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crs_R41936 | crs_R41936_0 | Under current law, public employees who have a pension plan, but who are not covered by Social Security, may hold a referendum on whether to elect Social Security coverage. Legislative History
The 1935 Social Security Act did not extend Social Security coverage to state and local government workers. In 1990, Congress made Social Security coverage mandatory, starting in July 1991, for most state and local government employees who are not covered by an alternative public pension plan. Social Security Coverage by State
Across the United States, about 27.5% of state and local government employees (about 6.6 million persons) work in positions that are not covered by Social Security. SSA's Office of the Chief Actuary estimates that, if mandatory coverage were implemented in 2011, it would close 9% of the system's projected long-range funding shortfall and extend the projected trust fund exhaustion date to 2040. Although mandatory coverage is projected to have a net positive effect on the Social Security Trust Funds on average over the 75-year projection period , the greatest positive effect with respect to Social Security's finances would occur during the initial period following implementation. This option is projected to increase revenues by about $24 billion over 5 years (2012 to 2016) and $96 billion over 10 years (2012 to 2021). In addition, they maintain that mandatory Social Security coverage of newly hired state and local government employees would prevent gaps in pension or Social Security coverage, resulting in better retirement, survivor, and disability insurance protections for workers who move between state and local government positions and other positions. Supporters of mandatory coverage also point out that it could result in better benefit protections for workers and their families through the provision of dependents' and survivors' benefits under Social Security. The net effect on a worker's total benefits, however, would depend in part on how state and local governments modify their existing non-covered pension plans in response to mandatory coverage. Opponents argue that mandatory Social Security coverage would not necessarily result in better benefit protections for workers because state and local governments could reduce some pension benefits currently available under non-covered pension plans to keep overall pension costs down. Moreover, Congress could enact changes to the Social Security contribution and benefit structure that result in higher payroll taxes and lower benefits for current workers (compared with current law) in response to Social Security's projected long-range funding shortfall. Some believe that the eligibility requirements under public pension plans for certain categories of workers (e.g., fire fighters and police officers) reflect the circumstances of these occupations, such as physical demands and higher disability rates. Potential Impact on State and Local Pension Plans
Some state and local government pension plans could be affected if newly hired state and local government employees were required to participate in Social Security. In response to mandatory Social Security coverage, employers might change the pension benefits of newly hired public employees to reflect the added Social Security coverage. Equity Considerations
Some argue that non-covered state and local government workers should share in providing the poverty reduction that occurs through the Social Security system, which offers disability benefits, dependents' benefits and survivors' benefits, in addition to retirement benefits. The remaining 27% was paid to disabled workers and their dependents (16% of total benefits paid) and to the survivors of deceased workers (11% of total benefits paid). Opponents argue that Social Security coverage has been available to state and local governments since the early 1950s. | Social Security covers about 94% of all workers in the United States. Most of the remaining 6% of non-covered workers are public employees. About one-fourth of state and local government employees are not covered by Social Security for various historical and other reasons. The 1935 Social Security Act did not extend coverage to state and local government workers. Since the 1950s, Congress has passed laws to allow state and local government employees who have public pensions to elect Social Security coverage through employee referendums. In 1990, Congress made Social Security coverage mandatory, starting in July 1991, for most state and local government employees who are not covered by an alternative public pension plan.
Some have proposed extending mandatory Social Security coverage to all newly hired public employees. Recently, this proposal was included in the recommendations of the Bipartisan Policy Center's Debt Reduction Task Force and the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. According to the Social Security Administration (SSA), mandatory Social Security coverage of newly hired state and local government workers would close an estimated 8% to 9% of Social Security's projected average 75-year funding shortfall (the greatest positive financial effect would occur during the initial period following implementation) and extend Social Security trust fund solvency by 2 to 3 years. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the proposal would increase net federal revenues by $24 billion over 5 years and $96 billion over 10 years.
Supporters of mandatory Social Security coverage maintain that it would result in better benefit protections for workers and their families through the provision of dependents' and survivors' benefits and full cost-of-living adjustments under Social Security. Opponents argue that mandatory coverage would not necessarily provide better benefit protections compared with existing non-covered pension plans; the net effect on a worker's total benefits would depend in part on how state and local governments modify their existing pension plans in response to mandatory coverage. Moreover, Congress could enact changes to the Social Security contribution and benefit structure that result in higher payroll taxes and lower benefits for current workers in response to Social Security's projected long-range funding shortfall. Supporters point out that, unlike state and local pension plan coverage, Social Security coverage is portable (i.e., coverage is transferrable as a worker moves from job to job). Mandatory Social Security coverage would prevent gaps in coverage that can adversely affect workers, especially those who become disabled. Some supporters of mandatory coverage argue that Social Security reduces poverty among retired and disabled workers, spouses, dependent children, and the survivors of deceased workers. They argue that all workers should share in providing this poverty reduction, which has national benefits.
Many state and local government employers and employees oppose mandatory Social Security coverage, even if it were extended only to newly hired employees. State and local governments are concerned that mandatory coverage could increase pension system costs significantly at a time when many state and local pension systems are struggling financially. The extent of cost increases would depend on how states and localities adjust their existing pension plans in response to mandatory Social Security coverage. Some state and local government employees and advocacy groups express concern that existing non-covered pension plans, including those designed for specific categories of workers such as fire fighters and police officers, could be "undermined" if Social Security coverage were mandated. |
crs_R44716 | crs_R44716_0 | It also includes some data on worldwide supplier transactions. This report focuses principally on the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world—where most analysts agree that the potential for the outbreak of regional military conflicts currently is greatest, and where the greatest proportion of the conventional arms trade is conducted. Nations in the developing world continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by conventional weapons suppliers. During the period of this report, 2008-2015, conventional arms transfer agreements (which represent orders for future delivery) to developing nations comprised 80.24% of the value of all international arms transfer agreements . The portion of agreements with developing countries constituted 80.92% of all agreements globally from 2012-2015. Major Findings
General Trends in Arms Transfers Worldwide
The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide (to both developed and developing nations) in 2015 was $79.9 billion. In 2015, the United States led in arms transfer agreements worldwide, making agreements valued at $40.2 billion (50.29% of all such agreements), up from $36.1 billion in 2014. France ranked second in 2015 with $15.3 billion in agreements (19.16% of these agreements globally), up considerably from $5.7 billion in 2014. In 2015, the United States ranked first in the value of all arms deliveries worldwide, making nearly $16.9 billion in such deliveries or 36.62%. Russia ranked second in worldwide arms deliveries in 2015, making $7.2 billion in such deliveries, and ranked second for all of those eight years. General Trends in Arms Transfers to Developing Nations
The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2015 was $65.2 billion, a substantial decrease from the $79.3 billion total in 2014 ( Figure 1 ) ( Table 1 ) ( Table 3 ) ( Table 4 ). Until France ranked second in 2015, the United States and Russia had dominated the arms market in the developing world since 2012. Both nations either ranked first or second among countries for three out of the four years in terms of the value of arms transfer agreements. From 2012 to 2015, the United States made approximately $85.6 billion of these agreements, or 33.38%. During this same period, Russia made $48.6 billion, 18.9% of all such agreements, expressed in current dollars. Collectively, the United States and Russia made 52.33%, just over half of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations during this four-year period. France from 2012 to 2015 made nearly $27.7 billion or 10.8% of all such agreements with developing nations during these years. In the earlier period (2008-2011) Russia ranked second with $32.8 billion in arms transfer agreements with developing nations or 15.3%; the United States made $111.1 billion in arms transfer agreements during this period or 51.8%. The United States ranked first among these suppliers for all but one year during this period. Of these four nations, France was the leading supplier with a record $15.2 billion in agreements in 2015. In the earlier period (2008-2011), the United States ranked first in the value of arms transfer agreements with Asia with 27.53% ($16.8 billion in current dollars).Russia made 26.23% of this region's agreements in 2008-2011. Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008-2015 : Agreements With Leading Recipients
Table 12 gives the values of arms transfer agreements made by the top 10 recipients of arms in the developing world from 2008 to 2015 with all suppliers collectively. | This report provides Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transactions. Similar data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all government suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons supplying governments to nations in the developing world.
Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers. During the years 2008-2011, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations comprised 80.39% of all such agreements worldwide. More recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations constituted 80.92% of all such agreements globally from 2012-2015, and 81.70% of these agreements in 2015.
The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2015 was $65.2 billion. In 2015, the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations was $33.6 billion.
Recently, from 2012 to 2015, the United States and Russia were predominant the arms market in the developing world, with both nations either ranking first or second in all but the most recent in these four years in the value of arms transfer agreements. From 2012 to 2015, the United States made nearly $86 billion in such agreements, 33.38%of all these agreements (expressed in current dollars). Russia made $48.6 billion, 18.94% of these agreements. During this same period, collectively, the United States and Russia made 52% of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations, ($134 billion in current dollars).
In 2015, the United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing nations with $26.7 billion or 41% of these agreements. In second place was France with $15.2 billion or 23.30% of such agreements.
In 2015, the United States ranked first in the value of arms deliveries to developing nations at $11.9 billion, or 35.42% of all such deliveries. Russia and France tied for second in these deliveries at $6.2 billion each and each representing 18.45%.
In worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2015—to both developed and developing nations—the United States was predominant, ranking first with $40.2 billion in such agreements or 50.29% of all such agreements. France ranked second in worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2015 with $15.3 billion in such global agreements or 19.16%. The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide in 2015 was $79.9 billion.
In 2015, Qatar ranked first among all developing nations weapons purchasers concluding $17.5 billion in the value of arms transfer agreements. Egypt ranked second, concluding $11.9 billion in such agreements. Saudi Arabia ranked third with $8.6 billion in such agreements. |
crs_RL33215 | crs_RL33215_0 | Some protections are available in statutes passed in recent years, including the IntelligenceCommunity Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998. Members of Congress regularly express a need toobtain information from employees within the agency, without seeking the approval of the agencyhead. (49)
The IG statute provided that nothing in the section "shall be construed to authorize the publicdisclosure of information which is (A) specifically prohibited from disclosure by any other provisionof law; (B) specifically required by Executive order to be protected from disclosure in the interestof national defense or national security or in the conduct of foreign affairs; or (C) a part of anongoing criminal investigation." This type of agency defense had been developedby the Supreme Court in Mt. (112)
In the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) of 1989, Congress found that federal employeeswho make protected disclosures "serve the public interest by assisting in the elimination of fraud,waste, abuse, and unnecessary Government expenditures." (114) The WPA incorporates the exemptions for national securityinformation included in the 1978 statute. Agency heads would not have theauthority to block disclosures by agency employees to Congress. The statutory language lists six findings: "(1) national security is a shared responsibilityrequiring joint efforts and mutual respect by Congress and the President; (2) the principles of comitybetween the branches of Government apply to the handling of national security information; (3)Congress, as a co-equal branch of Government, is empowered by the Constitution to serve as a checkon the executive branch; in that capacity, it has a "need to know" of allegations of wrongdoing withinthe executive branch, including allegations of wrongdoing in the Intelligence Community; (4) nobasis in law exists for requiring prior authorization of disclosures to the intelligence committees ofCongress by employees of the executive branch of classified information about wrongdoing withinthe Intelligence Community; (5) the risk of reprisal perceived by employees and contractors of theIntelligence Community for reporting serious or flagrant problems to Congress may have impairedthe flow of information needed by the intelligence committees to carry out oversight responsibilities;and (6) to encourage such reporting, an additional procedure should be established that provides ameans for such employees and contractors to report to Congress while safeguarding the classifiedinformation involved in such reporting." Conclusions
To perform its legislative and constitutional functions, Congress depends on information(domestic and national security) available from the executive branch. Balancing this legislative need for information with the protection of sensitive nationalsecurity information remains a continuing policy issue. Agency heads provide Congress with information,but some Members of Congress have also expressed a need to receive information directly fromrank-and-file employees within an agency. Whistleblowers have helped uncover agencywrongdoing, illegalities, waste, and corruption. The interest of Congress in maintaining an openchannel with agency employees is demonstrated through such statutes as Lloyd-LaFollette, theappropriations riders on the nondisclosure policy, the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, andthe Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act. Initially it was known as the Project on Military Procurement. | To discharge its constitutional duties, Congress depends on information obtained from theexecutive branch. Domestic and national security information is provided through agency reportsand direct communications from department heads, but lawmakers also receive information directlyfrom employees within the agencies. They take the initiative in notifying Congress, its committees,and Members of Congress about alleged agency illegalities, corruption, and waste within the agency. This type of information comes from a group known as whistleblowers.
Through such techniques as "gag orders" and nondisclosure agreements, Presidents haveattempted to block agency employees from coming directly to Congress. In response, Congress hasenacted legislation in an effort to assure the uninterrupted flow of domestic and national securityinformation to lawmakers and their staffs. Members of Congress have made it clear they do not wantto depend solely on information provided by agency heads. Overall, the issue has been how toprotect employees who are willing to alert Congress about agency wrongdoing.
The first procedures enacted to protect agency whistleblowers appeared in the Civil ServiceReform of 1978. It also contained language that excluded protections to whistleblowers who workin federal agencies involved in intelligence and counterintelligence. In 1989, Congress passed theWhistleblower Protection Act in an effort to strengthen statutory protections for federal employeeswho assist in the elimination of fraud, waste, abuse, illegality, and corruption. That statute continuedthe exemption for national security information. It did not authorize the disclosure of anyinformation by an agency or any person that is (1) specifically prohibited from disclosure by anyother provision of law, or (2) "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in theinterest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs."
Several statutes apply expressly to national security information. Congress has passed aseries of laws known collectively as the Military Whistleblowers Protection Act, under whichmembers of the military may give information to Members of Congress. It also passed theIntelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 to encourage the reporting toCongress of wrongdoing within the intelligence agencies. In crafting this legislation, Congress hassought to balance its need for information with national security requirements, giving intelligencecommunity whistleblowers access to Congress only through the intelligence committees. For legalanalysis see CRS Report 97-787, Whistleblower Protections for Federal Employees , by L. PaigeWhitaker and Michael Schmerling.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL32761 | crs_RL32761_0 | The act may be cited asthe "Class Action Fairness Act of 2005." Findings and Purposes of the Act. Theact sets out Congress' findings describing in essentially these words the: (1) circumstances in whichclass actions are valuable to our legal system; (2) abuses of the class action process that have harmedclass members with legitimate claims and defendants that have acted responsibly, adversely affectedinterstate commerce, and undermined public respect for our judicial system; (3) the manner by whichclass members have been harmed by a number of actions taken by plaintiffs' lawyers, which providelittle or no benefit to class members as a whole, including (i) plaintiffs' lawyers receiving large fees,while class members are left with coupons or other awards of little or no value, (ii) unjustifiedrewards made to certain plaintiffs at the expense of other class members, and (iii) confusingpublished notices that prevent class members from being able to fully understand and effectivelyexercise their rights; (4) abuses in class actions which undermine the national judicial system, thefree flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the framersof the United States Constitution, in that State and local courts are (i) keeping cases of nationalimportance out of federal court, (ii) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias againstout-of-state defendants, and (iii) making judgments that impose their view of the law on other statesand bind the rights of the residents of those states. Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights and ImprovedProcedures for Interstate Class Actions. S. 5 would add five newsections to 28 U.S.C. In doing so, the judge on the motion of any party may receive expert testimony as to the coupons'value. Section 1713-Protection against loss by classmembers
This provision provides that a judge may not approve a class action settlement in which theclass member will be required to pay attorney's fees that would result in a net loss to a class memberunless the court determines in a writing finding that the benefits to the class member substantiallyoutweigh the monetary loss. The appropriate federal officials include the Attorney General and in thecase of financial institutions the federal regulatory authorities. (12)
Section 5. It would allow class actionlawsuits to be removed from state court to federal court by any defendant without the consent of anyof the other defendants. Report on Class Action Settlements. | S. 5 , the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 has three main sections: (1) anamendment to the federal diversity statute; (2) a provision regarding removal; and (3) a consumerclass action "bill of rights." It would control and restrict class action lawsuits by shifting some ofthe suits from state to federal courts. This would be achieved by creating federal jurisdiction overclass action suits when the total amount in dispute exceeds $5,000,000 and when any plaintiff livesin a state different from that of any defendant. The bill would treat certain "mass actions" with morethan 100 plaintiffs as class actions for purposes of jurisdiction. S. 5 would requirejudges to review all settlements based on the issuance of coupons to plaintiffs and limit attorney'sfees to the value of the coupon settlements actually received by class members. It would also requirecareful scrutiny of "net loss" settlements in which class members ultimately lose money. Thelegislation would ban settlements that award some class members a larger recovery because they livecloser to the court. It would allow federal courts to maximize the benefits of class actionsettlements. Among other things, S. 5 would also require that a notice of proposedsettlements be provided to the appropriate state and federal officials such as the state attorneysgeneral. It was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee without amendment. On February10, 2005, the Senate passed S. 5 (72-26) without amendment. On February 17, 2005,the House also passed S. 5 without amendment, 279-149 and it is expected to be signedby the President. |
crs_R43032 | crs_R43032_0 | Introduction
On January 4, 2012, President Obama exercised his recess appointment power and appointed three individuals—Terrence F. Flynn, Sharon Block, and Richard F. Griffin, Jr.—to be members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board). Whether the President had authority to make these appointments pursuant to the Recess Appointments Clause was at issue in the 2014 Supreme Court case National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning . This case marked the first time that the Court would examine the scope of the Recess Appointments Clause. This report provides an overview of the Recess Appointments Clause, as well as the unique factual circumstances of the NLRB recess appointments. The report also reviews the Supreme Court's decision in Noel Canning , and discusses some of the practical implications at issue for the NLRB in the aftermath of the Court's decision. However, the Court was sharply divided when it came to the reasoning for why the appointments were infirm. Despite adopting a broad reading of the Recess Appointments Clause, such that the President can make appointments during an inter- or intra-session recess of longer than 10 days to any vacancy, the majority of the Court ruled the appointments invalid because it determined that the Senate was only in an intra-session recess of three days, a period of time deemed insufficient to trigger the President's recess appointment power. Practical Implications for the NLRB After Noel Canning
Between January 4, 2012, the date of appointment for the three NLRB members at issue in Noel Canning , and August 5, 2013, when the Board consisted of three Senate-confirmed members, it is believed that the NLRB issued approximately 700 decisions and approved the appointments of several regional directors. On July 9, 2014, for example, the NLRB's General Counsel indicated that the agency had already set aside its orders in 43 cases that were pending in federal appellate courts when Noel Canning was decided. Although the NLRB has not indicated formally how it will address the remaining decisions that were issued during the relevant period, its approach is likely to follow the actions taken by the agency in 2010, when approximately 550 Board decisions were similarly called into question following the Supreme Court's decision in New Process Steel, L.P. v. National Labor Relations Board . In addition to setting aside Board orders in 43 cases, the NLRB has also filed motions with the various federal courts of appeals to return cases to the Board for further action. | On January 4, 2012, President Obama exercised his recess appointment power and appointed three individuals—Terrence F. Flynn, Sharon Block, and Richard F. Griffin, Jr.—to be members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board). Whether the President had authority to make these appointments pursuant to the Recess Appointments Clause was at issue in the 2014 Supreme Court case National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning. The case marked the first time that the Court would examine the scope of the Recess Appointments Clause.
This report provides an overview of the Recess Appointments Clause, as well as the unique factual circumstances of the NLRB recess appointments. In Noel Canning, a unanimous Supreme Court concluded that the three recess appointments were constitutionally invalid. The Court was sharply divided, however, when it came to the reasoning for why the appointments were infirm. Despite adopting a broad reading of the Recess Appointments Clause, the majority of the Court ruled the appointments invalid because it determined that the Senate was only in an intra-session recess of three days, a period of time deemed insufficient to trigger the President's recess appointment power.
The report also discusses some of the practical implications at issue for the NLRB in the aftermath of the Court's decision, and examines how the Board will address the roughly 700 decisions that were issued between January 4, 2012, and August 5, 2013, when the NLRB consisted of three Senate-confirmed members. Although the NLRB has not formally outlined its plans for these decisions, its approach is likely to follow the actions taken by the agency in 2010, when approximately 550 Board decisions were similarly called into question as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in New Process Steel, L.P. v. National Labor Relations Board. In July 2014, the NLRB's General Counsel indicated that the agency had already set aside its orders in 43 cases that were pending in federal appellate courts when Noel Canning was decided. In addition, to setting aside these orders, the Board has also filed motions with the various federal courts of appeals to return other pending cases to the Board for further action. |
crs_R41827 | crs_R41827_0 | Within that debate, attention has focused on proposals to alter the overall size and composition of total federal spending. On February 14, 2011, President Obama submitted his detailed FY2012 budget request to Congress, and two months later he released a set of deficit reduction policies intended to build on his February proposal. Unlike the February budget submission, the President's April Framework for Shared Prosperity and Shared Fiscal Responsibility does not include detailed proposals and has not been scored by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The House Budget Committee reported a concurrent resolution on the FY2012 budget ( H.Con.Res. 34 ) that was based on a document titled Path to Prosperity , released by Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan on April 5. The Senate has not yet acted on a budget resolution for FY2012. This CRS report highlights spending trends and key policy initiatives in the President's February budget and April F ramework , and in the House-passed budget resolution, for the six functional categories of the federal budget that comprise the human resources "superfunction." The six human resources functions (and their function codes) are
education, training, employment, and social services (Function 500); health (primarily Medicaid) (Function 550); Medicare (Function 570); income security (Function 600); Social Security (Function 650); and veterans benefits and services (Function 700). H.Con.Res. CBO expects they will have peaked in FY2010, at 16.4%, and will fall to 14.8% in FY2014. This pattern reflects the assumed economic recovery, lower spending for programs that respond automatically to economic conditions such as Unemployment Insurance and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and the expiration of all stimulus funding. Beginning in FY2015, however, human resources spending would rise again as a share of GDP, according to CBO, reaching 15.7% by FY2021. Fueling this increased spending are several factors, including the continuing effects of the baby boom generation's retirement and increased enrollment in Medicare and Social Security, certain program design features such as wage indexing in Social Security (which allows initial monthly benefits to replace a constant proportion of pre-retirement earnings and keep pace with rising living standards), medical cost inflation in excess of general inflation, and new spending attributable to implementation of the health care reform law of 2010. With no change in current law, CBO projects that spending for income security as a share of GDP will contract over the next decade, as will spending for the two smallest functions—education, training, employment, and social services (Function 500), and veterans benefits and services (Function 700). The figure shows that the President's budget closely follows and slightly exceeds the CBO baseline, while the House budget resolution would result in significantly lower spending as a share of the national economy. This compares with 15.9% under the Administration's budget and 13.5% under the House resolution. 34 sets targets that would lower spending from the current law baseline in two additional functions: education, training, employment, and social services, and income security. 111-5 ). Estimated spending in FY2021 would exceed the CBO current law baseline by 5% under the President's February budget and would be 3% lower than CBO's projections under the House resolution. One of the most widely reported provisions in the House budget resolution assumes enactment of legislation to convert Medicare into a "premium subsidy" program. However, as envisioned in the budget resolution, this change would not take effect until FY2022, which is beyond the resolution's 10-year budget window and is therefore not reflected in Figure 7 . The Administration and Congress are engaged in a debate over reducing the federal deficit and stabilizing the national debt; proposals to reduce and change the composition of federal spending are a major part of this debate. Within the human resources category, the House resolution would reduce spending primarily in three functions. The largest reduction from the CBO baseline, if all provisions in the House resolution were enacted, would occur in Function 550 (health, including Medicaid); the House spending target for this function in FY2021 would be 50% below the baseline. | The 112th Congress is focusing attention on short- and long-term efforts to reduce the federal deficit and stabilize the national debt, including proposals to alter the overall size and composition of total federal spending. Components of the federal budget categorized as "human resources" account for the majority of federal outlays (70% in FY2010) and would be affected by these proposals. Six functional categories comprise the human resources "superfunction": education, training, employment, and social services; health (primarily Medicaid); Medicare; income security; Social Security; and veterans benefits and services.
President Obama submitted a detailed FY2012 budget request to Congress on February 14, and in April, he released a set of deficit reduction policies intended to build on the February proposal called the President's Framework for Shared Prosperity and Shared Fiscal Responsibility. On April 15, the House passed a concurrent resolution on the FY2012 budget (H.Con.Res. 34) that was based on a document called Path to Prosperity, released by Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan on April 5. The Senate has not yet acted on a budget resolution for FY2012.
As a share of the national economy, spending for human resources is expected to have peaked at 16.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in FY2010 and, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), will fall to 14.8% in FY2014. This decline reflects the assumed economic recovery, lower spending for programs that respond automatically to economic conditions (e.g., Unemployment Insurance, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program), and expiration of stimulus funding under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5). However, CBO estimates that, with no changes in current law, human resources spending will rise again as a share of GDP and reach 15.7% by FY2021 due to the continuing effects of the baby boom generation's retirement and increased enrollment in Medicare and Social Security, real growth in initial Social Security benefits, medical cost inflation in excess of general inflation, and new spending related to the health care reform law of 2010.
Reflecting these trends, all projected growth in the human resources budget will occur in three functional categories: health (primarily Medicaid), Medicare, and Social Security. CBO estimates that spending for income security will contract as a share of GDP over the next decade, as will spending for the two smallest human resources categories (i.e., education, training, employment, and social services; and veterans benefits and services).
Both the President's budget and H.Con.Res. 34 include provisions intended to reduce spending overall. However, the President's February proposals would result in spending for human resources that would closely follow, and slightly exceed, the CBO current law baseline, while the House resolution sets spending targets that are significantly lower. Specifically, human resources spending would equal 15.9% of GDP in FY2021 under the Administration's February budget and 13.5% under the House resolution, compared to CBO's baseline estimate of 15.7%. The most significant reductions from the CBO baseline, if all provisions assumed in the House resolution were enacted, would occur in three categories: education, training, employment, and social services (the smallest human resources category); Medicaid; and income security. As widely reported, the House resolution assumes enactment of legislation to convert Medicare into a "premium subsidy" program; however, this change would not occur until FY2022, which is after the resolution's 10-year budget window. Thus, the House resolution sets spending targets for the next 10 years that are relatively close to CBO's baseline projections for Medicare, Social Security, and veterans benefits and services. |
crs_RS20851 | crs_RS20851_0 | Background
This report focuses on the transformation of U.S. naval forces—the Navy and the Marine Corps, which are both contained in the Department of the Navy (DON). Key Elements of Naval Transformation
Table 1 summarizes several key elements of U.S. naval transformation. Reductions in personnel requirements ashore are to be accomplished through organizational streamlining and reforms, and the transfer of jobs from uniformed personnel to civilian DON employees. Is DON striking the proper balance between transformation initiatives for participating in the global war on terrorism (GWOT) and those for preparing for a potential challenge from improved Chinese maritime military forces? | The Department of the Navy (DON) has several efforts underway to transform U.S. naval forces to prepare them for future military challenges. Key elements of naval transformation include a focus on operating in littoral waters, increasing the Navy's capabilities for participating in the global war on terrorism (GWOT), network-centric operations, use of unmanned vehicles, directly launching and supporting expeditionary operations ashore from sea bases, new kinds of naval formations, new ship-deployment approaches, reducing personnel requirements, and streamlined and reformed business practices. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42064 | crs_R42064_0 | Introduction
Congress established the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) program in 2007 as a way to help raise U.S. fuel economy standards for vehicles and to encourage domestic production of more fuel-efficient cars and light trucks. Since a low point of 44% market share in 2009 during the recession, the Detroit 3 have gained some ground, as their sales accounted for nearly 47% of all U.S. sales in 2011 and about 45% each year since 2012. By the end of 2013, the U.S. Treasury had sold off its holdings of the new company. Ultimately, Congress did not reduce ATVM funding and the program remains as originally authorized and funded, although two recent reports have called for the unused funds to be rescinded. As enacted, the program authorized up to $25 billion in direct loans to manufacturing facilities in the United States. One of the key requirements for a qualifying vehicle or component is that it achieves at least 25% higher fuel economy than a comparable MY2005 vehicle. Among other provisions, the act appropriated $7.5 billion to cover the risk of default on up to $25 billion in loans, and $10 million was appropriated for administrative expenses. The chairman of the House Appropriations Committee noted in a statement that the ATVM program "has more than $4 billion in unspent funds in the pipeline." Recommendations to Rescind Unused ATVM Appropriations
Two reports in April 2014 called for the rescission of unobligated balances in the ATVM program. The House budget resolution for FY2015 recommended rescinding the unobligated balance because "funds have largely been unused, as production has not met current demand." In that report, GAO recommended that Congress may want to rescind all or part of the remaining ATVM credit subsidy appropriations "unless the Department of Energy (DOE) can demonstrate demand for new ATVM loans and viable applications." Subsidy Cost
Appropriations for the program do not cover the entire value of the loans, but instead cover the "subsidy cost" (i.e., the risk of default). For the original appropriation, Congress assumed a subsidy rate of 30%, meaning that $7.5 billion would be sufficient to fund $25 billion in total loan value. GAO estimates that a total of $3.3 billion in subsidy costs has been obligated to date, leaving approximately $4.2 billion of the appropriation unobligated. No component manufacturer has received an ATVM loan. Currently Funded ATVM Projects
As of January 8, 2015, DOE had approved ATVM loans to five companies totaling $8.4 billion. Current Issues and Critiques of the ATVM Program
ATVM and Fuel Efficiency
DOE estimated at the time of the loan announcements that, in aggregate, the vehicles produced from these projects would displace 282 million gallons of gasoline (roughly 18,000 barrels per day, or about 0.2% of U.S. consumption) and avoid 2.4 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions annually (about 0.04% of total U.S. emissions), compared to similar MY2005 vehicles. Job Creation and Preservation
DOE originally estimated that these loans will save or create about 38,700 jobs in the motor vehicle industry. | The Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) Loan Program is a Department of Energy (DOE) program designed to reduce petroleum use in vehicles and promote domestic manufacturing. It was established in 2007, when the Detroit 3 automakers—General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler—faced declining sales in a weakening economy at the same time that U.S. fuel economy standards were raised. It provides direct loans to automakers and parts suppliers to construct new U.S. factories or retrofit existing factories to produce vehicles that achieve at least 25% higher fuel economy than model year 2005 vehicles of similar size and performance.
The ATVM program is authorized to award up to $25 billion in loans; there is no deadline for completing such loan commitments. Congress funded the program in 2009, when it appropriated $7.5 billion to cover the subsidy cost for the $25 billion in loans, as well as $10 million for program implementation. Since the start of the program, DOE has awarded $8.4 billion in loans to five companies (Fisker, Ford, Nissan, Tesla, and the Vehicle Production Group). As of January 2015, ATVM has $16.6 billion in remaining loan authority. No new loans have been made since 2011. Two companies—Fisker and the Vehicle Production Group—were unable to make payments on their loans, and DOE auctioned the loans off in the fall of 2013. Tesla paid off all of its loan in 2013, nine years ahead of schedule.
Of the final loan agreements, DOE has estimated that the projects would create or save 38,700 jobs at facilities in nine states. DOE estimated that annually the projects would displace 282 million gallons of gasoline (roughly 18,000 barrels per day, or about 0.2% of U.S. consumption) and would avoid about 2.4 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions (about 0.04% of total U.S. emissions).
In April 2014, DOE announced a number of changes that appear designed to refocus the program to assist vehicle component manufacturers, rather than the vehicle assemblers that have received prior ATVM loans. As of January 8, 2015, however, no new loans have been made.
Appropriations for the program do not cover the entire value of the loans but instead cover the "subsidy cost" (i.e., the risk of default). For the original appropriation, Congress assumed a subsidy rate of 30%, meaning that $7.5 billion would be sufficient to fund $25 billion in total loan value. A report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates that a total of $3.3 billion in subsidy costs has been paid to date, with approximately $4.2 billion unobligated.
The unobligated funds remaining for the program have been a point of contention in recent appropriations debates. The House has voted several times to transfer some of the unused appropriation for the ATVM subsidy costs to other purposes. None of these transfers were enacted. Other legislators have sought to expand the program. Two recent federal reports call for rescinding the program's unobligated balance: the FY2015 budget resolution reported by the House Budget Committee calls for outright rescission, and an April 2014 GAO report recommends Congress consider taking the same step unless DOE can generate new demand for the program. |
crs_RL33321 | crs_RL33321_0 | Background
Administrative subpoena authority is the power vested in various administrative agencies to compel testimony or the production of documents or both in aid of the agencies' performance of their duties. Since then, proposals relating to the use of administrative subpoenas in criminal investigations have been confined to unregistered sex offenders, of the type ultimately enacted as part of the Child Protection Act of 2012. Criminal Administrative Subpoenas
Several statutes at least arguably authorize the use of administrative subpoenas primarily or exclusively for purposes of a criminal investigation. 3486 (administrative subpoenas in certain health care fraud, child abuse, and Secret Service protection cases); and (3) 5 U.S.C. (III) 6 (inspector general investigations). In a criminal investigation, however, the cases suggest that Fourth Amendment probable cause and warrant prerequisites may apply, when execution of the administrative subpoena involves the attributes of a search. It vests Section 3486's administrative subpoena power in the United States Marshals Service for use in tracking unregistered sex offenders. In one form or another, they endorse the general view that district courts must enforce administrative subpoenas that satisfy statutory requirements and conform to the reasonableness demands of the Fourth Amendment. Appendix A. | Administrative subpoena authority is the power vested in various administrative agencies to compel testimony or the production of documents or both in aid of the agencies' performance of their duties. Administrative subpoenas are not a traditional tool of criminal law investigation, but neither are they unknown. Several statutes authorize the use of administrative subpoenas primarily or exclusively for use in a criminal investigation in cases involving health care fraud, child abuse, Secret Service protection, controlled substance cases, inspector general investigations, and tracking unregistered sex offenders.
Proponents cite administrative subpoenas as a quick, efficient, and relatively unintrusive law enforcement tool. Opponents express concern that they may result in unchecked invasions of privacy and evasions of the Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements.
The courts have determined that, as long as they are not executed in a manner reminiscent of a warrant, administrative subpoenas issued in aid of a criminal investigation must be judicially enforced if they satisfy statutory requirements and are not unreasonable by Fourth Amendment standards.
The Child Protection Act of 2012, P.L. 112-206 (H.R. 6063) authorized the United States Marshals Service to issue administrative subpoenas in aid of tracking unregistered sex offenders.
This report is available abridged—without footnotes, appendixes, and most of the citations to authority—as CRS Report RS22407, Administrative Subpoenas in Criminal Investigations: A Sketch, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RS20913 | crs_RS20913_0 | In fact, U.S. producers of the major crops have asked for and received federalintervention --including various forms of counter-cyclical assistance -- to support their commodity prices and incomes for nearlythe past70 years. However, the 1996 law did continue another form of counter-cyclical support: marketing assistance loans. 2646 , P.L. 107-171 ),provides new long-term counter-cyclical support for grains and cotton, by restoring target prices and deficiencypayments,similar in some respects to the program terminated by the 1996 Act. Equity Issues
The new counter-cyclical aid in the 2002 law focuses on the "major" commodities -- grains, cotton, oilseeds, peanuts, andmilk. | Congress has approved legislation (P.L. 107-171) reauthorizing major farmincome and commodity price support programs through crop year 2007. This legislation includes new"counter-cyclicalassistance" programs for grains, cotton, oilseeds, peanuts, and milk. The intent of counter-cyclical assistance is toprovidemore government support when farm prices and/or incomes decline, and less support when they improve. In fact,farmershave, for many years, been eligible for various forms of counter-cyclical assistance. At issue has been the need for,andpotential impacts of, another counter-cyclical program. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R40422 | crs_R40422_0 | Farm commodity programs over the decades have focused on protecting farmers against declines in farm prices and not declines in revenue (price times production). Traditional programs for field crops—specifically marketing assistance loan benefits and counter-cyclical payments—provide benefits to producers when farm prices drop below specified (and fixed) levels. The 2008 farm bill debate produced a new program to help farmers manage their revenue risks. Congress included the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-246 , the 2008 farm bill) as a revenue-based program option for farmers who enroll in traditional farm commodity programs. Unlike revenue protection provided by some crop insurance products, ACRE is designed to protect against losses from multi-year price declines, using price triggers based on national average prices from the previous two marketing seasons. Program authorization for ACRE ends with the 2012 crop year. The ACRE program pays a farmer when two conditions are met: (1) actual state-level revenue for a crop (determined after harvest) falls below a guaranteed level (determined before harvest), and (2) the farmer experiences an individual crop revenue loss on a farm. If farmers select the ACRE option on a farm, they forgo 20% of their direct payments; loan rates are reduced by 30%; and participants on the farm are not eligible for counter-cyclical program payments. The program applies to all DCP crops on that farm, and payments for each crop are calculated separately. A farmer who operates more than one farm may elect to enroll one or all farms in ACRE. Importantly, once a farm is enrolled, it must remain in the program for subsequent crop years (the program covers crop years 2009-2012). Selecting the ACRE Option
When deciding to participate in ACRE, producers generally consider the trade-off between reduced benefits under traditional programs and the expected increase in revenue risk protection provided by ACRE. For the 2009 crop year, approximately 8% of the total number of farms elected to participate in ACRE, representing nearly 13% of base acres (total program acreage). Both measures increased less than one percentage point in 2010. In November 2010, USDA began issuing approximately $420 million in 2009 ACRE payments for wheat, corn, barley, dry peas, grain sorghum, lentils, oats, peanuts, soybeans, and upland cotton, with about 70% of the total expected to be issued to wheat producers and 23% to corn producers. Issues for the 111th Congress
In the next farm bill debate, Congress will likely be interested in the effectiveness and cost of the ACRE program, particularly how it reduces revenue risk for producers of program crops and how variations of the program might be incorporated as part of the farm safety net. | Farm commodity programs over the decades have focused on protecting farmers against declines in farm prices and not declines in revenue (price times production). Traditional programs for field crops provide benefits to producers when farm prices drop below specified levels. To help farmers manage their revenue risks, Congress included the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246 or 2008 farm bill) as a revenue-based program option for farmers who enroll in traditional farm commodity programs for crop years 2009-2012. Unlike revenue protection provided by some crop insurance products, ACRE is designed to protect against losses from multi-year price declines.
Program authorization ends with the 2012 crops. As part of the farm bill debate expected in 2012, Congress will likely be interested in how ACRE reduces revenue risk for producers of program crops and how variations of the program might be incorporated as part of the farm safety net, which includes commodity programs, crop insurance, and disaster assistance.
The ACRE program pays a farmer when two conditions are met: (1) state-level revenue for a crop falls below a guaranteed level, and (2) the farmer experiences an individual crop revenue loss. (Payments for each crop are calculated separately.) If farmers select ACRE, they forgo 20% of their direct payments under the Direct and Counter-cyclical Payment Program (DCP), and commodity loan rates under the Marketing Assistance Loan Program are reduced by 30%. Also, ACRE participants are not eligible for counter-cyclical program payments under DCP. When deciding to participate in ACRE, producers must consider the trade-off between reduced benefits under traditional programs and the expected increase in revenue risk protection and potential payments provided by ACRE.
Once a farm is enrolled in ACRE, the program applies to all eligible crops on that farm. A farmer who operates more than one farm may elect to enroll one or all of the farms in ACRE. Importantly, once a farm is enrolled in ACRE, it must remain in the program for subsequent crop years. For the 2009 crop year, approximately 8% of the total number of farms elected to participate in ACRE, representing nearly 13% of base acres (total program acreage). Both measures increased less than one percentage point in 2010. In November 2010, USDA began issuing approximately $420 million in 2009 ACRE payments for wheat, corn, barley, dry peas, grain sorghum, lentils, oats, peanuts, soybeans, and upland cotton, with about 70% of the total expected to be issued to wheat producers and 23% to corn producers. |
crs_R42962 | crs_R42962_0 | In December 2012, the Fed moved away from a time horizon for exceptionally low rates, instead tying the duration of exceptionally low rates to an economic threshold, namely as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6.5% and inflation and inflation expectations remain low. By purchasing Treasury securities, agency debt securities, and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), the Fed has increased the size of its balance sheet from less than $0.9 trillion in 2007 to about $4 trillion at the end of 2013. This announcement was popularly referred to as QEII. On December 18, 2013, the Fed announced that it would begin "tapering off" (reducing) its asset purchases, and beginning in January 2014, it would only purchase $35 billion MBS and $40 billion Treasury securities per month. Inflation has remained relatively low. Since the Fed did not pursue such policies in previous recessions, in part because it did not reach the zero lower bound on short-term interest rates, it is unknown at what point the Fed would choose to terminate its unconventional policies in this economic recovery and how willing it would be to use such policies in future recessions, which might be more typical than the recent one. Effect on Interest Rates and Economic Growth
The Fed has stressed that large-scale asset purchases (quantitative easing) stimulate the economy by reducing long-term interest rates. QE has also changed certain financial markets. In March 2009, the Fed announced that exceptionally low rates would be in place for an "extended period of time." More recently, the Fed has stated that
it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6.5%, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal. Once the Fed returns to conventional monetary policy and the federal funds rate is no longer at its lower bound, it is unclear whether the Fed will continue to announce a target date or economic phenomenon (such as a target unemployment rate) for when it expects to next change the federal funds rate. Credibility could also be undermined when the Fed repeatedly "moves the goal posts" on when exceptionally low rates will end. As a result of QE, there have been extraordinary increases in the monetary base that have not led to any demonstrable increase in inflation thus far. Legislative Options to Prevent Quantitative Easing
Congress has given the Fed broad discretion to implement monetary policies as it sees fit to meet its statutory mandate "to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates." For example, in its announcement of QEII, the Fed stated
To promote a stronger pace of economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with its mandate, the Committee decided today to expand its holdings of securities…. The members of the Federal Open Market Committee project that the unemployment rate will be at or near full employment in 2015, but most do not believe it would be appropriate to raise the federal funds rate above zero before then. Although it is difficult to disentangle the effects of the Fed's policies from other factors affecting interest rates, the fact that Treasury and MBS yields are at their lowest levels in decades suggests that the Fed's unconventional policies have had the direct effects that were intended. It is clear at this point that monetary policy alone is not potent enough to return the economy to full employment quickly, and there may be diminishing economic benefits from additional QE. While the economic benefits of unconventional monetary policy have not been sufficient to restore full employment, the main perceived risks (higher inflation, higher inflationary expectations, or asset price bubbles) have not yet materialized several years after QE began. If unconventional policy were failing because it is undermining the Fed's credibility, the evidence would be high interest rates, high inflation expectations, or both; to date, neither has occurred. | The "Great Recession" and the ensuing weak recovery have led the Federal Reserve (Fed) to expand its monetary policy tools. Since December 2008, overnight interest rates have been near zero; at this "zero bound," they cannot be lowered further to stimulate the economy. As a result, the Fed has taken unprecedented policy steps to try to fulfill its statutory mandate of maximum employment and price stability. Congress has oversight responsibilities for ensuring that the Fed's actions are consistent with its mandate.
The Fed has made large-scale asset purchases, popularly referred to as "quantitative easing" (QE), that have increased the size of its balance sheet from $0.9 trillion in 2007 to about $4 trillion at the end of 2013. In September 2012, the Fed began a third round of monthly purchases of Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities (MBS), referred to as "quantitative easing three" or QEIII. Unlike the previous rounds, the Fed has not announced when QEIII will end or its ultimate size. In December 2013, the Fed began "tapering off" its asset purchases, and announced in January 2014 that it would purchase $30 billion of MBS and $35 billion of Treasury securities per month. The Fed views QE as stimulating the economy primarily through lower long-term interest rates, which stimulate spending on business investment, residential investment, and consumer durables. Since QE began, Treasury yields and mortgage rates have reached their lowest levels in decades; it is less clear how much QE has affected private-borrowing rates and interest-sensitive spending. Critics fear QE's potentially inflationary effects, via growth in the monetary base. Inflation has remained low to date, but QE is unprecedented in the United States and the Fed's mooted "exit strategy" for unwinding QE is untested, so the Fed's ability to successfully maintain stable prices while unwinding QE is uncertain, as are potential unintended consequences.
The Fed has also changed its communication policies since rates reached the zero bound. From 2011 to 2012, it announced a specific date for how long it anticipated that the federal funds rate would be at "exceptionally low levels," and over time incrementally extended that horizon by two years. In December 2012, it replaced the time horizon with an unemployment threshold. It now anticipates that the federal funds rate would be exceptionally low "well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6.5%," provided inflation remains low. The Fed argues that its new communication policies make its federal funds target more stimulative today. In this view, if financial actors are confident that short-term rates will be low for an extended period of time, then long-term rates will be driven down today, thereby stimulating interest-sensitive spending. Uncertainty about economic projections hampers the Fed's ability to stick to a preannounced policy path, and repeatedly "moving the goal posts" on when it will raise rates could undermine its credibility. If unconventional policy were failing because it has undermined the Fed's credibility, the evidence would be high interest rates, high inflation expectations, or both; to date, neither has occurred.
The sluggish rate of economic recovery suggests that unconventional monetary policy alone is not powerful enough to return the economy to full employment quickly after a severe downturn and financial crisis. It also raises questions about the optimal approach to monetary policy. The economic recovery is now well established, but inflation was below the Fed's goal of 2% in 2013. The Fed officials who set interest rates project that the unemployment rate will be at or near full employment in 2015, but most do not believe it would be appropriate to raise the federal funds rate above zero before then. Although many perceived risks of unconventional policy have not been realized to date, risks may intensify as the economy nears full employment. |
crs_R41128 | crs_R41128_0 | Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. To pay for expanded health insurance coverage, there are a number of health-related revenue provisions in ACA. The new law also makes changes to tax-advantaged health care accounts such as flexible spending and health savings accounts. This report details the changes in tax law that will be made as a result of the health-related revenue provisions in ACA. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), these changes are projected to raise $391.7 billion in health-related provisions over 10 years. Provisions Affecting Health Care Firms and Other Employers
ACA will impose the following taxes or fees on health insurers, plan administrators, and health companies:
an excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health insurance; an annual fee on health insurance providers; an annual fee on manufacturers and importers of brand name pharmaceuticals; an excise tax on manufacturers and importers of certain medical devices; and an excise tax on indoor tanning services. The new law will also limit the deductibility of compensation for health insurance executives. While the provisions above are directly targeted toward firms in the health care sector, there is an additional provision that will affect all employers who provide prescription drug coverage to Medicare beneficiaries. Unearned Income Medicare Contribution
ACA as amended imposes an additional tax on net investment income. Tax-Advantaged Accounts and Itemized Deductions Used to Pay for Health Care Expenses
There are a number of tax-advantaged accounts and tax deductions for health care spending and coverage that will be affected by the revenue provisions in Title IX of ACA. | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 as amended) will, among other things, raise revenues to pay for expanded health insurance coverage. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, these health-related provisions are projected to increase federal revenues by about $392 billion over 10 years.
The majority (64%) of the health-related revenues will come from individuals, largely from taxes imposed on higher income tax filers though the Medicare payroll tax and adding an additional tax on net investment income. A much smaller share of revenues derived from individual taxpayers will come from limitations on tax-advantaged accounts (such as flexible spending and health savings accounts) and on the itemized deduction used to pay for health care expenses.
The remaining approximate one-third (36%) of these health-related revenues will be derived from taxes and fees on health insurers, plan administrators, and health companies. Specifically, these revenues include
an excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health insurance; an annual fee on health insurance providers; an annual fee on manufacturers and importers of brand-name pharmaceuticals; an excise tax on manufacturers and importers of certain medical devices; and an excise tax on indoor tanning services.
The new law will also limit the deductibility of compensation for health insurance executives. While the provisions above are directly targeted toward firms in the health care sector, there is an additional provision that will affect all employers who provide prescription drug coverage to Medicare beneficiaries, which will eliminate the tax deduction for expenses allocable to the Medicare Part D subsidy to employers.
This report summarizes the health-related revenue provisions in ACA, their effective dates, and, where data are available, potential impacts of these provisions.
This report will be updated as legislative activity warrants. |
crs_RL33521 | crs_RL33521_0 | 6 , P.L. Background and Analysis
Legislative Activities
The persistence of high gasoline prices led to a broad spectrum of proposed new legislation in the First Session of the 110 th Congress. Despite passage of the major Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 . One such proposed policy was increasing CAFE standards for automobiles and light trucks, and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ( H.R. Senator Domenici introduced a bill emphasizing U.S. petroleum production, including opening the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and part of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) for oil and gas leasing and encouraging leasing of oil shale deposits. This report reviews the major legislative initiatives to deal with the gasoline price issue. To put these proposals in perspective, it first describes some of the factors that have led to the high prices of both crude oil and gasoline. In 2004, a large number of factors combined to exert pressure on gasoline prices in all parts of the country. Another factor in recent months was been the decline in the value of the dollar compared to other currencies. The 2004 price surge intensified discussion of energy policy and led to further calls for passage of energy legislation. However, until the climax of the Katrina disaster, the urgency of previous energy crises had been lacking. At the beginning of the current crisis, the general expectation was that the price increase was a temporary phenomenon. In part, this may be due to the fact that there has been no physical shortage of gasoline or lines at the pump, as there were after the Arab oil embargo in 1973 and the Iranian revolution in 1979. But the continued and unrelenting increase in crude oil prices to record levels, even discounting inflation, is leading many to suggest that changing world market conditions may have led to permanent, or at least chronic, shortages of petroleum production capacity. Others continue to expect that growth in demand will moderate, and production will increase to meet demand, as it did following the shortages of the 1970s. 110-140 . | The high price of gasoline has been and continues to be a driving factor in consideration of energy policy proposals. Despite passage of the massive Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 2005, P.L. 109-58), and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (H.R. 6, P.L. 110-140), numerous other proposed initiatives came under active consideration in the Second Session of the 110th Congress. Measures proposed included opening the Outer Continental Shelf for oil and gas drilling, regulation of speculation in energy markets, and policies concerning the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
A large number of factors combined to put pressure on gasoline prices, including increased world demand for crude oil and limited U.S. refinery capacity to supply gasoline. The war and continued violence in Iraq added uncertainty, and threats of supply disruption added pressure, particularly to the commodity futures markets. Concern that speculation added volatility and upward pressure was frequently cited. In recent months, a decline in the value of the dollar compared to other currencies increased the dollar price of oil on futures markets.
The gasoline price surge stimulated much legislative activity, but until the last year or so there was not the sense of the extreme urgency of previous energy crises. In part, this may be due to the fact that there was been no physical shortage of gasoline or lines at the pump, as there were after the Arab oil embargo in 1973 and the Iranian revolution in 1979. At that time there was expectation that prices were destined to grow ever higher, and many believed that the world's supply of oil was running out. Such views have been less prevalent during the current run-up. But the continued and unrelenting increase in crude oil prices to record levels, even discounting inflation, led many to suggest that changing world market conditions may cause permanent, or at least chronic, shortages of petroleum production capacity. Others continued to expect that growth in demand would moderate, and production increase to meet demand, as it did following the shortages of the 1970s.
The continuing high prices led to a further search for legislative remedies. This report, after analyzing factors that have contributed to high gasoline prices, describes the major legislative initiatives and discusses the issues involved. |
crs_RL33030 | crs_RL33030_0 | Introduction
Overview of the Budget Reconciliation Process
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 established the congressional budget process. The budget reconciliation process is an optional procedure that operates as an adjunct to thebudget resolution process. The chief purpose of the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress'sability to change current law in order to bring revenue, spending, and debt-limit levels intoconformity with the policies of the budget resolution. Reconciliation is a two-stage process. First, reconciliation instructions are included in thebudget resolution, directing the appropriate committees to develop legislation achieving the desiredbudgetary outcomes. If the budget resolution instructs more than one committee in a chamber, thenthe instructed committees submit their legislative recommendations to their respective BudgetCommittees by the deadline prescribed in the budget resolution; the Budget Committees incorporatethem into an omnibus budget reconciliation bill without making any substantive revisions. (5)
The second step involves consideration of the resultant reconciliation legislation by theHouse and Senate under expedited procedures. Among other things, debate in the Senate on anyreconciliation measure is limited to 20 hours (and 10 hours on a conference report) and amendmentsmust be germane and not include extraneous matter. The House Rules Committee typicallyrecommends a special rule for the consideration of a reconciliation measure in the House that placesrestrictions on debate time and the offering of amendments. In cases where only one committee has been instructed, the process allows that committeeto report its reconciliation legislation directly to its parent chamber, thus bypassing the BudgetCommittee. As an optional procedure, reconciliation has not been used in every year that thecongressional budget process has been in effect. Beginning with the first use of reconciliation byboth the House and Senate in 1980, however, reconciliation has been used in most years. (In threeyears, 1998 (for FY1999), 2002 (for FY2003), and 2004 (for FY2005), the House and Senate did notagree on a budget resolution.) Congress has sent the President 19 reconciliation acts over the years;16 were signed into law and three were vetoed (and the vetoes not overriden). Section 310 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974
Section 310(a) of the 1974 act provides for the inclusion of reconciliation directives in abudget resolution. Initiating Consideration and ControllingTime. Accordingly, these factorseffectively guarantee that the House and Senate bills will be different. | The budget reconciliation process is an optional procedure that operates as an adjunct to thebudget resolution process established by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. The chief purposeof the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress's ability to change current law in order to bringrevenue, spending, and debt-limit levels into conformity with the policies of the annual budgetresolution.
Reconciliation is a two-stage process. First, reconciliation directives are included in thebudget resolution, instructing the appropriate committees to develop legislation achieving the desiredbudgetary outcomes. If the budget resolution instructs more than one committee in a chamber, thenthe instructed committees submit their legislative recommendations to their respective BudgetCommittees by the deadline prescribed in the budget resolution; the Budget Committees incorporatethem into an omnibus budget reconciliation bill without making any substantive revisions. In caseswhere only one committee has been instructed, the process allows that committee to report itsreconciliation legislation directly to its parent chamber, thus bypassing the Budget Committee.
The second step involves consideration of the resultant reconciliation legislation by theHouse and Senate under expedited procedures. Among other things, debate in the Senate on anyreconciliation measure is limited to 20 hours (and 10 hours on a conference report) and amendmentsmust be germane and not include extraneous matter. The House Rules Committee typicallyrecommends a special rule for the consideration of a reconciliation measure in the House that placesrestrictions on debate time and the offering of amendments.
As an optional procedure, reconciliation has not been used in every year that thecongressional budget process has been in effect. Beginning with the first use of reconciliation byboth the House and Senate in 1980, however, reconciliation has been used in most years. In threeyears, 1998 (for FY1999), 2002 (for FY2003), and 2004 (for FY2005), the House and Senate did notagree on a budget resolution. Congress has sent the President 19 reconciliation acts over the years;16 were signed into law and three were vetoed (and the vetoes not overriden).
Following an introduction that provides an overview of the reconciliation process anddiscusses its historical development, the report explains the process in sections dealing with theunderlying authorities, reconciliation directives in budget resolutions, initial consideration ofreconciliation measures in the House and Senate, resolving House-Senate differences onreconciliation measures, and presidential approval or disapproval of such measures. The text of tworelevant sections of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Sections 310 and 313) is set forth in theappendices, along with a list of other Congressional Research Service products pertaining toreconciliation procedures.
This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_R45084 | crs_R45084_0 | According to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 2017 was "a historic year of weather and climate disasters" for the United States:
In total, the U.S. was impacted by 16 separate billion-dollar disaster events tying 2011 for the record number of billion-dollar disasters for an entire calendar year....
More notable than the high frequency of these events is the cumulative cost, which exceeds $300 billion in 2017— a new U.S. annual record . 2017 Disaster Supplemental Appropriations
Enacted 2017 Hurricane Season Supplemental Appropriations
Congress has passed three supplemental appropriations bills in response to Administration requests made in September, October, and November 2017 in the wake of these incidents. For details on program operations and funding, see the CRS experts list included at the end of the report. Issues in Disaster Relief Appropriations
The series of supplemental appropriations requested and provided in the wake of 2017's hurricanes and wildfires are the latest exercise of the congressional role of exercising "the power of the purse" to provide relief to state and local governments overwhelmed by disaster response and recovery needs, fund certain relief for individuals and small businesses, and repair damage to federal facilities. Congress also often asks questions about how quickly relief and recovery funding is made available, and how it can ensure that the funding provided is not spent in wasteful or fraudulent endeavors. The BCA defined "disaster relief" as federal government assistance provided pursuant to a major disaster declared under the Stafford Act. | According to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 2017 was "a historic year of weather and climate disasters" for the United States. A combination of deadly hurricanes and wildfires were among the 57 major disasters declared under the Stafford Act in 2017. The series of supplemental appropriations requested and provided in the wake of 2017's hurricanes and wildfires are the latest exercise of one congressional role in disaster situations—to exercise "the power of the purse" to provide relief to state and local governments overwhelmed by disaster response and recovery needs, fund certain relief for individuals and small businesses, and repair damage to federal facilities.
Three supplemental appropriations bills have been enacted in response to Administration requests made in September, October, and November 2017 in the wake of these incidents, providing $120 billion in budget authority and canceling $16 billion in debt held by the National Flood Insurance Fund. This report provides a detailed breakdown of the requested and enacted supplemental funding in each of these measures, and provides a contact listing for CRS experts on the funded relief and recovery programs.
As Congress considers supplemental appropriations in response to disasters and chooses how to proceed, it faces a variety of issues, including the appropriate application of budget discipline when disaster relief is requested from the federal government, the appropriate breadth and promptness of the federal investment, and how to ensure that the funding provided is not spent on wasteful or fraudulent endeavors. This report also briefly explores those issues. |
crs_RL32669 | crs_RL32669_0 | (3)
Estimates of Mexico's Share of Drug Trafficking Activity
According to the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs, Mexico is the principal transit country for South American cocaine enteringthe United States, the leading foreign source of marijuana, and a principal source of heroin. With regard to cocaine, the major drug of concern, the State Department's INCSR reportcovering the year 2003 states that "an estimated 70 percent of the U.S.-bound cocaine shipments passthrough [Mexican] territory." This appears to be a slightly higher estimate than in the past. Mexico's role as a base for drug traffickers and as a center for money-laundering persisted andperhaps increased as well. The result for 2003 was still a 15% reduction from average seizures of 23.40 metric tons inthe previous five years (1998-2002), and it surpassed only two of the previous five years. Seizures of opium declined from 310 kilograms in 2002 to 189 kilograms in 2003, accordingto the State Department, a 39% reduction from the previous year, and a 30% reduction from theaverage of 409 kilograms in the 1998-2002 period. Seizures of heroin declined 41% from 282 kilograms in 2002 to 165 kilograms in 2003, asreported by the State Department, and this result was a 49% decline from the average seizures of 240kilograms in the 1998-2002 period. The Mexican datafor 2004 do not contain information on seizures of methamphetamine. Thenumber of arrests of Mexicans and the number of total arrests were up 10% from 2002 to 2003, butdown 20% from the average in the previous five years. Actions Against Major Traffickers. The report covering 2003 states that "Mexicanauthorities sustained an intensive counternarcotics effort throughout 2003, including the capture ofmajor drug cartel figures. . . ." In line with these reports, the Mexican State of the Nation reportstates that 31,719 people associated with seven drug organizations were arrested from December2000 to June 2004, including 15 cartel leaders, 39 financiers, and 64 lieutenants. Extraditions. Notable efforts to punish drug-related corruption include the arrest in January 2001 of prisonofficials who facilitated the escape of drug lord Joaquin Guzman; the arrest in February 2001 of stateand local police in Mexicali who had blocked official efforts to capture AFO lieutenant GilbertoHiguera Guerrero; the arrest in April 2001 of a brigadier general and two other officers forcomplicity with the Gulf Cartel; the arrests in Tecate in April 2002 of more than 40 high-level lawenforcement officials with ties to AFO traffickers; the arrest in October 2002 of 25 mid-levelofficials on suspicion of disclosing sensitive information to drug traffickers; the implementationthroughout 2002 of policies to force the retirement of all personnel in the Federal Judicial Police;the seizure in January 2003 of 17 offices of the elite federal anti-drug unit known as FEADS anddisbandment following the discovery of evidence that it was being corrupted by drug traffickers; andthe arrest in late January 2004 of a number of Mexican state police officers in the border state ofChihuahua on suspicion of involvement with drug traffickers in the killing of 11 men from rival druggangs. With a potentialharvest of 7,500 hectares, the potential yield of 13,500 metric tons of marijuana in 2003 was up 71%from 2002, and up 76% from the average of 7,460 for the 1998-2002 period. Mexico's Counter-Narcotics Cooperation with the United States
U.S.-Mexico counter-narcotics cooperation increased substantially during the Administrationof President Zedillo (1994-2000), with the full range of law enforcement, military, and border anddrug control agencies being involved. According to the INCSR covering 2002 and 2003, the cooperation between the countries hascontinued along the same trajectory. Despite impressive eradication efforts, the estimatedproduction in Mexico of opium poppy gum and marijuana increased significantly in the last year forwhich reporting is complete. | This report provides information on Mexico's counter-narcotics efforts during the first fouryears of the presidency of Vicente Fox. Special emphasis is placed on calendar year 2003, coveredby the State Department's March 2004 report on international narcotics control, and the first sixmonths of 2004, covered in President Fox's September 2004 "State of the Nation" report. This reportwill be updated when warranted by events.
Share of Traffic. According to the State Department, an estimated 70 percent of theU.S.-bound cocaine shipments pass through Mexican territory, a higher estimate than in past years. Mexico remains a major source country for heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine, and a majorcenter for money laundering activities.
Control Efforts. Seizures of cocaine by Mexico in 2003 were up 59% from 2002, but theywere down 15% from the average yearly seizures in the previous five years (1998-2002), accordingto the State Department's latest report. Seizures of marijuana were up 24% from 2002, as well, andup 33% from the average in the previous five years. Seizures of methamphetamine and drug labsincreased significantly in 2003 as compared to 2002 and as compared to the 1998-2002 average. Onthe other hand, seizures of opium in 2003 were down 39% from 2002, and down 30% from theaverage of the 1998-2002 period. Seizures of heroin were down 41% in 2003 compared to 2002, andwere down 49% from the previous five years. Arrests were up in all categories in 2003, and therewere major actions against leading drug lords. The Mexican State of the Nation report states that31,719 people associated with seven drug organizations were arrested from December 2000 to June2004, including 15 cartel leaders, 39 financiers, and 64 lieutenants. Mexico extradited 31 personsto the United States in 2003, including 18 Mexican nationals on drug-related charges. Eradication of opium and marijuana increased in 2003, but with more hectares of cultivation, the potential yieldof opium was up 74% over 2002 and up 45% from the previous five years, while the potential yieldof marijuana was up 71% from 2002 and up 76% from the 1998-2002 average.
Cooperative Efforts. President Bush and President Fox have met many times and havemade the bilateral relationship a top priority, although disagreements over Iraq created some tension. In these meetings, the presidents agreed to enhance law enforcement and counter-narcoticscooperation between the two countries, and this cooperation was facilitated by the modification ofthe U.S. drug certification process. Top officials say that the countries have achieved unprecedentedlevels of cooperation, including the sharing of sensitive intelligence and expanded training forMexican anti-drug forces. In the post 9/11/01 period, the countries have expanded cooperation intooverlapping counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism programs. |
crs_RS21978 | crs_RS21978_0 | That appears to be changing in states where animal activists have sponsored successful ballot measures to impose care standards on animal producers. In Congress
Members of Congress have offered various proposals to require changes in the treatment of animals on the farm, during transport, or at slaughter. Members of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees, which generally have jurisdiction over such bills, have held hearings on various farm animal welfare issues, but they have generally expressed a preference for voluntary rather than regulatory approaches to improving animal care. 1726 was introduced in the 111 th Congress. The measure, introduced on December 16, 2009, was referred to the House Agriculture Committee where no further action on the bill was taken. | Animal welfare supporters in the United States have long sought legislation to modify or curtail some practices considered by U.S. agriculture to be acceptable or even necessary to animal health. Members of Congress over the years have offered various bills that would affect animal care on the farm, during transport, or at slaughter; several proposals were introduced in the 111th Congress, although no further action was taken on the bills. No bills have been introduced in the 112th Congress. Members of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees generally have expressed a preference for voluntary rather than regulatory approaches to humane care. Meanwhile, animal welfare supporters have won initiatives in several states to impose some care requirements on animal producers. |
crs_R40691 | crs_R40691_0 | If, however, the President determines that it is essential to limit access to a covert action finding in order to "meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States," then rather than providing advanced notification to the full congressional intelligence committees, as is generally required, the President may limit such notification to the "Gang of Eight," and any other congressional leaders he may choose to inform. The statute defines the "Gang of Eight" as being comprised of the chairmen and ranking Members of the two congressional intelligence committees and the House and Senate majority and minority leadership. First, the President is required to provide a statement setting out the reasons for limiting notification to the Gang of Eight, rather than the full intelligence committees. In report language accompanying the 1980 enactment, Congress established its intent to preserve the secrecy necessary for very sensitive covert actions, while providing the President with a process for consulting in advance with congressional leaders, including the intelligence committee chairmen and ranking minority Members, "who have special expertise and responsibility in intelligence matters." In 1991, following the Iran-Contra Affair, Intelligence Conference Committee Conferees more specifically stated that Gang of Eight notifications should be used only when "the President is faced with a covert action of such extraordinary sensitivity or risk to life that knowledge of the covert action should be restricted to as few individuals as possible." Changes to Gang of Eight Provisions
Congress approved several changes to the Gang of Eight notification procedures as part of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act ( P.L. 111-259 ). The unclassified version of the FY2011 Intelligence Authorization Act ( P.L. 112-72 ), enacted June 8, 2011, contained no further changes to the Gang of Eight notification procedure. Congress Signaled Its Intent That the Gang of Eight Would Decide When To Inform the Intelligence Committees
During the Senate's 1980 debate of the Gang of Eight provision, congressional sponsors said their intent was that the Gang of Eight would reserve the right to determine the appropriate time to inform the full intelligence committees of the covert action of which they had been notified. With regard to Section 501(c), Senate report language stated:
The authority for procedures established by the Select Committees is based on the current practices of the committees in establishing their own rules. Such sentiments appear to have contributed to the subsequent decision by Congress to permit the executive branch to notify the Gang of Eight in such cases. Impact on Congressional Intelligence Oversight
The impact of Gang of Eight notifications on the effectiveness of congressional intelligence oversight continues to be debated. Doing so in cases involving particularly sensitive covert actions presents a special challenge. Success turns on a number of factors, not the least of which is the degree of comity and trust that defines the relationship between the legislative and executive branches. | Legislation enacted in 1980 gave the executive branch authority to limit advance notification of especially sensitive covert actions to eight Members of Congress—the "Gang of Eight"—when the President determines that it is essential to limit prior notice in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting U.S. vital interests. In such cases, the executive branch is permitted by statute to limit notification to the chairmen and ranking minority Members of the two congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, rather than to notify the full intelligence committees, as is required in cases involving covert actions determined to be less sensitive.
Congress, in approving this new procedure in 1980, during the Iran hostage crisis, said it intended to preserve operational secrecy in those "rare" cases involving especially sensitive covert actions while providing the President with advance consultation with the leaders in Congress and the leadership of the intelligence committees who have special expertise and responsibility in intelligence matters. The intent appeared to some to be to provide the President, on a short-term basis, a greater degree of operational security as long as sensitive operations were underway. In 1991, in a further elaboration of congressional intent following the Iran-Contra Affair, congressional report language stated that limiting notification to the Gang of Eight should occur only in situations involving covert actions of such extraordinary sensitivity or risk to life that knowledge of such activity should be restricted to as few individuals as possible.
In its mark-up of H.R. 2701, the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) replaced the Gang of Eight statutory provision, adopting in its place a statutory requirement that each of the intelligence committees establish written procedures as may be necessary to govern such notifications. According to committee report language, the adopted provision vests the authority to limit such briefings with the committees, rather than the President.
On July 8, 2009, the executive branch issued a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) in which it stated that it strongly objected to the House Committee's action to replace the Gang of Eight statutory provision, and that the President's senior advisors would recommend that the President veto the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act if the committee's language was retained in the final bill.
The Senate Intelligence Committee, in its version of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, left unchanged the Gang of Eight statutory structure, but approved several changes that would tighten certain aspects of current covert action reporting requirements.
Ultimately, the House accepted the Senate's proposals, which the President signed into law as part of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 111-259).
Both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees did not make any further changes to the Gang of Eight notification procedure when both committees approved respective versions of the 2011 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 112-72) enacted on June 8, 2011.
This report describes the statutory provision authorizing Gang of Eight notifications, reviews the legislative history of the provision, and examines the impact of such notifications on congressional oversight.
Contents |
crs_RL33274 | crs_RL33274_0 | The U.S. Balance of Payments
Table 2 presents a summary of the major accounts in the U.S. balance of payments over the four quarters of 2015 and the first two quarters of 2016. The current account balance represents the broadest measure of U.S. trade in goods, services, and certain income flows. The balance worsened by 16% from 2014 to 2015. Indeed, economists generally argue that it is this interplay between the demand for and the supply of credit in the economy, rather than the flow of manufactured goods and services, that drives the broad inflows and outflows of capital and serves as the major factor in determining the international exchange value of the dollar and, therefore, the overall size of the nation's trade deficit or surplus. Despite the drop in the average annual price of imported crude oil and the decline in the role of imported crude oil in the value of the U.S. trade deficit in 2014 to 2016, the U.S. merchandise deficit increased in 2015 over that recorded in 2014. The balance on the financial account (the difference between the net U.S. acquisition of foreign financial assets and the net foreign acquisition of U.S. financial assets) in 2015 fell from that recorded in 2014 due to an increase in U.S. net purchases of assets abroad and a drop in foreign net purchases of assets in the United States. The relative decline in foreign acquisitions of U.S. assets in 2015 below those recorded in 2014 reflects a 180% drop in foreign official purchases of U.S. portfolio assets, including a decline of 200% in official purchases of U.S. Treasury securities. Foreign private purchases of U.S. portfolio assets declined by 40%, reflecting a decline by 33% in foreign private purchases of U.S. treasury securities and an increase year-over-year of 75% in private purchases of corporate bonds. During the same period, U.S. purchases of foreign equities and debt securities fell by 75%, year-over-year. U.S. direct investment abroad rose slightly in 2015 to reach $348.6 billion, and foreign direct investment in the United States rose by 83% to reach $379 billion. Net private inflows by U.S. citizens resumed in the 2012 to 2014 period. According to the Department of the Treasury, the drop in net foreign purchases of U.S. securities reflects adjustments by private investors in their portfolios by reducing their holdings of U.S. corporate stocks and U.S. Treasury securities and increasing their net purchases of corporate bonds and the bonds of U.S. government agencies other than Treasury securities. Some observers have equated the trade deficit and the associated accumulation of foreign-owned dollar-denominated assets as a debt that the U.S. economy owes to foreigners that will have to be repaid. Depending on the tax convention the United States has with other governments, private foreign investors who own U.S. Treasury securities will owe taxes on the interest income. Some observers refer to the net of this investment position (or the difference between the value of U.S.-owned assets abroad and the value of foreign-owned assets in the United States) as a debt, or indicate that the United States is a net debtor nation, because the value of foreign-owned assets in the United States is greater than the value of U.S.-owned assets abroad. Another concern is with the outflow of profits that arise from the dollar-denominated assets owned by foreign investors. | The U.S. merchandise trade deficit is a part of the overall U.S. balance of payments, a summary statement of all economic transactions between the residents of the United States and the rest of the world, during a given period of time. Some Members of Congress and other observers have grown concerned over the magnitude of the U.S. merchandise trade deficit and the associated increase in U.S. dollar-denominated assets owned by foreigners. International trade recovered from the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the subsequent slowdown in global economic activity that reduced global trade flows and, consequently, reduced the size of the U.S. trade deficit. Now, however, U.S. exporters face new challenges with an increase in the international exchange value of the dollar relative to other key currencies and the slow rate of economic growth in important export markets in Europe and Asia. This report provides an overview of the U.S. balance of payments, an explanation of the broader role of capital flows in the U.S. economy, an explanation of how the country finances its trade deficit or a trade surplus, and the implications for Congress and the country of the large inflows of capital from abroad. The major observations indicate the following.
The current account balance, the broadest measure of U.S. trade in goods, services, and certain income flows, worsened by 18% in 2015 from that recorded in 2014. Foreign-owned assets in the United States continued to outpace U.S. ownership of foreign assets, reflecting the deficit in the current account, but the net amount, or the difference between U.S.-acquisition of foreign assets and foreign acquisition of U.S. assets, dropped by about one-third in 2015 compared with 2014 and down by over half since 2012. The relative decline in foreign acquisitions of U.S. assets in 2015 reflected a drop in the net private purchases of U.S. corporate stocks and a decline by one-third in net private purchases of U.S. treasury securities. In addition, foreign official purchases of U.S. portfolio purchases shifted from positive net purchases in 2014 to negative net purchases in 2015, including a 38% decline in purchases of corporate stocks and a 58% decline in official purchases of U.S. Treasury securities. Foreign private net purchases of U.S. Treasury securities in 2015 fell by one-third from those in 2014, but foreign private purchases of U.S. equities increased by 20% in 2015 compared with 2014. At the same time, foreign direct investment increased by 83% in 2015 compared with 2014, rising from $207 billion in 2014 to $379 billion in 2015; U.S. direct investment abroad in 2015 rose slightly above the amount invested in 2014, although U.S. net purchases of foreign equities and debt securities in 2015 fell by 75%, compared with net purchases in 2014. The inflow of capital from abroad supplements domestic sources of capital and likely allows the United States to maintain its current level of economic activity at interest rates that are below the level they likely would be without the capital inflows. Foreign official and private acquisitions of dollar-denominated assets likely will generate a stream of returns to overseas investors that would have stayed in the U.S. economy and supplemented other domestic sources of capital had the assets not been acquired by foreign investors. In general terms, foreign private holders of U.S. Treasury securities are taxed on their interest income, depending on U.S. tax conventions with other countries. |
crs_R42779 | crs_R42779_0 | Introduction
Changing economic, social, and political conditions at home and abroad have led some analysts to question whether the United States will remain globally competitive in the coming decades. The 2007 America COMPETES Act ( P.L. Designed to "invest in innovation through research and development, and to improve the competitiveness of the United States," the law authorized $32.7 billion in appropriations between FY2008 and FY2010 for programs and activities in physical sciences and engineering research and in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education. 110-69 —including funding for physical sciences and engineering research and STEM education—when it passed the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-358 ). The 2010 COMPETES Act authorized $45.5 billion in appropriations between FY2011 and FY2013. Given the pivotal role that funding levels played in the design, implementation, and congressional debate about the COMPETES Acts, policymakers have paid close attention to trends in these accounts. This report, which was written to aid Congress in tracking these trends, includes two tables summarizing authorization levels and funding for selected COMPETES-related accounts across both authorization periods (i.e., FY2008 to FY2010 and FY2011 to FY2013). | Changing economic, social, and political conditions at home and abroad have led some analysts to question whether the United States will remain globally competitive in the coming decades. In response to these and closely related concerns, Congress enacted the 2007 America COMPETES Act (P.L. 110-69), as well as its successor, the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-358). These acts were broadly designed to invest in innovation through research and development and to improve U.S. competitiveness. More specifically, the acts authorized increased funding for certain physical science and engineering research accounts and STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) education activities.
Congressional debate about the COMPETES Acts focuses closely on authorized and appropriated funding levels. To aid this debate, this CRS report tracks accounts and activities authorized by the 2007 and 2010 COMPETES Acts during each act's authorization period. It includes only those accounts and activities for which the acts provide a defined (i.e., specific) appropriations authorization. Table 1 includes FY2008 to FY2010 authorizations and final funding for accounts in the 2007 COMPETES Act; Table 2 includes FY2011 to FY2013 authorizations and final funding for accounts in the 2010 COMPETES Act. |
crs_R45153 | crs_R45153_0 | As Chief Justice John Marshall stated in Marbury v. Madison : "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Judges subscribing to these theories may employ different interpretive tools to discover Congress's meaning, looking to the ordinary meaning of the disputed statutory text, its statutory context, any applicable interpretive canons, the legislative history of the provision, and evidence about how the statute has been or may be implemented. To help provide Congress with a general understanding of how courts interpret statutory languge, this report begins by discussing the general goals of statutory interpretation, reviewing a variety of contemporary and historical approaches. The report then describes the two primary theories of interpretation employed today, before examining the main types of tools that courts use to determine statutory meaning. The report concludes by exploring developing issues in statutory interpretation. . . public policy" to the specific circumstances before the court. The predominant view of a judge's proper role in statutory interpretation is one of "legislative supremacy." Major Theories of Statutory Interpretation
The two predominant theories of statutory interpretation today are purposivism and textualism. Consequently, a judge's interpretive theory might influence which tools she uses. Ordinary Meaning
Courts often begin by looking for the "ordinary" or "plain" meaning of the statutory text. To gather evidence of statutory meaning, a judge may turn to the rest of the provision, to the act as a whole, or to similar provisions elsewhere in the law. To the extent that the substantive canons suggest that a judge should read a statute in a way that is not immediately evident from the statute's text or purpose, both textualists and purposivists may be wary of employing these canons. By contrast, many textualists argue that legislative history should be used sparingly. But, based on the statutory context and the "broader structure of the Act," the Court concluded that a strict textualist approach to interpreting the statute was not the best reading of the statute. | In the tripartite structure of the U.S. federal government, it is the job of courts to say what the law is, as Chief Justice John Marshall announced in 1803. When courts render decisions on the meaning of statutes, the prevailing view is that a judge's task is not to make the law, but rather to interpret the law made by Congress. The two main theories of statutory interpretation—purposivism and textualism—disagree about how judges can best adhere to this ideal of legislative supremacy. The problem is especially acute in instances where it is unlikely that Congress anticipated and legislated for the specific circumstances being disputed before the court. While purposivists argue that courts should prioritize interpretations that advance the statute's purpose, textualists maintain that a judge's focus should be confined primarily to the statute's text.
Regardless of their interpretive theory, judges use many of the same tools to gather evidence of statutory meaning. First, judges often begin by looking to the ordinary meaning of the statutory text. Second, courts interpret specific provisions by looking to the broader statutory context. Third, judges may turn to the canons of construction, which are presumptions about how courts ordinarily read statutes. Fourth, courts may look to the legislative history of a provision. Finally, a judge might consider how a statute has been—or will be—implemented. Although both purposivists and textualists may use any of these tools, a judge's theory of statutory interpretation may influence the order in which these tools are applied and how much weight is given to each tool.
This report begins by discussing the general goals of statutory interpretation, reviewing a variety of contemporary as well as historical approaches. The report then briefly describes the two primary theories of interpretation employed today, before examining the main types of tools that courts use to determine statutory meaning. The report concludes by exploring developing issues in statutory interpretation. |
crs_RL31991 | crs_RL31991_0 | Introduction and Background
Legislation is pending in both the House of Representatives and the Senate to provide variouspersonnel flexibilities to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). (5)
H.R. (8)
In the Senate, Senator George Voinovich introduced S. 610 , the NASA Workforce Flexibility Act of 2003, on March 13, 2003, and it was referred to the Senate Committee onGovernmental Affairs. On April 29, 2003, Representative Tom Davis introduced H.R. 1836 , the Civil Service and National Security Personnel Improvement Act, and it was referred to the HouseCommittees on Armed Services, Government Reform, Science, and Ways and Means. (14) Title III,Subtitle B of the bill includes provisions on personnel flexibilities for NASA which are similar tothose in S. 610 , as introduced. H.R. (16)
This report compares H.R. 1085 , (17) as reported to the House, and S. 610 , as passed by the Senate, with current law. Both bills would create a new Chapter 98 in Title5 (Government Organization and Management) of the United States Code to provide enhancedflexibilities for human resources management at NASA. 1085 and S. 610 would, among other provisions, provide more remunerative amounts of, and greater flexibility in administering, recruitment, relocation, andretention bonuses; permit term appointments up to six years; and authorize pay up to the VicePresident's salary (currently, $201,600 in January 2004 until enactment of the omnibusappropriations bill, then expected to be $203,000) for critically needed scientific, technical,professional, or administrative personnel. Unlike S. 610, H.R. 1085 would allowa personnel management demonstration project at NASA to cover up to 8,000 employees, rather thanthe up to 5,000 employees permitted under current law. Both bills ( H.R. 1085 , Section 9814; S. 610 , Section 9813) also would allow the Administrator of NASA to place limited term and limited emergency appointees incareer-reserved positions in the Senior Executive Service (SES). | Various personnel flexibilities would be provided to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) under legislation currently pending in both the House of Representativesand the Senate. H.R. 1085 , the NASA Flexibility Act of 2003, was introduced byRepresentative Sherwood Boehlert on March 5, 2003. S. 610 , the NASA FlexibilityAct of 2003, was introduced by Senator George Voinovich on March 13, 2003. H.R. 1836 , the Civil Service and National Security Personnel Improvement Act, introduced byRepresentative Tom Davis on April 29, 2003, includes, in Title III, Subtitle B, provisions similar tothose in S. 610, as introduced.
This report compares H.R. 1085 , as reported to the House, and S. 610 , as passed by the Senate, with current law. (See CRS Report RL31924 for H.R. 1836 .)Both bills would provide enhanced flexibilities for human resources management at NASA bycreating a new Chapter 98 on NASA in Title 5 of the United States Code .
H.R. 1085 and S. 610 , among other provisions, would provide more remunerative amounts of, and greater flexibility in administering, recruitment, relocation, andretention bonuses; permit term appointments of up to six years; and authorize pay up to the VicePresident's salary for critically needed scientific, technical, professional, or administrative personnel. Both bills also would allow the Administrator of NASA to place limited term and limited emergencyappointees in career-reserved positions in the Senior Executive Service. Career-reserved positionsare required by statute to be filled by career appointees. Unlike, S. 610, H.R.1085 would allow a personnel management demonstration project at NASA to cover upto 8,000 employees, rather than the up to 5,000 employees permitted under current law.
This report will be updated as legislative actions occur. |
crs_RL32142 | crs_RL32142_0 | Introduction
A succinct provision in an 1866 statute known as "R.S. (1)
This provision was repealed in 1976 by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act(FLPMA), an act that also protected valid rights of way established by that time. What definitions,criteria, and law should be applied to confirm or validate the existence of these pre-1976 R.S. The issues are important to states andcommunities whose highway systems are affected. Also, the rights of way may run either throughundeveloped federal lands that might otherwise qualify for wilderness designation or across landsthat are now private or within federal reserves (such as parks or national forests) created after thehighways might have been established. The issuance of a disclaimer can help remove a cloud fromland title because it has the same effect as though the United States had conveyed any interest it has. 2477 rights of way and therefore do not violate § 108 of P.L. 2477rights of way will be validated and by applying what criteria are controversial issues. Neither the Utah MOU nor the supplemental BLM guidance for implementing it sets out thecriteria that will be used by the United States to determine the validity of asserted R.S. 2477 claims. 2477 grants. The relationship of the amended disclaimer regulations to thatstatute and to the prohibition against rules that "pertain to" R.S. Finally, H.R.1639 and other actions in the current Congress also are discussed. This report will beupdated as circumstances warrant; see CRS Report for Congress RS21402: Federal Lands,"Disclaimers of Interest," and R.S. Section 315 Disclaimers
Section 315 and Regulations
Section 315 of FLPMA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to use disclaimers in certaincircumstances, and reads in part:
After consulting with any affected Federalagency, the Secretary is authorized to issue a document of disclaimer of interest or interests in anylands in any form suitable for recordation, where the disclaimer will help remove a cloud on the titleof such lands and where he determines (1) a record interest of the United States in lands hasterminated by operation of law or is otherwise invalid; or .... (23)
When a party formally disclaims an interest in real property, the result is to help clear titleto the property interest that is the subject of the disclaimer. Unchanged regulations also statethat the purpose of the procedure is to eliminate the necessity for court action or private legislationin certain circumstances, including when there is a cloud on the title to the lands that is attributableto the United States :
The purpose of a disclaimer is to eliminate the necessityfor court action or private legislation in those instances where the United States asserts no ownershipor record interest, based upon a determination by the Secretary of the Interior that there is a cloudon the title to the lands, attributable to the United States, and that: (1) A record interest of the United States in lands has terminated by operation of lawor is otherwise invalid; or ... [additional language reflecting the § 315 language ondisclaimers involving submerged lands]. See H.R. (72) It is not clear whether the 1997 R.S. 104-208 is still in effect, whether the new changes to the disclaimer regulations "pertain to"recognition and validity of R.S. 2477 rights of way has recently been clarified by the execution of a Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MOU) on April 9, 2003, between the Secretary of the Interior and the state of Utahto establish an "acknowledgment process" for recognizing some R.S. 2477 grant was for the"construction of highways across public lands not reserved." 2477, Congress can be said to have been awareof R.S. 2477 claims. 2477 right of way is that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travelfor the uses made of the right of way at the time of repeal of R.S. The House approved an amendment to FY2004 Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations( H.R. | A succinct provision in an 1866 statute known as "R.S. 2477" granted rights of wayacross unreserved federal lands for "the construction of highways." The provision was repealed in1976 by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), an act that also protected validrights of way already established by that time. What definitions, criteria, and law should be appliedto confirm or validate these R.S. 2477 rights of way has been controversial. The issuesare important to states and communities whose highway systems are affected. The issues are alsoimportant because the rights of way may run either through undeveloped federal lands that mightotherwise qualify for wilderness designation or across lands that are now private or within federalreserves (such as parks or national forests) created after the highways might have been established.
Section 315 of FLPMA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to issue a "disclaimer ofinterest" if an interest or interests of the United States in lands has "terminated by operation of lawor is otherwise invalid." A disclaimer is a recordable document that can help remove a cloud fromland title because it has the same effect as if the United States had conveyed the interest in question. The Department of the Interior has finalized amendments to existing regulations on disclaimers ofinterest that allow states, state political subdivisions, and others to apply for disclaimers thatpreviously were time-barred. A recent Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Utah andthe Department of the Interior establishes an "acknowledgment process" whereby R.S.2477 rights of way on certain federal lands can be validated and a disclaimer to themissued by the United States. Several other states have requested negotiations to develop MOUsregarding R.S. 2477 rights of way.
The disclaimer regulation changes are controversial for many reasons; one of which is thatCongress in § 108 of P.L. 104-208 prohibited regulations "pertaining to" R.S. 2477 frombecoming effective without Congressional approval. The use of disclaimers to acknowledge R.S.2477 rights of way is also controversial because the criteria that will be used to determinethe validity of asserted R.S. 2477 claims are not set out, and without clearly stated criteriaand standards, it is not clear whether the terms of § 315 have been met -- whether a disclaimableinterest of the United States has terminated or not. Most agree that a resolution of R.S.2477 validity issues is desirable, but there is disagreement on standards and on whetherand how the Congress and the courts should be involved. H.R. 1639 in the 108thCongress would authorize a process for determining the validity of R.S. 2477 claims anddefine crucial terms for those determinations. A House-passed amendment to FY2004 Interior andRelated Agencies Appropriations ( H.R. 2691 ) would have prohibited implementationof the disclaimer regulation amendments in certain federal conservation areas, but was removed inconference. This report reviews the disclaimer provision of § 315 of FLPMA, the Utah MOU, theR.S. 2477 grant to construct highways and interpretation of it, the relationship of the newdisclaimer regulations to that statute and to the statutory prohibition against rules that "pertain to"R.S. 2477, and H.R. 1639. It will be updated as events warrant; see CRS Report RS21402 for information on recent events. |
crs_RL32811 | crs_RL32811_0 | On May 25, 2005, theHouse Committee on Resources and the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the HouseCommittee on International Relations held a joint hearing on the Changed Circumstances Petition . On July 19, 2005, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources held an oversight hearingon the effects of the U.S. nuclear testing program on the Marshall Islands. (5) Thereport concludes that "the Marshall Islands' request does not qualify as 'changed circumstances'within the meaning of Article IX of the nuclear claims settlement agreement enacted under Title II,Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association Act of 1985." The report also disputes some keyscientific claims of the Petition regarding the geographical extent of radioactive fallout, radiationdose estimates, and the applicability of U.S. standards to conditions in the RMI. Consequently,according to the Bush Administration, there is no legal basis for considering additional payments. This report analyzes and discusses several issues related to key personal injury, health care,and property damages claims in the Petition. The RMI argues that a morerecent U.S. radiation protection standard warrants further cleanup in the Marshall Islands. In September 2000, the Marshall Islands government submitted to the United States Congressa nuclear claims petition ( Changed Circumstances Petition) requesting, over a 50-year period,approximately $3.3 billion for personal injuries, property damages, medical care and training, andradiological monitoring pursuant to the Compact of Free Association. U.S. 99-239 (the Compact of Free Association Act),and 108-188 (The Compact of Free Association Amendments Act). However, Article IX of the 177Agreement (the Changed Circumstances Clause ) provided for possible additional compensation, ifloss or damages to persons or property arose or were discovered that could not reasonably have beenidentified as of the effective date of the agreement (1986) and if such injuries rendered the provisionsof the Compact "manifestly inadequate." These include expected radiation-related illnesses in the Marshall Islands; themethodology for determining the value of "lost use" of damaged properties; the appropriate standardof risk (annual dose limit) for determining cleanup levels; and the extent of radioactive fallout. Finally, this report discusses possible legal options for the RMI in pursuing nuclear damages claims. List of Major Legislation Authorizing orAppropriating Compensation for Nuclear Testing, 1964-2004 (115)
Sources : Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of theRepublic of the Marshall Islands for Implementation of Section 177 of the Compact of FreeAssociation , Appendix A; U.S. Department of State, Report Evaluating the Request of theGovernment of the Republic of the Marshall Islands Presented to the Congress of the United Statesof America , November 2004, Appendix B; Nuclear Testing in the Marshall Islands: A Chronologyof Events http://www.rmiembassyus.org/Nuclear%20Issues.htm#Chronology . | In September 2000, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) government submitted to theUnited States Congress a Changed Circumstances Petition related to U.S. nuclear testing on theMarshall Islands atolls of Bikini and Enewetak during the 1940s and 1950s. The Petition requestsadditional compensation for personal injuries and property damages and restoration costs, medicalcare programs, health services infrastructure and training, and radiological monitoring. Accordingto various estimates, between 1954 and 2004, the United States spent over $500 million on nucleartest compensation and related assistance in the Marshall Islands.
The Petition bases its claims for compensation upon "changed circumstances" pursuant toSection 177 of the Compact of Free Association. The Compact of Free Association, enacted in 1986,governs the economic and strategic relationships between the United States and the RMI. TheSection 177 Agreement granted $150 million as part of a "full and final settlement" of legal claimsagainst the U.S. government, and provided for possible additional compensation, if loss or damagesto persons or property arose or were discovered that could not reasonably have been identified as ofthe effective date of the agreement, and if such injuries rendered the provisions of the Compact"manifestly inadequate." The Petition argues that "new and additional" information since theenactment of the Compact -- such as a wider extent of radioactive fallout than previously known ordisclosed and more recent radiation protection standards -- constitute "changed circumstances."
In November 2004, the U.S. Department of State released a report evaluating the legal andscientific basis of the Petition. The report concludes that "the Marshall Islands' request does notqualify as 'changed circumstances' within the meaning of Article IX of the nuclear claims settlementagreement enacted under Title II, Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association Act of 1986."Consequently, according to the Administration, there is no legal basis for considering additionalpayments. On May 25, 2005, the House Committee on Resources and the Subcommittee on Asiaand the Pacific of the House Committee on International Relations held a joint hearing on thePetition. On July 19, 2005, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources held anoversight hearing on the effects of the U.S. nuclear testing program on the Marshall Islands.
This report summarizes U.S. nuclear testing on the Marshall Islands, U.S. compensationefforts to date, relevant provisions in the Compact of Free Association, and the ChangedCircumstances Petition . It analyzes several issues related to the personal injury, health care, andproperty damages claims in the Petition. These issues include estimated occurrences ofradiation-related illnesses in the Marshall Islands; the methodology for determining the value of "lostuse" of damaged properties; the appropriate standard of risk (annual dose limit) for determiningcleanup levels; and the extent of radioactive fallout. This report also discusses possible legal optionsfor the RMI in pursuing nuclear test damages claims and identifies policy options for the 109thCongress. |
crs_RL34190 | crs_RL34190_0 | The federal government provides funding, guidance and technical assistance to state and local planners, and can require that certain activities be carried out as a condition of funding. Because the states are the seat of most authority for public health and medical preparedness, national preparedness for public health threats depends, in part, on the preparedness of individual states. Certain planning activities were required as a condition of the federal funds. It also presents an approach to the analysis of state pandemic plans, and the findings of that analysis. CRS analyzed pandemic plans available as of July 2006. This analysis is not intended to grade or rank individual state pandemic plans or capabilities. Rather, its findings indicate that a number of challenges remain in assuring pandemic preparedness, and suggest areas that may merit added emphasis in future planning efforts. This report will not be updated. A total of 66 variables were developed for analysis, to assess pandemic planning activities in the following eight topical areas:
(1) Leadership and Coordination;
(2) Surveillance and Laboratory Activities;
(3) Vaccine Management;
(4) Antiviral Drug Management;
(5) Other Disease Control Activities (e.g., isolation and quarantine);
(6) Communications Activities;
(7) Healthcare Services; and
(8) Other Essential Services (e.g., public utilities). This analysis is not intended to grade or rank individual state pandemic plans or capabilities. A discussion of these grants, and associated federal requirements for pandemic planning, is provided in the Appendix . In addition, Congress has continued to refine the delegations of authority among key federal response agencies. States were required to conduct public health emergency response exercises, and to develop pandemic plans, as conditions of their FY2005 CDC public health grants, but they were not required, at that time, to conduct exercises specifically for a flu pandemic. However, many of the plans pre-date 2006, when CDC reported that public health labs in all 50 states and the District of Columbia have the capability to test for H5N1 influenza. The state pandemic flu plans analyzed here reflected their authorship by public health officials. These elements may require stronger engagement by emergency management officials and others in planning. Some flexibility in those requirements is helpful in allowing states to prepare differently for those threats—such as hurricanes, earthquakes and wildfires—that are likely to affect states differently. A pandemic, on the other hand, is more likely to affect states in similar ways that are, to some extent, predictable. But the matter of what the states should do to be prepared for a pandemic is not always clear. For example, uncertainties about the ways in which flu spreads, the lack of national consensus in matters of equity in rationing, and a long tradition of federal deference to states in matters of public health, all complicate efforts to set uniform planning requirements for states. | States are the seat of most authority for public health emergency response. Much of the actual work of response falls to local officials. However, the federal government can impose requirements upon states as a condition of federal funding. Since 2002, Congress has provided funding to all U.S. states, territories, and the District of Columbia, to enhance federal, state and local preparedness for public health threats in general, and an influenza ("flu") pandemic in particular. States were required to develop pandemic plans as a condition of this funding.
This report, which will not be updated, describes an approach to the analysis of state pandemic plans, and presents the findings of that analysis. State plans that were available in July 2006 were analyzed in eight topical areas: (1) leadership and coordination; (2) surveillance and laboratory activities; (3) vaccine management; (4) antiviral drug management; (5) other disease control activities; (6) communications; (7) healthcare services; and (8) other essential services. A history of federal funding and requirements for state pandemic planning is provided in an Appendix. This analysis is not intended to grade or rank individual state pandemic plans or capabilities. Rather, its findings indicate that a number of challenges remain in assuring pandemic preparedness, and suggest areas that may merit added emphasis in future planning efforts.
Generally, the plans analyzed here reflect their authorship by public health officials. They emphasize core public health functions such as disease detection and control. Other planning challenges, such as assuring surge capacity in the healthcare sector, the continuity of essential services, or the integrity of critical supply chains, may fall outside the authority of public health officials, and may require stronger engagement by emergency management officials and others in planning.
Since different threats—such as hurricanes, earthquakes or terrorism—are expected to affect states differently, many believe that states should have flexibility in emergency planning. This complicates federal oversight of homeland security grants to states, however. Which requirements should be imposed on all states? When is variability among states desirable, and when is it not? A flu pandemic is perhaps unique in that it would be likely to affect all states at nearly the same time, in ways that are fairly predictable. This may argue for a more directive federal role in setting pandemic preparedness requirements. But the matter of what the states should do to be prepared for a pandemic is not always clear. For example, uncertainties about the ways in which flu spreads, the lack of national consensus in matters of equity in rationing, and a long tradition of federal deference to states in matters of public health, all complicate efforts to set uniform planning requirements for states.
In addition to assuring the strength of planning efforts, readiness also depends on assuring that states can execute their plans. This assurance can be provided through analysis of the response during exercises, drills, and relevant real-world incidents. Such an analysis is not within the scope of this report. |
crs_R40648 | crs_R40648_0 | Introduction
Several tax options have been proposed to provide financing for health care reform. President Obama initially proposed restricting itemized deductions for high-income taxpayers, along with some narrower provisions for other reforms or to reduce the tax gap. The House Ways and Means Committee has proposed financing the reform largely through a surtax on high-income individuals, which was passed by the House on November 14, 2009 ( H.R. The Senate Finance Committee reported S. 1796 relying in part on an excise tax on insurers for high-cost plans; the bill passed by the Senate on December 24, 2009, H.R. 3590 , largely reflects the revenue-raising provisions in that plan. 3590 as a starting point, but offers several changes to the revenue provisions of this bill. The President's proposal would delay the effective date for the tax on high-cost employer plans proposed in H.R. 3590 from 2013 to 2018 and raise the exemption threshold for this tax to $27,500 for families and $10,200 for individuals. In addition, the new plan offered by the Administration would broaden H.R. 3590 's proposed increase of the Medicare Hospital Insurance (HI) tax for high-income households by adding a tax on unearned income at a 3.8% rate. The President is signed H.R. 3590 ( P.L. 111-148 ) on March 23; H.R. 4872 was approved by the House and Senate on March 25 and signed by the President ( P.L. 111-152 ) on March 30. The tax proposals differ in their effects on behavior and where the burden falls in the income distribution. Note that the distributional analysis in this report refers only to the financing mechanism and not to the distributional effects of the entire health care reform proposals, as the health care benefits are likely to favor lower-income families. Thus even with a regressive revenue source, the overall proposal might redistribute in favor of lower-income individuals. More recently, most of the provisions of H.R. Some health related provisions are implemented earlier in the Senate bill. 3962 includes an additional provision to require information reporting by firms on payments to corporations. 3590 also reduced the fee on medical devices and introduced additional provisions—one of them, an increase in the payroll tax for hospital insurance (HI) for high-income earnings, was the second-largest revenue raiser, while the others (a 10% excise tax on indoor tanning facilities and a change in the treatment of Blue Cross) raised smaller amounts of revenue. The plan has a number of provisions that are in the House bill: to conform the definition of medical expenses for health savings accounts and similar accounts to those for itemized deductions for health care ($5 billion); limit health flexible spending arrangements in cafeteria plans to $2,500, but indexed to inflation ($14.6 billion); increase the penalty for nonqualified distributions from health savings accounts to 20% ($1.3 billion); and disallow the deduction for subsidies related to Medicare Part D ($5.4 billion). As is the case with the surtax, this provision would raise revenue from high-income taxpayers and be very progressive, although it would not fall on capital income, which is more important at higher income levels. The fee on branded drugs is $2.1 billion per year. 4872, the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 2010
On February 22, 2010, the Obama Administration released a new compromise proposal, which uses H.R. In particular, this new proposal adopts the tax on high-cost health insurance plans included in the Senate-passed H.R. The President's compromise proposal also includes two revenue provisions contained in the House-passed H.R. On March 22, 2010, the House passed the Senate bill, H.R. Some other commentators have proposed the elimination of the exclusion. Additional Health-Related Tax Expenditure Options
Other health-related income tax expenditures were considered and listed in the Senate Finance Committee's report. | Several tax options were proposed to provide financing for health care reform. President Obama initially proposed restricting itemized deductions for high-income taxpayers, along with some narrower provisions. H.R. 3962 passed in the House on November 14, 2009; its largest source of increased revenues was from additional income taxes for higher-income taxpayers. On December 24, 2009, the Senate adopted H.R. 3590, whose revenue provisions are similar to those in the bill reported by the Senate Finance Committee (S. 1796). Taxing insurance companies on high-cost employer plans was the largest single source of revenue in that plan. Both plans included health-related provisions, including fees or excise taxes, along with some other provisions.
On February 22, 2010, the Obama Administration released a new compromise proposal, which generally uses H.R. 3590 as a starting point, but offered several changes to the revenue provisions of this bill. The President's proposal would have delayed the effective date for the tax on high-cost employer plans proposed in H.R. 3590 from 2013 to 2018 and raised the exemption threshold for this tax to $27,500 for families and $10,200 for individuals. In addition, the new plan offered by the Administration would broaden H.R. 3590's proposed increase of the Medicare Hospital Insurance (HI) tax for high-income households by adding a tax on unearned income at a 3.8% rate. On March 22, 2010, the House passed the Senate bill, along with the revenue revisions (H.R. 4872). The President signed H.R. 3590 on March 23 (P.L. 111-148); the Senate and House agreed on H.R. 4872 on March 25, 2010, and it was signed by the President (P.L. 111-152) on March 30.
Several proposals for revenue, considered during the health care financing debate of 2009, have not been included in legislation reported out by congressional committees. These proposals include eliminating tax benefits from the exclusion of employer-provided health insurance, which has a significant revenue potential, and limiting tax savings to 28% of itemized deductions for the top two brackets, which was the centerpiece of the President's initial health reform tax proposals.
These provisions differ in their potential revenue gain, and behavioral and distributional effects. Some proposals are progressive (imposing higher relative burdens on higher income groups), some impose larger relative burdens on lower-income families, and some tend to fall on middle-class groups. The distributional analysis, however, relates only to finance: the total health care program may redistribute in favor of lower-income families even if the revenue sources do not.
The House bill (H.R. 3962) included a high-income surtax of 5.4% on income above $1 million (income levels are 50% as large for singles). The proposal would have initially raised more than $30 billion per year. One concern that has been raised about this surtax is the effect on small business, entrepreneurship, and job creation; however, much of this income is passive income or income of professions (e.g., stockbrokers, doctors). The proposal also includes some narrower, largely corporate provisions and restrictions on health-related tax expenditures. The Senate bill (H.R. 3590) would have imposed an excise tax on insurance companies for high-cost employer plans. Most of the remaining revenue is raised from restricting health-related tax expenditures; increasing the Medicare payroll tax for high-income earners; and imposing fees on medical devices, branded drugs, and health insurance providers.
One revenue raising provision that has produced some recent controversy is the requirement for information reporting by firms for all payments over $600. H.R. 5141, to repeal this provision, has been introduced. |
crs_R41816 | crs_R41816_0 | T he 409 units of the National Park System bear a wide range of titles—national park, national monument, national preserve, national historic site, national recreation area, and national battlefield, among many others. Are the units managed differently? This report addresses questions that legislators have asked about park unit titles, when considering proposals to establish new park units, to redesignate existing units, or to change the provisions governing a unit. It also discusses potential advantages and disadvantages of systemwide recommendations to simplify park nomenclature. The statutory authorities and management policies of the National Park Service (NPS) generally apply to all units, regardless of title. Also regardless of title, Congress may specify exceptions to NPS laws, regulations, and policies in a given unit—for example, Congress may authorize hunting or mining, generally prohibited in the National Park System, in a particular unit. While few statutory distinctions exist among the designations, their differences can nonetheless be meaningful. What Are the Park Titles? They tend to be among the most strictly protected units in the park system, in that Congress has historically been reluctant to authorize consumptive activities such as mining or hunting in the national parks. 90-542). 90-543). Others, in less developed areas, may contain natural attractions in addition to their historical resources. In some cases, however, the title has further implications. National monuments may be proclaimed on federal lands by the President, under the Antiquities Act of 1906, as well as by Congress. In particular, Congress has been reluctant to allow consumptive uses in national parks. For example, Congress has not authorized sport hunting in any national parks, whereas this activity is authorized in some other types of units, including some national recreation areas, national preserves, national rivers, national monuments, and national seashores and lakeshores. Relation to Other Land Management Systems
All park units are part of the National Park System, but a few types of units belong to other land management systems as well. Units titled "wild and scenic rivers" are established under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 (P.L. Similarly, units titled "national scenic trails" are established under the National Trails System Act of 1968 (P.L. 3619 proposes to redesignate Rock Creek Park in Washington, DC, as "Rock Creek National Park in the District of Columbia"; H.R. 2880 would redesignate the Martin Luther King Jr. National Historic Site in Georgia as a national historical park; and H.R. In the 112 th Congress, P.L. 112-245 redesignated Pinnacles National Monument in California as Pinnacles National Park, and previous Congresses have made similar title changes to other units. An issue faced by Congress is whether to continue using the current wide variety of park titles. The National Parks Second Century Commission expressed concern that the range of park titles is confusing to visitors, and recommended reducing the number of titles in order to enhance branding and recognition of the parks. Increased recognition of the National Park System "brand" could potentially boost visitation at under-recognized units, bringing consumers and jobs to surrounding communities. On the other hand, more rigid naming conventions could restrict Congress's flexibility to choose the most appropriate name for a unit. | Congress names individual units of the National Park System in the enabling legislation for each unit. In so doing, Congress establishes the range of titles used in the park system. The system's 409 units currently bear a wide range of titles—national park, national monument, national preserve, national historic site, national recreation area, national battlefield, and many others. This report addresses the significance of the different titles and discusses potential advantages and disadvantages of systemwide recommendations to simplify park nomenclature.
Legislators are concerned with park titles in several ways. First, Congress must determine appropriate titles for individual units when parks are established. Although the laws, regulations, and policies governing the National Park System generally apply to all units regardless of title, some meaningful differences nonetheless exist among the designations. Congress has grouped similar units under similar titles and has authorized resource-intensive activities, such as sport hunting or off-road vehicle use, in some types of units more than in others. In particular, Congress has been reluctant to allow such activities in national parks, but has authorized them in national preserves, national recreation areas, and national seashores and lakeshores, among other areas. A few unit titles are further associated with specific statutory authorities that govern their creation or development. National monuments, for example, can be proclaimed by the President under the Antiquities Act of 1906 (whereas other types of units cannot). National scenic trails and wild and scenic rivers are subject to requirements of the National Trails System Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-543) and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-542), respectively, as well as general park authorities.
In addition to naming units when they are established, Congress also considers proposals to retitle existing park units. For example, H.R. 3619 in the 114th Congress proposes to redesignate Rock Creek Park in Washington, DC, as a national park, and H.R. 2880 would redesignate the Martin Luther King Jr. National Historic Site in Georgia as a national historical park. In the 112th Congress, P.L. 112-245 redesignated the former Pinnacles National Monument in California as Pinnacles National Park. Among other things, such proposals may aim to increase visitation at a given unit and thus to boost local and regional economies. In particular, some studies have suggested that the "national park" title may attract visitors and bring economic benefits. Those opposing redesignations may be concerned that unwanted restrictions would be pursued along with a change in title.
An issue for Congress is whether the current wide array of park titles should be consolidated. The House Natural Resources Committee explored this question in 2010 hearings. The National Parks Second Century Commission, and the National Park Service (NPS) itself, have recommended reducing the number of park titles to better "brand" the units and make them more recognizable as part of the park system. Such branding could potentially bring more visitors to under-recognized units and thus help businesses in surrounding communities. On the other hand, the current, more loosely structured system maximizes Congress's flexibility to title units to reflect their unique features. |
crs_RS21831 | crs_RS21831_0 | National Review
To determine whether the problem in Washington, DC, is more widespread and to evaluate the effectiveness of the lead rule, EPA has undertaken a national review of lead monitoring conducted by water systems from 2000 through 2003. In November, EPA issued a memorandum clarifying these requirements. The education program must contain information about lead's health effects and sources, and explains steps to take to reduce exposure to lead. Addressing Lead in DC Drinking Water
The Safe Drinking Water Act allows EPA to delegate primary enforcement authority (primacy) for the Public Water System Supervision (PWSS) Program to states. Regulatory and Congressional Issues
The detection of high lead levels in Washington, DC, tap water, and the failure of officials to effectively notify the public of the detections, renewed congressional interest in examining the adequacy of the lead rule, including its monitoring and public notification requirements and overall enforcement of, and compliance with, the lead rule. During the 108 th Congress, the House Energy and Commerce and Government Reform Committees and the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee held hearings on this issue, and bills were introduced to strengthen the regulation of lead in drinking water. S. 2550 , a water infrastructure funding bill reported in the 108 th Congress, included provisions to address lead contamination. | Lead from various sources poses a key environmental threat to children's health, and the regulation of lead in drinking water has been a key component of federal efforts to reduce exposures to lead. Lead contamination of drinking water became a major issue in Washington, DC, in 2004, when news reports revealed marked increases in the levels of lead in tap water. The local water authority's failure to effectively inform the public about the high lead levels angered citizens and damaged public trust in the local water supply. These events led policy makers to examine the adequacy of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) lead in drinking water rule, including the rule's monitoring and public notification requirements, and EPA and state enforcement of the rule. Oversight hearings were held on these issues during the 108th Congress, and legislation to strengthen lead regulation was offered but not enacted. This report reviews issues surrounding the elevated lead levels in DC drinking water and actions to address this problem. More broadly, it discusses the lead regulatory framework, and EPA's national review of the rule and its implementation to determine whether the situation in Washington, DC, denotes a wider problem in need of a broader response. This report will be updated to reflect developments. |
crs_R43890 | crs_R43890_0 | For purposes of this report, "asset forfeiture" is the process of confiscating either property or money from a person because it is illegal to possess (contraband), constitutes the proceeds of a crime, or was used to facilitate a crime. In fact, in many cases, there is no criminal prosecution at all. After considerable hearings and debate, Congress enacted the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), the first major overhaul in federal forfeiture law in 200 years. While this law brought about significant reform to federal forfeiture policy and procedures, some have questioned whether CAFRA went far enough to rein in what they characterize as overzealous police forfeiture tactics. The Department of Justice (DOJ), on the other hand, has asserted that asset forfeiture plays a "critical and key role in disrupting and dismantling illegal enterprises, depriving criminals of the proceeds of illegal activity, deterring crime, and restoring property to victims." Concerns about the current legal framework are evidenced in new reports of possible police misuse of federal forfeiture laws. 5212 ), introduced in the 113 th Congress. With these proposals in mind, this report will provide an overview of select legal issues and reforms surrounding asset forfeiture, including the burden of proof standard and innocent owner defense in civil asset forfeiture cases, access to counsel in both civil and criminal forfeiture cases (including a discussion of the 2014 Supreme Court asset forfeiture decision Kaley v. United States ), allocation of profits from confiscated assets, and DOJ's equitable sharing program. Overview of Civil Asset Forfeiture
Asset forfeiture comes in two forms: civil and criminal. The government was not required to prove guilt of the property or its owner beyond a reasonable doubt, nor even by a preponderance of the evidence. Congress expanded criminal forfeitures as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 to cover all federal drug crimes, not just CCE violations. If the government seeks a pretrial restraining order before obtaining an indictment, it must meet the more stringent standard of demonstrating that there is a "substantial probability" that the government will prevail on the issue of forfeiture, that failure to issue the restraining order will result in the destruction or removal of the property, and that the need to preserve the availability of the property outweighs the hardship on the property owner. Beginning with the first federal statutes, and for the first 200 years of civil forfeitures, the burden of proof was on the property owner to prove the "innocence" of the seized property. Structural Reforms
In addition to procedural reforms, considerable attention has been given to the structural aspects of civil asset forfeiture. Equitable sharing is a policy in which federal law enforcement agencies can share forfeiture revenues with participating state and local law enforcement agencies. | From its beginning in the First Congress, Congress has viewed asset forfeiture as an integral part of federal crime fighting: It takes contraband off the streets, ensures that "crime doesn't pay," and deprives criminals of their "tools of the trade." In short, asset forfeiture is the process of confiscating money or property from a person because it is illegal to possess, it constitutes proceeds of a crime, or it was used to facilitate a crime. Asset forfeiture became a major tool in combating organized crime, drug trafficking, and other serious federal offenses throughout the mid-to-late 20th century and continues to play a major role in federal prosecutions.
In recent years, however, there has been growing opposition to the expanding scope of asset forfeiture, both civil and criminal, with objections primarily coming in two forms: procedural and structural. The procedural objections are based on the idea that the current rules pertaining to asset forfeiture heavily favor the government. With civil asset forfeiture, the property owner need not be convicted nor even prosecuted for a crime before the government can confiscate his or her property. Unlike criminal prosecutions, the property owner is not constitutionally entitled to an attorney or many other safeguards found in the Bill of Rights. The burden of proof is set at the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, lower than the traditional criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. If the property owner is claiming innocence, he has the burden of proving either that he had no knowledge of the criminal activity or that he tried to stop the activity if he did know about it. Structural objections pertain to how property and money are allocated once forfeited. The Department of Justice (DOJ) is permitted by law to keep most of the forfeited assets, creating what some view as a profit motive. Recently, DOJ stopped its practice of "adoptive forfeitures," which allowed it to adopt property seized by state and local law enforcement as part of its "equitable sharing" program. Some saw this as a way of bypassing more stringent state forfeiture laws.
Asset forfeiture faced comparable criticism several decades ago, leading Congress to enact the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), the first major overhaul in federal forfeiture law in 200 years. While this law brought about significant reform to federal forfeiture policy and procedures, some have questioned whether CAFRA went far enough to rein in what they characterize as overzealous police forfeiture tactics. Recent concerns about the current legal framework are evidenced in new reports of possible police misuse of federal forfeiture laws. Contemporaneously, reform legislation has been introduced in the 113th and 114th Congresses.
With these proposals in mind, this report will provide an overview of selected legal issues and reforms surrounding asset forfeiture, including the burden-of-proof standard and innocent-owner defense in civil asset forfeiture cases, access to counsel in both civil and criminal forfeiture cases (including a discussion of the 2014 Supreme Court asset forfeiture decision Kaley v. United States), allocation of profits from confiscated assets, and DOJ's equitable sharing program. |
crs_R42095 | crs_R42095_0 | Introduction
Murder, committed under any of more than 50 jurisdictional circumstances, is a federal capital offense. The Federal Death Penalty Act and related provisions establish the procedure that must be followed before a defendant convicted of a federal capital offense may be executed. Now federal capital offenses are confined to espionage, treason, certain drug kingpin offenses (that do not involve murder), and murder under various jurisdictional circumstances. The death penalty may be imposed under its provisions only after (1) the defendant is convicted of a capital offense; (2) in the case of murder, the defendant has been found to have acted with one of the required levels of intent; (3) the prosecution proves the existence of one or more of the statutory aggravating factors; and (4) the imbalance between the established aggravating factors and any mitigating factors justifies imposition of the death penalty. In rare cases, due process may preclude a stale prosecution even in the absence of a statute of limitations. Justice Department Review
The decision to seek or not to seek the death penalty is ultimately that of the Attorney General. Death-Ineligible Offenders
Whether by statute, by constitutional command, or both, some offenders may not be exposed to a federal trial in which the prosecution seeks the death penalty for a federal capital offense; some may not be executed. An accused who is incompetent to stand trial may not be tried for a capital offense or any other crime. A defendant convicted of a capital offense may be executed, however, only if it is shown beyond doubt at a subsequent sentencing hearing that one of the statutory aggravating circumstances exists, and that he either (A) killed the victim intentionally; (B) intentionally inflicted serious injuries that resulted in the victim's death; (C) intentionally participated in an act, aware that it would expose a victim to life-threatening force, and the victim died as a consequence; or (D) intentionally engaged in an act of violence with reckless disregard of its life-threatening nature and the victim died as a consequence. Even in the presence of the necessary intent and at least one of the statutory aggravating factors, a defendant may only be sentenced to death, if the jury unanimously concludes that on balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors imposition of the death penalty is justified. Justice Department approval forms once identified five possible non-statutory aggravating factors. No prior criminal record. Childhood hardships, remorse, and impact of the execution on the defendant's family are among the more common. Presenting and Weighing the Factors
The Federal Death Penalty Act establishes the same capital sentencing hearing procedures for all capital offenses—murder, treason, espionage, or murder-less drug kingpin offenses. Capital punishment may only be recommended and imposed, if the jurors all agree that the aggravating factors sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factors to an extent that justifies imposition of the death penalty. If they find the death penalty justified, they must recommend it. | Murder is a federal capital offense if committed in any of more than 50 jurisdictional settings. The Constitution defines the circumstances under which the death penalty may be considered a sentencing option. With an eye to those constitutional boundaries, the Federal Death Penalty Act and related statutory provisions govern the procedures under which the death penalty may be imposed.
Some defendants are ineligible for the death penalty regardless of the crimes with which they are accused. Children and those incompetent to stand trial may not face the death penalty; pregnant women and the mentally retarded may not be executed. There is no statute of limitations for murder, and the time constraints imposed by the due process and speedy trial clauses of the Constitution are rarely an impediment to prosecution.
The decision to seek or forgo the death penalty in a federal capital case must be weighed by the Justice Department's Capital Review Committee and approved by the Attorney General.
Defendants convicted of murder are death-eligible only if they are found at a separate sentencing hearing to have acted with life-threatening intent. Among those who have, capital punishment may be imposed only if the sentencing jury unanimously concludes that the aggravating circumstances that surround the murder and the defendant outweigh the mitigating circumstances to an extent that justifies execution.
The Federal Death Penalty Act provides several specific aggravating factors, such as murder of a law enforcement officer or multiple murders committed at the same time. It also permits consideration of any relevant "non-statutory aggravating factors." Impact on the victim's family and future dangerousness of the defendant are perhaps the most commonly invoked non-statutory aggravating factors. The jury must agree on the existence of at least one of the statutory aggravating factors if the defendant is to be sentenced to death.
The Federal Death Penalty Act permits consideration of any relevant mitigating factor, and identifies a few, such as the absence of prior criminal record or the fact that a co-defendant, equally or more culpable, has escaped with a lesser sentence.
The Federal Death Penalty Act recognizes other capital offenses that do not necessarily involve murder: treason, espionage, large-scale drug trafficking, and attempted murder to obstruct a drug kingpin investigation. The constitutional standing of these is less certain or at least different.
This report is available in an abridged form as CRS Report R42096, Federal Capital Offenses: An Abridged Overview of Substantive and Procedural Law, without the footnotes, attributions of authority, or quotations found here. |
crs_R43356 | crs_R43356_0 | Introduction
About 362 million travelers (citizens and non-citizens) entered the United States in FY2013, including about 102 million air passengers and crew, 18 million sea passengers and crew, and 242 million incoming land travelers. At the same time about 205,000 aliens were denied admission at ports of entry (POEs); and about 24,000 persons were arrested at POEs on outstanding criminal warrants. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for conducting immigration inspections at America's 329 POEs. CBP's primary immigration enforcement mission at ports of entry is to confirm that travelers are eligible to enter the United States and to exclude inadmissible aliens. Moreover, strict enforcement is in tension with a second core mission: to facilitate the flow of lawful travelers, who are the vast majority of persons seeking admission. A fundamental question for Congress and DHS is how to balance these competing concerns. As part of this dual mission, and in support of its broader mandate to manage the U.S. immigration system, DHS also is responsible for implementing an electronic entry-exit system at POEs. Congress required DHS' predecessor to develop an entry-exit system beginning in 1996, but the implementation of a fully automated, biometric system has proven to be an elusive goal. In the case of immigration inspections, risk management involves screening travelers at multiple points in the immigration process to distinguish between low- and high-risk travelers. Low-risk travelers may be eligible for expedited admissions processing through the Visa Waiver Program and/or trusted traveler programs, while higher-risk travelers may be subject to more extensive secondary inspections. CBP works with OBIM to collect and manage entry-exit data as described below. Collection of Exit Data
In general, the United States does not have a history of collecting exit data from departing travelers. No exit data are collected from persons leaving through southern border land ports; and data collection at other ports is limited to biographic data, is not always based on machine-readable data, and relies on information sharing with Canada and with air and sea carriers. The 114 th Congress is considering legislation that would require the completion of the entry-exit system. The act amended IIRIRA §110 to describe the entry-exit system in greater detail; clarified that the system's mandate did not impose new documentary requirements on travelers to the United States; and imposed new deadlines of December 2003 for implementation of the entry-exit system at all U.S. airports and seaports, December 2004 for implementation of the system as the 50 busiest land POEs, and December 2005 for making data from the system available to immigration officers at all POEs. | About 362 million travelers (citizens and non-citizens) entered the United States in FY2013, including about 102 million air passengers and crew, 18 million sea passengers and crew, and 242 million land travelers. At the same time about 205,000 aliens were denied admission at ports of entry (POEs); and about 24,000 persons were arrested at POEs on criminal warrants.
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for conducting immigration inspections at America's 329 POEs. CBP's primary immigration enforcement mission at ports of entry is to confirm that travelers are eligible to enter the United States and to exclude inadmissible aliens. Yet strict enforcement is in tension with a second core mission: to facilitate the flow of lawful travelers, who are the vast majority of persons seeking admission. A fundamental question for Congress and DHS is how to balance these competing concerns.
In general, DHS and CBP rely on "risk management" to strike this balance. One part of the risk management strategy is to conduct screening at multiple points in the immigration process, beginning well before travelers arrive at U.S. POEs. DHS and other departments involved in the inspections process use a number of screening tools to distinguish between known, low-risk travelers and lesser-known, higher-risk travelers. Low-risk travelers may be eligible for expedited admissions processing, while higher-risk travelers are usually subject to more extensive secondary inspections.
As part of its dual mission and in support of its broader mandate to manage the U.S. immigration system, DHS also is responsible for implementing an electronic entry-exit system at POEs. Congress required DHS' predecessor to develop an entry-exit system beginning in 1996, but the implementation of a fully automated, biometric system has proven to be an elusive goal. The current system collects and stores biographic entry data (e.g., name, date of birth, travel history) from almost all non-citizens entering the United States, but only collects biometric data (e.g., fingerprints and digital photographs) from non-citizens entering at air or seaports, and from a subset of land travelers that excludes most Mexican and Canadian visitors. With respect to exit data, the current system relies on information sharing agreements with air and sea carriers and with Canada to collect biographic data from air and sea travelers and from certain non-citizens exiting through northern border land ports; but the system does not collect data from persons exiting by southern border land ports and does not collect any biometric exit data. Questions also have been raised about DHS' ability to use existing entry-exit data to identify and apprehend visa overstayers.
The inspections process and entry-exit system continue to be perennial issues for Congress and a number of questions persist. Moreover, the scope of illegal migration through ports of entry, and how Congress and DHS can minimize such flows without unduly slowing legal travel continue to challenge policymakers and agency officials. The 114th Congress is considering legislation that would increase the number of port personnel as well as require the completion of the entry-exit system, a program that has been the subject of ongoing legislative activity since 1996, as summarized in the Appendix to this report. |
crs_R44854 | crs_R44854_0 | Since the beginning of the 21 st century, the U.S. energy sector has transformed from a situation of declining production, especially of oil and natural gas, to one in which the United States is a growing producer. U.S. Energy Profile
The United States is the second largest producer and consumer of energy in the world, behind China. While oil has remained at almost 40% of the fuel mix, natural gas and renewables have increased in both percentage and absolute terms at the expense of coal. Nuclear generation has stayed flat. For example, in 2017, as a percentage of total U.S. energy production, approximately 24% of crude oil and 13% of natural gas gross withdrawals came from federal lands. Oil and Natural Gas on Federal Lands
Oil production fluctuated year-to-year on federal lands from 2008 to 2017 but overall it increased by 47% over the 10-year period. However, because crude oil production on nonfederal lands doubled over the decade (primarily due to improved extraction technology, favorable geology, and the ease of leasing), the share of total U.S. crude oil production from federal lands fell from its peak of nearly 36% in 2009 and 2010 to about 24% in 2017. The share of gross natural gas withdrawals from federal lands fell from almost 25% in 2008 to 13% in 2017. Coal production on federal lands has consistently accounted for about 40% of total U.S. coal production over the past decade. This period was consistent with increasing oil import dependence and declining energy security. Since prices peaked in 2008, domestic gas production has risen significantly. Since 2005, U.S. natural gas production rose every year until 2016, even as prices declined. Low natural gas prices, due to the growth of domestic gas resources, contributed to a significant rise in the use of natural gas for electric power generation. The U.S. industrial sector increased its consumption of natural gas by 16% between 2010 and 2017, and the sector is expected to account for the majority of growth in natural gas consumption through 2050. The electricity infrastructure of the United States is aging, and uncertainty exists around how to modernize the grid, and what technologies and fuels will be used to produce electricity in the future. Unresolved questions about transmission and reliability of the grid also are arising due to potential cybersecurity threats as well as continuing interest in harnessing renewable energy and other low carbon sources of electricity. Concerns about reliability and electricity prices are complicated by environmental regulations and the rising production of electric power from unconventional resources such as shale gas. As a result, fossil fuels (coal and natural gas) have accounted for about two-thirds of electricity generation since 2000. With growth in demand for electricity having been essentially flat for many years, the need for new power plants has been delayed in many parts of the country. The projections for future demand growth in most regions of the United States are declining. Coal Reserves and Production
The United States has the largest coal reserves and resources in the world. While renewable energy is currently a relatively small portion of the total U.S. energy sector, renewables production and consumption have increased since 2000. Unlike other energy commodities, such as crude oil, renewable energy is available in a variety of distinct forms that use different conversion technologies to produce usable energy products (e.g., electricity, heat, and liquid fuels). As a result of these state and federal programs and incentives, in addition to technology cost declines and conversion efficiency improvements, the use of non-hydro renewable sources of energy to generate electric power in the United States increased considerably between 2001 and 2017. As a result, the amount of new power generation capacity needed each year has declined. | Since the start of the 21st century, the U.S. energy system has seen tremendous changes. Technological advances in energy production have driven changes in energy consumption, and the United States has moved from being a growing net importer of most forms of energy to a declining importer—and possibly a net exporter in the near future. The United States remains the second largest producer and consumer of energy in the world, behind China.
The U.S. oil and natural gas industry has gone through a "renaissance" of production. Technological improvements in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have unlocked enormous oil and natural gas resources from unconventional formations, such as shale. Oil has surpassed levels of production not seen since the 1970s. Natural gas has set new production records almost every year since 2000. In conjunction with the rise in oil and natural gas production, U.S. production of natural gas liquids has also increased. The rise in production of these fuel sources has also corresponded with increased consumption and exports of each.
The rise in U.S. oil and natural gas production has taken place mostly onshore and on nonfederal lands. Crude oil production from nonfederal land has doubled over the past decade. While production on federal land has increased, it has not grown as fast as oil production on nonfederal land, causing the federal land share of total U.S. crude oil production to fall from its peak of nearly 36% in 2009 to about 24% in 2017. U.S natural gas production shifted even more dramatically, with total U.S. dry production growing 33% since 2008, while gross withdrawals on federal lands declined by almost 32% over the same time period. The federal land share of total gross withdrawals decreased from 25% in 2008 to 13% in 2017.
The electric power industry is transforming. Growth in demand for electricity has essentially been flat for many years, and the amount of new power generation capacity needed has declined each year in many parts of the country. The projections for future demand growth in most regions of the United States are declining. Natural gas edged out coal to become the primary electric generation fuel in 2016 and the growth in wind and solar energy has shown little sign of abating. The electricity infrastructure of the United States is aging. Uncertainty exists about how to modernize the grid and what technologies and fuels will be used to produce electricity in the future. Unresolved questions about transmission and reliability of the grid are arising due to potential cybersecurity threats and continuing interest in renewable energy and other low carbon sources of electricity. Concerns about reliability and electricity prices are complicated by environmental regulations, the intermittent nature of wind and solar power, and the rising availability of natural gas for electric power production.
Renewables production and consumption have increased since 2000. As a source of total primary energy, renewable energy increased 80% between 2000 and 2017. Unlike some other energy commodities (e.g., crude oil), renewable energy is available in a variety of distinct forms that use different conversion technologies to produce usable energy products (e.g., electricity, heat, and liquid fuels). Therefore, it is important to distinguish between renewable fuel sources and uses.
The United States has the largest coal resources in the world. Coal is used primarily for electricity generation. Although its prices have stayed low, coal has faced increasing competition from natural gas and renewables. U.S. coal consumption peaked in 2007 and has since declined by 39%. Coal currently supplies approximately 30% of electricity generation. Nuclear-generated electricity output has stayed flat during the same time period, and faces significant challenges as a future source of electric power generation.
Energy production and consumption have been issues of interest to Congress for decades. Current topics of concern to Congress include independence, exports, imports, prices, security, infrastructure, efficiency, the environment, and geopolitics. Legislation has been introduced in both houses of Congress to address these issues and others. |
crs_R41776 | crs_R41776_0 | The Appointments Process
The Constitution (Article II, Section 2) empowers the President to nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint the principal officers of the United States, as well as some subordinate officers. There are a number of steps in this stage of the process for most Senate-confirmed positions. Senate Consideration
In the second stage, the Senate alone determines whether or not to confirm a nomination. Appointment
In the final stage, the confirmed nominee is given a commission, which bears the Great Seal of the United States and is signed by the President, and is sworn into office. Appointments During the 110th Congress
During the 110 th Congress, President George W. Bush submitted to the Senate 52 nominations to full-time positions in independent and other agencies. Of these nominations, 27 were confirmed, 16 were returned to the President, and 9 were withdrawn. The President made two recess appointments during this period to positions in organizations covered in this report. Each recess appointment was followed by a nomination which is included in the total of 52 nominations. The methodology used in this report to count the length of time between nomination and confirmation differs from that which was used in previous similar CRS reports. The statistics presented here include the days during which the Senate was adjourned for its summer recesses and between sessions of Congress. The methodological change reduces the direct comparability of statistics in this report with those of the earlier research. Reasons for the change include the conversion of traditionally long recesses into a series of short recesses punctuated by pro forma sessions during the 110 th Congress; the fact that although committees may not be taking direct action on nominations in the form of hearings or votes, they are likely still considering and processing nominations during recesses; and a desire to be consistent with the methodology used by many political scientists, as well as CRS research on judicial nominations. In addition, an argument could be made that the decision to extend Senate consideration of nominees over the course of a recess is intentional, and the choice to extend this length of time is better represented by including all days, including long recesses. A more detailed explanation of this methodological change is located in Appendix E .
Organization of This Report
Agency Profiles
The agency profiles provide data on presidential nominations and appointments to full-time positions requiring Senate confirmation, and Senate action on the nominations. | The appointment process for advice and consent positions consists of three main stages. The first stage is selection, clearance, and nomination by the President. This step includes preliminary vetting, background checks, and ethics checks of potential nominees. At this stage, the President may also consult with Senators who are from the same party if the position is located in a state. The second stage of the process is consideration of the nomination in the Senate, most of which takes place in committee. Finally, if a nomination is approved by the full Senate, the nominee is given a commission signed by the President and sworn into office.
During the 110th Congress, President George W. Bush submitted to the Senate 52 nominations to independent and other agencies for full-time positions. Of these 52 nominations, 27 were confirmed, 9 were withdrawn, and 16 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, an average of 110 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The President made two recess appointments to full-time positions in independent agencies during the 110th Congress. Each recess appointment was followed by a nomination which is included in the total of 52 nominations.
The methodology used in this report to count the length of time between nomination and confirmation differs from that which was used in previous similar CRS reports. The statistics presented here include the days during which the Senate was adjourned for its summer recesses and between sessions of Congress. The methodological change, which may reduce the comparability of statistics in this report with those of the earlier research, is discussed in the text of this report, as well as in Appendix E. Reasons for the change include the Senate's conversion of traditionally long recesses into a series of short recesses punctuated by pro forma sessions during the 110th Congress; the fact that although committees may not be taking direct action on nominations in the form of hearings or votes, they are likely still considering and processing nominations during recesses; and a desire to be consistent with the methodology used by many political scientists as well as CRS research on judicial nominations. In addition, an argument could be made that the decision to extend Senate consideration of nominees over the course of a recess is intentional, and the choice to extend this length of time is better represented by including all days, including long recesses.
Information for this report was compiled from data from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System at http://www.congress.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2008 "Plum Book" (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43944 | crs_R43944_0 | The President's budget proposes $145.694 billion for R&D in FY2016, an increase of $7.625 billion (5.5%) over the estimated FY2015 R&D funding level of $138.069 billion. Referred to frequently as the "doubling effort," Congress and Presidents Obama and Bush sought to increase support for the physical sciences and engineering by doubling funding for accounts at three federal agencies with a strong R&D emphasis in these disciplines: the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science, the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Department of Commerce (DOC) National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) core laboratory research and construction of research facilities (collectively referred to as the "targeted accounts"). 110-69 ) and the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 ( P.L. The America COMPETES Act and the reauthorization act set appropriations authorization levels consistent with a doubling pace of 7 years and 11 years, respectively. Under President Obama's FY2016 budget request, seven federal agencies would receive more than 95% of total federal R&D funding: the Department of Defense (DOD), 49.5%; Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (primarily the National Institutes of Health (NIH)), 21.3%; Department of Energy (DOE), 8.6%; National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 8.4%; National Science Foundation (NSF), 4.3%; Department of Agriculture (USDA), 2.0%; and Department of Commerce (DOC), 1.5%. The largest agency R&D increases in the President's FY2016 request (as measured in dollars), compared with FY2015, are for DOD, $4.670 billion (6.9%); DOE, $861 million (7.3%); DOC, $601 million (39.4%); HHS, $565 million (1.9%); USDA, $438 million (17.9%); and NSF, $310 million (5.2%). Multiagency R&D Initiatives
Although this report focuses primarily on the R&D activities of individual agencies, President Obama's FY2016 budget request supports several multiagency R&D initiatives. The President's request for NNI R&D funding for FY2016 is $1.495 billion. The PMI seeks to build on research and discoveries that allow medical treatments to be tailored to an individual's unique characteristics (e.g., a patient's genes) or the genetic profile of an individual's tumor. Two R&D-focused components of the AMP are the National Robotics Initiative (NRI) and the National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI). The President also included proposals for establishing the NNMI in his FY2014, FY2015 and FY2016 budgets. In addition, the President's FY2016 budget includes a request for $1.9 billion in mandatory funding for NIST for the establishment of 29 additional centers between FY2017 and FY2024, which would bring the total number of centers to 45. In December 2015, Congress passed, and the President signed, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ) providing discretionary appropriations for all federal agencies for FY2016. For some federal agencies it is possible to discern R&D funding levels directly from this act and its accompanying explanatory statement. In these cases, this report reflects the results of P.L. 114-113 ). The Brain Research through Application of Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Initiative is a collaborative effort with the National Science Foundation and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI) . Other accounts . The FY2016 NSF budget request included funding for three multi-agency initiatives: National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI, $416 million), Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD, $1.217 billion), and U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP, $341 million). As in previous requests, the President's FY2016 budget request did not include funding for these "national priorities." Funding for research and development is generally included in accounts with non-R&D funding. Funding for DOT R&D is generally included in appropriations line items that also include non-R&D activities; therefore, it is not possible to identify precisely how much of the funding that would be provided by appropriations bills is allocated to R&D unless funding is provided at the precise level of the request. | President Obama's budget request for FY2016 included $145.694 billion for research and development (R&D), an increase of $7.625 billion (5.5%) over the estimated FY2015 R&D funding level of $138.069 billion. The request represented the President's R&D priorities.
Funding for R&D is concentrated in a few departments and agencies. Under President Obama's FY2016 budget request, seven federal agencies would have received 95.6% of total federal R&D funding, with the Department of Defense (DOD, 49.5%) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS, 21.3%) accounting for more than 70% of all federal R&D funding. The largest increases in agency R&D funding in the President's request would have gone to the Department of Defense (DOD, up $4.670 billion, 6.9%), Department of Energy (DOE, up $861 million, 7.3%), and the Department of Commerce (DOC, up $601 million, 39.4%).
Legislation targeted the R&D budgets of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Science Foundation, and DOE Office of Science seeking to double them from their FY2006 levels. The America COMPETES Act aimed to double funding over 7 years, and the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 over 11 years. The President's FY2016 budget requested increases for these accounts, as it did in the President's FY2015 and FY2014 requests. It departs from earlier Obama and Bush Administration budgets that explicitly stated the doubling goal. Enacted funding for FY2015 for these accounts represents a compound annual growth rate of 3.25% since FY2006, a rate that would result in doubling in 22 years.
The President's FY2016 request continued support for three multi-agency R&D initiatives—the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) program, and the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP). The request also continued support for the Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) initiative, the Materials Genome Initiative, and the National Robotics Initiative. The President proposed FY2016 discretionary funding for seven new manufacturing institutes as part of his proposed National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI), in addition to the nine that have already been planned, competed, or awarded. The President also proposed $1.9 billion in mandatory funding for the establishment of 29 additional institutes between FY2017 and FY2024. In addition, the FY2016 budget proposed a new multiagency R&D initiative, the Precision Medicine Initiative which seeks to build on research and discoveries that allow medical treatments to be tailored to an individual's unique characteristics (e.g., a patient's genes) or the genetic profile of an individual's tumor.
In December 2015, Congress passed, and the President signed, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) providing discretionary appropriations for all federal agencies for FY2016. For some federal agencies it is possible to discern R&D funding levels directly from this act and its accompanying explanatory statement. In these cases, this report reflects the results of P.L. 114-113. For other federal agencies, R&D is included in appropriations accounts with non-R&D activities and it is not possible to determine specific R&D funding levels until reported by these agencies.
As in recent years, the annual appropriations process was completed after the start of the fiscal year. This can affect agencies' execution of their R&D budgets, including the delay or cancellation of planned R&D activities and acquisition of R&D-related equipment. |
crs_R40107 | crs_R40107_0 | Introduction
Policymakers at all levels of government are debating a wide range of options for addressing the nation's faltering economic conditions. This report presents policy issues associated with using infrastructure as a mechanism for economic stimulus. The Context: Current Economic Conditions
Interest in government spending to stimulate economic recovery has intensified recently in response to economic indicators showing significant and continuing deterioration of the national economy. Defining Infrastructure in Today's Context
Most people probably think about roads, airports, or water supply when they refer to infrastructure, having in mind the types of systems or facilities that are publicly provided and are important to the productive capacity of the nation's economy. Today, policymakers and stakeholder groups appear inclined to define the term broadly to include facilities and categories that vary considerably in the degree of historic federal investment in building or rebuilding physical structures (e.g., highways compared with public schools) and systems that have a long history of combined public and private ownership (water resource projects as well as electric transmission systems, some of which are federally owned, for example). A relatively new dimension in today's context is the notion of coupling public works with investments in environmentally friendly systems that incorporate renewable technologies or energy efficiency—called "green infrastructure" (see discussion below). Infrastructure and the Economy
Academics, economists, and policymakers debate two key issues concerning the contribution of infrastructure investment to the economy. One is the general issue of the effects of infrastructure spending and investment on productivity and growth. The second related issue is the role of infrastructure spending, including short-term job creation, as a countercyclical tool in stimulating a faltering economy. Infrastructure investment, it is argued, will be an important source of stimulating labor demand, which is lacking in the current labor market, and enhancing U.S. productivity through long-neglected investments in roads, bridges, water systems, etc. While there is growing momentum for more infrastructure investment, some analysts are cautious about the effectiveness of this type of fiscal stimulus because of one key issue: timing. By definition, the goal of stimulus spending is to get money into the economy swiftly. But that objective conflicts with the reality of building infrastructure projects that typically are multiyear efforts with slow initial spendout. First, they point out that because economists now expect the current recession to be of long duration (longer than 12 months), projects with extended timeframes can still contribute to the economy's recovery, which is likely to be a two-year undertaking. Thus, the overriding question in debating infrastructure spending as part of economic stimulus is, what will the stimulus buy? Two important considerations regarding any fiscal stimulus proposal are, will the proposal produce stimulus quickly, and will it produce a significant amount of stimulus, relative to its budgetary cost. A second issue, related to the first, concerns the tension between funding activities that will create jobs quickly and the desire to invest in projects that will have sustained value. The overriding governance issue, for all levels of government, is ensuring accountability for funds that will be spent through a stimulus program. The amounts of federal dollars committed to such a program are likely to be enormous (some advocates are proposing $850 billion or more in total stimulus, to include as much as $350 billion for infrastructure) and other direct spending, making it particularly important for the public to be assured that decisions involving public dollars are made quickly yet with transparency, that investments are made in quality projects, and that projects have adequate oversight. | Interest in using federal government spending to stimulate U.S. economic recovery has intensified recently in response to indicators showing significant deterioration of the economy. Policymakers at all levels of government are debating a range of options to address these problems. Some favor using traditional monetary and fiscal policies. Others, however, favor making accelerated investments in the nation's public infrastructure in order to create jobs while also meeting infrastructure needs. This report is an overview of policy issues associated with the approach of using infrastructure as a mechanism for economic stimulus.
When most people think about infrastructure, they probably have in mind systems that are publicly provided and are important to the productive capacity of the nation's economy. Today, policymakers define the term more broadly to include both publicly and privately owned systems and facilities and categories that vary considerably in the degree of historic federal investment in building or rebuilding physical structures. A relatively new dimension in today's context is the notion of coupling public works with investments in environmentally friendly systems that incorporate renewable technologies or energy efficiency—called "green infrastructure."
Academics, economists, and policymakers debate two issues concerning the contribution of infrastructure investment to the economy. One is the effects of infrastructure investment on productivity and growth, including job creation. The second related issue is the role of infrastructure spending, which is typically a long-term activity, as a short-term mechanism to stimulate a faltering economy. Research conducted over time has resulted in a general consensus that there can be positive returns on productivity of investing in infrastructure. Many experts now argue that infrastructure spending could be an important source of stimulating labor demand and enhancing U.S. productivity through investments in roads, bridges, water systems, etc. Still, some analysts are cautious about the effectiveness of this type of fiscal stimulus because of one key issue: timing. By definition, the goal of stimulus spending is to get money into the economy swiftly. But that objective can conflict with the reality of building infrastructure projects that typically are multiyear efforts with slow initial spendout. Spending advocates counter that because the current recession is expected to be of long duration, projects with extended timeframes can still contribute to the economy's recovery, and that investments that improve long-term productivity are preferable to options that focus on consumption as a stimulus tool.
The overriding question in debating infrastructure spending as part of economic stimulus is, what will the stimulus buy? Two important considerations are, will the proposal produce stimulus quickly, and will it produce a significant amount of stimulus, relative to its budgetary cost. Because of the urgency of responding to the recession, stakeholder groups have been preparing lists of projects that are "ready to go," but the criteria for developing these lists are largely unknown. There is tension between the goal of funding activities that will create jobs quickly and the desire to invest in projects that will have sustained value that contributes to U.S. productivity.
A critical issue for all levels of government is ensuring accountability for funds that will be spent through a stimulus program, to assure the public that decisions involving public dollars are made quickly yet with transparency, efficiency, and sufficient accountability.
This report will not track legislative developments; other CRS reports referenced here will do so. |
crs_R40984 | crs_R40984_0 | Part One: Introduction
On December 15, 2009, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published its most important action to date related to climate change. It found that the combined greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new motor vehicles in the United States contribute to an "endangerment" from climate change. More precisely, EPA found that such emissions, in the words of Clean Air Act (CAA) section 202(a), "cause or contribute to air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." Under section 202(a), this final determination requires that EPA promulgate "standards" to control such emissions from new motor vehicles. Rather, objection has been raised to the section 202 endangerment finding for GHGs and the upcoming motor vehicle GHG emission standards because of the argument they will trigger a cascade of unacceptable regulatory consequences under other CAA provisions. These regulatory consequences, objectors say, would impose unattainable air quality goals on EPA and the states, and/or economically and administratively unreasonable burdens on both EPA and regulated entities. This report examines the CAA provisions that have figured in this debate to assess whether this alleged "cascade" of legal consequences would likely occur as the result of EPA's endangerment finding under 202(a) and resulting emission standards. A caveat: the issue analyzed here is important primarily if Congress does not enact climate change legislation that puts regulation of emissions based on their climate change impacts beyond the reach of some of the CAA provisions discussed here. In particular, the House-passed climate change bill, H.R. 2454 , states that sections 108 (national ambient air quality standards) and 115 (international air pollution) may not be used to address air pollutants based on their climate change impacts. The bill also would prohibit the use of section 165 (requiring preconstruction "new source review" in Prevention of Significant Deterioration areas) to regulate GHG emissions, and specifies that no stationary source of GHGs could be required to obtain a permit under Title V of the CAA solely because of its GHG emissions. Actually, EPA's endangerment determination consists of two findings, one addressing each component of the section 202(a) endangerment provision. Part Three: CAA Sections with Endangerment Triggers Other Than Section 202(a)
To what extent will the endangerment finding under section 202(a) narrow EPA's discretion to deal, or not deal, with GHGs under other CAA provisions with endangerment preconditions? This is an important preliminary step in understanding the legal relevance of EPA's 202(a) endangerment finding to other endangerment-triggered sections of the CAA—but it is only a preliminary step. Pollution in a Foreign Country Caused by Emission Sources in the United States
Under CAA section 115, "[w]henever the [EPA] Administrator, upon receipt of reports … from any duly constituted international agency has reason to believe that any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United States cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country ," it must notify the governors of the states where the emission originates. In short, what event triggers the requirement of best available control technology (BACT) in PSD areas? EPA asserts in the preamble to the proposed tailoring rule that adherence to the 100/250 tons/year threshold for new source review in PSD areas would have precisely this result:
the extraordinary increases in PSD and Title V permit applications that would result from a literal application of the 100/250 tpy threshold requirements would, at least during the near term—until EPA and the permitting authorities can develop streamlining methods and ramp up resources—extensively disrupt the two permitting programs and impose undue regulatory burdens in the aggregate on the sources newly subject to PSD and Title V permit requirements. Title V permitting requirements likely will be triggered as well. Stationary source categories that do not emit large amounts of GHGs will not have to be covered by NSPSs if EPA defines "significantly" at a high tons/year level. | On December 15, 2009, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) took its most important action to date related to climate change. EPA published its final determination that the combined greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new motor vehicles in the United States contribute to an "endangerment" from climate change. More precisely, EPA found that such emissions, in the words of Clean Air Act (CAA) section 202(a), "cause or contribute to air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." Under section 202(a), this finding requires that EPA promulgate "standards" to control such emissions—as the agency proposed to do for light-duty motor vehicles in advance of its endangerment determination.
Some groups have objected to the endangerment determination and the emission standards to follow, arguing they will trigger a "cascade" of unacceptable regulatory consequences under other CAA provisions. These regulatory consequences, they say, would impose unattainable GHG-concentration goals on EPA and the states, and/or economically and administratively unreasonable burdens. This report examines the CAA provisions that have figured in this debate to see whether this alleged cascade of legal consequences likely would occur.
First, the report examines CAA sections that, like section 202(a), are triggered by endangerment findings. Of these, the one most likely to require EPA regulatory action after the 202(a) endangerment finding is section 111, authorizing new source performance standards—but only as to stationary source categories emitting the largest amounts of GHGs. Section 111, however, affords EPA wide discretion in setting new source performance standards. Two other sections that arguably might be triggered are 108, requiring national ambient air quality standards, and 115, which requires states to revise their implementation plans to prevent or eliminate the endangerment of public health or welfare in a foreign country. As to these sections, however, the arguable infeasibility of the regulatory goals—even if GHG emissions in the United States are significantly reduced, atmospheric concentrations would decline little—will give EPA room to argue that regulatory action is not mandatory. Other endangerment-triggered sections of the CAA can be distinguished from section 202(a) by their explicit terms, and thus would likely not be triggered by the 202(a) endangerment finding.
Second, the report looks at CAA provisions having no endangerment trigger. Of these, EPA has conceded that two require the agency to act after it promulgates the required emission standards following the 202(a) endangerment finding. One provision would require EPA to impose "best available control technology" (BACT) on GHG emissions from any major emitting facility proposed to be constructed in a Prevention of Significant Deterioration area. The other, Title V, creates an operating permit program for stationary sources of emissions, and would require stationary sources subject to BACT under the first provision to also apply for Title V permits. As to each of these requirements, EPA has proposed a "tailoring rule" setting emission thresholds far higher than in the CAA, at least for a few years. EPA justifies the departure from statutory language under the case law doctrines of "absurd results" and "administrative necessity."
A caveat: the issue analyzed in this report is important primarily if Congress does not enact climate change legislation that puts regulation of GHGs beyond the reach of some of the CAA provisions discussed here. In particular, the House-passed climate change bill, H.R. 2454 (the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009), states that three of the CAA sections treated in this report, and one CAA title, may not be used to address air pollutants based on their climate change impacts. |
crs_RL32631 | crs_RL32631_0 | Introduction
The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets details a major part of the Bush administration's overall homeland security strategy. A key implementation requirement, therefore, is clear definition of what the administration considers to be critical infrastructures and key assets. While the Strategy provides the administration's definitions, along with its rationale for including specific infrastructures on the critical list, the meaning of "critical infrastructure" in the public policy context has been evolving for decades and is still open to debate. Twenty years ago, "infrastructure" was defined primarily in debates about the adequacy of the nation's public works—which were viewed by many as deteriorating, obsolete, and of insufficient capacity. "Critical" Infrastructure and "Key Resources"
The growing threat of international terrorism in the mid-1990s renewed federal government interest in infrastructure issues. This concern, in turn, led policy makers to reconsider the definition of "infrastructure" in a security context. This Executive Order (E.O.) 's definition of vital infrastructure. The list of critical infrastructure sectors in E.O. However, the E.O. The USA PATRIOT and Homeland Security Acts
In response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001( P.L. 107-56 ). The list may continue to evolve and grow as economic changes or geopolitical developments influence homeland security policy. One concern is that an unclear or unstable understanding of what constitutes a critical infrastructure (or key resource) could lead to inefficient security policies. However, arbitrarily limiting the number of critical infrastructures a priori due to resource constraints might miss dangerous vulnerabilities. These criteria may become particularly important if federal agencies intend to implement and enforce any potential future security regulations related to critical infrastructure. Various private sector representatives state that they need clear and stable definitions of asset criticality so they will know exactly what assets to protect, and how well to protect them. Otherwise, they risk protecting too many facilities, protecting the wrong facilities, or both. | The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (NSPP) details a major part of the Bush administration's overall homeland security strategy. Implementing this Strategy requires clear definition of "critical infrastructures" and "key assets." Although the Strategy provides such definitions, the meaning of "critical infrastructure" in the public policy context has been evolving for decades and is still open to debate.
Twenty years ago, "infrastructure" was defined primarily with respect to the adequacy of the nation's public works.In the mid-1990's, however, the growing threat of international terrorism led policy makers to reconsider the definition of "infrastructure" in the context of homeland security. Successive federal government reports, laws and executive orders have refined, and generally expanded, the number of infrastructure sectors and the types of assets considered to be "critical" for purposes of homeland security. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001(P.L. 107-56) contains the federal government's most recent definition of "critical infrastructure." The NSPP contains the most recent detailed list of critical infrastructures and assets of national importance. The list may continue to evolve, however, as economic changes or geopolitical developments influence homeland security policy.
There is some debate among policy makers about the implications of an ambiguous or changing list of critical infrastructures. Ambiguity about what constitutes a critical infrastructure (or key resource) could lead to inefficient use of limited homeland security resources. For example, private sector representatives state that they need clear and stable definitions of asset criticality so they will know exactly what assets to protect, and how well to protect them. Otherwise, they risk protecting too many facilities, protecting the wrong facilities, or both. On the other hand, arbitrarily limiting the number of critical infrastructures a priori due to resource constraints might miss a dangerous vulnerability. Clear "criticality" criteria will also be important if federal agencies intend to implement and enforce any potential future security regulations related to critical infrastructure.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL34508 | crs_RL34508_0 | This report examines current conditions and trends in the U.S. natural gas markets. Key market elements examined include prices, consumption, production, imports, and infrastructure. Its share of the power generation market has grown. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports hit a record level in 2007, even as import facilities continue to have low utilization rates. Briefly, important developments in natural gas markets include the following:
The growth in natural gas for power generation has contributed to increased consumption and reduced seasonal variation in use because gas-for-power peaks in summer, versus the total natural gas use winter peak. The first quarter 2008 average spot price at Henry Hub increased 20% from the first quarter 2007 to $8.92 per thousand cubic feet (mcf), versus a 6% year-to-year increase from 2006 to 2007. The United States had record LNG imports in 2007, and increased LNG imports appear likely. Prices throughout this integrated market are influenced by demand (which may be influenced by weather, economic conditions, alternative fuel prices, and other factors), supply, and the capacity available to link supply sources and demand loads (transmission and distribution systems). According to EIA figures, average spot prices at Henry Hub increased about 6% between 2006 and 2007. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports producer price data for its wellhead price series. This price remained stable from 2006 to 2007, decreasing by $0.01 to $6.39 per mcf in 2007 (average). Residential consumption increased about 8.2%, primarily due to colder weather than 2006. Net imports (pipeline and LNG) increased almost 10%, to 3,793 Bcf. Interestingly, while some continue to call for more storage because of the growing consumption of natural gas, the decrease in the seasonal swing (through a decrease in the high month volume and an increase in the low month volume) means that less storage may be able to serve the annual cycling needs of the U.S. markets. For the first time, electric power use of natural gas became the largest end-use sector for natural gas. In its Short Term Energy Outlook, EIA forecasts a 1% increase in natural gas use for 2008, relative to 2007. EIA forecasts increased U.S. production in 2008 of almost 3%, primarily from growth in deepwater Gulf of Mexico and unconventional gas production. Recent Developments
Since the end of 2007, several noteworthy developments have occurred in the natural gas markets:
EIA reports natural gas price increases in 2008. For the 2007-2008 heating season (November-March), the average spot price at the wellhead increased more than 30% from the beginning to the end of heating season, to $8.06 per million Btu. | The functioning of the natural gas market in 2007 appeared relatively stable and infrastructure development continued at an appropriate pace. A tighter demand/supply balance for 2008, however, has generated more upward spot price movement in this latest period. From the beginning to the end of the 2007-2008 heating season, the average wellhead price rose more than 30%, according to Energy Information Administration estimates. In the foreseeable future, weather and economic performance appear most likely to influence prices.
Natural gas provided about 22% of U.S. energy requirements in 2007. It will continue to be a major element of the overall U.S. energy market for the foreseeable future. Given its environmental advantages, it will likely maintain an important market share in the growing electricity generation applications, along with other clean power sources.
As Congress seeks to address energy security issues, the increasing importation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is also a matter deserving careful attention. In 2007, LNG imports reached a record high and plans are to increase this fuel source.
This report provides an update to Congress on recent natural gas market developments and trends that have implications for important energy policy considerations, such as prices, natural gas use for power generation, and liquefied natural gas imports.
From 2006 to 2007, the average wellhead price reported to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) remained essentially unchanged at $6.39 per thousand cubic feet (mcf), down $0.01. The average citygate price increased about 3% to $6.98 per mcf. Domestic production grew, up about 0.8 trillion cubic feet, and domestic consumption increased more than 1 trillion cubic feet. This was the first increase in end-use consumption since 2004, according to EIA.
Natural gas use for electric power generation increased in 2007 by 10.5% and for the first time became the largest sector for natural gas consumption in the period covered by EIA records. Residential use increased 8.2%, with weather as a major factor. Commercial and industrial consumption also increased, by 6% and 2%, respectively. The industrial growth reversed a decline of 1.5% from 2005 to 2006.
On the supply side, onshore production in areas such as the Rocky Mountains and the Barnett Shales of Texas grew and liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports increased. LNG imports reached a record level of 0.8 trillion cubic feet.
EIA's Short Term Energy Outlook anticipates the Henry Hub spot price increasing almost 20% in 2008, reflecting strong demand, relatively low working gas in storage, and domestic production growth of almost 3%. The Henry Hub spot price did increase about 20% between the first quarter 2007 and first quarter 2008.
This report will be updated. This report supersedes CRS Report RL33714. |
crs_R42965 | crs_R42965_0 | Introduction
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been in effect since January 1, 1994. NAFTA was signed by President George H. W. Bush on December 17, 1992, and approved by Congress on November 20, 1993. The NAFTA Implementation Act was signed into law by President William J. Clinton on December 8, 1993 ( P.L. 103-182 ). On May 18, 2017, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) sent the 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks with Canada and Mexico to renegotiate the NAFTA, as required by the 2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) ( P.L. Some trade issues that Congress may address in regard to NAFTA, and the prospective renegotiation of the agreement, include the economic effects of withdrawing from the agreement, the impact on relations with Canada and Mexico, the demands that Canada and Mexico may bring to the negotiations, and an evaluation of how to "modernize" or renegotiate NAFTA. Another issue relates to the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed free trade agreement among the United States and 11 other countries, including Canada and Mexico. Some TPP participants support moving forward on a similar agreement without the participation of the United States, which may have implications for U.S. competitiveness in certain markets. NAFTA influenced other FTAs that the United States later negotiated and also influenced multilateral negotiations. While the FTA generated significant policy debate in the United States, it was a watershed moment for Canada. At the time, it probably was the most comprehensive bilateral FTA negotiated worldwide and contained several groundbreaking provisions. However, there were certain exclusions and reservations by each country. Foreign Investment. Trade Trends and Economic Effects
Most economists contend that trade liberalization promotes overall economic growth and efficiency among trading partners, although there are short-term adjustment costs. NAFTA was unusual in global terms because it was the first time that an FTA linked two wealthy, developed countries with a low-income developing country. Proponents argued that the agreement would help generate thousands of jobs and reduce income disparity between Mexico and its northern neighbors. Opponents warned that the agreement would create huge job losses in the United States as companies moved production to Mexico to lower costs. Effect on the U.S. Economy
The overall net effect of NAFTA on the U.S. economy has been relatively small, primarily because total trade with both Mexico and Canada was equal to less than 5% of U.S. GDP at the time NAFTA went into effect. Because many, if not most, of the economic effects came as a result of U.S.-Mexico trade liberalization, it is also important to take into account that two-way trade with Mexico was equal to an even smaller percentage of GDP (1.4%) in 1994. While there have been periods of positive and negative economic growth in Mexico after the agreement was implemented, it is difficult to measure precisely how much of these economic changes was attributed to NAFTA. It also provides that the agreement shall remain in force for the other parties. Congress may wish to consider ways in which NAFTA could be modernized and renegotiated, the congressional role in the prospective renegotiation, the negotiating positions of Mexico and Canada, and the ramifications of a possible withdrawal from NAFTA. Some proponents and critics of NAFTA agree that the three countries may wish to look at what the agreement has failed to do as they look to the future of North American trade and economic relations. His Administration has also declared that Mexico may consider withdrawing from NAFTA if negotiations are not favorable to the country, although the priority for the Mexican government would be to improve the agreement rather than withdraw from it. Congress may wish to address the implications of President Trump's decision to withdraw from TPP and its consequences. | The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force on January 1, 1994. The agreement was signed by President George H. W. Bush on December 17, 1992, and approved by Congress on November 20, 1993. The NAFTA Implementation Act was signed into law by President William J. Clinton on December 8, 1993 (P.L. 103-182). The overall economic impact of NAFTA is difficult to measure since trade and investment trends are influenced by numerous other economic variables, such as economic growth, inflation, and currency fluctuations. The agreement likely accelerated and also locked in trade liberalization that was already taking place in Mexico, but many of these changes may have taken place without an agreement. Nevertheless, NAFTA is significant, because it was the most comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) negotiated at the time and contained several groundbreaking provisions. A legacy of the agreement is that it has served as a template or model for the new generation of FTAs that the United States later negotiated, and it also served as a template for certain provisions in multilateral trade negotiations as part of the Uruguay Round.
The 115th Congress faces numerous issues related to NAFTA and international trade. On May 18, 2017, the Trump Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks with Canada and Mexico to renegotiate NAFTA, as required by the 2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). The Administration also began consulting with Members of Congress on the scope of the negotiations. Alternatively President Trump, at times, has threatened to withdraw from the agreement without satisfactory results. Congress may wish to consider the ramifications of renegotiating or withdrawing from NAFTA and how it may affect the U.S. economy and foreign relations with Mexico and Canada. It may also wish to examine the congressional role in a possible renegotiation, as well as the negotiating positions of Canada and Mexico. Mexico has stated that, if NAFTA is reopened, it may seek to broaden negotiations to include security, counter-narcotics, and transmigration issues. Mexico has also indicated that it may choose to withdraw from the agreement if the negotiations are not favorable to the country. Congress may also wish to address issues related to the U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement among the United States, Canada, Mexico, and 9 other countries. Some observers contend that the withdrawal from TPP could damage U.S. competitiveness and economic leadership in the region, while others see the withdrawal as a way to prevent lower cost imports and potential job losses. Key provisions in TPP may also be addressed in "modernizing" or renegotiating NAFTA, a more than two decade-old FTA.
NAFTA was controversial when first proposed, mostly because it was the first FTA involving two wealthy, developed countries and a developing country. The political debate surrounding the agreement was divisive with proponents arguing that the agreement would help generate thousands of jobs and reduce income disparity in the region, while opponents warned that the agreement would cause huge job losses in the United States as companies moved production to Mexico to lower costs. In reality, NAFTA did not cause the huge job losses feared by the critics or the large economic gains predicted by supporters. The net overall effect of NAFTA on the U.S. economy appears to have been relatively modest, primarily because trade with Canada and Mexico accounts for a small percentage of U.S. GDP. However, there were worker and firm adjustment costs as the three countries adjusted to more open trade and investment.
The rising number of bilateral and regional trade agreements throughout the world and the rising presence of China in Latin America could have implications for U.S. trade policy with its NAFTA partners. Some proponents of open and rules-based trade contend that maintaining NAFTA or deepening economic relations with Canada and Mexico will help promote a common trade agenda with shared values and generate economic growth. Some opponents argue that the agreement has caused worker displacement, and renegotiation could cause further job losses. |
crs_R42046 | crs_R42046_0 | Introduction
The Horn of Africa region, which includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, is facing its worst drought in 60 years. Conditions in Somalia have created an escalating refugee crisis, primarily in Kenya and Ethiopia. So far in FY2012, it has provided nearly $220 million. It is also working on long-term responses to break the disaster cycle in the Horn. The 112 th Congress has so far focused on the crisis in hearings, legislation, and congressional correspondence with the Administration. It is anticipated Congress will continue to follow and respond to events as they unfold in the Horn. Deterioration of security conditions along the Kenya-Somali border, security incidents within the Dadaab refugee camp complex in northeast Kenya, increasing restrictions on humanitarian access and a ban on 16 aid agencies in Somalia by Al Shabaab, an Al Qaeda-linked militant Islamist insurgent coalition, continue to have an impact on the relief effort. Background on the Region
In recent decades, humanitarian crises in the Horn of Africa have been caused not only by natural disasters, such as drought and famine, but also by violent internal political turmoil and periodic conflict between states in the region. An Islamist insurgency led by an Al Qaeda affiliate, Al Shabaab, complicates the delivery of international aid to famine-struck areas, an issue examined in greater detail later in this report. The World Food Program (WFP) has estimated that as of September 15, 2011, more than 13 million people in the Horn are in need of food and other humanitarian assistance. Many experts would agree the funding situation in the near term improved, but concerns remain about sustaining support through the crisis, which is expected to last well into 2012. If global humanitarian accounts are not replenished following a humanitarian crisis or disaster, U.S. capacity to respond to other emergencies could be impacted. Internal conflicts and conflicts between and among states are major contributing factors. Appendix A. Evolution of the Nutrition Situation in Somalia—January to August 2011
Appendix B. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
The current mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is outlined in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1772 (2007), adopted August 20, 2007, as follows:
(1) to support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by assisting with the free movement, safe passage, and protection of those involved in the political dialogue; (2) to provide protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions to help them carry out government functions and to provide security for key infrastructure; (3) to assist within its capabilities in the re-establishment and training of all-inclusive Somali security forces; (4) to contribute, as requested and within its capabilities, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian aid; and (5) to protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel. | As a result of the worst drought in 60 years, regional conflicts, and conflict within states, a humanitarian emergency of massive proportion has unfolded over the past year in the Horn of Africa region. Current estimates suggest that more than 13.3 million people are currently affected, 250,000 of whom need food assistance in the near term to avoid death. Somalia has been hardest hit so far, creating population displacement within its borders and a refugee crisis of nearly 1 million people in the region, primarily in Kenya and Ethiopia.
The international community continues to respond with a massive humanitarian operation that reached full strength in mid 2011. Although food security has begun to improve, the situation remains very fragile, particularly in southern Somalia, where conditions are considered among the worst in the world. Humanitarian needs are expected to demand sustained attention well into 2012. While life-saving assistance is the current priority, long-term responses may be needed to break the disaster cycle in the Horn. Though triggered by drought, the humanitarian emergency is complicated by political and security pressures within, between, and among the various countries in the region. The recent deterioration of security conditions along the Kenya-Somali border, security incidents within the Dadaab refugee camp complex in northeast Kenya, and increasing restrictions by Al Shabaab, an Islamist insurgency led by an Al Qaeda affiliate, on humanitarian access in Somalia all have had an impact on the relief effort.
This report provides an overview of the current status of the crisis, summary background on the region, a framework for the international and humanitarian response, and an analysis of some of the operational challenges.
The role of the 112th Congress, which has so far focused on the crisis in hearings, legislation, and congressional correspondence with the Administration, is also examined, particularly with regard to funding questions, including:
budget priorities on global humanitarian accounts and food aid; diversion of food aid; donor restrictions on aid; and burdensharing and donor fatigue.
It is anticipated Congress will continue to follow and respond to events as they unfold in the Horn. |
crs_RL34445 | crs_RL34445_0 | Controversy continues over Tibet's current political status as part of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the role of the Dalai Lama and his Tibetan government-in-exile, and the impact of Chinese control on Tibetan culture and religious traditions. Current Situation Concerning Tibet
March 2008 Demonstrations and Crackdown
On March 10, 2008, a series of demonstrations began in Lhasa and elsewhere in Tibetan regions of China to mark the 49 th anniversary of an unsuccessful Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule in 1959. These demonstrations also were contained by security forces. Both the protests and the response of the PRC authorities escalated in the ensuing days, spreading out from the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) and into parts of Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai Provinces that are populated by Tibetans. By the afternoon of March 14, 2008, in the absence of an apparent response by PRC security forces, mobs of angry people were burning and looting businesses and other establishments in downtown Lhasa. Many fear that PRC policies toward Tibet in recent years demonstrate that there is little hope that Beijing will make significant changes in its policy calculations, despite even the urgent advice of those who wish China well. They believe his demise, without having reached an understanding from Beijing for greater Tibetan autonomy, would remove an important source of restraint on more ideological elements in the Tibetan community. Having provided such extended economic assistance and development in Tibet with central government money, PRC officials often seem perplexed at the simmering anger many Tibetans nevertheless retain against the Chinese. China appears to have calculated that it can out-wait the 72-year-old Dalai Lama, and that the demise of this compelling personality will result in the disintegration of the Tibetan movement. Many westerners, on the other hand, see the Dalai Lama and his influence within the Tibetan community as the key to unlocking China's long-standing difficulties in Tibet. They see Beijing's continued rejection of the Dalai Lama's "middle way" approach as having undercut his ability to influence younger, more militant Tibetans who see his moderation as having brought nothing but opprobrium from Beijing. The decision reportedly was denounced by Beijing as a move that "seriously interferes with China's internal affairs and damages U.S.-China relations." The demonstrations and the PRC crackdown in response has prompted some Members to call for either a complete U.S. boycott of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing or a boycott of the opening ceremony to the games. H.Res. 1075 (Smith), condemning the Chinese government's violence against Tibetan protestors and urging Beijing to enter into dialogue with the Dalai Lama. H.Res. 355: China's Illegal Control of Tibet
Established the sense of Congress that Tibet, including those areas incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai, is an occupied country under the established principles of international law; that Tibet's true representatives are the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-exile; that throughout its history Tibet has maintained a distinctive and sovereign national, cultural, religious, and territorial identity except for periods of illegal Chinese occupation, has maintained a separate and sovereign political and territorial identity; and Congress' sense that the United States, Mongolia, Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, India, Japan, Great Britain, and Russia recognized Tibet as an independent nation or dealt with Tibet independently of any Chinese government; and that the PRC in 1949-1950 launched an armed invasion of Tibet in contravention of international law. | On March 10, 2008, a series of demonstrations began in Lhasa and other Tibetan regions of China to mark the 49th anniversary of an unsuccessful Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule in 1959. The demonstrations appeared to begin peacefully with small groups that were then contained by security forces. Both the protests and the response of the PRC authorities escalated in the ensuing days, spreading from the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) into parts of Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai Provinces with Tibetan populations. By March 14, 2008, mobs of angry people were burning and looting establishments in downtown Lhasa. Authorities of the People's Republic of China (PRC) responded by sealing off Tibet and moving in large-scale security forces. Beijing has defended its actions as appropriate and necessary to restore civil order and prevent further violence. Still, China's response has resulted in renewed calls for boycotts of the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony on August 8, 2008, and for China to hold talks with the Dalai Lama.
China sees itself as having provided Tibet with extensive economic assistance and development using money from central government coffers, and PRC officials often seem perplexed at the simmering anger many Tibetans nevertheless retain against them. Despite the economic development, Tibetans charge that the PRC interferes with Tibetan culture and religion. They cite as examples: Beijing's interference in 1995 in the choice of the Panchen Lama, Tibet's second highest-ranking personage; enactment of a "reincarnation law" in 2007 requiring Buddhist monks who wish to reincarnate to obtain prior approval from Beijing; and China's policy of conducting "patriotic education" campaigns, as well as efforts to foster atheism, among the Tibetan religious community. The PRC defends the campaigns as a tool to help monks become loyal, law-abiding citizens of China.
Controversy over the role of the Dalai Lama and the impact of PRC control on Tibet's language, culture, and religion have prompted recurring actions by Congress in support of Tibet's traditions—actions routinely denounced by Beijing. Members of the 110th Congress have responded to the March 2008 demonstrations and crackdowns with legislation requiring U.S. government officials to boycott the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony (H.R. 5668); proposals condemning the crackdown and asking Beijing to hold talks with the Dalai Lama (H.Res. 1075 and H.Res. 1077); and the formation of a new Tibet Caucus.
Many fear there is little hope that Beijing will make significant changes in its Tibet policy, despite even the urgent advice of China's friends. Beijing appears to have calculated that it can out-wait the 72-year-old Dalai Lama, and that his demise will result in the Tibetan movement's disintegration. But many see the Dalai Lama and his influence within the Tibetan community as the key to unlocking China's difficulties in Tibet. They see China's rejection of the Dalai Lama's "middle way" approach as having undercut his ability to influence younger, more militant Tibetans. They believe his death, without having reached an understanding from Beijing for greater Tibetan autonomy, would remove an important source of restraint on more ideological elements in the Tibetan community. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_97-1025 | crs_97-1025_0 | Introduction
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. It shields them from trespassing, threats, damage, espionage, and from being corruptly used as instruments of fraud. It is not a comprehensive provision; instead it fills cracks and gaps in the protection afforded by other state and federal criminal laws. This is a brief description of §1030 and its federal statutory companions. In their present form, the seven paragraphs of subsection 1030(a) outlaw
computer trespassing in a government computer, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(3); computer trespassing resulting in exposure to certain governmental, credit, financial, or computer-housed information, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2); damaging a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5); committing fraud an integral part of which involves unauthorized access to a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(4); threatening to damage a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(7); trafficking in passwords for a government computer, or when the trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(6); and accessing a computer to commit espionage, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1). Subsection 1030(b) makes it a crime to attempt or conspire to commit any of these offenses. Subsection 1030(c) catalogs the penalties for committing them, penalties that range from imprisonment for not more than a year for simple cyberspace trespassing to imprisonment for not more than 20 years for a second espionage-related conviction and to life imprisonment for death-result offenses. Subsection 1030(d) preserves the investigative authority of the Secret Service. Subsection 1030(e) supplies common definitions. Subsection 1030(f) disclaims any application to otherwise permissible law enforcement activities. Subsection 1030(g) creates a civil cause of action for victims of these crimes. The Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 inserted separate criminal and civil forfeiture subsections within §1030. Causing Computer Damage (18 U.S.C. 1030(g). (e) As used in this section—
(1) the term "computer" means an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device;
(2) the term "protected computer" means a computer—
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government; or
(B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States;
(3) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any other commonwealth, possession or territory of the United States;
(4) the term "financial institution" means—
(A) an institution, with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;
(B) the Federal Reserve or a member of the Federal Reserve including any Federal Reserve Bank;
(C) a credit union with accounts insured by the National Credit Union Administration;
(D) a member of the Federal home loan bank system and any home loan bank;
(E) any institution of the Farm Credit System under the Farm Credit Act of 1971;
(F) a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
(G) the Securities Investor Protection Corporation;
(H) a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as such terms are defined in paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978); and
(I) an organization operating under section 25 or section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act;
(5) the term "financial record" means information derived from any record held by a financial institution pertaining to a customer's relationship with the financial institution;
(6) the term "exceeds authorized access" means to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter;
(7) the term "department of the United States" means the legislative or judicial branch of the Government or one of the executive departments enumerated in section 101 of title 5;
(8) the term "damage" means any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information;
(9) the term "government entity" includes the Government of the United States, any State or political subdivision of the United States, any foreign country, and any state, province, municipality, or other political subdivision of a foreign country;
(10) the term "conviction" shall include a conviction under the law of any State for a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year, an element of which is unauthorized access, or exceeding authorized access, to a computer;
(11) the term "loss" means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service; and
(12) the term "person" means any individual, firm, corporation, educational institution, financial institution, governmental entity, or legal or other entity. | The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. 1030, outlaws conduct that victimizes computer systems. It is a cyber security law. It protects federal computers, bank computers, and computers connected to the Internet. It shields them from trespassing, threats, damage, espionage, and from being corruptly used as instruments of fraud. It is not a comprehensive provision, but instead it fills cracks and gaps in the protection afforded by other federal criminal laws. This is a brief sketch of CFAA and some of its federal statutory companions, including the amendments found in the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act, P.L. 110-326, 122 Stat. 3560 (2008).
In their present form, the seven paragraphs of subsection 1030(a) outlaw
computer trespassing (e.g., hacking) in a government computer, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(3); computer trespassing (e.g., hacking) resulting in exposure to certain governmental, credit, financial, or computer-housed information, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2); damaging a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce (e.g., a worm, computer virus, Trojan horse, time bomb, a denial of service attack, and other forms of cyber attack, cyber crime, or cyber terrorism), 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5); committing fraud an integral part of which involves unauthorized access to a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(4); threatening to damage a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(7); trafficking in passwords for a government computer, or when the trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(6); and accessing a computer to commit espionage, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1).
Subsection 1030(b) makes it a crime to attempt or conspire to commit any of these offenses. Subsection 1030(c) catalogs the penalties for committing them, penalties that range from imprisonment for not more than a year for simple cyberspace trespassing to a maximum of life imprisonment when death results from intentional computer damage. Subsection 1030(d) preserves the investigative authority of the Secret Service. Subsection 1030(e) supplies common definitions. Subsection 1030(f) disclaims any application to otherwise permissible law enforcement activities. Subsection 1030(g) creates a civil cause of action for victims of these crimes. Subsections 1030(i) and (j) authorize forfeiture of tainted property.
This report is available in abbreviated form—without the footnotes, citations, quotations, or appendixes found in this report—under the title CRS Report RS20830, Cybercrime: A Sketch of 18 U.S.C. 1030 and Related Federal Criminal Laws, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL32834 | crs_RL32834_0 | Introduction
The 109th Congress is considering legislation to reauthorize the block grant of TemporaryAssistance for Needy Families (TANF) for five years. The program has received 11 short-term extensions since the original funding authorityfor TANF expired on September 30, 2002. 109-68 ) funds the programthrough December 31, 2005. The Senate Finance Committee has reported an original bill, S. 667 ( S.Rept.109-51 ). That bill was approved by the House Ways and Means Committee's Subcommittee on HumanResources on March 15, and awaits full committee action, as well as consideration by othercommittees that have jurisdictions over parts of the bill. Both bills also raise TANF work participationstandards, though the two differ in terms of how much more work would be required and whatactivities count toward the participation standards. This report provides a comparison of the TANFprovisions of S. 667 and H.R. TANF Funding Provisions
S. 667 and H.R. The major difference in the funding provision between the two billsis that S. 667 would completely revamp the TANF contingency (recession) funds, whileH.R. 240 would make relatively minor revisions to the fund. The 1996 welfare reform law( P.L. Currently, supplemental grants total $319 million per year. TANF includes acontingency fund, which is designed to provide extra matching grants to states that meet criteria ofeconomic need (based on unemployment rates and food stamp caseloads) and have stateexpenditures in excess of their FY1994 level. Work Requirements
Both S. 667 and H.R. Both bills would raise work participation standards that states must meetfrom the current law's standard of 50% to 70%, raise the required hours of working to receive fullcredit and provide partial credit for participating families that do not meet the full credit standard,and revise the list of activities that recipients may participate in for states to receive credit towardTANF standards. The current participation standard is 50%. H.R. 240 narrows the listof core activities by eliminating job search and vocational education. Both H.R. 240 would allow states to define activities forfamilies with at least 24 hours in core activities; S. 667 would allow states to count anexpanded set of activities for single-parent families with at least 24 hours per week in core activities. Additionally, S. 667allows caring for a disabled family member to count as a work activity under certain circumstances. Although the two bills provide similar funding for "marriage promotion" activities, theydiffer significantly in the details of their provisions authorizing these grants. Other TANF Provisions
Both S. 667 and H.R. Among the other TANF provisions addressed in the reauthorization bills:
H.R. 240 funds tribal TANF programs and work program at current levels through FY2010 and makestribal organizations eligible for TANF bonuses. | The 109th Congress is considering legislation to reauthorize the block grant of TemporaryAssistance for Needy Families (TANF) for five years. Congress has inconclusively debatedlong-term TANF authorizations since 2002, instead adopting short-term extensions. The latestextension ( P.L. 109-19 ) funds the program through December 31, 2005. Thus far in the 109thCongress, the Senate Finance Committee has reported S. 667 ( S.Rept. 109-51 ). A billintroduced by House Republican leaders, H.R. 240 , has received approval from theHouse Ways and Means Committee's Subcommittee on Human Resources.
S. 667 and H.R. 240 are very similar in terms of how they wouldcontinue funding under the TANF program. Both bills extend basic TANF funding at current levels($16.6 billion for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the territories) through FY2010 andextend supplemental grants provided to 17 states through FY2009. Both bills provide new,categorical grants for marriage promotion activities totaling $200 million per year financed througha reduction in current TANF bonuses to states. The major difference in the TANF fundingprovisions of the two bills is how they provide extra contingency (recession-related) funding to thestates. H.R. 240 essentially extends the current law fund that provides matchinggrants to states experiencing high and increased unemployment rates and food stamp caseloads. S. 667 eliminates the requirement that states expend additional money to accesscontingency funds, and instead bases extra funding on the cost of increased caseloads for states thatmeet revised unemployment or food stamp caseload criteria.
The two bills would substantially revise the TANF work participation standards that statesmust meet. Under current law, 50% of TANF families with an adult or minor household head mustparticipate, though the 50% rate is reduced by caseload reductions that have occurred since welfarereform. Both S. 667 and H.R. 240 would raise this standard to 70%,though under both bills the standard could be reduced through credits (though the credits differbetween the two bills). Both also eliminate a separate 90% participation rate requirement fortwo-parent families. Both bills would raise the minimum hours required of family members in orderto be considered full participants, though H.R. 240 would raise them by morethan would S. 667. The bills also differ in the activities countable toward theparticipation standards: H.R. 240 narrows the list of activities countable,requiring recipients to spend at least 24 hours in work, community service, or work experienceprograms except for a short (usually three-month) period when states may themselves define whatcounts as "activities." S. 667 keeps all activities under current law as countable, andallows states to count a wider range of activities for three months (more under some circumstances).
Both bills contain non-TANF provisions relating to child support enforcement, responsible"fatherhood" programs, and transitional medical assistance (not addressed herein). This report willbe updated as S. 667 and H.R. 240 move through the legislative process. |
crs_R42482 | crs_R42482_0 | The Constitution requires a count of the U.S. population every 10 years. Based on the census, the number of seats in the House of Representatives is reapportioned among the states. Thus, at least every 10 years, in response to changes in the number of Representatives apportioned to it or to shifts in its population, each state is required to draw new boundaries for its congressional districts. Although each state has its own process for redistricting, congressional districts must conform to a number of constitutional and federal statutory standards, including the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965. The VRA was enacted under Congress's authority to enforce the 15 th Amendment, which provides that the right of citizens to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account of race, color, or previous servitude. The report also provides an overview of selected legislation in the 113 th and 114 th Congresses that would establish additional requirements and standards for congressional redistricting, and amend the VRA to, among other things, reinstitute a coverage formula for Section 5 preclearance. Specifically, Section 2 prohibits any voting qualification or practice—including the drawing of congressional redistricting plans—applied or imposed by any state or political subdivision that results in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote based on race, color, or membership in a language minority. The statute further provides that a violation is established if:
based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by [members of a racial or language minority group] in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political processes and to elect representatives of their choice. Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act—Invalidated by U.S. Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder
In Shelby County v. Holder the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Section 4(b) of the VRA. Section 4(b) contained a formula prescribing which states and jurisdictions with a history of discrimination were required to obtain federal approval or "preclearance" under Section 5 before changing any voting law, including redistricting plans. As a result of the Court's decision, the nine states, and jurisdictions within six states, that were previously covered under the formula are no longer subject to the VRA's preclearance requirement. Specifically, a covered jurisdiction had to demonstrate, in an action for declaratory judgment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, that during the previous 10 years and during the pendency of the action:
(A) "no ... test or device has been used within such State or political subdivision for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color";
(B) "no final judgment of any court of the United States, other than the denial of declaratory judgment under this section, has determined that denials or abridgements of the rights to vote on account of race or color have occurred anywhere in the territory of such State or political subdivision";
(C) "no Federal examiners or observers under this Act have been assigned to such State or political subdivision";
(D) "such State or political subdivision and all governmental units within its territory have complied with section 5 of this Act, including compliance with the requirement that no change covered by section 5 has been enforced without preclearance under section 5, and have repealed all changes covered by section 5 to which the Attorney General has successfully objected or as to which the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has denied a declaratory judgment";
(E) "the Attorney General has not interposed any objection (that has not been overturned by a final judgment of a court) and no declaratory judgment has been denied under section 5, with respect to any submission by or on behalf of the plaintiff or any governmental unit within its territory under section 5, and no such submissions or declaratory judgment actions are pending; and
(F) "such State or political subdivision and all governmental units within its territory—(i) have eliminated voting procedures and methods of election which inhibit or dilute equal access to the electoral process; (ii) have engaged in constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment of persons exercising rights protected under this Act; and (iii) have engaged in other constructive efforts, such as expanded opportunity for convenient registration and voting for every person of voting age and the appointment of minority persons as election officials throughout the jurisdiction and at all stages of the election and registration process." Although the Court invalidated only the coverage formula in Section 4, by extension, Section 5 has been rendered currently inoperable. In order to be granted preclearance, the covered jurisdiction had the burden of proving that the proposed voting change "neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color," or membership in a language minority group. 219 and H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. 114th Congress
H.R. 113th Congress
H.R. 3899 and S. 1945 , the "Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014," were identical to the bill introduced in the 114 th Congress, discussed above. | The Constitution requires a count of the U.S. population every 10 years. Based on the census, the number of seats in the House of Representatives is reapportioned among the states. Thus, at least every 10 years, in response to changes in the number of Representatives apportioned to it or to shifts in its population, each state is required to draw new boundaries for its congressional districts. Although each state has its own process for redistricting, congressional districts must conform to a number of constitutional and federal statutory standards, including the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965.
The VRA was enacted under Congress's authority to enforce the 15th Amendment, which provides that the right of citizens to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account of race, color, or previous servitude. Section 2 of the VRA prohibits the use of any voting qualification or practice—including the drawing of congressional redistricting plans—that results in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote based on race, color, or membership in a language minority. The statute further provides that a violation is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that political processes are not equally open to members of a racial or language minority group in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate and to elect representatives of choice. In decisions including Thornburg v. Gingles and Bartlett v. Strickland, the Supreme Court further interpreted the requirements of Section 2.
In its 2013 decision, Shelby County v. Holder, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Section 4(b) of the VRA. Section 4(b) contained a formula prescribing which states and jurisdictions with a history of discrimination were required to obtain prior approval or "preclearance" under Section 5 before changing any voting law, including congressional redistricting plans. Section 5 required those "covered" jurisdictions to preclear their redistricting plans with either the Department of Justice or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia before implementation. In order to be granted preclearance, the covered jurisdiction had the burden of proving that the proposed voting change neither had the purpose, nor would it have the effect, of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or membership in a language minority group. Although the Court invalidated only the coverage formula in Section 4, by extension, Section 5 has been rendered currently inoperable. As a result, the nine states and jurisdictions in six other states previously covered under the formula are no longer subject to the VRA's preclearance requirement. Section 2 of the VRA, which applies in all jurisdictions, was not at issue in this case.
In the 114th Congress, H.R. 885, the "Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2015," has been introduced. This bill is identical to companion bills H.R. 3899 and S. 1945, the "Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014," which were introduced in the 113th Congress. Among other things, the legislation would amend the VRA to reinstitute a coverage formula for Section 5 preclearance.
Bills have also been introduced that would establish certain standards and requirements for congressional redistricting, including H.R. 75, the "Coretta Scott King Mid-Decade Redistricting Prohibition Act of 2015"; identical bills, H.R. 219 and H.R. 1347, the "John Tanner Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act"; H.R. 934, the "Redistricting and Voter Protection Act of 2015"; and H.R. 1346, the "Redistricting Transparency Act of 2015." |
crs_R42969 | crs_R42969_0 | The breadth and variety of these statistics are reflected in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) complex border security mission, which calls on the agency to "prevent the illegal flow of people and goods across U.S. air, land, and sea borders while expediting the safe flow of lawful travel and commerce; ensure security and resilience of global movement systems; [and] disrupt and dismantle transnational organizations that engage in smuggling and trafficking across the U.S. This report focuses on the first major step in managing border-related risks: assessing the risk posed by different types of threats at U.S. borders. This report begins with a discussion of the types of threats the United States confronts at its international borders (see " Types of Border Threats "), followed by an overview of DHS's risk management methodologies, including in the context of border security (see " DHS and Risk Management "). The report concludes by placing threat assessment within the broader context of border security policymaking. Threat Actors
Any person who intends to harm the United States, or whose presence may lead to harmful consequences, may be considered a threat and a potential target for border enforcement policies. The key differences among terrorists, transnational criminals, and unauthorized migrants are summarized in Figure 2 ; the threats associated with these different types of border flows are discussed below (see " Evaluating Potential Consequences of Border Threats "). Illegal goods fall into two broad categories distinguished by their inherent illegitimacy : certain weapons, illegal drugs, and counterfeit goods are always illegal and categorically prohibited, while other goods are generally legal, but become illegitimate because they are smuggled to avoid the enforcement of specific laws, taxes, or regulations. DHS, for instance, has identified "high-consequence weapons of mass destruction (WMD)" as one of the primary threats to homeland security. A Framework for Assessing Border Threats
The diversity of border threats and the complexity of DHS's border security and border management mission create challenges for border security policymaking and planning. Rather than attempting specific predictions about where, when, and how border threats will be realized, DHS and other analysts often rely on risk management as an approach to border security, and on probabilistic risk models as a framework for analyzing and describing different types of potential threats. Understanding border threats can be a logical starting point for this process. The Strategic Actor Problem
Beyond these definitional and measurement problems, an additional obstacle to estimating the likelihood of particular border threats is that threat actors like unauthorized migrants, transnational criminal organizations, and potential terrorists are strategic and may adapt their behavior in response to U.S. border enforcement efforts. Members of Congress may reach different conclusions about potential consequences at each stage of this evaluation process. This report describes a possible framework for describing the risks posed by specific hazards at the border based on their likelihood and their potential consequences. As budgeting has grown tighter in the current fiscal climate, policymakers face increasingly difficult questions about how to set priorities and where to allocate scarce resources. | The United States confronts a wide array of threats at U.S. borders, ranging from terrorists who may have weapons of mass destruction, to transnational criminals smuggling drugs or counterfeit goods, to unauthorized migrants intending to live and work in the United States. Given this diversity of threats, how may Congress and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) set border security priorities and allocate scarce enforcement resources?
In general, DHS's answer to this question is organized around risk management, a process that involves risk assessment and the allocation of resources based on a cost-benefit analysis. This report focuses on the first part of this process by identifying border threats and describing a framework for understanding risks at U.S. borders. DHS employs models to classify threats as relatively high- or low-risk for certain planning and budgeting exercises and to implement certain border security programs. Members of Congress may wish to use similar models to evaluate the costs and benefits of potential border security policies and to allocate border enforcement resources. This report discusses some of the issues involved in modeling border-related threats.
Understanding border risks begins with identifying key threats. At their roots, border-related threats are closely linked to the flow of people (travelers) and goods (cargo) from one country to another. Any smuggled item or individual hidden among the legitimate flows potentially constitutes a threat to U.S. security or interests.
The intentions and actions of unauthorized travelers separate them into different threat categories, including terrorists, transnational criminals, and other illegal migrants.
Illegal goods are distinguished by their inherent legitimacy or illegitimacy. Certain weapons, illegal drugs, and counterfeit goods are always illegal and categorically prohibited, while other goods are legal under most circumstances, but become illegitimate if they are smuggled to avoid enforcement of specific laws, taxes, or regulations.
The risks associated with these diverse types of threats may be modeled as a function of (1) the likelihood that the threat will be realized, and (2) the potential consequences of a given threat. In practice, however, estimating likelihood and evaluating potential consequences are challenging tasks, particularly when it comes to the diversity and complexity of border threats. Assessing border threats is also difficult because terrorists, criminals, and migrants are strategic actors who may adapt to border defenses. This report describes some of these challenges, and suggests questions policymakers may ask to develop their own "maps" of border risks. Several potential border threats are described, and the report summarizes what is known about their likelihood and consequences.
The report concludes by discussing how risk assessment may interact with border security policymaking. Given the uncertainty and the subjective judgments involved in modeling risk, policymakers may struggle to reach a consensus on border priorities. Nonetheless, a systematic approach to studying border threats may help clarify the types of policy tradeoffs lawmakers confront at the border. |
crs_R45330 | crs_R45330_0 | Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, this report considers how such changes have affected the U.S. labor market since 2007, examining the performance of labor market indicators like employment, unemployment, and labor force participation; changes in the types of jobs available by industry and occupation; and employment outcomes for different demographic groups. Since 2007, the labor market has been affected by factors such as the Great Recession of 2007-2009, technological innovation, and an aging labor force that have altered the mix of jobs available to U.S. workers. Labor Market Impacts of Cyclical and Structural Change
This section discusses the contribution of business cycles (notably the Great Recession) and ongoing structural change to recent labor market developments. That is, despite greater success among job seekers in securing employment (as seen in recently low unemployment rates, Figure 1 ), fewer potential workers are participating in the labor market (see declining labor force participation rates in Figure 2 ) and this has driven down employment as a share of the population. Most other labor market utilization indicators are also consistent with full employment. One measure that has shown less improvement recently is the labor force participation rate (LFPR), which experienced an unprecedented drop in the 2000s and only a relatively small recovery in the current expansion ( Figure 2 ). The Great Recession led to greater employment loss in certain industries and occupations than others, but those effects have receded as the economy returns to full employment. Declining employment in goods-producing sectors, particularly manufacturing, has been attributed to firms' adoption of labor-saving technology and, more recently, markedly increased import competition for some products. As discussed in previous sections of this report, employment has not grown in each occupation and industry at the same pace since 2007 (and in particular during the Great Recession and recovery), and this implies that employment outcomes over the past decade are likely to vary across worker groups. The employment-population ratio is a summary indicator of labor market performance because it describes concurrently the proportion of the adult population who want jobs (i.e., the labor force participation rate) and the success rate of this group in obtaining jobs (i.e., the employment rate, or the complement of the unemployment rate). The employment-population ratio declined—and had not fully recovered by 2017—for all levels of educational attainment during the recession. Sex
Continuing a long-term pattern of difference in employment, prime-age (i.e., 25 to 54 years) men were more likely to be employed than prime-age women over the 2007 to 2017 period ( Figure 10 ). While prime-age men and women had similar unemployment rates before the Great Recession and in 2018, the prime-age male unemployment rate peaked at a higher level (10.0%) than the prime-age female unemployment rate (8.1%) following the recession ( Figure 12 ). At the same time, the LFPR fell for both men and women, but labor force participation losses were larger for prime-age males. As construction and manufacturing jobs decline, some men have moved into occupations with traditionally large female representation, such as food preparation and serving, personal services jobs, health care support positions, and others. What to Expect Going Forward
Looking forward, the labor market will continue to evolve in response to cyclical and structural developments, creating future opportunities and challenges for U.S. workers. With a historically low unemployment rate, the economy can only continue adding jobs at the recent pace if proportionately more new or former workers can be brought into the labor force. In the past, construction and manufacturing employment has been more sensitive to the business cycle, and labor market recovery has been slower for certain minorities. The participation rate of young workers (aged 16 to 24) has fallen by over 10 percentage points since 1990. According to the Social Security Trustees report, annual labor force growth fell from 2.1% between 1960 and 1980 to 1.4% between 1980 and 2000 to 0.6% between 2000 and 2015. Skill-biased technological change and globalization have not prevented a return to full employment, but have sparked concerns about a "hollowing out" of middle-wage jobs, especially for less-educated workers. | The period since 2007 has been a time of significant change for labor markets. The Great Recession of 2007-2009, the longest and deepest recession since the Great Depression, caused the unemployment rate to briefly reach 10%, and labor markets have subsequently experienced a long and gradual recovery. Most labor force metrics, including the unemployment rate and various other measures of labor force underutilization, have returned to levels that have historically been consistent with full employment.
Labor Force Participation
One exception is the labor force participation rate (the ratio of workers who have a job or are looking for a job to the overall adult population), which began declining before the Great Recession and has only levelled off more recently. The decline in the labor force participation rate is partly attributable to the aging of the population, particularly the retirement of the baby boomers. But even among prime-age workers (age 25-54), participation is historically low for men and has only just rebounded for women from the recession. Participation among young workers also fell sharply during the recession and has not fully rebounded. Economists disagree about whether there will be further recovery in the participation rate; without further recovery, the economy will not be able to continue adding jobs at recent rates.
Shifts in the Types of Jobs
Both the Great Recession and the continuation of longer-term structural changes have caused employment growth since 2007 to vary significantly by occupation and industry. Employment in goods-producing industries (such as manufacturing and construction) was hardest hit by the recession and had still not recovered by 2017, whereas employment has grown in 9 out of 10 service-producing industries over that period. When viewed by occupation, employment growth since 2007 has been concentrated in certain occupations with low median wages (food preparation and personal care) and high median wages (healthcare practitioners, business and financial operations, computer and mathematical, and management), while the decline in employment share has been concentrated in certain middle-wage occupations (production, office and administrative support, and construction). This pattern has been referred to as the "hollowing out" or "polarization" of labor markets, and has been attributed largely to technological change and globalization.
Outcomes for Demographic Groups
Employment outcomes vary widely across demographic groups. Employment rates have been persistently lower for young workers, lower-educated workers, and black workers. In addition to changing opportunities for those workers, the Great Recession hit those groups harder, with some lasting effects. Men were more likely than women to participate in the labor force and be employed, but women's employment rates rose relative to men's over the 2000 to 2007 period. High unemployment in male-dominated industries (construction and manufacturing) and low unemployment in female-dominated industries (health care and education) contributed to relatively higher male unemployment during the recession. Although unemployment rates for both sexes ultimately recovered, men's labor force participation rates trended downward over the last 10 years while women's were largely unchanged.
Looking Forward
Going forward, policymakers face several labor market challenges, including (1) accommodating the current tightness in labor markets, while preparing for a return to recession at some point; (2) the continuing slowdown in the growth of the labor force (from 1.4% between 1980 and 2000 to 0.6% between 2000 and 2015); (3) addressing the labor market impacts of structural changes posed by technological change and globalization; and (4) a decline in labor market dynamism (e.g., fewer workers switching jobs). |
crs_R41116 | crs_R41116_0 | Introduction
The International Criminal Court ("ICC" or "Court") is the first permanent international court with jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community." Since its inception, the ICC has received referrals for investigations from three States Parties and one referral from the United Nations Security Council. In particular, this report seeks to address the concern that the ICC might assert jurisdiction over U.S. nationals by providing insight into (1) how the ICC and Prosecutor determine whether the ICC has jurisdiction over the situations under preliminary investigation; (2) how the Prosecutor and ICC determine whether a situation would be admissible as a case before the ICC; (3) the basis for concerns that the ICC has the authority to request the surrender of a U.S. national; and (4) steps taken by the United States to prevent or deter the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over U.S. nationals. The History of U.S. Policy Toward the ICC
While the U.S. executive branch initially supported the idea of creating an international criminal court and was a major participant at the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court ("Rome Conference"), which produced the Statute, the United States ultimately voted against the Statute. The United States stated that its primary objection to the treaty is the potential for the ICC to assert jurisdiction over both U.S. civilian policymakers and U.S. soldiers charged with "war crimes" even if the United States does not ratify the Rome Statute. The Obama Administration seems to have continued this approach and has started engaging directly with the ICC. Article 17: Issues of Admissibility
Even if the ICC has jurisdiction over a case, it may be precluded from hearing it if the case is inadmissible under Article 17, which states:
the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; (c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3; (d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court. The proliferation of Article 98 Agreements has triggered a vigorous international debate over when and whether Article 98 prevents the ICC from requesting that a State Party arrest and surrender a person in its territory. Iraq
In 2006, the Office of the Prosecutor concluded its preliminary investigation into alleged offenses committed in Iraq. Selected Situations Undergoing Preliminary Analysis by the Prosecutor
Afghanistan
Preliminary Analysis in Afghanistan
On September 9, 2009, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo confirmed that his office was gathering information about possible war crimes committed by NATO soldiers, U.S. soldiers, and both Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents in Afghanistan. The ICC's jurisdiction over any alleged crimes would come solely from the PNA's declaration as neither Israel nor the PNA are States Parties to the Rome Statute. The United States has generally opposed ICC involvement in investigating alleged crimes committed during the December 2008-January 2009 conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Executive Branch Policy
Although remaining opposed to United States becoming a State Party to the Rome Statute, the Bush Administration in its second term took actions that evidenced an acceptance of the work and importance of the ICC in bringing perpetrators of atrocities to justice. The Obama Administration has undertaken an interagency review of its ICC policy and is expected to complete the review and make public its conclusions sometime in 2010. Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo, U.S. Alternate Representative to the United Nations for Special Political Affairs, stated in the Security Council on December 4, 2009, "Although the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, the United States was pleased to participate last week for the first time as an observer to the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute. Recent Congressional Action
Although several provisions in legislation opposing U.S. adherence to and support for the ICC Statute remain in effect, recent Congresses have eliminated or refrained from renewing sanctions provisions that affect U.S. assistance for countries that are ICC States Parties. Although these actions could be interpreted as indicating a change in Congress's position toward the ICC, the changes might also be interpreted as being primarily rooted in a concern that sanctions may have begun to hurt U.S. interests. | The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the first permanent international court with jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community." Currently, 110 countries are States Parties to the ICC. Since its inception in 2002, the ICC has received three referrals for investigations by States Parties and one referral from the United Nations Security Council.
While the U.S. executive branch initially supported the idea of creating an international criminal court, the United States ultimately voted against the Statute of the ICC (the "Rome Statute") and informed the United Nations that the United States did not intend to become a State Party to the Rome Statute. The United States' primary objection to the treaty has been the potential for the ICC to assert jurisdiction over U.S. civilian policymakers and U.S. soldiers charged with "war crimes."
This concern has been highlighted with recent preliminary investigations by the ICC's Prosecutor into alleged war crimes in the Middle East and Afghanistan. In 2006, the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor completed a preliminary investigation into alleged war crimes in Iraq, finding that the information did not establish sufficient grounds for the Prosecutor to launch a formal investigation into the situation. In 2009, the Office of the Prosecutor confirmed that it was conducting another preliminary investigation into possible war crimes committed by NATO soldiers, U.S. soldiers, and both Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents in Afghanistan. That same year, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) sought the ICC's jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed during the Gaza conflict of December 2008/January 2009, and the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Gaza issued a report recommending that the Security Council refer the situation to the ICC Prosecutor if Israel and the PNA did not undertake appropriate national level investigations and prosecutions.
The United States has taken both diplomatic and domestic actions with the potential to affect the ICC's authority over U.S. citizens. On a diplomatic level, the United States has concluded bilateral immunity agreements (BIAs) with many ICC States Parties to prevent other countries from surrendering U.S. citizens to the ICC without U.S. consent under Article 98 of the Rome Statute. These agreements have generated a vigorous debate over when and whether obligations in international agreements preempt an ICC request to a State Party for the arrest and surrender of a person in its territory. However, the ICC, in which the Rome Statute vests the sole responsibility for interpreting the Statute's text, has remained silent on the question, neither validating nor refuting the U.S. position that BIAs or any agreement creating similar obligations preempt an ICC request to surrender.
Although remaining opposed to U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute, the Bush Administration in its second term took actions that suggested its support for some ICC activities. The Obama Administration has also taken a more supportive stance toward the ICC and has begun to engage directly with the Court. The Obama Administration is currently reviewing its ICC policy and is expected to announce its conclusions sometime in 2010. Similarly, actions by Congress have eliminated or chosen not to extend provisions affecting U.S. assistance for countries that are ICC States Parties. Although these actions seem to soften Congress's position on the ICC, the changes might also be interpreted as a decision to reverse sanctions that were perceived as hurting U.S. interests. |
crs_R43164 | crs_R43164_0 | Introduction
Marijuana is the most commonly used illicit drug in the United States. In 2013, an estimated 19.8 million individuals in the United States aged 12 or older (7.5% of this population) were current (past month) users of marijuana. While reported marijuana use is similar to that in 2012, it has generally increased since 2007 when 5.8% of individuals aged 12 or older were current users of marijuana. Indeed, marijuana availability in the United States has increased, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). This increase has been linked to factors such as rising marijuana production in Mexico and increasing marijuana cultivation in the United States led by criminal networks including Mexican drug trafficking organizations. The uptick in availability and use of marijuana in the United States is coupled with a general shift in public attitudes toward the substance. In 1969, 12% of the surveyed population supported legalizing marijuana; today, more than half (52%) of surveyed adults feel that marijuana should be legalized. In addition, 60% indicate that the federal government should not enforce federal laws prohibiting marijuana use in those states that allow for its use. In the November 2012 elections, voters in Washington State and Colorado voted to legalize, regulate, and tax small amounts of marijuana for recreational use . These moves have spurred a number of questions regarding their potential implications for related federal law enforcement activities and for the nation's drug policies on the whole. Trends in States
Over the past few decades, some states have deviated from an across-the-board prohibition of marijuana. Evolving state-level positions on marijuana include decriminalization initiatives, legal exceptions for medical use, and legalization of certain quantities for recreational use. In the November 2014 elections, legalization initiatives also passed in Alaska, Oregon, and the District of Columbia (DC), further expanding the disparities between federal and state marijuana laws in the United States. Enforcement Priorities: A Focus on Traffickers
Federal law enforcement has generally tailored its efforts to target criminal networks rather than individual criminals; its stance regarding drug (particularly marijuana) offenders appears consistent with this position. In an August 2013 memorandum, Deputy Attorney General Cole stated that while marijuana remains an illegal substance under the Controlled Substances Act, the Department of Justice would focus its resources on the "most significant threats in the most effective, consistent, and rational way." The memo outlined eight enforcement priorities for the Department of Justice:
Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;
Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels;
Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some form to other states;
Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity;
Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana;
Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use;
Preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; and
Preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property. It is unclear whether or how the Department of Justice is tracking activity to ensure that standards are being met in states that have legalized marijuana. Data from the U.S. The U.S. Of the drug cases with marijuana as the primary drug type in FY2013, nearly 98% involved a drug trafficking sentence. As such, some policy makers may question whether the disparity between federal drug laws and those in states that have passed or enacted recreational legalization initiatives may pose challenges for the operation of collaborative law enforcement efforts and relationships—such as task forces and intelligence fusion centers in which federal, state, and local law enforcement all participate. As such, there is no evidence to suggest that the operation of these collaborative bodies will be impacted by the recreational legalization initiatives in the states. Legalization Impact on Criminal Networks
A number of criminal networks rely on profits generated from the sale of illegal drugs—including marijuana—in the United States. Without a clear understanding of (1) actual proceeds generated by the sale of illicit drugs in the United States, (2) the proportion of total proceeds attributable to the sale of marijuana, and (3) the proportion of marijuana sales controlled by criminal organizations and affiliated gangs, any estimates of how marijuana legalization might impact the drug trafficking organizations are purely speculative. Going Forward: Congressional Options
Given the differences in marijuana policies of the federal government and those of Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia, Congress may choose to address state legalization initiatives in a number of ways, or not at all. There are a host of options available to policy makers should they choose to address state-level legalization of marijuana, including affirming federal marijuana policy, exercising oversight over federal law enforcement activities, or incentivizing state policies through the provision or denial of certain funds. Policy makers may question whether federal law enforcement priorities have shifted in states that have altered their marijuana laws and regulations. | Marijuana is the most commonly used illicit drug in the United States. In 2013, an estimated 19.8 million individuals in the United States aged 12 or older (7.5% of this population) had used marijuana in the past month. While reported marijuana use is similar to that in 2012, it has generally increased since 2007 when 5.8% of individuals aged 12 or older were current users of marijuana. Mirroring this increase in use, marijuana availability in the United States has also increased. This growth has been linked to factors such as rising marijuana production in Mexico, and increasing marijuana cultivation in the United States led by criminal networks including Mexican drug trafficking organizations.
Along with the uptick in the availability and use of marijuana in the United States, there has been a general shift in public attitudes toward the substance. In 1969, 12% of the surveyed population supported legalizing marijuana; today, more than half (52%) of surveyed adults have expressed opinions that marijuana should be legalized. And, 60% indicate that the federal government should not enforce its marijuana laws in states that allow the use of marijuana.
The federal government—through the Controlled Substances Act (CSA; P.L. 91-513; 21 U.S.C. §801 et. seq.)—prohibits the manufacture, distribution, dispensation, and possession of marijuana. Over the last few decades, some states have deviated from an across-the-board prohibition of marijuana. Evolving state-level positions on marijuana include decriminalization initiatives, legal exceptions for medical use, and legalization of certain quantities for recreational use. Notably, in the November 2012 elections, voters in Washington State and Colorado voted to legalize, regulate, and tax the recreational use of small amounts of marijuana. In the November 2014 elections, legalization initiatives passed in Alaska, Oregon, and the District of Columbia, further spreading the discrepancy between federal and state marijuana laws in the United States. These latest moves have spurred a number of questions regarding their potential implications for related federal law enforcement activities and for the nation's drug policies on the whole. Among these questions is whether or to what extent state initiatives to decriminalize or legalize the use of marijuana conflict with federal law.
In general, federal law enforcement has tailored its efforts to target criminal networks rather than individual criminals; its stance regarding marijuana offenders appears consistent with this position. While drug-related investigations and prosecutions remain a priority for federal law enforcement, the Obama Administration has suggested that efforts will be harnessed against large-scale trafficking organizations rather than on recreational users of marijuana. In an August 2013 memorandum, Deputy Attorney General Cole stated that while marijuana remains an illegal substance under the Controlled Substances Act, the Department of Justice would focus its resources on the "most significant threats in the most effective, consistent, and rational way." The memo outlined eight enforcement priorities including preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors and preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law into other states. It is unclear whether or how the Department of Justice is tracking activity to ensure that federal enforcement priorities are being followed in states that have legalized marijuana.
Some may question whether state-level laws and regulations regarding marijuana prohibition—in particular those that clash with federal laws—may adversely impact collaborative law enforcement efforts and relationships. Currently, there is no evidence to suggest that the operation of these collaborative bodies has been impacted by current state-level marijuana decriminalization or legalization initiatives. Data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission seem to indicate a federal law enforcement focus on trafficking as opposed to possession offenses. Of the federal drug cases with marijuana listed as the primary drug type (21.6% of total drug cases sentenced), over 98% involved a sentence for drug trafficking in FY2013.
A number of criminal networks rely heavily on profits generated from the sale of illegal drugs—including marijuana—in the United States. As such, scholars and policy makers have questioned whether or how any changes in state or federal marijuana policy in the United States might impact organized crime proceeds and levels of drug trafficking-related violence, particularly in Mexico. In short, there are no definitive answers to these questions; without clear understanding of (1) actual proceeds generated by the sale of illicit drugs in the United States, (2) the proportion of total proceeds attributable to the sale of marijuana, and (3) the proportion of marijuana sales controlled by criminal organizations and affiliated gangs, any estimates of how marijuana legalization might impact the drug trafficking organizations are purely speculative.
Given the differences between federal marijuana policies and those of states that have authorized use of marijuana in some capacity, Congress may choose to address state legalization initiatives in a number of ways, or choose to take no action. Among the host of options, policy makers may choose to amend or affirm federal marijuana policy, exercise oversight over federal law enforcement activities, or incentivize state policies through the provision or denial of certain funds. |
crs_R40733 | crs_R40733_0 | Gun Laws
According to DOJ, ATF is the lead federal agency responsible for stopping the illegal flow of firearms, or gun trafficking, from the United States to Mexico, given the bureau's statutory mission and authority. ATF has developed a nationwide strategy to reduce firearms trafficking and violent crime by preventing convicted felons, drug traffickers, and juvenile gang members from acquiring firearms from gun traffickers. These criminals often acquire firearms from a person who otherwise is not prohibited to possess a firearms through straw purchases or by buying a firearm from a corrupt dealer who sells firearms off-the-books in an attempt to escape federal regulation. Although there is no statutory definition for "gun trafficking" in the GCA, it essentially entails the movement or diversion of firearms from legal to illegal markets. By inspecting the firearms transfer records that FFLs are required by law to maintain, ATF SAs and IOIs are able to trace crime guns from their domestic manufacturer or importer to the first retail dealer that sold those firearms to persons in the general public, generating vital leads in homicide and other criminal investigations. In addition, by inspecting those records, ATF investigators sometimes discover evidence of corrupt FFLs dealing in firearms "off the books," straw purchases, and other patterns of illegal behavior. ATF reports that there are around 6,700 FFLs in the United States operating in the Southwest border region of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. ATF also reports that Mexican DTOs are increasingly sending enforcers across the border to hire surrogates (straw purchasers) who buy several "military-style" firearms at a time from FFLs. The DTOs also reportedly favor pistols chambered to accommodate comparatively large cartridges and magazines that are capable of piercing through armor vests typically worn by law enforcement officers. Less frequently, but no less troubling to law enforcement, the DTOs have also sought .50 caliber sniper rifles. Funding for Gunrunner78
During FY2006 and FY2007, ATF dedicated approximately 100 special agents and 25 industry operations investigators to a Southwest border initiative known as "Project Gunrunner" to disrupt the illegal flow of guns from the United States into Mexico. By the end of FY2008, ATF had deployed 146 special agents and 68 industry operations investigators to the Southwest border to bolster that initiative at a conservatively estimated cost of $32.2 million. In the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. The House-passed FY2010 Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations bill ( H.R. 2847 ) would provide ATF with $1.106 billion, including the requested $18 million increase for Gunrunner. Prosecution of Firearms Trafficking Cases and Related Statutes
Currently, U.S. firearm laws govern the possession and transfer of firearms and create penalties for the violation of such laws. The following are examples from the Southwest border region that are demonstrative of the kinds of gun trafficking cases being prosecuted, and the federal statutes that are often implicated in such cases. This proposal would have
repealed ATF appropriations limitations that restrict the disclosure of information stored in the Firearms Trace System database or multiple handgun sales reports; required federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies that recovered a firearm that was determined to have been stolen or used in a crime to report this information to ATF, so that it could be included in the Firearms Trace System database; amended the Attorney General's (AG) authority to conduct unannounced inspections of FFLs, so that he could conduct such inspections "at any time that" he "may reasonably require"; made certain offenses under the GCA predicate offenses under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, including (1) disposal of a firearm to a prohibited person, (2) possession of a firearm or ammunition by a prohibited person, (3) knowingly handling firearms or ammunition for an employer who is known to be a prohibited person, and (4) shipping or receiving firearms while under felony indictment; and increased the maximum term of imprisonment for those violations from not more than 10 years to not more than 20 years. Questions that may arise include the following:
Southwest Border Gun Trafficking. Inter-American Gun Trafficking Convention. Gun Trafficking Statute. | According to the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is the lead federal agency responsible for stopping the illegal flow of firearms, or gun trafficking, from the United States to Mexico. ATF has developed a nationwide strategy to reduce firearms trafficking and violent crime by seeking to prevent convicted felons, drug traffickers, and juvenile gang members from acquiring firearms from gun traffickers. These criminals often acquire firearms from persons who are otherwise not prohibited from possessing firearms, or by buying firearms from corrupt federal firearms licensees (FFLs) who sell firearms off-the-books in an attempt to escape federal regulation. ATF also reports that Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are increasingly sending enforcers across the border to hire surrogates (straw purchasers) who buy several "military-style" firearms at a time from FFLs. The DTOs also reportedly favor pistols chambered to accommodate comparatively large cartridges that are capable of piercing through armor vests usually worn by law enforcement officers, and magazines capable of holding more than 10 rounds of ammunition. Less frequently, but no less troubling to law enforcement, the DTOs have also sought .50 caliber sniper rifles that are capable of penetrating bullet-proof glass and lightly armored vehicles.
ATF reports that there are around 6,700 FFLs in the United States operating in the Southwest border region of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. By inspecting the firearms transfer records that FFLs are required by law to maintain, ATF investigators are often able to trace crime guns from their domestic manufacturer or importer to the first retail dealer that sold those firearms to persons in the general public, generating vital leads in criminal investigations. In addition, by inspecting those records, ATF investigators sometimes discover evidence of illegal, off-the-books transfers, straw purchases, and other patterns of suspicious behavior. During FY2006 and FY2007, ATF dedicated approximately 100 special agents (SAs) and 25 industry operations investigators (IOIs) to a Southwest border initiative known as "Project Gunrunner" to disrupt the illegal flow of guns from the United States into Mexico. By the end of FY2008, ATF had deployed 146 SAs and 68 IOIs to the Southwest border to bolster that initiative at a conservatively estimated cost of $32.2 million. The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 included an increase of at least $5 million for Project Gunrunner, and the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act includes an additional $14 million for this initiative. Both the House-passed and Senate-reported FY2010 Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies appropriations bill (H.R. 2847) would provide ATF with an $18 million increase for Project Gunrunner, an amount equal to the President's request.
U.S. firearms laws currently govern the possession and transfer of firearms and provide penalties for the violation of such laws. "Gun trafficking," although not defined by statute, essentially includes the movement or diversion of firearms from legal to illegal markets. This report includes legal analyses of three ATF-investigated, Southwest border gun trafficking cases to illustrate the federal statutes that are typically violated as part of wider gun trafficking schemes. The report also examines anti-gun trafficking proposals introduced in the 110th Congress. So far, no similar proposals have been introduced in the 111th Congress. The report concludes with possible policy questions for Congress regarding the magnitude of Southwest border gun trafficking, the use and significance of ATF crime gun trace data, the possible ratification of an Inter-American Gun Trafficking Convention (CIFTA), and the adequacy of the federal statutes designed to deter and reduce illegal gun trafficking. |
crs_RS22829 | crs_RS22829_0 | Although Georgia was not offered a MAP, the Alliance pledged that Georgia would eventually become a member of NATO. Reportedly, about 100 troops may be deployed to support ISAF. U.S. Policy
The former Bush Administration was supportive of Georgia's NATO aspirations. | This report examines the aspirations of Georgia [Republic] to become a member of NATO. Issues related to Georgia's reform progress, Georgia-Russia relations, and U.S. policy are examined. This report may be updated. Related products include CRS Report RL34701, NATO Enlargement: Albania, Croatia, and Possible Future Candidates, by Vincent Morelli et al. |
crs_R44502 | crs_R44502_0 | Introduction
Both the House and the Senate are considering legislation to support medical innovation, primarily through reforms to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and changes to the drug, biologic and device approval pathways at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). On February 3, 2015 Senators Lamar Alexander and Patty Murray, chairman and ranking Member of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, announced the start of a bipartisan initiative to "examine the process for getting safe treatments, devices and cures to patients and the roles of the [FDA] and the [NIH] in that process." This initiative culminated in a package of 19 bipartisan bills that were reported out of the Senate Health, Labor, Education, and Pensions (HELP) Committee in a series of three executive sessions held on February 9, 2016; March 9, 2016; and April 6, 2016. The Senate's medical innovation package is that chamber's companion effort to the House's 21 st Century Cures initiative, which culminated in the House passage of H.R. 6 , the 21 st Century Cures Act, on July 10, 2015, on a vote of 344 to 77. 6 is the result of a series of hearings and roundtable meetings hosted by the House Energy and Commerce Committee dating back to spring 2014. While consisting of many different provisions, H.R. 6 is primarily focused on efforts to increase strategic investments in medical research at NIH and change some aspects of how the FDA executes its regulatory oversight mission with regard to the review and approval of new drugs, biologics, and medical devices. Report Roadmap
This report provides for each of the 18 bills in the Senate medical innovation package: (1) background on the issue, or issues, addressed by the bill including a summary of relevant current law; (2) a summary of the bill's provisions; and (3) where applicable, identification of comparable provisions in H.R. 6 that address the same topic. For a summary of all the provisions in H.R. 6 , as passed by the House, including an explanation of how the bill would change current law, see CRS Report R44071, H.R. 6: The 21st Century Cures Act . H.R. | Both the House and the Senate are considering legislation to support medical innovation, primarily through reforms to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and changes to the drug, biologic, and device approval pathways at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). On February 3, 2015 Senators Lamar Alexander and Patty Murray, chairman and ranking Member of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, announced the start of a bipartisan initiative to "examine the process for getting safe treatments, devices and cures to patients and the roles of the [FDA] and the [NIH] in that process." This initiative culminated in a package of 19 bipartisan bills that were reported out of the Senate Health, Labor, Education, and Pensions (HELP) Committee in a series of three executive sessions held on February 9, 2016; March 9, 2016; and April 6, 2016.
The Senate's medical innovation package is that chamber's companion effort to the House's 21st Century Cures initiative, which culminated in the House passage of H.R. 6, the 21st Century Cures Act, on July 10, 2015, on a vote of 344 to 77. H.R. 6 is the result of a series of hearings and roundtable meetings hosted by the House Energy and Commerce Committee dating back to spring 2014. While consisting of many different provisions, H.R. 6 is primarily focused on efforts to increase strategic investments in medical research at NIH and change some aspects of how the FDA executes its regulatory oversight mission with regard to the review and approval of new drugs, biologics, and medical devices.
This report provides for each of the bills in the Senate medical innovation package (1) background on the issue, or issues, addressed by the bill, including a summary of relevant current law; (2) a summary of the bill's provisions; and (3) where applicable, identification of comparable provisions in H.R. 6 that address the same topic. For a summary of all the provisions in H.R. 6, as passed by the House, including an explanation of how the bill would change current law, see CRS Report R44071, H.R. 6: The 21st Century Cures Act. |
crs_R44301 | crs_R44301_0 | 113-146 as amended by P.L. The rest of this report focuses on appropriations for VHA. Appendix B provides enacted VA appropriations from FY1995 to FY2015, including all three administrations that compose the VA: VBA, VHA, and NCA. Funding for the VHA
As noted previously, the VHA is funded through four appropriations accounts. On April 3, 2014, the House Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Subcommittee approved its version of a Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations bill for FY2015 (MILCON-VA Appropriations bill). 4486 proposed $56.2 billion for VHA. The full Senate Appropriations Committee approved the measure ( H.R. 113-174 ) on May 22. In between the President's request and the final passage of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, the House passed its version of the MILCON-VA appropriations bill for FY2016 ( H.R. 2029 ; H.Rept. 114-57 ) in November 2015. President's Request
The President submitted his FY2016 budget request to Congress on February 2, 2015. For VHA, the Administration requested $60.6 billion (without collections). For the three medical care accounts (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities), the President requested $1.3 billion over the advance appropriated amount of $58.7 billion for FY2016 ( Table 6 ). 114-92 ). The House passed the measure on April 30. The House-passed measure provides approximately $60.3 billion for VHA (without collections) for FY2016. 114-53)47
Because none of the regular FY2016 appropriations bills, including the MILCON-VA appropriations bill, were enacted before the start of FY2016, on September 30, Congress passed and the President signed into law a continuing resolution (CR) for the period October 1, 2015, through December 11, 2015. The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-53 ), funds most VA programs through a formula using the FY2015 level of appropriations minus an across-the-broad rescission of 0.2108%. 2763 in the nature of a substitute to H.R. The Senate passed S.Amdt. 2029 , as amended, on November 10. For the VHA, the Senate-passed version of the MILCON-VA appropriations bill provides $62.4 billion (without collections), which is $1.8 billion more than the Administration's request for FY2016 ( Table 5 and Table 6 ). Furthermore, the Senate-passed MILCON-VA appropriations bill provides $8.9 million more than the President's request of $621.8 million for the medical and prosthetic research account, requires the VA to spend not less than $10 million to hire additional caregiver support coordinators for the Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers program, and requires the VA to use not less than $5 million from the medical services account for FY2016 to carry out a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of establishing a grants program to provide furniture, household items, and other assistance to formerly homeless veterans who are moving into permanent housing. 2029 ; S.Rept. 2029; P.L. 114-113)
On December 18, 2015, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, completing the FY2016 appropriations process. The enacted measure provides $162.7 billion for the VA for FY2016 of this amount for VHA, P.L. 114-113 , provides a total of $61.8 billion (without collections). For the medical services account, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, provides $2.4 billion for FY2016 in addition to advance appropriations amount of $47.6 billion that was provided in P.L. For the medical and prosthetic research account, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. Department of Veterans Affairs, Enacted Appropriations FY1995-FY2015 | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions to hospital and medical care. The VA provides these benefits through three major operating units: the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA). This report focuses on funding for the VHA.
The President submitted his FY2016 budget request to Congress on February 2, 2015. The President's request for the VHA is approximately $60.6 billion (without collections), an additional $1.3 billion (for the three medical care accounts) above the enacted 2016 advance appropriations for VHA, which was $58.7 billion. When the $622 million request for the medical and prosthetic research account is taken into consideration, the total amount requested for VHA is a $1.9 billion increase over the FY2015 amount.
The House Appropriations Committee approved the FY2016 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs appropriations bill (MILCON-VA appropriations bill) on April 22, 2015. The House passed the measure (H.R. 2029, H.Rept. 114-92) on April 30. The House-passed bill provides approximately $60.3 billion for the VHA (without collections).
Because none of the FY2016 regular appropriations bills were enacted by October 1, 2015, on September 30 Congress passed and the President signed into law a continuing resolution (CR) for the period October 1, 2015, through December 11, 2015. The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-53), funds most VA programs through a formula using the FY2015 level of appropriations minus an across-the-board rescission of 0.2108%.
Although the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the MILCON-VA appropriations bill (H.R. 2029; S.Rept. 114-57) on May 21, 2015, the Senate did not consider the measure until November. On November 10, 2015, the Senate passed the MILCON-VA appropriation bill, 2016, as amended by S.Amdt. 2763, as amended, in the nature of a substitute, to H.R. 2029. For the VHA, the Senate-passed version of the MILCON-VA appropriations bill provides $62.4 billion (without collections), which is $1.8 billion more than the Administration's request for FY2016.
On December 18, 2015, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2029; P.L. 114-113). Division J of the act contained the FY2016 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act. The enacted measure provides $162.7 billion for the VA for FY2016 as whole. Of this amount, the MILCON-VA Appropriations Act provides $61.8 billion for VHA (without collections). This includes $2.5 billion in addition to the enacted FY2016 advance appropriations for VHA, which was $58.7 billion, and approximately $631 million for the medical and prosthetic research account. In total, the FY2016-enacted amount for VHA is $1.2 billion above the President's request for FY2016, and $5.3 billion above the FY2015-enacted amount of $56.4 billion (without collections).
The appendixes of this report provide funding levels for all VA accounts from FY1995 to FY2015 (including rescissions and supplements). |
crs_R43639 | crs_R43639_0 | Concerned about the armed conflicts in the DRC and about the need for transparency of resource extraction payments, Congress in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) added two sections to deal with these issues. Both of the sections require the issuing of regulations by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) in order to make public the involvement of U.S. companies in conflict minerals and in resource extraction payments. Very briefly, Section 1502 mandates the SEC to issue rules requiring the disclosure by publicly traded companies of the origins of listed conflict minerals. Section 1504 mandates SEC rules requiring resource extraction issuers to disclose payments made to a foreign government or the federal government for the purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals. Congress enacted this requirement because of its belief that the "exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and gender-based violence and contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation therein.... " If the minerals originate from the DRC or an adjoining country, the company must file a report with the SEC and include such information as a description of its due diligence on the source and chain of custody of the minerals and a description of the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured that are not DRC conflict free. National Association of Manufacturers v. Securities and Exchange Commission challenged the rule on the basis of several arguments:
1. Federal District Court Decision
On July 23, 2013, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. District Court) held that the SEC complied with its cost-benefit analysis and other Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirements and that it did not violate the Constitution's First Amendment. The statute and the rule violated the Constitution's First Amendment freedom of speech guarantee. The plaintiffs did not challenge the portion of the rule that required disclosure of this information to the SEC, which may have qualified for a lower standard of review than the public disclosure requirement. The court did not agree that the rule was so burdensome. U.S. Court of Appeals Decision
On September 18, 2013, NAM and the other plaintiffs filed an appeal of the D.C. District Court's decision with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. The court expressed some skepticism as to whether the disclosure requirement was commercial speech, but declined to decide the question because the panel found that the regulations would not survive even the lesser standards of scrutiny applied to commercial speech regulations. Circuit to rehear this case en banc . Plaintiffs challenged the SEC rule on the basis that it violated the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech, that it was arbitrary and capricious under the APA, and that the SEC, as with Section 1502, had made an inadequate cost-benefit analysis before promulgating the rule. The court found that the SEC wrongly concluded that Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank required reports of resource extraction issuers to be made publicly available and cited the language in the statute requiring the SEC to make public only a "compilation of the information required to be submitted" to the SEC "to the extent practicable." Circuit struck down as a violation of the First Amendment the part of the rules requiring issuers to describe certain products as having been "not found to be DRC conflict free." Upon rehearing the case in light of the en banc court's decision, the panel again struck the rule down under the First Amendment. Circuit Court of Appeals to rehear the case en banc . With respect to the Section 1504 rules, the D.C. District Court vacated the rules. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts has ordered the SEC to publish an "expedited schedule" for issuing the rule. | Two sections of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) require that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) issue regulations to make public the involvement of U.S. companies in conflict minerals and in resource extraction payments. Both sections have been subject to litigation. As of the date of this report, the rules pursuant to Section 1502 are in effect, with the exception of the disclosure requirements being reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The SEC continues its rulemaking proceedings under Section 1504.
Key Takeaways of This Report:
Section 1502 requires that the SEC issue rules mandating the disclosure by publicly traded companies of the origins of listed conflict minerals, which it did. The National Association of Manufacturers and other plaintiffs challenged this rule on the bases of several arguments, two of which claimed that the SEC did not conduct an appropriate cost-benefit analysis before promulgating the rule and that the rules violated the Constitution's First Amendment freedom of speech guarantee. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the rules, but the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, while largely upholding the SEC's authority to implement the rules, struck down the portion of the rules requiring issuers to describe certain products as having been "not found to be DRC conflict free." The court found that the rule was unconstitutional because narrower alternatives were available to achieve the government's goals. Recently, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, overruled an important aspect of the panel's decision finding that part of the DRC conflict mineral disclosure requirements violated the First Amendment. The en banc court opened up the possibility that a less restrictive test might be applied to the disclosure requirements. Upon rehearing, the panel issued a decision finding that, even after the decision of the en banc court, the requirement to label certain products as "not found to be DRC conflict free" was unconstitutional. The panel held that the lower standard of scrutiny did not apply to the rule, and argued that even if it did the rule still would not survive review. These decisions highlight an important question in First Amendment jurisprudence. The government more easily may require commercial disclosures in certain circumstances under the Constitution. This case raises important questions about when and how a regulation might qualify to receive that lower standard of scrutiny. Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to issue rules mandating resource extraction issuers to disclose payments made to a foreign government or the federal government for the purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals, which it did. The American Petroleum Institute brought suit, arguing, among other things, that the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in promulgating the rules, as well as that the rules violated the First Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia vacated the rules on administrative law grounds and did not reach most of the Administrative Procedure Act arguments and the First Amendment issues. The SEC is not appealing this decision and is, instead, working on Section 1504 rules that will take into consideration the court's decision. However, in response to a lawsuit filed by Oxfam, the U.S. District Court recently ordered the SEC to publish an "expedited schedule" for issuing a resource extraction rule. |
crs_RL33947 | crs_RL33947_0 | Background
Juvenile justice in the United States has been predominantly the province of the states and their localities. The first juvenile court in America was founded in 1899 in Cook County, Illinois. The mission of these juvenile courts was to attempt to turn young delinquents into productive adults rather than merely punishing them for their crimes. This led to marked procedural and substantive differences between the adult and juvenile court systems in the states, including a focus on the offenders and not the offenses, and on rehabilitation instead of punishment. The federal government began to play a role in the states' juvenile justice systems in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1974, Congress addressed the issue by passing the first comprehensive piece of juvenile justice legislation, the JJDPA. By 1925, all but two states had established separate juvenile justice systems. This act afforded juvenile offenders tried as adults in the federal system special rehabilitation outcomes. Although the JJDPA has been amended several times over the past 40 years, it continues to feature the same three components. Subsequent revisions to the act placed emphasis on influencing states to expand the use of sanctions and accountability measures through some existing grant programs, as well as adding new grant programs to the act's purview. Authorization for this program expired in FY2007, but it has continued to receive appropriations. Additionally, at least 75% of the funds provided to the state must be used for a wide array of juvenile justice related programs, including, but not limited to
community based alternatives to incarceration; counseling, mentoring, and training programs within the juvenile justice system as well as similar community based programs and services, including aftercare and after-school programs; comprehensive juvenile justice and delinquency prevention programs that assist the coordination of service provision among the various players involved; providing services to address child abuse and neglect; expanding the use of probation offices; programs that address the relationship between juvenile delinquency and learning disabilities, and programs that help juveniles and their families overcome language barriers; projects designed to deter juvenile gang members from participating in illegal activities, including those that promote their involvement in lawful activities; substance and drug abuse prevention and treatment programs, including mental health programs; programs that focus on positive youth development for at-risk youth and juvenile offenders; programs that focus on strengthening families and providing them assistance to ensure juveniles have a nurturing home environment; programs that provide mental health services to juveniles at every stage of the juvenile justice process; and programs that encourage juvenile courts to develop a continuum of post-adjudication restraints that bridge the gap between probation and detention in a juvenile correctional facility. The JABG program authorizes the Attorney General to make grants to states and units of local government to strengthen their juvenile justice systems and foster accountability within their juvenile populations. Issues for Congress
Congress may choose to consider the JJDPA's reauthorization because its major provisions expired at the end of FY2007 and FY2008. Similarly, the JABG expired at the end of FY2009, and Congress may also consider its reauthorization. What is the appropriate federal response to juvenile violence and juvenile crime? Should federal efforts to influence the states' juvenile justice systems focus on the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, on holding juvenile offenders accountable for their actions, or some combination of both? Are the grant programs as currently comprised the best way to support juvenile justice efforts in the states? The original JJDPA had three main components: it created a set of institutions within the federal government that were dedicated to coordinating and administering federal juvenile justice efforts; it established grant programs to assist the states with setting up and running their juvenile justice systems; and it promulgated core mandates that states had to adhere to in order to be eligible to receive grant funding. As it was passed in 1974, the JJDPA focused largely on preventing juvenile delinquency and on rehabilitating juvenile offenders. | Juvenile justice in the United States has predominantly been the province of the states and their localities. The first juvenile court in America was founded in 1899 in Cook County, Illinois, and, by 1925, all but two states had established juvenile court systems. The mission of these early juvenile courts was to rehabilitate young delinquents instead of just punishing them for their crimes; in practice, this led to marked procedural and substantive differences between the adult and juvenile court systems in the states, including a focus on the offenders and not the offenses, and rehabilitation instead of punishment.
The federal government began to play a role in the states' juvenile justice systems in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1974, Congress passed the first comprehensive piece of juvenile justice legislation, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA). The JJDPA had three main components: it created a set of institutions within the federal government that were dedicated to coordinating and administering federal juvenile justice efforts; it established grant programs to assist the states with setting up and running their juvenile justice systems; and it promulgated core mandates that states had to adhere to in order to be eligible to receive grant funding. Although the JJDPA has been amended several times over the past 30 years, its basic shape remains similar to that of its original conception.
As it was passed in 1974, the JJDPA focused largely on preventing juvenile delinquency and on rehabilitating juvenile offenders. Subsequent revisions to the act added sanctions and accountability measures to some existing federal grant programs, and new grant programs to the act's purview. In altering the JJDPA to include a greater emphasis on punishing juveniles for their crimes, Congress has essentially followed the lead of the states. During the 1980s and 1990s, most states revised their juvenile justice systems to include more punitive measures and to allow juveniles to be tried as adults in more instances. In 1997, Congress created the Juvenile Accountability Block Grant (JABG), allowing the Attorney General to make grants to states and units of local government to strengthen their juvenile justice systems and foster accountability within their juvenile populations. This has marked a significant change in the philosophy of the juvenile justice system, both at the state level and at the federal level, from its original conception. Juvenile justice in general has thus moved away from emphasizing the rehabilitation of juveniles and toward a greater reliance on sanctioning them for their crimes.
Authorization for the JJDPA's main provisions expired at the end of FY2007 and FY2008, but its major programs have continued to receive appropriations. Congress may choose to consider the JJDPA's reauthorization. Policy issues associated with its reauthorization include what the best federal response to juvenile violence and juvenile crime should be; whether the system should focus on the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders or on holding juvenile offenders accountable for their actions; and whether the grant programs as currently comprised represent the best way to support juvenile justice efforts in the states. Similarly, authorization for the JABG expired at the end of FY2009. One of the issues surrounding its potential reauthorization involves whether grant program purpose areas should be modified, expanded, or clarified. |
crs_R40653 | crs_R40653_0 | Supreme Leader Khamenei along with the military apparatus of the state appears willing and capable, at this point, of imposing the election outcome by force. Many analysts have turned their attention to the possible long-term implications of the post-election unrest on both the government of Iran and Iranian society. Iran's 2009 Presidential Election
The reported outcome of the June 12, 2009 presidential election in Iran prompted public demonstrations in several major cities of a size and intensity unprecedented since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The announcement that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was reelected by a 62% margin was followed by allegations of vote rigging and election fraud. Supporters of leading reformist candidate Mir Hussein Musavi and others staged large protests in the streets of Tehran and other major cities that have drawn international attention. Election and Results
On June 12, following the heated campaign between Musavi and Ahmadinejad, Iranians went to the polls. Internet sites and mobile phones were also reportedly disabled. Regardless of the actual election results, the public demonstrations on election night and continued protests in major cities across Iran caused observers to speculate about how the stand-off between the government and Musavi's supports would be resolved, and what the outcome might mean for U.S. efforts to resolve the issue of Iran's nuclear weapons program, its support for terrorism, and other national security concerns. Aftermath
Demonstrations in Iran
Shortly after the election results were announced, Iran's interior ministry issued a ban on unauthorized public gatherings. U.S. Response
The Obama Administration's response has been cautious. Many observers believe that President Obama is attempting to balance the need to condemn the violence against the protestors with the need to avoid the perception of U.S. interference, which some worry could prompt the Iranian government to clamp down further on freedom of expression as well as jeopardize U.S. efforts to engage Iran on the issue of its nuclear program. As the Iranian government continues to use the Basij and Revolutionary Guard to enforce the election outcome, reports of arrests, injuries, and deaths fuel human rights concerns and diplomatic tensions. | On June 12, 2009, following a heated campaign between reformist candidate Mir Hussein Musavi and incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iranians turned out in record numbers to vote in the presidential election. Shortly after the polls closed, the Interior Minister announced that President Ahmadinejad had been reelected by a 62% margin. The announcement was followed by allegations of vote rigging and election fraud and prompted supporters of leading reformist candidate Mir Hussein Musavi and others to hold public demonstrations in several major cities of a size and intensity unprecedented since the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
Despite a government ban on unauthorized public gatherings, protests reportedly have continued since the election. Restrictions on foreign and domestic journalists, reported disruptions of mobile phone networks, limited accessibility of some internet sites, mass arrests, and clashes between civilian protestors and Basij forces have garnered international attention and increased concerns about the Iranian government's apparent disregard for human rights and basic civil liberties.
Regardless of the actual election results, the Supreme Leader Khamenei, along with the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij, appear determined to impose the election outcome by force. The government crackdown on protestors appears to be effective, even as smaller gatherings have continued in Tehran and other major cities. Attention has now focused on the potential long-term effects of the post-election unrest on Iranian government and society, and what the outcome might mean for U.S. efforts to resolve the issues of Iran's nuclear program, its support for terrorism, and other national security concerns.
The Obama Administration's response has been cautious, but somewhat has hardened as reports of deaths, injuries, and mass arrests of Iranian citizens have increased. Many observers believe that President Obama is attempting to balance the need to condemn the violence against the protestors with the need to avoid the perception of U.S. interference, which some worry could prompt the Iranian government to clamp down further on freedom of expression or jeopardize U.S. efforts to engage Iran on the issue of its nuclear program.
For more information and background on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41054 | crs_R41054_0 | Introduction
On January 21, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission . At least two broad approaches may be available. Second, Congress could restrict spending under certain conditions or require those making expenditures to provide additional information to voters or regulators. Some may argue that the only way to provide Congress with the power to directly affect the content of the ruling would be to amend the Constitution—an option that is likely to be controversial and laborious. This report is intended to respond to Congress's ongoing interest in campaign finance policy options following Citizens United . Given the pace of developments since the ruling, the report is not intended to be exhaustive. This report does not provide—nor is it intended to provide—a legal analysis of Citizens United or of legal issues that might affect the policy options discussed here. CRS Report R41045, The Constitutionality of Regulating Corporate Expenditures: A Brief Analysis of the Supreme Court Ruling in Citizens United v. FEC , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R41096, Legislative Options After Citizens United v. FEC: Constitutional and Legal Issues , by [author name scrubbed] et al., discuss legal and constitutional issues. Events described in this report are current as of September 2010, when the report was last substantively updated. No major additional campaign finance activity occurred during the 111 th Congress. For discussion of the ongoing evolution of Citizens United policy issues, see CRS Report R41542, The State of Campaign Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. A more complete understanding of how Citizens United will affect the political environment, including campaign spending, will likely be unavailable until after the 2010 election cycle. Table 1 at the end of this report provides an overview of legislation that may be or has been relevant for a congressional response to Citizens United . By contrast, three bills that have been the subject of more recent attention are House and Senate versions of the DISCLOSE Act (an acronym for "Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections"), sponsored by Representative Van Hollen and Senator Schumer respectively. Provisions in H.R. (For additional discussion of the DISCLOSE Act, see CRS Report R41264, The DISCLOSE Act: Overview and Analysis , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].) As of this writing, the following relevant constitutional amendments have been introduced during the 111 th Congress: H.J.Res. 13 (Kaptur), H.J.Res. 68 (Boswell), H.J.Res. 74 (Edwards, MD), H.J.Res. 82 (Hodes), H.J.Res. 84 (Schrader), S.J.Res. 28 (Dodd), and S.J.Res. 158 (Obey) and H.R. 6116 (Larson), H.R. H.R. 4510 (Grayson), H.R. 4517 (Hall), H.R. 4522 (Pascrell), H.R. 4523 (Perriello), H.R. 1095 (Maloney), H.R. 4434 (Grayson), H.R. 4617 (Walz), H.R. 5175 , S. 3295 , and S. 3628 ) also proposes to amend the existing government contractor prohibitions. Relevant measures introduced thus far include H.R. 4487 (Grayson), H.R. 4537 (Capuano), H.R. 4644 (Sestak), H.R. 4630 (Ackerman), H.R. 4432 (Grayson), H.R. 4527 (Driehaus), H.R. 4583 (Boccieri), H.R. 4630 (Ackerman), H.R. | Following the Supreme Court's January 21, 2010, ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, questions have emerged about which policy options could be available to Congress. This report provides an overview of selected campaign finance policy options that may be relevant. It also briefly comments on how Citizens United might affect political advertising. A complete understanding of how Citizens United will affect the campaign and policy environments is likely to be unavailable until at least the conclusion of the 2010 election cycle.
As Congress considers legislative responses, at least two broad choices could be relevant. First, Congress could provide candidates or parties with additional access to funds to combat corporate influence in elections. Second, Congress could restrict spending under certain conditions or require those making expenditures post-Citizens United to provide additional information to voters or regulators. Options within both approaches could generate substantial debate. Some may contend that the only way to provide Congress with the power to directly affect the content of the ruling would be to amend the Constitution.
More than 40 bills introduced during the 111th Congress may be relevant for legislative responses to Citizens United. These include H.Con.Res. 13, H.J.Res. 13, H.J.Res. 68, H.J.Res. 74 ,H.J.Res. 82, H.J.Res. 84, H.Res. 1275, H.R. 158, H.R. 1095, H.R. 1826, H.R. 2038, H.R. 2056, H.R. 3574, H.R. 3859, H.R. 4431, H.R. 4432, H.R. 4433, H.R. 4434, H.R. 4435, H.R. 4487, H.R. 4510, H.R. 4511, H.R. 4517, H.R. 4522, H.R. 4523, H.R. 4527, H.R. 4537, H.R. 4540, H.R. 4550, H.R. 4583, H.R. 4617, H.R. 4630, H.R. 4644, H.R. 4749, H.R. 4768, H.R. 4790, H.R. 5175, S.J.Res. 28 ,S.J.Res. 36, S. 133, S. 752, S. 2954, S. 2959, S. 3004, S. 3295, and S. 3628. The House passed H.R. 5175, a version of the DISCLOSE Act (an acronym for "Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections"), on June 24, 2010. (For additional discussion, see CRS Report R41264, The DISCLOSE Act: Overview and Analysis, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]). Given the pace of developments since the ruling, this report is not intended to be exhaustive. Relevant legislation that has been introduced thus far is reflected through selected examples and in Table 1 at the end of this report.
This report is not intended to provide a legal analysis of Citizens United or of constitutional issues that might affect the policy options discussed here. CRS Report R41045, The Constitutionality of Regulating Corporate Expenditures: A Brief Analysis of the Supreme Court Ruling in Citizens United v. FEC, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R41096, Legislative Options After Citizens United v. FEC: Constitutional and Legal Issues, by [author name scrubbed] et al., discuss legal and constitutional issues.
Events described in this report are current as of September 2010, when the report was last substantively updated. No major additional campaign finance activity occurred during the 111th Congress. For discussion of the ongoing evolution of Citizens United policy issues, see CRS Report R41542, The State of Campaign Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL32460 | crs_RL32460_0 | Introduction
On December 18, 2007, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") concluded a review of its broadcast ownership rules by relaxing the ban on cross-ownership of a newspaper and a broadcast station in certain markets. In 2003, the FCC had adopted a comprehensive order (in its 2002 Biennial Review) revising many of its cross-ownership rules but, as will be discussed below, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found insufficient basis for many of the proposed changes in that order and remanded it to the FCC for reconsideration. The report also addresses the current status of the rules. The Commission had previously initiated proceedings regarding the local radio ownership rule and the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule. On June 2, 2003, the Commission adopted a Report and Order modifying its ownership rules. The numerous petitions for review were consolidated and the case was heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Philadelphia. However, the court found fault with the numerical limits set by the FCC in each of the local ownership rules. All other cross-ownership rules and restrictions will remain unchanged. The FCC also adopted rules in December 2007 to promote diversification of broadcast ownership in a separate order from the newspaper/broadcast station cross-ownership rule. Recent Court Proceedings
The relaxation of the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule as well as the other ownership rules promulgated by the FCC in December 2007 have yet to go into effect. Pursuant to the Third Circuit's final order in the Prometheus case, the FCC's newest rules may not go into effect until the Third Circuit lifts its stay. On June 12, 2009, the Third Circuit decided to keep the stay in place until further order of the court and ordered the parties to file status reports regarding whether the stay should remain in place later in the year. On October 1, 2009, the FCC filed its status report with the Third Circuit. The FCC argued that the stay should remain in place, because the 2008 order no longer incorporates the views of a majority of the Commissioners and the agency is set to begin a new review of the media ownership rules that should be completed in 2010. | In December 2007, the Federal Communications Commission relaxed its newspaper/broadcast ownership ban (order released February 2008). The decision raised concerns in Congress about increasing media consolidation that have long been at the forefront of the debate over ownership restrictions. The Commission's order served to rekindle the discussion of media consolidation and the perceived need to take action to preserve a diversity of voices in the marketplace of ideas. The FCC rule, as this report illustrates, has a history dating back to a previous failed attempt to relax a greater number of broadcast cross-ownership restrictions, and it is worthwhile to examine this previous proceeding in order to understand the current status of the rules.
On June 2, 2003, the FCC adopted a set of comprehensive rules addressing six different aspects of media ownership, including cross-ownership of broadcast and print media, local television and radio ownership, and national television ownership. On June 24, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Prometheus Radio v. FCC, remanded several of these rules to the Commission for further consideration finding that the Commission failed to adequately justify the numerical limitations used in the rules. This report provides an overview of the Commission's 2002 Biennial Review from which the 2003 rules originated and the Prometheus case.
The report also addresses current issues facing the actions taken by the FCC in response to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Prometheus. On December 18, 2007, the FCC concluded its review of broadcast ownership rules by relaxing the newspaper/broadcast station cross-ownership restrictions in certain markets. All other broadcast ownership rules, however, remain unchanged.
The relaxation of the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule as well as the other ownership rules passed by the FCC in December 2007 have yet to go into effect. Pursuant to the Third Circuit's final order in the Prometheus case, the FCC's newest rules may not take effect until the Third Circuit lifts its stay. On June 12, 2009, the Third Circuit decided to keep the stay in place until further order of the court. On October 1, 2009, the FCC filed a status report with the Third Circuit. The FCC argued that the stay should remain in place, because the 2008 order no longer incorporates the views of a majority of the Commissioners and the agency is set to begin a new review of the media ownership rules that should be completed in 2010. |
crs_RL33159 | crs_RL33159_0 | In addition to stockpiling existing antiviral drugs, the U.S. government is promoting the development of new antiviral drugs to combat influenza. Prior to 2006, Roche was the exclusive manufacturer of Tamiflu and significantly struggled to meet the strong demand for the patented drug. The Tamiflu production shortage in 2005 prompted both international and domestic pressures on Roche to ease its patent monopoly and permit other companies to manufacture generic versions of the drug. It was believed that such action would help to increase supplies of the flu treatment to meet the backlog of orders, as well as make the drug more affordable. However, we are concerned that the U.S. drug supply is increasingly vulnerable to a variety of increasingly sophisticated threats. The rise in global demand for Tamiflu has contributed to the production and sale of illegal, fake Tamiflu. Those same arguments were made in the case of Tamiflu. In 2006 and 2007, Roche expanded its capacity to manufacture Tamiflu by contracting with 19 external production partners. Due to its efforts to sublicense its patent rights to manufacture Tamiflu to these other drug companies, Roche has increased production of the drug to over 400 million treatments annually (as of April 2007)—an amount that exceeds the existing orders for Tamiflu from governments and corporations. While the concern over the then-limited supply of Tamiflu has largely been addressed by Roche's substantial manufacturing expansion, the issue of intellectual property rights potentially conflicting with public health needs may again arise in the future. Therefore, this report will now examine the ways in which a patented drug's production may be increased, either without a patent holder's consent or with the patent holder's cooperation. The primary legal mechanisms to accomplish permissible encroachment upon a patent right include (1) compulsory licenses under a government's statutory authority to issue them; (2) compulsory licenses pursuant to an international treaty that grants this right; and (3) voluntary licensing agreements negotiated between the patent owner (or patent licensee) and third parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). TRIPS and Compulsory Licenses
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement") is an international agreement on intellectual property that is one component of the treaties that created the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. As many nations attempt to stockpile antiviral drugs to prepare for the possible bird flu pandemic, the TRIPS "national emergency" provision for compulsory licenses has garnered public interest as a possible way to increase the production and supply of Tamiflu. In addition, Roche has donated "rapid response" supplies of Tamiflu (more than 5 million treatment courses) to the World Health Organization for establishing regional stockpiles to help contain or slow the spread of a pandemic. Finally, Roche has agreed to arrange for special pricing for government orders and to reduce the price of Tamiflu for low income countries. | The potential for a worldwide influenza pandemic caused by bird flu has generated public interest in the availability and affordability of influenza antiviral medications such as the prescription drug Tamiflu. The possibility of a pandemic flu outbreak has contributed to a surge in orders for Tamiflu, as countries attempt to stockpile sufficient countermeasures. In 2005, there was considerable concern that the owner of the exclusive right to manufacture the patented drug, the Swiss pharmaceutical company Roche, Inc., lacked the production capacity to meet the needs of these governments worldwide. In response to the heightened demand for the drug, as well as faced with threatened abrogation of its patent rights by U.S. politicians and government officials in other countries, Roche significantly boosted Tamiflu production in 2006 and 2007 by voluntarily signing licensing agreements with 19 external contractors in 9 different countries to manufacture the drug. This expansion in manufacturing capacity has increased production of the drug to over 400 million treatments annually—an amount that, according to the company, is sufficient to fulfill its existing orders (as of April 2007) for Tamiflu from governments and corporations. In addition, Roche has donated "rapid response" supplies of Tamiflu (more than 5 million treatment courses) to the World Health Organization for establishing regional stockpiles to help contain or slow the spread of a pandemic. Finally, Roche has agreed to arrange for special pricing for government orders and to reduce the price of Tamiflu for low income countries.
This report examines the role that intellectual property rights play in affecting the availability of a patented drug such as Tamiflu during public health crises. The report also explains one legal mechanism for increasing a patented drug's production without the patent holder's consent: governments may abrogate a pharmaceutical company's patent rights by issuing compulsory licenses to other drug companies to manufacture generic versions of the drug. Such option is available to countries under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement, a component of the treaties that created the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. The U.S. government's authority to declare compulsory licenses is Section 1498(a) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code. Other legal avenues to increase the supply of, and lower the price for, a patented drug include voluntary licensing agreements between the drug's patent holder and other companies for manufacturing or distributing the drug. In the case of Tamiflu and the avian influenza antiviral drug supply, Roche's willingness to sublicense its patent rights to several manufacturing partners has helped to lessen the concern over intellectual property rights hindering efforts to prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic. |
crs_RL32102 | crs_RL32102_0 | The Senate cloture rule (Rule XXII, par. 2) requires a super-majority vote to terminate a filibuster. The Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which provides that the President is to "nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, ... appoint" judges, does not impose a super-majority requirement for Senate confirmation. Since it has the effect of requiring a super-majority vote on a nomination, because it usually requires the votes of 60 Senators to end a filibuster, it has been argued that a filibuster of a judicial nomination is unconstitutional. Entrenchment
Several factors have the effect of entrenching the filibuster. The Arguments of Supporters and Critics of Filibusters of Judicial Nominations
Citing the language of the Appointments Clause and the intent of the Framers, supporters and critics of filibusters of judicial nominations disagree about the relative roles of the President and the Senate in regard to judicial appointments, about whether the Senate has a duty to dispose of the President's judicial nominations in a timely fashion, and about whether a majority of Senators has a constitutional right to vote on a nomination. Standing and the political question doctrine would be the primary justiciability issues raised by a court challenge to the filibuster rule. The constitutionality of the filibuster of a judicial nomination turns on an assessment of whether the Senate's power to make rules governing its own proceedings is broad enough to apply the filibuster rule to nominations. The constitutionality of the filibuster might be challenged in court, but it is uncertain whether such an action would be justiciable. | The Senate cloture rule requires a super-majority vote to terminate a filibuster (i.e., extended debate). The Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which provides that the President is to "nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, ... appoint" judges, does not impose a super-majority requirement for Senate confirmation. Critics of the Senate filibuster argue that a filibuster of a judicial nomination is unconstitutional in that it effectively requires a super-majority vote for confirmation, although the Appointments Clause does not require such a super-majority vote.
It has been argued that the Senate's constitutional power to determine the rules of its proceedings, as well as historical practice, provide the foundation for the filibuster. The question of the constitutionality of the filibuster of a judicial nomination turns on an assessment of whether the Senate's power to make rules governing its own proceedings is broad enough to apply the filibuster rule to nominations. Several factors have the effect of entrenching the filibuster (i.e., making it possible to filibuster a proposed amendment to the rules).
Supporters and critics of the filibuster of judicial nominations disagree about the relative roles of the President and the Senate in regard to judicial appointments, about whether the Senate has a duty to dispose of the President's judicial nominations in a timely fashion, and about whether a simple majority of Senators has a constitutional right to proceed to a vote on a nomination. The constitutionality of the filibuster might be challenged in court, but it is uncertain whether such an action would be justiciable (i.e., appropriate for judicial resolution). Standing and the political question doctrine would be the primary justiciability issues raised by a court challenge to the filibuster rule.
(Note: This report was originally written by [author name scrubbed], Legislative Attorney.) |
crs_R43171 | crs_R43171_0 | Introduction
Head Start is a federal program that has provided comprehensive early childhood development services (e.g., education, health, nutrition, and social services) to low-income children and their families since 1965. These services are intended to promote the school readiness of children by enhancing their cognitive, social, and emotional development. At the federal level, the Head Start program is administered by the Office of Head Start (OHS) within the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS provides federal Head Start funds directly to local public and private non-profit and for-profit agencies (called "grantees"), rather than through states. Head Start programs are locally designed and are administered by roughly 1,600 grantees. Since the program's inception, Head Start grantees have generally been given grant awards for indefinite periods (i.e., awards with no end date). However, the 2007 Head Start reauthorization law ( P.L. 110-134 ) changed this by instituting a five-year designation period for Head Start grantees. Under the new law, at the end of its five-year designation period, a grantee must demonstrate that it is delivering high-quality and comprehensive services, or else the grant is to be opened for re-competition. The law refers to the process of identifying grantees for re-competition as the Designation Renewal System (DRS). HHS was tasked with establishing the DRS, based on certain parameters specified within the law. Section 641(c) of the amended Head Start Act tasked the Secretary of HHS (the Secretary) with developing the DRS, in consultation with a panel of experts, and specified that the DRS must base determinations of program quality on
annual budget and fiscal management data; program monitoring reviews (which must occur at least once every three years according to requirements set forth in Section 641A(c) of the Head Start Act); annual audits (as required by Section 647 of the Head Start Act); classroom quality (as measured under Section 641A(2)(F) of the Head Start Act, which calls for the use of a "valid and reliable research-based observational instrument, implemented by qualified individuals with demonstrated reliability, that assesses classroom quality, including assessing multiple dimensions of teacher-child interactions that are linked to positive child development and later achievement"); and Program Information Reports (annual reports submitted by all Head Start grantees and delegate grantees, which provide comprehensive data on staff and services, as well as children and families served). To this end, the Secretary chartered an advisory committee in January 2008. Twelve months later, in December 2008, the advisory committee released a report with formal recommendations for implementing the DRS. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
In September 2010, HHS released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on designation renewal and re-competition based, in part, on the advisory committee's recommendations. During that time, HHS received approximately 16,000 comments on the NPRM from Head Start grantees, parents, teachers, state associations, national organizations, academic institutions, and legal entities. HHS took these comments into consideration before publishing a final rule on the DRS in November 2011. DRS Final Rule
HHS published the DRS final rule on November 9, 2011. Indicators/Triggers
The final rule established seven indicators for identifying programs that are not providing "high-quality and comprehensive services." Any Head Start grantee that fails to meet the minimum quality standards established by one or more of the seven indicators listed below (and described in greater detail in Table 3 at the end of this report) is automatically required to compete for continued funding. | Head Start is a federal program that has provided comprehensive early childhood development services (e.g., education, health, nutrition, and social services) to low-income children and their families since 1965. These services are intended to promote the school readiness of children by enhancing their cognitive, social, and emotional development. At the federal level, Head Start is administered by the Office of Head Start within the Administration for Children and Families at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Federal Head Start funds are provided directly to local public and private nonprofit and for-profit agencies (called "grantees"), rather than through states. At this time, programs are administered by roughly 1,600 grantees.
Since the program's inception, Head Start grantees have generally been given grant awards for indefinite periods (i.e., awards with no end date). However, the 2007 Head Start reauthorization law (P.L. 110-134) changed this by instituting a five-year designation period for Head Start grantees. Under this law, at the end of its five-year designation period, a grantee must demonstrate that it is delivering high-quality and comprehensive services, or else the grant is to be opened for re-competition. The law refers to the process of identifying grantees for re-competition as the Designation Renewal System (DRS). The law tasked HHS with establishing the DRS in consultation with a panel of experts and based on parameters specified in the law.
In January 2008, HHS convened an Advisory Committee on Re-designation of Head Start Grantees. Twelve months later, the advisory committee released a report with formal recommendations for implementing the DRS. In September 2010, HHS published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on the DRS based, in part, on the advisory committee's recommendations. HHS received approximately 16,000 comments on the proposed rule from Head Start grantees, parents, teachers, state associations, national organizations, academic institutions, and legal entities. HHS took all comments into consideration before publishing a final rule on the DRS in November 2011.
The DRS final rule established seven indicators for identifying Head Start grantees that are not providing "high-quality and comprehensive services." The indicators address various aspects of program quality, licensing and operations, and fiscal and internal controls. Any grantee that fails to meet the minimum quality standards set by one or more of the seven indicators will automatically be required to compete for continued funding.
Under the terms of the final rule, the DRS became effective on December 9, 2011. That month, HHS announced the first cohort of grantees required to re-compete. A second cohort of grantees designated for re-competition was announced in January 2013. DRS competitions began in 2012. As of July 2013, HHS had awarded roughly 153 grants through DRS competitions. |
crs_RL31313 | crs_RL31313_0 | 108-7 , formerly H.J.Res. OnFebruary 13, 2003, the House and Senate approved the conference report ( H.Rept. 108-10 ) accompanying H.J.Res. The House version of the bill included aprovision that would have allowed the District of Columbia to spend $5.8 billion in locally raisedfunds while Congress completed action on the proposed $517 million in federal contributions to theDistrict's FY2003 budget. In response to the CFO's findings andat the urging of Congress, the mayor and the city council submitted a revised budgeton September 27, 2002, aimed at addressing the budget shortfall. 108th Congress. The 107thCongress was unable to complete action on 11 appropriations bills, including theDistrict of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2003, before adjourning. 107-229 , a continuing budget resolution, froze appropriationsfor 11 appropriations bills for FY2003 at their FY2002 budget levels. 2 , as approved by the House on January8, 2003, would have allowed the District to spend $5.8 billion in locally raised fundsfor operating expenses in accordance with the city's revised financial plan and budgetfor FY2003. During the 107th Congress, the House Appropriations Committee reported out its version of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2003, H.R. 5521 , on October 2, 2002, several days after the District submitted a revised budget forFY2003. FY2003 General Provisions, House Bill. On January 23, 2003. the Senate passed its versionof H. J. Res. On July 26, 2002, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 2809 , the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2003. The bill included $517million in special federal payments and contributions to the District. These funds wereto be matched by local funds. FY2003 General Provisions, Senate Bill. The actalso allows unrelated heterosexual and homosexual couples to register as domesticpartners. 2, P.L. 108-7. 2 , wasapproved by the House and Senate on February 13, 2002. The Act, which was signedby the President on February 20, 2003, appropriates $512 million in special federalpayments and contributions to the District of Columbia and associated public andprivate entities. The Act includes:
$162 million for the operation of the District of Columbia Court system;
$155 million for court services and offender supervision activities;
$50 million federal payment to the Washington Water and Sewer Authority;
$33 million for defender services;
$30 million for security and emergency preparedness and response activities, including $15 million for security planningactivities;
$20 million for public education, including $3 million in support of special education, and $17 million for the District's public charter schools; and
$17 million for college tuition assistance plan. The Act prohibits the use of the use of federal and District funds for:
lobbying for District statehood or voting representation in Congress;
abortion services, except in the case of rape or incest;
a needle or syringe exchange program intended to reduce the spread of AIDS/HIV; or
legalize marijuana or the implementation of a medical marijuana initiative. The prohibition on the use of federal and District funds for a needle exchange program was first approved by Congress as Section 170 of the District of ColumbiaAppropriations Act for FY1999, P.L. Like the final conference provision, the House bill, H.R. 107-96 , includes a provision that continues to prohibit the District government from implementing theinitiative. Under the Health Care Benefits Expansion Act, which wasapproved by the city's elected leadership in 1992, an unmarried person who registersas a domestic partner of a District employee hired after 1987 may be added to theDistrict employee's health care policy for an additional charge. 108-07 , consistent with the provision included in the District's FY2002 Appropriations Act, includes a general provision that allows the use of District fundsto administer the program during FY2003. P.L. | On February 20, 2003, President Bush signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2003, P.L. 108-7 (formerly H. J. Res. 2). Division C of the act appropriates $512 million in federal fundsfor the District of Columbia. for fiscal year 2003. On February 13, 2003, the House and the Senateapproved the conference report ( H.Rept. 108-10 ) accompanying H. J. Res. 2. The Senate approvedan earlier version of H.J.Res. 2 , on January 23, 2003, that would have allowed theDistrict of Columbia to spend $5.8 billion in locally raised funds while Congress completed actionon the proposed $517 million in federal contributions to the District's FY2003 budget. The 107thCongress failed to complete action on the District's FY2003 Appropriations Act before it adjourned. As a consequence, Congress passed eight continuing budget resolutions freezing District ofColumbia and several other FY2003 appropriations bills at their FY2002 level until a budgetcompromise could be reached. during the 108th Congress.
On October 2, 2002, several days after the submission of a revised FY2003 budget by District officials, the House Appropriations Committee reported the District of Columbia Appropriations Actfor FY2003, H.R. 5521 . In response to a congressionally imposed October 1, 2002deadline, District of Columbia officials completed action on a revised budget for FY2003 onSeptember 27, 2002. Passage of an amended FY2003 budget by District officials was aimed at addressing a $323 million budget shortfall identified by the city's chief financial officer.
On July 26, 2002, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 2809 , the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2003. The Senate and House bills included $517million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia, which was significantly less than the$592 million requested by the District. The House and Senate bills included special federalpayments of $17 million for the District's college access program and $15 million for security andemergency preparedness activities associated with the city's status as the national capital. TheSenate bill included $15 million for capital infrastructure development while the House bill included$24 million, which was less than the $96 million requested by the District.
The House and Senate bills, as reported during the 107th Congress, would have continued to allow the District to use its local funds to administer a domestic partners health insurance actapproved by the city in 1992. Prior to the passage of the P.L. 107-96 , the District of ColumbiaAppropriations Act for FY2002, Congress prohibited the implementation of the Health Care BenefitsExpansion Act. The Act allows unmarried couples to register as domestic partners and extendshealth care benefits of city employees to unrelated individuals registered as domestic partners. P.L.108-7 , includes a provision included in the House bill prohibiting the use of local and federal fundingof a needle exchange program. The Senate bill would have allowed the use of District funds for aneedle exchange in an effort to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS. In addition, the final act includeda provision found in both House and Senate bills prohibiting the use of District or federal funds toprepare a medical marijuana ballot initiative and the use of federal or District funds for abortionservices except in instance of rape or incest. This report will be updated as warranted.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: G&F = Government and Finance Division; DSP = Domestic Social Policy Division |
crs_RL32092 | crs_RL32092_0 | Background
Medical malpractice and malpractice insurance continue to be issues of great concern tophysicians, consumers, legislators, and others. (1) Most of the discussion about the rising cost of malpracticeinsurance has centered on limiting the damage awards in malpractice suits. Some attention has beengiven to insurance market reforms. A third, related area that has received less consideration inmalpractice discussions is patient safety. Patient safety refers to the panoply of rules, practices, and systems related to the preventionof patient injury, also known as "adverse events." (2) While patient safety and medical errors have generated a great dealof discussion in the media and in legislatures in the past several years, such discussion typically hastaken place separately from the vigorous debates concerning malpractice litigation. 109-41 on July 29, 2005. However, medical liability issues are addressed in otherlegislation -- specifically, H.R. 5 / S. 354 , the Help Efficient, Accessible,Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2005; S. 22 , the Medical Care AccessProtection Act of 2006; and S. 23 , the Healthy Mothers and Healthy Babies Access toCare Act. (4)
The separation of patient safety concerns from medical malpractice issues has not alwaysbeen the case. Therefore, it may be appropriate to consider these issues collectively, and re-visit therole patient safety initiatives could play in the prevention of both medical errors and medicalmalpractice. The link between malpractice and medical error has its detractors. Others, however, question the quality of the NPDB data. Voluntary Reporting. Individual initiatives have resulted in promisingoutcomes, but the overall impact of these efforts has been mixed. To some degree, this is the casebecause implementation has not been as pervasive as initial intentions suggested, and also becausenot enough research has been done to identify, enumerate, and assess patient safety efforts. Tracking and Reducing Medical Errors. Specific IT initiatives also have enhanced patient safety. S. 720 also established a voluntary system for the reporting ofmedical errors to patient safety organizations. During the first session of the 109th Congress, Senator Jeffords introduced S. 544 , the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005. S.544 became P.L. (61)
While the majority of patient safety and medical malpractice bills address problems relatedto only one of these issues, a few bills have included provisions that address both issues. State Patient Safety Centers. | Medical malpractice and malpractice insurance continue to be issues of great concern tophysicians, consumers, legislators, and others. Most of the discussion about rising malpracticeinsurance premiums has centered on limiting the damage awards in malpractice suits, though someattention also has been given to insurance reforms. A third, related area that has received lessconsideration in malpractice discussions is patient safety. Patient safety refers to the panoply ofrules, practices, and systems related to the prevention of medical injury. Intrinsic to patient safetyefforts are strategies to prevent medical errors.
While patient safety and medical errors have generated a great deal of discussion inlegislatures in the past several years, such discussion typically has taken place separately from thedebates concerning malpractice. For example, S. 544 , the Patient Safety and QualityImprovement Act of 2005, encouraged the voluntary reporting and analysis of medical error data. S. 544 became P.L. 109-41 on July 29, 2005. However, medical liability issues areaddressed in other legislation -- specifically, H.R. 5 / S. 354 , the HelpEfficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2005, S. 22 , theMedical Care Access Protection Act of 2006, and S. 23 , the Healthy Mothers andHealthy Babies Access to Care Act.
The separation of patient safety concerns from medical malpractice issues has not alwaysbeen the case. Several states have passed legislation that included provisions that addressed bothmalpractice and patient safety issues. Research studies have explored the links between the twoissues, and a few bills introduced during the 109th Congress, such as S. 1337 and S. 1784 , address those links. Therefore, it is appropriate and timely to reconsider theseissues collectively, and revisit the role patient safety initiatives could play in the prevention of bothmedical errors and medical malpractice.
Strategies to enhance patient safety differ according to the specific provider type targeted. For instance, physician education includes providing clinical guidelines about appropriate treatmentsfor specific medical conditions, while hospital education involves performance feedback from anexternal organization. At the same time, general approaches may apply to both physicians andhospitals. For example, medical error reporting is a key component for patient safety enhancement,regardless of the provider focus.
The impact of patient safety initiatives on the quality of care provided continues to be anopen question. Individual initiatives have resulted in promising outcomes, but the overall impactof these efforts has been mixed. To some degree, this is the case because implementation has notbeen as pervasive as initial intentions suggested, and also because not enough research has been doneto identify, enumerate, and assess patient safety efforts.
This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R40514 | crs_R40514_0 | Overview
In recent years, federal education legislation has placed an increased emphasis on assessment in schools. Perhaps most notably, Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as reauthorized by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB; P.L. 107-110 ), has required all states that receive Title I-A funds to test all public school students annually in grades 3 through 8 and once in high school in the areas of reading and mathematics. To receive Title I-A funding, states must also participate in the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), a standards-based national test given at grades 4 and 8. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA; P.L. 108-446 ) requires states to use assessments to identify students with disabilities and track their progress according to individualized learning goals. In addition to assessments required by federal law, elementary and secondary school students generally participate in many other assessments, which range from small-scale classroom assessments to high-stakes exit exams. This report provides a framework for understanding various types of assessments that are administered in elementary and secondary schools. It broadly discusses various purposes of educational assessment and describes comprehensive assessment systems. Common assessment measures currently used in education are described, including state assessments, NAEP, and state exit exams. The report also provides a description and analysis of technical considerations in assessments, including validity, reliability, and fairness, and discusses how to use these technical considerations to draw appropriate conclusions based on assessment results. Finally, this report provides a brief analysis of the use of assessments in accountability systems, including implications for curriculum, students, and testing. Under NCLB, student scores on state assessments are used as key indicators in an accountability system that determines whether schools are making progress with respect to student achievement. | In recent years, federal education legislation has placed an increased emphasis on assessment in schools. Perhaps most notably, Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as reauthorized by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), requires states to test all students annually in grades 3 through 8 and once in high school in the areas of reading and mathematics. These assessments are used as key indicators in an accountability system that determines whether schools are making progress with respect to student achievement. To receive Title I funding, states must also participate in the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), a standards-based national test given at grades 4 and 8. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires states to use assessments to identify students with disabilities and track their progress according to individualized learning goals. In addition to assessments required by federal law, elementary and secondary school students generally participate in many other assessments, which range from small-scale classroom assessments to high-stakes exit exams.
This report provides a framework for understanding various types of assessments that are administered in elementary and secondary schools. It broadly discusses various purposes of educational assessment and describes comprehensive assessment systems. Common assessment measures currently used in education are described, including state assessments, NAEP, and state exit exams. The report also provides a description and analysis of technical considerations in assessments, including validity, reliability, and fairness, and discusses how to use these technical considerations to draw appropriate conclusions based on assessment results. Finally, this report provides a brief analysis of the use of assessments in accountability systems, including implications for curriculum, students, and testing. |
crs_RS22949 | crs_RS22949_0 | Such changes could affect the laws and rules governing foreign lawyers and foreign law firms in each of the 50-plus jurisdictions in the United States and the federal agencies. Negotiations in the Doha Round of the WTO could help resolve ethical issues that have arisen in the cross-border provision of legal services. | This report provides a broad overview of the treatment of legal services under the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements and its potential effect on laws and rules governing the provision of legal services by foreign lawyers in the United States and legal ethics rules. |
crs_RS21896 | crs_RS21896_0 | The Department of the Treasury may assert that it has the power to regulate Fannie and Freddie's debt issuances more strongly than it has in the past. As mentioned above, however, reports have circulated that the Treasury Department may seek to exercise its approval authority to regulate the amount of debt that Fannie and Freddie can issue. The statutory language in both Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's charters conditions the issuance of debt obligations upon the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. Put simply, although the statutory language concerning the Treasury Secretary's authority here is clear, one could argue that Congress's understanding of that authority may have changed between the time that it was granted over Fannie Mae and when it was granted to Freddie Mac, because of the way that the Department of the Treasury had traditionally chosen to exercise this authority. | The Department of the Treasury is developing a more formalized approach for approving Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's debt issuances. Although the Department of the Treasury has traditionally used its approval authority merely to coordinate the timing of debt issuances, the department may seek to regulate the amount of debt that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may issue. This report analyzes the Department of the Treasury's legal authority over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and concludes that a court would likely hold that the department possesses the power to regulate the amount of debt issued by these two organizations. |
crs_R44681 | crs_R44681_0 | Based on the distinction between national and operational/tactical, IC spending is usually understood as the combination of (1) the National Intelligence Program (NIP), which covers the programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence community oriented towards the strategic needs of decisionmakers, and (2) the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), which funds defense intelligence activity intended to support tactical military operations and priorities. NIP and MIP labels are also not definitive. The information in this report is based entirely on unclassified, publicly available sources. CRS Report R44381, Intelligence Spending: In Brief , by [author name scrubbed], contains tables comparing NIP and MIP spending to national defense spending from FY2007 to FY2017. National Intelligence Program (NIP)39
Both 50 U.S.C. For example, the IRTPA:
authorizes the DNI to "develop and determine" the NIP budget, based on budget proposals provided by IC elements heads and after obtaining the advice of the Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC); directs the DNI to "monitor implementation," and "ensure the effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence related activities;" stipulates that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), at the exclusive direction of the DNI, may direct ( apportion ) how congressionally appropriated funds will flow from the Department of the Treasury to each of the Cabinet-level agencies containing IC elements—to better ensure that the funds are spent as directed; stipulates that the DNI may allot appropriations directly, providing the DNI an additional opportunity to control spending at the sub-Cabinet agency and department level; requires the DNI to notify Congress if a departmental comptroller refuses to act in accordance with a DNI spending directive; provides the DNI with enhanced "transfer and reprogramming authority." Table E-1 ( Appendix E ) provides a table listing IC leaders in terms of a number of their management titles. NIP and MIP Budget Process (IPPBE and PPBE)
Management and oversight of intelligence programs is complicated by the fact that they are resourced through two separate budget processes—one entirely within the IC and one entirely within the DOD. Enduring Issues
Based on the FY2017 President's Budget request, the IC programs discussed in this report currently equate to approximately $70 billion dollars (or roughly 11%) of national defense spending. Observers point to a number of issues that may affect the ability of IC and DOD leadership to make the best use of those resources. Transparency
Total intelligence-related spending is almost impossible to calculate and its management and oversight is completely decentralized. IC funding alone is divided into two budget categories. The NIP and MIP are managed within the executive branch separately, justified to Congress separately, and overseen by congressional committees separately. Intelligence-related programs that are not part of the IC include, for example, the large Office of Intelligence within DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division. The ICE Office of Intelligence is not included in the IC because theoretically, ICE activities primarily support the DHS mission to protect the homeland. Furthermore, there is no one source that provides a list of all intelligence-related programs in the U.S. government. Further Reading
Appendix A. IC Collection Disciplines
Appendix B. Intelligence Programs: In Brief
Appendix C. CIARDS and ICMA
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS) and Community Management Account (ICMA or CMA) are seldom discussed in IC-related literature. Appendix E. IC Leaders and Selected Management Hats
Appendix F. Budget Processes (IPPBE and PPBE)
Appendix G. NIP MIP Program Integration
Appendix H. Selected Acronyms | Congress's and the American public's ability to oversee and understand how intelligence dollars are spent is limited by the secrecy that surrounds the intelligence budget process. Yet, total spending on the Intelligence Community (IC) programs discussed in this report equates to approximately $70 billion dollars—roughly 10% of national defense spending. This report is designed to shed light on the IC budget—in terms of its programs, management, and enduring issues—using unclassified materials available in the public domain.
This report focuses those IC programs, grouped, for the most part, under two labels: (1) the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and (2) the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). Nevertheless, the combined NIP and MIP budgets do not encompass the total of U.S. intelligence-related spending. Intelligence-related programs that are not part of the IC include, for example, the large Office of Intelligence within the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division. The ICE Office of Intelligence is not included in the IC because, theoretically, ICE activities primarily support the DHS mission to protect the homeland.
This report explains the management structure for the NIP and MIP to include their two separate budget processes and the roles of the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). The concluding section of this report considers the ability of the U.S. government to make the best use of its intelligence-related resources when: (1) total intelligence spending is impossible to calculate; (2) its management and oversight is completely decentralized; and (3) IC funding alone is largely divided into two categories (NIP and MIP)–managed within the executive branch separately, justified to Congress separately, and overseen by separate congressional committees.
The Appendices are designed, in a number of cases, to provide quick reference tables summarizing the more detailed information available in the body of the report.
Appendix A provides a summary of intelligence disciplines. Appendix B provides very brief explanations of NIP and MIP subordinate programs. Appendix C examines two unique and relatively obscure NIP programs, the Central Intelligence Agency's Retirement and Disability System and the IC's Community Management Account. Appendix D briefly describes a program called the Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP). Appendix E provides a summary table of management hats. (Senior executives are often referred to as dual-hatted, triple-hatted, and so on, when they are charged with a number of different roles and responsibilities and associated titles.) Appendix F provides a summary table comparing the IPPBE and PPBE budget systems. Appendix G provides a figure illustrating the ways in which the IPPBE and PPBE are integrated. Appendix H provides a list of IC-related acronyms, many of which are commonly used in this report.
For more on IC spending trends, see CRS Report R44381, Intelligence Community Spending: Trends and Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R45448 | crs_R45448_0 | S everal countries have placed tariffs on U.S. agricultural and food products in 2018 to retaliate against trade actions taken by the Trump Administration earlier in the year to protect U.S. aluminum and steel producers from imports and in response to China's intellectual property rights (IPR) and technology policies. China, Canada, Mexico, the European Union (EU), and Turkey have each placed tariffs on a range of U.S. agricultural and food products in response to the decision to levy tariffs on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum. The export value of the targeted U.S. agricultural products to the retaliating countries amounted to $26.9 billion in 2017, representing 18% of the value of U.S. agricultural and food exports globally. Any loss of agricultural exports would be a concern, since about 20% of U.S. farm income stems from exports, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Mexico, the EU, and Japan are forecast to rank, respectively, as the second-, third-, and fourth-leading export markets in FY2019, according to USDA. China, which is subject to the largest number of new tariffs, has countered by placing tariffs on almost all of its agricultural and food imports from the United States (see Figure 1 ). China has levied tariffs of 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, or a combination of those amounts on more than 800 U.S. food and agricultural products that were worth about $20.6 billion in calendar year (CY) 2017. The products subject to retaliatory tariffs span all agricultural and food categories, including grains, meat and animal products, fruits and vegetables, seafood, and processed foods. As part of the agreement, China committed to immediately begin purchasing "very substantial" quantities of U.S. agricultural products, including soybeans. Canada
Canada, which ranked as the leading export market by value for U.S. agricultural and food products in 2017, has levied retaliatory tariffs of 10% on more than 20 U.S. agricultural and food products. U.S. exports of the retaliatory-tariff-affected products to Canada were valued at $2.6 billion in 2017, representing 10% of the $25.4 billion in total U.S. exports of agricultural and food products to Canada that year. U.S. exports to Mexico of agricultural and food products that are subject to tariff retaliation amounted to approximately $2.5 billion in 2017, representing 13% of total U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico of $19 billion that year. In other cases, the effects have the potential to be more significant, as the retaliating markets represent leading export markets for certain U.S. products that are subject to new tariffs. For example, in 2017 China, Canada, Mexico, the EU, and Turkey accounted for about 20% or more by value of U.S. exports of pork, soybeans, sorghum, cheese, apples, cherries, seafood, ginseng, and whiskey (see Figure 2 ). U.S. soybean exports for January through October 2018 are 63% lower than during that time period in 2017. Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum and an additional 25% retaliatory tariff in response to the U.S. Section 301 tariffs. U.S. frozen pork offal exports to China are now subject to a 50% retaliatory tariff, which is in addition to a preexisting tariff of 12%. Exports account for about 20% of U.S. farm income, according to USDA, so U.S. farmers and ranchers have an interest in both maintaining and expanding export markets. Several bills introduced in the 115 th Congress in both the House and the Senate would have provided more export promotion money and additional adjustment assistance to farmers affected by the retaliatory tariffs, though none passed. | Countries have imposed tariffs on U.S. agricultural products to retaliate against actions the Trump Administration took in spring 2018 to protect U.S. steel and aluminum producers and in response to Chinese intellectual property rights and technology policies. Since then, more than 800 U.S. food and agricultural products have been subject to retaliatory tariffs from China, the European Union (EU), Turkey, Canada, and Mexico. U.S. exports of those products to the retaliating countries totaled $26.9 billion in 2017, according to USDA export data. The choice of agricultural and food products for retaliatory tariffs likely reflects the large volume of agricultural trade involved and that many of these products can be sourced from non-U.S. trading partners. Such tariff hikes threaten to reduce U.S. agricultural exports.
China, which is subject to both the U.S. Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs and separate Section 301 tariffs aimed as punishment for its handling of U.S. intellectual property rights, has placed retaliatory tariffs on the largest number and highest value of U.S. agricultural and food products. More than 800 products—including soybeans, pork, dairy products, fruits and nuts, seafood, and processed products—accounting for almost all U.S. agricultural and food exports to China in value terms in 2017 (the last full year without retaliatory tariffs) are now subject to additional tariffs of 5%, 10%, 15%, 25%, or a combination of those amounts. U.S. exports to China of those products that are subject to retaliatory tariffs were worth about $20.6 billion in 2017. China has fallen from the leading export market for U.S. agricultural products in FY2017 to the third-leading export market in FY2018 due to the retaliatory tariffs, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). USDA forecasts that China will fall to the fifth-leading market for those products in FY2019.
Canada and Mexico are each targeting about 20 U.S. food and agricultural products, which accounted for approximately $2.6 billion and $2.5 billion in exports to each respective country in 2017. The EU and Turkey have each put retaliatory tariffs on about 40 U.S. agricultural and food products that were valued at about $1 billion and $250 million, respectively, in 2017. India has threatened to impose tariffs on seven U.S. agricultural and food products, which accounted for about $857 million in exports in 2017. U.S. agricultural exports account for about 20% of U.S. farm income, according to USDA. Thus any loss in exports could have negative economic consequences for U.S. farmers.
Commodities that are highly dependent on exports to the retaliating markets may be more severely affected than others by any loss of markets from the tariffs. For instance, commodities for which U.S. exports to the retaliating countries represent 30% or more of its total exports include soybeans, sorghum, pork, cheese, apples, cherries, seafood, ginseng, whiskey, and some processed foods. U.S. soybean exports to China for January through October 2018 are 63% lower than during the same time period in 2017—a change due in large part to the tariffs.
USDA is attempting to ease the downside effects of the retaliatory tariffs on farmers and ranchers through a $12 billion trade aid package. Under this initiative, USDA has committed to making direct payments to farmers of selected commodities subject to the tariffs, as well as buying up surplus quantities of some commodities and providing funding for additional trade promotion efforts. In addition, legislation that was introduced in the 115th Congress sought to provide more trade assistance funding for farmers and ranchers, though none of the bills passed. |
crs_R42985 | crs_R42985_0 | Although there is a federal Department of Homeland Security, it is neither solely dedicated to homeland security missions, nor is it the only part of the federal government with significant responsibilities in this arena. Although DHS does include many of the homeland security functions of the federal government, several of these functions or parts of these functions remain at their original executive branch agencies and departments, including the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, and Transportation. 110-53 ):
Counterterrorism and Security Management, Border Security and Trade, Immigration, and Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. In many cases, a specific CRS report is highlighted as a source of more detailed information. The issues included in this report do not represent a comprehensive list of possible issues—they represent a broad array of issues likely to be addressed by Congress in the coming months. Twelve years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, policy makers continue to debate the definition of homeland security. The threat was brought into the spotlight by the November 2002 attack on a chartered Israeli airliner in Mombasa, Kenya. Some Members of Congress have raised questions about whether DHS's investments at the border have been effective, and some have argued that enforcement has been compromised by the fact that DHS does not have a single, overarching strategy for border security. S.Amdt. Management Issues at DHS
DHS Reorganization Authority
[author name scrubbed], Analyst in American National Government ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed])
From the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in January 2003 through 2007, the President and the Secretary of Homeland Security used provisions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, most notably Section 872, to implement a number of major and minor departmental reorganizations. Current initiatives in each of these areas are discussed below. | With the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), many observers have made a fresh assessment of where America's homeland security enterprise stands today. DHS is currently the third-largest department in the federal government, although it does not incorporate all of the homeland security functions at the federal level. The definition of homeland security remains unsettled, and questions about the effectiveness and efficiency of the department have been raised since it was first proposed. Evolution of America's response to terrorist threats has continued under the leadership of different Administrations, Congresses, and in a shifting environment of public opinion.
This report outlines an array of homeland security issues that may come before the 113th Congress. After a brief discussion of the overall homeland security budget, the report divides the specific issues into five broad categories:
Counterterrorism and Security Management, Border Security and Trade, Immigration, Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, and Departmental Management.
Each of those areas contains a survey of topics briefly analyzed by Congressional Research Service experts. The information included only scratches the surface on most of these issues. More detailed information can be obtained by consulting the CRS reports referenced herein, or by contacting the relevant CRS expert. |
crs_R41160 | crs_R41160_0 | This report presents what is known publicly about the tests, discusses detection and containment of nuclear tests, explores the possible significance of containment for North Korea, and raises, as issues for Congress, implications for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and possible means of improving U.S. and international ability to monitor nuclear testing. It establishes an International Monitoring System (IMS) to monitor signs of an explosion. As of November 2010, 182 nations had signed the treaty and 153 of them had ratified. In April 2009, President Obama pledged to pursue U.S. ratification of the CTBT "immediately and aggressively." It was clearly nuclear because it released radioactive materials. The 2009 Test
North Korea announced on May 25, 2009, that it had conducted a second nuclear test. The lack of certainty as to whether the test was nuclear arises because seismic signals, including those detected by 61 stations of the IMS, were consistent with a nuclear test, and seismic signals from the 2006 and 2009 events were very similar, but open sources did not report the detection of physical evidence that would provide conclusive proof of a nuclear test, such as certain radioactive isotopes of noble gases or radioactive particulates (i.e., fallout). The United States conducted large aboveground and underground tests using chemical explosives to simulate some effects of nuclear explosions. How might North Korea have contained its second test? Of course, OSIs pursuant to the treaty could only occur after the treaty had entered into force, though it is possible that OSIs could be done outside the treaty regime, such as if requested by one country before the treaty enters into force to prove that it had not conducted a nuclear test, or pursuant to a bilateral agreement permitting one state to monitor another state's nuclear test site. The United States has its own technical means of detecting nuclear explosions, which the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) operates. Either may prove that a nuclear test occurred. Some believe that argon-37 could be detected at long range. How Can Radioactive Material Be Contained? Better techniques can greatly improve containment. Some U.S. nuclear tests that were not reported as releasing radioactive material might have done so, but the amount released may have been below the detection threshold for instruments available at the time. While there is no publicly-available information on whether North Korea attempted to contain its second test, and if so what methods it used, containment could have resulted from one of the following factors, or a combination of several:
Lessons learned from the first test: As noted, a nuclear test provides data for many disciplines involved with the test. Use of a higher-yield nuclear device: It can be harder to contain lower-yield underground nuclear explosions than higher-yield ones. Nonnuclear explosion: The May 25 event may not have been a nuclear test, which would explain the lack of radioactive effluents. Fallout on Japan or South Korea would likely antagonize them. Fallout on North Korea could contaminate land. Of course, the surer way for North Korea to avert OSIs would be for that nation not to ratify the CTBT, keeping it from entering into force. For example, detecting uranium in debris from a nuclear test conducted inside North Korea would not be proof that the weapon was North Korean, even if it could be determined that the uranium was of North Korean manufacture: "David Asher, who helped direct efforts to counter North Korea's proliferation activities in the George W. Bush administration … [said] 'My fear is that just as Iran's demands for enriched uranium for a bomb are expanding, North Korea may be in the position to begin supplying.'" Opponents might argue that without detection of radionuclides there is no proof that North Korea conducted a nuclear test. Suspicious seismic signals and an absence of radionuclides, it is argued, would surely lead to calls for an OSI. Entry into force requires ratification by North Korea, among others, yet that nation's ratification may be difficult to obtain. In examining budgets and programs, Congress may wish to consider various means of improving U.S. and international ability to monitor nuclear testing by North Korea and other nations. | On May 25, 2009, North Korea announced that it had conducted its second underground nuclear test. Unlike its first test, in 2006, there is no public record that the second one released radioactive materials indicative of a nuclear explosion. How could North Korea have contained these materials from the May 2009 event and what are the implications?
As background, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would ban all nuclear explosions. It was opened for signature in 1996. Entry into force requires ratification by 44 states specified in the treaty, including the United States and North Korea. As of November 2010, 153 states, including 35 of the 44, had ratified. North Korea has not signed the CTBT. President Clinton signed it in 1996; in 1999, the Senate voted not to consent to its ratification. In 2009, President Obama pledged to press for its ratification.
The treaty establishes a verification mechanism, including an International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect nuclear tests. Three IMS technologies detect waves that pass through the oceans (hydroacoustic), Earth (seismic), or atmosphere (infrasound); a fourth detects radioactive material from a nuclear test. Scientists concur that only the latter proves that an explosion was nuclear. Some believe that deep burial and other means can contain radioactive effluents. Another view is that containment is an art as much as a science. The United States learned to improve containment over several decades. Yet by one estimate, North Korea contained over 99.9% of the radioactive effluents from its 2009 test. It might have done so by application of lessons learned from its 2006 test or the U.S. nuclear test experience, use of a higher-yield device, release of material below the detection threshold, good luck, or some combination. Alternatively, the 2009 event may have been a nonnuclear explosion designed to simulate a nuclear test.
Containment could be of value to North Korea. It could keep radioactive fallout from China, Japan, Russia, or South Korea, averting an irritant in relations with them. It could prevent intelligence services from gathering material that could reveal information about the weapon that was tested. It could permit North Korea to host nuclear tests by other nations, such as Iran; while such tests would be detected by seismic means, they could not be attributed to another nation using technical forensic means if effluents, especially particles, were contained.
An issue for Congress is how containment could affect CTBT prospects. Supporters might argue that explosion-like seismic signals without detected radioactive material would lead to calls for an onsite inspection. Opponents might claim that only detection of radioactive material proves that a nuclear explosion occurred. Both would note inspections could not be required unless the treaty entered into force, supporters to point to a benefit of the treaty and opponents to note that North Korea could block inspections by not ratifying the treaty. Congress may wish to consider ways to improve monitoring capability, such as supporting further research on test signatures, improving monitoring system capability, and deploying more monitoring equipment. This update reflects developments in the North Korean uranium program and prospects for another nuclear test.
Related CRS reports include CRS Report RL34256, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, which summarizes open-source information on that nation's nuclear weapons program, including fissile material and warhead estimates, and assesses developments toward denuclearization; and CRS Report R40684, North Korea's Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, which analyzes possible economic effects on North Korea of sanctions and vessel inspections that Resolution 1874 puts in place. |
crs_R44065 | crs_R44065_0 | Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) requires health insurance exchanges (also known as marketplaces ) to be established in every state. ACA exchanges are virtual marketplaces in which consumers and small businesses can shop for and purchase private health insurance coverage and, where applicable, be connected to public health insurance programs (e.g., Medicaid). This report provides an overview of key aspects of the health insurance exchanges. The report includes summary information about the major functions of exchanges and how they are structured. It describes individual and small business eligibility and enrollment processes, provides enrollment estimates, explains the financial assistance available to certain consumers and small businesses, and discusses consumer enrollment assistance options. The report also reviews the role of exchanges in certifying participating plans and outlines the range of plans offered through exchanges. It briefly addresses funding for the exchanges. Most states have two types of exchanges—an individual exchange and a small business health options program (SHOP) exchange . In a SHOP exchange, small businesses can compare and purchase small-group insurance and can apply for small business health insurance tax credits; in addition, employees of small businesses can enroll in plans offered by their employers on a SHOP exchange. Individual and SHOP exchanges can be operated by either the state or the federal government, as described below. If a state opts not to administer its own exchange, or if the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) determines that the state is not in a position to do so, then HHS is required to establish and administer the exchange in the state as a federally facilitated exchange (FFE). States also may have a state-based exchange using a federal platform (SBE-FP), which means they have an SBE but use the federally facilitated information technology (IT) platform (i.e., HealthCare.gov). Consumers can use their state's exchange website (Healthcare.gov or a state-run site) to compare and enroll in plans, and the exchange websites are required to display a calculator that estimates consumers' costs after any cost-sharing reductions or premium tax credits for which they are eligible (see " Premium Tax Credits and Cost-Sharing Reductions " in this report). States with SBEs may observe different OEPs. Premium Tax Credits and Cost-Sharing Reductions
Consumers purchasing coverage through the individual exchanges may be eligible to receive financial assistance. The intent of the credit is to assist small employers with the cost of providing health insurance coverage to employees. Qualified Health Plans
In general, health insurance plans offered through exchanges must be QHPs. A QHP is a plan that is offered by a state-licensed issuer that meets specified requirements, is certified by an exchange, and covers the essential health benefits (EHB) package. QHPs must comply with the same state and federal requirements that apply to health plans offered outside of exchanges. A QHP offered through an individual exchange must comply with state and federal requirements applicable to individual market plans; a QHP offered through a SHOP exchange must comply with state and federal requirements applicable to plans offered in the small-group market. | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) requires health insurance exchanges to be established in every state. Exchanges are marketplaces in which consumers and small businesses can shop for and purchase private health insurance coverage. In general, states must have two types of exchanges: an individual exchange and a small business health options program (SHOP) exchange.
Exchanges may be established either by the state itself as a state-based exchange (SBE) or by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) as a federally facilitated exchange (FFE). Some states have SBE-FPs: they have SBEs but use the federal information technology platform, including the federal exchange website www.Healthcare.gov. In states with FFEs, the exchange may be operated by the federal government alone or in conjunction with the state. States may have different structures for their individual and SHOP exchanges.
Consumers who obtain coverage through the individual exchange may be eligible for financial assistance from the federal government. Financial assistance in the individual exchanges is available in two forms: premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions. Small businesses that use the SHOP exchange may be eligible for small business health insurance tax credits. The tax credits assist small businesses with the cost of providing health insurance coverage to employees.
The ACA generally requires that health insurance plans offered through an exchange are qualified health plans (QHPs). To be a certified as a QHP, a plan must be offered by a state-licensed issuer and must meet specified requirements, including covering the essential health benefits (EHB). QHPs sold in the individual and SHOP exchanges must comply with the same state and federal requirements that apply to QHPs and other health plans offered outside of the exchanges in the individual and small-group markets, respectively. Exchanges also may offer variations of QHPs, such as child-only or catastrophic plans, and non-QHP dental-only plans.
This report provides an overview of the various components of the health insurance exchanges. It begins with summary information about how exchanges are structured and then discusses both individual and SHOP exchanges in terms of eligibility and enrollment, financial assistance for certain exchange consumers and small businesses, and enrollment assistance entities. The report also describes exchanges' role in certifying plans as qualified to be sold in their marketplaces and outlines the range of plans offered through exchanges. Finally, the report briefly addresses funding for the exchanges. Where applicable, the report references other CRS reports that have more information on various topics. |
crs_RL31306 | crs_RL31306_0 | 2 ) was signed into law as P.L. 108-7 . Previously, Interior and related agencies were operating under a series of resolutions, that continued funding at FY2002 levels. The final FY2003appropriation provided $19.08 billion for the Interior and related agencies plus$825.0 million to repay transferred amounts for fire fighting in FY2002 . The bill includes funding for the Interior Department,except for the Bureau of Reclamation (funded by Energy and Water DevelopmentAppropriations laws), and funds for some agencies or programs in three otherdepartments--Agriculture, Energy, and Health and Human Services. Status of Department of the Interior and RelatedAgencies Appropriations, FY2003
On February 4th, 2002, President Bush submitted his FY2003 budget toCongress. The FY2003 request for Interior and related agencies totaled $18.94billion compared to the $19.16 billion enacted for FY2002 ( P.L. Issues in addition to fire and drought that generated significant discussion during House and/or Senate consideration included: stewardship contracting and wildernessin the Tongass National Forest (see FS); development in the Arctic National WildlifeRefuge and renewal of grazing permits and leases (see BLM); Missouri River flows(see FWS); Everglades restoration; (see NPS and cross-cutting issues); funding forland acquisition and conservation (see cross-cutting issues); development of oil andgas leases off the California coast (see MMS); and management of the Indian tribes'trust funds and assets (see BIA and OST). On January 23rd, 2003, the Senate passed H.J.Res. 2 , the Omnibus Appropriations bill for FY2003 that included funding for Interior and relatedagencies and the 10 other FY2003 appropriations bills that have not been enacted. For Interior and related agencies, the Senate bill contained $18.97 billion forFY2003, and $825 million for FY2002 to replace monies spent on wildfire fighting,for a bill total of $19.80 billion. These figures do not reflect across-the-board cutscontained in the omnibus measure, as it is unclear how they would be calculated forthe Interior and related agencies bill overall and for particular departments, agencies,and programs in the bill. TheHouse-passed bill has the highest total amount--$19.71 billion for FY2003, plus a $700 million fire supplemental for FY2002, for a bill total of $20.41 billion. Although the Senate-passed bill did not specifically fund the Conservation SpendingCategory (Table 18) , the House bill provides $1.44 billion for FY2003, higher thanthe Administration ($1.32 billion). 5093 (107th Congress). The House and Senate agreed to the conference report ( H.Rept. It provided that a 0.65% cut beapplied on a proportionate basis to each account, and to each program, project, andactivity within an account. The figures in this report do not reflect across-the-boardcuts, as it is unclear how they would be calculated for the Interior and relatedagencies. Therequest did not include funds for DOI and related agencies. Bureau of Land Management. 107-564 , H.R. Wildland Fire Management. National Wildlife Refuge System. U.S. Forest Service. 4480) to add the Administration's request to the Interior bill. Other Agency Programs. Indian Health Service. Conservation Spending Category. | The Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations bill includes funds for the Department of the Interior (DOI), except for the Bureau of Reclamation, and funds for some agencies or programswithin three other departments--Agriculture, Energy, and Health and Human Services. It also fundsnumerous smaller related agencies. On February 4, 2002, President Bush submitted his FY2003budget for Interior and related agencies, totaling $18.94 billion compared to $19.17 billion enactedfor FY2002 ( P.L.107-63 ). While the House passed an Interior funding bill in the 107th Congress, theSenate did not. Thus, a series of resolutions were enacted to continue funding at FY2002 levels.
On January 23rd, 2003, the Senate passed H.J.Res. 2 , the omnibus appropriations bill for FY2003 that included funding for Interior and related agencies and 10 other regularappropriations bills not enacted for FY2003. For Interior and related agencies, the Senate billcontained $18.97 billion for FY2003, plus an $825 million fire supplemental for FY2002, for a billtotal of $19.80 billion. The Senate bill required an across-the board cut of 2.852% that the numbersin this report do not reflect, as it is unclear how they were to be calculated for the Interior and relatedagencies. The House-passed measure ( H.R. 5093 , 107th Congress) contained $19.71billion for FY2003, plus a $700 million fire supplemental for FY2002, for a bill total of $20.41billion. The conference report on the measure ( H.Rept. 108-10 ) was signed into law on February20, 2003 ( P.L. 108-7 ).
The FY2003 law contained $19.08 billion for Interior and related agencies, plus $825.0 million for fire fighting to repay transferred amounts for fire fighting in FY2002. It provides that an acrossthe board 0.65% cut be applied on a proportionate basis to each account, and to each program,project, and activity within an account. Again, the figures in this report do not reflect proportionatecuts, as it is unclear how they too would be calculated for the Interior and related agencies. The lawdoes not specifically fund the Conservation Spending Category, although the House bill hadrecommended $1.44 billion for FY2003, higher than the Administration ($1.32 billion). It providesincreases over the Administration's request for some agencies, including the U.S. GeologicalSurvey, Bureau of Land Management, Forest Service, Indian Health Service, and Energy Departmentprograms, while providing decreases from the request for other agencies.
Controversial issues addressed during Interior bill consideration included: fire management, stewardship contracting, and wilderness in the Tongass National Forest (see FS); development in theArctic National Wildlife Refuge and renewal of grazing permits and leases (see BLM); MissouriRiver flows (see FWS); Everglades restoration; (see NPS and cross-cutting issues); funding for landacquisition and conservation (see cross-cutting issues); development of oil and gas leases off theCalifornia coast (see MMS); management of the Indian tribes' trust funds and assets (see BIA andOST); and drought assistance. This report will not be updated.
Key Policy Staff
a Division abbreviations: DSP = Domestic SocialPolicy; G&F = Government and Finance; RSI =Resources, Science, and Industry. |
crs_R41955 | crs_R41955_0 | On August 5, 2011, Standard & Poor's (S&P), a prominent credit rating agency, lowered the rating of long-term U.S. government debt from AAA to AA+. In the view of S&P's analysts, the recent debt ceiling agreement passed by Congress ( P.L. 112-25 , the Budget Control Act of 2011) "falls short of the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government debt burden by the middle of the decade," and (more generally) "America's governance and policymaking [has become] less stable, less effective, and less predictable than what we previously believed." In municipal and corporate debt markets, in which investors may choose among many similar bonds, a ratings downgrade usually leads to higher borrowing costs for the affected firm or governmental entity, as investors demand higher interest rates to compensate for higher perceived risk. With U.S. Treasury securities, however, the effect of a downgrade is not straightforward, because Treasuries play a unique role in the global financial system. U.S. government bonds have long been considered the "risk-free" baseline against which other investments are measured; they serve as collateral in a wide range of financial transactions; they are held by many financial institutions around the world, including central banks that use them in monetary policy and exchange rate operations; and they serve as a "safe haven" during financial crises. Even if holders of Treasury debt wished to switch to other debt instruments, no immediate substitute is available in many cases. Thus, the downgrade does not convey any new information to the markets about the U.S. fiscal situation, beyond the pessimism of S&P's analysts themselves. Specific market sectors are linked to the Treasury bond market in different ways. Those affected were "agency" securities, obligations of the Federal Home Loan Banks, the Farm Credit System, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Impact on Bank Capital
Federally insured depository institutions hold more than $300 billion in Treasury securities. On August 5, 2011, the same day as S&P's downgrade announcement, the federal banking agencies issued a guidance stating that the risk weights for Treasury securities and other securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government, government agencies, and government-sponsored entities would not change. Money market funds are required to hold the highest -quality, lowest-risk instruments, but they invest in short-term debt, and U.S. short-term obligations were not downgraded. Within this framework, the following observations about the impact of the downgrade on consumer and business interest rates are possible:
the downgrade does not automatically imply higher rates for business and consumer borrowers; only if the downgrade leads to a significant increase in Treasury rates will there be a significant impact on consumer and business borrowing costs; and a long-term shift away from the use of Treasuries as a benchmark for other rates could change the way interest rates are determined, but what the effect would be on the availability and cost of credit is uncertain. On the other hand, the downgrade may be part of a gradual shift away from reliance on the United States as the center of the global financial system. | On August 5, 2011, Standard & Poor's (S&P) lowered the credit rating of long-term U.S. government debt from AAA (the highest possible rating) to AA+. The downgrade reflects S&P's judgment that (1) the recent Budget Control Act (P.L. 112-25) falls short of what is needed to stabilize the government's fiscal situation and (2) the capacity of Congress and the Administration to deal with the debt has become less stable, effective, and predictable.
A ratings downgrade is meant to signal the market that an issuer of bonds or other debt securities is less likely to repay interest or principal. In municipal and corporate bond markets, in which investors may choose among many similar debt issues, a downgrade usually leads to higher borrowing costs, as investors demand higher interest rates to compensate for greater perceived risk. U.S. Treasury securities, however, play a unique role in the global financial system, meaning that past experience with downgrades of private or government debt may not apply.
U.S. government bonds have long been considered the "risk-free" baseline against which other investments are measured; they are a global "safe haven" during financial crises; they serve as collateral in a wide range of financial transactions; they are held by many financial institutions around the world, including central banks. Even if holders of Treasury debt wished to switch to other debt instruments, no immediate substitute is available in many cases.
The long-term impact is difficult to gauge. There may be no visible effects, at least in the short run. Many in the market could question whether S&P has special insight into U.S. political dynamics. Hundreds of billions in Treasury securities change hands daily, and each trade represents a judgment about default risk (among many other things). During the recent debt ceiling negotiations, Treasury yields did not rise significantly, nor was there any flight from Treasuries during the first trading sessions after the downgrade.
On the other hand, the downgrade may be a step in a gradual process that erodes the United States' central position in the global financial system and the dollar's role as reserve currency. These developments could make the process of dealing with the U.S. budget and trade deficits more difficult.
The downgrade has implications for other debt markets, but is not likely to produce sudden, disruptive changes. Mutual and money market funds that hold Treasuries may suffer slight losses in value, but it does not appear that the loss of a AAA rating in itself will mandate large amounts of forced selling by these institutions or other investors such as pension funds. S&P also downgraded bonds issued by entities linked to the Treasury, including the Federal Home Loan banks, the Farm Credit System, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Borrowing costs at those institutions are subject to the same uncertainty that applies to the U.S. Treasury.
Bank regulators issued a statement on August 5, 2011, that depository institutions will not be required to hold more capital to offset greater perceived riskiness of Treasury securities.
The effect on consumer and business interest rates depends on what happens to Treasury interest rates. Many private borrowers pay rates that are implicitly or explicitly linked to Treasury rates; if Treasury securities pay higher interest, mortgage, credit card, automobile, and business loans are likely to become more expensive as well. But the downgrade alone need have no effect on those rates. |
crs_RL33354 | crs_RL33354_0 | It also provides information on PSSF funding. The first of these shows (in table form) selected provisions in prior law compared with provisions in reauthorization legislation considered in the 109 th Congress, as well as the final provisions enacted in P.L. Other appendices provide a legislative history of the PSSF program, discuss certain policy issues related to the program, and offer an overview of federal programs providing funding for purposes related to those of the PSSF program. 109-288 ) extended funding authorization for the Promoting Safe and Stable Families (PSSF) program (Title IV-B, Subpart 2 of the Social Security Act) for five years (FY2007-FY2011). 109-288 authorized a demonstration project to test the effectiveness of using vouchers to deliver these services more broadly. Provisions of the Child and Family Services Improvement Act of 2006 (P.L. The law now provides that HHS may continue to exempt tribes from requirements that limit the use of the federal PSSF funds for administrative purposes to no more than 10% and the requirement that provides that "significant portions" of PSSF federal funds must be spent on each of the four service categories: community-based family support, family preservation, time-limited reunification, and adoption promotion and support. The law now describes the purpose of the Child Welfare Services program as "to promote State flexibility in the development and expansion of a coordinated child and family services program that utilizes community-based agencies and ensures all children are raised in safe, loving families, by—(1) protecting and promoting the welfare of all children; (2) preventing the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of children; (3) supporting at-risk families through services which allow children, where appropriate, to remain safely with their families or return to their families in a timely manner; (4) promoting the safety, permanence, and well-being of children in foster care and adoptive families; and (5) providing training, professional development and support to ensure a well-qualified child welfare workforce." 109-288 provides that beginning with FY2008, no state may spend any federal CWS funds for foster care maintenance payments, adoption assistance payments, or child day care unless it can demonstrate to HHS that it used federal CWS funds for at least one of these purposes in FY2005. It requires states to describe how they consult with and involve physicians or other appropriate medical professionals in assessing the health and well-being of children in foster care and in determining appropriate medical treatment for them. 109-288 provides that, beginning with FY2009, if HHS determines that a state has not made the requisite progress toward meeting the monthly caseworker visitation standard, then the state must spend more of its own funds under the program in order to receive its full federal allotment. Extension of the Court Improvement Program
P.L. Appendix A. Selected Provisions of the Child and Family Services Act of 2006 as Compared to Prior Law and to Earlier Versions of the Bill
(Section references in prior law column are to the Social Security Act, as amended prior to enactment of P.L. Separately P.L. 109-288 ) extends the funding authorization of the PSSF program for five years (FY2007-FY2011) and annually targets the use of $40 million in new funds for the program for two purposes: to support monthly caseworker visits and to improve outcomes for children affected by their parent/caretaker's abuse of methamphetamine or another substance. In addition, the law requires states to report on their actual —as opposed to simply planned —use of PSSF (and Child Welfare Services) funds and both increases the PSSF set aside for tribal child and family services, and allows access to these funds for more tribes. | The Child and Family Services Improvement Act of 2006 was enacted on September 25, 2006 (P.L. 109-288). As enacted it extends the funding authorization of the Promoting Safe and Stable Families (PSSF) program for five years (FY2007-FY2011) and annually targets the use of $40 million in new funds for the program for two purposes: to support monthly caseworker visits and to improve outcomes for children affected by their parent/caretaker's abuse of methamphetamine or another substance. As under prior law, states must spend the majority of PSSF funds on four broad categories of child and family services: community-based family support, family preservation, time-limited reunification and adoption promotion and support. P.L. 109-288 requires states to report on their actual—as opposed to simply planned—use of PSSF (and Child Welfare Services) funds. It also increases the PSSF set-aside for tribal child and family services, and allows access to these funds for more tribes. (Appendix A of this report compares selected enacted provisions with prior law as well as provision in earlier versions of the reauthorization legislation.)
Separately, P.L. 109-288 amended the Child Welfare Services program (Title IV-B, Subpart 1 of the Social Security Act), re-organizing its provisions and limiting its funding authorization to FY2007-FY2011. Beginning with FY2008, the new law limits the use of Child Welfare Service funds for administrative purposes to no more than 10%, and prohibits their use for foster care maintenance payments, adoption assistance payments, and child care above a state's use of the program's funds for those purposes in FY2005. Further, it requires states to—1) develop procedures to respond to and maintain services in the wake of a disaster; 2) describe in their state plans how they consult with medical professionals to assess the health of and provide appropriate medical treatment to children in foster care; and 3) establish a standard of no less than monthly caseworker visits of children in foster care along with standards for the content of the visit. The new law provides that in any state where less than 90% of children in foster care are visited on a monthly basis—or where the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) determines that the state is not making enough progress to meet that standard by October 1, 2011—the state will need to supply a greater amount of non-federal funds in order to access its full federal Child Welfare Services allotment. P.L. 109-288 also extends authorization for five years (FY2007-FY2011) of Mentoring Children of Prisoners, and includes authority for a project to demonstrate the effectiveness of vouchers as a method of delivering these services. Further, it extends for five years (FY2007-FY2011) certain grants under the Court Improvement Program.
This report tracked successful legislative efforts to reauthorize these programs in the 109th Congress. It describes provisions enacted by P.L. 109-288 and provides information on PSSF funding. Further it contains an appendix showing (in table form) selected provisions in prior law compared to those proposed and enacted, and additional appendices that provide a legislative history of the PSSF program, discuss selected program policy issues and offer an overview of federal programs providing funding for purposes related to the PSSF program. It will not be updated. |
crs_R45304 | crs_R45304_0 | Among the key provisions, the 1996 amendments authorized a Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) program to help public water systems finance improvements needed to comply with federal drinking water regulations and to address the most serious risks to human health. States are authorized to use DWSRF funds to provide financial assistance (primarily subsidized loans) to eligible public water systems for expenditures that EPA has determined, through guidance, will facilitate SDWA compliance or significantly further the act's health protection objectives. The DWSRF program is patterned after the Clean Water Act State Revolving Fund (CWSRF) program that Congress authorized in 1987 for financing municipal wastewater treatment projects. Congress increased the amount states may use for administration purposes in the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act; P.L. P.L. For FY2019, the Administration requested $863.23 million for the DWSRF program. This survey indicates that public water systems need to invest $472.6 billion on infrastructure improvements over 20 years ($19.2 billion annually) to achieve compliance with SDWA drinking water regulations and "to continue to provide safe drinking water to the public." Lead Service Lines
Among other assessments of drinking water infrastructure needs, a 2012 study prepared by the American Water Works Association (AWWA) projected that restoring and expanding water systems to keep up with population growth would require a nationwide investment of at least $1 trillion over the next 25 years. Other persistent water infrastructure issues include the gap between funding and estimated needs, the growing cost of complying with SDWA standards (particularly for small communities), the ability of small or disadvantaged communities to afford DWSRF financing, and the broader need for cities to maintain, upgrade, and expand infrastructure unrelated to SDWA compliance. 113-121 , H.R. 3080 ) included in Title V, Subtitle C, the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 2014 (WIFIA). In WIFIA, Congress authorized a pilot loan guarantee program to test the ability of innovative financing tools to promote increased development of, and private investment in, water infrastructure projects—while reducing costs to the federal government. The five-year pilot program is intended to complement—not replace—the SRF programs. 114-254 ), Congress provided $20.0 million for EPA to begin providing loan guarantees for infrastructure projects under WIFIA. Also, Congress provided for WIFIA $10 million in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ), for a total of $30.0 million for the program for FY2017. For FY2018, the President requested $20.0 million for WIFIA, and Congress provided $63 million in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. In P.L. 114-254 , Congress appropriated the funding authorized in the WIIN Act to assist Flint. 3387 , the Drinking Water System Improvement Act of 2017 ( H.Rept. On September 13, 2018, the House passed S. 3021 , amended and renamed as America's Water Infrastructure Act (AWIA) of 2018. This omnibus water resources and infrastructure bill includes elements of H.R. 8 , the House-passed Water Resources Development Act of 2018 (WRDA 2018), and S. 2800 , America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018—which, as reported, includes WRDA, SDWA, CWA, WIFIA, and other provisions. Title II of S. 3021 , as amended, largely parallels H.R. 3387 , along with several other drinking-water-related provisions. S. 2800 ( S.Rept. 1068 , the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 2017, is a broad SDWA reauthorization bill, and Title IV includes numerous amendments to the DWSRF program. Among other revisions, the bill would (1) add Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirements, (2) make permanent the Buy American iron and steel requirement for projects receiving DWSRF assistance (which SDWA applied to FY2017 funding), (3) direct states to give funding priority to projects that improve the ability of water systems to protect health and comply with SDWA affordably and to give greater weight to applications that describe measures to improve the management and financial stability of the water system, (4) conditionally require states to use at least 6% of their capitalization grants to provide additional subsidization to disadvantaged communities, (5) incorporate in the statute a governor's authority to transfer as much as 33% of the annual DWSRF or CWSRF capitalization grant to the other fund, (6) increase the amount reserved for insular areas from 0.33% to 1.5%, (7) authorize DWSRF program appropriations at a level of $21.17 billion over five years, (8) authorize EPA to use unobligated funds to make grants to states with water systems disproportionately affected by new regulations to assist those systems, and (9) require EPA to use information from states to develop best practices for DWSRF program administration. (Bills with related lead provisions include H.R. 1653 , the Drinking Water Affordability Act, would (1) extend DWSRF loan amortization periods to 30 years after project completion for public water systems generally and to 40 years for disadvantaged communities, (2) increase the portion of DWSRF funds states may use to provide additional subsidization to disadvantaged communities from 30% to 35%, (3) reauthorize state authority to use DWSRF funds for source water assessment and protection activities, (4) direct EPA to exempt water systems from a federal cross-cutting requirement if the Administrator determined that the state had an equivalent requirement, (5) require EPA to review best practices for streamlining the DWSRF loan process and fund administration and to report to Congress, and (6) direct the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to study and report on the cost-effective and economically feasible rehabilitation or replacement of drinking water infrastructure to meet SDWA goals and an assessment of barriers that preclude use of materials and technologies identified in the study. | The state of the nation's water infrastructure and the challenges many communities face in addressing infrastructure needs continue to receive congressional attention. In 1996, Congress authorized the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) program under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) to help public water systems finance infrastructure projects needed to comply with federal drinking water regulations and to meet the act's health protection objectives. Under this program, states receive annual capitalization grants from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to provide financial assistance (primarily subsidized loans) to water systems for drinking water projects and related activities. Through FY2018, Congress has appropriated a total of $20.41 billion for the program. From FY1997 through FY2017, states provided $35.38 billion in DWSRF assistance to water systems for 14,090 projects.
EPA's latest survey of capital improvement needs indicates that public water systems need to invest $472.6 billion on infrastructure improvements over 20 years to ensure the provision of safe drinking water. EPA reports that, while all of the projects identified in the survey would promote SDWA health protection objectives, $57.6 billion (12%) of reported needs are attributable to SDWA compliance. An American Water Works Association study estimates that restoring aging infrastructure and expanding water systems to keep up with population growth would require a nationwide investment of at least $1 trillion through 2035.
Program issues include (1) the gap between estimated needs and funding; (2) the growing cost of complying with SDWA standards; (3) the ability of small or disadvantaged communities to afford DWSRF or other financing; and (4) the broader need for cities to maintain, upgrade, and expand infrastructure unrelated to SDWA compliance. Several overarching policy questions are under debate, including the appropriate federal role in providing financial assistance for local water infrastructure projects and potential funding mechanisms that could supplement or replace a program reliant on annual appropriations.
Enacted in 2014, the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA; P.L. 113-121,Title V) authorized a five-year pilot loan guarantee program to promote increased development of, and private investment in, primarily large water infrastructure projects. Congress noted that WIFIA was intended to complement, not replace, the DWSRF program and the similar Clean Water Act State Revolving Fund (CWSRF) program for wastewater infrastructure. For FY2017, Congress provided $30.0 million for WIFIA ($25 million for EPA to provide loan guarantees for water infrastructure projects and $5 million for administrative costs).
The Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act; P.L. 114-322) made several revisions to the DWSRF program and authorized $100 million in DWSRF appropriations to Michigan to assist the City of Flint in repairing its water system. In P.L. 114-254, Congress appropriated the DWSRF funding authorized in the WIIN Act. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), included $863.23 million in DWSRF program.
For FY2018, the President requested $863 million for the DWSRF program and $20 million for WIFIA. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141), included $1.16 billion for the DWSRF program and $63 million for WIFIA.
Numerous bills in the 115th Congress would expand DWSRF eligibilities, increase funding authority, and authorize new programs to assist water systems and improve infrastructure. Two such bills have been reported: (1) the Drinking Water System Improvement Act of 2017 (H.R. 3387), a SDWA reauthorization bill with provisions intended to improve water systems, SDWA compliance, infrastructure resilience, consumer confidence, and source water protection, among others; and (2) America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (S. 2800), an omnibus water resources development act (WRDA) and infrastructure bill that includes SDWA, the Clean Water Act (CWA) and WIFIA SRF provisions. On September 13, 2018, the House passed (amended and renamed) S. 3021, America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AWIA), which includes elements of S. 2800 and H.R. 8, the House-passed WRDA 2018 bill. Title II of AWAI closely parallels H.R. 3387 and includes other drinking water-related provisions. Title IV contains WIFIA SRF, CWSRF, and other CWA amendments. |
crs_R45074 | crs_R45074_0 | The government may elect not to prosecute the underlying offenses. The drug mandatory minimums are of more recent origins. The commission's initial report was quickly followed by a Department of Justice study that concluded that a substantial number of those sentenced under federal mandatory minimums were nonviolent, first-time, low-level drug offenders. Although each house devoted considerable attention to mandatory minimum sentencing and associated issues, the 114th Congress ended without consensus. Several proposals introduced in the 115th Congress address some of the same issues. Mandatory Minimums for Drug Crimes
Table 1 below describes the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions for various drug and drug-related offenses. The mandatory minimums must be imposed in addition to any sentence imposed for the underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking and vary depending upon the circumstances:
imprisonment for not less than five years, unless one of the higher mandatory minimums below applies; imprisonment for not less than seven years if a firearm is brandished; imprisonment for not less than 10 years if a firearm is discharged; imprisonment for not less than 10 years if a firearm is a short-barreled rifle or shotgun or is a semi-automatic weapon; imprisonment for not less than 15 years if the offense involves the armor piercing ammunition; imprisonment for not less than 25 years if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of Section 924(c); imprisonment for not less than 30 years if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer; and imprisonment for life if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of Section 924(c) and if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer. Such considerations are irrelevant ... under the Act." By the same token, there is no need to prove that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of the controlled substance involved in his predicate serious drug offense if the serious drug offense satisfied the 10-year requirement and, in the case of state law predicate, involved the manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The safety valve is available to qualified offenders convicted of violations of the possession-with-intent, simple possession, attempt, or conspiracy provisions of the Controlled Substances or Controlled Substances Import and Export Acts. He may not have used violence or a dangerous weapon in connection with the offense. The criminal history point qualification refers to the defendant's criminal record. One involves instances in which the offense resulted in death or serious bodily injury. Substantial Assistance
Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. Constitutional Considerations
Defendants sentenced to mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment have challenged their sentences on a number of constitutional grounds beginning with Congress's legislative authority and ranging from cruel and unusual punishment through ex post facto and double jeopardy to equal protection and due process. It also grants Congress authority to enact legislation necessary and proper to the execution of those powers which it vests in any officer or department of the federal government. In the area of mandatory minimum sentences for controlled substance violations, the constitutional challenges have arisen largely under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause; the equal protection element of the Fifth Amendment; the Fifth and Sixth Amendment components awakened by Apprend i v. New Jersey and its progeny; and the separation-of- powers doctrine. | As a general rule, federal judges must impose a minimum term of imprisonment upon defendants convicted of various controlled substance (drug) offenses and drug-related offenses. The severity of those sentences depends primarily upon the nature and amount of the drugs involved, the defendant's prior criminal record, any resulting injuries or death, and in the case of the related firearms offenses, the manner in which the firearm was used.
The drug offenses reside principally in the Controlled Substances Act or the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act. The drug-related firearms offenses involve the possession and use of firearms in connection with serious drug offenses and instances in which prior drug convictions trigger mandatory sentences for unlawful firearms possession.
The minimum sentences range from imprisonment for a year to imprisonment for life. Although the sentences are usually referred to as mandatory minimum sentences, a defendant may avoid them under several circumstances. Prosecutors may elect not to prosecute. The President may choose to pardon the defendant or commute his sentence. The defendant may qualify for sentencing for providing authorities with substantial assistance or under the so-called "safety valve" provision available to low-level, nonviolent, first-time offenders.
Over time, defendants, sentenced to mandatory terms of imprisonment for drug-related offenses, have challenged Congress's legislative authority to authorize them and the government's constitutional authority to enforcement. The challenges have met with scant success. Generally, courts have concluded that the provisions fall within congressional authority under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, Treaty, and Territorial Clauses of the Constitution. By and large, courts have also found no impediment to imposition of mandatory minimum sentences under the Due Process, Equal Protection, or Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses, or the separation-of-powers doctrine.
Proposals to amend drug-related mandatory minimum sentence provisions surfaced during the 114th Congress. In the 115th Congress, Senator Grassley introduced the successor to those proposals for himself and a bi-partisan list of co-sponsors as S. 1917, the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2017. Many of the same issues are addressed in H.R. 4261 introduced by Representative Scott of Virginia. This is an overview of the law from which those proposals spring.
This report is available in an abridged version, CRS Report R45075, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing of Federal Drug Offenses in Short, without the citations to authority and origin of quotations found here. |
crs_RL31278 | crs_RL31278_0 | This remote and largely untouched area is an example of an arctic ecosystem that, by virtue of being essentially intact, is increasingly rare. It is an important habitat for musk oxen, migratorywaterfowl, vast numbers of caribou, and predators such as grizzly bears, polar bears, wolves, andgolden eagles. Its development could help reduce America's energy dependenceto some degree and keep the Alaska pipeline in use for decades -- benefitting the national economy,the oil industry, and people in Alaska. Likewise, opposition to energy development continues to be strong, basedon concern for the area's wilderness values and wildlife. Shaded Relief Map of Northeastern Alaska. Rather, it provides background and basic material for analyzing possibilities and implications ofemerging options. Two considerations might be noted at this point. Introduction
The debate over whether to open the coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge(ANWR) to energy leasing has raged for decades, with the main periods of controversy occurringin the late 1950s before the refuge was established; the period 1977-1980 at the passage of theAlaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act; 1987 when the Final Legislative EnvironmentalImpact Statement (FLEIS) was released; the early 1990s during the Persian Gulf War; and the currentdebate, which began months before the attacks on New York and Washington, but was certainlyheated by those events. The issue has been debated several times since 1980. The report does not attempt to focus on specific legislative issues, bills,or provisions, but rather attempts to provide a baseline for analyzing such proposals. The executive branch was to conduct a comprehensive baseline study ofthe fish and wildlife resources of the coastal plain of the Refuge; to developguidelines for, initiate, and monitor an oil and gas exploration program; to preparea report to the Congress on the biological resources, the extent of hydrocarbonresources, the impacts of development, transportation of oil and gas, and the need forthem; and to make a recommendation on whether exploration, development, andproduction should proceed. As the years have passed, new fields in the area have been discovered, developed, and produced. The Meaning of Footprints. Resources: Status, Current Regulation, and Potential Effects of Development
While much is still unknown regarding both the biological and geologicalresources of the 1002 area, much has also been learned during 40 years of debateover the Refuge. (44) The potential for oil in the1002 area has been a focus of thatattention. Estimates of Prudhoe Bay Complex. Migratory Birds. It too is listed as threatened under ESA. Other Species. If Congress opened ANWR, it could choose to afford special protections to special areas. ANWR --
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge; also called "the Refuge." If Congress were toallow for energy development in ANWR, the price of oil would come intoplay in the decision to explore for and develop resources in the extremeconditions of the North Slope. GNP --
Gross National Product. | The rich biological resources and wilderness values of northeastern Alaska have been widely known for about 50 years, and the rich energy resource potential for much of that time. The futureof these resources has been debated in Congress for over 40 years. The issue for Congress is whetherto open a portion of what is now the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to allow thedevelopment of potentially the richest on-shore source of oil remaining in the United States, and ifso under what restrictions. Alternatively, Congress might choose to provide further protection forthe Refuge's biological and wilderness resources through statutory wilderness designation or tomaintain the current status of the area. Under current law, if Congress chooses not to act, the entireRefuge will remain closed to development under provisions of the 1980 Alaska National InterestLands Conservation Act.
The coastal northern plain of the Refuge is the focus of debate. This remote and largely untouched area is an example of an arctic ecosystem that, by virtue of being essentially intact, isincreasingly rare. It has been called "America's Serengeti", for the vast herd of caribou, for the manynesting and feeding migratory birds, and for its predators such as grizzly bears, polar bears, wolves,and golden eagles.
The area also is an immensely promising oil prospect, which some feel could be as productive as Prudhoe Bay. It is heralded as a place which could help reduce national dependence on foreignoil and keep the Alaskan oil pipeline in use for decades. Advocates for development foresee benefitsto the oil industry, the people of Alaska, and the national economy.
For over 20 years, the debate over energy development in the Refuge has been highly polarized and remains so. President George W. Bush is committed to opening the Refuge to development,citing unrest in the Middle East among his reasons. And opposition to development remains strong,as opponents point to other means of achieving national energy goals.
This report does not analyze specific proposals to develop or protect the Refuge. Rather, it provides basic material for analyzing possibilities and implications of the major issues that have beenthe focus of the legislative debate over its fate. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41252 | crs_R41252_0 | No person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. Amend. V.
Introduction
In Miranda v. Arizona , the Supreme Court held that no statement made by an individual during a custodial interrogation may be admitted into evidence against him at his criminal trial, unless he was first warned of his relevant constitutional rights and waived them. In New York v. Quarles , the Court later held that the Miranda rule was subject to a "public safety" exception. Confessions made during the course of any unnecessary delay are generally inadmissible at the suspect's subsequent criminal trial. Convinced that the coercive atmosphere of a law enforcement custodial interrogation could undermine the protection against self-incrimination, the Court declared that confessions that followed such interrogations could only be admitted in evidence against a defendant if he had been given explicit warnings beforehand. The Court has recognized exceptions to the rule. One, discussed below in greater detail, permits admission into evidence of unwarned statements elicited in the interest of an officer's safety and that of the public. The Court has yet to further refine the exception, but the lower federal appellate courts have construed it narrowly—some more narrowly than others. Miranda Overseas
The Supreme Court has thus far not indicated to what extent, if at all, Miranda applies overseas. The lower federal courts, however, have held that the Miranda warnings ordinarily do not apply to overseas custodial interrogations conducted by foreign officials. Such unwarned statements may be introduced against the defendant, if voluntary and otherwise admissible. They often identify, but rarely find, two exceptions to this general rule of admissibility—where the interrogation is a joint venture in which U.S. officials are joint participants, or where the circumstances shock the conscience of the court. In a case in which overseas statements were offered before an overseas tribunal, a military commission tribunal has concluded that the question of the application of the Fifth Amendment extraterritorially requires a case-by-case consideration. Based on its reading of Boumediene , the tribunal determined that
when analyzing the extraterritorial application of the Constitution in Guantanamo Bay, the Commission concludes that it should consider (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which the status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; (3) whether practical considerations and exigent circumstances counsel against application of the constitutional right; (4) whether the Executive has provided the accused an adequate substitute for the Constitutional right being sought; (5) whether there is "necessity for the Constitution to apply to prevent injustice; and (6) whether application of the Constitutional right would be "impractical and anomalous." In McNabb v. United States , the Supreme Court was faced with a case in which federal officers had disregarded statutory obligations to promptly present arrested defendants to a committing magistrate. When the various statutory presentation requirements were later superseded by rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (requiring presentation "without unnecessary delay"), no explicit mention was made of either the McNabb exclusionary rule or any other means of enforcement. It states that a presentation delay of less than six hours does not by itself render a voluntary confession inadmissible. The Court held that Congress intended to modify, not repudiate, McNabb-Mallory . Comparable provisions do not appear to have been introduced since. 111-186 ), would have prohibited the use of funds authorized for appropriation under the bill to provide Miranda warnings to foreign nationals outside the United States who were either in the custody of the Armed Forces or believed to have terrorist-related information. 570 would have directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide the House with information relating to the immigration status of any foreign national captured in Afghanistan who was given Miranda warnings by the Justice Department, was in the Defense Department's custody, was suspected of terrorism, and might have been subject to a transfer or release into the United States for civilian or military proceedings. | The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court declared that statements of an accused, given during a custodial interrogation, could not be introduced in evidence in criminal proceedings against him, unless he were first advised of his rights and waived them. In Dickerson v. United States, the Court held that the Miranda exclusionary rule was constitutionally grounded and could not be replaced by a statutory provision making all voluntary confessions admissible. In New York v. Quarles, the Court recognized a "limited" "public safety" exception to Miranda, but has not defined the exception further. The lower federal courts have construed the exception narrowly in cases involving unwarned statements concerning the location of a weapon possibly at hand at the time of an arrest.
The Supreme Court has yet to decide to what extent Miranda applies to custodial interrogations conducted overseas. The lower federal courts have held that the failure of foreign law enforcement officials to provide Miranda warnings prior to interrogation does not preclude use of any resulting statement in a subsequent U.S. criminal trial, unless interrogation was a joint venture of U.S. and foreign officials or unless the circumstances shock the conscience of the court. They suggest that warnings are a prerequisite for admissibility in U.S. courts following overseas interrogation by U.S. officials.
Miranda applies to courts-martial that are subject to a requirement for an additional warning under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The statutory provisions governing military commissions call for the admission of some unwarned, involuntary custodial statements. At least one tribunal operating under those provisions has concluded that the Fifth Amendment protections do not apply in the commission trial at Guantanamo Bay of an unprivileged foreign belligerent.
Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that federal arrestees be brought before a committing magistrate without unnecessary delay. In the McNabb v. United States and Mallory v. United States cases, the Court declared inadmissible confessions extracted during a period of unnecessary delay. The cases were decided under the Court's supervisory authority over the lower federal courts, and in Corley v. United States, the Court held that McNabb-Mallory had been statutorily supplemented with a provision that made admissible voluntary confession given within six hours of presentment. Neither Miranda nor McNabb-Mallory violations preclude the subsequent prosecution of the accused; they simply preclude the uninvited use of any unwarned, unwaived statements in such prosecutions.
The 111th Congress featured a number of proposals, some of which would have prohibited the use of funds to provide Miranda warnings; others would have restricted their use in the interrogation of high-value detainees overseas; and still others would have called upon the Administration to provide Congress with information related to the use of Miranda warnings in such circumstances. No comparable proposals appear to have been introduced in later Congresses.
A related discussion can be found in a Legal Sidebar entitled, Miranda Warnings: The Public Safety Exception in Boston. |
crs_R42625 | crs_R42625_0 | Congress maintains a strong interest in the health of the U.S. manufacturing sector due to its central roles in the U.S. economy and national defense. Some see the U.S. manufacturing sector as vibrant and healthy. Administration Proposal
President Obama first proposed the establishment of a National Network for Manufacturing Innovation in his FY2013 budget, requesting $1 billion in mandatory funding to support the establishment of up to 15 institutes. In addition, in the absence of congressional action on his FY2013 proposal, President Obama announced that three additional institutes would be competed and awarded in 2013—two by the Department of Defense (DOD) and one by the Department of Energy (DOE)—using existing authorities and FY2013 appropriations. The NNMI is to be managed collaboratively by the Department of Commerce's (DOC's) National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), DOD, DOE, National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and other agencies through the Advanced Manufacturing National Program Office (AMNPO), a multi-agency coordination office. The AMNPO held four regional workshops and published a Request for Information (RFI) in the Federal Register inviting public comment on the proposed NNMI program. The input gathered from the workshops and the RFI was used by the AMNPO in the preparation of a National Science and Technology Committee report, National Network for Manufacturing Innovation: A Preliminary Design, hereinafter the Preliminary Design report , published in January 2013 that articulates the Administration's perspective of the principles and characteristics for the NNMI program. Each IMI would have a specific focus area (discussed in detail below) and serve as a regional innovation hub. Legislative Status
In August 2013, bills were introduced in the House ( H.R. 2996 ) and Senate ( S. 1468 ) to establish a Network for Manufacturing Innovation. H.R. 2996 was approved by the House in September 2014. S. 1468 was reported by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in August 2014. Provisions of H.R. 2996 were incorporated in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( H.R. 83 ) as Title VII. H.R. 83 was passed by the House and Senate, and signed into law on December 16, 2014. To carry out the NNMI, NIST is authorized $5 million per year for FY2015-FY2024 from funds appropriated to its Industrial Technology Services account and DOE is authorized to transfer to NIST up to $250 million over the FY2015-FY2024 period from funds appropriated for advanced manufacturing research and development in its Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy account. The act also requires the NSTC to produce a quadrennial National Strategic Plan for Advanced Manufacturing. Other provisions of the bills included:
authorize the participation of representatives from industrial entities, research universities, community colleges, and such other entities as the Secretary considers appropriate, which may include career and technical education schools, federal laboratories, state, local, and tribal governments, businesses, educational institutions, and nonprofit organizations; authorize the Secretary of Commerce to award financial assistance to assist in planning, establishing, or supporting a center for manufacturing innovation; require the use of a competitive, merit review process in the selection of centers; limit financial assistance under the program to no more than seven years; establish a National Office of the Network for Manufacturing Innovation Program, led by a Director, to oversee and carry out the program; require each center receiving financial assistance from the program to report annually to the Secretary of Commerce on its expenditures and performance with respect to its goals, plans, financial support, and accomplishments, as well as to how the center has furthered the authorized purposes of the program; require the Secretary of Commerce to prepare an annual report to Congress on the performance of the program; require the Government Accountability Office to perform a triennial assessment of the program reporting on the management, coordination, and industry utility of the program; assessing the extent to which the program has furthered its authorized purposes; and recommending legislative and administrative actions to improve the program; authorize the establishment of a Network for Manufacturing Innovation Fund and authorize appropriations of $600 million for the execution of the program; and designate the National Additive Manufacturing Innovation Institute and manufacturing centers currently under interagency review as centers for manufacturing innovation. The Department of Defense is also playing a key role in the NNMI. As proposed, the NNMI would receive a one-time appropriation to be spent over nine years. | Manufacturing plays an important role in the nation's economy, employment, and national defense. Accordingly, Congress has maintained a strong interest in the health of the U.S. manufacturing sector. Some analysts have expressed concerns about a decades-long decline in manufacturing employment punctuated by a steep drop from 2001 to 2010, as well as about the offshore outsourcing of production and related functions, such as research and development, by U.S. manufacturers. Others see the U.S. manufacturing sector as vibrant and healthy as evidenced by growth in output and productivity.
In his FY2013 budget, President Obama proposed the creation of a National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI) to help accelerate innovation by investing in industrially relevant manufacturing technologies with broad applications, and to support manufacturing technology commercialization by bridging the gap between the laboratory and the market. Congress did not act on the President's proposal for FY2013. Nevertheless, the Administration used the Department of Defense's existing authorities and FY2012 regular appropriations to compete and award a pilot institute, the National Additive Manufacturing Innovation Institute, referring to it as "a proof-of-concept for the potential subsequent institutes." The Administration sought nationwide input from key stakeholder groups to help guide the design of the NNMI. The AMNPO held four regional workshops and published a Request for Information (RFI) in the Federal Register inviting public comment on the proposed NNMI program. The input gathered from the workshops and the RFI was used by the AMNPO to prepare a National Science and Technology Committee (NSTC) report, National Network for Manufacturing Innovation: A Preliminary Design, published in January 2013.
In his 2014 budget request, President Obama again included the NNMI proposal. He also announced his intention to establish three additional manufacturing institutes in FY2013 using existing authorities and appropriations, two by the Department of Defense (DOD) and one by the Department of Energy (DOE). These centers have been awarded, and a competition for a fifth center is under way. As in his FY2013 budget, the President's NNMI proposal calls for the establishment of up to 15 Institutes for Manufacturing Innovation (IMI) funded through a one-time infusion of $1 billion in mandatory funding to the Department of Commerce National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) to be spent over multiple years. Each IMI would be comprised of stakeholders from industry, academia, federal agencies, and state government entities. Each IMI is to be competitively selected, serve as a regional hub for manufacturing innovation (as well as part of the national network), and have a unique focus area. Under the proposal, the NNMI would be managed collaboratively by NIST, DOD, DOE, the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and other agencies.
In August 2013, bills were introduced in the House (H.R. 2996) and Senate (S. 1468) to establish a Network for Manufacturing Innovation. H.R. 2996 was approved by the House in September 2014. S. 1468 was reported by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in August 2014. Provisions of H.R. 2996 were incorporated in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R. 83) as Title VII. H.R. 83 was passed by the House and Senate, and signed into law on December 16, 2014. To carry out the NNMI, NIST is authorized $5 million per year for FY2015-FY2024 from funds appropriated to its Industrial Technology Services account and DOE is authorized to transfer to NIST up to $250 million over the FY2015-FY2024 period from funds appropriated for advanced manufacturing research and development in its Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy account. The act also requires the NSTC to produce a quadrennial National Strategic Plan for Advanced Manufacturing. |
crs_R42484 | crs_R42484_0 | 113-79 ; 2014 farm bill) throughout its legislative development. Congress returns to the "farm bill" about every five years to establish an omnibus policy for food and agriculture. The farm bill authorizes programs in two spending categories: mandatory and discretionary. Mandatory programs generally operate as entitlements; the farm bill pays for them using multi-year budget estimates when the law is enacted. Discretionary programs are authorized for their scope, but are not funded in the farm bill; they are subject to appropriations. While both types of programs are important, mandatory programs often dominate the farm bill debate. Of the projected net outlays, about 80% ($391 billion over five years) is for SNAP. Farm commodity support and crop insurance are expected to account for a combined 13% of mandatory program costs ($65 billion), with another 6% of costs in USDA conservation programs ($28 billion). Programs in all other farm bill titles are expected to account for about 1% of all mandatory expenditures ( Figure 1 ). The primary mandatory spending categories carried in the Agriculture appropriations bill are the:
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly called food stamps)—designed primarily to increase the food purchasing power of eligible low-income households to help them buy a nutritionally adequate low-cost diet; Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)—the funding mechanism for most mandatory farm bill programs, including the farm commodity programs and some conservation, trade, research, horticulture, bioenergy, and rural development programs; crop insurance—a risk management tool that offers subsidized premiums to farmers and administrative payments and reinsurance to private insurance companies; some Section 32 programming—Section 32 is a separate account funded by customs receipts and created to assist non-price-supported commodities; and child nutrition programs—to fund meals, snacks, and milk for children (and, in one program, some adults) in congregate, institutional settings. Baseline
As discussed earlier, the budgetary impact of the 2014 farm bill is measured relative to what the 2008 farm bill would have spent—that is, the CBO baseline. The May 2013 CBO baseline projected that the mandatory programs of the 2008 farm bill, if it were continued, would have spent $973 billion over the next 10 years (FY2014-FY2023). Score (Change to Baseline)
Compared to the $973 billion post-sequestration baseline, the 2014 farm bill—at enactment—reduced projected spending and the deficit by $16.6 billion (-1.7%) over the 10 year period FY2014-FY2023. Over the 5-year period through FY2018, the enacted farm bill reduced projected spending by $5.3 billion (-1.1%). The enacted 2014 farm bill saves less than either the House-passed or Senate-passed proposals. 3102 together would have reduced spending by $51.9 billion (-5.3%) over 10 years. The Senate-passed farm bill proposal ( S. 954 ) would have reduced spending by $17.9 billion (-1.8%) over 10 years. If the baseline had not already been reduced by sequestration, the enacted 2014 farm bill could have been credited for reducing spending by $23 billion over 10 years. But sequestration had already been factored into the baseline, so the official score of P.L. The net reduction is composed of some titles receiving more funding than in the past, while others receive less. The latter provide budgetary offsets to pay for titles with increased spending, and the rest of the savings go to deficit reduction. Budgetary savings are scored in the nutrition, farm commodity subsidies, and conservation titles. Additional funding is provided for the crop insurance, research, bioenergy, horticulture, rural development, trade, and forestry titles. Net Projected Outlays (Baseline + Score)
As mentioned at the beginning of this report, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that, at enactment, the total cost of the farm bill would be $489 billion over the next five years (FY2014-FY2018), which is -1.1% less than the May 2013 baseline. Despite the $14.3 billion reduction in Title I scored in the 2014 farm bill and the offsetting $5.7 billion increase in crop insurance—which scored as net reduction in the safety net—expected 10-year outlays for the farm safety net increased slightly (by +0.2% per year) from the enactment of the 2008 farm bill to enactment of the 2014 farm bill. | Congress returns to the "farm bill" about every five years to establish an omnibus policy for food and agriculture. Deficit reduction influenced the Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79; 2014 farm bill) throughout its legislative development. Related political dynamics sometimes forced Congress to make difficult choices concerning how much total support to provide for agriculture and nutrition, and how to allocate it among competing constituencies.
The farm bill authorizes programs in two spending categories: mandatory and discretionary. Mandatory programs generally operate as entitlements; the farm bill pays for them using multi-year budget estimates when the law is enacted. Discretionary programs are authorized for their scope, but are not funded in the farm bill; they are subject to appropriations. While both types of programs are important, mandatory programs often dominate the farm bill debate.
At enactment of the 2014 farm bill, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the total cost of mandatory programs would be $489 billion over the next five years (FY2014-FY2018).
Four farm bill titles account for most of the mandatory spending. Of the projected net outlays over five years, about 80% ($391 billion over five years) is for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program—SNAP, formerly food stamps. Farm commodity support and crop insurance are expected to account for a combined 13% of mandatory program costs ($65 billion), with another 6% of costs in USDA conservation programs ($28 billion). Programs in all other farm bill titles are expected to account for about 1% of all mandatory expenditures.
In terms of change from the former farm bill, the budgetary impact of the 2014 farm bill is measured relative to what the 2008 farm bill would have spent had it continued—that is, the CBO baseline. The May 2013 CBO baseline projected that the mandatory programs of the 2008 farm bill would have spent $973 billion over the next 10 years (FY2014-FY2023). This "baseline" already had been reduced by $6.4 billion to reflect the effects of sequestration.
Compared to the baseline, the 2014 farm bill—at enactment—reduced projected spending and the deficit by $16.6 billion (-1.7%) over the 10-year period FY2014-FY2023. Over the 5-year period through FY2018, the enacted farm bill reduces projected spending by $5.3 billion (-1.1%). If the baseline had not already been reduced by sequestration, the enacted 2014 farm bill could have been credited for reducing spending by $23 billion over 10 years. But since sequestration already had been factored into the baseline, the official score is the $16.6 billion 10-year reduction.
The net reduction is composed of some titles receiving more funding than in the past, while other titles receive less. Titles with reductions provide budgetary offsets to pay for titles with increased spending, and the rest of the savings go to deficit reduction. Budgetary savings totaling $26.3 billion are scored in the nutrition, farm commodity subsidies, and conservation titles. Additional funding totaling $9.8 billion is provided for the crop insurance, research, bioenergy, horticulture, rural development, trade, and forestry titles.
The enacted 2014 farm bill saves less (is projected to spend more) than either the House-passed or Senate-passed proposals. Over 10 years, the House-passed proposal would have reduced spending by $51.9 billion (-5.3%); the Senate-passed proposal would have reduced spending by $17.9 billion (-1.8%). |
crs_RS22975 | crs_RS22975_0 | Current Conditions
Since August, four major storms have directly struck or passed close to Haiti, killing hundreds and affecting hundreds of thousands of people. U.S. As of October 21, 2008, the U.S. government has either provided or pledged over $31 million in humanitarian assistance to affected Haitian populations in response to the storms. The FY2009 continuing resolution signed into law on September 30, 2008 ( P.L. 110 - 329 ) provides not less than $100 million for hurricane relief and reconstruction assistance for Haiti and other Caribbean countries subject to prior consultation with, and the regular notification procedures of, the Committees on Appropriations. International Disaster Assistance to Haiti
Haitian Ambassador Joseph stated at a Capitol Hill forum on September 18 that Haiti would need $400 million over the next 18 months for hurricane recovery and reconstruction, and that so far the international community had committed $145 million. Legislation in the 110th Congress
P.L. | In August and September 2008, four major storms directly hit or passed close to Haiti, causing widespread devastation. As of early October, 2008, the U.S. government has either provided or pledged just over $30 million in humanitarian assistance to affected Haitian populations in response to the hurricanes in Haiti. Congress provided not less than $100 million for hurricane relief and reconstruction assistance for Haiti and other Caribbean countries in the FY2009 continuing appropriations resolution (P.L. 110-329) signed into law September 30, 2008. The Haitian government says it needs $400 million over the next 18 months for hurricane recovery and reconstruction, and that so far the international community has committed $145 million. For more information, see CRS Report RL34687, The Haitian Economy and the HOPE Act, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS22879, Haiti: Legislative Responses to the Food Crisis and Related Development Challenges, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS21349, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34691 | crs_RL34691_0 | Introduction
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a broad civil rights act prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities. As stated in the act, its purpose is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." The threshold issue in any ADA case is whether the individual alleging discrimination is an individual with a disability. Several Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the definition of disability, generally limiting its application. Since these Supreme Court interpretations, lower court decisions also interpreted the definition of disability strictly. Congress responded to these decisions by enacting the ADA Amendments Act, P.L. 110-325 , which rejects the Supreme Court and lower court interpretations and amends the ADA to provide broader coverage. On September 23, 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued proposed regulations under the ADA Amendments Act. | The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a broad civil rights act prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities. As stated in the act, its purpose is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."
The threshold issue in any ADA case is whether the individual alleging discrimination is an individual with a disability. Several Supreme Court decisions, including those in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2004), have interpreted the definition of disability, generally limiting its application. Since these Supreme Court interpretations, lower court decisions also interpreted the definition of disability strictly. Congress responded to these decisions by enacting the ADA Amendments Act, P.L. 110-325, which rejects the Supreme Court and lower court interpretations and amends the ADA to provide broader coverage. On September 23, 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued proposed regulations under the ADA Amendments Act. |
crs_RS20721 | crs_RS20721_0 | RS20721 -- Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress
Updated January 30, 2001
Background
On October 12, 2000, the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole (1) was attacked by a small boat laden with explosives during a brief refueling stop in the harbor ofAden,Yemen. (2) The suicide terrorist attack killed 17members of the ship's crew, wounded 39 others, and seriously damaged the ship. Evidence developed to date suggests that it may have been carried out by Islamic militantswith possible connections to the terrorist networkled by Usama bin Ladin. The panel, in a report released January 9, 2001, avoided assigning blame but found significantshortcomings in security throughout the region andrecommend improvements in training and intelligence designed to thwart terrorist attacks. Issues for Congress
The attack on the Cole raises potential issues for Congress concerning (1) procedures used by the Cole and other U.S. forces overseas to protect against terroristattacks; (2) intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination as it relates to potential terrorist attacks; and (3) U.S.anti-terrorism policy and how the U.S. shouldrespond to this attack. | On October 12, 2000, the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole was attacked by a small boat ladenwith explosives during a briefrefueling stop in the harbor of Aden, Yemen. The suicide terrorist attack killed 17 members of the ship's crew,wounded 39 others, and seriously damaged theship. Evidence developed to date suggests that it may have been carried out by Islamic militants with possibleconnections to the terrorist network led by Usamabin Ladin. The FBI, Defense Department, and Navy launched investigations to determine culpability for the attackand to review procedures. A broad DoD reviewof accountability was conducted by a special panel. On January 9, 2001, the panel issued its report which avoidedassigning blame but found significantshortcomings in security against terrorist attacks, including inadequate training and intelligence. On January 23,2001, Senate Armed Services CommitteeChairman, John Warner, announced intentions for the Committee to hold its own investigation. Issues for Congressinclude the adequacy of (1) procedures byU.S. forces to protect against terrorist attacks; (2) intelligence related to potential terrorist attacks; and (3) U.S.anti-terrorism policy and response. This report willbe updated if major new developments warrant. |
crs_95-724 | crs_95-724_0 | Introduction
In Roe v. Wade , the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Constitution protects a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. In a companion case, Doe v. Bolton , the Court held further that a state may not unduly burden a woman's fundamental right to abortion by prohibiting or substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating her decision. Rather than settle the issue, the Court's decisions kindled heated debate and precipitated a variety of governmental actions at the national, state and local levels designed either to nullify the rulings or hinder their effectuation. These governmental regulations have, in turn, spawned further litigation in which resulting judicial refinements in the law have been no more successful in dampening the controversy. Development and Status of the Law Prior to 1973
The law with respect to abortion in mid-19 th century America followed existing common law of England in all but a few states. But, by the time of the Civil War, an influential anti-abortion movement began to affect legislation by inducing states to add to or revise their statutes in order to prohibit abortion at all stages of gestation. This, however, represented the high water mark in restrictive abortion laws in the United States, for 1967 saw the first victory of an abortion reform movement with the passage of liberalizing legislation in Colorado. Between 1967 and the Supreme Court's 1973 decisions in Roe and Doe , approximately one-third of the states had adopted, either in whole or in part, the Model Penal Code's provisions allowing abortions in instances other than where only the mother's life was in danger. The Supreme Court's 1973 Abortion Rulings
Between 1968 and 1972, the constitutionality of restrictive abortion statutes of many states was challenged on the grounds of vagueness, violation of the fundamental right of privacy, and denial of equal protection. However, in 1973, the Supreme Court issued its rulings in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton . In those cases the Court found that Texas and Georgia statutes regulating abortion interfered to an unconstitutional extent with a woman's right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. The constitutional basis for the decisions rested upon the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment right of personal privacy embraced a woman's decision whether to carry a pregnancy to term. In 1989, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the State of Missouri's abortion statute in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services . In this 5-4 decision, while the majority did not overrule Roe , it indicated that it was willing to apply a less stringent standard of review to state restrictions on abortion. The Pennsylvania case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey , was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 29, 1992. Instead, it adopted a new analysis, "undue burden." In April 2007, the Court again addressed the validity of a statute that prohibits the performance of partial-birth abortions. The federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 was signed by the President on November 5, 2003 ( P.L. The Court distinguished the federal statute from the Nebraska law at issue in Stenberg . | In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Constitution protects a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. In a companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Court held further that a state may not unduly burden a woman's fundamental right to abortion by prohibiting or substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating her decision. Rather than settle the issue, the Court's decisions kindled heated debate and precipitated a variety of governmental actions at the national, state and local levels designed either to nullify the rulings or hinder their effectuation. These governmental regulations have, in turn, spawned further litigation in which resulting judicial refinements in the law have been no more successful in dampening the controversy.
The law with respect to abortion in mid-19th century America followed the common law of England in all but a few states. By the time of the Civil War, a number of states had begun to revise their statutes in order to prohibit abortion at all stages of gestation, with various exceptions for therapeutic abortions. The year 1967 marked the first victory of an abortion reform movement with the passage of liberalizing legislation in Colorado. The legislation was based on the Model Penal Code. Between 1967 and 1973, approximately one-third of the states had adopted, either in whole or in part, the Model Penal Code's provisions allowing abortion in instances other than where only the mother's life was in danger. Between 1968 and 1972, abortion statutes of many states were challenged on the grounds of vagueness, violation of the fundamental right of privacy, and denial of equal protection. In 1973, the Court ruled in Roe and Doe that Texas and Georgia statutes regulating abortion interfered to an unconstitutional extent with a woman's right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. The decisions rested upon the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment right of personal privacy encompassed a woman's decision whether to carry a pregnancy to term.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Roe and Doe did not address a number of important abortion-related issues which have been raised subsequently by state actions seeking to restrict the scope of the Court's rulings. These include the issues of informed consent, spousal consent, parental consent, and reporting requirements. In addition, Roe and Doe never resolved the question of what, if any, type of abortion procedures may be required or prohibited by statute. In 1989, the Court indicated in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, that, while it was not overruling Roe and Doe, it was willing to apply a less stringent standard of review to state restrictions respecting a woman's right to an abortion. Then, in 1992, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Court rejected specifically Roe's strict scrutiny standard and adopted the undue burden analysis. In 2000, in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), the Court determined that a Nebraska statute prohibiting the performance of "partial-birth" abortions was unconstitutional. In 2007, however, the Court upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). In upholding the federal act, the Court distinguished between the federal measure and the Nebraska statute. |
crs_RL32294 | crs_RL32294_0 | On December 9, 2006, the 109 th Congress passed a special trade preferences bill for Haiti. H.R. Aristide's First Term in Office (February-September 1991)
Jean-Bertrand Aristide was first elected President in December 1990, in elections that were widely heralded as the first free and fair elections in Haiti's then-186-year history. For over three years, the military regime resisted international demands that Aristide be restored to office. On September 18, 1994, when it learned that a U.S. military intervention had been launched, the military regime signed an agreement with the United States providing for Aristide's return. It also called for the immediate, unopposed entry of U.S. troops, a legislative amnesty for the military, and the resignation of the military leadership. President Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994, under the protection of some 20,000 U.S. troops. Préval assumed office in February 1996. Saying that the 1997 elections were marred by fraud, Préval's Prime Minister resigned. Presidential elections were held on November 26, 2000. OAS/CARICOM12 Efforts to Resolve Haitian Conflict
Efforts to resolve the electoral disputes of 1997 and 2000 frustrated the international community for years. Tensions and violence in Haiti increased dramatically after Aristide assumed his second term in office. Opposition groups refused to negotiate a settlement or participate in elections unless Aristide resigned. CARICOM continued trying to negotiate a solution to the crisis. The Bush Administration suspects Philippe of drug trafficking. Results of February 2006 Elections
First round presidential and legislative elections were held, after several months of delays, on February 7, 2006. He was inaugurated to a five-year presidential term on May 14. The Préval Presidency
President René Préval has outlined two main missions for his government: to build institutions and to establish conditions for private investment in order to create jobs. 6142 , Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act of 2006], which was approved on December 9, 2006 and incorporated into the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 as Title V ( P.L. U.S. Policy and Congressional Concerns
The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti during the second session of the 110 th Congress are to continue to improve security, promote sustainable economic development, and strengthen fragile democratic processes now that an elected government is in place. The Bush Administration continued this policy. 2764 / P.L. The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( H.R. After armed rebellions led to the departure of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February 2004, an interim government took over, but security conditions remain tenuous. 110-161 ( H.R. H.Res. H.Res. 241 (Waters). H.Res. 909 (Meek). 351 (Lee). 454 (Meek). 522 (Hastings). H.R. H.R. 1001 (Spratt). H.R. 1645 (Gutierrez). 2830 (Oberstar). H.R. S. 222 (Graham). S. 821 (Smith). S. 1348 (Reid). Legislation in the 109th Congress
P.L. Section 549 (c) prohibits any 'International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement' funds from being used to transfer excess weapons, ammunition, or other lethal property of an agency of the United States government to the government of Haiti for use by the Haitian National Police until the Secretary of State certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that (1) the United Nations Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has carried out the vetting of the senior levels of the Haitian National Police and has ensured that those credibly alleged to have committed serious crimes, including drug trafficking and human rights violations, have been suspended; and (2) the Transitional Haitian National Government is cooperating in a reform and restructuring plan for the Haitian National Police and the reform of the judicial system as called for in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1608 adopted on June 22, 2005. 109-234 ( H.R. 109-432 ( H.R. 6142 ) was incorporated into the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 as Title V. Allows duty-free entry to specified apparel articles 50% of which were made and/or assembled in Haiti, the United States, or a country that is either a beneficiary of a U.S. trade preference program, or party to a U.S. free trade agreement (for the first three years; the percentage would be higher after that). | Following the first free and fair elections in Haiti's history, Jean-Bertrand Aristide first became Haitian President in February 1991. He was overthrown by a military coup in September 1991. For over three years, the military regime resisted international demands that Aristide be restored to office. In September 1994, after a U.S. military intervention had been launched, the military regime agreed to Aristide's return, the immediate, unopposed entry of U.S. troops, and the resignation of its leadership. President Aristide returned to Haiti in October 1994 under the protection of some 20,000 U.S. troops, and disbanded the Haitian army. U.S. aid helped train a civilian police force. Subsequently, critics charged Aristide with politicizing that force and engaging in corrupt practices.
Elections held under Aristide and his successor, René Préval (1996-2000), including the one in which Aristide was reelected in 2000, were marred by alleged irregularities, low voter turnout, and opposition boycotts. Efforts to negotiate a resolution to the electoral dispute frustrated the international community for years. Tension and violence continued throughout Aristide's second term, culminating in his departure from office in February 2004, after the opposition repeatedly refused to negotiate a political solution and armed groups took control of half the country.
An interim government, backed by the Bush Administration, was established with Gérard LaTortue as Prime Minister. The U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has tried to improve security conditions, but Haiti remains unstable. Natural disasters have contributed to instability. After several postponements, presidential elections were held on February 7, 2006, and runoff legislative elections were held on April 21. The electoral council declared René Préval winner after a controversial calculation process. He was inaugurated to a five-year presidential term on May 14, 2006. President Préval has sought to restore stability, build democratic institutions, and establish conditions for private investment in order to create jobs. He enjoys broad support from the international donor community, the Bush Administration, and Congress. On December 9, 2006, the 109th Congress passed a special trade preferences bill for Haiti (the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement/HOPE Act of 2006, Title V, P.L. 109-432).
Congressional concerns regarding Haiti include fostering democratic development, stability, and security; the cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and human trafficking; addressing Haitian migration; and alleviating poverty. The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161) includes a number of provisions on U.S. aid to Haiti that are described in this report. During its second session, the 110th Congress may consider a variety of legislation that has provisions on Haiti: H.Res. 234, H.Res. 241, H.Res. 909, H.R. 351, H.R. 454, H.R. 522, H.R. 750, H.R. 1001, H.R. 1645, H.R. 2830, H.R. 4986, S. 222, S. 821, and S. 1348. An expansion or extension of current trade benefits provided through the HOPE Act may also be considered. This report will be not be updated. |
crs_R43976 | crs_R43976_0 | Of that $136.5 million total, the 2012 Democratic and Republican conventions received a total of approximately $36.5 million from the Presidential Election Campaign Fund (which generally excludes security costs). Presidential public funds and security funds came from separate revenue sources. Because public funding for convention operations has now been eliminated, this report provides a historical overview of how PECF convention funding functioned and describes private funding sources that remain available. For historical discussion of policy debates that preceded the decision to repeal PECF convention funds, see archived CRS Report RL34630, Federal Funding of Presidential Nominating Conventions: Overview and Policy Options , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. For discussion of increased private fundraising limits for political parties, including for party conventions, see CRS Report R43825, Increased Campaign Contribution Limits in the FY2015 Omnibus Appropriations Law: Frequently Asked Questions , by [author name scrubbed]. First, funds for convention operations came from the Presidential Election Campaign Fund (PECF), which provides financial assistance to publicly financed presidential campaigns. Each convention was allocated approximately $68.2 million. The $100 million Congress appropriated for the FY2016 presidential nominating conventions is, reportedly, primarily to reimburse states and localities for law enforcement costs associated with their participation in securing the convention sites. Specifically, P.L. 113-94 ( H.R. The 114 th Congress appropriated $100 million for convention security in FY2012 ( P.L. 114-113 ). The 2014 elimination of convention financing means that, barring a change in the status quo, the 2016 conventions will be the first in more than a generation financed entirely with private funds. | During the 113th Congress, legislation (H.R. 2019) became law (P.L. 113-94) eliminating Presidential Election Campaign Fund (PECF) funding for convention operations. The 2012 Democratic and Republican convention committees each received grants, financed with public funds, of approximately $18.2 million (for a total of approximately $36.5 million, as rounded). Barring a change in the status quo, the 2016 presidential nominating conventions will, therefore, be the first since the 1976 election cycle not supported with public funds.
Changes in PECF funding for convention operations do not affect separately appropriated security funds. The 114th Congress enacted one law (P.L. 114-113) in FY2016 that affected convention security funding with the appropriation of $100 million for the Democratic and Republican nominating conventions (each was allocated $50 million). This security funding will not be provided to party convention committees but to the state and local law enforcement entities assisting in securing the convention sites.
Because public funding for convention operations has now been eliminated, this report provides a historical overview of how PECF convention funding functioned and describes private funding sources that remain available. This report will be updated if public financing for nominating conventions again becomes a major legislative issue. For historical discussion of policy debates that preceded the decision to repeal PECF convention funds, see archived CRS Report RL34630, Federal Funding of Presidential Nominating Conventions: Overview and Policy Options, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
For discussion of increased private fundraising limits for political parties, including for party conventions, see CRS Report R43825, Increased Campaign Contribution Limits in the FY2015 Omnibus Appropriations Law: Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43708 | crs_R43708_0 | The Dual Purposes of the Take Care Clause
[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed...
U.S. Constitution, Article II, §3
The Take Care Clause would appear to stand for two, at times diametrically opposed propositions—one imposing a "duty" upon the President and the other viewing the Clause as a source of Presidential "power." Primarily, the Take Care Clause has been interpreted as placing an obligation on both the President and those under his supervision to comply with and execute clear statutory directives as enacted by Congress. However, the Supreme Court has also construed the Clause as ensuring Presidential control over the enforcement of federal law. As a result, courts generally will not review Presidential enforcement decisions, including the decision of whether to initiate a criminal prosecution or administrative enforcement action in response to a violation of federal law or regulation. In situations where an agency refrains from bringing an enforcement action, courts have historically been cautious in reviewing the agency determination—generally holding that these nonenforcement decisions are "committed to agency discretion" and therefore not subject to judicial review under the APA. However, the Court also clearly indicated that the presumption against judicial review of agency nonenforcement decisions may be overcome in a variety of specific situations. First, a court may review an agency nonenforcement determination "where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers." However, when Congress removes or restricts that discretion, by expressly providing "guidelines" or "meaningful standards" for the manner in which the agency may exercise its enforcement powers, the presumption of nonreviewability may be overcome. Abdication of Statutory Responsibilities
In Heckler , the Supreme Court also suggested that the presumption against the review of nonenforcement decisions may be overcome if the agency has "'consciously and expressly adopted a general policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities." It is clear, however, that the judicial branch's reluctance to review executive branch prosecutorial and administrative enforcement decisions is grounded in a respect for the roles and functions of each branch of government; an acknowledgement that it would generally be improper and impractical for the court to review discretionary enforcement decisions made by executive branch officers; and the Take Care Clause, as control over the enforcement of law has been viewed as within the "special province of the Executive Branch" and an aspect of executive power that "lies at the core of the Executive's duty to see to the faithful execution of the laws." While it would appear that Congress may have greater authority over administrative enforcement discretion, legislation that can be characterized as significantly restricting the exercise of executive branch enforcement decisions, in either the criminal, civil, or administrative context, could raise questions under the separation of powers. | The Take Care Clause would appear to stand for two, at times diametrically opposed propositions—one imposing a "duty" upon the President and the other viewing the Clause as a source of Presidential "power." Primarily, the Take Care Clause has been interpreted as placing an obligation on both the President and those under his supervision to comply with and execute clear statutory directives as enacted by Congress. However, the Supreme Court has also construed the Clause as ensuring Presidential control over the enforcement of federal law. As a result, courts generally will not review Presidential enforcement decisions, including the decision of whether to initiate a criminal prosecution or administrative enforcement action in response to a violation of federal law.
In situations where an agency refrains from bringing an enforcement action, courts have historically been cautious in reviewing the agency determination—generally holding that these nonenforcement decisions are "committed to agency discretion" and therefore not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. The seminal case on this topic is Heckler v. Chaney, in which the Supreme Court held that an "agency's decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review."
However, the Court also clearly indicated that the presumption against judicial review of agency nonenforcement decisions may be overcome in a variety of specific situations. For example, a court may review an agency nonenforcement determination "where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers," or where the agency has "'consciously and expressly adopted a general policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities."
As such, it would appear that Congress may overcome the presumption of nonreviewability and restrict executive discretion through statute by expressly providing "meaningful standards" for the manner in which the agency may exercise its enforcement powers.
Nevertheless, legislation that can be characterized as significantly restricting the exercise of executive branch enforcement decisions, in either the criminal, civil, or administrative context, could raise questions under the separation of powers. |
crs_RL34162 | crs_RL34162_0 | This report describes the background and primary policy issue areas affecting renewable energy, including budget and funding, tax incentives, electricity regulatory initiatives, renewable fuels, and climate change. For renewable energy, these policies included a focus on the production of both liquid fuels and electricity. By the time that the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT) was enacted, a variety of tax, grant, loan, and regulatory provisions had been established for renewable fuels. Action in the 110th Congress
Economic and environmental concerns—namely energy security, international competitiveness, high energy prices, air pollution, and climate change—are now driving policy proposals to support renewable energy R&D and market deployment. 110-140 ) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 110-161 ) increased support for renewable energy. 110-343 , Division B) provided several billion in tax incentives for renewables. The Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY2009 ( P.L. Biofuels and Other New Program Authorizations
Several biofuels programs authorized by EPACT have not been funded, including sugar cane ethanol (§208), biodiesel (§757), advanced biofuels (§1514), and cellulosic ethanol (§942, §1511, §1512). P.L. 2638, Continuing Appropriations Resolution
On September 24, 2008, the House substitute to the Senate substitute to the proposed Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008 ( H.R. P.L. Also, the law has several incentives for biofuels. The renewable energy incentives include $5.8 billion for the renewable energy electricity production tax credit (PTC), $1.9 billion for business solar (and fuel cell) credits, $1.3 billion for residential solar tax credits, and $267 million for clean renewable energy (tax credit) bonds. 110-343 , Division B, §101 and§102) extended the PTC for windfarms for one year, through the end of 2009. 1424 . The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( P.L. B, §103) extends the business solar tax credit at the 30% level for eight years, through the end of 2016. 6 . H.R. 110-140 ). Cellulosic feedstocks may be cheaper and more plentiful than corn, but they require more extensive and costly conversion to ethanol. Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)
New Goals Set By the Energy Independence Act
Section 202 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ( P.L. The new standard starts at 9.0 billion gallons in 2008 and rises to 36 billion gallons in 2022. 110-329 ) continues FY2009 funding at the FY2008 level through March 6, 2009. It does not provide for a funding increase. 110-246) Provisions
The enacted version of the farm bill ( H.R. The law contains provisions that extend and/or expand upon renewable energy (and energy efficiency) provisions of the Farm Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 110-329 ( H.R. The cost of incentives are offset by a freeze in certain oil and natural gas deductions, a reduced foreign tax credit for certain foreign oil and gas income, reduced deductions for certain securities transactions, a change in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) surtax, and an increase of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund tax. | Renewable energy can be used to produce liquid fuels and electricity. A variety of funding, tax incentives, and regulatory policies have been enacted to support renewables as a means for addressing concerns about energy security, air pollution, international competitiveness, and climate change. This report reviews the background for renewables and describes the current congressional debate.
Budget and funding issues are key concerns. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized several new renewable energy demonstration and deployment programs, but most of them have not been funded. Further, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) authorized several new renewable energy programs that have not yet received appropriations. The Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2008 (P.L. 110-161) increased Department of Energy (DOE) renewable energy funding by $31.4 million (7%). The Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329, H.R. 2638) continues DOE funding at the FY2008 level through March 6, 2009.
Tax policies are also at issue. The interaction of the federal renewable energy electricity production tax credit (PTC) with state renewable portfolio standard (RPS) policies has forged a strong incentive for wind energy development. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343 [Division B], H.R. 1424) extends the PTC for wind farms for one year (three years for most other renewables) through the end of 2009, provides $800 million for a new category of clean renewable energy (tax credit) bonds, and extends for eight years the 30% level for the business solar tax credit and the 30% residential solar tax credit. Further, the law repeals nearly $17.7 billion in tax subsidies for oil and natural gas and reduces certain other financial incentives that will be used to offset the cost of the tax incentives for renewable energy ($9.1 billion) and energy efficiency ($3.6 billion).
The ethanol fuel issue intensified for much of the 110th Congress. Corn ethanol production climbed rapidly, but appeared to be causing food price increases. Concerns about rising food prices and apparent limits to the long-term potential for corn ethanol have brought a focus on cellulosic ethanol. Cellulosic sources avoid many limits on corn and appear to have much lower net CO2 emissions, but they require an extensive and costly conversion process. P.L. 110-140 set a new renewable fuels standard (RFS), which starts at 9.0 billion gallons in 2008 and rises to 36 billion gallons in 2022. P.L. 110-343 (H.R. 1424) and the farm bill (P.L. 110-246, H.R. 6124) contain several tax incentives and other provisions for biofuels. |
crs_RL33679 | crs_RL33679_0 | (7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay. The implementing amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including Rule 60 (victims' rights), became effective on December 1, 2008.
Who Is a Victim? Nor does it explicitly give the victim the right to be heard in any particular form. Nevertheless, it is certainly difficult to argue that the sponsors of Section 3771 believed the right to be heard could be confined to a written statement, particularly at sentencing, in the absence of an overwhelming number of victims:
This right of crime victims not to be excluded from the proceedings provides a foundation for the next section, section 2, (a)(4), which provides victims the right to reasonably be heard at any public proceeding involving release, plea, or sentencing. The right to be reasonably heard applies to public court proceedings. The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act added this to the inventory of victims' rights. Notice of Section 3771 Rights and Statutory Services
The right to be informed of the rights under this section and the services described in section 503(c) of the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. It affords these victims a limited range of rights which relate to matters within the control of the federal courts: attendance rights; the right to be heard; protection from unreasonable delays; the right to fair and respectful treatment; and the right to enforce those rights. The department issued the regulations called for in Section 3771(f) on November 17, 2005. (8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy. (9) The right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement. This paragraph does not affect the victim's right to restitution as provided in title 18, United States Code. (6) No cause of action. - The term "crime victim" means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia. – The regulations promulgated under paragraph (1) shall –
(A) designate an administrative authority within the Department of Justice to receive and investigate complaints relating to the provision or violation of the rights of a crime victim;
(B) require a course of training for employees and offices of the Department of Justice that fail to comply with provisions of Federal law pertaining to the treatment of crime victims, and otherwise assist such employees and offices in responding more effectively to the needs of crime victims;
(C) contain disciplinary sanctions, including suspension or termination from employment, for employees of the Department of Justice who willfully or wantonly fail to comply with provisions of Federal law pertaining to the treatment of crime victims; and
(D) provide that the Attorney General, or the designee of the Attorney General, shall be the final arbiter of the complaint, and that there shall be no judicial review of the final decision of the Attorney General by a complainant. (2) Who May Assert the Rights. | Section 3771 of Title 18 of the United States Code is a statutory bill of rights for victims of crimes committed in violation of federal law or the laws of the District of Columbia. It defines victims as anyone directly and proximately harmed by such an offense, individuals and legal entities alike. It does not appear to include family relatives of a deceased, child, or incapacitated victim except in a representative capacity.
Numbered among the rights it conveys are (1) the right to be reasonably protected from the accused; (2) the right to notification of public court and parole proceedings and of any release of the accused; (3) the right not to be excluded from public court proceedings under most circumstances; (4) the right to be heard in public court proceedings relating to bail, the acceptance of a plea bargain, sentencing, or parole; (5) the right to confer with the prosecutor; (6) the right to restitution under the law; (7) the right to proceedings free from unwarranted delays; (8) the right to be treated fairly and with respect to one's dignity and privacy; (9) the right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement; and (10) the right to be informed of the statutory rights and services to which one is entitled.
The section directs the courts and law enforcement officials to see to it that the rights it creates are honored. Both victims and prosecutors may assert the rights and seek review from the appellate courts should the rights be initially denied.
The section vests no rights in the accused nor does it create cause of action damages in any instance where a victim is afforded less than the section's full benefits.
Conforming amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective on December 1, 2008. The Justice Department promulgated implementing regulations on November 17, 2005. The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 added to the inventory of victims' statutory rights and clarified the appellate standard to be used to enforce those rights. Section 3771 in text form is appended. Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is as well.
This report is available in an abridged form, without quotation marks, footnotes, appendixes, and most of the citations to authority, as CRS Report RS22518, Crime Victims' Rights Act: A Sketch of 18 U.S.C. 3771, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33006 | crs_RL33006_0 | In the 109th Congress, the House approved an omnibus energy bill ( H.R. 6 ) onApril 21, 2005, that would open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to oil and gas leasing,substantially change oversight of electric utilities, increase the use of alternative motor fuels, provide$8.1 billion in energy tax incentives, extend the nuclear accident liability system, and authorizenumerous energy R&D programs. 6 on June 28without ANWR provisions but including $14.1 billion in tax incentives and provisions on globalclimate change. Use ofmethyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) as a domestic gasoline additive would be phased out, but statescould authorize continued use and under the House bill the President could void the ban. Producersof MTBE and renewable fuels would be granted protection (a "safe harbor") from product liabilitylawsuits under the House bill, while only renewable fuels would be covered in the Senate bill. The Senate bill includes a "renewable portfolio standard" (RPS) -- rejected by the HouseEnergy and Commerce Committee -- requiring utilities to generate at least 10% of their electricityfrom renewable energy sources by 2020. All ERO standards would be approvedby the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Senate bill would terminate FERC's Standard Market Design notice of proposedrulemaking. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of1935 (PUHCA) would be repealed. Renewable Fuel Standard and MTBE. The House bill would require that 3.1 billion gallons of renewablefuel be used in 2005, increasing to 5.0 billion gallons by 2012, and the Senate bill would require 8.0billion gallons by 2012 (compared with 3.4 billion gallons used in 2004). The ban has two possible exceptions. The Senate bill includes the safe harbor provision for renewable fuels but not MTBE; theSenate safe harbor would not be retroactive. Energy Taxes. First, the Senate bill would providenet tax reductions of $14.1 billion over 11 years compared with $8.1 billion in the House-passedversion. The Senate bill also provides more tax incentives for energy efficiency investments than theHouse bill. Nuclear Energy. The Senate version of H.R. The House version of H.R. 6 as passed by the House would authorize oil and gas exploration,development, and production in a portion of ANWR, with a 2,000-acre limit on certain productionand support facilities. The Senate version contains no ANWR provisions. Domestic Energy Production. 6 wouldencourage production on federal lands through royalty reductions for marginal oil and gas wells onpublic lands and the outer continental shelf. Overview of House and Senate Versions
The House and Senate versions of H.R. For example, only the House bill would openANWR to oil and gas activities, and only the Senate version includes extensive provisions explicitlyaddressing global climate change. | The House approved an omnibus energy bill ( H.R. 6 ) on April 21, 2005, thatwould open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to oil and gas leasing, substantiallychange oversight of electric utilities, increase the use of alternative motor fuels, provide $8.1 billionin energy tax incentives, and authorize numerous energy R&D programs. The Senate passed itsversion of H.R. 6 on June 28 without ANWR provisions but with $14.1 billion in taxincentives -- including a nuclear energy production credit -- and provisions on global climate change.Highlights of the bills include:
Electricity. Both the House and the Senate versions of the bill would repeal the Public UtilityHolding Company Act (PUHCA), but the Senate bill has provisions for more stringent oversight ofutility mergers than the House version. Standard market design (SMD) would be remanded to theFederal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) by the House bill, while the Senate version wouldterminate the rulemaking altogether.
Renewable Energy. An increase in renewable fuel and ethanol consumption to 5 billiongallons annually by 2012 would be mandated by the House bill, as opposed to 8 billion gallons inthe Senate bill. The Senate bill includes a "renewable portfolio standard" (RPS) -- rejected in theHouse -- requiring utilities to generate at least 10% of their electricity from renewable energy sourcesby 2020.
MTBE. Methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), a gasoline additive widely used to meet CleanAir Act requirements, has caused water contamination. The House and Senate bills would phase outthe use of MTBE with some possible exceptions and provide funds for MTBE cleanup, with somedifferences. The House version would provide protection for fuel producers and blenders ofrenewable fuels and MTBE from defective product lawsuits, while the Senate bill would coverrenewable fuels but not MTBE.
Energy Taxes. The House bill would reduce energy taxes by about $8.1 billion over 11 years,as compared with $14.1 billion in the Senate version. A nuclear energy production tax credit isincluded among the Senate incentives.
ANWR. The House-passed bill would authorize oil and gas exploration, development, andproduction in ANWR, with a 2,000-acre limit on production and support facilities. No ANWRprovisions are included in the Senate version.
Energy Production on Federal Lands. Both bills include numerous provisions to increaseenergy production on federal lands. The Senate version of H.R. 6 would require aninventory of oil and natural gas resources on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), while the Houseversion would not.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL32819 | crs_RL32819_0 | 2985 , was signed into P.L. Status of FY2006 Appropriations
Action on the FY2006 Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill
Submission of FY2006 Budget Request on February 7, 2005
On February 7, 2005, the President submitted the FY2006 U.S. Budget containing $4.028 billion in legislative branch budget authority, a 13.7% increase. As enacted into law, H.R. 2985 contained new discretionary budget authority of $3.804 billion, exceeding the 302(b) allocation by $85 million. 109-139 ), which contained $2.870 billion, a 1.7% increase. During consideration of H.R. As amended the committee's bill contains $3.83 billion, including funds for House items. The Senate mark was a 6.4% increase over the current FY2005 budget. 2985 as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee, after agreeing to an amendment offered by Senator Allard (for Lott/Dodd). The amendment did not change the total new budget authority in the bill, since the money was made available from funds already provided for elsewhere in the bill. 1268 :
direct that fees for use of the House exercise facility be deposited in the House Services Revolving Fund, under the account House of Representatives, House Services Revolving Fund; provide technical corrections to provisions regarding the Library of Congress by changing references to the chair of the Subcommittee on Legislative Branch to the chair of the Committee on Appropriations of the House for membership on the Joint Committee on the Library and the Board of Trustees of the Open World Leadership Program (to reflect the abolishment of the House Subcommittee on Legislative Branch at the beginning of the 109 th Congress); and eliminate the statutory requirement that the chair and ranking minority member of the House Appropriations Committee be required to approve the obligation of funds by the AOC for the CVC; the amendment requires approval by the House Appropriations Committee. Capitol Police
Funding Issues
Congress provided $249.46 million for the police, a 3.31% increase. Appropriations for the police are contained in two accounts:
the salaries account , for which $230.2 million was requested, a 14.1% increase; the House bill contained $210.4 million; the Senate bill, $222.6 million; and the conference report, $217.46 million; the general expenses account, for which $59.9 million was requested, a 109.2%increase; the House bill contained $29.4 million; the Senate bill, $42.0 million; and the conference report, $32.0 million;
The salaries account contains funds for the salaries of employees, including overtime, hazardous duty pay differential, and government contributions for employee health, retirement, social security, professional liability insurance, and other benefit programs. While the House bill contained a 69.9% increase, or $16.8 million, the Senate bill contained a 1.3% increase, or $10.0 million, or a 1.3% increase. 1268 did not contain funds for the Capitol Police. The Senate language also authorized the Architect of the Capitol to appoint an Executive Director of the Capitol Visitor Center. 109-55 on August 2, 2005, with President Bush's signature. Conferees agreed to the House-approved funding level of $35.45 million, a 2.3% increase, less than the level approved by the Senate, $35.85 million, or 3.5% over current funding. Conferees agreed to $3.1 million, as contained in both the House and Senate versions of the bill. Senate language providing $430,000 was agreed to by conferees. | The President signed H.R. 2985, the FY2006 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, into P.L. 109-55 on August 2, 2005 (119 Stat. 565). The act provides $3.804 billion in new budget authority, a 4.49% increase of $163.61 million over current budget authority. Going into conference, the House bill contained $2.87 billion, a 1.7% increase over the current budget, excluding funds for Senate items, which were determined by the Senate after House consideration of the bill. The Senate bill contained $3.83 billion, a 6.3% increase, including funds for House items.
The level of funding is less than the outlay of $3.809 billion projected by the House Budget Committee. The difference is to be offset by the use of prior year funds made available primarily for projects under jurisdiction of the Architect of the Capitol. As enacted into law, H.R. 2985 contained new discretionary budget authority of $3.804 billion, exceeding the 302(b) allocation by $85 million.
One of the more controversial issues, House language providing for continuity of representation in the House of Representatives pursuant to an emergency situation, was retained by conferees. The Senate bill did not contain the language.
Actions on the FY2006 bill follow last year's approval by the Committees on Appropriations of a virtual funding freeze. Congress eventually agreed to a 1.2% increase, which fell below the 1.3% increase agreed to by both houses for discretionary funds.
Among other issues that were under consideration during discussions on the FY2006 budget were
requests by the chairman of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees for agencies to identify further their FY2006 objectives in an effort to reduce their requests to more closely mirror the President's call for a 2.1% on discretionary appropriations; funding for the U.S. Capitol Police budget (the House bill contained a 0.7% decrease; the Senate bill, a 9.6% increase; and the conference report, a 3.31% increase; funding for the Capitol Visitor Center (the House bill contained $36.9 million; the Senate bill, $44.2 million, with conferees agreeing to the Senate figure); language in the House bill terminating the Capitol Police mounted horse unit, which was retained in conference; the Senate bill did not contain the provision; language regarding management of the Capitol Police; language in both the House and Senate bill limiting the pay of a legislative branch employee to that received by a Member of Congress, which was dropped during conference; and, language in the Senate report encouraging the application of performance standards for the legislative branch similar to those now statutorily required by the executive branch. |
crs_R44651 | crs_R44651_0 | Introduction
There are 14 U.S. territories, or possessions, five of which are inhabited: Puerto Rico (PR), Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI), American Samoa (AS), and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). Each inhabited territory's local tax system has features that help determine the structure of its public finances. The IRC also establishes interdependencies between federal and territorial tax systems, such that changes to the IRC can have economic and revenue effects in the territories and vice versa. This report summarizes U.S. tax policy related to the territories, including what federal tax policies apply to residents in each of the territories and how federal law affects the different territorial tax systems. It is not intended to be a comprehensive guide to territorial or federal tax policy or tax law. Most importantly is the distinction between the mirror code and non-mirror code tax systems. This means these territories must use the IRC as their territorial income tax law, substituting terms where appropriate (e.g., the territory's name for "United States"). Also, while these territories use the IRC as their income tax system, the tax imposed is a local tax (see Table A-1 for a discussion of how this could also affect tax filing requirements). Since then, PR has enacted its own income tax laws. First, while the United States taxes its citizens, residents, and corporations based on their worldwide income regardless of whether the income is earned within the United States or abroad, for federal tax purposes the residents of the U.S. territories are generally treated more similar to foreign citizens (even though they are U.S. citizens or nationals) and corporations organized or created in the territories are treated like foreign companies. The possession-source income exclusion currently applies to each of the territories through several sections of the IRC:
American Samoa (IRC Section 931) U.S. Virgin Islands (IRC Section 932) Puerto Rico (IRC Section 933) Guam and CNMI (former IRC Section 935)
The possession-source income exclusion and IRC tax coordination requirements between each territory and the United States will determine the filing situation of bona fide residents with income earned outside of their jurisdiction, and individuals who are not bona fide residents and earned territorial-source income. Policy Issues for Congress
This section of the report summarizes three tax policy issues relevant to the territories that could be of current interest to Congress: (1) tax-based assistance to households in the territories, (2) tax policy and economic development of the territories, and (3) tax arbitrage and U.S. tax avoidance activities related to the territories. While there are many ways to potentially structure this assistance, common proposals include (1) expanding the availability of the federal earned income tax credit (EITC) to households in the territories, (2) expanding the availability of the federal additional child tax credit (ACTC) to households in the territories, and (3) creating a payroll tax cut for territorial tax filers. Mirror code residents (Guam, CNMI, and USVI) and certain PR residents can claim the ACTC. Although a comprehensive historical analysis of U.S. tax policy toward the territory is beyond the scope of this report, notable examples include the now-repealed IRC Section 936 possessions tax credit (first enacted in 1976, but fully phased-out in 2005); deferral of tax on the earnings of territorial subsidiaries of U.S. corporations; and the federal, state, and local exclusion of interest on qualified public bonds issued by the territories. Both forms of tax incentives could be made available to encourage economic activity in any industry, or they could be structured to provide a relative boost to particular industries. Other studies, such as those by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 1993, provided additional evidence that the average tax benefit for 936 corporations often equaled if not surpassed average compensation per employee. Tax Arbitrage and U.S. Tax Avoidance
Tax arbitrage activity in the territories is symptomatic of the broader erosion of the U.S. tax base due to international income and profit shifting. For example, the revenue raised by shutting off these tax strategies could be used for paying down government debt or on spending programs (such as infrastructure, workforce education, or general social services) that could potentially have a larger effect on growth or income security in the territories. Non-mirror-code territories could also use this revenue to lower statutory income tax rates for all territorial taxpayers (and not just those who are granted special exemptions). Second, tax avoidance opportunities reduce economic efficiency by distorting relative rates of return to capital across locations. | There are 14 U.S. territories, or possessions, five of which are inhabited: Puerto Rico (PR), Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI), American Samoa (AS), and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). Each of these inhabited territories has a local tax system with features that help determine each territory's local public finances.
The U.S. Internal Revenue Code (IRC) has two important roles in establishing the tax policy relationship between the United States and the territories. First, native residents of U.S. territories are U.S. citizens or nationals but are taxed more similar to foreign citizens because income earned from territorial sources is treated like foreign-source income. The IRC also treats U.S. subsidiaries formed in the territories as foreign corporations, which can generally defer U.S. tax on income earned from business or trade in the territories.
Second, the IRC serves as the local tax laws in the territories that are required to use a mirror-code system (USVI, Guam, and the CNMI), in which the territory substitutes its name for the "United States" to give the IRC the proper effect as the territory's local income tax system. AS is not bound by the mirror system but has chosen to adopt much of the IRC for its income tax. PR has its own income tax system, which is not based on the IRC.
These dynamics between federal and territorial tax policy raise several potential issues for Congress. First, economic development of the territories has been of perennial congressional interest. Tax incentives enacted by the territories and the United States have been shown to direct offshore investment to the territories. With this said, though, economic studies of one broader U.S. tax incentive, the now-repealed Section 936 credit, indicate that any employment effects are usually secondary to the magnitude of effects on shareholder earnings, and average tax benefit for corporations often equaled if not surpassed average compensation per employee. Tax policies that effectively subsidize a more narrow set of industries in certain territories, such as rum production in PR and the USVI and manufacturing in AS, still exist today.
Second, federal tax benefits could be used to assist low-income households living in the territories. For example, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the additional child tax credit (ACTC) could be expanded to low-income territorial households. The EITC is typically not available to territorial residents and the ACTC is limited to residents of the mirror code territories and certain residents of PR. Although these options could target lower-income households, they could also impose administrative costs for territorial households that are not required to file U.S. tax returns (e.g., because they only have territorial-source income). A payroll tax cut could be administratively simpler (since all territorial residents withhold taxes for some federal payroll taxes), but it would also be less narrowly targeted to lower-income households.
Third, interactions and differences in tax rates between the U.S. and territorial tax policies also create opportunities for tax arbitrage and avoidance by corporations and certain individuals. For the United States, this tax revenue loss is part of a broader issue with international income and profit shifting. For the territories, the revenue lost from special tax incentives could be used to reform the local tax system, increase spending on social programs, or pay down their debt. Such tax avoidance opportunities can distort the allocation of capital away from locations and industries where investment earns the highest economic rate of return. Additionally, the ability for certain taxpayers to utilize sophisticated tax avoidance strategies could raise issues of fairness.
This report summarizes U.S. tax policy related to the territories, including a general discussion of how federal taxes apply to territorial residents and how federal law affects the different territorial tax systems in similar or different ways. This report is not intended to be a comprehensive guide to federal or territorial tax policy or tax law. |
crs_98-869 | crs_98-869_0 | When this eutrophication is extensive and persistent, bottom waters may become hypoxic, or even anoxic (no dissolved oxygen), while surface waters can be completely normal and full of life. Human activities that increase nutrient loading can increase the intensity, spatial extent, and duration of hypoxic events. Although the extent of effects of hypoxic events on U.S. coastal ecosystems is still uncertain, the phenomenon is of increasing concern in coastal areas. Hypoxia has become more frequent and widespread in shallow coastal and estuarine areas. About 21% to 43% of the area of the United States' estuaries have experienced a hypoxic event; more than half of the affected area is in the Mississippi/Atchafalaya River plume. The area of hypoxia extends westward from the mouth of the Mississippi River to the upper Texas coast. Nutrient enrichment is the primary cause of eutrophication, of some algal blooms, and of hypoxia, and is believed to be a major factor in areas such as the northern Gulf of Mexico. Evidence suggests that the dead zone forces fish and shrimp further offshore as well as into shallow nearshore areas, and reduces the area of essential habitat. In response to an integrated scientific assessment of hypoxia in the northern Gulf of Mexico by the multi-agency Watershed Nutrient Task Force, a Plan of Action for addressing hypoxia was released in January 2001. Near the end of the 105 th Congress, provisions of the Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act of 1998 were incorporated into the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1998. This measure was signed into law as P.L. 105-383 on November 13, 1998; Title VI authorized appropriations through NOAA to conduct research, monitoring, education, and management activities for the prevention, reduction, and control of hypoxia, harmful algal blooms, Pfiesteria , and other aquatic toxins. In 2004, Title I of P.L. 108-456 , the Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Amendments Act of 2004, expanded this authority and reauthorized appropriations through FY2008. Legislation has been introduced in the 110 th Congress to reauthorize and amend the Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act. | An adequate level of dissolved oxygen is necessary to support most forms of aquatic life. While very low levels of dissolved oxygen (hypoxia) can be natural, especially in deep ocean basins and fjords, hypoxia in coastal waters is mostly the result of human activities that have modified landscapes or increased nutrients entering these waters. Hypoxic areas are more widespread during the summer, when algal blooms stimulated by spring runoff decompose to diminish oxygen. Such hypoxic areas may drive out or kill animal life, and usually dissipate by winter. In many places where hypoxia has occurred previously, it is now more severe and longer lasting; in others where hypoxia did not exist historically, it now does, and these areas are becoming more prevalent.
The largest hypoxic area affecting the United States is in the northern Gulf of Mexico near the mouth of the Mississippi River, but there are others as well. Most U.S. coastal estuaries and many developed nearshore areas suffer from varying degrees of hypoxia, causing various environmental damages. Research has been conducted to better identify the human activities that affect the intensity and duration of, as well as the area affected by, hypoxic events, and to begin formulating control strategies.
Near the end of the 105th Congress, the Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act of 1998 was signed into law as Title VI of P.L. 105-383. Provisions of this act authorize appropriations through NOAA for research, monitoring, education, and management activities to prevent, reduce, and control hypoxia. Under this legislation, an integrated Gulf of Mexico hypoxia assessment was completed in the late 1990s. In 2004, Title I of P.L. 108-456, the Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Amendments Act of 2004, expanded this authority and reauthorized appropriations through FY2008. Legislation has been introduced in the 110th Congress to reauthorize and amend the Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act.
As knowledge and understanding have increased concerning the possible impacts of hypoxia, congressional interest in monitoring and addressing the problem has grown. The issue of hypoxia is seen as a search for (1) increased scientific knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon, as well as (2) cost-effective actions that might diminish the size of hypoxic areas by changing practices that promote their growth and development. This report presents an overview of the causes of hypoxia, the U.S. areas of most concern, federal legislation, and relevant federal research programs. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R41562 | crs_R41562_0 | Poor performance under a federal contract can have immediate consequences for contractors, who could potentially be denied award or incentive fees, required to pay damages, or terminated for default. In addition, it can affect their ability to obtain future contracts because federal law generally requires agencies to evaluate contractor's "past performance" and consider past performance information when making source selection decisions in negotiated procurements and when determining whether prospective contractors are "responsible." "Past performance" refers to contractors' performance on "active and physically completed contracts" and certain orders under existing contracts. Reports alleging that some contractors received new contracts despite allegedly deficient performance under prior or current contracts have recently prompted interest in the role that evaluations of past performance play in federal contracting, as well as attempts by some Members of Congress and the Obama Administration to improve agencies' compilation and use of past performance evaluations. The 112 th Congress enacted legislation that requires the Department of Defense (DOD) ( P.L. 112-81 ) and the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council ( P.L. 112-239 ) to develop "strateg[ies] for ensuring" that past performance reports are timely, accurate and complete; and would give contractors 14 days to comment on, rebut, or supplement past performance reports. The 113 th Congress also enacted legislation addressing certain issues relating to past performance, although such legislation was narrower in scope than that enacted in the 112 th Congress. In addition, the Obama Administration updated the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in 2013 to standardize the factors used in evaluating contractors' performance, and require that all past performance information be entered into the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). It made further updates to the FAR in 2014 to implement P.L. 112-81 and P.L. 112-239 . The evaluation and any response from the contractor should be marked "source selection information" and submitted to the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS), from which it is "automatically transmitted" to the Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS). A negotiated procurement is one in which the contract is awarded to the vendor whose proposal represents the "best value" for the government. Congress and the executive branch required agencies to consider past performance in source selection decisions in the hope that the government would obtain better performance under its contracts—and better value for its procurement dollars—by shifting the basis of its source selection decisions. Past Performance as an Evaluation Factor
Subpart 15.3 of the FAR currently requires agencies to consider past performance or some other non-cost evaluation factor in all procurements, although the requirements differ somewhat depending upon the value of the procurement:
With procurements valued at or below the simplified acquisition threshold (generally $150,000) , agencies must consider past performance or some other non-cost evaluation factor (e.g., technical excellence, management capability). Agencies are required to consider cost/price and the quality of the product or service, along with past performance, in all negotiated procurements. Agencies are prohibited from awarding a contract to a contractor who has not been determined to be affirmatively responsible. Consideration of this information would arguably be most helpful in assessing responsibility criteria other than whether the contractor possesses a satisfactory performance record (e.g., whether the contractor has a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics). Debarment and Suspension Under the FAR
Agencies also have legal authority under Subpart 9.4 of the FAR to debar or suspend contractors for willful failure to perform under a contract or a history of failure to perform. | Poor performance under a federal contract can have immediate consequences for contractors, who could be denied award or incentive fees, required to pay damages, or terminated for default. In addition, it could affect their ability to obtain future contracts because federal law generally requires agencies to evaluate contractors' past performance and consider past performance information when making source selection decisions in negotiated procurements and determining whether prospective contractors are "responsible." "Past performance" refers to performance on "active and physically completed contracts" and certain orders under existing contracts.
Federal law generally requires agencies to evaluate and document contractor performance on contracts or orders whose value exceeds the simplified acquisition threshold (generally $150,000). The evaluation must generally address the quality of the product or service supplied by the contractor, its efforts to control costs, its timeliness and compliance with schedules, its conduct of management or business relations, its performance in subcontracting with small businesses, and other applicable factors (e.g., tax delinquency). The evaluation and any contractor response comprise the past performance information that is stored in government databases (e.g., Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS), Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS)) and may be used in future source selection decisions.
Federal law also generally requires agencies to consider contractors' past performance when making source selection decisions in negotiated procurements whose value exceeds the simplified acquisition threshold. In a negotiated procurement, the contract is awarded to the offeror whose proposal represents the "best value" for the government based on various factors identified in the solicitation. These factors typically must include price and past performance. However, other factors may be considered, and procuring agencies determine the weight given to various factors.
Additionally, agencies are required by law to consider whether the contractor has a "satisfactory performance record" when determining whether the contractor is sufficiently "responsible" to be awarded a federal contract. Agencies generally cannot award a contract without determining that the contractor is "responsible." While agencies are generally prohibited from repeatedly finding a contractor nonresponsible based upon the same deficient past performance, they may debar or suspend contractors for willful failure to perform under a contract or contracts, or for a history of failure to perform or of unsatisfactory performance of a contract or contracts.
Reports alleging that contractors received new contracts or orders despite poor performance under prior ones have recently prompted interest in the role that evaluations of past performance play in contracting, as well as attempts by some Members of Congress and the Obama Administration to strengthen requirements pertaining to performance evaluations. The 112th Congress enacted legislation that requires the Department of Defense (P.L. 112-81) and the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (P.L. 112-239) to develop "strateg[ies] for ensuring" that past performance reports are timely, accurate and complete; and give contractors 14 days to comment on, rebut, or supplement past performance reports. The 113th Congress also enacted legislation addressing certain issues relating to past performance (P.L. 113-6, P.L. 113-291), although this legislation was narrower in scope than that enacted by the 112th Congress. In addition, the Obama Administration updated the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in 2013 to standardize the factors used in evaluating contractors' performance, and require that all past performance information be entered into the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). It made further updates to the FAR in 2014 to implement P.L. 112-81 and P.L. 112-239. |
crs_R40987 | crs_R40987_0 | Three primary categories of disadvantaged small businesses are currently eligible for various contracting programs under federal law: (1) small businesses participating in the Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program (commonly known as the 8(a) Program) (8(a) participants); (2) "small disadvantaged businesses" (SDBs); and (3) "disadvantaged business enterprises" (DBEs). These firms are characterized as "disadvantaged" because they are at least 51% unconditionally owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals or groups. Members of certain racial and ethnic groups are presumed to be disadvantaged, and other individuals can prove personal disadvantage by a preponderance of the evidence. Veterans and persons with disabilities are not presumed to be disadvantaged for purposes of these programs. Contracting opportunities for disadvantaged small businesses are perennially of interest to the Members and committees of Congress because of small businesses' widely asserted role in job creation. Also, there has been concern that the recession of 2007-2009 disproportionately affected disadvantaged small businesses, and that such businesses have been slow to recover. A separate report, CRS Report R43573, Federal Contracting and Subcontracting with Small Businesses: Legislation in the 113th Congress , by [author name scrubbed], discusses recently enacted and introduced legislation pertaining to the 8(a) and SDB programs. Implemented by the SBA under the authority of Sections 7(j) and 8(a) of the Small Business Act, as amended, this program is commonly known as the 8(a) Program, and participants in it are often called 8(a) participants or 8(a) firms. Additionally, socially and economically disadvantaged individuals may confer eligibility for the 8(a) Program upon only one firm over their lives. In particular, mentors and protégés may form joint ventures that could qualify as "small" for purposes of government procurements, including sole-source awards under Section 8(a). However, most federal programs for SDB prime contractors have been discontinued, with only the government-wide and agency-specific goals for the percentage of federal contract and/or subcontract dollars awarded to SDBs each year remaining. In the few cases where SDB certification is currently required, 8(a) participants are deemed to be certified, and other firms may be certified by the agency conducting the procurement, private certifying entities, or state and local governments. Firms do not need to be certified SDBs to qualify for federal programs for subcontractors. Federal agencies may also consider the extent of subcontracting with SDBs in determining to whom to award a contract, or give contractors "monetary incentives" to subcontract with SDBs. Firms that have been certified as DBEs generally remain certified "until and unless" the funding recipient removes their certification, in whole or in part, using procedures spelled out in federal regulation. Assuming firms must be recertified, there is no apparent limit on the number of times they may be recertified. The federal government has as a goal that 10% of such funds be awarded to DBEs. Funding recipients also generally set goals for DBE participation overall and on individual contracts that have the possibility of subcontracting. Similarly, in finding that the program was narrowly tailored to meet the government's interests, the court noted (1) that goals for contracting with small disadvantaged businesses are purely aspirational, and there are no penalties for failing to meet them; (2) the nine-year limits on program participation for individual owners and firms; and (3) that SBA may not accept a requirement for the 8(a) Program if it determines that doing so will have an adverse effect on another small business or group of small businesses. | Three primary categories of "disadvantaged" small businesses are currently eligible for various contracting programs under federal law: (1) small businesses participating in the Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program (commonly known as the 8(a) Program) (8(a) participants); (2) "small disadvantaged businesses" (SDBs); and (3) "disadvantaged business enterprises" (DBEs). All programs are based in statute. Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act authorizes the 8(a) Program; Section 8(d) of the Small Business Act, the SDB program; and various transportation statutes, the DBE program. However, many of the specific requirements pertaining to these programs derive from agency regulations.
8(a) firms, SDBs, and DBEs are all characterized as "disadvantaged" because they are at least 51% owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals or groups. However, social and economic disadvantage is defined somewhat differently for each program. Members of certain racial and ethnic groups are presumed to be socially disadvantaged for purposes of the 8(a) and SDB programs, while women are also presumed to be socially disadvantaged for purposes of the DBE program. Similarly, individuals' net worth must be $250,000 or less for entry into the 8(a) Program, while net worth can be as high as $750,000 for newly designated SDBs and $1.32 million for newly designated DBEs.
The programs for the various types of firms also differ in their operation. The 8(a) Program is open only to firms that have been certified by SBA, and firms and individual owners may generally participate in the 8(a) Program for a maximum of nine years. 8(a) participants are eligible for set-aside or sole-source contracts, as well as other assistance from the SBA. All 8(a) firms qualify as SDBs. Non-8(a) firms must be certified as SDBs by procuring agencies, private certifying entities, or state or local governments to qualify for federal programs for SDB prime contractors, although they may self-certify for similar programs for SDB subcontractors. SDB certification, when required, generally lasts three years, but could last longer and apparently be renewed. There are government-wide and agency-specific goals for the percentage of federal contract and subcontract dollars awarded to SDBs. Additionally, certain prime contractors must have "plans" for subcontracting with SDBs as terms of their contracts. Agencies may also use past performance in subcontracting with SDBs as an evaluation factor in source selection decisions, or give prime contractors "monetary incentives" for subcontracting with SDBs. DBEs must be certified by the state of the funding recipient. Certifications generally last "until and unless revoked," and there is no apparent limit on the number of times firms may be recertified. There is a national goal that 10% of federal funding for certain transportation-related projects be awarded to DBE contractors and subcontractors. Funding recipients must generally set similar goals, including on individual contracts.
Contracting opportunities for disadvantaged small businesses are perennially of interest to the Members and committees of Congress because of small businesses' widely asserted role in job creation. Also, there has recently been concern that the recession of 2007-2009 disproportionately affected disadvantaged small businesses, and that such businesses have been slow to recover. A separate report, CRS Report R43573, Federal Contracting and Subcontracting with Small Businesses: Legislation in the 113th Congress, by [author name scrubbed], discusses recently enacted and introduced legislation pertaining to the 8(a) and SDB programs. |
crs_R43145 | crs_R43145_0 | Overview of Family-Based Immigration
The United States has long distinguished settlement or permanent immigration from temporary immigration. Family reunification, which has long been a key principle underlying U.S. immigration policy, is embodied in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended (INA), which specifies five categories of family-based immigrants. These include the numerically unlimited category of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (spouses, minor children, and parents) and four numerically limited family preference categories. The latter vary according to individual characteristics such as the citizenship status of the petitioning U.S.-based relative, and the age, family relationship, and marital status of the prospective immigrant. Consequently, a visa queue has accumulated with roughly 4 million persons who qualify as family-based immigrants under the INA but who must wait for a numerically limited visa to immigrate to the United States. It outlines a brief history of U.S. family-based immigration policies, discusses current law governing family-based immigration, and summarizes recommendations made by previous congressionally mandated commissions charged with evaluating immigration policy. Given that continuity in immigration policy, earlier recommendations for revising family-based immigration policy to address certain perennial issues—in particular, the large "visa queue" of prospective family-based immigrants awaiting a numerically limited visa, and the high proportion of immigrants who enter based upon family ties—still have relevance. In FY2016, a total of 804,793 family-based immigrants made up just over two-thirds (68%) of all 1,183,505 new LPRs. In FY2016, derivative immigrants represented 9% of all family-based immigration, 43% of all other immigrant categories, and 20% of total immigration. About half of all immediate relatives of U.S. citizens adjusted their status from within the United States over this period, while most family-based preference category immigrants, particularly in recent years, were admitted from abroad. Supply-Demand Imbalance for U.S. Lawful Permanent Residence
Each year, the number of foreign nationals petitioning for LPR status through family-sponsored preferences exceeds the number of immigrants that can be admitted to the United States according to current law. As such, the visa queue constitutes not a backlog of petitions to be processed but, rather, the number of persons approved for visas that are not yet available due to the numerical limits enumerated in the INA. DOS adjusts these cut-off dates each month based on several variables, such as the number of visas used to that point, the projected demand for visas, and the number of visas remaining under the annual numerical limit for that country and/or preference category. Applicants with priority dates earlier than the cut-off dates in the Visa Bulletin are currently being processed. Countries that send many immigrants to the United States, such as China, India, Mexico, and the Philippines, currently have above-average waiting times. Broader Immigration Questions
Long-standing debates over the level of annual permanent immigration have regularly placed scrutiny on family-based immigration and revived debates over whether its current proportion of total lawful permanent immigration is appropriate. The Hesburgh Commission recommended more flexible family-based immigration numerical limits. A central argument for expanding family-based immigration is to reduce the current visa queue of roughly 4 million persons with approved immigration petitions who must wait years to receive a visa to immigrate. Selected Legislative Activity
Legislative options to address selected stand-alone policy issues surrounding family-based immigration—the supply-demand imbalance for U.S. lawful permanent residence, the per-country ceilings, limitations on foreign nationals who wish to visit U.S.-based relatives, the impetus to violate U.S. immigration laws, aging out of certain legal status categories, the marriage timing of immigrant children, and policies toward unaccompanied alien children—have been debated by scholars and policymakers as well as addressed in a range of legislative proposals. Examples of recent legislative proposals that focus on altering the level of permanent immigration include S. 744 , the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act introduced in the 113 th Congress and S. 1720 , the Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy (RAISE) Act introduced in the 115 th Congress. | Family reunification has historically been a key principle underlying U.S. immigration policy. It is embodied in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which specifies numerical limits for five family-based immigration categories, as well as a per-country limit on total family-based immigration. The five categories include immediate relatives (spouses, minor unmarried children, and parents) of U.S. citizens and four other family-based categories that vary according to individual characteristics such as the legal status of the petitioning U.S.-based relative, and the age, family relationship, and marital status of the prospective immigrant.
Of the 1,183,505 foreign nationals admitted to the United States in FY2016 as lawful permanent residents (LPRs), 804,793, or 68%, were admitted on the basis of family ties. Of the family-based immigrants admitted in FY2016, 70% were admitted as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. Many of the 1,183,505 immigrants were initially admitted on a nonimmigrant (temporary) visa and became immigrants by converting or "adjusting" their status to a lawful permanent resident. The proportion of family-based immigrants who adjusted their immigration status while residing in the United States (34%) was substantially less than that of family-based immigrants who had their immigration petitions processed while living abroad (66%), although such percentages varied considerably among the five family-based immigration categories.
Since FY2000, increasing numbers of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens have accounted for the growth in family-based immigration. In FY2016, related (derivative) immigrants who accompanied or later followed principal (qualifying) immigrants accounted for 9% of all family-based immigration. In recent years, Mexico, the Philippines, China, India, and the Dominican Republic have sent the most family-based immigrants to the United States.
Each year, the number of foreign nationals petitioning for LPR status through family-sponsored preference categories exceeds the numerical limits of legal immigrant visas. As a result, a visa queue has accumulated of foreign nationals who qualify as immigrants under the INA but who must wait for a visa to immigrate to the United States. The visa queue is not a processing backlog but, rather, the number of persons approved for visas not yet available due to INA-specified numerical limits. As of November 1, 2017, the visa queue numbered 3.95 million persons.
Every month, the Department of State (DOS) issues its Visa Bulletin, which lists "cut-off dates" for each numerically limited family-based immigration category. Cut-off dates indicate when petitions that are currently being processed for a numerically limited visa were initially approved. For most countries, cut-off dates range between 23 months and 13.5 years ago. For countries that send the most immigrants, the range expands to between 2 and 23 years ago.
Long-standing debates over the level of annual permanent immigration regularly place scrutiny on family-based immigration and revive debates over whether its current proportion of total lawful permanent immigration is appropriate. Proposals to overhaul family-based immigration were made by two congressionally mandated commissions in 1980 and 1995-1997. More recent legislative proposals to revise family-based immigration include S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act in the 113th Congress and S. 1720, the Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy (RAISE) Act in the 115th Congress.
Those who favor expanding family-based immigration by increasing the annual numeric limits point to the visa queue of approved prospective immigrants who must wait years separated from their U.S.-based family members until they receive a visa. Others question whether the United States has an obligation to reconstitute families of immigrants beyond their nuclear families and favor reducing permanent immigration by eliminating certain family-based preference categories. Arguments favoring restricting certain categories of family-based immigration reiterate earlier recommendations made by congressionally mandated immigration reform commissions. |
crs_R43364 | crs_R43364_0 | Traditional electronic banking products include credit cards and debit cards. Debit cards are provided primarily by depository institutions (banks and credit unions), but any institution that provides checking account services may provide debit cards. Hence, the loss of fee income increases as well as other regulatory requirements may increase the difficulty of providing retail payment services at little or no cost to customers. There is congressional interest in how the costs and availability of consumer retail payments services provided primarily by depository institutions have changed following the passage of recent legislative actions, namely the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act; P.L. 111-24 ) and Section 920 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203 ), which is known as the Durbin Amendment. Any one or all of the factors listed above that occurred after 2007 may have prompted changes in the consumer retail payment services market, making it difficult to determine which one had the greatest influence on market outcomes. This report recounts developments beginning in 2006 in the markets for credit cards and checking account services delivered primarily by depository institutions. Preliminary evidence indicates some recent segmentation of the consumer retail payments market. Customers with the ability to repay short-term loans in a timely manner or maintain sufficient deposit balances may notice little change in cost or availability of traditional retail payment services. Some depository institutions, however, are offering this market segment greater payment services characterized by less credit or nonpayment risks, such as direct deposit cash advances and prepayment cards. Given the historically and persistently low (prime) interest rate environment coupled with a decline in demand for consumer loans, banks have been looking for lending opportunities that would allow them to charge higher interest rates. Generally speaking, it is difficult to attribute outcomes in the credit card market solely to either the 2007-2009 U.S. recession or to the CARD Act, which simultaneously affected both the demand for and supply of revolving credit. Recent developments in both the cost and availability of checking account services are examined in this section because overdraft and debit card fees are tied to the delivery of this financial product to customers. In addition to higher fees, various checking account services reportedly became less available to customers as they become more costly to service. The financial services associated with serving this market segment may have one or more of the following characteristics:
the fees are required to be paid up front; the costs of a financial product, such as a short-term cash advance, are expensive relative to a loan arrangement expected to last for a year or longer; any information pertaining to customer payment history is unlikely to be reported to any credit bureau; a formal or long-term relationship with a traditional depository institution is not required to obtain alternative financial services. | Congressional interest in the performance of the credit and debit card (checking account services) markets and how recent developments are affecting customers is growing. This report discusses these developments and examines the costs and availability of consumer retail payments services, particularly those provided by depository institutions, since the recent recession and subsequent legislative actions.
Consumer retail payment services include products such as credit cards, cash advances, checking accounts, debit cards, and prepayment cards. Some depository institutions have increased fees and decreased availability of these services; many others are considering the best way to cover rising costs to provide these services without alienating customers. Recent declines in the demand for loans, a historically and persistently low interest rate environment, higher capital requirements, and the existence of potential profit opportunities in non-traditional banking markets may have motivated these reactions. In addition, passage of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act; P.L. 111-24) and Section 920 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203), which is known as the Durbin Amendment, placed limitations on fee income for credit cards and debit cards, respectively.
Determining the extent to which one or all of these factors have influenced changes in the consumer retail payment services markets, however, is challenging. Market outcomes are often influenced by multiple simultaneous or overlapping events, thus making it difficult to attribute the reactions of financial service providers and their customers solely to any one particular factor. Any one or all of the factors listed above that occurred after 2007 may have driven changes in the costs or availability of consumer retail payment services, making it difficult to determine which one had the greatest influence on market outcomes.
Depository institutions reduced credit card loan limits during the recent recession, but those limits have since been rising. Customers with impaired credit, however, have seen increases in credit card rates and reduced access to this product. Many large depository institutions have also discontinued debit card rewards programs and "free" checking. Many small financial institutions have not increased checking account fees as aggressively, but many have increased fees on less frequently used financial services and are considering further fee increases to cover anticipated higher costs. The consumer retail payment services market may also be growing more bifurcated. For example, customers more likely to repay obligations or maintain high checking account balances may experience few changes in costs or availability of traditional payments services. At the same time, customers likely to face higher costs to use or limited access to traditional payment services may increase their usage of direct deposit cash advances and prepayment cards, as depository institutions make these options increasingly available to this market segment. |
crs_RL33303 | crs_RL33303_0 | Many questions have been raised about how to design uniform policies and controls for SBU information. More recently, some researchers have initiated voluntary controls on the conduct and/or publication of sensitive research in biological sciences fields that might assist terrorists. To prevent potential use of sensitive information by terrorists, in March 2002, the White House issued the so-called "Card memo," which required agencies to examine their information holdings and policies; withhold information, including "sensitive but unclassified" information; and use FOIA exemptions if there was a sound legal basis to do so. The Freedom of Information Act Guide, 2004 , explained how an agency's ability to restrict the release of "sensitive" information via FOIA would be broadened; and, citing the September 11, 2001, attacks, the passage of P.L. In a related development, on December 16, 2005, the President issued a memorandum to federal agencies, "Guidelines and Requirements in Support of the Information Sharing Environment," that included requiring agencies to standardize procedures "for designating, marking, and handling SBU information ... across the Federal Government" in order to promote both appropriate, consistent safeguarding and sharing of information. In November 2006, the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment issued a report entitled, Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan . 107-347 updated NIST's mission in light of new understandings relating to information security and required NIST, in consultation with other agencies, including OMB, the National Security Agency, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the DHS, to develop risk-based standards to categorize "the criticality and sensitivity of agency information according to information security control objectives and across a range of risk levels" and to develop minimum information security requirements for each information category. It is likely that some scientists will object to guidelines requiring prepublication review. Nongovernmental professional groups have explored the use of codes of conduct or self-policing policies for research topics and publications. Congressional action in 2004 tightened controls on some geospatial information. During the 109 th Congress, H.R. These criticisms, which are discussed next, focus on allegations that some controls can exacerbate vulnerability or stifle scientific research and technological innovation; vagaries in nondisclosure requirements; the relationship of SBU to FOIA; inconsistency in agencies' definitions of and processes to identify SBU information; developing a standard definition of SBU information; monitoring agency use of risk-based standards for SBU; and recommendations for better governance of SBU information procedures. (For additional information, see a previous section of this report entitled " Summary of Federal Policies to Classify or Control Scientific and Technical Information ." As noted, the CSA specified it "was not to be construed to constitute authority to withhold information sought pursuant to the FOIA, or to authorize any federal agency to limit, restrict, regulate, or control, among other actions, the disclosure, use, transfer, or sale of any information disclosable under the FOIA...." According to the DOJ's Freedom of Information Act Guide, May 2004, SBU and SHSI are not to be exempt from disclosure under FOIA, except for CII (which is protected pursuant to P.L. Agencies also differ on how requests to release information under FOIA will be handled. In 2005 guidance, CDC said its SBU information is information that is exempt from disclosure under FOIA. One option for policymakers may be to consider limiting the number of persons who can designate information as SBU. Agencies That Use the Definition of "Sensitive" as Found in the Computer Security Act (CSA)
Some agencies use the CSA definition of sensitive, which identifies information based on its content, not on the risk of release. Only those who have a "need to know" are to have access to SSI. | Providing access to scientific and technical information (S&T) for legitimate uses while protecting it from potential terrorists poses difficult policy choices. Federally funded, extramural academic research is to be "classified" if it poses a security threat; otherwise, it is to be "unrestricted." Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, controls increasingly have been placed on some unclassified research and S&T information, including that used to inform decision making and citizen oversight. These controls include "sensitive but unclassified" (SBU) labels; restrictive contract clauses; visa controls; controlled laboratories; and wider legal restrictions on access to some federal biological, transportation, critical infrastructure, geospatial, environmental impact, and nuclear information. Some professional groups have supported voluntary controls on the conduct or publication of sensitive research. Federal agencies do not have uniform definitions of SBU or consistent policies to safeguard or release it, raising questions about how to identify SBU information, especially S&T information; how to keep it from terrorists, while allowing access for those who need to use it; and how to develop uniform nondisclosure policies and penalties. On December 16, 2005, President Bush instructed federal agencies to standardize procedures to designate, mark, and handle SBU information, and to forward recommendations for government-wide standards to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan, sent to Congress in November 2006, reports that final action will occur during the lst quarter of CY2006.
Following the 2001 terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration issued guidance that reversed the Clinton Administration's "presumption of disclosure" approach to releasing information under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and cautioned agencies to consider withholding SBU information if there was a "sound legal basis" to do so. Some agencies contend that SBU information is exempt from disclosure under FOIA, even though such information per se is not exempt under FOIA. The 2002 enactment of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) rendered moot the definition of SBU that some agencies had used since the passage of the Computer Security Act of 1987, which identified sensitive information by content. FISMA requires agencies to categorize the criticality and sensitivity of all information according to the security control objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability across a range of risk levels and to use safeguards based on risk of release. Many federal agencies have not yet fully implemented these new procedures. During the 109th Congress, P.L. 109-90 and P.L. 109-295 focused on management, oversight, and appropriate use of the sensitive security information (SSI) category. Legislative proposals focused on standardizing concepts of "sensitive" information; modifying penalties for disclosure; and clarifying FOIA. During the 110th Congress, additional topics likely to be controversial include limiting the number of persons who can designate SBU; widening the use of risk-based approaches to control; centralizing review, handling, and appeals; and evaluating the impact of federal policies on nongovernmental professional groups' prepublication review and self-policing of sensitive research. This report will be updated as necessary. |
crs_R41225 | crs_R41225_0 | Introduction
In the 111 th Congress, legislation was introduced that sought to clarify the scope of the Clean Water Act (CWA) in the wake of two Supreme Court decisions that interpreted the law's jurisdiction more narrowly than prior case law. The Court's narrow interpretation involved jurisdiction over some geographically isolated wetlands, intermittent streams, and other waters. The 111 th Congress legislation introduced in response to these rulings was S. 787 (the Clean Water Restoration Act), introduced by Senator Feingold and approved, with amendments, by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee in June 2009, and H.R. 5088 (America's Commitment to Clean Water Act), introduced by Representative Oberstar on April 21, 2010. Proponents of the legislation contended that the Court's rulings in these cases, and subsequent regulatory guidance issued by the Corps and EPA in 2003, 2007, and 2008, have unsettled several decades' worth of case law, misreading or ignoring congressional intent, and thus reinterpreting and narrowing the jurisdictional scope of the act. Supporters stated that the intention of the legislation was to return to the CWA regulatory jurisdiction that was recognized before the Court's 2001 and 2006 rulings. Both S. 787 and H.R. On the other hand, critics contended that the bills would greatly expand federal regulatory jurisdiction of the CWA over the pre- SWANCC interpretation, not simply reaffirm congressional intent. They were concerned that the proposed definition of "waters of the United States" was ambiguous, and that the changes proposed by the bills would have the potential to be interpreted far more broadly than what was understood to be jurisdictional before 2001—thus causing more uncertainty, rather than clarifying the issue. Like the Senate committee bill, it would have affected the key CWA phrase which sets the act's reach. 5088 would have inserted a longer definition based closely on existing regulatory language of the Corps and EPA, but with some modifications (see Table A-1 which compares existing regulatory text and proposed statutory text). 5088 would have defined the term "waters of the United States" in the CWA as including
(i) all waters that are currently used, were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(ii) all interstate and international waters, including interstate and international wetlands;
(iii) all other waters, including intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation, or destruction of which does or would affect interstate or foreign commerce, the obligations of the United States under a treaty, or the territory or other property belonging to the United States;
(iv) all impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United States under this paragraph;
(v) tributaries of waters identified in clauses (i) through (iv);
(vi) the territorial seas; and
(vii) waters, including wetlands, adjacent to waters identified in clauses (i) through (vi). But between the proponents and critics, there was wide disagreement whether the new statutory definition proposed in either bill, coupled with removing the word "navigable" from current law and other changes, would achieve the objective of clarity and certainty. Proponents argued that the bills would restore the original intent of Congress when it enacted the Clean Water Act, which the Court misread, they contended. H.R. 5088 also were concerned that the Court's SWANCC and Rapanos rulings, while decided on statutory grounds, raised related questions about the outer limits of Congress's power to regulate waters with little or no connection to traditional navigable waters under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. There was no further legislative action on either bill during the 111 th Congress. In light of the widely differing views of proponents and opponents, future prospects for similar legislation are highly uncertain. The legal and policy questions associated with the SWANCC and Rapanos cases—concerning the outer geographic limit of CWA jurisdiction and the consequences of restricting that scope—have challenged regulators, landowners and developers, policymakers, and courts for more than 35 years. | In the 111th Congress, legislation was introduced that sought to clarify the scope of the Clean Water Act (CWA) in the wake of Supreme Court decisions in 2001 and 2006 that interpreted the law's jurisdiction more narrowly than prior case law. The Court's narrow interpretation involved jurisdiction over some geographically isolated wetlands, intermittent streams, and other waters. The two cases are Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC) and Rapanos v. United States.
Bills to nullify the Court's rulings have been introduced repeatedly since the 107th Congress, but none had advanced until the 111th Congress. In June 2009, a Senate committee approved S. 787, the Clean Water Restoration Act. Companion legislation in the House, H.R. 5088 (America's Commitment to Clean Water Act), was introduced in April 2010. No further legislative action occurred on either bill.
Under current law, the key CWA phrase which sets the act's reach is the phrase "navigable waters," defined to mean "the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." Proponents of the current legislation contend that the Court misread Congress's intent when it enacted the CWA, and consequently the Court's ruling unduly restricted the scope of the act's water quality protections. Both S. 787 and H.R. 5088 would have replaced the phrase "navigable waters" in the CWA with "waters of the United States" and would have installed a definition of "waters of the United States," not found in the law now. The bills differed in how they would define the phrase. The Senate committee bill included a definition drawn from one paragraph of existing federal regulatory text, while H.R. 5088 included a longer definition based on the same regulatory language, but with some modifications. Both bills also included provisions affirming the constitutional basis for the act's jurisdiction. These provisions were intended to address the concern that the Court's rulings, while decided on statutory grounds, raised related questions about the outer limits of Congress's power to regulate waters with little or no connection to traditional navigable waters under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
Proponents of the legislation, including many states and environmental advocacy groups, contended that the Court's ruling in these cases, and subsequent regulatory guidance by federal agencies, have unsettled several decades' worth of case law, misreading or ignoring congressional intent, and thus reinterpreting and narrowing the jurisdictional scope of the act. Supporters said that the intention was to return to the CWA regulatory jurisdiction that prevailed before the Court's rulings. On the other hand, critics, including many industry groups and development and home builder organizations, contended that the legislation would greatly expand federal regulatory jurisdiction of the CWA beyond interpretations that existed before the two Supreme Court rulings, not simply reaffirm congressional intent. They were concerned that the legislation, were it enacted, had the potential to be interpreted far more broadly than what was previously understood to be jurisdictional—thus causing more uncertainty, rather than clarifying the issue.
Between proponents and critics, there was wide disagreement whether the new statutory definition proposed in either bill, coupled with other changes, would achieve the objective of clarity and certainty that has been broadly desired. In light of the differing views on the issues, future prospects for similar legislation in the 112th Congress are highly uncertain. The legal and policy questions associated with the SWANCC and Rapanos cases—concerning the outer geographic limits of CWA jurisdiction and consequences of restricting that scope—have challenged regulators, landowners and developers, and policymakers for more than 35 years. |
crs_RL32567 | crs_RL32567_0 | Introduction
Allegations of abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq raisequestions about the applicability of the law of war to interrogations for military intelligencepurposes. Particular issues involve the level of protection to which the detainees are entitled underthe Geneva Conventions of 1949. After photos of prisoner abuse became public, the DefenseDepartment (DOD) released a series of documents disclosing policy deliberations about appropriatetechniques for interrogating persons the Administration had deemed to be unprotected by the GenevaConventions with respect to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). (1) Investigations related to theallegations at Abu Ghraib revealed that some of the techniques discussed for "unlawful combatants"had come into use in Iraq, although none of the prisoners there was deemed to be an unlawfulcombatant. This report outlines the provisions of the Conventions as they apply to prisoners of war andto civilians, and the minimum level of protection offered by Common Article 3 of the GenevaConventions. The report analyzes key terms that govern the treatment of prisoners with respect tointerrogation, which include torture, coercion, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Finally,the report discusses and analyzes the various interrogation techniques approved or considered foruse during interrogations of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. 14, respect for the person of the prisoner of war. | Allegations of abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq haveraised questions about the applicability of the law of war to interrogations for military intelligencepurposes. Particular issues involve the level of protection to which the detainees are entitled underthe Geneva Conventions of 1949, whether as prisoners of war or civilian "protected persons," orunder some other status. After photos of prisoner abuse became public, the Defense Department(DOD) released a series of internal documents disclosing policy deliberations about the appropriatetechniques for interrogating persons the Administration had deemed to be "unlawful combatants"and who resisted the standard methods of questioning detainees. Investigations related to theallegations at Abu Ghraib revealed that some of the techniques discussed for "unlawful combatants"had come into use in Iraq, although none of the prisoners there was deemed to be an unlawfulcombatant.
This report outlines the provisions of the Conventions as they apply to prisoners of war andto civilians, and the minimum level of protection offered by Common Article 3 of the GenevaConventions. There follows an analysis of key terms that set the standards for the treatment ofprisoners that are especially relevant to interrogation, including torture, coercion, and cruel, inhumanand degrading treatment, with reference to some historical war crimes cases and cases involving thetreatment of persons suspected of engaging in terrorism. Finally, the report discusses and analyzessome of the various interrogation techniques approved or considered for use during interrogationsof prisoners at Abu Ghraib. |
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