, asylee, and unexpired nonimmigrant status); they have no legal basis to facilitate the admission of immediate relatives into the United States (unlike LPRs, refugees and asylees in some circumstances, and some nonimmigrants); they face considerable restrictions on eligibility for federal public benefits (particularly as compared with LPRs, refugees, and asylees); and, unless DHS decides to grant them advance parole, they generally cannot travel abroad with any legal basis to request re-entry to the United States (unlike all aliens with one of the four major statuses, except some nonimmigrants). Such aliens do not, however, possess "lawful immigration status," in the narrow sense that they remain technically removable under the INA's inadmissibility or deportability provisions and in the more general sense that they do not enjoy most of the statutorily fixed protections that come with LPR, refugee, asylee, and nonimmigrant status. Generally Available Reprieves Premised upon Enforcement Discretion or Executive Powers
Deferred Action . Thus, the term serves as a generic label for a decision by DHS not to remove an inadmissible or deportable alien pursuant to its enforcement discretion. Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) . Extended Voluntary Departure (EVD). Generally Available Reprieves Granted Pursuant to Statutory Authority
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) . Section 244 of the INA authorizes DHS to grant TPS to aliens who are nationals of countries that the Secretary of Homeland Security has designated as unsafe for return because of armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary conditions. Reprieves Granted Exclusively in Connection with the Removal Process
Administrative Closure . At the conclusion of removal proceedings, the immigration judge alone may grant voluntary departure for a maximum of 60 days. | Since at least the 1970s, immigration authorities in the United States have sometimes exercised their discretion to grant temporary reprieves from removal to non-U.S. nationals (aliens) present in the United States in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Well-known types of reprieves include deferred action, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), and Temporary Protected Status (TPS). The authority to grant some types of discretionary reprieves from removal, including TPS, comes directly from the INA. The authority to grant other types of reprieves generally arises from the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) enforcement discretion—that is, its discretion to determine the best manner for enforcing the immigration laws, including by prioritizing some removal cases over others.
The primary benefit that a reprieve offers to an unlawfully present alien is an assurance that he or she does not face imminent removal. Reprieves also generally confer other benefits, including eligibility for employment authorization and nonaccrual of unlawful presence for purposes of the three- and ten-year bars on admission to the United States under the INA. Reprieves do not confer "lawful immigration status," in the narrow sense that reprieve recipients typically remain removable under the INA's grounds of inadmissibility or deportability (although they may have defenses to removal, including a statutory defense in the case of TPS) and in the more general sense that recipients do not enjoy most of the statutorily fixed protections that come with lawful permanent resident (LPR), refugee, asylee, and nonimmigrant status. The availability and duration of reprieves often turn upon executive policies, and accordingly reprieves do not offer steadfast protection from removal or reliable access to other benefits.
Categories of reprieves premised upon executive enforcement discretion include the following:
Deferred Action. The generic term that DHS uses for a decision not to remove an inadmissible or deportable alien pursuant to its enforcement discretion. DACA. A large-scale, programmatic type of deferred action available since 2012 for a subset of aliens who arrived in the United States as children. Deferred Enforced Departure (DED). A reprieve premised on the President's exercise of foreign policy powers to protect nationals of countries experiencing war or instability. Extended Voluntary Departure (EVD). An earlier version of DED little used since 1990.
Reprieves granted pursuant to statutory authority include the following:
TPS Relief. A form of temporary protection from removal for aliens from countries that DHS designates as unsafe for return because of armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary conditions. Parole. A statutory power that authorizes DHS to grant entry (but not admission) to inadmissible aliens on a case-by-case basis.
Immigration authorities may grant other reprieves in connection with removal proceedings:
Administrative Closure. A decision to discontinue temporarily a removal proceeding. Voluntary Departure. A brief reprieve that allows an alien to depart the United States at his own expense in lieu of removal proceedings or enforcement of a removal order. Stay of Removal, Order of Supervision. Mechanisms often used together that allow DHS or an immigration judge to postpone enforcement of a removal order. |
crs_R43899 | crs_R43899_0 | This report presents basic information about this infectious disease, its history in the United States, available treatments to prevent individuals from contracting measles, and the federal role in combatting measles—from funding, to research, to the authority of the federal government in requiring mandatory childhood vaccinations. What Is Measles?1
According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), "measles is a highly contagious virus that lives in the nose and throat mucus of an infected person." It is transmitted through coughing and sneezing, and it can live for up to two hours on a surface or in an airspace where the infected person coughed or sneezed. Someone who is not immunized against measles and comes into contact with the virus has a 9-in-10 chance of becoming infected. According to data published in CDC's Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR), in 2013 (the year for which most recent data are available) "the overall national coverage for MMR vaccine among children aged 19 - 35 months was 91.9%." However, MMR vaccine coverage levels vary by state. According to the CDC, "in 10 states, 95% of the children aged 19–35 months in 2013 had received at least one dose of MMR vaccine, while in 17 other states, less than 90% of these children were vaccinated against measles." The President's FY2016 budget request for the CDC reports that "from January 1 to November 29, 2014, CDC received reports of 610 measles cases from 24 states in the United States. This is the highest number of cases reported in the United States, including the largest single measles outbreak, since the Vaccines for Children (VFC) Program was established in 1994." Thus far in 2015 (through January 30), CDC has received reports of 102 measles cases located in 14 states. What Is the Federal Role in Vaccine Policy?19
The role of the federal government in vaccine policy, particularly in the development of guidelines for when to administer specific vaccines (and when not to) and to what populations is extensive. The federal government also has a major role in the purchase and distribution of vaccines, particularly childhood vaccines. However, the role of the federal government is much more limited and constrained in its ability to mandate the use of specific vaccines by individuals—this responsibility rests primarily with state and local officials. | The earliest accounts of measles date back over 1,000 years. This report presents basic information about this infectious disease, its history in the United States, available treatments to prevent individuals from contracting measles, and the federal role in combatting measles—from funding, to research, to the authority of the federal government in requiring mandatory childhood vaccinations. The report provides additional resources for information on measles and recommendations for vaccination against the disease.
According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), "measles is a highly contagious virus that lives in the nose and throat mucus of an infected person." It is transmitted through coughing and sneezing, and it can live for up to two hours on a surface or in an airspace where an infected person coughed or sneezed. Someone who is not immunized against measles and comes into contact with the virus has a 90% chance of becoming infected.
According to the CDC, in 2013 (the most recent year in which data are available) "the overall national coverage for MMR vaccine among children aged 19-35 months was 91.9%." However, MMR (measles, mumps, rubella) vaccine coverage levels continue to vary by state, with 10 states reporting 95% of children aged 19-35 months receiving at least one dose of MMR vaccine, while in 17 other states, less than 90% were vaccinated.
The President's FY2016 budget request for the CDC reports that "from January 1 to November 29, 2014, CDC received reports of 610 measles cases from 24 states in the United States. This is the highest number of cases reported in the United States, including the largest single measles outbreak, since the Vaccines for Children (VFC) Program was established in 1994." Thus far in 2015 (through January 30), CDC has received reports of 102 measles cases located in 14 states. While the overall U.S. MMR annual vaccination rate has exceeded 90% since 1996, the increased number of imported measles cases, combined with pockets of unvaccinated individuals, has resulted in a larger number of outbreaks in recent years.
The role of the federal government in vaccine policy, particularly in the development of guidelines for when to administer specific vaccines (and when not to) and to what populations is extensive. The federal government also has a major role in the purchase and distribution of vaccines, particularly childhood vaccines. However, the role of the federal government is much more limited and constrained in its ability to mandate the use of specific vaccines by individuals—this responsibility rests primarily with state and local officials. |
crs_R42005 | crs_R42005_0 | Background
The U.S. Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) designations of metropolitan areas—officially called "core-based statistical areas" (CBSAs)—can attract congressional attention in part because they can be important to congressional constituents. This interest can be heightened insofar as the standards are used in a particular way unintended by OMB, in formulas for allocating certain federal grant program funds. Introduction to the 2010 Standards
In a June 28, 2010, Federal Register notice, OMB announced the standards for delineating core-based statistical areas—the two categories of which are metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas—during the decade 2010 to 2020. The terms "core-based statistical area" and "micropolitan" first were used in the 2000 standards. The Federal Register notice also presented the 2010 standards for delineating New England city and town areas (NECTAs), which are conceptually similar to CBSAs. The new standards, superseding those for 2000 to 2010, differ only slightly from the previous decade's and incorporate the changes recommended by the Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Area Standards Review Committee. Newly delineated NECTAs and their components were issued then, too. Producing these lists involved applying the 2010 standards to population data from the 2010 census, as well as employment and commuting data from the Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS) estimates for 2006 through 2010. Hence, although OMB establishes the criteria for designating metropolitan areas, Census Bureau data are used to generate the specific areas. CBSAs comprise whole counties and county equivalents in the United States and Puerto Rico. Counties that do not qualify to be in CBSAs are classified as "outside core-based statistical areas." New England city and town areas, like CBSAs, contain either urbanized areas or urban clusters and are called either "metropolitan" or "micropolitan." Principal Cities of CBSAs and NECTAs
CBSAs have one or more principal cities, which include
the most populous incorporated place in the CBSA with a 2010 census population of at least 10,000 people, or, if the CBSA contains no such place, the most populous incorporated place or census designated place (CDP); any additional incorporated place or CDP with a 2010 census population of at least 250,000 people, or where 100,000 or more people work; any additional incorporated place or CDP with a 2010 census population of at least 50,000 but fewer than 250,000 people, "in which the number of workers working in the place meets or exceeds the number of workers living in the place"; and any additional incorporated place or CDP with a 2010 census population of at least 10,000 but fewer than 50,000 people, which also has at least one-third the population size of the CBSA's most populous place, and where "the number of workers working in the place meets or exceeds the number of workers living in the place." Central and Outlying Counties of CBSAs
CBSAs have one or more central counties. A main county is automatically the basis for a metropolitan division. Updating the Designations After 2013
As previously mentioned, OMB released, on February 28, 2013, the lists of CBSAs and NECTAs delineated according to the 2010 standards. Difficulty of Ascertaining How the Designations Affect Federal Funds Distribution
No direct procedure exists for calculating precisely the amount of money distributed through all federal grant programs that use metropolitan area designations (referring to metropolitan statistical areas or micropolitan statistical areas), or for determining how changes in the delineations of specific jurisdictions affect the total funding allocated to them. Even generating a comprehensive list of programs whose funding formulas refer to these designations would be problematic. Other Strategies
Finding comprehensively which programs use metropolitan area designations would require reviewing the statutes, regulations, and formulas associated with all programs. Metropolitan Area Status and Eligibility for Federal Funds
If a complete list of programs whose formulas use metropolitan area designations were available, it would be only the beginning of any attempt to determine whether inclusion in, or exclusion from, a particular metropolitan area or its components translates directly into an increase or decrease in the funds a particular jurisdiction might receive from all federal grant programs that rely on these designations. Again, the question would have to be addressed program by program and posed to department or agency program staff. | On June 28, 2010, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) announced its uniform criteria, or "standards," for delineating metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas in the decade 2010 to 2020. Together, these areas are known informally as "metropolitan areas" and officially as "core-based statistical areas" (CBSAs); "core" refers to a large population concentration that is socially and economically integrated with surrounding territory. Also announced were the standards for delineating New England city and town areas (NECTAs), which are conceptually similar to CBSAs. The 2010 standards supersede those for designating metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas in the decade 2000 to 2010. The terms "core-based statistical area" and "micropolitan" first were used in the 2000 standards. The current standards have changed only slightly from the previous decade's. Changes include reference to "delineating," instead of "defining," CBSAs and NECTAs; a lower threshold for the automatic combination of two CBSAs; and no further provision for local opinion to influence whether some areas will combine or what titles combined areas will receive.
CBSAs consist of whole counties and county-equivalents in the United States and Puerto Rico. Each CBSA must contain at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more people (for a metropolitan statistical area) or at least one urban cluster of 10,000 to 49,999 people (for a micropolitan statistical area). CBSAs have one or more principal cities and central counties. Outlying counties are included in CBSAs on the basis of employment and commuting data. Counties that do not qualify for inclusion in CBSAs are classified as "outside core-based statistical areas." The criteria for designating NECTAs closely resemble the CBSA criteria, and NECTAs are either metropolitan or micropolitan, but they are based on cities and towns rather than counties.
On February 28, 2013, OMB issued the actual lists of CBSAs—the titles of the areas, with their principal city and county components. NECTAs and their components were listed, too. The lists were derived by applying the OMB standards to population data from the 2010 census, conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (Census Bureau, part of the U.S. Department of Commerce), as well as employment and commuting data from the Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS) estimates for 2006 through 2010. After 2013, updated data are to be used for any changes in the lists.
In principle, metropolitan area delineations are to be used solely for descriptive, statistical purposes. In practice, however, they can have a use unintended by OMB, in formulas for allocating certain federal grant program funds. For this reason, among other reasons, CBSAs can attract congressional attention because they can be important to congressional constituents.
No straightforward procedure exists for calculating the exact amount of money distributed through all federal grant programs whose funding formulas incorporate metropolitan area designations, or for determining how changes in these designations might affect the total funding allocated to a specific jurisdiction. Even identifying comprehensively which programs use metropolitan area designations would require reviewing the statutes, regulations, and formulas associated with all programs. If such identification were feasible, it would be only the beginning of any attempt to determine whether inclusion in, or exclusion from, a particular metropolitan area or its components translates directly into an increase or decrease in the money a particular jurisdiction might receive from all federal grant programs whose funding formulas rely on these designations. The question then would have to be addressed program by program and posed to department or agency program staff. |
crs_R41135 | crs_R41135_0 | Introduction
The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA; P.L. WIA includes five titles:
Title I—Workforce Investment Systems—provides job training and related services to unemployed or underemployed individuals; Title II—Adult Education and Literacy—provides education services to assist adults in improving their literacy and completing secondary education; Title III—Workforce Investment-Related Activities—amends the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 to integrate the U.S. Employment Service (ES) into the One-Stop system established by WIA; Title IV—Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1998—amends the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which provides vocational rehabilitation services to individuals with disabilities, to integrate vocational rehabilitation into the One-Stop system; and Title V—General Provisions—specifies components of State Unified Plans and provisions for state incentive grants. Workforce development programs provide a combination of education and training services to prepare individuals for work and to help them improve their prospects in the labor market. The federal government provides workforce development activities through WIA's programs and other programs designed to increase the employment and earnings of workers. Workforce development may include activities such as job search assistance, career counseling, occupational skill training, classroom training, or on-the-job training. Title III of WIA amends the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, which establishes the Employment Service (ES), to make the ES an integral part of the One-Stop system created by WIA. Because the ES is a critical part of the One-Stop system, it is discussed briefly in this report even though it is authorized by separate legislation (Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933). 113-128 ). P.L. Title I programs are administered by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), primarily through its Employment and Training Administration (DOLETA). 97-300 ). A system of "One-Stop" centers through which state and local WIA training and employment activities are provided and in which certain partner programs must be co-located. Characteristics of WIA Title I Programs
This report provides details of WIA Title I state formula program structure, services, allocation formulas, and performance accountability. In addition, it provides a program overview for national grant programs. This system is supposed to provide employment and training services that are responsive to the demands of local area employers. The demand driven nature of WIA is manifested in elements such as Workforce Investment Boards (WIBs), a majority of whose members must be representatives of business. Under the state formula grant portion of WIA, which accounts for nearly 60% of total WIA Title I funding, the majority of funds are allocated to local WIBs (after initial allocation from DOLETA to the states) that are authorized to determine the mix of service provision, eligible providers, and types of training programs, among other decisions. The WIA system provides central points of service by its system of One-Stop centers. Unlike its predecessor, the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), WIA provides universal access to its services. WIA is oriented toward a work first approach to workforce development. That is, placement in employment is the first goal of the services provided under Title I of WIA. Required statewide employment and training activities, which are funded by the 15% reserve funds from each of the youth, adult, and dislocated worker state allocations, include
dissemination of the state list of eligible providers of training services (including performance and program cost information for these providers) and eligible providers of youth activities; evaluations of state workforce investment programs for the purpose of "continuously improving" state activities to "achieve high-level performance" within the workforce development system and "high-level outcomes" from the workforce development system; distribution of incentive grants to local workforce investment areas for regional cooperation, local coordination of activities, and "exemplary performance" on local performance measures; technical assistance to local areas not meeting required performance measures; assistance to local areas in establishing One-Stop delivery systems; statewide activities and additional assistance to local areas with high concentrations of eligible youth to carry out program design and program elements for youth; and operation of a fiscal and management accountability system in order to report on and monitor the use of WIA funds. | The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA; P.L. 105-220), which succeeded the Job Training Partnership Act (P.L. 97-300) as the main federal workforce development legislation, was enacted to bring about increased coordination among federal workforce development and related programs. WIA authorized the appropriation of "such sums as may be necessary" for each of FY1999 through FY2003 to carry out the programs and activities authorized in the legislation. Authorization of appropriations under WIA expired in FY2003 but has been extended annually through the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Labor-HHS-ED). In 2014, Congress passed, and the President signed, a new law—the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA; P.L. 113-128)—that replaced WIA, the provisions of which start to be implemented in 2015. This report covers WIA and will not be updated.
Workforce development programs provide a combination of education and training services to prepare individuals for work and to help them improve their prospects in the labor market and may include activities such as job search assistance, career counseling, occupational skill training, classroom training, or on-the-job training. The federal government provides workforce development activities through WIA's programs and other programs designed to increase the employment and earnings of workers.
The WIA system provides central points of service by its system of around 3,000 One-Stop centers nationwide through which state and local WIA training and employment activities are provided and through which certain partner programs must be coordinated. This system is supposed to provide employment and training services that are responsive to the demands of local area employers. Administration of the One-Stop system occurs through Workforce Investment Boards (WIBs), a majority of whose members must be representatives of business and which are authorized to determine the mix of service provision, eligible providers, and types of training programs, among other decisions. Unlike its predecessor, the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), WIA provides universal access to its services. Finally, WIA is oriented toward a work first approach to workforce development, such that placement in employment is the first goal of the services provided under Title I of WIA
WIA includes five titles: Workforce Investment Systems (Title I), Adult Education and Literacy (Title II), Workforce Investment-Related Activities (Title III), Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1998 (Title IV), and General Provisions (Title V). Title I, whose programs are primarily administered through the Employment and Training Administration (DOLETA) of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), includes three state formula grant programs, multiple national programs, Job Corps, and demonstration programs. Title II, whose programs are administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED), includes a state formula grant program and National Leadership activities. Title III of WIA amends the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, and Title IV amends the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Title V includes provisions for the administration of WIA.
This report provides details of WIA Title I state formula program structure, services, allocation formulas, and performance accountability. In addition, it provides a program overview for national grant programs. It also provides brief overviews of Titles II and IV. Title III of WIA amends the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, which establishes the Employment Service (ES), to make the ES an integral part of the One-Stop system created by WIA. Because the ES is a central part of the One-Stop system, it is discussed briefly in this report even though it is authorized by separate legislation (Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933). |
crs_RL30731 | crs_RL30731_0 | Federal government AIDS spending is estimated at $23.3 billion in FY2008 (see Table 5 ). The Bush Administration request for FY2009 is $24.1 billion. Of the total amount spent by thefederal government on HIV/AIDS in FY2008, the majority (63%) of funding is for treatmentprograms; funding for research receives 13% of the total (see Figure 1 and Table 4 ). AIDS programs within HHS (Health and Human Services) account for 66% of the totalamount spent on AIDS by the federal government (see Figure 2 ). HHS discretionary funding supports AIDSresearch and prevention programs, as well as treatment programs. For example, in FY1992 HIV/AIDS research and prevention programs at HHS accounted for 51%of the total amount spent by HHS on HIV/AIDS; by FY2008, such programs were about 27% of thetotal amount spent by HHS on HIV/AIDS, reflecting the growing amounts spent on treatmentservices under Medicaid and Medicare. As indicated in Table 6 , federal government spending on international HIV/AIDS programsin FY2008 is $5.8 billion; the Administration's request for FY2009 is $5.9 billion. Table 6. HHS: Department of Health and Human Services. | Federal government spending on HIV (the human immunodeficiency virus) and AIDS(acquired immune deficiency syndrome) is estimated at $23.3 billion in FY2008. Of the total, 63%is for treatment programs; research programs receive 13%; prevention programs receive 14%, andincome support programs receive 10%. The Administration's government-wide request level for allHIV/AIDS programs in FY2009 is $24.1 billion.
AIDS programs within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) account for66% of the total amount spent on HIV/AIDS by the federal government in FY2008, a total of $15.2billion for both discretionary and entitlement programs. Within the HHS discretionary budget,funding for HIV/AIDS research, prevention, and treatment programs has increased from $200,000in FY1981 to an estimated $6.586 billion in FY2008; the Administration's request for FY2009 is$6.592 billion.
This report provides an overview of HHS spending on HIV/AIDS as well as budget numbersfor other federal government programs targeting HIV/AIDS. This report is updated once per yearto reflect the new budget figures. |
crs_R44326 | crs_R44326_0 | Introduction
Recent data breaches at major U.S. retailers have placed a spotlight on concerns about the security of personal information stored in electronic form by corporations and other private entities. A data breach occurs when data containing sensitive personal information is lost, stolen, or accessed in an unauthorized manner, thereby causing a potential compromise of the confidentiality of the data. Existing federal law imposes security and breach notification requirements on specific industries or types of data. For example, certain health information is subject to requirements under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act), while certain financial institutions are subject to requirements under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB). Additionally, 47 states, the District of Columbia (D.C.), and three territories have enacted laws requiring breach notification, while at least 12 states have enacted data security laws. Several data security and breach notification bills have been introduced in the 114 th Congress, which broadly would impose security and notification requirements on businesses regardless of industry sector, with limited exceptions. Second, what effect would such legislation have on the existing authority of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to bring enforcement actions related to data security and breach notification? It will then analyze how these preemption principles might be applied by a reviewing court seeking to determine the preemptive effect of different federal proposals. Next, it will examine the existing jurisdiction and enforcement authority of the FTC and the FCC with regard to data security and breach notification as applied to telecommunications providers and how these agencies' responsibilities might be altered by proposed legislation. There are two kinds of federal preemption: express preemption and implied preemption. All of the current federal legislative proposals in the area include express preemption clauses. For more information on the FTC's use of this authority in the data security and breach context, see CRS Report R43723, The Federal Trade Commission's Regulation of Data Security Under Its Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices (UDAP) Authority , by [author name scrubbed]. Other bills only eliminate the FCC's ability to enforce some of the relevant Communications Act provisions regarding data security and breach notification, but not all. | Recent data breaches at major U.S. retailers have placed a spotlight on concerns about the security of personal information stored in electronic form by corporations and other private entities. A data breach occurs when data containing sensitive personal information is lost, stolen, or accessed in an unauthorized manner, thereby causing a potential compromise of the confidentiality of the data. Existing federal laws, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act), and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, impose security and breach notification requirements on specific industries or types of data. Additionally, 47 states, the District of Columbia (D.C.), and three territories have enacted laws requiring breach notification, while at least 12 states have enacted data security laws, designed to reduce the likelihood of a data breach. Alabama, New Mexico, and South Dakota have not enacted breach notification laws.
Several data security and breach notification bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress, which broadly would impose security and notification requirements on businesses regardless of industry sector, with limited exceptions. This report begins by describing the common elements of these federal proposals and then discusses state laws that may apply in the event of a data breach.
The report then addresses two legal issues that may arise in consideration of new legislation about data security and breach notification. First, how would new federal legislation alter the application of existing state law or the availability of state law remedies for victims of data breaches? The report will discuss various forms of federal preemption (including express preemption, implied impossibility preemption, and implied obstacle preemption) and evaluate how a reviewing court might apply these preemption principles to federal proposals to determine which state laws would be superseded.
Second, the report examines the existing jurisdiction and enforcement authority of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with regard to data security and breach notification requirements. This section analyzes the FTC's unfair or deceptive acts and practices authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act and the FCC's authority to regulate data security and breach notification for common carriers and cable and satellite providers under the Communications Act. Finally, it evaluates how the current federal proposals would change the enforcement responsibilities of each agency, potentially increasing the jurisdiction of the FTC and limiting the FCC's ability to enforce its existing data security rules. |
crs_RL31312 | crs_RL31312_0 | 108-7 ). The conference report on H.J.Res. On February 4, 2002, the President submitted his FY2003 U.S. Budget , which contained arequest prepared by legislative branch entities of $3.48 billion for activities funded in theannual legislative branch appropriations bill. Subsequently, the FY2003 request was revisedby the legislative branch to $3.43 billion, a 5.3% increase over the FY2002 budget authorityof $3.25 billion. The House version of the FY2003 bill, H.R. 5121 ,contained $2.67 billion (excluding Senate items), an increase of $128.2 million (5.0%) overFY2002's appropriation of $2.54 million (excluding Senate items). On July 25,the Senate passed H.R. The bill contained $2.42 billion (excluding Houseitems), an increase of $163.8 million (7.3%) over the FY2002 level of $2.253 billion(excluding House items). Among its provisions were those to
increase funds for the Capitol Police by $52.6 million (33.5%), from $157.2 million to $209.8 million;
increase the pay of Capitol Police by 9.1%, including a 4.1% annual adjustment, and an additional 5% pay raise;
increase Capitol Police personnel by 269 FTEs, to a total of 1,839 FTEs;
merge the Library of Congress police with the Capitol police over 3years;
create the position of Deputy Architect of the Capitol as the chiefoperating officer for the Capitol complex;
make up to $50 million available for an alternative computing facility for the House, Senate and other legislative branch entities, subject to a study by the Architectof the Capitol and approval by the Senate and House AppropriationsCommittees;
direct the General Accounting Office to review printing and dissemination of Federal government information, particularly with respect to congressionalprinting and binding services of the Government Printing Office, the Federal DepositoryLibrary Program, and contracting of printing by the executive branch;
fund the Senate at $672.6 million (with a $31.2 million increase primarily to fund a new security system, enhanced mail handling, and a new Office ofEmergency Preparedness); Congressional Research Service at $87.0 million; CongressionalBudget Office at $32.4 million; Library of Congress (excluding CRS) at $410.0 million;General Accounting Office $454.5 million; and the Government Printing Office at $122.5million; and
fund the Architect of the Capitol at $388.0 million (including renovations of the Capitol Power Plant). (11)
The FY2003 appropriation, as contained in the version of H.J.Res. Both houses agreed tothe conference version later that day, and the resolution was signed into law on February 20. 108-7 contains $3.36 billion for the legislative branch, subject to a rescission of 0.65%(Section 601, Division N, P.L. Action on Third Continuing Resolution (H.J.Res.122; P.L. FY2003 Capitol Police funding contains a 9.1% increase in police pay, and provisions provide for the merger of the Library of Congress police force with the Capitol Police force;expand authority for the Capitol Police chief to enhance police recruitment and retention(including provisions for hiring and relocation bonuses, establishment of a student loanrepayment program, and authorization for training). The Act also contains languagemandating a redefinition of the mission and composition of the Capitol Police Board. 5121 , amended to contain the language of S. 2720 ) contained $176.6 million, an increase of 56.3%, for the salaries of atotal of 1,839 FTEs. 149, February 13,2003, pp. 2 contains $23.9 million for Capitol police buildings and grounds in the budget of theArchitect of the Capitol. House of Representatives Appropriations, FY2003(H.R.5121 (107th Congress); H.J.Res.2, FY2003 Omnibus Appropriations (108th Congress)) (in thousands of current dollars)
Conference figures do not reflect a 0.65% across the board rescission contained in H.J.Res.2. | Final congressional action on the FY2003 legislative branch bill was completed on February 13, 2003, when both houses agreed to the conference report on H.J.Res. 2 , the FY2003omnibus appropriations resolution. The President signed the resolution into law on February 20( P.L. 108-7 )
Division H of P.L. 108-7 contains $3.36 billion for legislative branch activities. Language in the Act also requires a rescission of 0.65% in the appropriations of most entities funded in the bill,including those for the legislative branch. The FY2003 legislative branch appropriation of $3.36billion, not adjusted for the rescission, is an increase of 3.3% from FY2002's $3.25 billion fundinglevel.
The increase will meet mandatory expenses required by law, including funding for a January 2003 salary increase of 4.1%, and related personnel costs, such as the federal retirement system. Theadditional money funds security programs for the Capitol complex, including a 17.6% increase inthe Capitol Police budget and an 11.4% increase in the Architect of the Capitol's budget in part forsecurity related enhancements.
Capitol Police funding contains a 9.1% increase in police pay, and related provisions that merge the Library of Congress police force with the Capitol Police force and expand authority of theCapitol Police chief to enhance police recruitment and retention (including provisions for hiring andrelocation bonuses, establishment of a student loan repayment program, and authorization fortraining). Other provisions mandate a redefinition of the mission and composition of the CapitolPolice Board.
The Architect of the Capitol's budget contains funds for an alternate computer facility for use during emergencies, and $23.9 million for a new line item, Capitol Police buildings and grounds. The budget also contains increases of $49.7 million (94.6%) for Capitol Power Plant improvements;and $15.8 million (72.5%) for Library of Congress buildings and grounds, partly for enhancedsecurity.
Both houses passed their versions of the FY2003 bill last year. The House passed its version, H.R. 5121 , on July 18, 2002, containing $2.67 billion (excluding Senate items) forlegislative branch activities, an increase of $128.2 million (5.0%) over the FY2002 appropriation of$2.54 billion (excluding Senate items).
The Senate passed its version of H.R. 5121 , amended to contain the language of S. 2720 , on July 25. It contained $2.42 billion (excluding House items), an increase of$143.1 million (6.3%) over the FY2002 level of $2.28 billion (excluding House items).
H.R. 5121, as amended, died with adjournment of the 107th Congress in December 2002. During the first month of the 108th Congress, FY2003 legislative funding language was inserted in H.J.Res. 2 during Senate floor consideration. Upon Senate passage, H.J.Res. 2 was sent directly to conference.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: GOV/FIN = Government and Finance |
crs_RL30679 | crs_RL30679_0 | Overview of U.S. Policy
U.S. security ties with the South Caucasus states increased in the latter part of the 1990s, as a result of Russia's military threat to Georgia, regional instability surrounding Russia's conflicts in its breakaway Chechnya region, and a U.S. focus on the transport of Caspian regional energy resources to Western markets. Most in Congress have supported U.S. assistance to bolster independence, security, and reforms in the South Caucasus, but questions have remained about the suitability, scope, emphasis, and effectiveness of U.S. interest and involvement in the region. Attention has included several hearings and legislation, the latter including regular earmarks of aid for Armenia, rebuilding aid for Georgia after its 2008 conflict with Russia, humanitarian aid for Nagorno Karabakh (NK; a breakaway region of Azerbaijan mostly populated by ethnic Armenians), and sense of Congress provisions on U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus. Beginning with FY1998 appropriations, Congress created a South Caucasus funding category to encourage conflict resolution, provide for reconstruction assistance, and facilitate regional economic integration. 3194 ; P.L. Congressional concerns about rising Russian military and economic coercion against Georgia were reflected in legislation criticizing Russian actions and supporting Georgia's NATO aspirations. In the wake of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, Congress condemned Russia's invasion and provided boosted aid for Georgia's rebuilding. The outside players have both complementary and competing interests and policies toward the three regional states. Many officials in Russia view the region as a traditional sphere of influence, while some in Iran view Azerbaijan and Armenia as part of a "new Middle East," and Turkish officials tend to stress common ethnic ties with Azerbaijan and most of Central Asia. However, regional security cooperation has been slow to develop. Armenia seeks close security and economic ties with Russia and Iran to counter Azerbaijan's close ties with Turkey. Internal Security Problems and Progress
The South Caucasus region has been the most unstable in the former Soviet Union in terms of the number, intensity, and length of its ethnic and civil conflicts. Other internal security problems include crime, corruption, terrorism, proliferation, and narcotics trafficking. Armenia and Azerbaijan have viewed NK's status as a major security concern. All three states have been faced with constructing military forces to address regional conflicts and low-intensity threats. Azerbaijan
The day after the terrorist attacks on the United States, Azerbaijan's then-President Heydar Aliyev averred that Azerbaijan was a "strategic partner" of the United States and would join the United States in operations against terrorism. Azerbaijan in November 2002 deployed 30 troops to assist the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. Ambassador to Armenia. U.S. Peace and Security Assistance
The United States has provided some security assistance to the region and bolstered such aid after September 11, 2001. Nonproliferation Aid
The United States has gained greater support in the region for combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by emphasizing how this goal enhances the security interests of the states. The United States has advocated that neighboring states respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the South Caucasian states, and resolve border and other disputes peacefully. In the wake of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, these contrasting arguments were at the forefront of debate over future U.S. military-to-military assistance to Georgia. | The South Caucasus region has been the most unstable in the former Soviet Union in terms of the number, intensity, and length of ethnic and civil conflicts. Other emerging or full-blown security problems include crime, corruption, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and narcotics trafficking. The regional governments have worked to bolster their security by combating terrorism, limiting political dissent they view as threatening, revamping their armed forces, and seeking outside assistance and allies.
The roles of neighbors Iran, Russia, and Turkey have been of deep security concern to one or more of the states of the region. These and other major powers, primarily the United States and European Union (EU) members, have pursued differing interests and policies toward the three states. Some officials in Russia view the region as a traditional sphere of influence, while Turkish officials tend to stress common ethnic ties with Azerbaijan and most of Central Asia. EU members are increasingly addressing instability in what they view as a far corner of Europe. Armenia has pursued close ties with Russia and Iran in part to counter Azerbaijan's ties with Turkey, and Georgia and Azerbaijan have stressed ties with the United States in part to bolster their independence vis-a-vis Russia.
The United States has supported democratization, the creation of free markets, conflict resolution, regional cooperation, and the integration of the South Caucasian states into the larger world community. The Administration has backed regional energy and pipeline development that does not give Iran and Russia undue political or economic influence. U.S. aid has been provided to bolster the security and independence of the states, including substantial rebuilding aid after the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. In January 2009, the United States and Georgia signed a partnership agreement to underline such U.S. support for Georgia. All three regional states have supported the global war on terrorism and sent troops to assist the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.
Congress has been at the forefront in supporting U.S. assistance to bolster independence and reforms in the South Caucasus, but debate has continued over the scope, emphasis, and effectiveness of U.S. involvement. Congressional support for the security of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh (NK; a breakaway region of Azerbaijan mostly populated by ethnic Armenians) led in 1992 to a ban on most U.S. government-to-government aid to Azerbaijan. Congress authorized a presidential waiver to the ban after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, to facilitate U.S.-Azerbaijan anti-terrorism cooperation. Congressional support for U.S. engagement with the region also was reflected in "Silk Road Strategy" legislation in FY2000 (P.L. 106-113) authorizing greater policy attention and aid for conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and communications, border control, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Congressional concerns about rising Russian military and economic coercion against Georgia were reflected in legislation criticizing Russian actions and supporting Georgia's NATO aspirations. In the wake of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, Congress condemned Russia's invasion and provided boosted aid for Georgia's rebuilding. Congress regularly has earmarked foreign aid to Armenia and upheld a South Caucasus funding category to encourage conflict resolution, provide for reconstruction assistance, and facilitate regional economic integration. |
crs_RS22236 | crs_RS22236_0 | Introduction
"Price gouging" is a term commonly used to refer to sellers inflating prices to "unfair" levels in order to take advantage of certain circumstances causing a decrease in supply, including emergencies. Currently, no federal law specifically addresses price gouging. However, bills have been introduced in the 112 th Congress that would prohibit price gouging of gasoline and other fuels. State Price-Gouging Laws
Many states have enacted some type of prohibition or limitation on price increases during declared emergencies. Many statutes of both kinds include an exemption if price increases are the result of increased costs incurred for procuring the goods or services in question. A Sampling of State Statutes
Prohibitions on "Excessive" or "Unconscionable" Pricing
One common format found in state statutes that attempt to address price gouging is a ban on prices that are considered to be "excessive" or "unconscionable" or another term, as defined in the statute or left to the discretion of the courts. Prohibitions of Price Increases Beyond a Certain Percentage
While some state statutes attempt to address price gouging by banning "excessive" or "unconscionable" pricing during emergencies and leaving it to the courts to determine whether such pricing has occurred in accordance with the statute's guidance, other state statutes leave less to the courts' discretion and instead place hard caps on pricing of certain goods during emergencies. For example, in Georgia, it is considered an "unlawful, unfair and deceptive trade practice" for anyone doing business in an areas where a state of emergency has been declared to
sell or offer for sale at retail any goods or services identified by the Governor in the declaration of the state of emergency necessary to preserve, protect, or sustain the life, health, or safety of persons or their property at a price higher than the price at which such goods were sold or offered for sale immediately prior to the declaration of a state of emergency. Federal Price-Gouging Legislation Introduced in the 112th Congress
As mentioned above, currently there is no federal law that deals specifically with price gouging. However, federal antitrust laws may apply to behavior generally regarded as price gouging. At least three bills introduced in the 112 th Congress would create a federal law that specifically addresses price gouging in response to emergencies. H.R. 1899 and H.R. 964 . In addition to this, H.R. Section 1 prohibits contracts or conspiracies in restraint of trade. Recently, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a grant of summary judgment for the defendants in a case in which a group of gasoline station owners on Martha's Vineyard were accused of violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. | Fluctuations in gasoline prices in recent years have renewed focus on the role of the government in discouraging "price gouging," a term commonly used to refer to sellers inflating prices to "unfair" levels in order to take advantage of certain circumstances causing a decrease in supply, including emergencies. There have been legislative efforts to create a federal law addressing gasoline price gouging, including bills that would bar certain commercial practices as well as legislation that mandated the study of pricing of gasoline in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
While the federal government has not enacted legislation aimed specifically at addressing price gouging for gasoline, a majority of states have enacted statutes to curtail price gouging for certain critical goods and services, including fuel, during emergencies. Some of these statutes attempt to address price gouging by barring pricing during emergencies that is considered to be "unconscionable" or "excessive" or otherwise is in violation of a subjective standard. Other statutes place a hard cap on prices during periods of emergency based on percentage increases from prices charged for the good or service in question prior to the emergency. All of these state statutes provide leeway if it can be shown that the price increases are the result of increased costs rather than simply a change in the marketplace.
At least three bills introduced in the 112th Congress would create a federal law that specifically addresses price gouging in response to emergencies. H.R. 964, H.R. 1748, and H.R. 1899 all contain language similar to the language found in the state statutes that attempt to curtail price gouging through limits or controls on pricing during declared periods of emergency. As of the date of this report, all three bills had been referred to House subcommittees, but no further action on them had been taken.
Although there is no federal law aimed specifically at price gouging, federal antitrust laws do forbid various types of anticompetitive business practices. For example, Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade. It is possible that if a group of gasoline retailers or other retailers collaborated to set prices unreasonably high during an emergency, this "price gouging" could be a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In addition, while not necessarily tied to retail price gouging, federal statutes addressing monopolies and vertical integration may play a role in evaluating retail gasoline price changes. |
crs_R45391 | crs_R45391_0 | The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act permits federal delinquency proceedings when state courts cannot or will not accept jurisdiction or in the case of a limited number of crimes when there is a substantial federal interest. In the more serious of these cases, the juvenile offender may be transferred for trial as an adult. State juvenile proceedings remained the preferred alternative, but the Attorney General might instead elect to proceed against a juvenile as an adult, and federal juvenile proceedings became possible should both parties agree. Because a majority of the federal cases have historically arisen in areas beyond state jurisdiction, i.e. , primarily Indian country, the majority of federal delinquency proceedings have historically involved Native Americans. For purposes of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act in its present form, a juvenile is an individual, under 21 years of age when the information is filed, alleged to have violated federal criminal law before reaching the age of 18. Once the federal courts have found a juvenile delinquent, however, a court that revokes a juvenile's delinquent supervised release may order the juvenile held until age 26. Moreover, while state crimes are the most common basis for state juvenile court jurisdiction, many state juvenile courts enjoy delinquency jurisdiction based upon a violation of federal law. Thus, an individual under 18 who violates federal criminal law can move through the state juvenile delinquency system without ever coming into contact with federal authorities. Much of the case law relating to the federal advice and notification provisions comes from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which has held that: (1) the word "immediate" means the same for both advice and notifications purposes; (2) advice given 4 hours after arrest and notification given 3½ hours after arrest has not been given "immediately"; (3) notice given within close to an hour after arrests had been given immediately; (4) parental notification must include advice as to the juvenile's rights; (5) parental notification may be accomplished through the good offices of the surrogate or appropriate foreign consulate when the juvenile's parents reside outside of the United States; (6) convictions or delinquency determinations must be overturned if they are tainted by violations of section 5033 so egregious as to violate due process; and (7)less egregious but prejudicial violations of section 5033 may require that any resulting incriminating statements be suppressed. The certificate must assert that either: (1) the state courts are unwilling or unable to proceed against the juvenile for the misconduct in question; or (2) the juvenile programs of the state are unavailable or inadequate; or (3) the offense is a drug dealing or drug smuggling violation, possession of an undetectable firearm, or felony and crime of violence and that a substantial federal interest exists warranting the exercise of federal jurisdiction. A transfer is mandatory in the case of a violent felony, drug trafficking, drug smuggling, or arson, allegedly committed by a juvenile 16 years of age or older who has previously been found to have committed comparable misconduct. Charges that would support a mandatory transfer if brought against a 16 year old recidivist, may be used to trigger a discretionary transfer if the juvenile is 15 or older regardless of his or her prior record; discretionary transfers are also possible for juveniles 13 or older in some cases of assault, homicide or robbery. Neither the right to grand jury indictment or to a jury trial are constitutionally required. At sentencing, the court may dispose of a juvenile delinquency case by suspending sentence, by ordering restitution or probation, or by committing the juvenile to the custody of the Attorney General for detention. Detention authority following revocation mirrors the court's initial detention authority with two exceptions. That is, when the misconduct that resulted in the delinquency determination would be punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 12 years or more, the court may order a term of supervision no longer than the shorter of (i) five years; (ii) the term at the top of the sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines that would apply had the juvenile been an adult; or (iii) the time before which the individual turns 26 years of age. Juveniles Tried as Adults
Juveniles transferred for trial as adults in federal court are essentially treated as adults, with few distinctions afforded or required because of their age. | Federal authorities have three options when a juvenile violates federal criminal law. First, they can refer the juvenile to state authorities. Second, they can initiate federal delinquency proceedings. Third, they can petition the federal court to transfer the juvenile for trial as an adult. The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act general favors referring juveniles to state authorities, but it permits federal delinquency proceedings where state courts cannot or will not accept jurisdiction. Because a majority of the federal juvenile delinquency cases have historically arisen in areas beyond state jurisdiction, i.e., primarily Indian country, the majority of federal delinquency proceedings involve Native Americans. In the more serious of these cases, the juvenile offender may be transferred for trial as an adult in federal court. The Act applies to those charged before the age of 21 with a breach of federal criminal law occurring before they reached the age of 18. Given the preference for state juvenile proceedings and the fact that a violation of federal law will ordinarily support the assertion of state juvenile court jurisdiction, most such offenders never come in contact with federal authorities. Many of those who do are returned to state officials to be processed through the state court system.
The United States Attorney, however, may elect to initiate federal proceedings if the state courts are unwilling or unable to assume jurisdiction, or the state has no adequate treatment plans, or the juvenile is charged with a crime of violence or with drug trafficking. Federal juvenile delinquency proceedings require neither grand jury indictment, public trial, nor trial by jury. The constitutional rights available to juveniles at delinquency proceedings are otherwise much like those found in adult criminal trials. Juveniles found delinquent may be released under suspended sentence, placed on probation, ordered to pay restitution and/or sentenced to the custody of the U.S. Attorney General for detention. The period of detention, if any, may not exceed the term which might be imposed upon an adult offender for the same misconduct. The period of detention may be followed by a period of juvenile delinquent supervision, revocation of which in serious cases may result in detention until the individual is 26 years of age.
The U.S. district court may, and in some cases must, transfer a juvenile for criminal trial as an adult. A juvenile may request a transfer to trial as an adult. Otherwise, a court must order a transfer when a juvenile, with a prior comparable conviction or juvenile adjudication, is charged with committing a violent offense or a drug trafficking offense at the age of 16 or older. Discretionary transfers come in two varieties. A court may transfer a juvenile, who when 13 years of age or older is alleged to have committed aggravated assault, murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, or armed rape. A court may also transfer a juvenile who when 15 years of age or older is alleged to have committed drug trafficking or a violent felony. The court orders or denies the transfer petition after considering the seriousness of the offense, the age and maturity of the juvenile, the juvenile's prior delinquency record, the results of past rehabilitative efforts, and the availability of existing rehabilitative programs. |
crs_RL33986 | crs_RL33986_0 | Yet clinicians often prescribe adult-approved drugs for children, a practice known as off-label prescribing, (1) because most drugs have not been tested in children, and (2) because clinicians presume that the safety and effectiveness demonstrated with adults generally means that the drugs are also safe and effective for children. The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA, P.L. This report describes how and why Congress developed these initiatives. Specifically, the report
describes why research on a drug's pharmacokinetics, safety, and effectiveness in children might be necessary; presents why the marketplace has not provided sufficient incentives to manufacturers of drugs approved for adult use to study their effects in children; describes how BPCA provides extended market exclusivity in return for FDA-requested studies on pediatric use, and how PREA requires studies of drugs' safety and effectiveness when used by children ( Appendix B analyzes how BPCA and PREA evolved from FDA's administrative earlier efforts); analyzes the impact BPCA and PREA have had on pediatric drug research; and discusses issues, some of which Congress considered leading up to FDAAA, that may form the basis of oversight and evaluative activities along with reauthorization efforts in 2012. Manufacturers face many obstacles—economic, mechanical, ethical, and legal—that make them reluctant to conduct these tests. Congress has offered incentives to manufacturers for pediatric research for two main reasons. BPCA and PREA:Laws to Encourage Pediatric Drug Research
Although Congress has designed other laws (such as those affecting drug development, safety and effectiveness efforts, and general health care and consumer protection) to promote or protect the health of the entire population (including children), the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act and the Pediatric Research Equity Act (both sections of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) authorize programs focused specifically on pediatric drug research. In 2007, Congress authorized their continuation for another five years. 355a) gives FDA the authority to offer manufacturers an additional six-month period of marketing exclusivity in return for FDA-requested pediatric use studies (including preclinical studies) and reports. Marketing exclusivity extends the time before which FDA grants marketing approval for a generic version of the drug. The law also has several public notice requirements for the Secretary, including the following:
notice of exclusivity decisions, along with copies of the written requests; public identification of any drug with a developed pediatric formulation that studies had shown were safe and effective for children that an applicant has not brought to market within one year; that, for a product studied under this section, the labeling include study results (if they do or do not indicate safety and effectiveness, or if they are inconclusive) and the Secretary's determination; dissemination of labeling change information to health care providers; and reporting on the review of all adverse event reports and recommendations to the Secretary on actions in response. 355c): Research into Pediatric Uses for Drugs and Biological Products. Their 2007 reauthorizations were paired in committee hearings and legislative vehicle (FDAAA) and Congress will likely consider them together in discussions of their 2012 reauthorizations. The House-passed bill for PREA 2007 would have eliminated PREA's link to the BPCA sunset provision; the Senate-passed bill continued it. Some researchers have examined the financial costs and benefits faced by manufacturers that receive pediatric exclusivity. Other manufacturers. Government. As Congress drafts language to continue BPCA and PREA, it could address whether FDA has adequate tools with which to assess, encourage, require, and enforce the development and dissemination of the information clinicians could use to reach better treatment decisions. By regulation, FDA requires pediatric-specific labeling in the following circumstances:
(B) If there is a specific pediatric indication different from those approved for adults that is supported by adequate and well-controlled studies in the pediatric population, …
(C) If there are specific statements on pediatric use of the drug for an indication also approved for adults that are based on adequate and well-controlled studies in the pediatric population, …
(D)(1) When a drug is approved for pediatric use based on adequate and well-controlled studies in adults with other information supporting pediatric use, …
(E) If the requirements for a finding of substantial evidence to support a pediatric indication or a pediatric use statement have not been met for a particular pediatric population, …
(F) If the requirements for a finding of substantial evidence to support a pediatric indication or a pediatric use statement have not been met for any pediatric population, …
(G) … FDA may permit use of an alternative statement if FDA determines that no statement described in those paragraphs is appropriate or relevant to the drug's labeling and that the alternative statement is accurate and appropriate. With each step of legislative and regulatory action over the years, Congress and FDA have tried to balance often conflicting goals:
drug development to address needs unique to children; tools to encourage drug manufacturers to test drugs for use in children, despite the expense, opportunity costs, and liability risk; protection of children as subjects of clinical research; public access to up-to-date and unbiased information on drug safety and effectiveness; and prioritizing agency activities in light of available resources. Current Law Evolved from Earlier Attempts
Before BPCA 2002 and PREA 2003, FDA attempted to spur pediatric drug research through administrative action. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997
Three years later, Congress provided another approach to increasing pediatric labeling. FDAMA ( P.L. It provided drug manufacturers with an incentive to conduct pediatric use studies on their patented products. If a manufacturer completed a pediatric study according to FDA's written request, which included design, size, and other specifications, FDA would extend its market exclusivity for that product for six months. The Pediatric Rule mandated that manufacturers submit pediatric testing data at the time of all new drug applications to FDA. In October 2002, a federal court declared the Pediatric Rule invalid, noting that its finding related not to the rule's policy value but to FDA's statutory authority in promulgating it:
The Pediatric Rule may well be a better policy tool than the one enacted by Congress (which encourages testing for pediatric use, but does not require it).... | Update: On June 20, 2012, the House of Representatives passed, by voice vote and under suspension of the rules, S. 3187 (EAH), the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, as amended. This bill would reauthorize the FDA prescription drug and medical device user fee programs (which would otherwise expire on September 30, 2012), create new user fee programs for generic and biosimilar drug approvals, and make other revisions to other FDA drug and device approval processes. It reflects bicameral compromise on earlier versions of the bill (S. 3187 [ES], which passed the Senate on May 24, 2012, and H.R. 5651 [EH], which passed the House on May 30, 2012). The following CRS reports provide overview information on FDA's processes for approval and regulation of drugs:
CRS Report R41983, How FDA Approves Drugs and Regulates Their Safety and Effectiveness, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL33986, FDA's Authority to Ensure That Drugs Prescribed to Children Are Safe and Effective, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R42130, FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R42508, The FDA Medical Device User Fee Program, by [author name scrubbed].
(Note: The rest of this report has not been updated since November 10, 2011.)
With the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA) and the Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA), Congress authorized the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to offer drug manufacturers financial and regulatory incentives to test their products for use in children. Congress extended both programs with the FDA Amendments of 2007 (FDAAA) and, because of the programs' sunset date, must act before October 1, 2012, to continue them. This report presents the historical development of BPCA and PREA, their rationale and effect, and FDAAA's impact. The report also discusses pediatric drug issues that remain of concern to some in Congress.
Most prescription drugs have never been the subject of studies specifically designed to test their effects on children. In these circumstances, clinicians, therefore, may prescribe drugs for children that FDA has approved only for adult use; this practice is known as off-label prescribing. Although some clinicians may believe that the safety and effectiveness demonstrated with adults would hold for younger patients, studies show that the bioavailability of drugs—that is, how much gets into a patient's system and is available for use—varies in children for reasons that include a child's maturation and organ development and other factors. The result of such off-label prescribing may be that some children receive ineffective drugs or too much or too little of potentially useful drugs; or that there may be side effects unique to children, including effects on growth and development.
Drug manufacturers are reluctant to test drugs in children because of economic, ethical, legal, and other obstacles. Market forces alone have not provided manufacturers with sufficient incentives to overcome these obstacles. BPCA and PREA represent attempts by Congress to address the need for pediatric testing. FDA had tried unsuccessfully to spur pediatric drug research through administrative action before 1997. With the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA, P.L. 105-115), Congress provided an incentive: if a manufacturer completed pediatric studies that FDA requested, the agency would extend the company's market exclusivity for that product for six months, not approving the sale of another manufacturer's product during that period. In 2002, BPCA (P.L. 107-109) reauthorized this program for five years.
In 1998, to obtain pediatric use information on the drugs that manufacturers were not studying, FDA published the Pediatric Rule, which required manufacturers to submit pediatric testing data at the time of all new drug applications. In 2002, a federal court declared the rule invalid, holding that FDA lacked the statutory authority to promulgate it. Congress gave FDA that authority with PREA (P.L. 108-155). PREA covers drugs and biological products and includes provisions for deferrals, waivers, and the required pediatric assessment of an approved marketed product.
In extending BPCA and PREA in 2007, Congress considered several issues: Why offer a financial incentive to encourage pediatric studies when FDA has the authority to require them? How does the cost of marketing exclusivity—including the higher prices paid by government—compare with the cost of the needed research? What percentage of labeling includes pediatric information because of BPCA and PREA? Do existing laws provide FDA with sufficient authority to encourage pediatric studies and labeling? Is FDA doing enough with its current authority? The 112th Congress will likely consider those questions as well as others: What information do clinicians and consumers need and how could industry and government develop and disseminate it? How can Congress balance positive and negative incentives to manufacturers for developing pediatric information to use in labeling? How could Congress consider cost and benefit when it deals with reauthorizing legislation in 2012? |
crs_R41435 | crs_R41435_0 | Introduction
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has administered and supervised several life insurance programs for servicemembers and veterans since 1919. The VA's Regional Office and Insurance Center (VAROIC) in Philadelphia, PA, supervises SGLI and VGLI, but the day-to-day administration of the programs is handled by the Office of Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance (OSGLI), a division of the Prudential Insurance Company of America. The Service-Disabled Veterans' Insurance (S-DVI) program, on the other hand, is administered entirely by the VA. Access to VA-administered life insurance programs gives servicemembers and veterans, who may not be eligible for private life insurance policies, the opportunity to carry group life insurance. This provides for their families in the event of the servicemember's or veteran's death. Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance Program
In September 1965, Congress established the Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance program in P.L. 89-214 by mandating the VA to enter into an agreement with the private insurance industry to meet the insurance needs of Vietnam era servicemembers. When first enacted, the SGLI program provided up to $10,000 in coverage for members. Today, all servicemembers can receive a maximum of $400,000 insurance coverage under the program. Veterans' Group Life Insurance Program
On August 1, 1974, Veterans' Group Life Insurance (VGLI) became available to former servicemembers ( P.L. 93-289 ). VGLI provides for the conversion of SGLI after separation from active duty. VGLI is a five-year renewable term policy which provides a maximum of $400,000 of coverage. Service-Disabled Veterans' Insurance Program
During the Korean War, Congress passed the Insurance Act of 1951 (P.L. 82-23) and established the Service-Disabled Veterans' Insurance (S-DVI) program, which is administered entirely by the VA. S-DVI was created to meet the insurance needs of certain veterans with service-connected disabilities, many of whom would not be eligible for private life insurance due to their service-connected disabilities. How Policy Proceeds are Paid Out
SGLI and VGLI proceeds are paid either as a lump sum or with periodic payments over a period of 36 months. The lump sum payment may, at the beneficiary's election, be made as a single check (or electronic transfer) or via an Alliance Account. Policy Issues
Coverage Limit for S-DVI
Currently, S-DVI policies are issued for a maximum face value of $10,000. | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers and supervises several life insurance programs for active servicemembers and veterans. The VA supervises the Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance (SGLI) and Veterans' Group Life Insurance (VGLI) programs, which are administered by the Office of Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance (OSGLI), a division of Prudential Insurance Company of America. The Service-Disabled Veterans' Insurance (S-DVI) program, on the other hand, is administered entirely by the VA. Access to VA-administered life insurance programs gives servicemembers and veterans, who may not be eligible for private life insurance policies, the opportunity to carry group life insurance. This provides for their families in the event of the servicemember's or veteran's death.
In September 1965, with the passage of P.L. 89-214, Congress established the SGLI program and mandated the VA to enter into an agreement with the private insurance industry to meet the insurance needs of Vietnam era servicemembers. As a result, VA established an agreement with Prudential Financial to administer its policies. When first enacted, the SGLI program provided up to $10,000 in coverage for policyholders. Today, servicemembers can receive a maximum of $400,000 insurance coverage under the program.
On August 1, 1974, with the enactment of P.L. 93-289, VGLI became available to servicemembers. VGLI provides for the conversion of SGLI after separation from active military duty. VGLI is a five-year renewable term policy that, like SGLI, provides a maximum of $400,000 of coverage.
Servicemembers may have their SGLI and VGLI proceeds paid either as a lump sum or over a period of 36 months. The lump sum payment may, at the beneficiary's election, be in the form of a single check via a retained asset account (called an Alliance Account). Free financial counseling is available to SGLI and VGLI beneficiaries.
During the Korean War, before SGLI and VGLI were established, Congress passed the Insurance Act of 1951 (P.L. 82-23) and established the S-DVI program. S-DVI was created to meet the insurance needs of certain veterans with service-connected disabilities, many of whom would not be eligible for private life insurance due to their service-connected disabilities. Currently, policies are issued for a maximum face value of $10,000. Retained asset accounts are not offered under the S-DVI program.
This report provides information on the current VA life insurance programs available for servicemembers and veterans, management and administration issues, and associated policy issues. |
crs_RL32486 | crs_RL32486_0 | Introduction
Scientific documentation of the ecological condition of the oceans, such as the reports recently issued by the United States Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission, has been cited as evidence of deteriorating aquatic conditions. The Bush Administration has also released a U.S. Recently there has been debate over whether the development of a more comprehensive system of marine resource preservation is appropriate. Currently, a number of U.S. marine sites have been designated for and receive special protections under laws specifically aimed at preserving ocean resources, such as the National Marine Sanctuary Program, established in 1972 by the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act; the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act; and the Coastal Zone Management Act. In September of 2006, the National Marine Protected Areas Center, a division of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, issued its Draft Framework for Developing the National System of Marine Protected Areas. This report analyzes various sources of legal authority to assess their possible application to marine environments and will outline the protection and management system each might support. U.S. Jurisdiction Over Marine Resources
International law recognizes that coastal nations have legal authority to manage certain ocean resources within their jurisdiction. Additionally, certain resource protection and management frameworks now in place might also be applied to ocean resources in the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and the EEZ should Congress or the President designate such areas for protection. The Exclusive Economic Zone
Consistent with UNCLOS III and international law and custom, the United States has claimed an EEZ extending, in general, 200 nautical miles from its coasts. § 1a-2(h), the act states that the Secretary of the Interior shall
[p]romulgate and enforce regulations concerning boating and other activities on or relating to waters located within areas of the National Park System, including waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States: Provided , That any regulations adopted pursuant to this subsection shall be complementary to, and not in derogation of, the authority of the United States Coast Guard to regulate the use of waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. the creation of a "marine reserve" via executive order. On the other hand, there is some indication that regulatory authority over the Hawaiian Islands National Wildlife Refuge is separate from the rest of the reserve. Conclusion
In light of the recent publication of the Revised Draft Framework for Developing the National System of Marine Protected Areas and the introduction of H.R. However, use of these various conservation authorities for the creation of an MPA would carry concerns peculiar to each particular statute and would be limited by the extent of U.S. jurisdiction over offshore lands and waters. | Recent events, including the release of the President's U.S. Ocean Action Plan and reports issued by the United States Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission, have prompted a reexamination of U.S. ocean policy and debate over an "ecosystem approach" to ocean resource management. One proposed mechanism for conserving ocean resources is the Marine Protected Area (MPA), conceptualized as a zoning system for the portions of the ocean under U.S. jurisdiction. This has been highlighted by the issuance of the Revised Draft Framework for Developing the National System of Marine Protected Areas (Draft Framework), issued on March 17, 2008, by the National Marine Protected Areas Center, part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The introduction of H.R. 21 in the 110th Congress has also focused attention on the health of ocean resources.
The relative merits and the potentially negative consequences of such an MPA system have been widely discussed. Advocates of additional protection argue that a more comprehensive system as outlined in the Draft Framework should be established. Others argue that the current system is effectively managing ocean resources and that additional restrictions would be economically harmful.
Apart from the relative merits of each position, there is some question as to the applicability of current federal law to the oceans and whether new protections could be imposed administratively, without additional legislation. To some extent, regulatory authority depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction that the United States has claimed over various ocean resources vis-à-vis other nations and vis-à-vis the states. Consistent with international law, the United States claims jurisdiction over marine areas extending 200 nautical miles from its coast and has regulated resources in the zones composing this area under multiple legal authorities.
Several current laws which might provide authority for the creation of MPAs are aimed specifically at the ocean environment. The National Marine Sanctuary Program, established by the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, and the Coastal Zone Management Act each specifically contemplate various levels and forms of aquatic resource protection.
Additionally, certain generally applicable laws, while primarily intended for use on land, would arguably support the designation of an MPA in some circumstances. Indeed, U.S. MPAs within the territorial seas have been established as national monuments, national parks, national wildlife areas, and, most recently, as a reserve via executive order.
This report outlines U.S. jurisdiction over ocean resources and analyzes the existing laws to assess their application to marine environments. |
crs_R40584 | crs_R40584_0 | Introduction
U.S. dairy farmers are facing low returns in 2009 following a sharp decline in milk prices since late 2008 and continuation of relatively high feed costs that have adversely affected their businesses. Organizations representing dairy farmers are seeking assistance to deal with the situation. Among the requests has been the reactivation of the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP). Reauthorized under the 2008 farm bill ( P.L. 110-246 ), DEIP can be used to subsidize U.S. dairy exports under certain conditions. Under DEIP, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) makes cash payments, on a bid basis, to entities that export U.S. dairy products. While the principal objective of the program is to develop export markets where the United States competes with other exporters who subsidize their products, DEIP can also increase the U.S. farm price of milk if enough dairy products are removed from the domestic market. DEIP has not been active since 2004 because, until late in 2008, market conditions were relatively strong and U.S. negotiators have been pursuing the elimination of all agricultural export subsidies as a trade policy objective. USDA is considering reactivating DEIP and is in the process of consulting with other agencies, including the U.S. Trade Representative's office. WTO Dairy Export Subsidy Limits
The United States' ability to provide export subsidies under DEIP is constrained by World Trade Organization (WTO) annual limits on quantities and budgetary outlays that can be provided as export subsidies. The allowable quantities and budgetary outlays for agricultural export subsidies, including dairy export subsidies, were negotiated as part of the WTO Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. The potential for market impact, therefore, depends on how much milk (or in this case milk-equivalent via product exports) is removed relative to the total market (i.e., total U.S. milk production). When converted to a milk-equivalent basis, the maximum quantity of subsidized U.S. exports allowed under WTO limits is about 1 to 2 billion cwt. of annual U.S. milk production in 2008, or between 0.5% and 1% of total U.S. production. Given that the calculated quantity is a small share of total U.S. milk production, DEIP-assisted exports would be expected to have a relatively small effect on U.S. milk prices and income for U.S. dairy farmers. However, there have been few evaluations of DEIP to assess its effectiveness in achieving these aims. OMB does point out, however, that DEIP was successful in offsetting EU export subsidies for dairy products to Mexico, which permitted the United States to develop and sustain a market for U.S. dairy product exports there. The United States and other WTO member countries reached agreement at a WTO ministerial meeting (Hong Kong 2005) to eliminate export subsidies by 2013. Making good on this commitment is contingent on reaching a comprehensive agreement in WTO Doha Round negotiations, which are currently stalled. The 2005 WTO proposal would require the elimination of DEIP, a much smaller export subsidy program than EEP. In the absence of a comprehensive Doha Round agreement on agriculture that eliminates export subsidies, the United States would be acting within its WTO rights and obligations if it decided to restart DEIP. On the other hand, long-standing U.S. opposition to export subsidies, especially to EU export subsidies, the opposition of trading partners like New Zealand and the Cairns Group, and the contingent agreement in the Doha Round to eliminate export subsidies could all be factors in a U.S. decision of whether to reactivate DEIP. | U.S. dairy farmers are facing low returns in 2009 following a sharp decline in milk prices since late 2008 and continuation of relatively high feed costs that have adversely affected their businesses. Organizations representing dairy farmers are seeking assistance to deal with the situation. Among the requests has been the reactivation of the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP). The principal objective of the program is to develop export markets where the United States competes with exporters who subsidize their products, but DEIP could also increase the U.S. price of milk if enough dairy products are removed from the domestic market. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is considering reactivating DEIP and is in the process of consulting with other agencies, including the U.S. Trade Representative's office.
Reauthorized through 2012 under the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246), DEIP can be used to subsidize U.S. dairy product exports under certain conditions. Under DEIP, USDA makes cash payments, on a bid basis, to entities that export U.S. dairy products. DEIP has not been active since 2004 because, until late in 2008, market conditions were relatively strong and U.S. trade negotiators have been pursuing the elimination of all agricultural export subsidies as a trade policy objective.
The United States' ability to provide export subsidies under DEIP is constrained by World Trade Organization (WTO) limits on quantities and budgetary outlays that can be provided as export subsidies. The allowable quantities and budgetary outlays for agricultural export subsidies, including dairy export subsidies, were negotiated as part of the WTO Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.
The potential for impact on farm milk prices and dairy farmer income depends on how much milk (or in this case milk-equivalent via dairy product exports) is removed relative to the total market. When converted to a milk-equivalent basis, the maximum quantity of subsidized U.S. exports allowed under WTO limits is between 0.5% and 1.0% of total U.S. production. Given that the calculated quantity is a small share of total U.S. milk production, DEIP-assisted exports would be expected to have a relatively small effect on U.S. milk prices and income for U.S. dairy farmers.
There have been few evaluations of DEIP to assess its effectiveness in achieving its aims, including increasing U.S. market share in targeted overseas markets. A 2006 Office of Management and Budget assessment determined that DEIP was only a moderately effective program, although it pointed out that DEIP was successful in offsetting European Union export subsidies for dairy products to Mexico, which permitted the United States to develop and sustain a market for U.S. dairy product exports there.
The United States and other WTO member countries reached agreement in 2005 to eliminate export subsidies by 2013. Making good on this commitment is contingent on reaching a comprehensive agreement in WTO Doha Round negotiations, which are currently stalled. The 2005 WTO proposal would require the elimination of DEIP, but in the absence of a comprehensive Doha Round agreement on agriculture that eliminates export subsidies, the United States would be acting within its WTO rights and obligations if it decided to restart DEIP. On the other hand, long-standing U.S. opposition to export subsidies, especially to EU export subsidies, the opposition of trading partners like New Zealand and the Cairns Group, and the contingent agreement in the Doha Round to eliminate export subsidies could all be factors in a U.S. decision of whether to reactivate DEIP. |
crs_RL32751 | crs_RL32751_0 | Introduction
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is an international agreement among national governments. The implementation and enforcement of CITES is of interest to Congress because of the prominence of the United States in the international wildlife trade. CITES entered into force in 1975 after 10 countries ratified the agreement. There are approximately 5,600 species of animals and approximately 30,000 species of plants listed under CITES. In the United States, the implementing legislation for CITES is the Endangered Species Act (ESA; 16 U.S.C. Appendix II
According to Article II, Appendix II species are:
(a) all species which although not necessarily now threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival; and (b) other species which must be subject to regulation in order that trade in specimens of certain species referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph may be brought under effective control. Among other things, Scientific Authorities are required to determine whether imports or exports of CITES species will have a harmful effect on the conservation status of a species; the intended facility for caring for an imported live specimen of a listed animal is adequately equipped; and import restrictions for a specimen to the country should be proposed because trade may have a negative effect on the status of the species in the wild, or because the introduction of the specimen into the country would present an ecological threat to native species. Species that are not prohibited for trade under CITES, yet are listed as threatened or endangered under the ESA, can be imported to the United States if they meet requirements of Section 10 or Section 4(d) of the ESA. The protection of species listed as endangered under the ESA and listed in Appendix I of CITES is not equivalent. CITES allows for the trade in endangered species, if trade is not detrimental to the survival of the species. For example, cheetahs are Appendix I species under CITES and listed as endangered under the ESA. Arguably, the success of CITES can be summarized with the fact that no species listed under CITES within the last 30 years has gone extinct. Some believe that penalties for CITES violations in party nations are not adequate to prevent illegal wildlife trade. Although most believe that the treaty has been effective in curbing the international trade of endangered and threatened species, some argue that many issues with implementation remain. | The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) has been ratified by 183 nations, including the United States. It regulates the international trade in animals and plants that may be threatened by trade. CITES entered into force in 1975 and currently regulates the trade of approximately 30,000 species of plants and 5,600 species of animals. Many believe that CITES has been a success, noting that no species listed under CITES has gone extinct in the last 30 years. Others believe that CITES, although successful, has had implementation difficulties, such as a lack of enforcement and failures to enact laws that relate to the treaty in some nations.
Protected species are organized under CITES into three appendixes. Species in Appendix I are threatened with extinction due primarily to trade, and trade in Appendix I species is prohibited for commercial purposes. Appendix II contains species that are not necessarily threatened with extinction but require controlled trade to prevent population declines. Species under Appendix III are listed because at least one country has requested other countries to assist it in regulating trade of that species.
In the United States, the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884. 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544) implements CITES and contains separate provisions for protecting rare foreign species. Many species listed under the ESA are also listed under CITES. However, listings under the ESA are based on several criteria that may threaten the survival of the species. Species listed under CITES are evaluated solely on the threat of trade to a species' survival. CITES might allow for the trade in a listed species if trade is not detrimental to the survival of the species, whereas the ESA might allow imports of foreign endangered species if trade enhances the survival of the species in its native country.
In the United States, the implementation and enforcement of laws related to CITES is of potential interest for Congress due to constituent interest in the protection of foreign species and as the treaty relates to the global illegal wildlife trade. Further, wildlife protection under the ESA and CITES for the import and export of particular species and their products, such as trophies for sport-hunted animals, has been of interest to Congress. |
crs_R44731 | crs_R44731_0 | One question that may trigger increased congressional interest, for example, is whether what some observers may see as inadequate progress in furthering ethnic reconciliation should inhibit the United States' further developing bilateral relations, especially at a time when China has been seeking to develop and expand its trade, investment, and geopolitical influence in Sri Lanka and the broader Indian Ocean region. Civil War and Aftermath
From 1983 to 2009, Sri Lanka's political, social, and economic development was constrained by ethnic conflict and war between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers. The war claimed over an estimated 70,000 lives. This result was affirmed in parliamentary elections later in 2015 that led to the formation of the National Unity Government. President Sirisena has pledged to reduce the authority of the executive presidency and has ushered in a period of constitutional and political reform. Main Political Parties
Sri Lankan politics is dominated by the right-of-center United National Party (UNP) and the socialist Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). The current government is a national unity government of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's UNP and President Sirisena's SLFP. Passage of the bill was also one of President Sirisena's 2015 campaign pledges. The Sirisena government has done more, such as allowing the national anthem to be sung in Tamil, returning some lands taken from Tamils during the war, lifting a ban on Tamil groups, and creating an office of missing persons. Many observers believe long-term peace and harmony between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority necessitates a reconciliation of grievances. Remittances are a significant part of Sri Lanka's economy. Geopolitical Context
Sri Lanka is situated near strategically important sea lanes that transit the Indian Ocean. According to some observers, one possible response to these questions is that, while China's trade and investment activities in Sri Lanka are not a direct threat to American interests, it is not in America's interest to have its, or its friends' and allies', influence marginalized to the point of irrelevance in Sri Lanka given Sri Lanka's strategic position near critical sea lanes. More specifically, Congress may be interested in exercising oversight in a number of areas including the Administration's policy toward Sri Lanka with regard to support for democratic reform, ethnic reconciliation, human rights and transitional justice, geopolitics related to India and China in the Indian Ocean region, trade and investment, military-to-military relations, and the environment. The United States has also provided over $2 billion in development assistance to Sri Lanka since 1948. The United States is Sri Lanka's single largest market with approximately 25% of the nation's exports reaching the United States. The United States and Sri Lanka adopted a Joint Action Plan to boost bilateral trade at the 12 th U.S.-Sri Lanka Trade and Investment Framework (TIFA) meeting in April 2016. The Obama Administration has sought to broaden and deepen the U.S. relationship with Sri Lanka, and the inaugural U.S.-Sri Lanka Partnership Dialogue was held in Washington, DC, in February 2016. Key objectives highlighted in the FY2017 Congressional Budget Justification for Sri Lanka include the following:
Sri Lanka accelerates reconciliation between the majority population and ethnic and religious minorities with the assistance of U.S. programs. Questions for Congress
Looking forward, Congress may consider a number of questions as it considers legislation and exercises oversight of policy related to Sri Lanka:
Does Sri Lanka's strategic significance merit stronger bilateral ties with Colombo? What is the nature of Sri Lanka's political and constitutional reform process? Should the United States continue to provide democracy assistance? Is the Sirisena government's progress on ethnic reconciliation sufficient to justify enhanced collaboration and increase U.S. foreign assistance or should such assistance be diminished pending further improvement in this area? Is there a danger that by pushing Colombo too hard on ethnic reconciliation the United States and the international community could unintentionally limit the Sirisena government's political room for maneuver to achieve moderate efforts of reconciliation? What are China's strategic interests in Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean region? Are these potentially a threat to U.S. interests? Presidential and Parliamentary Election Results | Sri Lanka is a nation of geopolitical importance despite its relatively small size. Strategically positioned near key maritime sea lanes that transit the Indian Ocean and link Asia with Europe and Africa, Sri Lanka's external orientation, in particular its ties to China, are of great interest to nearby India. Some observers view China's involvement in the Sri Lankan port at Hanbantota to be part of Beijing's strategy to secure sea lanes through the Indian Ocean.
United States-Sri Lanka relations are expanding significantly, creating new opportunities for Congress to play a role in shaping the bilateral relationship. For example, the United States is increasing its foreign assistance to Sri Lanka while seeking to further develop trade between the two countries. The total foreign assistance request in the FY2017 Congressional Budget Justification for Congress for Foreign Operations is $39,797,000 compared with actual foreign assistance provided in 2015 of $3,927,000. In February 2016, the United States and Sri Lanka held their inaugural Partnership Dialogue, while in April 2016, the governments held their 12th Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) talks. The United States is Sri Lanka's major export destination. Recent U.S.-Sri Lankan engagement has been prompted in part by a fundamental shift in Sri Lanka's domestic politics since early 2015. This shift has occurred against the backdrop of the more reconciliatory and reform-oriented approach of President Maithripala Sirisena of the Sri Lankan Freedom party (SLFP) and the "National Unity Government" he formed with Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe of the United National Party (UNP).
Under Sirisena's predecessor, former President Mahinda Rajapaksa (2005-2015), U.S.-Sri Lankan relations deteriorated, especially during the closing phase of Sri Lanka's civil war between government troops and the forces of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE). The war ended in 2009 after 26 years, having claimed over 70,000 lives. Disagreements between the United States and Sri Lanka stemmed from human rights concerns about how the Sri Lankan government fought the LTTE, particularly at the end of the war.
In presidential and parliamentary elections of January and August 2015, respectively, voters ousted the Rajapaksa regime and brought President Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe to power in what the two major parties call a National Unity Government. Some observers assert that this significant reorientation of the Sri Lankan government has created opportunities for Colombo to restore and enhance the country's democracy through constitutional and political reform and achieve reconciliation with the Tamil minority. President Sirisena's government has also sought to rebalance its relationship with China.
Human rights concerns remain, especially those related to implementing United Nations-supported transitional justice measures. Progress has been made in a number of areas including, for example, measures to create an office of missing persons and freedom of information legislation, but some observers indicate that more needs to be done to achieve lasting reconciliation with the Tamil minority. They deem such reconciliation to be necessary if Sri Lanka is to attain long-term peace and stability.
As Congress considers legislation and exercises oversight of policy related to Sri Lanka, Members and committees may consider a number of questions. Is Sri Lanka's strategic significance such that the United States has an interest in developing stronger bilateral ties with Colombo? What is the nature of Sri Lanka's political and constitutional reform process? Should the U.S. continue to provide democracy assistance? If so, how can it be most effectively structured? Is the Sirisena government's progress on ethnic reconciliation sufficient to justify enhanced collaboration and increase U.S. foreign assistance, or should such assistance be withheld pending further improvement in this area? Is there a danger that by pushing Colombo too hard on ethnic reconciliation the U.S. and the international community could unintentionally limit the Sirisena government's political room for maneuver to achieve moderate efforts of reconciliation or political reform? What are China's strategic interests in Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean region? Are these potentially a challenge to United States interests? |
crs_R41213 | crs_R41213_0 | Forestry programs have been addressed in past farm bills and other agriculture legislation. In addition to general forestry for national forests, the Agriculture Committees have jurisdiction over forestry research and forestry assistance to states and to private landowners. 107-171 ) contained a separate forestry title. The 2008 farm bill (the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246 ) included a forestry title and several forestry provisions in other titles. The forestry title:
established national priorities for private forest management and assistance; required statewide forest assessments and strategies for assistance; provided for competitive funding for certain programs; created new programs for open space conservation and for emergency reforestation; established a USFS tribal relations program for cultural and heritage cooperation and a competitive grants program for Hispanic-serving institutions; reauthorized four existing programs; amended the Lacey Act Amendments to prohibit imports of illegally logged wood products; and modified three national forest boundaries and certain timber contract provisions. In addition, the 2008 farm bill conservation title revised the definition of conservation actions to include forestry activities for all conservation programs. The statute required special reporting on softwood lumber imports, to assure implementation of the 2006 U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement. Three provisions altered tax treatments for forests and landowners. Finally, the energy title of the 2008 farm bill included two new woody biomass energy programs. Possible Forestry Issues for a Future Farm Bill
Reauthorization of the many agriculture programs is a major reason for the periodic farm bills, but most forestry programs are permanently authorized. Possible issues include funding forestry assistance programs; controlling invasive species; increasing wildfire protection; producing energy from woody biomass; marketing ecosystem services; supporting carbon sequestration projects; and diversifying local economies. FLEP was not reauthorized in the 2008 farm bill, but Congress might revisit the issue of separate funding for forest landowner assistance programs in the next farm bill. The 2008 farm bill included forestry as an accepted practice for almost all agriculture conservation programs. Congress could also choose, implicitly or explicitly, to have the agencies address invasive species through existing programs. Whether and how to assist private landowners and communities, to combine this assistance with other assistance and incentive programs, and to fund such assistance could be debated in the farm bill context or in other legislative settings, such as the annual appropriations bills, or not at all. Some were created in the 2008 farm bill, including two directed specifically at woody biomass. A new farm bill might extend, expand, alter, or terminate the 2008 provision. | Forest management generally, as well as forest research and forestry assistance, have long been within the jurisdictions of the Agriculture Committees. Although most forestry programs are permanently authorized, forestry has usually been addressed in the periodic farm bills to reauthorize many agriculture programs. The 2008 farm bill (the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246) contained a separate forestry title, with provisions establishing national priorities for forestry assistance; requiring statewide forest assessments and strategies; providing competitive funding for certain programs; creating new programs for open space conservation and for emergency reforestation; reauthorizing four existing programs; and prohibiting imports of illegally logged wood products, among other provisions. Forestry provisions were included in other titles as well—the conservation title revised the definition of conservation actions to include forestry activities for almost all conservation programs; the trade title required special reporting on softwood lumber imports; the energy title established two woody biomass energy programs; and the tax title included three provisions altering tax treatments for forests and landowners.
Additional forestry issues have been suggested by various interests for inclusion in the next farm bill. Funding is likely to play a central role in the overall farm bill debate. While forestry was included for almost all agriculture conservation programs in the 2008 farm bill, the previous sole forest-specific assistance program was not reauthorized. Whether reauthorization of these programs is necessary or whether additional funds are needed to assist landowners in implementing sustainable forestry practices are issues for debate. Protecting communities from wildfire continues to be a priority for some, while controlling invasive species that threaten native forests is a priority for others. Congress could address programs for these purposes in the next farm bill. Also, use of woody biomass for renewable energy could be combined with wildfire protection and invasive species control, and the next farm bill could extend, expand, alter, or add to the woody biomass energy programs created in the 2008 farm bill and in other legislation. Ecosystem services—forest values that have not traditionally been sold in markets, such as clean air and water, wildlife habitats, and scenic beauty—were addressed in the 2008 farm bill, and Congress could extend, expand, alter, or terminate the existing ecosystem services program. Protocols—or a direction to establish protocols—for measuring, monitoring, and verifying forest carbon sequestration projects, which might qualify as offsets under existing or proposed regulatory schemes (e.g., regional programs or a national cap-and-trade system) or in voluntary carbon markets, could also be included in the farm bill. Finally, assisting forest-dependent communities in diversifying their economies has also been debated. |
crs_R43020 | crs_R43020_0 | Ensuring that children get health care is one of the basic responsibilities of the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program. These costs may include payment of medical, dental, prescription and other health care expenses for children and provisions to cover health insurance costs as well as cash payments for unreimbursed medical expenses. For a detailed legislative history of provisions related to medical child support, see Appendix A . Health care coverage of children and medical child support are not synonymous. Conversely, a child may be receiving cash medical support but not be insured. Based on information from the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), in the future, the establishment and enforcement of medical child support may become a CSE program performance measure, however, more needs to be done before that can occur. Thus, even though states submit medical support data, the information is not subject to an audit to determine if it is "complete and reliable." (See Appendix B.) The public and policymakers generally agree that establishment and enforcement of medical support promotes equity in allocating childrearing costs between custodial and noncustodial parents, and usually saves federal and state dollars. 111-148 (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; ACA), as amended by P.L. Enforcement
Although there is widespread agreement that many children still lack health care coverage, OCSE data indicate some improvement in the establishment and enforcement of medical child support. Assignment Provision
Pursuant to the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 ( P.L. State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP)
In 1997, P.L. This was seen as the way to make noncustodial parents responsible for the health care needs of their children and lessen taxpayer burden by shifting costs from the taxpayers back to the noncustodial parents. Earlier data (2008) shows that 11% of child support-eligible children did not have any source of health insurance. As mentioned earlier, health care coverage of children and medical child support are not synonymous. A child could be covered by a custodial parent's health insurance plan but the noncustodial parent may not be sharing in the paying of premiums, co-payments, or other costs associated with the child's medical care. Some commentators who support narrowing the focus of the CSE program with regard to medical child support maintain that the CSE program is well positioned and has strong tools to collect cash support, so focusing on cash support (including cash medical support) would be an efficient and effective role for the CSE program given the enactment of the ACA. This section of the report summarizes major medical child support provisions. In any case in which a parent is required by court order to provide health coverage for a child and the child is otherwise eligible for family coverage through the insurer, insurers and employers were required: to permit the parent, without regard to any enrollment season restrictions, to enroll the child under such family coverage, to allow the custodial parent or the Medicaid agency to enroll the child in the noncustodial parent's health plan when the noncustodial parent has family coverage but fails to provide health insurance coverage for a dependent child, and with respect to employers only, not to dis-enroll the child unless there is satisfactory written evidence that the order is no longer in effect or the child is or will be enrolled in comparable health coverage through another insurer that will take effect not later than the effective date of the disenrollment. 6. 109-171 required child support orders enforced by the CSE program to include a provision for medical child support. It is the only available state data on medical child support. Also, because medical support establishment allows states to initiate legal medical support orders before determining whether the health insurance is affordable, state CSE agencies are severely hampered in successfully enforcing medical child support orders in cases in which a medical support order is established but the health insurance is not considered affordable by federal/state standards. | Medical child support is defined as the legal provision of payment of medical, dental, prescription, and other health care expenses for children living apart from one of their parents. It can include provisions for health care coverage (including payment of costs of premiums, co-payments, and deductibles) as well as cash payments for a child's medical expenses. The establishment and enforcement of medical support is intended to promote fairness in allocating childrearing costs between custodial and noncustodial parents and, when employer-sponsored health care is obtained, it saves federal and state dollars.
Medical child support has evolved over time. In the early days of the establishment and enforcement of medical child support, the primary goal was to make noncustodial parents responsible for their children and thereby lessen taxpayer burden by shifting costs to noncustodial parents. With the enactment of P.L. 109-171 (the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005), the emphasis on solely looking to the noncustodial parent for obtaining private health care coverage for children was replaced with the view that provision of medical child support is the goal regardless of which parent can provide it.
A study was commissioned by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and conducted by the Urban Institute, to shed light on health care coverage of child support-eligible children. Based on an analysis using 2008 data, the Urban Institute found that out of an estimated 26 million U.S. children age 18 or under who had at least one parent living outside the home, approximately 51% of such child support-eligible children were enrolled in the Medicaid or the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). An additional 31% of the child support- eligible population had private coverage from someone in their household and 6% obtained insurance coverage from someone outside the household (generally the noncustodial parent but sometimes a stepparent). A small proportion of children (1%) obtained coverage from other federal sources. The remaining 11% of child support-eligible children were classified as uninsured.
Health care coverage of children and medical child support are not synonymous. A child could be covered by a custodial parent's health insurance plan and the child support order may not contain any provision for medical support. Conversely, a child may be receiving cash medical support but not be insured.
Although there is agreement that many children still lack health care coverage, full implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148; ACA, as amended) should further reduce the problem of uninsured children, but the issue of successful establishment and enforcement of medical child support may become even more complex. Although states submit medical support data to the federal government, the information is not subject to an audit to determine if it is complete and reliable. Also, medical support establishment allows states to initiate legal medical support orders before determining whether or not health insurance is affordable. However, state Child Support Enforcement (CSE) agencies are severely hampered, if not totally stymied, in enforcing medical child support orders in cases in which a medical support order is established but the health insurance is not considered affordable by federal/state standards.
Even though it is not likely that medical child support will receive congressional attention this year, with the continued implementation of the ACA in 2014, Congress may examine the impact of the ACA on the CSE program and address unresolved issues. This report describes current federal policy with respect to medical child support. It also examines the potential impact of the ACA on the CSE program. It provides a legislative history of medical support provisions in the CSE program (see Appendix A) and state data on the medical support coverage of children in the CSE program (see Appendix B). |
crs_R41468 | crs_R41468_0 | As stated in the act, its purpose is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." The ADA and its regulations require reasonable accommodation or modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when such modifications are necessary to render the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations accessible to individuals with disabilities. The reasonable accommodation or modification requirement has been interpreted to allow the use of service animals, even in places where animals are generally not permitted. Recently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated regulations containing specific details about service animals, including when they may be denied access, and defining service animals as trained dogs. This report focuses on these regulatory requirements. Definition of Service Animal
Species Limitation
Currently, the DOJ regulations for titles II and III of the ADA define service animal as "any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability." Miniature Horses
Despite the regulatory limitation in the definition to dogs, miniature horses may be allowed in certain circumstances. Although they are not included in the definition of service animal, the regulations specifically provide that a public entity (title II) or public accommodation (title III) "shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a miniature horse by an individual with a disability if the miniature horse has been individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of the individual with a disability." A public entity or place of public accommodation may not ask about the nature or extent of an individual's disability but may ask two questions to determine if the animal is a service animal, when it is not readily apparent. These two questions are
if the animal is required because of a disability, and what work or task the animal is trained to do. Thus, there is considerable ambiguity concerning how potentially conflicting claims for accommodations relating to service animals should be addressed. | The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has as its purpose providing "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." In order to effectuate this purpose, the ADA and its regulations require reasonable accommodation or modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when such modifications are necessary to render the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations accessible to individuals with disabilities. The reasonable accommodation or modification requirement has been interpreted to allow the use of service animals, even in places where animals are generally not permitted.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has promulgated regulations containing specific details about service animals, and this report focuses on these regulatory requirements. Generally, a public entity (ADA title II) or a place of public accommodation (ADA title III) must modify its policies, practices, and procedures to allow an individual with a disability to use a service animal. The regulations also define service animals. A service animal is "any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability." (emphasis added). However, despite the regulatory limitation of the definition to dogs, miniature horses may be allowed in certain circumstances. A service animal does not need to be allowed when the animal is out of control or the animal is not housebroken. In addition, a public entity or place of public accommodation may not ask about the nature or extent of an individual's disability but may ask two questions to determine if the animal is a service animal when it is not readily apparent. These questions are, if the animal is required because of a disability, and what work or task the animal is trained to do.
Several issues remain unresolved by the DOJ regulations. For example, the relationship between the ADA and Fair Housing Act in some situations is unclear. In addition, there is considerable ambiguity concerning how potentially conflicting claims for accommodations relating to service animals should be addressed. |
crs_R44047 | crs_R44047_0 | Introduction
A "pit" is the core of the primary stage of a thermonuclear weapon. Detonating the pit provides the energy to detonate a weapon's secondary stage. During the Cold War, the Rocky Flats Plant (CO) made up to 2,000 pits accepted for use in the stockpile per year. Since then, the United States has made 29 such pits in total. Yet the Department of Defense (DOD) stated it needed the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE) that maintains the U.S. nuclear stockpile, to have the capacity to produce 50 to 80 pits per year (ppy). Pits are to be made at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL, NM) in the PF-4 building, potentially in proposed smaller structures called modules connected to PF-4 by tunnels, or in both. Producing 80 ppy requires enough "Material At Risk" (MAR) and space. Space is laboratory floor space available for plutonium operations. There are figures for available space and MAR, but figures for space and MAR required to produce 80 ppy have never been calculated rigorously , so this report cannot determine what options would provide enough margin for producing 80 ppy. Nor can it address whether certain options could meet the 2027 date because time to implement them cannot be determined. Instead, the report presents 16 options that increase the feasibility of producing at a rate of 80 ppy rate by 2027. Improve Modeling of Atmospheric Dispersion of Plutonium
NNSA calculates dose to an MEOI from an accident at PF-4 using computer models. Harmonizing MAR and time of day would reduce calculated dose. That reduction, if incorporated into PF-4's safety documents, would permit more than doubling the MAR permitted in PF-4. Yet an increase in the MAR ceiling in PF-4 by a factor of less than ten, and perhaps less than two, would probably permit enough MAR for production of 80 pits per year in PF-4. Yet a substantial amount of plutonium on PF-4's lab space is in process. One way to reduce space and MAR required for AC is to analyze fewer samples per pit. That would enable fewer pieces of equipment to support a given rate of production, reducing space requirements and cost and increasing throughput; would make it more likely that RLUOB could perform most AC needed, which would reduce the amount of AC that would have to be done in PF-4; and would reduce waste generated per pit, reducing the load on AC and on waste processing. A process ("salt scrub") can remove most of the rest of the plutonium from the calcium chloride-plutonium mixture. Remove Americium from Plutonium
Weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) consists of several plutonium isotopes. Since Pu-241 decay is the only source of Am-241, after passing aged plutonium through a final run of metal chlorination to remove Am-241, so little Pu-241 would remain that even if it all decayed to Am-241, the latter would never reach the level in 30-year-old WGPu, and the weapons laboratories have certified weapons with pits that old and older as acceptable for use in the stockpile. This final run would greatly reduce worker exposure. To increase MAR, reduce potential dose, and reduce the risk of collapse, LANL is taking steps to strengthen PF-4 seismically. Build One Module for Plutonium-238 Work
Plutonium-238 (Pu-238) is highly radioactive. On the other hand, some lessons from building a module might increase cost. One option by itself will not suffice to meet that requirement. As a result, NNSA faces the prospect of assembling a package of options, and Congress faces the prospect of evaluating, perhaps amending, and approving it. Any package would need to optimize among such goals as margin, cost, worker safety, and throughput. Using a different wind model and more realistic assumptions could reduce calculated dose by more than half in a major accident at PF-4, permitting more than doubling the MAR allowance for PF-4 quickly and at essentially no cost. What is the risk-benefit balance? In sum, while arriving at a satisfactory package will require complex analyses, many options offer the potential to boost U.S. pit production capacity toward, if not to, the congressionally mandated requirement of 80 pits per year by 2027. | A pit is the plutonium core of a thermonuclear weapon. Imploding it with conventional explosives provides the energy to detonate the rest of the weapon. The Rocky Flats Plant made up to 2,000 pits per year (ppy) through 1989; since then, the United States has made 29 pits for the stockpile. Yet the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act requires the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which manages the nuclear weapons program, to produce at a rate of 80 ppy for 90 days in 2027. How can that requirement be met?
Pits are to be made at Los Alamos National Laboratory's main plutonium facility, PF-4. To manufacture pits, a facility must have enough laboratory floor space and a high enough limit for Material At Risk (MAR), the amount of radioactive material a worst-case accident could release. Producing 80 ppy requires enough "margin," the space or MAR available to produce pits minus space or MAR required for that production rate. While space and MAR available have been calculated, amounts required to produce 80 ppy have never been calculated rigorously, leaving space and MAR needs undefined. Although CRS cannot address whether certain options could meet the 2027 date because time to implement them cannot be determined, this report presents 16 options that seek to increase the feasibility of producing 80 ppy by 2027, including:
The radiation dose an individual would receive from a worst-case accident determines MAR permitted in PF-4. A ten-factor equation calculates dose as a function of MAR. NNSA uses worst-case values in this equation, yet median values may provide sufficient conservatism. Median values reduce calculated dose by orders of magnitude, permitting a large increase in PF-4 MAR. Yet merely doubling permitted MAR might suffice for producing 80 ppy. Providing this increase through construction at PF-4 could be costly and take years. In determining MAR for PF-4, the closest offsite individual is at a nearby trailer park. Relocating it would place the next closest individual farther away. The added distance would reduce dose, permitting increased MAR in PF-4. Using a different meteorological model and different assumptions would greatly reduce the currently calculated dose, perhaps permitting doubling PF-4 MAR. Plutonium decays radioactively, creating elements that various processes remove to purify plutonium. One process generates byproducts; plutonium is recovered from them with processes that take space and MAR. Since the United States has tons of plutonium surplus to defense needs, byproducts could be dispositioned as waste. Pits use weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu). U.S. WGPu is about 50 years old. About nine-tenths of plutonium-241, a WGPu isotope, decays to americium-241 in that time. Since plutonium-241 is the source of americium-241 in WGPu, removing the current americium-241 would prevent WGPu from ever reaching its americium-241 limit, permitting reduction in equipment for that process and reducing worker radiation exposure. A plutonium isotope used in space probes, plutonium-238, is extremely radioactive. It accounts for a small quantity of PF-4 plutonium but a quarter of PF-4's MAR. Building a "module" near PF-4 for plutonium-238 work would free MAR and space in PF-4, so one module might suffice instead of two or three. To reduce risk of collapse, loss of life, and radiation release from an earthquake, NNSA increased the seismic resilience of PF-4. More steps are planned; more could be taken.
Many options may boost U.S. pit production capacity, but none by itself could meet capacity and schedule requirements. NNSA therefore faces the prospect of assembling a package of options, and Congress faces the prospect of evaluating, perhaps amending, and approving it. Arriving at a satisfactory package will require complex analyses to optimize among such goals as margin, cost, worker safety, and throughput. At issue for Congress: What are the risks, costs, and benefits of the options? What is the optimum package?
This report is a condensed version of CRS Report R44033, Nuclear Weapon "Pit" Production: Options to Help Meet a Congressional Requirement, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33054 | crs_RL33054_0 | Introduction
The United States is projected to experience two major demographic changes that could substantially affect labor markets in future years. The demographic changes are the aging of the U.S. population and the slowdown in U.S. population growth. Both are expected to raise the total dependency ratio (the number of younger and older persons relative to the economically productive population). Healthy older individuals face a number of impediments to spending more years in the labor force, however. Late career employees who involuntarily lose long-held jobs through no fault of their own could also be among those who have the most difficulty delaying retirement. Those older persons whose jobs are terminated through no fault of their own often have subsequent labor market outcomes that also compare unfavorably with nondisplaced older workers. The Rate of Reemployment
The displacement of older workers ends with comparatively few finding new jobs. The lower employment rate of older displaced workers compared to either younger workers or to older nondisplaced workers appears related to the restricted opportunities that older jobseekers typically encounter. Older persons' comparatively limited access to jobs could be due to age discrimination (which is difficult to measure directly because of methodological issues) and to lawful considerations of employers. Post-Displacement Compensation
Relatively more older displaced workers who find new full-time jobs earn less than they had on the full-time jobs they lost. Policy Responses
The Dislocated Worker program under Title I of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) and the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program are meant to help displaced workers obtain new employment by providing job search assistance and training among other services. (A wage supplement is sometimes referred to as wage insurance.) Thus, in addition to enabling displaced workers to remain in the labor force, a wage insurance program might reduce UI costs. It should be kept in mind that wage insurance and training operate on the supply side. The only federal program that focuses on the seemingly limited job opportunities of older unemployed workers is the Senior Community Service Employment Program (SCSEP), Title V of the Older Americans Act. It creates part-time public service jobs for persons aged 55 and older who have low incomes and poor employment prospects. To the extent that demand-side rather than supply-side obstacles prevent substantial numbers of older displaced workers from obtaining new jobs, then raising the eligibility age of Social Security may not succeed at delaying retirements among members of this group. Not only might older displaced workers be unable to ameliorate potential shortages by extending their working lives, but they also might live in reduced circumstances and qualify for means-tested government benefits as a result of their unplanned retirements. Further, older workers voluntarily retiring from long-held jobs who want to extend their stay in the labor force by taking non-career (bridge) jobs could be thwarted from doing so by these same demand-side obstacles. | The United States is projected to experience two major demographic changes that could greatly affect labor markets in the future. The demographic changes are the aging of the U.S. population and the slowdown in population growth. Both are expected to raise the total dependency ratio (the number of younger and older persons relative to the economically productive population). The possibility of a rising ratio has led to concern about the nation's ability to maintain the current standard of living. One way to lessen the dependency ratio's expected increase is for people to spend more years in the labor force.
Older workers who involuntarily lose long-held jobs through no fault of their own could experience great difficulty delaying their retirement. Older displaced workers usually have labor market outcomes that compare unfavorably with older nondisplaced workers, such as long-lasting lower employment rates. Older workers often are more adversely affected by displacement than younger workers as well. For example, older workers disproportionately end displacement by exiting the labor force than by finding new jobs.
The lower employment rate of older displaced workers appears related to their restricted job opportunities. The limited access of older jobseekers could be due to age discrimination and to lawful considerations of employers (e.g., compensation packages with health insurance). For their part, the likelihood that older displaced workers will earn considerably less upon reemployment dampens their motivation to find new jobs.
Both the Dislocated Worker program of the Workforce Investment Act and Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) are designed to actively help eligible displaced workers, regardless of age, find new jobs (e.g., by providing training). In addition, the Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance program for TAA-eligible older workers offers a wage supplement to those who become quickly reemployed in full-time jobs that pay less than their lost jobs. (A wage supplement sometimes is referred to as wage insurance.) Retraining and wage insurance operate on the supply side. The only federal program that addresses older workers' reemployment difficulties from the demand side is the Senior Community Service Employment Program (Title V of the Older Americans Act). It creates part-time public service jobs for older persons with low incomes and poor job prospects.
To the extent that it is more demand-side than supply-side obstacles that prevent substantial numbers of older displaced workers from obtaining new jobs, raising the Social Security eligibility age may not succeed at delaying retirements among members of this group. Not only might older displaced workers be unable to ameliorate potential labor shortages by extending their working lives, but they also might live in reduced circumstances and qualify for means-tested government benefits as a result of their unplanned retirements. Further, older workers voluntarily retiring from long-held jobs who want to extend their stay in the labor force by taking non-career bridge jobs could be thwarted from doing so by these same demand-side obstacles. |
crs_R44680 | crs_R44680_0 | Introduction
Gambling, once widely outlawed, is now a heavily regulated, taxed activity that is legal in some form in all states except Hawaii and Utah. While state governments have the main responsibility for overseeing gambling, Congress historically has played a significant role in shaping the industry. Like so many other industries, the gambling industry has been transformed by developments in computing and telecommunications. Delaware, Nevada, and New Jersey are the only states that currently allow intrastate Internet gambling. According to one private estimate, annual gross global revenue from online, television, and mobile gambling is now around $50 billion, and is forecast to exceed $65 billion by 2021 (see Figure 1 ). An American Gaming Association (AGA) survey showed that 4% of U.S. adults who gambled in 2014 did so over the Internet. Debate over the appropriate federal role has become more prominent with the increasing interest in online gambling. Other casino owners disagree, seeing Internet gambling as a potentially significant new revenue source and a possible complement to land-based casino operations. 109-347 ). However, UIGEA does not outlaw any specific types of gambling over the Internet and allows states and tribes to permit Internet gambling within their borders if they apply certain safeguards. While UIGEA included exceptions for certain intrastate and tribal Internet gambling operations, including state lotteries and Indian casinos, it did not clarify the scope of older laws that DOJ has used to prosecute Internet gambling, such as the Wire Act. A number of states and tribes have taken advantage of the DOJ memo to allow online betting on horse races and Internet lotteries. Internet gambling is also regulated in the U.S. Virgin Islands, another tiny Internet gambling market. And some states, such as Washington, expressly prohibit Internet gambling, including online fantasy sports wagering. Illinois's lottery privatization has not been smooth. (For more on daily fantasy sports, see " Sports Betting " below.) A bill introduced in the 114 th Congress, H.R. The Sports Gaming Opportunity Act ( H.R. This bill would not make online games themselves illegal, but rather would prohibit use of the communications network to play games like poker or bingo over the Internet, restoring the original interpretation of the Wire Act. The Coalition to Stop Internet Gambling supports these bills. S. 3376 , introduced in September 2016, would prohibit financial institutions from processing Internet gambling transactions, and it aims to overturn the Department of Justice's 2011 memorandum, which interpreted the Wire Act as applying only to sports gambling and not to other forms of online gambling, including casinos and poker. 2888 ), would allow a state or tribal gambling oversight commission approved by a new Office of Internet Poker Oversight in the Department of Commerce to license online poker sites only. In 2006, Congress passed the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA), which prevents payments to illegal gambling-related businesses but does not outlaw all forms of Internet gambling. | Gambling, once widely outlawed, is now a regulated, taxed activity that is legal in some form—bingo, card games, slot machines, state-run lotteries, casinos, and even online—in all states except Hawaii and Utah. Like so many other industries, the gambling industry is being transformed by technology that has begun to shift patronage from casinos, bingo halls, or stores selling lottery tickets to desktop computers and tablets connected to the Internet and to mobile devices that may communicate by telephone or direct satellite links. According to one private estimate, annual revenue in the global Internet gambling market, less gamblers' winnings, is around $50 billion.
State governments have the main responsibility for overseeing gambling. Congress, however, historically has played a key role in shaping the industry. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA; P.L. 109-347) of 2006 prevents payments to illegal gambling-related businesses, but does not outlaw all forms of Internet gambling. In December 2011, a Department of Justice (DOJ) interpretation of the 1961 Wire Act (18 U.S.C. §1084), which has been used to prosecute Internet gambling, authorized states to allow online gambling, except for sports betting. As a result, states and Indian tribes are allowed to permit Internet gambling within their territory if certain conditions are met.
With the increasing interest in online gambling, debate over the appropriate federal role has become more prominent. A survey by the American Gaming Association reported that 4% of U.S. adults who gambled in 2014 did so over the Internet. Currently, a majority of states allow Internet betting on horse racing, and a few now permit Internet lottery games. A number of Indian tribes and gaming companies have created entities to develop Internet gambling, and seem likely to expand them rapidly if the legal issues are clarified. Delaware, Nevada, and New Jersey have implemented online gambling programs within their borders. Several more states are considering whether to legalize Internet gambling, although some have laws that expressly prohibit online gambling. A growing number of states have taken a legislative interest in new forms of online gaming, such as daily fantasy sports.
The gambling industry is divided over Internet gambling. Some companies and Indian tribes see it as a promising revenue source. Others fear loss of patronage at brick-and-mortar casinos. One bill introduced in the 114th Congress, H.R. 2888, would allow online poker, overseen by a new Office of Internet Poker Oversight in the Department of Commerce. An opposing group that also includes prominent casino owners, the Coalition to Stop Internet Gambling, supports the Restoration of America's Wire Act (H.R. 707, S. 1668), which would prohibit the use of communications networks to gamble over the Internet. Another bill, S. 3376, would prohibit financial institutions from processing Internet gambling transactions. Perhaps reflecting divisions within the gambling industry, Congress has not acted on any of these proposals. No legislation affecting Internet gambling has been enacted since UIGEA. |
crs_RS20221 | crs_RS20221_0 | The first commemorative postage stamps were issued in 1893 to mark the Columbian Exposition of that year. However, in the effort to expand and appeal to a wider range of interests, USPS in the late 1990s began designing stamps not only to attract non-collectors, but also children. In 2007, USPS will issue 99 commemorative stamps. Errors and subject selection in commemorative stamps have sometimes generated controversy. While the primary responsibility of the committee is to review and appraise all proposals submitted for commemoration, the PMG has the exclusive and final authority to determine both the subject matter and the designs for U.S. postage stamps. Criteria for Selecting Commemorative Stamps
The Citizens' Stamp Advisory Committee receives about 50,000 nominations each year, and gives no special attention to those submitted by Congress or other legislative bodies. As a basis for its recommendation to the Postmaster General, the advisory committee uses 12 criteria when considering commemorative stamp subjects. | More than 1,800 commemorative stamps have been issued since the first in 1893. In recent years they have been marketed to attract non-collectors and children. In 2007, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) will issue 99 different commemorative stamps. In considering subjects for commemorative stamps, the USPS Citizens' Stamp Advisory Committee, guided by 12 basic criteria, reviews and appraises the approximately 50,000 proposals submitted for commemoration each year. The postmaster general (PMG) has the exclusive and final authority to determine both subject matter and design. A number of resolutions are introduced in Congress each year urging that consideration be given to a particular subject for commemoration, but few are passed, and the advisory committee accords them no special status. The commemorative stamp program contributed an estimated $225.9 million in retained revenues for the USPS in 2005. |
crs_RS21630 | crs_RS21630_0 | Underthe special immigrant provisions, the INAdefines ministers of religion and religious workers as follows:
(C) an immigrant, and the immigrant's spouse and children if accompanying or following to join the immigrant,who --
(i) for at least 2 years immediately preceding the time of application foradmission, has been a member of areligious denomination having a bona fide nonprofit, religious organization in the UnitedStates;
(ii) seeks to enter the United States --
(I) solely for the purpose of carrying on the vocation of a minister of thatreligiousdenomination,
(II) before October 1, 2003, in order to work for the organization at the requestof the organization in aprofessional capacity in a religious vocation or occupation, or
(III) before October 1, 2003, in order to work for the organization (or a bona fide organization which is affiliatedwith the religious denomination and is exempt from taxation as an organization described in Section 501(c)(3) ofthe Internal Revenue Code of 1986) at therequest of the organization in a religious vocation or occupation; and
(iii) has been carrying on such a vocation, professional work, or other workcontinuously for at least the 2-yearperiod described in clause (i); (5)
The regulations further define religious occupation as "an activity which relates to a traditional religious function." PDF version
Legislation
Bills ( H.R. 2152 / S. 1580 ) to extend the religious worker provision through September 30, 2008, have been introduced in bothchambers. 2152 reported onSeptember 10, 2003, and the House passed H.R. 2152 on September 17, 2003. Although the extension of the religious worker provision has a broad base of support, efforts to make it a permanent immigration category have not succeeded. Some have criticized the religious worker provision as vulnerable to fraud. | A provision in immigration law that allows for the admission of immigrants to performreligious work is scheduledto sunset on September 30, 2003. Although the provision has a broad base of support, some have expressed concernthat the provision is vulnerable to fraud. The foreign religious worker must be a member of a religious denomination that has a bona fidenonprofit, religious organization in the United States, and musthave been in the religious vocation, professional work, or other religious work continuously for at least 2 years. Bills (H.R. 2152/S. 1580) to extend the religious worker provision through September 30, 2008, have been introduced in both chambers. The House passed H.R. 2152 onSeptember 17, 2003. This report will be updated as legislative activity warrants. |
crs_R43678 | crs_R43678_0 | Introduction
The annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill contains appropriations for the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in the Department of the Interior (DOI). For FY2015, the Administration proposed a number of accounting changes. As a result, comparisons of FY2015 funding with levels in previous years are particularly difficult for a number of accounts or subaccounts. On July 23, 2014, the committee reported H.R. 113-551 ), approving $1.40 billion, down 2.0% from the FY2014 level of $1.43 billion contained in P.L. 113-76 . The President had requested $1.48 billion in annual appropriations, an increase of 3.4% over FY2014. The committee's proposed changes in accounts and subaccounts range from elimination (-100%) to an increase of 187.8%. 5171 . (Details of the funding for the Endangered Species program are shown in Table 2 .) Fisheries and Aquatic Resource Conservation
The committee moved funding for Fisheries and Aquatic Resource Conservation from the Resource Management account into its own separate account. The committee approved $147.9 million for this program, a 9.3% increase over FY2014, while generally commending the program for its work. In light of controversy in recent years over FWS funding for the mitigation necessary for fisheries loss from projects actually built and run by other agencies, the Secretary of the Interior is directed to "secure reimbursement from other Federal agencies for up to 100 but not less than 50 percent of the annual costs to the Federal Government to fulfill such mitigation responsibilities." Expenditures are currently controlled by the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission, consisting of the Secretary of the Interior (chair), the Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, one Republican and one Democrat from the House; one Democrat and one Republican from the Senate; the head of the FWS Realty Office; and—for each specific acquisition—a representative of the game department or of the governor of the relevant state. National Wildlife Refuge Fund
The National Wildlife Refuge Fund (NWRF, also called the Refuge Revenue Sharing Fund) compensates counties for the presence of the non-taxable federal lands under the primary jurisdiction of FWS. The committee provided level funding for the Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation Fund relative to the FY2014 level. Administrative and Other Provisions Affecting Wildlife
In addition to the regular appropriations provisions, H.R. Section 431: Hunting, Fishing, and Recreational Shooting
Section 431 of the House committee's bill directs that no funds under the bill "or any other Act for any fiscal year may be used to prohibit the use of or access to Federal land (as ... defined in ... (16 U.S.C. The cited provision in the U.S. Code applies to lands managed by the Forest Service and BLM. | The annual appropriation for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies provides funds for agencies and programs in three federal departments, as well as numerous related agencies and bureaus. Among the agencies represented is the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in the Department of the Interior. Many of its programs are among the more controversial of those funded in the bill. On July 23, 2014, the House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 5171. The bill provided $1.40 billion for FWS, down 2.0% from the FY2014 level of $1.43 billion contained in P.L. 113-76. The President requested $1.48 billion, an increase of 3.4% over the FY2014 level. In addition, the Administration proposed a number of significant accounting changes. As the committee noted, some of these changes make comparisons with funding in prior years impossible for some accounts. The House committee accepted a few of the Administration's changes, while rejecting others. The committee further made its own changes in accounting, in order to emphasize certain priorities. In combination, the many changes affect a number of comparisons.
Other highlights of H.R. 5171 include the following:
A 9.3% increase in funding for hatcheries and aquatic resources. Elimination of funding for most acquisition of new refuge lands. A 187.8% increase in the National Wildlife Refuge Fund, which compensates local governments for the presence of non-taxable refuge system lands. Elimination of funding for Cooperative Landscape Conservation and Adaptive Science.
There were also several funding restrictions or directives. Among these were the following:
A prohibition on expansion or creation of national wildlife refuges using moneys from the Land and Water Conservation Fund, the Migratory Bird Conservation Account, or any other sources without specific congressional approval. Directives to maintain funds for the fish hatchery and aquatic resources program to continue support for mitigation hatcheries, as well as to secure reimbursement from agencies whose projects produced the need for fisheries mitigation. A prohibition on funding for any new regulations applying within the United States on lawfully imported ivory. A prohibition on writing or issuing certain rules or proposed rules under the Endangered Species Act on specified populations of sage-grouse. A limitation on the ability to close lands under the Forest Service or Bureau of Land Management to hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting, except for temporary closures related to special events or public safety.
General efforts to reduce federal spending will encourage scrutiny of all spending, in FWS as in other agencies. |
crs_RS20811 | crs_RS20811_0 | The shape of the income distribution is not itself a subject of legislation, but Members of Congress appear to consider it in their decision-making process concerning a number of policy issues such as taxes, means-tested benefits, and social insurance programs. It then attempts to put the term middle class into greater perspective: first, by applying results from public opinion surveys on social class to the Census Bureau's data on the income distribution in 2012 and, second, by reviewing findings from empirical studies on the contribution of relative (as opposed to absolute) income to the identity of the middle class. (The Census Bureau does not disaggregate income within the group of households with incomes of $250,000 or more.) Another often-used way to describe the distribution of income is the share of total money income going to different household groups in order of increasing income. In 2012, there were a total of 122.459 million households with income, so each quintile (fifth) in the distribution represents 24.492 million households. As shown in Table 2 , the top 5% of households accounted for 22.3% of all income in 2012. Major sources of difference in CBO's estimate of household income are the inclusion of capital gains and the value of noncash benefits (such as food stamps, Medicare and Medicaid, and employer-paid health insurance premiums). The Middle Class
Although Congress often considers legislation specifically in the name of the middle class, there is no official government definition of the group, and it is not the aim of this report to develop one. What constitutes the middle class is subjective and comparative, meaning different things to different people. The term may refer to a group of people with a common point of view or similar incomes. A narrow view of the middle class might include only those in the middle (third) quintile, that is, those households with money income between $39,736 and $64,553 in 2012 (see Table 2 ). A still broader definition of middle class can be constructed by adding that part of the top quintile up to the point at which the top 5% of households begins. A few surveys asked people to indicate their social class. The surveys' results further suggest that the middle class extends into the top (fifth) quintile of the income distribution (households with income of $104,087 or more)—perhaps including households with income somewhat over $200,000. Relative Income
The satisfaction (utility) that households derive from their income appears to be associated with both their absolute level of income and how that income level compares with the incomes of others. In other words, whatever else they may have in common, those who may constitute the middle class seemingly have similar sentiments with regard to their economic situation. Specifically, having incomes far above those at the lower end of the income distribution generally correlates with satisfaction to members of the middle class, but when those at the upper end of the distribution fare much better than they do, the level of middle-class satisfaction is generally lessened. | Although not itself a subject of legislation, the shape of the income distribution enters Congress's decision-making process concerning such policy issues as taxes, means-tested benefits, and social insurance programs. Congress also considers legislation specifically in the name of those in the middle class, which is variously defined as some income level or income range within the distribution of U.S. households with income. After briefly analyzing the distribution of household money income in 2012, this report attempts to put the term middle class into greater perspective.
The first key point of the report is that, although there are a variety of ways to describe the income distribution, all show that income is concentrated among high-income households. Of the 122.459 million U.S. households with income in 2012, 2.3% had incomes of at least $250,000. (The Census Bureau does not disaggregate income within the $250,000-or-more income class.) In addition, a large share of total money income accrues to those at the upper end of the distribution. In 2012, the top 5% of U.S. households with income accounted for 22.3% of total income, and the top 20% of households (which includes the top 5%) had 51.0% of all money income. A broader definition of household income, incorporating capital gains and the value of noncash benefits (e.g., food stamps, Medicare and Medicaid, and employer-paid health insurance) and subtracting estimates of federal taxes, tends to make the income distribution slightly more equal.
The second major point is that there is no official government definition of who belongs to the middle class, and the term means different things to different people. The middle class may refer to a group with a common point of view or to those having similar incomes, for example.
Third, absolute income appears to partly determine who belongs to the middle class. Combining money income data from the latest Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS) with results from surveys that asked people to identify their social class indicates that the middle class may refer to households with income levels in 2012 that ranged from $39,736 (the bottom of the middle quintile, or 20%, of households) and extended into the top quintile (households with incomes of $104,087 or more)—perhaps including households with incomes somewhat over $200,000.
Last, relative income may also be a defining characteristic of the middle class. In other words, the middle class appears to identify itself relative to the income of a reference group (e.g., neighbors or coworkers). According to studies of self-reported well-being, those who constitute the middle class seemingly are of like minds with regard to their economic situation. Specifically, having incomes far above those at the lower end of the income distribution generally correlates with satisfaction to members of the middle class, but when those at the upper end of the distribution fare much better than they do, the level of middle-class satisfaction is generally lessened. |
crs_RL34490 | crs_RL34490_0 | Most Recent Developments
The FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-8 , was enacted on March 11, 2009. The act provides $4.40 billion for the legislative branch, a 10.88% increase over the $3.97 billion provided for FY2008. The Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 110-329 ) continued funding until March 6, 2009. P.L. 111-6 extended this funding through March 11, 2009. The Subcommittees on the Legislative Branch of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees held hearings during which Members considered the legislative branch requests. Status of FY2009 Appropriations
Action on the FY2009 Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill
Submission of FY2009 Budget Request on February 4, 2008
The FY2009 U.S. Budget contained a request for $4.7 billion in new budget authority for legislative branch activities, an increase of approximately 18% from FY2008 levels. Senate and House Hearings on FY2009 Budget
The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Legislative Branch held budget hearings on February 13, 2008, for the Architect of Capitol; on March 5 for the Library of Congress; on March 6 for the Government Printing Office; on March 12 for the Office of Compliance, Congressional Budget Office, and Open World Leadership Center; on March 13 for the House of Representatives; on April 9 for the U.S. Capitol Police; and on April 10 for the Government Accountability Office. House Appropriations Subcommittee Markup
The House subcommittee held a markup on June 23, 2008. The subcommittee proposal contained $3.4 billion, not including Senate items. For FY2009, the CAO requested $2 million for the Green the Capitol Initiative. The subcommittee also asked for an update on the use of the funds the USCP received in FY2007 emergency appropriations to purchase new radios that will be interoperable. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
An additional $25 million was provided for the Government Accountability Office in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The House Appropriations Committee, in its report on the FY2008 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill ( H.R. During the House hearing on the FY2009 bill, Tamara Chrisler, the Executive Director of the Office of Compliance, was asked for an update on asbestos abatement in the Capitol Power Plant tunnels and the settlement agreement between the Architect of the Capitol and the Office of Compliance. | The FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-8, was enacted on March 11, 2009. Division G of the act provides $4.4 billion for legislative branch activities. This represents an approximate 11% increase over the nearly $4 billion approved by Congress for FY2008. Legislative branch entities had requested nearly $4.7 billion for FY2009, or an increase of 18%.
An additional $25 million was provided for the Government Accountability Office in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5).
On September 30, 2008, the President signed the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574). Division A, the FY2009 Continuing Appropriations Resolution, extended funding for nine FY2009 regular appropriations bills, including the legislative branch, from October 1, 2008, through March 6, 2009. P.L. 111-6 continued funding through March 11, 2009.
The House Appropriations Legislative Branch Subcommittee previously held a markup of the FY2009 bill on June 23, 2008, and ordered it reported to the full committee. The subcommittee bill provided $3.4 billion for the legislative branch (excluding Senate items). Neither the full House Appropriations Committee nor the Senate Appropriations Committee held a markup on the bill.
Among issues that were considered during hearings on the FY2009 budget in the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, Subcommittees on Legislative Branch, are the following:
completion of the Capitol Visitor Center and funding for initial activities; the designation of appropriate locations for tour buses to drop off and pick up visitors given security concerns around the Capitol Complex; the Architect's request for $127 million to repair the Capitol Power Plant utility tunnels in accordance with the settlement agreed to with the Office of Compliance; funds for the Digital Talking Book program within the Library of Congress; the use of funds the U.S. Capitol Police received in the FY2007 emergency appropriations act to purchase new interoperable radios; funds requested to support the "Greening of the Capitol" initiative and the use of alternative fuels; and the future of the Open World Leadership Program, including the location of the program within the government and the selection of participant countries.
This report will be updated to reflect major congressional action. |
crs_R43179 | crs_R43179_0 | The VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through the nation's largest integrated health care system. In general, eligibility for VA health care is based on previous military service, presence of service-connected disabilities, and/or other factors. The rest of this report focuses on appropriations for VHA. For FY2014, the Administration requested approximately $147.9 billion. 113-90 ) that was passed by the House of Representatives June 4, 2013, and the Senate Appropriations Committee reported version of H.R. Furthermore, as required by the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-81 ), the President's budget requested $54.5 billion in advance appropriations for the three medical care accounts (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) for FY2014. Congressional Action
Congress did not enact a regular Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations bill for FY2013 (MILCON-VA Appropriations bill) prior to the beginning of FY2013, and funded most of the VA (excluding the three medical care accounts: medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) through a six-month government-wide continuing resolution ( P.L. 113-6 contained funding for the VA. P.L. 113-6 provided $133.9 billion in budget authority for the VA as a whole (excluding the Hurricane Sandy Funding Needs supplemental funding provided in P.L. Subsequent to the enactment of P.L. FY2014 VHA Budget
President's Request
The President submitted his FY2014 budget request to Congress on April 10, 2013. The FY2014 President's Budget is requesting $147.9 billion for the VA as a whole (see Table 7 ). In total, the President is requesting $55.2 billion for VHA for FY2014. This includes $43.7 billion for the medical services account, $6.0 billion for the medical support and compliance account, $4.9 billion for the medical facilities account, and nearly $586 million for the medical and prosthetic research account (see Table 8 ). 111-81 ), the President's budget is requesting $55.6 billion in advance appropriations for the three medical care appropriations (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) for FY2015 (see Table 8 ). House Action
On May 15, 2013, the House Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Subcommittee approved its version of a Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations bill for FY2014 (MILCON-VA Appropriations bill). The full House Appropriations Committee voted to report the measure on May 21, 2013, and the House passed H.R. 113-90 ) proposes a total of $147.6 billion for the VA (see Table 7 ). H.R. 2216 ( H.Rept. H.R. 2216 proposes $55.6 billion in advance FY2015 funding for the medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts—the same level included in the House-passed Budget Resolution, and the President's request (see Table 8 ). Senate Appropriations Committee Action
On June 18, 2013, the Senate Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Subcommittee approved its version of the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill. The full Senate Appropriations Committee marked up the bill and voted to report the measure on June 20, 2013. The MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2014 ( H.R. 2216 ; S.Rept. 113-48 ) proposes a total of $147.9 billion for the VA for FY2014. 2216 ; S.Rept. On January 17, 2014, the President signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. 113-76 ). 111-81), the MILCON-VA Appropriations Act, 2014, provides advance appropriations of $55.6 billion for FY2015 for three VHA accounts (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities). | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions to hospital and medical care. The VA provides these benefits through three major operating units: the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA). This report focuses on funding for the VHA. The VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through the nation's largest integrated health care system. Eligibility for VA health care is based primarily on previous military service, disability, and income.
The President's FY2014 budget request was submitted to Congress on April 10, 2013. The President's budget requested $147.9 billion in budget authority for the VA as a whole. For FY2014, the Administration requested $55.2 billion for VHA. This included $43.7 billion for the medical services account, $6.0 billion for the medical support and compliance account, $4.9 billion for the medical facilities account, and nearly $586 million for the medical and prosthetic research account. Furthermore, as required by the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-81), the President's budget requested $55.6 billion in advance appropriations for the three medical care accounts (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) for FY2015.
On May 15, 2013, the House Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Subcommittee approved its version of a Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations bill for FY2014 (MILCON-VA Appropriations bill). The full House Appropriations Committee voted to report the measure on May 21, 2013, and the House passed H.R. 2216 on June 4, 2013. The MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2014 (H.R. 2216; H.Rept. 113-90) proposed a total of $147.6 billion for the VA as whole. For FY2014, H.R. 2216 proposed $54.9 billion for VHA. H.R. 2216 also included $55.6 billion in advance FY2015 funding for the medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts—the same level included in the House-passed FY2014 Budget Resolution, and the President's request. On June 18, 2013, the Senate Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Subcommittee approved its version of the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill. The full Senate Appropriations Committee voted to report the measure (H.R. 2216; S.Rept. 113-48) on June 20. H.R. 2216 (S.Rept. 113-48) proposed appropriations totaling $147.9 billion for FY2014 for the functions of the VA as a whole and $55.2 billion for VHA. Similar to the House version, the Senate committee-approved version included $55.6 billion in advance FY2015 funding for the medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts.
Neither a MILCON-VA Appropriations bill, nor a continuing appropriations resolution (CR), including FY2014 funding for most of the VA (excluding the three medical care accounts: medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities), was enacted prior to the beginning of FY2014. A funding gap resulted in a partial government shutdown. The funding gap was terminated by the enactment of a CR (P.L. 113-46) on October 17, 2013. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), was enacted on January 17, 2014, providing appropriations totaling $147.9 billion for FY2014 for the functions of the VA as a whole and $55.1 billion for VHA. P.L. 113-76 includes $55.6 billion in advance FY2015 funding for the medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts. |
crs_RS22686 | crs_RS22686_0 | In June 2007, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. , a case that involved questions about the timeliness of claims filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. By a 5-4 vote margin, the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that each paycheck she received reflected a lower salary due to past discrimination and therefore constituted a new violation of the statute. Individuals who want to challenge an employment practice as unlawful are required to file a charge with the EEOC within a specified period—either 180 days or 300 days, depending on the state—"after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." As a result, the fact that Ledbetter may have been suffering from the continuing effects of past discrimination was not sufficient for her to establish a claim within the statutorily mandated filing period. First, employees might have had a more difficult time bringing pay discrimination claims under Title VII. As passed by Congress and signed into law by President Obama on January 29, 2009, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 ( H.R. 11 / S. 181 ) clarifies that the time limit for suing employers for pay discrimination begins each time they issue a paycheck and is not limited to the original discriminatory action. | This report discusses Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., a case in which the Supreme Court considered the timeliness of a sex discrimination claim filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In Ledbetter, the female plaintiff alleged that past sex discrimination had resulted in lower pay increases and that these past pay decisions continued to affect the amount of her pay throughout her employment, resulting in a significant pay disparity between her and her male colleagues by the end of her nearly 20-year career. Under Title VII, a plaintiff is required to file suit within 180 days after an alleged unlawful employment practice has occurred. Although the plaintiff in Ledbetter argued that each paycheck she received constituted a new violation of the statute and therefore reset the clock with regard to filing a claim, the Court rejected this argument, reasoning that even if employees suffer continuing effects from past discrimination, their claims are time barred unless filed within the specified number of days of the original discriminatory act. On January 29, 2009, President Obama signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (H.R. 11/S. 181). This legislation supersedes the Ledbetter decision by amending Title VII to clarify that the time limit for suing employers for pay discrimination begins each time they issue a paycheck. |
crs_RL31932 | crs_RL31932_0 | The 113 th Congress may also address two of the largest regional trade agreements proposed to date and the issue of trade promotion authority (TPA), which expired on July 1, 2007. The Obama Administration has initiated trade agreements with a broad collection of countries through the Trans-Pacific Partnership and with the Europe through the EU-U.S. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Economists and others have developed economic models that utilize advanced techniques to assess the economic impact of trade agreements on the economy as a whole and on specific sectors within the economy. To help Congress evaluate the potential economic effects, this report examines a sampling of these studies and offers an assessment of the estimates they have generated. Negotiations to reduce barriers to trade in services, however, potentially could have a very large and positive effect on the U.S. economy, since the United States is highly competitive in a number of services sectors and U.S. direct investment abroad often spurs exports. However, this lack of precision may be an issue when the models are used to estimate the effects of bilateral trade agreements where the overall amount of trade and, therefore, the impact of the agreement, is expected to be less than that of a comprehensive multilateral agreement. These effects of trade agreements often are overlooked in estimating the impact of trade agreements due to the complexity involved. In addition, changes in exchange rates and in the business cycle can affect the overall state of the economy in ways that can outweigh the effects of trade agreements, given the already highly open state of the U.S. economy. Without better data on the extent and nature of barriers to trade in the services sectors, it will continue to be difficult to develop monetary estimates of the costs of those barriers and, therefore, estimates of the economic benefits that could accrue as a result of market liberalization. Econometric modeling, aided by recent advances, can assist policymakers in analyzing the economic effects of trade agreements. These models are particularly helpful in exploring the effects of trade liberalization in such sectors as agriculture and manufacturing where the barriers to trade are identifiable and subject to some quantifiable estimates. Barriers to trade in the services sector, however, are proving to be more difficult to identify and, therefore, to quantify in an econometric model. This is especially helpful in identifying which sectors likely will experience the greatest adjustment costs. Such modeling is highly sensitive to the assumptions that are used to establish the parameters of the model and are hampered by a serious lack of comprehensive data in the services sector. | The United States is considering a number of trade agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement (TPP) and the U.S.-European Union Trade and Investment Partnership. The Congress also may address the issue of trade promotion authority (TPA), which expired on July 1, 2007. In contrast with trade agreements with smaller economies, these two recently proposed agreements could have a significant impact on some aspects of U.S. trade and investment activities that could affect numerous U.S. workers and businesses. During this process, Congress likely will be presented with an array of data estimating the impact of trade agreements on the economy, or on a particular segment of the economy.
Sophisticated models of the economy that are capable of simulating changes in economic conditions often are used to assist Congress in assessing the value and the impact of trade agreements. These models are particularly helpful in estimating the effects of trade liberalization in such sectors as agriculture and manufacturing where the barriers to trade are identifiable and subject to some quantifiable estimation. Barriers to trade in services and investment, however, are proving to be more difficult to identify and, therefore, to quantify in an economic model. All economic models incorporate various assumptions that are necessary in order for the models to generate results. Invariably, these assumptions determine to some extent the results that are generated and limit their usefulness. In addition, the models are highly sensitive to the assumptions that are used to establish the parameters of the model and they are hampered by a serious lack of comprehensive data in the services sector. Nevertheless, the models often provide basic insights into the magnitude of the economic effects that may occur across economic sectors as a result of trade liberalization. These insights are especially helpful in identifying those sectors that are expected to experience the greatest disruptions and adjustment costs and, therefore, where opposition to trade agreements is likely to occur.
This report examines the major features of economic models being used to estimate the effects of trade agreements. It assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the models as an aid in helping Congress evaluate the economic impact of trade agreements on the U.S. economy. In addition, this report identifies and assesses some of the assumptions used in the economic models and how these assumptions affect the data generated by the models. Finally, this report evaluates the implications for Congress of various options it may consider as it assesses trade agreements. |
crs_RL32487 | crs_RL32487_0 | Introduction
Trends in U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America generally reflect the trends and rationalesfor U.S. foreign aid programs globally. U.S.assistance has not reached levels attained during the Alliance for Progress. Some countries are benefitting from two newPresidential foreign aid initiatives. In Congress, the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations bills have been the vehicles by which Congress provides funding for, and exercises oversight of foreign assistance programs. ForFY2006, Congress provided $20.9 billion out of the President's $22.8 billion international affairsrequest in the FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-102 ). Assistance by Subregion
For FY2006, U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean is estimated at about $1.68billion, including Peace Corps and P.L. 480 food aid. The largest portion,$919 million, is allocated to the Andean countries of Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, andVenezuela, and represents 55% of regional assistance. Another $292 million, or 17%, is allocatedto Mexico and Central America, while the Caribbean would receive $307 million, or 18%. Braziland the Southern Cone of South America would receive an estimated $36 million, or 2%. TheUnited States also maintains aid programs of a regional nature, such as trade capacity building, andmigration and refugee assistance, that total an estimated $133 million, or 8%, in FY2006. The Andean Region. DA - Development Assistance
CSH - Child Survival and Health
ESF - Economic Support Funds
PL 480 - emergency food aid
IMET - International Military Education and Training
ACI - Andean Counterdrug Initiative
FMF - Foreign Military Financing
For FY2007, the Administration proposes spending a total of $721.5 million, with Colombiareceiving the same amount as in the previous year and neighboring countries receiving cuts. U.S. programs focus on economic growth, reproductive health, the environment, anddemocracy. Since FY2000, U.S. aid to the Caribbean region (including FY2006 aid estimates) hasamounted to almost $1.6 billion, because of increased HIV/AIDS assistance to the region (especiallyto Guyana and Haiti), disaster and reconstruction assistance in the aftermath of several hurricanesand tropical storms in 2004, and increased support for the interim government in Haiti followingthe departure of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide from power. ESF will also continue to supportUSAID-administered programs with democracy and human rights groups. Othersargue that programs are often ill-designed in relation to their goals. Because of the inclusion of Guyana and Haiti as focuscountries in the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), funded through the GlobalHIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI) account, U.S. assistance to the Caribbean and Central America forHIV/AIDS increased to $47 million in FY2004, $82.5 million in FY2005, and an estimated $92.7million in FY2006. CSH funds focus oncombating infectious disease and promoting child and maternal health, family planning, andreproductive health. Development Assistance. There are justice sector modernizationprograms underway in 12 countries in the region, as well as 15 anti-corruption programs throughoutLatin America. Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). FMF provides grantsto foreign nations to purchase U.S. defense equipment, services, and training. Theprogram also seeks to improve foreign military capabilities of countries that control land approachesto the United States and the Caribbean, which is referred to as the "third border." | Trends in U.S. assistance to the Latin America and Caribbean region generally reflect thetrends and rationales for U.S. foreign aid programs globally. Aid to the region increased during the1960s with the Alliance for Progress and during the 1980s with aid to Central America. Since 2000,aid levels have increased, especially in the Andean region as the focus has shifted from Cold Warissues to counternarcotics and security assistance. Current aid levels to Latin America and theCaribbean comprise about 11.8% of the worldwide FY2006 bilateral aid budget. Amounts requestedfor FY2007 would reduce this ratio to 10.6%. Two countries -- Honduras and Nicaragua -- havesigned compacts for Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) funds. Aid levels to the region couldincrease further as more countries become eligible for MCA. Both Haiti and Guyana are focuscountries for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).
For FY2006, U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean is estimated at $1.68billion, the largest portion of which is allocated to the Andean region -- $919 million. Mexico andCentral America are slated to receive $292 million, while the Caribbean would receive $307 million.Brazil and the Southern Cone of South America are to receive an estimated $36 million. The UnitedStates also maintains programs of a regional nature that total an estimated $133 million in FY2006.
Aid programs are designed to achieve a variety of goals, from poverty reduction to economicgrowth. Child Survival and Health (CSH) funds focus on combating infectious diseases andpromoting child and maternal health. Development Assistance (DA) promotes sustainable economicgrowth in key areas such as trade, agriculture, education, the environment, and democracy. TheEconomic Support Fund (ESF) assists countries of strategic importance to the United States, andfunds programs relating to justice sector reforms, local governance, anti-corruption, and respect forhuman rights. P.L. 480 food assistance is provided to countries facing emergency situations, suchas natural disasters. Counternarcotics programs seek to assist countries to reduce drug production,interdict trafficking, and promote alternative crop development. Foreign Military Financing (FMF)provides grants to nations for the purchase of U.S. defense equipment, services and training.
The annual Foreign Operations Appropriations bills are the vehicles by which Congressprovides funding for foreign assistance programs. The FY2006 Foreign Operations AppropriationsAct ( P.L. 109-102 ) provided $20.9 billion for the foreign assistance budget worldwide. In the secondsession of the 109th Congress, Members of Congress will likely continue to be interested in a numberof related issues, including the general effectiveness of foreign aid programs, and how best to addressthe HIV/AIDS problem and poverty issues. Congress may also debate the U.S. role in fightingnarcotics trafficking and illegally armed groups in Colombia and stabilizing the situation in Haiti. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33990 | crs_RL33990_0 | 111-88 ) to insulate other agency programs from high wildfire suppression costs. Total wildfire funding for FY2008 was a record high of $4.46 billion. A second category addresses protection of non-federal lands through programs to assist state and local governments and communities; these programs can be used by the state and local governments to reduce wildland fuels, to otherwise prepare for fire control, to contain and control wildfires, and to respond after severe wildfires have burned. A third category of federal programs supports fire research, fire facilities, and improvements in forest health. The last section of this report discusses issues associated with the high wildfire costs, including pending legislation. In addition to the concerns about fuel loads, concerns were voiced that, in a fire in Washington in 1994, federal firefighting resources had been diverted from protecting federal lands and resources to protecting nearby private residences and communities. Concerns about wildfire threats persist. The tables below present data on funding for the three categories of federal fire programs—protection of federal lands ( Table 1 and Table 2 ); assistance for protection of non-federal lands ( Table 3 and Table 4 ); and other fire-related expenditures (also Table 3 and Table 4 ). Federal Lands
Many wildfire management funds are used to protect federal lands. The tables show that total federal land fire management appropriations rose substantially in FY2001 and have since remained relatively high, with fluctuations generally depending on the severity of the fire season in the preceding calendar year. Preparedness
Fire preparedness appropriations provide funding for fire prevention and detection as well as for equipment, training, and baseline personnel. Suppression and Emergency Funds
Funds for fighting wildfires—appropriations for fire suppression and supplemental, contingency, or emergency funds—have fluctuated widely over the past decade, from less than $430 million in FY1999 to $2.41 billion in FY2008. Except for a fivefold increase for FY2001 and a doubling in FY2008, DOI site rehabilitation funds generally have ranged between $20 and $25 million annually since FY2000. Wildfire funds have also been provided for economic assistance. Fire Funding Issues
Four issues related to wildfire funding have arisen in the last few years. The one receiving the most congressional attention is the high cost of wildfire management and its effect on other aspects of federal land management. Another issue is the level of fire protection funding to reduce fuel loads on federal lands. Furthermore, wildfire suppression expenditures have exceeded agency appropriations annually for more than a decade. One, the Federal Land Assistance, Management and Enhancement (FLAME) Act, was enacted in Title V of P.L. Fuel Reduction Efforts
Fuel reduction efforts, as discussed above, are commonly proposed as a means of reducing wildfire suppression costs. However, the annual fuel treatment acreage appears to have stabilized at less than 3 million acres annually, which is less than 1% of federal lands. At this average treatment level, it would take nearly 25 years to treat the FS and DOI lands at high risk of ecological damage from wildfire, and another 52 years to treat the lands at moderate risk. Federal Role in Protecting Non-Federal Lands
The states are responsible for protecting non-federal lands from wildfires, but FS cooperative fire assistance to states has been authorized since the Clarke-McNary Act of 1924. Attention to post-fire rehabilitation has increased since 2000. Legislation was introduced relating to post-fire rehabilitation in the 109 th Congress. Opponents of legislated changes to existing environmental review and public involvement processes have expressed concerns that changes could reduce review and oversight of salvage logging decisions, since salvage logging is not generally precluded as a rehabilitation activity. | The Forest Service (FS) and the Department of the Interior (DOI) are responsible for protecting most federal lands from wildfires. Wildfire appropriations nearly doubled in FY2001, following a severe fire season in the summer of 2000, and have remained at relatively high levels. Acres burned annually have also increased over the past 50 years, with the six highest annual totals occurring since 2000. Many in Congress are concerned that wildfire costs are spiraling upward without a reduction in damages. With emergency supplemental funding, FY2008 wildfire funding reached a record high of $4.46 billion.
There are three basic categories of federal programs for wildfire: federal lands protection, non-federal lands protection, and other fire-related expenditures. The vast majority (about 95%) of federal wildfire funds are spent to protect federal lands—for fire preparedness (equipment, baseline personnel, and training); fire suppression operations (including emergency funding); post-fire rehabilitation (to help sites recover after the wildfire); and fuel reduction (to reduce wildfire damages by reducing fuel levels). Since FY2001, FS fire appropriations have included funds for state fire assistance, volunteer fire assistance, and forest health management, as well as for community assistance, fire research, and fire facilities.
Four issues have dominated wildfire funding debates. One is the high cost of fire management and its effects on other agency programs. Several studies have recommended actions to try to control wildfire costs, and the agencies have taken various steps, but it is unclear whether these actions will be sufficient. Wildfire suppression expenditures have exceeded agency appropriations annually for more than a decade. Borrowing to pay high wildfire suppression costs has affected other agency programs. The Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement (FLAME) Act of 2009 was enacted in P.L. 111-88 to insulate other agency programs from high wildfire suppression costs by creating a separate funding structure for emergency supplemental wildfire suppression efforts.
Another issue is funding for fuel reduction. Funding and acres treated rose (roughly doubling) between FY2000 and FY2003, and have stabilized since. Currently about 3 million acres, less than 1% of federal lands, are treated annually. However, 75 million acres of federal land are at high risk, and another 156 million acres are at moderate risk, of ecological damage from catastrophic wildfire. Since many ecosystems need to be treated on a 10-35 year cycle (depending on the ecosystem), current treatment rates are insufficient to address the problem. A third issue is the federal role in protecting non-federal lands, communities, and private structures. In 1994, federal firefighting resources were apparently used to protect private residences at a cost to federal lands and resources in one severe fire. A federal policy review recommended increased state and local efforts to match their responsibilities, but federal programs to protect non-federal lands have also expanded, reducing incentives for local participation in fire protection.
Finally, post-fire rehabilitation is raising concerns. Agency regulations and legislation in the 109th Congress focused on expediting such activities, but opponents expressed concerns that this would restrict environmental review of and public involvement in salvage logging decisions, leading to greater environmental damage. Legislation was introduced but not enacted in the 110th Congress to provide alternative means of addressing post-fire restoration in particular areas. The large wildfires to date in 2011 have reignited concerns about post-fire rehabilitation. Except for appropriations, legislative action regarding this issue since the 110th Congress has been minimal. |
crs_R45390 | crs_R45390_0 | On June 6, 2018, President Donald Trump signed into law the John S. McCain III, Daniel K. Akaka, and Samuel R. Johnson VA Maintaining Internal Systems and Strengthening Integrated Outside Networks Act of 2018, or the VA MISSION Act of 2018 ( S. 2372 ; P.L. 115-251 ), enacted on September 29, 2018, made some changes and technical amendments to the VA MISSION Act. 115-182 ; H.Rept. In addition, Section 802 of VACAA established the Veterans Choice Fund (VCF) and provided $10 billion in mandatory appropriations. The Department of Veterans Affairs Expiring Authorities Act of 2018 ( S. 3479 ; P.L. 115-251 ) made amendments and technical corrections to the VA MISSION Act. It also expands eligibility for veterans to access walk-in care from private community providers. Lastly, Title I liberalizes eligibility for the Program of Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers to pre-9/11 veterans under two phases. Under the first phase, veterans with serious service-connected injuries incurred on or before May 7, 1975, will qualify for benefits over a two-year period beginning on the date when the VA certifies to Congress that it has fully implemented the information technology system required for this program. Under the second phase, those with serious service-connected injuries incurred between May 7, 1975, and September 11, 2001, will qualify for the Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers program two years after the implementation of the first phase. §1703) and establishes a new Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP) to provide hospital care, medical services, and extended care services to eligible veterans through specified non-VA health care providers. Conditions under which care is required to be provided by the VA through VCCP:
An eligible veteran can elect to receive care if he or she meets one of the five major conditions:
1. the VA does not offer the care or services the veteran requires; or 2. the VA does not operate a full-service VA medical facility in the state the veteran resides; or 3. the veteran was eligible for care under the 40-mile distance eligibility criteria under the previous Veterans Choice Program (VCP) on the day before the date of enactment of the Caring for Our Veterans Act of 2018 (i.e., the veteran was eligible on June 5, 2018); and continues to reside in the same location that qualifies the veteran under the 40-mile distance eligibility criteria; and
(a) resides in one of the five states with the lowest population density based on data from the 2010 decennial census or
(b) resides in a state other than the five states with the lowest population density and
received care or services through the VA within one year before the enactment of the Caring for Our Veterans Act of 2018 (i.e., June 6, 2018) and is seeking care or services within two years of the date of the enactment of the Caring for Our Veterans Act of 2018 (i.e., June 6, 2018); or 1. the VA is unable to provide care or services that is requested by the veteran in a manner that meets designated access standards for care or services as developed by the Secretary; or 2. the veteran's referring clinician agrees, after consultations with the eligible veteran, that care and services through VCCP would be in the best medical interest of the veteran based on criteria established by the Secretary (see text box below). §1745 to authorize the VA to enter into VCAs with State Veterans Homes. Prior to this, the Secretary is required to provide the first update no later than 120 days after enactment. Subtitle A: Asset and Infrastructure Review
This title establishes a process for realigning and modernizing facilities of the VHA. Under this process, the VA will develop criteria for selecting VHA facilities to dispose of, modernize, or acquire, so as to better meet the health care needs of veterans. The VA must then create a list of recommendations based on those criteria and submit it to a newly created Asset Infrastructure Review Commission (the Commission). This nine-member commission reviews the VA's recommendations but may not alter them, unless it determines that one or more recommendations are inconsistent with the criteria. The Commission submits the list of recommendations to the President, who either approves the list in its entirety or sends it back to the Commission with the reasons for disapproval. The President may approve or disapprove of the revised list. If the President approves of the original or revised list, then VA must begin implementation of the recommendations within three years, unless Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval, in which case the process terminates. Appointment
This section establishes a nine-member Asset and Infrastructure Review Commission. Designated Scholarships for Physicians and Dentists Under the VA Health Professional Scholarship Program
This section amends 38 U.S.C. Increase in Maximum Amount of Debt That May Be Reduced Under Education Debt Reduction Program (EDRP) of the VA
This section amends 38 U.S.C. §§7691-7697, which authorize the Secretary to create, as part of the VA's Educational Assistance Program, a new program called the "Department of Veterans Affairs Specialty Education Loan Repayment Program." The purpose of the new program is to assist—via an incentive program—in recruiting physicians who are practicing in certain hard-to-recruit medical specialties to work at the VHA. Veterans Healing Veterans Medical Access and Scholarship Program
The section requires the Secretary to establish a pilot program that provides funding for 18 eligible veterans who are enrolled in medical school, with two veterans enrolled at each eligible medical school. Lastly, it authorizes and appropriates $5.2 billion for VCF to continue VCP. | On June 6, 2018, the John S. McCain III, Daniel K. Akaka, and Samuel R. Johnson VA Maintaining Internal Systems and Strengthening Integrated Outside Networks Act of 2018, or the VA MISSION Act of 2018 (S. 2372; P.L. 115-182; H.Rept. 115-671), was signed into law. The Department of Veterans Affairs Expiring Authorities Act of 2018 (S. 3479; P.L. 115-251), enacted on September 29, 2018, made some changes and technical amendments to the VA MISSION Act. This act, as amended, broadly addresses four major areas.
First, it establishes a new permanent Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP), replacing the current Veterans Choice Program (VCP). The VA MISSION Act stipulates that the new program must be operational when regulations are published by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) no later than one year after the date of enactment (June 6, 2018), or when the VA determines that 75% of the amounts deposited in the Veterans Choice Fund (VCF) have been exhausted.
Second, it expands the current Program of Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers, in two phases, to all eligible veterans who served prior to September 11, 2001.
Third, it establishes an asset and infrastructure review process by establishing an Asset and Infrastructure Review Commission. The purpose of the commission is to examine the VA's assets and to make recommendations for modernizing and realigning medical facilities.
Fourth, it provides various statutory authorities to the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) of the VA to recruit and retain health care providers.
Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP)
The VA MISSION Act establishes a new permanent discretionary community care program known as VCCP. The act provides conditions under which the VA is required to provide care in the community once the program is established. Generally, all veterans enrolled in the VA health care system would be able to qualify when (1) the VA does not offer the care or service required by the veteran; or (2) the veteran resides in a state without a full-service VA medical facility; or (3) the veteran previously qualified under the 40-mile criterion of the VCP; or (4) the VA cannot provide the veteran with care and services that comply with designated access and quality standards; or (5) the veteran and the veteran's primary care provider agree that it is in the best interest of the veteran to receive care in the community. In addition, the VA is required to enter into contracts to build a network of private community providers.
Expansion of Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers
The VA MISSION Act expands the Program of Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers to pre-9/11 veterans in two phases. Under the first phase, veterans with serious service-connected injuries incurred on or before May 7, 1975, would qualify for benefits over a two-year period beginning on the date when the VA certifies to Congress that it has fully implemented the information technology system required for this program. Under the second phase, those with serious service-connected injuries incurred between May 7, 1975, and September 11, 2001, would qualify for the Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers program two years after implementation of the first phase.
Capital Asset Review
The VA MISSION Act establishes a process for realigning and modernizing facilities of the VHA. Under this process, the VA will develop criteria for selecting VHA facilities to dispose of, modernize, or acquire, so as to better meet the health care needs of veterans. VA must then create a list of recommendations based on those criteria and submit it to a newly created Asset Infrastructure Review (AIR) Commission. The AIR Commission shall review the VA's recommendations but may not alter them, unless it determines that one or more recommendations are inconsistent with the criteria. The commission shall submit the list of recommendations to the President, who shall either approve the list in its entirety or send it back to the AIR Commission. The AIR Commission may change the recommendations and resubmit a revised list to the President for reconsideration. The President may approve or disapprove of the revised list. If the President approves of the original or revised list, then VA must begin implementation of the recommendations within three years, unless Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval, in which case the asset review process terminates.
Recruiting and Retaining Health Care Providers in the VHA
The VA MISSION Act authorizes or expands several programs, with the intention of recruiting and retaining health care providers in the VHA. Among other things, the act
increases the maximum amount of student loan debt that may be reduced under VA's Education Debt Reduction Program (EDRP); authorizes designated scholarships for physicians and dentists under the VA Health Professional Scholarship Program (HPSP); establishes the VA specialty education loan repayment program to incentivize VHA employees to pursue education and training in medical specialties for which VA determines there is a shortage; establishes a pilot Veterans Healing Veterans Medical Access and Scholarship Program; and extends eligibility for VA's EDRP to clinical staff working at Vet Centers.
The act also requires the VHA to establish a program to deploy mobile health teams to serve in underserved VA medical facilities.
Lastly, the VA MISSION Act authorizes and appropriates $5.2 billion in mandatory funding for the VCP until the VCCP is operational. |
crs_RL30812 | crs_RL30812_0 | This report provides a brief overview of federal statutes and where to find them, in print format and on the Internet. When Congress passes a law, it may amend or repeal earlier enactments or it may create new law. Newly enacted laws are published chronologically, first as separate statutes in "slip law" form and later cumulatively in the bound volumes of the Statutes at Large . Additionally, most statutes are also incorporated into the United States Code ( U.S.C. and its commercial counterparts, United States Code Service ( U.S.C.S.) , take the federal statutes that are of a general and permanent nature and arrange them by subject into 51 separate titles. As the statutes that underlie the Code are revised, superseded, or repealed, the provisions of the Code are updated to reflect these changes. compiles and publishes public laws chronologically in their slip law version. The United States Statutes At Large
Slip laws (both public laws and private laws) are accumulated, corrected, and published at the end of each session of Congress in a series of bound volumes entitled Statutes at Large . If the title is asterisked, the Code provides the authoritative version of the public law, as amended. Should there be a discrepancy, a court will accept the language in the Statutes at Large as the authoritative source and not the Code . In addition, the amended versions of some major public laws can be found on the Internet. United States Code
The United States Code (U.S.C.) is the official government codification of federal legislation. This reference also provides the public law number and the citations to the Statutes at Large , U.S.C ., and their amendments. Finding Federal Statutes on the Internet
Legal resources, including federal statutes, are widely available to both scholars and the general public through the Internet. | This report provides a brief overview of federal statutes and where to find them, both in print and on the Internet. When Congress passes a law, it may amend or repeal earlier enactments or it may create new law. Newly enacted laws are published chronologically, first as separate statutes in "slip law" form and later cumulatively in a series of volumes known as the Statutes at Large. Statutes are numbered by order of enactment either as public laws or, far less frequently, private laws, depending on their scope. Most statutes are incorporated into the United States Code. The United States Code and its commercial counterparts arrange federal statutes, that are of a general and permanent nature, by subject into titles. As the statutes that underlie the Code are revised, superseded, or repealed, the provisions of the Code are updated to reflect these changes.
Statutes and the United States Code can be found on the Internet. In addition, the slip law versions of public laws are available in official print form from the Government Printing Office. Federal Depository Libraries (e.g., university and state libraries) provide slip laws in print and/or microfiche format. The Statutes at Large series often is available at large libraries. The United States Code and its commercial counterparts are usually available at local libraries.
Many statutes (for example, the Social Security Act and the Clean Air Act) are published and updated both in the public law, as amended, version and in the United States Code. For some titles the public law, as amended, is the authoritative version of the statute and not the Code. If the title is asterisked, the Code provides the authoritative version of the public law, as amended.
After providing an overview on the basics of federal statutes, this report gives guidance on where federal statutes, in their various forms, may be located on the Internet. This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R42332 | crs_R42332_0 | Prior to the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-74 , H.R. 2055 ), on December 23, 2011, EPA and other departments and agencies funded within the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill were operating under a series of continuing resolutions sequentially extending FY2012 funding. However, on October 14, 2011, the bipartisan leadership of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies released a draft bill for FY2012 to serve as a starting point of discussions for markup. 112-74 ( H.Rept. 112-331 ) provided $8.46 billion for EPA for FY2012, not including a 0.16% across-the-board rescission. The total FY2012 appropriations for EPA was an 18.3% increase above the $7.15 billion proposed for FY2012 for EPA by the House Appropriations Committee in H.R. The enacted EPA FY2012 appropriation was $219.1 million (2.6%) less than the FY2011 enacted appropriations of $8.68 billion, and $510.0 million (5.7%) below the $8.97 billion included in the President's FY2012 budget request. These EPA regulatory actions, which were also the focus of considerable attention during deliberations on EPA's FY2011 appropriations, cut across the various environmental pollution control statutes' programs and initiatives. P.L. 112-74 included several administrative and general provisions affecting EPA actions and authorities (see " Selected Provisions Regarding EPA Actions " later in this report), but not nearly as many as the more than 25 provisions proposed in the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill, H.R. The Senate subcommittee draft did not include general provisions similar to the House committee-reported bill that would restrict or preclude EPA from using appropriated funds for implementing or proceeding with a number of regulatory actions. In response to congressional interest in several of the provisions affecting EPA program activities included in P.L. Only those provisions affecting EPA programs that are clearly identifiable by specific language or references are included in this report. 2584 as reported. Amendments that were agreed to or failed during House floor debate of H.R. The tables contained in the conference report ( H.Rept. Not including the 0.16% across-the-board rescission, the FY2012 enacted amount was generally the same as FY2011 enacted and the proposed amount for FY2012 in the Senate draft, more than the $250.0 million proposed in the House committee-reported H.R. P.L. 112-151 ) as reported by the House Appropriations Committee on July 19, 2011, and among amendments considered and submitted prior to suspension of the House floor debate on July 28, 2011. In addition to the rescission of unobligated balances and transfer of funds for the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative discussed in the previous section (" Comparison of EPA FY2012 Enacted and Proposed Appropriations ") and presented in Table 1 above, three other provisions were included in the EPA Administrative Provisions setting terms and conditions for the use of FY2012 appropriations, under Title II of Division E in P.L. 112-74 . Division E, Title IV "General Provisions" in P.L. 112-74 , included provisions specifying requirements and restrictions for the use of appropriations for certain air quality regulatory actions and greenhouse gas emission reporting requirements, and certain Clean Water Act permitting requirements associated with silvicultural activities:
Section 425 of Division E of the FY2012 appropriations law required the President to submit a comprehensive report to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees detailing all federal (including EPA) obligations and expenditures, domestic and international, for climate change programs and activities by agency for FY2011. Section 429 in P.L. Section 426 and Section 427 of P.L. 112-331 , included extensive language with regard to specific actions by EPA. For example, under the Science and Technology account in H.Rept. 112-331 (p. 1,072), the conferees required specific refinements and modifications to EPA's policies and practices for conducting assessments under the agency's Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS). 2584 . 112-74 and H.R. | Enacted December 23, 2011, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74, H.R. 2055), finalized appropriations for FY2012 for those agencies typically funded under nine of the 12 regular appropriations bills. Not including a 0.16% across-the-board rescission, Title II of Division E under P.L. 112-74 provided $8.46 billion for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for FY2012. The total was an increase above the $7.15 billion proposed by the House Appropriations Committee (H.R. 2584 as reported), but less than the $8.62 billion proposed in a draft released by the bipartisan leadership of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee and the $8.97 billion included in the President's FY2012 budget request. The EPA FY2012 appropriations were $219.1 million (2.6%) less than the FY2011 enacted appropriations of $8.68 billion. Prior to the enactment of P.L. 112-74, EPA and agencies included in the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill had been funded sequentially under a series of FY2012 continuing resolutions.
In addition to FY2012 appropriations for the various EPA programs and activities, P.L. 112-74 included directive provisions regarding certain EPA authorities and program activities, including some that restricted the use of appropriated funds for implementing or proceeding with several recent and pending EPA regulatory actions. Division E, Title IV "General Provisions" P.L. 112-74, included provisions specifying requirements and restrictions for the use of appropriations for certain air Clean Air Act regulatory actions and greenhouse gas emission reporting requirements (see sections 425, 426, 427 and 432), and certain Clean Water Act permitting requirements associated with silvicultural activities (section 429). Additionally, the Conference Report H.Rept. 112-331 included extensive language with regard to specific actions by EPA. For example, under the Science and Technology account in H.Rept. 112-331 (p. 1072), the Conferees required specific refinements and modifications to EPA's policies and practices for conducting assessments under the agency's Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS).
EPA regulatory actions received considerable attention during House and Senate oversight committee hearings, appropriations committee hearings, and House floor debate on the FY2012 appropriations during the first session of the 112th Congress. Several of the provisions included in P.L. 112-74 were the same or similar to a subset of more than 25 provisions included in H.R. 2584, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012 (H.Rept. 112-151), as reported on July 19, 2011, and additional proposed provisions regarding EPA among roughly 150 amendments considered or submitted during floor debate of H.R. 2584, which was suspended on July 28, 2011. These proposed directives cut across many of the various environmental pollution control statutes' programs and initiatives. An October 14, 2011, draft released by the bipartisan leadership of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies did not include comparable general provisions that would restrict or preclude the use of appropriations for certain EPA actions.
This report summarizes funding levels for EPA accounts and certain sub-account program activities as enacted in P.L. 112-74, and as proposed in H.R. 2584 as reported by the House Appropriations Committee, in the Senate subcommittee draft, and in the President's FY2012 request, compared to the FY2011 enacted appropriations. Selected provisions regarding EPA program activities extracted from P.L. 112-74, the conference report, and the House committee-reported bill are also presented. Only those provisions affecting EPA that are clearly identifiable by specific language or references contained in the bill are included. Amendments that were considered or pending during initial House floor debate at the end of July 2011 are not included. |
crs_RS22443 | crs_RS22443_0 | On May 15, 2006, President Bush announced that up to 6,000 National Guard troops would be sent to the southern border to support the Border Patrol. Guard units will not be involved in direct law-enforcement activities and will be under the control of the Governors. 3333 , would have authorized, under certain parameters, the use of military forces or the National Guard along the border. Indeed, direct military involvement in law enforcement activities without proper statutory authorization might run afoul of the Posse Comitatus Act. Military personnel for these operations are drawn from the active and reserve forces of the military and from the National Guard. The military indirectly supports border security and immigration control efforts under general legislation that authorizes the armed forces to support federal, state, and local LEAs. | The military generally provides support to law enforcement and immigration authorities along the southern border. Reported escalations in criminal activity and illegal immigration, however, have prompted some lawmakers to reevaluate the extent and type of military support that occurs in the border region. On May 15, 2006, President Bush announced that up to 6,000 National Guard troops would be sent to the border to support the Border Patrol. Addressing domestic laws and activities with the military, however, might run afoul of the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits use of the armed forces to perform the tasks of civilian law enforcement unless explicitly authorized. There are alternative legal authorities for deploying the National Guard, and the precise scope of permitted activities and funds may vary with the authority exercised. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL33208 | crs_RL33208_0 | Introduction
On June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court handed down Kelo v. City of New London , (1) addressing whether, under theFifth Amendment Takings Clause, the sovereign power of eminent domain ("condemnation") canbe used to transfer private property to new private owners for the purpose of economicdevelopment. 4128 hews tothe prevalent congressional approach to Kelo : imposing a condemnation-restricting condition on thegrant of federal money. 4128 and passed the House376-38 on November 3, 2005. This report also examines a bill amendment introduced by Senator Bond, like H.R. 4088 (restricting federal funds). Section 2(a) sets out the state andlocal activities that the bill prohibits --
No State or political subdivision of a State shall exerciseits power of eminent domain, or allow the exercise of such power by any person or entity to whichsuch power has been delegated, over property to be used for economic development or over propertythat is subsequently used for economic development, if that State received Federal economicdevelopment funds during any fiscal year in which it does so. (8)
Section 4: Private Right of Action. Other bill provisions areas follows. This omission raises the possibility that while aparcel was initially condemned in good faith for a non-economic-development purpose (as definedin the bill), its use many years or even decades later for economic development due to unforeseenchange in the law, policy priorities, or funding availability would trigger loss of federal funds perSection 2(b). Absence of Nexus and Proportionality Requirements. Rather, the fundscome with a condition that if a violative condemnation occurs during the same fiscal year as themoney is received, other federal monies are blocked -- namely, economic development funds for thetwo fiscal years after a court discerns the prohibited condemnation. (18) Certainly H.R.4128 presents a sharp contrast to some of the other Kelo bills in Congress, which terminateonly those funds destined for the particular project at which the offending condemnation took place. Returning the Condemned Property. Section 2(c), allowing the offending condemnor toreturn the property and thereby end the funds cut-off, does not explicitly state that the condemneehas to return the money received for the property. Thus, it seems H.R. Does the plaintiff seeking such remedy satisfy the standing to sue requirements derivedfrom Article III of the Constitution? Its full text states --
No funds in this Act may be used to support any federal,state, or local projects that seek to use the power of eminent domain, unless eminent domain isemployed only for a public use:
Provided, That for purposes of this section, public useshall not be construed to include economic development that primarily benefits privateentities:
Provided further, That any use of funds for mass transit,railroad, airport, seaport, or highway projects as well as utility projects which benefit or serve thegeneral public (including energy-related, communication-related, water-related andwastewater-related infrastructure), other structures designated for use by the general public or whichhave other common-carrier or public-utility functions that serve the general public and are subjectto regulation and oversight by the government, and projects for the removal of an immediate threatto public health and safety or brownsfield (35) as defined in the Small Business Liability Relief andBrownsfield (36) Revitalization Act (Public Law 107-118) shall be considered a public use for purposes of eminentdomain:
Provided further, That the Government AccountabilityOffice ... shall conduct a study to be submitted to the Congress within 12 months of the enactmentof this Act on the nationwide use of eminent domain, including the procedures used and the resultsaccomplished on a state-by-state basis as well as the impact on individual property owners and onthe affected communities. By its reference to "funds in this Act," the Bond Amendment limits itself to federal monies used ordisbursed by the agencies receiving appropriations under the statute, and applies only to FY2006funds. 4128 's list of exceptions from its definition of "economic development." | On June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court handed down Kelo v. City of New London , holding thatunder the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, the sovereign power of eminent domain("condemnation") can be used to transfer private property to new private owners for the purpose ofeconomic development. Kelo sparked a public outcry and a flurry of legislative proposals inCongress and the states to restrict the use of eminent domain.
The principal Kelo bill in Congress is H.R. 4128 , the "Sensenbrenner bill,"which passed the House on November 3, 2005. Its key provision prohibits states and their politicalsubdivisions (hereinafter "states") from using eminent domain to transfer private property to otherprivate parties for economic development -- or allowing their delegatees to do so. The prohibitionapplies to any fiscal year after the bill's enactment in which the state received federal economicdevelopment funds. A state that violates the prohibition is ineligible to receive federal economicdevelopment funds for two fiscal years following a judicial determination of violation -- a penaltyenforceable by private right of action.
H.R. 4128 raises several legal issues. The prohibition on economic developmentcondemnations extends not only to land taken for the explicit purpose of economic development butalso to land subsequently so used. The latter coverage raises the possibility that although a parcelwas initially condemned for a non-prohibited purpose, its use years later for a prohibited one wouldtrigger the two-year cut-off of federal funds. Nor does there seem to be any proportionalityrequirement between the prohibited condemnations and the length and scope of the federal fundssuspension. If Congress's Spending Power includes a proportionality requirement for conditions onfederal funds, as the Court suggests, the absence of proportionality in some of the bill's applicationsmay raise a constitutional issue.
Persons forced to move by a prohibited condemnation may run into a standing problemshould they attempt to use the bill's right of action to impose a funds suspension. Standing requiresthat the remedy sought in an Article III court will redress the complained-of injury. A suspensionof federal funding to the offending jurisdiction does not redress the fact that the person was madeto move, unless it can be argued that the funding cut-off makes it more likely that the jurisdictionwill elect to return the wrongfully condemned property.
The Bond Amendment, inserted into an FY2006 appropriations bill by Senator Bond, is nowenacted law. Like H.R. 4128 , it attaches a condemnation-restricting condition tofederal funds, though limited to funds appropriated under the statute. The Amendment's list ofacceptable and unacceptable condemnation purposes largely echoes existing case law construing the"public use" prerequisite for condemnation in the Constitution. |
crs_RL31269 | crs_RL31269_0 | Under the INA, a refugee is a person who is outside his or her country and who is unable or unwilling to return because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) of the Department of State (DOS) coordinates and manages the U.S. refugee program, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) makes final determinations about eligibility for admission. Refugee Admissions
By law, the annual number of refugee admissions and the allocation of these numbers by region of the world are set by the President after consultation with Congress. Refugee admissions for FY2018 totaled 22,491, about half the FY2018 ceiling of 45,000. These FY2018 admissions represented the lowest annual level of refugee arrivals in the United States since the establishment of the U.S. refugee admissions program in 1980. The refugee ceiling for FY2019 is 30,000. The FY2019 refugee ceiling is 30,000, the same as proposed in the FY2019 consultation document. East Asia's FY2019 allocation is 4,000. Europe and Central Asia have a combined FY2019 allocation of 3,000 refugee admissions. The Near East/South Asia allocation for FY2019 is 9,000. Generally, it arranges for a nongovernmental organization (NGO), an international organization, or U.S. embassy contractors to manage a Resettlement Support Center (RSC) that assists in refugee processing. Refugee processing is conducted through a system of three priorities for admission. Priority 2 covers groups of special humanitarian concern to the United States. Priority 3 covers family reunification cases. USCIS is responsible for adjudicating refugee cases. To be eligible for admission to the United States as a refugee, an individual must meet the INA definition of a refugee, not be firmly resettled in another country, be determined to be of special humanitarian concern to the United States, and be admissible to the United States. Refugee Resettlement Assistance
The HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), within the Administration for Children and Families (ACF), administers a transitional assistance program for temporarily dependent refugees, asylees, Cuban/Haitian entrants, and other specified humanitarian groups. | A refugee is a person fleeing his or her country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Typically, the annual number of refugees that can be admitted into the United States, known as the refugee ceiling, and the allocation of these numbers by region are set by the President after consultation with Congress at the start of each fiscal year.
For FY2019, the worldwide refugee ceiling is 30,000. The FY2019 regional allocations are, as follows: Africa (11,000), East Asia (4,000), Europe and Central Asia (3,000), Latin America/ Caribbean (3,000), and Near East/South Asia (9,000). This 30,000 ceiling is the lowest annual ceiling since the establishment of the U.S. refugee admissions program in 1980. Refugee admissions in FY2018 totaled 22,491, the lowest annual level of refugee arrivals in the United States in the history of the refugee admissions program.
The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) within the Department of State (DOS) coordinates and manages the U.S. refugee program. Generally, PRM arranges for a nongovernmental organization, an international organization, or U.S. embassy contractors to manage a Resettlement Support Center that assists in refugee processing.
Overseas processing of refugees is conducted through a system of three priorities for admission. Priority 1 comprises cases involving persons facing compelling security concerns. Priority 2 comprises cases involving persons from specific groups of special humanitarian concern to the United States (e.g., Iranian religious minorities). Priority 3 comprises family reunification cases involving close relatives of persons admitted as refugees or granted asylum.
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is responsible for adjudicating refugee cases. To be eligible for admission to the United States as a refugee, an individual must meet the definition of a refugee, not be firmly resettled in another country, be determined to be of special humanitarian concern to the United States, and be admissible to the United States.
The Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement (HHS/ORR) administers a transitional assistance program for temporarily dependent refugees, Cuban/Haitian entrants, and others. For FY2018, the Refugee and Entrant Assistance account was funded at $2.051 billion. |
crs_R41425 | crs_R41425_0 | Introduction
Commemorative commissions are entities established to oversee the commemoration of a person or event. These commissions typically coordinate celebrations, scholarly events, public gatherings, and other activities, often to coincide with a milestone anniversary. For example, the Christopher Columbus Quincentenary Jubilee Commission was created "to prepare a comprehensive program for commemorating the quincentennial of the voyages of discovery of Christopher Columbus, and to plan, encourage, coordinate, and conduct observances and activities commemorating the historic events associated with those voyages." This report examines commemorative commissions created by statute since the 96 th Congress (1979-1980) and focuses on the content of typical legislative language used to create commemorative commissions and how commemorative commissions are funded. This report does not address noncommemorative congressional commissions, nor does it address commemorative entities created by the President or statutory commissions tasked with designing and building monuments and memorials in Washington, DC. Commission Legislation Structure
Statutes establishing commemorative commissions generally include language that states the mandate of the commission, provides a membership and appointment structure, outlines the commission's duties and powers, and sets a termination date for the commission. A variety of options are available for each of these organizational choices, and legislators can tailor the composition, organization, and working arrangements of a commission, based on the particular goals of Congress. As a result, the organizational structure and powers of individual commissions are often unique. Funding
Commemorative commissions have been funded in two ways: through appropriations or through solicitation of nonfederal money. At times, commissions are authorized both for appropriations and to fundraise or accept donations. In addition, some commemorative commissions are not provided with explicit authorization to solicit funds or accept donations. Commissions without the statutory authority to solicit funds or accept donations are generally prohibited from engaging in those activities. | Commemorative commissions are entities established to oversee the commemoration of a person or event. These commissions typically coordinate celebrations, scholarly events, public gatherings, and other activities, often to coincide with a milestone anniversary. For example, the Christopher Columbus Quincentenary Jubilee Commission was created "to prepare a comprehensive program for commemorating the quincentennial of the voyages of discovery of Christopher Columbus, and to plan, encourage, coordinate, and conduct observances and activities commemorating the historic events associated with those voyages."
Using a dataset of all commemorative commissions created by statute since the 96th Congress (1979-1980), this report examines the content of typical legislative language used to create commemorative commissions and how commemorative commissions are funded. This report does not address noncommemorative congressional commissions, nor does it address commemorative entities created by the President or statutory commissions tasked with designing and building monuments and memorials in Washington, DC.
Statutes establishing commemorative commissions generally include language that states the mandate of the commission, provides a membership and appointment structure, outlines the commission's duties and powers, and sets a termination date for the commission. A variety of options are available for each of these organizational choices, and legislators can tailor the composition, organization, and working arrangements of a commission, based on the particular goals of Congress. As a result, the organizational structure and powers of individual commissions are often unique.
Commemorative commissions have been funded in two ways: through appropriations or through solicitation of nonfederal money. At times, commissions are authorized both for appropriations and to fundraise or accept donations. In addition, some commemorative commissions are not provided with explicit authorization to solicit funds or accept donations. Commissions without the statutory authority to solicit funds or accept donations are generally prohibited from engaging in those activities.
For general information on congressional commissions, see CRS Report R40076, Congressional Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Legislative Considerations, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_95-408 | crs_95-408_0 | Immigration and the Labor Market
Before the entrance of foreign-born workers to the U.S. labor market, the amount of labor that workers are willing to supply to employers is represented by the curve labeled S 1 in Figure 1 . Thus, the skill composition of foreign-born vis-a-vis native-born workers is expected to influence which native-born workers' labor market outcomes might benefit from or be harmed by immigrant inflows. The model also assumes that, in the short run, immigration affects labor supply but not labor demand. But, if immigrants are concentrated in particular geographic areas, then native-born workers who live in those communities and possess characteristics similar to those of foreign-born workers might be affected. Most of the inter-area studies have found little if any statistically significant and economically meaningful difference between the wage and employment experiences of native-born workers—overall, or disaggregated by race, gender, or skill level—in areas with high versus low concentrations of immigrants. A few spatially based studies have estimated a slight negative impact on a small share of the U.S. labor force—low-skilled natives , defined as persons who did not graduate from high school. The mobility of labor, capital, and goods between areas thus could make it difficult for cross-city studies to detect the labor market consequences of immigration. Na tional analyses typically have estimated that, by immigration ' s changing the nation ' s skill composition toward relatively more inexperienced workers who lack a high school degree than otherwise would have been the case , immigrants have harmed the labor market prospects of low-skilled native-born workers . However, the extent of the adverse wage effect appears sensitive to the definition of low-skilled workers according to other national and cross-city studies . Early studies that utilized the "factor-proportions" methodology were faulted because they did not directly estimate the responsiveness of natives' wages to the immigration-induced increase in the relative supply of low-skilled workers, and for this reason, might overstate immigrants' wage effect on U.S. workers. Economy-wide analyses also might overstate the impact of immigration in the long run if, for example, they do not take into account natives adjustment to the increased presence of immigrants by completing more years of schooling or choosing different fields of study which takes them out of competition with immigrants for jobs in which foreign-born workers have made substantial inroads. Enchautegui examined how much of the decline during the 1980s in the level of real (inflation-adjusted) wages among workers without a high school diploma was due to the influx of low-skilled foreign-born labor. He found that an increase in the supply of immigrant labor by skill group (defined by educational attainment and years of work experience) over the 1960-2000 period had a significantly adverse impact on the wages of native-born men with whom they competed: a 10% increase in the number of workers in a given skill group reduced the absolute weekly wage of similar native-born males by some 4%, and their employment (i.e., weeks worked), by some 3%. Even after allowing for the positive earnings impact that low-skilled (high-skilled) immigrants can have on native-born workers in high-skilled (low-skilled) groups, Borjas estimated that immigration over the 1980-2000 period reduced the wage of native-born workers in each skill group. This is in part because they found workers with at most a high school degree were close substitutes for those without one, which diminishes the competitive effect of immigrants on the least skilled native-born workers. | The large influx of immigrants in recent decades has led to an equally long debate over their effect on the labor market outcomes of native-born workers. Economic theory posits that an increase in the supply of labor, such as from immigration, will reduce the wage employers are willing to pay all workers (native-born and foreign-born) in a given labor market. As a result, some of the workers who had been earning a higher wage before the increase in labor supply will be unwilling to accept a lower wage and they will leave that labor market. The economic model assumes, however, that labor is homogenous. But, workers enter the United States possessing different skill levels and they therefore will compete with (i.e., put downward wage pressure on) native-born workers possessing very similar skill levels.
Economists have conducted empirical studies to measure the labor market effects of immigration that take into account the skill composition of foreign-born vis-à-vis native-born workers. They have employed two different approaches to do so.
The concentration of foreign-born workers in certain cities and skill groups led some economists to posit that immigration's greatest impact would be felt by similarly skilled native-born workers living in those areas. Studies thus have compared differences in labor market outcomes between native-born workers who live in high- versus low-immigrant areas and who most often compete for jobs with foreign-born workers; given the composition of the recent immigrant flow, these would be low-skilled U.S. workers. Most inter-area analyses have found scant evidence that foreign-born labor adversely affects the labor market prospects of U.S. workers in general. A few cross-city studies have estimated a slight negative impact on low-skilled natives.
Other economists have argued that the cross-city approach underestimates immigration's consequences because it assumes that labor, capital, and goods do not rapidly adjust to the immigration-induced increase in the supply of labor. If, for example, native-born competitors quickly leave labor markets in high-immigrant areas, their movements would spread any wage effects due to immigration across the nation, and thereby make it difficult for spatially based research to detect any impact. Some analysts, therefore, have concluded that immigration's labor market effects can best be identified by examining data at the national level.
For many years, national studies estimated that immigration in the short-run substantially reduced the wages of native-born workers in each skill (education-experience) group. Native-born workers who lacked a high school diploma were determined to be the most severely affected. More recent national studies have estimated the adverse wage effect of immigration in the short-run to be much smaller, even among the least skilled. The different results in part stem from the finding that workers with at most a high school degree are close substitutes for workers without a degree, which dampens the competitive effect of immigration on the least skilled workers. A 2009 study that utilized cross-city data similarly estimated that the two groups do not compete with one another; as a result, any adverse effect of low-skilled immigrants is not concentrated on the relatively few native-born workers who are high school dropouts. |
crs_RS22536 | crs_RS22536_0 | The federal government's basic procurement or acquisition process involves an agency identifying the goods and services it needs (also known as the agency's "requirements"), determining the most appropriate method for purchasing these items, and carrying out the acquisition. Eligibility Requirements for Businesses
With a few exceptions, a firm that wants to compete for federal government contracts must meet at least two requirements: (1) obtain a Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number, which is a unique nine-digit identification number for each physical location of a business, available at http://www.dnb.com/get-a-duns-number.html ; and (2) register with the government's System for Award Management (SAM), at https://www.sam.gov . Following the deadline for companies to submit their offers, agency personnel evaluate offerors' submissions, using the source selection method and criteria described in the solicitation. Selected Topics
Research and Development Procurement
Part 35 of the FAR provides guidance on research and development (R&D) contracting. Interested companies, organizations, and other entities may use FedBizOpps to identify R&D opportunities, which may be posted as solicitations or broad agency announcements (BAA). Subcontracting Opportunities
Another way to become involved in federal government contracting, albeit indirectly, is to serve as a subcontractor for a company (known as the "prime contractor") that has been awarded a government contract. | In the basic federal procurement process, acquisition personnel, after determining their agency's requirements (that is, the goods and services the agency needs), post a solicitation on the Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) website. Interested companies prepare their offers in response to the solicitation, and, in accordance with applicable provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), agency personnel evaluate the offers. Another type of procurement opportunity for a company is to serve as a subcontractor for a government contractor. To be eligible to compete for government contracts, a company must obtain a Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number and register with the federal government's System for Award Management (SAM). Several agencies, such as the General Services Administration (GSA), provide assistance and services to existing and potential government contractors. Research and development (R&D) procurement opportunities may involve traditional contracting methods, such as solicitations and contracts, as well as nontraditional methods, which include agency-sponsored contests and venture capital funds. |
crs_R43724 | crs_R43724_0 | C ongress passed comprehensive food safety legislation in December 2010 (FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, or FSMA, P.L. FSMA represented the largest expansion and overhaul of U.S. food safety authorities since the 1930s. FSMA greatly expanded food safety oversight authority at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), but did not alter oversight authorities within other federal agencies responsible for food safety, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Under FSMA, FDA is responsible for more than 50 regulations, guidelines, and studies. These included several "foundational" rules required to fully implement FSMA covering preventive controls for human food and for animal food, produce safety, sanitary transportation, intentional adulteration, and development of a Foreign Supplier Verification Program along with a program for the accreditation of third-party auditors to conduct food safety audits and issue certifications of foreign facilities producing food for humans or animals. These regulations become final in 2016. Among its many provisions, FSMA expanded FDA's authority to conduct a mandatory recall of contaminated food products; enhanced surveillance systems to investigate foodborne illness outbreaks; established new preventive controls and food safety plans at some food processing facilities and farms; enhanced FDA's traceability capacity within the nation's food distribution channels; increased inspection frequencies of high-risk food facilities (both domestic and foreign facilities); and expanded FDA's authority and oversight capabilities regarding foreign companies that supply food imports to the United States. These regulations were to have been proposed or, in some cases, finalized within one to two years of enactment (roughly January 2012 and January 2013); other rules were to have been submitted within 18 months of enactment (roughly mid-2012). Some other FDA actions under FSMA were also delayed. 111-353) . These delays were exacerbated by FDA's decision to extend the public comment and response period for most FSMA proposed regulations as well as the agency's decision to re-propose key provisions of some regulations. Other factors also contributed to delays in FSMA implementation, including oftentimes a lengthy review process by the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) and—according to FDA—limited agency resources and the lack of availability of discretionary appropriations. Delays in FDA's rulemaking process resulted in many FSMA regulations being released according to a court-ordered schedule under a federal lawsuit brought by the Center for Food Safety. Full implementation of the most FSMA regulations will be phased in over the next several years, mostly to provide flexibility to farms and food businesses to comply with the new requirements, as provided for in the enacted law. In addition, in September 2016, FDA further extended the compliance dates for many regulated facilities, especially small and very small businesses, within the main core regulations including Preventive Controls for Human and Animal Food, Produce Safety Standards, and the Foreign Supplier Verification Program (FSVP) for food imports. | Congress passed comprehensive food safety legislation in December 2010 (FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, or FSMA, P.L. 111-353), representing the largest expansion and overhaul of U.S. food safety authorities since the 1930s. FSMA greatly expanded food safety oversight authority at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Among its many provisions, FSMA expanded FDA's authority to conduct a mandatory recall of contaminated food products; enhanced surveillance systems to investigate foodborne illness outbreaks; established new preventive controls and food safety plans at some food processing facilities and farms; enhanced FDA's traceability capacity within the nation's food distribution channels; increased inspection frequencies of high-risk food facilities (both domestic and foreign facilities); and expanded FDA's authority and oversight capabilities with regard to foreign companies that supply food imports to the United States.
Under FSMA, FDA is responsible for more than 50 regulations, guidelines, and studies. This included seven "foundational" rules required to fully implement FSMA covering:
1. Preventive Controls for Human Food: Requires that food facilities have safety plans that set forth how they will identify and minimize hazards. 2. Preventive Controls for Animal Food: Establishes Current Good Manufacturing Practices and preventive controls for food for animals. 3. Produce Safety: Establishes science-based standards for growing, harvesting, packing, and holding produce on domestic and foreign farms. 4. Foreign Supplier Verification Program: Importers will be required to verify that food imported into the United States has been produced in a manner that provides the same level of public health protection as that required of U.S. food producers. 5. Third Party Certification: Establishes a program for the accreditation of third-party auditors to conduct food safety audits and issue certifications of foreign facilities producing food for humans or animals. 6. Sanitary Transportation: Requires those who transport food to use sanitary practices to ensure the safety of food. 7. Intentional Adulteration: Requires domestic and foreign facilities to address vulnerable processes in their operations to prevent acts intended to cause large-scale public harm.
These regulations were to have been proposed or, in some cases, finalized within one to two years of enactment (roughly January 2012 and January 2013); other rules were to have been submitted within 18 months of enactment (roughly mid-2012). However, many of these regulations did not become final until 2016. Other FDA actions under FSMA were also delayed. Several factors contributed to these delays, including the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) review process, extensions in the public comment and response period for many of FDA's proposed rules and the agency's re-proposal of key provisions of some major regulations, and also, according to FDA, limited agency resources and the lack of availability of discretionary appropriations. Delays in FDA's rulemaking process resulted in many FSMA regulations being released according to a court-ordered schedule under a federal lawsuit brought by the Center for Food Safety.
Full implementation of the most FSMA regulations will be phased in over the next several years, mostly to provide flexibility to farms and food businesses to comply with the new requirements, as provided for in the enacted law. In addition, in September 2016, FDA further extended the compliance dates for many regulated facilities, especially small and very small businesses. |
crs_RL31307 | crs_RL31307_0 | 5431 and S. 2784 did not reach the floor during the 107th Congress. Overview
The Energy and Water Development bill includes funding for civil worksprojects of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior's Bureau ofReclamation (BOR), most of the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number ofindependent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and theAppalachian Regional Commission (ARC). The Administration's request was $26.2billion for these programs for FY2003, compared with $25.8 billion appropriated forFY2002. 1 , P.L. 108-2 , covering the period through January 31, 2003,and H.J.Res. 18 , P.L. 108-5 , through February 20). After a House-Senate conference the omnibus measure passedboth Houses February 12 and was signed by the President February 20. The Energy and Water programs are funded in Division D of H.J.Res. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Title I: Corps of Engineers (in millions ofdollars)
*Figures do not include across-the-board recisions: 2.9% in Senate H.J.Res.2, 0.65% in P.L. , see H.R. For these two projects, the House and SenateAppropriations Committees, and the final bill, P. L. 108-7, provided the samefunding level as requested. 107-206 . Key Policy Issues - Bureau of Reclamation
CALFED. In the 108th Congress, the Senate Appropriations Committee's recommendations in the 107th Congress totaling $448.1 million (excluding $15.0 million in prior yearbalances) were adopted into the Senate-passed version of H.J.Res. According to the DOE budget justification, the Nuclear Power 2010 program, which received a $30.5 million increase over FY2002, will "identify the technical,institutional and regulatory barriers to the deployment of new nuclear power plantsby 2010." For FY2003, DOE requested $3.279 billion for Science, compared with $3.233 billion appropriated in FY2002. The final bill, P.L.108-7 , appropriated the requested amount, $1.1136 billion. Environmental Management. Five accounts within the annual appropriations bill for Energy and Water Development have traditionally funded DOE's Environmental Management Program. Civilian Nuclear Waste. The increased budget is intendedprimarily to pay for preparing a construction permit application for a national nuclearwaste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. South Florida Ecosystem Restoration and the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan . | The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation(BOR), most of the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies. The BushAdministration requested $25.5 billion for these programs for FY2003 compared with $25.2 billionappropriated in FY2002.
The House Appropriations Committee recommended a bill, H.R. 5431 , with $26.0billion on September 5, 2002. On July 24, 2002, the Senate Appropriations Committee had reportedout its own bill, S. 2784 , providing $26.3 billion in funding. However, neither of thesebills reached the floor. Before adjourning sine die, the 107th Congress passed H.J.Res. 124 ( P.L. 107-294 ), making continuing appropriations for FY2003 for Energy and Water, and otherprograms, through January 11, 2003.
The 108th Congress extended temporary funding until February 20 ( H.J.Res. 1 , P.L. 108-2 , and H.J.Res. 18 , P.L. 108-5 ), and on January 23 the Senate passed an omnibusappropriations resolution ( H.J.Res. 2 ), including all 11 unpassed appropriations billsfor the rest of FY2003. After a House-Senate conference the omnibus measure passed both HousesFebruary 12 and was signed by the President February 20, 2003 ( P.L. 108-7 ). The final bill fundedEnergy and Water Development programs at $26.7 billion (less an across-the-board reduction of0.65%, approximately $173 million).
Key issues involving Energy and Water Development appropriations programs included:
Matching budget request amounts with ongoing Corps construction schedules ("full capability funding") and congressional priorities;
Funding for major water/ecosystem restoration initiatives such as Florida Everglades and California "Bay-Delta";
Increased funding for DOE's civilian nuclear waste management program as the Department prepares a construction permit application for a waste repository under Nevada'sYucca Mountain;
A proposed $1.1 billion Environmental Management Cleanup Reform account in DOE, focused on radioactive sites where environmental regulators would allow alternativecleanup methods; and
DOE's "Nuclear Power 2010" initiative, to "identify the technical, institutional and regulatory barriers to the deployment of new nuclear power plants by2010."
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: RSI = Resources, Science, and Industry; FDT= Foreign Affairs, Defense,and Trade. |
crs_R43824 | crs_R43824_0 | These include such practices as
popular election of electors by the voters; joint tickets for presidential and vice presidential candidates—the voter casts a single ballot for both candidates; the predominance of the general ticket, or winner-take-all, system or method, which awards all of a state's electoral votes to the ticket that wins the most popular votes statewide; a range of differing nomination procedures for elector candidates in the states; and, an enduring tradition that electors are expected, but not constitutionally required, to vote for the candidates to whom they are pledged. The electoral college has almost always been the subject of some criticism, however. Proceeding from the lengthy convention debate on choosing the chief executive, they contrived a mode of election designed to
be free of undue influence by Congress, thus ensuring greater independence in the executive and separation of powers; provide a fundamental role for the states by establishing the election as a federal, as well as a national, process; allocate electors by a formula that provided a certain degree of advantage to less populous states, to avoid complete domination of the election process by the more populous ones; give the state legislatures broad authority over the choice of electors: at the legislatures' discretion, electors could be picked by popular vote, by the legislature itself, or by another body altogether; and, ultimately temper popular enthusiasms and partisan and sectional attachments by giving the actual vote to the electors, who, it was hoped, would be prominent citizens of their states and communities—well-informed and educated persons who would make a balanced and measured selection. The Electoral College in Function: How It Works in Contemporary Presidential Elections
The assorted components of the electoral college system come into operation before, during, and after presidential election day, once every four years. This is referred to as the "general ticket" or "winner-take-all" system or method. It has elected the candidates who received the most popular votes in 49 of those elections. Constitutional Issues
Some of the electoral college system's asserted failings are attributed by its critics to its structure and provisions as established in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution and the Twelfth Amendment. The Minority President: An Electoral College "Misfire"
Perhaps the most widely cited structural criticism of the electoral college system is that it can lead to the election of Presidents and Vice Presidents who win a majority of the electoral vote, but who have gained fewer popular votes nationwide than their major opponents. In the presidential election of 2016, however, three would-be faithless electors were prevented from voting for candidates other than those to whom they were pledged. These various biases have been debated over the years. The "Electoral College Lock"
A final asserted bias considered in this report is the so-called "electoral college lock," a perceived phenomenon identified in the late 1960s that was claimed to provide a long-term election advantage to the candidates of a particular party, originally to Republicans, and later, Democrats, at least through the 2016 election. Mend It? Leave It Alone? The "people's choice" would always be elected. They would
eliminate the office of presidential elector while retaining electoral votes; award electoral votes directly to the candidates, without the action of electors; and retain the requirement that a majority of electoral votes is necessary to win the presidency. The three most popular reform proposals include
the automatic plan or system, which would mandate the assignment of electoral votes automatically on the current general ticket/winner-take-all basis in each state and the District of Columbia; the district plan or system, as currently adopted in Maine and Nebraska, which would automatically award one electoral vote to the winning ticket in each congressional district in each state, but would also automatically assign each state's two additional "senatorial" electoral votes to the statewide popular vote winners; and the proportional plan or system, which would automatically award each state's electoral votes in proportion to the percentage of the popular vote gained by each ticket. Further, they maintain the electoral college system promotes political stability. Both resolutions have been referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and to its Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice. For additional information and analysis of current electoral college reform or replacement proposals, see CRS Report R44928, The Electoral College: Reform Proposals in the 114th and 115th Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. First, proposed amendments introduced in the past decade all embraced the "end it" option, substituting direct popular election for the electoral college; no proposal to reform the electoral college has been introduced since the 107 th Congress (2001-2003). None of these proposals has been successful to date. NPV is a nongovernmental initiative which seeks to establish direct popular election of the President and Vice President through an interstate compact, rather than by constitutional amendment. NPV relies on the Constitution's broad grant (in Article II, Section 1, clause 1) of power to each state to "appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct [emphasis added], a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress." The compact, however, would take effect only if states controlling a majority of the electoral college, 270 or more votes, were to approve the plan. Between 2007 and 2014, 10 states and the District of Columbia joined the compact. Since that time, amendments have been introduced to reform or replace the electoral college with direct popular election in almost every session of Congress. | The electoral college method of electing the President and Vice President was established in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution and revised by the Twelfth Amendment. It provides for election of the President and Vice President by electors, commonly referred to as the electoral college. A majority of 270 of the 538 electoral votes is necessary to win. For further information on the modern-day operation of the college system, see CRS Report RL32611, The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Presidential Elections, by [author name scrubbed].
The electoral college has been the subject of criticism and proposals for reform since before 1800. Constitutional and structural criticisms have centered on several of its features: (1) although today all electors are chosen by the voters in the presidential election, it is claimed to be not fully democratic, since it provides indirect election of the President; (2) it can lead to the election of candidates who win the electoral college but fewer popular votes than their opponents, or to contingent election in Congress if no candidate wins an electoral college majority; (3) it results in electoral vote under- and over-representation for some states between censuses; and (4) "faithless" electors can vote for candidates other than those they were elected to support. Legislative and political criticisms include (1) the general ticket system, currently used in all states except Maine and Nebraska, which is alleged to disenfranchise voters who prefer the losing candidates in the states; (2) various asserted "biases" that are alleged to favor different states and groups; and (3) the electoral college "lock," which has been claimed to provide an electoral college advantage to both major parties at different times.
In its defense, electoral college supporters claim that it is a fundamental component of federalism, that it has elected "the people's choice" in over 90% of presidential elections, and that it has promoted political stability and a broad-based, enduring, and generally moderate political party system.
Changing the electoral college system presents several options, sometimes characterized as: "end it," "mend it," or "leave it alone." Proposals to end the electoral college almost always recommend direct popular election, under which the candidates winning the most popular votes nationwide would be elected. In support of direct popular election, its advocates refer to the elections of 2000 and 2016, so-called electoral college "misfires," in which candidates were elected with an electoral college majority, but fewer popular votes than their principal opponents.
Almost all reform proposals—"mend it"—would keep electoral votes, but eliminate electors, thus ending the faithless elector phenomenon. They would then award the electoral votes directly by one of several methods: the general ticket system on a nationwide basis; the district system that awards electoral votes on a congressional district- and statewide-vote basis; or the proportional system that awards state electoral votes in proportion to the percentage of popular votes gained by each candidate. Despite more than 30 years of legislative activity from the 1940s through the late 1970s, proposed constitutional amendments did not win the approval of two-thirds of Members of both houses of Congress required by the Constitution for referral to the states.
Since 2004, some of the reforms identified above have been attempted in the states. District plan initiatives have been offered in California, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Proportional plans have been proposed in Colorado and Pennsylvania. Nebraska has considered returning to the general ticket system. None of these, however, has been enacted to date.
A nongovernmental organization is currently promoting the National Popular Vote (NPV) initiative, an interstate compact that would effectively achieve direct popular election without a constitutional amendment. It relies on the Constitution's broad grant of authority to the states in Article II, Section 1, to appoint presidential electors "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.... " States that join the compact pledge to award their electoral votes to the nationwide popular vote winners, regardless of who wins in their particular states. The compact would come into effect only after states controlling a majority of electoral votes (270 or more) were to join it. At the time of this writing, 10 states and the District of Columbia, which jointly control 165 electoral votes, have joined the NPV compact.
Since the 2016 presidential election, several amendments to eliminate the electoral college system and establish direct popular election have been introduced in the 114th and 115th Congress. For additional information on contemporary reform efforts, see CRS Report R44928, The Electoral College: Reform Proposals in the 114th and 115th Congress. |
crs_R45241 | crs_R45241_0 | "Disorderly" Language in Senate Debate
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Senate Rule XIX identify language that is considered to violate standards of decorum in debate. Such "disorderly" language includes directly or indirectly imputing to another Senator or Senators "any conduct or motive unworthy or unbecoming a Senator" (paragraph 2) and referrin g "offensively to any State of the Union" (paragraph 3). Rule XIX prohibits imputing conduct or motive "by any form of words" to a sitting Senator. The Senate has, from its earliest days, stressed the importance of decorum in debate and had a mechanism in its rules to sanction Senators who use disorderly language. The statements listed in Rule XIX are not considered to be a comprehensive recitation of language that may be considered disorderly and violate decorum in Senate debate. Procedures for Calling a Senator to Order
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Rule XIX establish a parliamentary mechanism whereby a Senator who engages in the type of disorderly language described in the rule (discussed above) can be "called to order" by the presiding officer or by another Senator. In current practice, the Rule XIX call to order is rarely formally invoked. It is far more common for the presiding officer, acting on his or her own initiative, to issue a "warning" to a Senator who has violated standards of decorum in debate or to simply read the provisions of Rule XIX aloud as a general reminder to the Senate in cases where debate has become heated. Occasionally, however, a formal call to order is made. I demand that the words of the Senator from [STATE] be read aloud for the information of the Senate. If, on the other hand, the presiding officer, in response to a call to order from the floor, ruled that the speaking Senator had not violated Rule XIX, the speaking Senator would be allowed to proceed in order. The ruling of the presiding officer under Rule XIX that a Senator has used disorderly words in debate is subject to an appeal by any Senator, including by a Senator who has been directed to take his or her seat. If a Senator has been found to have violated decorum in debate under Rule XIX, his or her objectionable words may be stricken from the Congressional Record either by unanimous consent or by motion. Table 1 , below, outlines the evolution of the Senate's call to order rule from its inception in 1789 to the present. Formal Calls to Order
CRS conducted full-text searches of the Congressional Record and the Senate Journal using the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress (LIS) and the ProQuest Congressional database in order to identify instances in which a call to order under Senate Rule XIX had been formally invoked since June 14, 1962. | The Senate has, from the 1st Congress (1789-1790), valued the importance of decorum in debate and included a "call to order" mechanism in its rules to sanction Senators who use "disorderly" language. The rules adopted in 1789 contained such a call-to-order provision, and its language has been amended multiple times over the years. Table 1 of this report details the historical evolution of the rule. The present form of the Senate's call-to-order provision was adopted on June 14, 1962.
Senate Rule XIX identifies specific language that is considered disorderly. This includes language directly or indirectly imputing to another Senator or Senators "any conduct or motive unworthy or unbecoming a Senator" (paragraph 2) and referring "offensively to any State of the Union" (paragraph 3). Rule XIX prohibits imputing conduct or motive "by any form of words" to a sitting Senator, which includes not just original words spoken in debate but quotes, news articles, and other materials. The statements in paragraphs 2 and 3 are not considered to be a comprehensive recitation of language that may violate decorum in Senate debate. Although precedents on the subject are mixed, Senators have at times also been called to order for making disparaging references in debate to the House of Representatives or its Members.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Rule XIX establish a parliamentary mechanism whereby a Senator who engages in the type of disorderly language described in the rule can be "called to order" by the presiding officer or by another Senator. This call to order is rarely formally invoked in the modern Senate. Table 2 of this report lists instances in which the rule has been invoked since 1962. It is far more common for the presiding officer, acting on his or her own initiative, to issue a "warning" to a Senator who has violated standards of decorum in debate or to read the provisions of Rule XIX aloud as a general reminder to the Senate in cases where debate has become heated.
If a formal call to order is made, however, any Senator may demand that the allegedly disorderly words be read aloud for the benefit of the Senate. Should the chair then rule that the speaking Senator's words have violated Rule XIX, the sanctioned Senator must take his or her seat. The chair's ruling in this regard is subject to an appeal to the full body. A Senator sanctioned under the rule in this manner is barred from participating in further debate on the pending matter unless the Senate, by unanimous consent or by nondebatable motion, permits him or her to proceed in order. Disorderly words used in Senate debate can be stricken from the Congressional Record by unanimous consent or by motion. |
crs_R41165 | crs_R41165_0 | Congress is responsible for several activities in this regard, including (1) authorizing periodic appropriations for U.S. financial contributions to the institutions, and (2) overseeing U.S. involvement in the programs. Issues of congressional interest include the overall development assistance strategy of the United States, U.S. leadership in global environmental and economic affairs, and U.S. commercial interests in trade and investment. This report provides an overview of one of the oldest, largest, and most comprehensive multilateral programs to date—the Global Environment Facility (GEF)—and analyzes its structure, funding, and objectives in light of the many challenges within the contemporary landscape of global environmental finance. The Global Environment Facility
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is an independent and international financial organization that provides grants, promotes cooperation, and fosters actions in developing countries to protect the global environment. Established in 1991, it unites 182 member governments and partners with international institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to assist developing countries with environmental projects related to six areas: biodiversity, climate change, international waters, the ozone layer, land degradation, and persistent organic pollutants (POPs). GEF receives funding from multiple donor countries —including the United States—and provides grants to cover the additional or "incremental" costs associated with transforming a project with national benefits into one with global environmental benefits (e.g., choosing solar energy technology over coal technology meets the same national development goal of power generation but is more costly, excluding long-term environmental externalities; GEF grants aim to cover the difference or "increment" between a less costly, more polluting option and a costlier, more environmentally sound option). In this way, GEF funding is structured to "supplement" base project funding and provide for the environmental components in national development agendas. Since its inception, GEF has allocated $11.5 billion—supplemented by more than $57 billion in co-financing—for more than 3,200 projects in over 165 countries. The United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Environment Program, and other international organizations contributed to project development, management, and delivery. International Conventions: GEF is the primary fund administrator for four Rio (Earth Summit) Conventions, including the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). GEF also establishes operational guidance for international waters and ozone activities, the latter consistent with the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and its amendments. GEF is one mechanism in the larger network of international programs designed to address environmental issues. Critics contend that the existing system has had limited impact in addressing major environmental concerns—specifically climate change and tropical deforestation—and has been unsuccessful in delivering global transformational change. A desire to achieve more immediate impacts has led to a restructuring of the Multilateral Development Banks' role in environmental finance and the introduction of many new bilateral and multilateral funding initiatives. The effectiveness of GEF depends on how the fund addresses its programmatic issues, reacts to recent developments in the financial landscape, and responds to emerging opportunities. The future of GEF remains in the hands of the donor countries that can choose to broaden the mandate and strengthen its institutional arrangements or to reduce and replace it by other bilateral or multilateral funding mechanisms. | The United States contributes funding to various international financial institutions to assist developing countries to address global climate change and other environmental concerns. Congress is responsible for several activities in this regard, including (1) authorizing periodic appropriations for U.S. financial contributions to the institutions, and (2) overseeing U.S. involvement in the programs. Issues of congressional interest include the overall development assistance strategy of the United States, U.S. leadership in global environmental and economic affairs, and U.S. commercial interests in trade and investment. This report provides an overview of one of the oldest international financial institutions for the environment—the Global Environment Facility (GEF)—and analyzes its structure, funding, and objectives in light of the many challenges within the contemporary landscape of global environmental finance.
GEF is an independent and international financial organization that provides grants, promotes cooperation, and fosters actions in developing countries to protect the global environment. Established in 1991, it unites 182 member governments and partners with international institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to assist developing countries with environmental projects related to six areas: biodiversity, climate change, international waters, the ozone layer, land degradation, and persistent organic pollutants. GEF receives funding from multiple donor countries—including the United States—and provides grants to cover the additional or "incremental" costs associated with transforming a project with national benefits into one with global environmental benefits. In this way, GEF funding is structured to "supplement" base project funding and provide for the environmental components in national development agendas. GEF partners with several international agencies, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), among others, and is the primary fund administrator for four Rio (Earth Summit) Conventions, including the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). GEF also establishes operational guidance for international waters and ozone activities, the latter consistent with the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and its amendments. Since its inception, GEF has allocated $11.5 billion—supplemented by more than $57 billion in co-financing—for more than 3,200 projects in over 165 countries.
GEF is one mechanism in a larger network of international programs designed to address the global environment. Accordingly, its effectiveness depends on how the fund addresses programmatic issues, builds upon national investment plans, reacts to recent developments in the financial landscape, and responds to emerging opportunities. Critics contend that the existing system has had limited impact in addressing major environmental concerns—specifically climate change and tropical deforestation—and has been unsuccessful in delivering global transformational change. A desire to achieve more immediate impacts has led to a restructuring of the Multilateral Development Banks' (MDBs') role in environmental finance and the introduction of many new bilateral and multilateral funding initiatives. The future of GEF remains in the hands of the donor countries, including the United States, which can choose to broaden the mandate and/or strengthen its institutional arrangements or reduce and replace it by other bilateral or multilateral funding mechanisms. |
crs_RL32919 | crs_RL32919_0 | Previously, on November 14, 2005, President Bush signed into law a $20.94 billion Foreign Operations appropriation for FY2006 ( P.L. 109-102 ; H.R. 3057 ). The total, however, remains about $1.4 billion higher than the regular FY2005 foreign aid spending measure (excluding emergency and supplemental appropriations), and falls between the House-passed $20.27 billion level and the Senate-passed $22.16 billion amount. Consequently, State Department funds were removed from the Senate-passed legislation ( H.R. Foreign Operations Overview
Foreign Operations, the larger of the two components with a request of $22.8 billion for FY2006, is the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews and votes on the U.S. foreign assistance budget and influences major aspects of executive branch foreign policy making generally. State Department/Broadcasting Overview
Budgets for the Department of State, including embassy construction and security and public diplomacy, are within the State Department and related programs title of the Science, State, Justice, and Commerce (SSJC) appropriations in the House and the State, Foreign Operations measure in the Senate. Although Foreign Operations appropriations had been rising for five consecutive years, amounts approved in FY2003 and FY2004 reached unprecedented levels compared with funding over the past 40 years. 95 and S.Con.Res. The House Appropriations Committee announced its subcommittee allocations on May 5, providing $20.27 billion to the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, a level $2.55 billion, or 11%, below the Administration's recommendation. The Senate 302(b) allocations, issued on June 9, provide $31.67 billion to the Subcommittee, $1 billion, or 3.1% less than the combined State Department/Foreign Operations request. These amounts were 15.7% and 12.2%, respectively, higher than FY2005 amounts enacted in regular, non-supplemental appropriations. The combined Foreign Operations/State Department request of $32.67 billion was 14.6% larger than regular FY2005 funding. The FY2006 budget continued to highlight foreign aid in support of the war on terrorism as the highest priority, with a 9% increase in aid to the front-line states in the war on terrorism and 12% more funds for global counter-terror programs. This included $500 million for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, 150% higher than the request; Full funding for counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics accounts; Full funding for aid to key states of strategic interest, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, and Pakistan; $24 million for the President's Conflict Response Fund, less than the $100 million proposal; the House denied this request; Increasing slightly the refugee aid request to $900 million; Adding about $700 million for development and child survival programs beyond the President's request; Raising amounts for international family planning programs to $485 million ($450 million for bilateral activities and $35 million for UNFPA), modifying the "Kemp-Kasten" restrictions on UNFPA eligibility, and adding text that would essentially overturn the President's "Mexico City policy" regarding abortion. 2862 ). The net Foreign Operations total falls $2.1 billion, or 9.3% below the President's request, and represents by far the largest cut in regular (non-supplemental) Foreign Operations spending relative to the Administration's proposal during the Bush Administration. The conference agreement on H.R. 1268 ). Congressional Action
H.R. In the Senate, H.R. | The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill in the House, and the State, Foreign Operations measure in the Senate are the primary legislative vehicles through which Congress reviews the U.S. international affairs budgets and influences executive branch foreign policy making generally. They contain the largest shares—the House bill, about two-thirds; the Senate bill, about 97%—of total U.S. international affairs spending.
Funding for Foreign Operations and State Department/Broadcasting programs have been rising for five consecutive years, while amounts approved in FY2004 reached an unprecedented level compared with the past 40 years. Emergency supplementals enacted since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to assist the front line states in the war on terrorism, Afghanistan and Iraq reconstruction, and for State Department operations and security upgrades have pushed spending upward.
The President sought $22.8 billion for Foreign Operations and $9.8 billion for State Department and Related Agencies appropriations. These amounts were 15.7% and 12.2%, respectively, higher than FY2005 amounts enacted in "regular," non-supplemental appropriations. The combined State/Foreign Operations request of $32.67 billion was 14.6% larger than regular FY2005 funding. Including the $4.55 billion FY2005 supplemental (H.R. 1268; enacted on May 11), the FY2006 combined request was slightly smaller (-1.1%) than the total appropriation of $33.05 billion for FY2005.
A major challenge for Congress in considering the President's Foreign Operations and State Department spending proposals has been the tightening budget environment. The FY2006 Budget Resolution (H.Con.Res. 95) set international affairs spending 7% below the President's request. The House Appropriations Committee's spending allocation among all spending bills provided $20.27 billion for Foreign Operations, 11.2% less than the proposal. The Senate Committee allocation of $31.67 billion for the combined State Department/Foreign Operations measure was $1 billion, or 3% below the request. Other key issues for congressional review were foreign aid in support of the war on terror, the Millennium Challenge Account, HIV/AIDS funding, allocations among "core" development programs, public diplomacy, educational exchange programs, rising demands for U.N. peacekeeping contributions, and democracy promotion activities.
On November 14, President Bush signed a $20.94 billion Foreign Operations appropriation for FY2006 (P.L. 109-102; H.R. 3057). The bill is nearly $1.9 billion, or 8% below the Administration's request. The total falls closer to the House-passed $20.27 billion level than to the Senate's $22.16 amount. State Department funds included in the Senate version of H.R. 3057 became part of the conference on H.R. 2862, the Science, State, Justice, and Commerce spending bill.
This report will be updated to reflect congressional action on the legislation. |
crs_R42873 | crs_R42873_0 | Introduction
In 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA, P.L. 104-199 ) "[t]o define and protect the institution of marriage." DOMA (1) allows states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages or partnerships and (2) limits the recognition of these same-sex partnerships for purposes of any act of Congress or by any federal bureau or agency. Federal employees are permitted by law to extend certain health, long-term care, and other benefits to their spouses. DOMA prohibits the distribution of these spousal benefits to same-sex partners. On June 2, 2010, President Obama released a second memorandum that extended specific benefits and perquisites to the same-sex partners of federal employees. On November 18, 2011, Senator Joseph Lieberman introduced S. 1910 , the Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obligations Act of 2011, and Representative Tammy Baldwin introduced a companion bill, H.R. 3485 . On May 16, 2012, S. 1910 was ordered to be reported favorably from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. No further action was taken on the bill. The Defense of Marriage Act and Federal Benefits
The federal government provides a variety of benefits to federal civilian and military employees and retirees. Among these benefits are health insurance; enhanced dental and vision benefits; retirement and disability benefits and plans; survivor benefits; family, medical, and emergency leave; and reimbursement of relocation costs. Executive Branch Actions to Extend Benefits to Same-Sex Partners of Federal Employees
Some benefits to federal employees are extended specifically to the spouse of the federal employee, while the laws and regulations governing other benefits may not explicitly use the term spouse. The benefit is also extended to a same-sex partner's children. It also provides information on whether these benefits are available to the same-sex partners of federal employees. Health care costs are shared between the federal government and the enrollee. Title 5 does not define the word marriage ; however, the Code of Federal Regulations defines marriage for purposes of determining eligibility for federal retirement benefits under Title 5 as "a marriage recognized in law or equity under the whole law of the jurisdiction with the most significant interest in the marital status of the employee, member, or retiree unless the law of that jurisdiction is contrary to the public policy of the United States." 112th Congress
In the 112 th Congress, however, two bills were introduced that, if enacted, would have provided insurance, travel, and other benefits to the same-sex partners of federal employees. That same day, Representative Tammy Baldwin introduced a companion bill, H.R. Chapters 89, 89A, 89B); retirement and disability benefits and plans (5 U.S.C. In the affidavit, the employee would have had to "attest" that he or she was in a "committed domestic-partnership," which included the following conditions:
the partners "are in a committed domestic-partnership relationship with each other ... and intend to remain so indefinitely"; the partners "have a common residence and intend to continue to do so"; the partners are at least 18 years old and are "mentally competent to consent to contract"; the partners "share responsibility for a significant measure of each other's common welfare and financial obligations"; the partners are not "married to or in a domestic partnership with anyone except each other"; the partners are not related by blood in a way that would prohibit legal marriage between individuals otherwise eligible to marry in the jurisdiction"; and the partners would be subject to the same ethical standards, financial disclosures, and conflict of interest requirements as those placed on the spouses of federal employees (5 U.S.C. Some Potential Policy Considerations Regarding Same-Sex Benefits and Federal Employees
This section provides analysis of some potential policy considerations Congress may consider that are related to federal employees and the extension of health and other benefits to same-sex partners of federal employees. The Administration has extended some benefits to same-sex partners and has argued that its actions are within the parameters of existing laws. Estimates presented at congressional testimony in 2009 indicated that there were 34,000 federal employees in same-sex relationships, including state-recognized marriages, civil unions, or domestic partnerships. Generally, the 2012 data demonstrated that health care benefits were "more prevalent for same-sex partners than for [unmarried] opposite-sex partners." Cost Estimates of Providing Domestic Partner Benefits to Federal Employees
In November 2012, CBO released its score of S. 1910 , which, as described above, sought to extend certain benefits and responsibilities to the same-sex partners of federal employees and annuitants. In testimony before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee's Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and District of Columbia on July 8, 2009, Office of Personnel Management Director Berry estimated that extending benefits to the same-sex partners of federal employees and annuitants would have cost the government $56 million in 2010. As noted earlier in this report, when DOMA was enacted, the House report that accompanied the legislation stated that a primary goal of the law was to "preserve scarce government resources." This report, however, does not address the ethical and legal debates surrounding DOMA and same-sex marriage. The extension of this benefit often increases the tax liability of a same-sex couple. | The information provided in this report reflects law and policies prior to the 2013 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Windsor.
The federal government provides a variety of benefits to its 4.4 million civilian and military employees and 4.7 million civilian and military retirees. Among these benefits are health insurance; enhanced dental and vision benefits; survivor benefits; retirement and disability benefits; family, medical, and emergency leave; and reimbursement of relocation costs. Pursuant to Title 5 U.S.C. Chapters 89, 89A, 89B, and other statutes, federal employees may extend these benefits to eligible spouses and children.
In 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA, P.L. 104-199; 1 U.S.C §7) "[t]o define and protect the institution of marriage." DOMA contains two provisions. The first provision allows all states, territories, possessions, and Indian tribes to refuse to recognize an act of any other jurisdiction that designates a relationship between individuals of the same sex as a marriage. The second provision prohibits federal recognition of these unions for purposes of federal enactments. Pursuant to DOMA, the same-sex partners of federal employees are not eligible to receive federal benefits that are extended to the spouses of federal employees. An estimated 34,000 federal employees are in same-sex relationships—including state-recognized marriages, civil unions, or domestic partnerships.
The Obama Administration has extended certain benefits to the same-sex partners of federal employees and annuitants—and argued that it has done so within the parameters of existing federal statutes. On June 2, 2010, President Obama released a memorandum that extended specific benefits to the same-sex partners of federal employees, including coverage of travel, relocation, and subsistence payments.
Some Members of Congress argue that same-sex partners of federal employees should have access to benefits afforded married, opposite-sex couples in order to attract the most efficient and effective employees to federal service. Other Members of Congress argue that the law prohibits the extension of such benefits, and, therefore, actions to distribute any spousal benefits to same-sex couples is contrary to both the text and spirit of DOMA.
Congress has had a long-standing interest in overseeing the benefits provided to federal employees. On the one hand, the federal government seeks to attract the most effective, highly trained workforce to address technical and complex issues. On the other hand, finite resources can present challenges when considering whether to extend benefits to federal employees. When DOMA was enacted, the House report that accompanied the legislation stated that a primary goal of the law was to "preserve scarce government resources."
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that extending benefits to the partners of employees in same-sex relationships pursuant to S. 1910 would cost the federal government $144 million in discretionary spending between 2013 and 2022. CBO also estimated, however, that extending the benefits could "limit future rate increases" in federal health care costs because health care providers would be required to recover certain health care costs that previously went unrecovered. These recovered costs could lower the federal government's health care premiums.
In the 112th Congress, two bills were introduced that, if enacted, would have permitted federal employees to extend insurance, long-term care, and other benefits to same-sex partners. On November 18, 2011, Senator Joseph Lieberman introduced S. 1910, the Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obligations Act of 2011. That same day, Representative Tammy Baldwin introduced a companion bill, H.R. 3485, also called the Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obligations Act of 2011, in the House. On May 16, 2012, S. 1910 was ordered to be reported favorably from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. H.R. 3485 was referred to multiple committees, but no further action was taken on the bill.
This report examines current policies on the application of benefits to the same-sex partners of federal employees and reviews certain policy debates about the extension or removal of these benefits. This report also presents data on the prevalence of same-sex partner benefits in the private and public sector. This report focuses on federal benefits for same-sex partners and not on same-sex relationships in general. For more information on the implementation of DOMA and how it affects same-sex partnerships, see CRS Report RL31994, Same-Sex Marriages: Legal Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. For information on private sector employee benefit plans and same-sex partner benefits, see CRS Report R41998, Same-Sex Marriage and Employee Benefit Plans: Legal Considerations, by Jennifer Staman and CRS Report RS21897, The Effect of State-Legalized Same-Sex Marriage on Social Security Benefits, Pensions, and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34524 | crs_RL34524_0 | Introduction
Rules of origin (ROO), the methodology used to prove country of origin, are central components of U.S. trade policy. Such rules can be very straightforward when all of the parts of a product are manufactured and assembled primarily in one country. However, when component parts of a finished product originate in many countries—as is often the case in global industries such as autos and electronics—determining origin can be a complex, sometimes subjective, and time-consuming process. The report concludes with some policy options for Congress that proponents assert could improve the ROO process. There are two types of rules of origin (ROO):
Non-preferential ROO are used to determine the origin of goods imported from countries with which the United States has most-favored-nation (MFN) status, and are the principal regulatory tools for accurate assessment of tariffs on imports, addressing country of origin labeling issues, qualifying goods for government procurement, and enforcing trade remedy actions and trade sanctions. Preferential ROO are used to determine the eligibility of imported goods from U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) partners and certain developing countries to receive duty-free benefits under U.S. trade preference programs (e.g., the Generalized System of Preferences and the African Growth and Opportunity Act), and other special import programs (e.g., goods entering from U.S. territories). Preferential ROO schemes vary from agreement to agreement and preference to preference. Instead, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—the agency primarily responsible for determining country of origin (as it is for enforcing tariffs and other laws that apply to imported products)—relies on a body of court decisions, CBP regulations, and agency interpretations to confer origin on an imported product if the matter is in doubt. Non-preferential ROO ensure that imports from U.S. MFN trading partners receive the proper tariff treatment. In most cases, the origin of the good is determined to be the last place in which it was substantially transformed into a new and distinct article of commerce based on a change in name, character, or use. When determining origin, CBP takes into account one or more of the following factors:
the character, name, or use of the article; the nature of the article's manufacturing process, as compared to the processes used to make the imported parts, components, or other materials used to make the product; the value added by the manufacturing process, including the cost of production, the amount of capital investment, or labor required, compared to the value imparted by other component parts; and, the essential character is established by the manufacturing process or by the essential character of the imported parts or materials. CBP noted that its experience in implementing NAFTA marking rules had shown that "by virtue of their greater specificity and transparency, codified rules result in determinations that are more objective and predictable than under the case-by-case adjudication method." The comment period was extended twice—first, until October 23, 2008 (73 F.R. Much of the public response opposed the 2008 CBP proposal. In September 2011, CBP issued a final rule making the NAFTA marking rules applicable to some products subject to non-preferential ROO, namely pipe fittings and flanges, greeting cards, glass optical fiber, rice preparations, and some textile and apparel products. Preferential Rules of Origin
Preferential rules of origin are used to verify that products are eligible for duty-free status under U.S. trade preference programs, such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), or free trade agreements (FTAs), such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the U.S- South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). Other experts maintain that, in a global manufacturing environment, there should be other means of determining country of origin. A major reason for this complexity is that, especially in situations involving non-preferential (MFN) origin rules, officials must often make these determinations on a "case-by-case" basis. Some importers have criticized CBP because they assert that some of these determinations are subjective and inconsistent. | Determining the country of origin of an imported product is important for properly assessing tariffs, enforcing trade remedies (such as antidumping and countervailing duties) or quantitative restrictions (tariff quotas), and statistical purposes. Other commercial trade policies are also linked with country of origin determinations, such as labeling and government procurement regulations.
Rules of origin (ROO),the methodology used to prove country of origin, can be very straightforward—as long as the parts of a product are manufactured and assembled in one country. However, when a finished product's component parts originate in many countries, as is often the case in today's global trading environment—determining origin can be a more complex process.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the U.S. agency responsible for determining country of origin. CBP uses non-preferential ROO to determine the origin of goods imported from countries with which the United States has most-favored-nation (MFN) status. A key principle used in non-preferential ROO cases is "substantial transformation," which means the country in which the product was last substantially transformed, or made into a "new and distinct" product. Since no U.S. laws specifically govern non-preferential ROO, these determinations are made by CBP primarily on a case-by-case basis using CBP's own rules and precedents.
Preferential ROO are used to determine the eligibility of imports from U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) partners to receive FTA benefits, and whether goods from eligible developing countries qualify for tariff benefits under U.S. trade preference programs like the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Preferential ROO apply specifically to each FTA or preference, meaning that they vary from agreement to agreement and preference to preference.
CBP has periodically proposed implementing a more uniform system of determining non-preferential ROO. CBP's last proposal was made in July 2008, when it suggested that a system implemented under North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) ROO "has proven to be more objective and transparent and provide greater predictability in determining the country of origin of imported merchandise than the system of case-by-case adjudication they would replace." The NAFTA scheme had already been used for several years to determine the origin of imports under NAFTA. The proposed ROO modifications received so many responses from the public that the deadline for public comment was extended twice. Changes in ROO requirements are opposed by some importers due to the costs involved in transitioning to new rules, or because they assert that some products they import might be at a disadvantage under different ROO methodology. According to a subsequent Federal Register notice, CBP implemented a portion of the proposed regulations applicable to a few specific products, including glass optical fiber, pipe fittings and flanges, and greeting cards.
This report deals with ROO in three parts. First, it describes the reasons that country of origin rules are important and describes U.S. laws and methods that provide direction in making ROO determinations. Second, it discusses some of the more controversial issues involving rules of origin, including the apparently subjective nature of some CBP origin determinations, and the effects of the global manufacturing process on ROO. Third, it concludes with some alternatives and options that Congress could consider that might assist in simplifying the process. |
crs_R41363 | crs_R41363_0 | Background
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund, or the Fund) was established in January 2002 as a public-private partnership to provide significant financial support for global responses to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria. By the end of 2011, the Global Fund had approved roughly $22.6 billion to help 150 countries fight HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria. Grants supported by the Global Fund have reportedly provided
AIDS treatment for 3.3 million HIV-positive people, anti-tuberculosis treatment for 8.6 million people, and 230 million insecticide-treated nets for the prevention of malaria. The Global Fund expects to offer new funding for grants in 2014. 4. U.S. Support of the Global Fund
Since the Global Fund was established, the United States has been a strong supporter of the organization. Global AIDS Coordinator, Ambassador Eric Goosby, linked the success of U.S. bilateral HIV/AIDS programs under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to the continuance of the Global Fund:
Our dependency on the Global Fund is a real one.... On October 4, 2010, when Global Fund donors met to make 2011-2013 pledges, the United States made its first multiyear pledge to the Fund of $4 billion. In FY2011 and FY2012, appropriations for the Fund remained at $1.05 billion. In order to meet his multiyear pledge to the Fund, made in 2010, as part of the FY2013 budget request, President Obama requests that the Fund receive an addition $250 million in FY2012 through a transfer of funds from the State Department's bilateral HIV/AIDS funding from that year. At the Global Fund Board's 23 rd meeting, held in May 2011, the board approved a series of measures recommended by the reform working group, including
strengthening the accountability framework —enhancing fiduciary control and risk management, improving the tailoring of risk management approaches to local contexts, and applying stronger standards for implementers; strengthening partnerships —at the country level, introducing formal agreements on technical and management assistance and at the global level, better clarifying partnership roles; enhancing value for money —leveraging the Global Fund's market-shaping role to improve price, quality, and availability of key health products, and encourage reprogramming of funding toward more cost-effective interventions; improving governance —reviewing the Global Fund Board's governance structures and operating procedures to ensure more efficient and effective decision making; and adapting the Global Fund business model —moving from one-size-fits-all solutions to better take into account the grant performance record, implementation risks, and the extent of Global Fund support in countries relative to other health financing. Shortly thereafter, both critics and supporters of the Global Fund released statements about corruption in foreign aid in general and the Global Fund's response to corruption in particular. Issues for Congress
Since making a founding pledge to the Fund in 2001, the United States has strongly supported the Fund: U.S. contributions have remained higher than any other country, U.S. officials have served on various Global Fund boards, and Congress has steadily raised appropriations to the Fund. Although some Members of Congress argue that cuts to these programs could yield important savings, others contend that the cuts would have little impact on the federal deficit, while significantly imperiling the lives of vulnerable populations reliant on U.S. assistance. The section below discusses issues the 112 th Congress might consider as it debates spending levels for the Global Fund. FY2013 Budget Debate
The FY2013 budget request included $1.65 billion for the Global Fund, a significant increase from previous years in contrast to some proposed cuts in bilateral global health programs. Should Congress meet the President's request, the Fund will become an even greater share of U.S. global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria spending in FY2013. Some also argue that the fund allows donors to pool and leverage their resources, reduces overlaps in programming, and has fewer overhead costs. In November 2011, the Global Fund announced that, due to inadequate resources from donors, it would cancel its 11 th round of funding and would not be supporting any new grants until 2014. These included calls to:
1. 3. 7. Despite these achievements, observers raise several issues that could influence U.S. support for the Fund:
The appropriate balance between U.S. support for the Global Fund and bilateral HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs —Since the Global Fund was created, some have weighed U.S. contributions to the Global Fund against U.S. spending on bilateral HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria efforts. The Fund's responses to allegations of corruption —The Global Fund's announcement that funds from some its grants were misspent has opened a rigorous debate in the foreign aid community. On the other hand, some have called for governments to withhold support for the Global Fund until adequate safeguards are established. | The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund, or the Fund) was established in 2002 as a public-private partnership that could provide significant financial support for global responses to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria. By the end of 2011, the Global Fund had approved roughly $22.6 billion to help 150 countries fight these three diseases. According to the Global Fund, from 2002 through 2011, it had supported AIDS treatment for 3.3 million HIV-positive people, anti-tuberculosis treatment for 8.6 million people, and 230 million insecticide-treated nets for the prevention of malaria, saving about 7.7 million lives.
In November 2011, the Global Fund Board announced that due to inadequate resources from donors, it would cancel its 11th round of funding, but would maintain support for existing activities to avoid disruptions in ongoing services. The Fund also announced that it expected to offer new funding for grants in 2014.
The United States has demonstrated strong support for the Global Fund since making a founding pledge in 2001. U.S. officials have served on several Global Fund boards, U.S. contributions to the Fund have surpassed those of any other country, and U.S. global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs have been increasingly coordinated with Global Fund activities. Donors last met on October 4, 2010, to make their pledges for the Global Fund over the next three years. There, the United States made its first multiyear pledge to the Fund of $4 billion.
Despite rigorous debate on the overall budget and the role of foreign aid in particular, the 112th Congress has maintained support for the Global Fund. In both FY2011 and FY2012, Congress appropriated $1.05 billion for the Global Fund, excluding rescissions. In order to meet the $4 billion multiyear pledge made in 2010, the President's FY2013 budget request included $1.65 billion for the Global Fund, a significant increase from previous years. As part of the budget request, the Administration requested a transfer of $250 million from the State Department's FY2012 bilateral HIV/AIDS funding to the Global Fund, bringing the estimated FY2012 funding level to $1.3 billion.
Global health advocates urge Congress to meet the President's FY2013 request for the Fund in order to support the sustainability of its activities and to encourage continued contributions from other donors. Although Congress has traditionally been a strong supporter of the Fund, several issues may affect congressional views about the Fund in the future. Such factors include the following:
Fiscal austerity. Proposals to reduce federal spending continue to dominate foreign aid debates, with some Members of Congress aiming to target foreign aid accounts, including those for global health, in an attempt to balance the budget. At the same time, others argue that cutting back on the relatively small size of foreign aid (about 1% of total budget authority) will do little to cut the deficit, but could imperil the lives of millions.
Oversight and transparency. In early 2011, reports about misuse of Global Fund resources in some grants ignited a debate about corruption in foreign aid in general, and in the Global Fund in particular. Some have called for donors to withhold support for the Fund until better safeguards are established. Others argue the Fund should not be penalized for oversight shortcomings, which are familiar to many aid programs.
Role of the Global Fund in U.S. global health policy. When the Global Fund was established, U.S. bilateral investments in HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB were relatively small. Since then, U.S. bilateral investments in fighting these diseases have grown significantly, particularly since the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) were launched in 2003 and 2005, respectively. Some observers advocate allocating the majority of U.S. funds for global HIV/AIDS and malaria to bilateral programs to ensure sufficient control and oversight of funds. On the other hand, other analysts argue that the Global Fund represents a more efficient and flexible funding mechanism than bilateral programs and offers the United States the ability to pool funds and share risk with other donors, which some believe is particularly important given the challenges of the current fiscal environment.
This report provides background information on the Global Fund, outlines U.S. funding for the Fund, discusses changes the Global Fund has made to improve the efficiency of its programs and address allegations of corruption, and analyzes issues Congress might consider as it debates the appropriate level of U.S support to provide the Fund. |
crs_R43173 | crs_R43173_0 | Introduction
In 2000, Congress passed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a U.S. trade preference program, in order to help spur market-led economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and deepen U.S. trade and investment ties with the region. A related measure, H.R. 1295 , which includes AGOA reauthorization among other tariff reforms, passed the House and Senate in different forms requiring the two chambers to resolve the differences in the bill before it can be sent to the President and become law (see " Proposed Renewal Legislation " section for details). 106-200 ), as amended, is a nonreciprocal preference program that provides duty-free access into the United States for qualifying exports from eligible SSA countries. It highlights the 39 current AGOA beneficiary countries, and notes their eligibility status for other aspects of the AGOA preferences and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In terms of these tariff benefits and country eligibility requirements, AGOA is essentially an expansion of GSP, a U.S. trade preference program that applies to over 120 developing countries, including SSA countries. Apparel production has been a significant component in some countries' economic development. Third-Country Fabric Provision
AGOA's third-country fabric provision is a special rule that allows U.S. apparel imports from least-developed SSA countries to qualify for duty-free treatment even if the yarns and fabrics used in the production of the apparel are imported from non-AGOA countries. Eligibility
Eligibility for the AGOA trade preference program consists of two separate steps. U.S. Imports under AGOA and GSP40
U.S. imports from AGOA countries represent a small share of overall U.S. imports. Excluding crude oil, 35% of U.S. imports from AGOA countries received duty-free treatment under AGOA or GSP. Energy-related products (e.g., crude oil) dominate U.S. imports from SSA under AGOA and GSP, representing 69% of such imports in 2014, though these imports have fallen sharply in the past three years. These and other more advanced manufactured products, such as chemicals, come almost exclusively from South Africa. Figure 2 highlights the top exporters of non-energy products to the United States under both programs. Among the other countries that have made significant use of the preferences, apparel exports account for most of their AGOA exports. Reauthorization Debate
AGOA's authorization is set to expire on September 30, 2015. In light of economic improvements in the region, some observers are calling for a greater focus on two-way trade in AGOA. The European Union (EU), however, successfully concluded an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with South Africa and other countries in the region, providing reciprocal preferential tariff treatment to EU exports, though these agreements exclude a range of products. A handful of AGOA countries, particularly Kenya, Lesotho, and Mauritius, provide the bulk of apparel exports under AGOA. Congress may wish to consider how AGOA-directed TCB funding could support this implementation process. While a majority of products are covered under AGOA, some of the excluded products are competitively produced in AGOA countries, particularly agricultural products. Proposed Renewal Legislation
Bills to renew the AGOA preference program ( H.R. Key issues addressed in the bills include (1) a ten year renewal of the overall program including the regional apparel article program and the third-country fabric provision; (2) modifications to the rules of origin allowing for the "direct costs of processing operations" to count toward a product's required regional value content to qualify for duty-free treatment; (3) changes to the eligibility review process administered by the President, including a required 60-day notification to Congress before termination of preferential treatment for beneficiary countries, a requirement to seek public comments and hold a public hearing on eligibility reviews as well as establish a public petition process open at all times, authorization of an out-of-cycle review process and a sense of Congress that the President should initiate such a review of South Africa within 30 days of enactment, and the ability to withdrawal, suspend, or limit preferential treatment rather than full termination; (4) sense of Congress that beneficiary countries should develop utilization strategies together with U.S. trade capacity building agencies; (5) policy statement to expand trade and investment by negotiating trade and investment framework agreements (TIFAs), bilateral investment treaties (BITs), FTAs with beneficiary countries and through accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements for beneficiary countries; (6) a biennial report on U.S. trade and investment relations with the region, eligibility status, regional integration efforts, and trade capacity building efforts; and (7) a report one year after enactment and five years thereafter that discusses the status of negotiating FTA's with sub-Saharan African countries. H.R. 1891 was reported by the House Committee on Ways and Means without amendment. The Senate Finance Committee considered a related measure, S. 1267 , which includes modifications to the U.S. harmonized tariff schedule, in addition to the preference renewal language in S. 1009 . On May 14, the Senate passed the provisions of S. 1267 , by including them as an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1295 . On June 11, the House passed with further amendment, the Senate amended version of H.R. 1295 . Sub-Saharan African Countries | The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is a nonreciprocal trade preference program that provides duty-free treatment to U.S. imports of certain products from eligible sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. There are 49 candidate SSA countries with 39 currently eligible for the preference benefits. Congress first authorized AGOA in 2000 to encourage export-led growth and economic development in SSA and improve U.S. economic relations with the region. Its current authorization expires on September 30, 2015.
Bills to renew the preference program (H.R. 1891/S. 1009) were introduced in the House and Senate in April. H.R. 1891 was reported by the House Committee on Ways and Means without amendment. The Senate Finance Committee reported a related measure, S. 1267, with two amendments. On May 14, the Senate passed the provisions of S. 1267, by including them as an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1295. On June 11, the House passed a further amended version of H.R. 1295. The two chambers must resolve the differences in H.R. 1295 before the AGOA renewal legislation can be sent to the President and become law.
In terms of tariff benefits and general eligibility criteria, AGOA is similar to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a U.S. trade preference program that applies to more than 120 developing countries. AGOA, however, covers more products and includes additional eligibility criteria beyond those in GSP. Additionally, AGOA includes trade and development provisions beyond its duty-free preferences.
U.S. imports from AGOA beneficiary countries (AGOA countries) represent a small share (1%) of total U.S. imports and are largely concentrated in energy-related products. Oil is consistently the top duty-free U.S. import from AGOA countries, accounting for 68% of such imports in 2014. Despite remaining the top U.S. import under AGOA, U.S. oil imports from the region have fallen by 80% or nearly $40 billion since 2011. Among non-energy products, apparel is the top export for a number of AGOA countries. U.S. apparel imports typically face relatively high tariffs and are excluded from duty-free treatment in GSP, but are included in the AGOA preferences, giving AGOA countries a competitive advantage over other apparel producers. A handful of countries, primarily Lesotho, Kenya, and Mauritius, make significant use of the apparel benefits. Apart from apparel and energy products, South Africa accounts for the bulk of U.S. imports under AGOA. As the most economically advanced country in the region, South Africa also exports a much more diverse range of manufactured goods than other AGOA countries; vehicles in particular have become a major South African export under AGOA.
Most observers agree that AGOA has successfully led to increased and more diversified exports to the United States from sub-Saharan African countries. Despite this, Congress may wish to address a number of issues and challenges as it considers possible reauthorization of AGOA. Among these challenges is how current and potential AGOA beneficiaries can better utilize the AGOA program and its duty-free benefits. Studies suggest that even among some countries that do make significant use of the AGOA preferences, the lower-skill apparel production which AGOA has spurred has not led to the production of higher-skill manufactured products. Other issues relate to the nonreciprocal nature of the AGOA preferences. Some argue that the United States should focus more on two-way trade agreements with the region, particularly with more advanced countries such as South Africa, given improving economic conditions in Africa in recent years. The European Union (EU), for example, has negotiated Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with several African countries that provide some reciprocal tariff benefits, potentially placing U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage relative to European firms in some markets. |
crs_R44353 | crs_R44353_0 | The eighth year of a presidency is significant, in part, because it is the final opportunity for a President to appoint individuals as U.S. circuit and district court judges. Such judges have what effectively has come to mean life tenure, holding office "during good Behaviour." This report, in light of continued Senate interest in the judicial confirmation process, provides statistics related to final Senate action on U.S. circuit and district court nominations during the eighth year of the George W. Bush, Clinton, and Reagan presidencies. Additionally, for the purposes of this report, final Senate action occurs either when the Senate confirms a nomination during a President's eighth year or when a nomination is returned to the President during his eighth year (and not resubmitted by the President and ultimately approved by the Senate). The specific statistics and data discussed below include (1) the number and percentage of U.S. circuit and district court nominees confirmed or returned during the eighth year of each presidency; (2) the number and percentage of U.S. circuit and district court nominees confirmed during a President's eighth year who were nominated either during a President's eighth year or prior to his eighth year; (3) the number of U.S. circuit and district court nominees confirmed each month during a President's eighth year; and (4) the final date during each President's eighth year on which the Senate confirmed U.S. circuit and district court nominees. The number of nominations not approved by the Senate and returned at the end of a President's eighth year in office ranged from a low of 9 (in 1988, during the Reagan presidency) to a high of 18 during the Clinton presidency. Table 1 also shows, for each of the three presidencies, fewer than half of all circuit court nominations on which the Senate acted during a President's eighth year in office were confirmed by the Senate—specifically, 23.5%, 30.8%, and 43.7% were confirmed during the eighth year of the George W. Bush, Clinton, and Reagan presidencies, respectively. Each of the three Presidents had at least one circuit court nomination made for the first time during his eighth year in office that was also approved by the Senate during his eighth year. For the two most recent Presidents in the comparison group, George W. Bush and Clinton, there were no circuit court nominees approved by the Senate after June or July, respectively, of each President's eighth year in office. Of the three most recent Presidents with a full eighth year in office, the number of U.S. district court nominees confirmed during the eighth year ranged from a low of 24 (in 2008, during the George W. Bush presidency) to a high of 33 (in 1988, during the Reagan presidency). The number of nominations not approved by the Senate and returned at the end of a President's eighth year in office ranged from a low of 12 during the Reagan presidency to a high of 25 (in 2000, during the Clinton presidency). For each President in the comparison group, a majority of district court nominees confirmed during his eighth year in office were also nominated for the first time during the eighth year—specifically, 62.5%, 77.4%, and 57.6% were nominated for the first time (and confirmed) during the eighth year of the George W. Bush, Clinton, and Reagan presidencies, respectively. | This report, in light of continued Senate interest in the judicial confirmation process during a President's final year in office, provides statistics related to Senate action on U.S. circuit and district court nominations during the eighth year of the George W. Bush, Clinton, and Reagan presidencies. The eighth year of a presidency is significant, in part, because it is the final opportunity for a President to appoint individuals as U.S. circuit and district court judges. Such judges have what effectively has come to mean life tenure, holding office "during good Behaviour."
For the purposes of this report, final Senate action occurs either when the Senate confirms a nomination during a President's eighth year or when a nomination is returned to the President during his eighth year (and not resubmitted and ultimately approved by the Senate).
Some of the report's findings include the following:
Of the three presidencies, the number of U.S. circuit court nominees confirmed during the eighth year ranged from a low of 4 (during the Bush presidency) to a high of 8 (during the Clinton presidency). The number of circuit court nominations not approved by the Senate and returned at the end of a President's eighth year in office ranged from a low of 9 (during the Reagan presidency) to a high of 18 during the Clinton presidency. Fewer than half of all circuit court nominations on which the Senate acted during a President's eighth year in office were confirmed by the Senate—specifically, 23.5%, 30.8%, and 43.7% were confirmed during the eighth year of the Bush, Clinton, and Reagan presidencies, respectively. Each of the three Presidents had at least one circuit court nomination made for the first time during his eighth year in office that was also approved by the Senate during his eighth year. During each President's eighth year in office, there was at least one month in which the Senate confirmed two or more of a President's circuit court nominees. For the two most recent Presidents in the comparison group, Bush and Clinton, there were no circuit court nominees approved by the Senate after June or July, respectively, of each President's eighth year in office. Of the three presidencies, the number of U.S. district court nominees confirmed during the eighth year ranged from a low of 24 (during the Bush presidency) to a high of 33 (during the Reagan presidency). The number of district court nominations not approved by the Senate and returned at the end of a President's eighth year in office ranged from a low of 12 during the Reagan presidency to a high of 25 (during the Clinton presidency). A majority of district court nominations that received final action during each President's eighth year in office were confirmed by the Senate—specifically, 54.5%, 55.4%, and 73.3% were confirmed during the eighth year of the Bush, Clinton, and Reagan presidencies, respectively. During each President's eighth year in office, there were at least two months in which the Senate confirmed more than five district court nominees each month. Senate confirmation of district court nominations extended into the final three or four months of each presidency. |
crs_R40169 | crs_R40169_0 | Federal dams have had an effect on salmon and steelhead populations in the Columbia Basin since the 1938 construction of Bonneville Dam, the first dam in the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS). FCRPS now includes federal hydropower dams in the Columbia Basin that are operated by either the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) or Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation). Currently, eight evolutionarily significant units (ESUs) of salmon and five distinct populations segments (DPSs) of steelhead in the Columbia Basin are listed as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) of the Department of Commerce has found that the estimated "current annual salmon and steelhead production in the Columbia River Basin is more than 10 million fish below historical levels, with 8 million of this annual loss attributable to hydropower development and operation." Consultation and Biological Opinions
The ESA requires federal actions, such as FCRPS operations, to be reviewed to determine whether they are likely to jeopardize the continued existence of threatened and endangered species or damage the species' critical habitat. The Corps, Reclamation, and BPA are the action agencies for purposes of operating the FCRPS and the consultation process under the ESA. If jeopardy is found, NMFS is required to include reasonable and prudent alternatives (RPAs) to the proposed action in order to avoid jeopardy, provided such alternatives are possible. Some actions intended to benefit salmon, such as spilling water to help juveniles pass safely downstream, come at a cost in terms of energy production. Rather than evaluate the aggregate impact of the FCRPS on the protected species, NMFS only evaluated the discretionary elements of the FCRPS operations. 2005 Snake River BiOp
In 2005, NMFS issued a BiOp separately addressing the effects of Reclamation's proposed operations on a portion of the Snake River (2005 Snake River BiOp). For the first time since 1995, the court ruled that a portion of NMFS's BiOp complied with the ESA. 2014 Supplement—Avoiding Jeopardy Through RPAs
In January 2014, NMFS issued a second supplement to the 2008 BiOp. The plaintiffs challenged the 2014 Supplement, and, on May 6, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon again concluded that NMFS did not satisfy the ESA. Through a newly assigned judge, Judge Michael H. Simon, the court cited flaws in NMFS's conclusion that protected species could be "trending toward recovery" even if the overall population levels remained critically low, called NMFS's habitat improvement data "too uncertain," and found that NMFS did not properly analyze the effects of climate change. Although the court found the 2014 Supplement to be arbitrary and capricious, it did not vacate the BiOp. Instead, it remanded for further consultation to be completed by March 1, 2018, and ordered NMFS to keep the 2014 Supplement in place in the interim. The challengers to the 2014 Supplement also successfully asserted a new claim that the action agencies (the Corps and Reclamation) violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") because they did not prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) in connection with the RPAs in the 2014 Supplement. | The decline of salmon and steelhead populations in the Columbia Basin began in the second half of the 19th Century. Activities such as logging, farming, mining, irrigation, and commercial fishing all contributed to the decline, and populations further declined since the construction and operation of the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) in the mid-1900s. In 1991, the Snake River sockeye became the first Pacific salmon stock identified as endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). There are now 13 salmon and steelhead stocks that are listed as either threatened or endangered.
FCRPS operations have been analyzed through an ESA process intended to address the impact of operations on protected species. The ESA requires the federal operators of the FCRPS—the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), and the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)—to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) of the Department of Commerce on how the FCRPS may impact listed species. At the end of the consultation, NMFS issues a biological opinion (BiOp) addressing whether the FCRPS action would jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or damage its critical habitat. If jeopardy is found, NMFS is required to develop reasonable and prudent alternatives (RPAs) to the proposed action in order to avoid jeopardy.
NMFS can recommend mitigation measures to avoid jeopardy, but protective measures for fish often come at a cost in terms of energy generation or irrigation supply from FCRPS. This tension between natural resources and energy production and irrigation is at the heart of conflict in the Columbia Basin.
Beginning in 1992, NMFS issued a series of BiOps, nearly every one of which courts have found inconsistent with the ESA. Since 2000, federal courts have rejected all or part of NMFS's four prior BiOps and their supplements. While courts have consistently demanded changes to the BiOps, they also allowed portions of each BiOp to stay in place so that FCRPS operations could continue while the federal agencies attempted to remedy the BiOps.
Most recently, in May 2016, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon held that NMFS's 2014 supplemental BiOp (2014 Supplement) did not comply with the ESA. The court cited flaws in NMFS's conclusion that protected species could be "trending toward recovery" even if the overall population levels remained critically low. The court also called NMFS's habitat improvement data "too uncertain" and found that NMFS did not properly analyze the effects of climate change.
The district court also held that the FCRPS action agencies (the Corps, BPA, and Reclamation) violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) by failing to prepare an environmental impact statement in connection with their proposals for operation of the FCRPS. Although it found the 2014 Supplement to be arbitrary and capricious, the court did not vacate the BiOp. Instead, it remanded for further consultation to be completed by March 1, 2018, and ordered NMFS to keep the 2014 Supplement in place in the interim. |
crs_RL34708 | crs_RL34708_0 | A variety of legislative issues have raised interest in the First Amendment implications of mandatory public health programs, such as the minimum coverage requirements enacted in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or considerations of vaccination programs to prevent an outbreak of serious illness that may arise from potential acts of bioterrorism. This report will discuss the legal issues that arise in the context of religious exemptions for mandatory health care programs. It will discuss constitutional and statutory provisions relating to religious protection and how such laws have been applied in the medical context. The report will also briefly address examples of health care programs that have included religious exemptions. It will analyze whether the U.S. Constitution requires religious exemptions for mandatory health care programs and whether, if not required, the Constitution allows religious exemptions for such programs. Federal and state courts have addressed these issues of forced care for patients with religious objections to medical care. Examples of Religious Exemptions for Health Care Programs
Federal Health Insurance Coverage Requirements
Individual Responsibility Requirement
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. State Mandatory Vaccination Programs
As a matter of public health, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws requiring vaccination, particularly in the context of school immunization laws. Exemptions that allow certain individuals to claim religious objections to a process required for others also may give the appearance of distinct treatment for those individuals who have religious objections in violation of equal protection doctrine. The court held that requiring certain individuals to be vaccinated while still allowing them to be exposed to individuals who are exempted does not provide equal protection and is therefore unconstitutional. Medicare Revenue Programs
The U.S. tax code includes several provisions that provide religious exceptions to certain revenue programs relating to health care. Does the Constitution Require a Religious Exemption for Mandatory Health Care Programs? Does the Constitution Allow a Religious Exemption for Mandatory Health Care Programs? | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148), enacted in 2010, established requirements for employers and individuals to ensure the provision or availability of certain health care coverage. Additionally, the threat of bioterrorism has caused some to consider the possibility of introducing vaccination programs to prevent an outbreak of serious illnesses. Programs like health care coverage and vaccinations have the potential to violate certain religious beliefs and therefore may conflict with the First Amendment. In the continuing debate over issues for which mandatory health care programs might be solutions, questions have been raised about the legal issues relating to exemptions for health care programs.
For the purposes of this report, mandatory health care programs are those which require individuals to take some action relating to a health care policy objective. A variety of mandatory health care programs currently exists at the federal and state levels. Some programs are medical programs that require individuals to participate in a medical program, while some programs are financial programs that require individuals to pay for program costs. For example, all 50 states and the District of Columbia require children to be vaccinated for certain illnesses and diseases before entering school. At the federal level, the tax system requires individuals to pay taxes that fund Medicare to provide health care to elderly citizens. In some instances, mandatory health care programs include exemptions that allow qualified persons to opt out of the required action. Religious exemptions permit individuals who object to the program based on religious beliefs to avoid compromising those beliefs.
This report will discuss the legal issues that arise in the context of religious exemptions for mandatory health care programs. It will discuss constitutional and statutory provisions relating to religious protection and how such laws have been applied in the medical context. The report will also briefly address examples of health care programs that have included religious exemptions. It will analyze whether the U.S. Constitution requires religious exemptions for mandatory health care programs and whether, if not required, the Constitution allows religious exemptions for such programs. |
crs_R40529 | crs_R40529_0 | Classification of biomass as an energy resource has prompted the investigation of its use for purposes additional to liquid fuel (e.g., on-site heating and lighting purposes, off-site electricity). Biomass
Biomass is organic matter that can be converted into energy. Common examples of biomass include food crops, crops for energy (e.g., switchgrass or prairie perennials), crop residues (e.g., corn stover), wood waste and byproducts (both mill residues and traditionally noncommercial biomass in the woods), and animal manure. Others contend that biomass has seen limited use as an energy source thus far because it is not readily available as a year-round feedstock, is often located at dispersed sites, can be expensive to transport, lacks long-term performance data, requires costly technology to convert to energy, and might not meet quality specifications to reliably fuel electric generators. Legislative History
The term biomass was first introduced by Congress in the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 ( P.L. The tax code contains four additional definitions. In total, 14 biomass definitions have been included in legislation and the tax code since 2004. Thus, because the various definitions determine which feedstocks can be used under the various programs, the definitions are critical to the research, development, and application of biomass used to produce energy. Analysis of Biomass Definitions
Of the many biomass definitions, two may be considered by policy makers, scientists, and program managers as the most comprehensive for energy production purposes: the definition in Title IX of the 2008 farm bill and the definition in Title II of EISA. In the 113 th Congress, there was some congressional discussion and legislation to expand the EISA definition to include biomass from federal lands to better meet the RFS biofuels usage mandate. Advocates of the renewable biomass definition in the 2008 farm bill include groups who seek to use the potentially substantial volumes of waste woody biomass from federal lands and other (non-plantation) forest lands (e.g., waste from timber harvests, from pre-commercial thinnings, or from wildfire fuel reduction treatments) as a source of renewable energy. Recent agricultural and energy legislation has incorporated provisions and established programs to promote the development and use of biomass as a renewable energy source. However, there also have been efforts in Congress to stall or prevent the use of biomass for energy production, which in turn would impact biomass feedstock development. For instance, there were repeated attempts to eliminate certain portions of the Renewable Fuel Standard ( H.R. The biomass definition in legislation influences decisions on the types of crops grown, where they are grown, and their potential preferred energy uses, among other things. 4426 , H.R. 4956 , H.R. 3084 , S. 1267 ). Forthcoming congressional consideration of energy issues, particularly legislation involving the Renewable Fuel Standard or energy tax incentives, may prompt further discussion about the biomass definition in the 114 th Congress. | The use of biomass as an energy feedstock has regularly been presented as a potentially viable alternative to address U.S. energy security concerns, foreign oil dependence, and rural economic development, and as a tool to possibly help improve the environment (e.g., through greenhouse gas emission reduction). Biomass (organic matter that can be converted into energy) may include food crops, crops grown specifically to produce energy (e.g., switchgrass or prairie perennials), crop residues, wood waste and byproducts, and animal manure. Most legislation involving biomass has focused on encouraging the production of liquid fuels from corn. Efforts to promote the use of biomass for power generation have focused on wood, wood residues, and milling waste. Comparatively less emphasis has been placed on the use of non-corn-based biomass feedstocks—other food crops, non-food crops, crop residues, animal manure, and more—as renewable energy sources for liquid fuel use or for power generation. This is partly due to the variety, lack of availability, and dispersed location of non-corn-based biomass feedstock. The technology development status and costs to convert non-corn-based biomass into energy are also viewed by some as obstacles to rapid technology deployment.
To aid in understanding the role of biomass as an energy resource, this report investigates the characterization of biomass in legislation. For over 30 years, the term biomass has been a part of legislation enacted by Congress for various programs, indicating some interest by the general public and policy makers in expanding its use. Biomass-related legislation has provided financial incentives to develop technologies that use biomass. How biomass is defined influences decisions about the types of crops that are grown, where they are grown, and potential preferred energy uses, among other things. There have been 14 biomass definitions included in legislation and in the tax code since 2004.
Future discussions about energy—particularly legislation involving the Renewable Fuel Standard, energy tax incentives, or tribal biomass demonstration projects—may prompt further discussion about the definition of biomass. For example, one point of contention regarding the biomass definition and the Renewable Fuel Standard is whether the term should be defined to include biomass from federal lands. Some argue that removal of biomass from these lands may lead to ecological harm. Others contend that biomass from federal lands can aid the production of renewable energy to meet certain mandates (e.g., the Renewable Fuel Standard) and that removal of biomass can enhance forest protection from wildfires.
Bills introduced in the 113th Congress (e.g., H.R. 4426, H.R. 4956, H.R. 3084, S. 1267) would have modified the biomass definition. However, little legislative action occurred regarding the definition of biomass in the 113th Congress. This report lists biomass definitions enacted by Congress in legislation and the tax code since 2004, and discusses the similarities and differences among the definitions. |
crs_R41698 | crs_R41698_0 | As amended and passed, Division B of H.R. 1 would have provided adjusted funding levels through the end of FY2011 for 11 of the 12 regular appropriations bills, including the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill which funds the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). On March 9, 2011, the Senate did not pass the House-passed version of H.R. 1 and did not agree to a subsequent substitute amendment to the bill ( S.Amdt. Several recent and pending EPA regulatory actions were the focus of considerable attention during the House floor debate and subsequently were included in the form of amendments in the House-passed bill. 149 ) and the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 ( P.L. 112-10 ; H.R. 1473 ), enacted April 15, 2011. 1 , this report highlights a number of these provisions and provides a summary of funding levels for EPA accounts and program activities specified in House-passed H.R. Only those provisions affecting EPA programs that are clearly identifiable by specific language or references as in the bill are included in this report. The information primarily is a compilation of excerpts of the bill language for purposes of reference and is not intended to provide a complete listing and analysis of all provisions contained in H.R. 1 that may otherwise directly or indirectly affect EPA programs. Background
Congress and the President did not complete action on any of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2011, including the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill that provides funding for EPA, prior to the end of FY2010. Beginning October 1, 2010 (the start of FY2011), EPA and other federal departments and agencies were funded under a series of interim CRs. Prior to the enactment of P.L. 112-10 on April 15, 2011, P.L. P.L. As amended and passed by the House on February 19, 2011, Title VII of Division B in H.R. 1 specified funding levels of certain EPA accounts for the full fiscal year instead of a temporary period as in earlier CRs, as well as several provisions restricting or prohibiting the use of appropriated funds to implement certain regulatory activities under the agency's jurisdiction. Additional provisions relevant to EPA were included in Division D of the House-passed H.R. These EPA regulatory actions cut across the various environmental pollution control statutes' programs and initiatives, such as those that address greenhouse gas emissions, hazardous air pollutants (including mercury), mountaintop mining regulation, management of coal ash, particulate matter emissions, and water quality management including geographical ecosystems (notably Chesapeake Bay and the Great Lakes). Title VII of Division B in the Senate substitute amendment ( S.Amdt. 112-10 and FY2010 in P.L. The funding in the two proposals is compared to the FY2011 (not including the 0.2% across-the-board rescission ) and FY2010 enacted appropriations, and as proposed in the President's FY2011 request. 149 are specified for EPA accounts (and certain program activities specified in those accounts) as per provisions in the act, the bill as passed by the House on February 19, 2011, and in the Senate amendment ( S.Amdt. 111-88 . 112-10 , House-passed H.R. P.L. H.R. 149 and P.L. 112-10 . | P.L. 112-10, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (H.R. 1473), enacted April 15, 2011, provided $8.70 billion for EPA for FY2011 prior to a 0.2% across-the-board rescission. None of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2011, including the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies bill that includes funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), were enacted before the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2010. Prior to the enactment of P.L. 112-10, a series of temporary continuing resolutions (CRs) were enacted that sequentially extended funding from October 1, 2010, through April 15, 2011 (P.L. 112-8). Passed by the House on February 19, 2011, Division B of H.R. 1 would have funded 11 of the 12 regular FY2011 appropriations bills in the form of a full-year continuing resolution (CR) (Division A separately would have provided FY2011 appropriations for the Department of Defense, the 12th bill).
Several recent and pending EPA regulatory actions were the focus of considerable attention during committee hearings and floor debate on EPA FY2011 appropriations, and were reflected in a number of provisions and amendments included in House-passed H.R. 1. These EPA actions cut across the various environmental pollution control statutes' programs and initiatives, such as those that address greenhouse gas emissions, hazardous air pollutants (including mercury), mountaintop mining regulation, management of coal ash, particulate matter emissions, and water quality management including geographical ecosystems (notably Chesapeake Bay and the Great Lakes). Although Congress did not include the provisions in P.L. 112-10, these environmental regulatory issues remain a prominent topic of debate as Congress deliberates on the FY2012 appropriations and other proposed legislation regarding EPA's authorities.
Title VII of Division B in H.R. 1, as passed by the House, included specified funding levels for certain EPA accounts. Title VII of Division B, as well as Division D of the House-passed bill, combined contained more than 20 provisions that would have restricted or prohibited the use of appropriated funds to implement various regulatory activities under the EPA's jurisdiction. On March 9, 2011, the Senate did not pass the House version of H.R. 1 and did not agree to a subsequent Senate substitute amendment (S.Amdt. 149) containing different funding levels and generally omitting the EPA provisions included in the House-passed H.R. 1.
This report provides a summary of funding levels for EPA accounts and program activities specified in P.L. 112-10, H.R. 1 as passed by the House and as proposed in the Senate amendment, compared to the President's FY2011 Budget Request and the FY2010 enacted levels in P.L. 111-88. The report also briefly highlights a number of the provisions regarding EPA program activities as presented in H.R. 1, as passed by the House. Only those provisions that are clearly identifiable by specific language or references contained in the bill are included. Nearly all of these EPA provisions were omitted from the Senate amendment (S.Amdt. 149) and P.L. 112-10 as enacted. The information presented throughout this report is primarily an extraction of the bill language for purposes of reference and is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of all provisions in H.R. 1 that may have directly or indirectly affected EPA programs. |
crs_R42073 | crs_R42073_0 | The Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 ( P.L. On March 30, 2011, President Barack Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (henceforth PPD-8) initiating the development of national preparedness policies that will fulfill many aspects of the mandate. Cumulatively, PPD-8 and its component policies are to guide how the nation "will prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation." PPD-8 rescinded the existing Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness (henceforth HSPD-8), which was released and signed by President George W. Bush on December 17, 2003. PPD-8 policy evolves from HSPD-8 by:
Expanding the scope of the end-state objective in the National Preparedness Goal to include mitigation as a key mission area for national preparedness, in addition to prevention, protection, response, and recovery; Modifying the capabilities-based planning approach through a reduced focus on national planning scenarios; Identifying a different set of national capabilities needed to achieve national preparedness in each mission area; and Directing the creation of National Planning Frameworks for all identified mission areas of national preparedness. These include evaluating: how PPD-8 policies conform with PKEMRA statute; how federal roles and responsibilities have been assigned to implement and execute PPD-8 policies; how non-federal resources and stakeholders will be impacted by national preparedness guidance; and how the overall federal budget may be reprioritized by a new national preparedness goal. This definition is echoed in the Implementation Plan for PPD-8. Current Status of PPD-8 Implementation
In addition to the main Directive, an Implementation Plan for PPD-8 and the National Preparedness Goal were completed in 2011. Two of the National Planning Frameworks are also complete. Multiple component PPD-8 policy documents are still being developed. However, PPD-8 notably differs from HSPD-8 in that it addresses mitigating threats and hazards. It may be particularly challenging to coordinate their available resources and assign responsibilities in this Framework. Additionally, Congress may wish to examine individual National Planning Frameworks, including the conformity of the National Disaster Recovery Framework to the PKEMRA mandate in 6 U.S.C. Further, some elements of PPD-8 policy may not be finalized until at least the end of September 2012. | Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) was signed and released by President Barack Obama on March 30, 2011. PPD-8 and its component policies intend to guide how the nation, from the federal level to private citizens, can "prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation." These threats include terrorist acts, natural disasters, and other man-made incidents. PPD-8 evolves from, and supersedes, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, which was released under President George W. Bush. PPD-8 is intended to meet many requirements of Subtitle C of the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-295, 6 U.S.C. §741- 764).
In addition to the main Directive, an Implementation Plan for PPD-8 and a National Preparedness Goal were finalized in 2011. Two National Planning Frameworks are also complete, but multiple component PPD-8 policy documents are still being developed. Some elements of PPD-8 may not be finalized until September 2012 or later. However, PPD-8 has already affected national preparedness policy by expanding the scope of the end-state objective for preparedness, modifying the capabilities-based planning methodology, identifying a new set of national capabilities, and directing the creation of more National Planning Frameworks. It is anticipated that the five National Planning Frameworks—one each for prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery—will assign federal roles and responsibilities in each mission area. The National Planning Frameworks are also to guide how nonfederal resources are leveraged, including non-profit and private sectors' resources.
Congress may wish to oversee how the Administration creates and implements the many elements of PPD-8. This report discusses several potential issues and challenges that may arise in the development and implementation of each National Planning Framework. These issues and challenges include evaluating: how PPD-8 policies conform with statute; how federal roles and responsibilities have been assigned to implement and execute PPD-8 policies; how non-federal resources and stakeholders will be impacted by national preparedness guidance; and how the overall federal budget may be reprioritized by a new national preparedness goal. However, it may be difficult to ascertain the full impact of PPD-8 on national preparedness until its provisions are fully operationalized and tested during real world hazards.
This report will be updated as required by any significant developments in the implementation of PPD-8. |
crs_RL31923 | crs_RL31923_0 | Price risk may also be managed through inventory control. Long term contracting at fixed prices might also reduce the firm's exposure to price volatility. The chosen strategy must be cost effective, flexible, and reliable. Financial derivative based strategies fit these requirements for many firms in the energy industries. While cash settlement expands the spectrum of participants in the market and is more efficient than physical delivery for most contract holders, it can create the perception that the motivation and focus of the contracts are a purely financial bet on the future price of oil rather than a business strategy designed to reduce risk. Through the use of OTC derivatives, the firm may be able to eliminate basis risk and more effectively hedge the effects of price risk. In many strategies, options are put together in combination to achieve the risk management goals of the company. Each of these transactions, as well as both taken together, could be legitimate hedging transactions. Also, the time frame can be important. This question has been answered for the traded derivative sector. As a result, the organized markets, including the NYMEX, self regulate with oversight by the Commission. However, the collapse of Enron's trading operations did put a chill on OTC energy trading and led to calls for a variety of specific reforms which are discussed later in this report. The use of derivatives might have the effect of reducing the cost of capital for firms, enhancing their real capital investment, and increasing their value. Although there is little direct evidence that the use of derivatives increases the value of the firm, the near universality of use by energy firms, as shown by the EIA, suggests that a wide spectrum of energy managers see value in using derivatives to manage risk. Derivatives and Commodity Prices
Since the value of a derivative contract is based on the value of the underlying commodity, when the price of the commodity varies the result is a variation in the price of the derivative. Specifically with respect to price volatility, the study found that changes in hedge fund positions, in both the crude oil and natural gas markets, tended to reduce price volatility, lending a stabilizing factor to the market. Senator Dianne Feinstein proposed derivatives legislation, ( S. 1951 ), in the Senate, while, independently, Representative Peter DeFazio introduced a bill, ( H.R. 4038 ), in the House of Representatives. Legislation introduced in the 109 th Congress focused on data reporting and the transparency of OTC trades. H.R. The proposals discussed above all touch on the issue of price transparency. | Risk management is important in the energy industries because of the volatility of oil and natural gas prices. Price volatility can reduce the profit of business strategies and hurt consumers. The use of financial derivatives, both traded and over-the-counter, has developed as a low cost method of hedging price risk. However, the use of derivatives has also been linked to major financial scandals and bankruptcies.
Risk management strategies can be undertaken without the use of derivatives. Vertical integration of the production process, inventory control, and long-term, fixed price contracts can all compensate for the effects of price volatility. Whether one of these choices, or a derivative strategy, is chosen depends on the cost and flexibility of each alternative. Derivative use has expanded rapidly both in value and volume.
Exchange traded and over-the-counter derivatives have different characteristics with respect to their liquidity, safety, transparency and flexibility. The benefits and costs of using either instrument depend on the circumstances and goals of the firm setting up the strategy. A wide variety of derivative contracts exists, including forwards, futures, options and swaps which can be put together to achieve a wide variety of objectives.
Although exchange traded derivatives are self regulated with oversight by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, over-the-counter derivatives are largely unregulated. Whether these transactions should be regulated might depend on their effect on commodity price volatility, their effect on the stability and integrity of U.S. capital markets, their ability to reduce the cost of capital, enhancing domestic real investment and the value of more open disclosure and price transparency.
Congress considered proposed derivative legislation in the 107th Congress. Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced legislation in the Senate, while Representative Peter DeFazio independently introduced a bill in the House. In the 108th Congress, Representative DeFazio again introduced a derivative regulation bill (H.R. 1109) and the 109th Congress considered H.R. 1638 and S. 509. In the time since the collapse of Enron, many specific proposals to reform the derivative markets have appeared. These include tying derivative trading more closely to the underlying business interests of the market traders, establishing a clearinghouse to manage transactions, establishing structured derivative trading companies and enhancing reporting and documentation requirements. Each proposal has its strengths, but each could also reduce the effectiveness of the derivative industry in managing risk.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL31759 | crs_RL31759_0 | According to many observers, themost serious challenge facing Afghans and Afghanistan today remains the lack of security. Most observers agreeon the need for substantial, long-term reconstruction and the need for international support, butquestions are raised about the funds required, the priorities, and the coordination necessary for thisprocess. This report examines U.S. foreign aid to Afghanistan in the context of the internationaleffort and explores the major issues for Congress. As a result of decades of violent conflict, Afghanistan is in great need of substantial reconstruction, from roads and schools to a broad range of development projects encompassing thewhole country. According to USAID, the decades of civil war and proxy regional war have createdfour intertwining and competing economies in Afghanistan. Effective reconstruction assistance could reconfigure these economies, reduce the war and drug economies, and provide incentives for viable economic growth. Humanitarian Assistance. (10)
According to the Afghan government, the United Nations, and international NGOs, the lack of security remains the most serious challenge. (16)
Reconstruction Goals
The international recovery and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan is immense and complicated, with the Afghan government, numerous U.N. agencies, bilateral donors, manyinternational organizations, and countless NGOs working to help Afghanistan. The internationalcommunity and the Afghan government have sought to establish a common set of goals in order toutilize donor funds most effectively. New Coordinating Institutions. (34)
Funding
International and U.S. Funding Levels
Areas of concern include whether the funding levels to Afghanistan are adequate and whether funding is being used for reconstruction. Donor countries have committed $1.7 billion and, from that, disbursed $1.5 billion. Reconstruction Programs
Government Capacity Building. (62)
Women's Programs. (70)
Road Construction. Agricultural Rehabilitation. Urban Reconstruction. Energy. Education. Health. Communications and Media. Funding
In March 2003, the next major donor conference for Afghanistan will take place. | Afghanistan has taken the first step toward reconstruction. According to many observers, the most serious challenge facing Afghans and Afghanistan today remains the lack of security. Mostexperts agree on the need for substantial, long-term reconstruction with international support, butquestions are raised about the funds required, the priorities, and the coordination necessary for thisprocess. This report examines U.S. foreign aid to Afghanistan in the context of the internationaleffort and explores the major issues for Congress.
As a result of decades of violent conflict, Afghanistan is in great need of substantial reconstruction, from roads and schools to a broad range of development projects encompassing thewhole country. Decades of civil war and proxy regional wars have created four intertwining andcompeting economies in Afghanistan revolving around war, drugs, agriculture, and humanitarian aidthat drive conflicting incentives for Afghans and their neighbors. Effective reconstruction assistancecould reconfigure these economies and provide incentives for viable economic growth.
The international recovery and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan is immense and complicated, with the Afghan government, numerous U.N. agencies, bilateral donors, manyinternational organizations, and countless non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working to helpAfghanistan. The international community and the Afghan government have sought to establishcoordinating institutions and a common set of goals in order to utilize donor funds most effectively. Officially, international assistance is coordinated through the United Nations Assistance Mission inAfghanistan (UNAMA), though there are other coordinating institutions tied to the Afghangovernment.
Donor countries have committed $1.7 billion and, from that, disbursed $1.5 billion. Key areas of concern include whether the funding levels to Afghanistan are adequate and how much is beingused for reconstruction. Some have argued that the majority of FY2002 funds-as much as 70%-went towards humanitarian aid.
The next major donor conference for Afghanistan will take place in March 2003. Some of the major reconstruction programs are government capacity building, women's programs, employmentgeneration, road construction, agricultural rehabilitation, urban reconstruction, energy, education,health, communications, and media. There is concern about creating enough momentum behindreconstruction initiatives in the short term and sustaining international focus on Afghanistan in thelong term, particularly in light of a possible war in Iraq. This report will be updated as eventswarrant. |
crs_R44403 | crs_R44403_0 | Background
In the wake of the 1973 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) embargo of oil shipments to the United States, and during an era of U.S. oil price controls, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA; P.L. For nearly four decades, total repeal of the crude oil export prohibition was not a major policy issue since U.S. oil production was declining and import volumes were increasing. From January 2010 to April 2015 U.S. crude oil production increased by approximately 4.3 million barrels per day, a nearly 80% increase. During certain periods, these discounts were as large as $30 per barrel (see Figure 1 ). On December 18, 2015, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( H.R. 2029 ), which was signed by the President and became P.L. 114-113 . The law includes a provision that repeals the EPCA crude oil export prohibition. 114-113 also included provisions that addressed two topics that were part of the export restriction debate: (1) maritime transportation of crude oil from the United States to foreign destinations, and (2) the effects of policy changes on independent oil refiners. 114-113 repeals Section 103 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA; P.L. 94-163 ), which provided the President authority to restrict the export of various hydrocarbon materials and directed the President to "promulgate a rule prohibiting the export of crude oil and natural gas produced in the United States." P.L. However, the law does include a "Savings Clause" and exceptions that either maintain or provide the President with authority to restrict crude oil exports under certain circumstances such as national emergencies or demonstrable effects to prices and supply that might result from allowing crude oil exports. Potential Crude Oil Export Volumes
During the crude oil export debate, and since enactment of P.L. Analytical studies published during the debate about the effects of removing crude oil export restrictions estimated that exports may range from 0 to approximately 2 million barrels per day. 114-113 . Second, and perhaps more important for all U.S. oil producers, domestic/international price differentials will likely be moderated by the ability to export crude oil on an unrestricted basis. However, U.S. refiners may not be able to financially benefit from large price differentials in the future should crude oil exports have the anticipated effect of eliminating or limiting the domestic/international price differential. In a 2015 hearing, Paul Jaenichen, head of the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), said that the lack of cargo has contributed to a decline in the number of ships participating in the Maritime Security Program (MSP), under which vessels receive operating subsidies in return for being made available to the Department of Defense in time of war or national emergency. P.L. The annual subsidy increases from $3.1 million per ship to around $5 million per ship through FY2020 and then $5.2 million per ship in 2021. Enhanced Section 199 Tax Deduction for Independent Refiners
Division P, Section 305 of P.L. Refinery advocates presented two oil transportation-related concerns that would result in a competitive disadvantage should crude oil export restrictions be removed. 114-113 changed how independent refiners account for transportation costs when calculating the deduction, potentially allowing higher oil transportation costs to be associated with greater tax relief. The change to Section 199 in P.L. Overall, the enhanced deduction for independent refiners has the potential to reduce tax liability by up to 1.575% of oil transportation costs. 114-113 have several notable limitations. 114-113 . Additionally, for independent refiners that are able to claim the enhanced deduction, the reduction in tax liability will generally be worth, at most, 1.575% of oil transportation costs. | On December 18, 2015, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2029), which was signed by the President and became P.L. 114-113. Included in P.L. 114-113 is a provision that repeals Section 103 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA; P.L. 94-163), which directs the President to promulgate a rule prohibiting crude oil exports. For nearly four decades, repeal of EPCA was generally not a policy issue since oil production was declining and imports were rising. However, increasing U.S. light oil production starting in the 2010/2011 timeframe, projected production increases, and domestic-to-international oil price differentials that were as large as $30 per barrel, motivated many companies and trade organizations to advocate removing the EPCA crude oil export prohibition. P.L. 114-113 also includes a "savings clause" and a list of exceptions that maintain and provide the President with authority to restrict exports under certain circumstances.
Enactment of P.L. 114-113 allows U.S. crude oil to be marketed and sold to international buyers and concludes a nearly two-year debate about the varied and multi-dimensional considerations associated with allowing the export of crude oil produced in the United States. Some oil producers may benefit from this policy change, when market conditions warrant, by potentially selling crude oil for a higher price to global buyers. Perhaps more important for all U.S. oil producers is that allowing crude oil exports may limit the domestic/international price differential in the future. Studies published during the debate estimated that crude oil exports might range between 0 and 2 million barrels per day, reflecting the uncertainty of future market conditions that might motivate exports. Exactly how much crude oil will be exported will depend on oil price differentials, which had narrowed to less than $1 per barrel in January 2016.
In addition to repealing EPCA Section 103, P.L. 114-113 also includes provisions that address two considerations discussed during the crude oil export debate. First, owners of U.S. flag ships advocated that crude oil exporters be required to use such ships for overseas transport. While this requirement was not included in P.L. 114-113, the law does include a provision that authorizes increasing the annual subsidy paid to U.S. flag cargo ships participating in the Maritime Security Program (MSP), which provides an operating subsidy in exchange for participating ships being subject to Department of Defense acquisition during times of war. The operating subsidy for each participating ship was increased from $3.1 million to around $5 million per year thru 2021.
Second, independent U.S. refiners were generally opposed to allowing unrestricted crude oil exports as many of them were benefiting from price discounts that might either be eliminated or limited as a result of removing export restrictions. Some refiners expressed concern that the cost of waterborne crude shipments from the Gulf coast may result in a competitive disadvantage and that the value of investments made in crude-by-rail infrastructure may be adversely affected should crude oil export restrictions be removed. P.L. 114-113 modified the Section 199 tax deduction for independent refiners by changing how independent refiners account for transportation costs when calculating the deduction, potentially allowing higher oil transportation costs to be associated with greater tax relief. Overall, the enhanced deduction for independent refiners may have fairly modest effects. For most independent refiners that are able to claim the enhanced deduction, the change has the potential to reduce tax liability by up to 1.575% of oil-related transportation costs. |
crs_RL32090 | crs_RL32090_0 | Most Recent Developments
On October 29, House and Senate appropriators announced a conference agreement, H.Rept.108-337 , on H.R. 3289 , a bill providing supplemental appropriations for militaryoperations and for reconstruction assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan. The House approved the billby a vote of 298-121 on October 31, and the Senate approved it by voice vote on November 3. 108-106 , on November 6. The conference agreement rejecteda Senate proposal to provide about half of the Iraq reconstruction assistance as loans. Overview
In a nationwide address on September 7, 2003, the President announced that he would requestan additional $87 billion for reconstruction assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan and for ongoingmilitary operations there and elsewhere. (1) OnSeptember 17, the White House submitted a formalrequest for the funds to Congress. The major issue in Congress was whether to provide Iraq reconstruction funds as grants, as the Administration proposed, or as loans. The request did notaddress ongoing military costs after FY2004. Floor action began on October 15. The President signed the bill into law, P.L. On other key issues, the conference agreement
provides $500 million for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for disaster relief for Hurricane Isabel and the California wildfires, which was not in eitherchamber's bill;
eliminates a House provision requiring that Iraq reconstruction aid be coordinated by an official subject to Senate confirmation - the conference also rejected by a vote of14-15 an alternative proposal by Senator Byrd to require Senate confirmation of the director of theIraq Coalition Provisional Authority;
cuts the Administration request for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction account by $1.655 billion as in the House bill rather than by $1.855 million as in the Senate bill. Theconference, however, further directs that $210 million of Iraq funding be transferred for aid toJordan, Liberia, and Sudan, leaving resources for Iraq $1.865 billion less thanrequested;
agrees, as in the House bill, to provide about $1.2 billion for Afghan reconstruction, $400 million more than the Administration requested and the Senateprovided;
provides $245 million for assessed costs of U.N. peacekeeping in Liberia, as in the House bill, and earmarks a total of $200 million for Liberian relief aid and $10 million forSudan humanitarian assistance rather than $200 million in the Senate bill and $100 million in theHouse measure;
provides $200 million in economic aid to Pakistan, as in the House bill;
includes a modified version of a Senate measure to provide health insurance through the DOD TRICARE program to non-active duty reservists who do not have access toemployer-provided health insurance; the conference report presents this and other reserve health caremeasures as a one-year trial through FY2004 and requires that DOD report on its cost andimplementation;
rejects a Senate provision to increase Army end-strength by 10,000 active duty personnel for assignment to peacekeeping types of duties;
provides $313 million in defense operation and maintenance and in procurement funds to repair Hurricane Isabel damage at military facilities, $100 million less than inthe House bill, and provides another $130 million in military constructions funds for disaster repair,as in the House bill;
provides $100 million in a general provision that was not in either chamber's bill for munitions security and destruction in Iraq;
moves $858 million from the defense part of the bill to the foreign operations part to cover operating expenses of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, as in the House bill;
provides $3 billion in general transfer authority to the Secretary of Defense with a requirement that Congress be notified promptly but not that Congress provide advanceapproval as in the House bill and rejects the Senate provision that would provide $5 billion in suchtransfer authority and an additional $2.5 billion subject to congressional approval;and
rejects a Senate provision to provide $1.3 billion for veterans health benefits, as in the Senate bill; Senator Stevens said that the funding would be addressed in the pendingVA-HUD-independent agencies appropriations bill. assistance. | In a nationwide address on September 7, 2003, the President announced that he would request an additional $87 billion for ongoing military operations and for reconstruction assistance in Iraq,Afghanistan, and elsewhere. On September 17, the White House submitted a formal request forFY2004 supplemental appropriations of that amount to Congress. Administration officials said theywould like to see congressional action completed some time before October 24, when aninternational donors conference was scheduled to meet in Madrid to seek pledges of economicassistance for Iraq.
On October 29, House and Senate appropriators announced a conference agreement, on H.R. 3289 , a bill providing supplemental appropriations for military operations and forreconstruction assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan. The House approved the conference agreementby a vote of 298-121 on October 31, and the Senate approved the measure by voice vote onNovember 3. The President signed the bill into law, P.L. 108-106 , on November 6.
The key issue in Congress was whether to provide reconstruction assistance to Iraq entirely as grants or partly as loans. The conference committee rejected a Senate proposal to provide about halfof the Iraq reconstruction assistance as loans. On other issues, conferees eliminated a Senateprovision adding 10,000 troops to the Army for peacekeeping duties; agreed to a modified versionof a Senate provision to provide health insurance through the DOD TRICARE program fornon-activated military reservists not eligible for employer-provided health insurance; cut theAdministration request for reconstruction assistance to Iraq by $1.655 billion as in the House billrather than by $1.855 million as in the Senate bill; agreed to provide $400 million more forAfghanistan than the Administration requested, as in the House bill; agreed to provided $245 millionfor assessed costs of U.N. peacekeeping in Liberia, as in the House bill; agreed to provide anadditional $100 million for Liberia and $10 million for Sudan for humanitarian assistance;eliminated a House provision to require that Iraq reconstruction be coordinated by aSenate-confirmed official; and did not include $1.3 billion for veterans health benefits that was inthe Senate bill (which may be provided instead in the pending VA-HUD-independent agenciesappropriations bill). The conference agreement also provides $500 million for the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA) for disaster relief for Hurricane Isabel and the Californiawildfires.
In earlier floor action, Congress rejected proposals to roll back tax cuts to pay for the bill; to shift funds from Iraq reconstruction to domestic programs; to make release of funds conditional onspecific requirements; and to transfer control of Iraq reconstruction from the Defense Departmentto the State Department. |
crs_R44240 | crs_R44240_0 | Scope of the Agriculture Appropriations Bill
The Agriculture appropriations bill—formally known as the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act—provides funding for:
All of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except the Forest Service, which is funded in the Interior appropriations bill, The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health and Human Services, and In the House, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The bill includes mandatory and discretionary spending, but the discretionary amounts are the primary focus during the bill's development. Within the discretionary total, the largest discretionary spending items are for the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), agricultural research, rural development, FDA, foreign food aid and trade, farm assistance program salaries and loans, food safety inspection, conservation, and animal and plant health programs ( Figure 1 ). The main mandatory spending items are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, and other food and nutrition act programs), child nutrition (school lunch and related programs), crop insurance, and farm commodity and conservation programs paid through USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Action on FY2016 Appropriations6
The FY2016 Agriculture Appropriation was enacted as part of an omnibus bill on December 18, 2015 ( P.L. Separate Agriculture bills were reported in both chambers, but neither went to the floor ( H.R. 3049 , S. 1800 ). The fiscal year began under three continuing resolutions. Summary of FY2016 Appropriation Amounts
The enacted omnibus appropriation uses a budget allocation that was provided in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-74 , November 2, 2015), which was greater than what was available to develop the House- and Senate-reported bills. The final Agriculture appropriation provides $21.750 billion for discretionary amounts ( Table 2 ). Comparison of Amounts for FY2016
The enacted FY2016 Agriculture appropriations act provides $21.75 billion of discretionary spending, which is an increase of $925 million over FY2015 (+4.4%), after adjusting for CFTC jurisdiction. Food for Peace grants for international food aid receive an extra $250 million. The Agricultural Research Service receives $178 million more than FY2015 (+15%), mostly for buildings and facilities. Emergency conservation, watershed, and forestry programs receive $157 million more than in FY2015, some of it offset by a disaster declaration. Policy Changes
In addition to specifying the amounts of budget authority, the appropriation prescribes various policies or conditions that affect how some agencies may use their appropriation. Among the notable policy-related provisions that are discussed in more detail in the relevant sections later:
Some country-of-origin labeling (COOL) laws are permanently repealed. Horse slaughter facility inspection continues to be prohibited for the fiscal year. Imports of processed poultry from China are forbidden for certain nutrition programs. Wh ole grain and sodium requirements in the child nutrition programs are to be implemented with continued flexibility. The appropriation directs some terms for the formation of dietary guidelines . Among policy changes, the FY2016 appropriation restores the use of "commodity certificates" for the marketing loan program, including not being subject to payment limits (§740). 114-113 . | The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), except for the Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and—in even-numbered fiscal years—the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
Agriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Discretionary amounts, though, are the primary focus during the bill's development since mandatory amounts generally are set by authorizing laws such as the farm bill.
The largest discretionary spending items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); agricultural research; FDA; rural development; foreign food aid and trade; farm assistance programs; food safety and inspection; conservation; and animal and plant health programs. The main mandatory spending items are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), child nutrition, crop insurance, and the farm commodity and conservation programs funded through the Commodity Credit Corporation.
The FY2016 Agriculture Appropriation was enacted as part of an omnibus bill on December 18, 2015 (P.L. 114-113). Separate Agriculture bills were reported in both chambers, but neither went to the floor (H.R. 3049, S. 1800). The fiscal year began under continuing resolutions.
The enacted omnibus appropriation uses a budget allocation that was provided in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74), which is higher than what was available to develop the House- and Senate-reported bills. The final Agriculture appropriation provides $21.750 billion for discretionary amounts, which is an increase of $925 million over FY2015 (+4.4%), after adjusting for differences in CFTC jurisdiction.
Compared to FY2015, the $925-million increase is largely allocated among a $318-million increase for the Rural Housing Service; $250 million extra for Food for Peace grants for international food aid; a $178-million increase for the Agricultural Research Service, mostly for buildings and facilities; a $132-million increase for the Food and Drug Administration, mostly for food safety; and $157 million more than last year for emergency conservation, watershed, and forestry programs, some of it offset by a disaster declaration.
In addition to specifying budget authority, the appropriation prescribes various policies or conditions that affect how some agencies may use their appropriation. Among notable policy-related provisions in the appropriation are to permanently repeal some country-of-origin labeling (COOL) laws, continue to prohibit horse slaughter facility inspection, prevent the import of processed poultry from China for certain nutrition programs, continue to implement with flexibility the whole grain and sodium requirements in the child nutrition programs, set some terms for the formation of dietary guidelines, and restore the use of commodity certificates for the marketing loan program, including not being subject to payment limits. |
crs_R42633 | crs_R42633_0 | Introduction
The U.S. Constitution vests Congress with the power to raise revenue and borrow money. Those funds may only by drawn from the Treasury in consequence of appropriations made by law. The Constitution, however, is largely silent with respect to the President's role in the budget process. Instead, the executive budget process as it exists today is primarily the result of statutes enacted by Congress. 20-27) established the modern executive budget process. The Budget and Accounting Act altered this practice by establishing a legal framework for a consolidated federal budget proposal to be developed by the President and submitted to Congress prior to the start of each fiscal year. This report outlines many of the budgetary procedures that are performed by the President, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and agencies. Though it is not legally binding, the President's budget initiates the congressional budget process and provides Congress with recommended spending levels for agency programs, projects, and activities funded through the annual appropriations acts. Under current law, the President is responsible for developing and submitting a consolidated budget to Congress no later than the first Monday in February prior to the start of the fiscal year. The development of the President's budget begins approximately 18 months prior to the start of the fiscal year that the budget will cover, which is about 10 months before the President must submit the proposal to Congress. The budget submissions of the past three Presidents have each included the following volumes:
Budget of the U.S. Government —includes a short budget message summarizing the President's policy priorities, summary tables of budgetary aggregates, and a detailed narrative description of proposed government activities, organized by issue and agency; Historical Tables —provides a historical overview of federal government finances, including time series statistics on budget authority, government receipts, outlays, government employment, gross domestic product (GDP), and the federal debt going back several decades and in some cases as far back as 1789; Analytical Perspectives —contains in-depth analysis of government programs, including credit and insurance programs, discussion of crosscut budgets that span two or more agencies, and technical explanation of the budget baselines used in the analyses and estimates contained in the President's budget proposal; and Appendix —includes detailed budget estimates and financial information on individual programs and appropriations accounts, proposed text of appropriations language, and information on the legislative and judicial branch appropriations that are not included in other volumes of the President's budget proposal. Agency Budget Requests and Justifications
Once the President has submitted the budget, OMB and agency officials explain and justify the request to Congress. Early in the congressional budget process, often in the week following the submission of the President's budget, the OMB Director and other Cabinet officials usually provide testimony regarding the President's broad budgetary objectives before congressional committees. Agencies also submit written justification of their budget requests to the appropriations committee and subcommittees of jurisdiction in each chamber. The President, OMB, and agencies also possess limited authority to make spending adjustments after appropriations and other spending legislation have been enacted. The budget authority provided to agencies may not be automatically available for obligation or expenditure. With certain exceptions, the Antideficiency Act requires that appropriated funds be apportioned (or divided)—by time period, function, or program—in order to prevent agencies from exhausting their appropriated funds prematurely. Funds appropriated to executive agencies are apportioned by OMB. Reallocation of Budget Authority: Transfers and Reprogramming
Agencies may also possess limited authority to reallocate funds during budget execution, either by transfers or by reprogramming. Transfers typically involve a shift of budgetary resources from one appropriations account to another, while reprogramming involves a shift of budgetary resources from one project or purpose to another within an appropriations account. For example, transfers may be limited to a specific dollar amount. Under the procedures established by the Impoundment Control Act (ICA) of 1974 (Title X of P.L. Under existing law, there are additional executive budgetary procedures that are triggered under specific, less common circumstances. A funding gap occurs when full-year or interim appropriations are not enacted by the start of the fiscal year. | The U.S. Constitution vests Congress with the power to raise revenue and borrow money. Those funds may only be drawn from the Treasury in consequence of appropriations made by law. The Constitution, however, is largely silent with respect to the President's role in the budget process. Instead, the current executive budget process is largely the result of statutes enacted by Congress.
The executive budget process consists of three main phases: development of the President's budget proposal, submission and justification of the President's budget proposal, and execution of enacted appropriations and other budgetary legislation. The purpose of this report is to provide an introduction to many elements of the executive budget process, highlighting the roles of the President, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and executive agencies.
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 established the modern executive budget process. It created a legal framework for a federal budget proposal to be developed by the President and submitted to Congress prior to the start of each fiscal year. In practice, development of the President's budget proposal begins approximately 18 months prior to the start of the fiscal year to which it applies. Executive agencies submit their requests and justification materials to OMB for examination and review. After final decisions have been made by the President, the budget proposal is compiled by OMB. Under current law, the President must submit the budget proposal to Congress no later than the first Monday in February.
Once the President has submitted the budget, OMB and agency officials explain and justify the request to Congress. Early in the congressional budget process, often in the week following the submission of the President's budget, the OMB director and other Cabinet officials typically provide testimony regarding the President's broad budgetary objectives before congressional committees. In addition, agencies typically submit written justifications of their budget requests to Congress, and agency officials often will testify before the committees of jurisdiction.
The President's budget, though not legally binding, provides Congress with recommended spending levels for programs, projects, and activities that are funded through appropriations and other budgetary legislation. Funds provided in appropriations and other budgetary legislation are not immediately available for obligation or expenditure. With certain exceptions, the Antideficiency Act requires that funds be apportioned (or divided), often by fiscal quarter, prior to obligation or expenditure. Agencies then allocate those funds to programs, projects, and activities.
Congress has recognized the need to permit agencies some flexibility during budget execution, and it has provided agencies with limited authority to make spending adjustments. For example, Congress may provide agencies with limited authority to reallocate funds from one appropriations account to another (i.e., transfers), or from one purpose to another within an appropriations account (i.e., reprogramming). Under the Impoundment Control Act (ICA) of 1974, the President may withhold appropriated funds temporarily (referred to as deferrals) or propose to Congress permanent cancellations of budget authority (referred to as rescissions).
Finally, certain executive budgetary procedures are triggered under limited, less common circumstances. For example, OMB and agencies have established procedures for implementing a shutdown of certain government operations in the event that their full-year or interim appropriations are not enacted by the start of the fiscal year. OMB and agencies may also be subject to additional procedures in the event of a statutorily prescribed sequestration. |
crs_R41726 | crs_R41726_0 | Introduction
This report presents figures showing trends in discretionary budget authority as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) by subfunction within each of 17 budget function categories, using data from President Trump's FY2018 budget submission. This report provides a graphical overview of historical trends in discretionary budget authority from FY1977 through FY2016, estimates for FY2017 spending, and the levels consistent with the President's proposals for FY2018 through FY2022. Spending in this report is shown as a percentage of GDP to control for the effects of inflation, population growth, and growth in per capita income. Discretionary spending is provided and controlled through appropriations acts. These acts fund many of the activities commonly associated with federal government functions, such as running executive branch agencies, congressional offices and agencies, and international operations of the government. For some program areas, such as surface transportation, the division of expenditures into discretionary and mandatory categories can be complex. Discretionary spending in this report is measured in terms of BA. Budget authority for an agency has been compared to having funds in a checking account. For example, rapid growth in national defense and other security spending in the past decade has played an important role in fiscal discussions. 112-25 ). Funding for FY2017 was first provided by a continuing resolution ( P.L. 114-223 ) enacted on September 29, 2016, which provided discretionary funding through December 9, 2016, and included a 0.496% across-the-board reduction relative to the previous fiscal year's levels for most federal programs. A second continuing resolution ( P.L. 114-254 ) was enacted on December 10, 2016, that extended funding through April 28, 2017. A one-week stopgap funding measure (P.L. 115-30) was enacted on April 28, 2017. An omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 115-31) enacted on May 5, 2017, provided funding for the remainder of FY2017. Overview of Recent Discretionary Spending
Spending caps and associated budget enforcement mechanisms, along with modifications of BCA provisions, framed policy discussions during recent budget cycles. Fiscal policy became a central concern of Congress in the wake of the 2007-2009 Great Recession. The Budget Control Act of 2011
The Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. When that committee did not report a plan by a November 2011 deadline, backup budget enforcement measures were triggered, including a January 2013 sequester (cancellation of budgetary resources), and a revised set of discretionary caps on funding for defense (defined as the national defense budget function 050) and non-defense programs (all other) for FY2013-FY2021. Congress Has Modified BCA Caps to Mitigate Fiscal Stringency
The stringency of BCA discretionary spending caps and backup enforcement measures prompted Congress and the President to adjust those limits to avoid dislocations of federal operations. 59 ; P.L. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA2015; P.L. For FY2018, the Trump Administration proposed raising the BCA cap on defense (budget function 050) spending by $54 billion and lowering the BCA cap on non-defense by an equal amount. Background on Functional Categories
Functional categories provide a means to compare federal funding for activities within broad policy areas that often cut across several federal agencies. Subfunction categories provide a finer division of funding levels within narrower policy areas. A flat line on such graphs indicates that spending in that category is increasing at the same rate as overall economic growth. Cold War, Peace Dividend, and the Global War on Terror
The allocation of discretionary spending between defense and non-defense programs is one reflection of changing federal priorities over time. Administrative costs for those programs, which account for a small portion of those costs, are generally funded by discretionary spending. Social Security benefits are generally funded by mandatory spending. Since then, the level of funding, measured as a percentage of GDP, has decreased. In other years, rental revenues exceeded building expenses, resulting in negative budget authority. | This report provides a graphical overview of historical trends in discretionary budget authority (BA) from FY1977 through FY2016, preliminary estimates for FY2017 spending, and the levels reflecting the President's proposals for FY2018 through FY2022 using data from the FY2018 budget submission released on May 23, 2017. This report, by illustrating trends in broad budgetary categories, provides a starting point for discussions about fiscal priorities. Other CRS products analyze spending trends in specific functional areas. Functional categories (e.g., national defense, agriculture, etc.) provide a means to compare federal funding for activities within broad policy areas that often cut across several federal agencies. Subfunction categories provide a finer division of funding levels within narrower policy areas. Budget function categories are used within the budget resolution and for other purposes, such as estimates of tax expenditures. Spending in this report is measured and illustrated in terms of discretionary budget authority as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Measuring spending as a percentage of GDP in effect controls for inflation and population increases. A flat line on such graphs indicates that spending has increased at the same rate as overall economic growth. In some cases, rescissions, offsetting receipts, or budgetary scorekeeping adjustments can result in negative budget authority.
Discretionary spending is provided and controlled through appropriations acts, which provide budget authority to federal agencies to fund many of the activities commonly associated with such federal government functions as running executive branch agencies, congressional offices and agencies, and international operations of the government. Essentially all spending on federal wages and salaries is discretionary. Administrative costs for entitlement programs such as Social Security are generally funded by discretionary spending, while mandatory spending—not shown in figures presented in this report—generally funds the benefits provided through those programs. For some federal programs, such as surface transportation, the division of funding into discretionary and mandatory categories can be complex.
Spending caps and budget enforcement mechanisms established in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25; BCA) strongly affected recent budgets. The BCA set discretionary spending caps on defense (budget function 050) and non-defense funding and created a formula to lower those caps to achieve a portion of spending cuts called for in the BCA. Congress modified BCA caps several times, first for FY2013 as part of the fiscal cliff deal at the start of January 2013 (American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012; P.L. 112-240), then through the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA2013; P.L. 113-67) and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74), thus avoiding decreases in levels of discretionary funding. The Trump Administration has proposed changes in BCA caps to allow higher defense spending and to constrain non-defense spending.
A first continuing resolution (P.L. 114-223) was enacted on September 29, 2016, which provides discretionary funding through December 9, 2016. A second continuing resolution (P.L. 114-254), enacted on December 10, 2016, extended funding through April 28, 2017. A stopgap funding measure (P.L. 115-30) was enacted on April 28, 2017. An omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 115-31) enacted on May 5, 2017, provided funding for the remainder of FY2017.
As the 115th Congress begins consideration of the FY2018 budget, past spending trends may help frame policy discussions. For example, rapid growth in national defense and other security spending during the past decade, along with the fiscal consequences and responses to the 2007-2009 Great Recession, has played an important role in fiscal discussions. Since FY2010, base defense discretionary spending has essentially been held flat and non-defense discretionary spending has been reduced significantly. The base defense budget excludes war funding (Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terror). While war funding levels are well below those of the last decade, they still represent significant commitments of federal resources. |
crs_RL34215 | crs_RL34215_0 | Drug Trafficking
Mexico, a major drug producing and transit country, is the main foreign supplier of marijuana and a major supplier of methamphetamine to the United States. Although Mexico accounts for only a small share of worldwide heroin production, it supplies "a large share of the heroin distributed in the United States." The State Department estimates that 90% of cocaine entering the United States transits Mexico. Mexico's cartels have existed for some time, but have become increasingly powerful in recent years with the demise of the Medellín and Cali cartels in Colombia. The National Drug Intelligence Center now considers Mexican drug cartels as dominating the U.S. illicit drug market. The DEA, however, maintains that the Mexican cartels now have command and control over the drug trade and are starting to show the hallmarks of organized crime, such as organizing into distinct cells with subordinate cells that operate throughout the United States. As a result of their dominance of the U.S. illicit drug market, Mexican cartels are the leading wholesale launderers of drug money from the United States. Mexican cartels also produce methamphetamine and marijuana in the United States. There is evidence that Mexican cartels are also increasing their relationships with prison and street gangs in the United States in order to facilitate drug trafficking within the United States as well as wholesale and retail distribution of the drugs. U.S. law enforcement officials report that the Tijuana cartel has been weakened due to the arrests and deaths of several cartel leaders, forcing the cartel to focus its energies on controlling trafficking routes through the corruption of Mexican law enforcement officials and intimidation measures, including kidnapping, torture, and murder. At its peak the cartel supplied 40% of cocaine consumed in the United States. This has led to the most publicized of Mexico's turf wars due to the intensity of the violence and its proximity to the United States. In July 2007 drug cartels reportedly threatened to kill an unnamed American journalist in Laredo for writing reports on the cartels. There are two possible explanations for the shift in the turf war: (1) the Gulf cartel and its enforcer gang, the Zetas, succeeded in maintaining control of the Nuevo Laredo corridor and (2) the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels reached a truce to reduce violence in Nuevo Laredo in response to the government crackdown in the area. Mexican Government Response
Since taking office in December 2006, President Calderón has made combating drug cartels and drug violence a top priority of his administration. He has called increasing drug violence in Mexico a threat to the Mexican state, and has sent 24,000 soldiers and federal police to nine states to combat the cartels. President Calderón has indicated that he will use extradition as a major tool to combat drug traffickers. WOLA suggested cutting cartel revenue by reducing U.S. demand for illicit drugs through improved drug prevention education and increasing access to addiction treatment. Michael Shifter, of the Inter-American Dialogue, also calls for renewed focus on demand reduction and reduction in arms trafficking from the United States. Mexico maintains that its counternarcotics efforts will fail without more U.S. support to: reduce arms trafficking into Mexico; stop the trafficking of drug earnings into Mexico; and reduce Americans' demand for illicit drugs. Walters maintained that over 60% of Mexican drug cartel profits from the United States are from marijuana. | Mexico, a major drug producing and transit country, is the main foreign supplier of marijuana and a major supplier of methamphetamine to the United States. Although Mexico accounts for only a small share of worldwide heroin production, it supplies a large share of heroin consumed in the United States. An estimated 90% of cocaine entering the United States transits Mexico. Violence in the border region has affected U.S. citizens and more than 60 Americans have been kidnapped in Nuevo Laredo. In July 2007, Mexican drug cartels reportedly threatened to kill a U.S. journalist covering drug violence in the border region. The proposed Mérida Initiative would provide at least $950 million to combat drug and organized crime.
Although Mexican drug cartels, or drug trafficking organizations, have existed for quite some time, they have become more powerful since the demise of Colombia's Cali and Medellín cartels in the 1990s. Mexican drug cartels now dominate the wholesale illicit drug market in the United States. Arrests of key cartel leaders, particularly in the Tijuana and Gulf cartels, have led to increasing drug violence as cartels fight for control of the trafficking routes into the United States. The Gulf and Sinaloa cartels reportedly use personal "enforcer gangs" to perpetuate violence and intimidate Mexican citizens and public officials. Mexican President Felipe Calderón has called drug violence a threat to the Mexican state.
This report provides an overview of: Mexican cartels and their operations, including the nature of cartel ties to gangs such as the Mara Salvatrucha; Mexican cartel drug production in the United States; and the presence of Mexican cartel cells in the United States. Mexican cartels allegedly have used their vast financial resources to corrupt Mexican public officials who either turn a blind eye to cartel activities or work directly for them. Since 2005, the Mexican government has made numerous efforts to purge corrupt police. In December 2006, President Felipe Calderón launched operations against the cartels in 9 of Mexico's 32 states. He has pledged to use extradition as a tool against drug traffickers, and sent 73 criminals to the United States as of August 2007, including the alleged head of the Gulf Cartel.
This report also examines potential policy approaches to the problem of drug trafficking and violence. Current U.S. and Mexican policy emphasizes interdiction and eradication. Supporters of this policy maintain that these efforts have reduced the supply of drugs in the United States. Critics maintain that Administration officials have refused to release data showing that cocaine prices are falling, suggesting that the drug supply is growing, not shrinking. These critics suggest that more emphasis should be placed on demand reduction in the United States, including drug prevention education and treatment. The Mexican government urges the United States to increase its efforts to reduce U.S. demand for drugs, stating that it cannot succeed in its efforts against the cartels so long as cartels stand to earn billions of dollars annually from the U.S. illicit drug market. Critics of current policy, including the Mexican government, are also calling for increased efforts to combat arms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. This report may be updated. For further information on Mexico, see CRS Report RL34215, Mexico's Drug Cartels, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL32694 | crs_RL32694_0 | Introduction
Open ocean aquaculture is broadly defined as the rearing of marine organisms in exposed areas beyond significant coastal influence. Open ocean aquaculture employs less control over organisms and the surrounding environment than do inshore and land-based aquaculture, which are often undertaken in enclosures such as ponds. Proponents of open ocean aquaculture believe it is the beginning of the "blue revolution"—a period of broad advances in culture methods and associated increases in production. Potential outcomes are difficult to characterize because of the diverse nature of potential operations and the lack of aquaculture experience in open ocean areas. On January 28, 2009, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council voted to approve a plan to issue aquaculture permits and regulate aquaculture in the Gulf of Mexico. On September 3, 2009, the plan took effect because the Secretary of Commerce declined to oppose it within the required statutory period. Environmentalists and some fishing industry representatives have opposed the plan because of concerns related to environmental protection and potential negative effects on wild fish populations. Many who oppose the plan support a precautionary approach and development of national aquaculture standards. Section 704 of the bill would have rescinded the authority of the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or Regional Fishery Management Councils to develop or approve fishery management plans to permit or regulate offshore aquaculture. On December 16, 2009, H.R. The bill would establish a regulatory system for offshore aquaculture in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone. Thus far, only a few aquaculture research facilities have operated farther offshore in the U.S. EEZ. Should such operations be located beyond coastal state jurisdiction within the EEZ, they would be regulated primarily by federal agencies. Development of commercial aquaculture facilities in federal waters is hampered by an unclear regulatory process in the EEZ and technical uncertainties related to working in offshore areas. Regulatory uncertainty has been identified by the Administration as the major barrier to developing offshore aquaculture in the United States. Potential environmental and economic impacts and associated controversy have also likely contributed to slowing potential expansion. Major categories of concerns related to open ocean aquaculture development include (1) biological, operational, and business concerns related to development of a new industry; (2) potential social and economic impacts; (3) potential environmental impacts; and (4) the legal and regulatory environment. However, significant questions remain concerning whether an appropriate mechanism exists for any federal agency to provide an open ocean aquaculture permit or lease applicant with the necessary property rights to begin construction and operation. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), generally 3 to 200 miles from the coastline. On September 8, 2009, H.R. 3534 , the Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2009, was introduced. On July 30, 2010, H.R. 3534 was passed by the House, but the section related to offshore aquaculture was removed from the bill. 4363 , the National Sustainable Offshore Aquaculture Act of 2009 was introduced. On May 25, 2010, S. 3417 , the Research in Aquaculture Opportunity and Responsibility Act of 2010 was introduced. The bill would prohibit offshore aquaculture until three years after the submission of a report to Congress on the impacts of offshore aquaculture. According to NOAA, challenges to achieving these production levels include:
a complicated, inefficient, and uncertain federal regulatory process to permit marine aquaculture facilities; the need for additional research on environmental implications and ecosystem carrying capacity of marine aquaculture; the lack of an adequate research, development, and technical infrastructure; the need to improve communication and foster understanding of the environmental, economic, and social implications of marine aquaculture; the lack of access to coastal sites for marine aquaculture facilities because of competing high-value uses for housing and tourism; and rapid international growth of worldwide aquaculture with supply, demand, and price implications for U.S. consumers and seafood producers. | Open ocean aquaculture is broadly defined as the rearing of marine organisms in exposed areas beyond significant coastal influence. Open ocean aquaculture employs less control over organisms and the surrounding environment than do inshore and land-based aquaculture, which are often undertaken in enclosures, such as ponds. When aquaculture operations are located beyond coastal state jurisdiction, within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ; generally 3 to 200 nautical miles from shore), they are regulated primarily by federal agencies. Thus far, only a few aquaculture research facilities have operated in the U.S. EEZ. To date, all commercial aquaculture facilities have been sited in nearshore waters under state or territorial jurisdiction.
Development of commercial aquaculture facilities in federal waters is hampered by an unclear regulatory process for the EEZ, and technical uncertainties related to working in offshore areas. Regulatory uncertainty has been identified by the Administration as the major barrier to developing open ocean aquaculture. Uncertainties often translate into barriers to commercial investment. Potential environmental and economic impacts and associated controversy have also likely contributed to slowing expansion.
Proponents of open ocean aquaculture believe it is the beginning of the "blue revolution"—a period of broad advances in culture methods and associated increases in production. Critics raise concerns about environmental protection and potential impacts on existing commercial fisheries. Potential outcomes are difficult to characterize because of the diverse nature of potential operations and the lack of aquaculture experience in open ocean areas.
On January 28, 2009, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council voted to approve a plan to issue aquaculture permits and regulate aquaculture in federal waters of the Gulf of Mexico. On September 3, 2009, the plan took effect because the Secretary of Commerce declined to oppose it within the required statutory period. Environmentalists and some fishing industry representatives have opposed the plan because of concerns related to environmental protection and potential negative effects on wild fish populations. Many who oppose the plan support a precautionary approach and development of national aquaculture standards. On September 8, 2009, H.R. 3534, the Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2009, was introduced. Section 704 of the bill would have rescinded the authority of the Secretary of Commerce to develop or approve fishery management plans to permit or regulate offshore aquaculture. On July 30, 2010, H.R. 3534 was passed by the House, but the section related to offshore aquaculture was removed from the bill. H.R. 4363, the National Sustainable Offshore Aquaculture Act of 2009, introduced on December 16, 2009, would establish a regulatory system for offshore aquaculture in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone. S. 3417, the Research in Aquaculture Opportunity and Responsibility Act of 2010, introduced on May 25, 2010, would prohibit offshore aquaculture until three years after the submission of a report on the impacts of offshore aquaculture.
This report discusses four general areas: (1) operational and business-related challenges; (2) potential economic impacts; (3) potential environmental impacts; and (4) the legal and regulatory environment. Significant questions remain about whether an appropriate mechanism exists for any federal agency to provide an open ocean aquaculture lease with the necessary property rights to begin construction and operation. Policy makers and regulators will be challenged to weigh the needs of a developing industry against potential environmental and social impacts. |
crs_R43699 | crs_R43699_0 | Introduction
This report provides a selective overview of court decisions that have shaped the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) implementation of the Clean Air Act (CAA or Act). Circuit addressed the primary and secondary NAAQSs for lead, holding that requiring EPA to consider cost and feasibility in setting NAAQSs was "totally without merit." Because Section 110(a)(2) does not require that SIPs be economically and technologically feasible, the Supreme Court concluded in Union Electric Co. v. EPA that EPA may not consider infeasibility when approving or disapproving a SIP. Most important to the court, CAIR's emissions trading program, though aimed at reducing emission-control costs as approved in Michigan , did not assure some "measurable" emission reduction in each upwind state. The CAA, held the Court, does not require that states be given a second opportunity to file a SIP after EPA has quantified the state's emissions budget. Rather, Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus says that Section 111 "looks toward what may fairly be projected for the regulated future, rather than the state of the art at present ...." Still, Lignite Energy Council v. EPA cautions that "EPA may not base its determination that a technology is adequately demonstrated or that a standard is achievable on mere speculation or conjecture ...." The agency may compensate for the absence of emissions data in a new source category by, for example, "extrapolation of a technology's performance in other industries." (See later section on " Bubble Concept .") "Routine Maintenance"
As mentioned, NSPSs and new source review in PSD areas apply not just to new sources, but also to existing sources that undergo modifications (NSPS) or major modifications (PSD). A modification is subject to the same requirements as a new source. The CAA definition of "modification" has been interpreted by EPA and state pollution control agencies. The case established that determining whether the RMRR exemption applies to an existing-source renovation depends on a case-by-case weighing of four factors: the resulting increase in a plant's life expectancy, and the project's cost, nature, and magnitude. The following year, the D.C. Circuit held in National Mining Ass'n v. EPA that EPA may determine if a facility is a major source by aggregating all sources in a contiguous plant site under common control; EPA is not restricted to aggregating only sources within a single source category or under the same Standard Industrial Classification Code. Nothing in the statute, the court said, suggests that EPA may set emission levels only for listed hazardous air pollutants that are currently controlled with technology. The Court did allow, however, that EPA could impose one of these programs, requiring installation of Best Available Control Technology on new and modified stationary sources in PSD areas, to GHG emissions from certain stationary sources: those that emit New Source Review pollutants in amounts sufficient to come under the program independently. Pre-enforcement review by a court, it held, must be made available to the recipient of the order. Glossary of Acronyms
ACO: administrative compliance order
BACT: best available control technology
BSER: best system of emission reduction
CAA: Clean Air Act
CAIR: Clean Air Interstate Rule
CO 2 : carbon dioxide
CPP: Clean Power Plan
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency
GHG: greenhouse gas
HAP: hazardous air pollutant
MACT: maximum achievable control technology
NAAQS: national ambient air quality standard
NESHAP: national emission standard for hazardous air pollutant
NO x : nitrogen oxides
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act
NSPS: new source performance standard
PSD: prevention of significant deterioration
RMRR: routine maintenance, repair, and replacement
SIP: state implementation plan
SO 2 : sulfur dioxide | This report provides a selective overview of court decisions that historically have most shaped EPA's program under the Clean Air Act (CAA or Act). Court decisions described in the report deal with the following:
National ambient air quality standards (NAAQSs), holding that in setting the standards EPA is not to consider economic and technological feasibility. State implementation plans for achieving NAAQSs, holding that EPA may not consider economic and technological feasibility in approving or disapproving such plans, or that the state plan is more stringent than necessary, or does not require an EPA-preferred control method. Interstate air pollution, holding that EPA may consider costs in applying the CAA "good neighbor" provision, but any emissions trading program must assure some emission reduction in each upwind state. Nor does the CAA require that states be given a second opportunity to file an implementation plan after EPA has quantified the state emissions budget; EPA may promulgate its own plan for the state immediately. New source performance standards (NSPSs), holding that while the Act requires NSPSs to be based on "adequately demonstrated" technology, EPA is allowed to consider technologies that will be fairly projected in the future so long as the technology is not speculative. New source review in areas not subject to NAAQSs, holding that EPA may override a state's determination of the "best available control technology" required for new stationary sources. EPA may require new source review for greenhouse gas emitters only if the new source will emit certain pollutants above threshold amounts. The "routine maintenance" exemption from NSPSs and new source review, created by EPA and accepted by the courts despite statutory silence. Courts hold that whether the exemption applies depends on the increase in a plant's expected life due to the project, and the project's cost, nature, and magnitude. Expansive interpretation of the exemption has been judicially rejected. The "bubble concept," an EPA approach that looks at net changes in the emissions of a pollutant from a facility, holding that its permissibility depends on statutory context. National standards for hazardous air pollutants, holding that EPA may determine if a facility triggers the Act's "maximum achievable control technology" requirement for such pollutants by aggregating emission sources in a contiguous plant under common control, not just sources within the same source category. EPA is not limited in setting emission standards to hazardous air pollutants currently controlled with technology. Greenhouse gas emissions, holding that the CAA generally covers them, and that EPA has to exercise that authority based on policy concerns. See, however, "new source review" above. Enforcement, holding that the recipient of an administrative compliance order must be allowed to seek pre-enforcement review of the order in court. |
crs_R40483 | crs_R40483_0 | Introduction
Requiring or encouraging parents' involvement in the education of their children has been a long-standing goal of Title I, Part A, Education for the Disadvantaged, authorized by the of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), most recently amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. 107-110 ). Most of the parental involvement requirements in the ESEA, as amended by NCLB, are in Title I-A, Section 1118, though Section 1116 includes parental notification requirements and Sections 1111 and 1112 also have parental involvement provisions. This report examines various modes of parental involvement in the education of their children. Research on Parental Involvement and Student Achievement
As mentioned previously, studying the effects of parental involvement on student achievement is a difficult task. The IASA mandated that Title I-A LEAs and schools have parental involvement policies and that Title I-A schools develop school-parent compacts, both new parental involvement requirements. While both the IASA and NCLB required LEAs that received over $500,000 in Title I-A funds to reserve at least 1% of such funds to support parental involvement activities, NCLB has an additional requirement that 95% of funds reserved for parental involvement be distributed to schools. Schools that are in year two (or a later year) of improvement must also explain students' right to SES. Other alternatives to increasing parental involvement include promoting more full-service models: public charter schools and community schools. | Requiring or encouraging parents' involvement in the education of their children has been a long-standing goal of Title I, Part A, Education for the Disadvantaged, authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), most recently amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. 107-110). NCLB encourages parents' involvement by requiring Title I-A schools and local educational agencies (LEAs) to develop, in conjunction with parents, parental involvement policies and school-parent compacts. Schools in LEAs that receive over $500,000 in Title I-A funding must also reserve at least 1% of their Title I-A funds for parental involvement activities. Additionally, the ESEA requires that parents receive notification on their child's school's performance, and, if applicable, their right to transfer their child to a school that met Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) or to request free tutoring for their child.
This report begins by discussing the various definitions of parental involvement, barriers to increasing parental involvement, research on parental involvement and student achievement, and parental involvement requirements prior to NCLB. It then covers the parental involvement requirements in Title I-A, Sections 1116 and 1118, that were enacted under NCLB and their implementation. A brief discussion of parental involvement requirements in other sections of the ESEA follows. This report concludes by considering two alternative approaches to increasing parental involvement: public charter schools and community schools. |
crs_RL33426 | crs_RL33426_0 | How does the statute interact with abandoned hardrock mining sites and animal feeding operations? To supply the context for these issues, this report first provides a background and overview of the Superfund program. Legislative Background
On December 11, 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, P.L. 96-510 ) to create the hazardous substance cleanup program. The program became known as "Superfund" in reference to the trust fund established by the law. The fund was originally supported by taxes levied on specific petroleum products and chemicals, and a corporate environmental income tax. Until recent years, the Superfund taxes provided the majority of the funding for the needs of the program. As noted in a comprehensive report prepared by Resources for the Future (RFF) (hereafter referred to as the RFF Report):
The expense and pace of cleaning up NPL sites has been, and continues to be, a contentious topic among followers of the Superfund program.... [E]ven though more than half of all NPL sites have been deemed "construction complete"—meaning that all physical remedies are in place and immediate risks posed by the site have been addressed—there remain hundreds of sites placed on the NPL during the early years of the program where cleanup remedies have still not been fully implemented. Selected Superfund Issues
This section of the report discusses four Superfund issues that have received interest in recent years. The first two issues concern program funding, including who should fund the program (industry or general taxpayers) and how much funding is needed to meet the program's obligations. Without dedicated taxes, and with a relatively small balance in the trust fund, Congress has been using general revenues for a larger percentage of cleanup funds. Although several Members of Congress have introduced bills to reinstate the taxes during these years, such efforts have lacked the necessary support. In general, the current Superfund funding debate (i.e., whether a dedicated tax or General Treasury revenues should support the trust fund) applies to this subset of NPL sites. Recent evidence indicates that appropriations from the past several years have fallen short of program needs. Abandoned Hardrock Mines
Although CERCLA liability is a powerful tool for EPA to drive cleanup of contaminated sites, the threat of CERCLA liability may act as a cleanup disincentive at abandoned hardrock mines. As discussed previously, the number of hardrock mining sites listed on the NPL in future years, particularly those without identifiable PRPs, could play an important role in the Superfund funding debate. Some stakeholders believe that the threat of CERCLA liability serves as a disincentive to good samaritan groups who might offer cleanup assistance. These parties have called for federal legislation that would provide good samaritans with protection from Superfund's liability scheme. CERCLA requires facilities to report hazardous substance releases into the environment, including ambient air, that are above reportable quantities (RQ). | Superfund is the federal government's principal program for cleaning up the nation's contaminated waste sites and protecting public health and the environment from releases of hazardous substances. Enacted into law as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA, P.L. 96-510), the program became known as Superfund because Congress established a large trust fund—originally supported by taxes levied on specific petroleum products and chemicals—to provide the majority of the program's funding needs. Although the 26-year-old program has seen less attention compared with earlier years, Superfund issues continue to generate debate. This report provides a background and overview of the Superfund program and examines four topics that received interest in recent years.
The first issue concerns Superfund program funding: who should pay for the program, general taxpayers or a dedicated tax on industry? The program was originally funded by a tax on industry that expired at the end of 1995. Without dedicated taxes, and with a relatively small balance in the trust fund, Congress has been using general revenues for a larger percentage of cleanup funds. Members introduced bills to reinstate the taxes in the current and past three Congresses, but so far these efforts have lacked the necessary support.
The second issue regards Superfund program appropriations. Recent evidence indicates that appropriations from the past several years have fallen short of program needs. The Administration's FY2007 budget proposal for Superfund also fell below levels that, according to some estimates, are needed to meet program obligations. Without reinstating the Superfund taxes, any increased appropriation would be funded through General Treasury revenues.
The third issue involves Superfund interaction with abandoned and contaminated hardrock mines. The number of hardrock mining sites requiring cleanup in future years, particularly those without identifiable responsible parties, could play an important role in the Superfund funding debate. There is also a concern that the threat of CERCLA liability may act as a cleanup disincentive for "good samaritans" who might offer cleanup assistance at abandoned hardrock mines.
The fourth issue concerns Superfund's role at animal feeding operations. Stakeholders argue about whether these operations should be required to report ammonia air emissions, primarily resulting from animal waste, as hazardous substance releases. This issue also concerns the responsibility for releases of animal waste that reach water bodies. |
crs_R42113 | crs_R42113_0 | Corporate tax revenues have been declining for the last six decades. This report discusses the three main factors for the decline. First, the average effective corporate tax rate has decreased over time, mostly due to reductions in the statutory rate and changes affecting the tax treatment of investment and capital recovery (depreciation). Second, an increasing fraction of business activity is being carried out by partnerships and S corporations, which are not subject to the corporate income tax. And third, corporate sector profitability has fallen over time, leading to a further erosion of the corporate tax base. As Congress considers options for tax reform, background on the decline in corporate tax revenue could prove useful in preserving any tax reforms enacted, or structuring a reform to obtain a desired revenue effect, such as revenue neutrality or enhancement. The House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance have held hearings on tax reform throughout the first session of the 112 th Congress. In his 2011 State of the Union address the President called for corporate tax reform that did not add to the deficit. Generally, the corporate tax reform discussion has focused on reducing statutory rates and achieving revenue neutrality through broadening the tax base by eliminating various deductions, exemptions, and credits, among other things, such as shifting to a territorial tax system. In the post-World War II era, corporate tax revenue as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) peaked in 1952 at 6.1% and generally declined since (see Figure 1 ). Taken together, the corporate tax has also decreased in importance relative to other revenue sources. At its post-WWII peak in 1952, the corporate tax generated 32.1% of all federal tax revenue. In that same year the individual tax accounted for 42.2% of federal revenue, and the payroll tax accounted for 9.7% of revenue. Today, the corporate tax accounts for 8.9% of federal tax revenue, whereas the individual and payroll taxes generate 41.5% and 40.0%, respectively, of federal revenue. This has led to an erosion of the corporate tax base. | Corporate tax revenues have declined over the last six decades. In the post-World War II era, corporate tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) peaked in 1952 at 6.1%. Today, the corporate tax generates revenue equal to approximately 1.3% of GDP. The corporate tax has also decreased in importance relative to other revenue sources. At its post-WWII peak in 1952, the corporate tax generated 32.1% of all federal tax revenue. In that same year the individual tax accounted for 42.2% of federal revenue, and the payroll tax accounted for 9.7% of revenue. Today, the corporate tax accounts for 8.9% of federal tax revenue, whereas the individual and payroll taxes generate 41.5% and 40.0%, respectively, of federal revenue.
This report discusses the three main factors for the decline in corporate tax revenue. First, the average effective corporate tax rate has decreased over time, mostly as a result of reductions in the statutory rate and changes affecting the tax treatment of investment and capital recovery (depreciation). Second, an increasing fraction of business activity is being carried out by partnerships and S corporations, which are not subject to the corporate income tax. This has led to an erosion of the corporate tax base. And third, corporate sector profitability has fallen over time, leading to a further erosion of the corporate tax base.
Understanding the decline in corporate tax revenue could be helpful in preserving any tax reforms enacted, or structuring a reform to obtain a desired revenue effect, such as revenue neutrality or enhancement. The House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance have held hearings on tax reform throughout the first session of the 112th Congress. The President, in his 2011 State of the Union address, called for corporate tax reform that did not add to the deficit. Generally, the corporate tax reform discussion has focused on reducing statutory rates and achieving revenue neutrality through broadening the tax base by eliminating various deductions, exemptions, and credits, among other things. |
crs_R40966 | crs_R40966_0 | Introduction
Under the federal crop insurance program, farmers can purchase crop insurance policies to manage financial risks associated with declines in crop yields and/or revenue. The program, which began in 1938 when Congress authorized the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) and now covers more than 100 crops, is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Risk Management Agency (RMA), which acts as both regulator and reinsurer. A Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) between USDA and the private companies spells out expense reimbursements and risk-sharing by the federal government, including the terms under which FCIC provides subsidies and reinsurance (i.e., insurance for insurance companies) on eligible crop insurance contracts sold or reinsured by insurance companies. As a result, the SRA plays a central role in determining program costs. In late 2009, RMA began the process of renegotiating the SRA established in 2004. In the run-up to the negotiations, some had criticized it as being too generous for insurance companies following a significant increase in government costs in recent years, driven in part by rising crop prices. The 2008 farm bill ( P.L. Although Congress does not directly approve any new agreement, Congress has been interested in the SRA negotiation in an oversight capacity, particularly with respect to cost-effectiveness and changes that might affect farmer participation, policy coverage, or industry interest in selling crop insurance to farmers. To encourage farmer participation and reduce the need for ad hoc disaster assistance, the federal government subsidizes the purchase of crop insurance policies, which are sold and completely serviced through 16 approved private insurance companies. Insurance company losses are reinsured by USDA, and their administrative and operating costs are reimbursed by the federal government. The SRA does not affect policy premiums paid by farmers, which are based on RMA's estimates of risk and on subsides set in statute. Cost Control and Financial Viability of Crop Insurance Companies
A&O Reimbursements
Since A&O reimbursements are based on a percentage of premiums, the dollar amount of A&O reimbursement has risen sharply in recent years as premiums have risen to reflect higher crop prices. The A&O reimbursement increased from an average of $881 million during FY2004-FY2006 to $1.6 billion in FY2009, after reaching $1.3 billion in FY2007 and $2.0 billion in FY2008. Underwriting
Similarly, company underwriting gains (the amount by which a company's share of retained premiums exceeds its indemnities) have increased substantially in recent years, as weather has been generally favorable for growing crops. They say that if the government share of gains is increased in exchange for a larger government share of the losses in loss years, average taxpayer costs would decline. The insurance industry contends that the net book quota share provision of the SRA is equivalent to a tax on underwriting income and crowds out private reinsurance. Developing the 2011 SRA
On December 4, 2009, USDA's Risk Management Agency (RMA) released it first draft of the 2011 SRA. Following industry feedback, USDA issued a second draft in mid-February and a "final draft" on June 10, 2010. On July 13, 2010, USDA announced that all of the approved crop insurance companies had signed the new SRA, which covers crops with policy closing dates after July 1, 2010 (e.g., 2011-crop corn). To control costs, the 2011 SRA places a cap on A&O reimbursements of $1.3 billion per year. | Under the federal crop insurance program, farmers can purchase crop insurance policies to manage financial risks associated with declines in crop yields and/or revenue. The program covers more than 100 crops and is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Risk Management Agency (RMA), which acts as both regulator and reinsurer. To encourage farmer participation and reduce the need for ad hoc disaster assistance, the federal government subsidizes the purchase of crop insurance policies, which are sold and serviced through 16 approved private insurance companies. Insurance company losses are reinsured by USDA, and their administrative and operating (A&O) costs are reimbursed by the government.
A Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) between USDA and the private companies spells out expense reimbursements and risk-sharing by the government, including the terms under which the government provides subsidies and reinsurance (i.e., insurance for insurance companies) on eligible crop insurance contracts sold or reinsured by insurance companies. As a result, the SRA plays a central role in determining program costs. The SRA does not affect policy premiums paid by farmers, which are based on RMA's estimates of risk and on subsides set in statute.
As provided under the 2008 farm bill, USDA in late 2009 began renegotiating the SRA established in 2004. On July 13, 2010, USDA announced that all of the approved crop insurance companies had signed the new SRA, which covers crops with policy closing dates after July 1, 2010 (e.g., 2011-crop corn). Prior to and during the negotiations, some had criticized the previous SRA as being too generous for insurance companies following a significant increase in government costs in recent years. Although Congress does not directly approve any new agreement, Congress has been interested in its oversight capacity, particularly with respect to cost-effectiveness and effects on farmer participation, the industry's selling and servicing of crop insurance products to farmers, and baseline funding levels for the next farm bill.
Since A&O reimbursements under the previous SRA were based on a percentage of premiums, their dollar amount had risen sharply in recent years as premiums rose to reflect higher crop prices. The A&O reimbursement increased from an average of $881 million during FY2004-FY2006 to $1.6 billion in 2009. Similarly, company underwriting gains (the amount by which a company's share of retained premiums exceeds its indemnities) have increased substantially in recent years, as weather has been generally favorable for growing crops. Some have argued that if the government share of gains is increased in exchange for a larger government share of losses, average taxpayer costs would decline. The insurance industry has contended that a certain SRA provision ("net book quota share") is a tax on underwriting income and crowds out private reinsurance.
RMA released its first draft of the 2011 SRA on December 4, 2009, a second draft in mid-February 2010, and a "final" draft on June 10, 2010. The final SRA places a cap on A&O reimbursements to control costs, and limits a company's expenditures on agent commissions. Among the changes to underwriting provisions, the final SRA improves profit potential and reduces company risk in higher-risk and underserved states. Overall, USDA expects the changes to save $6 billion over 10 years. The industry remains concerned that funding reductions are excessive, potentially jeopardizing program delivery to farmers. |
crs_R41077 | crs_R41077_0 | In a 2007 decision, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , and more forcefully in a 2009 decision, Ashcroft v. Iqbal , the U.S. Supreme Court heightened the standard for evaluating such pleadings. Although the extent of its impact has yet to be determined, the change appears to reduce the likelihood that plaintiffs' claims will survive the pleadings stage in federal courts, particularly in cases in which plaintiffs plan to rely on evidence discovered during litigation to bolster their claims. Bills pending in the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, the Open Access to Courts Act of 2009 ( H.R. 4115 ) and the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 ( S. 1504 ), aim to reverse the effects of the rulings. Thus, it seems probable that at least to some extent, the decisions will decrease the quantity of civil complaints which survive a motion to dismiss. A bill pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 ( S. 1504 ), would prohibit the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim "except under the standards set forth ... in Conley v. Gibson ." | In 2007 and 2009 decisions, Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the U.S. Supreme Court heightened the standard governing whether a civil complaint filed in federal court will survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. After those rulings, it appears that federal courts must evaluate the "plausibility" of claims made at the pleading stage. Previously, complaints typically survived a motion to dismiss as long as they stated a claim for which some set of facts could be assembled to warrant legal relief. The change makes it less likely for plaintiffs' claims to survive past the initial pleadings stage, particularly in cases in which plaintiffs may need to rely on the discovery of evidence once litigation begins in order to bolster their claims. Bills pending in the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, the Open Access to Courts Act of 2009 (H.R. 4115) and the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 (S. 1504), aim to reverse the effects of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions. |
crs_R41178 | crs_R41178_0 | Most Recent Developments
On the night of June 10-11, clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks broke out in Kyrgyzstan's southern city of Osh (population over 200,000), and intensified and spread to Jalal-Abad (population about 75,000) on June 12, and then to other smaller towns and villages. By some estimates, up to 1,000 or more people may have been killed and many more wounded. Over 100,000 ethnic Uzbeks reportedly have fled across the border to Uzbekistan. On June 14, the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek expressed deep concern about the violence in the south, called for the restoration of the rule of law, and announced that the United States would send more medical and humanitarian assistance to help remedy the results of the violence in the south. Background
Kyrgyzstan is a small and poor Central Asian country that gained independence in 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union. The United States has been interested in helping Kyrgyzstan to enhance its sovereignty and territorial integrity, increase democratic participation and civil society, bolster economic reform and development, strengthen human rights, prevent weapons proliferation, and more effectively combat transnational terrorism and trafficking in persons and narcotics. The significance of Kyrgyzstan to the United States increased after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. Kyrgyzstan offered to host U.S. forces at an airbase at the Manas international airport outside of the capital, Bishkek, and it opened in December 2001. Appearing to fuel this popular discontent, Russia launched a media campaign in Kyrgyzstan against Bakiyev (see below). Recent events have been troubling, including the past few days.... All human rights must be protected, including free speech and freedom of the media." She stated that the interim government would rule until presidential elections are held in six months. Implications for Kyrgyzstan
The coup resulted in relatively large-scale casualties and much property damage, compared to the 2005 coup that brought Bakiyev to power. A 75-member constitutional commission, headed by deputy prime minister Tekebayev, finalized a draft constitution in May which is scheduled for a referendum on June 27, 2010. On May 5, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the interim government discussed setting up a group of officials and experts from international financial institutions to coordinate assistance to enhance political and economic stability in Kyrgyzstan. We have interest in stability. At a hearing held by the House Subcommittee on National Security in April 2010, several witnesses called for boosted U.S. foreign assistance for Kyrgyzstan as a means of reversing perceptions by the Kyrgyz interim government and many Kyrgyz citizens that the United States had eased its backing for democracy and human rights in order to maintain good relations with Bakiyev. Transit Center and Northern Distribution Network
The Manas Transit Center near Bishkek (see Figure A-1 ) plays a vital role in the U.S. surge in Afghanistan. Otunbayeva warned on April 8 that questions of corruption involving commercial supplies for the transit center would be one matter of investigation. Some observers warn that the status of the transit center is likely to become a campaign issue in the run-up to the planned October 10, 2010, presidential and legislative elections. She was a former deputy prime minister, foreign minister, ambassador to the United Kingdom and the United States, and U.N. emissary. He resigned and accused the Bakiyev government of corruption and nepotism. He was the main opposition candidate in the 2009 presidential election. He was a former prosecutor-general. | Kyrgyzstan is a small and poor country in Central Asia that gained independence in 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union (see Figure A-1). It has developed a notable but fragile civil society. Progress in democratization has been set back by problematic elections (one of which helped precipitate a coup in 2005 that brought Kurmanbek Bakiyev to power), contention over constitutions, and corruption. The April 2010 coup appears to have been triggered by popular discontent over rising utility prices and government repression. After two days of popular unrest in the capital of Bishkek and other cities, opposition politicians ousted the Bakiyev administration on April 8 and declared an interim government pending a new presidential election in six months. Roza Otunbayeva, a former foreign minister and ambassador to the United States, was declared the acting prime minister. A referendum on a new constitution establishing a parliamentary form of government is scheduled to be held on June 27, 2010, to be followed by parliamentary elections on October 10, 2010, and a presidential election in December 2011.
On the night of June 10-11, 2010, ethnic-based violence escalated in the city of Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan, and over the next few days intensified and spread to other localities. The violence may have resulted in up to a thousand or more deaths and injuries and up to 100,000 or more displaced persons, most of them ethnic Uzbeks who have fled to neighboring Uzbekistan.
The United States has been interested in helping Kyrgyzstan to enhance its sovereignty and territorial integrity, increase democratic participation and civil society, bolster economic reform and development, strengthen human rights, prevent weapons proliferation, and more effectively combat transnational terrorism and trafficking in persons and narcotics. The significance of Kyrgyzstan to the United States increased after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. The Kyrgyz government permitted the United States to establish a military base at the Manas international airport outside Bishkek that trans-ships personnel, equipment, and supplies to support U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan. The former Bakiyev government had renegotiated a lease on the airbase in June 2009 (it was renamed the Manas Transit Center), in recognition that ongoing instability in Afghanistan jeopardized regional security. Otunbayeva has declared that the interim government will uphold Kyrgyzstan's existing foreign policy, including the presence of the transit center, although some changes to the lease may be sought in the future. She also has launched an investigation of corrupt dealings by the previous government on fuel contracts and other services for the transit center.
Cumulative U.S. budgeted assistance to Kyrgyzstan for FY1992-FY2008 was $953.5 million (FREEDOM Support Act and agency funds). Kyrgyzstan ranks third in such aid per capita among the Soviet successor states, indicative of U.S. government and congressional support in the early 1990s for its apparent progress in making reforms and more recently to support anti-terrorism, border protection, and operations in Afghanistan.
As Congress and the Administration consider how to assist democratic and economic transformation in Kyrgyzstan, several possible programs have been suggested, including those to buttress civil rights, bolster political institutions and the rule of law, and encourage private sector economic growth. (See also CRS Report RL33458, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, by [author name scrubbed].) |
crs_R43715 | crs_R43715_0 | Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, airlines were affected by a worldwide cancellation of third-party liability war risk coverage in the commercial market and significant increases in the costs of other war risk insurance. The commercial insurance market has since stabilized, and a number of air carriers are again purchasing war risk coverage from private insurers. A series of airliner losses in 2014, however, may lead to increases in aviation insurance premiums. These losses include the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines flight 370 with 239 people on board over the Indian Ocean in March, followed by the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in July, which killed 298 people on board. The insurance losses in 2014 may also lead to higher premiums for "all-risk" policies. Subsequently, it has been extended several times, most recently in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. 113-76 ). The expansion of the Aviation War Risk Insurance Program was not the only government response to the 9/11 attacks relating to the insurance market. Differences between the Aviation War Risk Insurance Program and the TRIA program are discussed in Appendix B .
FAA's Premium Aviation War Risk Insurance Program
Program Overview27
As of January 2014, the FAA's Aviation War Risk Insurance Program provided coverage to 44 U.S. air carriers that represented 99% of the total revenue-passenger-miles (RPMs) flown by all U.S. carriers in FY2013. By August 2014, it reduced that estimate to $125 million. Extent of Coverage
By statute, the coverage offered under the program begins with the first dollar of loss and reimburses 100% of losses. 5. 6. FAA is charged in 49 U.S.C. §44306 with basing the premiums charged on the risk assumed by the program "to the extent practical." According to FAA, most of the premiums paid for the program's coverage have been affected by the cap. Proposals for Change
On March 31, 2014, the Secretary of Transportation submitted to Congress a legislative proposal to reform the Aviation War Risk Insurance Program, permanently authorizing it with a reduced overall scope. Specifically, if the proposal were enacted, FAA would:
continue to provide war risk coverage for airline losses involving the use of nuclear, biological, chemical, and/or radioactive (NBCR) weapons, as such coverage is not available in the commercial market; provide full aviation war risk coverage, at the discretion of the Secretary of Transportation, for 90 days in the event of a widespread cancellation of coverage by the private insurance market, similar to the market disruption experience following the 9/11 attacks; and continue to provide non-premium war risk insurance for carriers operating under Department of Defense contracts in support of national defense. The current proposal is not the first proposed change to the Aviation War Risk Insurance Program in recent years. These budgets would have implemented a $150 million deductible for hull and liability exposures under the program. The Aviation Insurance Revolving Fund, currently over $2 billion, is invested in U.S. Treasury securities, as is the case with most other U.S. government funds. Appendix A. Any losses covered under TRIA would be paid from the government's general fund. The statute requires private insurers to offer coverage under the same terms as insurance against losses from causes other than terrorism, but these insurers may charge a separate premium for this coverage and the law does not specifically limit this premium. | Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, coverage for such attacks, and for "war risks," became difficult, if not impossible, for airlines to purchase from private insurers. In response, Congress passed expansions of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aviation War Risk Insurance Program. The amended statute (49 U.S.C. §44301 et seq) requires that the FAA offer war risk insurance to U.S. airlines with the premiums based on the cost of such coverage prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The federal coverage under the program is relatively expansive, with coverage provided after the first dollar of losses and with a broad definition of what constitutes a war risk loss. The expansion of the program was limited in time, but has been extended several times over the years, often as part of appropriations legislation. The last extension was in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), which extended the expanded program to September 30, 2014.
Up until 2014, most U.S. airlines purchased the FAA coverage and generally supported the existing program against proposed changes. In 2014, the number of air carriers purchasing insurance and the premium volumes dropped. This movement away from government insurance has occurred against a backdrop of increased private insurance capacity and lower prices. A recent series of large aircraft losses, including the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 in March 2014, the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine in July 2014, and attacks on aircraft on the ground in Pakistan and Libya, however, may lead to higher rates. It is unclear how much rates may increase and whether higher premiums might lead the airlines to again seek coverage from FAA, if such coverage remains available after FY2014.
Three claims have been filed by airlines under the current Aviation War Risk Insurance Program and claims payouts have been minimal. The premiums paid for the insurance are deposited in a dedicated fund at the Treasury with the balance, currently over $2 billion, invested in U.S. Treasury securities. While this may seem a large sum, according to FAA, the statutory cap on premiums has resulted in past premium amounts insufficient to cover the full risks assumed by the government. For example, the 9/11 attacks are estimated to have caused approximately $5.6 billion in aviation hull and liability losses, adjusted for inflation. A much smaller event could cause losses large enough to deplete the fund and require general fund revenue to cover claims.
Several presidential budgets in recent years have called for changes to the program to reduce government exposure. On March 31, 2014, the Secretary of Transportation submitted a draft legislative proposal to Congress which would make the program permanent but at the same time reduce its scope. Specifically, the administration proposal would create permanent coverage for war risk losses from nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological events, while giving the Secretary the authority to offer full war risk coverage for 90 days after a widespread disruption in the insurance market, such as that following the 9/11 attacks. The administration draft proposal has not been incorporated into legislation introduced in the 113th Congress. |
crs_R40226 | crs_R40226_0 | The Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA)
The Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA, H.R. 2 ) was passed in the House on January 14, 2009, and an amended version was passed in the Senate on January 29, 2009. On February 4, 2009, the House passed H.R. 2 (as amended by the Senate), and later that day President Obama signed the bill into law as P.L. 111-3 , the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA). One of the provisions of CHIPRA permits using CHIP as the program's acronym, instead of SCHIP. This report reflects this change, using CHIP instead of SCHIP. The overall structure of CHIPRA is similar to its two predecessors, H.R. The remainder of this report summarizes changes to prior law as enacted by CHIPRA. In addition to the prior-law requirements of the appropriation, for data collection beginning with FY2009, in consultation with the Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of Commerce is required to (1) make adjustments to the CPS to develop more accurate state-specific estimates of the number of children enrolled in CHIP or Medicaid, (2) make adjustments to the CPS to improve the survey estimates used to determine the child population growth factor in the new financing structure under CHIPRA and any other necessary data, (3) include health insurance survey information for the American Community Survey (ACS) related to children, and (4) assess whether estimates from the ACS produce more reliable estimates than the CPS for the child population growth factor in the new CHIP financing structure established under this new law. References to title XXI. 976 and H.R. | The Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (H.R. 2, CHIPRA) was first passed in the House on January 14, 2009, and an amended version was passed in the Senate on January 29, 2009. On February 4, 2009, the House passed H.R. 2 as amended by the Senate and later that day President Obama signed the bill into law as P.L. 111-3. One of the provisions of CHIPRA permits using CHIP as the program's acronym, instead of SCHIP. This report reflects this change, using CHIP instead of SCHIP.
The overall structure of CHIPRA is similar to its two predecessors, H.R. 976 and H.R. 3963 from the 110th Congress. This report summarizes changes to prior law made by CHIPRA, and provides a brief legislative history of the major State Children's Health Insurance (CHIP) reauthorization bills in the 110th and 111th Congresses.
This report reflects the provisions at the time of CHIPRA's enactment. It is meant to serve as a historical reference to the complete set of provisions included in the law, as of February 4, 2009. It will not be updated to capture subsequent legislative changes, program guidance, public notices, or rulemaking. Key statutory changes affecting the CHIPRA provisions are listed in the subsection titled "The Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA)" and are further identified through footnotes tied to the relevant provisions. However, these changes are not reflected in provision descriptions included in the body of this report. (For a current description of program rules and state activity, see CRS Report R43627, State Children's Health Insurance Program: An Overview.) |
crs_RS22572 | crs_RS22572_0 | Niyazov's Death and the Political Succession
Days after Turkmenistan's ruling Democratic Party voted to make its head, President Niyazov, its "eternal" party leader, he died on December 21, 2006, at age 66, ostensibly from a heart attack. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on December 28 voiced similar hopes of revitalized bilateral relations and U.S. interest in "advanc[ing] a stable, democratic, and prosperous future for Turkmenistan." A more pro-Russian leadership may join Russia in calling for ending U.S. and allied access to bases in Central Asia. | This report discusses the political succession in Turkmenistan following the death of long-time authoritarian leader Saparamurad Niyazov in December 2006. Implications for Turkmenistan and U.S. interests in Central Asia are examined. This report may be updated. Related products include CRS Report RL33458, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42686 | crs_R42686_0 | Introduction
Members of Congress have demonstrated their interest in the U.S. Foreign-Trade Zone (FTZ) system through hearings and legislation over the past seven decades. The program may enhance the competitiveness of U.S. businesses, support employment opportunities, and impact U.S. tariff revenues. The third section focuses on current issues for Congress relating to the U.S. FTZ program. Free trade zones have become a substantial part of the structure underpinning the global supply chain. Only then are tariffs payable, quotas honored, and full customs procedures applicable. Today, free trade zones employ at least 66 million workers worldwide, including 370,000 in the United States. The U.S. Foreign-Trade Zone Program
History
The U.S. FTZ Program was created by the U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones Act in 1934 (P.L. 81[a]-81[u]), in the midst of the Great Depression. It was designed to accelerate U.S. trade in the wake of the restrictive impact of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which raised U.S. tariffs on imported goods as high as 53%. See Table A-1 for a summary of zone and subzone activity. The zone system accounts for 13% of all foreign goods entering the United States and employs roughly 370,000 workers, representing about 3% of U.S. manufacturing workers in 2012—most but not all FTZ employees are in manufacturing. Only a small share of it is exported (light blue bars). There are no inverted tariff benefits from the refining of gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and jet fuel, which account for most of the output from crude oil. Savings from tariff reduction, administrative efficiencies, tax benefits, and duty deferral may help U.S. corporations maintain operations in the United States, and may attract foreign producers to establish manufacturing facilities in the United States. Third, the tariff benefits companies enjoy by operating in FTZs can also result in some loss or deferral of tariff revenue for the United States, although U.S. tariffs are generally low and represent a very small share of government revenue. Most of the financial benefits come from three of the seven sources: duty reduction on inverted tariff situations, customs inventory control efficiencies, and duty exemption on exports. Customs and Inventory E fficiencies. Merchandise can be re-exported from a zone without the payment of duties, providing another significant source of savings to U.S. exporters. In addition, no duty is payable on goods that are imported into zones and ultimately consumed, scrapped, or destroyed in the zone. The FTZ Board consists of two members: the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the Treasury. The Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) acts as an advisor to the FTZ Board and is responsible for direct oversight of zone activity and ensuring compliance with the FTZ Act and all laws and regulations pertaining to zone use. CBP is responsible for activating FTZs, securing them, controlling dutiable merchandise moving into and out of them, and protecting and collecting the revenue. While the new regulations address a variety of issues, they were designed primarily to streamline the application process for manufacturers and distributors who want to operate in an FTZ or establish a subzone. Domestic issues include whether FTZs represent a misallocation of U.S. resources; whether data relating to zone use are sufficient; and the extent to which U.S. FTZ zone use affects U.S. employment and the competitiveness of U.S. firms. Internationally, congressional issues relate to the effectiveness of trade zones worldwide as a tool for economic development and global competitiveness and U.S. influence on worker rights issues in zones around the world through trade policy. Do U.S. FTZs Encourage a Misallocation of U.S. Resources? Such broad-based tariff reductions have typically occurred in the United States through multilateral trade liberalization negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO). FTZ users benefit from more streamlined customs procedures and lower merchandise processing fees, while those outside zones do not. The U.S. FTZ Board publishes data on both foreign and domestic products entered into zones, and final products leaving zones for U.S. consumption and for export, respectively. This represents less than 3% of total U.S. manufacturing employment. Outlook: Future of U.S. FTZs and Zones Worldwide? | U.S. foreign-trade zones (FTZs) are geographic areas declared to be outside the normal customs territory of the United States. This means that, for foreign merchandise entering FTZs and re-exported as different products, customs procedures are streamlined and tariffs do not apply. For products intended for U.S. consumption, full customs procedures are applied and duties are payable when they exit the FTZ.
In 1934, in the midst of the Great Depression, Congress passed the U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones Act. It was designed to expedite and encourage international trade while promoting domestic activity and investment. The U.S. FTZ program offers a variety of customs benefits to businesses which combine foreign and domestic merchandise in FTZs. Similar types of "zones" exist in 135 countries, employing about 66 million workers worldwide. Though some aspects differ, all have streamlined customs procedures and no duties applicable on components and raw materials combined in zones and then exported. Use of the zones can facilitate cooperative international production for a substantial share of the global supply chain.
U.S. FTZs can affect the competitiveness of U.S. companies by allowing savings through (1) duty reduction on "inverted tariff structures" (where tariffs are higher on imported components than on finished products); (2) customs and inventory efficiencies; and (3) duty exemption on goods exported from, or consumed, scrapped, or destroyed in, a zone. Though difficult to achieve, other possible alternatives, such as broad-based tariff reductions through multilateral negotiations, and overall customs reform might provide some of the same competitive advantages as zone use in a more efficient manner, while also ensuring that all importers have equal access.
Zone activity represents a significant share of U.S. trade. In 2012, over 13% of foreign goods entered the United States through FTZs or bonded warehouses—72% of them as crude oil. Most shipments arriving through FTZs were consumed in the United States; the rest were exported. Crude oil byproducts such as gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, kerosene, and petrochemicals dominate FTZ output. Other key products include autos, consumer electronics, and machinery. U.S. zone activity occurs primarily in FTZ manufacturing operations.
Administration of the U.S. FTZ system is overseen by the Secretaries of Commerce and the Treasury, who constitute the U.S. FTZ Board. The Board is responsible for the establishment of zones, the authorization of specific production activity, and the general oversight of zones. It also appoints an Executive Secretary, who oversees the Board's staff. Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) directly oversees FTZs. It activates the zones and secures and controls dutiable merchandise moving into and out of them. CBP oversight also includes both protection of U.S. tariff revenue and protection from illegal activity through screening, targeting, and inspections.
In 2012, the U.S. FTZ Board issued new regulations. They focused primarily on streamlining the application procedures and shortening, generally from a year to four months, the time for FTZ approval for manufacturing.
Congressional Interest
Congress has demonstrated a continuing interest in U.S. Foreign Trade Zones (FTZs), as they (1) may help to maintain U.S. employment opportunities and the competitiveness of U.S. producers; (2) encompass a portion of U.S. trade; and (3) affect U.S. tariff revenue. U.S. FTZs account for less than one-half of 1% of all world zone workers and a small share of the U.S. workforce. However, most of this employment is in manufacturing, which has lost a significant share of its workers over the past several decades. Today, every state has at least one FTZ, and many have numerous manufacturing operations.
Current issues for Congress relating to the U.S. FTZ program may include (1) whether U.S. FTZs encourage a misallocation of U.S. resources; (2) data availability issues; (3) security concerns; and (4) the U.S. employment and global competitiveness impact of FTZs. Broader considerations relating to the world zone network include (5) the effectiveness of trade zones worldwide as a tool for economic development; and (6) trade zones worldwide and worker rights. |
crs_RS20558 | crs_RS20558_0 | In 1997 Congress made significant changes to IDEA in P.L. (6)
IDEA Amendments in the Violent and Repeat Juvenile Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999
Violence in schools surfaced on the congressional agenda in the 106th Congress with S. 254 , the Violent and Repeat Juvenile Accountability andRehabilitation Act of 1999 which passed the Senate on May 20, 1999, and H.R. Both of these bills contained amendments offered on the floor relating to discipline under IDEA. Essentially these amendments would havechanged section 615 of IDEA to eliminate IDEA's different disciplinary procedures for children with disabilitiesin certain situations. In the Senate theamendment applied to children with disabilities who carry or possess a gun or firearm while in the House theamendment would have covered a weapon. (8) The legislationwas not enacted. (9)
House Amendments Concerning Children with Disabilities in the ESEA Legislation
Two amendments relating to children with disabilities were offered and accepted during House Education and Workforce Committee markup of H.R. 4141 , 106th Cong. One amendment, offered by Representative Norwood, concerned the disciplineof a child with a disability who carries or possesses a weapon. The other amendment, offered by Representatives Talent, McIntosh and Tancredo, concerned the discipline of achild with a disability who knowingly possessesor uses illegal drugs at school or commits an aggravated assault or battery at school. The amendment offered by Representatives Talent, McIntosh and Tancredo required that each state that receives funds under the Act shall require each localeducational agency to have in effect a policy under which school personnel may discipline a child with a disabilityin the same manner as a child without adisability if the child with a disability (1) knowingly possesses or uses illegal drugs or sells or solicits the sale ofa controlled substance at a school, on schoolpremises, or to or at a school function or (2) commits an aggravated assault or battery, as defined under State or locallaw, at a school, on school premises, or to orat a school function. These amendments were not enacted. | Although Congress described its 1997 changes to discipline provisions in theIndividuals with Disabilities EducationAct (IDEA) as a "careful balance," it was not long before amendments to change the provisions surfaced. In 1999the Senate passed S. 254, 106thCong., the Violent and Repeat Juvenile Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, and the House passedH.R. 1501, 106th Cong., the ChildSafety and Protection Act, both of which contained amendments to IDEA. These amendments would have changedsection 615 of IDEA to eliminate IDEA'sdifferent disciplinary procedures for children with disabilities in certain situations. In the Senate the amendmentapplied to children with disabilities who carry agun or firearm while in the House the amendment would cover a weapon. These amendments were not enacted.
Two amendments relating to children with disabilities were offered and accepted during House Education andWorkforce Committee markup of H.R. 4141, 106th Cong., the Elementary and Secondary Education Act Amendments. One amendment, offered byRepresentative Norwood, concerned the discipline ofa child with a disability who carries or possesses a weapon. The other amendment, offered by RepresentativesTalent, McIntosh and Tancredo, concerned thediscipline of a child with a disability who knowingly possesses or uses illegal drugs at school or commits anaggravated assault or battery at school. Theseamendments were not enacted.
This report will be updated as appropriate. For a more detailed discussion of the due process provisions inIDEA see CRS Report 98-42, Individuals withDisabilities Education Act: Discipline Provisions in P.L. 105-17, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44567 | crs_R44567_0 | Introduction
This report discusses the FY2017 budget request, related congressional actions, and appropriations (discretionary budget authority) for the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Bureau of the Census (Census Bureau). The report focuses primarily on the Census Bureau, whose budget justification is published separately from ESA's and whose budget is far larger. Of the $114.6 million, $4.0 million was to fund ESA's policy support and management oversight. The request exceeded the $3.9 million FY2016 appropriation by $83,000 (2.1%). The rest of the FY2017 request, $110.7 million, was to go to BEA and would have been $5.6 million (5.3%) more than the agency's $105.1 million FY2016-enacted funding level. The FY2017 request was divided between the bureau's two major accounts:
Current Surveys and Programs would have received $285.3 million, a $15.3 million (5.7%) increase over the $270.0 million enacted for FY2016, and 17.5% of the total requested for the bureau; Periodic Censuses and Programs—the account that funds the decennial census—would have received $1,348.3 million, $248.3 million (22.6%) more than the $1,100.0 million approved for FY2016, and 82.5% of the bureau's total request. The Administration requested $778.3 million for the 2020 Decennial Census in FY2017, a $179.4 million (30.0%) increase from the $598.9 million enacted for FY2016. The Administration's FY2017 request for the ACS was $251.1 million, $20.2 million (8.7%) above the FY2016-enacted amount of $230.9 million. Senate Action
Economics and Statistics Administration (Except the Census Bureau)
On April 21, 2016, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 2837 , the Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2017, with recommended funding of $109.0 million for the Economics and Statistics Administration (showing no separate breakout for BEA). The recommendation was identical to the FY2016 funding level for ESA and $5.6 million (4.9%) below the FY2017 request of $114.6 million. Census Bureau
As reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee, S. 2837 recommended $1,518.3 million for the Census Bureau in FY2017, $148.3 million (10.8%) above the FY2016 funding level of $1,370.0 million and $115.3 million (7.1%) below the $1,633.6 million requested for FY2017. Current Surveys and Programs would have received $270.0 million, the same as the FY2016-enacted amount and $15.3 million (5.4%) below the FY2017 request of $285.3 million. 5393 , on June 7, 2016. The bill recommended $107.0 million in funding for ESA (with no separate breakout for BEA), $2.0 million (1.8%) less than the $109.0 million enacted for FY2016 and approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee for FY2017, and $7.6 million (6.7%) below the $114.6 million FY2017 request. 5393 , as reported by the House Appropriations Committee, was to fund the Census Bureau at $1,470.0 million in FY2017, $100.0 million (7.3%) above the $1,370.0 million FY2016 funding level, $163.6 million (10.0%) less than the $1,633.6 million requested for FY2017, and $48.3 million (3.2%) below the Senate committee's recommended $1,518.3 million. The $270.0 million approved for Current Surveys and Programs, which equaled the FY2016-enacted and FY2017 Senate committee-recommended amounts, was $15.3 million (5.4%) under the $285.3 million FY2017 request. Funding for Periodic Censuses and Programs was to be $1,200.0 million, $100.0 million (9.1%) above the $1,100.0 million FY2016-enacted level, $148.3 million (11.0%) less than the FY2017 request of $1,348.3 million, and $48.3 million (3.9%) below the $1,248.3 million approved by the Senate committee. 244 , P.L. 115-31 , became law on May 5, 2017. Division B of the legislation funded ESA at $107.3 million (with no separate amount shown for BEA), $1.7 million (1.6%) less than enacted for FY2016 and recommended by the Senate Appropriations Committee, $7.3 million (6.4%) below the FY2017 request, and $300,000 (0.3%) more than the House Appropriations Committee approved. Census Bureau
The $1,470.0 million provided for the Census Bureau in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, included $270.0 million for Current Surveys and Programs and $1,200.0 million for Periodic Censuses and Programs. These amounts matched the House committee's recommendations. | This report discusses FY2017 appropriations (discretionary budget authority) for the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Bureau of the Census (Census Bureau), which make up the Economics and Statistics Administration (ESA) in the U.S. Department of Commerce. The report will not be updated.
The Administration's FY2017 budget request for ESA (except the Census Bureau, whose budget justification is published separately from ESA's) was $114.6 million, $5.6 million (5.2%) above the $109.0 million FY2016-enacted funding level. Of the $114.6 million, the $110.7 million requested for BEA exceeded the $105.1 million FY2016-enacted amount by $5.6 million (5.3%); the $4.0 million requested to fund ESA's policy support and management oversight was $83,000 (2.1%) more than the $3.9 million approved for FY2016.
The FY2017 request for the Census Bureau was $1,633.6 million, $263.6 million (19.2%) above the $1,370.0 million FY2016-enacted amount. The FY2017 request was divided between the bureau's two major accounts: $285.3 million for Current Surveys and Programs and $1,348.3 million for Periodic Censuses and Programs. Two key programs under this account are the 2020 Decennial Census, with an FY2017 request of $778.3 million, $179.4 million (30.0%) above the $598.9 million enacted for FY2016; and the American Community Survey (ACS), with a request of $251.1 million, $20.2 million (8.7%) above the $230.9 million FY2016-enacted amount.
On April 21, 2016, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 2837, the Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2017 (CJS), with recommended funding of $109.0 million for ESA (showing no separate breakout for BEA). The amount was identical to ESA's FY2016 appropriation and $5.6 million (4.9%) below the FY2017 request. S. 2837, as reported, recommended $1,518.3 million for the Census Bureau, $148.3 million (10.8%) above the FY2016 appropriation and $115.3 million (7.1%) below the FY2017 request. Current Surveys and Programs was to receive $270.0 million, the same as in FY2016 and $15.3 million (5.4%) below the FY2017 request. The $1,248.3 million for Periodic Censuses and Programs would have exceeded FY2016 funding by $148.3 million (13.5%) and been $100.0 million (7.4%) less than requested for FY2017.
The House Committee on Appropriations approved the House FY2017 CJS appropriations bill, H.R. 5393, on June 7, 2016. Recommended funding for ESA was $107.0 million (with no separate breakout for BEA), $2.0 million (1.8%) less than enacted for FY2016 and approved by the Senate committee, and $7.6 million (6.7%) below the FY2017 request. The Census Bureau was to receive $1,470.0 million, $100.0 million (7.3%) more than in FY2016, $163.6 million (10.0%) less than requested for FY2017, and $48.3 million (3.2%) below the Senate committee's recommendation. The $270.0 million recommended for Current Surveys and Programs equaled the FY2016-enacted and FY2017 Senate-committee-recommended amounts and was $15.3 million (5.4%) less than requested. The $1,200.0 million for Periodic Censuses and Programs was $100.0 million (9.1%) above the FY2016-enacted level, $148.3 million (11.0%) less than the FY2017 request, and $48.3 million (3.9%) below what the Senate committee approved.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, H.R. 244, P.L. 115-31, became law on May 5, 2017. It provided ESA with $107.3 million (showing no separate amount for BEA), $1.7 million (1.6%) less than enacted for FY2016 and recommended by the Senate committee, $7.3 million (6.4%) below the FY2017 request, and $300,000 (0.3%) more than the House committee approved. The $1,470.0 million for the Census Bureau in FY2017, including $270.0 million for Current Surveys and Programs and $1,200.0 million for Periodic Censuses and Programs, matched the House committee's recommendations. |
crs_RS22339 | crs_RS22339_0 | Introduction
Since assuming office in 2001, President Bush has been a strong supporter of free trade and trade liberalization. The President has promoted trade liberalization on multiple fronts: globally, regionally, and bilaterally. The Bush Administration argues that these negotiations promote a host of U.S. domestic and foreign interests, both economic and political. Some of these concerns were central to the divisive debate in Congress this year over CAFTAâan agreement that became a proxy, in part, for more generalized concerns about America's standing in an increasingly globalized world economy. While CAFTA was approved by narrow margins in both houses, it is not clear how the outcome will affect the Administration's future free trade agreement program. Implications For Future Trade Agreements
The Bush Administration is now actively negotiating a large number of trade liberalizing agreements. | Since taking office in January 2001, President Bush has supported trade liberalization through negotiations on multiple fronts: globally, regionally, and bilaterally. During this period, Congress has approved five free trade agreements (FTAs) that the Bush Administration has negotiated and signed. The FTAs are designed to promote broad economic and political objectives, both domestic and foreign. However, the debate in Congress over the last FTA approvedâthe Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)âwas contentious, sparking concerns about how Congress might consider future trade liberalizing agreements. This report analyses some of the challenges that became apparent in the aftermath of a divisive trade debate and how they could affect consideration of future trade agreements. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43624 | crs_R43624_0 | During Senate debates over judicial nominations, differing perspectives have been expressed about the relative degree of success of a President's nominees in gaining Senate confirmation, compared with the nominees of other recent Presidents. In light of continued Senate interest in the judicial selection and confirmation process, this report seeks to inform Congress by (1) comparing the number and percentage of judicial nominees confirmed during the first five and a half years of the Obama presidency with the number and percentage of nominees confirmed during the same period of time during the G.W. Bush and Clinton presidencies; (2) comparing the pace of judicial confirmations during the Obama presidency as well as during the G.W. Please note that the purpose of this midyear report is to provide an overview and analysis of the number and percentage of U.S. circuit and district court nominees confirmed as of June 30 of President Obama's sixth year in office (and how such statistics compare to the number and percentage of nominees confirmed during the G.W. Bush, and Clinton, the total number of U.S. circuit and district court nominees submitted to the Senate from January 20 of a President's first year in office to June 30 of his sixth year in office, as well as the number and percentage of circuit and district court nominees whose nominations were confirmed by the Senate during this same period. U.S. District Court Nominees
Table 1 shows that, as of June 30 of his sixth year in office, President Obama had nominated the second greatest number of individuals to U.S. district court judgeships and also had the second greatest number and percentage of his U.S. district court nominees confirmed by the Senate. Of 253 nominees, 219 (86.6%) have, thus far, been confirmed. Bush had 18 nominees confirmed, and President Clinton had 24 nominees confirmed. Circuit and District Court Nominees (Combined)
Overall, combining the data in Table 1 for U.S. circuit and district court nominees, President Obama has had, as of June 30 of his sixth year in office, approximately the same percentage of nominees confirmed as President G.W. Bush (85.9% and 86.0%, respectively) and the greatest number of total nominees confirmed (268). President Clinton had the second-greatest number of nominees confirmed (266) during the same period of his presidency, while President G.W. Bush had the fewest number of nominees confirmed (246). Bush presidency is 22 and 20 fewer than the total number of nominees confirmed, respectively, during the comparable periods of time of the Obama and Clinton presidencies. As shown by Figure 1 , when considering just a President's first term, President Obama had 3.7 circuit court nominees confirmed, on average, every six months (compared to 4.4 nominees confirmed, on average, every six months during President G.W. Finally, Table 1 shows that, from January 20 of President Obama's first year in office to June 30 of his sixth year in office, the Senate confirmed, on average, 4.5 circuit court nominees every six months. Bush and Clinton are 4.2 and 4.0, respectively. As with the confirmation of circuit court nominees during President Obama's second term, this is the greatest number of district court judges approved by the Senate, on average, for any six-month period during any of the three Presidents' first or second terms. The number of district court nominees confirmed, on average, per six-month period during President G.W. Bush's second term, 14.3 circuit and district court nominees were confirmed, on average, every six months (the lowest number per six-month period for any of the three Presidents). Overall, from January 20 of his first year to June 30 of his sixth year, President Obama had 24.4 circuit and district court nominees confirmed, on average, per six-month period. The comparable statistics for Presidents G.W. Bush and Clinton were 22.4 and 24.2, respectively. Bush, and Clinton, (1) the percentage of U.S. circuit and district court judgeships vacant on January 1 of a President's fifth year in office; (2) the percentage of such judgeships vacant on June 30 of a President's sixth year in office; and (3) the change in the percentage of vacant U.S. circuit and district court judgeships from January 1 of a President's fifth year to June 30 of his sixth year. The percentage of vacant circuit court judgeships increased from January 1 of President G.W. | The nomination and confirmation process for U.S. circuit and district court judges is of ongoing interest to Congress. Recent Senate debates over judicial nominations have focused on issues such as the relative degree of success of President Barack Obama's nominees in gaining Senate confirmation compared with other recent Presidents, as well as the pace of confirmation of his nominees compared to the nominees of other recent Presidents, and the relative prevalence of vacant judgeships compared to years past.
This report addresses these issues by providing a statistical analysis of nominations to U.S. circuit and district court judgeships from January 20 of President Obama's first year in office to June 30 of his sixth year, and by comparing statistics during this period of the Obama presidency to statistics from comparable periods of time during the presidencies of his two most recent predecessors. Some of the report's findings include the following:
Of President Obama's 59 circuit court nominees, 49 (83.1%) have, thus far, been confirmed. The 49 confirmed nominees and 83.1% confirmation rate represent the highest number and percentage of circuit court nominees confirmed, during the three most recent presidencies, from January 20 of a President's first year in office to June 30 of his sixth year. G.W. Bush had the lowest percentage of circuit court nominees confirmed (68.7%) during the comparable period of time of his presidency, while President Clinton had the lowest number confirmed (44). Of the 253 persons nominated by President Obama to U.S. district court judgeships, 219 (86.6%) have been confirmed. Of the three Presidents, this was both the second-highest number and percentage of district court nominees confirmed. Of the comparison group, President Clinton had the greatest number of district court nominees confirmed between January 20 of his first year and June 30 of his sixth year (222), while President G.W. Bush had the greatest percentage of district court nominees confirmed (91.3%). Overall, combining nominees to both circuit and district court judgeships, President Obama has had, as of June 30 of his sixth year in office, approximately the same percentage of nominees confirmed as President G.W. Bush (85.9% and 86.0%, respectively). President Obama, however, has had the greatest number of nominees confirmed (268), while President G.W. Bush had the fewest number of nominees confirmed (246). President Clinton had the second-highest number of nominees confirmed (266) and the lowest percentage confirmed (81.1%). During the Obama presidency the Senate has confirmed, on average, 4.5 circuit court nominees every six months. Of the comparison group, this is the highest number of circuit court nominees confirmed, on average, every six months. For Presidents G.W. Bush and Clinton, the number of circuit court nominees confirmed, on average, per six-month period was 4.2 and 4.0, respectively. During the Obama presidency, as of June 30, 2014, the Senate has confirmed, on average, 19.9 district court nominees every six months. Of the comparison group, this is the second-highest number of district court nominees confirmed, on average, every six months. For Presidents G.W. Bush and Clinton, the number of district court nominees confirmed, on average, per six-month period was 18.2 and 20.2, respectively. Overall, from January 20 of his first year to June 30 of his sixth year, President Obama had 24.4 circuit and district court nominees confirmed, on average, per six-month period. This was the highest number of nominees confirmed, on average, per six-month period during the three presidencies. The comparable statistics for Presidents G.W. Bush and Clinton were 22.4 and 24.2, respectively. The percentage of vacant circuit and district court judgeships declined from January 1 of President Obama's fifth year in office to June 30 of his sixth year. The percentage of vacant judgeships also declined over the same period during the Clinton presidency, while the percentage of vacancies increased during the same period of the G.W. Bush presidency. |
crs_R43252 | crs_R43252_0 | On the previous Friday, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released its "Procedures Relating to a Federal Funding Hiatus." On October 17, 2013, the President signed into law legislation which carries a short-term continuing resolution (CR) funding government operations at a rate generally equivalent to FY2013 post-sequestration levels through January 15, 2014. This act resolves the lapse in funding that began October 1, 2013, returns federal employees to work, and retroactively authorizes pay for both furloughed and exempted employees for the duration of the funding lapse. This report discusses the DHS contingency plan and the potential impacts of a lapse in annual appropriations on DHS operations, and then it discusses several legislative vehicles that mitigated or had the potential to mitigate those impacts. Most of these employees relied on annual appropriations for their salaries, and therefore were not paid during the funding lapse. According to DHS, in the event of a funding lapse, these activities would continue and employees of these programs would continue to work and be paid as long as those revenues and multi-year appropriations were available, because emergency furlough and shutdown of these activities would occur only if resources were depleted. After appropriations are enacted, payroll centers will pay all excepted employees for time worked. Furlough, Exemptions, and DHS Personnel
DHS's contingency plan for the October 1, 2013, funding lapse was detailed enough to outline the impact of a shutdown by component using the number of staff in the component as a metric. Therefore, the following numbers only provide a limited perspective on the impact of the funding lapse. Figure 1 shows a graphic representation of the impact of the lapse in appropriations on the department's workforce as outlined in the DHS emergency furlough procedures document. The Department of Defense (DOD) and DHS did not initially avoid furlough for any of its employees under the provisions of the act, as the Department of Justice had cautioned that the law did not allow them to end furlough for all civilian employees, or allow all contractors to be paid, because of language in the act specifying funding civilian employees and contractors who provide "support" for military personnel in active service. Legislative Vehicles to Mitigate Impacts of the October 1, 2013, Funding Gap
Several pieces of legislation were introduced that would have impacted the funding status of the Department, allowing it to either pay employees or restore operations to varying degrees during the October 1, 2013, lapse in appropriations. 113-39—the Pay Our Military Act (H.R. 113-39 , 475 Coast Guard personnel remained furloughed until the enactment of P.L. 85 . | Absent legislation providing appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2014, the Department implemented a shutdown furlough on October 1, 2013. Operations of different components were affected to varying degrees by the shutdown. While an estimated 31,295 employees were furloughed, roughly 85% of the department's workforce continued with their duties that day, due to exceptions identified in current interpretations of law. Some DHS employees were recalled to work after the furloughs began on the basis of unanticipated needs (such as disaster preparedness activities) or the enactment of appropriations legislation that temporarily covered personnel costs.
While the DHS shutdown contingency plan's data on staffing and exemptions from furloughs is not a perfect metric for the broad impacts of the lapse in annual appropriations, some of the data provided by DHS lend a perspective on some of the effects on the department's staffing and operations during the funding gap until fuller post-shutdown reviews are completed.
Even though most of DHS continued to work through the shutdown, most of the department's civilian employees were not being paid until the lapse was resolved. A handful of activities were paid for through multi-year appropriations or other revenues, however, and employees working in those programs continued to be paid on schedule.
During the funding lapse, several pieces of legislation were introduced that would have impacted the funding status of the department, allowing it to either pay employees or restore operations to varying degrees. Two of these were enacted.
The Pay Our Military Act (P.L. 113-39) returned almost 5,800 furloughed Coast Guard civilian employees to work and restored pay for active military personnel and the civilian federal employees and the contractors that support them.
On October 17, 2013, the President signed into law a Senate-amended version of H.R. 2775 which carried a short term continuing resolution (CR) which funds government operations at a rate generally equivalent to FY2013 post-sequestration levels through January 15, 2014. This act resolves the lapse in funding, returns federal employees to work, and retroactively authorizes pay for both furloughed and exempt (or "excepted") employees for the duration of the funding lapse.
This report examines the DHS contingency plan for the funding lapse that began October 1, 2013, and the potential impacts of a lapse in annual appropriations on DHS operations, focusing primarily on the emergency furlough of personnel, and then discusses the legislative vehicles that had the potential to mitigate those same impacts.
CRS is continuing to gather information on the actual impact of the shutdown on DHS operations now that the October 1, 2013, lapse has been resolved, and will update this report as warranted. |
crs_R44528 | crs_R44528_0 | Introduction
The Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) is the main source of federal funding dedicated primarily to child care subsidies for low-income working families. Instead, it was coined by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in regulations issued after the 1996 welfare reform law made major changes to federal child care programs. The CCDF encompasses several funding streams, including
federal discretionary child care funds authorized by the Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) Act, federal mandatory child care funds authorized by Section 418 of the Social Security Act (sometimes referred to as the Child Care Entitlement to States (CCES)), state maintenance-of-effort (MOE) and matching funds associated with the Child Care Entitlement to States, and federal funds transferred to the CCDF from states' Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grants. Mandatory and discretionary CCDF funds are appropriated separately and are allocated to states using different formulas. Although these funds are allocated to states in different ways, federal law generally directs states to spend these dollars according to the same CCDBG Act rules. TANF funds transferred to the CCDF are also subject to CCDBG Act rules. States spent roughly $8.6 billion from these combined federal and state funding streams in FY2012, the most recent year for which data are fully available. Separate from the CCDF, statute allows states to spend federal TANF funds and state TANF MOE on child care services directly within state TANF programs. However, these "TANF-direct" child care expenditures are not subject to CCDBG Act rules. In FY2012, states spent roughly $2.8 billion in TANF-direct child care programs, when counting expenditures of federal TANF funds and certain state TANF MOE funds. Because of this broad universe of funding streams, federal appropriations are not necessarily the best measure of total spending on child care. Federal vs. State Share: Federal spending accounted for roughly 70% of all expenditures over this period, with state contributions making up the remaining roughly 30%. CCDF vs. TANF-Direct: Spending from the CCDF (federal and state, including TANF transfers) accounted for about 75% of all expenditures on child care during this period. TANF-direct child care spending (federal and state) accounted for the remaining 25%. Sources of Child Care Expenditures
This report presents expenditure data from multiple child care funding streams within the CCDF and TANF. Overall Spending Trends (including TANF-Direct Child Care)
Over the course of FY2000-FY2012, total combined CCDF and TANF spending on child care (federal and state) experienced both increases and decreases. When adding in amounts transferred from TANF programs to the CCDF, total spending originating in TANF programs represented more than one-third (between 36% and 48%) of all child care expenditures for each of FY2000-FY2012. | The Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) is the main source of federal funding dedicated primarily to child care subsidies for low-income working families. The term "CCDF" was coined in regulation by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to encompass multiple child care funding streams, including
federal discretionary child care funds authorized by the Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) Act, federal mandatory child care funds authorized by Section 418 of the Social Security Act (sometimes referred to as the "Child Care Entitlement to States"), state maintenance-of-effort (MOE) and matching funds associated with the Child Care Entitlement to States, and federal funds transferred to the CCDF from states' Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grants.
Mandatory and discretionary CCDF funds are appropriated separately and are allocated to states using different formulas. Although these funds are allocated to states in different ways, federal law generally directs states to spend these dollars according to the same CCDBG Act rules. TANF funds transferred to the CCDF are also subject to CCDBG Act rules. States spent roughly $8.6 billion from these combined federal and state funding streams in FY2012, the most recent year for which data are fully available.
Separate from the CCDF, states may spend federal TANF funds and state TANF MOE on child care services directly within state TANF programs. However, these "TANF-direct" child care expenditures are not subject to CCDBG Act rules. In FY2012, states spent roughly $2.8 billion in TANF-direct child care programs, when counting expenditures of federal TANF funds and certain state TANF MOE funds.
Because of this complex set of underlying funding streams, federal appropriations are not always the best measure of total spending on child care. This report reviews the legislative history behind these different funding streams, with particular emphasis on the relative importance of federal- and state-level decisions in setting spending levels and establishing basic program rules. In addition, the report presents historical data on child care spending from the CCDF and TANF over the course of FY2000-FY2012.
Highlights during this period include the following:
Total combined CCDF and TANF spending on child care (federal and state) increased by 12% in nominal dollars, but decreased by 17% in constant dollars (i.e., dollars adjusted for inflation). Federal spending accounted for roughly 70% of all expenditures, with state contributions making up the remaining roughly 30%. Spending from the CCDF (federal and state, including TANF transfers) accounted for about three-quarters of all expenditures on child care. TANF-direct child care (federal and state) accounted for the remaining expenditures. When including amounts transferred from TANF programs to the CCDF, total child care spending originating in TANF programs represented more than one-third (between 36% and 48%) of all child care expenditures in each year. |
crs_R40552 | crs_R40552_0 | At the start of the 111 th Congress, the House passed legislation ( H.R. 632 ) to establish a grant program to encourage states to establish, expand, and coordinate alert systems for vulnerable adults who may go missing due to cognitive or physical disabilities, among other reasons. A companion bill ( S. 557 ) was introduced in the Senate on March 10, 2009. The proposed program is similar to a federal grant program that funds training and technical assistance for what are known as AMBER (America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response) Alert systems. Each state has developed an AMBER Alert system to enlist the support of law enforcement agencies and the public in recovering children who are believed to have been abducted. In response to the increased congressional focus on alert systems for missing adults, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) gathered data on existing state alert systems in 11 states. CRS conducted a review of state laws, regulations, or executive orders that established the systems, and contacted officials in the 11 states to learn more about how they are carried out. The systems are intended to alert law enforcement entities and/or the public that vulnerable adults are missing and may need assistance. Many states activate the alerts on behalf of targeted groups of individuals who may be at high risk of going missing, such as those persons with cognitive or mental impairment, including Alzheimer's and other forms of dementia, as well as persons with developmental disability. Subsequent sections of this report provide an overview of each state's alert systems, including (1) the legal authority to establish the systems; (2) the target population for the alerts; (3) administrative responsibility for the alerts, including coordination with AMBER Alerts; (4) training of law enforcement agencies and other entities about the alerts; (5) the process for activating alerts; (6) coordination of alerts with other states; (7) system costs; (8) use of the systems; and (9) any information about outcomes of the individuals who were believed to be lost and for whom alerts were activated. The last section of the report provides a discussion of issues for Congress to consider with respect to the federal role, if any, in developing state alert systems for missing adults. The federal Missing Alzheimer's Disease Patient Alert grant assists in identifying missing individuals with Alzheimer's disease and other forms of dementia by funding what is known as Safe Return, a program administered by the Alzheimer's Association. The identification indicates that the individual is memory impaired and includes a toll-free, 24-hour emergency response number to call if the person is found wandering or lost. Six states (Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, and Virginia) were able to report whether the alerts aided in the recovery of missing individuals. Coordination Across States
Some states with alert systems reported that they might have difficulty coordinating with another state that lacks a similar system. States may also have challenges coordinating with states that have alert systems with different criteria for activating an alert. Although state and local governments have taken the lead in implementing alert systems, the federal government could play a role in coordinating efforts when a missing individual is believed to have crossed state lines as well as assist in the development of formal agreements or protocols for the use of interstate alerts. As a result, Congress is considering legislation that would provide the federal government with a role in assisting states to develop these systems nationwide. | A patchwork of alert systems to recover vulnerable missing adults is developing through the country. These systems, administered at the state and local levels, are intended to alert law enforcement entities and the public that adults with cognitive impairment or other disabilities are missing and may need assistance. The alerts are activated on behalf of targeted groups of individuals—such as those with cognitive or mental impairment (e.g., Alzheimer's disease and other forms of dementia), developmental disabilities, or suicidal tendencies—who may be at high risk of going missing and unable to make their way home or to a safe place.
Recent media attention to cases of vulnerable missing adults has prompted policymakers to consider whether the federal government should expand its role in helping these individuals. Currently, the federal Missing Alzheimer's Disease Patient Alert program funds a service that provides enrollees—individuals with Alzheimer's or dementia—with a bracelet indicating that the individual is memory impaired, including a toll-free, 24-hour emergency response number to call if the person is found wandering or lost.
Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in assisting states to create and expand alert systems for missing adults. In the opening weeks of the 111th Congress, the House passed legislation (H.R. 632) to establish a grant program to encourage states to develop, expand, and coordinate these alert systems. A companion bill (S. 557) was introduced in the Senate shortly thereafter. The proposed program is similar to a federal grant program that funds training and technical assistance for what are known as AMBER (America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response) Alert systems. Each state has developed an AMBER Alert system to assist in the recovery of children who are believed to have been abducted.
In response to the increased congressional focus on alert systems for missing adults, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) gathered data on 11 states (Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, and Virginia) that were known to have developed such systems. CRS conducted a review of state laws, regulations, or executive orders that established the systems, and contacted officials in each of the states to learn more about how the systems were administered. CRS found that most of the systems were established only recently, since 2006.
This report provides an overview of the alert systems in these 11 states, including (1) the legal authority to establish the systems; (2) the target population for the alerts; (3) administrative responsibility for the alerts, including coordination with AMBER Alerts; (4) training of law enforcement agencies and other entities about the alerts; (5) the process for activating alerts; (6) coordination of alerts with other states; (7) system costs; (8) use of the systems; and (9) any information about outcomes of the individuals for whom alerts were activated.
The last section of the report provides a discussion of issues for Congress to consider with respect to the federal role, if any, in developing state alert programs for missing adults. For example, some states with alert systems noted that they might have difficulty coordinating with another state that lacks a similar system. States may also have challenges coordinating with states that have alert systems with different criteria that must be met before an alert is activated. The federal government may be able to help establish protocols to coordinate cross-state alerts and to assist in establishing formal agreements or protocols for the use of interstate alerts. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44444 | crs_R44444_0 | A DOD agency has administered those funds under the Secretary of State's direction and oversight. After the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11), policymakers have increasingly come to view the United States as facing new military threats and challenges to which the State Department authorities could not appropriately respond. As a result, Congress has increasingly provided DOD with the means to provide such assistance under its own Title 10 U.S. Code (Armed Services) and the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authority and funding under the DOD budget. It includes
information on the historical evolution and current status of State Department and DOD responsibilities, an overview of current State Department, DOD, and joint State-DOD authorities, and a discussion of key oversight questions. Key Concepts and Terminology
Two concepts merit emphasizing as they are key to understanding the legal and institutional framework governing U.S. assistance (i.e., weapons, supplies, training, and other support) to and engagement with foreign military and other security forces:
U.S. assistance to and engagement with foreign forces is often a shared responsibility among two or more U.S. government agencies, principally between the State Department and DOD, but also with others. Legal and Institutional Framework
The current legal and institutional framework for assistance to foreign militaries and other security forces has its origins in congressional documents, legislation, and executive orders that, beginning in the late 1940s, established the respective roles and responsibilities of the Department of State and DOD. Beginning in the 1980s, Congress began providing DOD with authority in Title 10 of the U.S. Code and annual National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) (often referred to collectively as "Title 10 authorities") to conduct a wide range of programs and activities funded by DOD appropriations. Under its own Title 10 and NDAA authorities, DOD provides assistance to equip, train, and educate foreign military and other security forces, as well as to provide humanitarian relief and health assistance. Some of these authorities contain a specific provision requiring the "concurrence" (i.e., approval) of the Secretary of State. State Department and DOD Security Assistance Authorities
The State Department and DOD "shared responsibility" for security assistance is exercised in diverse ways. This section provides information on how the two departments share responsibility for State Department security assistance programs and a representative sample of programs conducted under Title 10 authority. They include the following:
how to assess effectiveness; whether and how to modify or change the statutory framework to better reconcile foreign policy concerns with at times competing perceived security needs; how to reconcile institutional roles and available resources; and how to provide appropriate transparency for oversight. Some analysts believe that responding to such threats may benefit from new approaches. Proponents of using Title 22 authority for most DOD security cooperation authorities recognize that an expanded use of these authorities might require modifications to provide the utility, flexibility and speed that DOD seeks through Title 10 authority, as well as changes in traditional practices. Some policymakers would prefer to transfer DOD funds to State Department security assistance accounts for such DOD security cooperation activities conducted under State Department authority. 2282, with DOD in the lead. A related inquiry may be whether DOD should create a security cooperation career path and assign general purpose forces to a dedicated security cooperation unit. Although Congress receives many State Department and DOD reports on these agencies' security assistance and cooperation programs and expenditures, the expansion of DOD activities has prompted concerns that reporting requirements are not sufficient to provide a full and authoritative accounting of U.S. funding for security assistance activities around the world. also charged the U.S. ambassadors to those countries with the responsibility to direct assistance activities within Greece and Turkey "under the guidance and instructions of the Secretary of State...." It instructed the Secretary of State to make "appropriate arrangements" with other departments, including the Department of the Navy and the Department of War, to enable ambassadors to fulfill their responsibilities under the act. The interim report discussed two elements to improve the working relationship: (1) "strengthening of the position of the State Department on the policy level of military assistance planning and an increased assurance of the conformity of the Military Assistance Program to foreign policy and to related assistance programs" and (2) "the focusing of responsibility on the Department of Defense for the planning, programming and execution of military assistance within the framework of policy guidance laid down in the National Security Council and by the Department of State." Over the years, as Congress added new security assistance authority through amendments to the 1961 FAA and other legislation, the division of responsibility between the Secretaries of State and Defense for security assistance became more complex. Addition of Title 10 Security Cooperation Authority
Beginning in the 1980s, Congress expanded the scope and character of the statutory framework by authorizing DOD to directly train, equip, and otherwise assist foreign military and other security forces through new provisions in annual National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA), some codified to Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Armed Services). Most stockpiled defense articles are sold to partner nations or provided to them through U.S. building partner capacity programs. The Global Security Contingency Fund authority is a pilot project scheduled to expire in FY2017. Appendix H. Title 10 Authorities: Exercises, Training, and Military-to-Military Contacts
The Department of Defense (DOD) has several authorities to train and otherwise engage with foreign military forces. | The Department of State and the Department of Defense (DOD) have long shared responsibility for U.S. assistance to train, equip, and otherwise engage with foreign military and other security forces. The legal framework for such assistance emerged soon after World War II, when Congress charged the Secretary of State with responsibility for overseeing and providing general direction for military and other security assistance programs and the Secretary of Defense with responsibility for administering such programs. Over the years, congressional directives and executive actions have modified, shaped, and refined State Department and DOD roles and responsibilities. Changes in the legal framework through which security assistance to foreign forces—weapons, training, lethal and nonlethal military assistance, and military education and training—is provided have responded to a wide array of factors.
Legal Authorization and Funding
For most of the past half-century, Congress has authorized U.S. security assistance programs through Title 22 of the U.S. Code (Foreign Relations) and appropriated the bulk of security assistance funds through State Department accounts. DOD administers programs funded through several of these accounts under the Secretary of State's direction and oversight. Beginning in the 1980s, however, and increasingly after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11), some policymakers have come to view the State Department authorities, or the funding allocated to them, as insufficient and too inflexible to respond to evolving and emerging security threats.
As a result, Congress has increasingly provided DOD with the means to offer security assistance under authorities in either Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Armed Services) or the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), both funded as part of the DOD budget. (These are collectively known as "Title 10" authorities and referred to by DOD as "security cooperation.")
DOD security assistance and other security cooperation programs conducted under Title 10 authority and established prior to 9/11 include counternarcotics, counter-proliferation, humanitarian assistance, and assistance for training and equipping NATO forces. Title 10 statutes also provide authority for DOD to pay the expenses of foreign forces to enable them to participate in exercises, exchanges, and other military-to-military contacts. Post-9/11 DOD security cooperation authorities focus on counterterrorism assistance, and assistance to foreign forces in areas of conflict. Much of this assistance is for "building partner capacity" (BPC) to enable foreign forces to take greater responsibility for their own defense and for achieving mutual security goals in order to reduce U.S. costs. As part of the BPC effort, recent legislation provides DOD with authority to help strengthen foreign Ministries of Defense and related defense institutions. (Some of these DOD authorities require the concurrence [i.e., approval] of the Secretary of State.) Post-9/11 innovations include Congress's establishment through NDAA authority of two joint State Department-DOD authorities with a lead role for the Secretary of State: (1) an Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund established in FY2011 and (2) the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), a pilot project established in FY2012 to address emerging threats. In FY2006, Congress created a DOD "joint formulation" BPC authority to address emerging counterterrorism threats, with DOD in the lead.
To some analysts, the increase of Title 10 authorities and funding to DOD for BPC support to foreign military and other security forces contributes to the perceived "militarization" of U.S. foreign policy. For others, the increase of Title 10 authorities emerged from perceived gaps in existing authorities but has resulted in a confusing, inefficient "patchwork" of authorities and coordination arrangements that are not sufficient to meet all needs.
Issues Covered in This Report
Since the late 1940s, Congress has played an active role in shaping the legal and institutional construct for security assistance activities. As Congress continues to consider legislation governing security assistance and cooperation, and to conduct oversight of such programs, some Members may seek new ways to improve program effectiveness and address inefficiencies in planning and implementation.
This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to and engagement with foreign military and other security forces, focusing on Department of State and DOD roles. It lays out the historical evolution and current framework of the Department of State-DOD shared responsibility. It concludes with a brief overview of salient issues:
how to assess effectiveness; whether and how to modify or change the statutory and institutional framework; how to reconcile institutional roles and available resources; how to provide appropriate transparency for oversight.
This discussion is relevant to current FY2017 NDAA proposals. S. 2943, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) version of the FY2017 NDAA, contains broad proposals to consolidate many DOD security cooperation authorities under a new Title 10 chapter dedicated to security cooperation authorities, expanding some, and codifying some NDAA statutes. The House-passed version of that Act, H.R. 4909, would also consolidate a number of existing Title 10 and NDAA statutes under a new Title 10 chapter, but it does not expand existing nor propose new authority.
The appendixes provide information on the history of the State-DOD shared responsibility, as well as details of selected State Department and DOD security assistance and cooperation statutes.
Additional information on the DOD "Building Partner Capacity" programs and activities may be found in CRS Report R44313, What Is "Building Partner Capacity?" Issues for Congress, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31654 | crs_RL31654_0 | T he Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205 , 87 Stat. 884. 16 U.S.C. It offers comprehensive protection for species identified as endangered or threatened with extinction. It is administered primarily by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for terrestrial and freshwater species, but also by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) for certain marine species. Under the ESA, individual species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) can be listed as either "endangered" or "threatened" according to assessments of the risk of their extinction. Once a species is listed, powerful legal tools are available to aid the recovery of the species and to protect its habitat. ESA prohibitions and penalties remain in effect regardless of appropriations. A stated purpose of the ESA is to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved." While the ESA plays an important role in protecting species, it also can become a surrogate battleground in debates whose primary focus is the allocation of scarce or diminishing lands, waters, or resources. Even though Congress has continued to appropriate funding for ESA, the following questions are sometimes raised: (1) are the act's various prohibitions and authorities still in effect; (2) what are the House and Senate rules concerning appropriating in the absence of a current authorization; and (3) what would be the effect of a failure to appropriate funds for the agencies (primarily for FWS and NMFS, but also Coast Guard, and Secretaries of Agriculture and Treasury) to carry out their responsibilities under the ESA? Because the authorization for appropriations expired in FY1992, it is sometimes said that the ESA is not authorized. No interagency consultations to approve agency actions (e.g., on construction of highways or dams, siting of pipelines on federal lands, or offshore energy drilling; see " Consultation "), nor issuance of incidental take statements to shield agencies from citizen suits; No species listed or delisted, potentially increasing lawsuits when Services fail to meet the listing deadlines in Section 4 (see " Listings "); No critical habitat designated, revised, or removed from designation, potentially increasing lawsuits when Services fail to meet deadlines (see " Critical Habitat "); No issuance of incidental take permits for nonfederal actions (see " Permits for Nonfederal Actions "); No or reduced inspections of incoming cargo for violations of species listed under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) (see " International Applications of the ESA "); No fulfillment of other obligations under CITES; No monitoring of candidate species (see " Candidate Species "); No federal enforcement of prohibitions on taking listed species or adverse modification of critical habitat (though citizen suits under the ESA still possible; see " Prohibitions, Penalties "); No acquisition of habitat for listed species (because money for administering purchases would not be available; see " Land Acquisition "); No state grants for conservation of listed or candidate species (see " Land Acquisition "); and No ability under Section 7 (e)-(p) to exempt agency actions from jeopardy opinions (see " Exemptions "). Major Provisions
The following are the major provisions of the ESA in the order they appear in the U.S. Code . By definition, only vertebrates may be designated as a DPS. The ESA contains a number of provisions relating to enforcement. | The Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884. 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544) has a stated purpose of conserving species identified as endangered or threatened with extinction and conserving ecosystems on which these species depend. The ESA is perennially controversial because the protections provided can make it the visible policy focal point for underlying situations involving the allocation of scarce or diminishing lands or resources, especially in instances where societal values may be changing or traditional land use patterns are affected. As a result, the act often becomes controversial even where a particular species is not the focus of a controversy but a symptom of it. In response to past controversies, Congress has repeatedly considered minor amendments and major changes to the ESA.
The major features of the ESA and related controversies are briefly summarized as follows:
ESA retains its authorities even though its authorization for funding expired in 1992, and funds may be and have been appropriated in the absence of a current authorization. ESA prohibitions and penalties remain in effect regardless of appropriations. ESA's principal parts are the listing and protection of species, designation of critical habitat and avoidance of its destruction, and consultation by federal agencies regarding actions that may harm listed species. Dwindling species are listed as either endangered or threatened according to assessments of the risk of their extinction. Once a species is listed, legal tools are available to aid its recovery and to protect its habitat. ESA has broad provisions for citizen suits to enforce the act, and lawsuits have played a major role in enforcement and interpretation of many, or perhaps most, of the act's provisions. ESA provides for exemptions from the act for agency projects, but the provisions are little used for a variety of reasons. The act is administered primarily by the Fish and Wildlife Service for terrestrial and freshwater and by the National Marine Fisheries Service for most marine and anadromous species. ESA is the implementing legislation for U.S. participation in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). |
crs_R42141 | crs_R42141_0 | The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) sets minimum standards for hourly wages, overtime pay, and child labor. The FLSA requires employers to pay covered employees at least $7.25 an hour. The act also requires employers to pay covered workers at least one-and-a-half times their regular hourly wage for hours worked over 40 hours a week at a given job. The FLSA includes a number of exemptions that exclude certain employees from the minimum wage and overtime standards of the act. In recent Congresses, legislation has been introduced that would expand the exemption for computer employees to include workers whose job duties include network or database analysis and workers who manage or train employees who qualify for the exemption. 101-583 ) stated that the Secretary of Labor must issue regulations that would allow "computer systems analysts, computer programmers, software engineers, and other similarly skilled professional workers as defined in such regulations to qualify as exempt executive, administrative, or professional employees under Section 13(a)(1)" of the FLSA. 101-583 also directed Congress to apply the EAP exemption to employees in computer-related occupations if they were paid on an hourly basis at a rate of at least six-and-a-half times the basic federal minimum wage. At the time, the federal minimum wage was $4.25 an hour. Thus, hourly computer employees were exempt if they met the job duties test and were paid at least $27.63 an hour. The regulations treated computer employees as professional employees under the EAP exemption. The 1996 Amendments to the FLSA
In 1996, Congress amended the FSLA to add a specific statutory exemption for computer professionals. The amendments also included in statute much of the regulatory language from the 1992 regulations that defined the primary duties of computer professionals. Under Section 13(a)(17) of the FLSA, the following employees are exempt from the minimum wage and overtime standards of the act:
(17) any employee who is a computer systems analyst, computer programmer, software engineer, or other similarly skilled worker , whose primary duty is—
(A) the application of systems analysis techniques and procedures, including consulting with users, to determine hardware, software, or system functional specifications;
(B) the design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing, or modification of computer systems or programs, including prototypes, based on and related to user or system design specifications;
(C) the design, documentation, testing, creation, or modification of computer programs related to machine operating systems; or
(D) a combination of duties described in subparagraphs (A), (B), or (C) the performance of which requires the same level of skills, and
who, in the case of an employee who is compensated on an hourly basis, is compensated at a rate of not less than $27.63 an hour. As provided in the 1996 amendments to the FLSA, computer professionals paid by the hour are exempt if they meet the duties test and their hourly wage is at least $27.63. Nonexempt Employees in Computer-Related Occupations
Regulations that implemented the 1990 amendments to the FLSA identified certain computer-related occupations that are not exempt from the minimum wage and overtime standards of the FLSA. According to the 2004 regulations, employees in computer-related occupations are exempt from the minimum wage and overtime standards of the FLSA if they meet both the job duties test and are paid a salary of at least $455 a week or a wage of at least $27.63 an hour. According to the 2004 regulations, the following computer employees are not exempt:
The exemption for employees in computer occupations does not include employees engaged in the manufacture or repair of computer hardware and related equipment. Regulations for Professional Employees in Effect Before the 1990 Amendments to the FLSA
In 1990, Congress directed the Secretary of Labor to issue regulations that would exempt certain employees in computer-related occupations from the minimum wage and overtime standards of the FLSA. | The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) sets minimum standards for hourly wages, overtime pay, and child labor. The FLSA requires employers to pay covered employees at least $7.25 an hour and at least one-and-a-half times their regular hourly wage for hours worked over 40 hours a week at a given job. However, the FLSA includes a number of exemptions that exclude certain employees from the minimum wage and overtime standards of the act.
Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA exempts from both the minimum wage and overtime pay standards of the act any person who is employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional occupation (the EAP exemption). Before 1990, employees in computer-related occupations were exempt if they met the requirements of the EAP exemption.
In 1990, Congress directed the Secretary of Labor to issue regulations that would allow "computer systems analysts, computer programmers, software engineers, and other similarly skilled professional workers" to qualify as exempt executive, administrative, or professional employees under Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA. The 1990 legislation also directed Congress to apply the EAP exemption to employees in computer-related occupations if they were paid on an hourly basis at a rate of at least six-and-a-half times the basic federal minimum wage. At the time, the federal minimum wage was $4.25 an hour. Thus, hourly computer employees were exempt if they met the job duties test and were paid at least $27.63 an hour. In 1992, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) published a final rule that implemented the 1990 legislation. The regulations treated computer employees as professional employees under the EAP exemption.
In 1996, Congress amended the FLSA to add a specific exemption for computer employees. The amendments fixed the minimum hourly wage for computer professionals at $27.63 an hour and included in statute much of the regulatory language from the 1992 regulations that defined the primary duties of computer professionals.
In 2004, DOL issued new regulations that revised the salary and duties tests for the EAP exemption. The regulations also simplified the duties test for computer professionals to reflect the 1996 amendments to the FLSA. Under the 2004 regulations, whether they are paid by the hour (at a minimum rate of $27.63) or the week (at a minimum rate of $455), computer professionals are exempt from the minimum wage and overtime standards of the FLSA if they meet the job duties test provided in regulations.
Employees in certain computer-related occupations are not exempt and must be paid at least the minimum wage and time-and-a-half for overtime. The exemption for workers in computer occupations does not include employees engaged in the manufacture or repair of computer hardware. Employees whose work is highly dependent on the use of computers but who are not engaged primarily in computer systems analysis, programming, or other similarly skilled computer occupations are not exempt. Depending on their job duties, Information Technology (IT) Support Specialists may not be exempt from the minimum wage and overtime standards of the FLSA.
In recent Congresses, legislation has been introduced that would expand the statutory exemption for computer employees to include workers whose job duties include network or database analysis and workers who manage or train employees who qualify for the exemption. |
crs_RS22967 | crs_RS22967_0 | Overview: Changes in U.S. Funding for Palestinians
U.S. aid to the Palestinians has changed more dramatically in calendar year 2018 than at any time since 2007, when it was restructured to respond to the takeover of the Gaza Strip by the Sunni Islamist group Hamas (for more background, see Appendix A ). The Trump Administration has taken several steps to reduce U.S. funding for programs benefitting Palestinians. The President's statements suggest that the Administration may seek to persuade the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to participate in U.S.-led diplomacy on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (see " 2018 Administration Actions " below). PLO Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas broke off diplomatic contacts with the Administration in December 2017 after President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital and announced his intention to relocate the U.S. embassy there from Tel Aviv. Also in September, the Administration announced that it was ending all U.S. humanitarian contributions to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). influence. 115-141 ). In October, U.S. government officials clarified that they would have been legally required to withhold $165 million in FY2017 ESF even if the Administration had not reprogrammed the entire $231.542 million. Some reports have suggested that the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 (ATCA, P.L. Various statements from President Trump, as well as observations from other sources, suggest that U.S. actions on aid may seek to persuade the Palestinians to participate in U.S.-led diplomacy on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Reprogramming FY2017 Bilateral ESF
The Administration appears to have reprogrammed all FY2017 bilateral economic aid originally intended for the West Bank and Gaza. Changing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Management and Mitigation Program
Additionally, in September, executive and legislative branch sources disclosed the Administration's decision to bar Palestinians from participating in a Conflict Management and Mitigation program (CMM) funded by USAID and the U.S. embassy in Israel. These children are part of the future of the Middle East. It also appears to encourage greater PA security coordination with Israel. 2018 Legislation
Taylor Force Act: No ESF That "Directly Benefits" the PA
Congress enacted the Taylor Force Act (Title X of P.L. The Taylor Force Act suspends all ESF aid that "directly benefits" the PA (with specific exceptions for the East Jerusalem Hospital Network and a certain amount for wastewater projects and vaccination programs) unless and until the Administration certifies that the PA and PLO
are taking credible steps to end acts of violence against Israeli citizens and U.S. citizens that are perpetrated or materially assisted by individuals under their jurisdictional control, such as the March 2016 attack that killed former U.S. Army officer Taylor Force, a veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; have terminated payments for acts of terrorism against Israeli citizens and U.S. citizens to any individual, after being fairly tried, who has been imprisoned for such acts of terrorism and to any individual who died committing such acts of terrorism, including to a family member of such individuals; have revoked any law, decree, regulation, or document authorizing or implementing a system of compensation for imprisoned individuals that uses the sentence or period of incarceration of an individual imprisoned for an act of terrorism to determine the level of compensation paid, or have taken comparable action that has the effect of invalidating any such law, decree, regulation, or document; and are publicly condemning such acts of violence and are taking steps to investigate or are cooperating in investigations of such acts to bring the perpetrators to justice. Absent further congressional action, the ATCA might indirectly lead to a complete end to U.S. bilateral aid for the Palestinians and shutdown of the accompanying in-country activities of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The Trump Administration may be pursuing efforts to have Congress change the ATCA to facilitate the continuation of security assistance, at least, with one media report suggesting that the White House belatedly realized the ATCA's possible impact. Background on U.S. Aid to the Palestinians
Overview
Significant bilateral U.S. aid to the Palestinians began when the Palestinians achieved limited self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the mid-1990s. Bilateral aid to the Palestinians since 1994 has totaled more than $5 billion. Since then, much of the U.S. bilateral aid has gone toward security, economic development, self-governance, and humanitarian needs—with an emphasis on strengthening the West Bank-based, Fatah-led PA vis-à-vis Hamas. PA personnel in Gaza. PLO and Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation (PBC). Palestinian state. General Issues for Congress
Vetting of UNRWA Contributions
Some Members of Congress have raised concerns that U.S. contributions to UNRWA might be used to support terrorists. | In calendar year 2018, the Trump Administration has significantly cut funding for the Palestinians during a time of tension in U.S.-Palestinian relations. Statements by President Trump suggest that the Administration may seek via these cuts to persuade the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to participate in U.S.-led diplomacy on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Despite the funding cuts, PLO Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and other PLO/PA officials have not reversed their decision to break off diplomatic contacts with the United States, which came after President Trump's December 2017 recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital.
Various observers are debating what the Administration wants to accomplish via the U.S. funding cuts, and how compatible its actions are with U.S. interests. Some Members of Congress have objected to the cuts, including on the grounds that they could negatively affect a number of humanitarian outcomes, especially in Hamas-controlled Gaza. Some current and former Israeli security officials have reportedly voiced concerns about the effects of drastic U.S. cuts on regional stability.
Until this year, the U.S. government had consistently supported economic assistance to the Palestinians and humanitarian contributions to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), even if funding in some cases was reduced or delayed. Bilateral assistance to the Palestinians since 1994 has totaled more than $5 billion, and has been a key part of U.S. policy to encourage an Israeli-Palestinian peace process, improve life for West Bank and Gaza residents, and (since 2007) strengthen the West Bank-based PA vis-à-vis Hamas in Gaza. U.S. contributions to UNRWA through global humanitarian accounts since 1950 have totaled more than $6 billion.
The 2018 changes raise questions about the future of various funding streams and U.S. political influence, as well as the impact on other international actors' support of and influence on the Palestinians. Congress has options to determine types and amounts of funding for the Palestinians and to place conditions or oversight requirements on it.
The 2018 changes included
Reprogramming $231.532 million of FY2017 bilateral economic assistance that was originally intended for the West Bank and Gaza (including $25 million for East Jerusalem hospitals) for other purposes. Ending U.S. humanitarian contributions to UNRWA. U.S. funding in FY2018 totaled $65 million, contrasted with $359.3 million in FY2017. Deciding to prevent Palestinians from participating in a Conflict Management and Mitigation program (CMM) funded by USAID and the U.S. embassy in Israel. Programs involving Israelis and Palestinians generally receive $10 million annually. Nonlethal U.S. security assistance for the PA security forces has continued, as has PA security coordination with Israel, but a majority of Palestinians support recent PLO recommendations to end the coordination.
Legislation enacted in 2018 is also significantly impacting U.S. aid to the Palestinians. Congress enacted the Taylor Force Act (Title X of P.L. 115-141) in March. This law augmented existing legislative provisions to suspend U.S. bilateral economic assistance for the PA unless and until Palestinian officials cease certain payments deemed under U.S. law to be "for acts of terrorism." The Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ACTA, P.L. 115-253) became law in October, as an apparent way to ensure that the PLO and PA would be subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts for past acts of Palestinian terrorism against U.S. citizens. Because the ATCA attempts to use U.S. aid to Palestinians as a means of establishing this jurisdiction, and Palestinian leaders apparently want to avoid that outcome, the ATCA might indirectly lead to a complete end of U.S. bilateral aid to the Palestinians by February 2019. The Trump Administration may not have realized the possible impact of the ATCA when it was enacted, and reportedly may be trying to have Congress change the ATCA to facilitate the continuation of security assistance, at least. |
crs_R44209 | crs_R44209_0 | T he labeling of genetically engineered (GE) foods, sometimes referred to as genetically modified foods (GMO foods), has been the subject of debate among members of the general public, industry participants, and federal and state governments. The U.S. House of Representatives also debated the issue of GE food labeling when passing the Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2015 ( H.R. While the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does not impose specific labeling requirements on food just because it may or may not contain GE ingredients, some states have responded to public demand for GE labeling by enacting state laws requiring such a labeling scheme. As of the date of this report, three states have passed mandatory labeling laws for GE foods: Vermont, Connecticut, and Maine. While none of these state labeling schemes are yet in effect, some industry participants have filed suit in federal court against the State of Vermont trying to prevent the state's GE labeling requirements from going into effect. These plaintiffs, generally industry representatives of grocery and food manufacturers, have claimed that Vermont's GE labeling law, Act 120, is unconstitutional by imposing undue burdens on speech, and by interfering with federal oversight of the food industry, and the federal regulation of commerce. GMA v. Sorrell thus serves as a case study on the constitutional implications of state GE labeling laws and provides some insight on the judicial consideration of GE labeling as Congress considers related legislation in the 114 th Congress. The report concludes with a discussion about the legislation introduced during the 114 th Congress that would impose a voluntary labeling and certification scheme for GE foods and may impact state law. Vermont's GE labeling act will take effect on July 1, 2016. Litigation over State GE Food Labeling Laws
In 2014, the Grocery Manufacturers Association, the Snack Food Association, the International Dairy Foods Association, and the National Association of Manufacturers filed a complaint in the federal district court in Vermont to invalidate Vermont's Act 120 on constitutional grounds, specifically claiming that Act 120 violates the First Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the doctrine of preemption found in the Supremacy Clause. However, as of the date of this report, the plaintiffs have appealed the district court's ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the district court should have granted the preliminary injunction because Act 120 violates the plaintiffs' First Amendment right of freedom of speech. Thus, the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims may proceed to trial, although the court also concluded when considering the preliminary injunction that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on only one of these claims, that Act 120's prohibition on the use of the term "natural" in GE labeling violates the First Amendment. A legislative change to the federal food labeling framework may signal a different congressional intent in this area. Thus, the plaintiffs claimed that these costs discriminate against interstate commerce and favor Vermont interests, violating the dormant Commerce Clause. The district court did not find such a burden here as Act 120 does not require GE food manufacturers to alter their labeling practices nationwide to meet these requirements, and ultimately dismissed this claim of the plaintiffs. However, the court suggested that a greater number of state GE laws that actually conflict with each other may strengthen a hypothetical claim of discrimination under the dormant Commerce Clause. | The labeling of genetically engineered (GE) foods, sometimes referred to as genetically modified foods (GMO foods), has been the subject of debate among members of the general public, industry participants, and federal and state governments. Grocery Manufacturers Association v. Sorrell serves as a case study on the constitutional implications of state GE food labeling laws and provides some insight on the judicial consideration of GE labeling as Congress considers GE labeling legislation in the 114th Congress.
Key Takeaways of This Report
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does not impose specific labeling requirements on food just because it may or may not contain GE ingredients, but some states have responded to public demand for GE labeling by enacting state laws requiring such a labeling scheme. As of the date of this Report, three states have passed mandatory labeling laws for GE foods: Vermont, Connecticut, and Maine. These laws have been controversial and have raised various constitutional considerations, particularly relating to the First Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Supremacy Clause. While none of these state labeling schemes are yet in effect, certain industry participants have filed suit in federal court against the State of Vermont, in Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) v. Sorrell, claiming that Vermont's GE labeling law, Act 120, is unconstitutional by imposing undue burdens on speech, and by interfering with federal oversight of the food industry, and the federal regulation of commerce. Vermont's law is scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 2016. The litigation in GMA v. Sorrell is in its early stages; as of the date of this Report, the court has denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed some of their claims, but has allowed other claims to continue to trial. The plaintiffs argued that Act 120's prohibition of the use of "natural" on food labeling and the statute's mandate to label GE food violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to freedom of speech. While the court has allowed both of these claims to continue to trial, the court indicated that it found the claim that the prohibition of the term 'natural' on food labels violates the First Amendment to be more likely to succeed at trial, suggesting that a state law that contains disclosure requirements generally, such as mandating labeling food as GE, rather than prohibits companies from using certain words on their labels, may be more likely to pass constitutional muster, at least in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The plaintiffs argued that various federal laws on food labeling should preempt Act 120, but the court dismissed these claims (except in the context of meat labeling), concluding that congressional intent to preempt state GE labeling laws, such as Act 120, is not sufficiently clear and manifest. Congress could legislate in this area were it to determine that federal laws should preempt state GE labeling laws. The plaintiffs argued that Act 120 violated the dormant Commerce Clause by impermissibly burdening interstate commerce, but the court dismissed these claims because the statute does not require GE food manufacturers to alter their labeling practices nationwide. The court did note that, were more states to pass conflicting GE food labeling laws, this may strengthen a claim in the future that the laws violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The U.S. House of Representatives recently passed the Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2015 (H.R. 1599), which would impose voluntary labeling and certification schemes for foods that contain GE plants, and has raised the issue of whether the legislation would preempt state GE labeling laws, including Vermont's Act 120. |
crs_R45006 | crs_R45006_0 | The Trump Administration has promoted increased LNG exports, and on September 1, 2017, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced a proposed rule intended to speed up the approval process for small-scale LNG exports from U.S. facilities. Cumulatively, the Caribbean consumed approximately 792 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas in 2016, about 3% of U.S. consumption. Some small-scale U.S. LNG export projects have targeted Caribbean countries as the relative size of the imports makes the export projects economical. Under DOE's proposed rule, a small-scale natural gas export facility may qualify for the expedited approval process if it meets two criteria: (1) it would export no more than 0.14 bcfd or 51.10 bcf per year, and (2) it qualifies for a categorical exclusion under DOE's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations. Congressional Interest
On October 18, 2017, S. 1981 was introduced by Senator Bill Cassidy to amend the NGA to provide an expedited DOE approval process for small-scale LNG projects. Similarly to the DOE's proposed rule, projects with a capacity of 0.14 bcfd or 51.1 bcf per year would be "deemed to be consistent with the public interest," and the permit would be "granted without modification or delay." The first large-scale LNG shipments from the continental United States occurred in February 2016 from the Sabine Pass LNG Terminal in Louisiana to Brazil, India, and the United Arab Emirates. U.S. Interest in the Caribbean Natural Gas Market
To date, DOE has received 13 applications (four to export exclusively to FTA countries, two exclusively to non-FTA countries, and seven to either FTA or non-FTA countries) from companies seeking approval to export relatively small quantities of LNG primarily to destinations in the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. Of the 13, 11 applications are to export natural gas to FTA countries, and all have been approved. Seven of the nine applications to export to non-FTA countries have been approved, with two non-FTA applications under review. Many of the projected projects in Figure 5 are targeting the Asian LNG demand centers. South Korea is the only major importer of LNG of the countries with which the United States has an FTA. To some, the position of the United States as a promoter of free trade may also be challenged. Caribbean Trade
In 2016, three Caribbean countries—Barbados (0.10 bcf), Dominican Republic (41.32 bcf), and Jamaica (0.35 bcf)—imported LNG. Puerto Rico was the largest importer of LNG in the region, with 57.56 bcf in 2016. Barbados and Dominican Republic imported LNG from the United States. Puerto Rico, in part because of the Jones Act, is not able to import LNG on LNG tankers. Puerto Rico has imported LNG from the continental United States in cryogenic containers. | With the advent of shale gas, the United States has transformed from a growing importer of natural gas to a burgeoning exporter. Exports by pipeline and ship have grown in the last couple of years. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports in 2013 were about 13 billion cubic feet (bcf), while in 2016 that figure jumped to almost 184 bcf. This increase can mostly be attributed to the opening of the Sabine Pass Liquefaction facility in Louisiana in February 2016.
Despite the large volumes associated with the large-scale U.S. LNG export terminals, like Sabine Pass Liquefaction, there has also been a growing interest in small-scale LNG exports, mainly in cryogenic containers, to the Caribbean. Currently, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), which permits the export of natural gas as a commodity, has received 13 applications (four to export exclusively to free trade agreement (FTA) countries, two exclusively to non-FTA countries, and seven to either FTA or non-FTA countries) from companies seeking approval to export relatively small quantities of LNG primarily to destinations in the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. Of the 13, 11 applications are to export natural gas to FTA countries, and all have been approved. Seven of the nine applications to export to non-FTA countries have been approved, with two non-FTA applications under review.
Globally, large quantities of LNG liquefaction capacity are projected to come into operation within the next decade. Most of those projected projects, including those in the United States, are large-capacity facilities targeting the biggest LNG importers, like Japan and South Korea. However, there is a subset of the U.S. projects that are small-scale in capacity and targeting a small market—the Caribbean. In 2016, three Caribbean countries—Barbados (0.10 bcf), the Dominican Republic (41.32 bcf), and Jamaica (0.35 bcf)—imported LNG. Puerto Rico was the largest importer of LNG in the region, with 57.56 bcf in 2016, predominantly on tankers. Barbados and Dominican Republic imported LNG from the United States. Puerto Rico, in part because of the Jones Act, is not able to import LNG on LNG tankers, but has imported LNG from the continental United States in cryogenic containers. The United States has not made an LNG tanker in almost 40 years.
On September 1, 2017, the DOE announced a proposed rule intended to speed up the approval process for small-scale exports of LNG from U.S. export facilities. To obtain the DOE expedited process for small-scale natural gas exports under the proposed rule, projects must meet two criteria: (1) the proposed facility cannot export more than 0.14 bcf per day (bcfd) or 51.10 bcf per year, and (2) the proposed facility must qualify for a categorical exclusion under DOE's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations.
On October 18, 2017, S. 1981 was introduced to amend the Natural Gas Act (NGA) to provide an expedited approval process for small-scale LNG projects. Similar to the DOE's proposed rule, projects with a capacity of 0.14 bcfd or 51.1 bcf per year would be "deemed to be consistent with the public interest," and the permit would be "granted without modification or delay." |
crs_RS22172 | crs_RS22172_0 | Background
Until they were placed under government conservatorship in September 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were stockholder-controlled companies that were chartered by Congress to improve the nation's residential mortgage market and are known as government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Congress enacted the modern conforming loan limit, which establishes the maximum size mortgage that the GSEs can purchase, in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1980. Since 2006, the basic conforming loan limit has held steady at $417,000. In 2008, the passage of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (ESA; P.L. With the expiration of the Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011, the conforming loan limit in high-cost areas is determined by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-289 ): 115% of area median house price, but not to exceed 150% of the national conforming loan limit, which results in a high-cost limit of $625,500. In other areas, the FHA mortgage limit was and is 65% of the national conforming loan limit or $271,050. According to recent congressional testimony, most recent home purchase mortgages are guaranteed by FHA and securitized by Ginnie Mae; the majority of mortgages purchased recently by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have refinanced existing mortgages. Under HERA, the conforming loan limit for those areas was 115% of the median home price in the area, except that increases were to be capped at 150% of the statutory loan limit (the limit that now applies to Alaska, Hawaii, and the two island territories). ARRA returned the conforming loan limits for mortgages originated in 2009 in high-cost areas to the 2008 ESA limit, that is, the high-cost limit was set at 175% of the statutory limit or $729,750. GSE status allows Fannie and Freddie to borrow at lower interest rates than non-GSE financial institutions. A portion of this subsidy is passed on to home buyers whose mortgage loans are purchased and securitized by the GSEs. Credit conditions in the jumbo market are said to be unusually tight—the spread between jumbo and conforming loan rates has widened. Allowing the GSEs to securitize some jumbo loans restored liquidity to the part of the secondary market covered by the higher limits, enabled lenders to transfer the risk of holding jumbo mortgages, and made loans more affordable and available. Home buyers in the conforming mortgage market may receive part of the GSE subsidy in the form of lower interest rates. The ultimate cost to taxpayers of this intervention is unknown. | Congress is concerned with the pace of the recovery in the housing and mortgage markets. A series of laws starting with the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (ESA; P.L. 110-185) were designed to increase the availability and affordability of mortgages in "high-cost" areas. This concern about housing and mortgage markets is balanced by attention being paid to possible taxpayer financial risks and the desire to minimize government intervention in economic markets.
Two congressionally chartered government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, provide liquidity to the mortgage market by purchasing residential mortgages from the original lenders and either reselling them as mortgage-backed securities to investors or holding them as investments in their own portfolios. Their charters include a ceiling on the size of loans the GSEs can buy.
Since the end of FY2011 (September 30, 2011), the maximum limit in high-cost areas was reduced to $625,500 from $729,750. The current high-cost limit is calculated as 115% of the area median house price, but cannot exceed 150% of the national limit or $625,500. The limit in other areas of the nation remains unchanged since 2006 at $417,000.
Securitization of mortgages that exceed the applicable limit—called non-conforming jumbo loans—is done by private financial institutions, although in the present financial environment virtually no jumbo mortgages are being securitized. GSE status allows Fannie and Freddie to issue debt at lower cost than other private firms; part of this subsidy is passed on to home buyers in the form of lower interest rates. Interest rates on jumbo mortgages are slightly higher than those on the conforming loans that the GSEs can purchase. The spread between non-conforming jumbo and conforming loan rates has been elevated since the start of the financial crisis and is now about three-fourths of 1%.
According to recent congressional testimony, most recent home purchase mortgages are guaranteed by FHA and securitized by Ginnie Mae; the majority of mortgages purchased recently by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have refinanced existing mortgages.
S. 1217, the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2013, would reduce the maximum high-cost limit from 150% of the national limit ($625,500) to 130% of the national limit ($542,100). H.R. 2767, the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners (PATH) Act of 2013, could reduce the high-cost limit to $525,500.
This report analyzes the implications of the higher conforming loan limit in high-cost areas. It will be updated as legislative and market developments warrant. |
crs_RS22453 | crs_RS22453_0 | Background
This report examines scenarios in which international trade could be heavily controlled or limited due to an avian flu pandemic. Some experts argue that these scenarios are not likely to occur, because they believe that the United States would probably not implement a general ban on the importation of goods from affected regions. Several studies have been undertaken to estimate the effects of a pandemic on the U.S. and global economy. Potential Impact of Trade Disruptions with Avian Flu-Affected Countries and Regions
This section considers the potential economic and trade effects on the United States of import disruptions from countries affected by avian flu, either as a result of border closings in the United States or supply side constraints in the exporting country or region. Finally, trade disruptions would account for only part of the economic impact of an avian flu pandemic. | Concerns about potential disruptions in U.S. trade flows due to a global health or security crisis are not new. The possibility of an avian flu pandemic with consequences for global trade is a concern that has received attention recently, although some experts believe there is little cause for alarm. Experts disagree on the likelihood of an avian flu pandemic developing at all. This report considers possible trade disruptions, including possible impacts on trade between the United States and countries and regions that have reported avian influenza infections. These trade disruptions could include countries banning imported goods from infected regions at the onset of a pandemic, de facto bans due to protective health measures, or supply-side constraints caused by health crises in exporting countries. |
crs_RS22697 | crs_RS22697_0 | Therefore, any federal action on parking privileges occurs separately from federal rules on physical parking space accessibility. Since that time, the federal government has created guidelines for parking privileges. Thus, the Uniform System provides model definitions and rules regarding eligibility, application procedures, and issuance of special license plates and placards. It also contains information to aid states in developing reciprocal systems of parking privileges, including sample placards and a model rule regarding reciprocity. The Uniform System is brief. State Responses
All states have laws governing parking privileges for individuals with disabilities, and nearly all states have adopted at least some portion of the Department of Transportation's Uniform System. | State law generally governs parking privileges for people with disabilities. However, federal regulations offer a uniform system of parking privileges, which includes model definitions and rules regarding license plates and placards, parking and parking space design, and interstate reciprocity. The federal government encourages states to adopt this uniform system. As a result, most states have incorporated at least some aspects of the uniform regulations into their handicapped parking laws. This report describes the federal role in parking privileges law, outlines the uniform system's model rules, and briefly discusses state responses to the model federal rules. |
crs_RS21261 | crs_RS21261_0 | Since 1988, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ("Hague Convention" or "Convention") has been the principal mechanism for enforcing the return of abducted children to the United States. While the Convention promotes the prompt return of an abducted child, it does not impose criminal sanctions on the abducting parent. The Hague Convention does not act as an extradition treaty, nor does it purport to adjudicate the merits of a custody dispute. It merely provides a civil remedy designed to preserve the status quo by returning an abducted child to the country of his or her "habitual residence" and allowing the judicial authorities in that country to adjudicate the merits of a custody dispute. As such, the proceeding is brought in the country to which the child was abducted or in which the child is retained. Although domestic relations involve issues typically governed by state law, the federal statute implementing the Hague Convention explicitly confers jurisdiction on the federal courts. Rights of Custody vs. Rights of Access
Procedures and remedies available under the Convention differ depending on the parental rights infringed. Courts must determine whether an order confers a right of custody or a lesser right of access under the Convention. For example, until recently, federal courts disagreed on what type of right is conferred by a ne exeat , or "no exit," order, which grants one parent the right to veto another parent's decision to remove their child from his or her home country. In Abbott v. Abbott , the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the circuit split by finding that such an order confers a right of custody, thus triggering enforceability under the Convention. It is important to note that the Court's decision is limited to ne exeat orders. Therefore, courts will have to address which side of the access-custody line any other arrangements may fall. Signatory nations do not have to automatically return the child to his or her place of habitual residence; discretionary exceptions exist that enable the child to remain with the removing parent. A parent seeking the return of a child who the parent claims has been wrongly abducted may apply to the "Central Authority" of the child's habitual residence or of any other signatory nation to the Hague Convention. | International child custody disputes are likely to increase in frequency as the global society becomes more integrated and mobile. A child custody dispute between two parents can become a diplomatic imbroglio between two countries. Since 1988, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ("Hague Convention" or "Convention") has been the principal mechanism for enforcing the return of abducted children to the United States. While the treaty authorizes the prompt return of the abducted child, it does not impose criminal sanctions on the abducting parent. Congress, to reinforce the Hague Convention, adopted the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act of 1993 to impose criminal punishment on parents who wrongfully remove or retain a child outside U.S. borders.
The Convention does not act as an extradition treaty, nor does it purport to adjudicate the merits of a custody dispute. It is a civil remedy designed to preserve the status quo by returning an abducted child to the country of his or her "habitual residence" and allowing the judicial authorities in that country to adjudicate the merits of a custody dispute. As such, the proceeding is brought in the country to which the child was abducted or in which the child is retained. Although domestic relations involve issues typically governed by state law, the federal statute implementing the Hague Convention explicitly confers jurisdiction on the federal courts. Federal courts continue to address the scope of this jurisdiction. In Chafin v. Chafin, the U.S. Supreme Court found that a child's return to her country of habitual residence does not render an appeal moot. In other words, an appellate court retains jurisdiction to review a lower court's decision as to the child's habitual residence.
The Hague Convention is not always applicable in international child custody cases. Signatory nations do not have to automatically return a child to his or her place of habitual residence, as discretionary exceptions exist that enable the child to remain with the removing parent. Also, procedures and remedies available under the Convention differ depending on the parental rights infringed. Courts must determine whether a particular order confers a right of custody or a lesser right of access. For example, federal courts disagreed on what type of right was conferred by a ne exeat, or "no exit," order granting one parent the right to veto another parent's decision to remove their child from his home country. In Abbott v. Abbott, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the circuit split by finding that such an order confers a right of custody, thus triggering enforceability under the Convention. However, it is important to note that this decision was limited to ne exeat orders. As such, courts will have to address which side of the access-custody line any other arrangements may fall.
This report will discuss the applicability of the Hague Convention and current U.S. laws, both civil and criminal, which seek to address the quandary of children abducted by parents to foreign nations. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R45257 | crs_R45257_0 | Under IPIA, an improper payment is defined as a payment that should not have been made or that was made in an incorrect amount, including both overpayments and underpayments. This definition includes payments made to ineligible recipients, duplicate payments, payments for a good or service not received, and payments that do not account for applicable discounts. The data reported between FY2004—the first year of improper payments reporting—and FY2009 showed that a small subset of programs accounted for 85% to 96% of the government's total improper payments each year. In November 2009, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order (E.O.) 13520, which required the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to work with agencies to identify "high-priority" programs (those which account for the "highest dollar value or majority of improper payments" across the government), establish annual targets for reducing improper payments under high-priority programs, and submit a report to the agency's inspector general that detailed how the agency planned to meet those targets. The executive order also required agencies to publish data on improper payments estimates and targets for the high-priority programs they administer. Under the revised circular, a program is deemed high-priority if it has
reported more than $750 million in improper payments in the most recent fiscal year; not reported an improper payments amount for the most recent fiscal year, but has reported more than $750 million in improper payments in a previous fiscal year; or not yet reported on improper payments for the program as a whole, but has determined that the total amount of improper payments for program components that have been measured exceeds $750 million. Trends in Total Improper Payments
Under IPIA, as amended, agencies are required to identify programs susceptible to significant improper payments, estimate the amount of improper payments issued under those programs, and notify Congress of the steps being taken to address the root causes of the improper payments. Table 2 identifies the amount of improper payments issued by each of these high-priority programs from FY2004 through FY2017. The data in Table 2 show that 20 high-priority programs issued more than $1.2 trillion in improper payments since FY2004. As the data in Table 4 show, the results have been mixed. While some high-priority programs have seen a steady decline in their improper payments error rates, others have shown little or no improvement—and some have seen their error rates increase over time. Specifically, the error rates for seven programs have increased since they first began reporting data, and the error rate for one program has remained unchanged. | The Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA) of 2002 defines improper payments as payments that should not have been made or that were made in an incorrect amount, including both overpayments and underpayments. This definition includes payments made to ineligible recipients, duplicate payments, payments for a good or service not received, and payments that do not account for applicable discounts. Since FY2004, federal agencies have been required to report on the amount of improper payments they issue each year and take steps to address the root causes of the problem. The data show a significant increase in improper payments from FY2007 ($42 billion) to FY2010 ($121 billion), followed by a slight decrease through FY2013 ($106 billion), another increase through FY2016 ($144 billion), and a slight decrease in FY2017 ($141 billion). The data also show that a small subset of programs has accounted for 85% to 98% of the government's total improper payments each year. With this in mind, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order (E.O.) 13520 in 2009, which requires agencies to take additional measures to reduce the amount of improper payments associated with these "high-priority" programs. Notably, the executive order requires agencies to identify high-priority programs, develop detailed plans for reducing related improper payments, and establish annual goals against which progress could be measured. Agencies have identified 20 high-priority programs, all but one of which have been reporting data for several years. The data on high-priority programs present mixed results. Nine high-priority programs have showed improvement over time, as indicated by decreasing error rates, while three others have reported no improvement in their error rates. The error rates for the eight remaining high-priority programs have increased since they were first reported. Without further progress in reducing the error rates among high-priority programs the government's total amount of improper payments may continue to exceed $100 billion per fiscal year, as it has since FY2009. Over the period of FY2004 through FY2017, high-priority improper payments have totaled $1.2 trillion and total improper payments have totaled $1.3 trillion. |
crs_R42017 | crs_R42017_0 | The principal focus of this report is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world—where most of the potential for the outbreak of regional military conflicts currently exists, and where the greatest proportion of the conventional arms trade is conducted. Nations in the developing world continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by conventional weapons suppliers. During the period of this report, 2003-2010, conventional arms transfer agreements (which represent orders for future delivery) to developing nations comprised 69.6% of the value of all international arms transfer agreements . The portion of agreements with developing countries constituted 78.9% of all agreements globally from 2007-2010. In 2010 arms transfer agreements with developing countries accounted for 76.2% of the value of all such agreements globally. Major Findings
General Trends in Arms Transfers Worldwide
The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide (to both developed and developing nations) in 2010 was $40.4 billion. This was a substantial decrease in arms agreements values over 2009 of 38.1%, and the lowest worldwide arms agreements total since 2003 ( Figure 1 ) ( Table 31 ). In 2010, the United States led in arms transfer agreements worldwide, making agreements valued at $21.3 billion (52.7% of all such agreements), a decline from $22.6 billion in 2009. In 2010, the United States ranked first in the value of all arms deliveries worldwide, making nearly $12.2 billion in such deliveries or 34.8%. Russia ranked second in worldwide arms deliveries in 2010, making $5.2 billion in such deliveries. General Trends in Arms Transfers to Developing Nations
The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2010 was $30.7 billion, a substantial decrease from the $49.8 billion total in 2009 ( Figure 1 ) ( Table 1 ) ( Table 3 ) ( Table 4 ). In 2010, the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations ($21.9 billion) was an increase over the value of 2009 deliveries (nearly $19.2 billion), and the highest delivery total since 2006 ( Figure 7 and Figure 8 ) ( Table 2 ) ( Table 15 ). Recently, from 2007 to 2010, the United States and Russia have dominated the arms market in the developing world, with both nations either ranking first or second for all four years in terms of the value of arms transfer agreements. From 2007 to 2010, the United States made nearly $72 billion of these agreements, or 38%. During this same period, Russia made $37.1 billion, 19.6% of all such agreements, expressed in constant 2010 dollars. Collectively, the United States and Russia made 57.6% of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations during this four-year period. In the earlier period (2003-2006) Russia ranked first with $41.5 billion in arms transfer agreements with developing nations or 32.2%; the United States made $30.5 billion in arms transfer agreements during this period or 23.7%. Individual suppliers within the major West European group have had notable years for arms agreements during this period: France in 2009 ($7.9 billion) and in 2005 ($5.7 billion); the United Kingdom in 2007 ($10.1 billion) and 2004 ($4.8 billion); Germany (over $4.8 billion) in 2008, and in 2006 ($2.6 billion); and Italy in 2009 ($.2.7 billion). The United States ranked second with 17% ($9.4 billion in current dollars). India ranked first among all developing world recipients in the value of arms transfer agreements in 2010, concluding $5.8 billion in such agreements. Taiwan ranked second in agreements with $2.7 billion. Saudi Arabia ranked third with $2.2 billion in agreements. | This report is prepared annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transactions. Similar data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world.
Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers. During the years 2003-2010, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations comprised 72.9% of all such agreements worldwide. More recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations constituted 78.9% of all such agreements globally from 2007-2010, and 76.2% of these agreements in 2010.
The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2010 was over $30.7 billion. This was a decline from $49.8 billion in 2009. In 2010, the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations was nearly $21.9 billion, the highest total in these deliveries values since 2006 (in constant 2010 dollars).
Recently, from 2007 to 2010, the United States and Russia have dominated the arms market in the developing world, with both nations either ranking first or second for each of these four years in the value of arms transfer agreements. From 2007 to 2010, the United States made nearly $72 billion in such agreements, 40.1% all these agreements expressed in constant 2010 dollars. Russia made $37.1 billion, 20.7% of these agreements. During this same period, collectively, the United States and Russia made 60.8% of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations, ($109.1 billion [in constant 2010 dollars]) during this four-year period.
In 2010, the United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing nations with over $14.9 billion or 48.6% of these agreements, a significant increase in market share from 2009, when the United States held a 30.3% market share. In second place was Russia with $7.6 billion or 24.7% of such agreements.
In 2010, the United States ranked first in the value of arms deliveries to developing nations at $8.6 billion, or 39.2% of all such deliveries. Russia ranked second in these deliveries at $4.8 billion or 21.4%.
In worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2010—to both developed and developing nations—the United States dominated, ranking first with $21.3 billion in such agreements or 52.7% of all such agreements. Ranking second in worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2010 was Russia with $7.8 billion in such global agreements or 19.3%. The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide in 2010 was $40.4 billion. This was a substantial decrease in arms agreements values over 2009 of 38.1%, and the lowest worldwide arms agreements total since 2003.
In 2010, India ranked first in the value of arms transfer agreements among all developing nations weapons purchasers, concluding $5.8 billion in such agreements. Taiwan ranked second with $2.7 billion in such agreements. Saudi Arabia ranked third with $2.2 billion. |
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