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crs_R45144 | crs_R45144_0 | Patronage has fallen in many of the other top 50 transit markets. This report discusses the implications of recent trends in transit ridership for future federal policy. If the New York region is excluded from the data, national transit ridership decreased by 7% over the past 10 years. These new rail lines, however, have not necessarily boosted transit ridership overall. Factors Affecting Public Transportation Ridership
There is no comprehensive explanation for the overall decline in ridership outside of New York. National trends in public transportation ridership are not necessarily reflected at the local level; thus, different areas may have different reasons for growth or decline. Probably the two most relevant factors in the current context are the attractiveness of other transportation options and transit service supply issues. Among the factors that account for transit ridership changes within the United States is the price of gasoline. Ridership fluctuations over the past decade seem to track changes in the average annual price of gasoline ( Figure 5 ). Public Transportation Service Supply
Among the factors that affect public transportation ridership, service supply variables are typically some of the most important. It appears that public transportation fares per unlinked trip have generally risen faster than inflation in recent years. The Future of Public Transportation Ridership
In the short to medium term, roughly 10 to 20 years, transit demand is likely to be determined by population growth and the public commitment to supplying transit. These include the extent, duration, and intensity of highway congestion; the price of parking; and the implementation of fuel taxes, tolls, and mileage-based user fees. Based on the introduction of past vehicle technology, it is likely that even if fully autonomous vehicles are available in a few years, it will take decades for them to become ubiquitous. Fleets of driverless taxis that can be hailed with a smartphone could potentially offer service much more cheaply than taxis and ridesourcing do today, as labor, which makes up about half of the cost of such a trip, would no longer be a significant factor. Widespread deployment of autonomous vehicles and driverless taxis, therefore, could lead to a greater number of vehicle trips and a decline in traditional transit ridership. Second, through the Capital Investment Grant (CIG) program (also known as the New Starts program), the federal government plays a significant role in the building of new transit rail and bus rapid transit systems and the extension and expansion of existing systems. Federal Public Transportation Funding
Incentive Funding
National transit ridership is somewhat dependent on the level of federal funding. A key policy issue is whether future federal funding should focus on buses, which last about 10 years and can be redeployed as demand changes, rather than on rail systems that last 30 years or more and are inflexible but are far more efficient at transporting large numbers of passengers in dense corridors. Another option would be to redirect CIG funding from building rail and perhaps even bus rapid transit in relatively small and dispersed urban areas to the large and dense cities where rail transit currently carries very large numbers of riders, such as New York, Chicago, and Washington, DC. | Despite significant investments in public transportation at the federal, state, and local levels, transit ridership has fallen in many of the top 50 transit markets. If strong gains in the New York area are excluded, ridership nationally declined by 7% over the past decade. This report examines the implications for federal transit policy of the current weakness and possible future changes in transit ridership.
Although there has been a lot of research into the factors that explain transit ridership, there seems to be no comprehensive explanation for the recent decline. One complication is that national trends in public transportation ridership are not necessarily reflected at the local level; thus, different areas may have different reasons for growth or decline. But at the national level, the two factors that most affect public transportation ridership are competitive factors and the supply of transit service. Several competitive factors, notably the drop in the price of gasoline over the past few years and the growing popularity of bikeshare and ridesourcing services, appear to have adversely affected transit ridership. The amount of transit service supplied has generally grown over time, but average fares have risen faster than inflation, possibly deterring riders.
The future of public transportation ridership in the short to medium term is likely to depend on population growth; the public funding commitment to supplying transit; and factors that make driving more or less attractive, such as the price of parking, the extent of highway congestion, and the implementation of fuel taxes, tolls, and mileage-based user fees. Over the long term, ridership is also likely to depend on the introduction of autonomous vehicle technology, although its timing is uncertain. Fleets of driverless taxis that can be hailed with a smartphone, a plausible scenario, promise to be much cheaper than taxis and ridesourcing today. Widespread deployment of driverless taxis could reduce transit ridership, unless restrictions or fees make them an expensive alternative in some areas.
Two major federal transit policies related to these issues are the general funding of public transportation, distributed mainly by formula, and the discretionary funding of new large capital projects such as rail and bus rapid transit systems through the Capital Investment Grant (CIG) Program, also known as New Starts. One option to boost ridership without raising funding would be to tie federal formula funds to ridership or fare revenue. If the most consequential uncertainty for transit ridership is the introduction of autonomous vehicles, federal funding might focus on buses, which last about 10 years, and not new rail systems that last 30 years or more. Another option would be to redirect CIG funding from building new rail systems and lines to refurbishing rail transit in the large and dense cities where rail transit currently carries large numbers of riders. If fully autonomous ridesourcing vehicles become available, policymakers may face pressure to subsidize ridesourcing trips for disabled and elderly passengers alongside or in place of traditional transit and paratransit services. |
crs_RL33555 | crs_RL33555_0 | As the global economic, political, and technological landscape evolves, and as terrorists may seek to surprise and attack through more fluid organizational structures and in innovative ways, data being collected to identify and track terrorism may need to change. Reported Trends in Terrorism
2006 State Department Report
On April 28, 2006, the Department of State sent to Congress its annual report on global terrorism: Country Reports on Global Terrorism 2005. The 262-page report provides an annual strategic assessment of trends in terrorism and the evolving nature of the terrorist threat, coupled with detailed information on anti-terror cooperation by nations worldwide. The report and underlying data portray a threat from radical Jihadists which is becoming more widespread, diffuse, possibly more deadly, and increasingly homegrown , often with a lack of apparent formal operational connection with al Qaeda ideological leaders although perhaps inspired by them or assisted through training. Five major trends in the evolution of terrorism are included in the State Department report:
More Micro-Actors
The report depicts the emergence of micro-actors as having been spurred by the widespread use of the internet, militant preachers and the impact of Arabic language television, coupled with U.S. and allied successes in capturing, isolating, and killing much of al Qaeda's leadership in Afghanistan, thereby reducing its centralized command and control capability. The result, according to the report, is an al Qaeda seen to be assuming more of an ideological, motivational, propaganda role, and a reduced operational role. Increased Sophistication
Increasingly, according to the report, terrorists are seen as exploiting the global movement of information, finance, and ideas to their benefit. Terror incidents in Iraq, according to the report, accounted for almost a third of all terror incidents globally in 2005 and more than half of all the terror related deaths worldwide. Decline in State-Sponsored Terrorism16
Aside from Iran, and perhaps to some degree Syria , the report suggests that, with a few notable exceptions, active state sponsorship of terror is declining. In some instances, the emergence of additional trends is also suggested. A Weakened al Qaeda? If the trend continues the immediate future is likely to bring "a larger number of smaller attacks, less meticulously planned, and local rather than transnational in scope." On the other hand, "an increasing number of such attacks could fail through lack of skill or equipment...."
Of growing concern is what many see as a trend by terrorists to launch near-simultaneous multiple attacks aimed at causing economic damage—such as attacks on transportation, tourism, and oil related targets and infrastructures. If terrorist acts are becoming more the product of localized micro-actors, it raises the question of whether United States anti-terror strategy and tactics should reflect a more international law-enforcement oriented approach. Such an approach was envisioned in the February 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism . | On April 28, 2006, the Department of State sent to Congress its annual report on global terrorism: Country Reports on Global Terrorism 2005. The 262-page report provides an annual strategic assessment of trends in terrorism and the evolving nature of the terrorist threat, coupled with detailed information on anti-terror cooperation by nations worldwide. The report and underlying data portray a threat from radical Jihadists that is becoming more widespread, diffuse, and increasingly homegrown, often with a lack of formal operational connection with al Qaeda ideological leaders such as Osama Bin Laden or Ayman al Zawahiri.
Three trends in terrorism are identified in the Department of State report which are independently reflected in the work of analysts elsewhere. First is the emergence of so called "micro actors," in part spurred by U.S. successes in isolating or killing much of al Qaeda's leadership. The result is an al Qaeda with a more subdued, although arguably still significant, operational role, but assuming more of an ideological, motivational, and propaganda role. Second is the trend toward "sophistication"; i.e. terrorists exploiting the global flow of information, finance, and ideas to their benefit, often through the internet. Third is an increasing overlap of terrorist activity with international crime, which may expose the terrorists to a broad range of law enforcement countermeasures.
The report notes an overall increase in suicide bombings, especially in Iraq, where terror incidents accounted for almost a third of all terror incidents globally in 2005 and more than half of terror related deaths worldwide. However, some observers suggest that much of what the report characterizes as terrorist incidents in Iraq would be better categorized as insurgent activity and also to some degree as criminal activity. The report suggests that active, direct, state sponsorship of terror is declining, with the notable exceptions of Iran and perhaps to some degree Syria.
Emerging trends that may require enhanced policy focus for the 110th Congress are (1) attacks that aim to cause economic damage such as attacks on transportation infrastructure, tourism, and oil installations, (2) the growing number of unattributed terrorist attacks, and (3) the growing power and influence of radical Islamist political parties in foreign nations. Recent suggestions that al Qaeda remains operationally active are of growing concern as well.
The State Department report suggests an immediate future with a larger number of "smaller attacks, less meticulously planned, and local rather than transnational in scope." If so, some adjustment in implementation of United States anti-terror strategy and tactics to reflect a more international law enforcement oriented approach, such as that envisioned in the February 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, may be warranted. As the global economic, political, and technological landscapes evolve, data being collected to identify and track terrorism may need to change.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33309 | crs_RL33309_0 | Side-by-Side Comparison of the Endangered Species Act (H.R. 3824), Miller/Boehlert Amendment to H.R. 3824, and S. 2110
a. Conservation Banks Under S. 2110
Under S. 2110 , a conservation bank is defined as an area of land,water, or other habitat (not necessarily contiguous) that is managed in perpetuity orfor an "appropriate period" under an enforceable legal instrument and for the purposeof conserving and recovering habitat, or an endangered, threatened, or candidatespecies, or a species of special concern (p. 31). Given the importance and benefits of habitat continuity for speciessurvival, some might argue that banks consisting of fragmented portions would haveless value than banks with contiguous habitats. The bill does not identify who will make the determination of anappropriate period or what criteria will be used. Conservation banks may be established by any private landowner who appliesand demonstrates that the affected area is managed under an enforceable legalinstrument and contributes to the conservation of a listed species, a candidate species,or a species of special concern (pp. There may be certain minimalcontents that all such instruments or banking agreements should contain to ensurethat protection of species and habitat will be effective and consistent from site to site. However, no criteria for holders are stated. Conditions for amending and nullifying the agreement are given (pp. TheSecretary shall consider the use of banks for implementing recovery plans and mustadopt regulations on managing banks that balance the biological conditions of thetarget species and habitat with "economic free market principles" to ensure value tolandowners through a tradeable credit program (p. 36). The regulations are to relate to 11 subjects, including conservation andrecovery goals, activities that may be carried out in any conservation bank, measuresthat ensure the viability of conservation banks, "the demonstration of an adequatelegal control of property proposed to be included in the conservation bank" (p. 37),criteria for determining credits and an accounting system for them, and theapplicability of and compliance with §7 and §10 of ESA. The regulations are to include provisions "relating to" how the consultationrequirements of §7 of the ESA and the incidental take provisions apply in the contextof conservation banks. Biological data would determine how many credits a bank can sell (p. 38),and the Secretary is to establish a standard process by which credits could betransferred. It is not clear in what circumstances states,local governments, or tribes would be defendants. The amount of tax credit gained depends on the length of the agreement: 1) if it is forat least 99 years, the credit equals the reduction in the land's fair market value due tothe recovery action or agreement plus the property owner's actual costs; 2) if it is forat least 30 years but less than 99 years, the credit equals 75% of the above amounts;3) if it is for at least 10 years but less than 30 years, the credit equals 75% of theactual costs (pp. This appears to require that the taxpayer reduce all deductions and othercredits by the amount of the credit allowed, regardless of whether they are based onthe same expenses used for this credit. | The Endangered Species Act (ESA) protects species that are determined to be eitherendangered or threatened according to assessments of their risk of extinction. The ESA has not beenreauthorized since September 30, 1992, and efforts to do so have been controversial and complex. Some observers assert that the current ESA is a failure because few species have recovered, and thatit unduly and unevenly restricts the use of private lands. Others assert that since the act's passage,few species have become extinct, many have improved, and that restrictions to preserve species donot place a greater burden on landowners than many other federal, state, and local laws.
This report provides a side-by-side analysis of two bills and a proposed amendment thatwould amend the ESA. This analysis compares H.R. 3824 , the Threatened andEndangered Species Recovery Act of 2005, as passed by the House; proposed House Amendment588 to H.R. 3824 (Miller/Boehlert Amendment); and S. 2110 , theCollaboration for the Recovery of Endangered Species Act.
Proponents of each proposal indicate that it is designed to make the ESA more effective byredefining the relationship between private and public property uses and species protection,implementing new incentives for species conservation, and removing what some see as undue landuse restrictions. Thus, all three proposals contain provisions meant to encourage greater voluntaryconservation of species by states and private landowners, a concept that has been supported by manyobservers. Further, all three proposals would modify or eliminate certain procedural or otherelements of the current ESA that some have viewed as significant protections and prohibitions,including eliminating or changing the role of "critical habitat" (CH) (which would eliminate oneaspect of the current consultation process); making the listing of all threatened and endangeredspecies more difficult or less likely; expanding §10 permits allowing incidental take (which couldincur a greater need for agency oversight and enforcement); and expanding state rather than federalimplementation of ESA programs (which might make oversight more difficult). Proponents of thesechanges assert that tighter listing standards would enable a better focus on species with the most direneeds, and that other measures would achieve recovery of more species. Critics argue that proposedchanges create gaps in the ESA safety net of protections and prohibitions.
It is difficult to assess whether, on balance, the proposals would be likely to achieve greaterprotection and recovery of species, or to what extent the controversies over land use constraintswould diminish. However, replacing some of the protections of the current ESA with newincentives, rather than adding the new incentives to the current protections, arguably makes adequatefunding of the new programs more critical to determining the outcome of the ESA.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R45032 | crs_R45032_0 | Introduction
Donald J. Trump promised that if elected President, he would instruct federal agencies to reduce their regulations significantly. During the first year of the Trump Administration, this deregulation was underway in agencies across the federal government. One way for Congress and the public to be informed about this deregulatory activity is to consult the "Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions" (hereinafter Unified Agenda). The Unified Agenda is a government-wide publication of rulemaking actions that agencies expect to take in the coming months, and it contains both regulatory actions (i.e., new regulations) and deregulatory actions (i.e., reductions in or elimination of current regulations). The Trump Administration's first edition of the Unified Agenda, which was issued on July 20, 2017, and was referred to by the Administration as the "Update to the 2017 Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions," contains information on many deregulatory actions that the Trump Administration has undertaken so far and intends to undertake in the coming months. The subsequent edition is expected to be issued in late 2017 and may contain more detailed information on the implementation of the Trump Administration's regulatory budget, which was announced on September 7, 2017, in addition to serving as an update on the deregulatory actions occurring across federal agencies. This report provides an overview of the Unified Agenda, discusses the additional significance of the Unified Agenda in the Trump Administration, provides summary information about the first edition of the Unified Agenda released by the Trump Administration, and discusses what additional information can be expected in the subsequent edition of the Agenda. Overview of the Unified Agenda
The Unified Agenda is typically published twice each year by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the General Services Administration (GSA), for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). OIRA is the entity within OMB that has primary oversight responsibilities over most agencies' rulemaking activities. All entries in the first three categories listed above have uniform data elements that are searchable in a database. The searchable data elements typically include the department and/or agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, the Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract of the action being taken, and a timetable of past actions and a projected date (sometimes just the projected month and year) for the next regulatory action. As will be discussed later in this report, it also appears that future editions of the Unified Agenda may contain information about the Trump Administration's regulatory budget. Reclassified . Withdrawn Actions37
The 2017 Update includes 469 rulemaking actions that were withdrawn since the Fall 2016 edition spanning 27 departments, agencies, and government corporations. Notably, 22 of the major and/or economically significant long-term actions had been previously classified as active actions in the Fall 2016 edition. The regulatory budgets are essentially cost caps for each agency's new regulations, and the caps are to be set by OMB for each agency and each fiscal year. | Donald J. Trump promised that if he were elected President, he would instruct federal agencies to reduce their regulations significantly. As of late 2017, this deregulation was underway in agencies across the federal government.
One way for Congress and the public to be informed about this deregulatory activity is to consult the "Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions." The Unified Agenda is a government-wide publication of rulemaking actions agencies expect to take in the coming months, and it contains both regulatory actions (i.e., new regulations) and deregulatory actions (i.e., reductions in or elimination of current regulations).
The Unified Agenda is typically published twice each year by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the General Services Administration (GSA), for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). OIRA is the entity within OMB that has primary oversight responsibilities over most agencies' rulemaking activities. All entries in the Unified Agenda have uniform data elements that can be searched in an online database. Each entry includes information about the rule, including the department and agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, the Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract of the action being taken, a timetable of past actions and a projected date for the next action, and information about the priority of the rule (e.g., whether it is "economically significant" or "major").
The Trump Administration's first Unified Agenda, which was issued on July 20, 2017, and was referred to by the Administration as the "Update to the 2017 Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions," contains information on many deregulatory actions that the Trump Administration has undertaken so far. For example, the Agenda lists 469 actions that agencies have withdrawn since the previous (Fall 2016) edition of the Unified Agenda and 22 major and/or economically significant actions that were reclassified from "active" under the Barack Obama Administration to "long-term" under the Trump Administration. The 2017 Update lists a total of 58 economically significant "active" actions, as compared to 113 such actions that had been published in the Fall 2016 edition.
Notably, it also appears that the Unified Agenda could be an important source of information for another major regulatory development in the Trump Administration: the regulatory budget, which was announced in a memorandum issued by OIRA on September 7, 2017. The Trump Administration's regulatory budget will require the cost of most agencies' new regulations to remain below a regulatory cost cap, which OMB will set for each covered agency in each fiscal year. The tracking of agencies' implementation of this regulatory budget is expected to be tied to future editions of the Unified Agenda, beginning with the next edition.
This report provides an overview of the Unified Agenda, discusses the additional significance of the Unified Agenda in the Trump Administration, provides summary information about content of the 2017 Update, and discusses what additional information can be expected in the subsequent edition of the Agenda. |
crs_R40141 | crs_R40141_0 | One restriction that arises is that these organizations are prohibited under the tax code from engaging in campaign activity. Separate from the tax code's prohibition, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) may also restrict the ability of Section 501(c)(3) organizations to engage in such activity. What is Prohibited Campaign Activity? Whether such an activity is campaign intervention depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Voter Registration
Section 501(c)(3) organizations may conduct nonpartisan voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives. Because there is no rule that campaign activity occurs only when an organization expressly advocates for or against a candidate, the line between issue advocacy and campaign activity can be difficult to discern. According to the IRS, key factors that indicate an issue advocacy communication does not cross the line into campaign intervention include the following:
the communication does not identify any candidates for a given public office, whether by name or other means, such as party affiliation or distinctive features of a candidate's platform; the communication does not express approval or disapproval for any candidate's positions and/or actions; the communication is not delivered close in time to an election; the communication does not refer to voting or an election; the issue addressed in the communication has not been raised as an issue distinguishing the candidates; the communication is part of an ongoing series by the organization on the same issue and the series is not timed to an election; and the identification of the candidate and the communication's timing are related to a non-electoral event (e.g., a scheduled vote on legislation by an officeholder who is also a candidate). Activities of the Organization's Leaders and Members
Members, managers, leaders, and directors of Section 501(c)(3) organizations may participate in campaign activity in their private capacity. Due to the tax code prohibition discussed above, Section 501(c)(3) organizations are generally not permitted to engage in the activities regulated by FECA, and thus the Citizens United decision does not appear to impact them in a significant manner. At the same time, the activities that constitute electioneering under the IRC and FECA are not necessarily identical. | The political activities of Section 501(c)(3) organizations are often in the news, with allegations made that some groups engaged in impermissible activities. These groups are absolutely prohibited from participating in campaign activity under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). On the other hand, they are permitted to engage in nonpartisan political activities (e.g., distributing voter guides and conducting get-out-the-vote drives) that do not support or oppose a candidate. Determining whether an activity violates the IRC prohibition depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, and the line between impermissible and permissible activities can sometimes be difficult to discern.
Due to the IRC prohibition, Section 501(c)(3) organizations generally are not permitted to engage in the types of activities regulated by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). However, the activities regulated under the IRC and FECA are not necessarily identical. An organization must comply with any applicable FECA provisions if engaging in activities regulated by FECA (e.g., making an issue advocacy communication under the IRC that constitutes an electioneering communication under FECA).
A 2010 Supreme Court case, Citizens United v. FEC, has received considerable attention for invalidating several long-standing prohibitions in FECA on corporate and labor union campaign treasury spending. This case does not appear to significantly impact the political activities of Section 501(c)(3) organizations because they remain subject to the prohibition on such activity under the IRC.
This report examines the restrictions imposed on campaign activity by Section 501(c)(3) organizations under the tax and campaign finance laws. For a discussion limited to the ability of churches and other houses of worship to engage in campaign activity, see CRS Report RL34447, Churches and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL32076 | crs_RL32076_0 | Introduction
Congressional interest in facilitating U.S. technological innovation led to the passage of P.L. 96 - 517 , Amendments to the Patent and Trademark Act, commonly referred to as the "Bayh-Dole Act" after its two main sponsors former Senators Robert Dole and Birch Bayh. The legislation is intended to use patent ownership as an incentive for private sector development and commercialization of federally funded research and development (R&D). Patents can provide an economic incentive for companies to pursue further development and commercialization. Studies indicate that research funding accounts for approximately one-quarter of the costs associated with bringing a new product to market. Patent ownership is seen as a way to encourage the additional, and often substantial investment necessary for new goods and services, particularly in the case of small business. In an academic setting, the possession of title to inventions is expected to provide motivation for the university to license the technology to the private sector for commercialization in anticipation of royalty payments. Current Issues and Concerns
While the Bayh-Dole Act provides a general framework to promote expanded utilization of the results of federally funded research and development, questions have been raised as to the adequacy of current arrangements. Most experts agree that closer cooperation among government, industry, and academia can augment funding sources (both in the private and public sectors), increase technology transfer, stimulate more innovation (beyond invention), lead to new products and processes, and expand markets. However, others point out that cooperation may provide an increased opportunity for conflict of interest, redirection of research, less openness in sharing of scientific discovery, and a greater emphasis on applied rather than basic research. Actual experience and cited studies suggest that companies which do not control the results of their investments—either through ownership of patent title, exclusive license, or pricing decisions—tend to be less likely to engage in related R&D. The importance of patent ownership has been reinforced by the positive effects studies have demonstrated P.L. 96 - 517 is reported to have had on the emergence of new technologies and new techniques generated by American companies. | Congressional interest in facilitating U.S. technological innovation led to the passage of P.L. 96-517, Amendments to the Patent and Trademark Act (commonly referred to as the Bayh-Dole Act after its two main sponsors). The act provides patent rights to certain inventions arising out of government-sponsored research and development (R&D) to non-profit institutions and small businesses with the expressed purpose of encouraging the commercialization of new technologies through cooperative ventures between and among the research community, small firms, and industry.
Patents provide an economic incentive for companies to pursue further development and commercialization. Studies indicate that research funding accounts for approximately one-quarter of the costs associated with bringing a new product to market. Patent ownership is seen as a way to encourage the additional, and often substantial investment necessary for generating new goods and services in the private sector. In an academic setting, the possession of title to inventions is expected to provide motivation for the university to license the technology to companies for commercialization in expectation of royalty payments.
The Bayh-Dole Act has been seen as particularly successful in meeting its objectives. However, while the legislation provides a general framework to promote expanded utilization of the results of federally funded research and development, questions have been raised as to the adequacy of current arrangements. Most agree that closer cooperation among industry, government, and academia can augment funding sources (both in the private and public sectors), increase technology transfer, stimulate more innovation (beyond invention), lead to new products and processes, and expand markets. However, others point out that collaboration may provide increased opportunities for conflicts of interest, redirection of research, less openness in sharing of scientific discovery, and a greater emphasis on applied rather than basic research. Additional concerns have been expressed, particularly in relation to the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, that the government and the public are not receiving benefits commensurate with the federal contribution to the initial research and development.
Actual experience and cited studies suggest that companies which do not control the results of their investments—either through ownership of patent title, exclusive license, or pricing decisions—tend to be less likely to engage in related R&D. The importance of control over intellectual property is reinforced by the positive effect P.L. 96-517 has had on the emergence of new technologies and techniques generated by U.S. companies. |
crs_R44416 | crs_R44416_0 | High poverty rates and low income levels in tribal lands—along with the fact that many tribal communities are located in remote rural areas (often with rugged terrain)—are major factors that explain why tribal areas have comparatively poor levels of broadband access, and why providers may lack an economic incentive to serve those areas. The presence of robust broadband and improved digital connectivity in tribal areas could play a significant role in revitalizing many tribal communities. Status of Tribal Broadband
Until recently, data on tribal broadband had been scarce. The FCC and the Department of Commerce (Census and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration) have begun to collect and compile data on tribal broadband deployment. According to December 2017 FCC deployment data, 32% of Americans living on tribal lands lacked access to terrestrial fixed broadband at speeds of 25 Mbps download/3 Mbps upload. Areas that are the most lacking in broadband service are rural Alaskan villages and rural tribal lands in the lower 48 states. Tribal entities or projects are eligible for virtually all of these programs, but with a few exceptions, there are no carve-outs or dedicated funding streams specifically for tribal applicants or nontribal entities proposing to serve tribal lands. Thus, annual amounts of federal financial assistance vary depending on the number and quality of tribal-related applications received, and the number of tribal-related broadband awards made by the funding agencies. GAO, in its 2016 report, Challenges to Assessing and Improving Telecommunications for Native Americans on Tribal Lands , identified programs in two federal agencies that serve as the primary source of funding for deploying broadband infrastructure in tribal lands and communities: the FCC and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Concluding Observations
With respect to broadband and telecommunications access and adoption, tribal areas and communities continue to lag behind other areas and segments of American society. Aside from providing funding for broadband deployment, the federal government has pursued other policies relevant to tribal broadband. Regarding funding, debate has centered on whether federal funding for tribal broadband is sufficient, and the extent to which portions of federal funds available for broadband generally should be specifically targeted for tribal broadband. In the 116 th Congress, notwithstanding whether federal broadband funding programs target tribal lands, whether or not tribal lands will receive additional funding for broadband will likely be determined by the ongoing trajectory of overall federal funding for broadband. | Tribal areas and communities continue to lag behind other areas and segments of American society with respect to broadband and telecommunications services. High poverty rates and low income levels in tribal lands—along with the fact that many tribal communities are located in remote rural areas (often with rugged terrain)—are major factors that may explain why tribal areas have comparatively poor levels of broadband access, and why providers may lack an economic incentive to serve those areas.
Until recently, data on tribal broadband deployment had been scarce. However, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Department of Commerce have begun to collect and compile data on tribal broadband deployment. The most recent data show that, as of December 31, 2017, approximately 32% of Americans living on tribal lands lacked access to broadband at speeds of at least 25 Mbps download/3 Mbps upload. This compares unfavorably to about 6% of all Americans lacking access to broadband at those speeds. Tribal areas that are the most lacking in broadband service are rural Alaskan villages and rural tribal lands in the lower 48 states.
Because the presence of robust broadband and improved digital connectivity in tribal areas could play a significant role in revitalizing many tribal communities, the federal government continues to provide some financial assistance to tribal lands for broadband deployment. The Government Accountability Office, in its 2016 report, Challenges to Assessing and Improving Telecommunications for Native Americans on Tribal Lands, identified programs in two federal agencies that serve as the primary source of funding for deploying broadband infrastructure in tribal lands and communities. These federal agencies are the FCC and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Tribal entities and projects in tribal areas are eligible for virtually all federal broadband programs. With a few exceptions, however, there are no carve-outs or dedicated funding streams specifically for tribal applicants or nontribal entities proposing to serve tribal lands. Thus, annual amounts of federal financial assistance vary, depending on the number and quality of tribal-related applications received, and the number of tribal-related broadband awards subsequently made by the funding agencies.
Debate has centered on whether federal funding for tribal broadband is sufficient, and the extent to which portions of federal funds available for broadband should be specifically targeted for tribal broadband. In the 115th Congress, bills were introduced to direct federal funding specifically for tribal broadband. Notwithstanding whether federal broadband funding programs target tribal lands, whether or not tribal lands will receive additional funding for broadband in the 116th Congress will likely be determined by the ongoing trajectory of overall federal funding for broadband. |
crs_R42732 | crs_R42732_0 | Introduction
In recent years a subject of continuing interest to Congress has been the length of time taken for lower court nominations to receive Senate confirmation. Most recently, during the 111 th and 112 th Congresses, Senate debate on this subject has concerned whether President Obama's nominees to U.S. circuit or district court judgeships, relative to the judicial nominees of other recent Presidents, have waited longer to receive up-or-down votes by the Senate. Part of this debate, in turn, has focused on the waiting times from nomination to confirmation of President Obama's uncontroversial judicial nominees who have enjoyed bipartisan support in the Senate. The section also shows, from the Reagan presidency to the Obama presidency, the percentage of circuit and district court nominees approved by the Senate and who, according to the methodology used in the report, qualify as uncontroversial. The average and median waiting times from nomination to confirmation, the section finds, generally increased from one presidency to the next for uncontroversial circuit and district court nominees. Figure 2 tracks, by presidency (from Reagan to Obama), the mean and median number of days from first nomination to confirmation for all circuit and district court nominees approved by the Senate, during the period January 20, 1981, to September 14, 2012, whose nominations were reported favorably out of the Senate Judiciary Committee by voice vote or a unanimous roll call vote and who were confirmed by the Senate by voice vote or, if a roll call vote was held, received 5 or fewer nay votes. Uncontroversial U.S. Finally, under President Obama, uncontroversial circuit court nominees have waited, on average, 227.3 days from nomination to confirmation. The mean and median number of days from first nomination to confirmation ranged from a low of 69.9 and 41.0 days, respectively, during the Reagan presidency to a high of 204.8 and 208.0 days, respectively, during the Obama presidency. The average number of days from nomination to confirmation for uncontroversial district court nominees increased from 69.9 days during the Reagan presidency to 112.6 days during the G.H.W. Percentage of Nominees Waiting Specified Length of Time from Nomination to Confirmation
As the mean and median trend lines in Figure 2 suggest, the percentage of uncontroversial judicial nominees waiting at least 200 days from nomination to confirmation has increased in recent years. Uncontroversial U.S. Circuit Court Nominees
Under both Presidents Reagan and G.H.W. Bush presidency to a low of 11.5% during the Reagan presidency. Bush's uncontroversial district court nominees). Circuit and District Court Nominees
Across the five most recent presidencies there has been a general increase in the waiting times from nomination to confirmation for uncontroversial U.S. circuit and district court nominees. There are various institutional and political factors that have possibly contributed to this increase—including ideological differences between a President and Senators of the opposite party or between the Senate's two parties; procedures used by the Judiciary Committee to process a President's judicial nominees; floor procedures used to dispense with judicial nominations; and the role taken by non-committee Senators in the vetting of judicial nominees. Bush presidency in the mean and median number of days from first nomination to confirmation for uncontroversial judicial nominees, might be regarded as attributable, in part, to the waiting time during the Bush presidency between when the Senate Judiciary Committee received a nomination and subsequently received the ABA's report on a nominee. Additionally, longer wait times might be desirable because they provide interest groups and citizens a greater opportunity to participate in the confirmation process by contacting Senators to express their views on judicial nominees (whether such nominees are uncontroversial or not). | In recent years, a recurring subject of debate in the Senate has been the length of time taken for lower court nominations to receive Senate confirmation. During the 111th and 112th Congresses, this debate has focused, in part, on President Obama's uncontroversial nominees to U.S. circuit and district court judgeships—and on whether, or to what extent, such nominees have waited longer to receive Senate confirmation than the uncontroversial judicial nominees of other recent Presidents.
To more fully inform this debate, the following report provides a statistical overview, from Presidents Reagan to Obama, of the waiting times from nomination to confirmation of uncontroversial U.S. circuit and district court nominees approved by the Senate from 1981 to September 14, 2012. For the purposes of this report, an uncontroversial judicial nominee is a nominee (1) whose nomination was reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee by voice vote or, if a roll call vote was held, the nomination was unanimously reported favorably by the committee to the full Senate, and (2) whose nomination was approved by voice vote when confirmed by the Senate or, if a roll call vote was held, received 5 or fewer nay votes.
Findings in the report include the following:
Average and median waiting times to confirmation increased steadily with each presidency, from Ronald Reagan's to Barack Obama's, for uncontroversial circuit court nominees and almost as steadily for uncontroversial district court nominees.
Uncontroversial Circuit Court Nominees
For uncontroversial circuit court nominees, the mean and median number of days from nomination to confirmation ranged from a low of 64.5 and 44.0 days, respectively, during the Reagan presidency to a high of 227.3 and 218.0 days, respectively, during the Obama presidency. The percentage of uncontroversial circuit court nominees waiting more than 200 days from first nomination to confirmation increased from 5.1% during the Reagan presidency to 63.6% during the Obama presidency.
Uncontroversial District Court Nominees
For uncontroversial district court nominees, the mean and median number of days from nomination to confirmation ranged from a low of 69.9 and 41.0 days, respectively, during the Reagan presidency to a high of 204.8 and 208.0 days, respectively, during the Obama presidency. The percentage of uncontroversial district court nominees waiting more than 200 days from first nomination to confirmation increased from 6.6% during the Reagan presidency to 54.7% during the Obama presidency.
Various political and institutional factors in the Senate might help explain the increase, across presidencies, in the waiting times from nomination to confirmation experienced by uncontroversial U.S. circuit and district court nominees. These include ideological differences between the President and Senators, how quickly the Senate Judiciary Committee holds hearings on and reports a President's nominees, how often holds are placed on nominations when they reach the Senate Executive Calendar, how readily unanimous consent agreements can be reached to bring nominees up for votes, and the role played by Senators not serving on the Judiciary Committee in vetting judicial nominees.
There are several possible implications for the longer waiting times from nomination to confirmation for uncontroversial U.S. circuit and district court nominees, including an increase in the number of judicial vacancies qualifying as "judicial emergencies," the reluctance of well-qualified nominees with bipartisan support to undergo a lengthy confirmation process, an increase in partisan or ideological tensions in the Senate, enhanced Senate consideration of nominees who are nominated to positions with lifetime tenure, and a greater opportunity for interest groups and citizens to participate in the confirmation process. |
crs_R42883 | crs_R42883_0 | Introduction
Much progress has been made in achieving the ambitious goals that Congress established 40 years ago to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters. However, long-standing problems persist, and new problems have emerged. Water quality problems are diverse, ranging from pollution runoff from farms and ranches, city streets, and other diffuse or "nonpoint" sources, to "point" source discharges of metals and organic and inorganic toxic substances from factories and sewage treatment plants. Authorizations of appropriations for some programs provided in P.L. Authorizations for wastewater treatment funding expired in FY1994. However, there is less agreement about what solutions are needed and whether new legislation is required. Several key water quality issues exist: what additional actions should be taken to implement existing provisions of the law, whether additional steps are necessary to achieve overall goals of the act that have not yet been attained, how to ensure that progress made to date is not lost through diminished attention to water quality needs, and what is the appropriate federal role in guiding and paying for clean water infrastructure and other activities. For some time, efforts to comprehensively amend the act have stalled as interests have debated whether and exactly how to change the law. These factors partly explain why Congress has recently focused legislative attention on narrow bills to extend or modify selected CWA programs, rather than taking up comprehensive proposals. Other factors also have been at work. These include a general reluctance by some Members of Congress to address controversial environmental issues in view of the relatively slim majorities held by political parties in the House and the Senate; a lack of legislative initiatives by the Administration on clean water issues (neither the Clinton nor the Bush Administration proposed CWA legislation, nor has the Obama Administration); and the high economic cost of addressing water infrastructure issues. The act's program of financial aid for municipal wastewater treatment plant construction is a key contributor to that effort. Legislative Responses
Congress has considered water infrastructure funding issues several times since the 107 th Congress, but no legislation other than appropriations has been enacted. 3080 / P.L. 113-121 were included in other legislation ( H.R. Regulatory Protection of Wetlands
How best to protect the nation's remaining wetlands and regulate activities taking place in wetlands has become one of the most contentious environmental policy issues. On March 25, 2014, the agencies released a proposed rule. Obama Administration officials have addressed concerns about the continuing uncertainties regarding the proper scope of CWA regulatory jurisdiction. Other Clean Water Act Issues
A number of other issues affecting efforts to achieve the goals and objectives of the CWA have drawn interest recently and been the subject of congressional oversight and legislation. Some legislators have been highly critical of recent regulatory initiatives, while others have been more supportive of EPA's implementation efforts. Critics of the Administration, both within Congress and outside of it, have accused the agency of reaching beyond the authority given it by Congress and ignoring or underestimating the costs and economic impacts of these rules. That ruling has been appealed. In January 2014, the court agreed to amend the 2009 consent decree in light of the adoption of new nutrient criteria, thus lifting the requirement for EPA to issue numeric nutrient standards under the second phase of rulemaking, and in September, EPA finalized a rule withdrawing the overlapping federally promulgated water quality standards to allow Florida to implement its standards to address nutrient pollution. In July 2011 EPA issued guidance on review of CWA Section 402 and 404 permit requests for surface coal mining in Appalachia. General permits are intended to minimize regulatory burdens on pesticide applicators and state permitting officials, but there still has been significant concern about impacts of EPA's actions. | Much progress has been made in achieving the ambitious goals that Congress established 40 years ago in the Clean Water Act (CWA) to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters. However, long-standing problems persist, and new problems have emerged. Water quality problems are diverse, ranging from pollution runoff from farms and ranches, city streets, and other diffuse or "nonpoint" sources, to toxic substances discharged from factories and sewage treatment plants.
There is little agreement among stakeholders about what solutions are needed and whether new legislation is required to address the nation's remaining water pollution problems. For some time, efforts to comprehensively amend the CWA have stalled as interests have debated whether and exactly how to change the law. Congress has instead focused legislative attention on enacting narrow bills to extend or modify selected CWA programs, but not any comprehensive proposals.
For several years, the most prominent legislative water quality issue has concerned financial aid for municipal wastewater treatment projects. House and Senate committees have approved bills to reauthorize CWA assistance on several occasions since the 107th Congress, but, for various reasons, no legislation other than appropriations has been enacted. At issue has been the role of the federal government in assisting states and cities in meeting needs to rebuild, repair, and upgrade wastewater treatment plants, especially in light of capital costs that are projected to be nearly $300 billion over the next 20 years. Congress agreed to legislation that creates a pilot program to provide federal loans for wastewater infrastructure (H.R. 3080/P.L. 113-121). The same legislation also revises certain of the water infrastructure provisions of the CWA.
Programs that regulate activities in wetlands also have been of interest, especially CWA Section 404, which has been criticized by landowners for intruding on private land-use decisions and imposing excessive economic burdens. Environmentalists view this regulatory program as essential for maintaining the health of wetland ecosystems, and they are concerned about court rulings that have narrowed regulatory protection of wetlands and about related administrative actions. Many stakeholders desire clarification of the act's regulatory jurisdiction, but they differ on what solutions are appropriate. On March 25, 2014, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers proposed a rule intended to clarify jurisdictional issues, but interpretive questions about the proposal remain controversial inside and outside of Congress. The agencies expect to issue a final rule by April 2015.
A number of other CWA issues have been the subject of congressional oversight and legislation, with some legislators highly critical of recent regulatory initiatives and others more supportive of EPA's actions. Some issues have drawn policy makers' attention following court rulings that addressed and in several cases expanded the regulatory scope of water quality protection efforts under the law. Among the topics of interest have been environmental and economic impacts of Chesapeake Bay restoration efforts, federal promulgation of water quality standards in Florida, regulation of surface coal mining activities in Appalachia, and other CWA regulatory actions. Congressional interest in several of these issues has been reflected in specific legislative proposals and debate over policy provisions of legislation to provide appropriations for EPA. In the 113th Congress, Members from both parties raised questions about the cost-effectiveness of some of EPA's actions and/or whether the agency has exceeded its authority. |
crs_R41007 | crs_R41007_0 | Introduction
This report is designed to provide Congress with a perspective on the contemporary political system of China, the world's second-largest economic power, one of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and the only Communist Party-led state in the G-20 grouping of major economies. By introducing some of the distinct features and governance challenges of China's political culture, the report aims to help Congress understand the ways in which political actors in China interact, or in some cases, fail to interact, with implications for China's relationship with its neighbors and the world. Today, although the Party is committed to maintaining a permanent monopoly on power and is intolerant of those who question its right to rule, analysts consider the political system to be neither monolithic nor rigidly hierarchical. Jockeying among leaders and institutions representing different sets of interests is common at every level of the system. China's new Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping raised hopes for a change in the Communist Party's relationship to the law when he called in December 2012 for full implementation of China's state constitution and declared that, "No organization or individual has the special right to overstep the Constitution and law, and any violation of the Constitution and the law must be investigated." Overview of China's Political Institutions
True to its Leninist roots, the Chinese Communist Party dominates state and society in China. The Party entrusts implementation of its policies and day-to-day administration of the country to the institution of the State , headed by the State Council and including the State's ministries and commissions and layers of "people's governments" below the national level. In practice, the NPC, like People's Congresses at every level of administration, is controlled by the Communist Party and is able to exercise little oversight over any of the institutions officially under its supervision. The second set of institutions is China's eight minor political parties , known as the "democratic parties." The existence of the PPCCs and the minor parties allows the Communist Party to describe China's political system as one of "multi-party cooperation and political consultation led by the Communist Party of China." Features of China's Formal Political Culture
The formal Chinese political system has a number of distinct features. The Military as an Armed Wing of the Communist Party
China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), is not a national army belonging to the state. The Power of Provincial Governments
Provincial leaders are powerful players in the Chinese political system. Each time the Party edges further away from its Marxist roots, even if only to catch up with reality on the ground, it faces howls of protest from China's marginalized but still vocal Marxists. Penchant for Long-Term Planning
As a legacy of the centrally planned economic system of the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese political system places a heavy emphasis on long-term planning. Corruption
Corruption in China is widespread. Laws must be passed by the National People's Congress. (For more on the NPC, see " The Legislature: Strong on Paper, Weak in Practice " and " Weak Rule of Law .") (See " The Distorting Influence of Bureaucratic Rank .") Others, however, play an influential role. | This report is designed to provide Congress with a perspective on the contemporary political system of China, the only Communist Party-led state in the G-20 grouping of major economies. China's Communist Party dominates state and society in China, is committed to maintaining a permanent monopoly on power, and is intolerant of those who question its right to rule. Nonetheless, analysts consider China's political system to be neither monolithic nor rigidly hierarchical. Jockeying among leaders and institutions representing different sets of interests is common at every level of the system.
The report opens with a brief overview of China's leading political institutions. They include the Communist Party and its military, the People's Liberation Army; the State, led by the State Council, to which the Party delegates day-to-day administration of the country; and the National People's Congress (NPC), China's unicameral legislature. On paper, the NPC has broad powers. In practice, the legislature is controlled by the Communist Party and is able to exercise little of its constitutionally mandated oversight over the state and the judiciary. Following its 18th Congress in November 2012, the Communist Party ushered in a new Party leadership. New State and NPC leaders took office following the opening session of the 12th NPC in March 2013.
Following the overview, this report introduces a number of distinct features of China's formal political culture and discusses some of their implications for U.S.-China relations. Those features include the fact that China is led not by one leader, but by a committee of seven; that the military is not a national army, but rather an armed wing of the Communist Party; that provincial leaders are powerful players in the system; and that ideology continues to matter in China, with the Communist Party facing vocal criticism from its left flank each time it moves even further away from its Marxist roots. Other themes include the role of meritocracy as a form of legitimization for one-party rule, and ways in which meritocracy is being undermined; the introduction of an element of predictability into elite Chinese politics through the enforcement of term and age limits for holders of public office; the Chinese system's penchant for long-term planning; and the system's heavy emphasis on maintaining political stability. The next section of the report discusses governance challenges in the Chinese political system, from "stove-piping" and bureaucratic competition, to the distorting influence of bureaucratic rank, to factionalism, corruption, and weak rule of law.
The second half of the report is devoted to detailed discussion of China's formal political structures—the Party, the military, the State, the National People's Congress, a consultative body known as the China People's Political Consultative Conference, and China's eight minor political parties, all of which are loyal to the Communist Party. Also discussed are other political actors who play a role in influencing policy debates, including the media, big business, research institutes, university academics, associations, and grassroots non-governmental organizations. The report concludes with a discussion of prospects for political reform, noting that while China's new Communist Party chief has called for everyone to be bound by the constitution and law, Party policy is to reject vigorously the notion of a multi-party system, separation of powers, a bicameral legislature, or a federal system, on the grounds that all are unsuited to China's conditions. |
crs_RL33218 | crs_RL33218_0 | (35)
Although a few Third Circuit opinions involving asylum claims have been discussed in othersections of this report, this section discusses some notable opinions by Judge Alito that have focusedprimarily on issues relating to the substantive grounds for asylum eligibility. Inreaching this decision, the majority noted that the Supreme Court had "historically drawn a sharpdistinction between 'judicial review' ... and the courts' power to entertain petitions for writs of habeascorpus." of Justice . | Judge Samuel Alito, President Bush's nominee to replace retiring Justice Sandra DayO'Connor as an associate justice on the Supreme Court, has been a judge for the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Third Circuit since 1990. This report discusses notable majority and dissentingopinions written by Judge Alito relating to immigration. |
crs_R43838 | crs_R43838_0 | The issue for Congress is how U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs should respond to the shift in the international security environment. Congress's decisions on these issues could have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements. New International Security Environment
Observers Conclude a Shift Has Occurred
World events in recent years—including Chinese actions in the South and East China Seas and Russia's seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014 —have led observers, particularly since late 2013, to conclude that the international security environment in recent years has undergone a shift from the post-Cold War era that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II. For additional discussion, see Appendix D .
Some Emerging Implications for Defense
Defense Funding Levels
The shift in the international security environment has become a major factor in the debate over future U.S. defense spending levels. Renewed Emphasis on Grand Strategy and Geopolitics
Discussion of the shift in the international security environment has led to a renewed emphasis on grand strategy and geopolitics as part of the context for discussing U.S. defense budgets, plans, and programs. Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe. Capabilities for high-end conventional warfare. Maintaining technological superiority in conventional weapons. Reliance on Russian and Chinese components and materials. Hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics . | World events in recent years have led observers, particularly since late 2013, to conclude that the international security environment in recent years has undergone a shift from the post-Cold War era that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II.
The shift in the international security environment has become a major factor in the debate over future U.S. defense spending levels, and has led to new or renewed emphasis on the following in discussions of U.S. defense strategy, plans, and programs:
grand strategy and geopolitics as part of the context for discussing U.S. defense budgets, plans, and programs; nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence; U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe; capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare (i.e., large-scale, high-intensity, technologically sophisticated warfare) against countries such as China and Russia; maintaining U.S. technological superiority in conventional weapons; speed of weapon system development and deployment as a measure of merit in defense acquisition policy; minimizing reliance in U.S. military systems on components and materials from Russia and China; and capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics employed by countries such as Russia and China.
The issue for Congress is how U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs should respond to the shift in the international security environment. Congress's decisions on these issues could have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements. |
crs_93-875 | crs_93-875_0 | The authority to expel a Member is expressly provided for in the Constitution at Article I, Section 5, clause 2. In the United States Senate, 15 Senators have been expelled, 14 during the Civil War period for disloyalty to the Union (one expulsion was later revoked by the Senate), and one Senator was expelled in 1797 for other disloyal conduct. In the House of Representatives, five Members have been expelled—3 during the Civil War period for disloyalty, one in 1980 after conviction of bribery and conspiracy in congressional office, and one Member in 2002 after his convictions for bribery, receipt of illegal gratuities, and other corruption charges, while several other Members, facing potential expulsion, resigned their offices prior to action by the full House of Representatives. Censure
The term "censure," unlike the term "expel," does not appear in the Constitution, although the authority is derived from the same clause in the Constitution at Article I, Section 5, clause 2, concerning the authority of each house of Congress to "punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour." The Standing Orders of the Senate provide that the Select Committee on Ethics may recommend to the Senate disciplinary action against a Member "including, but not limited to, in the case of a Member: censure, expulsion, or recommendation to the appropriate party conference regarding such Member's seniority or positions of responsibility ...."
A "censure" in the Senate has traditionally meant the "punishment" imposed by the Senate when the full body formally disapproves of conduct or behavior of a Member by way of the adoption, by majority vote, of a resolution expressing such condemnation or disapproval. The term "censure" is used to describe the formal action of the Senate adopting a resolution expressing the body's "censure," "condemnation," "denouncement," or general disapproval of a Member's conduct even when the word "censure" is not expressly included in the language of the resolution. Denounce
The term "denounce" has been used in two relatively recent censure resolutions in the Senate. Even when not a violation of a particular law or rule, the Senate has censured Members for conduct when found contrary to "acceptable norms of ethical conduct in the Senate," contrary to "good" or "accepted morals" and "senatorial ethics," when found to "derogate from the public trust expected of a Senator," and/or for "reprehensible" conduct which brings the Senate into "dishonor and disrepute." It should be noted that prior to 1968 there were no written Senate ethics rules. The Senate has "censured" Members for violating orders of secrecy of documents in their possession; for fighting in the Senate; for allowing a lobbyist with interests in particular legislation to be on one's staff and on a committee considering such legislation, with access to the secret meetings and considerations of the committee; for non-cooperation and abuse of investigating committees of the Senate; and for financial irregularities concerning contributions, official expenses, and outside income. Conclusion
Expulsions in the United States Senate, as well as in the House of Representatives, have been generally reserved for the most serious misconduct of a Member of Congress, historically concerning disloyalty to the government, or the conviction (or evidence) of an offense involving official corruption and/or the abuse of one's official position in Congress. The action of the full United States Senate formally adopting, by a vote requiring the majority of Members present and voting, a resolution disapproving of a Senator's conduct is considered by parliamentarians and historians as a "censure" of that Member. | The authority of the United States Senate (as well as of the House) to establish the rules for its own proceedings, to "punish" its Members for misconduct, and to expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds of Members present and voting, is provided in the Constitution at Article I, Section 5, clause 2. This express grant of authority for the Senate to expel a Senator is, on its face, unlimited—save for the requirement of a two-thirds majority. In the context of what the Supreme Court has characterized as, in effect, an "unbridled discretion" of the body, expulsions in the Senate, as well as the House, have historically been reserved for cases of the most serious misconduct: disloyalty to the government or abuses of one's official position. The Senate has actually expelled only 15 Members—14 of those during the Civil War period for disloyalty to the Union (one of these expulsions was subsequently revoked by the Senate), and the other Senator during the late 1700s for disloyal conduct. The House of Representatives has expelled only five Members in its history, three during the Civil War period, one in 1980, and another in 2002, after convictions for bribery and corruption offenses related to official congressional duties. In the Senate, as well as in the House, however, other Members for whom expulsion was recommended have resigned from office prior to official, formal action by the institution.
The term "censure," unlike the term "expel," does not appear in the Constitution, and has traditionally been used to describe the "punishment" imposed by the Senate under authority of Article I, Section 5, clause 2, when the full body formally disapproves of conduct by way of the adoption of a resolution expressing such condemnation or disapproval. There is no specific forfeiture of rights or privileges that automatically follows a "censure" by the Senate. The term "censure" is used to describe the action of the Senate formally adopting a resolution expressing the body's "censure," "condemnation," "denouncement," or other expression of disapproval of a Member's conduct, even when the word "censure" is not expressly included in the language of the resolution. There is no specific or official hierarchy or ranking of the terms that have been employed in a censure resolution, although there may be certain connotations associated with the language used in a resolution because of precedents and associations with past Members disciplined.
The Senate has censured nine Senators for various misconduct, including conduct not a violation of any law or specific written Senate ethics rule, when such conduct is found contrary to "acceptable norms of ethical conduct in the Senate," contrary to "accepted morals" and "senatorial ethics," when found to "derogate from the public trust expected of a Senator," and/or found to be "reprehensible" conduct which brings the Senate into "dishonor and disrepute." Conduct resulting in Senate "censure" has included violating orders of secrecy of documents; fighting in the Senate ("censure"); allowing a lobbyist with interests in particular legislation to be on official staff with access to the secret considerations of the legislation by committee ("condemn"); non-cooperation and abuse of investigating committees of the Senate ("condemn"); financial irregularities concerning political contributions ("censure"), office expenses and contributions ("denounce"), and excessive honoraria, official reimbursements and gifts ("denounce"). |
crs_R44522 | crs_R44522_0 | In some cases, the lower rate applies to income from other intellectual property. A number of countries, including the U.K., France, the Netherlands, and China, have adopted a patent box. The income tax rates of those boxes generally range from 5% to 15%. Patent boxes, as noted, can have narrow coverage (providing a lower tax rate on royalties and licenses from patents) or broadly cover income attributable to intellectual property, including that used directly by the firm in production. The purpose of a patent box is to encourage research and development, and, in some cases, to encourage the location of profits from intellectual property in the country. Proposals for a patent box in the United States include a draft proposal by Representatives Boustany and Neal, the Innovation Promotion Act of 2015, proposed legislation made by Senator Feinstein in the 112 th Congress, and a bill introduced by Representative Schwartz in the 113 th Congress ( H.R. 2605 ). The Feinstein proposal provided a 15% tax rate on income from patents developed and used for manufacture in the United States, whereas the Boustany-Neal proposal and H.R. 2605 allowed a 71% deduction of income, which produces an effective 10% statutory rate on income in the patent box. Expensing allows costs to be deductible immediately rather than being recovered over the life of the assets from investment. The patent box, rather than providing an up-front investment subsidy, provides a lower tax rate on the profits from innovation. The Potential Effects of Patent/Innovation Boxes on Innovation
The incentive effect of a patent or innovation box depends on its design. For a given eligible activity, the incentive effect on the patent box depends on whether R&D expense deductions are valued at the patent box rate (patent box rate applied to net income, that is, gross income less expenses) or the regular rate (patent box rate applied to gross income). This proposal would apply to production of domestic goods. If part of the investment is financed by debt, the total effective tax rate on earnings from intangible R&D would rise with the innovation box because the lower statutory rate reduces the value of interest deductions. The finding that adopting a patent box that taxes net profits from intangibles at a lower rate has no effect on R&D incentives rests on the equivalence of expensing to a zero tax rate regardless of the statutory tax rate. There are choices that could be affected by a patent box in a global economy. It is possible to design a patent box so that the marginal dollar of profit would be taxed at 10%. In this case, a patent box based on net profit is likely to discourage investment in the United States because research and development costs are now being deducted at a 10% rate rather than a 35% rate with no corresponding decrease in the tax rate on the profit that has been shifted to another jurisdiction. The share of the pre-tax return that is paid in taxes is the effective tax rate and it is equal to the pre-tax return minus the after-tax return divided by the pre-tax return. Differentiating (6):
(7) dx = (-C K KC KR dK R )/(C K K+C KR K R ) 2
Multiplying the bottom and top of the right hand side of (7) by K R and substituting from (6)
(8) dx= -x(1-x)dK R /K R
Since the rate of profit is constant for a small change,
(9) dK R /K R = d∏ R /∏ R
Thus substituting (9) into (8) and the subsequent equation for (8) into (5):
(10) dT = [-x(1-x)(u-v)(∏ +∏ R )/∏ R +(xu+(1-x)v)] (d∏ R )
If the share of net profits is equal to the share of costs, then (∏ +∏ R )/∏ R = 1/(1-x) and:
(11) dT/ d∏ R = -x(u-v) +(xu+(1-x)v) = v
In the estimated effective tax rate analysis, the statutory rate for both deductions and income is assumed to be v. If profits are a smaller share than costs, the rate will be less than v and if profits are a larger share the rate will be greater than v.
The derivation above suggests that the effective statutory tax rate on income from R&D is equal to the patent box rate of 10% under the assumption that the shares of net profit and the shares of costs are equal and this rate is used in the effective tax rate calculations. | A patent box provides a lower tax rate on income from patents, and in some cases, from other intellectual property. A number of countries, including the U.K., France, the Netherlands, and China, have adopted a patent box. Rates generally range from 5% to 15%. Patent boxes are in some cases referred to as innovation boxes because they cover income from non-patented as well as patented intellectual property. Patent boxes can have narrow coverage (providing a lower tax rate on royalties and licenses from patents) or broadly cover income attributable to intellectual property, including that used directly by the firm in production. The purpose of a patent box is to encourage research and development, and, in some cases, to encourage the location of profits from intellectual property in the country.
Proposals for a patent box in the United States include a draft proposal by Representatives Boustany and Neal, the Innovation Promotion Act of 2015; proposed legislation in the 112th Congress by Senator Feinstein; and a bill introduced by Representative Schwartz in the 113th Congress (H.R. 2605). The Feinstein proposal provided a 15% tax rate on income from patents developed and used for manufacture in the United States, whereas the Boustany-Neal proposal and H.R. 2605 allowed a 71% deduction of income, which produces an effective 10% rate for corporations. The Boustany-Neal draft proposal would allocate profit between the ordinary tax rate (35% for corporations) and the patent box rate, based on the share of (research and development) R&D spending in total spending.
Current tax law contains incentives for investment in research and development. One is the option to expense certain R&D costs (deduct immediately) rather than deduct them over the life of the investment. Expensing is the equivalent of a zero effective tax rate on the return to investment. The tax code also contains a research tax credit. R&D subsidies are justified because the average company is likely to invest less in R&D than the amount warranted by the social returns from the investment. There may be disagreement over whether tax subsidies are the best method.
The expected effectiveness of a patent box on R&D depends on its design, and particularly whether it applies to net profit, where the tax rate on the up-front deductible cost is the new, lower patent box rate, or to gross investment, where the deductible cost is still valued at the higher regular statutory rate. The Boustany-Neal draft proposal applies to net profit, which means that lower statutory rate has no effect on the incentive to invest in R&D. The effective rate is still zero under expensing regardless of the statutory tax rate, and the credit is not driven by the tax rate. Moreover, if part of the revenue cost for the lower patent box rate is offset by slower recovery of costs, the effective tax rate rises. Similarly, the R&D credit, which was recently made permanent, is more valuable in reducing effective tax rates than a lower rate applied to net profit.
It is possible to design a patent box where the lower rate applies to gross rather than net profit. This approach would produce large subsidies for R&D that could lead to negative pre-tax returns, which might be justified depending on the size of R&D spillover effects.
A global economy also raises a number of policy issues. To the extent that a patent box has been adopted to discourage profit shifting to low-tax foreign jurisdictions, the Boustany-Neal patent box proposal may not be very effective. For an additional dollar of profit, the rate is a weighted average of the regular 35% rate and the 10% patent box rate; estimates suggest that the rate would still be relatively high. The effect of a patent box when part of profits are already shifted to a low-rate country is an increase in effective rate domestic R&D, for a patent box that applies the rate to net income rather than gross income. |
crs_R44935 | crs_R44935_0 | FY2018 Consideration: Overview of Actions
The first section of this report provides an overview of the consideration of FY2018 judiciary appropriations, with subsections covering each major action, including
the initial submission of the request on May 23, 2017; a hearing held by the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government; the House Appropriations subcommittee markup on June 29, 2017; and the House Appropriations Committee markup on July 13, 2017. It contains a request for $7.86 billion in new budget authority for judicial branch activities, including $7.23 billion in discretionary funds and $0.64 billion in mandatory funding for judges' salaries and benefits. By law, the judicial branch request is submitted to the President and included in the budget submission without change. Funding in Recent Years: Brief Overview
FY2017
FY2017 judiciary funding was provided in Division E, Title 3, of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ), which was enacted on May 5, 2017. The Judiciary Budget and Key Issues
Appropriations for the judiciary comprise approximately 0.2% of total budget authority. The rest of the judiciary's budget provides funding for the lower federal courts and related judicial services. The largest account, approximately 72% of the total FY2017 enacted level, is the Salaries and Expenses account for the U.S. Courts of Appeals, District Courts, and Other Judicial Services. The remaining judiciary budget is divided among the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (0.4% of FY2017 enacted), U.S. Court of International Trade (0.3%), Fees of Jurors and Commissioners (0.5%), Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (1.2%), Federal Judicial Center (0.4%), U.S. Sentencing Commission (0.2%), and Judicial Retirement Funds (2.1%). The total represents a 2.5% increase over the FY2017 enacted level. | Funds for the judicial branch are included annually in the Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill. The bill provides funding for the Supreme Court; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; the U.S. Court of International Trade; the U.S. Courts of Appeals and District Courts; Defender Services; Court Security; Fees of Jurors and Commissioners; the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; the Federal Judicial Center; the U.S. Sentencing Commission; and Judicial Retirement Funds.
The judiciary's FY2018 budget request of $7.86 billion, including $7.23 billion in discretionary funding and $636.1 million in mandatory funding, was submitted on May 23, 2017. By law, the President includes the requests submitted by the judiciary in the annual budget submission without change.
The FY2018 budget request represents a 4.3% increase in discretionary funds over the FY2017 enacted level of $6.93 billion provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31, Division E, Title III), enacted May 5, 2017.
The House Appropriations Committee held a markup (H.R. 3280) on July 13, 2017, and recommended a total of $7.09 billion in discretionary funds, as well as such sums as necessary to provide for mandatory expenses.
Appropriations for the judiciary comprise approximately 0.2% of total budget authority for the federal government. |
crs_RS22771 | crs_RS22771_0 | Background
The franking privilege, which allows Members of Congress to transmit mail matter under their signature without postage, has its roots in 17 th century Great Britain. Postal Service for franked mail through annual appropriations for the legislative branch. Reform efforts during the past 30 years have reduced overall franking expenditures in both election and non-election years. Even-numbered-year franking expenditures have been reduced by over 85% from $113.4 million in FY1988 to $16.9 million in FY2014, while odd-numbered-year franking expenditures have been reduced by over 90% from $89.5 million in FY1989 to $8.3 million in FY2015. House mail costs have decreased from a high of $77.9 million in FY1988 to $6.8 million in FY2015. The Senate has dramatically reduced its costs, from $43.6 million in FY1984 to $1.5 million in FY2015. 1873 , the Ending Special Mail Privileges for Congress Act, would eliminate the traditional franking privilege of Members of Congressâthe use of the Member's signature in lieu of prepayment for the mailing of letters related to official business. The bill, however, would continue to authorize the use of official funds for the purpose of Member official communications with constituents and others, as "congressional mail." It would also eliminate, without replacement, the franking privilege of survivors of Members of Congress. Legislation in the 113th Congress
One piece of legislation was introduced in the 113th Congress that would have altered the franking privilege. Legislation in the 112th Congress
S. 3528 would have repealed the authorization providing franking privileges to former Speakers of the House. Legislation in the 111th Congress
Two bills introduced in the 111 th Congressâ H.R. 2056 and H.R. 5151 âwould have altered the congressional franking privilege. If enacted, Members of both the House and Senate would have been prohibited from mailing any mass mailing during the period starting 90 days prior to a primary election in which such Member is a candidate for reelection to any federal office and ending on the day of the general election. Senate rules further state that no Senator may frank mass mailings in the 60 days prior to the general election, regardless of whether or not he or she is a candidate for election. 5151 (the Congressional Oversight and Spending Transparency Act of 2010) would have amended existing statutes to prohibit the use of funds of the House of Representatives for official mail of a Member of the House for any material other than a document transmitted under the official letterhead used for Members' stationery. 2788 âwere introduced in the 110 th Congress that would have altered the congressional franking privilege. 2687 would have effectively prohibited Representatives from mass mailing newsletters, questionnaires, or congratulatory notices. 2788 would have required that each individual piece of franked mail contained in a mass mailing made by a Member of the House contain a statement indicating the aggregate cost of producing and mailing the mass mailing. H.R. H.R. | The congressional franking privilege, which dates from 1775, allows Members of Congress to transmit mail matter under their signature without postage. Congress, through legislative branch appropriations, reimburses the U.S. Postal Service for the franked mail it handles. Use of the frank is regulated by federal law, House and Senate rules, and committee regulations.
Reform efforts during the past 30 years have reduced overall franking expenditures in both election and non-election years. Even-numbered-year franking expenditures have been reduced by over 85% from $113.4 million in FY1988 to $16.9 million in FY2014, while odd-numbered-year franking expenditures have been reduced by over 90% from $89.5 million in FY1989 to $8.3 million in FY2015. House mail costs have decreased from a high of $77.9 million in FY1988 to $6.8 million in FY2015. The Senate has dramatically reduced its costs, from $43.6 million in FY1984 to $1.5 million in FY2015.
During the 114 th Congress, one piece of legislation ( H.R. 1873 ) has been introduced that would eliminate the traditional franking privilege of Members of Congressâthe use of the Member's signature in lieu of prepayment for the mailing of letters related to official business. The bill, however, would continue to authorize the use of official funds for the purpose of Member official communications with constituents and others, as "congressional mail." It would also eliminate, without replacement, the franking privilege of survivors of Members of Congress. An identical bill ( H.R. 4872 ) was introduced in the 113 th Congress.
During the 112 th Congress, one piece of legislation was introduced that would have altered the franking privilege for former Speakers of the House. S. 3528 would have repealed the authorization providing franking privileges to former Speakers of the House.
During the 111 th Congress, two pieces of legislation were introduced that would have altered the franking privilege for Members. H.R. 5151 would have restricted Representatives' use of the frank to documents transmitted under the official letterhead used for the Member's stationery. H.R. 2056 would have prohibited Senators and Representatives from sending mass mailings during a period starting 90 days prior to a primary and ending on the day of the general election for any election in which the Member is a candidate for reelection.
During the 110 th Congress, five pieces of legislation were introduced to alter the franking privilege for Members. One bill would have required that all pieces of mail sent in a mass mailing include a statement indicating the cost of producing and mailing the mass mailing. Another bill would have prohibited mass mailings in the form of newsletters, questionnaires, or congratulatory notices. Three bills would have prohibited Senators and Representatives from sending mass mailings during a period starting 90 days prior to a primary and ending on the day of the general election for any election in which the Member is a candidate for reelection.
This report will be updated as legislative action warrants. See also CRS Report RL34188, Congressional Official Mail Costs , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL34274, Franking Privilege: Historical Development and Options for Change , by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40089 | crs_R40089_0 | Background
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. The President, in a "Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid," delivered March 22, 1961, described the U.S. foreign aid programs emerging from World War II as
[b]ureaucratically fragmented, awkward and slow, its administration is diffused over a haphazard and irrational structure covering at least four departments and several other agencies. President Kennedy went on to note the declining prestige of the United States' foreign aid apparatus and the negative impact of that decline on administering and staffing programs abroad. From 1986 on, however, Congress turned more frequently to enacting freestanding authorities that did not amend the 1961 act, and included language in annual appropriations measures to waive the requirement to keep authorizations current. Some freestanding laws that authorize foreign aid or apply new conditions to aid authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 are shown in Table 2 . Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: Authorities and Appropriations
Table 3 presents the authorities enacted in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the corresponding appropriations that fund those authorities in the current foreign assistance appropriations act. All of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is stated in the United States Code, beginning at 22 U.S.C. This table reflects the language as amended. In many instances, the President has delegated his authority to the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, or some other appropriate office holder. Appropriation
The right-side column of Table 3 states appropriations levels that correspond to the authorized program, as enacted in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012 (division I of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012; P.L. 112-74 ; 125 Stat. 786 at 1164). | The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) serves as the cornerstone for the United States' foreign assistance policies and programs. Written, passed, and signed into law at what some consider the height of the Cold War, the act is seen by some today as anachronistic. Ironically, when President Kennedy urged the 87th Congress to enact foreign aid legislation that would exemplify and advance the national interests and security strategies of the United States post-World War II, he described the existing foreign aid mechanisms as bureaucratic, fragmented, awkward, and slow. Some have used the same language today, more than 50 years later, to characterize the legislation he promoted.
On several occasions over the past 20 years, Congress has set out to assess the current body of law that comprises foreign aid policy, starting with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, in recent past Congresses, have considered legislation to rebuild the United States' capacity to deliver effective foreign aid, and make aid more transparent and responsive to today's quick-changing international challenges. Proposals have ranged from setting up advisory committees to a complete overhaul of foreign aid objectives and programs.
This report presents the authorities of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and correlates those authorities with the operative appropriations measure (division I of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012; P.L. 112-74; 124 Stat. 786 at 1164) that funds those authorities. It replaces an earlier issue of the same report, dated July 29, 2011, to incorporate the current appropriations act.
For many years, foreign aid appropriations measures have waived the requirement that funds must be authorized before they are appropriated and expended. Understanding the relation between the authorities in the cornerstone act and appropriations is key to foreign aid reform. |
crs_R42404 | crs_R42404_0 | However, state and local governments have argued that federal lands are not only lost to the tax base, but also impose a burden on local taxpayers through demands for services such as law enforcement or search and rescue actions, which are commonly supported by local taxes. The program for FWS lands in the National Wildlife Refuge System (hereinafter referred to as the System) was enacted in 1935 and has been amended extensively since that time. The 1978 amendments to the program provided that NWRF payments to local governments are based on a complex formula; the authorized funding level varies from one year to the next, based on changes in the data used in the formula. The total payment a county receives for federal lands in its jurisdiction is further complicated by the interaction of NWRF and the Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) program, a broadly applicable federal land payment program for county governments, which uses a different payment formula. This report describes the key features of NWRF: the lands under FWS jurisdiction, the eligibility of most of those lands for NWRF payments, the sources of revenue for the fund, the payment formula for calculating an individual county's payments, the PILT payments available for certain FWS lands, some exceptions to normal authorized payment calculations, changing authorization levels, and falling annual appropriations. What Lands Are Under the Jurisdiction of FWS? National monument areas within the Refuge System are counted in the 'National Wildlife Refuges' category total." FWS lands can be further categorized based on whether (a) they are public domain lands or acquired lands; (b) whether FWS has sole or primary jurisdiction over the lands or instead has only secondary jurisdiction; (c) for acquired lands, whether some other federal agency initially acquired the lands and then transferred them to FWS, or whether FWS acquired the lands directly from a non-federal source as either a gift or a purchase; and (d) whether FWS jurisdiction rests on an agreement, easement, or lease, rather than outright ownership of the land. Criteria for eligibility are as follows:
For lands reserved from the public domain, payments to counties only if or when the lands in the refuge generated net revenues in the previous year. To the extent that the permanently appropriated net revenues are insufficient to meet the amounts calculated under the payment formulas, the Refuge Revenue Sharing Act authorizes discretionary appropriations in annual spending bills to meet any shortfall. This is the only NWRF payment option for such lands. Depending on revenues and costs, these lands might generate payments in some years and not others. However, as noted previously, these lands are also eligible for PILT payments. However, net receipts have never yet been sufficient to meet formula levels. To date, Congress has approved additional funds to supplement the net receipts. PILT payments are mandatory spending through FY2014. Therefore, increases in eligible FWS lands can explain only a part of the increase in authorization levels. Is the fair market value increasing? As a result of increasing FMVs, counties with lands having high FMVs receive an increasing fraction of funds appropriated to the NWRF. The Administration argued that the savings were justified, and that refuges added few costs to counties and provided economic benefits from increased tourism. Fully fund the existing NWRF program. The lands outside the System (administrative sites, national fish hatcheries, and the non-submerged lands in those national monuments outside the System), if they are in the public domain but generate no revenue, currently receive no NWRF payment and no PILT payment. | Many counties are compensated for the presence of federal lands within their boundaries because these lands are exempt from local taxes. Counties with lands under the primary jurisdiction of the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) are compensated through the National Wildlife Refuge Fund (NWRF). Counties have argued that the program is underfunded; in some instances, counties raise lack of funding as an argument against the establishment of new refuges. At the same time, some hold that budget constraints argue for a reduction in the program. Congress has begun to examine the program for possible changes.
Lands eligible for NWRF payments are largely in the National Wildlife Refuge System, but certain other FWS lands are included as well. Under the 1935 Refuge Revenue Sharing Act (16 U.S.C. §715s), NWRF was conceived as a program to share revenues from activities such as grazing or timber harvest on refuge lands, and such receipts are permanently appropriated to the fund. However, revenue-generating activities were (and are) often incompatible with refuge purposes and many refuges generate no revenue. In such situations, counties received no compensation from the federal government for the presence of the federal land. To address this perceived gap in the program, the law was amended in 1978 to add other payment criteria. Among these criteria was a payment option based on fair market value in the case of acquired lands. It became apparent almost immediately that revenues were not sufficient to meet the payment formula specified in the amended law. Congress has repeatedly appropriated additional funds to supplement the revenue stream. But the additional amounts appropriated have very rarely met the formula level, and never in the last decade. Recent Administration proposals for substantial funding reductions have intensified congressional interest. The Administration argues that the savings are justified and that refuges add few costs to counties and provide economic benefits from increased tourism.
Under NWRF, payments are distributed through a complex formula to counties with FWS lands, with different formulas for lands reserved from the public domain (that is, obtained from a sovereign power) and acquired lands (that is, those purchased from or donated by any entity other than a sovereign power). In turn, public domain lands in the System are also eligible for Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT; 31 U.S.C. §6901), which provides additional payments to local governments. Acquired FWS lands are not eligible for PILT.
When NWRF is not fully funded, the reluctance of some state and local governments to see lands within their boundaries acquired for addition to the System may be due in part to lost property tax revenues. As Congress debates changes in NWRF, several issues stand out as part of the debate:
The NWRF payment formula is causing a rapid increase in authorized payment levels. Current NWRF receipts are sufficient to provide only a small fraction of the authorized formula, even without the increasing authorized payment levels. PILT payments, at least through FY2014, are mandatory spending, while NWRF payments are dependent on annual appropriations for the bulk of the program. PILT payments are provided only for public domain lands within the System, and not for other FWS lands. |
crs_R44713 | crs_R44713_0 | U.S.-AU ties have strengthened and assumed increasing prominence since the establishment in 2006 of a U.S. diplomatic mission to the African Union (USAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where the AU is headquartered. In mid-2015, President Obama addressed the AU in a speech focused on democracy and a range of other issues centering on governance and security. He had previously met with the AU Commission Chair, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, in 2013 and in 2014. Key Obama Administration goals with respect to the AU have been to
support AU efforts to promote democratic and electoral reform across the continent; promote inclusive regional economic development and growth through improved trade and investment; support various AU developmental objectives, including projects in such areas as agriculture and education; strengthen the capacity of the AU and sub-regional organizations to effectively address peace and security challenges, and aid individual stabilization missions; improve AU staff and organizational/technical capacities; and increase public diplomacy and multilateral engagement with the AU and its member states to further U.S. interests. Background
The African Union is an intergovernmental grouping that includes as members all countries in Africa except Morocco. The AU, based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was established in 2002 as the successor to the now-defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU). That treaty, which remains in effect, and the AU Constitutive Act, the founding charter of the AU, are intended to promote African regional economic integration and socioeconomic development through the phased creation of a common African market and shared political and economic institutions. Other key objectives identified in the act include greater political and economic unity, peace and security, and stability within Africa; advocacy of common African positions in international forums; strengthening of democratic governance and the rule of law; respect for human rights; and greater regional self-reliance, gender equality, and social justice. The Assembly, a grouping of heads of state and government, is the AU's supreme decisionmaking organ and is supported by a network of subsidiary institutions. An executive council, made up of AU members' foreign affairs ministers, coordinates the AU Assembly's work and elects the AU Commission (AUC) from among the AU's five sub-regions. Notable among these are
the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU's primary decisionmaking organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts; the Department of Political Affairs, which coordinates AU election observation missions and other governance-related activities; and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Planning and Coordinating Agency, which carries out a number of the AU's flagship development projects. Other stated Dlamini-Zuma priorities have included crisis resolution in multiple countries, reconstruction and transitional aid in post-conflict countries, and continued AU monitoring of African elections. It has a broad mandate to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts in Africa. To help enforce the Charter and build a human rights protection system in Africa, the AU established the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (AfCHPR) headquartered in Tanzania, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) in The Gambia, and an AU Commission on International Law (AUCIL) in Ethiopia. In a meeting in July 2016, the AU Assembly took an additional step toward attaining these goals when it instituted a 0.2% levy on imports into the continent, to be imposed over several years at the REC level. U.S. Relations, Policy, and Assistance
While the United States has long aided and cooperated with the AU and the OAU before it, U.S.-AU ties have strengthened over the past decade, and have assumed a higher profile in U.S.-African relations. The U.S. move toward closer ties began in 2005, when then-President George W. Bush granted the AU international organization status, allowing it to open an office in Washington, DC; the first AU ambassador to the AU was accredited in 2007. AU mission (USAU) was initiated in 2006, making the United States the first non-African country to have an accredited AU mission. Conflict prevention, mitigation, and peace operations have been key traditional focuses of U.S.-AU relations. Most U.S. aid related to the attainment of AU goals is provided on a bilateral basis or to regional RECs, rather than to the AU itself, and is thus not always accounted for in analyses of U.S. support for the AU. U.S. support for AU democracy strengthening initiatives is another key area of engagement. | U.S. relations with the African Union (AU), an intergovernmental organization to which all African countries except Morocco belong, have strengthened over the past decade. U.S.-AU cooperation has traditionally focused on peace operations and conflict prevention and mitigation. U.S. aid for AU democracy-strengthening initiatives is another key focus of engagement. Other areas of cooperation include economic development, health, governance, peace and security capacity building, and criminal justice. Direct U.S. aid to the AU Commission (AUC, the organization's secretariat), which oversees AU program activity, is moderate; most U.S. aid in support of AU goals is provided on a bilateral basis or sub-regional basis. Consequently, such aid may not always be accounted for in analyses of U.S. support for the AU.
President George W. Bush formally recognized the AU as an international organization in 2005, and a U.S. mission to the AU was established in 2006, making the United States the first non-African country to have an accredited diplomatic mission to the AU. In 2007, the first AU ambassador to the United States was accredited. In 2010, an agreement on U.S. aid for the AU was signed and in 2013, the AU and the United States established annual partnership dialogues and extended the 2010 aid agreement. Later in 2013, President Obama met with the AUC Chairperson, marking the first exchange between an AUC chair and a U.S. president. In 2015, President Obama addressed the African Union at its headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, becoming the first U.S. president to do so. How the Trump Administration and the 115th Congress may view and potentially engage with the AU has yet to be determined.
The AU was established in 2002 as the successor to the now-defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU). The aim of the AU is to promote continental economic integration and socioeconomic development through shared political and economic institutions and the planned creation of a common African market. Other key AU goals include greater political and economic unity, peace and security, and stability within Africa; advocacy of common African positions in international forums; strengthened democratic governance and rule of law; respect for human rights; and gender equality and social justice, among others. The current AUC chair is Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma of South Africa. Her priorities have centered on conflict resolution, support for transitional aid in post-conflict countries, AU monitoring of African elections, and efforts to boost economic growth and increase AU finance resources, among other goals.
In July 2016, Dlamini-Zuma's tenure was extended until January 2017 after the AU Assembly (comprising heads of state and government) failed to agree on a successor. The Assembly also decided in July 2016 to impose a 0.2% levy on imports into Africa to fund AU programs and AU-led peacekeeping missions, to facilitate the intra-regional movement of persons through the expanded use of AU passports, and to speed the creation of a Continental Free Trade Area. It also addressed several country-level crises. Key AU challenges include organizational, technical, and skilled personnel capacity gaps and limited financial resources. Political tensions among member states, uneven commitment to AU goals and mandates across the region, and sovereignty concerns have also inhibited AU effectiveness.
The AU's top decisionmaking organ is an Assembly of heads of state and government. Its decisions are overseen by an Executive Council, made up of AU members' foreign affairs ministers. Other notable AU institutions include the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which manages the AU's efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts, and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Planning and Coordinating Agency, which manages economic programs and projects. The AU is also endeavoring to address violations of international human rights law through an expansion of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, a nascent continental court with a mandate to protect human rights and freedoms. |
crs_R40876 | crs_R40876_0 | Determinations of disability for both programs are made by state Disability Determination Services (DDS) in accordance with federal laws, regulations, and policies. Table A-2 , in the Appendix , summarizes the personnel actions taken or planned by the states that apply to DDS agencies and employees. As of October 15, 2009, 25 states had implemented or were planning to implement freezes on the hiring of new state employees. Other Personnel Actions
In addition to furloughs, RIFs, and hiring freezes, a number of states have implemented or are planning to implement other personnel actions that, if applied to DDS agencies, could reduce the capacity of the DDS to process new SSDI and SSI applications and continuing disability reviews. Potential Impacts of Furloughs or Other Personnel Actions Taken Against DDS Employees
Because all expenses associated with the DDS, including non-itemized and administrative expenses, are paid by the SSA, states will see no cost savings as a result of furloughs of DDS employees or other personnel actions such as hiring freezes or limitations on overtime. However, such furloughs and personnel actions would likely have a negative impact on the SSDI and SSI programs as well as on the states themselves. Benefit delays could also result in an increased reliance on Medicaid by program applicants. | Initial and continuing determinations of eligibility for the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs are made by state Disability Determination Services (DDS). These DDS agencies are fully funded by the federal government. However, because DDS employees work for the states, rather than the federal government, they are subject to furloughs, hiring freezes, and other personnel actions taken by state governments.
As of October 15, 2009, 10 states had either furloughed or plan to furlough DDS employees, and 6 states have either implemented or plan to implement hiring freezes that would affect DDS agencies. Eleven states had implemented or planned to implement other personnel actions, such as limitations on overtime or reductions in pay, that would apply to DDS agencies and employees.
These furloughs, hiring freezes, and other personnel actions will reduce the capacity of the DDS to process initial SSDI and SSI applications as well as continuing disability reviews (CDRs). This reduced capacity may result in delays in moving people who qualify for SSDI or SSI onto the benefit rolls, which may also result in a greater reliance by these people on benefits funded or administered by the states. |
crs_R41752 | crs_R41752_0 | Introduction
Congressional awareness of issues associated with locally owned and operated levees is increasing, largely because of the nationwide remapping of floodplains by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and efforts to reauthorize the FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) which expires on September 30, 2011. Most notably, FEMA coordinates updates to Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) and issues levee accreditations that waive the mandatory purchase requirement for homeowners who reside in areas protected by levees. In certain limited situations discussed later in this report, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) may certify the data submitted to FEMA for accreditation purposes. Levees are located throughout the country and are found in approximately 22% of U.S. counties, where almost half of the U.S. population resides. Nationally, average economic damage from floods in leveed areas ranges between $5 billion and $10 billion annually. One estimate puts the five-year level of investment for new construction or maintenance needed for the nation's existing levees at $50 billion. Congress has considered in recent years whether and how to change the current division of levee responsibilities and their costs, and whether to modify existing levee-related federal programs. The report first discusses the role of levees in flood risk reduction, the shared responsibilities for levees in the United States, and the role of three agencies: FEMA, the Corps, and the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Finally, the report outlines policy options for locally operated levees that might be considered by the 112 th Congress. 1570) declared some flood control a "proper" federal activity:
It is hereby recognized that destructive floods upon the rivers of the United States, upsetting orderly processes and causing loss of life and property, including the erosion of lands and impairing and obstructing navigation, highways, railroads, and other channels of commerce between the States, constitute a menace to national welfare; that it is the sense of Congress that flood control on navigational waters or their tributaries is a proper activity of the Federal Government in cooperation with States, their political sub-divisions and localities thereof; that investigations and improvements of rivers and other waterways, including watersheds thereof, for flood-control purposes are in the interest of the general welfare; that the Federal Government should improve or participate in the improvement of navigable waters or their tributaries including watersheds thereof, for flood-control purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs, and if the lives and social security of people are otherwise adversely affected. NRCS provides some funds for repair of damaged levees through its Small Watershed Program. However, expanding the Corps' role in NFIP data certification and post-construction improvements of locally operated levees is being discussed as part of the policy debate on how to manage flood risk and promote risk reduction nationally. Costs of Obtaining Levee Accreditation
Owners of locally operated levees are responsible for the costs associated with seeking and maintaining FEMA's levee accreditation. Some levee owners have expressed concerns about the costs and process for obtaining accreditation. In 2005, FEMA increased the information requirements needed to accredit a levee. FEMA has had little involvement in levee planning and construction. Approximately 2,000 projects, representing 14,000 miles of levees, participate in RIP—2,250 miles of locally constructed and operated levees; 9,650 miles of Corps-constructed, locally operated levees; and 2,100 miles of Corps operated levees. There is debate regarding the extent to which FEMA hazard mitigation assistance programs can be used for levee construction and betterment, if at all. The table clarifies that the Corps is the main federal partner in the construction of locally operated levees. Table 5 shows that there are no general federal authorities for assistance with the regular operation and maintenance of locally operated levees. These include, but are not limited to, maintaining the status quo, adopting the recommendations of the congressionally established National Committee on Levee Safety, creating a new grant program, supplementing existing grant programs, or reducing the federal role in levee funding. The NCLS draft proposes, among other investments:
a new levee safety grant program to assist states in achieving strong levee safety programs, at $113 million annually in federal appropriations; a National Levee Rehabilitation, Improvement, and Flood Mitigation Fund to address both structural and nonstructural levee rehabilitation needs, at $600 million annually in federal appropriations; and authority for the Corps to perform a one-time inspection of all locally operated levees (not only federally constructed levees or those participating in RIP) to support the development of the National Levee Database, at $125 million annually for the next five years. | Locally operated levees and the federal programs that assist and accredit them are receiving increasing congressional attention. Congressional authorization of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), expires on September 30, 2011. The pending reauthorization has increased congressional awareness of the link between the condition of locally operated levees, FEMA's Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) and levee accreditation (which determine which NFIP requirements and premiums apply in an area), and programs providing federal disaster assistance for these levees. Congress is considering whether and how to change current programs, federal funding, and the existing division of levee responsibilities. Options are complicated by the desire to promote state, local, and individual decisions and investments that reduce flood risk; concerns about the local costs associated with NFIP purchase and levee accreditation requirements; and consideration of whether to expand federal responsibilities and potential liability. Even though similar issues also exist for some of the federally operated levees, this report focuses on locally operated levees since these dominate the national levee portfolio.
Approximately 22% of U.S. counties across the country, representing almost half of the U.S. population, contain levees. Economic damage from floods in leveed areas ranges between $5 billion and $10 billion annually. Levees play an important role in protecting property against flood damage. More than 100,000 miles of levees may exist, with the federal government operating roughly 2,100 miles. One estimate puts the five-year level of investment needed for new construction or maintenance of the nation's levees at $50 billion.
FEMA is updating FIRMs and deciding whether to accredit levees which will determine whether they appear on those maps. There is some debate regarding the extent to which FEMA should assist with levees investment through its hazard mitigation programs. FEMA often cites overlap with activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Natural Resources Conservation Services (NRCS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture as justification for not funding levee activities.
The Corps is the main federal partner for construction of locally operated levees. Pursuant to congressional authorizations, the Corps participates in cost-shared planning and construction of levees. No general federal authorities exist for the Corps to assist with the regular operation and maintenance of locally operated levees; that is, local levee owners are responsible for operation, maintenance, and improvement. However, there are multiple authorities enacted by Congress for flood fighting, flood mitigation, and levee repair of damages caused by natural events. Since 2005, the Corps has had limited involvement in the data collected and certified to inform FEMA accreditation of locally operated levees. The Corps has limited authority to assist local levee owners in obtaining NFIP levee accreditation. Policymakers in recent years have considered whether to expand the Corps' role in NFIP data certification and post-construction improvements for locally operated levees. NRCS has limited authority to assist in the construction of smaller levees and to repair small, mostly rural levees damaged by a natural event.
Congressional options for assisting with levees include, but are not limited to, maintaining the status quo, adopting the recommendations of the National Committee on Levee Safety (such as federal support to develop new state levee safety programs), modifying federal programs, or creating new federal programs. |
crs_RL30230 | crs_RL30230_0 | Under the final regulations, non-recurrent, short-term benefits (provided for four months or less) for crisis situations do not count as TANF assistance. Since diversion is not to be considered TANF assistance, families receiving diversion aid are not subject to TANF work requirements, time limits, child support assignment, or data reporting requirements. As noted above, one strategy states are using to reduce the need for ongoing welfare is referred to as "diversion"assistance. Diversion payments generally are equal to several months' benefits. It is generally offered as a one-time payment in lieu of extended cash benefits. Acceptance of a diversion payment usually makes a family ineligible for TANF assistance for a certain period of time. Welfare diversion comes in a variety of forms such as lump sum payments, vendor payments, supportive services, and resource referral. In addition, applicant job search is used by some states as a diversion activity. Sometimes it is not easy to identify what diversion is and what it is not. According to Nathan and Gais, an activity like eligibility screening may be a form of diversion when it is carried out in certain ways, while other times it may simply be part of an eligibility review. State Use of Welfare Diversion
Based on the annual state reports on the TANF program, in FY2005, 28 states and the District of Columbia provided lump sum diversion payments to TANF applicants ( see Table 1 ); 16 states and the District of Columbia required TANF applicants to engage in active job searches before their application for TANF is approved; and 15 states were using a "fairly aggressive" form of resource referral. A family will be eligible for only one diversion payment in a 12-month period. | One strategy that states are using to reduce the need for ongoing welfare is referred to as "diversion." Diversion is typically considered to be a payment, program, or activity that is intended to divert applicants for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits from completing the application process and thereby becoming potentially eligible for monthly TANF assistance. Welfare diversion comes in a variety of forms, such as lump sum payments, vendor payments, supportive services, and resource referral. In addition, applicant job search is used by some states as a diversion activity.
Sometimes it is not easy to identify what diversion is and what it is not. A procedure like eligibility screening may be a form of diversion when it is carried out in a certain manner, while at other times it may merely be part of an eligibility review. Diversion payments generally are equal to several months' benefits. They usually are offered as a one-time payment in lieu of extended cash benefits. Acceptance of a diversion payment ordinarily makes a family ineligible for TANF assistance for a certain period of time.
According to the latest available reported data, 28 states and the District of Columbia provided lump sum diversion payments to TANF applicants; 16 states and the District of Columbia required TANF applicants to engage in active job searches before their application for TANF was approved; and 15 states were using a fairly aggressive form of resource referral. Under the final TANF regulations, non-recurrent, short-term benefits (e.g., diversion) for crisis situations (provided for no more than four months) do not count as TANF assistance. Since diversion is not considered TANF assistance, families receiving diversion aid are not subject to TANF work requirements, time limits, child support assignment, or data reporting requirements.
This report discusses welfare diversion and state use of diversion strategies. It will be updated periodically as new data and information become available. |
crs_R42642 | crs_R42642_0 | Introduction
The term "STEM education" refers to teaching and learning in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. It typically includes educational activities across all grade levels—from pre-school to post-doctorate—in both formal (e.g., classrooms) and informal (e.g., afterschool programs) settings. Federal policy makers have an active and enduring interest in STEM education, and the topic is frequently raised in federal science, education, workforce, national security, and immigration policy debates. For example, over 225 bills containing the term "science education" were introduced in the 20 years between the 102 nd (1991-1992) and 112 th (2011-2012) Congresses. The federal investment in STEM education programs is estimated at between $2.8 billion and $3.4 billion annually. The third section analyzes various STEM education policy issues and options, including broad issues that typically apply across the federal portfolio as well as those that are specific to the kindergarten-through-grade-12 (K-12) and higher education systems. However, three agencies account for about four-fifths of federal funding for STEM education: the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Departments of Education (ED) and Health and Human Services (HHS). Areas of Concern
In some respects, the overall trends paint a fairly optimistic picture for STEM education in the United States. Among these are persistent achievement gaps between various demographic groups, U.S. student performance on international mathematics and science assessments, foreign student enrollments in U.S. institutions of higher education, global STEM education attainment, U.S. STEM labor supply. Some STEM achievement gaps appear to hold relatively constant over time. For example, in the decade between 2000 and 2010, graduate enrollments in S&E fields grew by 35%. Further, among U.S. citizens and permanent residents, S&E graduate enrollments among Hispanic/Latino, American Indian/Alaska Native, and black/African America students grew at a higher rate than that of whites (not of Hispanic origin) and Asians. Governance
Governance concerns are central to the contemporary debate about the federal STEM education effort. The scope and scale of the federal STEM education portfolio have some analysts concerned that federal agencies may be duplicating effort. Analysts who perceive duplication and fragmentation in the federal STEM education effort often note the number of federal STEM education programs—ranging from 105 to 252 in various estimates—and assert that merging programs could result in cost savings and greater coherence in the federal STEM education effort. They tend to focus instead on a perceived lack of coordination among and within agencies. A variety of solutions to the shortage of STEM teachers have been proposed. (See section on " Broadening Participation .") Post-Secondary Education
As a proportion of all federal STEM education funding, the majority of the federal investment in STEM education supports undergraduate, graduate, and post-graduate education and research. Broadening Participation of Underrepresented Populations
The demographic profile of the U.S. student-age population is changing. Appendix A. Data Sources and Major Publications
Federal STEM education analysts rely on a number of sources and major publications for data about the federal STEM education effort and the condition of STEM education in the United States and around the globe. Appendix B. | The term "STEM education" refers to teaching and learning in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. It typically includes educational activities across all grade levels—from pre-school to post-doctorate—in both formal (e.g., classrooms) and informal (e.g., afterschool programs) settings. Federal policy makers have an active and enduring interest in STEM education, and the topic is frequently raised in federal science, education, workforce, national security, and immigration policy debates. For example, more than 225 bills containing the term "science education" were introduced between the 102nd and 112th Congresses.
The United States is widely believed to perform poorly in STEM education. However, the data paint a complex picture. By some measures, U.S. students appear to be doing quite well. For example, overall graduate enrollments in science and engineering (S&E) grew 35% over the last decade. Further, S&E enrollments for Hispanic/Latino, American Indian/Alaska Native, and African American students (all of whom are generally underrepresented in S&E) grew by 65%, 55%, and 50%, respectively. On the other hand, concerns remain about persistent academic achievement gaps between various demographic groups, STEM teacher quality, the rankings of U.S. students on international STEM assessments, foreign student enrollments and increased education attainment in other countries, and the ability of the U.S. STEM education system to meet domestic demand for STEM labor.
Various attempts to assess the federal STEM education effort have produced different estimates of its scope and scale. Analysts have identified between 105 and 252 STEM education programs and activities at 13 to 15 federal agencies. Annual federal appropriations for STEM education are typically in the range of $2.8 billion to $3.4 billion. All published inventories identify the Department of Education, National Science Foundation, and Health and Human Services as key agencies in the federal effort. Over half of federal STEM education funding is intended to serve the needs of postsecondary schools and students; the remainder goes to efforts at the kindergarten-through-Grade 12 (K-12) level. Much of the funding for post-secondary students is in the form of financial aid.
Federal STEM education policy concerns center on broad issues—such as governance of the federal effort and broadening participation of underrepresented populations—as well as those that are specific to STEM education at the elementary, secondary, and postsecondary levels. Governance concerns focus on perceived duplication and lack of coordination in the federal effort; broadening participation concerns tend to highlight achievement gaps between various demographic groups. Analysts suggest a variety of policy options in elementary, secondary, and postsecondary STEM education. At the K-12 level, these include proposals to address teacher quality, accountability, and standards. At the post-secondary level, proposals center on efforts to remediate and retain students in STEM majors.
This report is intended to serve as a primer on existing STEM education policy issues and programs. It includes assessments of the federal STEM education effort and the condition of STEM education in the United States, as well as an analysis of several of the policy issues central to the contemporary federal conversation about STEM education. Appendix A contains frequently cited data and sources and Appendix B includes a selection of major STEM-related laws. |
crs_RL33927 | crs_RL33927_0 | In addition, Congress has established a number of programs to compensate or assist victims of certain specific circumstances, including negligence, terrorism, and "acts of God." The programs fall, broadly, into three categories: (1) those that primarily limit compensation or assistance to specified groups of people , with little or no limitation on the types of injury that may be compensated (e.g., workers' compensation systems); (2) those that primarily limit compensation or assistance for specified types of injuries , with little or no limitation of the classes of individuals who may be compensated (e.g., the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program); and (3) hybrid programs, which limit both the classes of eligible individuals, and the compensable injuries or diseases (e.g., the Black Lung Program). These compensation programs display considerable diversity in program design and implementation. This report describes a number of federal programs that Congress established to compensate or assist individuals who have suffered physical or psychological harm as a consequence of specific events (including the actions of others), or who have suffered specific types of physical or psychological harm. First, several program attributes—which are used subsequently to describe the specific programs—are discussed in general. Next, selected compensation programs are presented in three groupings, as mentioned above: (1) programs to compensate specified groups of individuals; (2) programs to compensate for specified types of illness or injury; and (3) hybrid programs. Next, three veterans' compensation programs are presented. Veterans' disability compensation is based on establishing a connection between an illness or injury and military service. Congress has on three occasions granted a presumption of a service-connection for a specific group of veterans. A final section describes four additional federal assistance programs that do not fit into the above classifications, but that may nonetheless be of interest to policymakers: the Federal Tort Claims Act, Stafford Act emergency and disaster assistance, the Breast and Cervical Cancer Treatment Program, and the World Trade Center Medical Monitoring and Treatment Program. Eligibility or Participation of Health Care Providers
No restrictions. The MMTP is not explicitly authorized, but has received discretionary appropriations to pay for health care services for eligible individuals. Some Members of Congress have sought to establish explicit authority for the program. | Congress has established a number of programs to compensate or assist victims of certain specific circumstances, including negligence, terrorism, and "acts of God." Federal compensation programs can be described by certain common attributes. These include aspects of program administration; requirements for and determination of individual eligibility; eligibility of health care providers; types of benefits provided; whether certain diseases are presumed to be eligible for compensation; and the means by which the program is financed.
Though federal compensation programs display considerable diversity in these attributes, most can be classified into one of three categories: (1) programs that primarily limit compensation or assistance to specified groups of people, with little or no limitation of the types of injury that may be compensated; (2) programs that primarily limit compensation or assistance for specified types of injuries, with little or no limitation of the classes of individuals who may be compensated; and (3) hybrid programs, which limit both the classes of eligible individuals and the compensable injuries or diseases.
This report describes a number of federal programs that Congress established to compensate or assist individuals who have suffered physical or psychological harm as a consequence of specific events (including the actions of others), or who have suffered specific types of physical or psychological harm. First, several program attributes—which are used to describe the specific programs—are discussed in general. Next, selected compensation programs are presented in three groupings, as mentioned above. Next, three veterans' compensation programs are presented. Veterans' disability compensation is based on establishing a connection between an illness or injury and military service. Congress has on three occasions granted a presumption of a service-connection for a specific group of veterans. A final section describes four additional federal authorities or assistance programs that do not fit into the above classifications, but that may nonetheless be of interest to policymakers: the Federal Tort Claims Act, Stafford Act emergency and disaster assistance, the Breast and Cervical Cancer Treatment Program, and the World Trade Center Medical Monitoring and Treatment Program (MMTP). The first three of these are prescribed in statute and may provide federal funds to eligible individuals to pay certain health care costs. The MMTP is not explicitly authorized, but has received discretionary appropriations to pay for health care services for eligible individuals. Some Members of Congress have sought to establish explicit authority for the MMTP. |
crs_RL33004 | crs_RL33004_0 | This report examines the issue of whether a type of defined benefit pension plan, the cash balance plan, violates federal laws that prohibit age discrimination. The discrimination provisions are found in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). This report briefly describes a typical cash balance plan and discusses the claims that such plans violate the federal laws that prohibit age discrimination, as existed prior to the Pension Protection Act of 2006. The Act's provisions apply only to periods beginning on or after June 29, 2005, and leave unsettled the law for earlier periods. Two primary claims have been made that cash balance plans or the conversions to such plans violate the law. The vast majority of courts, including all of the appellate courts to examine this issue, have found that cash balance plans do not violate the pre-Act age discrimination provisions. Violation of the Age Discrimination Provisions
The age discrimination provisions in ERISA, the IRC, and the ADEA prohibit an employee's rate of benefit accrual from being decreased on account of age. One case to examine this issue, Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan , has received significant attention. In 2003, a U.S. district court held that IBM's cash balance plan violated ERISA § 204(b)(1)(H). This issue was perhaps most contentious in the Second Circuit, where multiple district courts held that cash balance plans violated the age discrimination prohibitions. Pension Protection Act of 2006
P.L. 109-280 ). The Act also makes clear that certain circumstances do not violate the age discrimination provisions. | Both federal courts and Congress have recently addressed the issue of whether cash balance pension plans violate federal laws that prohibit age discrimination. The relevant age discrimination provisions are found in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Two primary claims have been made: (1) that cash balance plans inherently violate the age discrimination provisions because the rate of benefit accrual is decreased on account of age and (2) that the conversion of traditional defined benefit plans to cash balance plans violates the ADEA because of the negative impact on older workers.
While certain district court decisions have held that cash balance plans violate the age discrimination provisions, all appellate courts to evaluate this issue have found that the plans are not age discriminatory. In a case that has received significant attention, Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit reversed one of the district courts and found that IBM's cash balance plan did not violate ERISA's age discrimination provision.
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-280) sets out new standards that a cash balance plan must meet in order to comply with the age discrimination provisions. These new standards apply only to periods beginning on or after June 29, 2005, and leave the age discrimination issue unsettled under prior law.
This report describes cash balance plans, discusses the claims that cash balance plans do and do not violate the pre-Act age discrimination provisions, and provides an overview of the Pension Protection Act, as it applies to this issue. |
crs_RL33155 | crs_RL33155_0 | On February 8, 2006, President Bush signed the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. The largest child welfare programs receive mandatory federal funding, and certain changes to these programs would be made by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. These were added during the December 2005 conference agreement negotiations. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that this provision will reduce federal outlays to the foster care program by $380 million over five years (FY2006-FY2010) and $863 million over 10 years (FY2006-FY2015). The "Candidates" Provision or Limiting Eligibility for Federal Matching of Foster Care Administrative Costs
As enacted, the Deficit Reduction Act ( P.L. CBO estimated that these provisions will reduce federal outlays for the Title IV-E foster care program by $174 million over five years (FY2006-FY2010) and $405 million over 10 years (FY2006-FY2015). 109-171 ) increased the FY2006 mandatory funding authorization level for the Promoting Safe and Stable Families program to $345 million from the previous level of $305 million. These provisions were not included in the House or Senate version of the reconciliation bill. However, under the provisions of P.L. 109-171 ) requires (as a condition of eligibility for funding under the Child Welfare Services program, Title IV-B, Subpart 1 of the Social Security Act) that a state demonstrate "substantial, ongoing, and meaningful collaboration" with state courts in developing and implementing the state plan for Child Welfare Services, the state plan for the Promoting Safe and Stable Families Program (Title IV-B, Subpart 2 of the Social Security Act), the state Adoption Assistance and Foster Care plan (under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act), and any Program Improvement Plan that may be required. Use of Child Welfare Records in Court Proceedings
The Deficit Reduction Act also amends the state plan requirements for foster care and adoption assistance (Section 471 in Title IV-E of the Social Security Act) to clarify that required confidentiality provisions related to information about the children served do not limit the ability of a state to determine its policies regarding public access to court proceedings on child abuse and neglect or other child welfare related court proceedings (except that the policies must, at a minimum, ensure the safety and well-being of the child, parents, and family). 109-171 ) includes statutory language (previously included in both the House and Senate versions of the reconciliation bill) that intends to clarify when states may make Medicaid claims related to optional targeted case management (TCM) services. This increased foster care spending would offset savings to the Medicaid program; the net federal savings are consequently estimated at $760 million over the same five years (FY2006-FY2010) and $2.1 billion over 10 years (FY2006-FY2015). What is Medicaid TCM? 4241 ) also included several other provisions relevant to child welfare, and for which no significant budget effect (savings or cost) was estimated or expected. These provisions, which would have extended the authority of HHS to issue waivers of federal child welfare policy through FY2010 (House bill only), authorized a federal student loan forgiveness program for child welfare workers and others (House bill only)," and amended the Higher Education Act in ways intended to encourage greater access to youth aging out of foster care (primarily included in the Senate bill) were not included in the final conference agreement. These provisions were not in the Senate reconciliation legislation nor the conference agreement, and were thus not a part of the Deficit Reduction Act as enacted ( P.L. | On February 8, 2006, President Bush signed the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 into law ( P.L. 109-171 ). As enacted, the Deficit Reduction Act includes two child welfare provisions intended to reduce federal foster care spending under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. Those provisions, sometimes called the Rosales provision and candidates provision, respectively, would 1) clarify individual eligibility for federal foster care and adoption assistance programs (Title IV-E of the Social Security Act); and 2) limit certain kinds of state claims for federal reimbursement of administrative costs under the federal foster care program. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that together, these changes will reduce federal spending under the foster care program by $554 million over five years, and by almost $1.3 billion over 10 years.
As enacted, the Deficit Reduction Act also includes several child welfare provisions that will increase federal child welfare spending and make other limited changes to federal child welfare policy. These provisions were added during conference negotiations and were not included in either of the earlier Senate or House versions of the budget reconciliation bill ( S. 1932 ) that passed in November 2005. Those provisions 1) increase the FY2006 mandatory funding authorization under the Promoting Safe and Stable Families program (Title IV-B, Subpart 2 of the Social Security Act) to $345 million (from current $305 million); 2) appropriate $100 million in mandatory funds over five years (FY2006-FY2010) to improve state courts' handling of child welfare proceedings; 3) require court and child welfare agency collaboration; and 4) clarify confidentiality rules with regard to open child welfare court proceedings. CBO estimated that the first two of these provisions will increase federal budget authority for child welfare purposes by $300 million over five years.
As enacted, the Deficit Reduction Act also includes provisions related to federal reimbursement of costs for "targeted case management" (TCM) under the Medicaid program (Title XIX of the Social Security Act). These provisions were included in both the House and Senate reconciliation bills (as they were passed in November 2005), and may limit the ability of state child welfare agencies to use Medicaid TCM for children in foster care. CBO estimated the net federal savings for this change, all of which would be to Medicaid (and not all of which would affect financing of services for children in foster care), at $760 million over five years and $2.1 billion over 10 years.
Finally, as enacted, the Deficit Reduction Act does not include House and Senate proposals that would have 1) extended the authority of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to grant child welfare waivers; 2) amended the Higher Education Act to improve higher education access for youth leaving foster care; and 3) authorized a discretionary student loan forgiveness program available to child welfare workers. This report discusses child welfare provisions in the enacted version of the budget reconciliation bill ( P.L. 109-171 ), and will not be updated. |
crs_R45422 | crs_R45422_0 | Introduction
The United States has played a leading role in global efforts to alleviate hunger and improve food security. Current food assistance programs originated in 1954 with the passage of what is now named the Food for Peace Act (FFPA, P.L. 83-480). This legislation, commonly referred to as "P.L. 480," established the Food for Peace program (FFP). For most of its existence, U.S. international food assistance provided exclusively i n-kind aid —commodities sourced in the United States and shipped to recipient countries. In recent decades, U.S. food assistance programs have shifted from exclusively in-kind to a combination of in-kind and cash-based assistance, such as locally procured food, cash transfers, or vouchers. U.S. law requires federal international food assistance to be provided primarily through in-kind aid. First, the FFPA authorizes traditional food assistance programs based primarily on in-kind aid. 87-195 ) in the Global Food Security Act of 2016 (GFSA, P.L. 114-195 ). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) implement international food assistance programs. The U.S. government provides food assistance through two distinct methods:
1. Cash-based assistance provides direct cash transfers or food vouchers to beneficiaries. The Obama Administration created Feed the Future (FTF) in 2010. USDA administers the McGovern-Dole program, and Congress funds the program through annual agriculture appropriations bills. Congress first authorized the Food for Progress program in the 1985 farm bill ( P.L. Emergency Food Security Program
Unlike FFP Title II, EFSP is a cash-based program. It can complement Title II when significant barriers exist to providing in-kind aid—for example, when in-kind food would not arrive soon enough or could potentially disrupt local markets or when it is unsafe to operate in zones of civil conflict. While FFP Title II has comprised the bulk of food assistance outlays since the mid-1980s, cash-based EFSP assistance has grown from approximately 10% of total international food assistance in FY2010 to 30% in FY2016. FFP Title II assistance also has specific requirements in addition to the requirements that apply to all international food assistance programs. According to the Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration (MARAD), the main purpose of cargo preference laws is to sustain a privately owned, U.S.-flag merchant marine to provide sealift capability in wartime and national emergencies and to protect U.S. ocean commerce from foreign control. ACP applies to all in-kind aid provided under international food aid programs. Since 2014, 202(e) funds can be used to fund cash-based assistance that enhances existing FFP Title II in-kind assistance. Issues for Congress
In-Kind vs. Cash-Based Food Assistance
Historically, the United States provided international food aid exclusively via in-kind commodities. Lack of reliable suppliers and poor infrastructure can also limit the efficiency of LRP. Critics of cash-based assistance contend that in poorly controlled settings, cash transfers or food vouchers could be stolen or used to purchase nonfood items. Shipping on U.S.-flag vessels typically costs more than on foreign-flag vessels. USA Maritime maintains that a primary reason for the higher cost is that U.S.-flag ships have better working conditions and pay higher wages than foreign-flag ships. Administrative Proposals and Legislation
The Trump Administration and some Members of Congress proposed changes to the structure and intent of U.S. international food assistance programs during the 115 th Congress. Some Members of Congress proposed changes in the House and Senate 2018 farm bills ( H.R. 2 ). 2 ). U.S. International Food Assistance Programs | The United States has played a leading role in global efforts to alleviate hunger and improve food security. U.S. international food assistance programs provide support through two distinct methods: (1) in-kind aid, which ships U.S. commodities to regions in need, and (2) cash-based assistance, which provides recipients with vouchers, direct cash transfers, or locally procured foods.
The current suite of international food assistance programs began with the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 83-480), commonly referred to as "P.L. 480," which established the Food for Peace program (FFP). Congress authorizes most food assistance programs in periodic farm bills. However, Congress authorized the Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP)—a newer, cash-based food assistance program—in the Global Food Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-195). Congress funds international food assistance programs through annual agriculture appropriations and state and foreign operations (SFOPS) appropriations bills. Since 2007, annual international food assistance outlays averaged $2.6 billion. In FY2016, FFP Title II and EFSP accounted for 87% of total international food assistance outlays. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) administer U.S. international food assistance programs.
Historically, the United States provided international food assistance exclusively through in-kind aid. Since the mid-1980s, FFP Title II, which provides in-kind donations, has been the dominant U.S. food aid program. (The name "FFP Title II" refers to Title II of the Food for Peace Act, in which Congress first authorized the program.) In the late 2000s, U.S. international food assistance began to shift toward a combination of in-kind and cash-based assistance. This is largely due to the Obama Administration creating the cash-based EFSP in 2010 to complement FFP Title II emergency aid. EFSP is used in conditions when in-kind aid cannot arrive soon enough or could potentially disrupt local markets or when it is unsafe to operate in conflict zones.
Despite the growth in cash-based assistance, U.S. international food assistance still relies predominantly on in-kind aid. Many other countries with international food assistance programs have converted primarily to cash-based assistance. U.S. reliance on in-kind aid has become controversial due to its potential to disrupt local markets and cost more than procuring food locally. At the same time, lack of reliable suppliers and poor infrastructure in recipient countries may limit the efficacy and efficiency of cash-based assistance. Also, in poorly controlled settings, cash transfers or food vouchers could be stolen or used by recipients to purchase nonfood items. Agricultural cargo preference (ACP)—the requirement that 50% of all in-kind aid be shipped on U.S.-flag ships—has also become controversial due to findings that it can lead to higher transportation costs and longer delivery times. Higher costs may be partially due to higher wages and better working conditions on U.S.-flag vessels compared to foreign-flag vessels. ACP may also contribute to maintaining a U.S.-flag merchant marine to provide sealift capacity during wartime or national emergencies.
The Trump Administration and certain Members of Congress have proposed changes to the structure and intent of international food assistance programs. Some Members of Congress proposed changes in the House and Senate 2018 farm bills (H.R. 2). These proposed changes include amending requirements for some international food assistance programs and expanding flexibility to use cash-based assistance. Other proposed legislation would address ACP, expand flexibility to use cash-based assistance, and consolidate and alter funding for most international food assistance programs. |
crs_RL32506 | crs_RL32506_0 | In December 2002, the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (5) , recommended that a new cabinetlevel Senate-confirmed NID position be established, and that a separate director be named to managethe CIA. [50 U.S.C. 10) Would Establish an NID
Senators Susan Collins and Joe Lieberman, and Speaker of the House of Representatives Dennis Hastert, have separately introduced legislation that would establish the NID position. See Appendix 1 for aside-by-side comparison of NID authorities in both bills. Arguments Offered In Favor of Establishing an NID
Supporters of the NID concept argue that the DCI, who manages the IC and the CIA, and servesas the principal intelligence advisor to the President, has too many jobs, and that an NID, unburdenedby the need to manage the CIA, must be established if the IC is to be effectively managed. (14)
From the prospective of proponents, failure to establish an empowered NID with hiring, firing and budget authority will leave the IC with divided management of intelligence capabilities; lack ofcommon standards and practices across the foreign-domestic intelligence divide; structural barriersthat undermine the performance of joint intelligence work; and a weak capacity to set priorities andmove resources. (18)
Other opponents contend that rather than strengthening control over the IC, the establishment of an NDI would actually weaken IC management. They assert an NID would lose day-to-daycontrol over the CIA, a natural power base. Without it, the NID will lose influence, according toopponents. Schlesinger criticized the IC's failure to coordinate resources, blamingthe deficiency on the lack of a strong, central IC leadership that could "consider the relationshipbetween cost and substantive output from a national perspective." Aspin-Brown Commission, 1996
The Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community (known as the Aspin-Brown Commission, after its respective chairmen Les Aspin and HaroldBrown) concluded that the relationship between the DCI and Secretary of Defense should not bealtered, but that the DCI should be given more time to manage the IC. (26)
The 9/11 Commission
The 9/11 Commission, in a report issued in July, 2004, recommended the establishment of a presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed National Intelligence Director who would overseenational intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across the U.S. government, manage thenational intelligence program, oversee the agencies that contribute to it, and have hiring, firing andbudgetary authority over the IC's 15 agencies. The Commission recommended that the director belocated in the Executive Office of the President and that a deputy NID be established to oversee theday-to-day operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Selected NID Legislation Compared to Current Law
Comparison of S. 2845, H.R. | The 9/11 Commission, in its recent report on the attacks of September 11, 2001, criticized the U.S. Intelligence Community's (IC) fragmented management structure and questioned whether theU.S. government, and the IC, in particular, is organized adequately to direct resources and build theintelligence capabilities that the United States will need to counter terrorism, and to address thebroader range of national security challenges in the decades ahead.
The Commission made a number of recommendations, one of which was to replace the current position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) with a National Intelligence Director (NID) whowould oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest -- including a NationalCounterterrorism Center (NCTC) -- across the U.S. government, manage the national intelligence program; oversee the agencies that contribute to it; and have hiring, firing, and budgetary authorityover the IC's 15 agencies. Although the Commission recommended that the director be located inthe Executive Office of the President, the Commission Vice Chairman in testimony before Congresson September 7, 2004, withdrew that portion of the recommendation in light of concerns that theNID would be subject to undue influence. The Commission further recommended that a deputy NIDbe established to oversee the day-to-day operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). TheCommission's recommendation to strengthen management authority over the IC is the latestcontribution to an IC structural reform debate that dates at least to 1955, when arguments forstronger IC authority began to surface. OMB deputy director James Schlesinger in 1971 firstbroached the NID concept.
Congress currently is considering two principal bills, S. 2845 , introduced by Senators Collins and Lieberman, and H.R. 10 , introduced by Representative Hastert,that would establish the NID position. [For a comprehensive comparison of all recent NIDlegislative proposals, see CRS Report RL32600(pdf) and CRS Report RL32601(pdf) ].
Reactions to the concept of an NID have been mixed since its inception. Supporters argue that the DCI cannot manage the IC, the CIA and serve as the President's chief intelligence advisor, anddo justice to any of the jobs. Other than at the CIA, the DCI also lacks hiring, firing and budgetauthority. They argue that the absence of strong, centralized leadership has resulted in dividedmanagement of intelligence capabilities; lack of common standards and practices across theforeign-domestic intelligence divide; structural barriers that undermine the performance of jointintelligence work; and a weak capacity to set priorities and move resources.
Opponents counter that an NID would lose day-to-day control over the CIA, a natural power base and, as a result, influence. They also contend that an NID will shift the balance of control awayfrom DOD, risking intelligence support to the warfighter. The congressional role includes decidingwhether to establish the position of the NID and its authority. This report will be updated as eventswarrant. |
crs_R41557 | crs_R41557_0 | Introduction
Although the economic recession that began in December of 2007 officially ended in June 2009, it has been a "jobless recovery" with unemployment rates near historical highs. Especially hard hit have been older workers, aged 55 and older. This report first looks at historical trends in unemployment and labor force participation among older workers, the reasons for their unemployment, and the duration of unemployment. It then identifies the challenges that certain subgroups of older workers may face and the availability of financial resources and health insurance coverage during their spell of unemployment. Duration of Unemployment
The older unemployed tend to have longer durations of unemployment, on average, than younger workers. As shown in Table 2 , older workers are unemployed, on average, over five weeks longer than their younger counterparts. About 41% of those aged 55 and older are unemployed for more than one year, compared with 34% of younger workers. First, job loss at older ages results in less time to replenish lost income before retirement. Older unemployed workers face a unique set of challenges, distinct from their younger counterparts. The magnitude of these challenges will vary depending on their individual circumstances. For example, although age discrimination laws may benefit those older workers in retaining a job, these laws are less effective for those older workers who have become unemployed and are searching for a new job. Furthermore, most public programs providing income support and health insurance for the unemployed are targeted toward those who have recently lost their jobs (regardless of age). These programs generally do not provide assistance to the older unemployed who may be returning to the workforce after an extended absence (e.g., retirement). Older Workers Looking For A Job
Older workers looking for a job may face a disadvantage as many employers view older workers more costly in terms of both compensation and health care costs. Hiring discrimination cases may be harder to prove than termination cases. As economic activity has slowed, there are numerous job applicants for many positions, providing potential employers with a much broader pool of applicants from which to choose. In many cases, their ability to access these resources will depend on their age. For example, some older workers may be eligible for public programs such as Social Security and Medicare when they reach a certain age. In addition, restrictions on access to retirement savings and home equity under a reverse mortgage are also tied to a certain age. Although the recent enactment of health care reform will improve access to health insurance coverage for the older unemployed under the age of 65, most of these provisions will not be effective until 2014 (see discussion below about the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). | Although the economic recession that began in December of 2007 has officially ended, unemployment rates still remain close to 10%. Especially hard hit have been older workers, aged 55 and older, for whom unemployment rates have reached historical highs. A combination of an increase in the number of older individuals re-entering the workforce and a limited number of job openings (i.e., weak demand for labor) is responsible for their historically high unemployment rate.
Older unemployed workers face a unique set of challenges, distinct from those of their younger counterparts. The magnitude of these challenges will vary depending on individual circumstances. For example, although age discrimination laws may help older workers retain a job, these laws are less effective for older workers who have become unemployed and are searching for a new job as hiring discrimination cases may be harder to prove than termination cases. Following the recent economic recession, there is a significant number of job applicants for many positions, providing potential employers with a much broader pool of applicants from which to choose. In deciding whom to choose, many employers may view older workers as more costly in terms of both compensation and health care costs relative to younger workers.
Furthermore, most public programs providing income support and health insurance for the unemployed are targeted toward those who have recently lost their jobs (regardless of age). For example, unemployment insurance generally does not provide assistance to the older unemployed who may be returning to the workforce after an extended absence (e.g., retirement). In many cases, their ability to access other resources will depend on their age. For example, some older workers may not be eligible for public programs such as Social Security and Medicare until they reach a certain age. In addition, restrictions on access to retirement savings and home equity under a reverse mortgage are also tied to age. Finally, although the enactment of health care reform will eventually improve access to health insurance coverage for the older unemployed under the age of 65, most of these provisions will not be effective until 2014.
Unemployed older workers also experience longer durations of unemployment compared to younger cohorts. Older workers are unemployed, on average, over five weeks longer than their younger counterparts. About 41% of those aged 55 and older are unemployed for more than one year, compared with 34% of younger workers. Longer durations and less time to replenish lost income before retiring may lead to a less secure future retirement.
This report first looks at historical trends in unemployment and labor force participation among older workers, the reasons for becoming unemployed, and the duration of their unemployment. It then identifies the challenges that certain subgroups of older workers may face and the availability of financial resources and health insurance coverage during their spell of unemployment. |
crs_R44614 | crs_R44614_0 | Marketplace lending combines all of the following characteristics:
Loans are made to individuals and small businesses. Marketplace lenders may hold loans once they have been originated or sell the loans to investors. Potential Opportunities
Some industry observers assert that marketplace lending has inherent advantages over traditional lending, including the following:
Cost structures may be lower. Some marketplace lending proponents argue that the automated underwriting used by marketplace lenders may be more accurate than traditional underwriting processes. Another challenge to traditional lenders is that assessing borrowers with a lack of credit history—which is vital to traditional credit assessments through credit scores—may involve too much uncertainty about the likelihood of repayment. Potential Risks
Some observers are concerned that a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the marketplace lending industry. These risks potentially threaten the borrowers of and investors in marketplace loans, marketplace lending companies themselves, and—if marketplace lending grows sufficiently in coming years—the financial system. Some observers are concerned that certain marketplace-lending companies could be threatened by changing economic conditions. Lenders have been able to do this successfully in recent years, but exclusively in a time of economic expansion and low interest rates. Many marketplace lenders originate a loan for a fee but do not hold the loan on their balance sheets. Investors in marketplace loans also face risks related to the accuracy of credit assessment. However, widespread failure of marketplace lenders—especially if these lenders grow to the point that they provide a substantial amount of credit to consumers and small businesses—could lead to a sharp contraction in the availability of credit to the economy. Regulation
Marketplace lending is subject to federal and state regulations and requirements. Although marketplace lending is subject to these rules and regulations, the existing regulatory system was designed prior to the advent of online marketplace lending. As a result, there is some uncertainty related to how regulation should be applied and how effective it can be. Potential lack of supervisory oversight. They assert that certain court decisions have created uncertainty regarding how existing laws and regulations will be applied to marketplace lenders and the loans they make. In addition, they argue that complying with 50 different sets of state laws and regulations is unnecessarily burdensome. By contrast, some observers have expressed concern over whether current regulations appropriately address the risks posed by marketplace lending. This section will cover issues related to the following:
Uncertainties over the degree to which federal or state laws and regulations apply to particular marketplace lenders and certain proposed solutions to create clarity; Supervisory authorities in regard to marketplace lenders; and Originate-to-sell models used by many marketplace lenders. In addition, the OCC stated that fintech firms granted the charter "will be subject to the same high standards of safety and soundness and fairness that all federally chartered banks must meet," and also that the OCC "may need to account for differences in business models and activities, risks, and the inapplicability of certain laws resulting from the uninsured status of the bank." "Originate-to-Sell" and the Risk-Retention Rule
When marketplace lenders sell a single loan or pieces of a single loan, they generally have not been required to adhere to risk-retention rules, which apply to issuers that pool many loans together into a single security, a common practice at banks and nonbank lenders. Traditional Lender Response
Incumbent lenders may respond to the emergence of marketplace lending in several ways, including no longer competing for small, unsecured loans; adopting the technology and practices of marketplace lenders; and entering into cooperative relationships with marketplace lenders. Small loans have low profit margins compared to large ones. One option for banks would be to independently start their own online, automated platforms and use more data in underwriting. Performance in Recession
Many uncertainties about marketplace lending will likely be clarified after the industry has been active during an entire economic cycle with a recession. In addition, potential investors and market analysts will be able to more meaningfully compare delinquency and default rates of marketplace loans relative to other lenders after a complete credit cycle, and the industry's relative performance may affect funding availability either positively or negatively. Regulatory Developments
As the marketplace lending industry develops, industry participants and policymakers will likely closely observe how laws and regulations are applied to marketplace lenders and what effect those applications have on the industry's growth and development. | Marketplace lending—also called peer-to-peer lending or online platform lending—is a nonbank lending industry that uses innovative financial technology (fintech) to make loans to consumers and small businesses. Although marketplace lending is small compared to traditional lending, it has grown quickly in recent years. In general, marketplace lenders accept applications for small, unsecured loans online and determine applicants' creditworthiness using an automated algorithm. Often, the loans are then sold—individually or in pieces—directly to investors (although holding the loans on their own balance sheet is not uncommon). More traditional lenders are more apt to use employees to make credit assessments and to have a greater need for office and retail space. Traditional lenders also may hold loans themselves, but when they sell loans they are more apt to package many loans together into large securities rather than to sell a single loan or pieces of a single loan, like marketplace lenders. Due to these differences and to marketplace lending's lack of industry track record, marketplace lending is facing uncertainty about its advantages, its risks, and how it should be treated by regulators.
Some observers assert that marketplace lending may pose an opportunity to expand the availability of credit to individuals and small businesses in a fair, safe, and efficient way. Marketplace lenders may have lower costs than traditional lenders, potentially allowing them to make more small loans than would be profitable for traditional lenders. In addition, some observers believe the accuracy of credit assessments will improve by using more data and advanced statistical modeling, as marketplace lenders do through their automated algorithms, leading to fewer delinquencies and write-offs. They argue that using more comprehensive data could also allow marketplace lenders to make credit assessments on potential borrowers with little or no traditional credit history.
Other observers warn about the uncertainty surrounding the industry and the potential risks marketplace lending poses to borrowers, loan investors, and the financial system. The industry only began to become prevalent during the current economic expansion and low-interest-rate environment, so little is known about how it will perform in other economic conditions. Many marketplace lenders do not hold the loans they make themselves and earn much of their revenue through origination and servicing fees, which potentially creates incentives for weak underwriting standards. Finally, some observers argue that lack of oversight may allow marketplace lenders to engage in unsafe or unfair lending practices.
Marketplace lenders are subject to existing federal and state regulations related to lending and security issuance, and some observers assert that the existing system is appropriate for regulating this lending. However, existing regulations were developed and implemented largely prior to the emergence of marketplace lending. Some observers argue that current regulation is unnecessarily burdensome or inefficient. By contrast, others argue that regulatory gaps and weaknesses exist and regulation should be strengthened. In addition, there is some uncertainty surrounding exactly how certain aspects of federal and state laws and regulations may be applied to marketplace lenders. Congress may consider policy issues related to these debates and uncertainties.
The evolution of the regulatory environment facing marketplace lenders is just one development that likely will occur in coming years. Traditional lenders that compete with marketplace lenders will adapt to the market entrants and market conditions, perhaps adopting certain marketplace lender technologies and practices. In addition, marketplace lending has not been through an entire economic cycle, and rising interest rates or the onset of a recession likely will reveal certain strengths and weaknesses of marketplace lending. |
crs_RL30510 | crs_RL30510_0 | Most Recent Developments
The Military Construction Appropriations conference report, recommending $8.834 billion,was approved by the House on June 29, 2000, and the Senate on June 30, 2000. It became P.L.106-246 on July 13, 2000. In authorization action, on May 18, 2000, the House approved its defense authorization bill ( H.R. The Senate substituted their version of the defenseauthorization bill - S. 2549 , S.Rept. 106-292 - in H.R. 4205 and passedthat bill on July 13, 2000. The conference report ( H.Rept. 106-945 ) was passed by the House onOctober 11, 2000 and by the Senate on October 12, 2000. The conference authorized $8.8 billion,$787 million more than the President's request. The FY2001 defense authorization bill became P.L.106-398 on October 30, 2000. The bill funds construction projects and real property maintenance of the active Army, Navy &Marine Corps, Air Force, and their reserve components; defense-wide construction; U.S.contributions to the NATO Security Investment Program (formerly called the NATO InfrastructureProgram); and military family housing operations and construction. The military construction appropriations bill is only one of several annual pieces of legislation that provide funding for national defense. On May 16, 2000, the House passed the FY2001 Military Construction AppropriationsAct ( H.R. 4425 ), by a 386-22 roll call vote. The House followed theHouse Appropriations Committee's lead and passed the bill with only oneamendment. On May 18, 2000, the Senate passed S. 2521 , by a vote of 96-4. Because emergency supplemental appropriations for FY2000 was added to this bill,the debate on S. 2521 has centered on domestic and defense ridersattached on the bill. The $8.634 billion bill passed by voice vote. For background and comprehensive information on the supplemental, see CRS Report RL30457(pdf) , Supplemental Appropriations for FY2000: Plan Colombia,Kosovo, Foreign Debt Relief, Home Energy Assistance and Other Initiatives , by[author name scrubbed], et al. 106-616 ) Following the lead of the MilitaryConstruction Subcommittee, the House recommended $8.4 billion dollars for militaryconstruction, $400 million more than the President's request. The conference report ( H.Rept. In recent years, Congress has added significant amountsto annual Administration military construction budget requests. The President proposes what Congress calls aninadequate military construction budget, especially for Guard and Reserve needs. This totalcontinues a downward trend from the FY1996 level of $11.2 billion, the FY1997level of $9.8 billion, the FY1998 level of $9.3 billion, the FY1999 level of $9.0billion. Legislation
Military Construction Appropriations
P.L. | The military construction (MilCon) appropriations bill finances (1) military construction projects in the United States and overseas; (2) military family housing operations and construction;(3) U.S. contributions to the NATO Security Investment Program; and (4) most base realignment andclosure costs.
This report reviews the appropriations and authorization process for military construction. The congressional debate perennially centers on the adequacy of the President's budget for militaryconstruction needs and the necessity for congressional add-ons, especially for Guard and Reserveprojects. In recent years, Congress has frequently complained that the Pentagon has not adequatelyfunded military construction.
The Administration's FY2001 budget request for military construction is $8.0 billion, which is 5.5% below the level provided in FY2000. This continues a downward trend from the peakFY1996 level of $11.2 billion, the FY1997 level of $9.8 billion, the FY1998 level of $9.3 billion,the FY1999 level of $9.0 billion and the FY2000 level of $8.4 billion.
On May 16, 2000, the House passed the Military Construction Appropriations Act FY2001 ( H.R. 4425 ), by a 386-22 roll call vote. The House followed the House AppropriationsCommittee's lead and passed the $8.634 billion bill with only one amendment.
On May 18, 2000, the Senate passed S. 2521 , their version of the FY2001 Military Construction Appropriations bill, on a 95-4 vote. Because emergency supplemental appropriationsfor FY2000 was added onto this bill, the conference debate has focused on domestic and defenseissues outside of military construction. For background and comprehensive information on theFY2000 supplemental funding, see CRS Report RL30457(pdf) , Supplemental Appropriations forFY2000: Plan Colombia, Kosovo, Foreign Debt Relief, Home Energy Assistance and OtherInitiatives , by [author name scrubbed], et al.
The Military Construction Appropriations conference report, recommending $8.834 billion, was approved by the House on June 29, 2000, and the Senate on June 30, 2000. It became P.L. 106-246 on July 13, 2000.
In authorization action, on May 18, 2000, the House approved its defense authorization bill ( H.R. 4205 , H.Rept. 106-616 ). The Senate substituted their version of the defenseauthorization bill - S. 2549 , S.Rept. 106-292 - in H.R. 4205 and passedthat bill on July 13, 2000. The conference report ( H.Rept. 106-945 ) was passed by the House onOctober 11, 2000 and by the Senate on October 12, 2000. The conference authorized $8.8 billion,$787 million more than the President's request. The FY2001 defense authorization bill became P.L.106-398 on October 30, 2000.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: FDT = Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade. |
crs_R43739 | crs_R43739_0 | Introduction
Traditionally, the exclusive locales for stock trades were exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ. In recent decades, cheaper and more powerful computer-based technology and at least two Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations helped give rise to an array of alternative trading venues, including a new type called "dark pools." Securities regulators and state officials have raised policy concerns about the pools, as have Members of Congress in various committee oversight hearings. Such concerns include the impact of the pools on market quality, their lack of pre-trade transparency, transparency about whether the pools allow high-frequency trading (HFT), and to what extent they do so. Another kind of ATS, "dark pools," do not provide quotes into the pre-trade public quote stream as is generally required of trades on the NASDAQ, the stock exchanges, and ECNs. This pre-trade opacity initially attracted institutional investors that wanted to anonymously trade blocks of shares without triggering unfavorable price movements. Front-running refers to the practice of trading ahead of a large order to benefit from the anticipated price movement that the large order will create. Like the aforementioned broker-dealer-owned dark pools, the transaction prices in pools are not calculated from the national best bid and offer (NBBO). Factors That Contributed to the Growth of Dark Pools
Economists perceive a mix of non-regulatory and regulatory factors to have played roles in boosting the popularity of dark pools, which reportedly grew from a share of about 4% of overall trading volume in 2008 to about 15% in 2013. Several such potential dark pool regulatory concerns are examined below, some of which are also discussed in the IOSCO report. Price Discovery
Because dark pools, which collectively account for a significant portion of trades in many stocks, do not publicly disseminate pre-trade data, there is concern that stock prices on the lit venues may not reflect the actual market price, thus impeding the price discovery process. A pending initiative will be a pilot project to be overseen by the SEC that will assess a protocol in which off-exchange trading venues, including dark pools, would be able to execute orders only if they could provide a significant price improvement or a significant size improvement. FINRA's New Trade Data Disclosure Requirements
In May 2014, FINRA began requiring ATSs, including dark pools, to report their aggregate weekly volume of transactions and number of trades by security, data that FINRA then reports on its website on a delayed basis. However, brokerage firms as well as the exchange BATS, which is owned by a brokerage firm that owns a dark pool, are reportedly critical of such trade-at rules. Canada and Australia Adopt "Trade-at" Rules
In 2012 and 2013, Canada and Australia (respectively) instituted system-wide trade-at rules for off-exchange orders, including in dark pools. The Potential for Future Regulation
In June 2014, Mary Jo White asked agency staff to draft recommendations for expanding the scope of the operational disclosures that dark pools and other ATSs might provide to both the SEC and the public. Enforcement Developments
Regulators and law enforcement authorities have taken a number of enforcement actions against dark pool owners for violations of laws or regulations. This section describes some examples of such actions, including a 2014 civil suit by the New York attorney general against Barclays, one of the largest dark pool operators, and some enforcement actions undertaken by the SEC and FINRA. The lawsuit charged, under New York state law's Martin Act, that Barclays falsified marketing material related to the extent and type of HFT in its dark pool. | The term "dark pools" generally refers to electronic stock trading platforms in which pre-trade bids and offers are not published and price information about the trade is only made public after the trade has been executed. This differs from trading in so-called "lit" venues, such as traditional stock exchanges, which provide pre-trade bids and offers publicly into the consolidated quote stream widely used to price stocks.
Dark pools arose partly due to demand from institutional investors seeking to buy or sell big blocks of shares without sparking large price movements. The volume of trading on dark pools has climbed significantly in recent years, from about 4% of overall trading volume in 2008 to about 15% in 2013. While dark pools reportedly have lower trading fees, their lack of price transparency has sparked concerns about the continued accuracy of consolidated stock price information. In addition, fairness concerns have surfaced in recent regulatory and enforcement actions, in the press, and in Michael Lewis's book Flash Boys over allegations that dark pool operators may have facilitated front-running of large institutional investors by high-frequency traders, in exchange for payment, and misrepresented the nature of high-frequency trading in the dark pools.
This report examines the confluence of factors that led to the rise of dark pools; the potential benefits and costs of such trading; some regulatory and congressional concerns over dark pools; recent regulatory developments by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which oversees broker-dealers; and some recent lawsuits and enforcement actions garnering significant media attention. These include a 2014 civil suit filed by New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman against the securities firm Barclays for its dark pool operations. A central allegation was that in marketing materials for prospective investors, Barclays misrepresented the extent and nature of the high-frequency trading in its pool. The report also examines steps regulators in Canada and Australia have taken to address any reduction in price transparency from dark pool trading.
Traditionally, the exclusive locales for stock trades were exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. In recent decades, the availability of cheaper and more powerful computers and at least two SEC regulations—Regulation ATS and Regulation NMS—helped give rise to an array of alternative trading venues that include dark pools. SEC Chair Mary Jo White and others have voiced concerns that the pools impede the overall process of price discovery in stocks. Proponents of dark pools, however, point out that they have lowered trading costs and that they may afford faster trading or superior technology and enable investors to buy or sell larger blocks of stocks without moving the market.
In an effort to increase market transparency, FINRA in 2014 began requiring dark pools to report their aggregate weekly volume of transactions and the number of trades executed in each security. In June 2014, White asked SEC staff to draft recommendations for expanding the scope of operational disclosures that dark pools would have to provide to the SEC and the public. The SEC also announced a pilot project dubbed the "trade-at" rule, in which off-exchange trading venues, including dark pools, could execute orders only if they provided a significant price improvement or size improvement over "lit" venues. Both Canada and Australia saw significant reductions in dark pool trades after adopting such trade-at rules. Critics of the trade at rule include brokerage firms, some of whom own dark pools. Congress has examined regulatory concerns over dark pools in a number of 2014 hearings on high-frequency trading as part of its oversight over the SEC. |
crs_R43692 | crs_R43692_0 | About This Report
Amidst concerns about college affordability, and suggestions that increases in student aid may help to fuel college price increases, numerous congressional requesters have asked for a product that examines what is actually known about the relationship between student aid and college prices. The report approaches this topic by examining trends in college prices and student aid, examining explanations for why college prices are increasing, and then focusing on one particular explanation—the notion that increases in student aid may lead to increases in the prices charged by colleges and universities. This is followed by an examination of trends in student aid. This is examined through a review of primary studies undertaken in the last decade that attempt to isolate the effects of increases in student aid on prices. While colleges post list prices they also engage in fairly extensive discounting of those prices on the basis of factors such as students' financial need or merit. Because colleges publish a list price, but in actuality do not ask all students to pay a common price, and because many governmental subsidies are available to help defray the actual price that students pay, a variety of terms are used to distinguish between published prices and the prices that are actually paid by students net of certain types of subsidies and discounts. A complication, however, is that annual data on list prices are readily available, while comprehensive historical data on net price are not, making it harder to systematically track net price trends. Price increases at this set of institutions also tend to be the focus of much of the affordability debate. After adjusting for inflation, the annual changes in average aid per FTE student for the types of aid examined were more volatile (sometimes escalating by large increments and sometimes declining from year to year) than were the changes in prices under any of the measures of price presented in this report. When the state contribution per student has declined (or failed to keep pace with growth in enrollment), the institutions generally have relied more heavily on tuition revenues. Often these questions arise when concerns about college prices have received a good deal of attention. Considering Student Aid as a Possible Explanation for College Price Increases
As noted in the introduction of this report, it has been undertaken in response to a series of questions from congressional offices about the effects of student aid on college prices. These questions have come in different forms, and have been raised with increasing frequency in recent years. This question arises because it is understood that colleges establish different prices for different students and out of concern that colleges may enjoy pricing power (i.e., the ability to raise prices without destabilizing demand). As this report moves into a review of studies examining the effects of aid increases on prices, it will initially discuss their alignment with the policy questions CRS receives, in terms of the types of aid they study, and the extent to which studies focus on prices for individuals targeted by the aid versus the broad effect on prices. The relationship between prices and loans or tax assistance—the types of aid that are most widely available and that are available to students and families across higher income categories—is not the focus of much of this research. There are a limited number of studies that attempt to study the Bennett Hypothesis, or more generally the relationship between financial aid and some measure of "price," and provide evidence that increases in federal financial aid lead to increases in college prices. In fact, the studies vary across many dimensions, including the main research questions explored, theorized mechanisms of causation (i.e., how they theorize aid would be captured by institutions), the analytical/methodological approaches employed to examine causality (e.g., natural or quasi experimental versus regression based approaches), selection and use of data, construction and use of proxy measures for aid and price, model specification, and universe of colleges and universities studied. There is also not consistency in findings for either public or private colleges across the studies. Limitations of Findings
Across the studies, findings are limited by challenges associated with measuring change in price as well as by challenges associated with isolating the effects of student aid on prices. Measuring Change in Price
Not having the outcome measure of primary interest available—a good measure of net or effective price—is ultimately a substantial limiting factor in understanding the relationship between aid and price. This precludes analyses that would be responsive to many prevalent policy questions, particularly those pertaining to the extent to which aid aiming to lower net price did so for targeted students or was captured by the institution, as well as those seeking a more thorough understanding of what an institutional price response might look like across students. Moreover, a challenge stemming from the lack of actual, all inclusive, composite measures of average net or effective price at an institution is that it leads to researchers examining the effects of student aid on the component parts of net price (e.g., institutional grants, list price for tuition—for in state and out of state students) in separate models, theorizing that upward change in list price accompanied by no change or downward change in institutional grant aid can be used to confirm an institution has responded to an aid increase by capturing aid. This raises the fundamental question of whether, across the studies, the outcome variables actually measure change in the outcome of interest. There is little to no consistency about the mix of covariates across studies. In fact, there are often contradictory findings within a single study and there is certainly no consensus on the existence, and certainly not the magnitude, of causal relationship between aid and price. In particular, the effect on price of student loans and tax credits, the forms of federal aid that are most widely available and that are available to students and families from middle and higher income levels, is not the focus of much research. | College affordability is an issue that has received considerable attention from federal policy makers in recent years as concerns have arisen that a college education may be out of reach for an increasing number of students and families. While there is little disagreement that escalating college prices pose a problem, there is not a consensus about the precise causes for these increases.
Among the possible explanations for price increases, one that has surfaced with some frequency in recent years is the notion that the availability of or increases in federal student aid may help to fuel price increases, as institutions seek to capture additional aid rather than stabilize or lower prices. This hypothesized relationship has received a good deal of attention and raised some concerns about the efficacy of federal student aid policies that aim to enhance access and affordability.
This report has been undertaken in response to numerous congressional requests to explain what is actually known about the relationship between student aid and prices. In this report, this task is approached first through analysis of trends in prices, examining different measures and concepts of price. This is followed by a brief examination of trends in student aid, and an examination of many of the competing explanations for why prices are increasing. Finally, the report explores what is known about the possible causal relationship between student aid and price increases, principally through a survey of primary studies that attempt to isolate the effects of student aid on college prices. Some of the themes highlighted in the report are as follows:
While colleges publish list prices, they also engage in fairly extensive price discounting, effectively reducing prices. Additionally, other subsidies such as governmental grants further defray the price students are asked to pay. Trends in college prices can be measured in terms of published prices, effective prices (prices net of institutional discounts), or net prices (prices net of governmental grant aid and institutional discounts). By any measure, in more recent years for which more comprehensive data are available, prices consistently increased at rates exceeding inflation. Overall, student aid per full time equivalent student has also increased in recent years although the trends in aid exhibit more volatility across years (than do the trends in price), sometimes escalating by large increments and sometimes declining or eroding from year to year. A plethora of potential explanations for escalating college prices exist. These include declining state appropriations on a per student basis and fluctuating endowments, which may lead to greater college reliance on tuition revenue from students. Similarly, the escalating cost of items upon which colleges are highly reliant, such as high-skill labor and technology, are identified as factors that increase the cost of providing education and potentially contribute to higher prices. Other explanations suggest that colleges have multiple institutional missions, have ineffective centralized control of costs, suffer from various types of productivity issues, and have institutional orientations and incentives targeted toward raising and spending considerable amounts to enhance students' experiences as opposed to orientations toward using resources efficiently. In addition, it is often suggested that durable, or relatively inelastic, demand for postsecondary education may endow colleges as credentialing institutions with considerable pricing power (i.e., the ability to raise prices without destabilizing demand). There are a substantial number of seemingly plausible explanations for why prices are increasing. This makes it challenging to isolate the effects of any single factor. Through CRS's review of research nine empirical studies have been identified, which over the last decade or so have attempted to isolate the effects of changes in aid on prices. Collectively, the studies focus on price responses associated with several different types of student aid, but the effects of grant aid on prices is the most heavily studied relationship. The relationship between prices and loans or tax assistance—the types of student aid that are most widely available and are available to students and families across higher income categories—is not the focus of much of this research. Concerns that colleges may "capture" some portion of the aid that is provided to students to lower their net price are generally not directly addressed in the studies. The studies are primarily focused on broad institutional price responses. That is, they do not typically address effects on prices for subgroups of students within institutions, and distinctions are not made between those students who are and are not receiving the student aid hypothesized to be affecting prices. Hence, questions about the extent to which aid policies aiming to lower the net price for targeted students actually do so are generally not directly addressed. The studies vary across many dimensions, including the main research questions explored, theorized mechanisms of causation (i.e., how they theorize aid would be captured by institutions), the analytical/methodological approaches employed to examine causality (e.g., natural or quasi experimental versus regression based approaches), selection and use of data, construction and use of proxy measures for aid and price, model specification, and universe of colleges and universities studied. This expansive set of differences makes it especially hard to compare and contrast the studies. There is not a high degree of consensus in the findings generated across the studies. Findings across studies are not consistent in terms of direction and magnitude of effects, and even within studies, changes in model specification or controls lead to vastly different results, often without strong rationales for the superiority of specifications generating more robust findings. Beyond the various differences in these studies and methodological challenges encountered across this research agenda, not having the outcome measure of primary interest available—a good measure of net price—is ultimately a substantial limiting factor in understanding the relationship between aid and price. Rather, the studies rely heavily on measuring change in list price or change in proxies for net price. This raises the fundamental question of whether, across the studies, the outcome variables actually measure change in the outcome of interest and suggests the need to develop more precise data on net price at institutions to further the understanding of the relationship between federal aid and college prices. |
crs_RL33349 | crs_RL33349_0 | Introduction
A strain of the avian influenza virus known as H5N1 threatens to develop into a human pandemic. First appearing in birds and humans in Hong Kong in 1997, the virus re-surfaced in late 2003 and since has spread throughout Asia, causing over 130 reported human deaths from Vietnam to Turkey and appearing in birds in Africa and Europe. The strain is considered particularly dangerous because of an apparent fatality rate of well over 50% and because of the risk that the virus may develop the ability to pass efficiently between humans. This report focuses on the efforts of overseas governments to combat the spread of avian influenza. For more information on H5N1, U.S. domestic preparedness efforts, agricultural issues, and U.S. international assistance to countries struggling with the virus, please see CRS Report RL33219, U.S. and International Responses to the Global Spread of Avian Flu: Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33795, Avian Influenza in Poultry and Wild Birds , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33145, Pandemic Influenza: Domestic Preparedness Efforts , by [author name scrubbed]. As of August 14, 2006, 21 cases of human H5N1 infection had been reported in China, of which 14 were fatal. In 2006, deaths from H5N1 jumped in Indonesia, surpassing Vietnam in number of fatalities from the virus. | A strain of the avian influenza virus known as H5N1 threatens to develop into a human pandemic. First appearing in birds and humans in Hong Kong in 1997, the virus re-surfaced in late 2003 and since has spread throughout Asia, causing over 100 reported human deaths from Vietnam to Turkey and appearing in birds in Africa and Europe. The strain is considered particularly dangerous because of its human fatality rate to date of over 50% and because of the risk that the virus may develop the ability to pass efficiently between humans.
This report focuses on the efforts of overseas governments to combat the spread of avian influenza, specifically on the response of those countries which have confirmed human deaths from the virus. As of August 2006, the vast majority of fatal and total cases have been in East Asia, including Vietnam (42/93), Indonesia (44/57), Thailand (16/24), China (14/21), and Cambodia (6/6). In 2006, human cases and deaths from H5N1 were newly reported in Azerbaijan (5/8), Turkey (4/12), Egypt (6/14), Iraq (2/2), and Djibouti (0/1). Appearance of the disease in animals has spurred prevention efforts on three continents, including the slaughter or vaccination of millions of domestic poultry.
For more information on H5N1, U.S. domestic preparedness efforts, agricultural issues, and U.S. international assistance to countries struggling with the virus, please see CRS Report RL33219, U.S. and International Responses to the Global Spread of Avian Flu: Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33795, Avian Influenza in Poultry and Wild Birds, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33145, Pandemic Influenza: Domestic Preparedness Efforts, by [author name scrubbed].
This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R43312 | crs_R43312_0 | It then describes developments in the Colorado River and Rio Grande basins. The IBWC is charged with addressing issues that arise during application of the boundary and water treaties. The U.S. The USIBWC is a federal government agency that operates under the foreign policy guidance of the Department of State, and it is included in the Department of State's budget. Water Distribution Requirements
The 1944 Water Treaty defines the basic water distribution arrangements as follows:
For the Colorado River basin, the United States is to provide Mexico annually with 1.5 million acre-feet (AF) of water. Minute 319 is set to expire on December 31, 2017; it may be renewed, replaced, or allowed to expire. Key elements of the agreement include the following:
extending provisions of Minute 318 (Cooperative Measures to Address the Continued Effects of the April 2010 Earthquake in the Mexicali Valley, Baja, California), to allow Mexico to defer delivery of its Colorado River water allocation while Mexico repairs earthquake-damaged infrastructure; delivering additional water (i.e., above the 1.5 million AF annual delivery required by the Treaty) to Mexico when water levels are high in Lake Mead; reducing deliveries to Mexico during water shortage conditions in the Colorado River basin (i.e., Mexico's annual water deliveries would be reduced if Lake Mead elevations indicate shortage conditions, similar to reduction by the U.S. lower basin states); creating a mechanism by which U.S. water deliveries to Mexico can be held in United States reservoirs for subsequent delivery; continuing to address salinity concerns per Minute 242; and implementing a pilot program of jointly funded water efficiency and conservation projects in Mexico to free up water for Colorado River delta pulse flows as well as base flows. Under Minutes 318 and 319, Mexico deferred delivery and stored in Lake Mead some of its water under the 1944 Water Treaty. As previously noted, negotiations on a new minute (often referred to by basin stakeholders as Minute 32X) were under way at the end of the Obama Administration. Southeastern Rio Grande Basin (below Fort Quitman, TX)
In the southeastern Lower Rio Grande basin, Mexico is required to deliver water to the United States under the 1944 Water Treaty. Diffusion of tensions over the debt was accomplished through presidential intervention, negotiation of new minutes under the 1944 Water Treaty, and investments in improved water efficiency. Some Members of Congress expressed concerns about the adequacy of the efforts by the U.S. Section of the IBWC to report to the Committees on Appropriations on various water delivery and accounting issues:
Not later than 45 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Commissioner for the United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), shall report to the Committees on Appropriations on the efforts to work with the Mexico Section of the IBWC and the Government of Mexico to establish mechanisms to improve the transparency of data on, and predictability of, the water deliveries from Mexico to the United States to meet annual water apportionments to the Rio Grande, in accordance with the 1944 Treaty between the United States and Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, and on actions taken to minimize or eliminate the water deficits owed to the United States in the current 5-year cycle by the end of such cycle: Provided, That such report shall include a projection of the balance of the water delivery deficit at the end of the current 5-year cycle, as well as the estimated impact to the United States of a negative delivery balance. Outlook for the 115th Congress
Mexican-U.S. relations generally grew closer during the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations. Water sharing was addressed through technical meetings led by the IBWC and bilateral talks between Mexican and U.S. federal government officials; these meetings and talks were the primary forum for addressing treaty compliance and frustrations of water users in Texas with Mexico's water delivery regime. It remains uncertain what principles will guide efforts to address water-sharing conflicts and the role of enhanced cooperation (e.g., measures similar to Minute 319) during the Trump Administration. For the Colorado River basin, issues before Congress may be largely related to oversight of the implementation of Minute 319, as well as developments in negotiations related to the future of Minute 319 or its successor (if any). Questions that Congress may confront related to water sharing in the Rio Grande basin include what are the most effective mechanisms and approaches for achieving a Mexican water delivery regime that provides more reliability and benefit for Texas water stakeholders. | The United States and Mexico share the waters of the Colorado River and Rio Grande pursuant to binational agreements. Increasing water demands and reduced supplies deriving from drought and air temperatures increase the challenges and significance of reliable water sharing.
The International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) is charged with addressing issues that arise during application of binational water treaties. The IBWC is a binational entity with a U.S. Section that operates under foreign policy guidance from the U.S. Department of State. Under the binational 1944 Water Treaty, disputes and new developments can be resolved through agreed-upon interpretations of the treaty, called minutes.
Mexican-U.S. relations generally grew closer during the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations. Water sharing was addressed through IBWC technical meetings and bilateral talks between government officials; these meetings and talks were the primary forum for addressing treaty compliance and frustrations of water users in Texas with Mexico's water delivery regime. Treaty minutes were used to enhance bilateral cooperation and provide flexibility in how treaty compliance was accomplished. It remains uncertain what principles will guide and what mechanisms will be used during the Trump Administration to address water conflicts and what role enhanced cooperation (e.g., measures similar to recent binational efforts in the Colorado River basin) may play in U.S.-Mexican water sharing.
Colorado River. The Colorado River flows through seven U.S. states before reaching Mexico; 97% of its basin is in the United States. Under the 1944 Water Treaty, the United States is required to provide Mexico with 1.5 million acre-feet (AF) of Colorado River water annually. This figure represents about 10% of the river's average flow.
Minute 319 is a set of binational cooperative measures in the Colorado River basin agreed upon in 2012. It provides for more cooperative basin water management, including environmental flows to restore riverine habitat. Minute 319 also provides for Mexico to share in cutbacks during shortage conditions in the basin; such cutbacks are not required under the 1944 Water Treaty. Under Minute 319, Mexico can delay its water deliveries from the United States under the 1944 Water Treaty and store its delayed deliveries in Lake Mead, thereby increasing the lake's elevation. Lake Mead elevation is the baseline used for determining shortage conditions and associated water delivery cutbacks for U.S. lower basin states. Minute 319 is to remain in force through December 31, 2017. It could be extended or replaced with a new minute, or it could be allowed to expire. Negotiations on a new minute were under way at the end of the Obama Administration. For the Colorado River basin, issues before Congress may be largely related to oversight of Minute 319 implementation, as well as developments in negotiations related to the future of Minute 319 or its successor (if any).
Rio Grande. The Rio Grande is governed by two separate agreements. Deliveries to Mexico in the northwestern portion of the shared basin (near El Paso/Ciudad Juárez) occur under a 1906 convention, whereas deliveries for the southeastern portion (which is below Fort Quitman, TX) are laid out in the 1944 Water Treaty. Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about the adequacy of Mexico's water deliveries in the Rio Grande basin and the resulting economic impacts, especially in Texas border counties. During the 115th Congress, Members of Congress and other Texas stakeholders may continue their efforts to promote the adoption of mechanisms to achieve a Mexican water-delivery regime that provides more reliability and benefit for Texas. |
crs_RL31872 | crs_RL31872_0 | The military use of UAVs in recent conflicts such as Iraq (2003), Afghanistan (2001), andKosovo (1999) has opened the eyes of many to the advantages and disadvantages provided byunmanned aircraft. UAVs regularly make national headlines as they are used to perform taskshistorically performed by manned aircraft. UAVs are thought to offer two main advantages overmanned aircraft: they eliminate the risk to a pilot's life, and their aeronautical capabilities, such asendurance, are not bound by human limitations. There are currently five major UAVs in theU.S. inventory: the Navy and Marine Corps's Pioneer, the Air Force's Global Hawk and Predator,and the Army's Hunter and Shadow UAVs. Reflecting a growing awareness and support in Congress for UAVs, investment in unmannedaerial vehicles has increased annually. (6) The scope of Congress'ssupport and confidence in UAV technology can be gleaned from a prediction in the reportaccompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, which stated that,"Within ten years, one-third of U.S. military operational deep strike aircraft will be unmanned." (7)
Congressional Considerations
In recent years, the pace of UAV development has accelerated, and the scope of UAVmissions and applications has expanded. The defining characteristic of UAVs is that they are "unmanned." Industrial base issues also need to be considered. Those who argue that UAVs will replace manned aircraft in the future are notas concerned with the industrial base issue as those who feel manned aircraft will still be needed tocombat future threats. UAV programs range from the combat tested -- Pioneer, Hunter, Predator and Global Hawk-- to the not yet tested -- the Air Force and Navy's Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles. Figure 1. a. The JointUAV Task Force released in 2001 and 2002 the UAV Roadmap and a follow up in 2005, entitled the 2005-2030 UAS Roadmap for the purpose of providing guidance on the future roles for UAVs, thetechnological progress and opportunities for UAVs, and the potential UAV investment needs. It is unfair,some might argue, to compare the mishap rates of developmental UAVs with manned aircraft thathave completed development and been modernized and refined over decades of use. That's been a real thorn in our side. Conversely, is DoD too eager to use UAVs? Flying armed UAVs may be more appealing to these personnel than isflying non-armed UAVs. (189)
Dragon Eye . | The war on terrorism has put a high premium on a primary mission of UAVs, intelligencegathering. Furthermore, the military effectiveness of UAVs in recent conflicts such as Iraq (1990)and Kosovo (1999) opened the eyes of many to both the advantages and disadvantages provided byunmanned aircraft. Long relegated to the sidelines in military operations, UAVs are now makingnational headlines as they are used in ways normally reserved for manned aircraft. Conventionalwisdom states that UAVs offer two main advantages over manned aircraft: they are considered morecost-effective, and they minimize the risk to a pilot's life. However, the current UAV accident rate(the rate at which the aircraft are lost or damaged) is 100 times that of manned aircraft.
UAVs range from the size of an insect to that of a commercial airliner. DOD currentlypossesses five major UAVs: the Air Force's Predator and Global Hawk, the Navy and MarineCorps's Pioneer, and the Army's Hunter and Shadow. Other key UAV developmental efforts includethe Air Force and Navy's unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV), Navy's vertical takeoff and landingUAV (VTUAV), and the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance UAV(BAMS), and the Marine Corps'sDragon Eye and Dragon Warrior. The services continue to be innovative in their use of UAVs. Recent examples include arming UAVs (Predator, Hunter), using UAVs to extend the eyes ofsubmarines, and teaming UAVs with strike aircraft and armed helicopters to improve targeting.
In the past, tension has existed between the services' efforts to acquire UAVs andcongressional initiatives to encourage a consolidated DOD approach. Some observers argue that theresult has been a less than stellar track record for the UAV. However, reflecting the growingawareness and support in Congress and the Department of Defense for UAVs, investments inunmanned aerial vehicles have been increasing every year. DoD spending on UAVs has increasedfrom $284 million in Fiscal Year 2000 to $2.1 billion in FY2005.
Congressional considerations include the proper pace, scope, and management of DoD UAVprocurement; appropriate investment priorities for UAVs versus manned aircraft; UAV future rolesand applications; personnel issues; industrial base issues; and technology proliferation. This reportwill be updated as necessary. |
crs_R45181 | crs_R45181_0 | Title X Program Administration and Grants
The federal government provides grants for family planning services through the Family Planning Program, Title X of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA; 42 U.S.C. §§300 to 300a-6). Enacted in 1970, Title X is the only domestic federal program devoted solely to family planning and related preventive health services. Administration
Title X is administered by the Office of Population Affairs (OPA) under the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Authorization of appropriations for Title X expired at the end of FY1985, but the program has continued to be funded through appropriations bills for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (Labor-HHS-Education). Title X grantees can provide family planning services directly or subaward Title X monies to other public or nonprofit entities to provide services. FY2019 Funding
On September 28, 2018, the President signed the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. It provides $286.479 million for Title X in FY2019, the same as the FY2018 enacted level. The FY2019 act continues previous years' provisions that Title X funds not be spent on abortions, among other requirements (see the text box below). 115-245 .") Abortion and Title X
The law prohibits the use of Title X funds in programs in which abortion is a method of family planning. On July 3, 2000, OPA released a final rule on abortion services in family planning projects. According to OPA, family planning projects that receive Title X funds are closely monitored to ensure that federal funds are used appropriately and that funds are not used for prohibited activities, such as abortion. The abortion prohibition does not apply to all Title X grantees' activities, but applies only to Title X projects' activities. The grantee's abortion activities must be "separate and distinct" from the Title X project activities. In June 2018, HHS published a proposed rule that would prohibit Title X projects from making abortion referrals and would require physical and financial separation between Title X projects and abortion-related activities, among other changes to Title X regulations. Although minors are to receive confidential services, Title X providers are not exempt from state notification and reporting laws on child abuse, child molestation, sexual abuse, rape, or incest. It would have added language that "No recipient making subawards for the provision of services as part of its Title X project may prohibit an entity from participating for reasons other than its ability to provide Title X services" to Title X Family Planning Services grant program regulations. The President signed P.L. 115-23 nullified the rule under the Congressional Review Act. | The federal government provides grants for family planning services through the Family Planning Program, Title X of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA; 42 U.S.C. §§300 to 300a-6). Title X, enacted in 1970, is the only domestic federal program devoted solely to family planning and related preventive health services. In 2017, Title X-funded clinics served 4 million clients.
Title X is administered through the Office of Population Affairs (OPA) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Although the authorization of appropriations for Title X ended in FY1985, funding for the program has continued through appropriations bills for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (Labor-HHS-Education).
Title X grantees can provide family planning services directly or subaward Title X monies to other public or nonprofit entities to provide services. In December 2016, OPA released a final rule to limit the criteria Title X grantees could use to restrict subawards by stating that "[n]o recipient making subawards for the provision of services as part of its Title X project may prohibit an entity from participating for reasons other than its ability to provide Title X services." On April 13, 2017, the President signed P.L. 115-23, which nullified the rule under the Congressional Review Act.
Federal law (42 U.S.C. §300a-6) prohibits the use of Title X funds in programs in which abortion is a method of family planning. According to OPA, family planning projects that receive Title X funds are closely monitored to ensure that federal funds are used appropriately and that funds are not used for prohibited activities. The abortion prohibition does not apply to all Title X grantees' activities, but applies only to their Title X project activities. Under current guidance, a grantee's abortion activities must be "separate and distinct" from its Title X project activities.
On June 1, 2018, HHS published a proposed rule that would prohibit Title X projects from making abortion referrals and would require "physical and financial separation" between Title X projects and abortion-related activities, among other changes to Title X regulations.
On September 28, 2018, the President signed the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 115-245), which provides $286.5 million for Title X, the same as the FY2018 level. The FY2019 act continues previous years' requirements that Title X funds not be spent on abortions, that all pregnancy counseling be nondirective, and that funds not be spent on promoting or opposing any legislative proposal or candidate for public office. Grantees continue to be required to certify that they encourage family participation when minors seek family planning services and to certify that they counsel minors on how to resist attempted coercion into sexual activity. The appropriations law also clarifies that family planning providers are not exempt from state notification and reporting laws on child abuse, child molestation, sexual abuse, rape, or incest. |
crs_R42459 | crs_R42459_0 | 99-198 , 1985 farm bill). The latter two "conservation compliance" provisions require that in exchange for certain U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) program benefits, a producer agrees to maintain a minimum level of conservation on highly erodible land and not to convert wetlands to crop production. Compliance violations related to the loss of federal crop insurance premium subsidies now have separate considerations from violations related to the loss of other farm program benefits. How compliance is calculated, where compliance provisions apply, and traditional exemptions and variances were not amended. The 2014 farm bill also extended limited protection for native sod in select states. Conservation Compliance Today
The 1985 farm bill included a number of significant conservation provisions designed to reduce crop production and conserve soil and water resources. Penalties may range from a good faith exemption that allows producers up to one year to correct the violation, to a determination that the producer is ineligible for any government payment and must pay back current and prior years' benefits. The level of interest and debate generated by the changes to conservation compliance in the 2014 farm bill is likely to continue as USDA proceeds with implementation. Crop Insurance
The majority of changes made by the 2015 rule are in response to the 2014 farm bill's addition of federal crop insurance subsidies to the list of program benefits that could be lost if a producer were found to be out of compliance with conservation requirements on highly erodible land and wetlands. Erosion and Conversion Rates
The reduction in soil erosion from highly erodible land conservation continues, but at a slower pace than following enactment of the 1985 farm bill ( Figure 2 ). The leveling off of reduced erosion leaves several broad policy questions, including whether an acceptable level of soil erosion on cropland has been achieved; whether additional reductions could be achieved, and if so, at what cost; and how federal farm policy should encourage additional reductions in erosion. 1985 Farm Bill
The Food Security Act of 1985 ( P.L. The other conservation provisions were highly erodible land conservation (sodbuster) and wetland conservation (swampbuster). Some of the major amendments to highly erodible land conservation compliance in the 1996 farm bill include
removing crop insurance from the list of benefits that could be lost if the farmer is found out of compliance; adding production flexibility contracts to the list of benefits that could be lost if found out of compliance; highly erodible land exiting CRP would not be held to a higher compliance standard than nearby cropland; providing violators with up to one year to meet compliance requirements; developing procedures to expedite variances for weather, pest, or disease problems; requiring an erosion measurement before the conservation system is implemented; allowing third parties to measure residue and require that residue measurements take into account the top two inches of soil; allowing producers to modify plans as long as the same level of treatment is maintained; allowing local county committees to permit relief if a conservation system causes a producer undue economic hardship; and establishing a wind erosion estimation pilot study to review and modify as necessary wind erosion factors used to administer conservation compliance. Ultimately the Agricultural Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-79 ) . | The Food Security Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-198, 1985 farm bill) included a number of significant agricultural conservation provisions designed to reduce farm production and conserve soil and water resources. Many of the provisions remain in effect today, including the two compliance provisions—highly erodible land conservation (sodbuster) and wetland conservation (swampbuster). The two provisions, collectively referred to as conservation compliance, require that in exchange for certain U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) program benefits, a producer agrees to maintain a minimum level of conservation on highly erodible land and not to convert wetlands to crop production.
Conservation compliance affects most USDA benefits administered by the Farm Service Agency (FSA) and the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS). These benefits can include commodity support payments, disaster payments, farm loans, and conservation program payments, to name a few. If a producer is found to be in violation of conservation compliance, then a number of penalties could be enforced. These penalties range from temporary exemptions that allow the producer time to correct the violation, to a determination that the producer is ineligible for any USDA farm payment and must pay back current and prior years' benefits.
A controversial issue in the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) debate was whether federal crop insurance subsidies should be included on the list of program benefits that could be lost if a producer were found to be out of compliance with conservation requirements on highly erodible land and wetlands. Ultimately the 2014 farm bill did add federal crop insurance subsidies to the list of benefits that could be lost, but created separate considerations when addressing compliance violations and the loss of federal crop insurance premium subsidies compared with the loss of other farm program benefits. How compliance is calculated, where compliance provisions apply, and traditional exemptions and variances were not amended. The 2014 farm bill also extended limited protection for native sod in select states.
The levels of interest and debate generated by the changes to conservation compliance in the 2014 farm bill are likely to continue with implementation, raising additional questions and oversight in Congress. Recent concerns about a growing backlog of wetland determinations in the Northern Plains and approaching compliance deadlines for crop insurance policyholders have been raised. Additionally, the reduction in soil erosion from highly erodible land conservation continues, but at a slower pace than following the enactment of the 1985 farm bill. The leveling off of erosion reductions leaves broad policy questions related to conservation compliance, including whether an acceptable level of soil erosion on cropland has been achieved; whether additional reductions could be achieved, and, if so, at what cost; and how federal farm policy could encourage additional reductions in erosion. |
crs_R43220 | crs_R43220_0 | Key among these provisions is the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, which generally restricts noncitizens' eligibility for public benefits. The public charge grounds are of recurring interest to Members of Congress because of questions about whether aliens who receive various forms of public assistance are inadmissible or deportable on public charge grounds. In particular, it describes the statutory basis for the public charge grounds; seminal administrative and judicial decisions construing the meaning of public charge ; and regulations and other guidance promulgated by executive agencies after the enactment of PRWORA to address questions about whether aliens who receive public benefits that they are permitted to receive under PRWORA could potentially be subject to removal on public charge grounds. The Immigration and Nationality Act
Since 1903, the INA has contained two separate provisions addressing the public charge grounds. This provision generally applies to
aliens seeking to obtain visas or admission at ports of entry; aliens within the United States who seek to adjust their status to that of lawful permanent resident (LPR); and aliens who entered the United States without inspection. This provision applies to LPRs and other aliens admitted to the United States. However, while the INA provides that an alien may be inadmissible or deportable on public charge grounds, it does not define what it means for an alien to be a public charge. Then, in 1996, Congress amended the INA provisions regarding the public charge ground of inadmissibility to require that consular and immigration officers take certain factors "into account" when determining whether aliens are inadmissible or ineligible for adjustment of status on public charge grounds. These factors include, "at a minimum," the alien's age; health; family status; assets, resources, and financial status; and education and skills. Early Administrative and Judicial Decisions
Given this general lack of statutory guidance, the executive and judicial branches initially construed the term public charge in adjudicating cases involving individual aliens. Thus, it concluded that the grounds of deportability must be more "strictly construed" than the grounds of inadmissibility. As to deportability , the rule would have specified that aliens are generally not deportable on public charge grounds unless the INS shows that
1. the government entity that provided, or is providing, public cash assistance for income maintenance, or the costs of institutionalization for long-term care, has a legal right to seek repayment of those benefits; 2. that entity demanded repayment of the benefit within five years of the alien's entry to the United States; 3. the alien or any other party obligated to repay the benefit failed to do so; 4. there is a final administrative or court judgment requiring the alien or another party to repay the benefit; and 5. the benefit-granting agency, or other applicable government entity, has taken "all actions necessary to enforce the judgment," including "all collections actions." DHS officials, in contrast, determine whether aliens arriving at U.S. ports of entry are to be admitted; whether applications for adjustment of status are to be granted; and whether aliens within the United States are to be removed. The U.S. The DOS regulations emphasize the role that the alien's "circumstances" play in determining whether an alien is inadmissible, in part, by specifying that:
[a]ny determination that an alien is ineligible [on public charge] grounds must be predicated upon circumstances indicating that, notwithstanding any affidavit of support that may have been filed on the alien's behalf, the alien is likely to become a public charge after admission, or, if applicable, that the alien has failed to fulfill the affidavit of support requirement ....
Consular officers are expressly authorized to issue visas to aliens subject to the affidavit of support requirement, noted above, who "giv[e] ... a bond or undertaking in accordance with INA 213 and INA 221(g)," provided that the officer is satisfied that the giving of such bond or undertaking removes the likelihood that the alien will become a public charge, and the alien is otherwise eligible for a visa. Public Benefits and the Public Charge Grounds
Collectively, the various sources addressing the meaning of public charge suggest that an alien's receipt of public benefits, per se, has historically been unlikely to result in the alien being deemed removable on public charge grounds. As previously noted, the INA does not define public charge , or link the public charge grounds of inadmissibility and deportability with the receipt of public benefits. The case law interpreting and applying the public charge grounds similarly suggests that receipt of certain public benefits could result in a determination that an alien is inadmissible or deportable on public charge grounds, if certain other conditions are met. It should also be noted that, in making determinations regarding aliens' deportability on public charge grounds, only causes that pre-date their entry are considered. | The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) has long provided for aliens' exclusion and deportation from the United States on "public charge" grounds. Under current law, aliens outside the United States who seek to obtain visas at U.S. consulates overseas, or admission at U.S. ports of entry, are generally denied entry if they are deemed "likely at any time to become a public charge." Aliens within the United States who seek to adjust their status to that of lawful permanent resident (LPR), or who entered the United States without inspection, are also generally subject to this ground of inadmissibility. Similarly, LPRs and other aliens who have been admitted to the United States are removable if they become a public charge within five years after the date of their entry due to causes that preexisted their entry. These public charge grounds are of recurring interest to Members of Congress because of questions about whether aliens who receive various forms of public assistance are inadmissible or deportable on public charge grounds.
The INA does not expressly define what it means for an alien to be a public charge, and, prior to 1996, there was no statutory guidance on what was to be considered in determining whether an alien is inadmissible or deportable on public charge grounds. Then, in 1996, the INA was amended to require that certain factors be taken into account when determining whether aliens are inadmissible on public charge grounds. These factors include the alien's age, health, family status, financial resources, education, and skills. There is no similar statutory guidance on what factors are to be considered in determining whether an alien is deportable on public charge grounds.
Given this general lack of statutory guidance, the executive and judicial branches initially construed the meaning of public charge in adjudicating cases involving individual aliens. In so doing, administrative authorities interpreted public charge differently for purposes of the grounds of inadmissibility than for the grounds of deportability. Specifically, public charge was construed broadly in the context of admissibility, with determinations based on a "totality of the circumstances" test that considered factors like those codified in the INA in 1996. In contrast, in the context of deportability, "public charge" was construed more narrowly. Aliens could only be found to be deportable on public charge grounds if (1) they received government assistance that they were legally obligated to repay; (2) the government entity providing the assistance demanded repayment; and (3) the alien or the alien's sponsor was unable to pay.
Following the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, executive agencies issued guidance regarding the public charge grounds. While PRWORA generally restricts noncitizens' eligibility for "public benefits," it permits them to receive specified benefits. Thus, its enactment raised questions about whether aliens who receive benefits for which they are eligible under PRWORA could potentially be removable on public charge grounds. Immigration officials addressed these questions in a 1999 policy letter that defined public charge and identified which benefits are considered in public charge determinations. This policy letter underlies current regulations and other guidance on the public charge grounds of inadmissibility and deportability.
Collectively, the various sources addressing the meaning of public charge have historically suggested that an alien's receipt of public benefits, per se, is unlikely to result in the alien being deemed to be removable on public charge grounds. Neither the INA nor implementing regulations address the role that receipt of public benefits plays in public charge determinations. Other agency guidance and court decisions have generally indicated that, while receipt of certain public benefits could be considered in public charge determinations, other factors are also considered (e.g., age, obligation to repay). |
crs_RS21732 | crs_RS21732_0 | Instead, a foreign national, whether in the United States as an immigrant, nonimmigrant or unauthorized (illegal) alien, is classified as a resident or nonresident alien for federal tax purposes. In general, an individual is a nonresident alien unless he or she meets the qualifications under either residency test:
Green card test: the individual is a lawful permanent resident of the United States at any time during the current year, or Substantial presence test: the individual is present in the United States for at least 31 days during the current year and at least 183 days during the current year and previous two years. For example, an individual will be treated as a nonresident alien if he or she has a closer connection to a foreign country than to the United States, maintains a tax home in the foreign country, and is in the United States for fewer than 183 days during the year. A residency definition in an income tax treaty will override these residency rules. Instead, the Code treats these individuals in the same manner as other foreign nationals—they are subject to federal taxes and classified for tax purposes as either resident or nonresident aliens. This classification is for tax purposes only and does not affect the individual's immigration status. While most taxpayers file tax returns using their Social Security number (SSN) as an identifier, individuals who are ineligible to receive an SSN file their returns using an individual taxpayer identification number (ITIN). Furthermore, in the 112 th Congress, legislation has been introduced that would impose, with some differences, an SSN requirement for claiming the additional child tax credit, any part of the child tax credit, or any credit or refund (e.g., H.R. 1196 ). Two of these bills— H.R. 3630 and H.R. 5652 —have been passed by the House; however, H.R. 3630 was enacted into law ( P.L. 112-96 ) without the SSN provision. The mechanism of using an SSN requirement for restricting the eligibility of unauthorized aliens to claim tax credits may be imprecise. Taxation of Income
Resident Aliens
Resident aliens are generally subject to the same federal income tax laws as citizens of the United States. There are limited circumstances in which a nonresident alien's U.S. source income is not subject to U.S. taxation. For example, some interest income that is not connected with a U.S. trade or business (e.g., portfolio interest) is exempt from U.S. tax. With respect to the issue of double coverage and taxation, agreements generally provide that individuals are only covered by the social security program (and therefore only subject to the program's taxes) in the country where they are working, although individuals who are covered in their home country and temporarily assigned by their employer to work in the other country are exempt from coverage in that country. In 2004, the United States signed an agreement with Mexico, which has been controversial. It has not yet been transmitted to Congress. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 prohibits the Social Security Commissioner or Social Security Administration (SSA) from using any of the funds appropriated by the act to pay compensation to SSA employees to administer Social Security benefit payments under any U.S.-Mexico totalization agreement that would not otherwise be payable. Other legislation has been introduced, the Loophole Elimination and Verification Enforcement Act (or LEAVE Act), that would state it is the sense of the House that the U.S.-Mexico totalization agreement "is inappropriate public policy and should not take effect." Another bill introduced in the 112 th Congress would address a constitutional issue with the existing totalization agreement process. | A question that often arises is whether unauthorized aliens and other foreign nationals working in the United States are subject to U.S. taxes. The federal tax consequences for these individuals are dependent on (a) whether an individual is classified as a resident or nonresident alien and (b) whether a tax treaty or totalization agreement exists between the United States and the individual's home country.
In general, an individual is a resident alien if he or she is a lawful permanent U.S. resident or is in the United States for a substantial period of time during the current and past two years (the "substantial presence" test). Otherwise, he or she will typically be classified as a nonresident alien. Resident aliens are generally taxed in the same manner as U.S. citizens. Nonresident aliens are subject to different treatment, such as generally being taxed only on income from U.S. sources. Exceptions exist for aliens with specific types of visas or employment.
An individual who is in the country unlawfully is, like any other alien, classified as either a resident or nonresident alien. This classification is for tax purposes only, and it does not affect the individual's immigration status. These individuals' eligibility to claim the earned income tax credit is restricted because the tax code requires that taxpayers claiming the credit provide their Social Security number (SSN), as well as those of their spouse and dependents. Unauthorized aliens are ineligible for SSNs, and therefore file their tax returns using an individual taxpayer identification number (ITIN). In the 112th Congress, legislation has been introduced that would, with some differences, impose an SSN requirement for claiming the additional child tax credit (e.g., H.R. 3630, H.R. 5652, H.R. 3275, and H.R. 1956), for claiming any part of the child tax credit (H.R. 3444 and S. 577), or for claiming any credit or refund (e.g., H.R. 1196). Two of these bills—H.R. 3630 and H.R. 5652—have been passed by the House; however, H.R. 3630 was enacted into law (P.L. 112-96) without the provision.
Finally, the provisions of an income tax treaty or totalization agreement may reduce or eliminate taxes owed to the United States. An income tax treaty is a bilateral agreement between the United States and another country that addresses the income tax treatment of each country's residents while in the other country, primarily with the intent of reducing the incidence of double taxation. Totalization agreements are bilateral treaties that address social security taxes. In 2004, the United States signed a totalization agreement with Mexico, but it has not yet been transmitted to Congress for review. In the 112th Congress, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 prohibits the Social Security Commissioner or Social Security Administration (SSA) from using any of the funds appropriated by the act to pay compensation to SSA employees to administer Social Security benefit payments under any U.S.-Mexico totalization agreement that would not otherwise be payable. Other legislation has been introduced that would state it is the sense of the House that the U.S.-Mexico totalization agreement "is inappropriate public policy and should not take effect" (H.R. 1196), or address a constitutional issue with the manner in which totalization agreements are disapproved by Congress (S. 181). |
crs_RS22656 | crs_RS22656_0 | The Title V Abstinence Education block grant administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) supports this approach. Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. won the contract for the evaluation. The report focuses on four selected Title V abstinence education programs for elementary and middle school students: (1) My Choice, My Future! According to the report:
Findings indicate that youth in the program group were no more likely than control group youth to have abstained from sex and, among those who reported having had sex, they had similar numbers of sexual partners and had initiated sex at the same mean age.... Comprehensive Sexual Education
Advocates of a more comprehensive approach to sex education argue that today's youth need information and decision-making skills to make realistic, practical choices about whether to engage in sexual activities. Many analysts and researchers agree that effective pregnancy prevention programs have many of the following characteristics:
Convince teens that not having sex or that using contraception consistently and carefully is the right thing to do. Actively engage participants and personalize the program information. address peer pressure. While the Bush Administration continues to support an abstinence-only program intervention (with some modifications), others argue that an abstinence message integrated into a comprehensive sex education program that includes information on the use of contraceptives and that enhances decision-making skills is a more effective method to prevent teen pregnancy. | The long-awaited experimentally designed evaluation of abstinence-only education programs, commissioned by Congress in 1997, indicates that young persons who participated in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Title V Abstinence Education block grant program were no more likely than other young persons to abstain from sex. The evaluation conducted by Mathematica Policy, Inc. found that program participants had just as many sexual partners as nonparticipants, had sex at the same median age as nonparticipants, and were just as likely to use contraception as nonparticipants. For many analysts and researchers, the study confirms that a comprehensive sex education curriculum with an abstinence message and information about contraceptives and decision-making skills is a better approach to preventing teen pregnancy. Others maintain that the evaluation examined only four programs for elementary and middle school students, and is thereby inconclusive. Separate experimentally designed evaluations of comprehensive sexual education programs found that some comprehensive programs, including contraception information, decision-making skills, and peer pressure strategies, were successful in delaying sexual activity, improving contraceptive use, and/or preventing teen pregnancy. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R40158 | crs_R40158_0 | However, some economists and forecasters have been concerned that a combination of factors might make this economic contraction much worse than other post-war slowdowns. The problems that began in housing, quickly spread to banking and financial services and were compounded earlier in 2008 by spikes in energy prices. The full House amended and approved H.R. 1 on January 28, 2009. Similar legislation to H.R. 1 was introduced in the Senate (ARRA, S. 350 ) and referred to the Committee on Finance, where a markup of selected health components was approved on January 27. 98 , which was offered as a substitute for H.R. 570 was offered in the nature of a substitute H.R. 1 . on February 10, 2009. Table 1 displays a summary of Medicaid provisions in H.R. 1 and S.Amdt. Additional detail on major provisions and differences between H.R. DSH Allotment Increases . 1 and S.Amdt. For a discussion of the Medicaid provisions approved in the Joint House and Senate Conference Agreement, see CRS Report R40223, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA): Title V, Medicaid Provisions , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. 1 ) is intended to stimulate additional economic activity in selected industrial sectors to save existing and create new jobs, reduce taxes, invest in future technologies, and fund infrastructure improvements. In addition, ARRA contains provisions to provide temporary support to families and individuals in need by providing additional unemployment compensation benefits, short-term access to Medicaid, financial assistance for individuals eligible under COBRA to purchase health insurance through their former employer, temporary increases in federal Medicaid matching rates for states, and other Medicaid changes. The Medicaid provisions in Title III and Title V of the House-approved version of ARRA included:
Title III — Health Insurance Assistance:
Temporary Optional Medicaid Coverage for the Unemployed. On January 27, 2009, an economic stimulus bill S. 336 , American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), was introduced in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Appropriations. The full Senate approved S.Amdt. 570 on federal spending. This report follows the organization of the Medicaid provisions in the House-passed version of ARRA, so the House-passed provisions are presented first, with comparable Senate provisions following, unless the House-passed version of ARRA does not have a comparable provision to the Senate version; then the Senate provisions are presented first. Provider Taxes. Outpatient Hospital Services. 570 . | The economy officially was considered in a recession in December 2008, but many forecasters had long recognized the downturn and some believed this economic contraction would be more severe than other post-World War II economic slowdowns. A combination of factors have combined to present policymakers with difficult decisions on how best to stimulate the economy. Troubling instability in the housing and financial services sectors have combined with weak auto manufacturing demand, and high energy costs earlier in the year to slow growth dramatically and force millions into unemployment. With declining tax revenue and increasing costs to provide unemployment and other benefits to unemployed workers, states are considering measures to rein in spending, including restricting Medicaid eligibility and services.
Congress is considering legislation aimed at stimulating economic activity in selected industrial sectors to save existing and create new jobs, reduce taxes, invest in future technologies, and fund infrastructure improvements. The House-approved the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, H.R. 1) on January 22. ARRA provisions would provide temporary support to families and individuals by providing additional unemployment compensation benefits, short-term access to Medicaid, financial assistance for individuals to maintain their health coverage under provisions in the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), and temporary increases in Medicaid matching rates and disproportionate share hospital allotments. The full House amended and approved H.R. 1 on January 28, 2009.
Similar legislation to H.R. 1 was introduced in the Senate (ARRA, S. 350) and referred to the Committee on Finance, among others, where provisions were approved on January 27. [See the Senate Committee on Finance website for S.Amdt. 98 at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/leg/LEG%202009/020209%20complete%20legislative%20text%20of%20American%20Recovery%20and%20Reinvestment%20Act.pdf.] An amendment in the nature of a substitute (SAmdt. 570) was offered as a substitute for H.R. 1 and was approved by the full Senate on February 10, 2009. The Senate version of ARRA was referred to a joint Senate and House conference committee.
This report describes Medicaid provisions presented under Division B, Title III and Title V, of the House-approved version of the ARRA, and similar provisions in Titles III and V in a Senate Amendment (ARRA, S.Amdt. 570) offered in the nature of a substitute for H.R. 1. Table 1 provides a summary of major provisions in H.R. 1 and S.Amdt. 570. For details on the Conference Agreement's Medicaid provisions, see CRS Report R40223, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA): Title V, Medicaid Provisions, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44290 | crs_R44290_0 | D etermining whether aliens who enter or remain in the United States in violation of federal immigration law (called unlawfully present aliens for purposes of this report) are permitted to claim refundable tax credits under federal law requires answering two questions. The second is whether any refundable tax credits are "Federal public benefits" under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), in which case it could be argued that any such credit should be disallowed to unlawfully present aliens regardless of whether the IRC contains such a restriction. There is no general rule in the IRC that prohibits unlawfully present aliens from claiming refundable tax credits. Rather, the restrictions that exist are established on a credit-by-credit basis. SSN Requirement
Some credits are denied to taxpayers without Social Security numbers (SSNs). In order to claim the EITC, taxpayers must provide SSNs for themselves, a spouse if filing a joint return, and any qualifying children. It appears the IRS permits unlawfully present aliens to claim any refundable tax credit that is not restricted under the IRC. No court has examined the issue of whether refundable tax credits are federal public benefits under PRWORA. These actions would arguably be unnecessary had Congress believed that PRWORA Section 401 applied to refundable tax credits. Until the IRS, a court, or Congress addresses whether any refundable credits are federal public benefits, the only clear restrictions on the ability of aliens to claim them are those found in the IRC (see Table 2 ). Additional Child Tax Credit: CRS Report R41873, The Child Tax Credit: Current Law and Legislative History , by [author name scrubbed]. | The question is frequently asked whether aliens who enter or remain in the United States in violation of federal immigration law (called unlawfully present aliens for purposes of this report) are permitted to claim refundable tax credits. There is no general provision in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) prohibiting unlawfully present aliens from claiming refundable tax credits. Rather, the restrictions that exist are established on a credit-by-credit basis. For example, one credit—the earned income tax credit (EITC)—requires that taxpayers provide work-authorized Social Security numbers (SSNs) for themselves, a spouse if filing a joint return, and any qualifying children. Because of this requirement, aliens who are not authorized to work in the United States are ineligible for the credit. This treatment can be contrasted with another credit, the additional child tax credit, which does not have an SSN requirement and can be claimed by taxpayers regardless of their immigration or work authorization status.
A related issue is whether any refundable tax credits are "Federal public benefits" under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). Section 401 of that act disallows such benefits to unlawfully present aliens. If any refundable tax credits were federal public benefits, it could be argued the credits should be disallowed to these aliens, even if the IRC does not contain such a restriction. It appears the IRS does not interpret PRWORA to apply to refundable tax credits. No court has examined this issue, and Congress has not taken any action to address it legislatively. Thus, at this time, the only clear restrictions on the ability of unlawfully present aliens to claim refundable tax credits are those found in the IRC. |
crs_R41573 | crs_R41573_0 | This report focuses specifically on federally subsidized or supported debt designed to promote investment in renewables and energy efficiency. Understanding what types of debt instruments currently are and previously have been available, the degree of federal subsidization contained within these instruments, and what types of investments have resulted from these programs, will help policymakers evaluate if and how these tools can be used in the future to promote renewables and efficiency. Energy tax policy in the United States has tended toward this alternative approach, providing a number of tax credits and other tax preferences for investments in renewables and energy efficiency. Federally Tax-Favored Financing
Federally subsidized financing offers an alternative to direct tax incentives for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. In recent years, various forms of federally subsidized financing have been available to promote investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency. Bonds are private activity bonds and not tax-exempt if both of the following conditions are met:
[use test] more than 10% of the proceeds of the issue are to be used for any private business use ,... [and] [security test] if the payment on the principal of, or the interest on, more than 10% of the proceeds of such issue is (under the terms of such issue or any underlying arrangement) directly or indirectly secured by any interest in: (1) property used or to be used for a private business use, or (2) payments in respect to such property. Tax credit bonds that subsidize investments in renewables and energy efficiency, through both the issuer and investor tax credits, are discussed in the following sections. Clean Renewable Energy Bonds (CREBs)
Clean renewable energy bonds (CREBs) have been made available to tax-exempt entities investing in renewables that are not able to take advantage of other tax incentives. CREBs, as tax credit bonds, reduce the cost of financing for renewable energy projects receiving a CREB allocation. As Table 1 indicates, CREB financing has been used to finance 1,727 renewable energy projects totaling $3.4 billion. Like tax-exempt bonds, BABs have been used to finance various types of projects. Since their introduction, 7.3% of BAB proceeds have been used to fund electric and public power projects. Tax-Favored Bonds: Economics Issues
Policymakers can subsidize investment in qualified projects such as renewables by allowing access to tax-favored financing. Comparison of Tax-Exempt Bonds, CREBs, and BABs
Below is an illustrative example of the variation in subsidy provided by the different types of bonds, highlighting how the subsidy changes across different types of investors. Tax-exempt bonds are economically inefficient if the loss in federal revenue exceeds the subsidy provided to issuers. Thus, the inefficiency associated with tax-exempt debt, where the loss in revenues to the federal government exceeds the subsidy to borrowers, is eliminated with the use of tax-credit bonds. For example, CREB financing is not currently an option for tax-exempt entities considering undertaking a renewable energy investment. BABs were no longer available as of December 31, 2010. In markets that may fail to consider the full costs associated with fossil energy sources, renewables may be disadvantaged. Requiring that some level of electricity be produced using renewable resources would drive markets to invest more in renewables and may lead to energy efficiency investments. Further, the use of tax-credit bonds addresses some of the economic efficiency and equity concerns that have been raised with respect to the use of tax-exempt bonds in the past. The goal of tax favored financing is to reduce the cost of borrowing for those investing in renewables and efficiency, making it easier for such projects to attract investors. In this case, tax favored bonds may reduce a project's borrowing costs, rewarding bond issuers at taxpayer expense without creating additional renewable energy capacity. | Tax policy is one tool available to promote the use of domestic renewable energy resources. Tax-subsidized financing, specifically tax-favored bonds, reduce the cost associated with making oftentimes capital intensive investments in renewables and energy efficiency. This report provides an overview of the various federally tax-favored financing options available for renewable energy and energy-efficiency investments. This report also highlights the economic foundations for subsidizing renewable energy investment and comments on economic issues specific to tax-favored financing.
Various forms of federally tax-favored bonds have been used to subsidize investments in renewables and efficiency. Some of these bonds, such as the Clean Renewable Energy Bonds (CREBs) and Qualified Energy Conservation Bonds (QECBs), are tax-credit bonds available only for investments in renewables or efficiency. CREBs alone have been used to finance 1,727 renewable energy projects, through $3.4 billion in CREB allocations. Other types of tax-favored bonds, such as tax-exempt governmental bonds or private activity bonds and Build America Bonds (BABs), are more widely available but have been used for energy-related projects. More than $10 billion worth of BABs have been issued to finance electric and public power projects (although it is not clear what share of this issue is dedicated to renewables).
The magnitude of the subsidy afforded by the different types of federally tax-favored financing differs from both the perspective of the bond issuer and the investor. An example, where a hypothetical CREB, BAB, and tax-exempt bond is used to finance the same project, illustrates how policymakers can adjust bond terms to manipulate the subsidy provided to issuers and investors.
Tax incentives promote investment in renewables and energy efficiency by reducing the cost of such investments relative to fossil energy alternatives. Investments in renewable energy generation capacity, especially wind, have led to an increasing share of renewables in the nation's overall energy portfolio. Subsidizing investments in renewables using tax policy, however, may not be the most economically efficient mechanism for increasing the use of renewable energy and promoting energy efficiency. Subsidizing renewables through tax incentives leads to federal revenue losses, requiring that federal revenues be raised by some other, potentially distortionary, form of taxation.
Tax-exempt bonds may not be the best tool for subsidizing investment in renewables when evaluated in terms of economic efficiency and equity. With tax-exempt bonds, federal revenue losses may exceed the subsidy provided to issuers, and thus be an inefficient subsidy. Tax-exempt bonds also provide a larger subsidy to taxpayers in higher tax brackets, raising equity concerns. Tax-credit bonds, as an alternative, represent a tax-subsidization option that is not subject to the inefficiencies and inequities associated with tax-exempt debt.
While tax-subsidized financing has been a popular tool in recent years for promoting investment in renewables and efficiency, a number of these bonds are not currently available as options for project investors. Specifically, all available CREB financing has been allocated, and projects were unable to issue BABs after December 31, 2010. Whether these programs have successfully promoted renewable energy investment, and should be extended, may be an issue the 112th Congress will want to consider. |
crs_R42142 | crs_R42142_0 | I n November 2011 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed two Clean Water Act permits to regulate certain types of discharges from vessels into U.S. waters. The proposed permits would replace a single permit issued by EPA in 2008 that was due to expire in December 2013. As proposed, the two permits would apply to approximately 71,000 large domestic and foreign vessels and perhaps as many as 138,000 small vessels. This universe of regulated entities is diverse as well as large, consisting of tankers, freighters, barges, cruise ships and other passenger vessels, and commercial fishing vessels. Their regulated discharges are similarly diverse, including among other pollutants non-native aquatic nuisance species (ANS), nutrients, pathogens, oil and grease, metals, and toxic chemical compounds that can have a broad array of effects on aquatic species and human health, many of which can be harmful. On March 28, 2013, EPA issued a final version of the VGP for large vessels. It became effective on December 19, 2013. The permit for smaller vessels was issued on September 10, 2014; it was scheduled to become effective on December 19, 2014, but Congress passed a three-year extension as part of P.L. 113-281 . The 2008 Vessel General Permit and 2011 Draft Vessel General Permits
In July 2008, Congress enacted two bills to exempt discharges incidental to the normal operation of certain types of vessels from CWA permitting, thus restricting the population of vessels subject to EPA regulation. 113-281 ). The CWA requires that all point source discharges must meet effluent limitations representing applicable levels of technology-based control. In anticipation of the expiration of the 2008 VGP on December 18, 2013, in November 2011, EPA proposed two Vessel General Permits, one for large vessels (draft VGP) to replace the 2008 VGP, and one for smaller vessels to authorize discharges from vessels covered by the congressionally enacted temporary moratorium (draft sVGP). Both draft permits largely retained the 2008 permit's approach of relying on specific behaviors or BMP techniques to control most regulated discharges, as EPA again concluded that it is infeasible to develop numeric effluent limits for most controlled discharges covered by the permit. Issues
Two prominent issues raised by the 2013 VGP are questions about inclusion of specific numeric ballast water discharge limits in the permit, and controversies about the role of states in regulating vessel discharges. At issue had been whether EPA would propose more stringent numeric limits, as some environmental advocacy groups favor and a few states have already adopted. The court remanded the permit to EPA for proceedings consistent with the opinion, but allowed the 2013 permit to remain in place until EPA issues a new VGP. Congressional Interest
Congressional interest in this topic has been evident for some time—as reflected in the bills enacted in 2008 and described previously to exempt certain vessels from a CWA permit requirement. Small Vessel Permit Moratorium
As discussed above, a permit moratorium for small non-recreational vessels and commercial fishing vessels enacted in 2008 was temporary, but was extended twice by Congress until December 18, 2014. The House passed H.R. As the date for the expiration of the moratorium approached, on December 10, 2014, the Senate and House passed legislation ( S. 2444 / P.L. As described in Appendix A , the sVGP prescribes best management practices (BMPs) for ballast water discharges, not numeric standards. In the 114 th Congress, several bills that would make the existing temporary permit moratorium for small vessels permanent have been introduced. These bills are S. 371 , a bill that only addresses the permit moratorium, and S. 373 / H.R. The Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee approved S. 373 in February 2015, and it later included the text of the bill as titles of S. 2829 , the Maritime Administration Authorization and Enhancement Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which the Senate passed by voice vote on June 29, 2016, and S. 1611 , Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015. In December 2012, Congress enacted H.R. 980 . 980 . | In November 2011 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed two Clean Water Act (CWA) permits to regulate certain types of vessel discharges into U.S. waters. The proposed permits would replace a single Vessel General Permit (VGP) issued in 2008 that was due to expire in December 2013. As proposed, the permits would apply to approximately 71,000 large domestic and foreign vessels and perhaps as many as 138,000 small vessels. This universe of regulated entities is diverse as well as large, consisting of tankers, freighters, barges, cruise ships and other passenger vessels, and commercial fishing vessels. Their discharges are similarly diverse, including among other pollutants aquatic nuisance species (ANS), nutrients, pathogens, oil and grease, metals, and toxic chemical compounds that can have a broad array of effects on aquatic species and human health, many of which can be harmful.
EPA proposed two permits, one for large vessels to replace the 2008 VGP, and one for smaller vessels covered by a congressionally enacted temporary moratorium. Both were proposed well in advance of the VGP's expiration to provide ample time for the regulated community to prepare for new requirements. On March 28, 2013, EPA issued a final version of the VGP for large vessels. It took effect December 19, 2013. The permit for smaller vessels, the sVGP, was issued on September 10, 2014, and was scheduled to take effect on December 19, 2014. However, in December 2014, Congress passed legislation (S. 2444/P.L. 113-281) extending until December 18, 2017, the date when small vessels will need a CWA permit.
The CWA requires that all regulated discharges must meet effluent limitations representing applicable levels of technology-based control. The 2013 VGP largely retains the current permit's approach of relying on best management practices to control most discharges, because EPA concluded that it is infeasible to develop numeric effluent limits for most controlled discharges. However, the new VGP includes for the first time numeric ballast water discharge limits, which are consistent with standards in a 2012 Coast Guard rule and an international convention.
The 2013 VGP raises two key issues. One concerns inclusion of specific numeric ballast water discharge limits in the permit. At issue had been whether EPA would propose more stringent numeric limits, as some environmental groups have favored and a few states have already adopted. A second issue concerns the role of states in regulating vessel discharges.
Environmental groups and Canadian shippers challenged the 2013 permit in federal court. In October 2015, the court supported the environmentalists' challenge, ruling that the permit violated the CWA because it did not require the use of best available technology to control discharges of invasive species from ships' ballast water. The court remanded the permit to EPA, but did not vacate it; the permit remains in effect until EPA issues a new permit.
Congressional interest in this topic has been evident for some time. In 2008 Congress enacted two bills to exempt certain vessels from a CWA permit requirement, thus restricting the population of vessels subject to the VGP. One was a permanent permit moratorium for recreational vessels of all sizes. The other act was a temporary permit moratorium for small commercial vessels and commercial fishing vessels, which was extended twice by Congress and would have expired December 18, 2014, had Congress not enacted an additional three-year extension in P.L. 113-281. In the 114th Congress, bills addressing the temporary permit moratorium for small vessels and regulation of ballast water discharges have been introduced (S. 373/H.R. 980 and S. 371). The Senate Commerce Committee approved S. 373 in February 2015; the committee also included provisions of this bill in S. 2829, which the Senate passed in June 2016, and S. 1611. Further, the House has passed H.R. 4909, which includes the text of H.R. 980 as one title of that bill. |
crs_RL31697 | crs_RL31697_0 | The country's stock exchange is among the 20 largest in the world, and South Africa is one of the few countries on the continent to rank as an upper middle income country. Some South Africans blame these immigrants for the country's high crime and unemployment rates, and in May 2008 tensions erupted in the townships, sparking a wave of xenophobic attacks that displaced over 25,000 and left over 60 dead. The African National Congress (ANC), which led the struggle against white minority rule and the apartheid system of state-enforced racial segregation, won control of the National Assembly. Following Mbeki's resignation, several prominent members of the party led a breakaway faction, now known as the Congress of the People (COPE). Strains in the ANC Alliance
The ANC has long worked in an interlocking tripartite alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). The ANC maintained its dominance but fell short of retaining its two-thirds majority in the parliament. Jacob Zuma was subsequently chosen by the new parliament to serve as South Africa's newest President. Several corruption scandals have centered on the country's justice organs themselves. HIV/AIDS
South Africa is believed to have the largest HIV/AIDS epidemic in the world, with almost six million people estimated to be living with the disease. Thabo Mbeki's stance on HIV/AIDS was a major political issue in South Africa during his tenure. The legislation was shelved, but the Zuma Administration is expected to resubmit it in 2011. The Economy
In 2009, South Africa weathered its first recession in 17 years. The rate of growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaged 3% per year in the first decade after apartheid and rose to an average of 5% from 2004 to 2007. President Zuma has actively sought for South Africa to play an increasing role in world economic fora. It also commits the government to fiscal discipline and emphasizes a role for the private sector. The 2010 World Cup
In June and July 2010, South Africa hosted the 2010 FIFA World Cup, games which the government hoped would draw global attention to the country and boost tourism and economic growth. The sport of soccer (referred to in South Africa as football) played an important role in the lives of the political prisoners held on Robben Island during the apartheid years. The government also made significant investments to ensure security during the event. But South Africa's leadership in the launching of NEPAD; the deployment of South African peacekeepers to Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, and Sudan; and intensive South African involvement in the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have highlighted South Africa's capabilities as a regional actor. Military relations are reportedly improving. The United Nations
South Africa's role as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council from 2007 through 2008 was controversial, and the Mbeki Administration was criticized by the United States as well as by many human rights activists for its lack of support for human rights issues raised before the Council. In July 2008, South Africa voted with Russia, China, Vietnam, and Libya in opposition to a U.S.-sponsored resolution on Zimbabwe (S/2008/447) that called for targeted sanctions on select members of the Mugabe regime, an international arms embargo, the appointment of a U.N. Special Representative on Zimbabwe, and the creation of a Panel of Experts to monitor and evaluate the situation and the effects of the sanctions. South Africa began a new term on the Security Council in January 2011. Resentment against immigrants remains a potential flashpoint for violence in South Africa. U.S. officials point out that South Africa continues to enjoy major benefits from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. Social tensions over perceived inequalities in the distribution of wealth and inadequate service delivery, which resulted in violent attacks on African immigrants in 2008, are likely to continue in the near term as the government struggles to address the needs of its poorest citizens. South Africa's longer-term stability is linked to the success of the South African government and its partners in fighting poverty and reducing the toll of the AIDS pandemic. | Over fifteen years after the South African majority gained its independence from white minority rule under apartheid, a system of racial segregation, the Republic of South Africa is firmly established as a regional power. With Africa's largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a diverse economy, and a government that has played an active role in promoting regional peace and stability, South Africa is poised to have a substantial impact on the economic and political future of Africa. The country is also playing an increasingly prominent role in the G20 and other international fora. South Africa is twice the size of Texas and has a population of almost 50 million. Its political system is regarded as stable, but South Africa faces serious long-term challenges arising from poverty, unemployment, and AIDS.
The United States government considers South Africa to be one of its strategic partners on the continent, and the two countries commenced a new Strategic Dialogue in 2010, with the encouragement of the U.S. Congress. Bilateral relations are cordial; however, the U.S. and South African administrations have expressed differences with respect to the situations in Zimbabwe and Iran, among other foreign policy issues. South Africa begins a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2011; U.S. officials articulated frustration with the South African government on positions it took during its last term on the Council in 2007-2008.
The African National Congress (ANC), which led the struggle against apartheid, has dominated the political scene since the end of apartheid and continues to enjoy widespread support among the population. The party has suffered internal divisions, though, some of which contributed to the resignation of President Thabo Mbeki in 2008 and the formation of a breakaway party, the Congress of the People (COPE). The ANC fell short of retaining its two-thirds majority in the parliament during the most recent elections, held in April 2009. Jacob Zuma, elected as head of the ANC in late 2007, weathered a series of corruption charges and was chosen by the ANC-dominated parliament after the 2009 elections to serve as the country's newest President.
South Africa has the largest HIV/AIDS population in the world, with almost 6 million people reportedly HIV positive. The Mbeki Administration's policy on HIV/AIDS was controversial, but the Zuma Administration has made significant commitments to addressing the disease. The country has weathered a series of corruption scandals, and continues to struggle with high crime and unemployment rates. Mounting social tensions related to the competition for jobs, resources, and social services led to an eruption of xenophobic violence against immigrants in 2008; some resentment against foreign workers in the country lingers. South Africa, with its wealth of mineral resources and diverse manufacturing sector, has benefitted from steady economic growth in recent years, but the country weathered a recession in 2009 and economists predict weaker growth prospects for the near future. Job creation remains a major challenge for the government.
In 2010, South Africa successfully hosted the largest event ever held on the African continent, the FIFA World Cup, an international football (soccer) competition. The government and the private sector undertook a wide variety of construction and infrastructure projects in preparation for the event, which was attended by over three million people and drew over 300,000 tourists. South Africa defied many expectations during the event—six new stadiums were finished on time, crime was low, and South Africans introduced the world to a long (and loud) plastic horn known as the vuvuzela. Americans bought more tickets to the event than any other nationality. The games were a point of pride, not only to South Africans, but to many across Africa. |
crs_RS22707 | crs_RS22707_0 | Background
Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles are a family of vehicles produced by a variety of domestic and international companies. They generally incorporate a "V"-shaped hull and armor plating designed to provide protection against mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). DOD's MRAP Requirement3
Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, has approved an acquisition objective of 25,700 MRAP vehicles for all services. Of this total, 8,100 will be the new MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) designed to better handle the rugged terrain of Afghanistan. DOD officials have indicated that this requirement may increase depending upon the operational needs in Afghanistan. MRAPs Deployment and Disposition
According to DOD, as of July 21, 2011, 14,749 MRAPs had been delivered to Afghanistan, including 6,980 M-ATVs. M-ATV Requirement for Additional Armor
While M-ATVs initially enjoyed success in Afghanistan, reports suggest that insurgents have increased the size of IEDs, thereby negating much of the protective value of M-ATVs, resulting in increased U.S. casualties. In the President's FY2012 DOD budget request, there was no request for procurement funds for the MRAP program. FY2012 MRAP Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Budget Request17
Citing an operational requirement for 27,344 MRAPS to support CENTCOM operations, DOD requested $3.195 for the MRAP vehicle program for FY2012, broken down as follows:
$2.4 billion for operations and sustainment, repair parts, sustainment, battle damage repair and contractor logistics support and foe leased maintenance facilities in Kuwait; $.765 billion for survivability and mobility upgrades; and $.03 billion for automotive and ballistic testing. 1540 and S. 1253)18
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees recommended fully funding the FY2012 OCO budget request. Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 201219
The House Committee on Appropriations recommended fully funding the FY2012 OCO budget request. Potential Issues for Congress
Status of Unused MRAPs in Afghanistan
As previously noted, many older MRAPs shipped to Afghanistan are reportedly not being used because their size and weight severely limit their effectiveness. Loaning unused MRAPs to coalition partners could not only help to reduce allied casualties but can also help to recoup some of the associated procurement costs of these vehicles. Are the M-ATV and JLTV Redundant Programs? Defense officials have also been asked if there is a need for the MRAP/M-ATV and JLTV programs, as these programs share as many as 250 requirements. Additional Armor for M-ATVs in Afghanistan
The use of larger and more lethal IEDs by Afghan insurgents has necessitated adding additional armor to M-ATVs. While this course of action is intended to provide additional protection for the vehicle's occupants, it might also result in a less maneuverable vehicle that might be too heavy for many Afghan roads (the main reason why many MRAPs deployed to Afghanistan are not in use) and perhaps more prone to roll over accidents. | Congress has played a central role in the MRAP program, suggesting to defense and service officials that MRAPs would provide far superior protection for troops than the up-armored High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs ). Congressional support for MRAPs, as well as fully funding the program, has been credited with getting these vehicles to Iraq and Afghanistan in a relatively short timeframe, thereby helping to reduce casualties. Congress will likely continue to be interested in the MRAP program to ensure that the appropriate types and numbers are fielded, as well as to monitor the post-conflict disposition of these vehicles, as they represent a significant investment.
In 2007, the Department of Defense (DOD) launched a major procurement initiative to replace most up-armored HMMWVs in Iraq with Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles. MRAPs have been described as providing significantly more protection against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) than up-armored HMMWVs. Currently, DOD has approved an acquisition objective of 25,700 vehicles, of which 8,100 are the newer Military-All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) version, designed to meet the challenges of Afghanistan's rugged terrain. DOD officials have indicated that this total may be increased depending on operational needs in Afghanistan. DOD reports that as of July 21, 2011, 14,749 MRAPs had been delivered to Afghanistan, including 6,980 M-ATVs. Many MRAPs deployed to Afghanistan are not in use because they have been deemed too heavy for some Afghan roads and do not have sufficient cross-country mobility.
Afghan insurgents are employing larger improvised explosive devices (IEDs), resulting in increased casualties to M-ATV occupants. In response, DOD is installing additional armor to M-ATVs. While this armor is intended to provide additional protection to occupants, it might also result in operational restraints associated with a heavier and possibly less stable vehicle.
Through FY2011, Congress appropriated $38.35 billion for all versions of the MRAP. In FY2012, there was no procurement funding requested for the MRAP program. The FY2012 MRAP Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request is for $3.195 billion to repair, sustain, and upgrade existing MRAPs. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees recommended fully funding the MRAP budget request, and the House Appropriations Committee has also recommended full funding.
Among potential issues for congressional consideration are the status of older, unused MRAPS in Afghanistan that are reportedly not being used because of their size and weight; possible redundancies with the MRAP, M-ATV, and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) programs; and the impact of adding additional armor to M-ATVs. |
crs_R42835 | crs_R42835_0 | Introduction
The Judgment Fund (or Fund) is a permanent appropriation enacted by Congress in 1956. It is only accessible when the United States has waived its sovereign immunity and certain statutory conditions are met. This report also outlines specific instances in which the Fund may be accessed, and when costs other than the principal award may be paid. Therefore, the United States can be sued pursuant to certain statutes, most commonly the Federal Tort Claims Act. Awards Prior to the Creation of the Judgment Fund
While waiver of sovereign immunity was less common in the early Republic than it is today, determining and settling claims against the United States occupied a substantial amount of Congress's time since its first session. In the Budget Accounting Act of 1921, Congress transferred authority to the General Accounting Office (GAO) for all claims settlement duties previously held by the Treasury Department. Originally, the Fund was available only for judgments for claims of less than $100,000 entered in the Court of Federal Claims or a U.S. district court. In 1961, Congress authorized payment from the Judgment Fund for settlements negotiated by the Department of Justice on behalf of the United States, where litigation could have resulted in a monetary judgment. In 1996, Congress transferred certification of payment from the Judgment Fund from GAO to the Financial Management Service in the Department of the Treasury. All judgments must be final, meaning the award will not be overturned on appeal. Finally, the Judgment Fund may be used to pay certain costs to the prevailing party in litigation, as enumerated in 28 U.S.C. The judgment must also be final, so that payments are not made from the Fund when there is a chance the award could be changed or overturned. Lastly, the Judgment Fund is limited to litigative awards, meaning awards that were or could have been made in a court. The Equal Access to Justice Act
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) provides for award of attorneys' fees for individuals and small entities that prevail in cases against the federal government. Contract Disputes Act and No FEAR Act
Congress has passed two statutes that require agencies to reimburse the Judgment Fund for payment of claims. The Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002 (No FEAR Act) covers whistleblower and employment discrimination suits for federal employees, creating a cause of action for federal employees who have been subjected to harassment or discrimination in the workplace. The act would require the Secretary of the Treasury to post on a publicly accessible website the claimant, agency, fact summary, and payment amount for each claim from the Judgment Fund, within 30 days after the payment was made, unless a law or court order otherwise prohibits the disclosure of such information. In the 112 th Congress, the Government Transparency and Recordkeeping Act of 2012 was introduced but not enacted. The bill would have amended the Judgment Fund enabling statute to require the Secretary of the Treasury to publicly report all Judgment Fund payments since 2003, and report all future payments from EAJA. The bill's provisions called for the disclosures to be made online and include those required under the Judgment Fund Transparency Act, as well as specific details about attorneys' fees and interest paid from the Judgment Fund. | The Judgment Fund is a permanent, indefinite appropriation that was created by Congress in 1956 to pay judgments entered against the United States. Generally, the United States cannot be sued unless it has waived its sovereign immunity. Originally, such waivers were rare, so individual claims were assigned to congressional committees, which in turn appropriated funds to satisfy the judgments. Prior to the creation of the Judgment Fund, the number of claims grew rapidly, taking up an increasing amount of Congress's time and resources. Eventually, the Judgment Fund was created to reduce Congress's workload, so that individual appropriations were not needed for each award entered.
The Fund's administration has changed substantially since its inception, with varying degrees of control and oversight by Congress, the Government Accountability Office, and the Treasury Department. Originally, the Fund was limited to claims of less than $100,000, entered by the Court of Federal Claims or a U.S. District Court. As payments grew in size, Congress transferred authority to the Justice Department to make payments on behalf of the United States, as certified by the Attorney General.
Today, the Fund is administered by the Financial Management Service in the Treasury Department and is only accessible when certain closely circumscribed statutory requirements are met. Most importantly, an agency may not access the Fund when there is another appropriation that may be applied or when the plaintiff prevailed through an administrative remedy. In addition, the fund can only be used for monetary awards that are final, meaning the award cannot be changed or overturned. The awards must result from claims that were or could have been litigated in court.
This report sets out specific instances in which the Fund can be accessed and illustrates the procedural mechanisms for obtaining payment under certain statutory causes of action. Although primarily used for the payment of principal awards, attorneys' fees and interest on awards may also be paid from the Fund. At the court's discretion, certain costs enumerated in 28 U.S.C. §1920 may be awarded to the prevailing party. In addition, certain statutes, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act, provide that attorneys' fees may be recovered by the prevailing party. In addition, interest that accrues after the judgment may also be payable from the Fund. This report provides examples of how the payments from the Fund may be made under the Equal Access to Justice Act, Contract Disputes Act, Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002 (No FEAR Act), and through tribe-specific judgment funds.
In addition, this report will briefly highlight several recently proposed changes to the Judgment Fund's administration. In the 113th Congress, the Judgment Fund Transparency Act of 2013 (H.R. 317) would require the Secretary of the Treasury to post on a public website the claimant, agency, fact summary, and payment amount for each claim paid out of the Fund. Introduced but not enacted in the 112th Congress, the Government Transparency and Recordkeeping Act of 2012 (S. 3415) would have required the Treasury Secretary to publicly report all payments from the Fund under the Equal Access to Justice Act since 2003 and all future claims. Amendments to the No FEAR Act that were proposed in H.R. 6780 (110th Congress) and H.R. 67 (111th Congress) would have impacted reimbursement of the Fund for payments under the No FEAR Act. |
crs_R44867 | crs_R44867_0 | As these examples show, "readiness" is used both in a narrow sense to discuss the military's current level of training and the status of its maintenance, and in a broader sense to describe the military's overall capability, which includes how large the force should be and what kinds of weapons it should have, even if those changes will not take effect for several years. What should the U.S. military be ready for? How does the FY2018 budget request affect the U.S. military's readiness? While this report discusses how differing uses of the term readiness affect the debate, it does not evaluate the current state of the U.S. military's readiness or provide a conclusive definition of readiness. Background
Two Principal Uses
Despite many definitions of readiness, CRS has identified two principal uses of the term. One, readiness has been used to refer in a broad sense to whether U.S. military forces are able to do what the nation asks of them. In this sense, readiness encompasses almost every aspect of the military. Two, readiness has also been cast more narrowly as only one component of what makes military forces capable. In this sense, readiness is parallel with other aspects of the military, like force structure and modernization (which usually refer, respectively, to the size of the military and the sophistication of its weaponry). These attempts to clarify the term "readiness" acknowledge that both uses embody accepted concepts: the broader use capturing the military's ability to accomplish its overall goals and the narrower use capturing the military's ability when its size and type of weaponry are held steady. O&M as an entire appropriations title, however, may not be the best way to measure readiness in the narrow sense. Significance for Congress
Readiness as DOD's Justification for More Resources
How the term readiness is used is important to Congress because DOD has made readiness central in its justifications for increased funding. Issues for Congress
Is There a Readiness Crisis? Whether observers see a readiness crisis often depends on whether they are using readiness in its broad or narrow sense. The two uses, however, are not the only reasons observers disagree over whether there is a readiness crisis. In the passage, therefore, General Milley assesses the U.S. Army as ready in the narrow sense even as he expresses concern it is not ready in the broad sense. Whether the military is ready in the broad sense depends on what the military should be ready for, and cannot be answered by describing readiness in the narrow sense. At the same time, readiness is used in differing ways that cloud the debate on how ready the military is and what steps would make it more ready. Used this way—describing the readiness of the medical forces themselves—medical readiness is still a sub-component of the narrow sense of readiness, but one that is interdependent with other components of the broader sense of readiness. | Many defense observers and government officials, including some Members of Congress, are concerned that the U.S. military faces a readiness crisis. The Department of Defense has used readiness as a central justification for its FY2017 and FY2018 funding requests. Yet what makes the U.S. military ready is debated.
This report explains how differing uses of the term readiness cloud the debate on whether a readiness crisis exists and, if so, what funding effort would best address it.
CRS has identified two principal uses of the term readiness. One, readiness is used in a broad sense to describe whether military forces are able to do what the nation asks of them. In this sense, readiness encompasses almost every aspect of the military. Two, readiness is used more narrowly to mean only one component of what makes military forces able. In this second sense, readiness is parallel to other military considerations, like force structure and modernization, which usually refer to the size of the military and the sophistication of its weaponry. Both uses embody accepted concepts: the broader use capturing the military's ability to accomplish its overall goals and the narrower use capturing the military's ability when its size and type of weaponry are held steady.
These two senses of the term are interdependent. Today, most observers assume the military should be as ready as possible in the narrow sense, but in past eras some favored accepting lower readiness in a narrow sense in order to redirect resources in ways they felt improved the military's readiness in the broad sense (to include funding a larger force or newer equipment).
Use of either sense of readiness affects Congress's evaluation of certain key issues:
Is there a readiness crisis? Most observers who see a crisis tend to use readiness in a broad sense, asserting the U.S. military is not prepared for the challenges it faces largely because of its size or the sophistication of its weapons. Most observers who do not see a crisis tend to use readiness in a narrow sense, assessing only the state of training and the status of current equipment. For what scenarios, contingencies, and threats should the U.S. military be ready? Some senior officials express confidence in the military's readiness for the missions it is executing today—although other observers are not as confident—but express concern over the military's readiness for potential missions in the future. How is readiness measured? Because of the two uses of the term, measuring readiness is difficult; despite ongoing efforts, many observers do not find DOD's readiness reporting useful. How might DOD's FY2018 budget request improve readiness? DOD's request increases operating accounts more than procurement accounts. If readiness is used in a narrow sense, these funding increases may be the best way to improve the military's readiness. If readiness is used in a broader sense, that funding may not be sufficient, or at least the best way to improve readiness. |
crs_R41120 | crs_R41120_0 | In this way, the Internet has proven to be an unprecedented and often disruptive force in some closed societies, as the governments seek to maintain their authority and control the ideas and information their citizens receive. These regimes are often caught in a dilemma: they need the Internet to participate in commerce in the global market and for economic growth and technological development, but they also seek to restrict the Internet in order to maintain the government's control. 2271 ), introduced by Representative Christopher Smith, would mandate that companies selling Internet technologies and services to repressive countries take actions to combat censorship and protect personally identifiable information. Some believe, however, that technology can offer a complementary and, in some cases, better and more easily implemented solution to prevent government censorship. Hardware and Internet services, in and of themselves, are neutral elements of the Internet; it is how they are implemented by various countries that makes Internet access "repressive." On the other hand, Internet services, such as Google, are often tailored for deployment to specific countries. Such tailoring is done to bring the company's products and services in line with the laws of that country, and not with the end goal of allowing the country to repress and censor its citizenry. In many cases, tailoring does not raise many questions about free speech and political repression because the country is not considered to be a repressive regime. In advancing Internet freedom as an objective of U.S. foreign policy, Secretary Clinton proposed a number of key initiatives:
Continue the work of the State Department's GIFT as it oversees U.S. efforts in more than 40 countries to help individuals circumvent politically motivated censorship by developing new tools and providing the training needed to safely access the Internet; Make Internet freedom an issue at the United Nations and the U.N. Human Rights Council in order to enlist world opinion and support for Internet Freedom; Work with new partners in industry, academia, and non-governmental organizations to establish a standing effort to advance the power of "connection technologies" that will empower citizens and leverage U.S. traditional diplomacy; Provide new, competitive grants for ideas and applications that help break down communications barriers, overcome illiteracy, and connect people to servers and information they need; Urge and work with U.S. media companies to take a proactive role in challenging foreign governments' demands for censorship and surveillance; and Encourage the voluntary work of the communications-oriented, private sector-led Global Network Initiative (GNI). | Modern means of communications, led by the Internet, provide a relatively inexpensive, open, easy-entry means of sharing ideas, information, pictures, and text around the world. In a political and human rights context, in closed societies when the more established, formal news media is denied access to or does not report on specified news events, the Internet has become an alternative source of media, and sometimes a means to organize politically.
The openness and the freedom of expression allowed through blogs, social networks, video sharing sites, and other tools of today's communications technology has proven to be an unprecedented and often disruptive force in some closed societies. Governments that seek to maintain their authority and control the ideas and information their citizens receive are often caught in a dilemma: they feel that they need access to the Internet to participate in commerce in the global market and for economic growth and technological development, but fear that allowing open access to the Internet potentially weakens their control over their citizens. The ongoing situation of Google in China is representative of these issues.
Legislation now under consideration in the 111th Congress would mandate that U.S. companies selling Internet technologies and services to repressive countries take actions to combat censorship and protect personally identifiable information. Some believe, however, that technology can offer a complementary and, in some cases, better and more easily implemented solution to some of those issues. They argue that hardware and Internet services, in and of themselves, are neutral elements of the Internet; it is how they are implemented by various countries that is repressive. Also, Internet services are often tailored for deployment to specific countries; however, such tailoring is done to bring the company in line with the laws of that country, not with the intention of allowing the country to repress and censor its citizenry. In many cases, that tailoring would not raise many questions about free speech and political repression.
This report provides information regarding the role of U.S. and other foreign companies in facilitating Internet censorship by repressive regimes overseas. The report is divided into several sections:
Examination of repressive policies in China and Iran, Relevant U.S. laws, U.S. policies to promote Internet freedom, Private sector initiatives, and Congressional action.
Two appendixes describe technologies and mechanisms for censorship and circumvention of government restrictions. |
crs_RL34660 | crs_RL34660_0 | In managing the collection of this debt, the FMS relies on two programs it operates with assistance from several federal agencies. This report briefly describes the origins and current status of both programs and discusses legislation being considered in the 110 th Congress to expand their scope. It will be updated to reflect recent developments affecting either program. The FPLP facilitates the collection of overdue federal taxes by imposing a continuous levy on designated federal payments disbursed by the FMS to business and individual taxpayers holding delinquent tax debt. Origins and Current Status of the Treasury Offset Program
The TOP arose from several provisions of the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, which authorized the Treasury Department to establish a mechanism for withholding or reducing certain federal payments to pay off delinquent federal and state non-tax debt held by individuals. Under the current program, the FMS offsets or lowers a variety of federal payments to satisfy an individual's delinquent federal non-tax debt, child support obligations, or state income tax debt. The act would require the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to make its payments to health care providers and vendors under Medicare Parts A and B available for screening for delinquent tax debt under the FPLP over two years: 50% of payments would be screened the first year and 100% of payments the following year. The House passed a bill ( H.R. 4848 ) in February 2008 that included a provision directing CMS to participate in the FPLP. In addition, the bill would require the FMS and IRS to assist the CMS in meeting those deadlines. What is more, in late June 2008, the House passed a measure ( H.R. 6275 ) to raise the exemption amounts for individual taxpayers under the alternative minimum tax in 2008. Among the offsets included in the bill is a proposed amendment of IRC Section 6331(h)(2) that would allow the IRS to apply a continuous levy to federal payments to vendors that sell or rent property (as opposed to goods and services) to the federal government and are delinquent in the payment of their federal taxes. | One of the numerous functions performed by the Financial Management Service (FMS) at the Treasury Department is the collection of delinquent tax and non-tax debt owed to a variety of state governments and federal agencies.
In managing the collection of this debt, the FMS relies on two programs it operates with assistance from several federal agencies: the Treasury Offset Program (TOP) and the Federal Payment Levy Program (FPLP). Both programs allow the FMS to offset or reduce specified federal payments to individuals or companies in order to satisfy qualified tax or non-tax debts. The TOP deals with federal non-tax debts (e.g., delinquent federal student loans) and state tax and non-tax debts, whereas the FPLP is targeted at federal tax debt only.
This report describes the origins and current status of both programs and discusses legislative initiatives in the 110th Congress to expand or modify their scope or design. It will be updated to reflect recent developments affecting either program.
Two bills passed by the House but not considered by the Senate would expand the list of federal payments subject to continuous levy under the FPLP. In February 2008, the House passed H.R. 4848. One of its provisions would direct the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to participate in the FPLP. It would also require CMS to take all necessary steps to ensure that all payments to health care providers under Medicare Parts A and B are processed through the program by the end of September 2011. The FMS and Internal Revenue Service would be required to provide all needed assistance to enable CMS to meet that deadline.
In addition, in late June 2008, the House passed a measure (H.R. 6275) to raise the exemption amounts for individual taxpayers under the alternative minimum tax in 2008. Among the offsets included in the bill is an amendment of IRC Section 6331(h)(2) that would allow the FMS to apply a continuous levy to federal payments to vendors that sell or rent property to the federal government and are delinquent in the payment of their federal taxes. |
crs_RL34668 | crs_RL34668_0 | Most Recent Legislative Developments
The "Foreign Service Overseas Pay Equity Act of 2008," H.R. 3202 , as amended, would eliminate, over three years, the pay difference between those Foreign Service personnel serving in Washington, D.C. and those serving abroad who are not eligible for a locality pay adjustment. This bill was referred to both the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (HCFA) and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (HOGR). On July 16, 2008, HCFA favorably reported the bill by voice vote. On August 1, 2008, an identical companion bill was introduced in the Senate, S. 3426 , and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC). Introduction
At a time when 55% of U.S. Foreign Service personnel are serving at a hardship and/or danger post, the 110 th Congress, in its closing days, may choose whether and how to address an issue that both the Department of State and the Foreign Service consider to be a high priority personnel issue—the elimination of a 20.89% pay difference between service in the Washington, D.C. and service abroad for the vast majority of the members of the Foreign Service below the Senior Foreign Service level. While opponents question the need for a change in the compensation system because of the other allowances and benefits that Foreign Service often get when serving abroad, proponents for the elimination of the pay difference contend that the disparity has negative implications on the morale of the Foreign Service, considerations about overseas assignments, and possibly eventually on retention. Legislative Background in the 109th and 110th Congresses
During the 109 th Congress, Republican and Democratic leadership of both the House Committee on International Relations and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations worked to resolve this pay differential issue by developing a proposal called the Foreign Service Compensation Reform. This proposal—developed through negotiations among the House and Senate committees, the Administration, and AFSA—would have (1) placed the Foreign Service compensation system on a pay-for-performance (PFP) basis with pay adjustments made only on the basis of performance and not longevity, and (2) eliminated the current pay difference by creating a new worldwide pay structure at the Washington, D.C., salary level over two years. H.R. On July 16, 2008, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its FY2009 State Department/Foreign Operations and related programs appropriations legislation, S. 3288 . This bill provided sufficient funding levels to meet the Administration's request. 3202 , as amended, which, without providing for a performance-based pay system, would eliminate the pay disparity over three years. On September 23, 2008, the SFRC considered and reported S. 3426 without amendments. While the Administration is seeking changes to the personnel system to make it performance-based, Foreign Service personnel believe that its personnel system is already a performance-based system. Why Change the Compensation System? Administration Perspective: To Correct the Pay Difference and Move Another Element of the Federal Service to a Full Pay-for-Performance Personnel System
The George W. Bush Administration, in its FY2009 budget, requested $35.9 million for the Department of State to fund the first step of transition to a performance-based system and a global rate of pay for Foreign Service personnel at grades of 01 and below. 3202, as amended, and S. 3426
Foreign Service Overseas Pay Equity Act of 2008
Both H.R. 3. | Proponents of revisions in the Foreign Service compensation system point out that as increasing numbers of Foreign Service personnel are going to posts of increased hardship and danger, Foreign Service personnel serving abroad receive 20.89% less than their colleagues who are posted in Washington, D.C. due to the loss of locality pay when serving abroad. These proponents of revision maintain that this difference negatively impacts morale and assignment considerations, and eventually retention also. Both the 109th and 110th Congresses have considered proposals to eliminate this pay difference.
The American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) has been working for several years with congressional supporters to change the compensation system. Since FY2007, the George W. Bush Administration has requested funds to create a new performance-based compensation system for the Foreign Service and eliminate the pay differential. For FY2009, the Administration requested $34.7 million for the first stage of a transition to pay equity. The Senate Appropriations Committee provided sufficient funding to meet the Administration's request in its appropriations bill, S. 3288, reported on July 18, 2008.
The "Foreign Service Overseas Pay Equity Act of 2008," H.R. 3202, as amended, would eliminate the pay differences over three years. This bill was referred to both the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (HCFA) and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (HOGR). HCFA reported the bill on July 16, 2008. An identical bill was introduced in the Senate, S. 3426, on August 1, 2008, and was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC). The SFRC reported the bill, without amendments, on September 23, 2008.
The major difference between the Administration's proposal and the current legislation is that the Administration, while proposing to eliminate the pay difference over two years, also seeks to develop a new performance-based worldwide compensation system for the Foreign Service. H.R. 3202 and S. 3426 would eliminate the pay differences over three years without reference to developing a new performance-based system. AFSA states that the Foreign Service personnel system is already performance-based, and the pay adjustment proposals eliminate an unintended inequity. Others with concerns about the legislation, however, state this is basically a pay increase for the Foreign Service and question whether increases are needed because of the benefits and allowances Foreign Service personnel generally receive when posted abroad. This report discusses (1) the legislative background leading to a proposal to change the compensation system, (2) the current Foreign Service personnel system and why the Foreign Service views it as already performance-based, (3) an examination of why the Foreign Service and the Administration are both requesting that Congress change the compensation system, (4) an examination of H.R. 3202 and S. 3426, the "Foreign Service Overseas Pay Equity Act of 2008," and (5) some issues that Congress might be asked to consider. This report may be updated. |
crs_R41679 | crs_R41679_0 | The incident produced the largest oil spill that has occurred in U.S. waters, releasing more than 200 million gallons over approximately 84 days. In its 2010 financial statement, BP estimated the combined oil spill costs—cleanup, natural resource and economic damages, potential Clean Water Act (CWA) penalties, and other obligations—will be approximately $41 billion. This framework, which is grounded in federal statute and regulations, determines the following:
1. who is responsible for paying for oil spill cleanup costs; 2. who is responsible for paying for economic and natural resource damages associated with an oil spill; 3. how these costs and damages are defined (i.e., what is covered); and 4. the degree to which (or conditions in which) the costs and damages are limited and/or shared by other parties, including general taxpayers. The OPA liability and compensation framework includes a combination of elements that distribute the costs of an oil spill between the responsible party (or parties) and a trust fund, which is largely financed through a per-barrel tax on domestic and imported oil. Responsible parties are liable up to their liability caps (if applicable); the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund covers costs above liability limits up to a per-incident cap of $1 billion. Issues for Policymakers
The 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill generated considerable interest in the existing oil spill liability and compensation framework. Policymakers may want to consider the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon incident and the liability and compensation issues raised under a scenario in which BP had refused to finance response activities or establish a claims process to comply with the relevant OPA provisions. BP has either directly funded oil spill response operations or reimbursed the federal government for actions taken by various agencies. BP has paid damage claims well above its liability limit of $75 million (assuming it would apply) and outside the scope of its liable damages (e.g., human health-related claims). Liability Limits
In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon spill, many Members of the 111 th Congress expressed concern about the level of the liability limit for offshore facilities. However, data from a 2007 GAO report suggest that the projected levels may be sufficient to address the more common mix of spills that have historically occurred. Potential Options for Policymakers
The current combination of liability limits and $1 billion per-incident cap is not sufficient to withstand a spill with damages/costs that exceed a responsible party's liability limit (assuming it would apply) by $1 billion. Even if the per-incident cap were increased, the current (and projected) level of funds in the OSLTF may not be sufficient to address costs from a catastrophic spill. The options available to address these issues depend upon on the overall objective of Congress. One objective—which has been expressed by many in and outside Congress—is to provide full restoration and timely compensation for the impacts from a catastrophic spill, without directly burdening the general taxpayers. Remove or raise the per-incident cap on the trust fund. Another objective might be to maintain the existing system, which may be sufficient to address all but the most extreme scenarios. Catastrophic spills in U.S. waters have historically been rare. Some may argue that establishing a system that can withstand a catastrophic event would impose costs and yield consequences that would not justify the (expected) ability to address a catastrophic event. | The 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident produced the largest oil spill that has occurred in U.S. waters, releasing more than 200 million gallons into the Gulf of Mexico. BP has estimated the combined oil spill costs—cleanup activities, natural resource and economic damages, potential Clean Water Act (CWA) penalties, and other obligations—will be approximately $41 billion.
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill raised many issues for policymakers, including the ability of the existing oil spill liability and compensation framework to respond to a catastrophic spill. This framework determines (1) who is responsible for paying for oil spill cleanup costs and the economic and natural resource damages from an oil spill; (2) how these costs and damages are defined (i.e., what is covered?); and (3) the degree to which, and conditions in which, the costs and damages are limited and/or shared by other parties, including general taxpayers.
The existing framework includes a combination of elements that distribute the costs of an oil spill between the responsible party (or parties) and the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), which is largely financed through a per-barrel tax on domestic and imported oil. Responsible parties are liable up to their liability caps (if applicable); the trust fund covers costs above liability limits up to a per-incident cap of $1 billion.
Policymakers may want to consider the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon incident and the liability and compensation issues raised under a scenario in which BP had refused to finance response activities or establish a claims process to comply with the relevant OPA provisions. BP has either directly funded oil spill response operations or reimbursed the federal government for actions taken by various agencies. BP has paid damage claims well above its liability limit and outside the scope of its liable damages.
Although evidence indicates that the levels of current framework (liability limits and OSLTF) may be sufficient to address the more common mix of spills that have historically occurred, the current combination of liability limits and $1 billion per-incident OSLTF cap is not sufficient to withstand a spill with damages/costs that exceed a responsible party's liability limit by $1 billion. Even if the per-incident cap were increased, the current (and projected) level of funds in the OSLTF may not be sufficient to address costs from a catastrophic spill.
The options available to address these issues depend upon the overall objective of Congress. One objective—which has been expressed by many in and outside Congress—is to provide full restoration and timely compensation (i.e., through channels other than litigation) for the impacts from the spill, without directly burdening the general taxpayers. If this is the objective, Congress may consider some combination of (1) increasing the offshore facility liability limit and corresponding financial responsibility demonstration; (2) increasing the OSLTF per-incident cap; or (3) increasing the level of funds available in the OSLTF. In addition, policymakers may want to consider an industry-financed fund, akin to the nuclear power industry's fund, that could supplement or potentially replace the current system.
Another objective might be to maintain the existing system, which may be sufficient to address all but the most extreme scenarios. Catastrophic spills in U.S. waters have historically been rare. Some may argue that establishing a system that can withstand a catastrophic event would impose costs and yield consequences that would not justify the (expected) ability to address a catastrophic event. |
crs_R43959 | crs_R43959_0 | Introduction
The Federal Perkins Loan program is one of three postsecondary student financial aid programs that are collectively referred to as the campus-based programs. The Perkins Loan program authorizes the allocation of federal funds to institutions of higher education (IHEs) to assist them in capitalizing revolving loan funds for the purpose of making low-interest loans to students with exceptional financial need. The program is authorized under Title IV, Part E of the Higher Education Act (HEA). Each institution's ICC must equal one-third of the FCC received. Is the Perkins Loan program currently authorized? What is the funding status of the Perkins Loan program? Without new appropriations, how does the program continue to function? Additionally, IHEs may transfer up to 25% of their federal allotments under the Federal Work-Study program to their Federal Perkins Loan fund. What happens if authorization of appropriations for the Perkins Loan program expires? However, when IHEs end their participation in the Perkins Loan program, they are required to assign any outstanding loans to ED for collection. What would be the cost to the federal government if authorization of appropriations for the Perkins Loan program is extended? | The Federal Perkins Loan program authorizes the allocation of federal funds to institutions of higher education to assist them in capitalizing revolving loan funds for the purpose of making low-interest loans to students with exceptional financial need. Institutions participating in the program are required to provide matching funds equal to one-third of the federal funds they receive. Authorization of appropriations for the Perkins Loan program is due to expire at the end of FY2015, and the future operation of the program is uncertain. This report answers several frequently asked questions regarding the current and future status of the Federal Perkins Loan program, including the following:
Is the Perkins Loan program currently authorized? What is the funding status of the Perkins Loan program? Without new appropriations, how does the program continue to function? What happens if authorization of appropriations for the Perkins Loan program expires? What would be the cost to the federal government if authorization for the Perkins Loan program is extended?
The Federal Perkins Loan program is one of three federal student aid programs authorized by the Higher Education Act, which are collectively known as the campus-based programs. The Federal Work-Study program and the Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant program are the two other campus-based programs. For an overview of each of the campus-based programs, see CRS Report RL31618, Campus-Based Student Financial Aid Programs Under the Higher Education Act, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34108 | crs_RL34108_0 | Introduction
The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) is a comprehensive trade agreement that eliminates tariffs and other barriers in goods and services trade between the United States and Peru. The agreement was signed on April 12, 2006 by the U.S. Trade Representative and the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Trade and Tourism. On November 8, 2007, the House of Representatives passed (285-132) H.R. 3688 to implement the PTPA under the Trade Promotion Authority, which requires an expedited process with limited debate and an up or down vote. The Senate approved (77-18) legislation on December 4, 2007, and President Bush signed the implementing bill for the free trade agreement on December 14, 2007 ( P.L. 110-138 ). In Peru, the Peruvian Congress voted 79 to 14 to approve the agreement on June 28, 2006. On January 16, 2009, President Bush issued a proclamation to implement the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement as of February 1, 2009. The PTPA negotiations began in May 2004, when the United States, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador participated in the first round of negotiations for a U.S.-Andean free trade agreement (FTA). After thirteen rounds of talks, however, negotiators failed to reach an agreement. Peru continued negotiations alone with the United States and concluded the bilateral agreement in December 2005. Implementing legislation for the PTPA was considered by the U.S. Congress under Title XXI (Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002) of the Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. On June 25, 2007, U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab announced that the United States reached an agreement with Peru on a number of legally binding amendments to the PTPA on labor, the environment, and other matters to reflect the bipartisan agreement of May 10. U.S.-Peru Merchandise Trade
The United States is Peru's leading trade partner. In 2007, 19% of Peru's exports went to the United States, and 18% of Peru's imports were supplied by the United States. As shown in Table 2 , the dominant U.S. import item from Peru is copper (19% of U.S. imports from Peru in 2007), followed by petroleum and other oils and products (12% of total), and silver (8% of total). Andean Trade Preference Act
The United States currently extends duty-free treatment to imports from Peru under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), a regional trade preference program. 102-182 ), enacted on December 4, 1991. The Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA; Title XXXI of P.L. Key PTPA Provisions25
Market Access
Upon implementation, the agreement would eliminate duties on 80% of U.S. exports of consumer and industrial products to Peru. An additional 7% of U.S. exports would receive duty-free treatment within five years of implementation. Remaining tariffs would be eliminated ten years after implementation. The PTPA would make the preferential duty treatment for U.S. imports from Peru under the ATPDEA permanent. Issues for Congress
Economic Impact
When fully implemented, the PTPA will likely have a have a small, but positive, net economic effect on the United States because of the relatively small size of Peru's economy in relation to the U.S. economy. U.S. imports from Peru account for 0.3% of total U.S. imports, and U.S. exports to Peru account for 0.3% of total U.S. exports. Other Members of Congress have expressed strong support for the PTPA and for the government of Peru in its efforts to strengthen laws and regulations on labor, environment, intellectual property. They argue that, among other things, that the PTPA will erode protection for the environment and workers' rights in Peru. | The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) is a comprehensive trade agreement that, upon implementation, eliminates tariffs and other barriers in goods and services between the United States and Peru. The agreement was signed on April 12, 2006 by the U.S. Trade Representative and the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Trade and Tourism. On November 8, 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives passed (285-132) implementing legislation for the PTPA (H.R. 3688). The U.S. Senate approved (77-18) legislation on December 4, 2007. President Bush signed the implementing bill for the free trade agreement on December 14, 2007 (P.L. 110-138). In Peru, the Peruvian Congress voted 79 to 14 on June 28, 2006 to approve the agreement. On January 16, 2009, President Bush issued a proclamation to implement the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement as of February 1, 2009.
The PTPA will likely have a small net economic effect on the United States because U.S. trade with Peru accounts for a small percent of total U.S. trade. For Peru, the impact will be more significant because the United States is Peru's leading trade partner. In 2007, 19% of Peru's exports went to the United States, and 18% of Peru's imports were supplied by the United States. In that same year, Peru accounted for 0.3% of total U.S. trade. Peru ranks 41st among U.S. export markets and 44th as a source of U.S. imports. The dominant U.S. import item from Peru is copper followed by petroleum oils and related products. The leading U.S. export item to Peru is petroleum oils and related products, followed by wheat and meslin.
Upon implementation, the PTPA will eliminate duties on 80% of U.S. exports of consumer and industrial products to Peru. An additional 7% of U.S. exports will receive duty-free treatment within five years of implementation. Remaining tariffs will be eliminated ten years after implementation. The PTPA will make the preferential duty treatment for selected U.S. imports from Peru permanent. The United States currently extends duty-free treatment to imports from Peru under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA; Title II of P.L. 102-182), enacted on December 4, 1991 and reauthorized under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA; Title XXXI of P.L. 107-210). The preference program is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2009.
The PTPA negotiations began in May 2004, when the United States, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador participated in the first round of negotiations for a U.S.-Andean free trade agreement (FTA). When negotiators failed to reach an agreement, Peru continued negotiations with the United States on a bilateral basis and concluded the agreement in December 2005. Implementing legislation for the PTPA was considered by the U.S. Congress under Title XXI (Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002) of the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210), which requires an expedited process with limited debate and an up or down vote. In June 2007, the United States and Peru reached an agreement to a number of legally binding amendments to the PTPA that were subsequently approved by both countries on labor, the environment, and other matters. House Democratic leaders have stated that the PTPA has potential to improve the standards of living in the United States and Peru but they have expressed concerns about Peru's labor laws and the lack of protection for workers' rights in Peru, especially with regard to freedom of association. Other Members of Congress have expressed strong support for the PTPA and for the government of Peru in its efforts to strengthen laws and regulations on labor, environment, and intellectual property. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R45203 | crs_R45203_0 | Introduction
Shortly following his confirmation as Secretary of State in April 2018, Secretary Mike Pompeo lifted the hiring freeze that former Secretary Rex Tillerson left in place for over a year. Subsequent guidance issued after the hiring freeze indicates that the department intends to increase Foreign and Civil Service personnel levels in a manner consistent with the language and funding Congress included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ). The Trump Administration has taken additional actions affecting Department of State personnel, including designing "keystone modernization projects" within its Leadership and Modernization Impact Initiative. These projects seek to strengthen workforce readiness and enhance performance management and employee accountability, among other goals. The State Department is also prioritizing efforts to address long-standing concerns regarding the perceived lack of diversity in the Foreign Service. The Trump Administration has moved more slowly than previous Administrations in transmitting nominations for senior Department of State positions to the Senate for advice and consent; meanwhile, the Senate has taken longer than it has in the past to provide advice and consent for many of those nominations that have been transmitted. Since his confirmation, Secretary Pompeo has pledged that he will work to enable the Department of State to play a central role in implementing President Trump's agenda and protecting the national security of the United States, empower the department's personnel in their roles, and ensure that department personnel have a clear understanding of the President's mission. While the President possesses a level of control over personnel policies at the Department of State, Congress has demonstrated interest in leveraging its constitutional and statutory prerogatives to shape the department's personnel policies since at least the mid-19 th century, when it codified compensation levels for individuals appointed to certain diplomatic and consular positions. More recently, passage of the landmark Foreign Service Act of 1980 ( P.L. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 ( P.L. 95-454 ), as amended, provides the modern statutory framework for the Civil Service. In addition to combining the U.S. diplomatic and consular services for the first time and establishing the modern Foreign Service, the Rogers Act of 1924 (P.L. Furthermore, this law
established grades and classes of Foreign Service Officers and established salaries for those grades and classes; stated that appointments to the position of Foreign Service Officer shall be made after examination and a suitable period of probation in an unclassified grade, or after five years of continuous service in the Department of State by transfer to the Foreign Service upon meeting the rules and regulations established by the President; established that all appointments to the Foreign Service shall be by commission to a class and not by commission to any particular post, and that a Foreign Service Officer shall be assigned to a post and may be transferred by the President from post to post depending upon the interests of the service; stated that Foreign Service Officers may be appointed as secretaries in the diplomatic service or as consular officers or both and that any such appointment shall be made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and authorized the President to establish a Foreign Service retirement and disability system to be administered by the Secretary of State, and provided for a mandatory retirement age of 65 with 15 years of service. 96-465 ) was enacted. Civil Service Personnel
The Department of State employed over 10,000 Civil Service (CS) employees as of December 2017. Congressional Responses and Options
Congress has weighed in on early aspects of the Department of State's redesign effort and its potential impacts on Department of State personnel. Some Members of Congress and others questioned the Trump Administration's efforts to reduce Department of State personnel levels. If Congress sought to impel the Department of State to further increase hiring, it could consider appropriating more funds to the Human Resources category of the department's Diplomatic & Consular Programs account, which is used to pay salaries for the department's domestic and overseas American employees. Congressional Responses and Options
The Senate has the authority, pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, to provide advice and consent for presidential appointments of ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls. Congress could also address other personnel issues through legislation. | Current Context and Recent Developments
Shortly after his confirmation as Secretary of State in April 2018, Secretary Mike Pompeo lifted the hiring freeze that former Secretary Rex Tillerson left in place for over a year. Guidance issued after Secretary Pompeo's action indicates that the department intends to increase Foreign and Civil Service personnel levels in a manner consistent with the language and funding Congress included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141). The Trump Administration has taken additional actions affecting Department of State personnel, including designing "keystone modernization projects" within its Leadership and Modernization Impact Initiative. These projects seek to strengthen workforce readiness and enhance performance management and employee accountability, among other goals. The State Department is also prioritizing efforts to address long-standing concerns regarding the perceived lack of diversity in the Foreign Service.
The Trump Administration has moved more slowly than previous Administrations in transmitting nominations for senior Department of State positions to the Senate for advice and consent; meanwhile, the Senate has taken longer than it has in the past to provide advice and consent for many of those nominations that have been transmitted.
Some Members of Congress and other observers have expressed varying levels of concern with some of these developments, with some arguing that the Trump Administration (especially under former Secretary Tillerson) had been purposefully attempting to weaken the Department of State and diminish its influence in developing and implementing U.S. foreign policy. Secretary Pompeo pledged that he will work to enable the Department of State to play a central role in implementing President Trump's agenda and protecting the national security of the United States, while empowering the department's personnel in their roles.
The Role of Congress in History and Today
The 115th Congress has demonstrated interest in applying the legislative branch's constitutional and statutory authorities to shape policies pertaining to Department of State personnel. Some congressional prerogatives date back to the 18th century: Congress established the Department of State and began prescribing salaries for personnel in 1789, while Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution provides the Senate the authority to provide advice and consent for presidential appointments of ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls. The role of Congress expanded more gradually elsewhere. The executive branch maintained almost exclusive authority in developing the administrative policies governing the U.S. diplomatic and consular services and their personnel until the mid-19th century, when Congress codified compensation levels for individuals appointed to certain diplomatic and consular positions. Congressional purview over this area has subsequently expanded considerably, as Congress merged the diplomatic and consular services into a Foreign Service with the passage of the Rogers Act of 1924 (P.L. 68-135) and later modernized and refined the Foreign Service's policies and procedures through the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-465).
The Department of State's Foreign Affairs Manual describes several categories of Foreign Service personnel at the Department of State. Many of these categories, or the authorities afforded to personnel employed within them, are provided through statute. In addition, the Department of State employed over 10,000 Civil Service (CS) employees as of December 2017, who work in 11 different job categories. Congress has long had a significant role in the administration of the Civil Service, whose framework is now defined in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-454), as amended.
Looking Ahead
While the President possesses a level of control over executive branch personnel policies, several options are available to the 115th Congress and future Congresses to facilitate, alter, block, or conduct oversight of the executive branch's initiatives. These include legislative action through Department of State or foreign relations authorization measures and annual appropriations bills or other measures, as well as periodic hearings on management and reform issues. On personnel issues, for example, Congress could encourage the Department of State to further increase hiring with additional appropriated funds to the Human Resources category of the department's Diplomatic & Consular Programs account, which is used to pay salaries for the department's domestic and overseas American employees. Congress could also weigh in on the department's plans to improve workforce management, or consider changes to aspects of the presidential appointments process. |
crs_R44453 | crs_R44453_0 | Introduction
Over the last several years, both the Supreme Court and Congress have actively considered the scope of class action lawsuits. Background
T he class action suit is a procedural device for joining numerous parties in a civil lawsuit when the "issues involved are common to the class as a whole" and when the issues "turn on questions of law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class." Class actions "save[] the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class member] to be lit igated in an economical fashion .... " The class action also affords aggrieved parties a remedy when it is not economically feasible to obtain relie f, such as where each claim involves only a small dollar amount. The modern class action appears to be derived from the Bill of Peace, an equitable proceeding developed by the English Court of Chancery, which enabled an equity court to hear an action by or against representatives of a group if the plaintiff could establish that the number of people involved was so large as to make traditional joinder impossible or impracticable. Class suits have long been a part of American jurisprudence, starting with their authorization by federal courts under equity rules. These rules gradually became codified at the state and federal level, but were generally restricted to cases where the class shared a common or general interest and where the parties were too numerous for the cases to be combined traditionally under joinder. With the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of modern society, the class action has taken on a more prominent role. Rule 23(b) further requires that one of the following elements be proven by the party seeking to bring the action:
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of: (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or (B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes , the Court has limited the ability of plaintiffs who are not similarly situated from bringing class action suits, which may result in smaller class sizes. The Court in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez declined to find that a defendant's offer to provide complete relief to settle a plaintiff's individual claims would moot a class action lawsuit before certification, which might have made it more difficult for a particular individual to bring a class action. The Court, however, left open the possibility that such an action might be rendered moot by the defendant putting funds in an account payable to the plaintiff. In Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo , the Court held that each person joined in a class action suit need not prove, individually, that she was harmed by the claimed misconduct, if statistical models can show such harm. Although the Court declined to articulate all the situations in which statistical evidence could be introduced, it left open the possibility that such evidence could be used in a number of future class action cases. In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , the Court is still considering whether a class action meets the standing requirements of Article III if the plaintiff suffered a statutory injury but no actual damages. If the Court finds that a statutory injury is sufficient to satisfy Article III, class actions brought under those claims might be more easily certified than class actions where proof of injury may vary from plaintiff to plaintiff. In January 2016, the House passed H.R. 1927 , the Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2016. This legislation, if enacted into law, would arguably limit the size of some class action suits by limiting class action suits to class members who have suffered injuries of the same type and scope. | The class action suit is a procedural device for joining numerous parties in a civil lawsuit when the issues involved are common to the class as a whole and when the issues turn on questions of law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class. Class actions are intended to save the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every class member to be litigated together in an economical fashion. The class action is also intended to allow parties to pursue a legal remedy when it is not economically feasible to obtain relief, such as where each claim involves only a small dollar amount.
The modern class action appears to be derived from the Bill of Peace, an equitable proceeding developed by the English Court of Chancery, which enabled an equity court to hear an action by or against representatives of a group, if the plaintiff could establish that the number of people involved was so large as to make joinder impossible or impracticable. Class suits have long been a part of American jurisprudence, starting with their authorization by federal courts under equity rules. These rules gradually became codified at the state and federal level, but were generally restricted to cases where the class shared a common or general interest and where the parties were too numerous for the cases to be combined under traditional rules of joinder. With the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of modern society, the class action has taken on a more prominent role.
Over the last several years, both the Supreme Court and Congress have actively considered the scope of class action lawsuits. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, decided in 2011, the Court has limited the ability of plaintiffs who are not similarly situated from bringing class action suits, which may result in smaller class sizes. During the 2015 term, the Court in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez declined to find that a defendant's offer to provide complete relief to settle a plaintiff's individual claims would moot a class action lawsuit before certification, which might have made it more difficult for a particular individual to bring a class action. The Court, however, left open the possibility that such an action might be rendered moot by the defendant putting funds in an account payable to the plaintiff.
In Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, also decided during the 2015 term, the Court held that each person joined in a class action suit need not prove, individually, that she was harmed by the claimed misconduct, if statistical models can show such harm. Although the Court declined to articulate all the situations in which statistical evidence could be introduced, it left open the possibility that such evidence could be used in a number of future class action cases. In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Court has been asked to consider whether a class action meets the standing requirements of Article III if the plaintiff suffered a statutory injury but no actual damages. If the Court finds that a statutory injury is sufficient to satisfy Article III, class actions brought under those claims might be more easily certified than class actions where proof of injury may vary from plaintiff to plaintiff.
In January 2016, the House passed H.R. 1927, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2016. This legislation, if enacted into law, would arguably limit the size of some class action suits by limiting class action suits to class members who have suffered injuries of the same type and scope. |
crs_R43975 | crs_R43975_0 | Federal law authorizes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to construct barriers along the U.S. borders to deter illegal crossings. DHS is also required to construct reinforced fencing along at least 700 miles of the land border with Mexico, though fencing is not required to be deployed at any "particular location" alon g that border. Although congressional interest in the legal framework governing fence deployment has, in recent years, tended to focus on the stringency of the statutory mandate to deploy fencing along at least 700 miles of the southern border, attention has now shifted to those provisions in current law which allow, but do not require, the deployment of fencing and other barriers along additional portions of the U.S. land borders. Within days of taking office, President Donald J. Trump issued an executive order instructing the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting under existing legal authorities, to "take all appropriate steps to immediately plan, design, and construct a physical wall along the southern border ... to most effectively achieve complete operational control" of the U.S.-Mexico border. The order defines a "wall" to mean "a contiguous, physical wall or other similarly secure, contiguous, and impassable physical barrier." The order does not identify the contemplated mileage of the wall to be constructed. The primary statute authorizing DHS to deploy barriers along the international borders is Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). Congress made significant amendments to IIRIRA Section 102 through three enactments—the REAL ID Act of 2005, the Secure Fence Act of 2006, and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008. These amendments established a mandate upon DHS to construct hundreds of miles of new fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border, and also provided the Secretary of Homeland Security with broad authority to waive "all legal requirements" that may impede construction of barriers and roads under IIRIRA Section 102. These statutory modifications, along with increased funding for border projects, resulted in the deployment of several hundred miles of fencing and other barriers along the southwest land border between 2005 and 2011. However, it appears that further fencing would need to be deployed in order for DHS to satisfy the statutory requirement that the agency construct fencing "along not less than 700 miles of the southwest border." DHS's policy not to deploy a substantial amount of additional fencing, beyond what is expressly required by law, appeared to be premised primarily on policy considerations and funding constraints, rather than significant legal impediments. Indeed, nothing in current statute would appear to bar DHS from installing hundreds of miles of additional physical barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border, even beyond the 700 miles required by law, so long as the action was determined appropriate to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry or was deemed warranted to achieve "operational control" of the southern border. Among other things, IIRIRA Section 102 in its current form
generally authorizes DHS to construct barriers and roads along the international borders in order to deter illegal crossings at locations of high illegal entry; requires the construction of reinforced fencing covering at least 700 miles along the southwest border, though the Secretary is not required to install fencing at any particular location; authorizes for the installation of additional physical barriers and infrastructure to gain operational control of the southwest border; requires a specified amount of fencing in priority areas along the southwest border, which DHS was instructed to have completed by December 31, 2008; and provides the Secretary of Homeland Security with authority to waive any legal requirements which may impede construction of barriers and roads under Section 102. | Federal law authorizes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to construct barriers along the U.S. borders to deter illegal crossings. DHS is also required to construct reinforced fencing along at least 700 miles of the land border with Mexico (a border that stretches 1,933 miles). Congress has not provided a deadline for DHS to meet this 700-mile requirement, and as of the date of this report, fencing would need to be deployed along nearly 50 additional miles to satisfy the 700-mile requirement. Nor has Congress provided guidelines regarding the specific characteristics of fencing or other physical barriers (e.g., their height or material composition) deployed along the border, beyond specifying that required fencing must be reinforced.
The primary statute authorizing the deployment of fencing and other barriers along the international borders is Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA; P.L. 104-208, div. C). Congress made significant amendments to IIRIRA Section 102 through three enactments—the REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13, div. B), the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367), and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161, div. E). These amendments required DHS to construct hundreds of miles of new fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border, and they also gave the Secretary of DHS broad authority to waive "all legal requirements" that may impede construction of barriers and roads under IIRIRA Section 102. These statutory modifications, along with increased funding for border projects, resulted in the deployment of several hundred miles of new barriers along the southwest border between 2005 and 2011. But in the years following, DHS largely stopped deploying additional fencing, as the agency altered its enforcement strategy in a manner that places less priority upon barrier construction.
On January 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued an executive order that, among other things, instructs the Secretary of Homeland Security to "take all appropriate steps to immediately plan, design, and construct a physical wall along the southern border ... to most effectively achieve complete operational control" of the U.S.-Mexico border. The order defines a "wall" to mean "a contiguous, physical wall or other similarly secure, contiguous, and impassable physical barrier." The order does not identify the contemplated mileage of the wall to be constructed.
Until recently, interest in the framework governing the deployment of barriers along the international border typically focused on the stringency of the statutory mandate to deploy fencing along at least 700 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border. But attention has now shifted to those provisions of law that permit deployment of fencing or other physical barriers along additional mileage. IIRIRA Section 102 authorizes DHS to construct additional fencing or other barriers along the U.S. land borders beyond the 700 miles specified in statute. Indeed, nothing in current law would appear to bar DHS from installing hundreds of miles of additional physical barriers, at least so long as this action was determined appropriate to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry or was deemed warranted to achieve "operational control" of the southern border. DHS's policy not to deploy a substantial amount of additional fencing, beyond what is expressly required by law, appeared primarily premised on policy considerations and funding constraints, rather than significant legal impediments.
This report discusses the statutory framework governing the deployment of fencing and other barriers along the U.S. international borders. For more extensive discussion of ongoing activities and operations along the border between ports of entry, see CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL32466 | crs_RL32466_0 | Introduction
Rising competition for energy in China, Japan, and South Korea are of interest to U.S. policymakers for three primary reasons. Third, competition in Asia over access to energy supplies could significantly alter the geopolitics of the region, with important ramifications for U.S. foreign policy. These measures are among those proposed by many analysts to address current concerns about how China's demand will impact the global oil markets and national security. Congress also established the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission in 2000 to review the national security implications of trade and economic ties between the United States and the People's Republic of China, including an assessment of China's energy needs and strategies. Russia's geographic proximity makes it an attractive supplier for Korea, and it increased its imports of both oil and gas from Russia in 2007. Energy has played a central and controversial role in the ongoing Six-Party Talks among the United States, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia to deal with North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. By nearly every conceivable metric, China has become a primary driver in world energy markets. Rising Competition Over Access to Oil and Gas in the Russian Far East
As China and Japan scramble to meet their energy needs while reducing dependence on the Middle East, the largely undeveloped resources of neighboring Siberia have become a prize. Implications
The long-term potential consequences of rising energy competition in East Asia range from dire predictions of military conflict to scenarios for unprecedented regional cooperation. Bilateral Relationships with Asian Allies
Energy security is an essential concern for the governments of Japan and South Korea, both key American partners in Asia. Japan's unprecedented deployment of Self Defense Forces to Iraq, as well as its active encouragement of Southeast Asian nations to join the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, may be indications of this trend. Increased Russian Stature
Particularly if Asian consumers turn more to natural gas to satisfy their energy needs, Russia stands to gain considerable leverage in the Asia-Pacific. Although Moscow may be challenged by Beijing's inroads with members of the former Soviet empire, the two powers appear to have moved toward cooperation to counter U.S. presence in the region. Given that U.S. alliance partners Japan and South Korea have been willing to engage countries like Iran to secure energy contracts, some fear that a rising China would be even more assertive in cultivating relationships with U.S. adversaries. Options for Congress and Executive Branch Policymakers
Taking a More Aggressive Approach to Securing Exclusive U.S. Access to Energy Supplies
As the world's sole superpower, the United States has pursued an energy policy that, while protecting the American interest in securing energy suppliers, also generally assures access for other energy consuming states. The Department of Energy has taken modest steps to enhance energy efficiency cooperation with Asian nations, including efforts to develop fuel cell technology research and development with the Japanese government; to cooperate with Chinese officials in pursuing cleaner air, with a particular focus on the 2008 Olympic Games to be held in Beijing; and to promote the use of cleaner-burning fuels and reform in the energy sector in the Philippines. Leadership in Developing Multilateral Cooperation
If, as many analysts believe, further globalization of the energy market will reduce the potential for major power conflict and instability, strong leadership is essential to coordinate cooperation between actors. | Asia has become a principal driver in world energy markets, largely due to China's remarkable growth in demand. As the gap between consumption and production levels in Asia expands, the region's economic powers appear to be increasingly anxious about their energy security, concerned that tight supplies and consequent high prices may constrain economic growth. Rising energy competition in East Asia promises to affect U.S. policy in many ways, from contributing to price spikes because of China's rapidly increasing demand to altering the geostrategic landscape in the years to come as regional powers struggle to secure access to energy supplies. This report analyzes how China, Japan, and South Korea's pursuits to bolster their energy security impacts U.S. interests. It also examines decisions being made by Asian states now that will significantly shape global affairs in the future, how these decisions might play out, and how Congress and the executive branch might play a role in those decisions.
China, Japan, and South Korea have been moving aggressively to shore up partnerships with existing suppliers and pursue new energy investments overseas, often downplaying doubts about the technical feasibility and economic profitability of new development. Their outreach to suppliers includes the development of close ties with Iran, a key concern to U.S. policymakers given skepticism about Tehran's nuclear program. This report outlines the energy portfolios and strategies of the three countries, including their pursuit of alternatives to petroleum.
The Russian Far East, with vast energy reserves and relative geographical proximity to northeast Asian markets, is already an arena for competition among the Asian powers. The current struggle between China and Japan over access to Russian oil via a pipeline from Siberia may be indicative of more conflicts ahead. If Russia continues to attract commercial and political overtures to gain access to its resources, Moscow stands to gain considerably more power in international affairs.
The possible implications of the surge in energy competition are wide-ranging, from provoking military conflict to spurring unprecedented regional cooperation. Depending on how events unfold, the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea, as well as relationships with Russia and China, could be challenged to adapt to changing conditions. Central Asia, with its considerable energy supplies and key strategic location, has re-emerged as an arena for geopolitical contests among major powers.
Many analysts concur that it is in the interest of the United States for the governments of China, Japan, and South Korea to approach energy policy from a market perspective. They believe that if Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul instead link energy supply with overall security, the potential for conflict and instability is heightened. The report concludes with a number of options, including those that U.S. policymakers might pursue to encourage a trend towards cooperation and the de-politicization of energy policy.
This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_RL34057 | crs_RL34057_0 | Introduction
On March 12, 2008, the EPA Administrator signed revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone. The revisions appeared in the March 27, 2008 issue of the Federal Register . Because they have widespread implications for public health and for the pollution control measures that will be imposed on sectors of the economy, the revisions (released in proposed form in June 2007) have stirred congressional interest and led many Members of Congress and state and local officials to comment on the Administrator's proposal. Primary NAAQS are standards, "the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the [EPA] Administrator ... are requisite to protect the public health," with "an adequate margin of safety." Once a NAAQS has been set, the agency, using monitoring data and other information submitted by the states, identifies areas that exceed the standard and must, therefore, reduce pollutant concentrations to achieve it. Depending on the severity of the pollution, ozone nonattainment areas have anywhere from 3 to 20 years to actually attain the standard. Thus, establishment or revision of a NAAQS sets in motion a long and complicated implementation process that has far-reaching impacts for public health, for sources of pollution in numerous economic sectors, and for states and local governments. The Ozone Standard
The ozone standard affects a larger percentage of the population than any of the other NAAQS. Nearly half the U.S. population currently lives in ozone nonattainment areas, 140 million people in all. Since the standard has been strengthened as a result of the current review, more areas will be affected, and those already considered nonattainment may have to impose more stringent emission controls. The Primary Standard
The pre-existing primary (health-based) standard, promulgated in 1997, was set at 0.08 parts per million (ppm), averaged over an 8-hour period. The revision will add a large number of counties to those showing nonattainment. Figure 2 shows what happens when the standard is strengthened to 0.075 ppm, again using 2004-2006 data: under the new standard, 345 counties, more than four times as many, show violations. Nevertheless, there appears to have been substantial disagreement between EPA and the White House over the form in which this standard should be set. Most stationary and mobile sources are considered to be contributors to ozone pollution. Issues
The major issues raised by the new standards concern whether the Administrator has made appropriate choices, i.e., whether his choices for the primary and secondary standards are backed by the scientific studies. The Administrator's choice for the primary standard is weaker than any part of the range proposed by CASAC. Even with these controls, the agency projected that 28 counties in 10 states (counties that include some of the nation's biggest cities) would violate the 0.075 standard in 2020. Another issue arises from a close inspection of EPA's maps: i.e., whether the current monitoring network is adequate to detect violations of a more stringent standard. Only 639 of the nation's 3,000 counties have ozone monitors in place. | EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson signed final changes to the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for ozone on March 12, 2008; the proposal appeared in the Federal Register on March 27. NAAQS are standards for outdoor (ambient) air that are intended to protect public health and welfare from harmful concentrations of pollution. By changing the standard, EPA has concluded that protecting public health and welfare requires lower concentrations of ozone pollution than it previously judged to be safe. This report discusses the standard-setting process, the specifics of the new standard, and issues raised by the Administrator's choice, and it describes the steps that will follow EPA's promulgation.
The ozone standard affects a large percentage of the population: nearly half the U.S. population currently lives in ozone "nonattainment" areas (the term EPA uses for areas that violate the standard), 140 million people in all. As a result of the standard's strengthening, more areas will be affected, and those already considered nonattainment may have to impose more stringent emission controls.
The revision lowers the primary (health-based) and secondary (welfare-based) standards from 0.08 parts per million (ppm) averaged over 8 hours to 0.075 ppm averaged over the same time. Using the most recent three years of monitoring data, 345 counties (54% of all counties with ozone monitors) would violate the new standards. Only 85 counties exceeded the pre-existing standards. Thus, the change in standards will have widespread impacts in areas across the country. (The 345 counties that would exceed the standard are shown in Figure 2 of this report.)
The revision follows a multi-year review of the science regarding ozone's effects on public health and welfare. The new standards will set in motion a long and complicated implementation process that has far-reaching impacts for public health, for sources of pollution in numerous economic sectors, and for state and local governments. The first step, designation of nonattainment areas is expected to take place in 2010, with the areas so designated then having 3 to 20 years to reach attainment.
The new standards raise a number of issues, including whether the choices for the primary and secondary standards are backed by the available science. Not only are the Administrator's choices weaker than those proposed by his scientific advisers, but the administrative record makes clear that, in part, they were dictated by the White House over the objections of EPA. Whether the standards should lead to stronger federal controls on the sources of pollution is another likely issue. Current federal standards for cars, trucks, power plants, and other pollution sources are not strong enough to bring all areas into attainment, thus requiring local pollution control measures in many cases. EPA, the states, and Congress may also wish to consider whether the current monitoring network is adequate to detect violations of a more stringent standard. Only 639 of the nation's 3,000 counties have ozone monitors in place. With half of those monitors showing violations of the new standards, questions arise as to air quality in unmonitored counties. |
crs_RL33043 | crs_RL33043_0 | Introduction
Federal officials, policy analysts, and homeland security experts express concern about thecurrent state of chemical facility security. Referring to them as "the single greatest danger of apotential terrorist attack in our country today," some experts fear these facilities are at risk of apotentially catastrophic terrorist attack. (1) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) identifies chemicalfacilities as being one of the highest priority critical infrastructure sectors. (2)
Currently, chemical facility security efforts include a mixture of local, state, and federal laws,industry trade association requirements, voluntary actions, and federal outreach programs. Many in the public and private sector call for federal legislation to address chemical facilitysecurity. (3) Still,disagreement exists over whether federal legislation is the best approach to securing chemicalfacilities, and, if legislation is deemed necessary, what approaches best meet the security need. Critical issues surrounding chemical facility security legislation include determining whichchemical facilities should be protected, which involves analyzing and prioritizing chemical facilitysecurity risks, identifying which chemical facilities pose the most risk, and establishing whatactivities could enhance facility security to an acceptable level. Mechanismsfor assessing security risk might include weighing the known or theoretical terrorist threat faced bya particular facility, the chemical hazards held at a facility, the quantities of those chemicals, and thelocation of those chemicals relative to the surrounding population. Security regulation of some chemical facilities is established under certain statutes, includingthe Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) ( P.L. 107-295 ) and the Safe Drinking Water Act(SDWA), as amended by the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act ( P.L. 107-188 ). Potential chemical facilitysecurity enhancement might be achieved through a range of policy approaches: providing grants toincrease security at high risk facilities; mandating site vulnerability assessments; compellingvulnerability remediation; establishing federal security standards; or requiring the consideration oruse of specific technologies. Proposed legislation may aim to complement existing law or tooverride it. In the 109th Congress, legislation has been introduced in both chambers addressing concernsregarding chemical facility security. In the Senate, S. 2145 , the Chemical FacilityAnti-Terrorism Act of 2005, and S. 2486 , Chemical Security and Safety Act of 2006,have been introduced. In the House, H.R. 1562 , the Chemical Facility Security Act of2005, H.R. 4999 , acompanion bill to S. 2145, and H.R. 4999, H.R. This report will discuss current chemical facility security efforts, considerations in definingchemical facilities, policy challenges in developing chemical facility security legislation, and selectpolicy approaches. Defining by Industry Classification. The basis for chemical facility security requirements is another areaof contention. States have passedchemical facility security legislation. | Federal officials, policy analysts, and homeland security experts express concern about thecurrent state of chemical facility security. Some security experts fear these facilities are at risk ofa potentially catastrophic terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security identifies chemicalfacilities as one of the highest priority critical infrastructure sectors. Current chemical plant orchemical facility security efforts include a mixture of local, state, and federal laws, industry tradeassociation requirements, voluntary actions, and federal outreach programs.
Many in the public and private sector call for federal legislation to address chemical facilitysecurity. Still, disagreement exists over whether legislation is the best approach to securing chemicalfacilities, and, if legislation is deemed necessary, what approaches best meet the security need. Manyquestions face policymakers. Is the current voluntary approach sufficient or should securitymeasures be required? If the latter, is chemical facility security regulation a federal role, or shouldsuch regulation be developed at the state level? To what extent is additional security required atchemical facilities? Should the government provide financial assistance for chemical facilitysecurity or should chemical facilities bear security costs?
Critical issues surrounding chemical facility security legislation include determining whichchemical facilities should be protected by analyzing and prioritizing chemical facility security risks;identifying which chemical facilities pose the most risk; and establishing what activities couldenhance facility security to an acceptable level. Mechanisms for assessing security risk mightinclude weighing the known or theoretical terrorist threat faced by a particular facility, the chemicalhazards held at a facility, the quantities and location of those chemicals relative to the surroundingpopulation, or the facility's industrial classification.
Some security regulation exists for some chemical facilities under other legislation, such asthe Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) ( P.L. 107-295 ), the Safe Drinking Water Act(SDWA), as amended by the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act ( P.L. 107-188 ), and select state laws. Potential chemical facility security enhancements might be achieved through a range of policyapproaches: providing security grants to high risk facilities; mandating site vulnerability assessments;compelling vulnerability remediation; establishing federal security standards; or requiring theconsideration or use of specific technologies. In some cases, proposed legislation complementsexisting law, while overrides it in others.
In the 109th Congress, legislation exists in both chambers. In the Senate, S. 2145 and S. 2486 have been introduced. In the House, H.R. 1562 , H.R. 2237 , H.R. 4999 , a companion bill to S. 2145, and H.R. 5695 have been introduced. The details of each bill's security requirements vary.
This report will discuss current chemical facility security efforts, issues in defining chemicalfacilities, policy challenges in developing chemical facility security legislation, and the variouspolicy approaches. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R44525 | crs_R44525_0 | Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are stockholder-owned, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), which purchase existing mortgages and pool the mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), which they guarantee will be paid on time. The GSEs either keep the MBSs as an investment or sell the MBSs to investors. Their congressional charters give the GSEs a special relationship with the federal government, and it is widely believed that the federal government implicitly guarantees their $808 billion in bonds and $4.6 trillion in MBSs. Their charters give these GSEs special public policy goals aimed at providing liquidity in the mortgage market and promoting homeownership for underserved groups and locations. In 2008, the GSEs' financial condition had weakened, and there were concerns over their ability to meet obligations. On September 7, 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) took control of these GSEs from their stockholders and management in a process known as conservatorship. Congressional interest in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has increased in recent years, primarily because the federal government's continuing conservatorship of these GSEs has raised doubts about their future and concerns about the potential cost of supporting them. Other reasons for congressional concern include the large role that the GSEs and government-guaranteed mortgages (such as those guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration) play in the overall mortgage market and Treasury's contract to purchase up to $200 billion in special senior preferred stock from each GSE. A glossary of terms is included at the end of this report. These factors will not contribute as much to the GSEs' profits going forward. How Much Have the GSEs Paid to Treasury in Dividends? If there are no profits, there is no payment. Previously each GSE made quarterly payments on a 10% annual dividend on the senior preferred stock regardless of profits or losses earned in the quarter. Has the Profit Sweep Increased the GSEs' Dividend Payments to Treasury? If the profit sweep had not replaced paying dividends to Treasury at a 10% annual rate, Fannie Mae would have paid $69 billion and Freddie Mac would have paid $47 billion to Treasury in dividends. In addition, HERA requires the GSEs to contribute to the HOPE Reserve Fund, the Housing Trust Fund, and the Capital Magnet Fund. The GSEs guarantee timely payment of principal and interest of the mortgages to MBS investors. In August 2012, the GSEs agreed to reduce their portfolios to $250 billion each by 2018. Like all other businesses, the GSEs have operational risk due to the failure of internal controls. If Treasury were to exercise these warrants, current common stockholders would own 20% of the enterprises. Currently, the profit sweep prevents them from accumulating capital. Neither GSE has required Treasury's support since the second quarter of 2012. When they went into conservatorship, each of the GSEs paid Treasury $1 billion of senior preferred stock for the promise of future financial support. What Other Actions Has the Federal Government Taken to Address the Financial Condition of the GSEs? | Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are chartered by Congress as government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) to provide liquidity in the mortgage market and to promote homeownership for underserved groups and locations. They purchase mortgages, guarantee them, and package them in mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), which they either keep as investments or sell to institutional investors. In addition to the GSEs' explicit guarantees, investors widely believe that MBSs are implicitly guaranteed by the federal government.
In 2008, the GSEs' financial condition had weakened and there were concerns over their ability to meet their obligations on $1.2 trillion in bonds and $3.7 trillion in MBSs that they had guaranteed. In response to the financial risks, the federal government took control of these GSEs in a process known as conservatorship as a means to stabilize the mortgage credit market. The GSEs accepted going into conservatorship, and Treasury agreed to provide up to $200 billion each to keep them solvent.
The GSEs agreed to pay Treasury a 10% cash dividend on funds received. If the GSEs do not have sufficient cash, they can pay Treasury a 12% dividend in special stock. Dividends were suspended for all other stockholders. If the GSEs had enough profit at the end of the quarter, the dividend came out of the profit. When the GSEs actually did not have enough cash to pay their dividend to Treasury, they asked for additional cash to make the payment instead of issuing additional stock. In August 2012, the 10% dividend was replaced with a "profit sweep" dividend. Under the profit sweep, Treasury received all of the profits above a declining capital reserve, but if there was no profit, there was no dividend.
The GSEs have paid dividends totaling $246 billion to Treasury. The majority of this sum—$191 billion—has been paid under the profit sweep. Paying the federal government all profits earned in a quarter prevents the GSEs from accumulating funds to redeem the senior preferred stock, which is held only by Treasury.
The GSEs have not taken a draw on their support from Treasury since the second quarter of 2012.
Congressional interest in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has increased in recent years, primarily because of the federal government's continuing conservatorship of these GSEs. Uncertainty in the housing, mortgage, and financial markets has raised doubts about the future of the enterprises and the potential cost to the Treasury of guaranteeing the enterprises' debt. Since more than 60% of households are homeowners, a large number of citizens could be affected by the future of the GSEs. Congress exercises oversight over the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which is both regulator and conservator of the GSEs, and is considering legislation to shape the future of the GSEs. |
crs_RS22609 | crs_RS22609_0 | However, some obese individuals have argued that their weight can be considered a disability for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and, therefore, they have legal protection against weight discrimination. The ADA regulations address whether obesity can be an impairment that qualifies as a disability under the ADA. The EEOC has expounded on how obesity is to be covered under the ADA. It is likely that courts will continue to look at obesity discrimination under the ADA. Based on the various ways in which courts have interpreted the act and its supporting regulations, the outcome of these cases will remain an open question. | The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides broad nondiscrimination protection for individuals with disabilities. However, to be covered under the statute, an individual must first meet the definition of an individual with a disability. Questions have been raised as to whether and to what extent obesity is a disability under the ADA and whether the ADA protects obese individuals from discrimination. This report provides background regarding how obesity is covered under the ADA and its supporting regulations. It also discusses some of the ways in which courts have applied the ADA to obesity discrimination claims. |
crs_RL34627 | crs_RL34627_0 | V ocational Rehabilitation and Employment for veterans (VR&E) is an entitlement program that provides job training and related services "to enable veterans with service-connected disabilities to achieve maximum independence in daily living and, to the maximum extent feasible, to become employable and to obtain and maintain suitable employment." The program is administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). For severely disabled veterans for whom employment is not possible, the program strives to help them achieve the highest quality of independent living possible with a future chance of employment, given medical and technological advances. The VR&E program is administered by the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) within the VA.
Financing and Costs
VR&E costs are divided between mandatory and discretionary spending. Costs for these activities in FY2016 were $1.315 billion. To be eligible for VR&E services, a veteran must
have served on or after September 16, 1940; have received, or will receive, a discharge under conditions other than dishonorable; and have a service-connected disability rating of 10% or more. An applicant is entitled to VR&E services if the evaluation finds that he or she has
a service-connected disability rated at 20% or more and an employment handicap; or a service-connected disability rated at 10% and a serious employment handicap. Case Management and Rehabilitation Planning
After a veteran is found to be entitled to VR&E services, a case manager is assigned to work with the veteran. The required services may be provided by the VRC or the case manager may provide referrals for other services. If necessary, a veteran may change tracks while enrolled in the VR&E program. Reemployment Track
The Reemployment Track is for veterans who wish to return to work with their previous employers. Rapid Access to Employment Track
The Rapid Access to Employment Track emphasizes the goal of immediate employment and is available to separating veterans who already have the skills necessary to compete in the job market in suitable occupations. Employment through Long-Term Services Track
This track targets veterans who need long-term employment training to prepare them for suitable employment. This limit is waived for veterans who have been adversely affected by a natural or other disaster, as determined by the VA.
IL programs for veterans are typically limited to 24 months. Veterans who are only receiving (1) initial evaluation, (2) placement or postplacement services, and (3) counseling from the VR&E program are not eligible for a subsistence allowance, nor are veterans who are enrolled in a training program less than half-time. | Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment for veterans (VR&E) is an entitlement program that provides job training and other employment-related services to veterans with service-connected disabilities. In cases where a disabled veteran is not able to work, the VR&E program provides independent living (IL) services to help the veteran achieve the highest possible quality of life. The VR&E program is administered by the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), part of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).
To be entitled to VR&E services, a veteran must have been discharged under conditions other than dishonorable and be found to have either (1) a service-connected disability rated at 20% or more and an employment handicap, or (2) a service-connected disability rated at 10% and a serious employment handicap. After a veteran is found to be entitled to VR&E, a vocational rehabilitation counselor helps the veteran identify a suitable employment goal and determine what services will be necessary to achieve that goal. The veteran is then assigned to one of five reemployment tracks:
Reemployment for veterans who wish to return to work they held prior to their military service; Rapid Access to Employment for veterans who already have the skills necessary to compete in the job market and only need short-term services such as job search assistance; Employment through Long-Term Services for veterans who require postsecondary or vocational training to reach their employment goals; Self-employment for veterans who have the skills to start businesses; or Independent Living for veterans for whom employment is not a viable goal.
Veterans may change tracks if a disability worsens or if their employment objective changes. Services may be provided by the VA, though they are more frequently purchased from an outside provider.
VR&E benefits are typically limited to 48 months, though the benefit period can be extended under certain circumstances. In most cases, veterans are entitled to a subsistence allowance while they are enrolled in an education or training program.
In FY2016, approximately 29,340 veterans developed a new plan of service with VR&E and 11,531 veterans completed rehabilitation. In FY2016, costs for mandatory VR&E benefits were approximately $1.3 billion. Discretionary support services and other administrative costs were approximately $218 million. |
crs_R45442 | crs_R45442_0 | T he Constitution neither establishes administrative agencies nor explicitly prescribes the manner by which they may be created. Even so, the Supreme Court has generally recognized that Congress has broad constitutional authority over the establishment and shape of the federal bureaucracy. Acting pursuant to its broad constitutional authority, Congress may create federal agencies and individual offices within those agencies, design agencies' basic structures and operations, and prescribe, subject to certain constitutional limitations, how those holding such offices are appointed and removed. Congress also may enumerate the powers, duties, and functions to be exercised by agencies, as well as directly counteract, through later legislation, certain agency actions implementing delegated authority. The most potent tools of congressional control over executive branch agencies, including structuring, empowering, regulating, and funding agencies, typically require enactment of legislation. Such legislation must comport with the constitutional requirements of bicameralism (i.e., it must be approved by both houses of Congress) and presentment (i.e., it must be presented to the President for signature). For legislation to take effect, that constitutional process requires the support of the House, Senate, and the President, unless the support in both houses is sufficient to override the President's veto. For example, subject to constitutional considerations explained below, Congress may
structure agency leadership in the form of a multi-member commission or a single director; create agency offices, which may be filled by persons appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, or in the case of "inferior" offices, vest the power of appointment in the President, the head of a department, or the "Courts of Law"; establish certain statutory qualifications for appointees, often based on political affiliation or substantive experience, or dictate the length of an official's term of office; choose to make an agency freestanding, or place it within an existing department or agency; provide that an agency official serve at the pleasure of the President, or, in certain situations, be protected from removal except in cases of "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office"; or choose to exempt an agency from certain aspects of presidential supervision—for example by excusing the agency from complying with generally applicable executive branch requirements that agency rules, legislative submissions, and budget requests be reviewed and cleared by the White House. But there are also many non-statutory tools (i.e., tools not requiring legislative enactment to exercise) that may be used unilaterally and independently by the House, Senate, congressional committees, or individual Members of Congress to influence and control agency action. Some of these non-statutory tools, such as impeachment and removal, are of potentially legally binding effect. | The Constitution neither establishes administrative agencies nor explicitly prescribes the manner by which they may be created. Even so, the Supreme Court has generally recognized that Congress has broad constitutional authority to establish and shape the federal bureaucracy. Congress may use its Article I lawmaking powers to create federal agencies and individual offices within those agencies, design agencies' basic structures and operations, and prescribe, subject to certain constitutional limitations, how those holding agency offices are appointed and removed. Congress also may enumerate the powers, duties, and functions to be exercised by agencies, as well as directly counteract, through later legislation, certain agency actions implementing delegated authority.
The most potent tools of congressional control over agencies, including those addressing the structuring, empowering, regulating, and funding of agencies, typically require enactment of legislation. Such legislation must comport with constitutional requirements related to bicameralism (i.e., it must be approved by both houses of Congress) and presentment (i.e., it must be presented to the President for signature). The constitutional process to enact effective legislation requires the support of the House, Senate, and the President, unless the support in both houses is sufficient to override the President's veto.
There also are many non-statutory tools (i.e., tools not requiring legislative enactment to exercise) that may be used by the House, Senate, congressional committees, or individual Members of Congress to influence and control agency action. In some cases, non-statutory measures, such as impeachment and removal, Senate advice and consent to appointments or the ratification of treaties, and committee issuance of subpoenas, can impose legal consequences. Others, however, such as House resolutions of inquiry, may not be used to bind agencies or agency officials and rely for their effectiveness on their ability to persuade or influence. |
crs_RL32380 | crs_RL32380_0 | Introduction
The Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (FPI), is a government-owned corporation that employs offenders incarcerated in correctional facilities under the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The FPI manufactures products and provides services that are primarily sold to executive agencies in the federal government. The FPI was created to serve as a means for managing, training, and rehabilitating inmates in the federal prison system through employment in one of its six industries. The FPI is intended to be economically self-sustaining and does not receive funding through congressional appropriations. The FPI has been able to sustain itself even though it has been operating at a loss for the past several fiscal years because it is able to draw funds from a revolving account (the "Prison Industries Fund") into which money received from the sale of the products or by-products of the FPI, or for the services of federal prisoners working in FPI, is to be deposited. Data show that the number of FPI work assignments available to inmates has not kept pace with the growing federal inmate population. As shown in Figure 2 , even though the number of inmates employed by the FPI generally increased between FY1970 and FY2001, starting in FY1988 the proportion of the federal inmate population employed by the FPI began a steady decease. Even though the BOP contends that the real product the FPI produces is rehabilitated inmates, opponents note that the FPI produces goods and services that are sold to the federal government, in many cases with advantages not available to the private sector. The Mandatory Source Clause: Central to the Debate
The debate regarding the competing visions of the FPI revolves around its mandatory source clause, the requirement for federal agencies to purchase products from the FPI. Critics argue that the FPI has lower labor costs. For example, prisoner wages in FPI are far below the minimum wage in the private sector. Critics also contend that the FPI has other competitive advantages. While inmates receive far lower pay than workers in private industry, the FPI asserts this advantage is offset by the lower average productivity of inmates and the inefficiencies associated with operating a business in a correctional setting. The FPI also argues that its operations benefit private businesses. Rehabilitation and Management
Advocates of the FPI maintain it is a proven rehabilitative program that does not cost taxpayers anything to operate. In addition, the DOJ OIG reports that "FPI officials ... viewed [PIECP] as a less viable option for new business development than the repatriation authority ... under [PIECP], FPI would be required to pay inmates higher wages, thus increasing overhead costs." The legislation would authorize funding for vocational education programs. This proposal would resolve any tension surrounding the FPI's mandatory source clause and its effect on private vendors' ability to secure federal contracts. Also, as outlined previously, it has been argued that vocational educational programs are more effective at reducing recidivism than work assignments through correctional industries. However, the BOP asserts that vocational and apprenticeship programs are not a substitution for, but rather a complement to, FPI work assignments. Using Inmate Labor in the Open Market
Another option to provide more work opportunities for inmates might be to repeal federal laws that prohibit the sale of prisoner-made goods on the private market and allow businesses to compete for inmates' labor on the open market. When this is combined with the additional cost of operating a business in a correctional environment, minimum wage or prevailing wage requirements make inmate labor look less attractive, thereby limiting work opportunities for inmates. Policymakers could consider keeping prevailing wage requirements in place, but a subsidy might have to be offered in order to make inmate labor attractive to private businesses. Some policymakers might be concerned about what effect additional inmate labor force participation might have on private workers. In addition, since any economic benefits, such as lower prices for consumers or a larger workforce of lower-skilled laborers willing to work for lower wages, are likely to be small, and increased inmate labor force participation could lead to non-inmate workers losing jobs, it might be argued that the economic costs of allowing inmates to work in the private market exceed any potential economic benefits. Concerns about whether the mandatory source clause has prevented private businesses from competing for federal contracts have led Congress to include language in certain legislation that modified how federal agencies procured products under the FPI's mandatory source clause. Before approving the expansion of an existing product or the creation of a new product, the act required the FPI to
prepare a written analysis of the likely impact of the FPI's expansion on industry and free labor; announce in an appropriate publication the plans for expansion and invite comments on the plan; advise affected trade associations; provide the FPI's Board of Directors with the plans for expansion prior to the Board making a decision on the expansion; provide opportunity to affected trade associations or relevant business representatives to comment to the Board of Directors on the proposal; and publish final decisions made by the Board of Directors. 108-199 ) modified the FPI's mandatory source clause by prohibiting funds appropriated by Congress for FY2004 to be used by any federal executive agency for the purchase of products or services manufactured by the FPI unless the agency making the purchase determines, pursuant to government-wide procurement regulations, that the products or services are being provided at the best value. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ( P.L. §1761(c) to allow the FPI to participate in the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP). | The Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (FPI), is a government-owned corporation that employs offenders incarcerated in correctional facilities under the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The FPI manufactures products and provides services that are sold to executive agencies in the federal government. The FPI was created to serve as a means for managing, training, and rehabilitating inmates in the federal prison system through employment in one of its industries.
The FPI is intended to be economically self-sustaining and it does not receive funding through congressional appropriations. In FY2015, the FPI generated $472 million in sales, which is greater than the FPI's sales in FY1993 ($405 million), but is below the FPI's peak sales of $885 million in FY2009. The FPI operated at an $18 million loss for FY2015, the seventh straight fiscal year in which the FPI's expenses exceeded revenues.
Data show that the number of FPI work assignments available to inmates has not kept pace with the growing federal inmate population. Starting in FY1988 the proportion of the federal inmate population employed by the FPI steadily deceased. In FY2015, approximately 7% of all federal inmates had an FPI work assignment.
The FPI manufactures products and provides services that are primarily sold to executive agencies in the federal government. In the past, federal departments and agencies were required to purchase products from the FPI. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the FPI's "mandatory source clause."
The debate about the FPI centers on the FPI's mandatory source clause. Some policymakers believe the mandatory source clause impedes private vendors' abilities to secure federal contracts. However, the FPI contends that the mandatory source clause is necessary to overcome some of the inefficiencies written into its authorizing legislation and problems associated with producing products in a prison environment, thereby allowing it to generate revenue and provide work opportunities for inmates.
Critics argue that the FPI's lower labor costs provide it with a competitive advantage over private sector employers. The FPI asserts that any lower labor costs are more than offset by the disadvantages associated with operating a business inside a prison.
Advocates of the FPI maintain it is a proven rehabilitative program that does not cost taxpayers anything to operate and it helps provide for the orderly operation of a prison by keeping inmates occupied. Critics contend that vocational education programs have been shown to be more effective at reducing recidivism and inmates who participate in them are not competing with private sector workers for federal contracts.
Congress has taken legislative action to lessen any adverse impact the FPI has had on small businesses. For example, in 2002, 2003, and 2004, Congress passed legislation that modified how the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) procured products offered by the FPI in its schedule of products. In 2004, Congress passed legislation prohibiting federal agencies from using appropriated funding for FY2004 to purchase products or services offered by the FPI unless the agency determined that the products or services are provided at the best value. This provision was extended permanently in FY2005. In the 110th Congress, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181) modified the way in which DOD procures products from the FPI. In addition, the Administration of President George W. Bush made several efforts to reduce the consequences the FPI's mandatory source clause might have on the ability of private businesses to compete for federal contracts.
Should Congress decide that it wants to try to reverse past trends and expand work opportunities for inmates, there are several options policymakers could consider. One option could be to expand a work-sharing initiative that the FPI has already started on a small scale. Congress could also consider replacing inmate work opportunities with vocational education programs. However, the BOP asserts that vocational and apprenticeship programs are not a substitution for, but rather a complement to, FPI work assignments. Congress might also consider allowing private businesses to compete for inmate labor on the open market. Congress has granted the FPI the authority to participate in the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP), which allows inmate labor to be used to produce goods for sale on the open market if certain conditions are met, such as paying inmates the prevailing wage for similar work. However, the FPI has had problems taking advantage of this new authority because the FPI would be required to pay inmates higher wages, thus increasing overhead costs. Also, inmates tend to be lower-skilled than non-incarcerated workers, which means that the prevailing wage requirement, and the additional costs associated with operating a business in a correctional environment, makes inmate labor less attractive to private businesses. This problem could be resolved by removing the prevailing wage requirement and allowing the market to set the price for inmate labor, but this raises questions about what effect inmate labor might have on non-incarcerated workers and the potential for inmate laborers to be exploited. |
crs_R43714 | crs_R43714_0 | Introduction1
U.S. corporations face a "growing and persistent threat" by individuals, rival companies, and foreign governments that seek to steal some of their most valuable intangible assets—their trade secrets. This expansive standard means that trade secret protection could be available to a wide range of proprietary information and technologies that companies rely on to give them an economic advantage over their competitors, including customer lists, methods of production, marketing strategies, pricing information, and chemical formulae. In contrast to the other three types of intellectual property that are governed primarily by federal law, trade secrets are primarily governed under state law, and thus owners of trade secrets have more limited legal recourse when their rights are violated by others. State law provides trade secret owners with the power to file civil lawsuits against those who misappropriate trade secrets. Economic Espionage
The EEA's "economic espionage" provision, 18 U.S.C. Section 1831, punishes those who misappropriate, or attempt or conspire to misappropriate, trade secrets with the intent or knowledge that the offense will benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent. Theft of Trade Secrets
The EEA's "theft of trade secrets" prohibition, 18 U.S.C. Section 1832, is of more general application. The principal elements of an EEA claim for theft of trade secrets are (1) the intentional and/or knowing theft, appropriation, destruction, alteration, or duplication of (2) a trade secret related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce (3) with intent to convert the trade secret and (4) intent or knowledge that such action will injure the owner. At the federal level, the Economic Espionage Unit located within the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) Counterintelligence Division has primary responsibility for investigating offenses under the EEA. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and its U.S. Attorneys have the power to prosecute cases involving corporate and state-sponsored trade secret theft. borders." In Support of a Federal Civil Cause of Action for Trade Secret Theft
Some observers have urged Congress to adopt a comprehensive, federal trade secret law in order to promote uniformity in trade secret law throughout the United States. They argue that: "(1) it will not address the cyberespionage problem that is most often used to justify the adoption of a federal trade secret law; (2) a federal trade secret law is not needed to protect U.S. trade secrets because there is already a robust set of state laws for the protection of such secrets; and (3) there are significant costs to creating a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation." Legislation in the 114th Congress: The Defend Trade Secrets Act
Two bills have been introduced in the 114 th Congress related to trade secret misappropriation, S. 1890 and H.R. On January 28, 2016, the Senate Judiciary Committee, by a unanimous voice vote, reported S. 1890 with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. The Senate passed S. 1890 by a vote of 87-0 on April 4, 2016. On April 20, the House Judiciary Committee unanimously approved S. 1890 by voice vote. The DTSA would establish this new private right by adding a subsection entitled "private civil actions" to the provision of the EEA that currently authorizes the Attorney General to bring a civil action to obtain "appropriate injunctive relief" against any violation of the EEA, codified at 18 U.S.C. | A trade secret is confidential, commercially valuable information that provides a company with a competitive advantage, such as customer lists, methods of production, marketing strategies, pricing information, and chemical formulae. (Well-known examples of trade secrets include the formula for Coca-Cola, the recipe for Kentucky Fried Chicken, and the algorithm used by Google's search engine.) To succeed in the global marketplace, U.S. firms depend upon their trade secrets, which increasingly are becoming their most valuable intangible assets.
However, U.S. companies annually suffer billions of dollars in losses due to the theft of their trade secrets by employees, corporate competitors, and even foreign governments. Stealing trade secrets has increasingly involved the use of cyberspace, advanced computer technologies, and mobile communication devices, thus making the theft relatively anonymous and difficult to detect. The Chinese and Russian governments have been particularly active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage with respect to U.S. trade secrets and proprietary information.
In contrast to other types of intellectual property (trademarks, patents, and copyrights) that are governed primarily by federal law, trade secret protection is primarily a matter of state law. Thus, trade secret owners have more limited legal recourse when their rights are violated. State law provides trade secret owners with the power to file civil lawsuits against misappropriators. A federal criminal statute, the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), allows U.S. Attorneys to prosecute anyone who engages in "economic espionage" or the "theft of trade secrets." The EEA's "economic espionage" provision punishes those who misappropriate trade secrets with the intent or knowledge that the offense will benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent. The EEA's "theft of trade secrets" prohibition is of more general application, involving the intentional theft of a trade secret related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce, with the intent or knowledge that such action will injure the trade secret owner. In addition to criminal enforcement of the statute, the EEA authorizes the Attorney General to bring a civil action to obtain injunctive relief against any violation of the EEA.
However, because the U.S. Department of Justice and its Federal Bureau of Investigation have limited investigative and prosecutorial resources, as well as competing enforcement priorities, some observers assert that the federal government cannot adequately protect U.S. trade secrets from domestic and foreign threats. They have urged Congress to adopt a comprehensive, federal trade secret law in order to promote uniformity in trade secret law throughout the United States and to more effectively deal with trade secret theft that crosses state and international borders (a challenging problem for state courts to address). Among other things, they support the establishment of a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation, to allow U.S. companies to obtain monetary and injunctive relief when their trade secret assets are stolen.
In the 114th Congress, the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) (H.R. 3326 and S. 1890) has been introduced that would create a federal private right of action for trade secret misappropriation. S. 1890 was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee in late January 2016 with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. On April 4, 2016, the Senate passed S. 1890 by a vote of 87-0. On April 20, the House Judiciary Committee unanimously approved S. 1890. |
crs_R42097 | crs_R42097_0 | T he standing qualifications to be President of the United States are set out in the Constitution, at Article II, Section 1, clause 5, and state three specific requirements: one must be at leas t 35 years old, a resident "within the United States" for 14 years, and a "natural born Citizen." According to the Supreme Court, words and phrases used, but not defined, within the Constitution, should generally "be read in light of British common law," since the U.S. Constitution is "framed in the language of the English common law." As noted by the Supreme Court of the United States, this "same rule" was applicable in the colonies and "in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the Constitution" with respect to "natural born" U.S. citizenship. Considering the history of the constitutional provision, the clause's apparent intent, the English common law expressly applicable in the American colonies and in all of the original states, the common use and meaning of the phrase "natural born" subject in England and the American colonies in the 1700s, and the subsequent action of the first Congress in enacting the Naturalization Act of 1790 (expressly defining the term "natural born citizen" to include those born abroad to U.S. citizens), it appears that the most logical inferences would indicate that the phrase "natural born Citizen" would mean a person who is entitled to U.S. citizenship "by birth" or "at birth." Such interpretation, as evidenced by over a century of American case law, would include as natural born citizens those born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction regardless of the citizenship status of one's parents, and would also appear to include those born abroad of one or more parents who are U.S. citizens (as recognized by statute), as opposed to a person who is not a citizen by birth and is thus an "alien" required to go through the legal process of naturalization to become a U.S. citizen. The Supreme Court of the United States, in its landmark opinion on birthright citizenship authored by Justice Gray in United States v. Wong Kim Ark , citing both the common law and numerous legal precedents in the United States, explained in 1898 that a child born of alien parents within the country and subject to its jurisdiction (that is, whose parents are not diplomatic personnel representing a foreign nation or troops in hostile occupation) is considered a "natural born" citizen (in the United States) or subject (in England), as that term has been used over the centuries in England and the United States:
It thus clearly appears that by the law of England for the last three centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country, and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in the dominions possessed by the Crown of England, were within the allegiance, the obedience, the faith or loyalty, the protection, the power, the jurisdiction, of the English Sovereign; and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural born subject, unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign State, or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born. That being said, however, one might argue that there existed what might be called a "common" or "general understanding," or at least common "usage" of the term "natural born," as it related to those who were considered "natural born" subjects of England in the American colonies at the time of independence, and "natural born" citizens at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Citizenship at Birth: Case Law and Interpretations
The evidence of historical intent, general understandings, and common law principles underlying American jurisprudence thus indicate that the most reasonable interpretation of "natural born" citizens would include those who are considered U.S. citizens "at birth" or "by birth," either by the operation of the strict "common law" of jus soli derived from English common law (physically born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, without reference to parentage or lineage), or under existing federal statutory law incorporating long-standing concepts of jus s an guin i s , the law of descent, including those born abroad of U.S. citizen-parents. Legal Background and Historical Cases
Although the Supreme Court has not needed to rule specifically on the presidential eligibility clause, as discussed in more detail below, numerous federal cases, as well as state cases, for more than a century have used the term "natural born citizen" to describe a person born in this country and under its jurisdiction, even to parents who were aliens in the U.S. Additionally, several Supreme Court cases, as well as numerous constitutional scholars, have used the term "native born" citizen to indicate all of those children physically born in the country (and subject to its jurisdiction), without reference to parentage or lineage, and employed such term in reference to those citizens eligible to be President under the "natural born" citizenship clause, as opposed to "naturalized" citizens, who are not. There appears, however, to be no legitimate legal issue outstanding concerning the eligibility of all citizens of the United States who are born in the country to be President. To date, every court or administrative body dealing with ballot access issues has ruled against the challenges to the eligibility of President Obama. | The Constitution sets out three eligibility requirements to be President: one must be 35 years of age, a resident "within the United States" for 14 years, and a "natural born Citizen." There is no Supreme Court case which has ruled specifically on a challenge to one's eligibility to be President (although several cases have addressed the term "natural born" citizen), and this clause has been the subject of several legal and historical treatises over the years, as well as more recent litigation.
The term "natural born" citizen is not defined in the Constitution, and there is no discussion of the term evident in the notes of the Federal Convention of 1787. At the time of independence, and at the time of the framing of the Constitution, however, the term "natural born" with respect to citizenship was in use for many years in the American colonies, and then in the states, from British common law and legal usage. Under the common law principle of jus soli (law of the soil), persons born on English soil, even of two alien parents, were "natural born" subjects and, as noted by the Supreme Court, this "same rule" was applicable in the American colonies and "in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the Constitution ..." with respect to citizens. In textual constitutional analysis, it is understood that terms used but not defined in the document must, as explained by the Supreme Court, "be read in light of British common law" since the Constitution is "framed in the language of the English common law."
In addition to historical and textual analysis, numerous holdings and references in federal (and state) cases for more than a century have clearly indicated that those born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction (i.e., not born to foreign diplomats or occupying military forces), even to alien parents, are citizens "at birth" or "by birth," and are therefore "natural born"—as opposed to "naturalized"—U.S. citizens. There is no provision in the Constitution and no controlling American case law to support a contention that the citizenship of one's parents governs the eligibility of U.S. citizens born within the United States to be President.
Although the eligibility of U.S. born citizens has been settled law for more than a century, there have been legitimate legal issues raised concerning those born outside of the country to U.S. citizens. From historical material and case law, it appears that the common understanding of the term "natural born" in England and in the American colonies in the 1700s included both the strict common law meaning as born in the territory (jus soli), as well as the statutory laws adopted in England since at least 1350, which included children born abroad to British fathers (jus sanguinis, the law of descent). Legal scholars in the field of citizenship have asserted that this common understanding and legal meaning in England and in the American colonies was incorporated into the usage and intent of the term in the U.S. Constitution to include those who are citizens at birth.
Challenges in 2008 to the eligibility of both Senators John McCain and Barack Obama to be President, and "ballot access" challenges to President Obama in 2012, have prompted numerous court decisions which appear to have validated the traditional, historical, and legal meaning of the term "natural born" citizen as one who is entitled to U.S. citizenship "by birth" or "at birth." This would include those born "in" the United States and under its jurisdiction (i.e. "native" born), even those born to alien parents; those born abroad to U.S. citizen-parents; or those born in other situations meeting legal requirements for U.S. citizenship "at birth." Such term, however, would not include a person who was not a U.S. citizen by birth or at birth, and who was thus born an "alien" required to go through the legal process of "naturalization" to become a U.S. citizen.
This report has been updated from a previous version to include recent relevant judicial and administrative decisions, and will be updated as new decisional material may warrant. |
crs_RS22529 | crs_RS22529_0 | Introduction
The NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, on November 28-29, 2006, focused primarily on consolidation of support for existing initiatives. Closely associated with the NATO mission in Afghanistan was a discussion of military capabilities. The Bush Administration and several other allies have proposed that all governments bear a proportional cost of operations, and that some equipment be bought and maintained jointly by the alliance. Some European allies wish to move slowly on further enlargement. | NATO leaders held a summit in Riga, Latvia, November 28-29, 2006. There were no major new initiatives. The allies concentrated their discussion on operations, above all in Afghanistan, capabilities, and partnerships. They also discussed enlargement, but no new members are likely to join the alliance for several years. This report will be updated as needed. See also CRS Report RL32342, NATO and the European Union , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44234 | crs_R44234_0 | Introduction
The procedure for appointing a Justice to the Supreme Court of the United States is provided for by the Constitution in only a few words. The "Appointments Clause" (Article II, Section 2, clause 2) states that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court." The process of appointing Justices has undergone changes over two centuries, but its most basic feature—the sharing of power between the President and Senate—has remained unchanged. To receive an appointment to the Court, a candidate must first be nominated by the President and then confirmed by the Senate. This report provides information and analyses related to the debate and consideration of Supreme Court nominations by the full Senate once nominations are reported by the Judiciary Committee. Sometimes, Senators may find themselves debating whether the Senate, in its "advice and consent" role, should defer to the President and give a nominee the "benefit of the doubt." Opponents, by contrast, rejected the notion that there was a presumption in favor of a Supreme Court nominee at the start of the confirmation process or that the President, in his selection of a nominee, is owed any special deference. As with other nominations listed in the Executive Calendar , information about a Supreme Court nomination includes the name and office of the nominee; the name of the previous holder of the office; whether the committee reported the nomination favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation; and, if there is a printed report, the report number. Voting from the desk during roll calls is in keeping with a standing order of the Senate, which rarely, however, is actually enforced; nevertheless, the rule has been applied by Senate leaders, in recent years, to roll-call votes on Supreme Court nominations, to mark the special significance for the Senate of deciding whether to confirm an appointment to the nation's highest court. For nominations approved, the level of support among Senators voting on the nomination is indicated as follows: (1) unanimous support (i.e., no nay votes cast on the nomination); (2) some opposition (fewer than 10 nay votes cast on the nomination); (3) some opposition (more than 10 nay votes cast on the nomination, but at least half of the Senators not belonging to the President's party still voted aye on the nomination); and (4) party opposition (a majority of Senators not belonging to the President's party cast nay votes on the nomination). The relatively high number of nay votes received by recent nominations approved by the Senate for the Supreme Court is atypical historically (see further discussion below). Percentage of Nays
The level of opposition to Supreme Court nominations approved by the Senate, as measured by the percentage of Senators voting against a nomination, has been relatively greater in recent years than in the past. Recommittals of Supreme Court Nominations
Although the Senate has never adopted a motion to reconsider a Supreme Court nomination after a confirmation vote, there have been at least eight pre-confirmation vote attempts to recommit Supreme Court nominations to the Judiciary Committee. After Senate Confirmation
Under the Constitution, the Senate alone votes on whether to confirm presidential nominations, the House of Representatives having no formal involvement in the confirmation process. | The procedure for appointing a Justice to the Supreme Court is provided for in the U.S. Constitution in only a few words. The "Appointments Clause" in the Constitution (Article II, Section 2, clause 2) states that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court." While the process of appointing Justices has undergone some changes over two centuries, its most essential feature—the sharing of power between the President and the Senate—has remained unchanged: to receive lifetime appointment to the Court, one must first be formally selected ("nominated") by the President and then approved ("confirmed") by the Senate.
For the President, the appointment of a Supreme Court Justice can be a notable measure by which history will judge his Presidency. For the Senate, a decision to confirm is a solemn matter as well, for it is the Senate alone, through its "Advice and Consent" function, without any formal involvement of the House of Representatives, which acts as a safeguard on the President's judgment. This report provides information and analysis related to the final stage of the confirmation process for a nomination to the Supreme Court—the consideration of the nomination by the full Senate, including floor debate and the vote on whether to approve the nomination.
Traditionally, the Senate has tended to be less deferential to the President in his choice of Supreme Court Justices than in his appointment of persons to high executive branch positions. The more exacting standard usually applied to Supreme Court nominations reflects the special importance of the Court, coequal to and independent of the presidency and Congress. Senators are also mindful that Justices—unlike persons elected to legislative office or confirmed to executive branch positions—receive the opportunity to serve a lifetime appointment during good behavior.
The appointment of a Supreme Court Justice might or might not proceed smoothly. From the appointment of the first Justices in 1789 through its consideration of nominee Neil Gorsuch in 2017, the Senate has confirmed 118 Supreme Court nominations out of 162 received. Of the 44 nominations that were not confirmed, 12 were rejected outright in roll-call votes by the Senate, while nearly all of the rest, in the face of substantial committee or Senate opposition to the nominee or the President, were withdrawn by the President, or were postponed, tabled, or never voted on by the Senate. Six of the unconfirmed nominations, however, involved individuals who subsequently were renominated and confirmed.
Additional CRS reports provide information and analysis related to other stages of the confirmation process for nominations to the Supreme Court. For a report related to the selection of a nominee by the President, see CRS Report R44235, Supreme Court Appointment Process: President's Selection of a Nominee, by [author name scrubbed]. For a report related to consideration of nominations by the Senate Judiciary Committee, see CRS Report R44236, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41415 | crs_R41415_0 | Introduction
Many users of peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks have been subjected to copyright infringement lawsuits regarding the unauthorized uploading and downloading of copyrighted material. The vast majority of these lawsuits have settled, with the file sharer agreeing to pay compensation to the copyright holders. However, a few of these cases have gone to trial, and two cases in particular resulted in substantial jury awards to the plaintiffs. The client application allows users to "share" files located on their computer hard-drives. While P2P file sharing technology could be used for legitimate purposes, the overwhelming majority of files available for sharing on peer-to-peer networks are copyrighted works —digital files that are electronic copies of copyrighted sound recordings, television shows, and motion pictures. Uploading and downloading of these copyrighted works without the authorization of the copyright holders using P2P file sharing technology is a violation of the copyright holders' exclusive rights to control the reproduction and distribution of their works. If the infringement is found to be willful, the Copyright Act permits "enhanced" statutory damages of up to $150,000 per infringed work. The remedy of statutory damages for copyright infringement was adopted by the First Congress in the Copyright Act of 1790; with subsequent revisions of the Copyright Act, Congress retained the statutory damages provision and increased the authorized amounts. In addition to this compensatory purpose, statutory damages also serve to punish the infringer and deter others from infringement. The jury found her guilty of willful copyright infringement and awarded to the plaintiff (recording companies that owned or controlled exclusive rights to copyrights in the sound recordings) $1.92 million in statutory damages ($80,000 per infringed song). Thomas-Rasset appealed the jury's damages award, arguing that it was either (1) violative of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (2) excessive and shocking, resulting in the necessity of remittitur to the minimum statutory damages amount of $750 per copyright infringement; or (3) excessive and shocking, resulting in the necessity of a new trial. In making this decision, the court avoided the constitutional question and instead employed the common law doctrine of remittitur. As such, while the plaintiff did not need to prove actual damages for an award of statutory damages, "statutory damages should bear some relation to the actual damages suffered." After a new trial on the issue of damages was held, the jury awarded $1.5 million in statutory damages ($62,500 per song) to the record labels on November 3, 2010. On December 6, the defendant filed a motion asking the court to reduce the statutory damages to zero, arguing that the award violates the Due Process Clause "because it bears no reasonable relationship to the actual damages that the defendant caused." The district court has not yet ruled on this motion as of the date of this report. Tenenbaum was found guilty of willful copyright infringement, and the jury awarded $675,000 in statutory damages. The court, however, agreed with the defendant. Adopting the reasoning of Thomas-Rasset that had embraced the "long tradition in the law of allowing treble damages for willful misconduct," the court reduced the jury's unconstitutional $675,000 award to three times the statutory minimum, for a total of $67,500 ($2,250 per song). The plaintiffs in the Tene n baum case have appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Also, because the Tenenbaum (and Thomas-Rasset) court had ruled that there must be some relationship between actual damages and the amount of statutory damages that is awarded, it may be difficult for some copyright plaintiffs to enforce their rights, as they must make some showing of the actual harm that they have suffered from the infringement—a potentially difficult and expensive task, especially in the context of digital media and file sharing. | The Copyright Act allows statutory damages of between $750 and $30,000 for each act of infringement, and up to $150,000 in cases where the infringement is committed willfully. Congress granted the copyright owner the power to choose to recover either statutory damages or the owner's actual damages plus additional profits of the infringer at any time before final judgment is rendered. Statutory damages serve both compensatory and deterrent purposes: they provide the copyright owner with restitution of profit and reparation for the harm suffered by the owner in situations where it may be difficult or impossible to submit evidence of actual damages (such as lost profits), and they also punish the infringer and discourage that individual, and others, from further infringement.
Peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks permit computer users to "share" with others digital files that are stored on their computers' hard drives. While P2P file sharing technology could be used for legitimate purposes, P2P users most often copy and distribute digital files that contain copyrighted sound recordings, television shows, and motion pictures, without the permission of (or payment to) the copyright holders; as such, it is a violation of the copyright holders' exclusive rights to control the reproduction and distribution of their works. P2P networks such as Napster, Grokster, Morpheus, Kazaa, and LimeWire have all been sued for copyright infringement or for inducing their users to commit copyright infringement, and most have shut down or changed their business models as a consequence of their adjudged legal liability. In addition, many users of P2P networks have been subjected to copyright infringement lawsuits filed by the motion picture and music recording industry associations that represent movie and sound recording copyright holders, respectively. The vast majority of these lawsuits have settled, with the file sharer agreeing to pay compensation to the copyright holders. However, a few of these cases have gone to trial, and two cases in particular resulted in substantial statutory damage awards.
In 2009, in Capitol Records Inc. v. Jammie Thomas-Rasset, the jury found the defendant guilty of willful copyright infringement with respect to 24 sound recordings that she had downloaded and distributed using the P2P file sharing software Kazaa, and awarded $1.92 million in statutory damages to the plaintiff ($80,000 per infringed song). Also in 2009, the jury in Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum found the defendant guilty of willful infringement for downloading and distributing 30 sound recordings using Kazaa, and awarded to the plaintiff $675,000 in statutory damages ($22,500 per infringed song). The defendants in these cases asked their judges to alter or amend the jury award of statutory damages, arguing that the Copyright Act's statutory damages provision, as applied to them, violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The judge in the Tenenbaum case ruled that the $675,000 award was "unconstitutionally excessive" and reduced the award to $67,500 ($2,250 per song). The plaintiffs in the Tenenbaum case have appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
The judge in the Thomas-Rasset case reduced the original award of nearly $2 million to $54,000 ($2,250 per song) using his power under the common law doctrine of remittitur; the court did not reach the question of the constitutionality of the jury's damages award. The judge opined that "statutory damages must still bear some relation to actual damages." However, the plaintiffs refused to accept the remittitur. After a new trial on the issue of statutory damages was held, the jury on November 3, 2010, returned a verdict of $1.5 million ($62,500 per song). A month later, the defendant filed a motion with the court to reduce the statutory damages to zero because she argued the award of statutory damages was unconstitutional. The district court has not yet ruled on this motion. |
crs_RL33700 | crs_RL33700_0 | In addition, the Committees on Appropriations and other appropriate committees are to be notified that the United Nations has acted to prevent U.N. employees, contractor personnel, and peacekeeping forces serving in any U.N. peacekeeping mission from trafficking in persons, exploiting victims of trafficking, or committing acts of illegal sexual exploitation, and to hold accountable individuals who engage in such acts while participating in the peacekeeping mission. Basic Information
United Nations peacekeeping might be defined as the placement of military personnel or forces in a country or countries to perform basically non-military functions in an impartial manner. The U.N. Security Council normally establishes peacekeeping operations in keeping with certain basic principles, which include agreement and continuing support by the Security Council; agreement by the parties to the conflict and consent of the host government(s); unrestricted access and freedom of movement by the operation within the countries of operation and within the parameters of its mandate; provision of personnel on a voluntary basis by U.N. members; and noninterference by the operation and its participants in the internal affairs of the host government. In other instances, the United Nations has conducted elections monitoring in an independent U.N. member state. U.S. arrearages to peacekeeping operations are associated with these assessed accounts. U.N. Proposals for Strengthening Peacekeeping
Agenda for Peace (1992)
As peacekeeping became an option of choice to resolve conflicts in the post-Cold War world, proposals were made for strengthening the U.N. response to all aspects of this peace and security challenge. Since 2004, reform of U.N. peacekeeping has become part of the overall review of the United Nations, its capabilities and capacities in the 21 st century, and the need to reform and renew the organization. The United States and Peacekeeping Proposals
The Clinton Administration initially supported collective security through the United Nations as a centerpiece of its foreign policy. During 1992 , some in Congress focused on finding new sources of funding for U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping obligations while others explored new directions for the United Nations in the area of peace and security. | A major issue facing the United Nations, the United States, and the 111th Congress is the extent to which the United Nations has the capacity to restore or keep the peace in the changing world environment. Associated with this issue is the expressed need for a reliable source of funding and other resources for peacekeeping and improved efficiencies of operation.
For the United States, major congressional considerations on U.N. peacekeeping stem from executive branch commitments made in the U.N. Security Council. The concern with these commitments, made through votes in the Council, is the extent to which they bind the United States to fund and to participate in some way in an operation. This includes placing U.S. military personnel under the control of foreign commanders.
Peacekeeping has come to constitute more than just the placement of military forces into a cease-fire situation with the consent of all the parties. Military peacekeepers may be disarming or seizing weapons, aggressively protecting humanitarian assistance, and clearing land mines. Peacekeeping operations also now involve more non-military personnel and tasks such as maintaining law and order, election monitoring, and human rights monitoring.
Proposals for strengthening U.N. peacekeeping and other aspects of U.N. peace and security capacities have been adopted in the United Nations, by the U.S. executive branch, and by Congress. Some are being implemented. Most authorities have agreed that if the United Nations is to be responsive to 21st century world challenges, both U.N. member states and the appropriate U.N. organs will have to continue to improve U.N. structures and procedures in the peace and security area.
This report serves as a tracking report for action by Congress on United Nations peacekeeping. |
crs_R43156 | crs_R43156_0 | Introduction to Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies (THUD)
The Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations subcommittees are charged with drafting bills to provide annual appropriations for the Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and related agencies. Status of the FY2014 THUD Appropriations Bill
Table 1 provides a timeline of legislative action on the FY2014 THUD appropriations bill, and Table 2 lists the total funding provided for each of the titles in the bill for FY2013 and the amount requested for that title for FY2014. Funding for the first half of FY2013 was provided through a continuing resolution at roughly the same level as in FY2012. This act generally funded THUD agencies at their FY2012 levels, with several exceptions (anomalies). It also included a 0.2% across-the-board rescission to the funding provided to federal agencies in the bill. According to a report accompanying the order, funding for DOT's programs and activities for FY2013 was reduced by about $1.6 billion as a result of the sequester. FY2014 THUD Funding and Sequestration
The President's FY2014 budget requested $76.9 billion in new budget resources for DOT. The major differences between the House and Senate bills are that the House bill proposed to zero out the Transportation Investments Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) grant program (and rescind $237 million of FY2013 funding for that program), would have provided roughly $800 million less for the Federal Aviation Administration's Operations and Facilities & Equipment accounts, would have provided $500 million less for bridge repairs funded by the Federal Highway Administration, would have provided roughly $500 million less for Amtrak and $100 million less for passenger rail grants, and would have provided roughly $350 million less for Federal Transit Administration programs. The President's FY2014 budget requested nearly $35 billion in net new budget authority for HUD in FY2014. Congress enacted $33.4 billion for HUD in FY2013, pre-sequester, or $31.4 billion post-sequester. The House bill ( H.R. 2610 ) would have provided $28 billion in net new budget authority, while the Senate bill ( S. 1243 ) would have provided just over $35 billion. The requested funding was $5.6 billion more than enacted for FY2013, and $6.3 billion more than actually received (not counting emergency funding provided in FY2013). The biggest change in the request from current funding is a request for an additional $5 billion for passenger rail grants. As with the House bill, the primary difference (in dollar terms) between the Senate bill and the Administration's request is the almost $5 billion in additional funding for passenger rail development, which the Senate bill also omits. Both the House and Senate bills support the Administration request. Neither the House nor the Senate bill supported this realignment and funding increase. Post-sequester funding levels are also provided, taken from estimates prepared by HUD. In FY2013, the total amount available for CDF after application of the 0.2% across-the-board rescission and sequestration was approximately $3.135 billion. Appendix A. FY2014 Funding Lapse
FY2014 Funding Lapse and Partial Government Shutdown
The federal government experienced a funding lapse beginning on October 1, 2013, which ended when the Continuing Appropriations Act ( P.L. 113-46 ) was signed into law on October 17, 2013. This is the amount of new funding allocated each year by the appropriations committees. | The House and Senate Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations subcommittees are charged with providing annual appropriations for the Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and related agencies. The HUD budget generally accounts for the largest share of discretionary appropriations provided by the subcommittee. However, when mandatory funding is taken into account, DOT's budget is larger than HUD's budget, because it includes funding from transportation trust funds.
The House and the Senate have considered FY2014 funding with significantly different assumed levels of total funding. Following from this, the House and Senate THUD bills were allocated very different levels of discretionary funding for FY2014: $44.1 billion in the House, and $54.0 billion in the Senate, a difference of 23%.
Comparing funding levels proposed for FY2014 with the amounts provided in FY2013 is complex. In FY2013, Congress funded THUD agencies through a full-year continuing resolution, which provided funding generally at the same level as in FY2012, with some exceptions, and which included a 0.2% across-the-board rescission. That funding was subsequently reduced by the imposition of a sequester, which cut discretionary funding levels by around 5%. This reduced THUD funding by roughly $4.6 billion: around $1.6 billion from DOT and $3 billion from HUD.
The Administration requested $76.9 billion for DOT for FY2014. Congress enacted $71.3 billion for DOT in FY2013; after the sequester reduction, DOT received around $70.6 billion. The biggest change in the Administration's request from current funding was a proposal to restructure the Federal Railroad Administration, creating two new programs that would support existing passenger rail service and fund improvements to rail infrastructure. The Administration requested $6.4 billion for those new programs, an increase of roughly $5 billion over the amount currently provided for those purposes. Neither the House nor Senate bills supported that proposal.
The President's FY2014 budget request for HUD included nearly $35 billion in net new budget authority. This amount is an increase over FY2013, as Congress enacted $33.4 billion for HUD in FY2013, pre-sequester and pre-rescission. Accounting for sequestration and the across-the-board rescission, HUD was provided with about $31.4 billion in FY2013. The House bill (H.R. 2610) proposed about $28 billion in net new budget authority, while the Senate bill (S. 1243) proposed about $35 billion.
Congress did not enact any final FY2014 appropriations prior to the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2013, resulting in a funding lapse and partial government shutdown that lasted until a short-term continuing resolution was enacted on October 17, 2013. Under the terms of that CR (P.L. 113-46), federal departments and agencies, including those typically funded by the THUD appropriations bill, are funded at their FY2013 levels, post-rescission and post-sequestration, back-dated from October 1, 2013, through January 15, 2014. The CR contained several THUD-related anomalies. |
crs_R40707 | crs_R40707_0 | New Challenges to a Secure Retirement Income
Over the past 25 years, defined contribution (DC) plans have become the most prevalent form of employer-sponsored retirement plan in the United States. The majority of assets held in DC plans are invested in stocks and stock mutual funds, and as a result, the decline in the major stock market indices in 2008 greatly reduced the value of many families' retirement savings. The effect of stock market volatility on families' retirement savings is just one issue of concern to Congress with respect to DC plans. This CRS report describes these seven major policy issues with respect to DC plans:
access to employer-sponsored retirement plans, participation in employer-sponsored plans, contribution rates, investment choices, fee disclosure, leakage from retirement savings, and converting retirement savings into income. Thirty million of these workers, or 40%, worked for employers that did not sponsor a retirement plan of any kind. At establishments with fewer than 100 employees, 42% of workers were offered a DC plan, and the take-up rate among those offered a DC plan was 79%. In 2007, about 75% of employees whose employer sponsored a 401(k) plan participated in the plan, and about 78% of eligible employees participated in DC plans of all types. In 2007, the median monthly contribution to defined contribution plans by households in which at least one worker aged 25 to 64 participated in a DC plan was $290. In 2007, the average 401(k) plan offered participants 18 investment options. At year-end 2007, 78% of all DC plan assets were invested in stocks and stock mutual funds. Investment in stocks and stock mutual funds varied little by age, indicating that many workers nearing retirement were heavily invested in stocks, and risked substantial losses in a market downturn like that in 2008. Investment education and target date funds are two approaches to achieving asset diversification in DC plans. Retirement plans contract with service providers to provide investment management, record-keeping, and other services. There can be many service providers, each charging a fee that is ultimately paid by plan participants. The arrangements through which service providers are compensated can be very complicated. Pre-retirement withdrawals from retirement accounts are sometimes described as "leakages" from the pool of retirement savings. Consequently, current law represents a compromise between limiting leakages from retirement accounts and allowing people to have access to their retirement funds in times of great need. Life annuities can help protect retirees against some of the financial risks of retirement, especially longevity risk and investment risk. Roughly 20% to 25% of workers employed at firms that sponsor a defined contribution plan do not participate in the plan. | Over the past 25 years, defined contribution (DC) plans—including 401(k) plans—have become the most prevalent form of employer-sponsored retirement plan in the United States. The majority of assets held in these plans are invested in stocks and stock mutual funds, and the decline in the major stock market indices in 2008 greatly reduced the value of many families' retirement savings. The effect of stock market volatility on families' retirement savings is just one issue of concern to Congress with respect to defined contribution retirement plans.
This report describes seven major policy issues with respect to defined contribution plans:
1. Access to employer-sponsored retirement plans. In 2007, only 61% of employees in the private sector were offered a retirement plan of any kind at work. Fifty-five percent were offered a DC plan. Only 45% of workers at establishments with fewer than 100 employees were offered a retirement plan of any kind in 2007. Forty-two percent were offered a defined contribution plan. 2. Participation in employer-sponsored plans. Between 20% and 25% of workers whose employer offers a DC plan do not participate. Workers under age 35 are less likely than older workers to participate. 3. Contribution rates. On average, participants in DC plans contributed 6% of pay to the plan in 2007. The median contribution by household heads who participated in a DC plan in 2007 was $3,360. This was just 22% of the maximum allowable contribution of $15,500 in that year. 4. Investment choices. At year-end 2007, 78% of all DC plan assets were invested in stocks and stock mutual funds. This ratio varied little by age, indicating that many workers nearing retirement were heavily invested in stocks and risked substantial losses in a market downturn like that in 2008. Investment education and target date funds could help workers make better investment decisions. 5. Fee disclosure. Retirement plans contract with service providers to provide investment management, record-keeping, and other services. There can be many service providers, each charging a fee that is ultimately paid by participants in 401(k) plans. The arrangements through which service providers are compensated can be very complicated and fees are often not clearly disclosed. 6. Leakage from retirement savings. Pre-retirement withdrawals from retirement accounts are sometimes called "leakages." Current law represents a compromise between limiting leakages from retirement accounts and allowing people to have access to their retirement funds in times of great need. In general, borrowing from a 401(k) plan poses less risk to retirement security than a withdrawal. Pre-retirement withdrawals can have adverse long-term effects on retirement income. 7. Converting retirement savings into income. Retirees face many financial risks, including living longer than they expected, investment losses, inflation, and possible large expenses for medical care and long-term care. Annuities can protect retirees from some of these risks, but few retirees purchase them. Developing polices that motivate retirees to convert assets into a reliable source of income will be a continuing challenge for Congress and other policymakers. |
crs_R43821 | crs_R43821_0 | The media reports data breaches exposing tens of millions of personal financial records at retailers, such as Target, Home Depot, and TJ Maxx. It would seem that companies could increase their cybersecurity at relatively little cost by sharing information about cyberattacks. Perceived Legal Barriers to Information Sharing
Firms and industry groups have expressed reluctance to share information in part because doing so might violate privacy or antitrust laws. Public disclosure of a breach may cost an organization customers and sales and affect its stock price. The Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) Council emphasized to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that "the benefits of sharing information are often difficult to discern, while the risks and costs of sharing are direct and foreseeable." So Why Do Some Firms Share Information? Information about the effects of an attack can also be shared, even if the method of attack is unknown—for example, by notifying other firms that information has been stolen or that a resource is not operational. ISACs are private-sector, nonprofit entities that collect, analyze, and share information on cybersecurity threats and best practices. Other experts advocate a strictly voluntary approach, because they believe it could impose fewer regulatory costs on businesses and cost less for taxpayers. Effects of Greater Information Sharing
Sharing more information could reduce the information asymmetries and increase the size and quality of the market for cybersecurity products and make cyberspace more secure, allowing firms to better estimate the probability and costs of data breaches, for example. It might provide a lesson to those using other software, but it is less likely to be directly applicable. Selected Legislation in the 114th Congress to Encourage Information Sharing
This section provides brief summaries of two bills that have been introduced in the 114 th Congress that might affect the willingness of organizations to share cybersecurity information. 1560 and H.R. 1560: Protecting Cyber Networks Act (Title I) and National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act (Title II, formerly H.R. 1731)
On April 22, 2015, the House passed H.R. 1560 . 1560 and H.R. 1731 . H.R. S. 754: Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015
On March 17, 2015, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported out S. 754 , Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA). Analysis
Both H.R. H.R. | Data breaches, such as those at Target, Home Depot, Neiman Marcus, JPMorgan Chase, and Anthem, have affected financial records of tens of millions of households and seem to occur regularly. Companies typically respond by trying to increase their cybersecurity, hiring consultants, and purchasing new hardware and software. Policy analysts have suggested that sharing information about these breaches could be an effective and inexpensive part of improving cybersecurity. Firms share information directly on an ad hoc basis and through private-sector, nonprofit organizations, such as Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) that can analyze and disseminate information.
Firms sometimes do not share information because of perceived legal risks, such as violating privacy or antitrust laws, and economic incentives, such as giving information that will benefit their competitors. A firm that has been attacked might prefer to keep such information private out of a worry that its sales or stock price will fall. Further, there are no existing mechanisms to reward firms for sharing information. Their competitors can take advantage of the information, but not contribute in turn. This lack of reciprocity, called "free riding" by economists, may discourage firms from sharing. Information that is shared may not be applicable to those receiving it, or it might be difficult to apply.
Because firms are reluctant to share information, other firms suffer from vulnerabilities that could be corrected. Further, by not sharing information about effective cybersecurity products and techniques, the size and quality of the market for cybersecurity products suffer.
Some industry leaders call for mandatory sharing of information concerning attacks. Other experts advocate a strictly voluntary approach, because they believe it could impose fewer regulatory costs on businesses and cost less for taxpayers.
A number of bills designed to encourage cybersecurity information sharing have been introduced in the 114th Congress, including H.R. 1560, Protecting Cyber Networks Act; H.R. 1731, National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015; and S. 754, Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA). In April 2015, the House passed both H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731, and it combined them into H.R. 1560 with the original H.R. 1560 as Title I and H.R. 1731 as Title II. On March 17, 2015, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported out S. 754. |
crs_R42377 | crs_R42377_0 | Concerns have focused on the sustainability of public deficits in some Eurozone countries, but the Eurozone has also faced a number of related economic challenges, including weaknesses in the Eurozone banking system, slow or negative economic growth, rising unemployment, and persistent trade imbalances within the Eurozone. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about the possible effects of the crisis on the U.S. economy, the appropriate role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the crisis, and the implications of the crisis for future U.S.-EU cooperation on foreign policy issues. Over the past two years, European leaders and institutions have pursued a set of unprecedented policy measures to respond to the crisis and stem contagion, particularly to Italy and Spain, the third- and fourth-largest economies in the Eurozone. However, a pledge by the European Central Bank (ECB) in September 2012 to intervene more aggressively has been credited with sustaining improved market sentiment, with many analysts remarking that the crisis may have "turned a corner." The economic crisis has also turned into a political crisis. Governments in many European countries have fallen as a direct or indirect result of the crisis. Additionally, disagreements among Germany, France, and the ECB over the appropriate crisis response, and complex EU policy-making processes, are seen as having exacerbated anxiety in markets. Economic Challenges Facing the Eurozone
Today, many of the concerns related to the Eurozone focus on high levels of public debt and government deficits in some Eurozone countries. Debt restructuring has also alleviated debt burdens for Greece and Ireland. A combination of deep cuts in public spending, rising unemployment, and economic recession in several Eurozone member states has provoked recurring, large-scale protests. Current Status
Market pressure against the Eurozone eased considerably in the fourth quarter of 2012 and the start of 2013, with some analysts suggesting that the Eurozone has "turned a corner." In February 2013 and March 2013, the Eurozone crisis cycled back into a period of uncertainty, fueled by recent developments in Italy and, in particular, Cyprus. In February 2013, a general election in Italy failed to produce a clear winner, leading many analysts to worry that political instability might heighten investor unease about the country's fiscal position. Concerns about the stability of public finances and banks in Cyprus came to the forefront in March 2013. A tentative agreement between the Cypriot government, the Europeans, and the IMF was unanimously rejected by the Cypriot parliament. To date, however, contagion of Cyprus to other Eurozone countries has been limited. Although new institutional arrangements being proposed could increase integration among European countries, they argue that the result will fall short of a creating a full fiscal or political union and that the Eurozone will emerge from the crisis largely in its current form. In general, the Eurozone crisis has bolstered interest in trade and investment liberalization between the United States and the EU, as a way of promoting economic recovery in both economies, as discussed in greater detail below. In February 2013, the Obama Administration, the European Commission, and the European Council announced that the United States and the EU plan to launch negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The United States has not pledged any new funds to the IMF as part of this effort. As the biggest shareholder in the institution, the United States may want to consider how to balance, on the one hand, making sure that the IMF has the resources it needs to ensure stability in the international economy with, on the other hand, exercising oversight over the exposure of the IMF to Europe and any potential concessions that countries are looking for in exchange for providing financial assistance. Implications for Broader U.S.-European Cooperation
The United States looks to Europe for partnership in addressing a wide range of global challenges, and some analysts and U.S. and European officials have expressed concern about the potential effects of the Eurozone crisis on U.S.-European political and security cooperation. The crisis could also exacerbate a long-standing downward trend in European defense spending and cast further doubt on Europe's willingness and capability to be an effective global security actor in the years ahead. | Crisis Overview
What started as a debt crisis in Greece in late 2009 evolved into a broader economic and political crisis in the Eurozone and European Union (EU). The Eurozone faces four major, and related, economic challenges: (1) high debt levels and public deficits in some Eurozone countries; (2) weaknesses in the European banking system; (3) economic recession and high unemployment in some Eurozone countries; and (4) persistent trade imbalances within the Eurozone.
The economic crisis also turned into a political crisis. A combination of deep cuts in public spending, rising unemployment, and economic recession has provoked large-scale protests in several Eurozone countries, and several governments have fallen as a direct or indirect result of the crisis. Additionally, disagreements among key policymakers over the appropriate crisis response and a complex EU policy-making process are seen as having exacerbated the crisis.
Recent Developments and Outlook
Market pressure against the Eurozone eased considerably in the fourth quarter of 2012 and the start of 2013, but uncertainty increased in February and March 2013, particularly driven by developments in Cyprus. The sentiment that the crisis had "turned a corner" at the end of 2012 was largely driven by the European Central Bank (ECB) and its new bond-buying program. Announced in September 2012, the program has not yet been triggered but is viewed by many as successful in restoring market confidence, particularly in Italy and Spain, the third and fourth largest economies in the Eurozone. Other developments helped calm markets, including debt restructuring in Greece and Ireland and progress towards creating a Eurozone "banking union."
The crisis flared in February and March 2013, highlighting the continuing challenges facing the Eurozone. The February 2013 election in Italy failed to produce a clear winner, raising concerns that political instability could heighten investor unease about the country's fiscal position. In March 2013, Cyprus's banking crisis came to the forefront. A tentative assistance package that included taxing depositors was rejected by the Cypriot parliament. After a week of tense negotiations, a new agreement was reached that does not tax small depositors. Although the new agreement is broadly expected to be finalized without problems, concerns persist about potential contagion to other Eurozone countries.
More broadly, fundamental challenges in the Eurozone remain, including lack of economic growth, high unemployment, and internal trade imbalances. Analysts disagree about the likely outcome of the crisis. Some analysts argue that the Eurozone will be able to "muddle through," making incremental changes without changing the structure of the Eurozone. Others argue that European leaders and institutions will reform, and that the EU could emerge from the crisis stronger and more integrated. Others still have not ruled out some countries, particularly Greece, exiting the Eurozone, although improved market sentiment has limited discussions about a potential Eurozone breakup.
Issues for Congress
Impact on the U.S. Economy: The United States has strong economic ties to Europe, and many analysts view the Eurozone crisis as one of the biggest potential threats to the U.S. economic recovery. Additionally, the crisis has bolstered interest in U.S.-EU trade and investment liberalization, to bolster both economies. In February 2013, the Administration and EU officials announced plans to launch talks on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
IMF Involvement: In response to the crisis, some countries have pledged additional funds to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The United States has not pledged new funds to the IMF as part of this initiative. Members of Congress may want to consider how to guarantee that the IMF has the resources it needs to ensure international economic stability and to exercise oversight over the exposure of the IMF to the Eurozone.
U.S.-European Cooperation: The United States looks to Europe for partnership in addressing a range of global challenges. Some analysts and policymakers express concern that the crisis could keep much of the EU's focus turned inward and exacerbate a long-standing downward trend in European defense spending. |
crs_RL33022 | crs_RL33022_0 | Introduction
The Indian Health Service (IHS), part of the Public Health Service (PHS) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), funds health services to about 1.8 million Indians, members of the nation's 562 federally recognized American Indian and Alaska Native (AI/AN) tribes in IHS service delivery areas. Organization of the IHS Health Delivery System
Currently, the IHS health care delivery system, a largely rural system, is organized into regional area offices and, within each region, local service units. Eligible Population
In general, persons eligible for IHS services are members of federally recognized tribes. bloodlines, or both. Health Status
IHS comparisons of mortality measures indicate that the IHS service population has historically had a greater incidence of illness and higher mortality rates than the general U.S. population. In terms of life expectancy, IHS has found that "American Indians and Alaska Natives born today have a life expectancy that is 2.4 years less than the U.S. all races population (74.5 years to 76.9 years, respectively; 1999-2001 rates)." Appropriations and Funding
IHS funding is separated into four budget categories: health services, facilities, collections (reimbursements from Medicare and Medicaid, as well as private insurance), and SDPI. FEHBP-level coverage for the 1.44 million IHS user population, according to the FDI study, would call for IHS appropriations of about $3.97 billion in FY2004 for personal medical services. Current Legislative Issues
There are a number of Indian health issues that have been or likely will be debated in the 110 th Congress. In the 110 th Congress, the Senate's IHCIA reauthorization bill, S. 1200 , was introduced on April 24, 2007, and reported, with amendments, by the Senate Indian Affairs Committee on October 16, 2007 ( S.Rept. 110-197 ). The Natural Resources Committee ordered H.R. 1328 reported, with amendments, on April 25, 2007; the printed report was published April 4, 2008 ( H.Rept. 110-564 , part 1). S. 1200 was passed, amended, in the Senate on February 28, 2008, and referred in the House to the same committees as H.R. 1328 was discharged from the Energy and Commerce Committee and the Ways and Means Committee on June 6, 2008, and the Natural Resources-reported bill was placed on the House calendar. Neither S. 1200 nor H.R. No IHCIA reauthorization bill has been introduced in the 111 th Congress as of the date of this report, although Medicaid-related provisions concerning cost-sharing, property exclusions, and consultation have been included in current draft economic-stimulus legislation. S. 1200 , as passed by the Senate, and H.R. They would expand the roles of tribes, tribal organizations (TOs), and urban Indian organizations (UIOs) in management and decision-making; organize behavioral health services (alcohol and substance abuse, social services, and mental health programs) into a "comprehensive continuum" of prevention and treatment programs; create a construction priority system for IHS-funded health facilities; authorize long-term and hospice care; exempt Indians from Medicaid and SCHIP premiums and copayments; allow urban Indian health programs (UIHPs) to get reimbursements from Medicare and other third parties; and establish a commission on how to improve Indian health care delivery. 1328 by the House Health Subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce Committee, in the version it forwarded to the full committee in November 2007. Amendments to the Social Security Act
Separate from the reauthorization of the IHCIA, S. 1200 and H.R. 1328 . 1328 . U.S. Congress. | The Indian Health Service (IHS), an agency in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), provides health care for eligible American Indians/Alaskan Natives through a system of programs and facilities located on or near Indian reservations and in certain urban areas. The IHS health delivery program is organized into 12 regional area offices and 161 local service units, and serves federal reservations, Indian communities, and urban Indians. In general, persons eligible for IHS services must be in IHS service areas and belong to federally recognized tribes.
The IHS-served population generally has a higher incidence of illness and premature mortality than the U.S. population as a whole. Several IHS publications compare the health conditions and causes of death of the IHS service population with those for the entire U.S. population. According to the latest of these, the average life expectancy at birth for the IHS service area population in 1999-2001 was 74.5 years, or 2.4 years less than the 76.9 years for the total U.S. population.
IHS appropriations are separated into two budget categories: health services and health facilities. For FY2008, the total appropriation for IHS was $3.35 billion, of which $2.97 billion (89%) was for health services and $374.6 million (11%) was for health facilities. Other sources of IHS funding include a special diabetes program and reimbursements from Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurance. Total IHS "program-level" funding, including all sources, was $4.28 billion in FY2008. Indian health advocates argue that IHS funding falls short of the need.
Although a number of legislative issues concerning IHS face the 111th Congress, the primary focus has been on the reauthorization of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA). Two bills (S. 1200 and H.R. 1328) were introduced in the 110th Congress to reauthorize the IHCIA. Both reauthorization bills would have expanded health services, eased processes for reimbursements from Medicaid and other federal programs, coordinated behavioral health programs, and authorized other actions. S. 1200 was reported, amended, by the Senate Indian Affairs Committee on October 17, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-197). S. 1200 was passed, amended, by the Senate February 28, 2008, and sent to the House. H.R. 1328 was reported, amended, by the House Natural Resources Committee on April 4, 2008 (H.Rept. 110-564, part 1). Separately H.R. 1328 was forwarded, amended, by the House Energy and Commerce Committee's Health Subcommittee to the full Committee on November 7, 2007. H.R. 1328 was discharged by the Energy and Commerce and Ways and Means Committees on June 6, 2008, and the Natural Resources version reported in April was placed on the calendar. Concerns continue about many issues in the IHCIA bills, including provisions on Medicaid and other issues listed in a January 2008 Statement of Administration Policy on S. 1200, which threatened a veto of that bill. Neither S. 1200 nor H.R. 1328 were passed by Congress. No IHCIA bill has been introduced in the 111th Congress as of the date of this report, but certain Medicaid-related provisions have been included in draft economic-stimulus legislation. This report will be updated. |
crs_RL30440 | crs_RL30440_0 | The four commissions (activated in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995) generated 499recommendations for closing and realigning bases. Four base closure and realignment (BRAC) commissions, on the basis of their individual reports,recommended a total of 534 actions to close, realign, or otherwise affect specific bases, facilities,and activities. Most recently, in December 1998, the General AccountingOffice (GAO) reported that the four BRAC commissions generated 499 recommendations, but thatin its final tally "only 451 of these ultimately required action, primarily because 48 were changed insome manner by recommendations of a later commission." (7)
The closing of all 451 BRAC installations (major, minor, and "other") from the four rounds isexpected to be completed by the end of FY2001, as originally scheduled. The disposing of alltheclosed property, however, is expected to take many more years. In its recommendations to the 1995 Base Closure Commission, the Department of Defense estimated that adding the 1995 closures (recommended by DOD) to the previous ones would reducethe domestic base structure by approximately 21%. It has stressed that base structure reductions lag significantly behind thereductions in the defense budget and in the force structure (military units and personnel). 3197) that sought two additional rounds of base closures and realignments beginning in 2003 and2005. Costs and Savings
Two important aspects of analyzing costs and savings are associated with BRAC closings. At the request of Congress, the Department of Defense submitted a report in April 1998 on the status of baserealignments and closures. With this caveat, the DOD report proceeded to estimate net total savings from the four BRAC rounds of about $14 billion through 2001 (see Table 1). It projected that annual savings, thereafter,would be in the vicinity of $5.6 to $5.7 billion. a. General Accounting Office. Second, regardless of substantial initial costs, much greatersavings will be achieved in the long run as a result of the four rounds of military base closures. According to DOD's estimates, two new rounds, each roughly the size of the lasttwo rounds initiated in 1993 and 1995, would generate annual savings of about $3 billion after theyare implemented. The long-standing argument of many Members of Congress against anynew rounds as long as the Clinton Administration remained in place (because of perceived abuse inthe handling of McClellan and Kelly air force bases) has now become largely moot. A majorimpediment to further closures and realignments, thus, appears to have been removed. | Approximately 13 years ago, in December 1988, the first military base closure commission recommended the closing and realignment of 145 U.S. domestic bases and facilities. This action wasthe consequence of the Department of Defense's broad reevaluation of its mission in conjunctionwith the weakening and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union. There was little need, according tothe Pentagon, to continue to retain the vast Cold War-era infrastructure. Funds saved from closingdown underutilized bases, DOD further noted, could be used to enhance development of newweapons and improved readiness.
The 1988 round of infrastructure reductions was followed by three additional rounds in 1991, 1993, and 1995. Since then, no further rounds of base closures and realignments have beenauthorized by Congress, despite repeated requests from the Department of Defense in recent yearsfor two additional rounds. The reasons for congressional resistance are two-fold. First, there isconcern over a likely backlash from constituents living in or near military installations. Second,many Members of Congress remain wary about a repetition of the perceived political intrusion bythe Clinton Administration that occurred in regard to the 1995 recommendations to close Kelly andMcClellan air force bases.
The four base closure and realignment (BRAC) commissions recommended, individually, a total of 534 actions to close, realign, or otherwise affect specific bases, facilities, and activities. InDecember 1998, the General Accounting Office reported that the four BRAC commissions generated499 recommendations, but that in its final tally "only 451 of these ultimately required action,primarily because 48 were changed in some manner by recommendations of a later commission."
The closing of all 451 BRAC installations (major, minor and "other") from the four rounds is expected to be completed by the end of FY2001, as originally scheduled. The disposing of all theclosed property, however is expected to take many more years. The Pentagon's current estimate ofthe percentage reduction in base structure as a result of the first four rounds is 21%. This figure isused as support for additional infrastructure reductions, since other key indicators, such as thedefense budget and the force structure (personnel and units) have declined 40% and 36%,respectively.
In terms of costs and savings associated with the first four rounds of closures and realignments, a DOD report (April 1998) estimated a net total savings of about $14 billion through FY2001. Itprojected that net annual savings, thereafter, would be in the vicinity of $5.6 to $5.7 billion. As forthe two new rounds currently being sought, the Pentagon has estimated an annual savings of about$3 billion after they are implemented. |
crs_RL32509 | crs_RL32509_0 | 20-27) established for the first time the requirement that the President annually submit a budget proposal to Congress. §1105(a)), the President is required to submit the annual budget on or after the first Monday in January, but no later than the first Monday in February. Origin of the Mid-Session Review
For nearly half a century after the 1921 act took effect, Presidents submitted their annual budgets to Congress toward the beginning of the session but were not required to update the budget submissions later in the session. As the federal budget became larger, more complex, and more dynamic, Congress felt a greater need for more extensive and updated budgetary information from the President. In addition, Section 221(b) of the act requires the President to submit to Congress an update of the budget in the middle of the legislative session. The most current mid-session review (FY2017) is available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/MSR . Content of the Mid-Session Review
Under 31 U.S.C. The content and structure of the mid-session review has varied by President. The mid-session review may also include discussion of the potential effects of pending budgetary reforms or other legislative proposals that have not been enacted. Timing of Submission: FY1973-FY2017
Since the first year the mid-session review was required (FY1973), each President has submitted at least one mid-session review on time and at least one late. Controversy has occasionally surfaced regarding the timing of its submission to Congress. On more than one occasion, some Members of Congress have suggested that the President has timed submission of the mid-session review in order to gain a political or legislative advantage over Congress. Delayed Submission of the Mid-Session Review
Since the first year the mid-session review was required it was submitted, on average, 8 calendar days late. In 23 of the 45 years, the mid-session review was submitted after the deadline, with delays ranging from 1 to 52 calendar days. When the mid-session review was late, it was delayed, on average, three weeks (20.96 calendar days). Timely and Accelerated Submission of the Mid-Session Review
In 22 of the 45 years, the mid-session review was submitted on or before the deadline. Seven of the 22 timely submissions were made on the deadline. In 11 instances, the mid-session review was submitted fewer than 10 days before the deadline. In the remaining four instances, the mid-session review was submitted at least two weeks before the deadline. For FY1978, FY2000, and FY2001, the mid-session review was submitted in late June—16, 17, and 19 calendar days ahead of the deadline, respectively. For FY1999, it was submitted on May 26, 1998—50 calendar days before the deadline. Statutory Requirement for a Mid-Session Review of the President's Budget (31 U.S.C. The summary shall include—
(1) for that fiscal year—
(A) substantial changes in or reappraisals of estimates of expenditures and receipts;
(B) substantial obligations imposed on the budget after its submission;
(C) current information on matters referred to in section 1105(a)(8) and (9)(B) and (C) of this title;
and (D) additional information the President decides is advisable to provide Congress with complete and current information about the budget and current estimates of the functions, obligations, requirements, and financial condition of the United States Government;
(2) for the 4 fiscal years following the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, information on estimated expenditures for programs authorized to continue in future years, or that are considered mandatory, under law; and
(3) for future fiscal years, information on estimated expenditures of balances carried over from the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted. | The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 established for the first time the requirement that the President annually submit a budget proposal to Congress. Under current law (31 U.S.C. §1105(a)), the President is required to submit the budget proposal to Congress on or after the first Monday in January, but no later than the first Monday in February. For further information, see CRS Report R43163, The President's Budget: Overview of Structure and Timing of Submission to Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
For nearly half a century after the 1921 act took effect, Presidents submitted their annual budgets to Congress toward the beginning of the session but were not required to update their budget submissions later in the session. As the federal budget became larger and more complex, Congress felt a need for more extensive and updated budgetary information from the President.
Section 221(b) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the President to submit to Congress an update of the budget proposal in the middle of the legislative session. This update, commonly referred to as the mid-session review (or MSR), was first required for FY1973. The mid-session review for FY2017 is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/MSR.
Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §1106, the mid-session review must include, in part, (1) any substantial changes to estimated receipts or expenditures, (2) changes resulting from enacted or pending appropriations, and (3) estimated end-of-year Treasury figures. Presidents also have some discretion regarding additional content and overall structure of the mid-session review. For example, in addition to the required elements, some Presidents have included updates to their original budget request or discussion of the potential effects that pending legislative proposals may have on their budgetary estimates.
Since the first year the mid-session review was required, each President has submitted at least one mid-session review on time and at least one late. Controversy has occasionally surfaced regarding the timing of its submission to Congress. At times, some Members of Congress have suggested that the President has timed submission of the mid-session review in order to gain a political or legislative advantage over Congress.
Delayed Submission of the Mid-Session Review. During the 45 years that the President has been required to submit a mid-session review, it has been submitted, on average, 8 calendar days late. In 23 of the 45 years, the mid-session review was submitted after the deadline, with delays ranging from 1 to 52 days. When the mid-session review was submitted late, it was delayed, on average, 21 calendar days.
Timely and Accelerated Submission of the Mid-Session Review. In 22 of the 45 years, the mid-session review was submitted on time. Seven of the 22 timely submissions were made on the deadline, including FY2017. In 11 instances, the mid-session review was submitted fewer than 10 days before the deadline. In the remaining four instances, the mid-session review was submitted at least two weeks before the deadline. For FY1978, FY2000, and FY2001, the mid-session review was submitted in late June—16, 17, and 19 calendar days ahead of the deadline, respectively. For FY1999, it was submitted on May 26, 1998—50 calendar days ahead of the deadline.
This report, which provides an overview of the mid-session review and analysis of the timing of the mid-session review, will be updated annually or as developments warrant. |
crs_R44253 | crs_R44253_0 | In 1972, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) was enacted to set operational requirements for federal advisory committees. Pursuant to statute, the General Services Administration (GSA) maintains and administers management guidelines for federal advisory committees. In the 114 th Congress, one bill has been introduced that, if enacted, would affect FACA's implementation and administration government-wide. The Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 2016 ( H.R. 2347 seeks to clarify the ethics requirements of committee members and would increase certain federal advisory committee records access requirements. On March 2, 2016, H.R. This report provides a legislative and executive-branch history of FACA, and examines its application. Subsequently, Congress enacted FACA in 1972. FACA places certain requirements on the formation and oversight of federal advisory committees. Most committee meetings are required to be advertised in the Federal Register and open to the public. Committee Operations and Cost Statistics44
In FY2015, 1,009 committees reported a total of 72,200 members and a cost to the federal government of $367,568,370. 2347 , the Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 2015. 2347 would increase public access to federal advisory committees, clarify ethics requirements of FACA committee members, and extend FACA requirements to federal advisory committees established by entities outside of a federal agency, but under contract with the agency. On March 1, 2016, H.R. 2347 passed the House. 2347 was referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. No further action has been taken on the bill. 2347 would require the selection of members without regard to their partisan affiliations. In addition, H.R. The agency must also put online a copy of each such certification, a summary description of the conflict necessitating the certification, and the reason for granting the certification Any recusal agreement made by a member or any recusal known to the agency that occurs during the course of a meeting or other work of the committee A summary of the process used by the advisory committee for making decisions Detailed minutes of all meetings of the committee and a description of committee efforts to make meetings accessible to the public using online technologies (such as video recordings) or other techniques (such as audio recordings) Any written determination by the President or the head of the agency to which the advisory committee reports, pursuant to Section 10(d), to close a meeting or any portion of a meeting and the reasons for such determination Notices of future meetings of the committee Any additional information considered relevant by the head of the agency to which the advisory committee reports. Below are discussions of potential policy options that Congress may consider when examining the operations of FACA committees. Appendix. 5. The purpose of S. 3529 is to: strengthen the authority of Congress and the executive branch to limit the use of Federal advisory committees to those that are necessary and serve an essential purpose; provide uniform standards for the creation, operation, and management of such committees; provide that the Congress and the public are kept fully and currently informed as to the number, purposes, membership, and costs of advisory committees, including their accomplishments; and assure that Federal advisory committees shall be advisory only. 4383 as amended. | Federal advisory committees—which may also be labeled as commissions, councils, task forces, or working groups—are established to assist congressional and executive branch policymaking and grantmaking. In some cases, federal advisory committees assist in solving complex or divisive issues. Federal advisory committees may be established by Congress, the President, or an agency head to render independent advice or provide the federal government with policy recommendations.
In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA; 5 U.S.C. Appendix—Federal Advisory Committee Act; 86 Stat. 770, as amended). FACA was prompted by the perception that some advisory committees were duplicative, inefficient, and lacked adequate oversight. FACA mandates certain structural and operational requirements, including formal reporting and oversight procedures. Additionally, FACA requires committee meetings be open to the public, unless certain requirements are met. Also, FACA committee records are generally required to be accessible to the public. Pursuant to statute, the General Services Administration (GSA) maintains and administers management guidelines for federal advisory committees.
During FY2015, 1,009 active FACA committees reported a total of 72,200 members. Federal operating costs for those committees was reported as $367,568,370, of which $205,800,103 (56.0%) was spent on federal support staff to administer the committees. The preponderance of FACA committee members and meetings are providing advice and recommendations in the grantmaking processes of the federal government.
For Congress, several aspects of federal advisory committees may be of interest. For example, Congress can
require the establishment of new federal advisory committees; oversee the operations of existing advisory committees; and legislate changes to FACA or the ethics responsibilities placed on members who serve on FACA committees.
This report offers a history of FACA, examines its current requirements, and provides data on federal advisory committees' operations and costs.
To date in the 114th Congress (2015-2016), one bill has been introduced that would amend FACA's implementation and administration. H.R. 2347, the Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 2016, would create a formal process for the public to recommend potential advisory committee members and require member selection without regard to partisan affiliations. In addition, H.R. 2347 seeks to clarify the ethics requirements placed on committee members, and would increase each FACA committee's records access requirements. On March 1, 2016, H.R. 2347 passed the House. On March 2, 2016, H.R. 2347 was referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. No further action has been taken on the bill. |
crs_RS20794 | crs_RS20794_0 | Because of the high volume and complexity of its work, Congress divides its legislative, oversight, and internal administrative tasks among committees and subcommittees. The House and Senate each have their own committees and related rules of procedure, which are similar but not identical. Within the guidelines of chamber rules, each committee adopts its own rules addressing organizational, structural, and procedural issues; thus, even within a chamber, there is considerable variation among panels. | Because of the high volume and complexity of its work, Congress divides its tasks among committees and subcommittees. Both the House and Senate have their own committee systems, which are similar but not identical. Within chamber guidelines, however, each committee adopts its own rules; thus, there is considerable variation among panels. This report provides a brief overview of the organization and operations of House and Senate committees. |
crs_RL31591 | crs_RL31591_0 | If all checks were replaced by electronic transactions, the exact cost savings would still be unknown, because estimates of the cost of using a check and the number of checks written each yearremain in dispute. Consequently, estimates of cost savings range from $1.4 billion annually fortruncation alone to $68 billion for replacing checks with electronic payments. Legislation
On October 28, 2003, President Bush signed the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act intolaw ( P.L. 108-100 ). The act is also known as Check 21 Act. In December 2001, the Federal Reserve Board drafted the Check TruncationAct (CTA) and sent it to both the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Committeeon Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs to be introduced in Congress. They would eliminate therequirement to physically return the original checks to the paying bank and therefore make it easierfor more banks to voluntarily adopt electronic check clearing instead of continuing to use the papercheck clearing process. The main difference between the Fed's proposal and H.R. In the 108th Congress , on April 3, 2003, the Senate held its first hearing on the Fed's CheckTruncation Act proposal that was received in December 2001. 1474 , the Check Clearing for the21st Century Act of 2003. On June 27, 2003, the full Senate passed the Check Truncation Act of 2003 ( S. 1334 ) and incorporated it in H.R. At a markup on June 18, 2003, the SenateCommittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs approved S. 1334. 1474 , which was passed by theHouse of Representatives the same day and referred it to the Senate. The CTA ismore generous in its consumer protection provisions. On October 1, 2003, House and Senate conferees reported H.R. 1474 ( Conference Report H.Rept. 108-291 ). At the same time, the paying bank receives the greatest benefit. The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (H.R.1474, P.L. 1474 and the Fed's Check Truncation Actproposal is that H.R. 1474 came from theConsumers Union. The views in its testimony were supported by the Consumer Federation ofAmerica, the U.S. Public Interest Research Group, and the National Consumer Law Center. TheConsumers Union argued that the Act would make it impossible for an estimated 45.8 million U.S.households who are currently getting their paper checks back to continue to do so. It states that theseconsumers would be less protected from fraud under the Act than under the existing check clearingprocess when there are disputes about errors in the check payment process. 5414 , the Consumers Union suggests changes in the proposed legislation that would significantly increase consumer protectionwhen checks are cleared electronically. In short, the Consumers Union's changes would protect consumersfrom the loss of the fraud protection provided by the right to have the original check returned tothem. | The clearing process for checks is more expensive than other methods of payment which are cleared electronically, such as credit cards and Internet banking. The main reason is that checkclearing requires banks to physically present and return checks unless they obtain legal agreementsto clear electronically. The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act of 2003 ( P.L. 108-100 )eliminates the requirement to physically return the original checks to the paying bank. Before thebill by the same title became law, on April 3, 2003, the Senate held its first hearing on the Fed'sCheck Truncation Act (CTA) proposal that was sent to banking committees of both Houses inDecember 2001. On June 5, 2003, the House passed H.R. 1474 and referred it to theSenate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. On June 18, 2003, at a markup, theSenate Banking Committee approved its Check Truncation Act of 2003 ( S. 1334 ) andon June 27, 2003, the full Senate passed S. 1334 and incorporated it in H.R. 1474 . On October 1, 2003, House and Senate conferees reported H.R. 1474 (Conference Report H.Rept. 108-291 ). On October 28, 2003, President Bushsigned the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act ( P.L. 108-100 ) into law, which is now also knownas Check 21 Act.
Estimates of cost savings from moving to electronic check clearing vary widely because estimates of the cost of using a check and the number of checks written each year remain in dispute. Consequently, estimates of cost savings range from $1.4 billion annually for truncation alone to $68billion for replacing checks with electronic payments. In testimony at the hearing of Senate andHouse banking committees in the 108th Congress, the Fed's CTA in the Senate and H.R. 1474 in the House were supported by the Federal Reserve Board, which testified that it would liketo remove some of the consumer protection provisions that were in its 2001 proposal because theywere unnecessary. The Fed argued that the regulatory costs these provisions would place on bankswould outweigh the consumer benefits. Still, the bill is supported by America's CommunityBankers, the American Bankers Association, the Consumer Bankers Association, and the FinancialServices Roundtable.
The opposition to the Check 21 Act came from the Consumers Union, supported in its testimony by the Consumer Federation of America, the U.S. Public Interest Research Group, and theNational Consumer Law Center. The Consumers Union argued that the Act would make itimpossible for an estimated 45.8 million U.S. households who are currently getting their paperchecks back to continue to do so. These consumers would be less protected from fraud under theAct than under the existing check clearing process when there are disputes about check payments.The Consumers Union's suggested changes in the proposed legislation would significantly increaseconsumer protection. At the same time, these changes would increase financial institutions' costsof voluntarily adopting check truncation. Other witnesses argued that those banks with decades ofusing truncated checks have not experienced many disputed check payments, and when they did theywere quickly resolved.
This report will be updated as legislative and financial developments warrant. |
crs_R43193 | crs_R43193_0 | This report provides an overview of appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Major Developments
April 10, 2013—President's FY2014 Budget Request Submitted
For FY2014, the Administration requested $39.028 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS, as part of an overall budget request of $60.0 billion (including fees, trust funds, and other funding that is not appropriated or does not score against the overall discretionary spending caps budget allocation for the bill). More than 31,000 DHS employees were furloughed, and tens of thousands of others that were excepted from furlough and whose salaries were paid through annual appropriations worked without pay until the funding lapse was resolved. For a broader discussion of a federal government shutdown, see CRS Report RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. October 17, 2013—P.L. January 14-15, 2014—P.L. 106 , a short term continuing resolution, that would allow for three days of continued funding under the same terms as P.L. 113-46 . January 17, 2014—President Signs the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act
On January 17, 2014, the President signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, which included annual appropriations legislation covering the entire discretionary budget for the federal government for FY2014. 113-76 is the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2014, which includes $39,270 million in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS. This amount is $922 million more than DHS reportedly received in its annual appropriation for FY2013 after taking into account the impact of sequestration. The act also included an additional $5.6 billion requested by the Administration for FEMA in disaster relief funding as defined by the Budget Control Act, and an additional $227 million for the Coast Guard to pay the costs of overseas contingency operations. Those additional costs are compensated for by adjustments in the discretionary spending limits outlined through the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, as amended. Division F of P.L. 113-76 . | This report provides a brief outline of the FY2014 appropriations legislation for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Administration requested $39.0 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2014, as part of an overall budget of $60.0 billion (including fees, trust funds, and other funding that is not appropriated or does not score against the budget caps).
Congress did not enact annual FY2014 appropriations legislation prior to the beginning of the new fiscal year. From October 1, 2013, through October 16, 2013, the federal government (including DHS) operated under an emergency shutdown furlough due to the expiration of annual appropriations for FY2014. More than 31,000 DHS employees were furloughed. Tens of thousands of others that were excepted from furlough, and those whose salaries were paid through annual appropriations, worked without pay until the lapse was resolved by passage of a short-term continuing resolution. From October 17, 2013, to January 17, 2014, the federal government operated under the terms of two consecutive continuing resolutions: P.L. 113-46, which lasted until its successor was enacted on January 15, 2014; and P.L. 113-73, which lasted until the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), was enacted on January 17, 2014.
Division F of P.L. 113-76 is the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2014, which includes $39,270 million in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS. This is $922 million more than DHS reportedly received in its annual appropriation for FY2013 after taking into account the impact of sequestration. The act also included an additional $5.6 billion requested by the Administration for FEMA in disaster relief funding as defined by the Budget Control Act, and an additional $227 million for the Coast Guard to pay the costs of overseas contingency operations. Those additional costs are compensated for by adjustments in the discretionary spending limits outlined through the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act as amended.
For a more detailed discussion of policy matters and legislative details beyond funding levels, see CRS Report R43147, Department of Homeland Security: FY2014 Appropriations, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33053 | crs_RL33053_0 | Overview of the Stafford Act
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) authorizes the President to issue major disaster, emergency, and fire management declarations, which in turn enable federal agencies to provide assistance to state and local governments overwhelmed by catastrophes. Following the investigation into the response to Hurricane Katrina, Congress also authorized the Administrator to provide federal leadership before and after catastrophes, including "assisting the President in carrying out the functions" of the Stafford Act. The 1974 Disaster Relief Act, As Amended
The Stafford Act consists of the text of the statute enacted by Congress in 1974 and that of a series of amendments approved over the past 35 years that have added administrative requirements, enhanced the types of assistance that may be provided, expanded eligibility to certain non-profit organizations, and coordinated Stafford assistance with other federal authorities. The 2006 Amendments
Through the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Title VI, P.L. Aid to individuals with special needs. Assistance to nonprofit organizations. Action in the 111th Congress
Legislation introduced in the 111 th Congress could have expanded categories of federal assistance in the Stafford Act and, if enacted, make relatively minor adjustments to the statute. H.R. 941 and S. 1069 : H.R. H.R. Similarly, but not as an amendment to the Stafford Act, S. 713 would mandate that the FEMA Administrator evaluate the existing stock of temporary housing units and plan for their disposition or storage. H.R. Funding would be authorized through FY2012 for the Pre-Disaster Mitigation program (described below in this report), the Administrator of FEMA would be required to modernize and modify the existing federal public warning and alert system, the Mortgage and Rental Assistance program would be reauthorized, temporary or intermittent employees who provide disaster assistance would be eligible for federal health benefits, the National Urban Search and Rescue Response system would be authorized, the Disaster Relief Fund would be authorized, and grants for hazard mitigation would be increased if states meet minimum building code standards. Second, the FY2010 appropriations statute for DHS authorizes the reemployment of retired administrative law judges to settle disputes related to the arbitration panels established in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 in order to expedite recovery from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. (The statute also allows Governors to request the use of Department of Defense resources before a major disaster or emergency declaration is issued.) Disaster Relief Fund
Congress appropriates money to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) to ensure that the federal assistance described earlier in this report is available to help individuals and communities stricken by severe disasters. H.R. Other bills ( H.R. 3377 and H.R. After Senate defeat on March 9, 2010 of a proposal to include the supplemental in legislation ( H.R. 111-112 that provided more than $5.5 billion in additional supplemental disaster relief funding. | The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) authorizes the President to issue major disaster or emergency declarations in response to catastrophes in the United States that overwhelm state and local governments. Such declarations result in the distribution of a wide range of federal aid to individuals and families, certain nonprofit organizations, and public agencies. Congress appropriates money to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), through both annual appropriations and emergency supplemental appropriations, for disaster assistance authorized by the Stafford Act. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) administers most, but not all, of the authority the statute vests in the President.
The most recent significant action concerning the statute occurred in the closing months of the 109th Congress as a result of the congressional investigation on the response to Hurricane Katrina (August 2005). Senators inserted Stafford Act amendments into the FY2007 DHS appropriations legislation (Title VI of P.L. 109-295). These amendments expanded FEMA's authority to expedite emergency assistance to stricken areas, imposed new planning and preparedness requirements on federal administrators, provided new authority to regional offices, and increased federal assistance to victims and communities. More recently, Congress included a provision in the FY2010 appropriations legislation (P.L. 111-83) that allows retired law judges to arbitrate conflicts concerning the recovery of public infrastructure in the Gulf Coast due to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. While not an amendment to the Stafford Act, this provision affects the administration of the FEMA appeals process under which applications for Stafford assistance are reconsidered. The decisions made to date by the arbitration panels resulted in an Administration request for supplemental funding that resulted in P.L. 111-112, which added more than $5.5 billion to the Disaster Relief Fund.
Previously introduced legislation during the 111th Congress would have amended the statute. Among the proposals, H.R. 3377, the Disaster Response, Recovery, and Mitigation Enhancement Act of 2009, would have authorized the Disaster Relief Fund, provided health benefits to temporary or intermittent federal employees who provide disaster assistance, authorized the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System, and requested FEMA to update standards for individual assistance disaster requests. Other bills sought to reauthorize a mortgage and rental assistance program terminated in 2000 (H.R. 888/S. 763), establish new eligibility criteria (H.R. 941, H.R. 1059, H.R. 1494, H.R. 2484, H.R. 4141, and S. 1069), and mandate establishment of a tracking and storage plan for housing units used by disaster survivors (H.R. 3437/S. 713). |
crs_R44423 | crs_R44423_0 | Introduction
The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was enacted in 1975 as a federal-state program (Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, P.L. 93-647 ). It is intended to help strengthen families by securing financial support for children from t heir noncustodial parent on a consistent and continuing basis and by helping some of these families to remain self-sufficient and off public assistance. Child support payments enable parents who do not live with their children to fulfill their financial responsibility to them by contributing to the payment of childrearing costs. When the program was first established its goals were to reimburse the states and the federal government for the welfare payments they provided families, in addition to helping families obtain consistent and ongoing child support payments from the noncustodial parent and helping some of these families remain self-sufficient and stay off welfare. Moreover, it is widely agreed that since the late 1990s the CSE program has been effective in improving the well-being of families by making child support a more reliable source of income. The CSE program has the potential to impact more children and for longer periods of time than most other federal programs. In FY2014, the program served 16.3 million children (22% of the 73.6 million children in the United States). Total CSE expenditures amounted to $5.7 billion and the program collected $28.2 billion in child support payments from noncustodial parents. The CSE program collected $5.25 for every $1 it spent in that year. According to Census Bureau data, 29% of custodial families have income below the federal poverty level. Child support represented 49% of family income for poor custodial families that received it. As noted, the CSE program began in part as a "welfare cost-recovery" program. For many years the program has been an integral part of helping families escape poverty. As part of its oversight duties, Congress periodically examines the effectiveness and efficiency of the CSE program. Since its enactment in 1975, almost 50 laws have made changes to the CSE program. This report provides a legislative history of the program. It includes a discussion of precursor legislation, describes the provisions that were part of the initial law, and describes the many subsequent provisions in other laws that made changes to the CSE program. It also includes a summary table of laws that pertain to the program. The information related to individual CSE provisions generally provides enough detail to demonstrate how some of the main provisions of the CSE program changed over time. For most of its history changes to the CSE program have been achieved in tandem with changes to other social welfare programs. | The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was enacted in 1975 as a federal-state program (Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, P.L. 93-647). It is intended to help strengthen families by securing financial support for children from their noncustodial parent on a consistent and continuing basis and by helping some of these families to remain self-sufficient and off public assistance. Child support payments enable parents who do not live with their children to fulfill their financial responsibility to them by contributing to the payment of childrearing costs.
When the program was first established its goals were to reimburse the states and the federal government for the welfare payments they provided families, in addition to helping families obtain consistent and ongoing child support payments from the noncustodial parent and helping some of these families remain self-sufficient and stay off welfare. The CSE program has evolved over time from a "welfare cost-recovery" program into a "family-first" program that seeks to enhance the well-being of families by making child support a more reliable source of income.
The CSE program has the potential to impact more children and for longer periods of time than most other federal programs. In FY2014, it served 16.3 million children (nearly one in four children in the United States). Total CSE expenditures amounted to $5.7 billion and the program collected $28.2 billion in child support payments. The CSE program collected $5.25 for every $1 it spent in that year.
According to Census Bureau data, 29% of custodial families have income below the federal poverty level. Child support represented 49% of family income for poor custodial families that received it. As noted, the CSE program began in part as a "welfare cost-recovery" program. For many years the program has been an integral part of helping families escape poverty.
As part of its oversight duties, Congress periodically examines the effectiveness and efficiency of the CSE program. Since its enactment in 1975, almost 50 laws have made changes to the program. Although it generally garners bipartisan support, for most of its history changes to the program have been achieved in tandem with more controversial changes to other social programs. This report provides a legislative history of the CSE program. It includes a discussion of precursor legislation, describes the provisions that were part of the initial 1975 law, and summarizes the many subsequent provisions in other laws that made changes to the CSE program. It also includes a summary table of laws that pertain to the program. Moreover, the information related to individual CSE provisions generally provides enough detail to demonstrate how some of the main provisions of the CSE program have changed over time. |
crs_R43726 | crs_R43726_0 | Introduction
Federal outlays for grants to state and local governments have grown from $15.4 billion in 1940 to $509.7 billion in 2013. The number of congressionally authorized grant programs has also increased over time, with over 2,179 congressionally authorized grant programs currently being administered by federal agencies. Recently, congressional interest has focused on the efficient and effective management of federal grant programs. GAO has reported that it found more than $794 million in undisbursed federal grant funds in expired grant accounts administered by federal agencies and concluded that federal agencies needed to improve the timeliness of federal grant closeouts to address the undisbursed funds issue. While delayed federal grant closeout may contribute to the issue of undisbursed grant funds, there may be underlying causes, other than inefficient grants management, that might help to explain how undisbursed funds end up in expired grant accounts. Furthermore, it is possible, if not likely, that the estimated amount of undisbursed funds in expired grant accounts may be inflated. While the undisbursed funds identified by GAO represent significantly less than 1% of annual federal grant outlays to state and local governments, the existence of undisbursed grant funds in expired grant accounts is an indicator of a systemic grants management challenge. It suggests a lack of coordination between the financial and program management of federal grants. This report is designed to assist Congress in its oversight of federal grants-in-aid programs by providing a summary of relevant laws, processes, and authorities. The report analyzes the causes of undisbursed grant funds in expired grant accounts and presents congressional options to reform federal grant administration to increase the timeliness, reliability, and comprehensiveness of grant management-related information. The agency's authority to reprogram undisbursed grant funds in expired accounts may be limited by the type of budget authority provided for that particular grant program. Challenges in Reconciling Grants Administration Systems and Cash Management Systems
Federal agencies have discretion in determining the methods by which grant funds are administered. | Federal outlays for grants to state and local governments have grown from $15.4 billion in 1940 (in constant FY2009 dollars) to $509.7 billion in 2013 (in constant FY2009 dollars). The number of congressionally authorized grant programs has also increased over time, with over 2,179 congressionally authorized grant programs currently being administered by federal agencies. Recently, congressional interest has focused on the efficient and effective management of federal grant programs. A recent congressional hearing evaluated the impact of alleged inefficient grant management which, according to a GAO report, resulted in more than $794 million in undisbursed federal grant funds in expired grant accounts. GAO concluded that federal agencies needed to improve the timeliness of federal grant closeouts to address the undisbursed funds issue. However, there may be underlying causes, other than inefficient grant management, that might help to explain why undisbursed funds may end up in expired grant accounts. Furthermore, it is possible, if not likely, that the estimated amount of undisbursed funds in expired grant accounts may be inflated. While the undisbursed grant funds identified by GAO represent significantly less than 1% of annual outlays for grants to state and local governments, the existence of undisbursed grant funds in expired grant accounts is an indicator of a systemic grants management challenge; suggesting a lack of coordination between the financial and program management of federal grants.
This report is designed to assist Congress in its oversight of federal grants-in-aid programs by first providing a summary of relevant processes and authorities and then analyzing the causes of undisbursed grant funds in expired grant accounts. The report also presents congressional options to reform federal grant administration to increase the timeliness, reliability, and comprehensiveness of grant management-related information.
The analysis contained in this report concludes that delays in federal grant closeout may be attributed to unclear guidance from federal agencies; that the ability of a federal agency to reprogram undisbursed grant funds in expired accounts may be limited by the type of budget authority for that particular grant program; and that federal agencies struggle to reconcile grant administration systems and grant management systems. Among other potential consequences of this disconnect, inadequate reconciliation of grant management systems could result in inflated estimates of the amount of undisbursed grant funds in expired accounts and increasing the likelihood of inefficient administration of federal grants. |
crs_RL34203 | crs_RL34203_0 | 109-171 (the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005) prohibits federal matching (effective October 1, 2007) of state expenditure of federal CSE incentive payments. The repeal of federal matching funds for incentive payments reinvested in the CSE program garnered much concern over its fiscal impact on the states and renewed interest in the incentive payment system per se. It helps strengthen families by securing financial support from noncustodial parents. In FY2011, total CSE program expenditures amounted to $5.7 billion, of which $513 million were incentive payments (i.e., 9% of total program expenditures). The CSE program is funded with both state and federal dollars. The federal government bears the majority of CSE program expenditures and provides incentive payments to the states for success in meeting CSE program goals. However, in 2009 P.L. 111-5 required HHS to temporarily provide federal matching funds (in FY2009 and FY2010) on CSE incentive payments that states reinvest back into the CSE program. Thus, starting again in FY2011, CSE incentive payments that are received by states and reinvested in the CSE program are no longer eligible for federal reimbursement. 105-200 , the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998 (enacted July 16, 1998), replaced the old incentive payment system to states with a revised revenue-neutral (with respect to the federal government) incentive payment system that (1) provided incentive payments based on a percentage of the state's CSE collections; (2) incorporated five performance measures related to establishment of paternity and child support orders, collections of current and past-due child support payments, and cost-effectiveness; (3) phased in the incentive system, with it being fully effective beginning in FY2002; (4) required reinvestment of incentive payments into the CSE program; and (5) used an incentive payment formula weighted in favor of TANF and former TANF families. In FY2011, the aggregate incentive payment amount was $513 million. A comparison of FY2002 performance score data to FY2011 performance score data shows that CSE program performance has improved with respect to all five performance measures. Incentive Payments for All Performance Measures
Although CSE incentive payments were awarded to all 54 jurisdictions (including the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) in FY2002, FY2005, FY2010, and FY2011, some jurisdictions performed poorly on certain performance measures and thereby did not receive an incentive for that measure. On the basis of the unaudited FY2011 performance incentive scores of the 54 jurisdictions, 53 jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures, and 1 jurisdiction received an incentive for four performance measures (the Virgin Islands). Despite a general consensus that the CSE program is doing well, questions still arise about whether the program is effectively meeting its mission and concerns exist over whether the program will be able to meet future expectations in light of reductions in federal funding that were made pursuant to the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. Some in the CSE "community" (e.g., states, CSE workers, analysts, state policymakers, and advocates) contend that several factors may cause a state not to receive an incentive payment that is commensurate with its relative performance on individual measures. These factors include static or declining CSE collections; sliding scale performance scores that financially benefit states at the upper end (but not the top) of the artificial threshold and financially disadvantage states at the lower end of the artificial threshold; a limited number of performance indicators that do not encompass all of the components critical to a successful CSE program; and a statutory maximum on the aggregate amount of incentive payments that can be paid to states—which causes states to have to compete with each other for their share of the capped funds. (2)" Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Additional Performance Indicators? " (3) " Should TANF Funds Be Reduced Because of Poor CSE Performance? " (4) " Why Aren't the Incentives and Penalties Consistent for the Paternity Establishment Performance Measure? " (5) " Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Individual State Performance Rather Than Aggregate State Performance? " and (6) " Will the Elimination of the Federal Match of Incentive Payments Adversely Affect CSE Programs? " Does the CSE Incentive Payment System Reward Good Performance? The percentage of improvement required varies with a state's performance level. P.L. 105-200 . 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (February 17, 2009)
P.L. | The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program, enacted in 1975, to help strengthen families by securing financial support from noncustodial parents, is funded with both state and federal dollars. The federal government bears the majority of CSE program expenditures and provides incentive payments to the states (which include Washington, DC, and the territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) for success in meeting CSE program goals. In FY2011, total CSE program expenditures amounted to $5.7 billion. The aggregate incentive payment amount to states was $513 million in FY2011.
P.L. 105-200, the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, established a revised incentive payment system that provides incentive payments to states based on a percentage of the state's CSE collections and incorporates five performance measures related to establishment of paternity and child support orders, collections of current and past-due support payments, and cost-effectiveness. P.L. 105-200 set specific annual caps on total federal incentive payments and required states to reinvest incentive payments back into the CSE program. The exact amount of a state's incentive payment depends on its level of performance (or the rate of improvement over the previous year) when compared with other states. In addition, states are required to meet data quality standards. If states do not meet specified performance measures and data quality standards, they face federal financial penalties.
P.L. 109-171 (the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005) prohibited federal matching (effective October 1, 2007, i.e., FY2008) of state expenditure of federal CSE incentive payments. However, in 2009 P.L. 111-5 (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009) required the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to temporarily provide federal matching funds (in FY2009 and FY2010) on CSE incentive payments that states reinvested back into the CSE program. Thus (since FY2011), CSE incentive payments that are received by states and reinvested in the CSE program are no longer eligible for federal reimbursement. The FY2008 repeal of federal reimbursement for incentive payments reinvested in the CSE program garnered much concern over its fiscal impact on the states and renewed interest in the incentive payment system per se.
A comparison of FY2002 incentive payment performance score data to FY2011 performance score data shows that CSE program performance has improved with respect to all five performance measures. Although CSE incentive payments were awarded to all 54 jurisdictions in FY2002, FY2005, FY2010, and FY2011 (the years covered in this report), some jurisdictions performed poorly on one or more of the five performance measures. Even so, on the basis of the unaudited FY2011 performance incentive scores of the 54 jurisdictions, 53 jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures, and 1 jurisdiction (the Virgin Islands) received an incentive for four performance measures.
Despite a general consensus that the CSE program is doing well, questions still arise about whether the program is effectively meeting its mission and concerns exist over whether the program will be able to meet future expectations. Several factors may cause a state not to receive an incentive payment that is commensurate with its relative performance on individual measures. These factors include static or declining CSE collections; sliding scale performance scores that financially benefit states at the upper end (but not the top) of the artificial threshold and financially disadvantaged states at the lower end of the artificial threshold; a limited number of performance indicators that do not encompass all of the components critical to a successful CSE program; and a statutory maximum on the aggregate amount of incentive payments that can be paid to states. These factors are discussed in the context of the following policy questions: (1) Does the CSE incentive payment system reward good performance? (2) Should incentive payments be based on additional performance indicators? (3) Should Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) funds be reduced because of poor CSE performance? (4) Why aren't the incentives and penalties consistent for the paternity establishment performance measure? (5) Should incentive payments be based on individual state performance rather than aggregate state performance? and (6) Will the elimination of the federal match of incentive payments adversely affect CSE programs? |
crs_RL33273 | crs_RL33273_0 | During the First Session of the 110 th Congress, three data security bills were reported favorably out of Senate committeesâ S. 239 (Feinstein), a bill to require federal agencies, and persons engaged in interstate commerce, in possession of data containing sensitive personally identifiable information, to disclose any breach of such information; S. 495 (Leahy), a bill to prevent and mitigate identity theft, to ensure privacy, to provide notice of security breaches, and to enhance criminal penalties, law enforcement assistance, and other protections against security breaches, fraudulent access, and misuse of personally identifiable information; and S. 1178 (Inouye), a bill to strengthen data protection and safeguards, require data breach notification, and further prevent identity theft. 4791 (Clay), a bill to strengthen requirements for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls over information resources that support federal operations and assets, was passed by the House by voice vote under suspension of the rules. H.R. H.R. 958 preempts state information security laws. H.R. The bill prescribes data security standards to be implemented by federal agencies. H.R. H.R. H.R. On June 3, 2008, H.R. S. 1260 (Carper)
Data Security Act of 2007. S. 1558 (Coleman)
Federal Agency Data Breach Protection Act. | During the First Session of the 110 th Congress, three data security bills were reported favorably out of Senate committeesâ S. 239 (Feinstein), a bill to require federal agencies, and persons engaged in interstate commerce, in possession of data containing sensitive personally identifiable information, to disclose any breach of such information; S. 495 (Leahy), a bill to prevent and mitigate identity theft, to ensure privacy, to provide notice of security breaches, and to enhance criminal penalties, law enforcement assistance, and other protections against security breaches, fraudulent access, and misuse of personally identifiable information; and S. 1178 (Inouye), a bill to strengthen data protection and safeguards, require data breach notification, and further prevent identity theft. On June 3, 2008, H.R. 4791 (Clay), a bill to strengthen requirements for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls over information resources that support federal operations and assets and to protect personally identifiable information of individuals that is maintained in or transmitted by federal agency information systems, was passed by the House by voice vote under suspension of the rules.
Other data security bills were also introduced including S. 1202 (Sessions), S. 1260 (Carper), S. 1558 (Coleman), H.R. 516 (Davis), H.R. 836 (Smith), H.R. 958 (Rush), H.R. 1685 (Price), H.R. 2124 (Davis), and H.R. 4175 (Conyers).
This report discusses the core areas addressed in federal legislation. For related reports, see CRS Report RL34120, Federal Information Security and Data Breach Notification Laws , by [author name scrubbed]. Also see the Current Legislative Issues web page for "Privacy and Data Security" available at http://apps.crs.gov/ cli/ cli.aspx?PRDS_CLI_ITEM_ID=2105 . This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R41150 | crs_R41150_0 | President Obama's proposed FY2011 budget for Energy and Water Development programs, released in February 2010, totaled $35.3 billion. On July 15, 2010, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development approved a bill to fund these programs at $34.7 billion, but the full committee did not report out the bill. In the Senate, the Energy and Water Development subcommittee approved a bill on July 20, and the full Appropriations Committee reported out S. 3635 ( S.Rept. The bill did not come to the floor of either the House or the Senate. On September 30, the Senate and the House passed a continuing resolution ( H.R. 3081 , P.L. 111-242 ), funding government programs at the FY2010 level, until December 3. 111-322 extended funding through March 4, 2011. H.J.Res. 111-242 , extending funding through March 18, 2011, and reducing funding levels for a number of Energy and Water Development programs. On February 14, 2011, H.R. 1 was introduced, continuing funding through the rest of FY2011 at the FY2010 level, but with many specified exceptions in which funding was reduced. On February 19 the House passed H.R. 1 by a vote of 235-189. In the Senate, S.Amdt. 149 was offered as a substitute for H.R. 1 , continuing funding through the rest of FY2011 but with fewer funding reductions, totaling approximately $32.4 billion in Energy and Water Development funding. On March 9 the Senate rejected both the House-passed version of H.R. 1 and the S.Amdt. 149 . After two more short-term extensions, H.R. 1473 was introduced April 11, passed by the House and Senate April 14, and signed by the President April 15 ( P.L. Overview
The Energy and Water Development bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). The Continuing Resolution as passed, P.L. As a result, the agency's funding is often part of the debate over earmarks. In addition to funding for Corps activities through Energy and Water Development appropriations, federal activities in the Everglades are also funded through Department of the Interior appropriations bills. It also bars funding for the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act in P.L. 112-10 did not specify funding levels for the settlement. Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)
DOE's FY2011 request sought $2,355.5 million for the EERE programs. However, in its FY2011 request, the Administration proposed to suspend spending in support of expansion of the SPR. Congress provided $5 million for the Commission in the FY2010 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. The FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 112-10 . | The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies.
As with other funding bills, the FY2011 Energy and Water Development bill was not taken to the floor in either the House or the Senate in the 111th Congress. Funding for its programs was included in a series of continuing resolutions, and at the beginning of the 112th Congress was part of a major debate over overall spending levels. Energy and Water Development programs were included in the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-10) that became law April 15, 2011.
Besides the overall spending debate, a number of issues specific to Energy and Water Development were important during the FY2011 budget cycle:
the distribution of Corps appropriations across the agency's authorized planning, construction, and maintenance activities (Title I); support of major ecosystem restoration initiatives, such as Florida Everglades (Title I) and California "Bay-Delta" (CALFED) and San Joaquin River (Title II); alternatives to the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, which the Administration has abandoned (Title III: Nuclear Waste Disposal); and several new initiatives proposed for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) programs (Title III).
Funding for FY2010 Energy and Water Development programs was contained in P.L. 111-85, which passed in October 2009. The legislation retained significance during the FY2011 budget process because the continuing resolutions passed by the Congress retained FY2010 funding levels except where specifying new levels for individual programs.
President Obama's proposed FY2011 budget for Energy and Water Development programs was released in February 2010. On July 15, 2010, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development approved a bill to fund these programs, but the full committee did not report out the bill. In the Senate, the Appropriations Committee reported out S. 3635 (S.Rept. 111-228) on July 22. The bill did not reach the floor of either the House or the Senate. On September 30, the Congress passed H.R. 3081 (P.L. 111-242), funding government programs at the FY2010 level through December 3. Several more continuing resolutions extended funding through March 4, 2011. H.J.Res. 44 (P.L. 112-4) extended funding through March 18, 2011, and reduced funding levels for a number of Energy and Water Development programs.
On February 14, 2011, H.R. 1 was introduced, continuing funding through the rest of FY2011 at the FY2010 level, but with many specified exceptions in which funding was reduced. On February 19 the House passed H.R. 1 by a vote of 235-189. In the Senate, S.Amdt. 149 was offered as a substitute for H.R. 1, continuing funding through the rest of FY2011 but with fewer funding reductions. On March 9 the Senate rejected both the House-passed version of H.R. 1 and the S.Amdt. 149. After two more short-term extensions, H.R. 1473 was introduced April 11, passed by the House and Senate April 14, and signed by the President April 15 (P.L. 112-10). |
crs_RL32159 | crs_RL32159_0 | Developing Ideas for the Proposal
The first step in proposal planning is the development of a clear, concise description of the proposed project. For a summary of federal programs and sources, see CRS Report RL34012, Resources for Grantseekers , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and other CRS reports on topics such as community or social services block grants to states, rural development assistance, federal allocations for homeland security, and other funding areas. For more information, see CRS Report R40486, Block Grants: Perspectives and Controversies , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R40638, Federal Grants to State and Local Governments: A Historical Perspective on Contemporary Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. Developing a concept paper is excellent preparation for writing the final proposal. The summary should include a description of the applicant, a definition of the problem to be solved, a statement of the objectives to be achieved, an outline of the activities and procedures to be used to accomplish those objectives, a description of the evaluation design, plans for the project at the end of the grants, and a statement of what it will cost the funding agency. Areas to document are as follows:
Purpose for developing the proposal. Program Methods and Program Design: A Plan of Action
The program design refers to how the project is expected to work and solve the stated problem. In preparing the budget, the applicant may first review the proposal and make lists of items needed for the project. Additional Proposal Writing Websites
GrantSpace, Knowledge Base, How do I write a grant Proposal? | This report is intended for Members and staff assisting grant seekers in districts and states and covers writing proposals for both government and private foundation grants. In preparation for writing a proposal, the report first discusses preliminary information gathering and preparation, developing ideas for the proposal, gathering community support, identifying funding resources, and seeking preliminary review of the proposal and support of relevant administrative officials.
The second section of the report covers the actual writing of the proposal, from outlining of project goals, stating the purpose and objectives of the proposal, explaining the program methods to solve the stated problem, and how the results of the project will be evaluated, to long-term project planning, and, finally, developing the proposal budget.
The last section of the report provides a listing of free grants-writing websites, including guidelines from the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance and the Foundation Center's "Introduction to Proposal Writing."
Related CRS reports are CRS Report RL34035, Grants Work in a Congressional Office, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL34012, Resources for Grantseekers, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL34054 | crs_RL34054_0 | Public-Private Partnership: The Auction
As structured by the FCC, two adjacent spectrum license-holders would collaborate so that their combined spectrum capacity would be adequate to support a broadband network. In anticipation of obtaining a commercial partner, the FCC assigned a national license for 10 MHz to a not-for-profit corporation formed to represent public safety interests. In an Order adopted and released on March 20, 2008, the FCC directed the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau not to proceed with the re-auction of the D Block because it is "in the public interest to provide additional time to consider all options ..."
The FCC therefore initiated a review of its rules regarding licensing, structuring a partnership, setting service requirements, and other rules and obligations established prior to the commencement of Auction 73. It prepared a further notice of proposed rule-making that sought comments on identified options that might be pursued in disposing of the D Block. The FCC and the Office of Emergency Communications at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are pursuing separate paths for developing this communications response. As discussed below, the FCC has proposed to resolve these needs through levies on the commercial partner or requirements for performance. The key elements for a public-private partnership as set forth by the FCC are: 1) a Public Safety Broadband Licensee; 2) a public-private partnership; and 3) a Network Sharing Agreement, required in order to build and manage a network shared by commercial users and emergency personnel. Although it is outside the power of the FCC to assign the D Block to public safety, with the assistance of Congress it would be possible to create a broadband network for public safety at 700 MHz using the existing Public Safety Broadband License and the D Block. The FCC seeks opinions and information on a wide range of questions covering such topics as: provisions and eligibility for using the Public Safety Broadband License; revisions to the public-private partnership, negotiation of the Network Sharing Agreement; structuring the new auction of the D Block; relocation costs and deadlines for changes in 700 MHz frequency assignments; service rules for the D Block; and other opportunities for providing broadband wireless access for public safety. Regulatory Governance Through Service Rules
The FCC followed past procedures in the creation of service rules to establish the structure for a public-private partnership as part of its preparation for the auction of licenses in the 700 MHz band. Network Sharing Agreement (NSA) that the two licensees would be required to create in order to build and manage a shared network. Proposed Legislation to Fund Operating Costs
The Public Safety Broadband Authorization Act of 2008 ( H.R. 6055 , Harman) would provide $1 million in both FY2009 and FY2010 for operating expenses of the Public Safety Broadband Licensee. Appropriations for an additional $2 million would be authorized for used by the FCC "to promote the establishment of a nationwide, interoperable broadband public safety communications network." Proposed Legislation to Fund Radios
The Reliable, Effective, and Sustained Procurement of New Devices for Emergency Responders (RESPONDER) Act of 2008 ( S. 3465 , Wicker) would create a First Responders Interoperable Device Availability Trust Fund to provide grants to purchase interoperable radios for the new public safety network proposed for some of the channels being released in the transition to digital TV. | This report summarizes salient points of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) actions regarding the creation of a public-private partnership to build and manage a national communications network for public safety use. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, empowers the FCC to set rules for auctions and to take steps to ensure the safety of the public. The FCC has used this authority to design a governance structure that would allow a Public Safety Broadband Licensee (PSBL) to share spectrum rights with a commercial enterprise and to collaborate in the construction and management of a shared network. As currently proposed by the FCC, a public-private partnership would build a shared network on spectrum capacity assigned to two separate license-holders. In the FCC plan, the PSBL would hold a national license of 10MHz in the 700 MHz band and a commercial partner would hold an adjacent license for 10 MHz, nationwide, designated as the D Block. The two licensees and the network would operate according to requirements set out by the FCC as part of its rulemaking for the auction of frequencies within the 700 MHz band. These frequencies are being vacated by television broadcasters in their switch to digital technologies.
In an auction that ended on March 18, 2008, the one bid for the D Block was well below the reserve price set for that license. The FCC therefore did not assign the license but has proceeded to review its rules regarding licensing, structuring a partnership, setting service requirements, and other rules and obligations established prior to the commencement of Auction 73. It has prepared a further notice of proposed rule-making that seeks comments on identified options that might be pursued in disposing of the D Block. The FCC's current proposals for the creation of a nationwide, interoperable public safety broadband network depend on the successful sale of the D Block to a commercial entity willing to invest in a public-private network partnership. The FCC auction requirements do not reference Congress's requirements for the Department of Homeland Security to provide a national communications capability (P.L. 109-295, Title VI, Subtitle D).
Some of the proposals from the FCC or frequently mentioned by industry experts are reviewed in this report. Some of the possible solutions can be achieved exclusively through the rule-making process but several that address how best to salvage plans for a nationwide, broadband network for public safety would require the assistance of Congress through legislation. A bill that would provide financial assistance to the Public Safety Broadband Licensee through grants made by the FCC has been introduced. The Public Safety Broadband Authorization Act of 2008 (H.R. 6055, Harman) would establish conditions for the operations of the PSBL and would provide $1 million in both FY2009 and FY2010 for expenses. An additional $2 million would be authorized for used by the FCC "to promote the establishment of a nationwide, interoperable broadband public safety communications network." The Reliable, Effective, and Sustained Procurement of New Devices for Emergency Responders (RESPONDER) Act of 2008 (S. 3465, Wicker) would create a First Responders Interoperable Device Availability Trust Fund to provide grants to purchase interoperable radios for the new public safety network. |
crs_RL34348 | crs_RL34348_0 | The International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC)
In 1997, in response to increasing claims against European insurance companies operating in the United States, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) formed a Working Group on Holocaust Insurance Claims to reach out to Holocaust victims and their heirs to better determine the scope of the problem, and to initiate a dialogue with European insurers about how to resolve the issue of unpaid claims. ICHEIC's claims process opened in 2000 and closed in March 2007. In total, it facilitated the payment of just over $300 million to 47,353 of about 90,000 claimants. Administration Policy on ICHEIC
U.S. Administrations, ICHEIC was broadly criticized, including by Members of Congress. ICHEIC supporters generally acknowledge that the claims process got off to a slow and problematic start, but argue that initial missteps were addressed and that the claims process was ultimately fair and comprehensive. "ICHEIC is not an adequate alternative forum for the litigation of plaintiffs' claims," the court explained, pointing out that despite ICHEIC's inclusion of the State of Israel and "certain U.S. state insurance regulators," the Commission remained, at bottom, a "privately funded, non-profit entity ... created ... among six European insurance companies ... with certain nongovernmental Jewish organizations.... "
The court was persuaded neither by the fact that ICHEIC was assumed to be a recognized agent for purposes of carrying out the obligations assumed in the German Foundation Agreement, nor by the presumption of both the German government and the various German insurance companies against whom there were Holocaust-era-related claims pending in U.S. courts that the conclusion of the Foundation Agreement would bring "legal closure" to those claims. Congressional Concerns and Proposed Legislation
Since the late 1990s, Members of Congress have taken a variety of steps seeking to ensure that Holocaust survivors and their heirs receive fair compensation for unpaid insurance policies. A series of hearings before the House Committee on Government Reform between 2001 and 2003 focused specifically on ICHEIC and on proposed legislation intended to create alternative and more effective means for Holocaust survivors and their heirs to resolve unpaid insurance claims. None of these bills was enacted, and each was opposed by the Administration, which continued to consider ICHEIC the exclusive vehicle for resolving Holocaust-era insurance claims. ICHEIC's closure, and growing concern about the well-being of survivors of an average age of over 80 years old, have reignited congressional interest in resolving outstanding Holocaust-era insurance claims. 890) and the Restoration of Legal Rights for Claimants under Holocaust-Era Insurance Policies Act of 2011 (S. 466)
On March 2, 2011, Representative Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.R. Companion legislation was introduced in the Senate, by Senator Bill Nelson, on the same day as H.R. In general, those supportive of the proposed legislation argue that both the ICHEIC process and previous agreements between the United States and European governments failed to compensate a significant number of Holocaust survivors and/or their heirs and beneficiaries. Opponents of the proposed legislation often argue that by effectively reversing past commitments made by the U.S. government—specifically, the granting of legal peace to German companies—the bills could damage future cooperation with European governments on other Holocaust compensation and restitution issues. Critics also argue that given the legal and historical complexities of substantiating the existence and value of Holocaust-era insurance policies, it is unlikely that claims would be satisfactorily settled in U.S. courts. | In November 1998, U.S. insurance regulators, six European insurers, international Jewish organizations, and the State of Israel agreed to establish the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC). ICHEIC was tasked with identifying policyholders and administering payment of hundreds of thousands of Holocaust-era insurance policies alleged never to have been honored by European insurance companies. It ended its claims process in March 2007, having facilitated the payment of just over $300 million to 47,353 claimants. An additional $190 million was allocated to a "humanitarian fund" for Holocaust survivors and Holocaust education and remembrance.
Throughout its existence, ICHEIC was criticized, including by some Members of Congress, for delays in its claims process, for conducting its activities with a lack of transparency, and for allegedly honoring an inadequate number of claims. Although they acknowledge initial delays in the claims process, ICHEIC supporters—among them successive U.S. Administrations and European governments—argue that the process was fair and comprehensive, especially given the unprecedented legal and historical complexities of the task.
Members of Congress have shown a long-standing interest in seeking to obtain compensation for Holocaust survivors and their heirs for unpaid insurance policies. Hearings before the House Committee on Government Reform between 2001 and 2003 exposed broad criticism of ICHEIC, and legislation proposed in the 107th-111th Congresses sought to provide survivors alternative legal mechanisms to pursue claims. These proposals were never enacted and were opposed by U.S. Administrations, which considered ICHEIC the exclusive vehicle for resolving Holocaust-era insurance claims.
ICHEIC's closure, and growing concern about the well-being of aging survivors—now predominantly over 80 years old—have reignited congressional interest in Holocaust-era insurance and other compensation issues. In March 2011, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Senator Bill Nelson introduced companion legislation in the House and the Senate (H.R. 890 and S. 466) that would affirm Holocaust survivors' and their heirs' right to pursue claims against European insurance companies in U.S. courts and would prohibit executive agreements reached by the federal government from preempting state laws that impose disclosure requirements on European insurers. Critics of the proposed legislation argue that by effectively reversing past commitments made by the U.S. government, the bills could damage future cooperation with European governments on other Holocaust compensation and restitution issues. Furthermore, they contend that the legislation would enable costly, but likely fruitless, litigation.
This report aims to inform consideration of H.R. 890 and S. 466 and possible alternatives by providing: background on Holocaust-era compensation and restitution issues; an overview of ICHEIC, including criticism and support of its claims process and Administration policy on ICHEIC; and an overview of litigation on Holocaust-era insurance claims and the proposed legislation. |
crs_98-807 | crs_98-807_0 | It is a federal crime to make a material false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency or department. This is an overview of federal law relating to the principal false statement and to the three primary perjury statutes. In outline form, Section 1001(a) states the following:
I . Section 1001(b) creates an exception, a safe harbor, for statements, omissions, or documentation presented to the court by a party in judicial proceedings. One proscribes false statements in matters of legislative branch administration and reaches false statements made in financial disclosure statements. The other proscribes false statements in the course of congressional investigations and reviews, but does not reach false statements made concurrent to such investigations or reviews. § 1621(1), a defendant's false statement must be material." § 1621(2))
Congress added Section 1621(2) to the general perjury statute in 1976 in order to dispense with the necessity of an oath for various certifications and declarations. Perjury in a Judicial Context (18 U.S.C. § 1623)
Congress enacted Section 1623 to avoid some of the common law technicalities embodied in the more comprehensive perjury provisions found in Section 1621 and thus "to facilitate perjury prosecutions and thereby enhance the reliability of testimony before federal courts and grand juries." statement, under penalty of perjury as permitted under [Section] 1746 of title 28, United States Code; I II . Conviction does require a showing, however, that the two statements were made under oath; it is not enough to show that one was made under oath and the other was made in the form of an affidavit signed under penalty of perjury. § 1622)
Section 1622 outlaws procuring or inducing another to commit perjury: "Whoever procures another to commit any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both." Conspiracy under Section 371 is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years. When the defendant is convicted of a crime other than perjury or false statements, however, perjury or false statements during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the defendant for the underlying offense will often be treated as the basis for enhancing his sentence by operation of the obstruction of justice guideline of the U.S. | Federal courts, Congress, and federal agencies rely upon truthful information in order to make informed decisions. Federal law therefore proscribes providing the federal courts, Congress, or federal agencies with false information. The prohibition takes four forms: false statements; perjury in judicial proceedings; perjury in other contexts; and subornation of perjury.
Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the general false statement statute, outlaws material false statements in matters within the jurisdiction of a federal agency or department. It reaches false statements in federal court and grand jury sessions as well as congressional hearings and administrative matters but not the statements of advocates or parties in court proceedings. Under Section 1001, a statement is a crime if it is false regardless of whether it is made under oath.
In contrast, an oath is the hallmark of the three perjury statutes in Title 18. The oldest, Section 1621, condemns presenting material false statements under oath in federal official proceedings. Section 1623 of the same title prohibits presenting material false statements under oath in federal court proceedings, although it lacks some of Section 1621's traditional procedural features, such as a two-witness requirement. Subornation of perjury, barred in Section 1622, consists of inducing another to commit perjury. All four sections carry a penalty of imprisonment for not more than five years, although Section 1001 is punishable by imprisonment for not more than eight years when the offense involves terrorism or one of the various federal sex offenses. The same five-year maximum penalty attends the separate crime of conspiracy to commit any of the four substantive offenses.
A defendant's false statements in the course of a federal criminal investigation or prosecution may also result in an enhanced sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for the offense that was the subject of the investigation or prosecution.
This report is available in an unabridged form—with footnotes, quotations, and citations to authority—as CRS Report 98-808, False Statements and Perjury: An Overview of Federal Criminal Law. |
crs_RS21683 | crs_RS21683_0 | RS21683 -- Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003
November 28, 2003
Measures Providing Tax Relief to Members of the Military
Expanded eligibility to exclude gain from the sale of a principal residence (sec. The one-year period began on November 11, 2003. Other Measures
Suspension of tax-exempt status for terrorist organizations (sec. 108). Tax relief for astronauts killed in the line of duty (sec. (8)
Extension of customs user fees (sec. The authorization for the customs userfees found in 19 U.S.C. | The Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003, H.R. 3365, became P.L.108-121 on November 11, 2003. The Act provides various types of tax relief to members of the Armed Forces. Additionally, theAct suspends the tax-exempt status of organizations involved in terrorist activities, offers tax relief to astronautswho die in the lineof duty, and extends the authorization for certain customs user fees. |
crs_RS22557 | crs_RS22557_0 | Under the formula change, some PHAs were eligible to receive an increase in federal operating funds compared to the previous formula, and others qualified for a decrease. Both the increases and the decreases are phased in; PHAs facing decreases had an opportunity to limit their formula eligibility losses through the adoption of management changes. However, the amount that a PHA qualifies for under the new operating fund formula (whether it is an increase or a decrease) is reduced if Congress appropriates less money than is necessary to fund all agencies at 100% of their eligibility (as Congress has done in most recent years). The new formula took effect in January 2007. | The local public housing authorities (PHAs) that administer the federal public housing program began receiving their annual federal operating subsidies under a new formula in January 2007. As a result of this formula change, some PHAs were eligible for an increase in their eligibility for funding and others were eligible for a decrease. Both the increases and the decreases were phased in (over two and five years, respectively) and PHAs that faced declines were eligible to limit their losses by adopting management reforms—which were also a part of the new operating fund requirements—earlier than required.
Since the formula is only used to determine eligibility for funding, the amount that a PHA qualifies for under the formula (whether it is an increase or a decrease) will be reduced if Congress appropriates less money than is necessary to fund all agencies at 100% of their eligibility, which it has done in the past. |
crs_R45408 | crs_R45408_0 | Introduction
The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP; previously the Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program) provides federally purchased commodities and a smaller amount of cash support to food banks, food pantries, soup kitchens, shelters, and other types of emergency feeding organizations serving low-income households and individuals. Commodities include fruits, vegetables, meats, and grains, among other foods. TEFAP is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS). The program was most recently reauthorized by the 2014 farm bill ( P.L. At the state level, TEFAP is administered by a "state distributing agency" designated by the governor or state legislature: generally the state department of health and human services, agriculture, or education. Some of these programs provide cash assistance while others primarily distribute food. With nearly $354 million in appropriated funding in FY2018, TEFAP is the largest source of federal support for emergency feeding organizations. Other related federal programs include the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Emergency Food and Shelter Program, funded at $120 million in FY2018, which, among its other services for homeless individuals, provides food through shelters, food banks, and food pantries. This report begins by describing the population using emergency food assistance. Program Administration
Federal Role
TEFAP is administered by USDA's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), which is responsible for allocating aid to states (see " State Allocation Formula ") and coordinating the ordering, processing, and distribution of commodities. Local Role
Organizations that are eligible for TEFAP aid are referred to as "recipient agencies" in the Emergency Food Assistance Act. As discussed above, they may also have additional responsibilities as delegated by the state agency; for example, food banks, which operate food warehouses, may be tasked with distributing food to subcontracting recipient agencies like food pantries and soup kitchens, which in turn distribute foods or serve prepared meals to low-income individuals and families. A smaller amount of assistance is provided in the form of cash support for administrative and distribution costs. In FY2018, the enacted appropriation provided $289.5 million for entitlement commodities and $64.4 million for administrative costs. In FY2017 (the most recent year with complete data), USDA purchased and distributed $268.6 million worth of bonus commodities for TEFAP. Commodity Food Support
Entitlement Commodities
Mandatory funding for TEFAP commodities is authorized by Section 27 of the Food and Nutrition Act (7 U.S.C. 113-79 ) . Bonus Commodities
Bonus commodities are purchased at USDA's discretion throughout the year using separate (non-TEFAP) USDA budget authority for that purpose. The Emergency Food Assistance Act specifies that administrative funds must be made available to states, which must in turn distribute at least 40% of the funds to emergency feeding organizations. 110-246 ) also increased funding for TEFAP's entitlement commodities. State Allocation Formula
TEFAP's entitlement commodity and administrative funds are allocated to states based on a statutory formula that takes into account poverty and unemployment rates. Reauthorization Proposals in the 115th Congress
The House- and Senate-passed 2018 farm bills (two versions of H.R. 2 ) include TEFAP provisions. In addition, both bills would authorize new aspects of TEFAP, taking similar but not identical approaches to incorporating new donated foods and reducing food waste. | The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP) is a federal food distribution program that supports food banks, food pantries, soup kitchens, and other emergency feeding organizations serving low-income Americans. Federal assistance takes the form of federally purchased commodities—including fruits, vegetables, meats, and grains—and funding for administrative costs. Food aid and funds are distributed to states using a statutory formula that takes into account poverty and unemployment rates. TEFAP is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS).
TEFAP was established as the Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program by the Emergency Food Assistance Act of 1983. The Emergency Food Assistance Act continues to govern program operations, while the Food and Nutrition Act provides mandatory funding authority for TEFAP commodities. Based on levels set in statute, appropriations provided $289.5 million in mandatory funding for TEFAP's "entitlement" commodities in FY2018. TEFAP also incorporates "bonus" commodities, which are distributed at USDA's discretion throughout the year to support different crops using separate budget authority. USDA purchased $268.6 million worth of bonus commodities for TEFAP in FY2017. A smaller amount of cash assistance ($64.4 million in FY2018) is appropriated to cover administrative and distribution costs under Emergency Food Assistance Act authority. These administrative funds are discretionary.
USDA-FNS coordinates the purchasing of commodities and the allocation of commodities and administrative funds to states, and provides general program oversight. State agencies—often state departments of health and human services, agriculture, or education—determine program eligibility rules and allocations of aid to feeding organizations (called "recipient agencies"). States often task food banks, which operate regional warehouses, with distributing foods to other recipient agencies. TEFAP aid makes up a modest proportion of the food and funds available to emergency feeding organizations, which are reliant on private donations as well.
TEFAP is the largest source of federal support for emergency feeding organizations. Other related food distribution programs focus on specific subpopulations; for example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Emergency Food and Shelter Program distributes food to homeless individuals and USDA's Commodity Supplemental Food Program distributes food to low-income elderly individuals.
TEFAP is typically amended and reauthorized through farm bills. Most recently, the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) extended and provided additional funding for TEFAP's entitlement commodities. Current 2018 farm bill proposals (two versions of H.R. 2) would reauthorize and continue additional funding for entitlement commodities (as of the date of this report). They also include different approaches to incorporating non-federally donated foods and reducing food waste. Recent program developments include TEFAP's use in disaster response and receipt of commodities from the 2018 trade aid package. |
crs_RS22762 | crs_RS22762_0 | DL Program Loan Forgiveness for Public Service Employees
The College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 amended the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) to establish a new loan forgiveness provision under the William D. Ford Direct Loan (DL) program for borrowers who are employed full-time in public service jobs for ten years during the repayment of their loans. Borrowers of DL program loans who make 120 monthly payments on or after October 2, 2007, according to specified repayment plan terms, while concurrently employed full-time in certain public service jobs, will have any loan balance of principal and interest remaining due after their 120 th payment canceled or forgiven by the Secretary of Education. Implementation Issues
The DL program loan forgiveness provision for public service employees is available to borrowers of DL program loans who make 120 payments according to specified repayment plans while concurrently employed full-time in specified public service jobs, on or after October 2, 2007. | The College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 (CCRAA; P.L. 110-84) establishes a new loan forgiveness provision for borrowers of loans made under the William D. Ford Direct Loan (DL) program who are employed in public service jobs for 10 years during the repayment of their loans. Borrowers who make 120 monthly payments on or after October 2, 2007, according to specified repayment plan terms, while concurrently employed full-time in certain public service jobs, will have any loan balance of principal and interest remaining due after their 120th payment canceled or forgiven by the Secretary of Education. Since borrowers must make 120 monthly payments on or after October 2, 2007, while concurrently employed in public service jobs, borrowers will become eligible for loan forgiveness no earlier than 2017.
This report provides a brief description of the DL program loan forgiveness provision for public service employees and identifies issues that may be addressed as it is implemented. It will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R41389 | crs_R41389_0 | This report evaluates the implications of the potential U.S. agreement with South Korea for American manufacturers and compares it with a similar pending free trade agreement between South Korea and the European Union (EU). On December 3, 2010, President Obama announced that cabinet-level negotiations and his discussions with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak produced modifications in the KORUS FTA that he believes addresses his concerns and those of Congress. In a nutshell, the pending KORUS FTA would eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers for U.S. and South Korean manufacturers in a range of industrial sectors, including automobiles, consumer and industrial products, textiles and apparel, and pharmaceuticals and medical devices. The main section of this report compares the manufacturing components of the two agreements. In particular, it reviews automotive trade, the most politically and economically sensitive manufacturing sector in both agreements. Agricultural and services trade are not covered. As Congress considers what action it might take on the KORUS FTA, the European Union and South Korea have completed their own negotiations of a comprehensive free trade agreement (KOREU FTA). If approved, it means the FTA is provisionally ratified in the European Union and can enter into force. The possible competitive impact on U.S. manufacturers of a KOREU FTA will likely be debated by Congress when it considers whether or not to ratify the KORUS FTA, which could be in 2011. Some observers speculate that the auto sections of the FTAs may require some form of side agreement or other arrangement, which have yet to be worked out, before either agreement can be passed by the U.S. Congress or the European Parliament. The steel sectors in the United States and the European Union are also notable dissenters. If the KOREU FTA takes effect first, business groups such as NAM claim U.S. manufacturers could find themselves locked out of the South Korean market. Notwithstanding a possible first mover advantage, it seems U.S. and EU manufacturers are likely to benefit less from their respective FTAs with South Korea when compared with the possible gains for South Korean manufacturers in the larger U.S. and EU markets. Another estimate produced by the Ways & Means Committee Republican Staff found that the United States could lose $1.1 billion in exports to South Korea if the pending KOREU FTA is fully implemented and the United States fails to implement the KORUS FTA. The European Union's 22% truck tariff will be removed over three or five years, depending on the type of vehicle. Some in the United States and the European Union auto sectors remain skeptical South Korea will faithfully implement its NTB obligations in autos, even if the two pending FTAs are ultimately approved and implemented, given its past haphazard enforcement record. For U.S. manufacturers, South Korea is an important market. This should provide U.S., EU, and South Korean textile and apparel manufacturers greater access to each others markets, with South Korean textile manufacturers likely to increase their exports to the United States and European Union markets. On the other side, the American Apparel & Footwear Association has expressed its general support for the KORUS FTA, with the footwear industry strongly supportive of the KORUS FTA. Comparison of Automobile Tariff Reductions
Appendix C. Agreements between South Korea and Various Partner Countries
Beyond their commercial engagement with the United States, the European Union and South Korea are also exploring free trade agreements with other trading partners. | South Korea has negotiated free trade agreements (FTAs) with the United States and the European Union (EU), but neither agreement has yet been approved. The U.S. Congress must approve the United States and South Korea free trade agreement (KORUS FTA) and the European Parliament must vote on the European Union and South Korea free trade agreement (KOREU FTA) before the FTAs can take effect. If the FTAs are ratified, it is possible there could be a "first mover" advantage for either the United States or the European Union, depending on which FTA is approved first. Some argue that both agreements have shortcomings and should not be approved.
This report provides U.S. lawmakers with a comparison of the manufacturing components in the KORUS and KOREU FTAs. Congressional interest in an FTA between the European Union and South Korea mostly centers on those U.S. industries competing with European industrial sectors, especially motor vehicles. The two pending FTAs raise questions about what it could mean for U.S. manufacturers if the United States takes longer, or fails altogether, to implement the KORUS FTA, while the European Union and South Korea possibly move ahead to approve and implement their outstanding FTA. In such a case, the possibility exists that the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers between the European Union and South Korean markets could result in U.S. manufacturers losing South Korean market share to European competitors. On balance, most U.S. and European manufacturing sectors, with some auto manufacturers in particular among notable dissenters, argue that the pending FTAs will be beneficial and are largely supportive. On the other side, labor unions in the United States and the European Union are considerably more skeptical, claiming that South Korean companies could be the biggest beneficiaries, since they could gain even greater access to the significantly larger U.S. and EU markets. Labor union leaders say the FTA will result in further job losses as their respective manufacturing workforces compete for market share with competitive South Korean manufacturers in their own domestic markets.
Various forces will affect how and when each side might move forward on its respective FTA. Congress has a direct role in the approval of the KORUS FTA, but until recently legislative consideration of the agreement had been at a standstill. On December 3, 2010, President Obama announced that cabinet-level negotiations and his discussions with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak produced modifications in the KORUS FTA that he believes addresses his concerns and those of Congress. Some lawmakers argue that the KORUS FTA provides a greater advantage to South Korean manufacturers than to U.S. manufacturers. Others have expressed their support for economic and national security reasons.
No specific date has been announced by the European Union on when it expects to approve its FTA with South Korea, but the European Commission (the EU's executive charged with negotiating agreements with other countries, among its areas of responsibility) has indicated that it would like to move forward in 2011.
Automotive trade is the primary focus of this report because it is one of the most contentious and high-profile manufacturing issues in the KORUS and KOREU FTA deliberations. Additionally, brief overviews are included of other selected U.S. manufacturing sectors that could be affected by these FTAs, such as home appliances, consumer electronics, and pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Trade in agricultural products and services are not covered by this report. |
crs_RL31988 | crs_RL31988_0 | In 2001, Congress appeared to partially reverse course, directing DOE to revamp its polygraph screening program, and in so doing to take into account any forthcoming recommendations by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), which, then under contract with DOE, was reviewing the scientific evidence with regard to the validity and reliability of polygraph testing, particularly when used for personnel security screening [hereafter, referred to as the NAS Report or NAS Study]. After some Members of Congress criticized DOE's initial efforts to revamp its polygraph program to reflect NAS's findings, including its criticism of screening polygraphs, the Department in October 2006 eliminated the use of polygraph testing for screening applicants for employment and employees without specific cause, a policy that remains in effect as of the date of this report. Specifically, the new DOE policy established in 2006 requires mandatory polygraph screening only if one of the following five causes is triggered: (1) a counterintelligence evaluation of an applicant or employee reveals that the individual may be engaged in certain activities, including clandestine or unreported relationships with foreign powers, organizations, or persons; (2) an employee is to be assigned to certain activities within DOE which involve another agency, and that agency requires a polygraph examination; (3) an agency to which a DOE employee will be assigned requests that DOE administer a polygraph examination as a condition of the assignment; (4) an employee is selected for a random counterintelligence evaluation, including a polygraph test; or (5) an employee is required to take a specific-incident polygraph examination. The Intelligence Community uses the polygraph both as an investigative tool and as a screening device. DOE also said a "specific-cause" standard also would "significantly reduce" the number of employees DOE would test. As a result, DOE estimated it will polygraph-test between 2,000 and 2,500 employees in 2006-2007, far less than the estimated more than 20,000 employees who would have been subject to such testing under Secretary Abraham's original plan. Issues for Congress
Adequacy of the Current Polygraph Program
Beyond monitoring DOE's implementation of its revamped polygraph screening program, Congress may also examine whether the Department's polygraph testing is sufficiently focused on a small enough number of individuals occupying only the most sensitive positions. The NAS Report recommended that the government broaden its research into alternatives to the polygraph. Finally, CIA has claimed that certain classified research suggests that the polygraph is sufficiently accurate. | Four years after Congress directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to revamp its polygraph program, taking into account a 2003 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report that questioned the scientific basis for the accuracy of polygraph testing, particularly when used to "screen" employees, DOE promulgated a regulation on October 30, 2006, that eliminated polygraph screening tests without specific cause. DOE said its counterintelligence evaluation policies were now consistent with existing Intelligence Community practices and the NAS 2003 report's recommendations, particularly for cases when polygraph tests were used for screening purposes rather than for investigating specific events.
Under its 2006 regulation, DOE requires that an applicant or employee be polygraph tested only if one of the following five causes is triggered: (1) a counterintelligence evaluation of an applicant or employee reveals that the individual may be engaged in certain activities, including clandestine or unreported relationships with foreign powers, organizations, or persons; (2) an employee is to be assigned to certain activities within DOE which involve another agency, and that agency requires a polygraph examination; (3) an agency to which a DOE employee will be assigned requests that DOE administer a polygraph examination as a condition of the assignment; (4) an employee is selected for a random counterintelligence evaluation, including a polygraph test; or (5) an employee is required to take a specific-incident polygraph examination.
DOE said that by adopting a "specific-cause" polygraph testing standard, it significantly reduced the number of "covered employees" subject to polygraph examinations, from an earlier estimate of more than 20,000 employees to between 2,000 to 2,500 employees in 2006-2007.
The value of polygraph testing, with its associated uncertainties, has been a part of Congress's continuing oversight interest concerning DOE. This report examines how DOE's polygraph testing program has evolved and reviews certain scientific findings with regard to the polygraph's scientific validity. Several issues include whether: DOE's new screening program is focused on an appropriate number of individuals occupying only the most sensitive positions; the program should be expanded in order to adequately safeguard certain classified information; further research into the polygraph's scientific validity is needed; there are possible alternatives to the polygraph; and whether DOE should continue polygraph screening.
Possible options include a more focused polygraph screening program, an expanded polygraph program, additional research into the polygraph's scientific validity, and eliminating the use of the polygraph to screen applicants and employees.
This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R43981 | crs_R43981_0 | This is known as the employer "shared responsibility" provision. However, in 2015, employers with between 50 and 100 FTE employees were eligible for transition relief if certain criteria were met. Employer Shared Responsibility Determinations
Applies to All Employers
The ACA employer shared responsibility provisions apply to all common law employers, including government entities (such as federal, state, local, or Indian tribal government entities) and nonprofit organizations that are exempt from federal income taxes. However, it does impose penalties on certain firms with at least 50 FTE employees if one or more of their full-time employees obtains a premium tax credit through the newly established health insurance exchanges. As shown in Figure 1 , determining the potential exposure to the employer penalty is a multi-stage process. This calculation determines only whether an employer is considered large for purposes of potentially being subject to a penalty. Owners or part-owners in multiple businesses must follow Internal Revenue Service (IRS) aggregation rules. Large Employers Determined to Not Offer Health Coverage
A large employer that does not offer health coverage will be subject to the ACA employer penalty only if any of its full-time employees obtain coverage through an exchange and receive a premium tax credit. The ACA specified that working 30 hours or more per week is considered full-time. However, the statute did not specify what time period (i.e., monthly or annually) employers would use to determine if a worker is full-time. An employer can be subject to a penalty only during the stability period. Employers may opt to use an administrative period (between the measurement and stability periods) to determine which ongoing employees are eligible for coverage and to notify and enroll employees in health care plans. Determining Full-Time Worker Status for Seasonal Workers
When determining the number of full-time employees for purposes of applying the employer penalty, the final regulations allow employers to employ a look-back measurement period of up to 12 months for determining if seasonal employees are full-time employees. Health Insurance Coverage Requirements for Employer Plans
To fulfill the shared responsibility requirements, employers must provide health insurance coverage that is both affordable and adequate to full-time employees and their dependents. Affordable Coverage
Employer coverage is deemed affordable if the employee's portion of the self-only premium for the employer's lowest-cost health coverage plan does not exceed 9.66% of the employee's W-2 wages . Adequate Coverage (Minimum Value)
Under the ACA, a plan is considered to provide adequate coverage (also called minimum value) if the plan's actuarial value (i.e., share of the total allowed costs that the plan is expected to cover) is at least 60%. An employer was not treated as eliminating or materially reducing health coverage if any of these conditions were met:
It continued to offer each employee who was eligible for coverage an employer contribution toward the cost of employee-only coverage that either (1) was at least 95% of the dollar amount of the contribution toward such coverage that the employer was offering on February 9, 2014, or (2) was at least the same percentage of the cost of coverage that the employer was offering to contribute toward coverage on February 9, 2014; In the event of a change in benefits under the employee-only coverage offered, that coverage provided minimum value after the change; and It did not alter the terms of its group health plans to narrow or reduce the class or classes of employees (or the employees' dependents) to whom coverage under those plans was offered on February 9, 2014. Appendix A. Large employers must provide the following to the IRS:
a return including the name, address, and employer identification number; a certification as to whether the employer offers its full-time employees (and dependents) the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored plan; the length of any waiting period; months coverage was available; monthly premiums for the lowest-cost option; the employer plan's share of covered health care expenses; the number of full-time employees; the name, address, and tax identification number of each full-time employee; and information about the plan for which the employer pays the largest portion of the costs (and the amount for each enrollment category). This provision had been added by Section 1511 of the ACA. Appendix B. | The Affordable Care Act (ACA) creates shared responsibilities for both employers and individuals with regard to health insurance coverage. The ACA expands federal private health insurance market requirements and requires the creation of health insurance exchanges to provide individuals and small employers with access to insurance. This report examines the new employer responsibilities.
To ensure that employers continue to provide some degree of health coverage, the ACA includes a "shared responsibility" provision. This provision does not require that an employer offer employees health insurance; however, the ACA imposes penalties on a "large" employer if at least one of its full-time employees obtains a premium credit through the newly established exchange.
As of 2015, employers with at least 50 full-time equivalent (FTE) employees are subject to the shared responsibility provisions. However, in 2015 only, employers with between 50 and 100 FTE employees were eligible for transition relief if certain criteria were met.
The ACA sets out a multi-stage process for determining, first, which firms may be subject to the penalty (i.e., definition of large), and second, which workers within a firm would trigger the penalty. Complex calculations and multiple definitions of full-time work have led to confusion among policymakers and employers. This report discusses these definitions and the application to the employer penalty in greater detail.
The potential employer penalty applies to all common law employers, including government entities (such as federal, state, local, or Indian tribal government entities) and nonprofit organizations that are exempt from federal income taxes. If multiple businesses are owned by one individual or entity, employees in each of the franchises must be aggregated to determine the number of both FTEs and full-time employees.
The actual amount of the penalty varies depending on whether an employer currently offers insurance coverage and the number of full-time employees. Employers must provide both affordable and adequate health insurance coverage to avoid paying a penalty. Coverage is considered affordable if the employee's required contribution to the plan does not exceed 9.66% of the employee's household income for 2016. However, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) allows employers to use the employee's W-2 income in lieu of household income for this calculation (because most employers do not readily have information on an employee's household income). A health plan is considered to provide adequate coverage if the plan's actuarial value (i.e., the share of the total allowed costs that the plan is expected to cover) is at least 60%.
The total penalty for any applicable large employer is based on its number of full-time employees. The ACA specified that working 30 hours or more per week is considered full-time. Employers have some flexibility to designate certain measurement or look-back periods (up to 12 months) during which they calculate whether a worker is full-time or not. Once an employee is determined to be full-time, there is an administrative period to enroll employees in a health plan, if necessary. If an employer penalty is levied under the ACA requirements, it applies only for the time period following the administrative period, which is called the stability period. An employer is not penalized if an employee enters the exchange and receives a premium credit during the measurement period.
Appendix A provides a list of employer reporting requirements. Appendix B includes a table of relevant legislation introduced in the 114th Congress. |
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