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crs_R41977 | crs_R41977_0 | Introduction
On October 5, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Golan v. Holde r, a case considering whether Congress had the power under the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution to grant copyright protection to creative works that have already entered the public domain. In 1994, Congress enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) of 1994; Section 514 of the URAA "restored" copyright protection to certain foreign works that had been in the U.S. public domain, in order to bring the United States into compliance with the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886, which the United States had joined in 1989. In 2001, a group of artists, performers, businesses, teachers, publishers, archivists, and movie distributors who had depended on artistic works in the public domain for their livelihoods, filed a lawsuit against the federal government challenging the constitutionality of the URAA. The U.S. Court of Appeals rejected these constitutional arguments in two separate rulings, holding that § 514 of the URAA was a valid exercise of Congress's power and that it did not violate the plaintiffs' free speech rights because the law is a content-neutral regulation of speech that was narrowly tailored to serve a substantial or important governmental interest—securing copyright protection for American works in foreign countries, as many of the United States' trading partners (who were signatories to the Berne Convention) had made clear that they would restore American copyrights that were in their public domain only if the United States restored foreign copyrights. Does the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution prohibit Congress from taking works out of the public domain? Does Section 514 of the URAA violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution? According to the former Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters, the effect of § 514 of the URAA was to remove millions of foreign works from the public domain. Legal Analysis of Golan v. Holder
Factual Background
Similar to the plaintiffs in Eldred, the plaintiffs in Golan v. Holder are orchestra conductors, educators, performers, publishers, film archivists, and motion picture distributors who rely on the free availability of artistic works in the public domain for their livelihoods. A decision in Golan v. Holder is expected by the end of the Supreme Court's October 2011 term. | Golan v. Holder is a case that will be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court on October 5, 2011. The Court will consider whether Congress has the power to grant copyright protection to creative works that have already entered the public domain. At issue in Golan is the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) of 1994 that Congress passed in order to bring the United States into compliance with international agreements on intellectual property (IP). Section 514 of the URAA "restored" copyrights in certain foreign works that were previously in the public domain in the United States. After these works became protected by copyright as a result of URAA, anyone wishing to use them needs to seek prior permission from the copyright holders and also likely pay licensing fees. Although it is difficult to determine the exact number of foreign works that the URAA removed from the public domain, the former Register of Copyrights estimated that it may be in the millions.
A group of orchestra conductors, educators, performers, film archivists, and motion picture distributors, who had relied on the free and unrestricted availability of these artistic works in the public domain for their livelihoods, filed a lawsuit against the federal government challenging the constitutionality of the URAA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that § 514 of the URAA was within Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and that it did not violate the free speech and expression rights of the plaintiffs who had enjoyed freely using the foreign works that were in the U.S. public domain before the restoration of their copyright protection.
The Supreme Court's anticipated ruling in Golan v. Holder is expected to provide definitive answers to the following significant questions in copyright law: whether Congress is prohibited by the Copyright Clause from taking works out of the public domain, and whether § 514 of the URAA violates the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. |
crs_R42927 | crs_R42927_0 | First, American companies can use tax deferral and other techniques to avoid or delay taxes by moving profits out of high-tax countries (or out of the U.S.) and into low-tax countries with little corresponding change in business operations, a practice known as "profit shifting." Data on the activities of American based companies with overseas operations is analyzed to understand the degree to which, if any, profit shifting may be occurring. The analysis appears to show that American companies report earning profits in tax haven or tax preferred countries that, when compared to more traditional economies, appear to be disproportionate to hiring and capital investment in those countries. By all indicators examined in this report, profit shifting has generally trended upward overtime. For example, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations held a hearing in September 2012 on the methods companies use to shift profits and possible options for curbing such behavior. Profit shifting has also been the specific target of several bills that were introduced in the 112 th Congress ( H.R. The first group consists of the five countries commonly identified as being "tax preferred" or "tax haven" countries, and includes Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The second group, which provides a baseline for comparison, consists of the five more traditional economies. This group includes Australia, Canada, Germany, Mexico, and the United Kingdom. Two measures of the real economic presence of MNCs are considered. Where Profits Are Reported
Figure 1 displays the share of profits that foreign affiliates of American MNCs reported in the tax preferred and traditional country groups between 1999 and 2008. In the most recent data year available (2008), American MNCs reported earning 43% of their overseas profits in the country group comprised of Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. If companies are shifting real production and business activities, then it should be expected that the location of profits would change as well. In 2008, for example, American companies hired 40% of their foreign labor from and made 34% of their foreign investments in the country group containing Australia, Canada, Germany, Mexico and the United Kingdom. The two profit ratios in Figure 3 would appear to give an indication that the return to real business activities (hiring and investment) in the tax preferred countries are significantly higher than in the traditional economies. Profits Relative to GDP
Further indication of profit shifting is found from a comparison of the business profits reported by U.S. MNCs in the two country groups as a share of GDP. For example, in Bermuda, profits reported by U.S. MNCs affiliates have increased from 260% of GDP in 1999 to over 1000% of GDP in 2008. In Luxembourg, MNC's profits went from 19% of GDP in 1999 to 208% of GDP in 2008. Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland have seen a less dramatic, but still significant increase in profits as a share of GDP—from 5% in 1999 to 20% in 2008 in the case of the Netherlands, from 14% to 42% in the case of Ireland, and from 5% to 15% in the case of Switzerland. By reducing this discrepancy, the incentive to shift profits would be reduced as well. | This report uses data on the operations of U.S. multinational companies (MNCs) to examine the extent to which, if any, MNCs are moving profits out of high-tax countries (or out of the U.S.) and into low-tax countries with little corresponding change in business operations, a practice known as "profit shifting." To do this, the profits reported by American firms in two groups of countries are compared with measures of real economic activity in those locations. The first group consists of the five countries commonly identified as being "tax preferred" or "tax haven" countries, and includes Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The second group, which provides a baseline for comparison, consists of five more traditional economies. This group includes Australia, Canada, Germany, Mexico, and the United Kingdom.
Consistent with the findings of existing research, the analysis presented here appear to show that significant shares of profits are being reported in tax preferred countries and that these shares are disproportionate to the location of the firm's business activity as indicated by where they hire workers and make investments. For example, American companies reported earning 43% of overseas profits in Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in 2008, while hiring 4% of their foreign workforce and making 7% of their foreign investments in those economies. In comparison, the traditional economies of Australia, Canada, Germany, Mexico and the United Kingdom accounted for 14% of American MNCs overseas' profits, but 40% of foreign hired labor and 34% of foreign investment. This report also shows that the discrepancy between where profits are reported and where hiring and investment occurs, as examples of business activity, has increased over time.
Additional evidence that profit shifting has increased over time is found from a comparison of business profits with economic output (gross domestic product) in the two country groups. MNC profits as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) in the traditional economies averaged from 1% to 2% between 1999 and 2008, while their profits in the tax preferred countries profits averaged 33% of GDP in 2008, up from 27% in 1999. Individual countries within the tax preferred group displayed more dramatic increases in the ratio of profits to GDP. For example, profits reported in Bermuda have increased from 260% of that country's GDP in 1999 to over 1000% in 2008. In Luxembourg, American business profits went from 19% of that country's GDP in 1999 to 208% of GDP in 2008.
This report may be of interest to Members of Congress for at least four reasons. First, profit shifting has been the specific target of recent Congressional action, including a September 2012 hearing held by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, as well as several bills introduced in the 112th Congress. Second, anti-abuse provisions have been included in general tax reform proposals in the 112th Congress. Third, most general tax reform proposals would lower the top corporate rate which would diminish the incentive to shift profits. And fourth, to the extent that profit shifting is reduced, federal tax revenues would increase, although the net effect on federal tax revenues would depend on the existence and magnitude of offsetting revenue changes, which, in turn, would depend on the approach taken to curb profit shifting. |
crs_RL34492 | crs_RL34492_0 | Building upon the Clinger-Cohen Act, the E-Government Act serves as the primary legislative vehicle to guide evolving federal IT management practices and to promote initiatives to make government information and services available online. In doing so, it also represents a continuation of efforts to realize greater efficiencies and reduce redundancies through improved intergovernmental coordination, and by aligning IT investments. The law contains a variety of provisions related to federal government IT management, information security, and the provision of services and information electronically. One of the most recognized provisions involves the creation of an Office of Electronic Government (OEG) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The OEG is headed by an Administrator, who is responsible for carrying out a variety of information resources management (IRM) functions, as well as administering the interagency E-Government Fund authorized by the law. Shortly before the fifth anniversary of the passage of the E-Government Act, authorization of appropriations for several key provisions expired on September 30, 2007. Some of the activities and offices affected by the expiring authorizations include, but are not limited to, the General Services Administration (GSA) E-Government Fund (Sec. 101); the OMB Office of Electronic Government (Sec. However, the occasion to consider reauthorization of the E-Government Act provides Congress the opportunity to assess the results of federal e-government initiatives since 2002, consider how they have affected the administration of government, and decide what changes, if any, are necessary. S. 2321 would amend and reauthorize appropriations for the E-Government Act of 2002. A comparable bill has not been introduced in the House. The activities covered by this section include those related to the operation of the federal Internet portal (USA.gov); activities related to the operation of an online repository of federally funded research and development; GSA efforts to study and enhance the use of community centers to provide computer and Internet access to the public; GSA efforts to develop and maintain common protocols for geographic information systems; the Federal Information Security Management Act; NIST responsibilities for standards to protect federal information systems; the Information Technology Exchange Program; the E-Government Fund; and to carry out activities related to Title I and II of the E-Government Act that are not otherwise specifically provided for. Related Issues for Congress
In considering whether to reauthorize the E-Government Act, Congress may also wish to consider a number of other issues related to the implementation and oversight of the E-Government Act, and e-government initiatives generally. Cross Agency Funding and the Role of the E-Government Fund
The problem of cross agency funding highlights the clash between the horizontal nature of government-wide e-government initiatives and the vertical organization of government. Although the E-Government Act authorized a significant sum that can be spent on e-government initiatives in the form of the E-Government Fund (a cumulative minimum of $345 million from FY2003-FY2007), concerns regarding oversight have prompted Congress to appropriate no more than $5 million in any given fiscal year since the passage of the E-Government Act. | December 2007 marked the fifth anniversary of the passage of the E-Government Act of 2002. Shortly before this anniversary, authorization of appropriations for several key provisions expired on September 30, 2007. Some of the activities and offices affected by the expiring authorizations include, but are not limited to, the Office of Electronic Government (OEG) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the General Services Administration (GSA) E-Government Fund; the GSA program to operate a federal Internet portal; and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) responsibility to develop standards, guidelines, and associated methods and techniques for protecting federal information systems.
Building upon the Clinger-Cohen Act, the E-Government Act serves as the primary legislative vehicle to guide evolving federal IT management practices and to promote initiatives to make government information and services available online. In doing so, it also represents a continuation of efforts to realize greater efficiencies and reduce redundancies through improved intergovernmental coordination, and by aligning IT investments. The law contains a variety of provisions related to federal government IT management, information security, and the provision of services and information electronically. One of the most recognized provisions involves the creation of an Office of Electronic Government (OEG) within the OMB. The OEG is headed by an Administrator, who is responsible for carrying out a variety of information resources management (IRM) functions, as well as administering the interagency E-Government Fund authorized by the law.
Although the E-Government Act authorized a cumulative minimum of $345 million from FY2003-FY2007 for the E-Government Fund, concerns regarding oversight have prompted Congress to appropriate no more than $5 million in any given fiscal year since the passage of the act.
The occasion to consider reauthorization of the E-Government Act provides Congress the opportunity to assess the results of federal e-government initiatives since 2002, consider how they have affected the administration of government, and decide what changes, if any, are necessary. In considering whether to reauthorize any, some, or all of these provisions, Congress may also wish to consider a number of other issues related to the implementation and oversight. These issues include, but are not limited to: what actions may be needed to reconcile the fundamental disparity between the horizontal nature of government-wide e-government initiatives, and the vertical organization of government oversight and funding mechanisms; how e-government initiatives should be funded and the role of the E-Government Fund; and the continuity and future direction of e-government efforts with the upcoming transition of presidential administrations.
On November 7, 2007, S. 2321, the E-Government Reauthorization Act of 2007 was introduced. The bill would amend and reauthorize appropriations for the E-Government Act. A comparable bill has not been introduced in the House. |
crs_RL34081 | crs_RL34081_0 | The "Section 32" account is funded by a permanent appropriation of 30% of the previous calendar year's customs receipts, nearly $10 billion in recent years. The remainder funds a variety of activities that support both farmers and domestic food assistance programs. The program's name stems from its authorization: Section 32 of the act of August 24, 1935 (P.L.74-320, as amended; 7 U.S.C. 612c). Encourage export of farm products through producer payments or other means; 2. Encourage the domestic consumption of farm products by diverting surpluses from normal channels or increasing their use by low-income groups; and 3. Re-establish farmers' purchasing power by making payments to farmers. $ 144 million , transferred to the Commerce Department for fisheries activities. From this:
$465 million was designated for planned AMS commodity purchases to fulfill the commodity assistance entitlement set by the National School Lunch Act (23.75 cents per meal in the 2016 school year beginning July 1, 2015). $ 306 million was used for contingency fund "emergency removals" of surplus commodities (primarily cranberries, tart cherries, chicken products, raisins, and canned salmon), and provided as a "bonus" to schools (over and above their "entitled" amounts) and to other designated domestic food assistance programs. First, much of the Section 32 permanent appropriation simply is transferred into USDA's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) child nutrition account (approximately $8.4 billion in FY2015) to help meet the entitlement spending requirements of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. In addition, the Secretary has chosen to provide food commodities to victims of natural disasters, among other activities. Historically, USDA has had considerable discretionary authority to spend Section 32 funds to help the farm sector via commodity purchases, direct payments, and other activities. Over time, though, Congress has reduced the extent of this discretionary authority through new authorizing provisions and through appropriations riders: (1) the 2008 farm bill capped the amount USDA is permitted to spend after transfers for use in the child nutrition programs and to Commerce for fisheries activities, (2) the farm bill set minimum levels of fruit, vegetable, and nut purchases from Section 32 to support domestic nutrition programs via the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program for participating elementary schools, and (3) congressional appropriators have prohibited the use of Section 32 for emergency disaster payments to farmers in each annual appropriation act since FY2012. In general, Section 32 pays for direct federal purchases of commodities such as meats, poultry, fruits, vegetables, and seafood that are not covered by mandatory farm programs through USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Such decisions are left to the Secretary of Agriculture, acting through USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). However, in an effort to boost specialty crop purchases and limit USDA's discretion, the 2008 farm bill ( P.L. The premise is that removing products from normal marketing channels helps to limit supply and thereby increase prices. The development of permanent farm disaster programs and enhancements to the federal crop insurance program have reduced the pressure for funding ad hoc disaster programs through Section 32. | "Section 32" is a permanent appropriation that since 1935 has set aside the equivalent of 30% of annual customs receipts to support the farm sector through the purchase of surplus commodities and a variety of other activities. The appropriation has totaled nearly $10 billion annually in recent years. Today, most of the appropriation (about $8.4 billion) is transferred to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) child nutrition account, with a separate amount (about $144 million) transferred to the Department of Commerce for fisheries activities. The Secretary of Agriculture, acting through USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), has had broad discretion in how to spend the remaining non-transferred (unobligated and carryover) money.
The program's name stems from its authorization: Section 32 of the act of August 24, 1935 (P.L.74-320, as amended; 7 U.S.C. 612c). Funds are to be used to (1) encourage the export of farm products through producer payments or other means; (2) encourage the domestic consumption of farm products by diverting surpluses from normal channels or increasing their use by low-income groups; and (3) re-establish farmers' purchasing power. In recent years, USDA has pursued primarily the second and third objectives.
The Secretary historically has chosen to use much of the non-transferred money to purchase agricultural commodities like meats, poultry, fruits, vegetables, and fish, which are not typically covered by other mandatory farm support programs. The premise for commodity purchases is that removing products from normal marketing channels helps to limit supply and thereby increase prices and farm income. Purchased commodities are diverted to the National School Lunch Program and other domestic food assistance programs. In FY2015, $465 million was designated for planned AMS commodity purchases to fulfill the commodity assistance entitlement set by the National School Lunch Act. Another $306 million was used for "emergency removals" of surplus commodities throughout the fiscal year (primarily fruits, vegetables, and meat products). The surplus commodities are distributed as "bonuses" to domestic food assistance programs.
Over time, Congress has reduced USDA's discretion to use Section 32 authority via authorizing legislation and through appropriations. Most significantly, the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246) permanently capped the amount USDA is permitted to spend after transfers for use in the child nutrition programs and to the Department of Commerce for fisheries activities. It also required minimum levels of fruit, vegetable, and nut purchases to support domestic nutrition programs and required USDA to use Section 32 to fund the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program, which provides snacks to participating elementary schools.
Section 32 is also used less for direct farm disaster assistance than in the past. This policy shift has occurred by the authorization and funding of "permanent" disaster programs in the 2008 and 2014 farm bills, enhancements to the federal crop insurance program, and limitations by appropriators on using Section 32 for disaster payments. |
crs_R42584 | crs_R42584_0 | Introduction
The provision of $8 billion for intercity passenger rail projects in the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ) reinvigorated the development of high speed intercity passenger rail (HSR) transportation in the United States. Only the HSR project in California is using federal funds for tracks dedicated to passenger trains, on which speeds could reach 220 mph. Plans for HSR in some states, including Florida, Wisconsin, and Ohio, were shelved by political leaders opposed to the substantial spending such projects entail, particularly for capital and operating costs. Some projects were stopped after federal funds were awarded; these funds were subsequently redirected to HSR projects in other states. In March 2009, the Obama Administration announced that it would ask Congress to provide $1 billion annually for high speed and intercity passenger rail projects. Congress approved $2.5 billion for high speed rail and intercity passenger rail in FY2010 ( P.L. 111-117 ), but has provided no funding since then. In addition, the FY2011 appropriations act rescinded $400 million from prior year unobligated balances of program funding. These five corridors are Seattle-Portland; Chicago-St. Louis; Chicago-Detroit; the Northeast Corridor (NEC); and Charlotte-Washington, DC. In the sixth corridor, Los Angeles-San Francisco, the plans are to build a new very high speed rail line that may allow trains to reach speeds of up to 220 mph. It consists mostly of one track with sidings to allow trains to pass. To date, the project has been awarded nearly $4 billion in federal funds.. The other 15% to 20% of the increase results from higher expected construction costs. Options for Building High Speed Rail
There are two options for developing high speed rail service; the option chosen determines the level of high speed service that can be attained:
upgrading existing track, signaling systems, and equipment (e.g., tilting trains) to enable trains to travel somewhat faster over the existing rail network, or building new rail lines for the exclusive use of passenger trains enabling trains to travel at much higher speeds than are possible over the existing rail network, which is shared with freight rail. As a consequence, the costs of constructing and maintaining an intercity maglev line are unclear. Of the many high speed routes in the world, it is thought that only two have earned enough revenue to cover both their infrastructure and operating costs. Few if any passenger rail operations anywhere in the world generate sufficient revenue to cover all capital as well as operating costs. Trains depend on population density to operate efficiently. Completed as part of a wide-ranging review of transportation policy in the United Kingdom, an analysis of building a high speed rail system connecting London with Glasgow and Edinburgh (distances of approximately 350 miles and 330 miles, respectively), including its energy use and carbon emissions profile, concluded:
high level analysis of the potential carbon benefits from modal shift from air to high speed rail suggests that these benefits would be small relative to the very high cost of constructing and operating such a scheme, and that under current assumptions a high speed line connecting London to Scotland is unlikely to be a cost-effective policy for achieving reductions in carbon emissions compared to other policy measures. Also, there is a significant difference in the structure of the rail industry in countries with HSR compared to the United States. | The provision of $8 billion for intercity passenger rail projects in the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) reinvigorated efforts to expand intercity passenger rail transportation in the United States. The Obama Administration subsequently announced that it would ask Congress to provide $1 billion annually for high speed rail (HSR) projects. This initiative was reflected in the President's budgets for FY2010 through FY2014. Congress approved $2.5 billion for high speed and intercity passenger rail in FY2010 (P.L. 111-117), but has provided no funding for the program since then, and in the FY2011 appropriations act rescinded $400 million from prior year unobligated balances of program funding.
There are two main approaches to building high speed rail: (1) improving existing tracks and signaling to allow trains to reach speeds of up to 110 miles per hour (mph), generally on track shared with freight trains; and (2) building new tracks dedicated exclusively to high speed passenger rail service, to allow trains to travel at speeds of 200 mph or more. The potential costs, and benefits, are relatively lower with the first approach and higher with the second approach.
Much of the federal funding for HSR to date has focused on improving existing lines in five corridors: Seattle-Portland; Chicago-St. Louis; Chicago-Detroit; the Northeast Corridor (NEC); and Charlotte-Washington, DC. Most of the rest of the money has been allocated to a largely new system dedicated to passenger trains between San Francisco and Los Angeles, on which speeds could reach 220 mph. Plans for HSR in some states were shelved by political leaders opposed to the substantial risks such projects entail, particularly the capital and operating costs; the federal funds allocated to those projects were subsequently redirected to other HSR projects. California's HSR plans are being challenged in court, and court decisions in the fall of 2013 have put its funding in question.
Estimates of the cost of constructing HSR vary according to train speed, the topography of the corridor, the cost of right-of-way, and other factors. Few if any HSR lines anywhere in the world have earned enough revenue to cover both their construction and operating costs, even where population density is far greater than anywhere in the United States. Typically, governments have paid the construction costs, and in many cases have subsidized the operating costs as well. These subsidies are often justified by the social benefits ascribed to HSR in relieving congestion, reducing pollution, increasing energy efficiency, and contributing to employment and economic development. It is unclear whether these potential social benefits are commensurate with the likely costs of constructing and operating HSR.
Lack of long-term funding represents a significant obstacle to HSR development in the United States. The federal government does not have a dedicated funding source for HSR, making projects that can take many years to build vulnerable to year-to-year changes in discretionary budget allocations. |
crs_95-712 | crs_95-712_0 | They assert that the employment and wage prospects of domestic workers are depressed by additions to the U.S. labor supply through guest worker programs. The remainder of this report focuses on the impact an agricultural guest worker program might have on U.S. workers. In other words, there were a great many more braceros than H-2A workers when both the Bracero program (1942-1964) and H-2A program (1952-present) were in effect. In summary, the limited empirical research on the impact of the Bracero program on U.S. workers suggests that while the program successfully expanded the supply of temporary farm labor, it did so at the expense of domestic farm workers as measured by their reduced wages and employment. Although the magnitudes of these adverse effects might differ today depending on the extent to which U.S. farm labor and product markets have changed over time, their direction likely would be the same. | Guest worker programs are meant to assure employers (e.g., fruit, vegetable, and horticultural specialty growers) of an adequate supply of labor when and where it is needed while not adding permanent residents to the U.S. population. They include mechanisms such as the H-2A program's labor certification process to avoid adversely affecting the wages and working conditions of comparable U.S. workers. If changes to the H-2A program or creation of a new agricultural guest worker program led growers to employ many more aliens, the effects of the Bracero program might be instructive: although the 1942-1964 Bracero program succeeded in expanding the farm labor supply, studies estimate that it also harmed domestic farm workers through reduced wages and employment. The magnitudes of these adverse effects might differ today depending upon how much the U.S. farm labor and product markets have changed over time, but their direction likely would be the same. |
crs_R44441 | crs_R44441_0 | Action on FY2017 Agriculture Appropriations
The FY2017 appropriation for Agriculture and Related Agencies was enacted on May 5, 2017, as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 115-31 , Division A). The fiscal year started on October 1, 2016, under a continuing resolution (CR) that lasted until December 9, 2016 ( P.L. The CRs continued FY2016 funding with a few exceptions. In regular action, the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees reported their FY2017 Agriculture appropriations bills ( H.R. The discretionary total of the enacted appropriation is $20.877 billion, which is $623 million less than enacted in FY2016 (-2.9%). The appropriation also carries mandatory spending—largely determined in separate authorizing laws—that totaled about $132.5 billion. The overall total therefore exceeded $153 billion ( Table 1 ). Scope of Agriculture Appropriations
The Agriculture appropriations act funds all of USDA, except for the U.S. Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health and Human Services. In even-numbered fiscal years, the enacted Agriculture bill carries CFTC funding under the usual practice for handling jurisdictional differences between the House and Senate . Agriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending, but discretionary amounts are the primary focus since mandatory amounts are generally set by authorizing laws. The largest discretionary spending items are domestic nutrition, agricultural research, rural development, FDA, foreign food aid, farm assistance programs, food safety inspection, conservation, and animal and plant health. The main mandatory spending items are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, child nutrition, crop insurance, and the Commodity Credit Corporation (which pays for the farm commodity, conservation, and other mandatory USDA programs). It achieves this primarily by increasing budgetary offsets over the FY2016 level through greater rescissions of prior appropriations and greater scorekeeping adjustments primarily from "negative subsidies" from loan programs that charge fees ( Table 1 ). However, the budget authority provided to agencies in the major titles of the bill actually increase s by $462 million (the top of the shaded bars in Figure 3 ). Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service . Food and Drug Administration. +$42 million , including $36 million more for food safety activities. Farm Service Agency. USDA administration . + $ 20 million to modernize headquarters facilities. Disaster assistance. -$114 million , comprised from $38 million less appropriated for programs than in FY2016 ($206 million in the second continuing resolution plus $28 million in the omnibus appropriation) and $76 million more in disaster designation offsets that do not count against budget caps. -$46 million , comprised primarily of $25 million more for Agriculture and Food Research Initiative (AFRI) grants, and $26 million more for Agricultural Research Service (ARS) operations, offset by $112 million less for ARS buildings and facilities. | The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), except for the Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and—in even-numbered fiscal years—the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). (For CFTC, the Agriculture appropriations subcommittee has jurisdiction in the House but not in the Senate.)
Agriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Discretionary amounts, though, are the primary focus during the bill's development, since mandatory amounts are generally set by authorizing laws such as the farm bill.
The largest discretionary spending items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); agricultural research; FDA; rural development; foreign food aid and trade; farm assistance programs; food safety inspection; conservation; and animal and plant health programs. The main mandatory spending items are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), child nutrition, crop insurance, and the farm commodity and conservation programs paid by the Commodity Credit Corporation.
The FY2017 appropriation for Agriculture and Related Agencies was enacted on May 5, 2017, as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-31, Division A). The fiscal year started on October 1, 2016, under continuing resolutions (CRs) that continued FY2016 funding with a few exceptions. The House and the Senate Appropriations Committees reported their FY2017 Agriculture appropriations bills (H.R. 5054, S. 2956) in April and May 2016.
The discretionary total of the enacted appropriation is $20.877 billion, which is $623 million less than enacted in FY2016 (-2.9%). It achieves this primarily by increasing budgetary offsets over the FY2016 level through greater rescissions of prior appropriations and greater scorekeeping adjustments.
However, the budget authority for FY2017 provided to agencies in the major titles of the bill actually increases by $462 million compared to FY2016. Increases primarily include $163 million more for discretionary conservation programs than in FY2016, $119 million more for rural development, $65 million more for discretionary domestic nutrition programs, $52 million more for animal and plant health programs, $51 million more for agricultural research programs, $42 million more for the Food and Drug Administration, $29 million more for the Farm Service Agency, $20 million more for USDA administrative facilities, and $17 million more for food safety inspections. Reductions primarily come from a rescission of unused domestic nutrition assistance funding ($850 million rescission), supplemental funding for international food aid ($116 million less than in FY2016), agricultural research facilities ($112 million less), greater use of a disaster designation that does not count against budget caps ($76 million extra offset), and disaster assistance ($38 million less).
The appropriation also carries mandatory spending that totaled about $132.5 billion. The overall total of the FY2017 Agricultural appropriation therefore exceeded $153 billion. |
crs_RS21391 | crs_RS21391_0 | In 1994, North Korea pledged, under the Agreed Framework with the United States, to freeze its plutonium programs and eventually dismantle them in return for several kinds of assistance. North Korea appears to have mastered the engineering requirements of plutonium production. Although the U.S. Director of National Intelligence confirmed that a nuclear test was conducted on October 9, 2006 in the vicinity of P'unggye, the sub-kiloton yield of the test suggests that the weapon design or manufacturing process likely needs improvement. What Does North Korea Have Now? Some Members of Congress interpreted then-CIA Director Porter Goss' statements in March 2005 on a "range" of nuclear weapon estimates to confirm that North Korea's arsenal has multiplied. Complete Other Reactors
The reactors at Yongbyon (50MWe) and Taechon (200MWe) are likely several years from completion. Although seismographs registered the October 9 th detonation, and environmental sampling confirmed radioactivity, there is still no information on what North Korea intended to accomplish with the test, from technical, security, political, and diplomatic perspectives. | On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test, with a yield of under 1 kiloton (vice the anticipated 4-kiloton yield). The United States and other countries condemned the test and the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1718 on October 14, which requires North Korea to refrain from nuclear or missile tests, rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and dismantle its WMD programs. The test is the latest provocative act of many since 2002, when North Korea ended an eight-year freeze on its plutonium production program, expelled international inspectors and restarted facilities. North Korea may now have enough Pu for eight to ten weapons. On February 13, 2007, North Korea reached an agreement with other members of the Six-Party talks to begin the initial phase (60 days) of implementing the Joint Statement from September 2005 on denuclearization. Key components include halting production at Yongbyon and delivery of heavy fuel oil. Many other aspects are yet to be decided. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL31395 | crs_RL31395_0 | Recent Developments
A permanent cease-fire agreement between the Angolan government and its long-time military adversary, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was signed on April 4, 2002. It provides for the demobilization of UNITA forces and for their integration into a unified national military, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol, an abortive peace accord. A new law provides UNITA forces with a general amnesty for wartime offenses. The cease-fire accord followed the death of Jonas Savimbi, UNITA's founder and long-time leader. He was killed in a government ambush in February, 2002 in the eastern province of Moxico. In 1979, Eduardo dos Santos, Angola's current president and leader of the governing MPLA, succeeded Agostino Neto, the country's president at independence. The Dos Santos government has been labeled authoritarian by many observers because of its sometimes harsh repression of its domestic political opponents, and journalists – and for curtailing public expression and the opportunity for its citizens to change their government (see " Human Rights " section, below). The country's first and only national election was held in 1992; it ended in an aborted run-off election and a return to civil war. International pressure on UNITA to return to negotiations grew. In September 1993, the United Nations imposed an oil and arms embargo on UNITA. A 7,000-member U.N. peacekeeping operation was deployed, but implementation of the Protocols was repeatedly delayed. UNITA managed to stall the offensive, and launched counterattacks, making significant territorial gains by mid-1999, including the seizure of much of diamond-rich eastern Angola. The U.N. targeted further sanctions against UNITA in April 2000. Recent Fighting
The MPLA claimed many military successes in 1999-2000. Despite the government's military successes and UNITA's reported loss of most of its conventional military capability, the group carried out many attacks across Angola throughout 2001 and into 2002. UNITA was able to fund its operations by selling diamonds and obtaining arms, in violation of U.N. sanctions against it, U.N. reports state – albeit at a diminished level compared to earlier periods. Savimbi's death raised the prospect that subsequent UNITA leadership changes or internal realignments might lead to a cease-fire or negotiations to end the conflict. The current de facto political leader of the former Savimbi-led wing of UNITA is General Paulo "Gato" Lukamba, the UNITA secretary-general and head of UNITA's Administrative Affairs commission Gato has a reputation as a military hawk, but recently is reported to have stated that "the phase of the armed struggle is over. | A permanent cease-fire agreement between the Angolan government and its long-time military adversary, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was signed on April 4, 2002. The accord provides for the demobilization of UNITA's forces, and for their integration into a unified national military. Under a separate law passed prior to ratification of the accord, UNITA's armed forces will receive a general amnesty for wartime offenses committed against the state and Angolan people. The agreement followed the death of Jonas Savimbi, the founder and long-time leader of UNITA, who was killed in a government ambush in February, 2002 in eastern Angola. Savimbi's death raised the prospect of possible realignments within the UNITA organization or of changes in its leadership. The current de facto political leader of the former Savimbi-led wing of UNITA is General Paulo "Gato" Lukamba, the UNITA secretary-general and head of UNITA's Administrative Affairs commission.
Eduardo dos Santos, Angola's current President and leader of the ruling Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA), indicated in 2001 that he would step down prior to elections that may be held in late 2002 or in 2003. Dos Santos has designated no clear successor, and some analysts believe that he may yet stand as a presidential candidate. The Angolan government has been labeled authoritarian by many observers because of its sometimes harsh repression of domestic political opponents and journalists, and for curtailing public expression and the opportunity of its citizens to change their government. Angola has been engaged militarily in several neighboring countries in recent years.
The country's first and only national election was held in 1992, following a peace accord between the government and UNITA; it ended in an aborted run-off election and a return to civil war. International pressure on UNITA to return to peace talks grew. In 1993, the United Nations (U.N.) imposed an oil and arms embargo on UNITA. Peace talks ensued, culminating in a renewed cease-fire agreement in accord with the Lusaka Protocol. A U.N. peacekeeping operation was deployed, but the Lusaka accord was never fully implemented. A period of instability ensued, and by late1998 Angola again faced full-scale civil war. The government attacked UNITA strongholds in central Angola. UNITA launched counterattacks; it had seized much territory by mid-1999, including many diamond-rich zones. The U.N. imposed further sanctions on UNITA. The MPLA claimed many military successes in 1999-2002, but UNITA carried out many attacks across Angola during the same period. UNITA was able to fund its operations by selling diamonds and obtaining arms, in violation of U.N. sanctions against it. |
crs_R43900 | crs_R43900_0 | There is increasing concern both in the United States and globally about whether a "pollinator crisis" has been occurring in recent decades. The focus of this report on bee exposure to pesticides is not intended to imply that pesticides are any more or less important in influencing the health and wellness of bees than any of the other identified factors influencing bee health. Background and Introduction
In the United States, honey bee colony losses due to bee pests, parasites, pathogens, and disease are not uncommon. However, in late 2006, concerns about honey bees gained heightened attention when commercial beekeepers along the East Coast began reporting sharp declines in their bee colonies. Because of the severity and unusual circumstances of these colony declines, scientists named this phenomenon colony collapse disorder (CCD). This issue was legislatively active in the 110 th Congress and resulted in increased funding for honey bee research, among other types of farm program support to protect pollinators, as part of the 2008 farm bill (Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246 ). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that U.S. beekeepers continue to lose colonies each year. Since 2006, USDA estimates that overwinter bee colony losses have averaged nearly 30% annually. To date, the precise reasons for honey bee colony losses are still unknown. USDA and most scientists working on the subject seem to agree that none of the research conclusively points to one single cause for the large-scale number of honey bee deaths. This general conclusion was reconfirmed in a May 2013 report by USDA and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Stakeholders Conference on Honey Bee Health (commonly referred to as the "USDA-EPA joint report"). Reasons cited for bee population declines include a wide range of possible factors. Potential identified causes include bee pests and diseases, diet and nutrition, genetics, habitat loss and other environmental stressors, agricultural pesticides, and beekeeping management issues, as well as the possibility that bees are being harmed by cumulative, multiple exposures and/or the interactive effects of each of these factors. One issue widely reported in the media is the potential role that pesticides—in particular, neonicotinoid pesticides—might play in overall bee health. However, it is not clear, based on current research, whether pesticide exposure is a major factor associated with U.S. honey bee health declines in general, or specifically affects production of honey or delivery of pollination services. It is clear, however, that in some instances honey bee colonies can be severely harmed by exposure to high doses of insecticides when these compounds are used on crops, or via drift onto flowers in areas adjacent to crops that are attractive to bees. This report provides information regarding the potential role of pesticides in the health of bee colonies, and also the importance of pesticides relative to other influences on bee health. Some experts, however, emphasize that research studies support the hypothesis that "total pesticide load" is an important influence on honey bee health, probably in combination with mite infestation, poor nutrition, viruses, and perhaps other stressors. The 2014 farm bill ( P.L. The bill would have suspended registrations of neonicotinoids and banned new registrations of any pesticide for use on "bee attractive plants, trees, and cereals." H.R. 2692 . 5447 , which would have amended U.S. pesticide laws (FIFRA; 7 U.S.C. H.R. The report required by EPA would address the availability of pesticides to manage parasites and also EPA's efforts to expedite approvals of new products to control parasites of managed bees. | Over the past few decades there has been heightened concern about the plight of honey bees as well as other bee species. Given the importance of honey bees and other bee species to food production, many have expressed concern about whether a "pollinator crisis" has been occurring in recent decades. Although honey bee colony losses due to bee pests, parasites, pathogens, and disease are not uncommon, there is the perception that bee health has been declining more rapidly than in prior years, both in the United States and globally. This situation gained increased attention in 2006 as some commercial beekeepers began reporting sharp declines in their honey bee colonies. Because of the severity and unusual circumstances of these colony declines, scientists named this phenomenon colony collapse disorder (CCD). Since then, honey bee colonies have continued to dwindle each year, for reasons not solely attributable to CCD. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that CCD may not be the only or even the major cause of bee colony losses in recent years. In the United States, USDA estimates of overwinter colony losses from all causes have averaged nearly 30% annually since 2006.
The precise reasons for honey bee losses are not yet known. USDA and most scientists working on the subject seem to agree that no research conclusively points to one single cause for the large number of honey bee deaths. This general conclusion was reconfirmed in a 2013 joint report by USDA and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Reasons cited for bee declines include a wide range of possible factors thought to be negatively affecting pollinator species. However, one issue widely noted is the role that pesticides—in particular, neonicotinoid pesticides—might play in overall bee health. Pesticides are the focus of this report. Pesticides are among many identified factors known to affect bee health, including pests and diseases, diet and nutrition, genetics, habitat loss and other environmental stressors, and beekeeping management issues, as well as the possibility that bees are being negatively affected by cumulative, multiple exposures and/or the interactive effects of several of these factors.
The focus of this report on bee exposure to pesticides is not intended to imply that pesticides are any more important in influencing the health and wellness of bees than other identified factors influencing bee health. Pesticides are one of many influences on bee health. The current state of knowledge on pesticides and bee health is summarized in the USDA-EPA report:
it is not clear, based on current research, whether pesticide exposure is a major factor associated with U.S. honey bee health declines in general, or specifically affects production of honey or delivery of pollination services. It is clear, however, that in some instances honey bee colonies can be severely harmed by exposure to high doses of insecticides when these compounds are used on crops, or via drift onto flowers in areas adjacent to crops that are attractive to bees.
Some experts emphasize research supporting the hypothesis that "total pesticide load" is an important influence on honey bee health, probably in combination with mite infestation, poor nutrition, viruses, and perhaps other stressors.
The past two farm bills (P.L. 110-246, P.L. 113-79) provided for increased funding for bee research, among other types of support to protect pollinators. Other bills in the 113th Congress addressed pesticide issues more directly. H.R. 2692 would have suspended registrations of neonicotinoids and banned new registrations of any pesticide in some cases. Another bill, H.R. 5447, would have amended U.S. pesticide laws to expedite the review and approval of products to control "parasitic pests" in managed commercial bee colonies, and would have required USDA and EPA to evaluate threats to pollinators and the availability of pesticides to manage bee pests. |
crs_RL34274 | crs_RL34274_0 | Introduction
The franking privilege, which allows Members of Congress to transmit mail matter under their signature without postage, has existed in the United States since colonial times. During the 18 th and 19 th centuries, the franking privilege served a fundamental democratic role, allowing Members of Congress to convey information to their constituents about the operations of government and policy matters before Congress. Conversely, it also provided a mechanism for citizens to communicate their feelings and concerns to Members (prior to 1873, Members could both send and receive mail under the frank). Congress has also occasionally granted the privilege to various executive branch officers and others. Although the rise of alternative methods of communication in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries have arguably reduced the democratic necessity of franking, Members of Congress continue today to use the frank to facilitate communication with their constituents. The franking privilege has carried an element of controversy throughout American history. During the 19 th century, the privilege was commonly attacked as financially wasteful and subject to widespread abuse through its use for other than official business. Although concerns about cost and abuse continued in the 20 th century, strong criticism of the franking privilege developed regarding the use of the frank as an influence in congressional elections and the perceived advantage it gives Members running for reelection. Contemporary critics of the franking privilege continue to express concerns about its cost and its effect on congressional elections. In attempting to balance a need for the franking privilege against charges of abuse, Congress has routinely amended the franking statutes. Dimensions of the Franking Privilege
In general, the franking privileges granted to Members at any given point in time can be defined by five dimensions: who is entitled to frank mail, what is entitled to be franked, how much material can be sent, where franked material can be sent, and when franked material can be sent. Changes to the franking privilege typically have not altered all of these dimensions at once, resulting in a wide variety of legislative arrangements of the franking privilege. Similarly, proposed options for future legislative changes may involve altering some, but not all, of these dimensions. | The franking privilege, which allows Members of Congress to transmit mail matter under their signature without postage, has existed in the United States since colonial times. During the 18th and 19th centuries, the franking privilege served a fundamental democratic role, allowing Members of Congress to convey information to their constituents about the operations of government and policy matters before Congress. Conversely, it also provided a mechanism for citizens to communicate their feelings and concerns to Members (prior to 1873, Members could both send and receive mail under the frank). Congress has also occasionally granted the privilege to various executive branch officers and others. Although the rise of alternative methods of communication in the late 19th and early 20th centuries have arguably reduced the democratic necessity of franking, Members of Congress continue today to use the frank to facilitate communication with their constituents.
The franking privilege has carried an element of controversy throughout American history. During the 19th century, the privilege was commonly attacked as financially wasteful and subject to widespread abuse through its use for other than official business. Although concerns about cost and abuse continued in the 20th century, strong criticism of the franking privilege developed regarding the use of the frank as an influence in congressional elections and the perceived advantage it gives incumbent Members running for reelection. Contemporary opponents of the franking privilege continue to express concerns about both its cost and its effect on congressional elections.
In attempting to balance a democratic need for the franking privilege against charges of abuse, Congress has routinely amended the franking statutes. In general, the franking privileges granted to Members at any given point in time can be defined by five dimensions: who is entitled to frank mail, what is entitled to be franked, how much material can be sent, where franked material can be sent, and when franked material be sent. Historically, changes to the franking privilege typically have not altered all of these dimensions at once, resulting in a wide variety of legislative arrangements of the franking privilege. Similarly, proposed options for future legislative changes may involve altering some, but not all, of these dimensions.
This report will be updated as legislative action warrants. See also CRS Report RS22771, Congressional Franking Privilege: Background and Recent Legislation, by Matthew E. Glassman; CRS Report RL34188, Congressional Official Mail Costs, by Matthew E. Glassman; and CRS Report RL34458, Franking Privilege: Mass Mailings and Mass Communications in the House, 1997-2015, by Matthew E. Glassman. |
crs_R43191 | crs_R43191_0 | Bees, both commercially managed honey bees and wild unmanaged bees, among many other types of insect pollinators, play an important role in global food production. Given the importance of bees and other types of pollinators to food production, many have expressed concern about whether a "pollinator crisis" has been occurring in recent decades. In the United States, honey bee colony losses due to bee pests, parasites, pathogens, and disease are not uncommon. This situation gained increased attention in 2006 as some commercial beekeepers began reporting sharp declines in their honey bee colonies. Because of the severity and unusual circumstances of these colony declines, scientists named this phenomenon colony collapse disorder (CCD). 110-246 ). Since 2006, USDA estimates that overwinter colony losses have averaged more than 30% annually. To date, the precise reasons for honey bee colony losses are still unknown. Reasons cited for honey bee population losses include a wide range of possible factors. Potential identified causes include bee pests and disease, diet and nutrition, genetics, habitat loss and other environmental stressors, agricultural pesticides, and beekeeping management issues, as well as the possibility that bees are being negatively affected by cumulative, multiple exposures and/or the interactive effects of several of these factors. Importance of Bee Pollination
Worldwide, the contribution of bees and other insects to worldwide crop production for human food is valued at about $190 billion each year. In the United States alone, the value of insect pollination to U.S. agricultural production is estimated at $16 billion annually, of which about three-fourths of the value is attributable to honey bees. However, bee colonies have continued to "dwindle away" each year for reasons not solely attributable to CCD, which is characterized by colony populations that are suddenly lost. The U.S. Factors Affecting Bee Health
Among the factors that are thought to be harming bee health are (listed in no particular order):
parasites , pathogens , and diseases (for a detailed listing, see text box); bee genetics including lack of genetic diversity and lineage of bees, and increased susceptibility and lowered disease resistance; miticide resistance ; diet and nutrition including poor nutrition due to apiary overcrowding, pollination of crops with low nutritional value, and pollen or nectar scarcity associated with invasive plants; bee management issues including transportation stress from migratory beekeeping, overcrowding, feeding practices, chemicals used by beekeepers to control mites (antibiotics and miticides), confinement and temperature fluctuations, susceptibility to disease, potential for cumulative exposure to diseases and parasites, use of bees for honey production versus pollination, chemical residue or contamination in the wax, and reliability of the queen source; habitat loss, and other environmental or biological stressors including loss of foraging area, interspecific competition between honey bees and native bees, pathogen spillover effects, and climate change; pesticides including acute or cumulative exposure to new types or combinations of agricultural pesticides through a variety of media including dust, water droplets, pollen, and nectar; other agricultural practices including the use of genetically incorporated pesticides in seeds or treated seeds, such as with bioengineered crops; and potential cumulative and interactive effects of each of these factors. However, CCD may not be the single leading cause of honey bee colony losses in recent years. USDA-EPA Joint Report
In 2013, USDA and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a USDA-EPA Joint report, National Stakeholders Conference on Honey Bee Health . Issues for Congress
Following concerns over honey bee colony losses in 2006-2007, Congress provided for increased funding for bee research, among other types of farm program support to protect pollinators, as part of the 2008 farm bill. 113-79 , H.Rept. The 2014 farm bill reauthorized and expanded many of the 2008 farm bill provisions that address honey bees and pollinators as part of the law's research, conservation, specialty crop, and miscellaneous title provisions. Overall, regarding managed honey bees and native pollinators, the 2014 farm bill:
extends through 2018 various USDA research and conservation provisions directed at protecting pollinators, enacted in the 2008 farm bill (see " Research Provisions " and " Conservation Provisions ," below, for more information); expands annual reporting requirements on CCD along with other health disorders; requires USDA to publish guidance on enhancing long-term pollinator health and long term viability of pollinators, including addressing habitat and forage needs for native pollinators and managed honey bees; and requires USDA to assess federal efforts to mitigate pollinator losses and threats to the U.S. commercial beekeeping industry, and to recommend how to better coordinate federal agency efforts to address the decline of managed honey bees and native pollinators. The bill would promote conservation practices on 17 million acres of highway "rights-of-ways" (managed by state Departments of Transportation or state DOTs), and would promote native plantings that provide improved habitat, forage, and migratory corridors for pollinators, ground nesting birds, and other small wildlife, as well as encourage reduced mowing and overall maintenance costs to state DOTs. The bill would suspend registrations of neonicotinoids and ban new registrations of any pesticide for use on "bee attractive plants, trees, and cereals" until the EPA determines that the insecticide will not cause "unreasonable adverse effects" on pollinators, including native bees, honey bees, and other beneficial insects, as well as birds and bats. | Bees, both commercially managed honey bees and wild bees, play an important role in global food production. In the United States alone, the value of insect pollination to U.S. agricultural production is estimated at $16 billion annually, of which about three-fourths is attributable to honey bees. Worldwide, the contribution of bees and other insects to global crop production for human food is valued at about $190 billion. Given the importance of honey bees and other bee species to food production, many have expressed concern about whether a "pollinator crisis" has been occurring in recent decades.
Over the past few decades there has been heightened concern about the plight of honey bees as well as other bee and pollinator species. Although honey bee colony losses due to bee pests, parasites, and disease are not uncommon, there is the perception that bee health has been declining at a faster rate both in the United States and globally in recent years. This situation gained increased attention in 2006 as some commercial beekeepers began reporting sharp declines in their honey bee colonies. Because of the severity and unusual circumstances of these colony declines, scientists named this phenomenon colony collapse disorder (CCD). Since then, honey bee colonies have continued to dwindle each year, for reasons not solely attributable to CCD. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that CCD may not be the only or even the major cause of bee colony losses in recent years. In the United States, USDA estimates of overwinter colony losses from all causes have averaged more than 30% annually since 2006.
To date, the precise reasons for bee colony losses are not yet known. Reasons cited for bee declines include a wide range of possible factors thought to be affecting pollinator species. These include bee pests and disease, diet and nutrition, genetics, habitat loss and other environmental stressors, agricultural pesticides, and beekeeping management issues, as well as the possibility that bees are being affected by cumulative, multiple exposures and/or the interactive effects of several of these factors.
USDA continues to research possible causes of bee colony losses, and has published a series of reports detailing the agency's progress in this area. In 2013, USDA and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a joint report, National Stakeholders Conference on Honey Bee Health. Both USDA and the NAS report conclude that many factors contribute to pollinator declines in North America. A 2007 report by the National Research Council, Status of Pollinators in North America, also provides a detailed scientific context concerning bee health.
Following heightened concern over honey bee colony losses in 2006-2007, Congress provided for increased funding for bee research, among other types of farm program support to protect pollinators, as part of the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246). The 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) reauthorized and expanded many of these provisions, addressing managed honey bees and native pollinators as part of the law's research, conservation, specialty crop, and miscellaneous title provisions. In addition, outside the farm bill, H.R. 4790 would promote conservation practices on millions of acres of highway rights-of-way by encouraging states to reduce mowing and plant for pollinators, providing improved habitat for pollinators and other small wildlife. Also, H.R. 2692 would suspend registrations of neonicotinoids and prohibit new registrations of any pesticide for use unless EPA determines the insecticide would not cause unreasonable adverse effects on pollinators, including honey bees and native bees as well as other pollinators. Another bill, H.R. 5447, would amend U.S. pesticide laws to provide for expedited registration of pesticides that improve bee health, including managing resistance to some parasitic pests. |
crs_RL33837 | crs_RL33837_0 | 1591 , in part because of measures designed to limit the U.S. military role in Iraq. Congress then passed a new version of the supplemental appropriations bill, H.R. As Congress considers defense authorization and appropriations bills for FY2008, there may be a renewed focus on whether or to what extent Congress has the constitutional authority to legislate limits on the President's authority to conduct military operations in Iraq. It has been suggested that the President's role as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces provides sufficient authority for his deployment of additional troops, and any efforts on the part of Congress to intervene could represent an unconstitutional violation of separation-of-powers principles. While even proponents of strong executive prerogative in matters of war appear to concede that it is within Congress's authority to cut off funding entirely for a military operation, it has been suggested that spending measures that restrict but do not end financial support for the war in Iraq would amount to an "unconstitutional condition." The question may turn on whether the President's decisions on troop deployment and mission assignment are purely operational decisions committed to the President in his role as Commander in Chief, or whether congressional action to limit the availability of troops and the missions they may perform is a valid exercise of Congress's authority to allocate resources using its war powers and power of the purse. Background
On October 16, 2002, Congress passed and President Bush signed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. Early exercises of Congress's war powers may shed some light on the original understanding of how the war powers clauses might empower Congress to limit the President's use of the armed forces. In the 110 th Congress, a number of proposals have been introduced that would repeal or establish an expiration date for the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002. The following sections discuss the constitutional authority implicated by a repeal of military authorization, procedural, and other considerations involved in rescinding prior military authorization as compared to limiting appropriations, and the legal effect that a repeal would have on continuing hostilities. However, these measures did not include a deadline for troop withdrawal. Accordingly, it does not appear that the termination of direct authorization to use force, absent additional action such as the denial of appropriations or possibly the inclusion of an unambiguous deadline for troop withdrawal, would be interpreted by a reviewing court as constraining the executive's ability to continue U.S. combat operations. Use of the Power of the Purse to Restrict Military Operations
Congress has used its spending power to restrict the deployment and use of the armed forces in the past. These benchmarks, similar to those that were included in the vetoed H.R. The act provides $70 billion in supplemental appropriations for military activities in Iraq. Congress has ample constitutional authority to enact legislation that restricts the scope of military operations. | On October 16, 2002, President Bush signed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. Since the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, Congress has enacted appropriation bills to fund the continuation of the Iraq war, including military training, reconstruction, and other aid for the government of Iraq. In April, 2007, however, Congress passed a supplemental appropriations bill to fund the war that contained conditions and a deadline for ending some military operations. The President vetoed the bill, arguing in part that some of its provisions are unconstitutional. The current dispute is centered on whether Congress has the constitutional authority to legislate limits on the President's authority to conduct military operations in Iraq, even though it did not initially provide express limits. Specific issues include whether Congress may, through limitations on appropriations, set a ceiling on the number of soldiers or regulate which soldiers the President may assign to duty in Iraq, and whether an outright repeal or expiration of the authorization for use of military force (AUMF) against Iraq would have any effect.
It has been suggested that the President's role as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces provides sufficient authority for his deployment of troops, and any efforts on the part of Congress to intervene could represent an unconstitutional violation of separation-of-powers principles. While even proponents of strong executive prerogative in matters of war appear to concede that it is within Congress's authority to cut off funding entirely for a military operation, it has been suggested that spending measures that restrict but do not end financial support for the war in Iraq would amount to an "unconstitutional condition." The question may turn on whether specific proposals involve purely operational decisions committed to the President in his role as Commander in Chief, or whether they are instead valid exercises of Congress's authority to allocate resources using its war powers and power of the purse.
This report begins by providing background, discussing constitutional provisions allocating war powers between Congress and the President, and presenting a historical overview of relevant court cases. It discusses Congress's power to rescind prior military authorization, concluding, in light of relevant jurisprudence and the War Powers Resolution, that the repeal of the AUMF, absent the further denial of appropriations or the establishment of a specific deadline for troop withdrawal, would likely have little, if any, legal effect on the continuation of combat operations. The report discusses Congress's ability to limit funding for military operations in Iraq, examining relevant court cases and prior measures taken by Congress to restrict military operations, as well as possible alternative avenues to fund operations if appropriations are cut. There follows a summary of relevant measures included in the vetoed FY2007 supplemental appropriations bill, H.R. 1591, and the enacted act, H.R. 2206. The report provides historical examples of measures that restrict the use of particular personnel, and concludes with a brief analysis of arguments that might be brought to bear on the question of Congress's authority to limit the availability of troops to serve in Iraq. Although not beyond debate, such a restriction appears to be within Congress's authority to allocate resources for military operations. |
crs_RL32967 | crs_RL32967_0 | Background
More than most countries, Poland's relations today with the rest of the world are influencedby its past. Poland has conducted a proactiveforeign policy over the past 15 years. It has aggressively pursued its national interests, and has notbeen reluctant to assert itself with major powers -- for example, with Germany, its leading tradingpartner; with the European Union; and with the United States. But Poland's main foreignpolicy initiatives in Europe have been directed to the east and west. In May 2004, Poland fulfilled a long-term foreign policy goal when it joined nine othercountries in becoming a member of the European Union (Poland achieved NATO membershipearlier, in 1999.) But several factors -- chiefly the March 11, 2004terrorist attacks in Madrid and the revelations of prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib -- contributed toincreased public pressure against continued military engagement in Iraq. (5)
There were practical benefits of joining the Iraq operation. (7)
Some Poles also maintain that their country has begun to see itself as paying for U.S.mistakes in Iraq, and that this might have an impact on bilateral relations. (8)
Poles also have begun to ask themselves what they have received in return for their loyaltyto the United States; in particular, Poles had hoped for help in three areas: military assistance, Iraqreconstruction contracts, and U.S. visa policy. Many of Poland's actions within the EU have been consistent with policies preferred by theUnited States: Poland and the Bush administration both support the notion of taxing consumption,rather than investment. For example, Poland was instrumental in advancing the practice of democracyin Ukraine; Warsaw played a lead role in resolving the fall 2004 election crisis. Many believe it is inevitable thatPoland will draw closer to Europe. Some believe that Poland as an EU member will likelywind up being more like the United Kingdom, a staunch U.S. ally, than like Belgium, which has attimes taken positions contrary to U.S. policy. | More than most countries, Poland's relations today with the rest of the world are influencedby its past. The victim of historical forces and powerful neighbors, Poland was partitioned in the 18thcentury, and once again in the 20th. This loss of sovereignty may partly explain its assertive foreignpolicy. Poland has carved out a unique, sometimes maverick role for itself in Europe. A NATOmember since 1999, and an EU member since 2004, Poland has forcefully pursued its nationalinterests and has not been reluctant to assert itself with major powers -- for example, with Germany,its leading trading partner; with the European Union; and with the United States.
Poland has been a staunch U.S. ally, not only in the global war on terrorism, but also in theU.S.-led campaign in Iraq. However, several factors -- including the revelations of prisoner abuseat Abu Ghraib prison and the March 2004 Madrid bombings -- have caused Poland to weigh thecosts and benefits of its participation in Iraq and reassess its partnership with the United States. Many Poles are also disappointed that their cooperation in the Iraq mission has yet to yield tangiblebenefits. In particular, the Poles had hoped for help in three areas: military assistance, Iraqreconstruction contracts, and U.S. visa policy.
Poland has been an active member of the European Union (EU), and has not always sidedwith the majority; many of its positions within the EU -- and toward its eastern neighbors -- havebeen in accord with U.S. policy preferences that have at times been at odds with EU members. However, some analysts believe that, for economic and social reasons, Poland likely will draw closerto its fellow EU countries over the long term, and may eventually play a leadership role on thecontinent.
This report analyzes Polish foreign policy motivations and trends, and implications forU.S.-Polish relations and U.S. interests in Europe. It will be updated after the 2005 Polish elections. For additional information, see CRS Report RL32966 , Poland: Background and Current Issues, by[author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL32841 | crs_RL32841_0 | Introduction
Border and Transportation Security (BTS) is a pivotal function in protecting the American people from terrorists and their instruments of destruction. The issue for Congress is how to achieve desired levels of security, while not compromising other important values in the process. In a series of three reports, a strategic approach to BTS using a variety of frameworks to clarify objectives and help identify policy options is discussed. This final report builds on the analysis presented in the first two reports, and explores possible new directions and policy options that spring directly from the analytical frameworks contained in those reports. Before doing so, however, it is useful to place this set of activities in the broader context of overall Homeland Security efforts and to review the development of congressional concern and policy approaches up to this point. The Role of Border and Transportation Security in Homeland Security
The homeland security effort can be seen as a series of concentric circles or screens, with the outer screen being that of preventive efforts launched outside the country. The continuum of activities to provide homeland security then moves through progressively smaller circles starting from more distant efforts to closer and more localized measures. The congressional response began with inquiries as to the nature of the terrorist threat and the commissioning of several studies, and was followed by specific, targeted measures to protect the nation following the events of 9/11. Interest in broader, more comprehensive substantive approaches . The Complexity of the Border Security Challenge and Selected Policy Tools Now in Use
The task of providing border and transportation security is complex both because of its scale and possible conflicts with other important national goals. (See CRS Report RL32839, Border Security: The Complexity of the Challenge , by [author name scrubbed].) The current programs designed to accomplish this interception are discussed more fully in the second report in this series: CRS Report RL32840, Border and Transportation Security: Selected Programs and Policies , by Lisa M. Seghetti, [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. The realization that multiple points of vulnerability might be turned into expanded opportunities for interdiction has given rise to the notion of a "layered" approach to security. The basic idea of layering is that multiple and overlapping measures applied at key points in the border security environment could succeed where only more targeted measures might fail because of their rising expense, increasing conflict with other goals, or inability to cover all conceivable risks arising from opportunistic terrorist tactics. Possible New Directions and Policy Options
To pursue a layered approach to border and transportation security would mean applying some measures of security effort to each of the following points of vulnerability/opportunity:
Staff authentication —focusing on any staff involved with the transportation of people or shipment of goods; Passengers —screening anyone traveling on any of the conveyances of concern; Conveyances (passenger or cargo)—monitoring the vessel, car, truck, plane, train used in conveying travelers or goods—including concern for the physical security of the conveyance itself; Access control —implementing a system to achieve and maintain control of the physical space where the conveyances or cargo are either stored, staged, maintained, repaired, loaded, or inspected. | There is consensus that Border and Transportation Security (BTS) is a pivotal function in protecting the American people from terrorists and their instruments of destruction. The issue for Congress is how to achieve desired levels of security, while not compromising other important values in the process. This report addresses possible new approaches and policy options that might be explored by Congress to attain these goals. It is one of three CRS reports in a series that make use of analytical frameworks to better understand complex problems in BTS and to facilitate consideration of alternative policies and practices. (The first report in the series, CRS Report RL32839, Border Security: The Complexity of the Challenge, by [author name scrubbed], analyzes the reasons why BTS is so difficult to achieve. The second report CRS Report RL32840, Border and Transportation Security: Selected Programs and Policies, by Lisa M. Seghetti, [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed], discusses programs now in place. This report is the last in the series).
BTS plays an important role in the broader function of providing homeland security. The overall homeland security effort can be seen as a series of concentric circles or screens, with the outer screen being that of preventive efforts launched outside the country—before terrorists or their weapons can reach the country. The next screen is interdiction efforts at the border and in the transportation system. The continuum of activities then moves through progressively smaller circles ending with emergency preparedness and response. Congressional concern over homeland security began with broad-gauged efforts to learn more about the nature of the terrorist threat, and then moved to much more specific actions following the events of 9/11. Congressional interest in broader, more strategic approaches continues—which makes this review of possible new directions and policy options timely.
Both the complexity of the challenges at the border, and the realization that multiple points of vulnerability might be turned into expanded opportunities for interdiction, have given rise to the notion of a "layered" approach to security. The basic idea of layering is that multiple and overlapping measures applied at several points in the border security environment could be more successful than more targeted measures alone. The problem in hardening a few selected targets is the rising expense of unit costs, increasing conflict with other goals, and/or inability to cover all conceivable risks posed by the shifting and opportunistic nature of terrorist tactics.
To pursue a layered approach to border and transportation security would mean applying some measure of security effort to each of the following points of vulnerability/opportunity: transportation staff, passengers, conveyances, access control, cargo and baggage, ports, and security en route. Several possible policy options are presented that flow directly from the framework presented in the three-part series of CRS reports. Before action is contemplated in any of these areas, however, it would be important to assess the priority of each step, its relative cost-effectiveness, and the level of intrusiveness and possible conflicts with other important social goals (e.g., privacy and civil liberties). This report will not be updated. |
crs_R40470 | crs_R40470_0 | The procedural route for a circuit or district court nomination is as follows: Once the President has submitted such a nomination to the Senate, it is almost invariably referred to the Judiciary Committee. Typically, if the committee votes on a nomination, it votes to report favorably; however, in a very small number of cases, the committee has voted against reporting a nomination, or has voted to report the nomination either unfavorably or without recommendation. If a majority of the committee agrees to any one of the motions to report, the nomination moves to the full Senate. Additionally, the nomination remains in committee if the committee votes against reporting, if there is no committee vote on the nomination, or if the committee votes to table the nomination. Once a lower court nomination is reported to the full Senate by the Judiciary Committee, the nomination is listed on the Senate's Executive Calendar, with Senate consideration of the nomination scheduled by the majority leader. If the Senate, when voting on whether to confirm, rejects the nomination (as has happened on rare occasions), it is returned to the President with a resolution of disapproval. This report identifies, from the 76 th Congress (1939-1941) through the first session of the 113 th Congress (January 3, 2014), 19 U.S. circuit court or district court nominations that received other than a favorable vote from the Senate, the Senate Judiciary Committee, or both. Among these 19 nominations were 18 (or all but one of the nominations) on which the Judiciary Committee voted other than to report favorably. Each cell provides the total number of circuit and district court nominations receiving the final committee and floor actions as indicated by the corresponding row and column. Table 2 lists the nominations to the circuit courts of appeals (7 in all) and district courts (12 in all) in separate sections. Beyond the scope of this report are U.S. circuit and district court nominations which were reported out of the Judiciary Committee and on which the Senate failed to invoke cloture. Two district court nominations were reported to the Senate favorably. One circuit and two district court nominations were ultimately withdrawn by the nominating President. The Senate Judiciary Committee failed to report all but one of these nominees to the full Senate. This was the case for 9 of 12 of the nominations during this period that received other than favorable votes by the Judiciary Committee or the full Senate. | Once a nomination to a U.S. circuit court of appeals or district court judgeship is submitted to the Senate by the President, the Senate almost invariably refers it to the Senate Judiciary Committee. If the Judiciary Committee schedules a vote on a nominee, it usually will vote on a motion to report the nomination favorably. However, the committee could also vote on a motion to report without recommendation, to report unfavorably, or to table the nomination. If the committee votes to report—whether favorably, without recommendation, or unfavorably—the nomination moves to the full Senate. By contrast, the nomination remains in committee if the committee votes against reporting, if there is no committee vote on the nomination, or if the committee votes to table the nomination.
Once a nomination is reported to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee, the nomination is listed on the Senate's Executive Calendar, with Senate consideration of the nomination scheduled by the majority leader. On rare occasions, the Senate, when voting on confirmation, has rejected a circuit or district court nomination. In such cases, the nomination is then returned to the President with a resolution of disapproval.
Between 1939 and the adjournment sine die of the first session of the 113th Congress on January 3, 2014, 19 U.S. circuit or district court nominations received other than a favorable vote from the full Senate, the Senate Judiciary Committee, or both. These 19 nominations represent less than 1.0% of the total circuit and district court nominations during this period. Among these 19 nominations were 7 circuit court nominations and 12 district court nominations.
This report lists the votes cast by the Judiciary Committee and the full Senate on each of the 19 nominations and identifies senatorial courtesy, ideological disagreement, and concern over nominees' qualifications as among the circumstances that led to committee consideration of actions other than a favorable report (or other than approval by the full Senate).
Beyond the scope of this report are U.S. circuit and district court nominations which were reported out of the Judiciary Committee and on which the Senate failed to invoke cloture.
Senate and Senate Judiciary Committee actions on judicial nominations are discussed more generally in CRS Report R43369, U.S. Circuit and District Court Nominations During President Obama's First Five Years: Comparative Analysis With Recent Presidents; and CRS Report R42556, Nominations to U.S. Circuit and District Courts by President Obama During the 111th and 112th Congresses. |
crs_R40528 | crs_R40528_0 | Hostages are also being detained longer, as pirates hold out for ransom payments that now reportedly average over $5 million per ship. Pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, and the waters far off Somalia's eastern coast, including the Arabian Sea, have been attributed to Somali pirates. As of March 2011, Somali pirates had been sighted as far east as off the coast of India, and as far south as the Mozambique Channel. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports that, in 2010, over 1,016 crew members on dozens of hijacked vessels were taken hostage by Somali pirates. Most were released following ransom negotiations, but at least 13 were injured and 8 killed. Attacks on U.S. In addition to an existing advisory warning to U.S. vessels regarding the threat of piracy in the waters off the Horn issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration (MARAD), the U.S. Coast Guard has, in the wake of the Quest attack, issued a warning strongly advising all U.S. registered yachts and sailing vessels against passage in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Somali Basin, and western parts of the Indian Ocean. Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Profile
The Pirates
Several pirate groups currently operate in Somali waters, according to U.N. and independent sources. While these explanations may mask the opportunistic piracy of some, reports suggest that illegal fishing and dumping have disrupted Somalia's coastal economy. One of the unique characteristics of Somali piracy has been the taking of hostages for ransom. This has presented maritime security forces with significant challenges to traditional engagement strategies and tactics. In order to provide a short term response to the immediate threat to international navigation in the region's waters, the U.N. Security Council has authorized third party governments to conduct anti-piracy operations in Somali territorial waters and ashore, but only with authorization from and in coordination with the TFG. In pursuit of that objective, the plan outlined three "lines of action" for U.S. policy:
1) prevent pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain to piracy; 2) disrupt acts of piracy consistent with international law and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag States; and 3) ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their actions by facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates by flag, victim and coastal States, and, in appropriate cases, the United States. In addition to providing expanded material assistance to the Somali Transitional Federal Government to support its efforts to provide security ashore, U.S. officials and military personnel have engaged leaders and officials from the regions of Puntland and Somaliland to encourage them to take action against piracy and to improve coordination with international efforts. A September 2010 GAO assessment of current implementation of the Action Plan and the Obama Administration's wider counter-piracy strategy concluded that "the effectiveness of U.S. resources applied to counter-piracy is unclear because the interagency group responsible for monitoring the Action Plan's implementation has not tracked the cost of U.S. activities—such as operating ships and aircraft and prosecuting suspected pirates—nor systematically evaluated the relative benefits or effectiveness of the Action Plan's tasks." United Nations Security Council
The U.N Security Council has issued a series of resolutions since 2008 to facilitate an international response to Somali piracy. The other option emphasizes increased capacity building assistance for regional governments, which is ongoing. Experts also point to a so-called "catch and release" practice by many international naval forces, in which, by some estimates, 90% of pirates captured by patrols are released because no jurisdiction is prepared to prosecute them. Congress appropriates funding and provides oversight for a number of Administration efforts with implications for piracy in the region. Hundreds of suspected pirates have been apprehended by international navies in recent years. The United Nations and the international Contact Group are currently exploring new mechanisms to expand the options for incarceration, both in Somalia and the broader region. These include measures that can be taken before and during pirate attacks. In the short term, the international community has primarily responded to the threat of piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa with multinational naval patrols, diplomatic coordination, and enhanced self-protection and private security efforts by members of the commercial shipping industry. | Pirate attacks in the waters off Somalia and the Horn of Africa, including those on U.S.-flagged vessels, have brought renewed international attention to the long-standing problem of maritime piracy. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), at least 219 attacks occurred in the region in 2010, with 49 successful hijackings. Somali pirates have attacked ships in the Gulf of Aden, along Somalia's eastern coastline, and outward into the Indian Ocean. Using increasingly sophisticated tactics, these pirates now operate as far east as the Maldives in good weather, and as far south as the Mozambique Channel. Hostage taking for ransom has been a hallmark of Somali piracy, and the IMB reports that more hostages, over 1,180, were taken at sea in 2010 than any year since records began; over 86% of those were taken by Somali pirates.
The increase in pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa is directly linked to continuing insecurity and the absence of the rule of law in war-torn Somalia. The absence of a functioning central government there provides freedom of action for pirates and remains the single greatest challenge to regional security. The lack of law enforcement capacity creates a haven where pirates hold hostages during ransom negotiations that can last for months. Some allege that the absence of Somali coastal security authorities has allowed illegal international fishing and maritime dumping to go unchecked, which in turn has undermined coastal communities' economic prospects, providing economic or political motivation to some pirates. The apparent motive of most pirate groups, however, is profit, and piracy has proven to be lucrative. Somalia's "pirate economy" has grown substantially in the past two years, with ransoms now averaging more than $5 million. These revenues may further exacerbate the ongoing conflict and undermine regional security.
The annual cost of piracy to the global economy ranges from $7 billion to $12 billion, by some estimates. The U.N Security Council has issued a series of resolutions since 2008 to facilitate an international response, which is coordinated by a multilateral Contact Group. The Council has authorized international navies to counter piracy both in Somali territorial waters and ashore, with the consent of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and has also authorized, as an exemption to the U.N. arms embargo on Somalia, support for the TFG security forces.
Counter-piracy patrols by multinational naval forces near Somalia are intended to complement mariners' self-protection measures. Increased patrols and proactive efforts by ships have reduced attacks in the Gulf of Aden, but the U.N. Secretary-General warns that "while the effectiveness of naval disruption operations has increased and more pirates have been arrested and prosecuted, this has not stopped piracy. The trend of the increased levels of violence employed by the pirates as well as their expanding reach is disconcerting." Some suggest that a perception of impunity exists among pirates and financiers; 9 out of 10 Somali pirates apprehended by naval patrols are reportedly released because no jurisdiction is prepared to prosecute them.
The United States has sought to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute Somali piracy through a range of interagency and multilateral coordination and enforcement mechanisms. The Obama Administration has initiated a new "dual track" policy toward Somalia, where some contend that international efforts to build a credible central authority have failed. Congress has examined options to address piracy both diplomatically and militarily. Congress appropriates funding and provides oversight for policy initiatives with implications for piracy in the region, including maritime security assistance to regional governments, support to peacekeeping operations in Somalia, and funding for U.S. Navy operations. Congress continues to debate options for addressing pirate safe havens and improving the prospects for prosecution of pirate suspects. |
crs_R44018 | crs_R44018_0 | Introduction
The unresolved political crisis in the tiny central African nation of Burundi is among several threats to stability and humanitarian welfare in the turbulent Great Lakes region of central Africa. In 2015, President Pierre Nkurunziza—age 53, in office since 2005—was reelected to a third term, despite domestic and international criticism that his candidacy violated a landmark peace agreement signed in 2000. Nkurunziza's third-term bid sparked divisions in the ruling party, an attempted military coup, and an elections boycott by most opposition parties. Regional efforts to broker talks between the government and opposition have stalled, and East African leaders in 2017 have voiced growing acceptance of Nkurunziza's continued tenure and opposition to Western sanctions. Congress has influenced U.S. policy toward Burundi through its authorization and appropriation of foreign aid and through oversight. Several Members have expressed concern about the situation in Burundi, its impact on the region, and its implications for longstanding U.S. efforts to promote stability and democratic governance on the continent. Of particular concern to some is the potential impact on Burundi's participation in the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is fighting the Al Qaeda-linked group Al Shabaab. The full picture of the Trump Administration's approach to Burundi remains to be seen. The Administration's FY2018 budget proposal would also decrease bilateral health and economic aid for Burundi, along with funding for global humanitarian and food aid programs of which Burundi has been a recipient. Statements by U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Nikki Haley decrying human rights violations nonetheless suggest some continuity with the previous Administration's Burundi policy (see " U.S. Policy and Aid "). 310 , which called on the Obama Administration's interagency Atrocities Prevention Board to pay "particular regard" to certain "troubled countries," including Burundi, and the House and Senate each passed resolutions urging respect for constitutional term limits in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Context
Burundi is among the world's poorest countries. Its history has been marked by political instability, military interference in politics, and ethnic violence. Burundi, like neighboring Rwanda, is majority Hutu (estimated at 85%), with minority Tutsi (estimated at 14%) and Twa (1%) ethnic communities, but the two countries' political histories are in some ways mirror-images. Nkurunziza, a Hutu former rebel leader, became president. Violence remained a prominent feature of Burundian politics, however, while high-level corruption became a "serious problem." The government subsequently increasingly restricted the activities of opposition parties, civil society, and independent media. Tit-for-tat killings suggest a widening rift in the army, previously viewed as a triumph of post-conflict integration. The crisis has caused growing ethnic polarization, as elites on both sides have appealed to hardline sentiment and existential fears. At the same time, reports suggest that security forces continue to crack down on perceived opponents of Nkurunziza regardless of ethnicity, and that attacks have often targeted members of the Hutu-led FNL (as during the 2010-2015 period). Also in 2015, President Obama revoked Burundi's eligibility for U.S. trade preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, reauthorized in P.L. The top sources of this assistance have been: 1) the State Department's Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, with some funds provided under the U.S. Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program and others budgeted as U.S. bilateral aid for Somalia; and 2) Defense Department-administered training and equipment provided under authorities enacted by Congress in annual defense authorization measures since FY2006. The evolving U.S. response to the situation in Burundi may raise several issues for Congress. In light of the Burundian military's internal divisions and polarization, Congress may continue to examine the U.S. security assistance that has supported Burundi's deployments in Somalia (where its troops make up a quarter of the authorized total for AMISOM) and the Central African Republic. | This report provides context on the political crisis in Burundi, which is rooted in President Pierre Nkurunziza's decision to run for a third term in 2015, in violation of a landmark peace accord. The crisis has spurred a low-intensity conflict and serious human rights violations, sparking a refugee influx into neighboring states and undermining Burundi's hard-won stability following a civil war in the 1990s. Coinciding with a parallel stand-off over term limits in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the situation in Burundi has implications for longstanding U.S. efforts to promote peace in central Africa's Great Lakes region. It may also impact whether Burundian troops continue to participate in the U.S.-supported regional military operation in Somalia aimed at countering the Al Qaeda-linked group Al Shabaab. Additional potential issues for Congress include the authorization, appropriation, and oversight of any new U.S. funding in support of humanitarian aid, stabilization, and/or civilian protection efforts.
Nkurunziza's ultimately successful third-term bid provoked large protests, an opposition boycott, and a failed military coup d'état in 2015. Since then, regime hardliners have cracked down on dissent, while some opposition figures have sought to mobilize an armed rebellion from outside the country. Many civil society, independent media, and political opposition groups now operate either clandestinely or in exile. Tit-for-tat assassinations have targeted prominent figures on both sides of the political divide. The security forces and ruling party youth wing have been implicated in politically motivated killings, disappearances, torture, and sexual violence. The military, previously viewed as a successful model of post-conflict ethnic integration and donor-backed professionalization, appears increasingly fractured. Already one of the world's poorest countries, Burundi has seen its economy contract due to instability, government policies, and donor aid restrictions. Food insecurity has expanded and the health system has been badly weakened.
A worst-case scenario in Burundi, which could involve a return to civil war, large-scale atrocities, intractable ethnic polarization, and/or a spillover of conflict into the tense surrounding region, has not materialized. Yet international mediation efforts aimed at achieving a political settlement and averting a full-blown crisis have stalled. One reason is that key regional leaders now appear inclined to view Nkurunziza's continued tenure as preferable to alternatives. The next round of elections, slated for 2020, could spark new violence, particularly if Nkurunziza runs again. The president, a former rebel leader, remains popular, by many accounts, among his rural ethnic Hutu constituency. Opposition nonetheless spans Burundi's ethnic divide between majority Hutu (estimated at 85% of the population) and minority Tutsi (estimated at 14%) communities—notably splitting the Hutu-led ruling party. Ruling party efforts to amend the constitution to further undo principles of power-sharing and ethnic balance could also prove destabilizing.
The 114th Congress held multiple hearings to examine the situation in Burundi and trends in the wider Great Lakes region. Congress has also influenced U.S. policy toward Burundi through its authorization and appropriation of foreign aid. The full extent of the Trump Administration's approach to Burundi and the region remains to be seen, but statements by U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Nikki Haley suggest some degree of continuity with the Obama Administration's emphasis on human rights concerns and regional diplomatic engagement. The Trump Administration's FY2018 budget proposal would decrease bilateral health and economic assistance for Burundi, along with funding for global humanitarian and food aid programs of which Burundi has been a recipient. The Administration has not announced plans to alter a 2015 Executive Order that authorizes targeted sanctions in Burundi, or the 2015 suspension of Burundi's eligibility for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). U.S. logistical support for Burundian troops serving in Somalia has also continued, along with a suspension of U.S. pre-deployment training and equipment programs within Burundi. |
crs_R41516 | crs_R41516_0 | They argue that the short-term focus of the current budget process has a dire effect on the long-term budget for several reasons: it allows difficult long-term decisions to be avoided; it hides the long-term effects of certain budgetary decisions; and it does not provide incentives or tangible goals for achieving long-term deficit reduction. To address these concerns, some have recommended modifying the budget process in various ways to focus on the long-term budgetary outlook. This report will provide information on (1) the current horizons used in the budget process, including already existing long-term components; (2) the rationale for increased focus on long-term budgeting; (3) general challenges to long-term budgeting; and (4) an analysis of general proposals that have been made to increase the focus of long-term budgeting in the budget process. This report defines long-term budget process proposals to be those that affect the budget beyond the traditional five- or 10-year budget window. Existing Long-Term Budgeting Components
Some components of the budget process already deal with long-term budget issues. This means that data already exist, in publicly available formats, to assist in evaluating the country's long-term fiscal health. In some instances, data evaluating the long-term outlook of certain programs are currently available, including on those programs which are generally thought of as the most challenging to deal with going forward. Long-term components of the budget process can be separated into two general categories and are currently used for two distinct purposes: long-term budgetary data used for informational purposes and rules affecting long-term outcomes that are used for enforcement purposes. A shift to long-term budgeting alone would not change this fact. These include addressing the automatic nature of most mandatory spending and revenue, projection uncertainty, unforeseen events, underlying projection assumptions, and the problem of trying to bind future Congresses or the President to Congress's current goals. President Obama's National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, several outside groups, and some members of Congress have released or are expected to release proposals with the goal of returning the federal budget to a more sustainable course. Those proposals include extending the current budget window, adopting a multi-year budget process, creating statutory deficit targets, switching from cash-flow accounting to accrual-basis accounting, and increasing the transparency of budget decisions. This would require Congress and the President to submit budget proposals that adhere to those targets. Sequestration is currently used to enforce Statutory PAYGO. | One criticism of the current budget process is that it does not encourage or require the consideration of long-term budgetary concerns. In this context, a long-term concern is one that affects the budget beyond the traditional five- or 10-year budget window as currently used in the congressional budget resolution and the President's budget.
Some components of the budget process already deal with long-term budget issues. This means that data already exist, in publicly available formats, to assist in evaluating the country's long-term fiscal health. In some instances, data evaluating the long-term outlook of certain programs are currently available, including on those programs that are generally thought of as the most challenging to deal with going forward. Long-term components of the budget process can be separated into two general categories and are currently used for two distinct purposes: long-term budgetary data used for informational purposes and rules affecting long-term outcomes that are used for enforcement purposes.
Proponents of more formal long-term budgeting have expressed concerns that the current process allows difficult long-term decisions to be avoided, hides the long-term effects of certain budgetary decisions, and does not provide incentives or tangible goals for achieving long-term deficit reduction. To address these concerns, some have recommended modifying the budget process in various ways to incorporate a long-term budgetary outlook.
Some critics of this approach, however, suggest that information already exists to make long-term evaluations possible, so that a shift to longer-term budgeting alone would not improve the ability of Congress or the President to make the decisions necessary to achieve long-term sustainability of budget policies. Further, some have argued that there are fundamental issues that make successful longer-term budgeting impractical, such as projection uncertainty, unforeseen events, and the problem of trying to bind future Congresses to specific goals.
President Obama's Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, several outside groups, and some members of Congress have released or are expected to release budget and budget process reform proposals. Many proposals contain reform options that focus on a longer-term outlook.
Five major proposals are analyzed in this report: (1) extending the time period of the current budget window to provide greater detail about fiscal challenges ahead and the long-term effects of proposed legislation; (2) employing multi-year budget controls that would require the outyears of the President's budget proposal and the congressional budget resolution to be adhered to; (3) creating annual fiscal targets that could be used either for informational purposes or to enforce specific budgetary outcomes; (4) increasing budget transparency in various ways; and (5) switching from cash-flow accounting to accrual-basis accounting to capture the effects of future entitlements in the current budget. |
crs_94-970 | crs_94-970_0 | It has, however, numerous statutory exceptions (listed at the back of this report), some if not most of which Congress enacted in order to encourage private litigation to implement public policy. Under these exceptions, a federal court (and sometimes a federal agency) may order the losing party to a lawsuit to pay the winning party's attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court has held that the dual standard does not apply under the attorneys' fees provision of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. Awards of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights Cases
All federal civil rights laws permit awards of attorneys' fees and the major litigation concerning fee awards has occurred under these laws. § 7430, authorizes the Internal Revenue Service and federal courts to award attorneys' fees of up to $125 an hour in tax cases in which the United States fails to establish that its position in the proceedings was substantially justified. The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which took effect October 1, 1981, amended § 1988(b) to remove its authorization for awards of attorneys' fees in tax cases. 26 U.S.C. § 2412(a), which provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of this title but not including the fees and expenses of attorneys may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States....
A Senate report said that the 1966 change was enacted to correct the—
disparity of treatment between private litigants and the United States concerning the allowance of court costs.... As things now stand, only in rare cases can costs be awarded against the United States in the event that it is the losing party. In addition, the plaintiff must pay the defendant's costs incurred after such time. § 1983, and several other civil rights statutes. Statutory Limitations on Attorneys' Fees
Some federal statutes and regulations limit the amount attorneys may charge their clients for representing them before various federal agencies. Awards of Attorneys' Fees to Prevailing Criminal Defendants
Until the enactment of P.L. Some courts have interpreted this provision to allow attorneys' fees. Committee Print. The Awarding of Attorneys' Fees in Federal Courts. 4584 and Similar Bills. Taxpayer Protection and Reimbursement Act. Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice. | In the United States, the general rule, which derives from common law, is that each side in a legal proceeding pays for its own attorney. There are many exceptions, however, in which federal courts, and occasionally federal agencies, may order the losing party to pay the attorneys' fees of the prevailing party. The major common law exception authorizes federal courts (not agencies) to order a losing party that acts in bad faith to pay the prevailing party's fees.
There are also roughly two hundred statutory exceptions, which were generally enacted to encourage private litigation to implement public policy. Awards of attorneys' fees are often designed to help to equalize contests between private individual plaintiffs and corporate or governmental defendants. Thus, attorneys' fees provisions are most often found in civil rights, environmental protection, and consumer protection statutes.
In addition, the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) makes the United States liable for attorneys' fees of up to $125 per hour in many court cases and administrative proceedings that it loses (and some that it wins) and fails to prove that its position was substantially justified. EAJA does not apply in tax cases, but a similar statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7430, does.
Most Supreme Court decisions involving attorneys' fees have interpreted civil rights statutes, and this report focuses on these statutes. It also discusses awards of costs other than attorneys' fees in federal courts, how courts compute the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded, statutory limitations on attorneys' fees, and other subjects. In addition, it sets forth the language of all federal attorneys' fees provisions, and includes a bibliography of congressional committee reports and hearings concerning attorneys' fees.
In 1997, Congress enacted a statute allowing awards of attorneys' fees to some prevailing criminal defendants. |
crs_R42558 | crs_R42558_0 | DOD spends billions of dollars per year on fuel, and is pursuing numerous initiatives for reducing its fuel needs and changing the mix of energy sources that it uses. DOD's energy initiatives pose several potential policy and oversight issues for Congress, and have been topics of discussion and debate at hearings on DOD's proposed FY2013 budget. Points that help describe DOD's use of energy include the following:
DOD is by some accounts the largest organizational user of petroleum in the world. Even so, DOD's share of total U.S. energy consumption is fairly small. DOD is by far the largest U.S. government user of energy. The amount of money that DOD spends on petrol eum-based fuels is large in absolute terms , but relatively small as a percentage of DOD's overall budget. Petroleum-based liquid fuels are by far DOD's largest source of energy . When divided by platform t ype, aircraft are DOD's largest user s of petroleum. Installation energy is not defined in law, but in practice refers to energy used at installations, including by non-tactical vehicles, that does not fall under the definition of operational energy. According to DOD, currently about 75% of DOD's energy use is operational energy and about 25% is installation energy. Financial
Financial challenges and risks associated with DOD's reliance on fuel relate to the possibility of a longer-term trend of increasing costs for fuel, and to shorter-term volatility in fuel prices. Operational
Operational challenges and risks associated with DOD's reliance on fuel relate to
the diversion of resources to the task of moving fuel to the battlefield; the negative impact of fuel requirements on the mobility of U.S. forces and the combat effectiveness of U.S. equipment; and the vulnerability of fuel supply lines to disruption. Strategic
Strategic challenges and risks associated with DOD's reliance on fuel relate to getting fuel to the overseas operating area, and ensuring the global free flow of oil. As part of its FY2013 budget submission, DOD is requesting more than $1.4 billion for operational energy initiatives in FY2013. The office is headed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Operational Energy Plans and Programs (ASD(OEPP)), and is responsible for developing DOD policy for operational energy and alternative fuels, and for coordinating operational energy efforts across the services. Past Legislation on DOD Energy Use
Congress has been concerned with energy policy since the 1970s, and has passed legislation relating to federal government energy use, including DOD installation energy use. Congress has set specific energy-reduction targets for DOD installation energy, but not for operational energy. 138c, which states in subsection (b) that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs shall:
(1) provide leadership and facilitate communication regarding, and conduct oversight to manage and be accountable for, operational energy plans and programs within the Department of Defense and the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps;
(2) establish the operational energy strategy;
(3) coordinate and oversee planning and program activities of the Department of Defense and the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps related to -
(A) implementation of the operational energy strategy;
(B) the consideration of operational energy demands in defense planning, requirements, and acquisition processes; and
(C) research and development investments related to operational energy demand and supply technologies; and
(4) monitor and review all operational energy initiatives in the Department of Defense. Data and Metrics for Evaluating DOD's Initiatives
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the status of DOD's efforts to gather data and develop metrics for evaluating DOD energy initiatives. Operational energy is defined in Section 331 as,
"operational energy" means the energy required for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for military operations. | The Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars per year on fuel, and is pursuing numerous initiatives for reducing its fuel needs and changing the mix of energy sources that it uses. DOD's energy initiatives pose several potential oversight issues for Congress, and have been topics of discussion and debate at hearings on DOD's proposed FY2013 budget.
By some accounts, DOD is the largest organizational user of petroleum in the world. Even so, DOD's share of total U.S. energy consumption is fairly small. DOD is by far the largest U.S. government user of energy. The amount of money that DOD spends on petroleum-based fuels is large in absolute terms, but relatively small as a percentage of DOD's overall budget. DOD's fuel costs have increased substantially over the last decade, to about $17 billion in FY2011. Petroleum-based liquid fuels are by far DOD's largest source of energy, accounting for approximately two-thirds of DOD energy consumption. When DOD's fuel use is divided by service, the Air Force is the largest user; when divided by platform type, aircraft are the largest user.
According to DOD, currently about 75% of DOD's energy use is operational energy and about 25% is installation energy. Operational energy is defined in law as "the energy required for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for military operations." Installation energy is not defined in law, but in practice refers to energy used at installations, including non-tactical vehicles, that does not fall under the definition of operational energy.
DOD's reliance on fuel can lead to financial, operational, and strategic challenges and risks. Financial challenges and risks relate to the possibility of a longer-term trend of increasing costs for fuel, and to shorter-term volatility in fuel prices. Operational challenges and risks relate to (1) the diversion of resources to the task of moving fuel to the battlefield; (2) the negative impact of fuel requirements on the mobility of U.S. forces and the combat effectiveness of U.S. equipment, and (3) the vulnerability of fuel supply lines to disruption. Strategic challenges and risks relate to getting fuel to the overseas operating area, and ensuring the global free flow of oil.
As part of its FY2013 budget submission, DOD has requested more than $1.4 billion for operational energy initiatives in FY2013. DOD's office of Operational Energy Plans and Programs, headed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Operational Energy Plans and Programs (ASD (OEPP)), is responsible for developing DOD policy for operational energy and alternative fuels, and for coordinating operational energy efforts across the services.
Congress has been concerned with energy policy since the 1970s, and has passed legislation relating to federal government energy use, including DOD installation energy use. Congress has set specific energy-reduction targets for DOD installation energy, but not for operational energy.
Potential oversight issues for Congress regarding DOD's energy initiatives include:
DOD's coordination of operational energy initiatives being pursued by the military services. DOD's efforts to gather reliable data and develop metrics for evaluating DOD's energy initiatives. DOD's estimates of future fuel costs. DOD's role in federal energy initiatives. The Navy's initiative to help jumpstart a domestic advanced biofuels industry. The potential implications for DOD energy initiatives of shifts in U.S. military strategy. |
crs_R42428 | crs_R42428_0 | This report focuses on the MCH Services Block Grant, which receives the largest single appropriation under Title V. The MCH Services Block Grant is administered by the Maternal and Child Health Bureau (MCHB) of the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Goals
Title V of the Social Security Act established seven broad goals for the MCH Services Block Grant. Programs and Services
The primary use of funds under the MCH Services Block Grant, including formula grants to states, discretionary grants for Special Projects of Regional and National Significance (SPRANS), and discretionary grants for Community Integrated Services Systems (CISS), is to fill gaps in core public health services for low-income mothers and children. Title V programs, including the Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant, serve women and children who are covered by public and private insurance, as well as those who have no insurance coverage. Use of Block Grant Funds
Block grants to states provide funding for core public health services provided by maternal and child health agencies. The four levels of services are infrastructure building, population-based, enabling, and direct health care, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Approximately 15% of MCH Services Block Grant funds are set aside for SPRANS programs. Strategies used include maternal and infant health home visiting; projects to increase participation of obstetricians and pediatricians in Title V and Medicaid; integrated maternal and child health service delivery systems; maternal and child health centers providing pregnancy services for women and preventive and primary care services for infants (up to one year) that operate under the direction of a not-for-profit hospital; maternal and child health projects to serve rural populations; and outpatient and community-based services programs for children with special health care needs who are primarily treated through inpatient institutional care. Of the amount appropriated, an estimated $550.8 million was for block grants to states (86%), $77.1 million was for SPRANS (12%), and $10.3 million was for CISS (2%). The President's budget requested $638.2 million for the program for FY2017. Funding for the MCH Services Block Grant is discretionary and subject to the annual appropriations process. Full-year appropriations for FY2017 have yet to be enacted. Program Participation and Maternal and Child Health Reporting at the State and National Levels
The MCH Services Block Grant has several reporting mechanisms required by law: first, the needs assessment, as discussed in a previous section of this report; second, an annual report, including program participation data, state maternal and child health measures, and state pediatric and family workforce measures; third, an independent audit must be performed every two years. HRSA, in turn, must report to Congress on the activities carried out under the SPRANS and CISS programs, in addition to providing a summary of state reports on block grant activities. Program Participation Data
In FY2014, 59 states and jurisdictions received MCH Services Block Grant Funding. Selected measures are presented in this report to provide readers with context on the maternal and child health issues that Congress has chosen to address through the MCH Services Block Grant. Although these and other indicators are referred to as outcome measures and performance indicators by HRSA, and improvement in these measures is an objective of Title V funding, it is important to note that Title V funding is only one component affecting these measures. Other federal and state programs and policies, including Medicaid, and WIC, as well as complex societal issues, also substantially affect the health and well-being of low-income children and their families. | The Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Services Block Grant program, authorized under Title V of the Social Security Act, is a flexible source of funds that states use to support maternal and child health programs. The program provides grants to states and territories to enable them to coordinate programs, develop systems, and provide a broad range of direct health services. In addition to block grants to states, the MCH Services Block Grant includes a set-aside for Special Projects of Regional and National Significance (SPRANS), and another set-aside for the Community Integrated Service Systems (CISS) program. The Maternal and Child Health Bureau of the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers the block grant. The Maternal and Child Health Bureau of HRSA also receives funding for other maternal and child health programs authorized under both Title V of the Social Security Act and the Public Health Service Act, including maternal and infant home visiting and autism services.
The MCH Services Block Grant received an appropriation of $638.2 million in FY2016. Of that amount, an estimated $550.8 million was for block grants to states (86%), $77.1 million was for SPRANS (12%), and $10.3 million was for CISS (2%). The President's budget requested the same amount for the program in FY2017. Funding for the MCH Services Block Grant is discretionary and subject to the annual appropriations process. Full-year appropriations for FY2017 have yet to be enacted.
Title V programs, including the MCH Services Block Grant, serve women and children who are covered by public and private insurance, as well as those who have no insurance coverage. MCH Services Block Grant funds are distributed for the purpose of funding core public health services provided by maternal and child health agencies. These core services are often divided into four categories: infrastructure-building, population-based, enabling, and direct health care. A wide array of programs is supported in each of these categories, including newborn screening, health services for children with special health care needs, and immunization programs. Another main objective of the MCH Services Block Grant is to increase pediatric workforce capacity, and to link low-income children and families to other services and programs, such as Medicaid.
To receive MCH Services Block Grant funds, states are required to (1) conduct a needs assessment every five years; (2) provide an annual report, including program participation data, state maternal and child health measures, and state pediatric and family workforce measures; and (3) ensure that an independent audit is performed every two years. HRSA, in turn, must report to Congress on the activities carried out under the SPRANS and CISS programs, in addition to providing a summary of state reports on block grant activities.
This report provides MCH Services Block Grant background and funding information. It also includes selected program participation data. Selected maternal and child health indicators are presented to provide readers with context on issues that Congress has sought to address through MCH Services Block Grant funding. Although improvement in these measures is an objective of Title V funding, it is important to note that Title V funding is only one component affecting these measures. Other federal and state health and social services policies, as well as complex societal issues, substantially affect these measures and maternal and child health in general. |
crs_RS22099 | crs_RS22099_0 | Short sellers borrow shares from a broker, sell them, and make a profit if the share price subsequently drops, allowing them to buy back the same number of shares for less money. In other words, short selling is a bet that the price of a stock will fall. In the 1930s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a regulation to prevent bear raiding. The "uptick rule" stated that a short sale may occur only if the last price movement in a stock's price was upward. With smaller corporations, however, the number of shares in circulation may be limited, and brokers may find it difficult to locate shares to deliver to the buyer in a short sale transaction. If it occurs sporadically and on a small scale, naked short selling does not raise serious manipulation concerns. Regulation SHO
After several years of deliberation, the SEC in 2004 adopted rules designed to control abusive naked short selling. On July 15, the SEC issued an emergency order banning naked short sales of the shares of Fannie, Freddie, and 17 other large financial institutions. All short selling (naked or not) of the shares of more than 700 financial firms was banned. The emergency order expired October 8, 2008. On October 1, 2008, in addition to extending the short sale ban announced on September 18, the SEC adopted a "interim final" rule that in effect banned naked short selling in all stocks. This order, in the form of an interim final rule, requires that when a failure to deliver shares within the normal three-day settlement period occurs, the seller's broker must immediately purchase or borrow securities and close out the fail to deliver position by no later than the beginning of trading on the next business day. On July 27, 2009, the SEC made the interim rule permanent. | Short sellers borrow stock, sell it, and hope to profit if they can buy back the same number of shares later at a lower price. A short sale is a bet that a stock's price will fall. A short sale is said to be "naked" if the broker does not in fact borrow shares to deliver to the buyer. When executed on a large scale, naked short sales can constitute a large portion of total shares outstanding, and can put serious downward pressure on a stock's price. Critics of the practice characterize it as a form of illegal price manipulation. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2004 adopted Regulation SHO, a set of rules designed to control short selling abuses, focusing on small-capitalization stocks where the number of shares held by the public was relatively small.
Until the current financial crisis, the SEC did not view short selling of large, blue-chip stocks as a problem. In July 2008, however, the SEC temporarily banned naked short sales of the stock of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 17 other large financial institutions. On September 18, 2008, the SEC banned all short selling of the shares of more than 700 financial companies in an emergency action that expired on October 8, 2008. On October 1, 2008, the SEC adopted an interim rule requiring short sellers' brokers to actually borrow shares to deliver to buyers, within one day after the expiration the normal three-day settlement time frame. The rule was made permanent on July 27, 2009, and it applies to all stocks. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41334 | crs_R41334_0 | More precisely, Section 2339A outlaws:
(1) whoever
(2) [knowingly]
(3)(a) attempts to,
(b) conspires to, or
(c) actually
(4)(a) provides material support or resources, or
(b) conceals or disguises
i. the nature,
ii. location,
iii. source, or
iv. ownership
of material support or resources
(5) knowing or intending that they be used
(a) in preparation for,
(b) in carrying out,
(c) in preparation for concealment of an escape from, or
(d) in carrying out the concealment of an escape from
(5) an offense identified as a federal crime of terrorism. An attempt to provide material support in violation of Section 2339A and actually providing such assistance are punished the same: imprisonment for not more than 15 years (for any term of years or life, if death results from the commission of the offense), and/or a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for an organization) (or not more than twice the amount of gain or loss associated with the offense). Under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction : Unlike Section 2339B, Section 2339A has neither a general nor a descriptive statement of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In its present form, Section 2339B condemns:
(1) whoever
(2) knowingly
(3)(a) attempts to provide,
(b) conspires to provide, or
(c) provides
(4) material support or resources
(5) to a foreign terrorist organization
(6) knowing that the organization
(a) has been designated a foreign terrorist organization, or
(b) engages, or has engaged, in "terrorism" or "terrorist activity." Knowingly : Section 2339B has two knowledge elements. Material Support : The precise scope of the term "material support or resources" for purposes of Section 2339B prove controversial initially. With some additions, the section uses the definition found in Section 2339A(b) and thus covers "any property, tangible or intangible, or service." Under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. Again, neither Section 2339B nor Section 2339A creates a private civil cause of action, but 18 U.S.C. | The material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§2339A and 2339B, have been among the most frequently prosecuted federal anti-terrorism statutes. Section 2339A outlaws:
(1) whoever
(2) [knowingly]
(3)(a) attempting to,
(b) conspiring to, or
(c) actually
(4)(a) providing material support or resources, or
(b) concealing or disguising
(i) the nature,
(ii) location,
(iii) source, or
(iv) ownership of material support or resources
(5) knowing or intending that they be used
(a) in preparation for,
(b) in carrying out,
(c) in preparation for concealment of an escape from, or
(d) in carrying out the concealment of an escape from
(6) an offense identified as a federal crime of terrorism.
Section 2339B outlaws:
(1) whoever
(2) knowingly
(3)(a) attempting to provide,
(b) conspiring to provide, or
(c) actually providing
(4) material support or resources
(5) to a foreign terrorist organization
(6) knowing that the organization
(a) has been designated a foreign terrorist organization, or
(b) engages, or has engaged, in "terrorism" or "terrorist activity."
The sections use a common definition for the term "material support or resources": any service or tangible or intangible property. The Supreme Court in Humanitarian Law Project upheld Section 2339B, as applied, against challenges that it was unconstitutionally vague and inconsistent with the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of association requirements. Violations of Section 2339A are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years; violations of Section 2339B by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. Although neither section creates a civil cause of action for victims, treble damages and attorneys' fees may be available for some victims under 18 U.S.C. §2333. Section 2339B has two extraterritorial jurisdiction provisions. One is general (there is extraterritorial jurisdiction over an offense under this section) and the other descriptive (there is extraterritorial jurisdiction over an offender under this section if the offender is a U.S. national, etc.). Section 2339A has no such provisions, but it is likely applicable overseas at least in cases in which its predicate offenses have extraterritorial reach. This report is an abridged version of CRS Report R41333, Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. §2339A and §2339B, by [author name scrubbed], without some of the discussion, the footnotes, and much of the attributions of authority and quotations found there. |
crs_RS20785 | crs_RS20785_0 | Background and Opening Day Actions
The November 2000 elections caused the Senate to be tied with 50 Republicans and 50 Democrats. 8
Two days later, on the afternoon of January 5, 2001, Senator Daschle presented to the Senate S.Res. The key provisions of the resolution were as follows:
Committees
All Senate committees would have equal numbers of Republicans and Democrats; a full committee chair could discharge a subcommittee from further consideration of a measure or matter, if it was not reported because of a tie vote; and budgets and office space for all committees were equally divided, with overall committee budgets to remain within "historic levels;"
Discharging Measures or Matters
If a measure or nomination was not reported because of a tie vote in committee, the majority or minority leader (after consultation with committee leaders) could move to discharge the committee from further consideration of such measure or nomination; this discharge motion could be debated for four hours, equally divided and controlled by the majority and minority leaders. Agenda Control and Cloture
The agreement prohibited a cloture motion from being filed on any amendable item of business during the first 12 hours in which it is debated; required both party leaders "to seek to attain an equal balance of the interests of the two parties" in scheduling and considering Senate legislative and executive business; and noted that the motion to proceed to any calendar item "shall continue to be considered the prerogative of the Majority Leader," although qualifying such statement with the observation that "Senate Rules do not prohibit the right of the Democratic Leader, or any other Senator, to move to proceed to any item." Supplemental Colloquy, January 8, 2001
On January 8, 2001, the provisions of S.Res. Conclusion
On May 24, 2001, Senator James Jeffords announced his intention to leave the Republican party, to become an Independent, and to caucus with the Senate Democrats. The powersharing agreement in effect in the Senate from January to June of 2001 was an experiment. | The 2000 elections resulted in a Senate composed of 50 Republicans and 50 Democrats. An historic agreement, worked out by the party floor leaders, in consultation with their party colleagues, was presented to the Senate ( S.Res. 8 ) on January 5, 2001, and agreed to the same day. The agreement was expanded by a leadership colloquy on January 8, 2001. It remained in effect until June of 2001, when Senators reached a new agreement to account for the fact that a Senator had left the Republican party to become an Independent who would caucus with the Democratic party.
This report describes the principal features of this and related agreements which provided for Republican chairs of all Senate committees after January 20, 2001; equal party representation on all Senate committees; equal division of committee staffs between the parties; procedures for discharging measures blocked by tie votes in committee; a restriction on the offering of cloture motions on amendable matters; restrictions on floor amendments offered by party leaders; eligibility of Senators from both parties to preside over the Senate; and general provisions seeking to reiterate the equal interest of both parties in the scheduling of Senate chamber business. Also noted is that not all aspects of Senate practice were affected by the powersharing agreement. |
crs_R44553 | crs_R44553_0 | In instances where the President has issued a major disaster declaration, Section 312 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (hereinafter the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288 ) requires federal agencies providing disaster assistance to ensure that individuals and businesses do not receive disaster assistance for losses for which they have already been compensated or may expect to be compensated. Duplication of benefits occurs when compensation from multiple sources exceeds the need for a particular recovery purpose. In such instances, the recipient receiving federal assistance is liable to the United States when the assistance duplicates benefits provided for the same purpose by any other source. The purpose of this report is to
provide a brief review of the SBA Disaster Loan and CDBG-DR programs; identify federal statutory authorities, regulations, and policy guidance documents governing the duplication of benefits in the provision of federal disaster assistance to businesses and individuals; identify issues and conflicts that may arise in interpreting and implementing the federal requirements governing duplication of benefits; highlight key policy considerations with respect to the SBA Disaster Loan Program and CDBG-DR duplication of benefits; and examine legislative policy options that may address issues related to the duplication of benefits in the provision of SBA Disaster Loan and CDBG-DR disaster recovery assistance. Policy Issues
There are several key areas of congressional concern related to the duplication of CDBG-DR assistance and SBA disaster loans, including confusion about the orderly execution of the delivery sequence as dictated by FEMA, how the duplication of benefits policy and the delivery sequence are interpreted, and concerns expressed about fairness, fraud, and delays in rebuilding efforts. A review of the issues surrounding the use of both SBA disaster loans and CDBG-DR assistance in addressing the needs of individuals and businesses engaged in disaster recovery efforts yields several observations:
Despite quality checks and audits, agencies continue to provide duplicative disaster assistance to ineligible individuals and businesses. It has also been argued that the duplication assessment and collection process costs more to conduct than the money recouped. Federal guidelines regarding the process that states may follow in an effort to minimize potential duplication of benefits in the awarding of CDBG-DR are advisory and are not mandated requirements. To some this gives states too much flexibility to determine who is eligible for CDBG-DR. The issue of inequitable treatment includes concerns that
CDBG-DR is not provided for all disasters. Major disasters with similar losses to other major disasters may not benefit from CDBG-DR without affirmative action by Congress to appropriate funds; and in some cases, homeowners were denied CDBG-DR financial assistance because they obtained an SBA disaster loan. To some, it may have appeared that homeowners who took the initiative to repair or rebuild through SBA disaster loans were unfairly penalized. A multitude of assistance sources can be difficult to coordinate and monitor—particularly if the entities are not communicating with each other. Consequently, CDBG-DR is generally provided later than other forms of disaster assistance. This explains, in part, why the delivery sequence is often broken—because other forms of assistance can be provided more quickly. Creating a permanent CDBG-DR might provide a gateway for smaller incidents to receive CDBG-DR assistance. It is not uncommon for SBA loan recipients to see the denial of a CDBG-DR grant as an equity issue. | Numerous nonprofit, private, and governmental organizations provide a wide range of assistance after a disaster strikes. Section 312 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288) requires federal agencies providing disaster assistance to ensure that individuals and businesses do not receive disaster assistance for losses for which they have already been compensated. Duplication of benefits occurs when compensation from multiple sources exceeds the need for a particular recovery purpose. Recipients are liable to the United States when the assistance duplicates benefits provided for the same purpose.
The combination of any type of disaster assistance can cause duplication. This report focuses on duplication of benefits between the Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) grant program and the Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program. Key areas of congressional concern over the past decade with respect to the two programs include:
despite quality checks and audits, agencies continue to provide duplicative disaster assistance to individuals and businesses; duplication assessment and collection process costs often exceed the money recouped; the execution of the required delivery sequence can be complex and confusing because a multitude of assistance sources can be difficult to coordinate and monitor; the execution can also be complex and confusing because CDBG-DR is not listed in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's regulatory sequence procedures; benefits stem from multiple authorities subject to different interpretations; federal guidelines regarding the process that states may follow in an effort to minimize potential duplication of benefits in the awarding of CDBG-DR are advisory and are not mandated requirements. To some this gives states too much flexibility to determine who is eligible for CDBG-DR; disaster victims are sometimes unaware that they received an improper payment and, in some cases, receive collection notices well after they had spent the money on recovery needs.
Equity concerns also stem from the duplication of benefits. These include:
that CDBG-DR is not provided for all disasters. Consequently, some major disasters may benefit from CDBG-DR while others may not—even if they have similar losses; in most cases, SBA disaster loans can be provided more quickly than financial assistance from a CDBG-DR grant. As a consequence, it is possible for some homeowners to receive an SBA disaster loan and later be deemed ineligible when applying for financial assistance from a CDBG-DR grant due to duplication of benefits requirements. To some, it may appear that homeowners who took initiative to repair and rebuild were unfairly penalized.
This report provides a brief description of the SBA Disaster Loan Program and CDBG-DR. It lists relevant authorities, and highlights policy considerations. The report also explores a number of policy options Congress might consider when addressing duplication of benefits issues related to SBA disaster loans and CDBG-DR. These policy options include
requiring FEMA to clarify the regulatory delivery sequence to help eliminate potential confusion; prohibiting SBA disaster loan recipients from receiving CDBG-DR assistance or developing other policy options so that CDBG-DR assistance is awarded uniformly; establishing CDBG-DR assistance as a permanent disaster assistance program; replacing suggested guidelines for the disbursal of CDBG-DR with requirements; investigating the use of a centralized database to identify duplication of benefits more effectively.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_97-357 | crs_97-357_0 | Rules X-XIII are the primary House rules that govern the authority and operations of House committees and subcommittees. Because the committees are the agents of the House, they are obligated to comply with all House directives that apply to them. However, in some respects the House allows each of its committees to decide for itself how to conduct its business. This report identifies and summarizes the provisions of the House's standing rules and certain other directives that affect committee powers, authority, activities, and operations. The report is organized under seven headings: (1) general, (2) establishment and assignments, (3) hearings, markups, and other meetings, (4) reporting, (5) oversight and investigations, (6) funding, staff, and travel, and (7) other duties. | The rules of the House of Representatives, especially Rules X-XIII, govern the authority and operations of its committees and subcommittees. In many respects, the House allows each of its committees to decide for itself how to conduct its business. However, the House does impose various requirements and prohibitions on its committees; and because the committees are the agents of the House, they are obligated to comply with all House directives that apply to them.
This report identifies and summarizes the provisions of the House's standing rules and certain other directives that affect committee powers, authority, activities, and operations. It is organized under seven headings: (1) general, (2) establishment and assignments, (3) hearings, markups, and other meetings, (4) reporting, (5) oversight and investigations, (6) funding, staff, and travel, and (7) other duties. |
crs_RL33755 | crs_RL33755_0 | In December 2010, the 2001-2003 tax cuts, which were set to expire after 2010, were extended for an additional two years ( P.L. 111-312 ). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ) contained temporary provisions that are aimed at middle-class and lower-income families. 112-1240 ) and made permanent at the end of 2015 by the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act ( P.L. 114-113 ). This shift of burden to families with children was changed dramatically by the adoption of the $500 child credits in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and by the increase in that credit to $1,000 in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001. These changes increased the marriage bonus. These provisions were extended on two occasions and were made permanent by the PATH Act ( P.L. These provisions benefit large low-income families and reduce the marriage penalty. For the income tax, this standard might mean that families of the same size with the same income should pay the same tax. Provisions included in the calculations are the rate structure, the most beneficial of standard deductions or itemized deductions (the latter are assumed to be 15% of income, with 5% of income reflecting state and local taxes included in the alternative minimum tax base), personal exemptions, the earned income credit, the child credit, and the alternative minimum tax. Table 2 reports the tax rates for higher-income families. Moreover, the variation across families that have the same ability to pay is substantial. The child credit also contributes to the favorable treatment of families with children, including in the middle and upper middle income levels where it is not phased out. The provisions that increase the phase-out level for the earned income credit reduce tax burdens for low-income joint returns and further reduce marriage penalties and increase marriage bonuses. At the lowest income level, and a 50/50 split, one of the singles files a single return with a very small negative rate because of the small earned income credit for those without children, while the other claims a child and has a much higher negative tax rate than a married couple because there is no phaseout of benefits. Conclusion
The analysis of equity across families suggests that, based on an ability-to-pay standard, families with children are paying lower rates of tax (or receiving larger negative tax rates) than single individuals and married couples at lower and middle incomes, while families with children are being taxed more heavily at higher-income levels. At the lowest income levels, the EIC plus child credits provide the largest tax subsidies to families with two to four children. The smallest subsidies go to childless couples or individuals. At middle-income levels, families with many children will have the most favorable treatment because of the effect of the child credit, which has a very large effect relative to tax liability. At higher-income levels, large families are penalized because the adjustments for children such as personal exemptions and child credits are too small or are phased out, while graduated rates cause larger families that need more income to maintain a given living standard to pay higher taxes. Tax rates are more variable at lower-income levels. At all but the lowest and highest income levels, singles pay higher taxes than married couples without children. | Individual income tax provisions have shifted over time, first in increasing the burden on larger families, and then in decreasing it. These shifts were caused by changing tax code features: personal exemptions, standard and itemized deductions, rates, the earned income credit (EIC), the child credit, and other standard structural aspects of the tax. Some of these features reflect changes made by the 2001 Bush tax cuts, which were extended for an additional two years by P.L. 111-312 and largely made permanent by the American Taxpayer Relief Act (P.L. 112-240). The most recent legislative change was making the temporary provisions liberalizing the child credit and earned income credit enacted in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), and subsequently extended, permanent. These provisions were made permanent at the end of 2015 by the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act (P.L. 114-113).
Taxes as a share of income have decreased for lower-income families and to a lesser extent for middle-income families, while remaining at approximately the same level for higher-income families.
While several standards may be considered in determining equitable treatment of families over family type and size, a standard approach is based on ability to pay, so that large families with the same income as small ones pay less tax. Based on this standard, the analysis of equity across families suggests that families with children are paying lower rates of tax (or receiving larger negative tax rates) than single individuals and married couples at lower and middle incomes. However, families with children are being taxed more heavily at higher-income levels. At the lowest income levels, the EIC provides the largest tax subsidies to families with three children. The smallest subsidies go to childless couples. At middle-income levels, families with many children will have the most favorable treatment, due to the effect of the child credit, which has a very large effect relative to tax liability. At higher-income levels, large families are penalized because the adjustments for children, such as personal exemptions and child credits, are too small or are phased out, while graduated rates cause larger families that need more income to maintain a given living standard to pay higher taxes. Tax rates are more variable at lower-income levels. At all but the lowest and highest income levels, singles pay higher taxes than married couples.
The analysis of the marriage penalty indicates that marriage penalties have largely been eliminated for those without children throughout the middle-income range, but this change has inevitably expanded marriage bonuses. Marriage penalties remain at the high and low income levels and could also apply to those with children, where the penalty or bonus is not very well defined. But by and large, the current system is likely to encourage rather than discourage marriage and favors married couples over singles.
The analysis of equity across families suggests that increases in earned income tax credits for those without children would lead to more equal treatment based on the ability to pay approach, while full refundability of the child credit would exacerbate inequalities. At the higher end of the scale, eliminating phase outs of provisions that differentiate across families would probably lead to more equitable treatment, and limiting or repealing the alternative minimum tax would reduce the burden of taxes on families with children at upper middle-income levels as well as marriage penalties. |
crs_R41949 | crs_R41949_0 | Thirty-two U.N. funds, programs, agencies, departments, and offices play a role in international development. Congress appropriates funds to several U.N. entities involved in development, and as such has demonstrated an ongoing interest in UNDS efforts, including:
the role and efficiency of the U.N. system, and multilateral assistance as a whole, in international development; the U.N. system's effectiveness in providing development assistance at the country level; and the level of U.S. funding of such activities, most recently in light of the global financial crisis, economic recession, and calls to reduce the U.S. budget deficit. The UNDS aims to help countries achieve social and economic progress by undertaking or supporting a range of operational and normative development activities—including technical assistance, setting and facilitating technical standards and norms, providing forums for intergovernmental cooperation and policy-sharing, advocacy and awareness raising, and research and data collection. The panel found that U.N. development assistance was "fragmented and weak," contributing to inefficiencies and duplication across the U.N. development system, particularly at the country level. Most U.N. entities are independent international intergovernmental organizations with distinct rules, membership, and financial resources. This had led some policymakers in the United States, including Members of Congress, to question whether providing financial contributions to UNDP and, more broadly, other parts of the UNDS, is the most effective use of U.S. foreign assistance dollars. This universal membership provides it with a neutrality and legitimacy not enjoyed by other development organizations. In 2009, the UNDS spent approximately $14.7 billion on development-related activities, compared with $8.7 billion in 2004. When discussing U.N. system development activities in U.N. forums, Administration officials have consistently raised the importance of:
achieving overall coherence at the country level , which includes enhancing and recognizing the important role of the U.N. Resident Coordinator, strengthening the individual capacities and coordination of U.N. entities, and supporting the concept of country ownership in the development process; improving transparency and accountability through enhanced oversight, such as results-based budgeting and greater access to audit information to ensure that expenditures are accounted for and that programs demonstrate effective results; and improving evaluation mechanisms to better demonstrate the effectiveness of UNDS activities to donors and host countries, and to provide mechanisms for organizations to measure their effectiveness. The following sections highlight two issues that might be of particular significance to the 112 th Congress as it considers U.S. participation in and funding of the UNDS: (1) the impact of limiting U.S. contributions to U.N. system entities, and (2) the benefits and drawbacks of multilateral versus bilateral assistance. Many donors contend that through bilateral aid they have more control over how and where their money is spent. Experts maintain that it benefits the United States because it allows the government to share development costs and resources with other governments and organizations (often referred to as burden sharing). Accordingly, they have implemented reforms that have generally been undertaken every 10 to 15 years, usually with mixed results. During the last decade, some of these reform efforts, such as the establishment of the UNDG to coordinate UNDS activities, have demonstrated progress. Generally, however, experts agree that additional changes, some of which are discussed below, are needed for the current system to operate as efficiently and effectively as possible. Congress may wish to view U.S. participation in the UNDS in this broader context. This is due primarily to the decentralized nature of the U.N. system; the autonomy of U.N. agencies, funds, and programs; and disagreements among the United Nations' 193 member states on the mandate and role of the U.N. development system. In the United States, the role of the United Nations in U.S. foreign assistance will likely remain a point of continuous debate for policymakers as they aim to balance domestic concerns and the recession on the one hand, with key foreign policy and development priorities on the other. | Members of Congress continue to demonstrate an ongoing interest in the efficiency and effectiveness of United Nations (U.N.) development activities, both in the context of U.N. reform and broader U.S. development and foreign assistance efforts. Thirty-two U.N. agencies, funds, programs, and offices play a role in development. These entities, collectively referred to as the U.N. development system (UNDS), are independent intergovernmental organizations with distinct mandates, rules, membership, and financial resources. They work to help countries achieve social and economic progress through a range of development activities—including program implementation, technical assistance, providing forums for intergovernmental cooperation, setting and facilitating international standards and norms, advocacy and awareness raising, and research and data collection. In 2009, U.N. system development-related expenditures were estimated at $14.7 billion and accounted for 41% of all U.N. system-wide contributions.
Many experts and policymakers recognize the unique role that the United Nations plays in development. In their view, the United Nations' universal membership provides it with a neutrality, legitimacy, and convening power not enjoyed by countries and other development organizations. At the same time, however, the United Nations has been criticized for lacking effectiveness and cohesion in its development activities, particularly at the country level. Some experts suggest that the decentralized nature of the U.N. system has had an unfavorable impact on development coordination, accountability, and information-sharing efforts. To address these issues, U.N. member states have implemented incremental reforms every 10 to 15 years. While some of these reforms have shown progress, experts generally agree that additional changes are needed for the UNDS to operate as effectively as possible.
The United States is the largest contributor to the U.N. system as a whole and is often one of the top financial contributors to UNDS entities. It holds leadership roles in U.N. governance mechanisms and annually appropriates funding to UNDS organizations. Given the extent of U.S. participation in and funding of the UNDS, the 112th Congress may raise questions regarding:
The overall effectiveness of the UNDS, particularly at the country level—A 2006 report on U.N. system-wide coherence found that U.N. development assistance was "fragmented and weak," contributing to inefficiencies and duplication across the UNDS. Members of Congress may wish to consider ways to improve UNDS activities by examining current challenges and reform efforts. The level and extent of U.S. contributions to the UNDS—During the past decade, some U.S. policymakers have raised concerns about perceived lack of transparency and accountability within the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) and the UNDS. Consequently, some Members of Congress have debated whether providing financial contributions to UNDP and, more broadly, other parts of the UNDS, is an effective use of U.S. foreign assistance. The benefits and drawbacks of multilateral versus bilateral assistance—The role of the United States in the UNDS plays into broader discussions about U.S. foreign assistance and the role of multilateral and bilateral aid in achieving U.S. foreign policy and national security goals. Some contend that bilateral aid provides the government with control over how money is spent. On the other hand, many argue that multilateral aid, including contributions to the UNDS, allows the government to share development costs with other donors. |
crs_RL32306 | crs_RL32306_0 | The measure was enacted into law on December 8, 2004 ( P.L. The bill includes funding for the Department of the Interior (DOI), except for the Bureau of Reclamation (funded in Energy and Water Development Appropriations laws), and for some agencies or programs in three other departments—Agriculture, Energy, and Health and Human Services. Many controversial issues arose during consideration of the FY2004 Interior and related agencies appropriations bill. FY2005 Budget and Appropriations
Current Overview
Annual appropriations for Interior and related agencies were included in P.L. 108-447 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005. The law contains a total of $20.09 billion for Interior and related agencies, including two across-the-board rescissions in the law, of 0.594% and 0.80%. The total includes $493.1 million for emergency firefighting if certain conditions are met. 4568 , the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations bill for FY2005, was passed by the House (334-86) on June 17, 2004. The bill also contained $20.03 billion. H.R. On September 14, 2004, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its bill ( S. 2804 , S.Rept. 108-341 ) with $20.26 billion, including $500 million in supplemental fire funds. Both the House-passed and Senate Committee-reported bills reflected an increase over the President's FY2005 request ($19.69 billion), but a decrease from the FY2004 enacted level ($20.51 billion). Similarly, both the House-passed and Senate Committee-reported bills included $500 million for emergency firefighting for FY2005; emergency funds would become available if certain conditions are met. Prior to enactment of P.L. 108-447 , a series of continuing resolutions were enacted to provide temporary funding for FY2005 for Interior and related agencies. The FY2005 law includes changes to wild horse and burro management on federal lands. Yukon Flats Land Exchange
The appropriation for Land Acquisition provides funds to FWS for acquisition of lands for waterfowl habitat in the Yukon Flats National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska and the related conveyance of federal lands and interests in the Refuge to Doyon, Limited, an Alaska Native Corporation. These funding levels represent a slight increase over FY2004 levels. Another provision in the FY2005 law pertains to categorical exclusions for grazing. Other provisions were considered but not enacted. FY2005 funding for other fire operations totals $671.8 million, $17.4 million (3%) more than the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended, and $12.2 million (2%) less than the House-passed level. For FY2005, Congress enacted $138.1 million for NEH, a decrease of (3%) from the House-passed bill ($142.0 million) and of 15% from the FY2005 budget ($162.0 million), but an increase of 2% over the FY2004 appropriation and the Senate committee-reported bill (both $135.3 million). House Committee on Appropriations http://appropriations.house.gov/
Senate Committee on Appropriations http://appropriations.senate.gov/
CRS Appropriations Products Guide http://www.crs.gov/products/appropriations/apppage.shtml
Congressional Budget Office http://www.cbo.gov/
General Accounting Office http://www.gao.gov
House Democratic Caucus http://www.dems.gov/
House Republican Conference http://www.gop.gov/
Office of Management and Budget http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
Senate Democratic Conference http://www.democrats.senate.gov/
Senate Republican Policy Committee http://rpc.senate.gov/
Title I: Department of the Interior16
Department of the Interior (DOI) http://www.doi.gov/
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) http://www.blm.gov/nhp/index.htm
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) http://www.fws.gov/
Historic Preservation http://www2.cr.nps.gov/
Insular Affairs http://www.doi.gov/oia/index.html
Minerals Management Service (MMS) http://www.mms.gov/
National Park Service (NPS) http://www.nps.gov/
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) http://www.osmre.gov/osm.htm
Office of Special Trustee for American Indians http://www.ost.doi.gov/
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) http://www.usgs.gov/
Title II: Related Agencies
Departments
Agriculture, Department of (USDA) http://www.usda.gov/
Department of Agriculture: U.S. Forest Service http://www.fs.fed.us/
Energy, Department of (DOE) http://www.doe.gov/engine/content.do
Energy Budget http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/05budget/
Energy Conservation Programs http://www.eere.energy.gov/
Fossil Energy http://www.fe.doe.gov/
Naval Petroleum Reserves http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/reserves/npr/
Strategic Petroleum Reserve http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/reserves/spr/
Health and Human Services, Department of (HHS) http://www.dhhs.gov/
Indian Health Service (IHS) http://www.ihs.gov/
Agencies
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation http://www.achp.gov
Institute of American Indian and Alaska Native Culture and Arts Development http://www.iaiancad.org/
Institute of Museum and Library Services http://www.imls.gov/
John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts http://Kennedy-Center.org/
National Capital Planning Commission http://www.ncpc.gov
National Endowment for the Arts http://arts.endow.gov/
National Endowment for the Humanities http://www.neh.gov/
National Gallery of Art http://www.nga.gov/
Smithsonian Institution http://www.si.edu/
U.S. | The Interior and related agencies appropriations bill includes funds for the Department of the Interior (DOI), except for the Bureau of Reclamation, and for some agencies or programs within three other departments—Agriculture, Energy, and Health and Human Services. It also funds numerous related agencies. H.R. 4568, the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations bill for FY2005, was passed by the House (334-86) on June 17, 2004. The bill contained $20.03 billion. The Senate companion bill, S. 2804, was reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations (S.Rept. 108-341) on September 14, 2004 and would have provided $20.26 billion. Both the House passed and Senate committee-reported bills reflected an increase over the President's FY2005 request ($19.69 billion), but a decrease from the FY2004 enacted level ($20.51 billion). Both FY2005 bills included $500 million for emergency firefighting for FY2005, with emergency funds available if certain conditions are met.
FY2005 appropriations for Interior and related agencies ultimately were included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (P.L. 108-447; December 8, 2004). The law contains a total of $20.09 billion for Interior and related agencies, including $493.1 million for emergency firefighting if certain conditions are met. These figures reflect two across-the-board rescissions in the law, of 0.594% and 0.80%. The FY2005 total is a decrease of $424.6 million (2%) from the FY2004 level, but an increase of $403.3 million (2%) over the FY2005 request. Also, the FY2005 total is more than ($59.4 million, 0.3%) the House passed level, but less than ($167.3 million, 0.8%) the amount reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations. Prior to enactment of P.L. 108-447, a series of continuing resolutions were enacted to provide temporary funding for FY2005 for Interior and related agencies.
The House, Senate, and conference committee debated many controversial policy issues during consideration of FY2005 funding. They included the appropriate funding level for wildland fire fighting, land acquisition, and the arts; agency competitive sourcing activities; agency maintenance backlogs; Indian trust fund management; Outer Continental Shelf leasing; filling the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR); alteration of the Abandoned Mine Lands fund; snowmobiling in Yellowstone National Park; management of wild horses and burros on federal lands; categorical exclusions for grazing on Forest Service lands; and Missouri River management. Other contentious provisions related to lands and resources in Alaska, such as development of roads in the Tongass National Forest (AK); challenges to logging projects in Alaska; and an exchange of lands in the Yukon Flats National Wildlife Refuge (AK). Some of the controversial provisions (both general and Alaska related) were not enacted into law. |
crs_RL31861 | crs_RL31861_0 | Introduction
Since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, policymakers have been attempting to decreasethe vulnerability of the United States to the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. This reportdescribes the different types of high-threat chemical agents. It also discusses their availability,treatment, and detection, and possible policy approaches to reducing the threat posed by them. Terrorist use of chemical agents is widely believed to be an event that has low probability, but potentially high consequences. While there is still debate over whether terrorist groups have anincreased interest in chemical acquisition and use, the domestic vulnerability of the United Statesto chemical attack remains high. Treatments for chemical exposure vary as well, dependingon the type of chemical, and so must be addressed on a chemical by chemical basis. What Are High-Threat Chemical Agents? Different chemical weapons cause different symptoms in and injuries to their victims. While the nerve and blister agents are predominantly only manufactured and used by militaries asweapons, both choking agents and blood agents include chemicals widely used in industrialprocesses. Nerve agents interfere with the nervous system, causing overstimulation of muscles. Gas mask filters equipped with chemical filters are effective against inhaled chemical agents, butmay not provide sufficient protection against chemical agents active on skin contact, such as VX ormustard agents, or high concentrations of other nerve agents. Detection of Chemical Agents
Chemical weapons detection has been predominantly an area of concern for military planners,although the manufacture of some of these agents for commercial use requires detection capabilitiesat manufacturing plants and by hazardous- materials first responders. While some military unitshave equipment designated for chemical weapon detection, civilian first responders use a variety ofcommercial equipment to detect and identify a wide range of chemicals. (49)
Chemical Agents as Weapons of Terror Rather Than as Weapons of Mass Destruction
Many experts believe that it would be difficult for terrorist groups to use chemical agents asweapons of mass destruction. Blister agents, while not likely to cause mass destruction, mightcause mass terror and injury. It has been suggested that the chemical agent used in thosevideotapes was a blood agent, most likely hydrogen cyanide. The Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate will fund research and development activities against chemical terrorism. It is located atIndian Head, Maryland, and could be deployed in the case of chemical terrorism. Policy Implications
There are several areas where policymakers may wish to further address the danger posed byterrorist acquisition and use of high-threat chemical agents: the availability of such chemical agents;the availability of chemical detectors, their sensitivity, and their use; the ability of first respondersand diagnostic laboratories to detect, respond to, and resolve a chemical attack; the development ofnew treatments and prophylaxis; and determining whether an appropriate amount of funds andfederal attention is being given to this topic. (92)
Chemical Detector Research
Policymakers may wish to direct or increase research efforts in developing reliable, sensitive chemical agent detectors. | Terrorist use of chemical agents has been a noted concern, highlighted after the Tokyo Sarin gas attacks of 1995. The events of September 11, 2001, increased Congressional attention towardsreducing the vulnerability of the United States to such attacks. High-threat chemical agents, whichinclude chemical weapons and some toxic industrial chemicals, are normally organized by militaryplanners into four groups: nerve agents, blister agents, choking agents, and blood agents. While therelative military threat posed by the various chemical types has varied over time, use of thesechemicals against civilian targets is viewed as a low probability, high consequence event.
High-threat chemical agents, depending on the type of agent used, cause a variety of symptoms in their victims. Some cause death by interfering with the nervous system. Some inhibit breathingand lead to asphyxiation. Others have caustic effects on contact. As a result, chemical attacktreatment may be complicated by the need to identify at least the type of chemical used. Differencesin treatment protocols for the various high-threat agents may also strain the resources of the publichealth system, especially in the case of mass casualties. Additionally, chemical agents trapped onthe body or clothes of victims may place first responders and medical professionals at risk.
Protection from and detection of chemical agents is an area of much concern. The range of protection and detection equipment available to first responders has led to questions regardingequipment standardization and state and local preparedness.
Whether terrorist groups are capable of using chemical agents as weapons of mass destruction is unclear. Some have asserted that the volumes of chemicals required to cause mass casualtieswould make that scenario unlikely. They claim that chemical terrorism is more likely to be smallin scale. Others have suggested that there has been an increase in terrorist interest regardingchemical agents, and that this interest could lead to their use in terrorist attacks.
Current policies seek to reduce the proliferation of chemicals that could be transformed into chemical weapons, prevent unrestricted access to large amounts of toxic chemicals, provide federalassistance to locations that are affected by chemical terrorism, and support research and developmentactivities. It is expected that the Department of Homeland Security will take a major role in federalpolicy efforts.
Additional measures suggested for addressing potential chemical terrorism vulnerabilities include further restricting domestic access to precursor chemicals and technologies required tomanufacture high-threat chemical agents; directing continued research and development intoselective, sensitive chemical agent detectors; implementing air monitoring equipment to detectchemical releases in, for example, public transportation or urban spaces; and overseeing furtherresearch into protective equipment, prophylaxis, and treatment against high-threat chemicals. Thisreport will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_RL33411 | crs_RL33411_0 | The Great Lakes are recognized by many as an international natural resource that has been significantly altered over the last two centuries. The U.S. Congress has recognized the importance of the Great Lakes ecosystem and has played a role in restoration efforts in the Great Lakes. Congress has enacted more than 30 federal laws specifically focused on restoring aspects of the Great Lakes basin. Its purpose is to provide strategic direction on federal Great Lakes policy. The task force, in collaboration with the Council of Great Lakes Governors, the Great Lakes Cities Initiative, Great Lakes tribes, and the Great Lakes Congressional Task Force, convened a group known as the Great Lakes Regional Collaboration. The first goal of the Collaboration was to create a workable strategy to restore and protect the Great Lakes within one year of the creation of the task force. The second goal of the Collaboration is to serve as a forum for addressing regional issues related to the protection and restoration of the Great Lakes. Great Lakes Regional Collaboration Strategy
The Strategy is a series of recommendations for actions and activities aimed at restoring the Great Lakes ecosystem. Recommendations from the Strategy are intended to be implemented over the next five years and represent the highest priorities for restoration, according to the strategy teams. The Strategy encompasses eight issue areas: aquatic invasive species, fish and wildlife habitat (habitat/species), coastal health, contaminated sediments, nonpoint source pollution, toxic pollutants, indicators and information, and sustainable development. The estimated costs represents the sum of federal and nonfederal contributions. The Collaboration emphasizes that the Strategy is not meant to chart out the complete restoration of the Great Lakes ecosystem, and that decisions to implement activities affecting the Great Lakes should be guided by the Strategy. Some have asserted that $20 billion over five years is too high for restoring the Great Lakes ecosystem, and cite funding totals for other large-scale ecosystem restoration initiatives, namely the Florida Everglades, which has a total estimated cost of $10.5 billion. Some proponents also contend that one of the main barriers to restoration in the Great Lakes is inadequate funding. Governance
The Collaboration and Strategy were created partly to improve coordination of ecosystem restoration activities in the Great Lakes among federal, state, and local stakeholders. Fish and Wildlife Service to conduct regional projects. | The Great Lakes are recognized by many as an international natural resource that has been significantly altered over the past two centuries by human development. Problems in the Great Lakes include poor water quality, degraded fish and wildlife habitat, contaminated sediments, and non-native invasive species, among others. Restoration of the Great Lakes ecosystem has emerged as a top priority among a wide variety of federal, state, and local stakeholders, and among several members of Congress. In the past few decades, the U.S. Congress has enacted more than 30 federal laws specifically focused on restoring aspects of the Great Lakes basin.
Attention to restoration in the Great Lakes was heightened in 2004 with the creation of a federal Great Lakes Interagency Task Force. The purpose of the task force is to provide strategic direction for Great Lakes policies on restoration and to form a regional collaboration of stakeholders interested in restoring the Great Lakes ecosystem. The latter purpose was accomplished with the creation of the Great Lakes Regional Collaboration in 2004. The Collaboration, which consists of over 1,500 stakeholders, recently released the Great Lakes Regional Collaboration Strategy, a plan for restoring the Great Lakes ecosystem. The Strategy is a series of recommendations for actions and activities aimed at starting the restoration of the Great Lakes ecosystem over the next five years. The Strategy encompasses eight issue areas: aquatic invasive species, fish and wildlife habitat (habitat/species), coastal health, contaminated sediments, nonpoint source pollution, toxic pollutants, indicators and information, and sustainable development. The total cost of implementing the Strategy is estimated to be $20 billion over five years.
Some have criticized the Strategy for being too costly, relying too heavily on new sources of funding, and not establishing a governance structure to coordinate implementation. Proponents of the Strategy contend that the estimated funding needs for the Great Lakes ecosystem match the size and breadth of the ecosystem, and are similar to those of other large-scale ecosystem restoration initiatives, such as the Everglades and Chesapeake Bay. Further, they contend that one of the functions of the Interagency Task Force is to provide governance, and to oversee and coordinate restoration activities in the Great Lakes. This report summarizes the Strategy, analyzes issues related to the Strategy and its implementation, and discusses federal legislation related to restoration in the Great Lakes. |
crs_RL31625 | crs_RL31625_0 | Introduction
Title VI of the Higher Education Act (HEA, P.L. 89-329, as amended)—International Education Programs—authorizes a variety of grants to institutions of higher education (IHEs) and related institutions for the purpose of enhancing instruction in foreign language and area studies (FLAS). This is one of the oldest, continuous programs of federal support to higher education, having been initiated as Title VI of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 (NDEA, P.L. The long history of this program reflects the special priority placed by the federal government on FLAS, especially with respect to diplomacy, national security, and trade competitiveness. Interest in HEA Title VI and other federal programs supporting FLAS has increased recently as a result of concerns regarding terrorism arising from foreign regions which are infrequently included in American postsecondary curricula, and a related interest in greater expertise in those areas. As can be seen in Table 1 , while HEA Title VI authorizes a relatively large number of distinct activities, approximately three-fifths of the funds are used for two of these programs: National Language and Area Centers (NLACs) and FLAS Fellowships. This pair of programs has long been the core activity supported under Title VI, while the others are smaller-scale supplementary activities intended to serve more specific goals (e.g., the Business and International Educational Education or Institute for International Public Policy Programs) and/or to support the two primary programs (e.g., the Language Resource Center or International Research and Studies programs). Should the Federal Government Continue to Support Foreign Language and Area Studies in American Institutions of Higher Education Through HEA Title VI? There appears to be broad agreement that interaction between American society and people and cultures from throughout the world is increasing steadily, in some cases generating national security concerns involving nations large and small. Further, since it may be impossible to predict which additional nations will generate such concern in the future, and substantial time is required to develop the necessary human capital, it is important to provide ongoing support for instruction in all of the world's major languages and cultures, and even many of the minor ones. Rather it may be questioned whether such support should be provided specifically by the federal government and if so, whether it should be focused on the nation's colleges and universities, on federally-operated institutions which are dedicated to providing instruction to government employees, or both. Are HEA Title VI Programs Appropriately Coordinated with Other Federal Efforts to Support Advanced Foreign Language and Area Studies? Should There Be Increased Targeting of Title VI Grants on Foreign Languages and World Regions of "Critical" Interest to the Federal Government? | Title VI of the Higher Education Act (HEA)—International Education Programs—authorizes a variety of grants to institutions of higher education (IHEs) and related entities to enhance instruction in foreign language and area studies (FLAS). This is one of the oldest U.S. Department of Education (ED) programs of support to higher education, having been initiated as Title VI of the National Defense Education Act of 1958. This program reflects the special priority placed by the federal government on FLAS, especially with respect to diplomacy, national security, and trade competitiveness. Interest in HEA Title VI and other federal programs supporting FLAS has increased recently due to concerns regarding terrorism arising from foreign regions which are infrequently included in American postsecondary curricula.
Although HEA Title VI authorizes several distinct activities, approximately three-fifths of the funds are used for two of these—National Language and Area Centers (NLACs) and FLAS Fellowships. This pair of programs has long been the core activity supported under Title VI, while the others are smaller-scale supplementary activities intended to serve more specific goals (e.g., the Business and International Educational Education Program) or to support the two primary programs (e.g., the Language Resource Center program).
There appears to be broad agreement that interaction between American society and people and cultures from throughout the world is increasing steadily, generating national security concerns involving nations large and small. International education advocates argue that since it may be impossible to predict which nations will generate such concern in the future, and substantial time is required to develop the necessary human capital, it is important that ongoing support be provided from some source for instruction in all of the world's significant languages and cultures. However, it may be questioned whether this support should be provided by the federal government, and whether it should be focused on the nation's colleges and universities, on federally operated language schools, or both.
It is likely that the 110th Congress will consider reauthorizing the HEA. Major reauthorization issues regarding HEA Title VI include the following: Should the federal government continue to support foreign language and areas studies in American institutions of higher education through HEA Title VI? Are HEA Title VI programs appropriately coordinated with other federal efforts to support advanced foreign language and area studies? And, should there be increased targeting of Title VI grants on foreign languages and world regions of "critical" interest to the federal government?
This report will be updated periodically, in response to relevant legislative or budgetary actions. |
crs_R43466 | crs_R43466_0 | Introduction
Children in foster care are more likely to have mental health care needs than children generally. They are also more likely than other children to receive psychotropic medications, which are prescribed drugs that affect the brain chemicals related to mood and behavior. Psychotropic medications are used to treat a variety of mental health conditions including attention disorders, depression, anxiety, conduct disorders, and others. Children in foster care are placed in another setting that is designed to provide round-the-clock care (e.g., foster family home, group home, child care institution). Most children enter foster care because of neglect or abuse experienced at the hands of their parents, although a child's behavior problem may also be a factor in foster care placement. Maltreatment by a parent or other caregiver is stressful for children and may alter how their brains develop in ways that lead them to have more difficulty regulating their emotions and interpreting cues and communication from others. In general, children who have mental health challenges may benefit from health care services that could include psychosocial treatment, such as counseling and case management from mental health professionals. Use of Psychotropic Drugs by Children in Foster Care
Between 16% and 33% of children in out-of-home care may be using psychotropic medication on any given day, although the rate of use varies significantly based on certain factors, including the child's age, placement setting, and length of involvement with the child welfare agency. The use of psychotropics by children in foster care has come under growing scrutiny by policymakers and stakeholders in the child welfare field. Despite these concerns, some children in foster care may benefit from psychotropic medication for managing symptoms and issues associated with mental health and behavior concerns stemming from their exposure to complex trauma, particularly if this treatment is coupled with psychosocial services. Congressional Oversight
Congress has taken an interest in oversight of prescription medications used by children in foster care. Current Federal Provisions Related to the Oversight of Health Care for Children in Foster Care
As noted previously, under the Stephanie Tubbs Jones Child Welfare Services Program (Title IV-B, Subpart 1 of the Social Security Act) states must develop a coordinated strategy and oversight plan to ensure access to health care, including mental health services and dental care, for all children in foster care. The coordinated strategy must outline
a schedule for initial and follow-up health screenings that meet reasonable standards of medical practice; how health needs identified through screenings, including emotional trauma associated with a child's maltreatment and removal from home, will be monitored and treated; how medical information for children in care will be updated and appropriately shared, which may include the development and implementation of an electronic health record; steps to ensure continuity of health care services, which may include the establishment of a medical home for every child in care; the oversight of prescription medicines, including protocols for the appropriate use and monitoring of psychotropic medications (italics added for emphasis); how the state actively consults with and involves physicians or other appropriate medical or nonmedical professionals in assessing the health and well-being of children in foster care and in determining appropriate medical treatment for the children; and steps to ensure that the components of the transition plan development process related to the health care needs of children aging out of foster care are met. The guidance noted that children in foster care may be more likely to receive psychotropic medication, and may not be prescribed psychotropics properly, because of the complexity of their symptoms and the lack of appropriate screening, assessment, and treatment. FY2017 Request: Demonstration to Address "Over-Prescription" of Psychotropic Medication for Children in Foster Care105
President Obama's FY2017 budget proposed a five-year joint initiative between CMS and ACF to reduce reliance on psychotropic medications for children in foster care and improve their well-being. | Children in foster care are children that the state has removed from their homes and placed in another setting designed to provide round-the-clock care (e.g., foster family home, group home, child care institution). The large majority of children enter foster care because of neglect or abuse at the hands of their parents. Maltreatment by a caregiver is often traumatic for children, and may lead to children having challenges regulating their emotions and interpreting cues and communication from others, among other problem behaviors. Children in foster care are more likely to have mental health care needs than children generally.
Children in foster care who have mental health needs may receive psychosocial services such as individual or group counseling and case management to improve their health. Alternatively, or in addition, a medical professional may prescribe psychotropic medications. These are prescribed drugs that affect the brain chemicals related to mood and behavior. They are used to treat a variety of mental health conditions including attention disorders, depression, anxiety, conduct disorders, and others. While psychotropic medication alone is not necessarily advised, children in foster care may more readily receive psychotropics to treat their mental health needs due to the complexity of their symptoms and the lack of appropriate screening and assessment and/or the limited availability of health care professionals trained to provide effective therapies (e.g., cognitive behavioral therapy).
Between 16% and 33% of children in out-of-home care may be using psychotropic medication on any given day, although the rate of use varies significantly based on certain factors, including the child's age, placement setting, and length of involvement with the child welfare agency. Among children generally, about 6% are taking psychotropic medications at some point during a given year. Some of the difference in prevalence of use may be explained by the higher levels of mental health risk factors among children in foster care.
The use of psychotropics by children in foster care has come under increased scrutiny by policymakers and stakeholders in the child welfare field. Little research has been conducted to show whether psychotropics are effective and safe for children who need mental health services. Despite these concerns, some children may benefit from specific psychotropic medication for managing mental and behavioral symptoms associated with their exposure to traumatic events. President Obama's FY2017 budget proposed a five-year initiative to reduce reliance on psychotropic medications for children in foster care by encouraging the use of evidence-based screening, assessment, and treatment of trauma and mental health disorders. Congress has also taken a strong interest in oversight of prescription medications used by children in care, addressing the issue in oversight hearings and other fact-finding forums.
Further, federal law (Title IV-B, Subpart 1 of the Social Security Act) requires states and other jurisdictions to describe their oversight of prescription medications for children in foster care, including specific protocols used with regard to psychotropic medication. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has issued guidance about these provisions and requires jurisdictions to submit annual reports to the department that describe this oversight. |
crs_RL32099 | crs_RL32099_0 | Several temporary provisions affecting the taxation of capital income were adopted in the 2001-2003 period, and further changes may be considered. Congress also enacted general corporate tax cuts in a bill that terminated the extraterritorial income (ETI) provision of the tax law that has been found to be an illegal export subsidy by the World Trade Organization (WTO). This tax revision also included a number of other provisions largely directed at business. This measure indicates the change in the total burden on corporate investment. It can also be compared with tax rates on noncorporate investment to measure the differential between the total tax on investment in the corporate and noncorporate sectors, as well as federal income taxes on owner-occupied housing (which tend to be around zero). While buildings are taxed at rates slightly above the statutory rate, equipment is taxed at rates well below it. The 30% bonus depreciation reduces effective tax rates for equipment, on average, from 26% to 20%; the 50% bonus depreciation reduces the rate to 15%. If these effects are taken into the account, current tax rates are lower and the effect of changes in individual tax rates less important. If the pension and IRA case is taken to be the most reasonable one, then there is a very minimal effect on the distortion between debt and equity due to individual rate changes not only because they benefit both debt and equity but also because the changes are quite small. All forms of business investment benefit from bonus depreciation. The dividend relief provisions (and slightly lower capital gains tax rates) benefit corporate equity, but the lower individual tax rates benefit corporate and non-corporate debt and non-corporate equity. Distortions of Payout Decisions
The dividend relief provision will significantly reduce the favorable treatment of retained earnings by lowering the tax rate on dividends to the tax rate on capital gains. Bonus depreciation has about the same percentage point effect regardless of the tax regime – about two percentage points for 30% bonus depreciation and about four for 50% bonus depreciation. The overall effects on tax burdens are small, however, because these provisions would have covered only manufacturing equipment, estimated to be about 20% to 25% of equipment assets, and about 10% of combined equipment and structures. Overall manufacturing investment would have a reduction in effective tax rate of about 1.5 percentage points – about the same as the depreciation speedup; thus, as in the case of the depreciation provision, the reduction in the total tax rate in the economy would be less than a quarter of a percent. The bills contained provisions in several other areas, including repeal of ETI. The extension of bonus depreciation has already been noted, but the 2003 House bill would also have reduced the depreciation period for leasehold improvements and restaurants, which would lower tax rates on this group of structures' investments (which are currently subject to relatively high rates); these effects are difficult to measure but would be small. Reducing individual tax rates magnifies existing distortions, by favoring debt finance and noncorporate investment. | Several temporary provisions affecting the taxation of capital income were adopted in the 2001-2003 period. These provisions include lower individual tax rates, bonus depreciation (which allows part of the cost of equipment to be deducted upon acquisition), and lower individual income tax rates on dividends and capital gains. Bonus depreciation has expired, but there are some indications such provisions might be included as part of a major tax reform; the other provisions remain currently in effect. This study measures their effect on tax burdens on income from different prospective investments, differentiated by physical type, form of finance, and sector. Further provisions of a permanent nature enacted in 2004 in a bill to eliminate the extraterritorial income (ETI) provision, ruled an illegal export subsidy by the World Trade Organization (WTO), are also discussed.
Effective tax burdens are determined by the statutory tax rate and value of depreciation deductions. Although the 1986 depreciation revision left income from equipment and structures investments taxed at close to the statutory rate (now 35% for large corporations), the fall in inflation and legislative changes led to a growing differential between these assets, with equipment taxed at 26% and buildings taxed slightly above 35%. Bonus depreciation widens that discrepancy, lowering the equipment tax rate to 20% (15%) for 30% (50%) bonus depreciation. The distortions between debt and equity finance within the corporate sector and between the corporate and non-corporate sector investment are narrowed, but only slightly, by the changes, especially if tax exempt financial holdings (through pensions and IRAs) are considered. This small effect occurs because bonus depreciation covers all types of equipment investment (whether financed by debt or equity and regardless of sector), and while dividend and capital gains relief benefits corporate equity, individual rate cuts benefit non-corporate investment and debt-financed corporate investment. There is a significant reduction in the differential rates on retained earnings and dividends, however. The reduction in the total tax rate on investment income in the economy is about two to four percentage points for all individual tax changes and two to four percentage points for 30% to 50% bonus depreciation.
The temporary provisions have mixed effects. All changes reduce the total tax rate and the current favorable treatment of owner-occupied housing. Within the business sector, the dividend relief provisions lead to a more neutral tax system as well, but the effects of bonus depreciation lead to less efficiency because the benefits are confined to equipment. Tax changes in the 2004 tax bill include provisions directed at the manufacturing sector. The tax cuts directed at manufacturing would lower tax rates in that industry by about 1.5 percentage points but they would have a negligible effect on the total tax rate (lowering it by less than a quarter of a percentage point). The bill also contains other provisions (e.g. benefitting foreign source investment) which would lower tax rates, but also include repeal of the ETI which would raise rates. For the aggregate economy, these effects are small, although the changes favor some assets and sectors over others. This report will be updated for legislative changes. |
crs_RL33024 | crs_RL33024_0 | Conversely, expansion of immigration restrictions and elimination of relief in the public immigration laws may lead to an increase in private bills. For further information on parliamentary procedure re private bills, see CRS Report 98-628, Private Bills: Procedure in the House , by [author name scrubbed] (pdf). A minority of private immigration laws provided for citizenship. The precedent concerning adoption cases is well-established. | Private immigration bills warrant careful consideration with regard to precedent since they are a special form of relief allowing the circumvention of the public laws concerning immigration and nationality in uniquely meritorious cases. This report will give an overview of the congressional subcommittee procedure and precedents concerning private immigration bills. This report will not cover parliamentary procedural issues for private bills, which are covered by CRS Report 98-628, Private Bills: Procedure in the House, by [author name scrubbed] (pdf). |
crs_R40540 | crs_R40540_0 | Corporate Governance1
Concern about shareholder value, corporate governance, and the economic and social impact of escalating pay for corporate executives has led to a controversy regarding the practices of paying these executives. Recently Enacted Legislation
In the 110 th Congress, two laws containing executive compensation provisions applicable to executives of specific types of businesses were enacted: P.L. 110-289 , the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, and P.L. 110-343 to set forth somewhat different and more detailed restrictions on the compensation of executives of companies during the period in which any obligation arising from financial assistance provided under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) remains outstanding. Provisions to limit executive compensation, including golden parachute payments, have existed within the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) for many years; however, new provisions affecting entities receiving funds from the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) were introduced in the 110 th Congress by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). These are discussed in the corporate governance section of this report. Administrative expenses have a high statutory priority in bankruptcy and generally must be paid before other priority claims as well as non-priority unsecured claims. Congressional Proposals
Recent Congresses have offered a number of proposals concerning executive compensation. Proposals to Impose Limitations on TARP Recipients49
Bills concerning executive compensation limits have been introduced in the 111 th Congress. H.R. H.R. H.R. S. 651 proposed imposing an excise tax on "excessive bonuses." In the 110 th Congress, H.R. The bills also included a number of provisions that would indirectly limit executive compensation by linking it to compensation provided to other employees. Appendix. 110-343 ) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ). | Concern about shareholder value, corporate governance, and the economic and social impact of escalating pay for corporate executives has led to controversy regarding the practices of paying these executives. This report focuses on legal provisions related to tax, bankruptcy, and corporate governance that attempt to limit executive compensation. Many provisions have existed for a number of years, but some have a more recent origin in the 110th and 111th Congresses.
In the 110th Congress, two laws containing executive compensation provisions were enacted: P.L. 110-289, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), and P.L. 110-343, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). In the 111th Congress, H.R. 1, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), became law (P.L. 111-5). Title VII of ARRA sets forth restrictions on the compensation of executives of companies during the period in which any obligation arising from financial assistance provided under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) remains outstanding and requires standards and a review board to determine appropriate executive compensation, which must be voted on by shareholders of TARP recipients.
In the wake of American International Group's (AIG's) bonus announcement, several bills (H.R. 1575, H.R. 1586, H.R. 1664, and S. 651) were introduced in the 111th Congress to recover, directly or indirectly, bonuses paid by TARP recipients and to discourage future bonus payments. Other bills have also been introduced in the recent Congresses concerning limiting executive compensation. These bills include proposals to modify the corporate governance provisions as well as the Bankruptcy and Internal Revenue Codes.
This report includes, as an Appendix, Table A-1, which outlines a number of statutory provisions that limit executive compensation. |
crs_R44493 | crs_R44493_0 | Background
The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 ( CARA; S. 524 ) aims to address the problem of opioid addiction in the United States. It passed t he Senate ( S. 524 ES) o n March 10, 2016 , and it passed the House with an amendment in the nature of a substitute ( S. 524 EAH) o n May 13, 2016 . The two versions of the bill differ substantially. The scope of the differences may be illustrated by their structures: The Senate bill has 28 sections organized in 8 titles, whereas the House bill has 69 sections organized in 18 titles . This report discusses selected differences and similarities between the Senate- and House-passed versions of S. 524 . Comparison of Senate- and House-Passed CARA
Both the House- and Senate-passed bills include provisions that would authorize new activities, provisions that would reauthorize and amend existing activities, and provisions that would codify activities already taking place. Few provisions, however, are directly comparable across the two bills. More often, the two bills include provisions addressing the same theme in different ways. Each bill also includes provisions for which the other bill has no comparable provisions; see Appendix A for a summary of the Senate bill and Appendix B for a summary of the House bill. Parallel Provisions in Both Bills
The bills include two parallel provisions, which share the same headings and would require or authorize similar activities: (1) Pain Management Best Practices Interagency Task Force and (2) Grants for Treatment of Pregnant and Postpartum Women. | The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA; S. 524) aims to address the problem of opioid addiction in the United States. It passed the Senate (S. 524 ES) on March 10, 2016, and it passed the House with an amendment in the nature of a substitute (S. 524 EAH) on May 13, 2016. The two versions of the bill differ substantially. The scope of the differences may be illustrated by their structures: The Senate bill has 28 sections organized in 8 titles, whereas the House bill has 69 sections organized in 18 titles. This report discusses selected differences and similarities between the Senate- and House-passed versions of S. 524.
Both bills include provisions that would authorize new activities, provisions that would reauthorize and amend existing activities, and provisions that would codify activities already taking place. Few provisions, however, are directly comparable across the two bills. The bills include two parallel provisions, which share the same headings and would require or authorize similar activities: (1) Pain Management Best Practices Interagency Task Force and (2) Grants for Treatment of Pregnant and Postpartum Women.
More often, the two bills include provisions addressing the same theme in different ways. Common themes include comprehensive opioid abuse grants, accountability of grantees, veterans, criminal justice provisions, and access to naloxone to reverse opioid overdose.
Each bill also includes provisions for which the other bill has no comparable provisions; see Appendix A for a summary of the Senate bill and Appendix B for a summary of the House bill. |
crs_R41029 | crs_R41029_0 | Introduction
In December 2001, Argentina suffered a severe financial crisis, leading to the largest sovereign debt default in history, except for Greece. In 2005, Argentina abandoned negotiations to restructure the debt and made a unilateral offer on terms highly unfavorable to creditors. Still, $62.3 billion of the $81.8 billion in principal was exchanged. A diverse group of "holdouts" representing $18.6 billion did not tender their bonds. At the close of 2010, Argentina reported that it owed private investors $11.2 billion ($6.5 billion in principal, $4.7 billion in past due interest). Argentina does not recognize the private holdout debt in its budget, and legislation bars the government from making further offers to the holdouts. Recent court decisions have left Argentine central bank assets in the United States immune from attachment, but require Argentina to treat both holdout and exchange bondholders equally. In this case, the district court ordered Argentina to pay litigant holdouts the full $1.3 billion of their claim. Should this occur, it could prohibit banks from allowing Argentina to make payments to exchange bondholders unless it also paid the holdouts, creating a conundrum for Argentina: either pay all parties per the court order, or for lack of an ability to pay only the exchange bondholders, find itself in technical default. This report reviews Argentina's financial crisis, the bond exchanges of 2005 and 2010, ongoing litigation, prospects for a final solution, related U.S. legislation, and broader policy issues. A sovereign default means the government is no longer willing or able to pay the debt it has legally incurred in the international markets. According to official Argentine sources, as of December 31, 2010, Argentina was in arrears with holdouts and some members of the Paris Club in the following amounts:
$11.2 billion to the holdouts worldwide (including $6.5 billion in principal past and coming due, and $4.7 billion in past due interest through December 2010). Holdout creditors argue that this number could be $15 billion by 2013, of which $1.3 billion is being litigated by hedge funds in U.S. courts, and $6.3 billion to the Paris Club, including PDI through December 31, 2010, plus the possible addition of interest and penalties. Holdout Responses Since 2010
In the eyes of holdout creditors, and apparently increasingly the U.S. courts, the 2005 and 2010 bond exchanges have set a precedent that cannot be condoned, even though 91.3% of total bondholders have accepted the terms. Although Argentina continues to argue that the restructurings took place after extensive negotiations, they were not mutually agreed solutions. Bondholders had to accept or reject the offers with the alternative being the promise of no restitution at all. Holdout bondholders remain unpaid while Argentina is current on its obligations to the bondholders who exchanged their debt, an outcome that is currently being challenged in court as illegal under the equal treatment ( pari passu ) provision of the bond contracts. The holdout bondholders formally rejected the offer and urged the appeals court to enforce the lower court ruling requiring Argentina to pay them in full. Argentina has said it will continue to make payments due to exchange bondholders as long as the stay issued by the appeals court is in effect. The bond exchange addressed two aspects of outstanding debt. | In December 2001, Argentina suffered a severe financial crisis, leading to the largest sovereign debt default in history, until Greece. In 2005, after prolonged, contentious, and unsuccessful attempts to restructure the debt, Argentina abandoned the negotiation process and made a unilateral offer. The terms were highly unfavorable to creditors, but $62.3 billion of the $81.8 billion in principal owed was exchanged. A diverse group of "holdouts" representing $18.6 billion did not exchange their bonds, and some have opted to litigate instead. These actions resulted in attachment orders against Argentine assets, leaving the country unable to access the international credit markets. Holdout creditors also lobbied against Argentina's debt policy, which has triggered actions by the U.S. government and legislation in previous Congresses.
The lingering effects of the debt default became a legacy problem for Argentina. The government decided to open another bond exchange in 2010 to deal with remaining holdouts, on slightly less favorable terms than before. Argentina reduced its outstanding defaulted debt by another $12.4 billion. As of December 31, 2010, Argentina reported that it owed private investors $11.2 billion ($6.5 billion in principal and $4.7 billion in past due interest). Holdout creditors estimate that with additional interest, this number could be as high as $15 billion by 2013, with $1.3 billion under litigation in federal court. Argentina also owes the Paris Club countries $6.3 billion in principal and past due interest. The U.S. portion is estimated at $550 million.
Argentina does not recognize the remaining private holdout debt in its official budget and is legislatively barred from making another offer to bondholders. Nonetheless, in the eyes of holdout creditors, the bond exchanges have set a precedent that cannot be condoned, even though 91.3% of total bondholders have accepted terms. Although Argentina continues to argue that the restructurings were negotiated solutions, they were not mutually agreed ones. Bondholders had to accept or reject the offers with the alternative being the promise of no restitution at all. Holdout bondholders remain unpaid while Argentina is current on its obligations to bondholders who participated in the two bond exchanges, an outcome that is currently being challenged in court under the equal treatment provision of the bonds.
Recent district court decisions require Argentina to treat both holdout and exchange bondholders equally. In this case, the court ordered Argentina to pay litigant holdouts the full $1.3 billion of their claim. The appeals court stayed the order and required Argentina to offer a payment plan to the holdouts that would satisfy the equal treatment clause. On April 19, 2013, the holdouts formally rejected an offer that was effectively the same as the 2010 exchange, and urged the appeals court to enforce the lower court ruling. Argentina has said it will continue to pay the restructured bonds, but is no position to pay the holdouts in full. A final ruling against Argentina could prohibit banks from allowing Argentina to make those payments unless it also paid the holdouts, creating a conundrum for Argentina: either pay all parties per the court order, or for lack of an ability to pay only the exchange bondholders, find itself in technical default.
This report reviews Argentina's financial crisis, the bond exchanges of 2005 and 2010, ongoing litigation, prospects for a final solution, related U.S. legislation, and broader policy issues. These include lessons on the effectiveness and cost of Argentina's default strategy, the ability to force sovereigns to meet their debt obligations, and ways to avoid future defaults like Argentina's. |
crs_RL32950 | crs_RL32950_0 | Introduction
Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services as well as long-term care. Medicaid is jointly funded by the federal government and the states. The federal government pays a share of each state's Medicaid costs; states must contribute the remaining portion in order to qualify for federal funds. This report describes the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) calculation used to reimburse states for most Medicaid expenditures, and it lists the statutory exceptions to the regular FMAP rate. In addition, this report discusses other FMAP-related issues, including state fiscal conditions, the temporary FMAP rate increase, the exclusion of certain employer contributions, FMAP changes in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as amended), the Medicaid proposal included in the House budget resolution, and other federal deficit reduction proposals. The FMAP rate is used to reimburse states for the federal share of most Medicaid expenditures, but exceptions to the regular FMAP rate have been made for certain states, situations, populations, providers, and services. To help mitigate state fiscal conditions, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. Thus, while the fiscal environment for states is improving, states continue to face fiscal challenges. 111-148 as amended) added a disaster-recovery FMAP adjustment for states that have experienced a major, statewide disaster. There are two criteria for states to qualify for the disaster-recovery FMAP adjustment. Exclusion of Certain Employer Contributions from FMAP Rate Calculations
The Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA, P.L. To accommodate these sometimes significant revisions to states' per capita personal income data, Section 614 of CHIPRA allows for a state's regular FMAP rate to be adjusted if it had a significantly disproportionate employer pension and insurance fund contribution in any calendar year since 2003. This disregard will have the effect of reducing a state's per capita personal income relative to the national average, which in turn will increase the state's FMAP rate. Legislation During the 111th Congress
Temporary FMAP Rate Increase in ARRA and Six-Month Extension
During the 111 th Congress, a temporary FMAP rate increase was provided to states through ARRA and later extended by P.L. 111-226 . ACA contains a number of provisions that affect FMAP rates, such as "newly eligible" beneficiary FMAP rates, "expansion state" FMAP rates, and other FMAP rate changes discussed below. One of the proposals would restructure the Medicaid program from an individual entitlement to a block grant, starting in FY2013. As a result, controlling federal Medicaid spending has been a focus of federal deficit reduction proposals, such as the House Budget Resolution (discussed above) and the National Commission on Fiscal Reform. | Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services as well as long-term care. Medicaid is jointly funded by the federal government and the states. The federal government's share of a state's expenditures is called the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) rate. The remainder is referred to as the nonfederal share, or state share.
Generally determined annually, the FMAP formula is designed so that the federal government pays a larger portion of Medicaid costs in states with lower per capita incomes relative to the national average (and vice versa for states with higher per capita incomes). For FY2013, regular FMAP rates range from 50.00% to 74.43%. The FMAP rate is used to reimburse states for the federal share of most Medicaid expenditures, but exceptions to the regular FMAP rate have been made for certain states, situations, populations, providers, and services.
Some recent issues related to FMAP include state fiscal conditions, the disaster-related FMAP adjustment, and the exclusion of certain employer contributions from the FMAP calculation. While the fiscal environment for states is improving, states continue to face fiscal challenges, which makes it difficult for states to finance the state share of Medicaid expenditures. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as amended) included a provision providing a disaster-recovery FMAP adjustment for states that have experienced a major, statewide disaster. The Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA, P.L. 111-3) included a provision allowing a state's FMAP rate to be adjusted if the state had significantly disproportionate employer pension and insurance fund contributions in any calendar year since 2003.
Legislation was enacted during the 111th Congress that impacts the FMAP rate. First, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) provided assistance to states through a temporary FMAP rate increase that was later extended by P.L. 111-226. Also, ACA contains a number of provisions affecting FMAP rates. Most notably, ACA provides initial FMAP rates of up to 100% for certain "newly eligible" individuals.
During the 112th Congress, there has been a focus on reducing the federal deficit; controlling federal Medicaid spending is often discussed as a means to reduce federal expenditures. For this reason, the FY2012 House budget resolution proposed restructuring Medicaid from an entitlement program to a block grant, and most federal deficit reduction proposals include Medicaid provisions.
This report describes the FMAP calculation used to reimburse states for most Medicaid expenditures, and it lists the statutory exceptions to the regular FMAP rate. In addition, this report discusses other FMAP-related issues, including state fiscal conditions, the temporary FMAP rate increase, the exclusion of certain employer contributions, FMAP changes in ACA, the Medicaid proposal included in the House budget resolution, and other federal deficit reduction proposals. |
crs_RS22808 | crs_RS22808_0 | However, economists contend that these figures are very misleading. Purchasing Power Parity and GDP Size
Economists have attempted to factor in national price differentials by using a purchasing power parity (PPP) measurement, which converts foreign currencies into a common currency (usually the U.S. dollar) on the basis of the actual purchasing power of those currencies (based on surveys of the prices of various goods and services) in each respective country. The ICP's New PPP Estimates of China's GDP
Prior to December 2007, data from the ICP and various private economic forecasting firms all seemed to agree that China's economy, measured on a PPP basis, was close to $9 trillion in 2005, ranking it as the world's second-largest economy, after the United States. Based on these estimates, and projections of continued rapid economic growth, many analysts predicted that China's economy would surpass that of the United States within a few years. The revised data indicate it will likely take many more years than previously thought before China's GDP and living standards reach U.S. levels. Although the estimated size of China's economy decreases under the PPP revisions, other aspects on China's economy remain significantly large. | China's rapid economic growth since 1979 has transformed it into a major economic power. Over the past few years, many analysts have contended that China could soon overtake the United States to become the world's largest economy, based on estimates of China's economy on a "purchasing power parity" (PPP) basis, which attempts to factor in price differences across countries when estimating the size of a foreign economy in U.S. dollars. However, in December 2007, the World Bank issued a study that lowered its previous 2005 PPP estimate of the size of China's economy by 40%. If these new estimates are accurate, it will likely be many years before China's economy reaches U.S. levels. The new PPP data could also have an impact on U.S. and international perceptions over other aspects of China's economy, including its living standards, poverty levels, and government expenditures, such as on the military. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL31775 | crs_RL31775_0 | This report reviews theoretical and empirical evidence to see what relationship exists between budget deficits and interest rates. Any explanation of the budget deficit-interest rate relationship must first come to grips with an indisputable fact: budget deficits consume real resources. When the government borrows from the public to finance public spending or tax cuts, the resources must come from somewhere. In mainstream theory, the resources come from the nation's pool of saving, which pushes up interest rates for simple supply and demand reasons. This "crowds out" private investment that was competing with government borrowing for the same pool of national saving. But other theories offer different explanations of where the resources come from that do not involve higher interest rates. To determine the effect of budget deficits on interest rates, these other factors must be held constant using statistical methods. The capital mobility view and Barro-Ricardo view both explain how deficits could have no effect on interest rates, and yet the deficits still impose a burden in both views. In the capital mobility view, they crowd out the trade sector of the economy; in the Barro-Ricardo view, they crowd out current private consumption. Because less investment leads to a smaller economy in the future, economists often describe deficits as placing a burden on future generations. In the capital mobility view, foreigners lend the United States the saving it needs to finance a deficit, leaving interest rates unaffected. But foreign capital can only enter the country through a trade deficit, leading to a decline in the output of U.S. exporting and import-competing industries. In the Barro-Ricardo view, forward-looking, rational, infinitely-lived individuals see that a budget deficit would result in higher taxes or lower government spending in the future. Therefore, they reduce their consumption and save more today. This provides the government with the saving needed to finance its deficit, placing no upward pressure on interest rates. Empirical evidence that budget deficits do not affect interest rates is not evidence that government budget deficits do not impose a burden. Simply comparing changes in budget deficits to changes in interest rates is not a valid way to determine whether budget deficits affect interest rates because there are many other factors that simultaneously affect interest rates. Otherwise, the effect of budget deficits on interest rates could be misestimated or even reversed. Gale and Orszag (2002) argue that more recent evidence tends to find a stronger, positive relationship between the two, with all sixteen of the studies they surveyed finding positive or mixed evidence. In addition, 10 major forecasting models all predict that a budget deficit would increase interest rates. According to Gale and Orszag (2002), the models predict that a budget deficit equal to 1% of GDP would increase interest rates, with a range of 0.1 to 1.0 (mean=0.52) percentage points after one year and 0.05 to 2.0 (mean=0.99) percentage points after 10 years. | Persistent budget deficits have directed attention to their economic effect, particularly whether they raise interest rates. Any explanation of the budget deficit-interest rate relationship must first come to grips with an indisputable fact: budget deficits consume real resources, and this is the more relevant public policy concern. When the government borrows from the public to finance public spending or tax cuts, the resources must come from somewhere. In mainstream theory, the resources come from the nation's pool of saving, which pushes up interest rates for simple supply and demand reasons. As a result, the deficit "crowds out" private investment that was competing with government borrowing for the same pool of national saving. Since less investment reduces the future size of the economy, economists often describe deficits as placing a burden on future generations.
But other theories offer different explanations of where the resources come from that do not involve higher interest rates. In the capital mobility view, foreigners lend the United States the savings it needs to finance a deficit, leaving interest rates unaffected. But foreign capital can only enter the country through a trade deficit, leading to a decline in the output of U.S. exporting and import-competing industries. In an alternative theory, popularly known as the Barro-Ricardo view, forward-looking, rational, infinitely-lived individuals see that a budget deficit would result in higher taxes or lower government spending in the future. Therefore, they reduce their consumption and save more today. This provides the government with the saving needed to finance its deficit, placing no upward pressure on interest rates. Empirical evidence that budget deficits do not affect interest rates does not prove that government budget deficits do not impose a burden, as demonstrated by the capital mobility and Barro-Ricardo views. In the capital mobility view, deficits crowd out the trade sector of the economy; in the Barro-Ricardo view, they crowd out current private consumption. And in both of these views, deficits no longer have any stimulative effect on the economy.
Comparing changes in budget deficits to changes in interest rates is not a valid way to determine whether budget deficits affect interest rates. That is because there are many other factors that also affect interest rates, such as the state of the economy. To determine the effect of budget deficits on interest rates, these other factors must be held constant using statistical methods. Otherwise, the effect of budget deficits on interest rates could be misestimated or even reversed.
Empirical evidence on a link between budget deficits and interest rates is mixed. There is not a consensus among economists on how to model the economy and what relevant variables should be included. Therefore, conclusions drawn from empirical evidence vary widely. More recent evidence tends to find a stronger, positive relationship between the two. In addition, 10 major forecasting models all predict that a budget deficit would increase interest rates. According to Gale and Orszag (2002), the models predict that a budget deficit equal to 1% of GDP would increase interest rates, with a range of 0.1-1 (mean=0.52) percentage points after one year and 0.05-2 (mean=0.99) percentage points after 10 years. This report will be updated. |
crs_R44029 | crs_R44029_0 | FY2016 Consideration: Overview of Actions
The first section of this report provides an overview of the consideration of FY2016 legislative branch appropriations, with subsections covering each action, including
the initial submission of the request on February 2, 2015; hearings held by the House and Senate Legislative Branch Subcommittees; the House subcommittee markup on April 23, 2015; the House Appropriations Committee markup on April 30, 2015; adoption of 302(b) suballocations; consideration of a structured rule in the House Rules Committee on May 18, 2015 ( H.Res. 2250 in the House on May 19, 2015; the Senate Appropriations Committee reporting the bill, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, on June 11, 2015 ( S.Rept. 114-64 ); the enactment of continuing resolutions (CRs) including a CR funding the legislative branch from October 1 through December 11, 2015 ( P.L. 114-100 ); and the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, on December 18, 2015 ( P.L. 114-113 ). It contains a request for $4.528 billion in new budget authority for legislative branch activities. By law, the legislative branch request is submitted to the President and included in the budget without change. A budget amendment was transmitted by the President to Congress on April 14, 2015, also without change. At $3.341 billion (not including Senate items, which are determined by the Senate), the bill would have provided the same level of funding as in FY2015. Three amendments were adopted, all by voice vote, including
a manager's amendment which addressed report language related to committee room renovations, encouraging the Capitol Police to relax enforcement of sledding restriction on Capitol Hill, and communications and coordination between the Capitol Police and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority and other first responders; an amendment offered to the report by Representative Wasserman Schultz directing the House Chief Administrative Officer to establish a House Technology Task Force, which is to identify opportunities to enhance coordination of information technology efforts; and an amendment offered by Representative Fortenberry increasing funding for the Open World Leadership Center by $4.7 million, offset by a reduction to the Capitol Power Plant. The bill was ordered reported by voice vote ( H.R. 2250 , H.Rept. 114-110 ). 2. The committee voted, 9-4, to report the rule ( H.Res. 271 , H.Rept. 114-120 ). 271 was agreed to in the House (242-179) the next day. 240 ) prohibiting any funds for delivering printed copies of the Congressional Pictorial Directory, which was agreed to (voice vote); and 3. an amendment offered by Representative Blackburn ( H.Amdt. 241 ) providing for a 1% across-the-board reduction—with exceptions for the Capitol Police, "Architect of the Capitol—Capitol Police Buildings, Grounds and Security," and funding for the House Office of the Sergeant at Arms—which was not agreed to (172-250). The bill, as amended, was agreed to (357-67). 2250 . The amendment was not agreed to (14-16). 114-53 ). It provides $4.36 billion for legislative branch activities for FY2016, an increase of 1.5% from the FY2015 level ( P.L. Funding in Prior Years: Brief Overview
FY2015
FY2015 funding was provided in Division H of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ), which was enacted on December 16, 2014. The $4.300 billion provided by the act represented an increase of $41.7 million (1.0%) from FY2014 and $164.9 million (-3.7%) less than the request. 113-76 ), providing $4.259 billion for the legislative branch for FY2014. The act funded legislative branch accounts at the FY2012 enacted level, with some exceptions (also known as "anomalies"), and not including across-the-board rescissions required by Section 3004 of P.L. The act did not alter the sequestration reductions implemented on March 1, which reduced most legislative branch accounts by 5.0%. This level was $236.9 million (-5.2%) below the FY2011 enacted level. This level represented a $125.1 million decrease from the $4.668 billion provided in the FY2010 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act ( P.L. 2. 2. Congressional Research Service—The FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act provides $106.9 million, which is equivalent to the FY2015 enacted level and the level contained in the FY2016 House-passed and Senate-reported bills. 1. 239 , was agreed to (224-199). The House-passed FY2012 bill ( H.R. | The legislative branch appropriations bill provides funding for the Senate; House of Representatives; Joint Items; Capitol Police; Office of Compliance; Congressional Budget Office (CBO); Architect of the Capitol (AOC); Library of Congress (LOC), including the Congressional Research Service (CRS); Government Publishing Office (GPO); Government Accountability Office (GAO); the Open World Leadership Center; and the John C. Stennis Center.
The legislative branch FY2016 budget request of $4.528 billion was submitted on February 2, 2015. By law, the President includes the legislative branch request in the annual budget without change. A budget amendment was transmitted by the President to Congress on April 14, 2015.
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees' Legislative Branch Subcommittees held hearings in February and March to consider the FY2016 legislative branch requests.
The House subcommittee held a markup of its bill on April 23, 2015. The full committee met on April 30, 2015, and agreed to (1) a manager's amendment; (2) an amendment establishing a House Technology Task Force; and (3) an amendment increasing the funding for Open World (offset from funding from the Architect of the Capitol, Capitol Power Plant). All were adopted by voice vote. One additional amendment was defeated (21-29) and two were withdrawn. The bill would have provided $3.341 billion (not including Senate items), equivalent to the FY2015 level. It was ordered reported by voice vote (H.R. 2250, H.Rept. 114-110).
The House Rules Committee met on May 18 to discuss a structured rule for H.R. 2250. The rule made in order three amendments. The committee voted, 9-4, to report the rule (H.Res. 271, H.Rept. 114-120). H.Res. 271 was agreed to in the House (242-179) the next day.
H.R. 2250 was considered in the House on May 19. The three amendments included (1) eliminating funding for Open World, which was agreed to (224-199); (2) prohibiting the use of any funds for delivering printed copies of the Congressional Pictorial Directory, which was agreed to (voice vote); and (3) providing for a 1% across-the-board reduction, with some exceptions, which was not agreed to (172-250). The bill, as amended, was agreed to (357-67).
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported the bill, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, on June 11, 2015 (S.Rept. 114-64).
No further action occurred prior to the start of the fiscal year, and the legislative branch was funded by continuing resolutions enacted on September 30 (P.L. 114-53), December 11 (P.L. 114-96), and December 16 (P.L. 114-100). The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, was enacted on December 18, 2015, and provides $4.36 billion for legislative branch activities, an increase of 1.5% from the FY2015 level (P.L. 114-113).
Legislative branch funding peaked in FY2010, and the FY2016 enacted level remains below the FY2009 level of $4.501 billion. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235, Division H, enacted December 16, 2014) provides $4.300 billion, an increase of $41.7 million (1.0%) from the FY2014 funding level of $4.259 billion. The FY2013 act funded legislative branch accounts at the FY2012 enacted level, with some exceptions (also known as "anomalies"), less across-the-board rescissions that applied to all appropriations in the act, and not including sequestration reductions implemented on March 1. The FY2012 level represented a decrease of $236.9 million (-5.2%) from the FY2011 level, which itself represented a $125.1 million decrease (-2.7%) from FY2010.
The smallest of the appropriations bills, the legislative branch comprises approximately 0.4% of total discretionary budget authority. |
crs_R44506 | crs_R44506_0 | Housing finance reform, however, remains one of the major unresolved issues stemming from the financial crisis. Congress has debated housing finance reform at length and legislation making modest changes to the system has been enacted. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the regulator and conservator for the GSEs, has used its regulatory authority to lay the foundation for the future housing finance system. The FHFA-directed restructuring of the system focuses on three main policy questions:
1. Who will bear credit risk in the future? How will mortgage-backed securities (MBS) be issued? and 3. What will the MBS look like once issued? The Financial Regulatory Improvement Act ( S. 1484 ), which was reported by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, would codify the actions taken by FHFA in some cases and alter FHFA's actions in others. The MBS are sold to investors, with the GSEs guaranteeing that investors will receive timely payment of principal and interest on their MBS even if a borrower with a mortgage that is part of the MBS becomes delinquent. Under the pre-FHFA reform system shown in Figure 1 , Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guarantee their MBS and, in doing so, absorb the credit risk. Credit risk is the focus of the risk-sharing transactions, but it is only one of many different types of risks to which the GSEs are exposed. Risk sharing is one of the ways in which FHFA is attracting private capital back into the market and reducing taxpayers' risk exposure. Freddie Mac's debt issuance deals are called Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) and Fannie Mae's are called Connect Avenue Securities (CAS). Congress may be interested in the different transaction types for how they affect the housing finance system and reduce taxpayers' risk exposure in the short term, but also in how risk sharing could be incorporated into broader housing finance reform (how much, if any, credit risk the federal government should be exposed to is a source of contention in the reform debate). Rather than updating two separate systems, FHFA determined that the GSEs should jointly develop a new, common system that they could both use. Section 705 of S. 1484 would
require FHFA to submit (1) an annual report to Congress on the status of the CSP's development and of the legal and contractual framework needed for non-GSEs to securitize through the CSP and (2) a report within three years of enactment on a plan to transition the CSP from joint ownership by the GSEs into a private, nonprofit entity; require FHFA to direct the GSEs to alter the composition of CSS's board of directors to include directors not affiliated with the GSEs; authorize CSS to develop standards for a non-GSE company to securitize mortgages through the CSP and to facilitate issuing MBS through the CSP by a non-GSE company; prohibit CSS from performing certain activities, such as owning, holding, or assuming the credit risk of mortgages or MBS; give FHFA regulatory authority over CSS to ensure safety and soundness; instruct FHFA to transfer funds from the GSEs to the CSS as needed for CSS to perform its functions and direct the GSEs to transfer or sell to the CSP any property, systems, or infrastructure necessary for the CSP to perform its functions; require the CSP to be transferred from the joint ownership of the GSEs to a private, nonprofit entity within 5 years of enactment and, within 10 years of that transition, the GSEs would be repaid the total cost of the property that was transferred. As mentioned above, some argue that an open access CSP is important to ensuring that other private companies will play a larger role in the mortgage market in the future. Single Security
The Single Security is FHFA's initiative to alter the type of MBS that would be issued in the future. Currently, each GSE issues its own MBS. Fannie MBS and Freddie MBS are different securities governed by different legal contracts and trade in different markets at different prices. The Single Security would be a single MBS that the GSEs could issue through the CSP and trade in a single market. As discussed in more detail below, FHFA argues that the primary benefits of the Single Security would be to enhance the liquidity of the MBS market—the ease with which MBS can be bought and sold—and remove the subsidy that Freddie Mac currently offers to keep its MBS competitive. Promoting Liquidity. Congressional Action on GSE Reform
The three policy issues explained above—risk-sharing transactions, the Common Securitization Platform, and the Single Security—are part of FHFA's reform of the housing finance system. | Housing finance reform remains one of the major unresolved issues stemming from the financial crisis. Congress has held hearings and marked up bills related to reform, but so far only modest structural changes have been enacted. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has used its regulatory authority to enact certain policy changes.
FHFA is the regulator and conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that play a significant role in the housing finance system. FHFA has leveraged the authority that it has over the GSEs and their market dominance to implement changes to the housing finance system that could shape the future course of the system.
The FHFA-directed restructuring of the system focuses on three main policy questions:
1. Who will bear credit risk in the future? 2. How will mortgage-backed securities (MBS) be issued? and 3. What will the MBS look like once issued?
The Credit Risk Transactions (CRT) are FHFA's efforts to modify who bears credit risk. The GSEs guarantee that investors in their MBS will receive timely payment of principal and interest. In doing so, the GSEs absorb the credit risk—the risk that a borrower would not make the required mortgage payment. Because of the contractual agreements that the Department of the Treasury has entered into with the GSEs in which Treasury has agreed to provide them with financial support, taxpayers are potentially exposed to the GSEs' credit risk. To reduce this risk, FHFA has directed the GSEs to transfer credit risk to other private investors. Congress is interested in several aspects of risk sharing, including the methods through which risk is being shared, how much risk is being shared, the effect of sharing risk on credit availability, and how effective the transactions are at protecting the taxpayer.
The Common Securitization Platform (CSP) is FHFA's attempt to improve the way in which MBS are issued. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac each have their own securitization method (i.e., the process of transforming a pool of mortgages into MBS), but FHFA determined that their technology associated with creating and issuing MBS is outdated. Rather than invest in updating two systems, FHFA directed the GSEs to create one platform for securitizing mortgages. Congress is interested in multiple aspects of the CSP, including whether other private companies will be able to access it as well as the CSP's future ownership structure.
The Single Security is FHFA's initiative to alter the type of MBS that would be issued in the future. Currently, each GSE issues its own, distinct MBS. Fannie MBS and Freddie MBS are different securities governed by different legal contracts and trade at different prices. The Single Security would be a single MBS that the GSEs could issue through the CSP and would be traded in a single market. FHFA argues that the Single Security would enhance the liquidity of the MBS market—the ease with which MBS can be bought and sold—and remove the subsidy that Freddie Mac currently offers to keep its MBS competitive. Congress is interested in whether the Single Security will be effective in promoting liquidity in the MBS market and in what effect the Single Security will have on competition between the GSEs.
These three topics, although important, are just a subset of the many issues facing Congress as it considers broader reform of the housing finance system. Because FHFA's actions touch on the key issues of reform and, in some cases, are incorporated into legislative reform proposals, many in Congress have followed FHFA's actions closely. In addition, the Senate Banking Committee has reported the Financial Regulatory Improvement Act of 2015 (S. 1484), legislation that would codify FHFA's actions in some cases and would modify FHFA's actions in others. |
crs_RL32732 | crs_RL32732_0 | In FY2002, Congresscreated a new fund (Health Services Improvement Fund) to collect increases inpharmacy copayments (from $2 to $7 for a 30-day supply of outpatient medication)that went into effect on February 4, 2002. Theprogram was created by the Veterans' Omnibus Health Care Act of 1976 ( P.L.94-581 ) to provide rehabilitative services to certain veteran beneficiaries receivingmedical care and treatment from VA. Funds collected in this program are derivedfrom goods and services produced and sold by patients and members in VA healthcare facilities. Theprogram was established by the Veterans' Benefits Act of 1992 ( P.L.102-568 ). Underthis program, veterans who do not have either a spouse or child may have theirmonthly pension reduced to $90 after the third month a veteran is admitted for nursing home care. The difference between the veteran's pension and the $90 is usedfor the operation of the VA medical facility. Collections to this revolving fund are realized from the transferon any interest in real property that is owned by VA and has an estimated value inexcess of $50,000. Appendix 2. VHA's New Account Structure
Medical Services. Provides fundsfor treatment of veterans and eligible beneficiaries in VA medical centers, nursinghomes, outpatient clinic facilities, and contract hospitals. Overhead costs associated with medical and prosthetic researchis also funded by this account. Medical Administration. Providesfunds for the management and administration of VA's health care system. Funds areused for the costs associated with the operation of VA medical centers, otherfacilities, VHA headquarters, costs of Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN)offices, billing and coding activities, and procurement. Provides funds for medical, rehabilitative, and health services research. In addition to funds fromthis appropriation, reimbursements from the Department of Defense (DOD), grantsfrom the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and private sources supports VAresearches. Appendix 3. VHA's Appropriation for Capital Investments
Medical Administration. Providesfunds for capital projects costing $7 million or more that are intended to design,build, alter, extend or improve a VHA facility. As part of VA's budget process,Congress reviews, approves, and funds major construction on a project by projectbasis. Appendix 4. | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides services and benefits such as hospital andmedical care, rehabilitation services, and pensions, among other things, to veterans who meet certaineligibility criteria. VA provides these benefits and services through four administrative units: theVeterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), the NationalCemetery Administration (NCA), and the Board of Veterans' Appeals. VHA is primarily a directservice provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support servicesto veterans through an integrated health care system.
Funding for VHA is an issue of perennial interest to Congress, especially with the increasingdemand for VA medical services and with some veterans increasingly having to wait more than sixmonths for a primary care or speciality care appointment. VHA is funded through multipleappropriation accounts, which are supplemented by other sources of revenue. Over the past decade,the composition of VHA's funding has changed. Not only has VA's appropriation account structurebeen modified, but also VA's ability to retain nonappropriated funds has increased. These changespresent challenges in comparing VHA funding over a period of time.
Between FY1995 and FY2004, appropriations for VA medical care grew by 63%. For thefirst four years of this time period, from FY1995 through FY1999, appropriations for VA medicalcare grew by 6.7%, from $16.2 billion in FY1995 to $17.3 billion in FY1999. In comparison, duringthe last five years of this time period, from FY1999 through FY2004, VA medical careappropriations grew by 52.7%, from $17.3 billion in FY1999 to $26.4 billion in FY2004. Theseamounts do not include appropriations for medical research, medical administration andmiscellaneous operating expenses (MAMOE), and funds from nonappropriated funding sources.
The total number of veteran enrollees has grown by 76.9% from FY1999, the first year VHAinstituted an enrollment system, to FY2004. During this same period the number of veteransreceiving medical care has grown by almost 50%, from 3.2 million veterans in FY1999 to anestimated 4.7 million veterans in FY2004.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL34548 | crs_RL34548_0 | Pollution from ships is also affected by the fuel they use. Provisions of Annex VI
Annex VI of the Convention, which was adopted in 1997 but did not enter into force until 2005, addresses the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships. Implementing Legislation (P.L. 110-280)
The United States is a party to MARPOL 73/78 and most of its annexes, but did not enact legislation to implement Annex VI until the summer of 2008. The House passed H.R. The President signed the bill July 21, 2008 ( P.L. The Annex VI standards apply to: any oceangoing vessel that is registered in the United States; ships of any registry in ports, shipyards, terminals, or the internal waters of the United States; ships of any registry bound for or departing from the United States, while they are located in the navigable waters of the United States or designated emission control areas; and ships bearing the flag of any country that has ratified Annex VI traveling through U.S. waters or designated emission control areas, even if they are not bound for or departing from a U.S. destination. Thus, 2009 has seen several developments that will strengthen emission standards for ships and expand the use of cleaner fuels. On July 1, 2009, EPA proposed regulations that will strengthen emission standards for new C3 marine engines and will implement the low sulfur fuel requirements that apply in ECAs starting in 2015. This prohibition applies only to the period covered by the appropriation, i.e., FY2010. 111-316 ), states that EPA has received comments detailing significant negative economic impacts for carriers that operate Category 3 engine vessels exclusively within the Great Lakes, and the report adds:
Because of these economic impacts, EPA should include waiver provisions similar to those in other EPA rules in the final rule—one to waive the 10,000 ppm sulfur standard for Great Lakes Category 3 diesel engine vessels that burn residual fuel if EPA determines that 10,000 ppm residual fuel is not available; and one to waive fuel requirements for an owner/operator of a Great Lakes Category 3 diesel engine vessel based upon a showing of serious economic hardship. Greenhouse Gases
Ships are also an important source of greenhouse gas (GHG) pollutants. Nevertheless, it is possible without changes in technology or fuels to achieve significant GHG emission reductions, and shipping companies have begun to implement slow steaming policies to reduce their emissions. A detailed discussion of options (in the context of Navy ships) is provided in CRS Report RL33360, Navy Ship Propulsion Technologies: Options for Reducing Oil Use—Background for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]
Conclusion
As pollution from cars, trucks, and land-based stationary sources has been more tightly controlled over the last 40 years, the contribution of ships and port operations to air pollution in port cities has become more important. Simultaneously, foreign trade has grown dramatically, adding to the burden of pollution from these sources. Controlling these sources of pollution is complicated by the fact that most oceangoing ships are registered in foreign countries. EPA and state and local agencies (particularly those in California) have also begun to address pollution from ships using the Clean Air Act and comparable state authorities. Because ships and port operations are now such significant sources of air pollution, and because of the importance of shipping to the national and world economy, implementation of the emissions regulations for ships and ports, including the cleaner fuels requirements, may continue to be of interest to Congress. But this is likely to be just the start of Congressional attention to air pollution from ships. | This report provides information regarding pollution from ships and port facilities; discusses some of the measures being implemented and considered by local, state, and federal regulatory agencies; discusses the efforts to strengthen Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL); and describes legislation in Congress to control emissions from ships, as well as efforts in Congress to address the applicability of proposed EPA regulations to ships on the Great Lakes.
As pollution from cars, trucks, and land-based stationary sources has been more tightly controlled over the last 40 years, the contribution of ships and port operations to air pollution in port cities has become more important. In the same period, foreign trade has grown dramatically; thus, pollution from shipping and port operations is growing as a percentage of total emissions. In many cities, ships are now among the largest sources of air pollution. As Congress and the Administration turn their attention to climate change, there is also a growing recognition that marine vessels are an important source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
Controlling these sources of both conventional and greenhouse gas pollutants is complicated by the fact that most ocean-going ships are not registered in the United States and may not even purchase the fuel they are using here. Thus, controlling such pollution would seem to lend itself to an international approach. Such efforts have been slow to yield results: in 1997, the United States and most countries signed an international agreement known as MARPOL Annex VI, setting extremely modest controls on air pollution from ships, but the agreement did not enter into force until 2005, and the United States did not enact legislation to implement it until July 21, 2008 (P.L. 110-280). Negotiations to strengthen Annex VI accelerated in 2008, however, and amendments that will strengthen its provisions have received preliminary approval. Discussions regarding GHG emissions have also begun, although without results to date.
While awaiting congressional action and international agreement, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), port cities, and states have begun to act on their own. This report discusses a number of these efforts, including EPA measures that will require cleaner fuels and will greatly strengthen emission standards, and measures being implemented in California to reduce pollution from ships and ports.
In the current Congress, greenhouse gas emissions from ships are addressed in H.R. 2454, the Waxman-Markey climate change bill. As passed by the House, the bill would direct EPA to establish emission standards for nonroad vehicles and engines (a category that includes ships), by December 31, 2012.
In other action, Congress added a provision to the FY2010 EPA appropriation (P.L. 111-88) that prohibits FY2010 funds being used to implement cleaner fuel requirements as they apply to Great Lakes ships. Accompanying report language directs EPA to develop provisions to establish waivers of the low sulfur fuel requirements for Great Lakes ships if the fuel is not available or in cases of serious economic hardship. |
crs_R42114 | crs_R42114_0 | For more than a decade, various experts have expressed concerns about information-system security—often referred to more generally as cybersecurity —in the United States and abroad. It involves both securing federal systems and fulfilling the appropriate federal role in protecting nonfederal systems. There is no overarching framework legislation in place, but many enacted statutes address various aspects of cybersecurity. Revisions to many of those laws have been proposed. Several bills propose revisions to current laws, and several have received significant debate, with four bills specifically focusing on cybersecurity being enacted at the end of the 113 th Congress. Under current law, all federal agencies have cybersecurity responsibilities relating to their own systems, and many have sector-specific responsibilities for CI, such as the Department of Transportation for the transportation sector. The Obama Administration has also launched several initiatives. Proposed Legislation
In general, legislative proposals on cybersecurity in recent Congresses have focused largely on issues in 10 broad areas:
protection of CI (especially the electricity grid and the chemical industry), information sharing and cross-sector coordination, responsibilities and authority of federal agencies, reform of FISMA, research and development (R&D), the cybersecurity workforce, data breaches resulting in theft or exposure of personal data such as financial information, cybercrime offenses and penalties, national cybersecurity strategy, and international efforts. For most of those topics, at least some of the bills addressing them have proposed changes to current laws. None passed the Senate until the end of the 113 th Congress. Subsequently, several House bills have been considered that would address several of the issues raised and recommendations made by the Task Force Report. 113th Congress
The four bills that had passed the House in the 112 th Congress were all reintroduced and passed, with some amendments, in April 2013:
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2013 ( H.R. 756 ); Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act ( H.R. 624 ); Advancing America's Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Act of 2013 ( H.R. 967 ); and Federal Information Security Amendments Act of 2013 ( H.R. 113th Congress
Several cybersecurity bills were reported out of committee in 2014:
Cybersecurity Act of 2013 ( S. 1353 ), which would address federal cybersecurity R&D, cybersecurity workforce and education, and public/private partnerships to protect CI; DHS Cybersecurity Workforce Recruitment and Retention Act of 2014 ( S. 2354 ), which would provide DHS with additional cybersecurity workforce authority and require an assessment of workforce needs; National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center Act of 2014 ( S. 2519 ), which would establish an information sharing and coordination center in DHS; Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 ( S. 2521 ), which would address FISMA reform; and Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014 ( S. 2588 ), which would address information sharing and coordination, including sharing of classified information. S. 2519 and S. 2521 also passed the Senate in December. Bills Enacted in the 113th Congress
Four of the cybersecurity bills debated in the 113 th Congress were enacted, as amended, in December 2014:
the CIRDA Act ( H.R. 1163 . The discussion below compares various approaches from proposals in the 112 th and 113 th Congresses that would address the following issues: " Selected Issues Addressed in Proposed Legislation ," " Sharing of Cybersecurity Information " Department of Homeland Security Authorities for Protection of Federal Systems ," " Reform ," " Cybersecurity Workforce ," and " Research and Development ," as well as some " Other Topics "—cybercrime law, data breach notification, and defense-related cybersecurity. The federal role in protection of privately held CI has been one of the most contentious issues in the debate about cybersecurity legislation. The Task Force Report , H.R. They would have required three relevant reports: (1) an annual joint report to Congress by the DHS and Department of Justice privacy officers assessing impacts; (2) a report from the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board assessing impacts and recommending statutory changes; and (3) a joint report by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Defense that would have included disclosure of significant noncompliance by nonfederal entities with the requirements of the information-sharing title of the bill, especially with respect to privacy and civil liberties, with recommendations for any statutory changes ( S. 2102 and S. 2105 ) or that identified changes in the information technology environment that challenged the adequacy of the law ( S. 3414 ). Reform of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)
The " Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) " was enacted in 2002. 3696 , S. 1691 , S. 2354 ). 113th Congress
In the House, most provisions in H.R. Similar bills passed the House in the 112 th ( H.R. See also " Sharing of Cybersecurity Information Among Private and Government Entities ." | For more than a decade, various experts have expressed increasing concerns about cybersecurity, in light of the growing frequency, impact, and sophistication of attacks on information systems in the United States and abroad. Consensus has also been building that the current legislative framework for cybersecurity might need to be revised.
The complex federal role in cybersecurity involves both securing federal systems and assisting in protecting nonfederal systems. Under current law, all federal agencies have cybersecurity responsibilities relating to their own systems, and many have sector-specific responsibilities for critical infrastructure (CI).
More than 50 statutes address various aspects of cybersecurity either directly or indirectly, but there is no overarching framework legislation in place. Revisions to many of those laws have been proposed over the past several years. Recent legislative proposals, including many bills introduced in recent Congresses, have focused largely on issues in several broad areas, including the following:
"Protection of Privately Held Critical Infrastructure (CI)" "Sharing of Cybersecurity Information Among Private and Government Entities," "Department of Homeland Security Authorities for Protection of Federal Systems," "Reform of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)," "Cybersecurity Workforce," and "Research and Development."
"Other Topics"—including cybercrime law, data breach notification, and defense-related cybersecurity—have also been addressed in legislative proposals.
At least some of the bills addressing those areas have proposed explicit changes to current laws. However, no bills making such revisions were enacted until the end of the 113th Congress.
In the 112th and 113th Congresses, several bills that specifically focused on cybersecurity received committee or floor action. Comprehensive legislative proposals in the 112th Congress included the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 (S. 3414), recommendations from a House Republican task force, and a proposal by the Obama Administration. S. 3414 was debated in the Senate but failed two cloture votes. In the absence of enactment of cybersecurity legislation in that Congress, the White House issued Executive Order 13636, with provisions on protection of CI, including information sharing and standards development.
In the 113th Congress, several narrower House bills addressed some of the issues raised and recommendations made by the House task force. Four had passed the House in the 112th Congress but were not considered by the Senate. They were reintroduced and passed the House again, with some amendments:
The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (H.R. 624) focuses on information sharing and coordination. The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2013 (H.R. 756) and the Advancing America's Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Act of 2013 (H.R. 967) address federal cybersecurity R&D and technical standards. The Federal Information Security Amendments Act of 2013 (H.R. 1163) addresses FISMA reform.
Also passing the House were three bills that address the role of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in cybersecurity: The CIRDA Act of 2013 (H.R. 2952), the Homeland Security Cybersecurity Boots-on-the-Ground Act (H.R. 3107), and the National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2013 (H.R. 3696). They include provisions on workforce, R&D, information sharing, and public/private sector collaboration in protecting CI.
Three Senate cybersecurity bills passed in the 113th Congress:
The DHS Cybersecurity Workforce Recruitment and Retention Act of 2014 (S. 2354), bill addressing workforce issues, passed the Senate as an amendment to S. 1691. The National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 (S. 2519) provides authorization for a DHS information-sharing center. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (S. 2521), addresses FISMA reform.
Four of the bills, as amended, were enacted at the end of the 113th Congress: H.R. 2952, S. 1691, S. 2519, and S. 2521. The bills address FISMA reform and DHS workforce issues and information-sharing activities. |
crs_RL32975 | crs_RL32975_0 | The Military Construction, Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs AppropriationsAct, 2006 (MIL-CON-QUAL-VA Appropriations Act, P.L.109-114 ) was signed into law by thePresident on November 30, 2005. The MIL-CON-QUAL-VA Appropriations Act appropriated$22.5 billion for medical services, of which $1.2 billion was designated as an emergencyappropriation. The conference agreement includes$225 million for the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) to address recovery activities relatedto the hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and to prepare for a possible pandemic influenza outbreak,and excludes the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) programs from a 1% across-the-boardrescission for all non-emergency discretionary programs. (3) The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006 ( P.L.109-148 ) was signed into law on December 30, 2005. The total amount of funds available forVHA is $31.5 billion, including $2.2 billion in collections (copays and third-party insurancepayments). Background
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certaineligibility rules. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions, education,training and rehabilitation services, hospital and medical care, and other benefits, such as home loanguarantees and death benefits that cover burial expenses. P.L.109-54 provided $1.5billion in supplemental appropriations for veterans medical services for FY2005, with carryoverauthority for FY2006 as well. FY2006 VHA Budget
President's FY2006 Budget
The President's FY2006 budget requested $30.4 billion for VHA: $22.2 billion for medicalservices, $4.5 billion for medical administration, $3.3 billion for medical facilities, and $393 millionfor medical and prosthetic research. VHA medical care collections (e.g., copays, third-partyinsurance payments) for FY2006 are expected to be $2.2 billion. 2528 ,( H.Rept. The House passed H.R.2528 on May 26, 2005. On June 29, 2005 the Senate passed H.R. (23)
In response to the FY2005 budget shortfall for VA medical services, on July 26, 2005, theconferees of the Department of the Interior, Environment and Related Agencies, Appropriations bill,2006 ( H.R. The totalamount recommended for VHA is composed of $23.3 billion for medical services including $1.97billion in "emergency appropriations" as requested by the President's budget amendment, (24) $2.9 billion for medicaladministration, $3.3 billion for medical facilities, $412 million for medical and prosthetic research,and $1.5 billion for information technology. Furthermore, the Committee did not approve any of the Administration's fee proposals. The total amount of funding available for VHA for FY2006, includingcollections, is $31.5 billion. a. e. On August 2, 2005, the FY2006 Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill ( H.R. 2361 , P.L.109-54 ) was signed into law. a. This change occurredwith the enactment of the Veterans Millennium Health Care and Benefits Act( P.L. Medical Administration. | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certaineligibility rules. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions to hospitaland medical care. VA provides these benefits to veterans through three major operating units: theVeterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) and theNational Cemetery Administration (NCA). VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primarycare, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through anintegrated health care system.
The President's FY2006 budget requested $30.4 billion for VHA: $20.0 billion for medicalservices, $4.5 billion for medical administration, $3.3 billion for medical facilities, and $393 millionfor medical and prosthetic research. VHA medical care collections (e.g., copays, third-partyinsurance payments) for FY2006 are expected to be $2.2 billion.
On May 26, 2005, the House passed its version of H.R. 2528 , the MilitaryQuality of Life and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies appropriations bill for FY2006. This billprovided $28.8 billion for VHA. On June 23, 2005, VA announced a budget shortfall of more than$1 billion from its FY2005 enacted level for veterans health programs. On August 2, 2005, theDepartment of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-54 )was signed into law, providing $1.5 billion in supplemental appropriations for veterans medicalservices for FY2005.
On September 22, 2005, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 2528 , the MilitaryConstruction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies appropriations bill for FY2006. The Senateappropriated a total of $31.3 billion for VHA.
On November 30, 2005, the Military Construction, Military Quality of Life and VeteransAffairs Appropriations Act, 2006 ( P.L.109-114 ) was signed into law. This act provided $22.5 billionfor medical services, of which $1.2 billion was designated as an emergency appropriation. P.L.109-114 also appropriated $2.9 billion for medical administration, $3.3 billion for medical facilities,and $412 million for medical and prosthetic research. On December 30, 2005, the Department ofDefense Appropriations Act, 2006 ( P.L.109-148 , H.Rept. 109-359 ) was signed into law, providingan additional $225 million for VHA for FY2006 and excluding VA programs from a 1%across-the-board rescission for all non-emergency discretionary programs. The total amount of fundsappropriated for VHA for FY2006 is $29.3 billion. The total amount of funds available for VHAis $31.5 billion, including $2.2 billion in collections.
In its FY2006 budget submission to Congress, the Administration proposed severallegislative and regulatory changes to increase certain copayments and other cost-sharing charges forcertain veterans. P.L.109-114 did not include any of the Administration's cost-sharing proposals forVHA. This report will be not be updated. |
crs_R44515 | crs_R44515_0 | FY2017 Consideration: Overview of Actions
The first section of this report provides an overview of the consideration of FY2017 legislative branch appropriations, with subsections covering each action, including
the initial submission of the request on February 9, 2016; hearings held by the House and Senate Legislative Branch Subcommittees in March; the House subcommittee markup on April 20, 2016; the House full committee markup on May 17, 2016; the Senate full committee markup on May 19, 2016; House consideration of a special rule on June 8, 2016; House floor consideration on June 9 and 10, 2016; the enactment of three continuing resolutions ( P.L. 114-223 , through December 9, 2016; P.L. 114-254 , through April 28, 2017; and P.L. 115-30 , through May 5, 2017); and the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 on May 5, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ), which provides $4.440 billion for legislative branch activities. It contains a request for $4.659 billion in new budget authority for legislative branch activities. By law, the legislative branch request is submitted to the President and included in the budget without change. The bill was reported out of committee by voice vote ( H.R. 5325 , H.Rept. 114-594 ). Senate Appropriations Committee Legislative Branch Markup
On May 19, 2016, the Senate Appropriations Committee met to mark up its version of the FY2017 bill. No amendments were offered, and the bill was ordered reported by a vote of 30-0 ( S. 2955 , S.Rept. 114-258 ). These include $4.399 billion for the legislative branch, or 0.4% of total discretionary budget authority. The House- and Senate-proposed suballocations for the legislative branch differ by $37.0 million. 771 , which made in order 13 amendments. Six were agreed to (all voice votes), and four were not (all recorded votes). H.R. 5325 , as amended, was agreed to on June 10, with a vote of 233-175 (Roll no. 294). The $4.300 billion provided by the act represented an increase of $41.7 million (1.0%) from FY2014 and was $164.9 million (-3.7%) less than the request. The act funded legislative branch accounts at the FY2012 enacted level, with some exceptions (also known as "anomalies"), and not including across-the-board rescissions required by Section 3004 of P.L. This level represented a $125.1 million decrease from the $4.668 billion provided in the FY2010 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act ( P.L. The FY2017 level (not included in the table and figure) of $4.440 billion remains nearly 5% below the FY2010 level (not adjusted for inflation), which was the peak of legislative branch funding. An amendment agreed to during the full committee markup increased this level by $8.3 million, offset by a reduction to the Architect of the Capitol's account, to a total of $1.189 billion (an increase of $8.3 million, or 0.7%, from the FY2016 enacted level) in the bill reported by the House Appropriations Committee (hereinafter House-reported bill). H.R. The Senate-reported bill would have provided $67.0 million (+1.5%). The House Appropriations Committee Legislative Branch Subcommittee recommended $560.1 million, not including funding for the Senate office buildings. During consideration of H.R. Government Publishing Office (GPO)32
The FY2017 act provides $117.1 million, the same level as provided in FY2016 and contained in GPO's budget request and the House-passed and Senate-reported versions of the bill. 2. The FY2011 level of $11.4 million represented a decrease of $623,000 (-5.2%) from the $12.0 million provided for FY2010. | The legislative branch appropriations bill provides funding for the Senate; House of Representatives; Joint Items; Capitol Police; Office of Compliance; Congressional Budget Office (CBO); Architect of the Capitol (AOC); Library of Congress (LOC), including the Congressional Research Service (CRS); Government Publishing Office (GPO); Government Accountability Office (GAO); Open World Leadership Center; and the John C. Stennis Center.
The FY2017 legislative branch budget request of $4.659 billion was submitted on February 9, 2016. By law, the President includes the legislative branch request in the annual budget submission without change.
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees' Legislative Branch Subcommittees held hearings in March to consider the FY2017 legislative branch requests.
On April 20, 2016, the House Appropriations Committee Legislative Branch Subcommittee held a markup of the draft bill. The bill was ordered reported to the full committee by voice vote.
On May 17, the House Appropriations Committee held a markup of the bill. Seven amendments were considered: two were adopted, four were not adopted, and one was withdrawn. The bill was ordered reported by voice vote. It would have provided $3.481 billion, not including Senate items (H.R. 5325, H.Rept. 114-594).
On June 9, 2016, the House agreed to a structured rule for consideration of the legislative branch bill (H.Res. 771), which made 13 amendments in order. During consideration of H.R. 5325, 10 amendments were offered. Six were agreed to (all voice votes), and four were not (all recorded votes). H.R. 5325 was agreed to on June 10, with a vote of 233-175 (Roll no. 294).
On May 19, the Senate Appropriations Committee held a markup of its version of the FY2017 bill. It would have provided $3.021 billion, not including House items. The bill was reported by a vote of 30-0 (S. 2955, S.Rept. 114-258).
The House- and Senate-proposed totals for legislative branch activities (including all House and Senate items) differ by $37.0 million, with the House proposing $4.436 billion for FY2017 and the Senate proposing $4.399 billion.
H.R. 5325 was not enacted, however, and funding for the beginning of FY2017 was provided by three continuing resolutions (P.L. 114-223, through December 9, 2016; P.L. 114-254, through April 28, 2017; and P.L. 115-30, through May 5, 2017).
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), enacted on May 5, 2017, provides $4.440 billion for legislative branch activities for FY2017 (+1.7% from FY2016).
The enacted FY2017 level remains nearly 5% below the FY2010 level, which was the peak of legislative branch funding, not adjusted for inflation. The FY2016 level of $4.363 billion represented an increase of $63 million (+1.5%) from the FY2015 level of $4.300 billion, and the FY2015 level represented an increase of $41.7 million (+1.0%) from the FY2014 funding level of $4.259 billion. The FY2013 act funded legislative branch accounts at the FY2012 enacted level, with some exceptions (also known as "anomalies"), less across-the-board rescissions that applied to all appropriations in the act, and not including sequestration reductions implemented on March 1. The FY2012 level of $4.307 billion represented a decrease of $236.9 million (-5.2%) from the FY2011 level, which itself represented a $125.1 million decrease (-2.7%) from FY2010.
The smallest of the appropriations bills, the legislative branch comprises approximately 0.4% of total discretionary budget authority. |
crs_RL31381 | crs_RL31381_0 | The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that foreign nationals may be admitted to the United States temporarily or may come to live permanently. Nonimmigrants are admitted for a designated period of time and for a specific purpose. The U.S. Department of State (DOS) consular officer, at the time of application for a visa, as well as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) immigration inspectors, at the time of application for admission, must be satisfied that the alien is entitled to a nonimmigrant status. The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish eligibility for nonimmigrant status and the type of nonimmigrant visa for which the application is made. Various data on nonimmigrants who establish residence in the United States are also discussed. Broad Categories of Nonimmigrants
There are 24 major nonimmigrant visa categories, and 87 specific types of nonimmigrant visas are issued currently. These visa categories are commonly referred to by the letter and numeral that denotes their subsection in §101(a)(15); for example, B-2 tourists, E-2 treaty investors, F-1 foreign students, H-1B temporary professional workers, J-1 cultural exchange participants, and S-4 terrorist informants. U.S. Both DOS consular officers (when the alien is petitioning abroad) and CBP inspectors (when the alien is entering the United States) must confirm that the alien is not ineligible for a visa under the so-called "grounds for inadmissibility" of the INA. Combined, visitor visas issued for tourism and business comprised the largest group of nonimmigrants in FY2009—about 4.1 million, down from 5.7 million in FY2000. Notable among the non-tourist categories of visas issued in 2009 were the 0.7 million students and exchange visitors (12.3%) and the 0.5 million temporary workers, managers, executives, and investors (8.7%). Since many types of visas allow people to depart and re-enter the United States, the CBP data record multiple admissions during the same year. During 2009, CBP inspectors tallied 163 million nonimmigrant admissions to the United States. Mexican nationals with border crossing cards and Canadian nationals traveling for business or tourist purposes accounted for the vast majority of admissions to the United States in FY2009, with approximately 126.8 million entries. The remaining categories and countries of the world contributed the 36.2 million I-94 admissions in FY2009. In other words, there were a total of 7.6 million visas issued and 32.8 million admissions in FY2001, in contrast to a total of 5.8 million visas issued and 36.2 million admissions in FY2009. Of the 1.8 million nonimmigrants, 50.8% (0.93 million) were temporary workers and their families, 32.2% (0.59 million) were students and their families, 13.1% (0.24 million) were exchange visitors and their families, and 3.8% (0.07 million) were diplomats, other representatives, and their families. Pathways to Permanent Residence
As discussed above, most foreign nationals seeking to qualify for a nonimmigrant visa must demonstrate that they are not coming to reside permanently. Delineating Current Law
The law and regulations set terms for nonimmigrant lengths of stay in the United States, typically have foreign residency requirements, and often limit what the aliens are permitted to do in the United States (e.g., gain employment or enroll in school). | U.S. law provides for the temporary admission of various categories of foreign nationals, who are known as nonimmigrants. Nonimmigrants are admitted for a designated period of time and a specific purpose. They include a wide range of visitors, including tourists, foreign students, diplomats, and temporary workers. There are 24 major nonimmigrant visa categories. These visa categories are commonly referred to by the letter and numeral that denotes their subsection in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); for example, B-2 tourists, E-2 treaty investors, F-1 foreign students, H-1B temporary professional workers, J-1 cultural exchange participants, or S-4 terrorist informants.
The U.S. Department of State (DOS) consular officer, at the time of application for a visa, as well as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) inspectors, at the time of application for admission, must be satisfied that the alien is entitled to nonimmigrant status. The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish eligibility for nonimmigrant status and the type of nonimmigrant visa for which the application is made. Both DOS consular officers (when the alien is petitioning abroad) and DHS inspectors (when the alien is entering the United States) must confirm that the alien is not ineligible for a visa under the so-called "grounds for inadmissibility" of the INA, which include criminal, terrorist, and public health grounds for exclusion.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors in DHS tallied 163 million temporary admissions of foreign nationals to the United States during 2009. Mexican nationals with border crossing cards and Canadian nationals traveling for business or tourist purposes accounted for the vast majority of admissions to the United States, with approximately 126.8 million entries in FY2009. The remaining categories and countries of the world contributed 36.2 million admissions in FY2009. Since many types of visas allow people to depart and re-enter the United States, the CBP data record multiple admissions during the same year.
In FY2009, DOS's consular officers issued 5.8 million nonimmigrant visas. Nonimmigrant visas issued abroad had dipped to 5.0 million in FY2004 after peaking at 7.6 million in FY2001. Combined, visitor visas issued for tourism and business comprised the largest group of nonimmigrant visas in FY2009, with about 4.1 million, down from 5.7 million in FY2000. Other notable groups were 0.7 million students and exchange visitors (12.3%) and 0.5 million temporary workers, managers, executives, and investors (8.7%).
According to the most recent analysis, there were 1.8 million nonimmigrants who maintained a residence in the United States in 2008. Of the 1.8 million nonimmigrants, 50.8% (0.93 million) were temporary workers and their families, 32.2% (0.59 million) were students and their families, 13.1% (0.24 million) were exchange visitors and families, and 3.8% (0.07 million) were diplomats, other representatives, and their families. Although most nonimmigrants must demonstrate that they are not coming to reside permanently in the United States, many ultimately adjust their status to become legal permanent residents.
The law and regulations set terms for nonimmigrant lengths of stay in the United States, typically have foreign residency requirements, and often limit what aliens are permitted to do in the United States (e.g., gain employment or enroll in school), but many observers assert that the policies are not uniformly or rigorously enforced. Achieving an optimal balance among major policy priorities, such as ensuring national security, facilitating trade and commerce, protecting public health and safety, and fostering international cooperation, remains a challenge. |
crs_RL32700 | crs_RL32700_0 | Moreover, as required by Section 125 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C.2535), beginning with March 1, 2000, and every fifth year thereafter, such report, transmitted by thePresident, must "include an analysis of the effects of the WTO Agreement on the interests of theUnited States, the costs and benefits to the United States of its participation in the WTO, and thevalue of the continued participation of the United States in the WTO." As pointed out in the section on Disapproval Resolutions contained in the Statement ofAdministrative Action, a part of the documentation which is required to be transmitted by thePresident to the Congress together with the draft of the implementing bill for the Uruguay RoundAgreements Act,
[t]he provision creates a mechanism that will permitperiodic Congressional review of U.S. participation in the WTO. (2)
Following the submission of such quinquennial report and its review by Congress, Congresscan withdraw its approval of the WTO Agreement, leading to the termination of the United States'participation in the WTO, through the enactment of a joint resolution disapproving the originalapproval of the WTO Agreement. Legislative Procedure
The legislation lays out a specific, expedited (fast-track) procedure to be followed by theCongress in the consideration of the withdrawal measure. A joint resolution of withdrawal may be introduced in either House by any member of thatHouse (Sec. (This provision by its very nature makes the withdrawal resolution nonamendable.) (Hence, like all expedited procedures, this procedure can be superseded by the House'sadoption of a resolution reported by the Rules Committee providing for a different procedure.) As in the debate on the withdrawal resolution introduced in 2000 (see section of PastActivity on next page), the salient arguments in favor of the resolution as put forward by itssupporters in the debate are likely to be: the encroachment on U.S. sovereignty by virtue of U.S.membership in the WTO and submission to the obligations under the WTO Agreement; usurpationof Congress' constitutional power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations"; violation of the U.S.Constitution by implementing the WTO Agreement as a Congressional-Executive agreement ratherthan a treaty; and, more tangibly, the perceived, for the United States adverse, results of the WTOdispute settlement mechanism (16) in cases where the United States is either the complainant or thedefendant. Such applicabilitywould not cease due to the U.S. withdrawal from the WTO. (20) On June 9, 2005, theHouse disapproved withdrawal resolution H.J.Res. 27 by a vote of 338-86. | The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) legislatively approved the World TradeOrganization (WTO) Agreement and the specialized agreements annexed to it. It also enacted theprovisions implementing the many obligations the United States undertook under them, and containsprovisions (Section 125) establishing the legislative procedure for Congressional withdrawal of suchapproval.
Initiation of such withdrawal action is predicated on the transmission by the Administrationof a mandatory quinquennial report, next due by March 1, 2005, analyzing the costs and benefits ofpast U.S. participation in the WTO as well as the value of continued U.S. participation. Thereupon,a privileged joint resolution may be introduced by any Member to withdraw the Congress' approvalof the WTO Agreement provided by the URAA.
The legislative procedure for such withdrawal basically follows Section 152 of the Trade Actof 1974, which provides for the enactment of joint resolutions disapproving certain trade-relatedactions, which for this purpose has been modified specifically by Section 125 of the URAA. Theprocedure provides for a (nonmandatory) introduction of the resolution, with mandatory,nonamendable language, and specific expedited (fast-track) consideration.
Although the immediate function of the withdrawal provision is to create a mechanism thatwill permit periodic Congressional review of U.S. participation in the WTO and the provisionfocuses specifically on withdrawing the approval of the WTO Agreement, it has been considered inCongress and in the civil society in the broader context of United States' withdrawal from actualparticipation (i.e., membership) in the WTO.
On June 9, 2005, the House defeated a resolution ( H.J.Res. 27 ) to withdrawapproval of the WTO Agreement by a vote of 338-86. A similar resolution in the year 2000 failedby a wider margin (363-56) in the House, and a withdrawal resolution was not even introduced inthe Senate. A resolution offers Congress the opportunity to debate the costs and benefits of U.S.participation in the WTO. In this context, Congressional concern with U.S. trading partners,particularly the European Union and Canada, and various other contentious issues emerged in thefloor debate and statements on H.J.Res. 27 . Such issues are dealt with in detail in CRS Report RL32918 , World Trade Organization (WTO): Issues in the Debate on U.S. Participation, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
This report, which will be updated as needed, sets out the background of the issue, thefunctional timetable and requirements for taking the legislative action for such withdrawal, and therelated WTO procedure. It also describes past and current activity under the withdrawal provisionand suggests the probable consequences of the withdrawal resolution, if enacted and implemented. |
crs_R44682 | crs_R44682_0 | Introduction
The length of time a congressional staff member spends employed in Congress, or job tenure, is a source of recurring interest among Members of Congress, congressional staff, those who study staffing in the House and Senate , and the public. There may be interest in congressional tenure information from multiple perspectives, including assessment of how a congressional office might oversee human resources issues, how staff might approach a congressional career, and guidance for how frequently staffing changes may occur in various positions. This report provides tenure data for 16 staff position titles that are typically used in House Member offices, and information for using those data for different purposes. The positions include the following:
Administrative Director Casework Supervisor Caseworker Chief of Staff Communications Director Counsel District Director Executive Assistant Field Representative Legislative Assistant Legislative Correspondent Legislative Director Office Manager Press Secretary Scheduler Staff Assistant
Data Source and Concerns
Publicly available information sources do not provide aggregated congressional staff tenure data in a readily retrievable or analyzable form. House Member staff tenure data were calculated for each year between 2006 and 2016. Presentation of Tenure Data
Tables in this section provide tenure data for selected positions in the personal offices of House Members and detailed data and visualizations for each position. Table 1 provides a summary of staff tenure for selected positions since 2006. The "Trend" column provides information on whether the time staff stayed in a position increased, was unchanged, or decreased between 2006 and 2016. A number of staff who stay in a position for only a brief period may depress the average length of tenure. Finally, since each House Member office serves as its own hiring authority, variations from office to office, which for each position may include differences in job duties, work schedules, office emphases, and other factors, may limit the extent to which aggregated data provided here might match tenure in a particular office. Between 2006 and 2016, staff tenure, based on the trend of the median number of years in the position, appears to have increased by six months or more for staff in three position titles in House Member offices. The median tenure was unchanged for 13 positions. This may be consistent with overall workforce trends in the United States. Although pay is not the only factor that might affect an individual's decision to remain in or leave a particular job, staff in positions that generally pay less typically remained in those roles for shorter periods of time than those in higher-paying positions. Some of these lower-paying positions may also be considered entry-level positions in some House Member offices; if so, House office employees in those roles appear to follow national trends for others in entry-level types of jobs, remaining in the role for a relatively short period of time. Similarly, those in more senior positions, which often require a particular level of congressional or other professional experience, typically remained in those roles comparatively longer, similar to those in more senior positions in the general workforce. | The length of time a congressional staff member spends employed in a particular position in Congress—or congressional staff tenure—is a source of recurring interest to Members, staff, and the public. A congressional office, for example, may seek this information to assess its human resources capabilities, or for guidance in how frequently staffing changes might be expected for various positions. Congressional staff may seek this type of information to evaluate and approach their own individual career trajectories. This report presents a number of statistical measures regarding the length of time House office staff stay in particular job positions. It is designed to facilitate the consideration of tenure from a number of perspectives.
This report provides tenure data for a selection of 16 staff position titles that are typically used in House Member offices, and information on how to use those data for different purposes. The positions include Administrative Director, Casework Supervisor, Caseworker, Chief of Staff, Communications Director, Counsel, District Director, Executive Assistant, Field Representative, Legislative Assistant, Legislative Correspondent, Legislative Director, Office Manager, Press Secretary, Scheduler, and Staff Assistant. House Members' staff tenure data were calculated as of March 31, for each year between 2006 and 2016, for all staff in each position. An overview table provides staff tenure for selected positions for 2016, including summary statistics and information on whether the time staff stayed in a position increased, was unchanged, or decreased between 2006 and 2016. Other tables provide detailed tenure data and visualizations for each position title.
Between 2006 and 2016, staff tenure appears to have increased by six months or more for staff in three position titles in House Member offices, based on the trend of the median number of years in the position. For 13 positions, the median tenure was unchanged. These findings may be consistent with overall workforce trends in the United States.
Pay may be one of many factors that affect an individual's decision to remain in or leave a particular job. House Member office staff holding positions that are generally lower-paid typically remained in those roles for shorter periods of time than those in generally higher-paying positions. Lower-paying positions may also be considered entry-level roles; if so, tenure for House Member office employees in these roles appears to follow national trends for other entry-level jobs, which individuals hold for a relatively short period of time. Those in more senior positions, where a particular level of congressional or other professional experience is often required, typically remained in those roles comparatively longer, similar to those in more senior positions in the general workforce.
Generalizations about staff tenure are limited in some ways, because each House office serves as its own hiring authority. Variations from office to office, which might include differences in job duties, work schedules, office emphases, and other factors, may limit the extent to which data provided here might match tenure in another office. Direct comparisons of congressional employment to the general labor market may have similar limitations. An employing Member's retirement or electoral loss, for example, may cause staff tenure periods to end abruptly and unexpectedly.
This report is one of a number of CRS products on congressional staff. Others include CRS Report R43947, House of Representatives Staff Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977-2016 and CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014. |
crs_RS21727 | crs_RS21727_0 | (10)
A second controversy arose when the U.S. attorney's office in Miami dropped a criminal case against a former federal baggagescreener who was charged with stealing from passengers in November 2003. The problem with the decision of the JusticeDepartment accordingto a TSA spokeswoman, is that "future prosecutions of dishonest agency employees would be hamstrung by thesame dilemma thatled to the dismissal of the indictment." (12) Thepublic defender in the case suggested that "prosecutors could have drop[ped] the partof the conspiracy charge relating to the sensitive security information ... and [moved] forward with the other twounderlying offenses-- breaking into baggage and stealing their contents." | In November 2003, the U.S. attorney's office in Miami dropped a criminal case againstaformer federal baggage screener charged with stealing from a passenger's luggage. The case was dropped becauseprosecutors fearedthat sensitive security information (SSI) would have to be disclosed. At issue is the ability of the TransportationSecurityAdministration (TSA) to prosecute other dishonest agency employees in the future. Will the same dilemma that ledto the dismissalof this particular case occur again? In recent months, this and other important issues relating to SSI have beenraised. This reportprovides a brief background on SSI regulation, an overview of the current policy issues, and a description of thecriticism of, andsupport for, SSI policy. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS21519 | crs_RS21519_0 | Introduction
Nearly all of the outstanding debt of the federal government is subject to a statutory limit. Periodic adjustments to the debt limit typically have taken the form of amendments to 31 U.S.C. The budget resolution, however, does not become law. Therefore, subsequent legislation is necessary in order to implement budget resolution policies, including changes to the statutory limit on the public debt. In addition, Congress may consider adjustments to the public debt limit outside the context of the budget resolution, such as when the House and Senate are unable to agree on a budget resolution or when the current debt limit is not sufficient to meet existing financial obligations. Legislative Procedures for Adjusting the Public Debt Limit
Under current legislative procedures, the House and Senate may originate and consider legislation adjusting the debt limit in several different ways. They may consider such legislation under regular legislative procedures, either as freestanding legislation or as a part of a measure dealing with other topics. Alternatively, they may change the debt limit as part of the budget reconciliation process provided for under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. In addition, Congress has twice established special procedures for congressional disapproval of adjustments to the debt limit authorized by certain statutes. Finally, the House has originated debt limit legislation under its former House Rule XXVIII (the so-called Gephardt rule); the House repealed the rule at the beginning of the 112 th Congress (2011-2012). Regular Legislative Procedures in Both Chambers
The House and Senate may develop and consider legislation adjusting the debt limit under regular legislative procedures in both chambers, either as freestanding legislation or as a part of a measure dealing with other topics. Of the 20 joint resolutions originated by the House under the Gephardt rule, 15 have been enacted into law. | Nearly all of the outstanding debt of the federal government is subject to a statutory limit, which is set forth as a dollar limitation in 31 U.S.C. 3101(b). From time to time, Congress considers and passes legislation to adjust or suspend this limit.
The annual budget resolution is required to include appropriate levels of the public debt for each fiscal year covered by the resolution. The budget resolution, however, does not become law. Therefore, the enactment of subsequent legislation is necessary in order to implement budget resolution policies, including changes to the statutory limit on the public debt. In addition, Congress may consider adjustments to the public debt limit outside the context of the budget resolution, such as when the House and Senate are unable to agree on a budget resolution or when the current debt limit is not sufficient to meet existing financial obligations.
Under current legislative procedures, the House and Senate may originate and consider legislation adjusting the debt limit in several different ways. They may consider such legislation under regular legislative procedures, either as freestanding legislation or as a part of a measure dealing with other topics. Alternatively, they may change the debt limit as part of the budget reconciliation process provided for under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. The House also has originated debt limit legislation under its former House Rule XXVIII (the so-called "Gephardt rule"); the House repealed the rule at the beginning of the 112th Congress (2011-2012). In addition, Congress has twice established special procedures for congressional disapproval of adjustments to the debt limit authorized by certain statutes.
During the period from 1940 to the present, Congress and the President have enacted a total of 96 measures adjusting the public debt limit—77 under regular legislative procedures in both chambers, 15 under the Gephardt rule, and 4 under reconciliation procedures.
This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_RL34470 | crs_RL34470_0 | Introduction
The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement entered into force on May 15, 2012. It is a comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) between the United States and Colombia that eventually will eliminate tariffs and other barriers in bilateral trade in goods and services. During the 112 th Congress, President Obama submitted the draft legislation on October 3, 2011 that was then introduced by request in both houses of Congress ( H.R. 3078 / S. 1641 ) to implement the U.S.-Colombia FTA. On October 12, 2011, the House passed H.R. 3078 (262-167) and sent it to the Senate. The Senate passed the legislation (66-33) on the same day. The two countries signed the agreement on November 22, 2006. The Colombian Congress approved the agreement in June 2007 and again in October 2007, after the agreement was modified to include new labor and environmental provisions. An FTA with Canada, approved by both countries in 2010, entered into force on August 15, 2011. In 2017, Colombia ranked 22 nd among U.S. export markets and 27 th among foreign exporters to the United States. FTA Potential Economic Impact
Upon full implementation, the U.S.-Colombia FTA will likely have a small, but positive, net economic effect on the United States. The net overall effect on the United States is expected to be minimal because Colombia's economy is very small when compared to the U.S. economy and the value of the U.S. trade with Colombia is a very small percentage of overall U.S. trade. U.S. agricultural exports would gain a small but not insignificant preference in the Colombian market for temperate-zone agricultural produce. Numerous Members of Congress opposed the FTA with Colombia because of concerns about violence in Colombia against labor union members and other human rights defenders. Some Republican and Democratic supporters of the FTA took issue with these charges against the Colombian government and contended that Colombia has made significant progress in recent years to curb the violence. Colombia Action Plan related to Labor Rights
The United States and Colombia negotiated to develop an "Action Plan Related to Labor Rights" (the Action Plan) to help resolve the following U.S. concerns related to labor-related issues in Colombia: alleged violence against Colombian labor union members; inadequate efforts to bring perpetrators of violence to justice; and insufficient protection of workers' rights in Colombia. The Prosecutor General's Office of Colombia informed the Colombian government of numerous actions it had taken or plans to take to combat impunity in cases involving union members and labor activists:
Issued a directive requiring criminal investigators to determine whether a victim was a union member or labor activist in the initial phase of the investigation; Issued a directive to the chiefs of the Unit of Justice and Peace and the Unit of Human Rights to share evidence and information about criminal cases involving union members, labor activists, teachers, journalists, and human rights activists; Developed a plan and identified budgetary needs for training judicial police investigators and prosecutors on crime scene management, and in investigative techniques with specific reference to the issues involved in labor cases; worked with the U.S. government in developing a detailed training program; Developed a plan and specified budgetary needs by May 20, 2011, to strengthen the institutional capacity, number of prosecutors and number of judicial police investigators; Finalized an analysis by July 15, 2011, on closed cases of homicides of union members and activists, in order to extract lessons that could improve investigations and prosecutions in future cases; the results of this analysis were widely publicized to help reduce impunity and deter future crimes; Developed a plan and identified specific budgetary needs for victims' assistance centers specialized in human rights cases, including labor cases; the Prosecutor General's Office agreed to staff the centers with professionals with expertise on human rights and labor issues; Colombia agreed to share the plans and budgetary allocations for this project to the U.S. government by June 15, 2011; Developed a program by the Prosecutor General's Office to address the backlog of unionist homicide cases that included (a) meeting with representatives of the union confederations and the National Labor School, Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS), an independent labor rights monitoring body, in order to try to reconcile discrepancies; and (b) internal guidance to prosecutors to accelerate action on cases with leads, with a special focus on "priority labor cases", and to provisionally close cold cases by June 15, 2011; and Improved public reporting of completed criminal cases involving labor violence by the Prosecutor General's Office through the following: (a) publication by April 22, 2011, of cases decided as of January 1, 2011, and thereafter; and (b) identification of methods by June 15, 2011, for posting information regarding all completed cases on the Prosecutor General's Office website. Much of the U.S. business contends that the agreement helps increase exports of U.S. products, especially in agriculture. Prior to passage of the agreement, U.S. exporters were concerned that they were losing market share in the Colombian market as a result of passage of FTAs that Colombia has negotiated with other countries. Numerous policymakers voiced concern about the United States losing market share of the Colombian market if Congress did not approve the U.S.-Colombia FTA. They maintain that Colombia's labor movement is under attack through violence, intimidation, and harassment, as well as legal channels. | The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement entered into force on May 15, 2012. It is a comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) between the United States and Colombia, which will eventually eliminate tariffs and other barriers in bilateral trade in goods and services. On October 3, 2011, during the 112th Congress, President Barack Obama submitted draft legislation (H.R. 3078/S. 1641) that was introduced by request in both houses of Congress to implement the agreement. On October 12, 2011, the House passed H.R. 3078 (262-167) and sent it to the Senate. The Senate passed the implementing legislation (66-33) on the same day. The agreement was signed by both countries almost five years earlier, on November 22, 2006. The Colombian Congress approved it in June 2007 and again in October 2007, after it was modified to include new provisions agreed to in the May 10, 2007, bipartisan understanding between congressional leadership and President George W. Bush.
The United States is Colombia's leading trade partner. Colombia accounts for a very small percentage of U.S. trade (approximately 1%), ranking 22nd among U.S. export markets and 27th among foreign exporters to the United States in 2017. Because the FTA has been in effect for only five and a half years, the economic effects of the agreement are not yet clear. Some economic studies estimated that, upon full implementation, the impact on the United States would likely be positive but very small due to the small size of the Colombian economy.
The congressional debate surrounding the US-Colombia FTA mostly centered on violence, labor, and human rights issues in Colombia. Numerous Members of Congress opposed passage of the agreement because of concerns about alleged targeted violence against union members in Colombia, inadequate efforts to bring perpetrators to justice, and weak protection of worker rights. However, other Members of Congress supported the FTA and took issue with these charges, stating that Colombia had made great progress over the last 10 years to curb violence and enhance security. They also argued that U.S. exporters were losing market share of the Colombian market and that the agreement would further open the Colombian market for U.S. goods and services.
To address the concerns related to labor rights and violence in Colombia, the United States and Colombia agreed upon an "Action Plan Related to Labor Rights" that included specific and concrete steps to be taken by the Colombian government with specific timelines. It included numerous commitments to protect union members, end impunity, and improve worker rights. The Colombian government submitted documents to the United States in time to meet various target dates listed in the Action Plan.
The U.S. business community generally supports the FTA with Colombia because it contends that FTAs help increase U.S. exports. At the time of the debate, U.S. exporters urged policymakers to move forward with the agreement, arguing that the United States was losing market share of the Colombian market, especially in agriculture, as Colombia entered into FTAs with other countries. Colombia's FTA with Canada, which was implemented on August 15, 2011, was of particular concern for U.S. agricultural producers. Critics of the agreement expressed concerns about violence against union members and the lack of protection of worker rights in Colombia, especially in labor cooperatives. Labor unions in general remain highly opposed to the agreement. They argue that Colombia's labor movement is under attack through violence, intimidation, and harassment, as well as legal challenges. |
crs_R44118 | crs_R44118_0 | The prominence of immigration enforcement issues during the 2016 presidential election as well as publicity surrounding crimes committed by some unauthorized aliens have reignited debates over immigration enforcement in the interior of the country. One homicide case, the July 2, 2015, slaying of a woman on a San Francisco pier by a reported unauthorized alien with a criminal and deportation history, is particularly noteworthy because the law enforcement agency in question reportedly had not honored an ICE request to detain the criminal alien who, upon his release, subsequently committed the crime. Some jurisdictions, through resolutions, executive orders, or local ordinances, have expressly defined or limited their roles and the activities of their employees regarding immigration enforcement. Critics of sanctuary jurisdictions contend that they impede law enforcement's primary mission in ways that could lead to calamitous outcomes (such as the homicide described above) or could encourage illegal immigration. Supporters of sanctuary jurisdictions maintain that they are needed because of resource and legal constraints, the need to avoid the disruption of critical municipal services by diverting local law enforcement personnel to handle immigration enforcement, and community policing concerns. While immigration enforcement is a federal responsibility, interior enforcement programs that involve cooperation between ICE and state and local law enforcement agencies can allow a relatively small number of ICE agents to leverage much larger numbers of state and local law enforcement agents. CAP is guided by the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP ), which represents a set of enforcement priorities that describe which foreign nationals should be removed and in what priority order. PEP also comprises a data sharing infrastructure or "interoperability" between DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) that screens for immigration violations when individuals are booked into jails. Section 287(g) Program
Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) permits the Secretary of Homeland Security to delegate certain immigration enforcement functions to state and local law enforcement agencies. Criminal Alien Numbers and Crimes
As mentioned, ICE has made the removal of certain criminal aliens its top priority. Federal data are compiled by the U.S. Table 2 indicates that at the end of CY2014, the most recent year for which these data are available, 23,532 noncitizens accounted for 11.2% of the 209,561 individuals incarcerated in federal prisons. In state prisons, 44,305 noncitizens accounted for 3.5% of the 1,268,740 individuals incarcerated at the end of CY2014. In total, noncitizens represented 4.6% of the year-end incarcerated population in CY2014. Table 3 , which presents the federal prison population by offense category for the end of FY2013, shows that drug offenders accounted for 50% of all federal offenders in federal prison, with incarcerated noncitizens having a comparable if slightly lower proportion in this category (46%) compared with incarcerated citizens (52%). Although immigration offenders represented almost 12% of all incarcerated federal offenders at the end of FY2013, they represented 43% of all federal noncitizen offenders. Together, drug and immigration offenses represented almost 90% of all noncitizen federal offenses at the end of FY2013. Impact on Communities
As mentioned, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, greater emphasis has been placed on enforcing the nation's immigration laws. Funding for State and Local Cooperation
Congress could appropriate additional funding to state and local law enforcement agencies for their cooperation with enforcing immigration law. Congressional Action in the 114th Congress
The 114 th Congress introduced several legislative proposals related to sanctuary jurisdictions. Some would have prohibited jurisdictions from receiving certain federal grants if they limited in specified ways their cooperation with ICE regarding immigration enforcement. The House passed H.R. 3009 on July 23, 2015. That bill would have penalized states and localities that restrict information gathering or communication with federal immigration enforcement agencies regarding an individual's citizenship or immigration status by withholding funding for three Department of Justice grant programs: the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP), the Community-Oriented Policing Services Program (COPS), and the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program. | The prominence of immigration enforcement issues during the 2016 presidential election as well as publicity surrounding crimes committed by some unauthorized aliens have reignited debates over immigration enforcement in the interior of the country. One homicide case, the July 2, 2015, slaying of a woman in San Francisco by a reported unauthorized alien with a criminal and deportation history, is noteworthy, because the law enforcement agency in question reportedly did not honor an immigration detainer issued by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for the individual who committed the crime. ICE has made the removal of certain criminal aliens its top priority. Funding for all criminal alien programs has increased substantially since their inception in FY2004. In FY2016, funding amounted to $341 million, compared to $6 million in FY2004.
In 2014, noncitizens represented 7.0% of the U.S. population. At the end of 2014, noncitizens accounted for 11.2% of the 209,561 individuals incarcerated in federal prisons, 3.5% of the 1,268,740 individuals incarcerated in state prisons, and 4.6% of the entire incarcerated population. These figures are understated because they do not include figures for California which did not report its non-citizen incarcerated population.
Drug and immigration offenses represented almost 90% of all federal offenses committed by noncitizens in FY2013. Incarceration data from FY2013 indicate that drug offenders accounted for 50% of all offenders in federal prison, with incarcerated noncitizens having a comparable if slightly lower proportion in this offense category (46%) compared with incarcerated citizens (52%). Although immigration offenders represented almost 12% of all incarcerated federal offenders, they represented 43% of all federal noncitizen offenders. Published data on the state and local prisoners by offense type and citizenship status are not available.
Immigration enforcement is a federal responsibility, but efforts have been made continually to use the potential "force multipliers" offered by local law enforcement. Legislation enacted in 1996 allows the federal government to enter into "287(g)" agreements with state and local law enforcement jurisdictions that permit it to delegate certain immigration enforcement functions to state and local law enforcement agents. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, this program and others involving federal and state and local cooperation expanded.
ICE also operates the Criminal Alien Program (CAP), which is guided by the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), a set of immigration enforcement priorities that describe which foreign nationals should be removed and in what priority order. PEP also employs "interoperability," a data sharing infrastructure between DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) that screens individuals for immigration-related violations when they are booked by law enforcement jurisdictions. PEP replaced the former Secure Communities, which many jurisdictions with large foreign-born populations had opposed.
In recent years, some jurisdictions have expressly defined or limited their roles and the activities of their employees regarding immigration enforcement. These have been referred to as "sanctuary" jurisdictions. Critics of sanctuary jurisdictions contend that they impede law enforcement's primary mission in ways that could lead to calamitous outcomes (such as the homicide in San Francisco) or could encourage illegal immigration. Supporters maintain that they are needed because of resource and legal constraints, the need to avoid the disruption of critical municipal services by diverting local law enforcement personnel to handle immigration enforcement, and community policing concerns.
Congress may choose to consider several issues, including whether the potentially positive impacts on public safety of state and local involvement in immigration enforcement outweigh the potentially negative impacts on both law enforcement resource utilization and community relations within such jurisdictions; and whether increasing law enforcement funding or tying the provision of certain federal grants to greater cooperation with federal immigration enforcement agencies—or a mix of both approaches—would yield the greater cooperation proponents seek.
The 114th Congress introduced several legislative proposals related to sanctuary jurisdictions. Some would have prohibited jurisdictions from receiving certain federal grants if they limited in specified ways their cooperation with ICE regarding immigration enforcement. The House passed H.R. 3009 on July 23, 2015. That bill would have penalized states and localities that restrict information gathering or communication with federal immigration enforcement agencies regarding an individual's citizenship or immigration status by withholding funding for three DOJ grant programs: the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP), the Community-Oriented Policing Services Program (COPS), and the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program. |
crs_R43413 | crs_R43413_0 | Introduction
In August 2007, asset-backed securities (ABS), particularly those backed by subprime mortgages, suddenly became illiquid and fell sharply in value as an unprecedented housing boom turned into a housing bust. Losses on the many ABS held by financial firms depleted their capital. Uncertainty about future losses on illiquid and complex assets led to firms having reduced access, sometimes catastrophically, to the private liquidity necessary to fund day-to-day activities. In September 2008, the crisis reached panic proportions. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that supported a large proportion of the mortgage market, were taken into government conservatorship. Initially, the government approach was largely an ad hoc one, attempting to address the problems at individual institutions on a case-by-case basis. The panic in September 2008 convinced policymakers that a larger and more systemic approach was needed, and Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) to create the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in October 2008. In addition to TARP, the Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) implemented broad lending and guaranty programs. Because the crisis had so many causes and symptoms, the response tackled a number of disparate problems, and can be broadly categorized into programs that
increased institutions' liquidity (access to cash and easily tradable assets), such as direct lending facilities by the Federal Reserve or the FDIC's Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP); provided financial institutions with equity to rebuild their capital following asset write-downs, such as the Capital Purchase Program (CPP); purchased illiquid assets from financial institutions in order to restore confidence in their balance sheets in the eyes of investors, creditors, and counterparties, such as the Public-Private Partnership Investment Program (PPIP); intervened in specific financial markets that had ceased to function smoothly, such as the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Lending Facility (TALF); used public funds to prevent the failure of troubled institutions that were deemed by some "too big to fail" (TBTF) because of their systemic importance, such as AIG, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. Estimating the Costs of Government Interventions
The primary goal of the various interventions was to end financial panic and restore normalcy to financial markets. Altogether, the financial crisis programs covered in this report brought back more in principal repayments and income than was paid out. Altogether to date, realized gains across the various programs exceed realized losses by tens of billions of dollars. Housing Assistance Programs . $0.1 billion is still outstanding. Over the life of the program, income exceeded losses. (This program is also often popularly referred to as TAG, however.) In this sense, the programs were arguably a success. Nevertheless, an important part of evaluating the government's performance is whether financial normalcy was restored at a minimum cost to the taxpayers. The true net cost to the government of these programs is the difference in present value between the initial outlay to acquire or guarantee the asset or make the loan, and the money recouped by the government from income payments and subsequent sale or repayment, taking into account the risks that the government was exposed to in the transaction. Altogether, these interventions have yielded tens of billions of dollars of net income for the taxpayers on a cash-flow basis, comp ared with initial estimates that they would cost taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars. | In August 2007, asset-backed securities (ABS), particularly those backed by subprime mortgages, suddenly became illiquid and fell sharply in value as an unprecedented housing boom turned into a housing bust. Losses on the many ABS held by financial firms depleted their capital. Uncertainty about future losses on illiquid and complex assets led to firms having reduced access to private liquidity, sometimes catastrophically. In September 2008, the financial crisis reached panic proportions, with some large financial firms failing or needing government assistance to prevent their failure.
Initially, the government approach was largely ad hoc, addressing the problems at individual institutions on a case-by-case basis. The panic in September 2008 convinced policymakers that a system-wide approach was needed, and Congress created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in October 2008. In addition to TARP, the Treasury, Federal Reserve (Fed), and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) implemented broad lending and guarantee programs. Because the crisis had many causes and symptoms, the response tackled a number of disparate problems and can be broadly categorized into programs that (1) increased financial institutions' liquidity; (2) provided capital directly to financial institutions for them to recover from asset write-offs; (3) purchased illiquid assets from financial institutions to restore confidence in their balance sheets and thereby their continued solvency; (4) intervened in specific financial markets that had ceased to function smoothly; and (5) used public funds to prevent the failure of troubled institutions that were deemed systemically important, popularly referred to as "too big to fail."
The primary goal of the various interventions was to end the financial panic and restore normalcy to financial markets, rather than to make a profit for taxpayers. In this sense, the programs were arguably a success. Nevertheless, an important part of evaluating the government's performance is whether financial normalcy was restored at a minimum cost to taxpayers. By this measure, the financial performance of these interventions was far better than initial expectations that direct losses to taxpayers would run into the hundreds of billions of dollars.
Initial government outlays are a poor indicator of taxpayer exposure, because outlays were used to acquire or guarantee income-earning debt or equity instruments that could eventually be repaid or sold, potentially at a profit. For broadly available facilities accessed by financially sound institutions, the risk of default became relatively minor once financial markets resumed normal functioning. Of the 23 programs reviewed in this report, about $280 billion combined remains invested in preferred shares and bonds through two programs related to the housing government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and about $0.1 billion remains invested in two TARP programs. All other programs have been wound down entirely.
This report summarizes government assistance programs and presents how much the programs ultimately cost (or benefited) the taxpayers based on straightforward cash accounting as reported by the various agencies. Of the 23 programs reviewed in this report, principal repayment and investment income exceeded initial outlays in 19, principal repayment and income fell short of initial outlays in three, and it is too soon to tell for the remaining one. Of the three programs that lost money, two assisted automakers, not financial firms. Altogether, realized gains across the various programs exceed realized losses by tens of billions of dollars. Although investments in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain outstanding, net income from those investments already exceeds initial outlays. More sophisticated estimates that would take into account the complete economic costs of assistance, such as the time value of the funds involved, are not consistently available. In this sense, cash flow measures overestimate gains to the taxpayers. |
crs_RL32783 | crs_RL32783_0 | The House passed the conference agreement on May 5 (368-58), followed by the Senate on May 10 (100-0). President Bush signed the bill ( P.L. 109 - 13 ) on May 11. As approved, the $82 billion conference agreement is roughly the same as the President's overall request, but with numerous changes in funding allocations and policy provision, including the attachment of immigration legislation. P.L. Overview and Context of the FY2005 Supplemental
The FY2005 supplemental is the fifth of the Bush administration to focus on the global war on terrorism and homeland security. As emergency funding, these requests have not been subject to limits on spending in annual budget resolutions. That total is over 45% higher than the $64.9 billion provided to DOD in the FY2004 Supplemental. Foreign Policy Request
The President's request for $6.3 billion in FY2005 supplemental funding would support a broad range of foreign policy activities:
U.S. diplomatic costs in Iraq Afghanistan reconstruction and counternarcotics programs Darfur humanitarian relief and peace implementation aid for Sudan War on Terrorism assistance, including funds for Jordan and Pakistan Palestinian aid Ukraine assistance U.N. peacekeeping contributions Broadcasting programs in the Middle East Tsunami recovery and reconstruction
Other Supplemental Requests
The Administration's supplemental request also included several additional items addressing homeland security and global war on terrorism matters:
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation—$110 million for the deployment of radiation detection equipment and the training of law enforcement personnel at four overseas posts designed to provide officials with the means to detect, deter, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. If not dealt with in the FY2005 supplemental under an "emergency" designation, however, these foreign policy items could be added to pending FY2006 international affairs appropriation requests that seek 13% higher spending compared with enacted levels for FY2005. This would place additional pressure on the Administration to defend an already sizable foreign policy increase that some believe will be closely scrutinized by Congress. Within the Defense request, some members questioned whether funds for the Army's modularity initiative launched in the fall of 2003 to create 10 additional brigades that would be more deployable individually fits the emergency criteria. The Defense Department request was in addition to the $25 billion already provided in the FY2005 DOD appropriations act ( P.L. 108 - 287 ) for war-related costs in the initial months of the fiscal year. The conference bill retains the Sense of the Senate language calling on the Administration to submit future war costs in the Defense Department's regular appropriations act, a provision also included in the FY2004 Supplemental, and reiterates a requirement that DOD report its costs for Iraq and Afghanistan, semi-annually as required in the FY2004 supplemental and the FY2005 DOD Appropriations Act. 108 - 106 ). The total request included several major types of expenses as shown in Table 4 :
Recurring costs for military operations a 17% increase from $60.2 billion in FY2004 to $70.5 billion in FY2005; Investment costs, a six-fold growth from $3 billion in FY2004 to almost $18 billion in FY2005 to replace equipment damaged or lost in battles, recapitalize equipment for units returning to the United States who leave their equipment behind, and buy additional equipment for units to improve capability or add force protection; Support for other nations , a five-fold increase from $2 billion to $11.5 billion including funds to train and equip Afghan and Iraqi security forces, funds to pay for cooperative operations in the war on terrorism by Jordan and Pakistan (coalition support), DOD counterdrug programs in Afghanistan, administrative costs in Iraq, and the Commanders Emergency Response Fund (CERP), a program providing funds directly to unit commanders to distribute for local needs. 1268 provides $5.78 billion in new appropriations for State Department, foreign aid, tsunami relief, and other foreign policy activities. Police training—$400 million. H.R. | On February 14, 2005, President Bush submitted an $81.9 billion supplemental appropriation request for FY2005 (subsequently amended to total $82.04 billion) to provide funds for ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the "global war on terror," reconstruction in Afghanistan, Tsunami relief and rehabilitation, and other activities. As the fifth supplemental of the Bush Administration to focus on the "global war on terrorism" and homeland security, these supplemental funds for FY2005 would be in addition to the $25.7 billion received in August 2004 as part of the FY2005 DOD Appropriations Act to cover war-related costs for the initial months of the fiscal year (P.L. 108-287).
The Administration's request included $74.96 billion for the Department of Defense, $5.6 billion for reconstruction and other foreign aid, $950 million for Tsunami relief, and $770 million for other activities. If enacted as an emergency appropriation, as requested, the funds would not be subject to limits in annual budget resolutions but would add to the size of the U.S. budget deficit. Taking into account the funds already provided, DOD's request would bring its FY2005 total appropriation to about $100 billion, which is over 45% higher than the amount provided in the FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106).
While OMB Director Joshua Bolten argued that the request was an emergency for "known and urgent requirements," that could not be met with existing funds, some Members questioned whether this characterization fit some elements in the request. Some questioned whether the $5 billion requested by the Defense Department for the Army's initiative to re-organize Army units was an unanticipated emergency since it was announced in the fall of 2003; others argued that the initiative was a war-related expense because it was expected to relieve war-induced stress on Army forces. For foreign aid and Iraq diplomatic facilities, the issue was whether the requests represented true emergencies or could wait for later consideration. If not dealt with in the FY2005 supplemental under an "emergency" designation, however, these foreign policy items could be added to the pending FY2006 international affairs appropriation bills and would place additional pressure on the Administration to defend an already sizable foreign policy increase proposed for next year.
Another controversial issue was the Administration's proposal to place policy authority and control of funding with the Defense Department rather than the State Department to train and equip Afghan and Iraqi security forces. The Administration also requested $400 million for contingency funds related to the war on terror and $200 million in aid to the Palestinian Authority, both of which raised concerns.
The conference agreement on H.R. 1268 passed the House on May 5 (368-58) and the Senate on May 10, providing $82 billion in supplemental funding, the same overall amount requested, but with many changes in program allocations and the additional of immigration legislation. President Bush signed the measure on May 11, when it became P.L. 109-13. |
crs_R40862 | crs_R40862_0 | Introduction
Medical malpractice insurance has attracted congressional attention numerous times over the past few decades, particularly in the midst of three "crisis" periods in the mid-1970s, the mid-1980s, and the early 2000s. These periods were marked by sharp increases in physicians' liability insurance premiums, difficulties in finding any liability insurance in some areas as insurers withdrew from providing coverage, reports of physicians leaving areas or retiring following insurance difficulties, and a variety of public policy measures at both the state and federal levels to address the market disruptions. Over time, the availability of medical liability insurance and premiums for such insurance has exhibited cyclical characteristics. Which public policy measures have been effective in addressing the successive insurance market disruptions has been a matter of debate. Data gathered by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) indicate that total premiums for medical malpractice liability insurance have dropped every year from 2006 to 2009. However, even during a period of relative calm, the malpractice system experiences issues with equity and access. For example, some observers have criticized the current system's performance with respect to compensating patients who have been harmed by malpractice, deterring substandard medical care, and promoting patient safety. Medical Malpractice and Health Reform
The current legislative interest in medical malpractice reform differs from the past in that it has been largely driven by overall health reform and issues of healthcare costs, rather than an immediate crisis in malpractice liability insurance. In terms of direct costs, medical malpractice insurance adds relatively little to the cost of health care. Medical malpractice premiums written in 2009 totaled approximately $10.8 billion, while health expenditures estimated by CBO total $2.6 trillion. Indirect costs, particularly increased utilization of tests and procedures by physicians to protect against future lawsuits ("defensive medicine"), have been estimated to be much higher than direct premiums. The most recent CBO analysis estimated that federal tort reforms would reduce national health care spending by about 0.5% in 2009 (equivalent to approximately $11 billion). By combining the impact of tort reform on mandatory health spending and tax revenues, CBO estimated that tort reforms could reduce the federal budget deficit by approximately $54 billion over 10 years. PPACA and Medical Malpractice
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. H.R. 2 , which would repeal P.L. This bill was passed by the House on January 19, 2011. Medical liability reform was the topic of the first committee hearing in the House Committee on the Judiciary, held on January 20, 2011. 5 , the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2011, was introduced by Representative Phil Gingrey. The House Committee on the Judiciary marked up the bill on February 8, 2011, and February 16, 2011, and ordered the bill reported by a voice vote. Among other things, H.R. Challenges in Medical Malpractice Policymaking
Addressing problems in the medical malpractice insurance markets can be challenging, as these markets react to three different systems, each of which is complex in its own right: health care, tort, and insurance. | As a policy area, concerns about medical malpractice typically involve issues related to the market for physician liability insurance, the prevalence of malpractice in the health care system, and the resolution of malpractice complaints through the tort system. This report focuses primarily on the private insurance market. Medical malpractice liability insurance has attracted congressional attention numerous times over the past decades, particularly in the midst of three "crisis" periods in the mid-1970s, the mid-1980s, and the early 2000s. These periods were marked by sharp increases in physicians' liability insurance premiums, difficulties in finding any insurance in some areas as insurers withdrew from providing coverage, reports of physicians leaving areas or retiring following insurance difficulties, and a variety of public policy measures at both the state and federal levels to address the perceived crises. Which public policy measures have been effective in addressing the difficulties in the medical malpractice liability market has been a matter of debate, in part because these difficulties have been at the intersection of the health care, tort, and insurance systems.
The overall medical liability insurance market is not currently exhibiting the same level of disruption as in the past. Over the past few years, losses incurred by medical malpractice insurers have dropped dramatically and premiums paid have fallen, albeit more modestly. Nonetheless, problems with the affordability and availability of malpractice insurance persist, especially in particular regions and physician specialties (e.g., obstetricians). Even during a period of relative calm, the malpractice system experiences issues with equity and access. For example, some observers have criticized the current system's performance with respect to compensating patients who have been harmed by malpractice, deterring substandard medical care, and promoting patient safety. Yet there are differing opinions as to the extent that each of these particular areas has been affected by the current malpractice system.
The latest legislative interest in medical malpractice reform differs from the past in that it is largely driven by overall health reform and issues of health care costs, rather than widespread disruptions in the medical malpractice insurance market. In terms of direct costs, medical malpractice insurance adds relatively little to the cost of health care overall. According to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), medical malpractice premiums written in 2009 totaled approximately $10.8 billion, while overall health expenditures are estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to total $2.6 trillion. Indirect costs, particularly increased utilization of tests and procedures by physicians to protect against future lawsuits ("defensive medicine"), have been estimated to be much higher than direct premiums. CBO estimated that enacting federal tort reforms would reduce both health care spending by approximately 0.5% ($11 billion in 2009), and the federal budget deficit by $54 billion over a 10-year period.
The recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148) included language that allows states to receive grants to enact and implement alternatives to tort litigation. In the 112th Congress, H.R. 2, which would repeal P.L. 111-148, passed the House on January 19, 2011. The specific issue of medical liability reform was addressed by the House Committee on the Judiciary in a January 20, 2011 hearing. The committee marked up H.R. 5, the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2011, on February 8 and February 16, 2011, and ordered the bill reported to the full House by a voice vote. Among other things, the HEALTH Act would implement a cap on non-economic damages for health care lawsuits. |
crs_R43785 | crs_R43785_0 | The combination of state policies and general sentiment has led to heightened debate over the merits of marijuana legalization at the federal level. Another bill proposes the establishment of a National Commission on Federal Marijuana Policy that would review the potential revenue generated by taxing marijuana, among other things. This report focuses solely on one aspect of the economic debate over federal marijuana legalization: imposing an excise tax on legalized marijuana. First, it provides a brief overview of marijuana production. Second, it presents possible arguments for taxes and, in some cases, estimates the level of tax suggested by that rationale. Third, possible marijuana tax designs are analyzed. As with the case of tobacco, these external costs are typically much smaller than the total costs. These numbers suggest that the external costs of marijuana range from $0.5 billion to $1.7 billion. The ONDCP report also provides estimates of $30 billion, $41 billion, and $60 billion (given various assumptions) for total U.S. expenditures on marijuana in 2010. Consumer demand is relatively unresponsive to changes in price. After legalization, it is estimated that the cost of marijuana will decrease significantly because more will be produced and the implicit costs of evading law enforcement will decline. According to an examination by the authors of some of the most-reviewed marijuana shops in Denver, a gram of marijuana is priced around $9 to $15, an eighth of an ounce of marijuana can be priced around $29 to $40, and an ounce can be priced around $190 to $350. Colorado prices provide some indication of falling prices with legalization, but prices appear not close to the cost of production. Although the range of projected prices in a fully legal market is wide, from a few dollars to $100 per ounce, street prices of $200-$300 per ounce suggest that there could be a wide scope for a tax rate designed to align legalized marijuana prices close to current street prices of illegal marijuana. Miron and Waldock of the Cato Institute estimate that a federal excise tax could raise $5.8 billion (in 2008 dollars) annually in excise taxes if marijuana is taxed at a rate equal to 50% of its price to consumers. To illustrate the potential effect on revenue assume a fully legalized industry nationwide, assume a pretax price of $50 per ounce, a state tax of $50 per ounce, and the consequences of a federal tax of $50 per ounce. Design Issues for a Federal Marijuana Excise Tax
Aside from the general level of the tax, there are a number of design issues for an excise tax discussed in this section. Other Options
Various methods of taxation could also be combined. Production Limits
Production limits could be enacted based on the total market size or per grower. The Marijuana Tax Equity Act of 2013 ( H.R. Effects of Federal Marijuana Laws on State Tax and Regulatory Regimes
Some experts have also noted that the decision, or delay, of legalization at the federal level could have significant effects on the development of marijuana tax policy at the state level. This uncertainty surrounding the relationship between alcohol and marijuana use is important because it limits the plausibility that a marijuana tax could be initially levied based on the external costs to society. For example, marijuana legalization could impose significant external costs or savings on society, even if marijuana consumption has a minor effect on the demand for alcohol due to the relatively large external costs of alcohol consumption. In the 113 th Congress, the Small Business Tax Equity Act of 2013 ( H.R. | The combination of state policy and general public opinion favoring the legalizing of marijuana has led some in Congress to advocate for legalization and taxation of marijuana at the federal level. The Marijuana Tax Equity Act of 2013 (H.R. 501) would impose a federal excise tax of 50% on the producer and importer price of marijuana. The National Commission on Federal Marijuana Policy Act of 2013 (H.R. 1635) proposes establishing a National Commission on Federal Marijuana Policy that would review the potential revenue generated by taxing marijuana, among other things.
This report focuses solely on issues surrounding a potential federal marijuana tax. First, it provides a brief overview of marijuana production. Second, it presents possible justifications for taxes and, in some cases, estimates the level of tax suggested by that rationale. Third, it analyzes possible marijuana tax designs. The report also discusses various tax administration and enforcement issues, such as labeling and tracking.
Economic theory suggests the efficient level of taxation is equal to marijuana's external cost to society. Studies conducted in the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada suggest that the costs of individual marijuana consumption to society are between 12% and 28% of the costs of an individual alcohol user, and total social costs are even lower after accounting for the smaller number of marijuana users in society. Based on an economic estimate of $30 billion of net external costs for alcohol, the result is an external cost of $0.5 billion to $1.6 billion annually for marijuana. These calculations imply that an upper limit to the economically efficient tax rate could be $0.30 per marijuana cigarette (containing an average of one half of a gram of marijuana) or $16.80 per ounce. An increased number of users in a legal market would raise total costs, but not necessarily costs per unit.
Some could also view excise taxes as a means to curtail demand, particularly as the price of marijuana can be expected to drop from current retail prices of up $200-$300 per ounce to prices closer to the cost of production at $5-$18 per ounce, if broadly legalized. The demand for marijuana is estimated to be relatively price inelastic, meaning that consumer demand is relatively insensitive to price changes. Although previous studies of marijuana demand largely examine consumers willing to engage in illegal activities, it appears that higher tax rates would have a minor effect on reducing demand. With this said, tax policy, coupled with adequate law enforcement, could be an effective tool to limit marijuana consumption among youth, as empirical studies indicate that their demand is more sensitive to price than non-youth.
Excise taxes on marijuana could also be levied primarily to raise revenue, as has been historically the case with tobacco and alcohol. As an illustration, assuming a total market size of $40 billion, a federal tax of $50 per ounce is estimated to raise about $6.8 billion annually, after accounting for behavioral effects associated with price decreases following legalization.
The choices in administrative design could affect consumer behavior, production methods, evasion rates, or the tax base of a federal marijuana excise tax. Some of the more significant choices include whether to exempt medicinal uses or homegrown marijuana from tax. |
crs_RL34120 | crs_RL34120_0 | Information security laws are designed to protect personally identifiable information or sensitive personal information from compromise, and from unauthorized disclosure, acquisition, access, or other situations where unauthorized persons have access or potential access to personally identifiable information for unauthorized purposes. Data breach notification laws typically require covered entities to implement a breach notification policy, and include requirements for incident reporting and handling and external breach notification. In the private sector, different laws apply to private sector entities engaged in different businesses. Federal Information Security and Data Breach Notification Laws
The following report describes information security and data breach notification requirements included in the Privacy Act, the Federal Information Security Management Act, Office of Management and Budget Guidance, the Veterans Affairs Information Security Act, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The Privacy Act also applies to systems of records created by government contractors. To formulate their policy, agencies are directed to review existing privacy and security requirements, and include requirements for incident reporting and handling and external breach notification. Attachment 3 also includes specifics as to the content of the notice, criteria for determining the method of notification, and the types of notice that may be used. "[A] major purpose of the Act is the privacy of a consumer's credit-related data." The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) is an industry regulation developed by VISA, MasterCard, and other bank card distributors. | The following report describes information security and data breach notification requirements included in the Privacy Act, the Federal Information Security Management Act, Office of Management and Budget Guidance, the Veterans Affairs Information Security Act, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Also included in this report is a brief summary of the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), an industry regulation developed by VISA, MasterCard, and other bank card distributors.
Information security laws are designed to protect personally identifiable information from compromise, unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized acquisition, unauthorized access, or other situations where unauthorized persons have access or potential access to such information for unauthorized purposes. Data breach notification laws typically require covered entities to implement a breach notification policy, and include requirements for incident reporting and handling and external breach notification.
Expectations of many are that efforts to enact data security legislation will continue in 2010. In the first session of the 111th Congress the House passed H.R. 2221 (Rush and Stearns), the Data Accountability and Trust Act, which would apply only to businesses engaged in interstate commerce, and require data security programs and notification of breaches to affected consumers. The Senate Judiciary Committee approved S. 139 (Feinstein), the Data Breach Notification Act, which would apply to any agency, or business engaged in interstate commerce; and S. 1490 (Leahy), the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, which would apply to business entities engaged in interstate commerce and require data security programs and notification to individuals affected by a security breach. S. 1490 also includes data accuracy requirements for data brokers, and requirements concerning government acccess to and use of commercial data.
For related reports, see the Current Legislative Issues Web page for "Privacy and Data Security" available at http://www.crs.gov/Pages/subissue.aspx?cliid=2105&parentid=14. This report will be updated. |
crs_R41527 | crs_R41527_0 | 110-233 , prohibits discrimination based on genetic information by health insurers and employers. GINA is divided into two main parts: Title I, which prohibits discrimination based on genetic information by health insurers; and Title II, which prohibits discrimination in employment based on genetic information. Title II of GINA prohibits discrimination in employment because of genetic information and, with certain exceptions, prohibits an employer from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information. The law prohibits the use of genetic information in employment decisions—including hiring, firing, job assignments, and promotions—by employers, unions, employment agencies, and labor management training programs. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promulgated final regulations under Title II of GINA on November 9, 2010. The EEOC noted that the regulations closely track the statutory language. However, they do provide clarification regarding definitions in GINA; provide guidance regarding the exceptions in GINA to employer liability for acquiring genetic information; discuss the application of GINA to wellness programs; and discuss the interplay between GINA and other statutes. The regulations also provide specific examples to help clarify the requirements of the statute and regulations. For example, a genetic test includes a test to determine whether an individual has a BRCA1 or BRCA2 variant which would indicate a predisposition to breast cancer, and would include preimplantation genetic diagnosis on embryos. One of the examples given in the regulations of a test that is not a genetic test is a test for cholesterol levels, since a cholesterol test does not detect mutations. In its comments on this definition, the EEOC notes that when the diagnosis of a disease depends on both signs and symptoms and genetic information, the disease will be considered manifested. It was emphasized, however, that such information is still subject to other laws, such as Title I of the ADA which regulates the acquisition and use of medical information. The statute and regulations provide that it is unlawful
for an employer to discriminate against an individual on the basis of genetic information in regard to hiring, discharge, compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment or otherwise discriminate against any individual because of genetic information of the individual; for a labor organization to exclude or to expel from the membership of the organization, or otherwise discriminate against, any member because of genetic information; and for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training programs to discriminate against an individual because of genetic information of the individual. The EEOC regulations reiterate the exception and its requirements. In the final regulations, the EEOC concluded that inducements may be offered to encourage individuals to participate in wellness programs, but inducements may not be offered to provide genetic information. The EEOC specifically declined to include an exemption that would permit a covered entity to request genetic information in order to evaluate whether an employee or applicant is able to safely and effectively perform the job. This is in contrast to the ADA as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Chevron v. Echazabal , where the Court found no violation of the ADA when an employer refused to hire an individual whose health would be endangered by the job. This issue may become more problematic as genetic information becomes more precise. | The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) prohibits discrimination based on genetic information by health insurers and employers. GINA is divided into two main parts: Title I, which prohibits discrimination based on genetic information by health insurers; and Title II, which prohibits discrimination in employment based on genetic information. Title II of GINA prohibits discrimination in employment because of genetic information and, with certain exceptions, prohibits an employer from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information. The law prohibits the use of genetic information in employment decisions—including hiring, firing, job assignments, and promotions—by employers, unions, employment agencies, and labor management training programs and mandates confidential treatment of any genetic information that is obtained.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promulgated final regulations under Title II of GINA on November 9, 2010. The EEOC noted that the regulations closely track the statutory language but they do provide clarification regarding definitions in GINA; provide guidance regarding the exceptions in GINA to employer liability for acquiring genetic information; discuss the application of GINA to wellness programs; and discuss the interplay between GINA and other statutes. The regulations also provide specific examples to help clarify the requirements of the statute and regulations. For instance, the regulations clarify that a genetic test includes a test to determine whether an individual has a BRCA1 or BRCA2 variant which would indicate a predisposition to breast cancer, and would include preimplantation genetic diagnosis in embryos. The regulations also specifically state that a test for cholesterol levels is not a genetic test. Similarly, the regulations provide a definition of manifested disease, and note that when the diagnosis of a disease depends on both signs and symptoms and genetic information, the disease will be considered manifested. It was emphasized, however, that medical information is still subject to other laws, such as Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which regulates the acquisition and use of medical information.
GINA and its regulations prohibit the collection of genetic information by employers but do provide some exceptions. The question of how the EEOC would interpret GINA's application to employer-run wellness programs was highly anticipated. In the final regulations, the EEOC concluded that inducements may be offered to encourage individuals to participate in wellness programs, but inducements may not be offered to provide genetic information. However, the EEOC does not permit a covered entity to request genetic information in order to evaluate whether an employee or applicant is able to safely and effectively perform the job. This is in contrast to the ADA as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Chevron v. Echazabal, where the Court found no violation of the ADA when an employer refused to hire an individual whose health would be endangered by the job. This issue may become more problematic as genetic information becomes more widely used.
Generally, the EEOC GINA regulations provide significant guidance to employers, especially in the use of examples, and in the clarification of GINA's applicability to wellness programs. However, due to the lack of decided cases and the ever-changing science, there is still some uncertainty concerning GINA's exact parameters. |
crs_RS22401 | crs_RS22401_0 | Introduction
Money laundering is commonly understood as the process of cleansing the taint from the proceeds of cr ime. In federal criminal law, however, it is more. In the principal federal criminal money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957, and to varying degrees in several other federal criminal statutes, money laundering involves the flow of resources to and from several hundred other federal, state, and foreign crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 1956
Section 1956 outlaws four kinds of laundering—promotional, concealment, structuring, and tax evasion—committed or attempted under one or more of three jurisdictional conditions (i.e., laundering involving certain financial transactions, laundering involving international transfers, and stings). Section 1956(a)(2) outlaws the international transportation or transmission (or attempted transportation or transmission) of funds (1) with the intent to promote a predicate offense; (2) knowing that the purpose is to conceal laundering of the funds and knowing that the funds are the proceeds of a predicate offense; or (3) knowing that the purpose is to avoid reporting requirements and knowing that the funds are the proceeds of a predicate offense. Moreover, the RICO predicate offense list encompasses by cross-reference the federal crimes of terrorism cataloged in 18 U.S.C. Any violation of Section 1956 is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. 18 U.S.C. A. in or affecting U.S. interstate or foreign commerce, or
B. committed by a U.S. national outside the United States. The Travel Act punishes interstate or foreign travel (or use of the facilities of interstate or foreign commerce) conducted with the intent to (1) distribute the proceeds of a more modest list of predicate offenses ("unlawful activity"), or (2) to promote or carry on such offenses when there is an overt act in furtherance of that intent, or (3) to commit some violent act in their furtherance. Property associated with a violation of Section 1952 is not subject to confiscation solely by virtue of that fact, although the property may be confiscated by operation of the laws governing Section 1952 predicate offenses or by operation of RICO or the Section 1956 money laundering provisions. § 5318 – suspicious transaction reports by financial institutions;
-31 U.S.C. Violations are punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years (not more than 10 years if committed in conjunction with another federal offense or if committed as part of a pattern of activity involving $100,000 or more) and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations), with the fine maximum doubled if the offense is committed in conjunction with another federal crime or as part of a pattern of activity involving $100,000. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
As noted earlier, all RICO predicate offenses are by definition money laundering predicate offenses under Sections 1956 and 1957. | This report provides an overview of the elements of federal criminal money laundering statutes and the sanctions imposed for their violation. The most prominent is 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Section 1956 outlaws four kinds of money laundering—promotional, concealment, structuring, and tax evasion laundering of the proceeds generated by designated federal, state, and foreign underlying crimes (predicate offenses)—committed or attempted under one or more of three jurisdictional conditions (i.e., laundering involving certain financial transactions, laundering involving international transfers, and stings). Its companion, 18 U.S.C. § 1957, prohibits depositing or spending more than $10,000 of the proceeds from a predicate offense. Section 1956 violations are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. Section 1957 carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 10 years. Property involved in either case is subject to confiscation. Misconduct that implicates either offense may implicate other federal criminal statutes as well. Federal racketeer influenced and corrupt organization (RICO) provisions outlaw acquiring or conducting the affairs of an enterprise (whose activities affect interstate or foreign commerce) through the patterned commission of a series of underlying federal or state crimes. RICO violations are also 20-year felonies. The Section 1956 predicate offense list automatically includes every RICO predicate offense, including each "federal crime of terrorism." A second related statute, the Travel Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952), punishes interstate or foreign travel, or the use of interstate or foreign facilities, conducted with the intent to distribute the proceeds of a more modest list of predicate offenses or to promote or carry on such offenses when an overt act is committed in furtherance of that intent. Such misconduct is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years. Other federal statutes proscribe, with varying sanctions, bulk cash smuggling, layering bank deposits to avoid reporting requirements, failure to comply with federal anti-money laundering provisions, or conducting an unlawful money transmission business.
Section 1956's ban on attempted international transportation of tainted proceeds for the purpose of concealing their ownership, source, nature, or ultimate location is limited to instances where concealment is a purpose rather than an attribute of the transportation (simple smuggling is not proscribed as such), as the Supreme Court explained in Cuellar v. United States v. Cuellar, 553 U.S. 550 (2008). In a second case, the Court held that the "proceeds" of a predicate offense often referred to the profits rather than the gross receipts realized from the offense. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008). Congress responded by defining "proceeds" for money laundering purposes as the property obtained or retained as a consequence of a predicate offense, including gross receipts. P.L. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1618 (2009) (S. 386) (111th Cong.).
This report is an abridged version of a longer report, CRS Report RL33315, Money Laundering: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law, without the footnotes, full citations, or appendixes found in the longer version. Related CRS Reports include CRS Report R44776, Anti-Money Laundering: An Overview for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1127, Anti-Terrorist/Anti-Money Laundering Information-Sharing by Financial Institutions Under FinCEN's Regulations, by [author name scrubbed] (available upon request). |
crs_R41513 | crs_R41513_0 | 84-373; 69 Stat. Pursuant to the law, the General Services Administration's (GSA's) Administrator could, among other actions,
accept … the papers and other historical materials of any President or former President of the United States, or of any other official or former official of the Government, and other papers relating to and contemporary with any President or former President of the United States. (P.L. Congress then has 60 days of continuous session to disapprove of the acquisition or agreement. Through NARA, the federal government currently operates and maintains 13 presidential libraries—including the facility for the records of former President George W. Bush, which opened in April 2013. The libraries, which primarily serve as archival depositories for presidential records and memorabilia, are privately constructed on behalf of former Presidents. Upon completion, the land, buildings, and sometimes other library amenities are deeded to or otherwise placed under the control of the federal government. Among some concerns associated with the construction and maintenance of presidential libraries is the role of the private organizations that build and, sometimes, continue to inhabit the library buildings. The private organizations, commonly referred to as presidential library foundations, support the construction of the libraries and sometimes the exhibitions displayed within the library or its museum. This close association with the library may create an amicable public-private partnership at library facilities. Such a relationship, however, may also render unclear which portions of the library and its exhibitions are funded by government appropriations and which portions are not. This report details the legislative history of the Presidential Libraries Act. It then provides information on existing library facilities and their locations. It then analyzes legislative options for the act, including changing endowment requirements; creating a single, centralized presidential library; or more clearly identifying the role of the libraries' supporting foundations. NARA is currently examining proposals for the construction of a future Barack Obama presidential library. Legislative History of the Presidential Libraries Act
The Presidential Libraries Act (P.L. 695), as originally enacted in 1955, sought to create a system of government "preservation and administration … of papers and other historical materials of any President or former President of the United States." Amid concerns about growing costs of the libraries, the act was substantially amended in 1986 ( P.L. 99-323 ; 100 Stat. 84-373). Pursuant to the new statute, the GSA Administrator could
accept the papers and other historical materials of any President or former President of the United States, or of any other official or former official of the government, and other papers relating to and contemporary with any President or former President of the United States; accept and take title to, for and in the name of the United States, after a detailed report to Congress in each instance, land, buildings, and equipment offered as a gift to the United States to be utilized as a presidential archival depository; enter into agreements, after a detailed report to Congress in each instance, with any state, political subdivision, university, institution of higher learning, institute, or foundation, to utilize as a presidential archival depository land, building, and equipment of any such state, subdivision, institution, or organization to be made available by it without transfer of title to the United States; maintain, operate, and protect such presidential archival depositories as part of the national archives system; and accept gifts or bequests of money or other property for the purpose of maintaining, operating, protecting, or improving any presidential archival depository. 99-125), the committee wrote that the bill would "shift the burden of on-going building operations costs of future libraries from the taxpayer to endowment funds required to be provided by the same private parties who build and donate the library buildings." The relationship between the foundation and the library is different at each facility. | The Presidential Libraries Act (P.L. 84-373; 69 Stat. 695), as originally enacted in 1955, sought to create a system of government "preservation and administration … of papers and other historical materials of any President or former President of the United States." Pursuant to the law, the General Services Administration's (GSA's) Administrator could, among other actions,
accept … the papers and other historical materials of any President or former President of the United States, or of any other official or former official of the Government, and other papers relating to and contemporary with any President or former President of the United States. (P.L. 84-373)
Amid concerns about growing costs of the libraries, the act was substantially amended in 1986 (P.L. 99-323; 100 Stat. 495) to "shift the burden of on-going building operations costs of future libraries from the taxpayer to endowment funds."
Through the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), the federal government currently operates and maintains 13 presidential libraries, and is currently engaging with representatives seeking to construct a presidential library for President Barack Obama. The libraries, which primarily serve as archival repositories and museums in which the records and memorabilia of the former Presidents are held and made available to researchers and the public, are privately constructed on behalf of former Presidents. Before construction on a presidential archival facility can begin, the Archivist must approve a plan, and Congress must be provided 60 days of continuous session during which it can disapprove of the plan. If Congress chooses not to act, the land, buildings, and sometimes other amenities for the library may be deeded to or otherwise placed under the control of the federal government.
Among some concerns associated with the construction and maintenance of presidential libraries is the role of the private organizations that build and, sometimes, continue to inhabit the buildings. The private organizations, commonly referred to as presidential library foundations, support the construction of the libraries and sometimes provide funding for the exhibitions displayed within the library or its museum. Each library and foundation has a unique partnership. Such a relationship, however, may also lead to difficulties in determining which exhibits are displayed, ensuring a balanced portrayal of the President's legacy, and differentiating between public and private space at the facilities.
This report details the legislative history of the Presidential Libraries Act. The report then examines information on existing library facilities and their locations, organizational characteristics, and outreach efforts. It also analyzes legislative options for the act, including increasing endowment requirements for the library foundations and clearly delineating the relationship between NARA and the libraries' supporting organizations. Congress, for example, might consider consolidating the libraries into one centralized location or could attempt to create standards for the historical exhibits at the libraries.
The Barack Obama Foundation, the private organization that will be managing and partially financing the official library of President Obama, is currently reviewing proposals for a library facility. This library is expected to become the 14th library facility under NARA management. Three cities—Chicago, Honolulu, and New York City—have submitted proposals, and a decision on where to locate the library is expected in March 2015. Congress has the authority to deny any presidential library proposal. |
crs_RS22472 | crs_RS22472_0 | On June 26, 2006, the Supreme Court agreed to review Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. EPA , setting the stage for the Court's first pronouncements in a global warming case. In the decision below, the D.C. Circuit rejected a challenge to EPA's denial of a rulemaking petition under the Clean Air Act (CAA). The denied petition, filed by numerous states and environmental groups, requested EPA to impose limits on four pollutants emitted by new motor vehicles, owing to the alleged contributions of those emissions to global warming. In resolving the case, the Court might address, among other things, Article III standing doctrine; whether the CAA reaches the global warming impacts of motor vehicle emissions; and the latitude allowed an agency to inject policy considerations into its decisions when the governing statute makes no mention of them. | On June 26, 2006, the Supreme Court agreed to review Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. EPA, a global warming-related case. In the decision below, the D.C. Circuit rejected 2-1 a challenge to EPA's denial of a petition under the Clean Air Act requesting the agency to limit four pollutants emitted by new motor vehicles, owing to their alleged contribution to global warming. In resolving the case, the Court might address, among other things, Article III standing doctrine; whether the Clean Air Act reaches the global warming impacts of motor vehicle emissions; and the latitude allowed an agency to inject policy considerations into its decisions when the governing statute makes no mention of them. It is unlikely, even should petitioners in the Supreme Court gain a favorable ruling, that the case will result in a direct order by the Court that EPA regulate the global warming impacts of auto emissions. |
crs_RL32154 | crs_RL32154_0 | Current approaches to managing resources in the marine environment often appear to be ineffective because of continuing population and environmental quality declines, thus prompting a search for alternatives. This report identifies a number of issues related to establishing MPAs in the United States. It then considers some of the key issues and potential benefits and costs of designating additional MPAs. As one becomes more specific about possible goals and objectives for an MPA, the question of how MPAs would be defined quickly grows complex. These terms include:
marine reserve , where uses that remove resources are generally prohibited (these areas may also be called ecological reserves); ocean wilderness , like the terrestrial concept for wilderness areas on federal lands where no alterations or activities that leave lasting impacts are permitted, but low-impact recreational activities may be permitted; fully protected marine area , generally a "no-take" area where a wide variety of extractive and consumptive uses/activities are prohibited; national marine sanctuary , a specific designation created in federal legislation more than 30 years ago to ensure conservation and management for areas of special national significance; marine managed area , managing for multiple objectives, where protection is not the only, and may not even be the main, objective; and marine park , similar to the terrestrial concept for a park where recreational activities are allowed and resource conservation is also a goal of the designation. This interest has been heightened by actions initiated by the Clinton Administration and continued by the Bush Administration. This order called for "strengthening and expanding the Nation's system of marine protected areas ... throughout the marine environment ... [to] enhance the conservation of our Nation's natural and cultural marine heritage and the ecologically and economically sustainable use of the marine environment for future generations." On January 6, 2009, President Bush designated three marine national monuments in the Central and Western Pacific under the Antiquities Act of 1906. The three areas include:
the Marianas Trench Marine National Monument (includes the Marianas Trench, the coral reef ecosystem of the three northern most islands of the Mariana Archipelago, and a series of undersea volcanoes and thermal vents); the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument (includes seven central Pacific Line Islands and adjacent waters); and the Rose Atoll Marine National Monument (the easternmost Samoan island consisting of pristine and diverse ecosystems). MPA Center Activities
In 2000, the National MPA Center was created to implement E.O. The committee's main purpose is to provide advice to the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior on developing a national system of MPAs. Some of the strongest opposition to MPAs is raised by fishing interests that could be hurt by a designation. Among the most contentious aspects of designating and managing MPAs for fishery management are:
deciding whether and where MPAs might be appropriate for restoring fish populations; deciding whether certain fishing techniques should be limited or prohibited because they capture nontarget species and damage marine habitat; determining how MPA protection would be integrated with other management measures both within and outside the MPA; and understanding the effects of MPAs on the economic, social, and cultural well-being of nearby coastal communities. Many of these can be documented by tracking the experiences and issues addressed both at NOAA's MPA Center and at other organizations around the world charged with MPA-related responsibilities, or by reviewing the types of controversies that have been raised when national marine sanctuaries have been proposed. Congressional Interest
Currently, the National Marine Sanctuary Program is the closest to providing a comprehensive approach to using MPAs. Several bills have been introduced in the 111 th Congress to expand the boundaries of existing National Marine Sanctuaries (NMSs), to prohibit specific activities within NMSs, and to reauthorize the Northwest Straits Marine Conservation Initiative Act. 223 and S. 212 would expand the boundaries of Gulf of the Farallones (CA), and Cordell Bank (CA) National Marine Sanctuaries. It authorizes NOAA to designate specific sites for comprehensive and coordinated management and conservation. | There continues to be congressional interest in limiting human activity in certain areas of the marine environment, as one response to mounting evidence of declining environmental quality and populations of living resources. The purposes of proposed additional limits would be both to stem declines and to permit the rehabilitation of these environments and populations. One method of implementing this concept is for Congress to designate areas where activities would be limited, often referred to as marine protected areas (MPAs). Translating the MPA approach into a national program, however, would require that Congress resolve many economic, ecological, and social dilemmas.
The complexity of creating a program is compounded by controversy over the uses that would be allowed, curtailed, or prohibited in MPAs; the purposes of a system of MPAs; and the location, size, and distribution of MPA units. One possible way to get past some of these complexities is to think of MPA designations as a form of zoning in the ocean. Experiences related to designating MPAs in other countries also may be instructive. However, questions have arisen about the effectiveness of administration and enforcement, the benefits and costs of MPAs, and the evaluation of outcomes at some sites.
Numerous marine sites have been designated by federal and state governments for some kind of protection. Perhaps the best-known federal sites are units in the National Marine Sanctuary System. The National Marine Sanctuaries Act authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to designate areas of marine and Great Lakes environments to protect cultural and natural resources. The Bush Administration supported the MPA concept and it continued most of the Clinton Administration initiatives to coordinate protection of marine resources at designated sites, including implementing Executive Order 13158 (May 2000), which endorsed a comprehensive system of MPAs. President Bush designated the Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument (Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Marine National Monument) in 2006, and the Marianas Trench, Pacific Remote Islands, and Rose Atoll Marine National Monuments on January 6, 2009.
Additional actions by Congress would be needed to create an MPA system that could be characterized as integrated or comprehensive. Some issues that would likely be raised in congressional discussions include whether a comprehensive system is desired or needed; what the basic characteristics of units in any MPA system should be; how MPAs might be used to resolve use conflicts; and whether adequate funding would be authorized and appropriated to both enforce the protected status and evaluate the ecological and social impacts of MPAs. In the 110th Congress, several bills related to MPAs were introduced, including a bill to reauthorize the National Marine Sanctuary Act, but none of the legislation was enacted. In the 111th Congress, bills have been introduced to expand boundaries for the Gulf of the Farallones (CA), Cordell Bank (CA), and Thunder Bay (MI) National Marine Sanctuaries. |
crs_RL32994 | crs_RL32994_0 | The act included a provision subjecting all discretionary appropriations for FY2006, including special federal payments to the District of Columbia, to a 1% across-the-board rescission to help offset the cost of Hurricane Katrina disaster relief assistance. One month earlier, on November 30, 2005, the President signed into law the Departments of Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act for FY2006, P.L. 109-115 (TTHUD). The act includes $603 million in special federal payments, including funding for two new initiatives: $3 million for marriage development accounts for low-income persons, and it transfers 15 acres of federal land at Robert F. Kennedy Stadium to the District for lease to public charter school entity to construct a boarding school. Budget Request
FY2006: The President's Budget Request
On February 8, 2005, the Bush Administration released its FY2006 budget request. The Administration's proposed budget included $573.397 million in federal payments to the District of Columbia. FY2006: District's Budget Request
On June 2, 2005, the District's city council unanimously approved the city's $8.8 billion operating budget for FY2006 and forwarded it to the President for review, approval, and transmittal to Congress. 3058 would have continued to maintain the restrictions and prohibitions on the use of federal and District funds for medical marijuana, abortion services, and needle exchange programs. These proposed funding reductions, which total $8.6 million, would have offset three new initiatives not included in the House bill: $3 million for marriage development accounts and life skills training for low-income persons; $2 million for a Latino youth education and health initiative; and $3 million for a housing initiative for recently released ex-offenders. Consistent with the provisions included in the House bill, the Senate bill would have prohibited the use of District and federal funds to implement the District medical marijuana initiative, or for abortion services except in cases of rape or incest, or the mother's life is endangered. 109-115 . P.L. This includes $73 million in support of elementary, secondary, and post secondary education. In addition, the bill includes $465.6 million in special federal payments for four functions (court operations, defender-related services, offender supervision, and criminal justice coordination), which represents 77.2%, of the $603 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia. 109-115
The general provisions of P.L. 109-115 contain several social rider provisions included in previous appropriations acts. It does not include language included in the Senate bill that would have liberalized District gun control laws. 109-148 . The budget also provides $3 billion in capital outlays, including $535 million to finance the construction of a new baseball stadium. The Senate version of H.R. The final version of the act, as approved by both the House and the Senate and signed by the President, prohibits the use of federal and District funds in support of a needle exchange program. Language prohibiting the implementation of the initiative was included in P.L. P.L. 3058 . The House, Senate, and final conference versions of the TTHUD Appropriations Act for FY2006, consistent with the provision first included in the District's FY2002 Appropriations Act, include a general provision that allows the use of District, but not federal, funds to administer the program. The House version of H.R. | On February 8, 2005, the Administration released its FY2006 budget request. The Administration's proposed budget included $573.4 million in federal payments to the District of Columbia. Four payments (for court operations, defender services, offender supervision, and criminal justice coordination) represented $471.4 million, or 82%, of the proposed $573.4 million in total federal payments to the District.
On June 2, 2005, the District's city council approved the city's $8.8 billion operating budget for FY2006. The District's budget, which must be approved by Congress, also included $3 billion in capital outlays, including $535 million to finance a new baseball stadium. In addition, the District's budget included a request for $635 million in special federal payments.
The conference version of H.R. 3058—a bill providing FY2006 appropriations for the Departments of Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies (TTHUD)—was signed into law by the President on November 30, 2005, as P.L. 109-115. The act appropriated $603 million in special federal payments to the District, including $75 million in special federal payments in support of elementary, secondary, and post-secondary education initiatives. P.L. 109-148 subjects the $603 million to a 1% rescission to help offset the cost of Hurricane Katrina disaster relief and avian flu pandemic preparedness.
In addition, P.L. 109-115 contains a number of general provisions, including several so-called social riders. Consistent with provisions included in previous appropriations acts, P.L. 109-115 prohibits the use of federal and District funds to finance or administer a needle exchange program intended to reduce the spread of AIDS and HIV; or for abortion services except in an instance of rape or incest, or when the life of the mother is threatened. A provision not included in the final version of the act, but included in a Senate version of H.R. 3058, would have allowed the use of local, but not federal, funds for a needle exchange program.
The act, as approved by Congress, restricts the use of District and federal funds for abortion services and prohibits the implementation of the city's medical marijuana initiative, which would decriminalize the use of marijuana for medical purposes. It does not include a House provision that would have prohibited the District from enforcing a section of its gun control laws that requires registered owners of handguns to keep such weapons unloaded, disassembled, or trigger-locked in their homes.
The final version of the act includes two new initiatives: $3 million for marriage development accounts for low-income persons and a transfer of 15 acres of federal land at Robert F. Kennedy Stadium to the District for construction of a public charter boarding school. P.L. 109-115 does not include two initiatives included in the Senate version of the act: a $2 million Latino youth education and health initiative and a $3 million housing initiative for recently released ex-offenders. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42945 | crs_R42945_0 | Endangered and threatened species—and the law that protects them, the 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA, P.L. §§1531-1543)—are controversial, in part, because dwindling species are often harbingers of resource scarcity. The most common cause of species' decline is habitat loss or alteration. Congressional efforts in the 110 th , 111 th , and 112 th Congresses focused on addressing specific controversial features of ESA and on oversight of concerns such as the science used for making decisions and designating critical habitat, but few bills related to ESA were enacted. In addition, an express purpose of ESA is to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved" (16 U.S.C. Under ESA, species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) may be listed as either endangered or threatened according to assessments of the risk of their extinction. Once a species is listed, legal tools, including penalties and citizen suits, are available to aid species recovery and to protect habitat. Foreign species are also addressed by international wildlife treaties. Issues in the 113th Congress
ESA reauthorization has been on the legislative agenda since the funding authorization expired in 1992, and bills have been introduced in each subsequent Congress to address various aspects of endangered species protection. Endangered Species and Climate Change
In another version of the debate over science and ESA, the focus is less on the use of science in ESA decision-making, per se, and more on the use of the act to force decisions on a scientific issue. In the 113 th Congress, Section 307(b) of S. 17 would amend ESA to prohibit the consideration of impacts from greenhouse gases in implementation of ESA. It proposes to address conflicting water management objectives and outstanding water rights claims in the Basin. No such bills were enacted. They would allow governors to determine whether species may be listed within their states; allow governors to assume sole authority for listed species found only within the state's boundaries as determined by the governor; eliminate petitions to list species; require congressional approval to list species; remove species from protection five years after listing; and allow property owners to seek compensation for a broad range of impacts on fair market value due to the statute's prohibitions on taking listed species, among other changes. ESA Appropriations
Appropriations play an important role in the ESA debate, providing funds for listing and recovery activities as well as financing consultations that are necessary for federal projects. The Administration proposed level funding for the Multinational Species Conservation Fund and for the Neotropical Migratory Bird Fund. | The Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543) was enacted to increase protection for, and to provide for the recovery of, vanishing wildlife and vegetation. Under ESA, species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) can be listed as endangered or threatened according to assessments of their risk of extinction. Habitat loss is the primary cause for listing species. Once a species is listed, powerful legal tools are available to aid its recovery and protect its habitat. Accordingly, when certain resources are associated with listed species—such as water in arid regions like California, energy resources in sagebrush country, or free-flowing rivers—ESA is seen as an obstacle to continued or greater human use of these resources. ESA may also be controversial because dwindling species are usually harbingers of broader ecosystem decline or conflicts. As a result, ESA is considered a primary driver of large-scale ecosystem restoration issues.
Previous Congresses have conducted oversight hearings on the implementation of various federal programs and laws that address threatened and endangered species. This has ranged from addressing listing and delisting decisions under ESA to justifying funding levels for international conservation programs. In the 113th Congress, resource-specific issues may be addressed independently, whereas oversight on the implementation of ESA may be addressed in debates about particular species (e.g., wolves, polar bears, sage grouse, and salmon).
Major issues for the 113th Congress include how to allocate funds to activities and programs seeking to assist species adaptation to climate change. Other major issues concerning ESA in recent years have included the role of science in decision-making, critical habitat (CH) designation, incentives for property owners, and appropriate protection of listed species, among others.
Authorization for spending under ESA expired on October 1, 1992. The prohibitions and requirements of ESA remain in force, even in the absence of an authorization, and funds have been appropriated to implement the administrative provisions of ESA in each subsequent fiscal year. Proposals to reauthorize and extensively amend ESA were last considered in the 109th Congress, but none was enacted. No legislative proposals were introduced in the 110th, 111th, 112th, or 113th Congresses for a broad reauthorization of ESA.
This report discusses oversight issues and legislation in the 113th Congress that address ESA implementation and management of endangered and threatened species. |
crs_R41461 | crs_R41461_0 | Serious Violent Felonies
The federal three strikes provision recognizes convictions for two categories of serious violent felonies—one enumerated, the other general. The question of what constitutes a conviction for an unenumerated "serious violent felony" under section 3559(c) seems to have proven as perplexing as what constitutes a "violent felony" conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Recent Supreme Court construction of the term "violent felony" in the ACCA may provide clarification for future cases arising under section 3559(c). In Johnson , Chambers , and Begay , the Court has made it clear that the ACCA's reference to violent felonies refers to purposeful, aggressive use of force capable of inflicting physical pain or injury upon another. They have argued (1) that requiring the defendant to prove to a judge by clear and convincing evidence the inapplicability of an injury free conviction offends the principles identified in Apprendi and its progeny; (2) that the section results in the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the proscription of the Eighth Amendment; (3) that the mandatory sentencing provision impermissibly intrudes upon the constitutional prerogatives of the federal courts in violation of the separation of powers doctrine; (4) that section 3559(c) results in punishment for prior convictions in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment and in some instances of the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws; and (5) that, under some circumstances, application of section 3559(c) constitutes a violation of the equal protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 18 U.S.C. — Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person who is convicted in a court of the United States of a serious violent felony shall be sentenced to life imprisonment if—
(A) the person has been convicted (and those convictions have become final) on separate prior occasions in a court of the United States or of a State of—
(i) 2 or more serious violent felonies; or
(ii) one or more serious violent felonies and one or more serious drug offenses; and
(B) each serious violent felony or serious drug offense used as a basis for sentencing under this subsection, other than the first, was committed after the defendant's conviction of the preceding serious violent felony or serious drug offense. | The federal three strikes provision calls for a mandatory term of life imprisonment for defendants convicted of a serious violent felony who have two or more federal or state serious violent felony convictions or one or more of such felony conviction plus one or more federal or state serious drug conviction, 18 U.S.C. 3559(c). The qualifying violent felonies are those specifically enumerated within the section—murder, rape, violent robberies, extortion, among others—as well as unenumerated felonies, that is, any state and federal 10-year felony that involves the fact or risk of physical violence. The qualifying serious drug offenses are those punishable by imprisonment for 10 years or more under state or federal law. The section creates an exemption where defendants can prove that an otherwise qualifying conviction involved neither the fact nor risk of injury.
Defendants have regularly challenged the constitutionality of the section and whether their felony convictions constitute convictions for qualified offenses. The question of when a felony should be considered an unenumerated serious violent felony has proven perplexing, but recent Supreme Court construction of the term in another context may be illuminating. The Court has said in Johnson, Chambers, and Begay that for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) a violent felony is one that involves the purposeful, aggressive use of force, capable of inflicting physical pain or injury upon another.
Constitutional challenges have been to no avail, at least thus far. Defendants have argued without success (1) that requiring the defendant to prove to a judge by clear and convincing evidence, the inapplicability of an injury free conviction offends the due process and jury trial principles identified in Apprendi and its progeny; (2) that the section results in the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (3) that the mandatory sentencing provision impermissibly intrudes upon the constitutional prerogatives of the federal courts in violation of the separation of powers doctrine; (4) that application of the section results in punishment for prior convictions in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, and in some instances of the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws; and (5) that, under some circumstances, application of the section constitutes a violation of the equal protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The text of section 3559(c) is appended. |
crs_RL30548 | crs_RL30548_0 | Whether legislative, oversight, investigative, confirmation, or a combination of these, all hearings share common elements of preparation and conduct. This report emphasizes these shared elements. A committee can expand upon Rule XXVI. Among other topics, this section covers:
deciding whether to hold a hearing; sources that assist committees with hearings; obtaining supplemental staff by contract or detail; holding joint hearings; prohibitions on when committees may meet; scheduling and public notice of hearings; selecting witnesses and determining the order and format of testimony; securing advance written testimony from witnesses; procedures for issuing subpoenas and taking depositions; preparing briefing books for committee members; procedures for broadcasting hearings and techniques for attracting and managing the media; and administrative arrangements. For instance, committee staff may prepare a summary of testimony, prepare additional questions for witnesses, or print the hearing transcript along with supplemental materials. Hearings in the Committee Process
Hearings are the broad information-gathering techniques committees use in policymaking and oversight. In order to obtain approval for a hearing, committee staff often prepare a preliminary hearing memorandum for the chair that includes information such as the scope and purpose of the hearing, the expected outcome, possible witnesses, how many hearing days are planned, and perhaps, the views of the minority party. The rules of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions contain an addendum with additional hearing guidelines requiring the full committee and its subcommittees to provide each member of the committee with the time, place, and subject matter of the hearing seven days prior to the public notice of a hearing as well as a list of witnesses three days in advance. Briefing books frequently contain questions or talking points for Senators to use in opening statements and in examining witnesses. Two important matters are reserving a hearing room and arranging early in the planning stage for a reporter of debates. It may be necessary for staff to travel to the field location a day or more before the hearing to make certain arrangements are to the committee's satisfaction, including the specific layout of tables and chairs for Senators, witnesses and the public, and the availability of a sound system and the technicians to operate it. Closing a Hearing
The vast majority of committee hearings are open to the public, as required under Senate rules. A hearing, like other committee meetings, may, however, be closed for specific reasons stated in Senate rules (Rule XXVI, paragraph 5(b)). The Senate rules also contain a specific procedure for closing a hearing. Time Limitations for Questioning Witnesses
The question and answer period that follows a witness's statement presents an opportunity for Senators to clarify assertions made in testimony, to expand upon witness statements, and sometimes to question the veracity of statements. Moreover, it offers an opportunity for the committee to build a public record and to obtain information to support future committee actions. Senate rules provide a procedure whereby a committee may direct its staff to prepare a daily digest of the written statements submitted by witnesses. Summaries can be distributed to committee members and the press. Many hearings are printed. | Congressional hearings are the principal formal method by which committees collect and analyze information during the legislative policymaking process. Whether confirmation hearings—a procedure unique to the Senate—legislative, oversight, investigative, or a combination of these, all hearings share common elements of preparation and conduct.
Senate Rule XXVI sets forth many of the hearing regulations to which committees must conform, including the quorum requirement, advance submission of witness statements, the opportunity for minority party Senators to call witnesses of their choosing, and procedures for closing a hearing to the public. Senate committees, guided mainly by their chairmen, have broad discretion in how they conduct a hearing, in part because the committees adopt their own rules of procedure. These rules may supplement Senate rules, but they can not contravene them. Committee customs and leadership style not embodied in rules also vary considerably among committees and influence hearing procedures.
Committee members and staff usually plan extensively for hearings. Early planning activities commonly include collecting background information; preparing a preliminary hearing memorandum for the chair and members; discussing the scope of the hearing and the expected outcome; scheduling and providing public notice of a hearing; selecting witnesses; determining the order and format of their testimony; and preparing questions or talking points for committee members to use in questioning witnesses. Other considerations include preparing briefing books, determining whether the hearing will be broadcast and alerting the media, and attending to the many administrative arrangements, such as reserving a hearing room, scheduling a hearing reporter, and arranging for there to be a video or audio recording of the proceeding or a written transcript that will be available to the public soon after the event.
On the day of the hearing, a committee needs a quorum to proceed with testimony. While the vast majority of hearings are open to the public, a committee can vote to close a hearing for specific reasons stated in Senate rules. Senators typically make opening statements at the beginning of a hearing, then witnesses are introduced and may be sworn by the chair. Witnesses present oral testimony in accordance with an arranged format; this testimony generally is a summary of a written statement submitted in advance. The question and answer period that follows is an opportunity for a committee to expand upon a witness's statement and gather information to support future actions.
Following a day of hearings, committee staff may prepare a summary of testimony, draft additional questions for the day's witnesses, and begin initial preparation of the transcript for printing. While not required, hearing transcripts commonly are printed, along with additional materials approved by the committee.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS22708 | crs_RS22708_0 | Background
Federal courts may not order a defendant to pay restitution to the victims of his or her crimes unless authorized to do so. One, 18 U.S.C. 3663, permits it for certain crimes. In addition, several individual restitution statutes authorize awards for particular offenses. In addition, federal courts may order restitution pursuant to a plea agreement or as a condition of probation or supervised release. In the case of mandatory restitution, federal courts must order victim restitution when sentencing a defendant for a felony that constitutes either (1) a crime of violence; (2) an offense against property, including fraud or deceit proscribed in Title 18; (3) maintaining a drug-involved premise; (4) animal enterprise terrorism; (5) failure to provide child support; (6) human trafficking; (7) sexual abuse; (8) child pornography; (9) stalking or domestic violence; (10) copyright infringement; (11) telemarketing fraud; or (12) amphetamine or methamphetamine offenses. Sections 3663 and 3663A authorize restitution orders for the benefit of the victims of the crime of conviction, and now expressly define the term "victim" (i.e., "a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered"). Yet, the general conspiracy provision in title 18 can provide the necessary basis for a mandatory restitution order when the defendant is convicted of conspiracy to commit property damage in violation of a federal law found outside of title 18. First, there must be an identifiable victim who has suffered a physical injury or a pecuniary loss. 853(q) (restitution in controlled substances cases involving amphetamine and methamphetamine offenses). Section 3663 authorizes restitution when the defendant has been convicted of a crime proscribed under title 18 of the United States Code . In addition, as mentioned earlier, a court may also order restitution consistent with a plea agreement or as a condition of probation or supervised release, even with respect to crimes for which restitution is not authorized under §§3663 or 3663A. If not, restitution takes the form of compensatory payments. As a general rule, victims are entitled only to be made whole; unlike the sentencing guidelines which calculate sentence enhancements based on both actual and intended losses, the restitution statutes permit awards only for actual losses. Those authorizations, found in 18 U.S.C. They each: (1) insist on restitution of the "full amount of the victim's losses;" (2) define "victims" in much the manner of §§3663 and 3663A; (3) supply a list of losses for which restitution must be ordered; (4) make it clear that neither the defendant's poverty nor victim compensation from other sources absolves the court of its obligation to order restitution; and (5) otherwise adopt the procedural mechanisms used for restitution under Section 3663A. The probation officer's report is presented to the court, the defendant, and the prosecutor. The court resolves contested restitution issues by a preponderance of the evidence following a hearing, at which the prosecution bears the burden of establishing the existence and extent of the victim's losses, and the defendant bears the burden on questions regarding his or her finances and the extent to which the defendant has compensated the victim for the losses. Victims may assign their right to receive restitution payments to Crime Victims Fund, but the courts are divided over whether the court may order restitution to be paid to the Crime Victims Fund on its own initiative if the victim refuses to accept it. There are several means to enforce a restitution order. In addition, the victims' rights provisions of 18 U.S.C. | Federal courts may not order a defendant to pay restitution to the victims of his or her crimes unless authorized by statute to do so. Several statutes supply such authorization. For instance, federal courts are statutorily required to order victim restitution when sentencing a defendant either for an offense against property, including fraud or deceit, proscribed in Title 18 of the United States Code or for a crime of violence. The obligation exists even if the defendant is indigent, and restitution must take the form of in-kind, lump sum, or installment payments. Federal courts are permitted, but not required, to order victim restitution when sentencing a defendant for any offense proscribed in Title 18 for which restitution is not required. Federal courts are permitted to order victim restitution when sentencing a defendant for various controlled substance and aviation safety offenses. In addition, a federal court may order restitution pursuant to a plea bargain or as a condition of probation or supervised release.
As a general rule, restitution is available only to victims who have suffered a physical injury or financial loss as a direct and proximate consequence of the crime of conviction, and only to the extent of their losses. Several provisions governing restitution following conviction for particular crimes permit awards for types of losses that might not otherwise be permitted under the general restitution provisions. For example, the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 (18 U.S.C. 3663(b)(6)) authorizes restitution orders to compensate victims for the cost of remediating the intended or actual harm caused by certain identity theft violations. The courts are divided over the extent to which a defendant convicted of possession of child pornography may be ordered to make restitution to the child depicted in the material.
When restitution is authorized, a probation officer gathers information from victims, the government, the defendant, and other sources for a report to the court. The parties receive copies of the report and may contest its recommendations. The court has considerable discretion as to the manner and scheduling of restitution payments, but the authority may not be delegated to probation or prison officials. Furthermore, the order must provide for full restitution for all victims unless the sheer number of victims or the complications of a given case preclude such an order.
Under the abatement doctrine, when a defendant dies before his or her appeal has become final, the law treats the indictment and conviction as though they had never happened. The conviction is vacated and the indictment dismissed. The courts do not agree on whether the doctrine also reaches unfulfilled obligations under a restitution order.
This report is an abridged version of CRS Report RL34138, Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases—without footnotes, citations to most authorities, or appendixes found in the longer report. Related reports include CRS Report RL33679, Crime Victims' Rights Act: A Summary and Legal Analysis of 18 U.S.C. 3771, available in abridged form as CRS Report RS22518, Crime Victims' Rights Act: A Sketch of 18 U.S.C. 3771. |
crs_R44210 | crs_R44210_0 | Introduction
The World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) establishes obligations that WTO members must adhere to when they impose requirements on a product's characteristics. To date, relatively few WTO disputes have been raised challenging member compliance with the TBT Agreement's provisions. However, in recent years, the United States has faced claims alleging its failure to abide by the terms of the TBT Agreement. In two of these cases, which are still ongoing, the WTO found that certain U.S. labeling requirements for food products violated the TBT Agreement's nondiscrimination obligations—that is, the measures at issue treated foreign products less favorably than domestic products. The Appellate Body reports from these two disputes provide insight into how the WTO applies these nondiscrimination provisions, and can provide guidance for Congress to consider when enacting future programs that regulate product characteristics. First, to provide a basic understanding of the objectives and requirements of the TBT Agreement, this report provides a general overview of that instrument. Next, it briefly describes the regulatory programs at issue in these two WTO disputes and analyzes how the WTO's Appellate Body applied Article 2.1 in U.S. – COOL and U.S. – Tuna II . The report takes an in-depth look at the test established by the Appellate Body for determining whether a measure is impermissibly discriminatory. Finally, the report provides a brief description of how the United States amended these programs in response to the WTO decisions, and explains why subsequent WTO rulings found that the amended programs still failed to comply with international trade obligations. However, these measures can be trade-distorting, and sometimes countries implement such regulations solely to protect domestic markets. To that end, the TBT Agreement is intended to balance the need to protect members' regulatory autonomy with the need to prevent unnecessary obstacles to international trade. COOL program violated Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. | The World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) contains obligations that WTO members must adhere to when they impose requirements on a product's characteristics. Countries typically implement such requirements in order to protect human health or the environment, prevent deceptive practices, or further other legitimate policy goals. However, these measures can be trade-distorting, and sometimes countries implement such regulations solely to protect domestic markets. To that end, the TBT Agreement is intended to balance the need to protect members' regulatory autonomy with the need to prevent unnecessary obstacles to international trade.
To date, relatively few WTO disputes have been raised challenging member compliance with the TBT Agreement's provisions. However, in recent years, the United States has faced claims alleging its failure to abide by the terms of the TBT Agreement. In two of these cases, U.S.–COOL and U.S.–Tuna II, the WTO found that the United States violated the nondiscrimination obligations contained in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement because the measures treated foreign products less favorably than domestic products. The Appellate Body reports from these two disputes provide insight into how the WTO applies these nondiscrimination provisions, and can provide guidance to Congress when it enacts future programs that regulate product characteristics.
First, to provide a basic understanding of the objectives and requirements of the TBT Agreement, this report provides a general overview of that instrument. Next, it briefly describes the regulatory programs at issue in these two WTO disputes before analyzing how the WTO's Appellate Body applied Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement in U.S.–COOL and U.S.–Tuna II. The report takes an in-depth look at the test established by the Appellate Body for determining whether a measure is impermissibly discriminatory. Finally, the report provides a brief description of how the United States amended these programs in response to the WTO decisions, and explains why subsequent WTO rulings found that the amended programs still failed to comply with international trade obligations. |
crs_RL31676 | crs_RL31676_0 | Overview
Military action in Iraq raised concerns about disruption of the world's crude oil supplies. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, it appears as if this patternwas replayed, as prices briefly spiked at $40 per barrel early in the conflict and then quickly wounddown into the $20s. Frequent disagreements with the United Nations have resulted inIraq's exports averaging less than 1.5 mbd during the past year, about half the country's potential.Therefore, the March 2003 disruption of Iraq's exports involved much less oil than a decade ago,so direct price and supply impacts were less severe. In addition to the relatively small loss as a result of the conflict -- which did not spread beyond Iraq -- other exporting nations increased crude supply to the world market. The Organization ofPetroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has most of the world's spare production capacity, equal toabout three times Iraq's average exports in 2002. Had a Persian Gulf conflict involved other producing nations or export transport routes serving them, much larger oil market impacts would have been involved. But this might not happen quickly: It could take up to two years of rehabilitationto boost Iraq's output to its historic high levels (2)
To offer protection in the event that world oil supply had been more seriously impacted for a longer period, the United States has a range of policy options that are available for a timelyresponse. Chief among these tools is the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), which has an initialdrawdown rate of 4.3 million barrels per day (mbd). A Northeast Heating Oil Reserve (NHOR)could provide temporary relief should there be shortages of home heating oil in New England. ThePresident can also release funds from LIHEAP, the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program. Because disruption andprice spikes often spur discussion about energy conservation, and diversification of energyproduction and sources for imported oil, longer-term policies, such as raising Corporate AverageFuel Economy (CAFE) standards, are also discussed in this report. OPECadministers a set of crude oil production quotas for its members, attempting to maintain prices in arange of $22 to $28 per barrel established in March 2000. Figure 7 below shows gasoline prices as well as crude oil prices during the recent past. Were this to take place, Iraq might become a majordeterminant of world oil prices. Lost Iraqi supplies were largely made up by other exporters. However, had aprolonged shortfall to world oil markets occurred, the option with the greatest potential in the shortterm would almost certainly have been the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), which has an initialdrawdown rate of 4.3 million barrels per day. When OPEC adjusted production quotas of member nations in March 1999, crude supply was reduced by roughly 2 mbd from prior levels of production. International Energy Agency. High prices, it can be argued,will encourage additional domestic production, but the course of oil prices over time is difficult topredict. | Military action in Iraq disrupted the world's crude oil supplies, but sufficient world supply was available during the disruption to keep the resulting price spikes within tolerable levels. With theelimination of the regime of Saddam Hussein, the resumption of Iraqi oil exports seems near, worldoil prices have fallen, and adequate supplies from other exporters are available to satisfy near-termdemand, which is entering the seasonally slack spring period.
Until they halted in mid-March 2003, Iraq's petroleum exports recently averaged about 1.5 million barrels per day (mbd), significantly less than the 3.7 mbd lost to world markets during theGulf crisis in 1991. Consequently, price and supply impacts of the recent interruption were lesssevere. And other exporting nations were able and willing to increase crude oil supply during thedisruption. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) -- holder of nearly all ofthe world's spare production capacity (equal to about three times Iraq's exports in 2002) -- filledthe supply gap.
OPEC administers a set of production quotas for its members, attempting to maintain prices in a range of $22 to $28 per barrel. Production by the OPEC-10 (excluding Iraq) increased as quotaswere raised in the face of prices exceeding $30 (they briefly peaked at $40). The high prices resultedfrom added factors outside the Persian Gulf, including an oil workers strike in Venezuela. WithVenezuela producing at about half its pre-strike level and Iraq's exports halted, other OPECproducers were able to keep world production constant. However, little reserve margin remains andprices have been slow to fall into OPEC's target price range.
This relatively benign oil disruption scenario took place because the conflict in Iraq did not impact other Persian Gulf producers. Had the conflict involved other producing nations or transportroutes serving them, much larger oil market impacts would have resulted. With only Iraqiproduction affected, crude oil prices spiked briefly above $30 per barrel, and average U.S. gasolineprices rose by 31 cents per gallon. A wider disruption could have caused price spikes as great as $53per barrel and of indefinite duration.
In case of a major loss of crude oil to world markets, the United States has a range of policy options that are available for a timely response. Chief among these is the Strategic PetroleumReserve (SPR), which has an initial drawdown rate of 4.3 mbd. A Northeast Heating Oil Reserve(NHOR) could provide temporary relief should there be shortages of home heating oil in NewEngland. The President can also release funds from LIHEAP, the Low Income Home EnergyAssistance Program. The United States is also a member of the International Energy Agency (IEA),which can orchestrate a coordinated world drawdown of oil stocks. Oil disruptions often spurdiscussion as well about energy conservation measures, increased domestic production, and otherlong-term policy options.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43181 | crs_R43181_0 | Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 and P.L. 111-152 ) contains several provisions to encourage employer-sponsored health coverage, particularly among small businesses. The provisions that most directly relate to small businesses are (1) an employer penalty for not providing health insurance, (2) a tax credit to increase the affordability of health care for the smallest firms, and (3) small business health insurance exchanges designed to increase plan options and lower plan costs. On July 2, 2013, the Obama Administration announced a delay in the implementation of the employer penalty for all applicable firms until 2015, citing the need to simplify administrative complexities for businesses and give businesses more time to comply with an appropriate plan. This report analyzes several ACA provisions that are most relevant to small business. Third, it analyzes each provision for potential economic effects on small businesses. Lastly, this report presents several approaches that could address some criticisms of the ACA's employer penalty and reduce its effects on small businesses. 3. Small Business Insurance Exchanges
Since 2014, small employers seeking health insurance coverage for their employees have been able to use the ACA's SHOP exchange. A March 2013 survey of very small employers (those with between 2 employees and 10 employees) that would not be subject to the employer penalty under the ACA found that 56% of respondents misunderstood portions of the ACA's employer penalty, with 32% believing they will be required to provide group health insurance in 2014, regardless of the number of employees, and 24% believing they will have to pay a penalty for failing to provide group coverage. These exempt businesses accounted for 27.6% of all workers. Although the firms with more than 50 employees account for 72.4% of all employees (as shown in Table 1 ), only about 2.4% of all employees work in larger firms that do not already offer health insurance. First, many business owners felt the credit was too small of an incentive to begin offering insurance. Second, even if these small employers offered health insurance, some employees declined coverage because they felt they could not afford their share of the premium. Firms with healthier employees, however, could see a rise in cost. Change the Definition of "Full-Time" to 40 Hours Per Week
In the 114 th Congress, the Save American Workers Act of 2015 ( H.R. 30 ) would change the ACA's definition of "full-time" from 30 hours per week to 40 hours per week. In addition, proponents of the revision argue that the 30-hour definition encourages employers to reduce the number of hours allotted to each worker (thereby reducing each worker's pay) to decrease the number of full-time workers and reduce employers' compliance costs with the ACA (or the size of their employer penalty, because the penalty is only based on full-time workers). Exempt More Firms with Low-Income Employees
Some are concerned that the effects of the employer penalty could be concentrated among smaller firms in certain industries that are large enough to be over the 50-FTE-employee threshold and that primarily employ low-income workers (who are less likely to be able to afford out-of-pocket premium costs of an employer-sponsored health plan). Expand the Small Business Health Care Tax Credit
Although not directly related to the employer penalty, the current small business health care tax credit could be expanded to encourage more small businesses to offer health care coverage (and potentially avoid the employer penalty). | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 and P.L. 111-152) contains several provisions to encourage employer-sponsored health coverage, particularly among small businesses. The provisions that most directly relate to small businesses are (1) an employer penalty for not providing health insurance, (2) a tax credit to increase the affordability of health care for the smallest firms, and (3) small business health insurance exchanges designed to increase plan options and lower plan costs.
Several events have altered the ACA's implementation since its enactment in 2010. Most notably, the Obama Administration delayed the implementation of the employer penalty and part of the small business health exchanges from 2014 to 2015 to allow more time for developing these provisions and allowing firms to come into compliance. Subsequently, the Administration suspended the penalty for employers with fewer than 100 full-time equivalent (FTE) employees for an additional year (until 2016). These delays have added to uncertainty over the potential effects of the ACA on small businesses.
First, this report explains how employer-sponsored insurance can be used to address concerns about health insurance coverage and cost. Second, it summarizes the three ACA provisions most relevant to small businesses, listed above. Next, it analyzes these provisions for their potential effects on small businesses. Finally, this report presents several approaches that could address some concerns associated with these provisions (particularly the employer penalty).
According to analysis of the most recent employer size and insurance coverage data, the ACA's employer penalty is structured so that it could exempt approximately 96.2% of employer firms simply because these firms would be too small and thus fall below the employer penalty threshold of 50 FTE employees. These exempt firms account for approximately 27.6% of all workers. After accounting for firms that already provide insurance, less than 1% of employer firms could be subject to the employer penalty. Although 72.4% of all employees work for firms that are large enough to be potentially subject to the penalty, only about 2.4% of employees work in firms that do not already offer health insurance.
Less than 4% of small businesses that could have been eligible for the small business health care tax credit in 2010 actually claimed it. According to a report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), many business owners felt that (1) the credit was too small of an incentive to begin offering insurance; (2) even if these small employers offered health insurance, some employees declined coverage because they could not afford their share of the premium; and (3) the rules were too complex. President Obama has proposed simplifying and expanding the credit.
Small business health exchanges could help to reduce some barriers to accessing relatively affordable health coverage in the small-group market. By pooling risk among multiple businesses and reducing administrative costs, average insurance costs could reduce costs for these firms. Firms with relatively healthier employees, however, could see a rise in insurance costs.
One issue of concern is the incentive for firms to reduce part-time employee hours below the 30 hours that define full-time employment (under the ACA) as a means to exclude these employees from coverage. The Save American Workers Act of 2015 (H.R. 30, approved by the House on January 8, 2015) would increase the definition of full-time to at least 40 hours per week. This change would reduce the incentive at 30 hours per week, but it also would introduce an incentive to reduce hours among those who work around 40 hours (a larger share of all workers). |
crs_RL32731 | crs_RL32731_0 | Introduction
The conventionally powered aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy (CV-67) was decommissioned at Mayport, FL, on March 23, 2007. The ship will be towed to the Navy's inactive ship facility at Philadelphia, where it will be placed in preservation ("mothball") status. Until mid-2005, the Kennedy was homeported in Mayport, FL. Prior to the proposal to retire the Kennedy, the Navy's plan was to maintain a 12-carrier force and keep the Kennedy in operation until 2018. In acting on the proposed FY2006 defense budget, the 109 th Congress passed a provision that amended 10 U.S.C. 5062 to require the Navy to maintain a force of not less than 12 operational carriers. In acting on the proposed FY2007 defense budget, the 109 th Congress passed a provision ( Section 1011 ) in the FY2007 defense authorization act ( H.R. 109-364 of October 17, 2006) that amended 10 U.S.C. 5062 to reduce the required size of the carrier force from 12 operational ships to 11 and to permit the retirement of the Kennedy under certain conditions. In light of Section 1011 and the Kennedy's retirement, one potential issue for the 110 th Congress concerns the Navy's future plans for the home port facility at Mayport. Issues for 109th Congress
DOD's proposal in FY2006 and FY2007 to retire the Kennedy and reduce the carrier force to 11 ships raised potential issues for the 109 th Congress concerning the appropriate size of the carrier force, the Navy's selection of the Kennedy as the carrier to retire, and carrier homeporting arrangements. Options for 109th Congress
Options for the 109 th Congress arising from the proposal the retire the Kennedy in FY2006 and reduce the carrier force to 11 ships included the following:
Options for Preserving 12 Carriers
Permanent Legislation
This option would involve adding a provision to Title 10 of the U.S. Code (the primary title covering DOD) stating that the Navy shall include not less than 12 large-deck aircraft carriers or prohibiting the Navy from taking any steps to reduce the carrier force to less than 12 ships. One potential option would be to qualify Mayport for homeporting a nuclear-powered carrier—a process that could take a few years—and then transfer one of the Navy's nuclear-powered carriers there. Another potential option would be to transfer one or more conventionally powered non-carrier ships, rather than a nuclear-powered carrier, to Mayport—a step that could be taken in the near term. A third potential option would combine the previous two by homeporting one or more additional conventionally powered ships at Mayport until Mayport is qualified for homeporting a nuclear-powered carrier and a nuclear-powered carrier takes their place. 5122/P.L. The provision prevents the Navy from retiring the Kennedy until it has certified to Congress that it has received formal notices from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and NATO that these organizations do not desire to maintain and operate the ship. The provision requires, as a condition for transferring custody and control of the ship to another party, that the transferee return the ship to the Navy upon request of the Secretary of Defense in time of national emergency. The provision does not appear to require the transferee, while it has custody and control of the ship, to maintain the ship in a condition that would allow for it to be reactivated by the Navy in response to a national emergency. John F. Kennedy (CV-67), the Secretary of the Navy—
(1) while the vessel is in the custody and control of the Navy, shall maintain that vessel in a state of preservation (including configuration control, dehumidification, cathodic protection, and maintenance of spares) that would allow for reactivation of that vessel in the event that the vessel was needed in response to a national emergency; and
(2) if the vessel is transferred from the custody and control of the Navy, shall require as a condition of such transfer that—
(A) if the President declares a national emergency pursuant to the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. | The conventionally powered aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy (CV-67) was decommissioned at Mayport, FL, on March 23, 2007. The ship will be towed to the Navy's inactive ship facility at Philadelphia, where it will be placed in preservation ("mothball") status. The Navy had proposed retiring the Kennedy and reducing the size of the carrier force from 12 ships to 11 as part of its proposed FY2006 and FY2007 budgets. Until mid-2005, the Kennedy was homeported in Mayport, FL. Prior to the proposal to retire the Kennedy, the Navy's plan was to maintain a 12-carrier force and keep the Kennedy in operation until 2018. The issue for the 109th Congress was whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's proposal in the FY2006 and FY2007 budget submissions to retire the Kennedy and reduce the carrier force to 11 ships.
In acting on the proposed FY2006 defense budget, the 109th Congress passed a provision that amended 10 U.S.C. 5062 to require the Navy to maintain a force of not less than 12 operational carriers. In acting on the proposed FY2007 defense budget, the 109th Congress passed a provision (Section 1011) in the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006) that amended 10 U.S.C. 5062 to reduce the required size of the carrier force from 12 operational ships to 11 and to permit the retirement of the Kennedy under certain conditions. Specifically, Section 1011 prevented the Navy from retiring the Kennedy until it certified to Congress that it had received formal notices from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and NATO that these organizations did not desire to maintain and operate the ship. The provision requires, upon retirement of the ship, that while the ship is in the Navy's custody and control, the Navy maintain the ship in a condition that would allow for it to be reactivated in response to a national emergency. The provision requires, as a condition for transferring custody and control of the ship to another party, that the transferee return the ship to the Navy upon request of the Secretary of Defense in time of national emergency. The provision does not appear to require the transferee, while it has custody and control of the ship, to maintain the ship in a condition that would allow for it to be reactivated by the Navy in response to a national emergency.
In light of Section 1011 and the Kennedy's retirement, one potential issue for the 110th Congress concerns the Navy's future plans for the home port facility at Mayport. One potential option would be to qualify Mayport for homeporting a nuclear-powered carrier—a process that could take a few years—and then transfer one of the Navy's nuclear-powered carriers there. Another potential option would be to transfer one or more conventionally powered non-carrier ships, rather than a nuclear-powered carrier, to Mayport—a step that could be taken in the near term. A third potential option would combine the previous two by homeporting one or more additional conventionally powered ships at Mayport until Mayport is qualified for homeporting a nuclear-powered carrier and a nuclear-powered carrier takes their place.
This report will no longer be updated. |
crs_R41108 | crs_R41108_0 | With China's economy now the second largest in the world, Washington seeks Beijing's cooperation in rebalancing the global economy and sustaining global growth. With the United States focused on restoring its economic strength, Washington is seeking to achieve a so-called level playing field for U.S. firms that trade with and operate in China; to address cyber intrusions allegedly originating from China that target commercial and military secrets; and to stem violations of U.S. intellectual property rights in China. The Obama Administration has repeatedly assured China that it "welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs," and China has stated that it "welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability, and prosperity in the region." They have also committed China's military to an ambitious schedule of high-level exchanges and modest operational cooperation with the United States military. Some in China believe that when the United States presses China to ease restrictions on freedom of speech and internet freedom, improve its treatment of religious practitioners and ethnic minorities, and respect the legal rights of its citizens, the United States' real goal is to destabilize China and push the Communist Party from power. An immediate concern is that China's use of coercion in disputes with its neighbors over territory in the East China Sea and the South China Sea could undermine the stability upon which the prosperity of the region depends. For a list of select upcoming events in the bilateral relationship, see Appendix C .
Obama Administration Policy on China
With some in the United States concerned that a rising China poses challenges to the U.S. economy and to U.S. global leadership, and with many in China believing that the United States feels threatened by China's growing economic and military might, President Obama has declared that the United States welcomes China's "peaceful rise." Mindful of that history, China's new top leader, President Xi Jinping, has pressed for a U.S. commitment to a "new model" of U.S.-China relationship that explicitly seeks to avoid strategic rivalry or conflict between a rising China and this era's established power, the United States. In addition, the United States has sought to resolve trade disputes with China through the rules-based mechanisms of the World Trade Organization, and engaged with China on climate change through meetings of parties to the U.N. Congressional Action Related to China in the 113th Congress
The 113 th Congress has so far passed two laws with provisions related to China, P.L. Selected policy issues for Congress related to the bilateral relationship are summarized in the sections below, starting with security issues and Taiwan, followed by economic issues, climate change and renewable energy cooperation, and human rights issues. It has also been suspicious of the intentions behind the U.S. policy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific. The United States has long been concerned about the intentions behind China's military modernization. China's Reaction to U.S. Strategic Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific
While concerns about cyber security have rapidly emerged as a top concern for the United States in the U.S.-China relationship, the U.S. strategic rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific is among China's top concerns. "However, China is not convinced." With China serving as North Korea's largest supplier of fuel and food supplies and its most powerful diplomatic ally, however, the United States continues to call on China to do more to leverage its relationship with Pyongyang to persuade it to avoid provocations and denuclearize. The comment was widely interpreted to be directed at Pyongyang. Adopted by China's National People's Congress in March 2011, the 12 th Five-Year Plan includes plans for:
slower GDP growth than China has enjoyed in the past, with a target of 7% annual GDP growth over the five years of the plan; boosting domestic consumption as a percentage of GDP, in part by increasing wages for Chinese workers and improving China's social welfare net, so that citizens do not need to set aside so much of their incomes to pay for education, health care, and retirement; increasing the service sector's contribution to GDP; expanding urbanization, with a target of creating more than 45 million jobs in urban areas and increasing China's urbanization rate to 51.5%, an increase of four percentage points; prioritizing development of seven "emerging strategic industries," three intended to support China's goal of moving toward more environmentally sustainable growth, and four intended to support China's goal of moving away from labor-intensive low-end manufacturing; meeting ambitious energy and environmental targets, including increasing the proportion of non-fossil fuels in China's energy mix to 11.4% and reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by16%. | The United States relationship with China touches on an exceptionally broad range of issues, from security, trade, and broader economic issues, to the environment and human rights. Congress faces important questions about what sort of relationship the United States should have with China and how the United States should respond to China's "rise." After more than 30 years of fast-paced economic growth, China's economy is now the second-largest in the world after that of the United States. With economic success, China has developed significant global strategic clout. It is also engaged in an ambitious military modernization drive, including development of extended-range power projection capabilities. At home, it continues to suppress all perceived challenges to the Communist Party's monopoly on power.
In previous eras, the rise of new powers has often produced conflict. China's new leader Xi Jinping has pressed hard for a U.S. commitment to a "new model of major country relationship" with the United States that seeks to avoid such an outcome. The Obama Administration has repeatedly assured Beijing that the United States "welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs," and that the United States does not seek to prevent China's re-emergence as a great power. China, for its part, has pledged to follow "the path of peaceful development." Washington has wrestled, however, with how to engage China on issues affecting stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region. Issues of concern for Washington include the intentions behind China's military modernization program, China's use of its paramilitary forces and military in disputes with its neighbors over territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and its continuing threat to use force to bring Taiwan under its control. With U.S.-China military-to-military ties improving but still fragile, Washington has struggled to convince Beijing that the U.S. policy of rebalancing toward the Asia Pacific is not intended to contain China. The two countries have cooperated, with mixed results, to address nuclear proliferation concerns related to Iran and North Korea.
While working with China to revive the global economy, the United States has also wrestled with how to persuade China to address economic policies the United States sees as denying a level playing field to U.S. firms trading with and operating in China. High on the U.S. agenda is commercial cyber espionage that the U.S. government says appears to be directly attributable to official Chinese actors. Other economic concerns for the United States include China's apparent backsliding on its World Trade Organization commitments, its weak protections for intellectual property rights, and its currency policy. In recent months, the United States has strengthened cooperation with China on efforts to combat climate change, while continuing to work with China on the development of clean energy technologies. Human rights remains one of the thorniest areas of the relationship, with the United States pressing China to ease restrictions on freedom of speech, internet freedom, religious expression, and ethnic minorities, and China's leaders suspicious that the United States' real goal is to end Communist Party rule.
This report opens with an overview of the U.S.-China relationship, recent developments in the relationship, Obama Administration policy toward China, and a summary of legislation related to China in the 113th Congress. The report then reviews major policy issues in the relationship. Throughout, the report directs the reader to other CRS reports for more detailed information about individual topics. This report will be updated periodically. A detailed summary of 113th and 112th Congress legislative provisions related to China is provided in appendices. |
crs_RL33792 | crs_RL33792_0 | Issue areas include access to energy resources on federal lands; development of hardrock minerals; designation of the National Landscape Conservation System; wilderness designation; management of wild horses and burros; wildfire protection; Forest Service implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); and other issues. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct, P.L. Implementation of these changes is discussed below. H.R. 6 was enacted on December 19, 2007, as P.L. A claim gives the holder the right to develop the minerals and apply for a patent to obtain full title of the land and minerals. Two oversight hearings on mining law reform have been held by the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee in the 110 th Congress—one on hardrock mining on federal land (September 27, 2007) and a second on reform of the General Mining Law of 1872 (January 24, 2008). National Landscape Conservation System (by [author name scrubbed])
Background
The BLM created the National Landscape Conservation System (NLCS) in 2000 to focus management and public attention on its specially protected conservation areas. Current issues for Congress include whether to establish the system legislatively, and the adequacy of funds for the system. Qualified organizations must have 10 years of "demonstrated compliance and consistency" with one of three specified purposes: "(i) to promote the development and preservation of trails throughout Federal lands; (ii) to promote and encourage education of the public about the fragile nature of mountain and forest ecology and the necessity for its protection and preservation; or (iii) to gather and disseminate information regarding the use and enjoyment of wilderness areas and other Federal land ..."
Wild Horses and Burros (by [author name scrubbed])
Background
The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971 (16 U.S.C. A second change removed the ban on the sale of wild horses and burros or their remains for processing into commercial products. Although adoptions have been declining over the past several years, they have continued to outpace sales of animals. The BLM currently needs additional space in long-term holding facilities and has been soliciting bids for new facilities. Legislative Activity
On April 26, 2007, the House passed H.R. 249 to overturn the changes enacted in the 108 th Congress. Several bills on forest health restoration to reduce wildfire threats have been introduced. Companion bills ( H.R. Two bills have been introduced in the House and two in the Senate to establish a separate fund for major wildfire suppression efforts. Since 2003, the FS has expanded the types of activities that can be conducted without environmental review, increasing the number of types from 18 to 27. They include national forest roadless areas, national forest planning, national forest county payments, BLM land sales, and grazing management. | The 110th Congress, the Administration, and the courts are considering many issues related to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) public lands and the Forest Service (FS) national forests. Key issues include the following.
Energy Resources. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 has led to new regulations on the leasing programs and application of environmental laws to certain agency actions. H.R. 6 was enacted as P.L. 110-140 on December 19, 2007, without many of the federal lands provisions considered earlier.
Hardrock Mining. The General Mining Law of 1872 allows prospecting for minerals in open public domain lands, and staking a claim, developing the minerals, and applying for a patent to obtain title to the land and minerals. The House passed H.R. 2262 on November 5, 2007, to reform aspects of the General Mining Law.
National Landscape Conservation System. The BLM created the National Landscape Conservation System in 2000 to enhance the focus on specially protected conservation areas. Congress is considering measures to establish the 27 million acre system legislatively and debating the adequacy of funds for the system.
Wilderness. Many agency recommendations for wilderness areas are pending. Questions persist about wilderness review and managing wilderness study areas (WSAs). Nearly fifty wilderness area bills have been introduced this Congress, several have been passed by at least one chamber, and one has been enacted into law.
Wild Horses and Burros. Changes in 2004 to the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971 removed the ban on selling certain animals for commercial products; the House passed H.R. 249 on April 26, 2007, to overturn these changes. The BLM continues to dispose of animals by sale, adoption, and long-term holding.
Wildfire Protection. Various initiatives seek to protect communities from wildfires by expanding fuel reduction, and bills have been offered to restore forest health. Concerns over high and rising suppression costs have led to bills for separate wildfire suppression funding accounts.
FS NEPA Application. The FS has proposed altering its process for activity review under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), and has added activities that can be categorically excluded from such environmental and public reviews. Many of these changes and proposals have been challenged in court.
Other issues discussed briefly include roadless areas in the National Forest System, national forest planning, national forest county payments, BLM land sales, and grazing management. |
crs_R42450 | crs_R42450_0 | Introduction
On March 21, 2012, the Supreme Court resolved a long-simmering issue of federal environmental enforcement. The issue in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency involved the "administrative compliance order" (ACO), a device frequently used by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to enforce statutes it administers. The Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act makes available "pre-enforcement review" of ACOs under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), which establishes the federal wetlands permitting program. Simply put, recipients of Section 404 ACOs no longer have to wait until the EPA files a civil action to enforce the ACO before they can have jurisdictional objections to the order heard by a court. In an ACO, EPA directs the recipient to comply with a specified statutory, regulatory, or permit requirement by a stated deadline, and recites the penalties that noncompliance may entail (the order itself imposes no penalties). It is often described as a quick, flexible enforcement tool that serves as an advance warning allowing the recipient to sit down with EPA to negotiate a reasonable settlement that generally avoids penalties. For all their advantages, however, ACOs sometimes come with a distinct downside from the recipient's vantage point: for ACOs issued under Section 404, the lower courts had barred pre-enforcement review. Thus, if the recipient disagreed with the facts or legal conclusions on which the ACO is based, he/she/it faced a difficult dilemma. The recipient could do nothing, challenging the order only later when EPA filed an enforcement action in court. If so and the challenge failed, the recipient faced the prospect of large civil penalties—in the case of the CWA, up to $37,500 per day for each violation of the act and an additional $37,500 per day for violating the ACO. Alternatively, the recipient could comply with the order even though disagreeing with it, at sometimes substantial cost, then apply for a permit and challenge any denial thereof (or unacceptable conditions therein) in court. In the spring of 2007, they filled in most of the lot with dirt and rock to prepare it for house construction. The ACO required the Sacketts to remove the fill material and restore the lot to its pre-fill condition, and set out a compliance schedule. The Sacketts sought a hearing to challenge the jurisdictional finding, which EPA denied. In response to Sackett , EPA will have to decide which of at least three enforcement options to pursue under Section 404, and possibly other statutes involving ACOs. Of course, under this option, EPA faces a trade-off between preparation of full administrative records and the number and timeliness of ACOs it can issue. A second option is that the agency could forego compliance orders in some instances and proceed directly to civil enforcement actions in court seeking money penalties. In sharp contrast with ACOs, however, they have no direct legal consequences. Thus, the legacy of Sackett will be greater if the decision is viewed by lower courts as applying elsewhere in the CWA outside Section 404, and outside the CWA entirely. Within the Section 404 permitting program, it may be speculated whether changes will be made after Sackett in the current divvying up of enforcement responsibilities between EPA and the Corps of Engineers. Under a 1989 memorandum of agreement between the two agencies, EPA generally has responsibility for Section 404 enforcement where, as in Sackett , the landowner fails to apply for a permit—so-called "unpermitted discharges." Reviewability of Corps jurisdictional determinations. | On March 21, 2012, the Supreme Court resolved a long-simmering issue of federal environmental enforcement. The issue in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency involved the "administrative compliance order" (ACO), frequently used by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to enforce statutes it administers. The Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act makes available "pre-enforcement review" of ACOs under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), which establishes the federal wetlands permitting program. Recipients of Section 404 ACOs no longer have to wait, while penalties accrue, until EPA files an action to enforce the ACO before they can have jurisdictional objections to the order heard by a court.
In an ACO, EPA directs the recipient to comply with a statutory, regulatory, or permit requirement and recites the penalties that noncompliance may entail should EPA file an enforcement action in court. ACOs are often described as a quick, flexible enforcement tool that serves as an advance warning allowing the recipient to sit down with EPA to negotiate a reasonable settlement that generally avoids penalties. From the recipient's vantage point, however, there is a distinct downside: for ACOs issued under CWA Section 404, the lower courts had barred pre-enforcement review. Thus, if the recipient disagreed with the facts or legal conclusions on which the ACO was based, the recipient faced a dilemma. The recipient could do nothing, challenging the order only later when EPA brought an enforcement action. If so and the challenge failed, the recipient faced the prospect of large civil penalties—up to $75,000 per day. Or, the recipient could comply with the order at sometimes substantial cost, even though disagreeing with it, then apply for a permit later and challenge any denial thereof.
This was the dilemma faced by the petitioners in Sackett. The Sacketts filled in a lot to prepare it for house construction. EPA then claimed they should have first obtained a wetlands fill permit and so issued an ACO ordering them to restore the lot to its pre-fill condition, even if they intended at some point to apply for a permit. EPA denied the Sacketts' request for a hearing as to whether their land was a wetland covered by the CWA. The couple then sued, but the lower courts found that pre-enforcement review of ACOs issued under Section 404 was unavailable. The Supreme Court reversed unanimously, holding as described above.
Though the Sackett decision was written narrowly to apply only to ACOs under CWA Section 404, it has wider implications. First and most importantly, it may serve as precedent for establishing the availability of pre-enforcement review under other CWA sections, or outside the CWA entirely. Second, EPA would seem to have at least three enforcement options following Sackett. It may simply prepare fuller administrative records supporting each jurisdictional determination, a course involving a trade-off between ensuring the defensibility of its ACOs and the number of ACOs it can issue. Or it might forego ACOs occasionally and proceed directly to civil enforcement actions seeking money penalties, an option offering less opportunity for landowners to sit down and negotiate with the agency, avoiding penalties in many cases. Or EPA could turn increasingly to sending out nonbinding noncompliance letters. Unlike an ACO, these would have no direct legal consequences and thus likely would be deemed unreviewable.
Third, Sackett might lead to a reappraisal of the current allocation of Section 404 enforcement responsibility between EPA and the Corps of Engineers. And finally, it may prompt litigation efforts to reverse current case law under which jurisdictional determinations by the Corps under Section 404 are deemed nonfinal, hence unreviewable in the courts. |
crs_R43074 | crs_R43074_0 | Although future contingency operations may differ from those of the past decade, many analysts and defense officials believe that contractors will continue to play a central role in military operations. These observers believe that, in order to meet the challenges of future operations, DOD should be prepared to effectively award and manage contracts at a moment's notice, anywhere in the world, in unknown environments, and on a scale that may exceed the total contract obligations of any other federal agency. DOD's extensive use of contractors poses several potential policy and oversight issues for Congress and has been the focus of numerous hearings. Congress' decisions on these issues could substantially affect the extent to which DOD relies on contractors in and is capable of planning for and overseeing contractors in future operations. The Role of Contractors in Military Operations
DOD has long relied on contractors to support overseas military operations. Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and before that in the Balkans, have reflected this increased reliance on contractors supporting U.S. troops—both in terms of the number of contractors and the type of work being performed. Contractors can provide significant operational benefits to DOD, including freeing up uniformed personnel to conduct combat operations; providing expertise in specialized fields, such as linguistics or weapon systems maintenance; and providing a surge capability, quickly delivering critical support capabilities tailored to specific military needs. Because contractors can be hired when a particular need arises and released when their services are no longer needed, contractors can be less expensive in the long run than maintaining a permanent in-house capability. Just as the effective use of contractors can augment military capabilities, the ineffective use of contractors can prevent troops from receiving what they need, when they need it, and can lead to the wasteful spending of billions of dollars—dollars that could have been used to fund other operational requirements. Contractors can also compromise the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. military and undermine operations, as many analysts believe happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. Improved planning for and management of contractors may not eliminate all problems, but it could mitigate the risks of relying on contractors during overseas operations. Understanding what enabled this progress could help DOD more effectively prepare for the use of contractors in the future. In light of future budget constraints, some observers are concerned that DOD may not sufficiently fund the efforts to effectively institutionalize operational contract support and prepare for the use of contractors in future operations. 2. 3. Issues for Congress
The role contractors are expected to play in future operations raises a number of questions for Congress, including the following:
To what extent will potential budget cuts or force structure changes impact DOD reliance on contractors? To what extent is DOD preparing for the role of contractors in future military operations? To what extent is the use of contractors being incorporated into education, training, and exercises? What steps is DOD taking to ensure that sufficient resources will be dedicated to create and maintain the capabilities to ensure effective operational contract support in the future? Most analysts believe that effective use of contractors to support military operations requires dedicating sufficient resources to plan for, manage, and oversee the use of contractors. | Throughout its history, the Department of Defense (DOD) has relied on contractors to support a wide range of military operations. Operations over the last thirty years have highlighted the critical role that contractors play in supporting U.S. troops—both in terms of the number of contractors and the type of work being performed. Over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, and before that, in the Balkans, contractors accounted for 50% or more of the total military force.
Regardless of whether future operations are similar to−or significantly different from− those of the past decade most analysts and defense officials believe that contractors will continue to play a central role in overseas military operations. Consequently, these observers believe that DOD should be prepared to effectively award and manage contracts at a moment's notice, anywhere in the world, in unknown environments, and on a scale that may exceed the total contract obligations of any other federal agency.
Contractors provide a wide range of services, from transportation, construction, and base support, to intelligence analysis and private security. The benefits of using contractors include freeing up uniformed personnel to conduct combat operations; providing expertise in specialized fields, such as linguistics or weapon systems maintenance; and providing a surge capability, quickly delivering critical support capabilities tailored to specific military needs. Because contractors can be hired when a particular need arises and released when their services are no longer needed, contractors can be less expensive in the long run than maintaining a permanent in-house capability.
Just as the effective use of contractors can augment military capabilities, the ineffective use of contractors can prevent troops from receiving what they need, when they need it, and can lead to the wasteful spending of billions of dollars. Contractors can also compromise the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. military and undermine operations, as many analysts believe have occurred in recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Improved planning for and management of contractors may not eliminate all problems, but it could mitigate the risks of relying on contractors during overseas operations.
DOD's use of contractors has been a significant oversight issue for Congress in recent years. With the help of Congress, DOD has made substantial progress to improve its use of operational contract support; however, many observers believe the military is not yet sufficiently prepared to use contractors in future operations. In their view, better planning, expanded educating and training, ensuring sufficient resources to effectively manage and oversee contractors, and providing operational commanders with more reliable data can help build the foundation for the more effective use of contractors. In light of current and future budget constraints, some observers are concerned that DOD may not be able to sufficiently fund efforts underway to effectively prepare for the use of contractors in future operations.
DOD's extensive use of contractors poses several potential policy and oversight issues for the 113th Congress, including
1. To what extent will potential budget cuts or force structure changes impact DOD reliance on contractors?
2. To what extent is DOD preparing for the role of contractors in future military operations?
3. To what extent is the use of contractors being incorporated into DOD education, training, and exercises?
4. What steps is DOD taking to ensure that sufficient resources will be dedicated to create and maintain the capabilities to ensure effective operational contract support in the future?
Congress' decisions on these issues could substantially affect the extent to which DOD relies on contractors and is capable of planning for and overseeing contractors in future operations. |
crs_RS20764 | crs_RS20764_0 | The first federal absentee voting law was the Soldier Voting Act of 1942 (P.L. The Federal Voting Assistance Act (P.L. It consolidated the provisions of the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955 that pertained to military voters and their dependents, and the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975 that pertained to American citizens abroad. 107-107 ), the Defense Authorization Act for FY2005 ( P.L. 108-375 ), the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007 ( P.L. 109-364 ), the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 ( P.L. In addition to the amendments to UOCAVA mentioned above, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 did the following:
required the Secretary of Defense to establish procedures to provide time and resources for voting action officers to perform voting assistance duties; established procedures to ensure a postmark or proof of mailing date on absentee ballots; required secretaries of the Armed Forces to notify members of the last day for which ballots mailed at the facility can be expected to reach state or local officials in a timely fashion; required that members of the military and their dependents have access to information on registration and voting requirements and deadlines; and required that each person who enlists receives the national voter registration form; amended UOCAVA to require each state to designate a single office to provide information to all absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters who wish to register in the state; amended UOCAVA to require states to report the number of ballots sent to uniformed services and overseas voters and the number returned and cast in the election; and amended UOCAVA to require the Secretary of Defense to ensure that state officials are aware of the requirements of the law and to prescribe a standard oath for voting materials to be used in states that require such an oath. The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2005 ( P.L. Provisions of the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act
The latest revision of UOCAVA, the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE Act), was signed into law by President Obama on October 28, 2009, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 ( P.L. 111-84 ). Under the current law, the director of the Federal Voting Assistance Program administers the FVAP for citizens covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act. Under P.L. Legislation
114th Congress
Thus far in the 114 th Congress, two bills have been introduced that would amend UOCAVA. Finally, although not otherwise substantially related to UOCAVA, the version of the FY2017 NDAA bill passed by the House ( H.R. 113th Congress
Six bills were introduced that concerned uniformed services and overseas voters. 3576 and S. 1728 , as introduced (see discussion of amended version below in this section), were identical and
would have required states to submit a pre-election report 43 days before an election on whether absentee ballots were sent to absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters 46 days before an election; would have repealed the waiver from the 45-day ballot availability deadline, would have required express delivery for a failure to meet the deadline; would have permitted the use of a single absentee ballot application for subsequent elections; would have prohibited a state from accepting a voter registration and absentee ballot application from an overseas voter because of early submission; would have applied UOCAVA to the Northern Mariana Islands; would have required a biennial report on the performance of the Federal Voting Assistance Program, to be reviewed by the Comptroller General with a report to the oversight committees for election years 2014 through 2020; would have required providing active assistance to active duty members of the Armed Forces through an online system to facilitate voter registration, updating the voter registration record, and requesting an absentee ballot; would have repealed the voting demonstration project authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002; and would have extended a guarantee of residency to family members of absent military personnel (see discussion of S. 1728 , as amended, immediately below). The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration held a hearing on S. 1728 on January 29, 2014. 1540 , which did not include such a provision. 111-84 ). Other bills introduced in the 111 th Congress included two sponsored by Representative Maloney, H.R. More than half (277,266) of the ballots transmitted were sent from just four states: California, Florida, New York, and Washington. Election officials in the states and territories counted 94.6% of the ballots returned by UOCAVA voters. 2012 Election
In July 2012, the Election Assistance Commission issued its biennial report on voting by members of the uniformed services and overseas citizens. The Overseas Vote Foundation issued its report on the 2010 election on February 10, 2011, which found that 18% of UOCAVA voters in the survey reported that they did not receive a requested ballot and another 16.5% reported that they had received the ballot "late." It is the only area of election administration law in which legislation has been enacted since passage of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-252 ). In the 2014 midterm election, 34.6% of transmitted UOCAVA ballots were not returned to election officials. | Members of the uniformed services and U.S. citizens who live abroad are eligible to register and vote absentee in federal elections under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA, P.L. 99-410) of 1986. The law was enacted to improve absentee registration and voting for this group of voters and to consolidate existing laws. Since 1942, a number of federal laws have been enacted to assist these voters: the Soldier Voting Act of 1942 (P.L. 77-712, amended in 1944), the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955 (P.L. 84-296), the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-203; both the 1955 and 1975 laws were amended in 1978 to improve procedures), and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986. The law is administered by the Secretary of Defense, who delegates that responsibility to the director of the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) at the Department of Defense (DOD).
Improvements to UOCAVA were necessary as the result of controversy surrounding ballots received in Florida from uniformed services and overseas voters in the 2000 presidential election. Both the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-107) and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-252) included provisions concerning uniformed services and overseas voting. The Ronald W. Reagan Defense Authorization Act for FY2005 (P.L. 108-375) amended UOCAVA as well, and the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364) extended a DOD program to assist UOCAVA voters.
In the 111th Congress, a major revision of UOCAVA was completed when President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) on October 28, 2009. It included an amendment (S.Amdt. 1764) that contained the provisions of S. 1415, the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (the MOVE Act).
In July 2014, the Election Assistance Commission issued its Election Administration and Voting Survey report that included data on UOCAVA as well as domestic registration and voting in the 2014 election cycle. The biennial UOCAVA report is mandated by the Help America Vote Act and had previously been issued separately from the general survey report. According to the results, ballots were transmitted to UOCAVA voters by election officials in all 50 states and four of the territories, but more than half of all ballots were sent from California, Florida, New York, and Washington. The rate of ballots returned for counting was slightly lower than in the midterm election of 2010, and substantially lower than in the presidential election of 2012. States counted 94.6% of the ballots that were returned. The Overseas Vote Foundation released the results of its 2014 post-election survey in February 2015. Overall, 74% of those who requested an absentee ballot received it and 23% did not (slightly more than 2% did not know or remember whether a ballot was received).
Two bills introduced in the 114th Congress would amend UOCAVA. These include H.R. 12 which is primarily related to other voting issues; and S. 2814, a version of the FY2017 NDAA bill introduced "by request" but that did not advance. In addition, a provision in the House-passed NDAA bill (H.R. 4909) would continue some UOCAVA reporting requirements, despite terminating some unrelated reports. In the 113th Congress, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration held a hearing on S. 1728 on January 29, 2014, and reported the bill with an amendment in the nature of a substitute on April 10, 2014. It would have required states to report statistics on the number of absentee ballots sent to UOCAVA voters before the election, established online voter registration and updating for uniformed services voters, and made an absentee ballot request valid for the entire two-year federal election cycle. The legislation did not advance. |
crs_RS21887 | crs_RS21887_0 | The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA or the act), introduced most recently as H.R. 1409 and S. 560 in the 111 th Congress, would have amended the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to allow union certification based on signed employee authorizations, provided a process for the bargaining of an initial agreement, and prescribed new penalties for certain unfair labor practices. This report reviews the current process for selecting a bargaining representative under the NLRA, and examines how the EFCA would have altered that process. In addition, this report discusses the other changes proposed by the act. Role of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
In addition to providing for union certification without an election, the EFCA would have amended the NLRA to allow for the involvement of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) during the negotiation of an initial agreement following certification or recognition of a labor organization. | This report discusses legislative attempts to amend the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to allow for union certification without an election, based on signed employee authorizations. The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), introduced most recently as H.R. 1409 and S. 560 in the 111th Congress, would have allowed union certification based on signed authorizations, provided a process for the bargaining of an initial agreement, and prescribed new penalties for certain unfair labor practices. This report reviews the current process for selecting a bargaining representative under the NLRA and discusses the role of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in resolving bargaining disputes under that act. The EFCA was introduced in four consecutive Congresses, beginning with the 108th Congress. Despite expectations, the measure was not reintroduced in the 112th Congress. During the 110th Congress, however, the House passed the measure by a vote of 241-185. In the Senate, proponents of the EFCA fell 9 votes short of the 60 votes needed to limit debate and proceed to final consideration of the bill. |
crs_R44108 | crs_R44108_0 | Introduction
The fleet of manned aircraft that accomplishes the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions for the joint military community (E-8, E-3, RC-135, WC-135, OC-135, and E-6) is primarily based on Boeing 707 aircraft procured from the 1960s to the early 1990s. As the age of these legacy C2ISR aircraft increases, understanding the Air Force and Navy modernization and recapitalization plans is likely important for Congress. This report examines the Air Force's and Navy's current sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization efforts for these Boeing 707-based aircraft. This report addresses potential congressional oversight and appropriations concerns for the sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization of the DOD's Boeing 707-based legacy C2ISR aircraft fleet. It does not address options for recapitalization currently being offered by industry to other countries. Congress has the authority to approve, reject, or modify Air Force and Navy funding requests for C2ISR aircraft sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization, as well as maintain oversight of the nation's C2ISR requirements and capabilities. Congress's decisions on appropriations for the C2ISR force could impact the nation's C2ISR capabilities and have additional consequences for the U.S. aerospace industry. Another issue for Congress is DOD, Air Force, and Navy priorities for sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization efforts. Additionally, potentially shifting some of the legacy C2ISR missions to remotely piloted aircraft may affect recapitalization efforts. E-8C Joint Surveillance Targeting Attack Radar System (Joint STARS or JSTARS)
The E-8C JSTARS is an airborne battle management, command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform. E-3 Sentry (AWACS)35
The E-3 Sentry is an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft with integrated command and control battle management (C2BM), surveillance, target detection, and tracking. RC-135V/W RIVET JOINT43
The RC-135V/W RIVET JOINT reconnaissance aircraft supports theater and national level leaders with near real time on-scene intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination capabilities. The COMBAT SENT locates, identifies, collects, and examines foreign military land, naval, and airborne radar signals, providing strategic analysis. Information garnered from the data helps determine detailed operating characteristics and capabilities of foreign systems. WC-135 Constant Phoenix50
The WC-135 Constant Phoenix atmospheric collection aircraft supports national leaders by collecting particulate and gaseous effluents and debris to detect nuclear weapons testing and detonations from accessible regions of the atmosphere. OC-135B Open Skies53
The OC-135B Open Skies Observation Aircraft supports the Open Skies Treaty. The aircraft flies unarmed observation flights over participating parties of the treaty. E-6B Mercury57
The E-6B Mercury is communications relay and strategic airborne command post aircraft. Issues for Congress63
Potential for Shortfall in C2ISR Capabilities
As the current C2ISR force continues to age and shrink, and development of replacements for some aircraft begins, a potential oversight issue for Congress is whether current DOD plans to sustain, modernize, and/or recapitalize the Boeing 707-based C2ISR fleet may result in a shortfall in the nation's C2ISR capabilities. Will modernization efforts allow for delayed recapitalization efforts? Implications of Modernization and Recapitalization on Basing
Another potential oversight issue is the possible implications of reduced legacy C2ISR aircraft sustainment and modernization, and subsequent diminishing numbers of airframes, on any future rounds of base realignment and closure (BRAC). Industrial Base Concerns Associated with C2ISR Sustainment
Another potential oversight issue is the ability of the nation's industrial base to sustain the legacy C2ISR aircraft force. The central issue is how much Congress should consider appropriating for the continued sustainment and modernization of these aircraft compared to funding for recapitalization of these missions to new aircraft. Pertinent to the discussion is the potential for a shortfall in the nation's C2ISR capabilities if Congress or the DOD chooses to minimize funding for sustainment and upgrades that would keep the weapon systems viable until they are recapitalized. | The fleet of manned aircraft accomplishing the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions for the joint military community (E-8, E-3, RC-135, WC-135, OC-135, and E-6) is primarily based on Boeing 707 aircraft procured from the 1960s to the early 1990s. As the age of these legacy C2ISR aircraft increases, understanding the Air Force and Navy modernization and recapitalization plans is likely important for Congress. This report examines the Air Force's and Navy's current sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization efforts for these Boeing 707-based aircraft, and issues Congress may take into account when considering appropriating funds for continued sustainment and modernization of these aircraft versus funding for recapitalization of these missions to new aircraft.
This report addresses potential congressional oversight and appropriations concerns for the sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization of the DOD's Boeing 707-based legacy C2ISR aircraft fleet. It does not address options for recapitalization currently being offered by industry to other countries. Congress has the authority to approve, reject, or modify Air Force and Navy funding requests for C2ISR aircraft sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization, as well as oversight of the nation's C2ISR requirements and capabilities. Congress's decisions on appropriations for the C2ISR force could impact the nation's C2ISR capabilities and have additional consequences for the U.S. aerospace industry.
The starting point for Congress's debate on legacy C2ISR sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization is the existing Boeing 707-based C2ISR fleet consisting of 89 operational aircraft, which includes
16 E-8C Joint Surveillance Targeting Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft providing airborne battle management, command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; 31 E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft with integrated command and control battle management (C2BM), surveillance, target detection, and tracking; 17 RC-135V/W RIVET JOINT aircraft supporting theater and national level forces with near real time on-scene intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination capabilities; 2 RC-135U COMBAT SENT aircraft that locate and identify foreign military land, naval, and airborne radar signals to determine detailed operating characteristics and capabilities of those systems; 3 RC-135S COBRA BALL aircraft that collect optical and electronic data on ballistic missile targets; 2 WC-135 Constant Phoenix atmospheric collection aircraft that collect particulate and gaseous effluents and debris from accessible regions of the atmosphere supporting the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963; 2 OC-135B Open Skies aircraft that perform unarmed observation flights over participating parties of the Open Skies Treaty, and 16 E-6B Mercury communications relay and strategic airborne command post aircraft.
Potential congressional oversight and appropriations concerns for the sustainment, modernization, and/or recapitalization of the DOD's Boeing 707-based legacy C2ISR aircraft fleet include
a potential shortfall in C2ISR capabilities if there is a funding gap for sustainment and upgrades that would keep the weapon systems viable until they are recapitalized; ascertaining DOD, Air Force, and Navy priorities for sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization; determining if modernization efforts allow for delayed recapitalization efforts; consideration of shifting some of the legacy C2ISR missions to remotely piloted aircraft; the potential implications of reduced legacy C2ISR aircraft sustainment and modernization, and subsequent diminishing numbers of airframes on any future rounds of base realignment and closure efforts; and the ability of the nation's industrial base to sustain the legacy C2ISR aircraft force. |
crs_R40102 | crs_R40102_0 | After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration elevated the significance of foreign assistance as a foreign policy tool. President George W. Bush elevated global development as a third pillar of national security, with defense and diplomacy, as articulated in the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002, and reiterated in 2006. In the FY2009 budget request, the Bush Administration reiterated the importance of the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) by saying that the FY2009 budget "reflects the critical role of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development in implementing the National Security Strategy.... " At the same time that foreign aid is being recognized as playing an important role in U.S. foreign policy and national security, it also is coming under closer scrutiny by Congress, largely in response to a number of presidential initiatives (such as implementing the F process and creating the Millennium Challenge Account, or "MCA" ), and by critics who argue that the U.S. foreign aid infrastructure is cumbersome and fragmented, and without a coherent aid strategy. Implementation of the F Bureau
In January 2006, Secretary of State Rice announced the "transformational development" initiative, or "F process," to foster greater aid program coordination and to achieve specified objectives. The Secretary created a new State Department Bureau of Foreign Assistance (the F Bureau) headed by the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) who also serves concurrently as Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. In 2006 the F Bureau developed a Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance (FAF) to align U.S. aid programs with American strategic objectives. This Framework heavily guided the writing of the FY2008 and FY2009 budgets and the FY2010 budget request. While the 14 studies surveyed by CRS emphasize different aspects of the importance of U.S. foreign assistance, all agree that foreign assistance must be reformed to improve its effectiveness. Only one of the recommendation categories—enhancing civilian agency resources—has the support of all of the studies covered in this report. The next two most-often cited recommendations are (1) raising development to equal status with diplomacy and defense; and (2) increasing the emphasis of U.S. foreign aid to be more needs-based, with recipient governments taking ownership of both identifying needs and taking responsibility for using aid to meet them. The role of Congress in foreign aid should expand, according to half of the studies reviewed. Since these studies were written for the purpose of making recommendations to reform U.S. foreign aid, it is not surprising that none of them recommend maintaining the status quo. It should be noted, however, that given the current economic environment and budget constraints along with the numerous other major concerns, such as two wars, health care, energy policy, and global warming, some Members in the 111 th Congress may prefer a continuation of the existing foreign aid structure with minor modifications and increased or adjusted resources where possible. Foreign Affairs , Vol. The author recommends that the next President:
Develop a national foreign assistance strategy that elevates global development as critical to our national interest and lays out the principal missions and mandates for foreign assistance; Reform the organizational structure by merging most foreign assistance programs and related development policy instruments into a new cabinet-level department and strengthen the organization by expanding and deepening the professional staff, revamping delivery mechanisms, and building a serious monitoring and evaluation system; Rewrite the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to streamline procurement rules, earmarks, and restrictions, and to re-establish a strong partnership between the executive branch and Congress that allows greater flexibility to executive aid agencies provided there is greater accountability and responsiveness to Congress; Place a higher priority on multilateral channels of assistance; and Increase the quantity and improve the allocation of assistance, because, even with recent increases, U.S. foreign assistance is not great enough or unencumbered enough to meet our foreign policy goals. Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. Hearing on Foreign Aid Reform . | Both the 111th Congress and the Obama Administration have expressed interest in foreign aid reform and are looking at ways to improve and strengthen the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), coordination among implementing agencies, and monitoring effectiveness of aid activities. Legislation containing elements of reform includes H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Act for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011; H.R. 2139, the Initiating Foreign Assistance Reform Act of 2009; and S. 1524, the Foreign Assistance Revitalization Accountability Act of 2009.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the role of foreign assistance as a tool of U.S. foreign policy has come into sharper focus. President George W. Bush elevated global development as a third pillar of national security, with defense and diplomacy, as articulated in the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002, and reiterated in 2006.
In January 2006, Secretary of State Rice announced the "transformational development" initiative to bring coordination and coherence to U.S. aid programs. She created a new Bureau of Foreign Assistance (F Bureau), led by the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA), who also serves as Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. F Bureau developed a Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance (Framework, or F process) to align aid programs with strategic objectives. The Framework became a guiding force in the FY2008 and FY2009 budgets, as well as the FY2010 budget request.
In recent years, numerous studies have addressed various concerns and provided recommendations regarding U.S. foreign aid policy, funding, and structure. Views range from general approval of the F process as a first step toward better coordination of aid programs and the need to build on it, to strong criticism of the creation of the F Bureau, its inadequacy in coordinating or reforming much of what is wrong with foreign aid, and the need to replace it with a cabinet-level department of foreign aid.
While the 14 studies surveyed by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) emphasize different aspects of the importance of U.S. foreign assistance, all agree that foreign assistance must be reformed to improve its effectiveness. Of the 16 recommendation categories CRS identifies, only enhancing civilian agency resources has the support of all of the studies covered in this report. The next two most-often cited recommendations are raising development to equal status with diplomacy and defense, and increasing needs-based foreign aid, while encouraging recipient-government ownership of aid effectiveness. Half of the studies urge a greater congressional role in foreign aid budgeting and policy formulation.
Because these studies were written for the purpose of reforming U.S. foreign aid, it is not surprising that none of them recommends maintaining the status quo. Given the current economic crisis and budget constraints along with other major concerns, such as health care, energy policy, and global warming, however, some Members of Congress may prefer a continuation of the existing foreign aid structure. This report is a review of selected studies written between 2001 and 2008. For related information on foreign aid and foreign affairs budgets, see CRS Report R40693, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2010 Budget and Appropriations, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and Marian Leonardo Lawson. |
crs_R41578 | crs_R41578_0 | These bills followed several policy steps taken while the recession was in effect. Attention most recently had focused on the significant increase in taxes and decrease in spending scheduled to occur at the end of 2012, popularly referred to as the "fiscal cliff." Economic projections had suggested that these policies would reduce spending and dramatically slow growth in 2013, most likely leading to a recession in the first part of 2013. Three policy issues are examined: whether to take additional measures to increase jobs (or avoid contractionary measures), what measures might be most effective, and how job creation proposals should be financed. The Labor Market Situation
From December 2007 to June 2009, the economy experienced the longest and deepest recession since the Great Depression. The labor market remained weak in 2010, with the unemployment rate averaging 9.6% for the year. Although the rate fell during 2011, it nonetheless was a still high 8.9% for the year. The labor market continued to slowly improve in 2012. In the fourth quarter of 2012, the unemployment rate fell to just under 8.0% for the first time since January 2009. Similarly, the provisions expiring in 2013, if no action is taken, will have contractionary effects (although small compared with those in the original fiscal cliff). These policies include traditional monetary and fiscal policy as well as federal interventions into the financial sector. A provision that was considered (but not included) in the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-185 ) was a 26-week extension of unemployment benefits. 110-343 ). 111-240 ). In December 2010, the President signed into law ( P.L. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act also extended through the end of 2011 the alternative minimum tax relief and various other expiring tax provisions, and it extended and expanded bonus depreciation while also extending emergency unemployment benefits through 2011. Aside from the payroll tax cut, the other provisions of the legislation could be considered to prevent policy from becoming contractionary in 2011 (by allowing the deficit to decrease through the expiration of existing policy), rather than generating additional fiscal stimulus. On December 23, the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 ( H.R. 112-78 ). 112-96 ). 8 and S. 3413 , the Republican tax proposal, that would extend the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for a year and the AMT patch for two years; S. 3412 , the Democratic tax proposal, that would extend the 2001and 2003 tax cuts, except for high income individuals, and the parts of the 2009 tax cuts that expire at the end of 2012, along with a one-year AMT patch; and S. 3521 , approved by the Senate, that would extend the AMT for two years, most of the "extenders" for a year, and provisions allowing increased expensing of small business for a year. At the end of the 112 th Congress, in early January, the American Taxpayer Relief Act ( P.L. It included offsetting effects and should have a negligible effect on the economy. Spending, Transfers, and Tax Cuts
The objective of traditional fiscal stimulus is to increase total spending (aggregate demand) either through direct spending on programs or by providing funds to others that will spend (through transfer payments, tax cuts, and aid to state and local governments). Employment Tax Credits
Some argue the employment tax credits are different from traditional fiscal policies in that their objective is to directly increase employment through a subsidy to labor costs. Should Fiscal Stimulus Be Deficit Financed? The choice of financing affects both the macroeconomic impact and the cost-benefit tradeoff of the policy proposal. Deficit-neutral proposals would tend to neutralize the effects of job creation provisions on total spending in the economy by cutting other spending or lowering the spending of those whose taxes are raised. | The longest and deepest recession since the Great Depression ended as expansion began in June 2009. Although output started growing in the third quarter of 2009, the labor market was weak in 2010, with the unemployment rate averaging 9.6% for the year. Despite showing improvement in 2011, the unemployment rate averaged a still high 8.9% for the year. The labor market continued to improve slowly, reaching 8% for the first time since January 2009. The rate fell slowly in 2013, reaching 7% by November, but still above the pre-recession rate of 5%.
Several policy steps were taken after the economy entered the Great Recession. They include stimulus bills in 2008 (P.L. 110-185) and 2009 (P.L. 111-5), an unprecedented expansion in direct assistance to the financial sector by the Federal Reserve, and the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP; P.L. 110-343). In December 2010, after the recession had ended, P.L. 111-312 extended the 2001 and 2003 "Bush" income tax cuts through 2012 as well as other expiring tax provisions and emergency unemployment benefits through 2011. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act also cut the payroll tax by two percentage points through 2011. The payroll tax cut was extended into early 2012 as part of the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act (P.L. 112-78) and again through 2012 as part of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act (P.L. 112-96), which also extended emergency unemployment benefits.
In 2012, attention focused on the significant increase in taxes and decrease in spending popularly referred to as the "fiscal cliff." Economic projections had suggested that these policies would have dramatically slowed growth and perhaps lead to a recession in the first part of 2013. The American Taxpayer Relief Act (P.L. 112-240) eliminated somewhat more than half the fiscal cliff, but fiscal policy remained contractionary for 2013 as compared with 2012 and was projected to cause growth to slow by one to two percentage points compared to what otherwise would have been the case. Some provisions of that legislation expire at the end of 2013. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 allowed for higher spending limits, but had offsetting provisions with a negligible effect on the economy and did not extend most expiring tax and spending programs, including extended unemployment benefits. These provisions cause further contractionary fiscal policy effects.
This report addresses three policy issues: whether to take additional measures to increase jobs (or avoid contractionary policies), what measures might be most effective, and how job creation proposals should be financed. Most proposals that have been discussed in the past as part of a potential additional macroeconomic jobs bill are traditional fiscal stimulus policies. Their objective is to increase total spending in the economy (aggregate demand) either through direct government spending on programs or by providing funds to others that they will spend (through tax cuts, transfer payments, and aid to state and local governments). Proposals for employment tax credits are different from traditional fiscal policies in that their objective is to directly increase employment through a subsidy to labor costs.
To be effective, fiscal stimulus is generally deficit financed. Although a stimulus measure could be paid for by cutting other spending or raising other taxes, these financing options will offset the stimulative effects on aggregate demand. It is possible to choose a deficit-neutral package of tax and spending changes that would stimulate aggregate demand if some types of measures induce more spending per dollar of cost than others, but such an effect would likely not be very large. The choice of financing affects both the macroeconomic impact and the cost-benefit tradeoff of the policy proposal. If such an effective stimulus package could be designed, it would have the advantage of not exacerbating the challenges of a growing debt. |
crs_R40685 | crs_R40685_0 | The bill also provides funds for agencies in two other departments—the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, and the Indian Health Service (IHS) in the Department of Health and Human Services—as well as funds for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). P.L. Current Overview
The Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-88 ) contained a total of $32.29 billion for FY2010. This was $4.45 billion (16%) higher than the FY2009 appropriation of $27.84 billion (excluding stimulus appropriations). The House, Senate, and Administration had all supported significantly higher levels for FY2010—ranging between 15% and 16% higher—than the FY2009 appropriation of $27.84 billion. 111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, contained an additional $10.95 billion in emergency funds for FY2009 for some of the accounts within agencies typically funded by the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations laws. In general, the funds were made available for obligation until September 30, 2010 (the end of FY2010). The FY2010 appropriation of $32.29 billion in P.L. 111-88 was $6.50 billion (17%) less than the total FY2009 appropriations of $38.79 billion (including stimulus appropriations). A variety of funding and policy issues were debated during consideration of FY2010 legislation. They included oil and gas leasing in the Outer Continental Shelf, wildland fire fighting, Indian trust fund management, royalty relief, and climate change. Other issues included funding for Bureau of Indian Affairs construction, education, and housing; Indian Health Service construction and urban Indian health; wastewater/drinking water needs; land acquisition; and the Superfund program. 2996 , the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill for FY2010. The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations laws have provided funds to several DOI agencies for restoration projects. | The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Interior (DOI), except for the Bureau of Reclamation, and for agencies within other departments—including the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service (IHS) within the Department of Health and Human Services. It also includes funding for arts and cultural agencies, the Environmental Protection Agency, and numerous other entities.
The Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-88), contained a total of $32.29 billion for FY2010. This was $4.45 billion (16%) higher than the FY2009 appropriation of $27.84 billion (excluding stimulus appropriations). The House, Senate, and Administration had all supported significantly higher levels for FY2010—ranging between 15% and 16% higher—than the FY2009 appropriation of $27.84 billion.
P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, contained an additional $10.95 billion in emergency funds for FY2009 for some of the accounts within agencies typically funded by the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations laws. In general, the funds were made available for obligation until September 30, 2010 (the end of FY2010). The FY2010 appropriation of $32.29 billion in P.L. 111-88 was $6.50 billion (17%) less than the total FY2009 appropriations of $38.79 billion, including stimulus appropriations.
A variety of funding and policy issues were debated during consideration of the FY2010 Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. They included oil and gas leasing in the Outer Continental Shelf, wildland fire fighting, Indian trust fund management, royalty relief, and climate change. Other issues included funding for Bureau of Indian Affairs construction, education, and housing; Indian Health Service construction and urban Indian health; wastewater/drinking water needs; land acquisition; and the Superfund program.
This report is not expected to be updated. |
crs_RL30876 | crs_RL30876_0 | Plans were submitted that arguably would not have beenaccepted as legislation using the regular legislative process, thus increasing tensions between thebranches. While Secretary of Commerce, President Herbert Hoover (1929-1933) had beena proponent of the idea that Congress should delegate to the President authority to proposereorganizations of the executive branch subject to some form of congressional disapproval. (4)
Hoover, a Progressive in his politics, believed that "economy and efficiency" in the executivebranch were possible only if the President could act decisively according to "scientific managementprinciples." This criticalview, held by many members of Congress themselves, (6) has been recurrent over the years and continues to this day to be amajor rationale offered for proposals to renew the President's reorganization authority. Section 905 of the Reorganization Act of 1977 listed additional limitations on the President'sauthority to submit Reorganization Plans as follows:
§ 905 Limitations on Powers
(a)A reorganization plan may not provide for, and a reorganization under this chapter may nothave the effect of --
(1) creating a new executive department,abolishing or transferring an executive department or independent regulatory agency,or all the functions thereof, or consolidating two or more executive departments, ortwo or more independent regulatory agencies, or all the functionsthereof;
(2) continuing an agency beyond theperiod authorized by law for its existence or beyond the time when it would haveterminated if the reorganization had not beenmade;
(3) continuing a function beyond theperiod authorized by law for its exercise or beyond the time when it would haveterminated if the reorganization had not beenmade;
(4) authorizing an agency to exercise afunction which is not expressly authorized by law at the time the plan is transmittedto Congress;
(5) increasing the term of an officebeyond that provided in law for the office; or
(6) dealing with more than one logicallyconsistent subject matter. None of the plans involved major reorganization proposals. What About the Future? Reorganization of the executive branch has been, and will be, a continuous process. Organizational change is the norm in agency life, not the exceptional action. The principal argument favoring renewing the President'sreorganization authority appears to be that this will encourage the President, through the Office ofManagement and Budget, to take the initiative in organizational management issues, something thathas not been the case in recent years. | Among the initiatives being promoted with the beginning of the Administration of PresidentGeorge W. Bush is that of renewing the President's lapsed authority to submit reorganization plansto Congress. The general rationale offered for renewing this authority is that it would provideadditional flexibility and discretion to the President in organizing the executive branch to promote"economy and efficiency" as well as his political priorities. The regular legislative route forconsidering presidential proposals involving organizational changes is deemed by reorganizationauthority supporters as being unduly slow and cumbersome. Thus, the proposal to permit thePresident to submit reorganization plans subject to mandatory congressional consideration with "fasttrack" procedures is viewed by the reorganization proposal's proponents as a necessary reform forgood government. Critics of the reorganization plan authority reject the arguments and assumptionsbehind the proposal and defend the efficacy and legitimacy of the regular legislative process forexecutive reorganization proposals.
This report addresses three specific issues: (1) the historical basis and use of the President'sreorganization authority; (2) the factors contributing to the lapse of the President's reorganizationauthority in 1984, (1) and(3) thoughts on the future of reorganization in the executive branch. |
crs_RL31808 | crs_RL31808_0 | Most Recent Developments
On January 23, 2004, President Bush signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004( H.R. 108-199 ), which included the conference version of theTransportation, Treasury and Independent Agencies Appropriations bill (Division F); theHouse had passed the bill on December 8, 2003, the Senate on January 22, 2004. Transportation-Treasury conferees agreed on a total of $89.8 billion; the Act includes anacross-the-board rescission of 0.59% (the figures in this report do not reflect the impact of thatrescission). On November 21, 2003, Congress passed the fourth continuing resolution for FY2004 funding, extending funding for those programs whose FY2004 appropriations bills had not already beenpassed by Congress to January 31, 2004. On October 23, the Senate passed its version of the FY2004 Transportation, Treasury and Independent Agencies Appropriation bill. The major financial change from the Administrationrequest was an additional $4.5 billion in highway funding. The bill provides$85.8 billion. Key financial differences from the Administration request include an additional $4.4billion in highway funding; another major difference, the deletion of the $3.4 billion for grants-in-aidto airports, was the result of a point of order against funding the administrative expenses of theprogram from contract authority. Prior to FY2004, appropriations for the Department of Transportation and the Department of the Treasury were in separate bills. Funding for these programsmay be restored in conference. These figures do not reflect the 0.59% across-the-board rescission included in H.R.2673. The same amount was included in both the House and Senate bills. Grants-in-Aid for Airports. The bill set the obligation limitation at $33.4 billion, $1.8 billion above the FY2003level and $4.1 billion above the President's request. Amtrak's authorization expired at the end of FY2002. For FY2003, in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution ( P.L. 2989 on September 9, 2003. 2989 prohibited the IRS from using appropriated funds to issue final regulations lifting a 1999moratorium on the conversion of corporate pension plans from traditionaldefined-benefit plans to cash-balance plans. (22)
Included with the FY2004 budget request for consolidation is a proposal for a Title VI general provision that would provide for a 10% transfer authority among thefollowing accounts:
The White House (Compensation of the President, White House Office (including the Office of Homeland Security), Executive Residence,White House Repair and Restoration, Office of Administration, Office of PolicyDevelopment, National Security Council, Council of EconomicAdvisers)
Office of Management and Budget
Office of National Drug Control Policy
Special Assistance to the President and Official Residence ofthe Vice President (transfers would be subject to the approval of the VicePresident)
Council on Environmental Quality and Office of EnvironmentalQuality
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Office of the United States TradeRepresentative (23)
According to the EOP budget submission, the transfer authority would "allow the President to address, in a limited way, emerging priorities and shifting demands"and would "provide the President with flexibility, improve the efficiency of the EOP,and reduce administrative burdens." Cuba Sanctions
(117)
Both House- and Senate-approved versions of the FY2004 Transportation-Treasury appropriations bill, H.R. But the provisions weredropped in the conference report to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, P.L.108-199 (H.R. | For FY2004 Congress began providing, in a single bill, appropriations for the Departments of Transportation and the Treasury, the United States Postal Service, the Executive Office of thePresident, and Related Agencies, as well as General Government provisions.
On January 23, 2004, President Bush signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 ( H.R. 2673 ; P.L. 108-199 ), which included the conference version of the FY2004Transportation, Treasury and Independent Agencies Appropriations bill. On September 9, 2003, theHouse passed H.R. 2989 , the FY2004 Transportation, Treasury and IndependentAgencies Appropriations bill, which provided $85.8 billion. The major financial change from theAdministration's request was to recommend an additional $4.4 billion in highway spending (anothermajor change, the deletion of the $3.4 billion for grants-in-aid to airports, was a procedural change;funding may be restored in conference). On October 23, the Senate passed its version of the bill,which provided $91.0 billion, adding $4.5 billion in highway funding to the Administration'srequest. Conferees agreed on $89.8 billion on November 25th. The conference version of the billwas added to the Consolidated Appropriations bill, which the House passed on December 8, 2003. The Senate adjourned for the year without voting on the bill; they approved the bill on January 22,2004. The Consolidated Appropriations Act contains a 0.59% across-the-board rescission; thefigures in this report do not reflect the impact of that rescission. They also do not reflect the $55million in transportation projects and $1 billion for election reform grants projects located in the"Miscellaneous Appropriations" Division at the end of the Act.
Prior to passage of P.L. 108-199 , FY2004 funding for agencies and programs in the Transportation, Treasury, and Independent Agencies appropriations bill was provided, at FY2003levels, through January 31, 2004 by a series of continuing resolutions.
Key issues in the FY2004 appropriations bill included: pay for federal civilian employees (the White House proposed a 2% raise; the bill provides a 4.1% raise for federal civilian employees, inline with the military pay raise); outsourcing of federal work (the bill restricts the Administration'splan to increase outsourcing, but the broader restrictions contained in both House and Senate billswere dropped due to veto threats); "cash balance" pension plans (the bill prohibits the TreasuryDepartment from finalizing rules affecting conversion of traditional pension plans to cash balancebasis); and Cuba (the conference bill omitted provisions contained in both House and Senate billsthat constrained enforcement of travel restrictions to Cuba). This report will not be updated.
Key Policy Staff
DSP = Domestic Social Policy
G&F= Government & Finance
RSI = Resources, Science, and Industry Division. |
crs_R43784 | crs_R43784_0 | Background
Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ( P.L. Emergency declarations are made to protect property and public health and safety and to lessen or avert the threat of a major disaster or catastrophe. In contrast, a major disaster declaration is made as a result of a disaster or catastrophic event and constitutes a broader authority that helps states and local communities, as well as families and individuals, recover from the damage caused by the event. It is the declaration process that sets the federal recovery help in motion. In implementing assistance authorized by the President under this chapter in response to a request of the Chief Executive of an affected Indian tribal government for a major disaster declaration, any reference in this subchapter or subchapter III (except sections 5153 and 5165d of this title) to a State or the Governor of a State is deemed to refer to an affected Indian tribal government or the Chief Executive of an affected Indian tribal government, as appropriate. The process for an emergency declaration is also contained in the Stafford Act. 113-2 . Congress and the Declaration Process
Tribal Declarations
In the 113 th Congress, following Hurricane Sandy, Congress passed the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA), P.L. That significant change was one that Native Americans had long sought: the ability to directly request assistance from the federal government during times of disaster, rather than having to submit any requests through the governors of the affected tribal areas. Various Administrations have also considered the process and FEMA's role in it. In recent years, however, the need for assistance has been increasingly tied to a string of incidents as opposed to a single, large event. One example, now in law, of the desire to reform but not obstruct the declaration process is in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) of October of 2006. FEMA drafted regulations in 1986 that would have been more certain in their delineation of state requirements prior to a declaration, reduced overall federal contributions, and would have installed a formula to determine whether a state would receive a presidential disaster declaration for repairs to state and local infrastructure (known as "public assistance" in the Stafford Act). While the process is informed by that information and its relationship to potential assistance programs, the information that is gathered at the state and local level does not preclude the exercise of judgment by the tribal leader, governor, or the President. Just as the governor or tribal leader retains the discretion to request federal assistance regardless of thresholds or indicators, the President retains the discretion to make a decision that may be counter to recommendations he receives. Politics and the Declarations Process
The number of major disaster declarations on average has been increasing over the last several decades. Two researchers asserted that presidential and congressional influence have an impact on the decisions for declarations and spending. Unlike the procedures of the federal process, a governor's decision to request a declaration can be a public and often newsworthy action. Factors Considered for Public Assistance in Major Disaster Declarations
Public Assistance (PA) refers to various categories of assistance to state and local governments and non-profit organizations. 1859 ) has been introduced that would direct FEMA to consider all factors as equal to the cost-estimate information. Reflecting this interest in localized impacts, the report accompanying the House Appropriations Committee legislation for DHS for FY2015 notes:
Although FEMA may consider the localized impacts of a disaster when recommending a disaster declaration to the President, the Committee is aware of concerns that, in practice, FEMA primarily relies on the state-wide damage threshold, which will be higher for more populous states even if the local impacts of a disaster may be relatively severe. Factors Considered for Individual Assistance in Major Disaster Declarations
Individual Assistance (IA) includes various forms of help for families and individuals following a disaster event. During the last Congress, attention was directed to the nature of the disaster declaration process. In considering such legislation, Congress may choose to engage a broad review of the process that might include the consistency of FEMA's approach across the nation in making damage assessments, other potential indicators of state capabilities and capacities, and the currency of the factors it employs to evaluate those assessments of disaster damage and the state requests on which they are based. | The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (referred to as the Stafford Act—42 U.S.C. 5721 et seq.) authorizes the President to issue "major disaster" or "emergency" declarations before or after catastrophes occur. Emergency declarations trigger aid that protects property, public health, and safety and lessens or averts the threat of an incident becoming a catastrophic event. Given their purpose, the emergency declarations may precede an event. A major disaster declaration is generally issued after catastrophes occur, and constitutes broader authority for federal agencies to provide supplemental assistance to help state and local governments, families and individuals, and certain nonprofit organizations recover from the incident.
The end result of a presidential disaster declaration is well known, if not entirely understood. Various forms of assistance are provided, including aid to families and individuals for uninsured needs; and assistance to state and local governments, and to certain non-profits for rebuilding or replacing damaged infrastructure.
Over the last quarter century, the amount of federal assistance provided through presidential disaster declarations has exceeded $150 billion. Often, in recent years, Congress has enacted supplemental appropriations legislation to cover unanticipated costs. While the amounts spent by the federal government on different programs may be reported, and the progress of the recovery can be observed, much less is known about the process that initiates all of this activity. Yet, it is a process that has resulted in an average of more than one disaster declaration a week over the last decade.
The disaster declaration procedure is foremost a process that preserves the discretion of the governor or tribal leader to request assistance and the President to decide to grant, or not to grant, supplemental help. The process employs some measurable criteria for evaluating disaster damage in two broad areas: Individual Assistance that aids families and individuals and Public Assistance that is mainly for emergency work such as debris removal and permanent repairs to infrastructure. The criteria, however, also consider many other factors, in each category of assistance, that help decision makers assess the impact of an event on communities and states.
Under current law while a governor or a tribal leader may make a request, the decision to issue a declaration rests solely with the President. Congress has no formal role, but has taken actions to adjust the terms of the process. For example, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, P.L. 109-295, established an advocate to help small states with the declaration process. More recently, Congress passed the Hurricane Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, P.L. 113-2, which had two potentially major impacts on the declaration process. First, the act authorized Native American tribal groups to directly request disaster assistance from the President rather than only requesting through a state governor. The second potential major impact in the act was that FEMA was directed to update its criteria for considering whether to make a recommendation to the President for Individual Assistance declarations.
Since the decision for a declaration is at the discretion of the President, there has been some speculation regarding the influence of political favor in these decisions. Some have posited various connections between the political party of the governor requesting or the prominence of some state's congressional delegation on committee's important to FEMA. While of interest, those theories are usually not connected to, or at least fail to consider, the natural events that were the impetus for both the request and the decision.
Given the importance of the decision, and the size of the overall spending involved, hearings have been held to review the declaration process so as to ensure fairness and equity in the process and its results. Congress continues to examine the process and several pieces of legislation have been introduced during the 113th Congress to adjust the factors considered for a major disaster declaration. This report discusses the evolution of this process, how it is administered and recent changes enacted in law as well as amending legislation that has been introduced. This report will be updated as warranted by events. |
crs_RL31253 | crs_RL31253_0 | This is an overview of federal law relating to the statutes of limitation in criminal cases, including those changes produced by the act. The phrase "statute of limitations" refers to the time period within which formal criminal charges must be brought after a crime has been committed. "The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. The common law recognized no period of limitation. Federal statutes of limitation are as old as federal crimes. Others suspend or extend the applicable period under certain circumstances such as the flight of the accused, or during time of war. Limits by Crime
Although the majority of federal crimes are governed by the general five-year statute of limitations, Congress has chosen longer periods for specific types of crimes—20 years for the theft of art work; 10 years for arson, for certain crimes against financial institutions, and for immigration offenses; and 8 years for the nonviolent terrorist offenses that may be prosecuted at any time if committed under violent circumstances. For example, an otherwise applicable limitation period may be suspended or extended in cases involving child abuse, the concealment of the assets of an estate in bankruptcy, wartime fraud against the government, dismissal of original charges, fugitives, foreign evidence, or DNA evidence. DNA
There are two DNA provisions. That is no longer the case. It provides the following:
(a)(1) Upon application of the United States, filed before return of an indictment, indicating that evidence of an offense is in a foreign country, the district court before which a grand jury is impaneled to investigate the offense shall suspend the running of the statute of limitations for the offense if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an official request has been made for such evidence and that it reasonably appears, or reasonably appeared at the time the request was made, that such evidence is, or was, in such foreign country. Conspiracies and Continuing Offenses
Statutes of limitation "normally begin to run when the crime is complete," which occurs when the last element of the crime has been satisfied. The rule for conspiracy is a bit different. Thus, the statute of limitations for such conspiracies begins to run not with the first overt act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy but with the last. Constitutional Considerations
Ex post Facto
Historically, constitutional challenges to the application of various statutes of limitation have arisen most often under the ex post facto or due process clauses. Due Process
Retroactivity aside, the due process clauses may be implicated when a crime has no statute of limitations or when the period of limitation has not run. Attachment 1. § 2250 (failure to register as a sex offender)
18 U.S.C. | A statute of limitations dictates the time period within which a legal proceeding must begin. The purpose of a statute of limitations in a criminal case is to ensure the prompt prosecution of criminal charges and thereby spare the accused of the burden of having to defend against stale charges after memories may have faded or evidence is lost.
There is no statute of limitations for federal crimes punishable by death, nor for certain federal crimes of terrorism, nor for certain federal sex offenses. Prosecution for most other federal crimes must begin within five years of the commitment of the offense. There are exceptions. Some types of crimes are subject to a longer period of limitation; some circumstances suspend or extend the otherwise applicable period of limitation.
Arson, art theft, certain crimes against financial institutions, and various immigration offenses all carry statutes of limitation longer than the five-year standard. Regardless of the applicable statute of limitations, the period may be extended or the running of the period suspended or tolled under a number of circumstances, such as when the accused is a fugitive or when the case involves charges of child abuse, bankruptcy, wartime fraud against the government, or DNA evidence.
Ordinarily, the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the crime has been completed. Although the federal crime of conspiracy is complete when one of the plotters commits an affirmative act in its name, the period for conspiracies begins with the last affirmative act committed in furtherance of the scheme. Other so-called continuing offenses include various possession crimes and some that impose continuing obligations to register or report.
Limitation-related constitutional challenges arise most often under the Constitution's ex post facto and due process clauses. The federal courts have long held that a statute of limitations may be enlarged retroactively as long as the previously applicable period of limitation has not expired. The Supreme Court recently confirmed that view; the ex post facto proscription precludes legislative revival of an expired period of limitation. Due process condemns pre-indictment delays even when permitted by the statute of limitations if the prosecution wrongfully caused the delay and the accused's defense suffered actual, substantial harm as a consequence.
A list of federal statutes of limitation in criminal cases and a rough chart of comparable state provisions are attached. This report is available in an abbreviated form as CRS Report RS21121, Statute of Limitation in Federal Criminal Cases: A Sketch, without the attachments, footnotes, or attributions to authority found here. |
crs_R44697 | crs_R44697_0 | The VHA, the largest and most visible operating unit, is predominantly a direct service provider of primary and specialty care, similar in many ways to a large private sector health care system. In addition to providing inpatient, outpatient, and a range of other medical care services, the VHA has been authorized by Congress since the 1960s to provide nursing home care to eligible veterans in VA facilities, private nursing facilities contracted by the VA, and state veterans homes. These services include programs of care directly provided by the VA, such as home-based primary care and geriatric evaluation, as well as services purchased by the VA, such as home health aide and home respite care. P.L. P.L. 91-101, enacted in 1969, amended P.L. Based on recommendations of the Federal Advisory Committee on the Future of VA Long-Term Care, Congress began to examine the VA's long-term care programs, which led to the enactment of the Veterans Millennium Health Care and Benefits Act ( P.L. VHA Eligibility, Enrollment, and Long-Term Care
In general, eligibility for VA long-term care services depends on several factors, including veterans' need for the service, as determined by the VA; whether the service is institutional or non-institutional; and, for certain programs, veterans' service-connected status. VHA Enrollment
The size and scope of the VA health care system are influenced by several factors, including the size of the veteran population, the number of veterans eligible for VA health care, veterans' decisions about whether to enroll, and once enrolled, whether to utilize VA health care services, including long-term care services. An estimated 9.1 million veterans (43% of all veterans) were enrolled in the VA health care system in FY2016. While overall the number of veterans in the United States has declined since FY2000, the number of veterans enrolled in the VA health care system has increased significantly. As shown in Figure 2 , just over 4.9 million veterans (19% of all veterans) were enrolled in the VHA in FY2000; by FY2016, that number was estimated to have increased 86%, to 9.1 million enrollees. Each VAMC/HCC offers certain mandatory programs and may offer several optional programs as well. VHA Long-Term Care Services
The VA offers long-term care in both institutional and non-institutional settings. Institutional settings may include both inpatient acute care and nursing home care, although the majority of long-term care the VA provides in institutional settings occurs in a nursing home setting, which is the primary focus in this report. Non-institutional care includes outpatient or ambulatory care settings, as well as care that occurs in the home or another community-based setting. Some long-term care services are provided directly by VA staff, while other services are purchased from providers outside the VA. 106-117 ) requires the VA to provide nursing home care to the following veterans:
any veteran in need of such care for a service-connected disability; or to any veteran who is in need of such care and who has a service-connected disability rating of 70% or more; or any veteran who has a service-connected disability rated 60% or more and unemployable; or any veteran who has a service-connected disability rated 60% or more and who has been rated permanently and totally disabled. VHA Long-Term Care Expenditures
Long-term care expenditures are a small but not insignificant part of the VHA medical care budget, at just over one-tenth of the VHA's total medical care budget. In FY2015, the VHA spent $7.4 billion, just over 13% of its total medical care spending ($55.8 billion), for veteran's long-term care (see Table 5 ). Institutional care accounted for almost $5.3 billion, or 71% of VA's total long-term care spending, while non-institutional care accounted for $2.1 billion, or 29%. Institutional Care
The majority of VHA institutional care spending (64%) is for VA Community Living Centers (CLCs), which are nursing facilities owned and operated by the VHA (see Table 6 ). Issues for Congress
Three broad issues emerge for Congress when considering VA long-term care eligibility, financing, and delivery. The second issue is the setting where long-term care services are provided and the appropriate balance between home and community-based versus institutional services. Further, the number of veterans who have disabilities that are rated as 70% or more service-connected, and therefore are eligible for VA-paid nursing home care, has increased. One issue that may affect the balance of long-term care services offered is VA's statutory requirement to provide nursing home care to veterans with 70% or more service-connected disability, as well as the requirement to provide nursing home care to veterans who are service-connected and need care for their service-connected disability. | The Veterans Health Administration (VHA), an operating unit of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), is a direct service provider of health care, similar in many ways to a large private sector health care system. In addition to providing inpatient, outpatient, and a range of other medical care services, the VHA provides and purchases long-term care services. The VA is one of two federal payers of long-term care services (the other being Medicaid).
Since the 1960s, the VA has been authorized to provide nursing home care to eligible veterans in various settings, including VA facilities, private nursing facilities contracted by the VA, and state veterans homes (P.L. 88-450). These nursing home benefits were further expanded in subsequent legislation (P.L. 91-101 and P.L. 93-82). In 1999, the Veterans Millennium Health Care and Benefits Act (P.L. 106-117) required the VA to provide such benefits to veterans needing nursing home care due to one of their service-connected conditions, as well as veterans who overall have a service-connected disability rating of 70% or more, who need the care for any condition, service-connected or not. In addition, the law required the VA to maintain staffing and level of services for institutional care not less than the FY1998 level; the law also required non-institutional long-term care services as part of the VA medical benefits package.
About 9.1 million veterans (43% of all veterans) were estimated to be enrolled in the VHA in FY2016. Although the overall number of veterans in the United States has declined since FY2000, the number of veterans enrolled in the VHA has increased significantly in that same time period. In FY2000, just over 4.9 million veterans were enrolled in the VHA; by FY2016 that number was estimated to have increased 86%, to 9.1 million enrollees. This increase is due, in part, to the growing number of veterans with service-connected disabilities, as well as more liberal enrollment policies. Among veterans with a service-connected disability, the proportion who have a disability rated as 70% or more service-connected (and therefore eligible for VA paid nursing home care) has also increased.
VA long-term care programs are administered at the VA facility level, with some variability in how programs are administered. Each VA facility offers certain mandatory programs and may offer several optional programs as well. Eligibility for VA long-term care programs depends on eligibility for VA health care, which is based primarily on "veteran status" resulting from military service. Once enrolled, veterans' eligibility for long-term care services depends on several factors, including veterans' need for the service (as determined by the VA), whether the service is institutional or non-institutional, and (for certain programs), veterans' service-connected status.
Institutional settings may include both inpatient acute care and nursing home care. However, the majority of VA long-term care provided in institutional settings occurs in nursing home facilities, such as VA Community Living Centers (CLCs), community nursing homes, and state veterans homes. Non-institutional care includes outpatient and ambulatory care settings, as well as care that occurs in the home or another community-based setting. Non-institutional services include
home-based primary care, community residential care, geriatric evaluation, palliative care, adult day health care, homemaker/home health aide care, respite care, home skilled care, home hospice, and veteran-directed home and community-based services and medical foster homes (at some facilities).
Some long-term care services are provided directly by VA staff, whereas others are purchased from providers outside of the VA. Long-term care expenditures are a small but not insignificant part of the VHA total medical care budget, at just over one-tenth of the VHA's budget. In FY2015, the VHA spent $7.4 billion (13% of its total appropriated funding for medical care, which was $55.8 billion) for veterans' long-term care. Institutional care accounted for almost $5.3 billion, or 71% of VA's total long-term care spending, while non-institutional care accounted for $2.1 billion, or 29%. The majority of VHA institutional care spending (64%) was for VA Community Living Centers (CLCs), nursing facilities owned and operated by the VA.
This report provides an overview of VA long-term care services, including legislative highlights, eligibility, organizational structure, descriptions of services (both institutional and non-institutional care), and expenditures. The report also describes three key issues for Congress when considering the VA and its long-term care financing and delivery system:
1. Veterans' access to long-term care services. 2. Settings where services are provided and the appropriate balance between institutional and non-institutional care. 3. Veteran's health coverage options and federal coordination. |
crs_R42406 | crs_R42406_0 | Congressional Oversight of Agency Public Communications
In February 2012, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight began a wide-ranging investigation of executive agencies' public communications activities. Thus, many, and perhaps most, federal agencies routinely communicate with the public in the course of their daily work. Agencies do so for many purposes, including
informing the public of its rights and entitlements; telling the public of the agency's activities; inviting public comment on proposed rules; warning the public of perils; and discouraging harmful or dangerous behaviors. However, CRS has estimated that executive branch agencies spent nearly $945 million on contracts for advertising services in FY2010, a figure that does not include all agency public communications expenditures. Enforcement of Statutory Restrictions
Historically, Congress has found enforcing the restrictions on government communications is inherently challenging for at least three reasons. Each agency has the authority to communicate with the public; there is no central federal communications agency that reviews agency communications for legal propriety before they are released to the public. Annual appropriations restrictions, for example, speak of "publicity or propaganda purposes" but do not define these terms. Executive Agency Use of New Media for Public Communications
Over the past two decades, federal agencies have adopted new electronic communication technologies. These "new media" technologies include e-mail, websites, weblogs (or blogs), text messaging, and social media, such as Facebook and Twitter. Implications for Congressional Oversight
The development and use of new media by agencies has several implications for Congress in its oversight and enforcement of agency public communications. The nature of new media communications could complicate oversight further. (5) Identifying Publicity Experts . It makes no mention of the statutory prohibitions. Requiring agencies to report annually to Congress on their public communications activities, expenditures, and the agencies' rationales for these activities. | This report intends to assist Congress in its oversight of executive branch agencies' public communications. Here, "public communications" refers to agency communications that are directed to the public.
Many, and perhaps most, federal agencies routinely communicate with the public. Agencies do so for many purposes, including informing the public of its rights and entitlements, and informing the public of the agency's activities. Agencies spent more than $900 million on contracts for advertising services in FY2010, a figure that does not include all agency communications expenditures.
Congress frequently has investigated agency public communication activities. For example, in late February 2012 the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight began investigating 11 federal agencies' public communications activities and expenditures.
Congressional oversight of agency public communications activities is not new; it has occurred frequently since at least the beginning of the 20th century. Congress has enacted three statutory restrictions on agency communications with the public. One limits agencies' authority to hire publicity experts, another prohibits using appropriated funds to lobby Congress, and a third disallows using appropriated funds for "publicity or propaganda." For a number of reasons, enforcing these restrictions has been challenging, not least of which is that these statutory prohibitions do not well clarify licit from illicit public communications.
Many federal agencies have adopted new electronic communication technologies over the past two decades. These "new media" technologies include e-mail, websites, weblogs (or blogs), text messaging, and social media such as Facebook and Twitter.
Agencies' use of these new media has implications for congressional oversight of agency public communications. Most fundamentally, the ease of use of new media and the nature of digital communications further complicates congressional oversight and enforcement of the public communications restrictions.
This report will be updated in the event of any significant developments. |
crs_R42527 | crs_R42527_0 | The Community Disaster Loan (CDL) Program, managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), provides loan assistance to local governments to help them overcome a loss in revenues. The CDL program was first authorized by the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, which was later renamed the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). These loans also had some different provisions for eligibility and size, as will be discussed, and will be referred to as the 2008 CDLs for the purposes of distinguishing them in this report. An approximate total of $1,615 million in principal was offered to local governments through the program, with roughly $1,326 million borrowed. FEMA has cancelled approximately of $896 million of the $1,326 million of principal advanced to the local governments since program inception. In sum, 249 loans were issued to 200 local governments under 26 different disaster declarations from 1974 to 2010. Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, FEMA issued 157 special loans to 109 local governments. The limited use of the program may be attributable to a number of reasons, including, but not limited to:
A general lack of awareness of the program among local governments impacted by disasters, or limited advertisement of the program by FEMA to those governments; The eligibility provisions of the loan program may exclude many potential applicants; The size, interest rate, or others terms of the loan may be unattractive to local governments; The procedures for applying and managing the loan may be considered too cumbersome or intrusive by local or state governments following a disaster; There is relatively little need for the program overall, except in particular disaster situations, in comparison to other programs. The program is instead funded through the Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program (DADLP) account. Of note, there were 64 traditional loans issued between 1976 and 1998, with no loans issued between 1998 and 2005. Though it has been amended, this provision's intention was included in the original authorization in 1974. FEMA may consider requests for an extension on the repayment of the loan, based on the local government's financial condition. Summary of Traditional Loan Cancellation Rates
The total dollar amounts and percentage rates of cancellation for TCDLs are displayed by government type in Table 8 and Table 9 . Though collectively the loans from both laws are called special community disaster loans (SCDLs), each law had slightly different statutory provisions for how the loans could be issued and administered by FEMA. After the change in law in May 2007 that allowed SCDLs to be cancelled ( P.L. Legislative Proposals in FY2013 Homeland Security Appropriations and in the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 Bills
As reported out of the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2013 ( S. 3216 ) includes a general provision that would alter existing procedures for cancelling SCDLs. This provision is also included, almost verbatim, in the draft Senate version of the disaster relief supplemental appropriations bill for Hurricane Sandy, as released by the Senate Appropriations Committee. If passed by Congress, this provision is likely to reopen the cancellation application and review process for most, if not all, remaining loans that have not been fully cancelled. There are 71 special loans, issued to 54 different local governments, that could be reviewed again by FEMA with new procedures. Table 8 and Table 9 provide several measures for comparing the cancellation rates of TCDLs to SCDLs. In summary, TCDLs had a lower percentage of loans fully cancelled or with some level of cancellation than SCDLs (33.9% and 46.4% versus 50.0% and 59.7%, respectively). On average, TCDLs also had lower dollar amounts of principal forgiven per loan than SCDLs (38.9% versus 54.1%). However, as a function of total dollar amount of principal cancelled in each loan category, TCDLs had a much higher cancellation rate than SCDLs (97.2% versus 68.9%). FEMA has not issued new regulations in response to the unique provisions of the 2008 loans. Options Regarding the Use of Loan Funds
As discussed in the " Use of Funds " and " Purpose of the Special Loans " sections of the report, there has been only one major policy change to how funds could be used in the history of the program. Converting the disaster loan program into either a full or hybrid grant program may also involve modifying the current appropriation account, the Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program account. Considerations for Eliminating the CDL Program
The core purpose of the CDL program is to provide financial assistance to local governments that are having difficulty providing government services because of a loss in tax or other revenue. | The core purpose of the Community Disaster Loan (CDL) program is to provide financial assistance to local governments that are having difficulty providing government services because of a loss in tax or other revenue following a disaster. The program assists local governments by offering federal loans to compensate for this temporary or permanent loss in local revenue. The CDL program is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). First authorized in the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-288), the Community Disaster Loan program is currently codified in Section 417 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. §5184, as amended). The program is funded through the Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program account, rather than the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) that funds the majority of other Stafford Act programs. In sum, 249 loans were issued to 200 local governments under 26 different disaster declarations from 1974 to 2010. An approximate total of $1,615 million in principal was offered to these governments in loans, of which roughly $1,326 million was borrowed by the governments. Through the program, FEMA may also cancel the repayment of the loans if certain financial conditions prevailed after the three fiscal years following the disaster. Through its cancellation authority, FEMA has forgiven approximately $896 million of the $1,326 million in principal advanced to local governments since program inception.
This report compares and analyzes three different categories of loans issued in different time periods in the program's history: "traditional" loans issued between 1974 and 2005, in 2007, and between 2009 and June 2012 (TCDLs); "special" (SCDLs) loans issued in 2005-2006 following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita; and loans issued under unique provisions in 2008 (2008 CDLs). As authorized by Congress and administered by FEMA, the SCDL and 2008 loan categories had different provisions than traditional loans to guide the eligibility of local governments and dollar size of the loans. SCDLs also had unique provisions that slightly altered the purpose of the loans, lowered the interest rate charged on the loans, and clarified the cancellation procedures for the loans.
In the original legislation authorizing and appropriating the SCDLs, repayment of the loans was not allowed to be cancelled by FEMA. However, Congress later amended the law to allow cancellation for SCDLs. Some controversy has arisen over FEMA's administration of the cancellation authority for these special loans, with many suggesting that FEMA has not cancelled the appropriate amount of loan balances. Table 8 and Table 9 provide several measures for comparing the cancellation rates of TCDLs to SCDLs. In summary, TCDLs had a lower percentage of loans fully cancelled or with some level of cancellation than SCDLs (33.9% and 46.4% versus 50.0% and 59.7%, respectively). On average, TCDLs also had lower dollar amounts of principal forgiven per loan than SCDLs (38.9% versus 54.1%). However, as a function of total dollar amount of principal cancelled in each loan category, TCDLs had a much higher cancellation rate than SCDLs (97.2% versus 68.9%). As reported out of the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2013 (S. 3216) includes a provision that would alter existing cancellation procedures for SCDLs. This provision is also included, almost verbatim, in the draft bill entitled the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, as released by the Senate Appropriations Committee. The provision may require FEMA to reopen the review process for 71 special loans, issued to 54 local governments, that have not been fully cancelled in existing procedures. If passed into law, this provision may result in higher rates of cancellation for the SCDLs. All statistical figures provided in this report are accurate as of June 15, 2012.
Congress may consider changes to the overall CDL program in the future. Options could include altering future authorization and appropriations for the program in favor of more tailored disaster assistance programs, or converting the loan assistance into a grant program. There are also options for amending the program less significantly, including changing the way loan funds may be used by local governments, changing the total dollar size of the loans, and altering how the cancellation authority can be applied by FEMA. |
crs_RL32728 | crs_RL32728_0 | The Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) (1) and the Federal Power Act(FPA) of 1935 (Title I and Title II of the Public Utility Act) (2) established a regime ofregulating electric utilities that gave specific and separate powers to the states and the federalgovernment. The oil embargoes of the 1970s created concerns about the security of the nation's electricitysupply and led to enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). PURPA was established in part to augment electric utilitygeneration with more efficiently produced electricity and to provide equitable rates to electricconsumers. This first incremental change of traditional electricity regulation started a movement towarda market-oriented approach to electricity supply. Specifically, EPACT provides for thecreation of entities, called "exempt wholesale generators" (EWGs), that can generate and sellelectricity at wholesale without being regulated as utilities under PUHCA. It was argued that retail prices would decline with additional competition. In part, this law repeals the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA). Transmission
In addition to creating a new type of wholesale electricity generator, exempt wholesalegenerators (EWGs), the Energy Policy Act (EPACT) provides EWGs with a system to assuretransmission of their wholesale power to its purchaser. As a result of EPACT, on April 24, 1996, FERC issued Orders888 and 889. (7) In issuingits final rules, FERC concluded that these orders will "remedy undue discrimination in transmissionservices in interstate commerce and provide an orderly and fair transition to competitive bulk powermarkets." Regional Transmission Organizations
On December 20, 1999, FERC issued Order 2000, which described the minimumcharacteristics and functions of regional transmission organizations (RTOs). The ERO will developand enforce reliability standards for the bulk-power system. One argument for additional PUHCA reform has been made by electric utilities that wantto further diversify their assets. State regulators have expressed concerns that increased diversification could lead to abuses,including cross-subsidization: a regulated company subsidizing an unregulated affiliate. PUHCA repeal, such groups argue, could only exacerbatemarket power abuses in what they see as a monopolistic industry where true competition does notyet exist. Proponents of PURPA repeal -- primarilyinvestor-owned utilities (IOUs) located in the Northeast and in California -- argued that their stateregulators' "misguided" implementation of PURPA in the early 1980s has forced them to paycontractually high prices for power they do not need. | The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) and the Federal Power Act(FPA) were enacted to eliminate unfair practices and other abuses by electricity and gas holdingcompanies by requiring federal control and regulation of interstate public utility holding companies. Prior to PUHCA, electricity holding companies were characterized as having excessive consumerrates, high debt-to-equity ratios, and unreliable service. PUHCA remained virtually unchanged for50 years until enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978. PURPA was, in part,intended to augment electric utility generation with more efficiently produced electricity and toprovide equitable rates to electric consumers. Qualifying facilities (QFs) are exempt from regulationunder PUHCA and the FPA.
Electricity regulation was changed again in 1992 with passage of the Energy Policy Act(EPACT). The intent of Title 7 of EPACT is to increase competition in the electric generating sectorby creating new entities, called "exempt wholesale generators" (EWGs), that can generate and sellelectricity at wholesale without being regulated as utilities under PUHCA. This title also providesEWGs with a way to assure transmission of their wholesale power to their purchasers. The effect ofthis act on the electric supply system has been more far-reaching than PURPA.
On April 24, 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Orders 888and 889. FERC issued these rules to remedy undue discrimination in transmission services ininterstate commerce and provide an orderly and fair transition to competitive bulk power markets.Order 2000, issued December 20, 1999, established criteria for forming transmission organizations.
Comprehensive electricity legislation may involve several components. The first is PUHCAreform. Some electric utilities want PUHCA changed so they can more easily diversify their assets. State regulators have expressed concerns that increased diversification could lead to abuses,including cross-subsidization. Consumer groups have expressed concern that a repeal of PUHCAcould exacerbate market power abuses in a monopolistic industry where true competition does notyet exist.
The second issue is PURPA's requirement that utilities purchase power from QFs. Manyinvestor-owned utilities support repeal of these mandatory purchase provisions. They argue that theirstate regulators' "misguided" implementation of PURPA has forced them to pay contractually highprices for power that they do not need. Opponents of this legislation argue that it would decreasecompetition and impede development of renewable energy.
The third main issue is reliability. Without mandatory and enforceable reliability standards,proponents argue that reliability of the electric power system will not be at acceptable levels. Opponents say these standards are unnecessary.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43654 | crs_R43654_0 | Though closely divided, the U.S. Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc . has settled the question of whether certain for-profit corporations must be exempt from the requirement, unless Congress chooses to amend the statute providing those corporations legal protection. Imputing the beliefs of owners of closely held corporations to the corporations themselves, the Court found that the ACA could not require such companies to provide contraceptive coverage in group health plans offered to their employees. It based its decision on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which provides heightened protection for burdens on religious exercise. This report analyzes the Court's opinions in Hobby Lobby , examining the rights of closely held corporations under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. It also addresses the implications for the contraceptive coverage mandate under ACA and discusses potential legislative responses to the Court's decision. Traditionally it had been interpreted to require that the government show a compelling interest for any government action that interfered with a person's exercise of religious beliefs. In effect, the decision therefore is limited to "closely held corporations, each owned and controlled by members of a single family." If the owners were to refuse to comply with the demand, the companies would face penalties under the ACA that the Court characterized as "surely substantial." It is important to remember that the Court's decision was based on the statutory protections in RFRA, not in constitutional protections of the First Amendment. Because this provision may interfere with religious employers' religious practices (e.g., hiring employees of the same faith of the organization), Congress included an exemption for religious entities, stating that the prohibition against religious discrimination does not apply to "a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion.... " This provision explicitly applies only to religious organizations, and courts generally have interpreted the scope of the provision to take into account (1) the purpose or mission of the organization; (2) the ownership, affiliation, or financial support of the organization; (3) requirements placed upon staff and members of the organization; and (4) the extent of religious practices in or the religious nature of the products and services offered by the organization and whether it operates for a profit. Unlike the previous potential legislative response, this approach would mean that Congress considers RFRA's applicability to each present and future law on a case-by-case basis. Effect on Contraceptive Coverage Requirements
Generally speaking, the Hobby Lobby decision clarified the scope to which persons may be eligible for protection under RFRA, but in the practical context of the contraceptive coverage requirement, it essentially addressed the question of whether the requirement's implementing regulations sufficiently addressed the range of entities with religious objections. Additionally, though the majority in Hobby Lobby noted the possibility that the accommodation could be a "less restrictive" means to achieve the government's interest in the contraceptive coverage mandate, it did not determine it to be the least restrictive means. Thus, the decision to expand protection under RFRA to closely held corporations affects only federal law. A number of states have enacted separate contraceptive coverage requirements, predating ACA. | A 5-4 decision, issued over a highly critical dissent, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. resolved one of the many challenges raised in response to the contraceptive coverage requirement of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Imputing the beliefs of owners of closely held corporations to such corporations, the U.S. Supreme Court found that closely held corporations that hold religious objections to certain contraceptive services cannot be required to provide coverage of those services in employee health plans. The Court's decision was based on the protections offered under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), a statute prohibiting the government from imposing a substantial burden on a person's religious exercise unless it can show a compelling interest achieved by the least restrictive means. The Court declined to address the constitutional challenge, holding that the companies were protected under RFRA.
In the absence of a definition under RFRA, the majority interpreted the term "person" to include closely held corporations, even if they operated for-profit, and determined that the penalties that such companies would face if they failed to comply with the contraceptive coverage requirement would impose a substantial burden. Though the Court assumed that the government had a compelling interest to require contraceptive coverage under ACA, it found that less restrictive means (e.g., expanding the regulatory accommodation available to nonprofit employers with similar objections) could achieve that interest without requiring companies with religious objections to be subject to the requirement.
Although Hobby Lobby resolved the question regarding the applicability of RFRA to closely held corporations—defined by the Court as "each owned and controlled by members of a single family"—the decision leaves open a number of questions about the scope of RFRA's protections and future enforcement of the contraceptive coverage requirement. One such question, now awaiting review by the Court, is whether RFRA may provide protection for nonprofit religious entities already eligible for the accommodation, but which nonetheless object to the process of qualification for eligibility. Because the Court's decision was based on statutory grounds, Congress remains free to define which entities may be governed by ACA or other federal laws generally.
This report analyzes the Court's decision in Hobby Lobby, including arguments made between the majority and dissent, to clarify the scope of the decision and potential impacts for future interpretation of RFRA's applicability. It also examines potential legislative responses, should Congress consider addressing the current applicability of RFRA. Finally, the report addresses the decision's effect on requirements that employers offer contraceptive coverage in group health plans under federal or state law. |
crs_R41344 | crs_R41344_0 | Introduction
The United States Supreme Court in City of Ontario v. Quon overturned a federal appellate court decision which had held that officials in the City of Ontario, California engaged in an unconstitutional search and seizure when they acquired and read the contents of messages sent to and from a city police officer's city-provided pager. As for Quon's Fourth Amendment allegations, it held that while the officers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their text messages, the City's intrusion was reasonable in its inception and scope. The panel found that the Stored Communications Act outlawed handing over the transcripts of the officer's pager messages to the City. Because the City had a legitimate work-related reason to conduct its search, the Court concluded that it was reasonable under either the O'Connor standard – that of Justice Scalia (a search that would be considered reasonable in a private-employer context) or that of the O'Connor plurality (a work-related purpose for a search not excessive in scope). | In City of Ontario v. Quon, the Supreme Court held that officials had acted reasonably when they reviewed transcripts of messages sent to and from Sergeant Quon's city-issued pager in order to determine whether service limits on the pager's use should be increased. The Court assumed, without deciding, that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes, but found that the search of the transcripts was reasonable.
In O'Connor v. Ortega, the Court had earlier split over the question of what test should be used to assess the reasonableness of a search of a public employee's work space. A plurality favored one test (work-related purpose for a search not excessively intrusive in scope); Justice Scalia another (search that would be considered reasonable in a private-employer context). In Quon, the Court declined to resolve the issue, but concluded that the search at issue was reasonable under either test. |
crs_RL34722 | crs_RL34722_0 | Introduction
At its heart, a presidential transition is the transfer of executive power from the incumbent President to his or her successor. However, a successful transition between the incumbent Administration and the incoming Administration begins with pre-election planning and continues through inauguration day. Establishing a Presidential Transition Framework
The passage and implementation of the Presidential Transition Act (PTA) of 1963 and subsequent amendments led to the provision of services and facilities to transition teams and the establishment of formal mechanisms to facilitate presidential transitions while legitimizing pre-election planning by candidates. This commitment of resources on the part of the federal government (particularly the White House), as well as on the part of the presidential candidates, and, ultimately, the President-elect, highlights the importance of the presidential transition to the continuity of operations of the federal government. Moreover, the incumbent might use the transition period to enact policies and effect changes that might stymie his successor. And if the sitting president (or his party) lost the election, he has every reason to hurry through last-minute public policies, doing whatever possible to tie his successor's hands. Additionally, the President can appoint individuals to positions which require Senate approval (PAS positions); the Administration can influence the pace of agency rulemaking; significant decisions regarding presidential and vice presidential records may be made; and some political appointees might be converted to civil service positions in a practice known as "burrowing in." Depending upon the timing, frequency, content (in the case of executive orders and regulations), and other salient features of certain presidential or Administration actions or decisions, some may question the propriety of an outgoing Administration's actions during the presidential transition period. In addition to the possibility of having to address certain actions taken by the outgoing Administration, a new President and his staff have to deal with "the challenges of moving from a campaign to a governing stance," which can include handling "the issues of staffing, management, agenda setting, and policy formulation.... " Eager to hit the ground running, an incoming President can use the same tools his predecessor did during the transition period—for example, executive orders, agency rulemaking, and political appointments—to establish his policy agenda, populate the executive branch with his appointees, and possibly overturn or modify some of his predecessor's policies and actions. If the sitting President defers to his successor regarding the submission of a budget, this is an additional task for the newly elected President. Congress has a role to play in presidential transitions, though the extent and type of its involvement varies. Other Administration activities, such as the issuance of executive orders, the disposition of presidential records and vice presidential records, and the granting of pardons, may be of interest to Congress, and, in some cases, might become the subject of congressional oversight or other congressional action. 114-136 ( S. 1172 ), the Edward "Ted" Kaufman and Michael Leavitt Presidential Transitions Improvement Act of 2015, enacted on March 18, 2016, requires the OPM Director to provide annual reports to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on requests by agencies to appoint political appointees or former political appointees to covered civil service positions. Finally, some have argued that the task of evaluating a previous Administration's midnight rules can potentially overwhelm a new Administration. The relatively large number of vacant judgeships at the beginning of a new presidency is due, in part, to the Senate approving fewer judicial nominations during an outgoing President's final year in office (particularly if it is a President's eighth year in office). | The crux of a presidential transition is the transfer of executive power from the incumbent to the President-elect. Yet the transition process encompasses a host of activities, beginning with pre-election planning and continuing through inauguration day. The process ensures that the federal government provides resources to presidential candidates' transition teams, and, eventually, the President-elect's team; and includes close coordination between the outgoing and incoming Administrations. The Presidential Transition Act (PTA) of 1963, as amended, established formal mechanisms to facilitate presidential transitions and authorizes the Administrator of General Services to provide facilities and services to eligible presidential candidates and the President-elect. A presidential transition facilitates the establishment of a new Administration and prepares it to govern. Additionally, as noted by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs in a report on S. 1172 (114th Congress, Presidential Transitions Improvements Act of 2015), planning for a presidential transition helps to ensure the nation's security.
The smooth and orderly transfer of power generally is a notable feature of presidential transitions, and a testament to the legitimacy and durability of the electoral and democratic processes. Yet, at the same time, a variety of events, decisions, and activities contribute to what some may characterize as the unfolding drama of a presidential transition. Interparty transitions in particular might be contentious. Using the various powers available, a sitting President might use the transition period to attempt to secure his legacy or effect policy changes. Some observers have suggested that, if the incumbent has lost the election, he might try to enact policies in the waning months of his presidency that would "tie his successor's hands." On the other hand, a President-elect, once in office, and eager to establish his policy agenda and populate his Administration with his appointees, will be involved in a host of decisions and activities, some of which might modify or overturn the previous Administration's actions or decisions.
The President's authority to exercise power begins immediately upon being sworn into office and continues until he is no longer the officeholder. By the same token, while congressional oversight of the executive branch is continuous, some activities may take on special significance at the end or beginning of an Administration. The disposition of government records (including presidential records and vice presidential records), protections against "burrowing in" (which involves the conversion of political appointees to career status in the civil service), the granting of pardons, and the issuance of "midnight rules" are four activities associated largely with the outgoing President's Administration. The incumbent President may also submit a budget to Congress, or he may defer to his successor on this matter. Continuing this transition process, the first actions of a new President generally focus on establishing the priorities and leadership of the Administration. These can include executive orders, appointments to positions that require Senate confirmation as well as those that do not, and efforts to influence the pace and substance of agency rulemaking.
Depending upon the particular activity or function, the extent and type of Congress's involvement in presidential transitions may vary. As an example of direct involvement, the Senate confirms the President's appointees to certain positions. On the other hand, Congress is not involved in the issuance of executive orders, but it may exercise oversight, or take some other action regarding the Administration's activities. |
crs_RS22983 | crs_RS22983_0 | Progress on these issues was severely threatened in 2008 by a sharp decline in Pakistan's economic stability, culminating in an immediate need for capital assistance. Pakistan needed $4 billion to $5 billion in assistance by the end of November in order to avoid defaulting on maturing sovereign debt obligations. During the autumn of 2008, Pakistan sought the needed capital from a variety of sources, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and an informal group of nations known as the "Friends of Pakistan." In a February 2009 report, the Atlantic Council stated, "Pakistan faces dire economic and security threats that threaten both the existence of Pakistan as a democratic and stable state and the region as a whole." The Atlantic Council called for an additional $4 billion - 5 billion of immediate financial aid for Pakistan to avert "an economic meltdown." Other legislation has been introduced during the 111 th Congress designed to help improve the economic situation in Pakistan. In the autumn of 2008, Pakistan was in danger of defaulting on its sovereign debt. Zardari reportedly sought $100 billion in aid from the group. On October 22, 2008, the IMF released a statement announcing that "The Pakistani authorities have requested discussions with the IMF on an economic program supported by financial assistance from the Fund to meet the balance of payments difficulties the country is experiencing.... " The Pakistani government, however, denied at that time making a formal request to the IMF. Terms of the Loan
Under the agreement with the IMF, Pakistan is to be provided up to $7.6 billion over 23 months. Pakistan's Continuing Economic Problems
Assuming Pakistan is able to secure the additional capital assistance it needs, it will not end the nation's economic problems. Implications for U.S. Relations
As previously mentioned, the U.S. government considers a stable Pakistan important for several reasons. During her February 2009 trip to Asia, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asserted that the current economic crisis, if left unresolved, could "breed instability." Even before Pakistan's capital crisis began, some analysts maintained that there was a need for the United States to demonstrate its commitment to a stable and democratic Pakistan with an increase in non-military assistance. | Pakistan, a key U.S. ally in global efforts to combat Islamist militancy, is facing a serious capital crisis. In the autumn of 2008, Pakistan was in urgent need of an estimated $4 billion in capital to avoid defaulting on its sovereign debt. The elected government of President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani sought short-term financial assistance from a number of sources, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China, and an informal group of nations (including the United States) known as the "Friends of Pakistan."
The Pakistani government reached an agreement with the IMF for $7.6 billion in loans, but their capital crisis continues. In February 2009, Pakistan requested an additional $4.5 billion in assistance from the IMF and Prime Minister Gillani traveled to Beijing seeking financial support. According to a recent study by the Atlantic Council, Pakistan needs $4 billion - $5 billion in the next 6 to 12 months to avoid another possible default.
Pakistan's continuing capital crisis is affecting the nation's overall economic performance and raising concerns about its political stability. During her Asia trip in February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made several references to the importance of solving Pakistan's economic problems in the continued campaign to combat Islamic militants in the region. The Atlantic Council has called for an increase in U.S. assistance "to avert an economic meltdown." The severity of Pakistan's economic situation has also been raised by several members of Congress.
Several different research groups have recently issued reports on the situation in Pakistan that contain recommendations on what the United States could do to help alleviate Pakistan's economic problems. There are indications that Congress may consider some of these recommended actions, including an increase in U.S. non-military assistance and the creation of "reconstruction opportunity zones" in Pakistan.
This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_RS20783 | crs_RS20783_0 | Introduction
One of the primary tasks of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is to encourage the deployment of broadband throughout the United States. Broadband technology is now available over a wide array of delivery systems including cable, wireless, telephone, and fiber optic networks. The FCC moved, in recent years, to ease some of the regulatory burdens inherent in erecting new broadband facilities within the current legal framework. Congress has also taken steps to encourage the deployment of wireless facilities. This report will discuss some of the important legal developments related to broadband facilities deployment. Federal Law Governing the Placement of Wireless Telecommunications Facilities
Section 704 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 governs federal, state, and local regulation of the siting of "personal wireless service facilities" or cellular communication towers. Many community groups also oppose the siting of towers based on health and environmental concerns. Section 6409 of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 contained provisions intended to standardize and facilitate the placement of towers on federal property. As corporations that won recent large spectrum auctions begin to build out new facilities, new towers may need to be constructed. These industry participants expressed concern to the Commission over the length of time frequently taken for action on tower siting applications. On November 18, 2009, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling to clarify certain portions of Section 332 of the Communications Act. This decision may be significant because it could streamline the tower siting application process across the country. Most states delegate zoning authority to local bodies. Pole Attachment Rule Amendments
Similar to the FCC's efforts to increase the deployment of wireless facilities across the country, the agency launched a similar effort to streamline the process of collocation of equipment on existing poles owned by utility companies. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit disagreed, upholding the FCC's interpretation of the statute. The utility companies also challenged the FCC's decision to adopt telecom rates that were substantially equivalent to cable rates for pole attachments and the amendments to the calculation of the so-called "refund period." | One of the primary tasks of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is to encourage the deployment of broadband throughout the United States. Broadband technology is now available over a wide array of delivery systems including cable, wireless, telephone, and fiber optic networks. The FCC moved, in recent years, to ease some of the regulatory burdens inherent in erecting new broadband facilities within the current legal framework. Congress has also taken steps to encourage the deployment of wireless facilities. This report will discuss some of the important legal developments related to broadband deployment.
The siting of wireless communications facilities has been a topic of controversy in communities all over the United States. Telecommunications carriers need to place towers in areas where coverage is insufficient or lacking to provide better service to consumers, while local governing boards and community groups often oppose the siting of towers in residential neighborhoods and scenic areas. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 governs federal, state, and local regulation of the siting of communications towers by placing certain limitations on local zoning authority without totally preempting state and local law. This report provides an overview of the federal, state, and local laws governing the siting of wireless communications facilities, including recent amendments to federal law governing tower siting contained in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012.
This report will also discuss the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC's or Commission's) recent actions related to streamlining the tower siting application process at the state and local level. As corporations that won recent spectrum auctions begin to build out new facilities, new towers may need to be constructed. These industry participants expressed concern to the Commission over the length of time frequently taken for action on tower siting applications. On November 18, 2009, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling to clarify certain portions of Section 332 of the Communications Act. This decision was intended to streamline the tower siting application process across the country.
The FCC has also amended regulations for pole attachments to currently existing poles owned by utilities. The amendments were intended to increase the number of pole attachments, thereby increasing broadband availability. The utility companies challenged the FCC's interpretation of the statute granting it the authority to regulate pole attachments. The D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC's rules. |
crs_RS22745 | crs_RS22745_0 | Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) to provide statutory protection for employees against religious discrimination by certain employers. Among other things, Title VII generally prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their religious beliefs and requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for employees' religious practices. However, certain religious organizations may be exempt from some of the prohibitions of Title VII. This report analyzes the scope of Title VII's prohibition on religious discrimination, exemptions for religious organizations, and requirements for accommodations. Title VII of the CRA prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. Scope of Protection for Religion and Religious Belief
Section 701 of Title VII defines religion to include
all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to [sic] an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. If an employer discriminates based on a religious observance or practice that can be reasonably accommodated, the employer may be in violation of Title VII's prohibition on discrimination on the basis of religion. Furthermore, an employee cannot be required to participate in any religious activity as part of his or her employment. In addition to exempting employers with fewer than 15 employees, Title VII includes exceptions that allow certain employers to consider religion in employment decisions. Exemptions for religious organizations in the context of Title VII are not absolute. Once an organization qualifies as an entity eligible for Title VII exemption, it is permitted to discriminate on the basis of religion in its employment decisions. This constitutional "ministerial exception" reconciles Title VII with the First Amendment by allowing religious organizations to select clergy without regard to any of Title VII's restrictions yet requiring that employment decisions made regarding other positions within the organization comply with Title VII's requirements or exemptions. In order for these accommodations to be appropriate under Title VII, they must not cause undue hardship to the employer. | Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. It prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their religious beliefs and requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for employees' religious practices. Title VII defines religion broadly and relies on an individual's subjective understanding of his or her beliefs, which may result in broad protections for employees with sincerely held beliefs.
Congress has recognized that restrictions on employment decisions by religious employers may interfere with the employer's religious practice. As a result, Title VII includes exemptions for religious entities, allowing qualifying employers to consider religion in hiring decisions. Such an exemption allows the religious organization to hire individuals who share the same beliefs as the employer. However, Congress did not define which organizations would qualify for exemption from Title VII and courts have not established a definitive standard. If an organization does qualify for exemption and therefore is allowed to consider religion in employment decisions, it is not permitted to base employment decisions on other prohibited factors under Title VII.
In addition to prohibiting discrimination in employment decisions, Title VII requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for current employees' religious practices. Reasonable accommodations may include scheduling adjustments or reassignment to other comparable positions that would not interfere with the employee's religious exercise. The employer is not required to make such an accommodation, however, if doing so would pose an undue hardship on the employer's business or operations.
This report reviews the scope of Title VII's prohibition on religious discrimination and its exemptions for religious organizations. It analyzes which organizations may qualify for exemption and also explains the related constitutional protection known as the ministerial exception that often arises in the context of Title VII claims. Finally, the report examines Title VII's accommodations requirement, noting what accommodations may be required and which may be declined as an undue hardship to the employer. |
crs_R43049 | crs_R43049_0 | Introduction
The central issue addressed by this report is how much Congress should consider appropriating for the continued sustainment and modernization of the B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers over the remainder of their service lives. The B-52H Stratofortress, B-1B Lancer, and B-2A Spirit are now about 50, 28, and 20 years old respectively. Although the Department of Defense and the Air Force are committed to the development and fielding of a new Long-Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B), flight-testing of the new bomber will likely not start until the mid-2020s. With this in mind, can the U.S. Air Force's B-52Hs, B-1Bs, and B-2As physically last and continue to be credible weapon systems until the LRS-B is fielded? The average age of the bomber force is 33. This report addresses potential congressional oversight and appropriations concerns for the sustainment and modernization of the U.S. Air Force's bomber force. Congressional interest in this subject stems from Congress's authority to approve, reject, or modify Air Force funding requests for bomber sustainment and modernization, as well as their oversight of the nation's long-range strike requirements and capabilities. In addition, sustainment, modernization, and size of the bomber force have been perennial legislative topics since the early 1990s. As the Air Force progresses through development and acquisition of the LRS-B and begins the gradual phase-out of 50-year-old bombers, it is anticipated that Congress will continue dealing with bomber sustainment and modernization legislation. Congress's decisions on appropriations for the bomber force could impact the nation's long-range strike capabilities and have additional consequences for the U.S. aerospace industry. Background
United States' Military Strategy Shift: Do the Bombers' Capabilities Meet Strategic Requirements? The Obama Administration's 2012 shift in national security and defense strategy towards the Asia-Pacific region has significant implications for America's legacy bomber force. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense . All three of the nation's bombers have made, and are expected to continue making, significant contributions to all of the critical missions set forth in DOD's strategic guidance. Anti-access refers to those adversary actions and capabilities, usually employed from long ranges, designed to prevent an opposing force entry to an operational area by restricting its access to the global commons (sea, air, space, and cyberspace). Existing U.S. Bomber Force
The Air Force's existing bomber fleet includes 76 B-52H bombers, 63 supersonic B-1B bombers, and 20 B-2 stealth bombers. Additional information on the existing bomber force is presented in Appendix A .
B-52H Stratofortress42
The B-52 is currently the USAF's only nuclear bomber capable of employing long-range standoff weapons. The B-52H first entered service on May 9, 1961, with operational aircraft currently stationed at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, and Minot AFB, North Dakota. It serves as both a conventional and nuclear bomber. It achieved initial operational capability (IOC) in April 1997 and achieved full operational capability (FOC) on December 17, 2003. Issues for Congress
Potential for Inducing a Shortfall in Long-Range Strike Capabilities
As the bomber force continues to age and shrink, and development of the LRS-B continues, a potential oversight issue for Congress is whether failure to sustain and modernize the Air Force's legacy bomber fleet will induce a shortfall in the nation's long-range strike capabilities. The ability of the current bomber force to bridge a potential long-range strike capabilities gap may depend upon the feasibility and cost effectiveness of sustainment and modernization programs that will make these weapon systems viable in the 21 st century A2/AD environment while extending their service lives until the LRS-B becomes operational in the late 2020s. At the same time, the DOD's priorities require continued modernization of aging capabilities to address the proliferation of modern A2/AD threats in that the DOD and Air Force plan on the B-52, B-,1 and B-2 to operate well into the 2030s, especially in the global strike and nuclear deterrent roles. As Legacy Bombers Phase Out, Are 80-100 LRS-Bs Sufficient? Another oversight issue for Congress will be whether development of the LRS-B can be further delayed given sufficient levels of funding for legacy bomber sustainment and modernization. As potential adversaries acquire better and advanced A2/AD defenses, the legacy bombers' ability to get close enough to targets to employ weapons will likely continue to deteriorate. Potential Implications of Bomber Modernization on Air Force Basing and any Future Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC)
Another potential oversight issue is the potential implications of reduced bomber sustainment and modernization, and subsequent diminishing numbers of airframes, on any future rounds of base realignment and closure (BRAC) efforts. Industrial Base Concerns Associated with Bomber Sustainment
Another oversight issue is the ability of the nation's industrial base to sustain the legacy bomber force. 112-81 sought to clarify the Air Force's plan by restricting FY2012 funds for the retirement of any B-1 aircraft until the Secretary of the Air Force submitted a plan to congressional defense committees detailing the following:
Identification of each B–1 bomber aircraft that will be retired and the disposition plan for such aircraft; an estimate of the savings that will result from the proposed retirement of B–1 bomber aircraft in each calendar year through calendar year 2022; an estimate of the amount of the savings that will be reinvested in the modernization of B–1 bomber aircraft still in service in each calendar year through calendar year 2022; a modernization plan for sustaining the remaining B–1 bomber aircraft through at least calendar year 2022; and, an estimate of the amount of funding required to fully fund the modernization plan for each calendar year through calendar year 2022. (a) AIR FORCE REPORT.—
(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Air Force shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes—
(A) a discussion of the cost, schedule, and performance of all planned efforts to modernize and keep viable the existing B–1, B–2, and B–52 bomber fleets and a discussion of the forecasted service-life and all sustainment challenges that the Secretary of the Air Force may confront in keeping those platforms viable until the anticipated retirement of such aircraft;
(B) a discussion, presented in a comparison and contrast type format, of the scope of the 2007 Next-Generation Long Range Strike Analysis of Alternatives guidance and subsequent Analysis of Alternatives report tasked by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in the September 11, 2006, Acquisition Decision Memorandum, as compared to the scope and directed guidance of the year 2010 Long Range Strike Study effort currently being conducted by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office; and
(C) a discussion of the preliminary costs, any development, testing, fielding and operational employment challenges, capability gaps, limitations, and shortfalls of the Secretary of Defense's plan to field a long-range, penetrating, survivable, persistent and enduring ''family of systems'' as compared to the preliminary costs, any development, testing, fielding, and operational employment of a singular platform that encompasses all the required aforementioned characteristics. | The United States' existing long-range bomber fleet of B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s are at a critical point in their operational life span. With the average age of each airframe being 50, 28, and 20 years old, respectively, military analysts are beginning to question just how long these aircraft can physically last and continue to be credible weapon systems. As potential adversaries acquire 21st century defense systems designed to prevent U.S. access to the global commons (sea, air, space, and cyberspace) and to limit U.S. forces' freedom of action within an operational area, the ability of these Cold War era bombers to get close enough to targets to be effective will continue to deteriorate. Although the Air Force is committed to the development and acquisition of its proposed Long-Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B), it is anticipated that flight-testing of the new bomber will not start until the mid-2020s, with initial operational capability near 2030. With this timeline in mind, the Air Force has extended the operational lives of the B-52 and B-1 out to 2040 and the B-2 out to 2058. Air Force and aerospace industry experts insist that with sufficient funding for sustainment and modernization over their expected lifespans, all three of the existing bombers can physically last and continue to remain credible weapon systems. However, appropriations decisions made by Congress based on required military capabilities to meet national security objectives will ultimately determine how long the B-52, B-1, and B-2 will remain in service.
The central issue for Congress is how much funding should be appropriated for the continued sustainment and modernization of the B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers over the remainder of their service lives. Interest in this subject stems from Congress's authority to approve, reject, or modify Air Force funding requests for bomber sustainment and modernization as well as its oversight of the nation's long-range strike requirements and capabilities. In addition, sustainment, modernization, and size of the bomber force have been perennial legislative topics since the early 1990s. As the Air Force progresses through development and acquisition of the LRS-B and begins the gradual phase-out of 50-year-old bombers, it is anticipated Congress will continue dealing with bomber sustainment and modernization legislation. Congress's decisions on appropriations for the bomber force could affect the nation's long-range strike capabilities and have unintended consequences on U.S. national security as well as the U.S. aerospace industry.
The context through which Congress will make these decisions includes U.S. national security and defense strategies and the expectation of the role the B-52, B-1, and B-2 will play in executing those strategies. Some of the many global and strategic variables that could become central in Congress's decision making on the bomber force include the following:
the Obama Administration's 2012 rebalance in national security strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region and the military implications applicable to the bomber force; the expected contribution of bombers in accomplishing the critical missions of U.S. forces as outlined in the Department of Defense's strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense; the effectiveness and sustainability of the Air Force's continuous bomber presence operation—based in the Pacific at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam—and corresponding displays of worldwide power projection missions by all three bombers; the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenge presented by potential adversaries and the developments related to bombers' employment in an A2/AD threat environment; and the bombers' role in nuclear deterrent operations and the impact of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty on the B-52 and B-2.
The starting point for Congress's debate on bomber modernization and sustainment is the existing Air Force bomber force, which includes
76 B-52H Stratofortress bombers capable of both conventional and nuclear operations and capable of employing long-range standoff weapons. The B-52H first entered service on May 9, 1961. 63 B-1B Lancer bombers capable of supersonic and low-level flight, conventional only operations, and employing long-range standoff weapons. The B-1B became operational in 1986. 20 B-2A Spirit, low observable (stealth) bombers capable of both conventional and nuclear operations. The B-2A entered service in December 1993 and became fully operational capable (FOC) on December 17, 2003.
Potential congressional oversight and appropriations concerns for the sustainment and modernization of the U.S. Air Force's bomber force may include the following:
the potential for a shortfall in the nation's long-range strike capabilities as development of the Air Force's proposed LRS-B continues; the feasibility and affordability of Air Force bomber sustainment and modernization plans and whether those plans bridge any potential long-range strike capabilities gap until the LRS-B becomes operational; the amount of money Congress and the nation should continue spending on 28- and 50-year-old bombers; the sufficiency of acquisition plans for the 80 to 100 LRS-Bs to backfill U.S. long-range strike requirements as the legacy bomber force ages out of service; the possibility of further delaying development and acquisition of the proposed LRS-B given sufficient levels of funding for sustainment and modernization of the current bomber force; the modernization, sustainment, and development of the weapons employed by the bomber force that affect the bombers' effectiveness and ability to operate in advanced, 21st century A2/AD threat environment; the potential implications of reduced bomber sustainment and modernization, and subsequent diminishing numbers of airframes, on any future rounds of base realignment and closure efforts; and the ability of the nation's industrial base to sustain an aging bomber force. |
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