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crs_R42691 | crs_R42691_0 | Introduction
Federal law punishes convicted sex offenders for failure to register as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) demands. The offense consists of three elements: (1) a continuing obligation to report to the authorities in any jurisdiction in which the individual resides, works, or attends school; (2) the knowing failure to comply with registration requirements; and (3) a jurisdictional element, i.e ., (a) an obligation to register as a consequence of a prior qualifying federal conviction or (b)(i) travel in interstate or foreign commerce, (ii) travel into or out of Indian country; or (iii) residence in Indian country. If an offender also commits a federal crime of violence, the registration transgression carries an additional penalty of imprisonment for not more than 30 years, but not less than 5 years. SORNA's use of the phrase "resides ... in a [U.S.] jurisdiction," led the Supreme Court to conclude recently in Nichols v. United States that the maintenance requirement of Section 16913(c) does not apply to offenders who relocated abroad, i.e ., outside of any U.S. Anticipating the limit identified in Nichols , Congress passed the International Megan's Law to Prevent Child Exploitation and Other Sexual Crimes Through Advanced Notification of Traveling Sex Offenders [Act], which among other things, amends SORNA to compel offenders to supplement their registration statements with information relating to their plans to travel abroad. Qualifying Convictions : Only those who have been convicted of a qualifying sex offense need register. An individual need only have a knowing failure to register and a prior conviction for a qualifying sex offense under federal law or the law of the District of Columbia, the Code of Military Justice, tribal law, or the law of a United States territory or possession. Federal bail laws permit the prosecution to request a pre-trial detention hearing prior to the pre-trial release of anyone charged with a violation of Section 2250. Imprisonment : Upon conviction, the individual may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years and/or fined not more than $250,000. Section 2250 also sets an additional penalty of not more than 30 years, but not less than 5 years, in prison for the commission of a federal crime of violence when the offender has also violated Section 2250. One argues that SORNA or Section 2250 operates in a manner which the Constitution specifically forbids, for example in its clauses on Ex Post Facto laws, Due Process, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment. Legislative authority : The most frequent constitutional challenge to SORNA and Section 2250 is that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to enact them. The Supreme Court in Comstock described the breadth of Congress's authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause in the context of another Walsh Act provision. SORNA Qualifying Convictions
Federal Qualifying Offenses
18 U.S.C. | Section 2250 of Title 18 of the United States Code outlaws an individual's failure to comply with federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) requirements. SORNA demands that an individual—previously convicted of a qualifying federal, state, or foreign sex offense—register with state, territorial, or tribal authorities. Individuals must register in every jurisdiction in which they reside, work, or attend school. They must also update the information whenever they move, or change their employment or educational status. Section 2250 applies only under one of several jurisdictional circumstances: the individual was previously convicted of a qualifying federal sex offense; the individual travels in interstate or foreign commerce; or the individual enters, leaves, or resides in Indian country. The Supreme Court in Nichols v. United States held that SORNA, as originally written, had limited application to sex offenders in the U.S. who relocated abroad. The International Megan's Law to Prevent Child Exploitation and Other Sexual Crimes Through Advanced Notification of Traveling Sex Offenders [Act], P.L. 114-119 (H.R. 515), however, anticipated and addressed the limit identified in Nichols.
Individuals charged with a violation of Section 2250 may be subject to preventive detention or to a series of pre-trial release conditions. If convicted, they face imprisonment for not more than 10 years and/or a fine of not more than $250,000 as well as the prospect of a post-imprisonment term of supervised release of not less than 5 years. An offender guilty of a Section 2250 offense, who also commits a federal crime of violence, is subject to an additional penalty of imprisonment for up to 30 years and not less than 5 years for the violent crime.
The Attorney General has exercised his statutory authority to make SORNA applicable to qualifying convictions occurring prior to its enactment. The Supreme Court rejected the suggestion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that Congress lacks the constitutional authority to make Section 2250 applicable, on the basis of a prior federal offense and intrastate noncompliance, to individuals who had served their sentence and been released from federal supervision prior to SORNA's enactment, United States v. Kebodeaux, 134 S. Ct. 2496 (2013).
The Fifth Circuit's Kebodeaux opinion aside, the lower federal appellate courts have almost uniformly rejected challenges to Section 2250's constitutional validity. Those challenges have included arguments under the Constitution's Ex Post Facto, Due Process, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Spending Clauses.
This report is in an abridged version of CRS Report R42692, SORNA: A Legal Analysis of 18 U.S.C. §2250 (Failure to Register as a Sex Offender), without the footnotes or the attribution or citations to authority found in the parent report. |
crs_R45042 | crs_R45042_0 | Introduction
Each year, in October, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) publishes the Short-Term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook (STEWFO). However, the 2016-2017 winter fuel season was warmer than normal. On average, the EIA projects that U.S. household expenditures on heating fuel for the 2017-2018 heating season will increase for all households irrespective of the heating fuel utilized. The STEWFO projects, on average, natural gas to be the lowest-cost heating source for the winter of 2017-2018. The projected heating oil expenditure for winter 2017-2018 is more than double the total expenditure for a household heating with natural gas ($631), and two-thirds higher than a household heating with electricity, $967. Propane consumers are projected to experience an increased expenditure of about $211, or 10.6% in the Northeast, while consumers in the Midwest are projected to experience an increase of $276, or 23.5%. Heating Expenditure Assistance
The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP ) is the primary federal government program to supplement home heating expenditures. LIHEAP funding for FY2018 has been set at $3.39 billion (Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2018, P.L. 115-56 ). If the weather in the winter of 2017-2018 is severe, or if energy prices are volatile, the fixed amount of LIHEAP funding will likely result in smaller assistance payments to families, or fewer families receiving payments. Fuel costs are generally expected to be higher than last year and the weather is expected to be colder. | The Energy Information Administration (EIA), in its Short-Term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook (STEWFO) for the 2017-2018 winter heating season, projects that American consumers should expect to see heating expenditures that will be higher than last winter. However, the winter of 2016-2017 was relatively warm. Average expenditures for those heating with natural gas are projected to increase by 12%, while those heating with electricity are projected to see an increase of about 8%. These two fuels serve as the heating source for about 87% of all U.S. household heating. Propane and home heating oil consumers are also projected to see increased costs.
Within the United States, average expenditures projections differences exist with respect to region of the country. Differences in weather conditions and fuel prices contribute to differing regional expenditures.
Economic conditions of relatively high growth and low unemployment suggest that higher consumption levels of all fuels may occur. Increased consumption could lead to higher prices for all winter fuels. The STEWFO provides analysis of scenarios covering a warmer, or colder, winter than the base case forecast.
The key federal program designed to assist low-income households is the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). LIHEAP funding beyond the expiration of the Continuing Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 115-56) is uncertain and if reduced could put an additional burden on families qualified for benefits. If the weather in the winter of 2017-2018 is severe, or if energy prices are volatile, the fixed amount of LIHEAP funding will likely result in smaller assistance payments to families, or fewer families receiving payments. |
crs_RL33920 | crs_RL33920_0 | While Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reauthorization legislation was considered at length during the 110 th Congress, and a FAA reauthorization bill ( H.R. 2881 ) was passed by the House, the only related legislation enacted consisted of several short term extensions for aviation trust fund revenue collections and aviation program authority. The Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act, Part II ( P.L. 110-330 ) extends these authorizations until March 31, 2009, thus carrying the issue of FAA reauthorization over to the 111 th Congress. Funding authorization for aviation programs set forth in Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act ( P.L. Also, authorization of the existing tax and fee structure that provides revenue for the aviation trust fund expired at the end of FY2007. 1356 / S. 1076 , hereafter referred to by bill number or as the FAA proposal), entitled the Next Generation Air Transportation System Financing Reform Act of 2007, proposes a new system for financing aviation system operations and capital improvements that includes various fee-for-service charges (user fees), directed primarily at commercial system users, and excise taxes (primarily fuel taxes) for general aviation system users. The FAA proposal also includes several modifications to airport revenues, including increases in the maximum passenger facility charges (PFCs) that airports can impose on passengers, and initiatives intended to modify and simplify the apportionment of grants to airports. Overview of S. 1300 and S. 2345
On May 3, 2007, Senator Rockefeller introduced the Aviation Investment and Modernization Act of 2007 ( S. 1300 ). S. 1300 proposes a four-year reauthorization, including modest increases to the FAA's authorized spending levels through FY2011. S. 1300 , as amended, offers an alternative to the FAA-proposed user fee structure, proposing to create a separate treasury fund, called the Air Traffic Modernization Fund, that would be financed through the collection of $25 surcharges imposed on certain flights for air traffic control costs. This report discusses H.R. Perhaps the most notable increase in S. 1300 would be for the Facilities and Equipment (F&E) account. 2881 proposes an increase of almost 25% in FY2008 authorizations for F&E spending compared to FY2007 appropriated amounts. FAA Proposal
The Next Generation Air Transportation System Financing Reform Act of 2007 ( H.R. 2881
The bill does not include the FAA proposal. Major provisions of the FAA proposal and S. 1300 addressing management and organizational issues include:
Measures designed to achieve better integration of NGATS planning and implementation into the FAA's ongoing planning and acquisition activities; Measures to establish a mechanism for considering possible realignment and consolidation of various FAA facilities and services; and Provisions to increase the flexibility in the design and implementation of NGATS by allowing airports and private entities to play a more direct role in acquiring, deploying, and maintaining facilities and services to augment the FAA's air traffic communications, navigation, and surveillance capabilities. 2881 seek increased funding and other program enhancements. | Funding authorization for aviation programs set forth in Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-176) and authorization for taxes and fees that provide revenue for the aviation trust fund expired at the end of FY2007. While Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reauthorization legislation was considered during the 110th Congress, the only related legislation enacted consisted of several short term extensions for aviation trust fund revenue collections and aviation program authority. The Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act, Part II (P.L. 110-330) extends these authorizations until March 31, 2009, thus carrying the issue of FAA reauthorization over to the 111th Congress.
Consideration of FAA reauthorization during the 110th Congress began with the introduction of the FAA's reauthorization proposal, entitled the Next Generation Air Transportation System Financing Reform Act of 2007 (H.R. 1356/S. 1076, introduced by request), which recommends a new system for financing aviation system costs through direct user fees and increased fuel taxes. The FAA proposal would also allow airports to increase passenger facility charges (PFC), and includes initiatives to simplify the apportionment of airport grants. The proposal also seeks to better integrate development of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS) into ongoing planning and acquisition activities, and would allow airport and private investment in certain aviation facilities and services. The FAA proposal would authorize funding for research on aviation noise, air emissions, and water quality impacts, and seeks to modify the Essential Air Service Program (EAS).
The Aviation Investment and Modernization Act of 2007 (S. 1300; S.Rept. 110-144) proposes a four-year authorization with modest overall budget increases and larger increases specifically for facilities and equipment (F&E) modernization. S. 1300 proposes a $25 surcharge for certain flights and retention of existing taxes and fees. S. 1300 would establish a modernization oversight board and would set up offices at each federal agency supporting NGATS for defining agency resources and budgetary commitments to air traffic modernization. S. 2345, introduced by the Senate Finance Committee, may be considered as the revenue title of the overall bill, and modifies certain aviation taxes and fees as a possible alternative to the $25 surcharge proposal.
The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2007 (H.R. 2881) seeks higher spending authorizations for F&E compared to S. 1300. While the bill does not propose any direct user-fee mechanisms, it proposes modest increases to existing aviation fuel taxes. The overall legislation also seeks to increase accountability and coordination of NGATS planning and implementation. An amendment agreed to would create a binding arbitration process to resolve labor negotiations impasses, and would apply this process to settle the current impasse between the FAA and air traffic controllers. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R41716 | crs_R41716_0 | The Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program, commonly known as Social Security, is the most well-known of these programs. SSA is also responsible for carrying out two cash assistance programs for certain groups of low-income individuals: (1) Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled and (2) Special Benefits for Certain World War II Veterans. This report provides background on SSA's core programs and related mandatory spending but its focus is on SSA's annual discretionary appropriations for administrative expenses. SSA estimates that the average number of federal beneficiaries of its core programs (adjusted for double counting) will be 68.4 million in FY2017. FY2017 Budget Request and Appropriations for SSA
Although benefit payments for SSA's programs are considered mandatory spending and thus are not controlled by the annual appropriations process, the agency requires annual discretionary appropriations to carry out its programs and to support the administration of non-SSA programs, such as Medicare. SSA's accounts are traditionally funded via the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill. Nearly this entire amount is from subjecting a portion of Social Security benefits to federal personal income tax. Limitation on Administrative Expenses
The appropriation for the LAE account funds SSA's administrative costs associated with the OASI, SSDI, SSI, and Special Benefits for Certain World War II Veterans programs as well as costs incurred by the agency to support Medicare and certain other non-SSA programs. The FY2017 President's budget request for SSA's LAE account is $13.1 billion. Program Integrity Activities
The FY2017 President's budget request includes $1.8 billion for costs associated with SSA's program integrity activities, which include continuing disability reviews (CDRs) and SSI redeterminations. | The Social Security Administration (SSA) is responsible for administering a number of federal entitlement programs that provide income support (cash benefits) to qualified individuals. These programs are
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), commonly known as Social Security; Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled; and Special Benefits for Certain World War II Veterans.
In FY2017, SSA's programs are projected to pay a combined $1.0 trillion in federal benefits to 68.4 million recipients. Spending on administrative costs for these programs is projected to be about 1.3% of benefit outlays.
Although benefit payments for SSA's programs are considered mandatory spending and thus are not controlled by the annual appropriations process, the agency requires annual discretionary appropriations to carry out its programs and to support the administration of non-SSA programs, such as Medicare. SSA's funding is part of the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill.
The FY2017 President's budget request for SSA's limitation on administrative expenses (LAE) account, which funds virtually all of SSA's operations, is $13.1 billion. Of this amount, $1.8 billion is for program integrity activities, which include continuing disability reviews (CDRs) and SSI non-medical redeterminations. The total FY2016 appropriation for SSA's LAE account was $12.2 billion, with $1.4 billion dedicated to program integrity work.
This report provides an overview of SSA's mandatory spending but focuses primarily on discretionary appropriations for the agency's administrative expenses. |
crs_R41152 | crs_R41152_0 | Introduction
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law a comprehensive health care reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which, among other things, reauthorizes the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA ). This report, one of a series of CRS products on the ACA, summarizes some of the key changes made in the reauthorization of IHCIA. In addition, the report summarizes other ACA provisions related to American Indians and Alaska Natives enrolled in and receiving services from Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP)—also called SSA health benefit programs. It also discusses ACA changes to private health insurance coverage that may affect American Indians' and Alaska Natives' access to private health insurance coverage. Another report, CRS Report R41630, The Indian Health Care Improvement Act Reauthorization and Extension as Enacted by the ACA: Detailed Summary and Timeline , by [author name scrubbed], provides a detailed section-by-section summary of the IHCIA Reauthorization and Extension Act of 2009. Indian Health Care Improvement Act
The Indian Health Care Improvement Act, as passed in 1976 and subsequently amended, authorized many specific IHS activities, set out the national policy for health services administered to Indians, and declared that it was a federal goal to improve the health status and conditions of the IHS service population. IHCIA also authorized direct collections from Medicare, Medicaid, and other third-party insurers for American Indians and Alaska Natives receiving services at facilities operated by the IHS, an IT, or a TO. Prior to reauthorizing IHCIA in the ACA, lawmakers introduced multiple reauthorization bills. Despite the lapse in authorization of appropriations during this period, Congress continued to appropriate funds for IHCIA programs. Title II, "Role of Public Programs," Subtitle K, "Protections for American Indians and Alaska Natives," contains provisions related to American Indians and Alaska Natives in SSA health benefit programs and in the private health insurance exchange established by the ACA. In addition, other sections of the ACA include changes related to private insurance that may affect American Indians and Alaska Natives. In addition, the bill maintains a number of IHCIA-defined terms. Expanded Access to UIOs and TOs: Permits TOs and UIOs to apply for grant and contract programs for which these entities were previously not eligible. Behavioral Health Programs: Expands mental health services to create a comprehensive behavioral health and treatment program. Office of Direct Service Tribes: Requires that IHS establish an Office of Direct Service Tribes to serve tribes that receive their health care and other services directly from IHS rather than through facilities or programs operated by ITs or TOs. Nevada Area Office : Requires a plan to establish a new area office to serve tribes in Nevada. The ACA also includes a new provision that authorizes the Secretary to accept funding from any other source for facilities construction. ACA Private Health Insurance Changes
The ACA makes significant changes to private health insurance coverage that may affect certain American Indians and Alaska Natives. This subtitle does the following: (1) it designates facilities operated by IHS, an IT, a TO, or a UIO as the payor of last resort notwithstanding federal or state law to the contrary; (2) it includes IHS, ITs, and TOs as entities that are permitted to determine Medicaid and CHIP eligibility; (3) it prohibits cost sharing for Indians whose incomes are at or below 300% of the federal poverty level and who are enrolled in a qualified health benefit plan in the individual market through the exchange (as established by the ACA), and (4) it extends the period for which IHS, IT, and TO services are reimbursed by Medicare Part B for all services, indefinitely, beginning January 1, 2010. Prior to the ACA, authority for these facilities to receive Medicare Part B reimbursements for certain specified services had expired on January 1, 2010. | On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law a comprehensive health care reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148). The law, among other things, reauthorizes the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (P.L. 94-437, IHCIA), which authorizes many programs and services provided by the Indian Health Service (IHS). In addition, it makes several changes that may affect American Indians and Alaska Natives enrolled in and receiving services from the Medicare, Medicaid, and State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP)—also called Social Security Act (SSA) health benefit programs. The ACA also includes changes to private health insurance that may affect American Indians and Alaska Natives and may affect tribes that offer private health insurance.
IHCIA authorizes many IHS programs and services, sets out the national policy for health services administered to Indians, and articulates the federal goal of ensuring the highest possible health status for Indians, including urban Indians. In addition, it authorizes direct collections from Medicare, Medicaid, and other third-party insurers. Prior to the ACA, IHCIA was last reauthorized in FY2000, although programs continued to receive appropriations in later years. The ACA reauthorizes IHCIA and extends authorizations of appropriations for IHCIA programs indefinitely. It amends a number of sections of IHCIA in general, to permit tribal organizations (TOs) and urban Indian organizations (UIOs) to apply for contract and grant programs for which they were not previously eligible; to create new mental health prevention and treatment programs; and to require demonstration projects to construct modular and mobile health facilities in order to expand health services available through IHS, Indian Tribes (ITs), and TOs. It also made several organizational changes to IHS. It requires IHS to establish an Office of Direct Service Tribes to serve tribes that receive their health care and other services directly from IHS as opposed to receiving services through IHS-funded facilities or programs operated by ITs or TOs. In addition, the law requires IHS to develop a plan to establish a new area office to serve tribes in Nevada and requires the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to appoint a new IHS Director of HIV/AIDS Prevention and Treatment.
In addition to reauthorizing IHCIA, the ACA includes a number of provisions that may affect American Indians and Alaska Natives who have private insurance coverage or who receive services through SSA health benefit programs. With regard to private insurance coverage, the ACA provides a special enrollment period for American Indians and Alaska Natives who may enroll in private insurance offered through an exchange and exempts certain American Indians and Alaska Natives from the requirement to obtain insurance coverage. Under regulation, additional American Indians and Alaska Natives may also be exempt from the ACA requirement to obtain insurance coverage. With regard to SSA health benefit programs, the new law permits specified Indian entities to determine Medicaid and CHIP eligibility and extends the period during which IHS, IT, and TO services are reimbursed for all Medicare Part B services, indefinitely, beginning January 1, 2010. Prior to the ACA, authority for these facilities to receive Medicare Part B reimbursements for certain specified services had expired on January 1, 2010.
This report, one of a series of CRS products on the ACA, summarizes some of the key changes made in the reauthorization of IHCIA and summarizes other changes included in the ACA that may affect American Indian and Alaska Native health and health care. Another report, CRS Report R41630, The Indian Health Care Improvement Act Reauthorization and Extension as Enacted by the ACA: Detailed Summary and Timeline, by [author name scrubbed], provides a detailed section-by-section summary of the IHCIA Reauthorization and Extension Act of 2009. |
crs_RS22594 | crs_RS22594_0 | Introduction
Check cashers are nonbank businesses that cash checks for a fee. To provide these services, a check cashing enterprise establishes a business relationship with a bank to clear checks, transfer funds, and open lines of credit for liquidity purposes. The Bank Secrecy Act regulations define check cashers as money services businesses (MSBs). Concern is twofold: (1) widespread termination of account relationships could result in the loss of access to financial services and products by the significant market segment currently served by check cashers and (2) if these businesses are consequently forced "underground" the potential loss of transparency could damage ongoing efforts to safeguard the U.S. financial system. Many states require a license for check cashing enterprises and/or regulate their fee structures. A customer's funds are immediately available while banks may impose check clearing holds. Conversely, it is estimated that 58% of the check cashing industry's clientele are bank account holders. BSA reporting and record keeping requirements apply to both banks and MSBs. 2005 Interagency Guidance
The intent of the interagency guidelines was to clarify the supervisory expectations of banks to remain in compliance with the requirements of the BSA while providing services to check cashers and other MSBs. Banks' relationship with Check Cashers
Check cashers require specific banking services to operate. These financial services include depository accounts, check collection and clearing operations, funds transfer, and access to lines of credit for liquidity purposes. | A check cashing enterprise is a fee-based business that will cash a customer's check without requiring an account relationship. The U.S. check cashing industry underwent a significant expansion in the 1990s. Customers are attracted by the immediate access to funds, availability of service without a bank account, and convenience of extended hours of operation. In general, the industry is viewed as a provider of valuable financial services to an under served market segment.
Check cashers are dependent on access to bank services to operate. Banks provide depository accounts, check collection and clearing operations, funds transfer, and access to lines of credit for liquidity purposes. Banks and check cashers are both subject to Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) regulations. The BSA is an anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing statute. Federal regulators have cautioned banks that nonbank money service businesses (an umbrella term that includes check cashing enterprises) can present heightened money laundering risks. Consequently, some banks have discontinued their business relations with check cashers. The discontinuance of services to check cashers brought about complaints to regulators and increased lobbying of Congress. Bank regulators have issued guidance to clarify BSA compliance expectations. Congress held hearings on the concerns of banks and check cashers. This report will be updated as events and legislation warrant. |
crs_R41954 | crs_R41954_0 | Introduction
The U.S. energy sector is large and complex. The U.S. electric power sector generates approximately 4 million gigawatthours of electricity each year. This report addresses two fundamental questions about U.S. renewable electricity generation potential: (1) How much renewable electricity generation might be possible in the United States? Renewable Electricity Terminology and Units
This section defines terms and units used to describe and quantify renewable energy sources, and electricity generation potential from these sources, and how renewable energy might be compared to other forms of energy. Summary of Current U.S. Renewable Electricity
In 2009 renewable energy resources provided 11% of U.S. electricity net generation. Future Renewable Electricity Generation Potential
The following sections discuss the estimated range of electricity generation potential from wind, solar, geothermal, hydro, ocean-hydrokinetic, and biomass renewable energy sources. Table 2 provides a summary of U.S. renewable electricity generation potential, based on the research and analysis performed for this report, current and projected renewable electricity generation potential, cost of electricity estimates, and a summary of key challenges for each renewable energy source. Research and analysis conducted for this report indicates that renewable energy sources may, theoretically, have the potential to satisfy a large portion of U.S. electric power needs. Third, different system configurations are used to collect data and calculate solar resource estimates. However, estimating the amount of electricity that might be generated from biomass depends on the amount of biomass material available and on the portion of that material that might be used for electricity generation. Since different organizations often use different assumptions, the variation in LCOE estimates is not surprising. To date, there is no standard methodology to produce these estimates. In addition to new transmission requirements, some renewable energy sources may require investments in specialized infrastructure in order to provide a source of renewable electricity. Based on the current status of renewables in the United States, policy makers may consider some key questions about the future of renewable energy:
Should the United States actively seek greater use of renewable energy to supply electricity, or should the energy and electricity markets be allowed to work without further interference with the existing structure of subsidies and incentives? In 2010, renewable sources of energy provided approximately 11% (7% from hydropower and 4% from other renewables) of total net electricity generation and the EIA AEO 2011 reference case projects that renewable electricity generation will increase to between 14% and 15% by 2035. However, renewable electricity generation will likely encounter serious challenges, issues, and barriers as technologies and projects look to realize large-scale deployment. As Congress evaluates various energy policy objectives, policy makers may move to holistically evaluate the potential intended benefits, such as emissions reduction and job creation, with potential risks and consequences, such as electricity cost/price increases and electricity delivery reliability issues associated with increasing renewable electricity generation. | The United States faces important decisions about future energy supply and use. A key question is how renewable energy resources might be used to meet U.S. energy needs in general, and to meet U.S. electricity needs specifically. Renewable energy sources are typically used for three general types of applications: electricity generation, biofuels/bioproducts, and heating/cooling. Each application uses different technologies to convert renewable energy sources into usable products. The literature on renewable energy resources, conversion technologies for different applications, and economics is massive. This report focuses on electricity generation from renewable energy sources. In 2010, renewable sources of energy were used to produce almost 11% (7% from hydropower and 4% from other renewables) of the 4 million gigawatthours of electricity generated in the United States.
This report provides a summary of U.S. electricity generation potential from wind, solar, geothermal, hydroelectric, ocean-hydrokinetic, and biomass sources of renewable energy. The focus of this report is twofold: (1) provide an assessment of U.S. renewable electricity generation potential and how renewables might satisfy electric power sector demand, and (2) discuss challenges, issues, and barriers that might limit renewable electricity generation deployment.
Data sources from 15 different organizations were reviewed to derive estimates of electricity generation potential. One key finding is that there exists no uniform national assessment of renewable electricity generation potential. No standard methods or set of assumptions are used to estimate renewable electricity generation potential. So even existing assessments for individual energy sources are difficult to compare objectively. In order to compare various estimates on an equivalent basis, CRS engaged experts in each renewable energy resource area to help normalize electricity generation potential estimates into a common metric: gigawatthours per year.
After surveying, researching, and normalizing all of the third-party electricity generation estimates, results indicate that renewable energy sources may, in principle, have the potential to satisfy a large portion of U.S. electricity demand. However, a number of potential barriers to large-scale deployment exist, including cost, power system integration, intermittency and variability, land requirements, transmission access, possible limits to the availability of key materials and resources, certain environmental impacts, specialized infrastructure requirements, and policy issues. Ultimately, the amount of renewable electricity generation in the U.S. may be dependent on the ability to address these deployment barriers. The Energy Information Administration projects that U.S. renewable electricity generation will increase from 11% today to between 14% and 15% in 2035.
As Congress considers policy options associated with increasing renewable electricity generation, policy makers may assess potential benefits such as emissions reduction, job creation, and global competitiveness, along with possible risks and consequences such as electricity cost and price increases, electricity delivery reliability, and environmental impacts associated with large-scale deployment of renewable electricity generation technologies. |
crs_RL34673 | crs_RL34673_0 | Introduction
As of June 2009, the General Schedule (GS) covered roughly 59.8% of federal employees. Federal employees rise within grades in the GS pay scale based on performance and length of service. The Department of Defense (DOD), however, operates a pay system called the National Security Personnel System (NSPS), which attempts to link pay increases more closely to employee performance without the use of grades or steps. As of June 2009, 211,000 (29.4%) of DOD's 717,000 employees were covered by NSPS. On October 7, 2009, House and Senate conferees reported a version of the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2010 that included language to terminate NSPS by 2012. On October 28, 2009, the President signed the bill into law ( P.L. DOD must now return employees to the pay system in which they were formerly enrolled prior to the installation of NSPS. This report reviews the creation of the NSPS, examines how NSPS operates, and discusses litigation against it. The report then analyzes lessons that can be learned from NSPS and that may be applied to future attempts to create a federal performance-based pay system. This report will be updated as necessary. An employee must score at least a three—which is equal to a nominal rating of "valued performer"—to be eligible for performance-based pay increases. In NSPS, each employee may be assigned a certain number of performance pay shares. An employee who is at the maximum level of his or her pay band may receive his or her performance-based bonus as a one-time lump sum paid at the beginning of the following year. DOD employees currently in NSPS will be returned to the GS or to whichever pay scale they were on prior to their transition into NSPS. On October 8, 2009, the House agreed to the conference report. The Senate agreed to the conference report on October 22, 2009. 111-84 ). The areas cited for possible improvement were as follows:
to involve employees in the system's design and implementation; to link employee objectives and the agency's strategic goals and mission; to train and retrain employees in the system's operation; to provide ongoing performance feedback between supervisors and employees; to better link individual pay to performance in an equitable manner; to allocate agency resources for the system's design, implementation, and administration; to include predecisional internal safeguards to determine whether rating results are consistent, equitable, and nondiscriminatory; to provide reasonable transparency of the system and its operation; and to impart meaningful distinctions in individual employee performance. Such analyses may be useful as both Congress and the Administration face whether to maintain the GS pay scale or create a new pay scale that more directly links pay to an employee's performance. | Most federal employees (59.8%) are paid on the General Schedule, a pay scale that consists of 15 pay grades in which an employee's pay increases are to be based on performance and length of service. Some Members of Congress, citizens, and public administration scholars have argued that federal employee pay advancement should be more closely linked to job performance. With explicit congressional authorization enacted in 2003, the Department of Defense (DOD) created the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) as a unique pay scale attempting to more closely link employee pay to job performance.
NSPS has been plagued by criticisms since it went into effect in 2006. The system has faced legal and political challenges from unions and employees who claim it is inconsistently applied and causes undeserved pay inequities, among other concerns.
On October 7, 2009, House and Senate conferees reported a version of the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2010 that included language to terminate NSPS. On October 8, 2009, the House agreed to the conference report. The Senate agreed to the conference report on October 22, 2009. On October 28, 2009, the President signed the bill into law (P.L. 111-84). DOD must now return the employees currently enrolled in NSPS to the GS or to the pay scale in which they were previously enrolled. The return to the GS or other pay scales must be completed by 2012, pursuant to the legislation.
NSPS was initially intended to cover all DOD employees, but has a current enrollment of roughly 211,000 civilian employees, or 29.4% of the department's 717,000-person workforce.
Like other performance-based pay systems, NSPS makes job performance a predominant factor in determining employee pay. A supervisor and an employee who use NSPS are to work together to create an annual appraisal plan that accurately reflects an employee's performance. A supervisor then is to use the appraisal to evaluate the employee. At the end of each appraisal year, an employee may be assigned a percentage increase in pay based on his or her performance. These increases are called pay shares. Lower-performing employees may receive fewer pay shares or no pay shares. An employee must acquire at least a satisfactory performance rating to be eligible for any performance-based bonuses.
This report reviews the creation of the NSPS, examines how NSPS operates, discusses litigation against it, and analyzes lessons that can be learned from NSPS as Congress decides whether to maintain the GS, create a new federal pay system, or modify existing ones. It will be updated as necessary. |
crs_R40543 | crs_R40543_0 | Recently, however, new initiatives to expand the role of TSA personnel beyond traditional physical screening of passengers and their belongings, as well as initiatives to improve screening efficiency and effectiveness through the deployment of new technologies, have been implemented and are being tested. However, policymakers and aviation security planners have not yet agreed upon a clear strategy and well-defined plan for evolving airline passenger screening functions to incorporate new technologies, capabilities, and procedures to more effectively and efficiently detect explosives, weapons, and other threat objects as well as individuals who may pose a threat to aviation security. Over the next several years, the TSA will likely face continuing challenges to address projected growth in passenger airline travel while maintaining and improving upon the efficiency and effectiveness of passenger and baggage screening operations. Policy Issues for Airport Passenger Screening
The TSA faces a number of ongoing challenges to maintain and improve upon the effectiveness and efficiency of passenger screening functions. These challenges include:
Addressing projected airline passenger traffic growth and its potential impacts on screening operations; Optimizing screening efficiency and throughput and minimizing passenger wait times; Identifying and addressing potential airport space constraints for screening checkpoints and equipment; Improving the capability to detect explosives at passenger checkpoints as recommended by the 9/11 Commission and called for in legislation; Developing strategic plans for addressing identified technology and human factors needs related to passenger screening; and Defining funding requirements to implement these strategic plans. Provisions in P.L. The fund provided $250 million in passenger security fees for the acquisition and deployment of technologies to improve the detection of explosives at passenger screening checkpoints in FY2008. 111-5 ) specifies an additional $1 billion for aviation security, designated for the procurement and installation of checkpoint explosives detection equipment and checked baggage explosives detection systems. | Over the next several years, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will likely face continuing challenges to address projected growth in passenger airline travel while maintaining and improving upon the efficiency and effectiveness of passenger screening operations. New initiatives to expand the role of TSA personnel beyond screening operations, as well as initiatives to improve screening efficiency and effectiveness through the deployment of new technologies, will likely require additional investment. In addition to annual appropriations of $250 million in FY2008 and FY2009, a portion of the $1 billion identified for aviation security in the stimulus measure (P.L. 111-5) has been designated for acquiring and deploying technologies to screen passengers for explosives.
However, policymakers and aviation security planners have not yet agreed upon a well-defined strategy and plan for evolving airline passenger and baggage screening functions to incorporate new technologies, capabilities, and procedures to more effectively and efficiently detect potential threats to aviation security.
Ongoing challenges to maintaining and improving upon screening functions include: addressing the potential impacts of projected airline passenger traffic growth on screening operations; optimizing screening efficiency and minimizing passenger wait times; addressing potential airport space constraints for screening checkpoints and equipment; improving the capability to detect explosives at passenger checkpoints; optimizing inline explosives detection systems for checked baggage; developing strategic plans for addressing screening technology and human factors needs; and defining the funding requirements to implement these strategic plans.
A number of initiatives related to passenger and baggage screening are currently being evaluated by the TSA. These include tests of new passenger checkpoint layouts and field testing of next-generation checkpoint technologies for detecting explosives, including explosives chemical trace detection devices, whole body imaging systems, and advanced technology (AT) X-ray capabilities. |
crs_R41107 | crs_R41107_0 | Subsequently, the ACTA would enter into force after the sixth instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval ("formal approval") is deposited by the ACTA participants. In May 2011, ACTA negotiating parties publicly released a final version of the agreement text. Overview of the ACTA
The proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is a new agreement for combating intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement. Negotiated by the United States, Australia, Canada, the European Union and its 27 member states, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and Switzerland, the ACTA is intended to build on the standards of IPR protection and enforcement set forth in the 1995 World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) and to address emerging IPR issues believed to be not addressed adequately in the TRIPS Agreement, such as IPR infringement in the digital environment. The ACTA, which was negotiated outside of the WTO, focuses primarily on enforcement of trademarks and copyrights; enforcement of patents generally is outside of the agreement's scope. The ACTA establishes a legal framework for IPR enforcement, which contains provisions on civil enforcement, border measures, criminal enforcement in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale, and enforcement for the infringement of copyrights or related rights over digital networks. It also provides for enhanced enforcement best practices and increased international cooperation. The ACTA negotiation concluded in October 2010, nearly three years after it began. No negotiating party has submitted a formal instrument of approval to date. Entry-into-Force of the ACTA
On October 1, 2011, the governments of Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States signed the ACTA. The USTR maintains that the ACTA is consistent with existing U.S. law and does not require the enactment of implementing legislation. On July 4, 2012, the European Parliament voted against the ACTA, meaning that neither the EU nor its individual member states can join the agreement in its current form. EU member states have been undertaking national ratification processes. The Bush Administration began, and the Obama Administration continued, negotiation of the ACTA as an executive agreement, meaning that the agreement would not be subject to congressional approval, unless it were to require statutory changes to U.S. law. The congressional role in the ACTA is rooted in the U.S. Constitution. The protection and enforcement of IPR internationally is a major component of U.S. trade policy, due to the importance of IPR to the U.S. economy and the potentially negative commercial, health and safety, and security consequences associated with counterfeiting and piracy. Certain stakeholders have voiced concerns about the negotiation's scope, transparency, and inclusiveness. In addition, various civil society groups, such as public health and consumer rights advocates, have voiced concerns about the implications of the ACTA for trade in legitimate goods, consumer privacy, and free flow of information. With the existence of the WTO TRIPS Agreement and other international agreements on IPR, some question the rationale behind creating a new agreement to combat counterfeiting and piracy. | The proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is a new agreement for combating intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement. The ACTA negotiation concluded in October 2010, nearly three years after it began, and negotiating parties released a final text of the agreement in May 2011. Negotiated by the United States, Australia, Canada, the European Union and its 27 member states, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and Switzerland, the ACTA is intended to build on the IPR protection and enforcement obligations set forth in the 1995 World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). It also is intended to address emerging IPR issues believed to be not addressed adequately in the TRIPS Agreement, such as IPR infringement in the digital environment. The ACTA, which was negotiated outside of the WTO, focuses primarily on trademark and copyright enforcement. It establishes a legal framework for IPR enforcement, which contains provisions on civil enforcement, border measures, criminal enforcement in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale, and enforcement in the digital environment for infringement of copyrights or related rights. It also provides for enhanced enforcement best practices and increased international cooperation.
The ratification ("formal approval") of the ACTA is in a state of uncertainty, despite the fact that most negotiating parties (Australia, Canada, the EU and 22 of its member states, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States) have signed the proposed agreement. Following months of controversy over the ACTA in the EU, on July 4, 2012, the European Parliament voted against the ACTA, meaning that neither the EU nor its individual member states can join the agreement in its current form. The ACTA would enter into force after the sixth instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval is deposited by ACTA negotiating parties. No party has submitted a formal instrument of approval to date.
The Bush Administration began, and the Obama Administration continued, negotiation of the ACTA as an executive agreement, meaning that the ACTA would not be subject to congressional approval, unless it were to require statutory changes to U.S. law. The U.S. Trade Representative maintains that the ACTA is consistent with existing U.S. law and does not require the enactment of implementing legislation. Congress could play an oversight role in the implementation of the agreement. Some Members and other groups have debated whether implementation of the ACTA without congressional approval would raise constitutionality issues.
The U.S. government has made the enforcement of IPR a top priority in its trade policy, due to the importance of IPR to the U.S. economy and the potentially negative commercial, health and safety, and security consequences associated with counterfeiting and piracy. Policymakers face a challenge of finding an appropriate balance between protecting private rights and promoting broader economic and social welfare. The ACTA negotiation has spurred various policy debates. While governments involved in the negotiation and IPR-based industries have voiced strong support for the ACTA, other groups have expressed concern about the ACTA's potential impact on trade in legitimate goods, consumer privacy, the free flow of information, and public health. There also have been concerns about the negotiation's scope, transparency, and inclusiveness. Some have questioned the rationale behind creating a new IPR agreement and have advocated, instead, for better enforcement of existing agreements, such as the WTO TRIPS Agreement. |
crs_RL34655 | crs_RL34655_0 | On May 10, 2010, President Obama transmitted the proposed text of the U.S.-Russian civilian nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress for approval, along with the required Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) and his determination that the agreement promotes U.S. national security. The agreement was signed by the two countries in Moscow on May 6, 2008. President George W. Bush first submitted it to Congress on May 13, 2008, but in September 2008 rescinded the national security determination following Russian military actions in the Republic of Georgia. Therefore, the agreement would enter into effect after a 30-day consultation period and a review period of 60 days of continuous session unless Congress enacted a joint resolution of disapproval. The bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Russia entered into force after an exchange of diplomatic notes on January 11, 2011. governs significant nuclear cooperation between the United States and other states. Congressional Consideration
Congressional debate over the agreement in the past has focused on several key issues: the nature of Russian-Iranian cooperation, the impact of a U.S.-Russian agreement on the future of nuclear fuel cycle policies, and the impact of the agreement on bilateral relations including nuclear nonproliferation cooperation. Congressional consideration of the agreement ended on December 8, 2010. | The bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Russia entered into force after an exchange of diplomatic notes on January 11, 2011. The United States and Russia signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on May 6, 2008. President Bush submitted the agreement to Congress on May 13. The agreement was withdrawn from congressional consideration by President George W. Bush on September 8, 2008, in response to Russia's military actions in Georgia. President Obama transmitted the proposed text of the agreement to Congress on May 10, 2010, along with the required Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) and his determination that the agreement promotes U.S. national security. Under U.S. law, Congress had 30 days of continuous session for consultations with the Administration, followed by an additional 60 days of continuous session to review the agreement. Since it was not opposed by a joint resolution of disapproval or other legislation, the agreement was considered approved at the end of this time period on December 8, 2010.
This report discusses key policy issues related to the agreement, including future nuclear energy cooperation with Russia, U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, nonproliferation cooperation, and Russian policies toward Iran. These issues were relevant to the debate when the agreement was being considered in the 111th and 110th Congresses.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42563 | crs_R42563_0 | Introduction
Provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA, P.L. 94-265 , as amended; 16 U.S.C. §§1801 et seq.) added during the 1996 reauthorization and amended in 2006, included specific requirements to end overfishing and to rebuild overfished stocks. To implement these requirements, the MSFCMA directed the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (also referred to as NOAA Fisheries) within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce to develop regulations by 2008 to provide guidance for establishing annual catch limits (ACLs) and related biological benchmarks. By the end of 2011, a requirement to implement ACLs and end overfishing in all federally managed fisheries came into effect. For fish stocks at low levels of abundance, stock rebuilding within a 10-year time frame (with some exceptions) is also required. Furthermore, they assert that assessments of fish stocks are often flawed or incomplete because of inadequate data and simplistic population models. Environmentalists counter that overfishing and previous management failures illustrate the need to maintain established fish stock rebuilding schedules. They emphasize that relatively short-term sacrifices associated with rebuilding will result in long-term economic gains to recreational and commercial fishermen. Several different bills related to overfishing and stock rebuilding have been introduced during the 112 th Congress. S. 2184 and H.R. 2304 , H.R. Several hearings have been held to explore broad concerns related to overfishing, ACLs, and the related need to reduce uncertainty by improving fisheries data collection and stock assessments. The most recent was held on December 1, 2011, by the House Committee on Natural Resources, which considered a variety of bills and associated issues related to fisheries, including H.R. 1646 , H.R. 2304 , and H.R. No further congressional action has been taken by either the House or the Senate. Since 2000, 27 overfished stocks have been rebuilt, including several notable examples such as Northeast scallop, mid-Atlantic bluefish, and Pacific lingcod. Progress has been made in some fisheries where stock rebuilding has increased yield and the associated economic value of the fishery. However, often improvements have come at a cost to commercial and recreational fisheries and associated fishing communities, especially in cases where stocks have not responded to management actions as rapidly as managers anticipated. Some fishermen, fishery managers, and academics have posed questions related to (1) the effects of ACLs on allocation of fisheries benefits; (2) the possible social and economic benefits of greater flexibility during stock rebuilding, (3) the data and models used to determine ACLs and rebuilding objectives, and (4) the decision making process, especially in situations with limited data and related uncertainty. 1646, H.R. H.R. Fish populations vary for many reasons that are often beyond the immediate control of fishermen and managers such as the condition of fish habitat, ecosystem shifts, and global climate change. | Provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA, P.L. 94-265, as amended; 16 U.S.C. §§1801 et seq.) enacted during the 1996 reauthorization and amended during the 2006 reauthorization, added specific requirements to end overfishing and to rebuild overfished fish stocks. To implement these requirements, the MSFCMA directed the National Marine Fisheries Service of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to develop regulations by 2008 to provide guidance for establishing annual catch limits (ACLs) and related biological benchmarks. By the end of 2011, a requirement to implement ACLs and end overfishing in all federally managed fisheries came into effect. For fish stocks at low levels of abundance, stock rebuilding within a 10-year time frame (with some exceptions) is also required.
Fishermen and fishing communities sometimes suffer from economic and social effects of harvest restrictions needed to satisfy MSFCMA overfishing and stock rebuilding requirements. Many question whether these requirements adequately address the complexities and uncertainties associated with managing fish stocks. Often fishermen express doubt over the efficacy of fish population assessments used for developing management measures because of data constraints and inadequate population models. Furthermore, they refer to studies showing that other factors, often outside the immediate control of fisheries managers, such as environmental conditions and the quality of fish habitat, also affect fish population abundance.
Others, including environmentalists and fishery managers, counter that overfishing and previous management failures illustrate the need to maintain established fish stock rebuilding schedules. They emphasize that relatively short-term sacrifices today will result in long-term economic gains to recreational and commercial fishermen in the future. They point to 27 stocks that have been rebuilt since 2000 and cite notable examples of fully rebuilt stocks such as Northeast scallop, Mid-Atlantic bluefish, and Pacific lingcod.
Overfishing has been arrested in most U.S. fisheries and progress has been made in rebuilding many others. However, these improvements have sometimes come at a cost to commercial and recreational fishermen and associated fishing communities, and in some cases stocks have not responded to management actions as managers anticipated. Some fishermen, fishery managers, and academics have posed questions related to (1) the effects of ACLs on allocation of fisheries benefits; (2) the possible social and economic benefits of greater flexibility during stock rebuilding, (3) the accuracy of data and models used to determine ACLs and rebuilding objectives, and (4) the decision-making process, especially in situations with limited data and related uncertainty.
Several different bills concerning overfishing, stock rebuilding, and related issues have been introduced during the 112th Congress, including H.R. 1646, H.R. 2304, H.R. 3061, H.R. 4208, S. 238, S. 632, S. 1916, and S. 2184. Several hearings have been held to explore broad concerns related to overfishing, ACLs, and the related need to reduce uncertainty by improving fisheries data collection and stock assessments. The most recent was held on December 1, 2011, by the House Committee on Natural Resources, which considered a variety of bills and associated issues related to fisheries, including H.R. 1646, H.R. 2304, and H.R. 3061. No further congressional action has been taken by either the House or the Senate. |
crs_RL34048 | crs_RL34048_0 | The Bush Administration requested $142.7 billion in federal R&D funding for FY2008. Total R&D funding for FY2008 is approximately $142.7 billion, a 1.2% increase over the enacted FY2007 total of $141.1 billion. Funding for FY2008 is provided for in the Defense Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-116 ), signed into law by President Bush on November 13, 2007, and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-161 provides funding covered in the eleven appropriations acts on which action had not been completed. The President's FY2008 proposed R&D increase over the FY2007 funding level was due primarily to requested increases for NASA's space vehicles development program, the Department of Defense, and continuation of the American Competitiveness Initiative (ACI). The President's proposed FY2008 increase for DOD RDT&E funding resulted almost entirely from its request for $3.9 billion for RDT&E in support of its Global War on Terror (GWOT) initiative. 110-116 or P.L. 110-161 , and has not completed action on separate legislation. Congress established authorization levels for FY2008-2010 that would put funding for R&D at these agencies on track to double in approximately seven years. However, FY2008 R&D funding provided in P.L. Total FY2008 funding for NSF was increased by 2.5%, though NSF's research and related activities increased by only 1.1%. The DOE Office of Science received a 5.8% increase for FY2008. NIST's FY2008 core laboratory R&D increased by 1.4%. Over 10 years, the ACI would double R&D funding for the Office of Science and two other agencies. Department of Defense (DOD)
Congress supports research and development in the Department of Defense (DOD) through its Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation. Congress provided $1.1 billion. 110-116 ) on November 13, 2007. This request was a 7.3% increase over FY2007, in a total NASA budget that was to increase by 6.4%. The final appropriation was $12.8 billion ( P.L. National Science Foundation (NSF)
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
On December 26, 2007, the President signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. P.L. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a laboratory of the Department of Commerce with a mandate to increase the competitiveness of U.S. companies through appropriate support for industrial development of precompetitive, generic technologies and the diffusion of government-developed technological advances to users in all segments of the American economy. P.L. 110-161 , the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, as passed by Congress, provides NIST with $755.8 million, an increase of 11.7% over FY2007 and almost 18.0% over the Administration's request. Funding for Geological Resources R&D in FY2008 increases by 2.5% to $219 million. 110-161 ), provided $785.8 million for the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Science and Technology account, which reflects most of the Agency's R&D funding. P.L. | The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161) was the measure used by Congress and the President to wrap up action on the regular appropriations acts in late 2007. On December 19, 2007, Congress completed action on the act, and it was signed into law by President Bush on December 26, 2007. Previously, action had been completed on only one of the regular appropriations acts, the Defense Appropriations Act, FY2008 (P.L. 110-116) which was signed into law by President Bush on November 13, 2007. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 provides appropriations covered in the eleven outstanding appropriations acts. To ensure continuity of government operations, Congress had passed four continuing resolutions (P.L. 110-92, P.L. 110-116 Division B, P.L. 110-137, and P.L. 110-149) that provided funding for all agencies that had not received appropriations from the beginning of FY2008 through passage of the Consolidated Appropriations Act.
The Bush Administration requested $142.7 billion in federal research and development (R&D) funding for FY2008. Total federal R&D funding for FY2008 provided in P.L. 110-161 and P.L. 110-116 is estimated to be $142.7 billion, a 1.2% increase over FY2007.
FY2008 funding for the American Competitive Initiative (ACI) fell short of the President's ten-year doubling target for innovation-related research at the National Science Foundation (NSF), Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Science, and National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) core laboratory programs. It also falls short of the authorization levels set by Congress that put R&D funding for these agencies on a seven-year doubling pace. Funding for DOE's Office of Science increased by 5.8% in FY2008 to $4.0 billion. NIST's core laboratory programs increased 1.4% in FY2008 to $441 million. Total FY2008 funding for NSF was increased by 2.5%. NSF's research and related activities increased by only 1.1%, joining other R&D agencies (notably the Environmental Protection Agency (-2.4%) and National Institutes of Health (0.5%)) whose R&D budgets decreased or received increases below the rate of inflation.
In total, DOE received $9.9 billion for R&D in FY2008, a 7.7% increase over FY2007, led by a 24.0% increase in its energy programs. Total funding for NIST increased by 11.7% in FY2008 to $755.8 million due in large measure to increases in its construction budget. NASA's FY2008 R&D budget increased to $12.8 billion, a 7.5% increase over FY2007, due primarily to increases in two initiatives: the international space station and the crew launch vehicle/crew exploration vehicle combination. FY2008 research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding for the Department of Defense increased by 1.1%. DOD's science and technology research programs received $12.8 billion for FY2008, though DOD had requested $10.8 billion. DOD's request for a $3.9 billion RDT&E increase under its Global War on Terror initiative was not included in P.L. 110-116 or P.L. 110-161. |
crs_RL32303 | crs_RL32303_0 | 108-447 (H.R. 4818) Enacted
Following a series of three continuing resolutions, the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED) Appropriations Act, 2005, was enacted on December 8, 2004, as Division F of P.L. Prior to the 0.80% reduction for most discretionary activities (see page 8 ), the act provides $144.0 billion for L-HHS-ED discretionary programs; the comparable FY2004 amount was $139.8 billion. 108-636 ) , its version of FY2005 bill, which would have provided $143.1 billion in L-HHS-ED discretionary appropriations. President's Budget Submitted
On February 2, 2004, the President submitted the FY2005 budget to Congress; the request was for $142.9 billion in discretionary funds for L-HHS-ED programs. This bill provides most of the discretionary funds for three federal departments and several related agencies including the Social Security Administration (SSA). The request proposed increases of $1.0 billion for ESEA Title I, Part A Grants to Local Educational Agencies (LEAs) for the Education of the Disadvantaged, $1.0 billion for Special Education Part B Grants to States under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and $0.8 billion for Pell Grants. 5006 ( H.Rept. 4818 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, was signed into law on December 8, 2004, as P.L. For DOL, funding changes of at least $100 million occurred only for WIA programs in aggregate, with an increase of $217 million; the WIA total includes $250 million for the initial funding of the WIA Community College Initiative. For HHS, compared to FY2004 appropriations, $131 million more is provided for Community Health Centers, $113 million more for Health Care-related Facilities and Activities, $167 million more for the CDC, $800 million more for the NIH, $311 million more for LIHEAP, and $124 million more for Head Start. Educational Technology State Grants are decreased by $192 million. For Related Agencies, the SSA Limitation on Administrative Expenses is increased by $467 million compared to FY2004. Overall, the conference agreement provides $10.6 billion in discretionary appropriations for the L-HHS-ED related agencies, $0.5 billion more than in FY2004. This new prohibition has been referred to as the "Weldon Amendment" ( H.Rept. Department of Health and Human Services
The FY2005 budget request for discretionary appropriations at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was $63.2 billion, $1.0 billion (1.6%) more than the FY2004 appropriations of $62.2 billion, as shown in Table 8 . The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), funded at $4.4 billion in FY2004, would have been reduced by $153 million under the request. 108-792 , p. 1271)—so that health care entities cannot be required to provide abortion services. CRS Report RL31865, The Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP): Program and Funding , by [author name scrubbed]. 108-309 , P.L. H.R. 108-199 (H.R. 108-345 ). 108-447 . | This report tracks the legislative progress of the FY2005 appropriations for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED). This legislation provides discretionary funds for three major federal departments and related agencies. The report summarizes L-HHS-ED discretionary funding issues but not authorization or entitlement issues.
On February 2, 2004, the President submitted the FY2005 budget request to the Congress, including $142.9 billion in discretionary L-HHS-ED funds; the comparable FY2004 appropriation was $139.8 billion, enacted primarily through P.L. 108-199. The House and Senate FY2004 proposals—H.R. 5006 (H.Rept. 108-636) and S. 2810 (S.Rept. 108-345), respectively—were combined in Division F of H.R. 4818 (H.Rept. 108-792), the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, to provide $144.0 billion of discretionary L-HHS-ED funds prior to a reduction (see page 8). Three continuing resolutions, beginning with P.L. 108-309, provided temporary FY2005 funding until H.R. 4818 was signed into law on December 8, 2004, as P.L. 108-447.
Department of Labor (DOL): DOL discretionary appropriations were $11.8 billion in FY2004; $12.1 billion is provided for FY2005. Funding is increased by $217 million for the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) programs; $250 million is designated for a WIA Community College Initiative. Restrictions on new DOL overtime regulations were not included in P.L. 108-447.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): HHS discretionary appropriations were $62.2 billion in FY2004; $64.2 billion is provided for FY2005. Funding for the National Institutes of Health (NIH) is increased by $800 million. The Community Health Centers, Health Care-related Facilities and Activities, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), and Head Start each receive increases of at least $100 million. Abortion restrictions are extended to protect funding for health care entities that do not provide abortion services; this additional restriction has been referred to as the "Weldon Amendment."
Department of Education (ED): ED discretionary appropriations were $55.7 billion in FY2004, $57.0 billion is provided for FY2005. Funding is increased for Title I, Part A Grants to Local Educational Agencies by $500 million, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Part B Grants to States by $607 million, and Pell Grants by $458 million. Funding for Educational Technology State Grants is reduced by $192 million.
Related Agencies: Discretionary appropriations for related agencies were $10.1 billion in FY2004, $10.6 billion is provided for FY2005. Administrative Expenses of the Social Security Administration (SSA) are increased by $467 million. |
crs_R43262 | crs_R43262_0 | Introduction
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. Section 953(b) of the act, the so-called pay ratio provision, requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to craft rules necessary to implement a requirement that public company quarterly mandatory disclosures to the agency include the ratio between the total compensation of their chief executive officer (CEO) and all other employees. To address concerns over the challenges of calculating worker median pay, the SEC has proposed giving firms the flexibility to "select a [calculation] methodology," which could include the use of a statistical sample of the total worker population. Other factors that may help to reinforce a "cozy" CEO/board dynamic are when CEOs also serve as the board chair and when many directors are themselves active or retired CEOs. Since 1938, as part of its mission to ensure that public companies provide investors with material information to make informed investment and corporate governance voting decisions, the SEC has adopted an array of additional executive pay-related mandatory corporate disclosure regulations, including
disclosure of information concerning the amount and the kinds of compensation paid to its chief executive officer, chief financial officer, and the three other most highly compensated executive officers; disclosure of the criteria used in reaching executive compensation decisions and the degree of the relationship between the company's executive compensation practices and corporate performance; disclosure on how a company's executive pay policies might encourage excessive risk-taking; the objectives of the company's compensation program; what kinds of performance the compensation program is designed to reward; the elements of the compensation program; why the company has selected each element in the compensation program; how the amount of each compensation element is determined; and how each compensation element fits into the issuer's overall compensation objectives. The SEC's Proposal to Implement the Pay Ratio Provision
On September 18, 2013, the SEC voted 3-2 to propose a new rule that would require public companies to disclose the ratio of the total compensation of its CEO to the median total compensation of the rest of its employees as required by Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act. 1135 (Huizenga) was ordered to be reported by the House Financial Services Committee on June 19, 2013, and is similar to legislation in the 112 th Congress, H.R. H.R. She argued that the pay ratio provision "has the potential to provide useful information to shareholders about the ratio of CEO pay to median worker pay." Still, there appears to be a general consensus among critics that the provision is not likely to result in meaningful information to investors because the resulting data are not likely to pass the materiality test. Some investor groups have lent conceptual support to the operational importance of firms paying attention to CEO-worker pay ratios. An example is a scenario in which a high CEO-worker pay ratio could publicly embarrass a corporate board. This is because global firms could have overseas workers who reside in different countries with different average wage rates, different costs of living, different tax regimes, and different levels of government-provided benefits. Proponents of the pay ratio provision counter that such shortcomings can be reasonably addressed. Expressing doubts about the benefits some ascribe to the pay ratio provision, SEC staff commentary in the SEC's pay provision proposal noted that company-specific information about median employee pay would be new investor information that resulted from the pay ratio provision. Various proponents of the pay provision, such as Senator Robert Menendez (its original sponsor), say that the provision was in part a response to perceived excessive CEO pay levels. A concern is that the cost of computing the ratio may impose what some describe as "immense" costs, especially for large multinational or multi-segment companies. It has also been reported that many large and sophisticated global companies have human resource, payroll, and benefits systems that are not centralized, which could mean that they would have to reconcile data calculations across all countries in which they have a presence and then ensure that the data are accurate to comply with the pay ratio provision. Based on the survey, the center said that for many companies, implementation costs for the pay provisions are likely to be in the millions of dollars. | Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Consumer Protection and Wall Street Reform Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203), known as the "pay ratio provision," requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to write rules to implement a requirement that public companies disclose the ratio between the total compensation of a company's chief executive officer (CEO) and the median compensation of all other employees. On September 18, 2013, the agency released proposals to implement the pay ratio provision. A firm will be able to choose its own methodology to calculate worker median pay, including statistical sampling.
Supporters of the provision, including its sponsor Senator Robert Menendez, argue that the public company data on CEO-worker pay disparity that will result from the provision will pressure corporate boards to be more restrained in pay packages to CEOs. The strategy can be seen as a measure to address what some describe as a board/CEO dynamic that can result in perceived excessive compensation for CEOs: board members may feel beholden to the CEO, who may also serve as board chair. Research consistent with this notion of insufficiently independent boards exists. Other research, however, appears to be consistent with the view that public company CEOs operate in a generally competitive marketplace in which the value that they give to shareholders is fairly compensated.
Other supporters of the pay ratio provision, including consumer groups, labor groups, and pension funds, also claim that disclosures that will result from the provision will help to inform investor decision making, including on whether a CEO's compensation is reasonable given a firm's overall worker compensation picture. If a corporate disclosure adds value to the investing process, it is said to provide material information. Materiality is central to the SEC's adoption of disclosure regulations, including the compensation disclosure rules that it has issued over the years. The SEC has observed that the usefulness to investors of the company-specific pay ratio data in the pay ratio provision cannot be quantified.
Critics of the pay ratio provision, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, human resources groups, and other business-related groups, counter that the value of corporate disclosure data is linked to the ability of investors to use it to compare various firms. A principal concern is that this comparative value of the ratios will be undermined. An additional concern is that the provision will mislead investors who try to compare the CEO-worker pay ratios from domestic firms in industries with differing levels of worker pay and from domestic firms without a global workforce relative to domestic firms with global workers who are paid at varying wage levels in different currencies.
There is also some concern that the pay ratio provision is likely to result in substantial compliance challenges and costs, especially for large multinational or multi-segmented firms with decentralized payroll systems. Some estimates are that implementation costs for some companies could be in the millions of dollars. The SEC acknowledged that such firms would be likely to face greater compliance challenges and costs. In the aggregate, the proposal estimated that firms would spend about $72 million over a three-year period to comply with the pay ratio provision with large, multinational firms likely facing the greatest costs.
H.R. 1135 (Huizenga) would repeal the pay ratio provision, Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act. H.R. 1135 was ordered to be reported by the House Financial Services Committee on June 19, 2013. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R40709 | crs_R40709_0 | Background
The Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program was created by Title I of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (the '94 Crime Act). The mission of the COPS program is to advance community policing in all jurisdictions across the United States. The COPS program awards grants to state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies throughout the United States so they can hire and train law enforcement officers to participate in community policing, purchase and deploy new crime-fighting technologies, and develop and test new and innovative policing strategies. The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-162 ) reauthorized the COPS program through FY2009. Authorized appropriations for the COPS program expired in FY2009. As such, Congress could consider legislation to reauthorize the COPS program. Debate about reauthorization of the program could be contentious because the COPS program is one of the primary means for providing federal assistance to state and local law enforcement, but at the same time, Congress is considering ways to reduce discretionary spending in order to shrink the federal budget deficit. This report provides an overview and analysis of issues Congress might consider if it chooses to take up legislation to reauthorize the COPS program. Current Legislative Issues
If Congress considers the future of the COPS program, there are several issues it might discuss, including the following:
Given current trends in violent crime and research findings on the ability of additional law enforcement officers and COPS grants to reduce crime, should Congress consider changing the focus of the COPS program away from providing grants to hire additional officers and toward providing grants to support law enforcement's operations? Did the COPS Office meet its goal of placing 100,000 new officers on the street? What does this mean for oversight of the program? Are hiring grants a cost-effective way of combating crime? Is there programmatic overlap between the COPS Office of Justice Programs (OJP) grant programs? Should funding for the COPS program be appropriated as currently authorized in statute? | The Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program was created by Title I of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322). The mission of the COPS program is to advance community policing in all jurisdictions across the United States. The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-162) reauthorized the COPS program through FY2009 and changed the COPS program from a multi-grant program to a single-grant program.
The COPS program awards grants to state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies throughout the United States so they can hire and train law enforcement officers to participate in community policing, purchase and deploy new crime-fighting technologies, and develop and test new and innovative policing strategies. Authorized appropriations for the COPS program expired in FY2009. As such, Congress could consider legislation to reauthorize the COPS program. Debate about reauthorization of the program could be contentious because the COPS program is one of the primary means for providing federal assistance to state and local law enforcement, but at the same time, Congress is considering ways to reduce discretionary spending in order to shrink the federal budget deficit. This report provides an overview of issues Congress may consider if it chooses to take up legislation to reauthorize the COPS program.
If Congress considers the future of the COPS program, there are several issues it might discuss, including the following:
Given current trends in violent crime and research findings on the ability of additional law enforcement officers and COPS grants to reduce crime, should Congress consider changing the focus of the COPS program away from providing grants to hire additional officers and toward providing grants to support law enforcement's operations? Did the COPS Office meet its goal of placing 100,000 new officers on the street? What does this mean for oversight of the program? Are hiring grants a cost-effective way of combating crime? Is there programmatic overlap between the COPS Office of Justice Programs (OJP) grant programs? Should funding for the COPS program be appropriated as currently authorized in statute? |
crs_RS22543 | crs_RS22543_0 | Background
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act is both a grants statute and a civil rights statute. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 27, 2006. Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School District was dispositive of the question of whether non-attorney parents of a child with a disability could represent their child in court. Currently, there is a three way split in their determinations of this issue with some circuits finding that non-attorney parents may not proceed pro se , another circuit holding that non-attorney parents have no limitations on their ability to proceed, and other courts of appeals holding that parents can proceed on procedural claims but must use a lawyer for substantive claims. | The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Winkelman v. Parma City School District (05-983) to determine whether, and if so, under what circumstances non-attorney parents of a child with a disability may bring suit without using an attorney under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The circuit courts are split in their determinations of this issue with some circuits finding that non-attorney parents may not proceed pro se , another circuit holding that non-attorney parents have no limitations on their ability to proceed, and other courts of appeals holding that parents can proceed on procedural claims but must use a lawyer for substantive claims. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43239 | crs_R43239_0 | The first section surveys the political transformation of Venezuela under the populist rule of President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) and the first two years of the government of President Nicolás Maduro, including the government's severe crackdown on opposition protests in 2014. On December 7, 2016, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported S.Res. On September 27, 2016, the House approved H.Res. 851 (Wasserman Schultz) expressing profound concern about the humanitarian situation, urging the release of political prisoners, and calling for the Venezuelan government to hold the recall referendum this year. 2012 Presidential Election. Human rights abuses increased as the government violently suppressed the opposition. Efforts toward dialogue at the Organization of American States were thwarted by Venezuela, and a dialogue facilitated by the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) ultimately was unsuccessful. The government imprisoned a major opposition figure, Leopoldo López, in February, and two opposition mayors in March. Vatican Prompts Renewed Efforts at Dialogue
In late October 2016, after an appeal by Pope Francis, the Venezuelan government and most of the opposition (with the exception of Leopoldo López's Popular Will party) agreed to talks mediated by the Vatican along with the former presidents of the Dominican Republic, Spain, and Panama, and the head of UNASUR. The two sides issued a declaration on November 12 expressing firm commitment to a peaceful, respectful, and constructive coexistence. They also issued a statement that included agreement to improve the supply of food and medicine, resolve the situation of the three National Assembly representatives blocked from taking office, and work together in naming two CNE members whose terms expire in December. Some opposition activists strongly criticized the dialogue as a way for the government to avoid taking any real actions, such as releasing all political prisoners. The next round of talks, scheduled for December 6, 2016, was suspended until January 2017, but many observers are pessimistic about the dialogue's future. Since mid-2014, however, the rapid decline in the price of oil, which accounts for 96% of Venezuelan exports, has hit Venezuela hard, with a contracting economy, rising inflation, declining international reserves, and increasing poverty—all exacerbated by what most observers see as the Maduro government's economic mismanagement. U.S. Relations and Policy
While the United States traditionally has had close relations with Venezuela, a major oil supplier to the United States, there was significant friction with the Chávez government, and this has continued under the Maduro government. 113-278 and EO 13692 in July 2015.) In the run-up to Venezuela's legislative elections in December 2015, the Obama Administration continued to speak out about the poor human rights situation and efforts by the Venezuelan government to disadvantage the opposition. In terms of congressional action, the House Appropriations Committee's report to the FY2017 foreign operations appropriations measure, H.Rept. 114-290 to S. 3117 , would have fully funded the Administration's request but noted that additional funds could be made available if further programmatic opportunities in Venezuela arise. As noted above, the 114 th Congress did not complete action on FY2017 appropriation, but in December 2016, it approved a continuing resolution providing ( P.L. The opposition focused much of 2016 on efforts to recall President Maduro through a national referendum, but the government resorted to delaying tactics to impede and slow the process. It imposed visa restrictions on more than 60 current and former Venezuelan officials responsible for or complicit in human rights violations and imposed asset-blocking sanctions on 7 Venezuelans for human rights violations. Legislation Initiatives
113 th Congress
P.L. The Administration requested $5 million in Economic Support Funds for Venezuela democracy and human rights projects, and ultimately an estimated $4.3 million in appropriations is being provided. Section 5(e) terminates the requirement to impose sanctions on December 31, 2016. 114 th Congress
P.L. The law extended the termination of sanctions under the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 through December 31, 2019. 114-254 ( H.R. In April 2015, the bill was originally introduced as the Energy and Water Development and Related Agency Appropriations Act, 2016, but in December 2016, the measure became the legislative vehicle for a FY2017 continuing resolution funding most programs, including foreign aid appropriations, at the FY2016 level minus an across-the-board reduction of almost 0.2%, through April 28, 2017. P.L. As passed, the resolution (1) expresses profound concern about widespread shortages of essential medicines and basic food products and urges President Maduro to permit the delivery of humanitarian assistance; (2) calls on the Venezuelan government to release all political prisoners, including U.S. citizens, to provide protections for freedom of expression and assembly, and to respect internationally recognized human rights; (3) supports meaningful efforts toward dialogue that leads to respect for Venezuelan's constitutional mechanisms and resolves the country's political, economic, social, and humanitarian crisis; (4) affirms support for OAS Secretary General Almagro's invocation of Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and urges the OAS Permanent Council to undertake a collective assessment of the constitutional and democratic order in Venezuela; (5) expresses great concern over the Venezuelan executive's lack of respect for the principle of separation of powers, its overreliance on emergency decree powers, and its threat to judicial independence; (6) calls on the Venezuelan government and security forces to respect the Venezuelan constitution, including provisions that provide citizens with the right to peacefully purse a fair and timely recall referendum for their president this year; (7) stresses the urgency of strengthening the rule of law and increasing efforts to combat impunity and public corruption in Venezuela; (8) urges the U.S. President to provide full support for OAS efforts in favor of constitutional and democratic solutions to the political impasse and to instruct appropriate federal agencies to hold Venezuelan government officials accountable for violations of U.S. law and abuses of internationally recognized human rights; and (9) urges the U.S. President to continue to stand in solidarity with the Venezuelan people by urging the Maduro government to hold a fair and free recall referendum by the end of 2016; release all political prisoners, including U.S. citizens; adhere to democratic principles; and permit the delivery of emergency food and medicine. The report to the House bill would have provided $8 million for democracy and human rights programs in Venezuela. 537 (Cardin) . | Although historically the United States had close relations with Venezuela, a major oil supplier, friction in bilateral relations increased under the leftist, populist government of President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), who died in 2013 after battling cancer. After Chávez's death, Venezuela held presidential elections in which acting President Nicolás Maduro narrowly defeated Henrique Capriles of the opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD), with the opposition alleging significant irregularities. In 2014, the Maduro government violently suppressed protests and imprisoned a major opposition figure, Leopoldo López, along with others.
In December 2015, the MUD initially won a two-thirds supermajority in National Assembly elections, a major defeat for the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). The Maduro government subsequently thwarted the legislature's power by preventing three MUD representatives from taking office (denying the opposition a supermajority) and using the Supreme Court to block bills approved by the legislature.
For much of 2016, opposition efforts were focused on recalling President Maduro through a national referendum, but the government slowed down the referendum process and suspended it indefinitely in October. After an appeal by Pope Francis, the government and most of the opposition (with the exception of Leopoldo López's Popular Will party) agreed to talks mediated by the Vatican along with the former presidents of the Dominican Republic, Spain, and Panama and the head of the Union of South American Nations. The two sides issued a declaration in November expressing firm commitment to a peaceful, respectful, and constructive coexistence. They also issued a statement that included an agreement to improve the supply of food and medicine and to resolve the situation of the three National Assembly representatives. Some opposition activists strongly criticized the dialogue as a way for the government to avoid taking any real actions, such as releasing all political prisoners. The next round of talks was scheduled for December but was suspended until January 2017, and many observers are skeptical that the dialogue will resume.
The rapid decline in the price of oil since 2014 hit Venezuela hard, with a contracting economy (projected -10% in 2016), high inflation (projected 720% at the end of 2016), declining international reserves, and increasing poverty—all exacerbated by the government's economic mismanagement. The situation has increased poverty, with severe shortages of food and medicines and high crime rates.
U.S. Policy
U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress have had concerns for more than a decade about the deterioration of human rights and democratic conditions in Venezuela and the government's lack of cooperation on antidrug and counterterrorism efforts. After a 2014 government-opposition dialogue failed, the Administration imposed visa restrictions and asset-blocking sanctions on Venezuelan officials involved in human rights abuses.
The Obama Administration continued to speak out about the democratic setback and poor human rights situation, called repeatedly for the release of political prisoners, expressed deep concern about the humanitarian situation, and strongly supported dialogue. The Administration also supported the efforts Organization of American States Secretary General Luis Almagro to focus attention on Venezuela's democratic setback.
Congressional Action
Congress enacted legislation in 2014—the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278)—to impose targeted sanctions on those responsible for certain human rights abuses (with a termination date of December 2016 for the requirement to impose sanctions). In July 2016, Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 114-194) extending the termination date of the requirement to impose sanctions set forth in P.L. 113-278 through 2019.
In September 2016, the House approved H.Res. 851 (Wasserman Schulz), which expressed profound concern about the humanitarian situation, urged the release of political prisoners, and called for the Venezuelan government to hold the recall referendum this year. In the Senate, a similar but not identical resolution, S.Res. 537 (Cardin), was reported, amended, by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in December 2016.
For more than a decade, Congress has appropriated funding for democracy and human rights programs in Venezuela. An estimated $6.5 million is being provided in FY2016, and the Administration requested $5.5 million for FY2017. The House version of the FY2017 foreign operations appropriations bill (H.R. 5912, H.Rept. 114-693) would have provided $8 million, whereas the Senate version (S. 3117, S.Rept. 114-290) would have fully funded the request. The 114th Congress did not complete action on FY2017 appropriations, although it approved a continuing resolution in December 2016 (P.L. 114-254) appropriating foreign aid funding through April 28, 2017, at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the board reduction of almost 0.2%.
Note: This report provides background on political and economic developments in Venezuela, U.S. policy, and U.S. legislative action and initiatives from 2013 to 2016 covering the 113th and 114th Congresses. It will not be updated. For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Situation and U.S. Policy Overview. |
crs_RL32924 | crs_RL32924_0 | 109-148 , on December 30, 2005, and he signed the FY2006 defense authorization into law, P.L. On December 19, the House approved the appropriations conference agreement by a vote of 308-106 and the authorization conference agreement by a vote of 371-41. On December 21, the Senate approved the conference agreement on the defense authorization bill, and it approved the appropriations conference agreement by 93-0, though only after removing from the bill a provision to allow oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. The House approved the enrolling resolution on December 22, clearing the bill for the President. The appropriations bill not only provides funding for the Department of Defense, but it is also a vehicle for other measures, including reallocation of $29 billion in Hurricane Katrina recovery funds, emergency funding of $3.8 billion for avian flu preparedness, and an across-the-board spending cut of $8.5 billion. Cuts in defense spending in the defense appropriations bill: The House-passed defense appropriations bill trimmed $3 billion from the Administration request, and the defense appropriations bill as passed by the Senate trimmed $7 billion, leaving those amounts available for non-defense appropriations. In a measure attached to the defense appropriations bill, Congress also approved an across-the-board cut in all appropriations, which trims an additional $4.1 billion from Department of Defense funds. The conference agreements on the authorization and appropriations bills both include, without change, the McCain amendments requiring DOD adherence to the Army field manual on interrogations and prohibiting cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees. The conference agreements also include an amended version of the Graham-Levin amendment establishing procedures for tribunals. The conference provision removes a Senate reference to a "schedule" for achieving specified measures of progress in Iraq and substitutes a requirement for a "plan." The authorization conference report provides an increase of 10,000 in Army and 1,000 in Marine Corps end-strength in FY2006. On July 21, the Senate approved a Graham-Clinton amendment to the authorization bill to allow all non-deployed reservists to enroll in TRICARE. The President signed the defense appropriations bill into law on December 30, and he signed the defense authorization into law on January 6. A number of other issues were also on the agenda in Congress this year, including,
Whether Congress should, while not directly setting a date for withdrawing from Iraq, require the Administration to establish a strategy and measures of progress that will lead to withdrawal; Whether the appropriations committees should trim defense funding in order to limit cuts in non-defense discretionary programs; Whether Congress should provide additional military personnel benefits, including (1) greater access to DOD-provided health insurance for non-deployed military reservists and their dependents and (2) permanently increased death gratuities and insurance; Whether Congress should require a substantial increase in active duty end-strength, particularly in the Army, to ease pressures on the force caused by operations abroad; Whether Congress should increase funding for navy shipbuilding or should approve advance appropriations or other novel funding mechanisms; Whether Congress should accept or reject Administration plans to retire an aircraft carrier and reduce the number of deployable carriers from 12 to 11; Whether Congress should approve the proposed termination of C-130J cargo aircraft procurement (a proposal the Administration subsequently withdrew); Whether Congress should approve the proposed termination, after FY2008, of F/A-22 fighter procurement; How Congress should exercise oversight over a number of major weapons programs in which cost have grown or development has been delayed, including the Army Future Combat System, missile defense, the multi-service F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and a number of space-launch and satellite systems; Whether Congress should restructure priorities in the Administration's missile defense development program; How Congress should oversee and finance Army plans for a far-reaching reorganization of its combat forces to increase the number of deployable combat brigades and to turn brigades, rather than divisions, into the major unit of action in future operations; Whether Congress should take steps to regulate the Defense Department's restructuring its civilian personnel system following Congress's approval, in the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act, of the Pentagon's request for broad authority to reform civil service pay and performance rules; Whether Congress should approve the Defense Department's request for changes in environmental laws and regulations governing military training in addition to changes Congress approved in the FY2004 defense authorization; Whether Congress should approve Department of Energy plans to study new nuclear weapons, including the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, and whether Congress should establish guidelines for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program; Whether Congress should require changes in DOD policies affecting a number of "social issues," including the deployment of women in combat support units, abortions at military facilities abroad, and handling of sexual abuse cases; Whether Congress should take any action to restrict military base closures, even as the a formal base closure process was proceeding; and Whether Congress should take any action on a number of other issues, including treatment of military detainees, acquisition of tanker aircraft, and strengthening of defense "Buy American" requirements. The appropriations conference agreement provides $50 billion. P.L. The conference agreement included the Senate measure. The authorization conference agreement includes a provision prohibiting acquisition of the DD(X) through a single shipyard. The conference agreement on the energy and water bill eliminates RNEP funding. Defense Authorization
H.R. 109-163 ), January 6, 2006. Defense Appropriations
H.R. | The House approved conference agreements on the FY2006 defense appropriations (H.R. 2863) and defense authorization (H.R. 1815) bills on December 19, 2005. The Senate approved both measures on December 21, though only after removing from the appropriations bill a provision to allow oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. On December 22, the House approved an enrolling resolution that removed the ANWR provision, clearing the measure for the President. The appropriations bill is also a vehicle for other measures, including reallocation of $29 billion in Hurricane Katrina recovery funds, emergency funding of $3.8 billion for avian flu preparedness, and an across-the-board spending cut of $8.5 billion. The President signed the defense appropriations bill into law on December 30, 2005, P.L. 109-148, and he signed the authorization on January 6, 2006, P.L. 109-163. Key issues resolved by the conference agreements on the defense bills include:
Amount of defense appropriations: The Senate cut $7 billion from the Administration request, and the House trimmed $3 billion. The conference agreement cuts $4.4 billion, and the across-the-board cut trims an additional $4.1 billion from DOD. Prisoner abuse: The authorization and appropriations conference agreements include Senate provisions regulating DOD interrogation of detainees and prohibiting cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Tribunals for prisoners: The authorization and appropriations conference agreements include amended Senate language that establishes military tribunals to review the status of detainees and that permits limited appeals of findings to federal courts. Exit strategy in Iraq: The House rejected amendments to the authorization and appropriations bills to establish an exit strategy. The Senate approved a measure that requires quarterly reports on conditions for withdrawal and a schedule for achieving such conditions but does not set a timetable. The authorization conference includes an amended version of the Senate measure. Women in combat: The conference agreement requires 30 days notice to Congress of changes in current regulations. Additional Iraq funding: The appropriations conference agreement provides $50 billion. Army and Marine end-strength: The authorization conference adds 10,000 to Army and 1,000 to Marine end-strength in FY2006. Navy shipbuilding: The House authorization and appropriations bills restructured Navy shipbuilding dramatically and terminated the DD(X) destroyer. The conference agreements do not terminate the DD(X) and require that it be produced at two shipyards. Reserve health insurance: The Senate authorization allowed all reservists to enroll in the TRICARE health insurance program. The conference agreement limits it to those without private insurance. New nuclear weapons: The conference agreement on the Energy and Water appropriations bill eliminates Department of Energy funds for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. |
crs_R42532 | crs_R42532_0 | Introduction
Carbon capture and sequestration (or storage)—known as CCS—is a physical process that involves capturing manmade carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) at its source and storing it before its release to the atmosphere. CCS could reduce the amount of CO 2 emitted to the atmosphere despite the continued use of fossil fuels. An integrated CCS system would include three main steps: (1) capturing CO 2 and separating it from other gases; (2) purifying, compressing, and transporting the captured CO 2 to the sequestration site; and (3) injecting the CO 2 in subsurface geological reservoirs or storing it in the oceans. As a measure for mitigating global climate change, CCS has attracted congressional interest and support because several projects in the United States and abroad—typically associated with oil and gas production—are successfully capturing, injecting, and storing CO 2 underground, albeit at relatively small scales. The oil and gas industry in the United States injects nearly 50 million metric tons of CO 2 underground each year to help recover oil and gas resources (a process known as enhanced oil recovery, or EOR). Electricity-generating plants are among the most likely initial candidates for capture, separation, and storage or reuse of CO 2 because they are predominantly large, stationary, single-point sources of emissions. The capture phase of the CCS process, however, may be 80% or more of the total costs for CCS. U.S. commercial electricity-generating plants currently do not capture large volumes of CO 2 because they are not required to and there are no economic incentives to do so. The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) flagship CCS demonstration project, FutureGen, plans to retrofit an existing power unit with an oxy-fuel combustion unit. CO2 Sequestration
Three main types of geological formations are being considered for carbon sequestration: (1) depleted oil and gas reservoirs, (2) deep saline reservoirs, and (3) unmineable coal seams. Advantages and Disadvantages
Depleted or abandoned oil and gas fields, especially in the United States, are considered prime candidates for CO 2 storage for several reasons:
oil and gas originally trapped did not escape for millions of years, demonstrating the structural integrity of the reservoir; extensive studies for oil and gas typically have characterized the geology of the reservoir; computer models have often been developed to understand how hydrocarbons move in the reservoir, and the models could be applied to predicting how CO 2 could move; and infrastructure and wells from oil and gas extraction may be in place and might be used for handling CO 2 storage. The sheer volume of CO 2 envisioned for CCS as a climate mitigation option is overwhelming compared to the amount of CO 2 used for EOR. From estimates of the potential storage capacity in saline reservoirs, it is likely that the vast majority of CO 2 injected underground would be stored in these formations, assuming that CCS were deployed on a commercial scale across the United States. One disadvantage is therefore the possibility that displaced brine could leak into underground sources of drinking water. The total lower estimate (sum of the three reservoir types) from the 2012 Carbon Sequestration Atlas shown in Table 2 indicates the potential to store the equivalent of over 1,100 years of CO 2 emissions from electricity generation in the United States at current emission rates (2.1 billion tons per year). Although DOE has identified substantial potential storage capacity for CO 2 , particularly in deep saline formations, large-scale injection experiments are only beginning in the United States to test how different types of reservoirs perform during CO 2 injection. Data from the experiments will undoubtedly be crucial to future permitting and site approval regulations. Acceptance by the general public of large-scale deployment of CCS may be a significant challenge if the majority of CCS projects involve private land. Some of the large-scale injection tests could garner information about public acceptance, as local communities become familiar with the concept, process, and results of CO 2 injection tests. | Carbon capture and sequestration (or storage)—known as CCS—has attracted congressional interest as a measure for mitigating global climate change because large amounts of carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted from fossil fuel use in the United States are potentially available to be captured and stored underground and prevented from reaching the atmosphere. Large, industrial sources of CO2, such as electricity-generating plants, are likely initial candidates for CCS because they are predominantly stationary, single-point sources. Electricity generation contributes over 40% of U.S. CO2 emissions from fossil fuels. Currently, U.S. power plants do not capture large volumes of CO2 for CCS.
Several projects in the United States and abroad—typically associated with oil and gas production—are successfully capturing, injecting, and storing CO2 underground, albeit at relatively small scales. The oil and gas industry in the United States injects nearly 50 million tons of CO2 underground each year for the purpose of enhanced oil recovery (EOR). The volume of CO2 envisioned for CCS as a climate mitigation option is overwhelming compared to the amount of CO2 used for EOR. According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the United States has the potential to store billions of tons of CO2 underground and keep the gas trapped there indefinitely. Capturing and storing the equivalent of decades or even centuries of CO2 emissions from power plants (at current levels of emissions) suggests that CCS has the potential to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions substantially while allowing the continued use of fossil fuels.
An integrated CCS system would include three main steps: (1) capturing and separating CO2 from other gases; (2) purifying, compressing, and transporting the captured CO2 to the sequestration site; and (3) injecting the CO2 in subsurface geological reservoirs or storing it in the oceans. Deploying CCS technology on a commercial scale would be a vast undertaking. The CCS process, although simple in concept, would require significant investments of capital and of time. Capital investment would be required for the technology to capture CO2 and for the pipeline network to transport the captured CO2 to the disposal site. Time would be required to assess the potential CO2 storage reservoir, inject the captured CO2, and monitor the injected plume to ensure against leaks to the atmosphere or to underground sources of drinking water, potentially for years or decades until injection activities cease and the injected plume stabilizes.
Three main types of geological formations in the United States are being considered for storing large amounts of CO2: oil and gas reservoirs, deep saline reservoirs, and unmineable coal seams. The deep ocean also has a huge potential to store carbon; however, direct injection of CO2 into the deep ocean is controversial, and environmental concerns have forestalled planned experiments in the open ocean. Mineral carbonation—reacting minerals with a stream of concentrated CO2 to form a solid carbonate—is well understood, but it is still an experimental process for storing large quantities of CO2.
Large-scale CCS injection experiments are underway in the United States to test how different types of reservoirs perform during CO2 injection of 1 million tons of CO2 per year or more. Results from the experiments will undoubtedly be crucial to future permitting and site approval regulations. Acceptance by the general public of large-scale deployment of CCS may be a significant challenge. Some of the large-scale injection tests could garner information about public acceptance, as citizens become familiar with the concept, process, and results of CO2 injection tests in their local communities. |
crs_RS22777 | crs_RS22777_0 | China has been a strong proponent of an arms control regime in space and has argued for the peaceful use of outer space in the United Nations' Conference on Disarmament and at the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space dialogue. China collaborates with other countries on civilian space activities, but it is not considered a key member of the international space community. Compared to the U.S. Apollo and Soviet Soyez programs of the 1960s and 1970s, China's Shenzhou effort is far more modest. U.S.-China Space Cooperation
China and the United States have a limited history of both civilian and military collaboration in space. China has publicly pushed for more dialogue and joint activities. Mistrust of Chinese space intentions grew in the mid-1990s when U.S. companies were accused of transferring potentially sensitive military information to China. The international community condemned the test as an irresponsible act because it polluted that orbital slot with thousands of pieces of debris that will threaten the space assets of more than two dozen countries, including China's, for years. Options for Possible Cooperation
Information and data sharing. Space policy dialogue. Joint activities. | China has a determined, yet still modest, program of civilian space activities planned for the next decade. The potential for U.S.-China cooperation in space—an issue of interest to Congress—has become more controversial since the January 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test. The test reinforced concerns about Chinese intentions in outer space and jeopardized space assets of more than two dozen countries by creating a large cloud of orbital space debris. Some argue that Chinese capabilities now threaten U.S. space assets in low earth orbit. Others stress the need to expand dialogue with China.
This report outlines recent activities and future plans in China's civilian space sector. It also discusses benefits and trade-offs of possible U.S.-China collaboration in space, as well as several options to improve space relations, including information exchange, policy dialogue, and joint activities. For more information, see CRS Report RS21641, China's Space Program: An Overview, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL32234 | crs_RL32234_0 | Introduction
Congress first mandated that the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) implement an automated entry and exit data system that would track the arrival and departure of every alien in §110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA; P.L. The objective for an automated entry and exit data system was, in part, to develop a mechanism that would be able to track nonimmigrants who overstayed their visas as part of a broader emphasis on immigration control. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks there was a marked shift in priority for implementing an automated entry and exit data system. While the tracking of nonimmigrants who overstayed their visas remained an important goal of the system, border security has become the paramount concern with respect to implementing the system. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program by the Bush Administration. Volume of Entries
Tracking the entry and exit of most foreign nationals at U.S. ports of entry is not a small undertaking. In FY2005, there were over 428 million inspections conducted at U.S. ports of entry, with the majority of the inspections conducted on foreign nationals. Following the terrorist attacks, several provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act, the Border Security Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, however, required the immediate implementation of an automated entry and exit data system and called for enhancements in its development. Related Provisions
While statutorily distinct from §110, the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000 also mandated the development and implementation of a "fully automated entry and exit control system" covering all aliens who enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) at airports and seaports. The act required the plan to describe the functionality of the entry and exit data system that includes the following:
a listing of ports of entry and other DHS and DOS locations with biometric entry data systems in use and whether the systems are located at primary or secondary inspections areas; a listing of ports of entry and other DHS and DOS locations with biometric exit data systems in use; a listing of databases and data systems that are interoperable with the entry and exit data system; a description of identified deficiencies with respect to the accuracy or integrity of the information contained in the entry and exit data system; a description of identified deficiencies with respect to the technology used to process individuals through the system; a description of programs and policies to correct such deficiencies; and an assessment of the effectiveness of the system in fulfilling its intended purposes. Observers fear that the full implementation of US-VISIT will cause massive delays at U.S. ports of entry, primarily at land ports of entry. Some believe that the cost of implementing such a system would outweigh the benefits. Others expressed concern about the inadequacy of current infrastructure, and the lack of consensus with respect to the type of biometric technology that should be used in travel documents. Many continue to question the purpose of such a system. Some argue that resources should be directed at immigration interior enforcement, rather than on an expensive system whose capability is not fully known. | Congress first mandated that the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) implement an automated entry and exit data system that would track the arrival and departure of every alien in §110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). The objective was, in part, to develop a mechanism that would be able to track nonimmigrants who overstayed their visas as part of a broader emphasis on immigration control. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks there was a shift in priority for implementing the system. While the tracking of nonimmigrants who overstayed their visas remained an important goal, border security has become the paramount concern.
Legislation enacted from 1997 to 2000 changed the scope and delayed implementation of §110 of IIRIRA. For example, the INS Data Management Improvement Act rewrote §110 to require the development of a system using data currently collected with no new documentary requirements. The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000 required the development and implementation of a "fully automated entry and exit control system" covering all aliens who enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) at airports and seaports.
Following the terrorist attacks, several provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act and the Border Security Act, however, required the immediate implementation of an automated entry and exit data system and called for enhancements in its development. More recently, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 implements the 9/11 Commission recommendations, including those recommendations that pertain to the integrated entry and exit data system and biometric identifiers in travel documents.
Tracking the entry and exit of foreign nationals at U.S. ports of entry is not a small undertaking. In FY2005, there were over 428 million inspections conducted at U.S. ports of entry, with the majority of the inspections conducted on foreign nationals. Implementing the requirements of an automated entry and exit data system, however, is not without controversy. Some observers fear that the full implementation of US-VISIT will cause massive delays at U.S. ports of entry, primarily at land ports of entry. Some believe that the cost of implementing such a system would outweigh the benefits. Others express concern about the inadequacy of current infrastructure, and the lack of consensus with respect to the type of biometric technology that should be used in travel documents. Many continue to question the purpose of such a system. Some argue that resources should be directed at immigration interior enforcement, rather than on an expensive system whose capability is not fully known.
The automated entry and exit data system was administratively renamed the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT). It is being implemented in phases over the next several years. This report will be updated to reflect new developments. |
crs_R44102 | crs_R44102_0 | Two recent bills, S. 556 and S. 659 , address giving hunting and fishing activities a higher priority in land management. Although both bills address hunting, fishing, and other forms of outdoor recreation, S. 556 is focused on federal lands while S. 659 covers diverse topics such as the regulation of lead shot, imports of polar bear trophies, the funding of land acquisition for recreation, and the reauthorization of certain international wildlife conservation laws. The four traditional land management agencies—the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS), all in the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture—do not maintain data on how many acres of land are currently open to hunting, fishing, and/or recreational shooting. Examples of agencies that limit access to their lands include the Department of Energy and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Both are titled "the Bipartisan Sportsmen's Act of 2015." In addition to its provisions affecting federal lands, S. 556 contains a provision amending the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA; 5 U.S.C. Both bills use definitions of federal land or similar terms in various sections in a manner that leaves some doubt as to the land under consideration. Issues raised during the hearing included the availability of hunting, fishing, and shooting opportunities on federal lands, particularly those of BLM and FS; the use of the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) to purchase lands to support access for recreation; the appropriate use of funds derived from the sale of federal land; and the effect of the bill on wilderness management, among other matters. It would create an "open until closed" management policy for federal lands. It specifies the factors a land management agency would need to consider to justify closing federal lands to hunting, trapping, fishing, or recreational shooting. Trapping currently is allowed under some circumstances on some federal lands, but the use of traps (particularly a design called leghold traps) has been controversial and is less common than traditional hunting on federal lands. The reference to trapping may be unnecessary, because the bill defines hunting to include trapping. In the case of some agency plans, those revisions may not occur for 15 years. Reports to Congress
Two provisions of S. 556 would require federal land management agencies to notify Congress of restrictions on hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting. Land agencies already have permit requirements for some activities mandated in Section 101. 106-206 or results in a loss to the federal government. Study of Hunting, Fishing, and Other Recreational Access to Federal Land
Section 202 would direct federal public land management agencies to study federal lands on which hunting, fishing, and other recreation is allowed but for which the public's access is difficult or nonexistent. Its provisions concern regulating lead shot and sinkers, funding shooting ranges, importing polar bear trophies, hunting over baited fields, carrying loaded arms at Army Corps of Engineers water resource project areas open to the public, and reauthorizing seven wildlife statutes. Lead shot has been banned in the United States for the hunting of migratory waterfowl since 1991 under authority of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205 ). Use of Pittman-Robertson Funds for Shooting Ranges
Section 3 of S. 659 would allow territories and states to use more of the funds allocated to them under the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act (16 U.S.C. §669) for projects involving land acquisition, construction, and expansion of public target ranges for firearms or archery. Section 3 would amend 16 U.S.C. | Hunting, fishing, trapping, and recreational shooting, particularly on federal lands, have been the subjects of various bills for several Congresses. In general, federal land management agencies work with state fish and game agencies in setting quotas, bag or size limits, and other specifics of management. Some agencies currently open more than 90% of their acreage to hunting and fishing. Yet there has been criticism in recent years that insufficient federal land is open to hunting. In the 114th Congress, attention has focused on a pair of companion bills, S. 556 and S. 659. While both are entitled the "Bipartisan Sportsmen's Act of 2015," each addresses different issues.
S. 556 is intended to create or reinforce an "open until closed" management policy regarding these activities as well as for trapping and recreational shooting on federal lands. The bill describes criteria for federal land management agencies to consider in closing federal lands to fishing, hunting, or recreational shooting, and it directs that management is subject to existing law. Ambiguities in the text leave some doubt as to which federal lands are subject to the bill's provisions, which may result in the inclusion of lands managed by the Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Department of Energy. Those agencies typically are not considered land management agencies. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), National Park Service (NPS), and Forest Service (FS) generally are considered land management agencies.
S. 556 would change land management practices on some federal lands and require additional or different analyses, reports, or notices. For some agencies and some of the defined activities, modification may only add or change steps in the planning process. In addition, by including trapping under the definition of hunting, the practice of trapping may be added or encouraged on federal lands where it currently is not encouraged or permitted. Other provisions of the bill specify new procedures for small film crews to operate on federal lands, permit the carrying of bows and crossbows in national parks, and set aside a portion of appropriations under the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) for promoting physical access to federal lands for recreationists. The bill also would require reporting of expenditures under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA; 5 U.S.C. §504) and of payments under the federal government's judgment fund in litigation against the federal government.
S. 659 also addresses matters related to wildlife but is less focused on federal lands. It would exempt lead shot and ammunition and fishing sinkers from the provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA; 15 U.S.C. §2602(2)(B)) and allow territories and states to use more of the funds allocated to them under the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act (16 U.S.C. §669) for projects involving public target ranges for firearms or archery. The bill would allow hunters to import polar bear trophies taken in Canada before the species was listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205). In addition, it would redefine what constitutes hunting waterfowl over a baited field and allow the possession of loaded firearms at Army Corps of Engineers projects in areas open to the public. Finally, the bill would reauthorize or amend seven statutes relating to international wildlife conservation. |
crs_R43365 | crs_R43365_0 | This report discusses the federal regulation of potential "conflicts of interest" which may arise as a result of the personal financial holdings, assets, securities, property, and financial transactions in assets and securities of an official in the executive branch of the federal government. Conflicts of Interest, Generally
Principles Underlying Conflict of Interest Regulation
The underlying principle of the financial conflict of interest laws adopted by Congress, and of the regulations promulgated in the executive branch, embodies the axiom "that a public servant owes undivided loyalty to the Government," and that decisions, advice, and recommendations made by or given to the government by its officers be made in the public interest and not be tainted, even unintentionally, with influence from personal financial interests. When used specifically in reference to federal laws and rules regulating official conduct, however, it generally relates to a potential conflict between a federal employee's official governmental duties and responsibilities on the one hand, and the personal financial or economic interests of the employee on the other. Officers and employees of the federal government may naturally have many outside, private, and personal "interests." Disqualification
The principal statutory method of dealing with potential conflicts of interest of an executive branch officer or employee is to require, under 18 U.S.C. § 208, the disqualification (or "recusal") of the officer or employee from participating in any official governmental matter in which that official (or those persons or entities close enough to the official that their interests may be "imputed" to the official) has any "financial interest." Although there is no de minimis exception expressly stated in the statute, the law does provide that regulations may exempt certain categories of investments and interests which are deemed too remote or inconsequential to affect the performance of an official's governmental duties. The current Office of Government Ethics regulations exempt several such interests, including all interests in "diversified" mutual funds; interests in sector funds which include some companies affected by a governmental matter but where those companies are outside of the primary sector in which that fund specializes; and other sector funds specializing in the particular sector but where one's interest in the fund is no more than $50,000; securities, stocks, and bonds in a publicly traded company which is a party to and directly affected by a governmental matter if one's ownership value is no more than $15,000; securities, stocks, and bonds in such a company which is not a specific party to a matter but is in a class affected by the governmental matter, if the employee's ownership interest is no more than $25,000 (if securities in more than one such company are owned, then the aggregate value cannot exceed $50,000 to be exempt from the statute). Finally, advisory committee members who are "special Government employees" may receive individual waivers for conflicting interests even though such interests are not "insubstantial" (as under a 208(b)(1) waiver), if, after a review of the financial disclosure report of the advisory committee member by the official who appoints that advisory committee member, the appointing official determines that the "potential" conflicts of interest raised by the financial interests of the individual, or by those imputed to him, are "outweigh[ed]" by the "need for the individual's services.... " This waiver may apply to even substantial economic or financial interests of the employee/advisor. The report is reviewed within the agency (and by the Director of the Office of Government Ethics when appropriate for high level officials and nominees) to flag potential conflict of interest issues or problems, and to resolve any such conflicts. Confidential Disclosures
In addition to the legislative and regulatory scheme for public financial disclosure for certain federal officials, there is in place a requirement for confidential disclosure reports to be filed with an employee's agency by some lower level federal officers and employees. However, there are a few instances in which divestiture of an asset or assets may be required. In reviewing or examining the financial interests and potential conflicts of interest of an executive branch official, the agency-specific regulations or statutory provisions—specifically applicable only to officers and employees of that particular agency, commission, or bureau—which limit or prohibit the acquisition or ownership of a particular category or type of financial asset or financial interest, need to be considered and consulted. Divestiture Required Upon Ethics Review
The divestiture of particular assets, properties, or holdings may be required of an individual as a conflict of interest resolution or avoidance mechanism by administrative provisions and review in the executive branch, as well as required by a Senate committee or the Senate as a whole as a condition of favorable action on a presidential nominee requiring Senate confirmation. | Congressional offices reviewing or conducting oversight concerning the operations of executive agencies and departments, reviewing executive branch nominees for high-level appointments, or responding to constituent inquiries or petitions, may often be confronted with issues and questions of possible "conflicts of interest" of agency officials or nominees. This report summarizes and analyzes the issues of conflicts of interest that are addressed in federal law and regulation regarding officers and employees in the executive branch of the federal government.
Federal conflict of interest laws and regulations deal for the most part with the potential conflict between the official duties and responsibilities of a public officer on the one hand, and the outside, personal economic or financial interests of that individual (including the financial interests of that individual's spouse and minor children) on the other. When a particular governmental matter may have a real and predictable impact on an officer's or employee's personal financial interests or assets, that officer's or employee's work on such a matter for the government would raise conflict of interest issues. The concern in such cases is that the judgment of the officer or employee could be influenced and affected, even subtly or unconsciously, by his or her own personal financial stake in the matter, as opposed to decisions, advice, and official actions of public officers being based solely on the overall, general public interest.
Although federal officials may have many and varied outside, personal "interests," federal conflict of interest law and regulation focuses specifically on regulating outside, personal financial interests of the officer. The regulatory scheme for conflicts of interest in the executive branch of the federal government may generally be summarized in three broad categories: disqualification, disclosure, and divestiture.
The principal conflict of interest statute under federal law is a criminal provision which requires federal executive branch officials to disqualify or "recuse" themselves from working personally and substantially on any particular matter before the government in which that official (or those close enough to the official that their interests may be imputed to the official) has any "financial interest." 18 U.S.C. § 208. There are certain financial interests which are considered either de minimis, or too remote or inconsequential to affect the duties expected of employees, and such interests are exempted from the prohibition by regulations of the Office of Government Ethics. Most high-ranking federal officials must file public annual financial disclosure reports, as well as periodic disclosure reports on certain financial transactions, which detail financial holdings, assets, property, and financial transactions of the official, the official's spouse, and dependent children. Additionally, there may be confidential financial disclosure reports required from certain rank-and-file employees who do not file publicly. All of these disclosure reports are reviewed by agency ethics personnel, and are intended to facilitate conflict of interest regulation by identifying assets, property, and ownerships with a conflict potential, and to resolve any such conflicts of interest. Although there is no overall, general divestiture requirement in federal law, the divestiture of assets may be one method of conflict of interest resolution or avoidance that could be required by agency ethics personnel for assets with conflict of interest potential. Additionally, there are particular statutes and regulations applicable to certain officers and agencies which may prohibit the ownership of a range or category of particular assets. These provisions, in addition to prohibiting the acquisition of such assets, may also require the divestiture of such assets already held by incumbent officers or nominees to certain positions. |
crs_R40701 | crs_R40701_0 | Introduction
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. 107-110 ), and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, P.L. 108-446 ) both require all students with disabilities to participate in district and state assessments. Because student achievement on state assessments is used to determine adequate yearly progress (AYP) in state accountability systems mandated by ESEA, schools are now held accountable for the achievement of all students, including students with disabilities. The 113 th Congress is actively considering whether to amend and extend the ESEA. As part of these deliberations, consideration has been given to how students with disabilities are included in accountability systems. Although many students with disabilities are able to participate in the general state assessment, either with or without accommodations, other students with disabilities may not be able to participate fully in the general state assessment because of the nature and severity of their disability. These students may need an alternate assessment that is tailored to their needs and allows them to more accurately demonstrate what they know and can do. There are currently five assessment options for measuring the achievement of students with disabilities: (1) general state assessment, (2) general state assessment with accommodations, (3) alternate assessment based on grade-level standards, (4) alternate assessment based on alternate achievement standards (AA-AAS), and (5) alternate assessment based on modified achievement standards (AA-MAS). These restrictions are outlined in regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) and have numerous implications for state accountability systems. In August 2013, ED proposed regulations that would require states to transition away from AA-MAS. 107-110 ) in exchange for meeting four principles established by ED. No later than the 2014-2015 school year, states operating under the ESEA flexibility package must include students who are currently eligible to take alternate assessments based on modified academic achievement standards in their assessments based on grade-level academic achievement standards. Thus, 42 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico will no longer be able to administer alternate assessments based on modified academic achievement standards as of the 2014-2015 school year, regardless of when or if ED enacts the aforementioned proposed regulations. As none of the aforementioned changes have been promulgated through statutory language or regulation, this report focuses primarily on the current ED regulations that allow states to use scores from alternate assessments for AYP calculations in accountability systems. It does, however, highlight some issues that may arise due to the proposed regulations and the issuance of the ESEA flexibility package. The following sections describe the regulations issued by ED concerning the development of AA-AAS and AA-MAS and their use in state accountability systems. Students in any of the disability categories described in IDEA may be eligible to participate in AA-MAS. The number of proficient and advanced scores based on AA-MAS may not exceed 2% of all students in the grades assessed in reading/language arts and in mathematics within the state accountability system. Reporting Requirements
States are required to report to the Secretary separately on the participation of students with disabilities in state accountability systems. Development and Implementation of AA-AAS
In school year 2005-2006, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had alternate assessments in reading and mathematics. An analysis of these proposed changes to current practice is provided in the following sections. Under this proposal, the number of proficient and advanced scores based on AA-AAS may not exceed 1% of all students assessed, and the number of proficient and advanced scores based on AA-MAS may not exceed 1% of all students assessed. 5 would not limit the use of alternate assessments in the accountability system. | The 113th Congress is actively considering whether to amend and extend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA, P.L. 107-110). As part of these deliberations, consideration has been given to how students with disabilities are included in accountability systems. The ESEA and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, P.L. 108-446) both require all students with disabilities to participate in district and state assessments. Because student achievement on state assessments is used to determine adequate yearly progress (AYP) in state accountability systems mandated by the ESEA, schools are held accountable for the achievement of all students, including students with disabilities.
While many students with disabilities are able to participate in the general state assessments, either with or without accommodations, other students with disabilities may not be able to participate fully in the general state assessment because of the nature or severity of their disability. These students may need an alternate assessment that is tailored to their needs to allow them to accurately demonstrate what they know and can do. In response to these needs, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) created five assessment options for measuring the achievement of students with disabilities through regulations, including two options that allow students to take an alternate assessment (AA), one based on alternate achievement standards (AA-AAS) and the other based on modified achievement standards (AA-MAS). There are restrictions on how the performance of students participating in AA-AAS or AA-MAS assessments are included in state accountability systems. Specifically, the regulations limit the number of proficient and advanced scores based on these alternate assessments that may be included in the determination of AYP. The number of proficient and advanced scores based on AA-AAS may not exceed 1% of all students in the grades assessed in reading and in mathematics within the state accountability system. Similarly, the number of proficient and advanced scores based on AA-MAS may not exceed 2% of all students in the grades assessed in reading and in mathematics within the state accountability system. These limits are commonly referred to as the "1% and 2% caps or rules."
ED is currently engaged in an examination of the regulations related to AA-MAS and has proposed eliminating the use of AA-MAS entirely. Currently, 42 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have had their applications for an ESEA flexibility package approved by ED. Under this package, states have been granted waivers of ESEA accountability requirements in exchange for meeting principles specified by ED. As part of these principles, no later than the 2014-2015 school year, states operating under the ESEA flexibility package must include students who are currently eligible to take AA-MAS in their assessments based on grade-level academic achievement standards. Thus, 42 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico will no longer be able to administer AA-MAS as of the 2014-2015 school year, regardless of when or if ED enacts the aforementioned proposed regulations.
This report focuses primarily on current law and state and local implementation of alternate assessments in state accountability systems, including the challenges in developing and implementing these assessments and an analysis of recommended changes to assessment policies for students with disabilities. In addition, it highlights some issues that may arise due to changes made by ED through waivers of ESEA accountability requirements and the associated conditions that states must meet to receive the waivers. This report does not reflect ED's proposal to eliminate AA-MAS and require states to start transitioning away from the use of AA-MAS in the near future, as the proposed changes have not been adopted. |
crs_R42982 | crs_R42982_0 | On September 26, 2016, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and the head of the FARC—Rodrigo Londoño, alias "Timochenko"—signed the final agreement in a ceremony held in the port city of Cartagena, henceforth known as the Cartagena Agreement. On October 2, 2016, a peace plebiscite vote was held. On December 13, 2016, the Colombian Constitutional Court approved the fast-track mechanism for swift implementation of the peace accord between the Colombian government and the FARC. Colombia's Internal Armed Conflict and Key Players
Colombia, a longtime U.S. ally, has long been riven by internal conflict. In June 2000, the U.S. Congress approved legislation in support of Plan Colombia, providing $1.3 billion for counternarcotics and related efforts in Colombia and neighboring countries, which began a multi-year effort with the United States as the major international funder. When the exploratory talks between the FARC and the government were announced by President Santos in late August 2012, the ELN leader expressed an interest in joining the process that was acknowledged by the President. The negotiations with the FARC began following the government and FARC's agreement to a bilateral cease-fire, with a small demilitarized zone established in the municipality of La Uribe in the Meta department, long a FARC stronghold. Out of these preliminary discussions, the government and the FARC leadership agreed to a framework for formal peace talks that began in Norway in October 2012. In June 2012, the Colombian Congress approved another government initiative—the Peace Framework Law. Colombia's warming relations with neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela also seemed to have laid the groundwork for the peace talks. Although the negotiators from the other insurgent group, the ELN, and the Santos government continued their "preparatory" talks for formal negotiations in parallel with the FARC-government peace talks, nothing was announced during the year. In September 2015, President Santos met with FARC chief Timochenko in Havana. Santos and Timochenko publicly shook hands and announced that a final agreement would be signed not later than March 23, 2016. On December 15, 2015, the FARC and government negotiating teams signed a partial agreement on victims of the conflict, providing a comprehensive system for reparation, justice, truth, and guarantees for non-repetition and outlining a transitional justice system. On January 25 th , the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2261, which committed a U.N. mission to monitor and verify a definitive bilateral cease-fire, once it was negotiated. The proposed funding for the Obama Administration's initiative was $450 million, $391 million of which was requested in the FY2017 congressional budget justification for foreign operations. A continuing resolution passed by Congress on December 9, 2016, funds assistance programs to Colombia at slightly below the FY2016 level ($300 million) through April 28, 2017, with the balance of FY2017 assistance levels to be determined after the 115 th Congress takes office. The U.S. Congress continued to express bipartisan support for the peace process at various points. On July 18, 2016, the Colombian Constitutional Court approved a peace plebiscite that would allow Colombians to vote on the agreement. The court also ruled that the vote would be binding on the executive branch. On August 24, 2016, the two sides reached the long-awaited final accord. Colombian voters surprised many on October 2, 2016, when, by a margin of 54,000 votes (out of 13 million cast) they rejected the original peace accord negotiated by the Santos government and the FARC. Without the public's backing, the government's investment in the process could be challenged, especially in the first critical year. The delegates of the Government of the Republic of Colombia (National Government) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP):
As a result of the Exploratory Meeting held in Havana, Cuba, between 23 February 2012 and 26 August 2012, that counted on the participation of the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of Norway as guarantors, and on the support of the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela as facilitator of logistics and companion:
With the mutual decision to put an end to the conflict as an essential condition for the construction of stable and lasting peace;
Attending the clamour of the people for peace, and recognising that:
construction of peace is a matter for society as a whole that requires the participation of all, without distinction, including other guerrilla forces that we invite to join this effort;
respect of human rights within the entire national territory is a purpose of the State that should be promoted;
economic development with social justice and in harmony with the environment is a guarantee for peace and progress;
social development with equity and well-being that includes big majorities allows growing as a country;
a Colombia in peace will play an active and sovereign role in peace as well as regional and worldwide development;
it is important to broaden democracy as a condition to build solid foundations for peace. | In August 2012, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos announced that the government was engaged in exploratory peace talks with the violent leftist insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), in a bid to resolve a nearly 50-year internal armed conflict. The secret, initial dialogue between the Santos government and the FARC's leadership led to the opening of formal peace talks with the FARC—the oldest, largest, and best-financed guerrilla organization in Latin America. Formal talks began in Oslo, Norway, in October 2012 and then, as planned, moved to Havana, Cuba, where they continued for more than 50 rounds.
Despite more than three years of negotiations, the leader of the FARC, Rodrigo Londoño, alias "Timochenko," had not met publicly with President Santos. In September 2015, the two leaders shook hands in a televised meeting and announced that the negotiating parties would reach a final accord no later than March 23, 2016. However, that deadline, as many others before it, went unmet. By the end of 2015, the most difficult issue in the peace talks' agenda, outlined in a framework agreement, was resolved. Government and FARC negotiators reached a partial agreement on victims of the conflict, providing a comprehensive system for reparations, justice, truth and guarantees for non-repetition and outlining a transitional justice system.
In late January 2016, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council adopted Resolution 2261, stating that a U.N. mission would monitor and verify a definitive bilateral cease-fire and cessation of hostilities between the parties, following the signing of the final peace agreement. Terms for operationalizing the accord were announced in June 2016, when the Santos government and the FARC agreed to a bilateral cease-fire, security guarantees for demobilized guerrillas, mechanisms for dismantling paramilitaries, and the location of demobilization zones. On July 18, 2016, the Colombian Constitutional Court approved a peace plebiscite as the appropriate mechanism for the public to endorse or reject the final agreement arrived at in Havana. The court also determined that the plebiscite vote would be binding for Colombia's executive branch.
In a surprise loss, on October 2, 2016, the first accord—known at the Cartagena Agreement—was rejected in a peace plebiscite, defeated by 54,000 votes out of 13 million ballots cast. In November 2016, the government and the FARC signed a second accord, which the government maintained responded to criticisms of the "No" campaign leaders, who objected to the first accord. The Colombian Congress approved the second accord, and the Colombian Constitutional Court upheld the fast-track mechanism that would have allowed rapid implementation of the Cartagena Agreement was upheld to apply to the second accord on December 13, 2016.
The Santos Administration had anticipated the peace process with the FARC by proposing several legislative reforms that were enacted in the first years of Santos's first term (2010-2012), including a law to restitute victims of the conflict and a "peace framework" law. In addition, the warming of relations with neighboring countries, such as Ecuador and Venezuela, helped to lay the groundwork for the peace process. Venezuela, Chile, Cuba, and Norway also actively supported the process, which most countries in the region have lauded.
The U.S. Congress remains deeply interested in Colombia's political future, as the country has become one of the United States' closest allies in Latin America. Congress has expressed that interest by its continued investment in Colombia's security and stability. Over the years, the U.S.-Colombian relationship has broadened from counternarcotics to include humanitarian concerns; justice reform and human rights; and economic development, investment, and trade. Peace Colombia, the assistance program proposed by the Obama Administration, foresaw a peace accord with the insurgents building on many gestures of support made by the Administration. The initiative was designed to help Colombia secure peace with $450 million of support, $391 million of which was requested in the FY2017 congressional budget justification. A continuing resolution passed by Congress on December 9, 2016, funds assistance programs to Colombia at slightly below the FY2016 level ($300 million) through April 28, 2017, after the 115th Congress takes office.
This report provides background on Colombia's armed conflict and describes its key players. The report briefly analyzes prior negotiations with the FARC and the lessons learned from those efforts. It examines what transpired during the preparatory negotiations and four years of formal talks that led to the final accord with the FARC. The report also examines some of the constraints that could limit the success of the peace accord's implementation and the possible influence of implementation on future U.S.-Colombian relations. |
crs_R41681 | crs_R41681_0 | Unease with advertising can be magnified if the advertiser is the government, especially if an advertisement conflicts with widely held beliefs about government. Estimates of Government Advertising Expenditures
The Challenges
The federal government's expenditures on advertising are difficult to ascertain. There are at least two reasons for this: (1) there is no government-wide definition of what constitutes advertising and (2) there is no central authority to which agencies are required to report advertising-related expenditures. One Approach to Estimating Government Advertising Expenses
Despite these challenges, an estimate of the federal government's expenditures on contracts for advertising services can be derived from utilizing data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). According to FPDS data, federal agencies spent $892.5 million on contracts for "advertising services" in FY2013. A fuller statement of the limitations on government advertising may be found in GAO's Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, Volume I . Otherwise, oversight, investigation, and enforcement of appropriate practices regarding government advertising falls to agencies' inspectors general, GAO, and Congress. Primary oversight of government agency advertising has been exercised by Congress. | Government advertising can be controversial if it conflicts with citizens' views about the proper role of government. Yet some government advertising is accepted as a normal part of government information activities.
It is difficult to calculate the amount of funds spent by the federal government on advertising each year. The reasons for this include (1) there is no government-wide definition of what constitutes advertising and (2) there is no central authority to which agencies are required to report advertising expenses.
However, an estimate of the federal government's expenditures on contracts for advertising services can be derived from data in the Federal Procurement Data System. According to these data, federal agencies spent $892.5 million on advertising services in FY2013.
Agencies' discretion to advertise is limited primarily by restrictions imposed by Congress in authorization and appropriations statutes and by the principles set forth in volume 1 of the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) Principles of Federal Appropriations Law. Any oversight of government advertising expenditures rests with agencies' inspectors general, GAO, and Congress. |
crs_RL33895 | crs_RL33895_0 | Such research may be accomplished by using governmental, congressional, or commercial services. govinfo.gov https://govinfo.gov
The Government Publishing Office launched govinfo.gov as a beta website in February 2016. It is still a work in progress and will eventually replace GPO's Federal Digital System (FDsys). GovTrack http://www.govtrack.us
GovTrack is a free service that can help determine the status of U.S. federal legislation, voting records for the Senate and the House of Representatives, information on Members of Congress, congressional district maps, and the status of legislation. HeinOnline is available only to subscribers. CRS Resources
Classes at CRS
Introduction to Legislative Research
This two-and-a-half-hour seminar, offered six times a year by the Law Library of Congress and CRS, is designed for those with no legal research experience. Selected CRS Reports
Additional information on researching legislation and regulations is provided in the following CRS reports. | This report is designed to introduce congressional staff to selected governmental and nongovernmental sources that are useful in tracking and obtaining information on federal legislation and regulations. It includes governmental sources, such as Congress.gov, the Government Publishing Office's Federal Digital System (FDsys), and U.S. Senate and House websites. Nongovernmental or commercial sources include resources such as HeinOnline and the Congressional Quarterly (CQ) websites. The report also highlights classes offered by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the Law Library of Congress.
This report will be updated as new information is available. |
crs_R41589 | crs_R41589_0 | Soft power complements hard power, and, in cases, may substitute for it. Traditionally, the economy entered into the national security debate through four issues: the defense industrial base, base closures and program cuts, international economic sanctions, and export controls. This broad review of economics and national security illustrates how disparate parts of the U.S. economy affect the security of the nation and that security is something achieved not only by military means but by the whole of the American economy and how it performs. In national security, the economy is both an enabler and a constraint. The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the economic contributors to national security as well as to furnish links to further resources. The first is the nature of the external threat to physical security—the rise of terrorism and militant Islam. Congress plays a major role in each element of national security. Not only does Congress provide funding for these elements of national security, but it provides oversight, defines the scope of U.S. action, and provides a crucible in which U.S. policies are debated and often determined. Those related to the economy were:
in order to build an America that is stronger, more secure, and able to overcome challenges while appealing to aspirations of people around the world, the United States must foster economic growth, reduce the federal budget deficit, educate our people, develop clean energy alternatives, pursue science and innovation, and build capabilities and alliances to pursue interests shared with other countries and peoples; the United States seeks an international order and cooperation with other nations that will counter violent extremism and insurgency, stop the spread of nuclear weapons, combat climate change, sustain global growth, and help countries feed themselves; and the United States will continue to advocate for and advance human rights, economic development, and democracy as a bulwark against aggression and injustice. The economy always was there, both to fund the military and underpin the provision of economic security for households. Policies for economic growth and issues such as unemployment were viewed as domestic problems largely separate from considerations of national security. As the world begins the second decade of the twenty-first century, the United States still has a preeminent military, large economy, strong alliances, and democratic values. However, the economy has come more into play because the country has long been accustomed to pursuing a "rich man's" approach to national security strategy. The United States could field an overwhelming fighting force and combine it with economic power and leadership in global affairs to bring to bear far greater resources than any other country against any threat to the nation's security. National security is sought through a combination of hard power, soft power, and economic opportunity. In the short-term, therefore, the financing of the deficit does not appear to be a problem. In addition to providing resources for the defense community needed to provide physical security, the economy, itself, provides the means for Americans to attain economic security. On a global basis, the importance of economic growth to national security was demonstrated in the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. Human Capital
Economic growth is highly dependent on increasing the productivity of workers. It depends greatly on the ability of workers to generate and use knowledge in the production process, which, in turn, depends on the skill and education of workers. Globalization, Trade, Finance, and the G-20
The U.S. economy and national security depends greatly on what happens in countries and economies in the world at large and on the financial impact of trillions of dollars that flow through international foreign exchange markets each day. However, some remain skeptical of China's willingness to eliminate its export-oriented economic policies. | As the world begins the second decade of the twenty-first century, the United States holds what should be a winning hand of a preeminent military, large economy, strong alliances, and democratic values. The nation's security should be secure. Yet the debate over national security seems to be both intensifying and broadening. The problem appears not only in the difficulty of finding a winning strategy in the long war against acts of terrorism but having to face economic constraints that loom large in the public debate. In addition, the global financial crisis and recession have highlighted the trade-off between spending to protect against external threats and spending to provide jobs and income for citizens at home. The United States has long been accustomed to pursuing a "rich man's" approach to national security. The country could field an overwhelming fighting force and combine it with economic power and leadership in global affairs to bring to bear far greater resources than any other country against any threat to the nation's security. The economy has always been there both to provide the funds and materiel for defense and to provide economic security for most households. Policies for economic growth and issues such as unemployment have been viewed as domestic problems largely separate from considerations of national security.
The world, however, has changed. Globalization, the rise of China, the prospect of an unsustainable debt burden, unprecedented federal budget deficits, the success of mixed economies with both state-owned and private businesses, huge imbalances in international trade and capital flows, and high unemployment have brought economics more into play in considerations of national security. Traditionally the economy has entered into the national security debate through its impact on the nation's hard power: the funding of defense, the efficacy of the defense industrial base, and the use of economic sanctions and other instruments as non-kinetic tools of warfare. The long-term efficacy of hard power, however, depends greatly on the ability of a country to provide for it through an ever growing and innovative economy.
National security depends also on soft power, the ability of a country to generate and use its economic power and to project its national values. This, in turn, depends on long-term factors that contribute to economic growth and increase the total resource base available not only for defense but to provide economic security in the form of income and business opportunities for individuals. Economic growth depends on building human capital. It also depends on science, technology, and innovation. In addition, the increased integration of the U.S. economy into global markets means that U.S. security also depends on global economic stability, on a balanced international economy, the ability to coordinate key economic policies with other leading nations, and deterring threats to the international financial system. Soft power also enables the country to project American values through diplomacy, economic assistance, fostering democracy and human rights, and promoting sustainable development abroad. Congress plays a major role in each of these elements of national security.
This analysis illustrates how disparate parts of the U.S. economy affect the security of the nation. Security is achieved not only by military means but by the whole of the American economy. In national security, the economy is both the enabler and the constraint. This report briefly addresses each of the above issues and provides a context and some possible alternatives to current policy. The purpose of this report is not to provide an exhaustive analysis but to survey the landscape, show how each issue relates to national security, examine possible Congressional actions, and refer the reader to relevant CRS products and analysts. |
crs_RL33890 | crs_RL33890_0 | In May 2007, Congress approved the Small Business Tax Relief Act of 2007 as part of a larger appropriations bill, P.L. 110-28 . Among the act's provisions were an extension of the increased "expensing" tax-benefit for small businesses and an extension of the work opportunity tax credit (WOTC) incentive for hiring members of certain targeted groups. As 2007 progressed, Congress considered a number of narrow, sector-specific business tax items. In part, these were provisions designed to promote certain types of economic activity—for example, both the House and Senate considered energy tax provisions aimed at conservation and alternative energy sources. Also, Congress considered extension of a set of numerous temporary targeted tax benefits that were scheduled to expire by the end of the year (the "extenders"). Congress also looked to various aspects of business taxation as a way to raise tax revenue that would offset the revenue loss from selected tax cuts it was considering. Revenues were a key concern given the large and continuing federal budget deficits as well as House and Senate procedural rules designed to restrain deficit-increasing tax and spending legislation. For example, Congress demonstrated considerable interest in measures to restrict corporate tax shelters, several measures related to international taxation, and a reexamination of the domestic production deduction enacted in 2004. In the closing months of 2007, Congress began to consider broader revision in corporate taxation. In October, Chairman Charles Rangel of the House Ways and Means Committee introduced H.R. 3970 , an omnibus business tax bill with a variety of both tax cuts and tax increases. In part, the bill was formulated with an eye towards the international economy and the attractiveness of the United States as an investment location—it contains, for example, a cut in the general corporate statutory tax rate and a permanent increase in the small business expensing benefit. However, the bill also echoes the classic tax-reform approach of the landmark Tax Reform Act of 1986, proposing to couple its rate cut with a set of base-broadening measures, including a paring-back of the deferral tax benefit for multinational firms and repeal of the domestic production deduction. In early 2008, Congress focused on stimulating the economy and renewing general farm legislation. In February, Congress enacted the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, P.L. The act's two business investment provisions provided for a temporary increase of small business expensing and temporary "bonus" depreciation limits. In May, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-234 ) was enacted and modified several alternative fuel production tax credits. Currently, other congressional deliberations regarding business taxation involve energy taxation and the extenders ( H.R. 6049 , S. 3098 , S. 2886 , etc.). The most prominent business tax cuts can be summarized as follows: temporary "bonus" depreciation provisions designed to spur investment spending; capital gains and dividend reductions, intended (in part) to increase capital formation and the flow of savings to the corporate sector; extension of a set of narrowly-applicable temporary tax benefits (the "extenders") that were addressed by several acts; and provisions enacted in 2004 designed to boost U.S. manufacturing and competitiveness (the domestic production deduction and foreign tax credit provisions). | In early 2007, congressional action on business taxes began with a focus on small business, to counter the purported adverse impact of an increase in the federal minimum wage on small business. In May, Congress enacted the Small Business Tax Relief Act of 2007 as part of a larger appropriations bill (P.L. 110-28). Among the act's tax measures were an extension of the "expensing" tax benefit for small business investment and an extension of the work opportunity tax credit incentive for hiring members of targeted groups.
As 2007 progressed, Congress considered a number of narrow, sector-specific business tax items. In part, these were provisions designed to promote certain types of economic activity—for example, both the House and Senate considered energy tax provisions aimed at conservation and alternative energy sources. Also, Congress considered extending a set of numerous temporary targeted tax benefits that were scheduled to expire by the end of the year (the "extenders").
Congress also looked to various aspects of business taxation as a means to raise tax revenue that would offset the revenue loss from selected tax cuts it was considering—a key concern given the large and continuing federal budget deficits and House and Senate procedural rules designed to restrain deficit-increasing tax and spending legislation. For example, Congress showed considerable interest in measures to restrict corporate tax shelters, several measures related to international taxation, and a reexamination of the domestic production deduction enacted in 2004.
In the closing months of 2007, Congress began to consider broader revision in corporate taxation. In October, Chairman Charles Rangel of the House Ways and Means Committee introduced H.R. 3970, a business tax bill with a variety of both tax cuts and tax increases. The bill was partly formulated with an eye towards the international economy and the attractiveness of the United States as an investment location. The bill also echoes the classic tax-reform approach of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, proposing to couple its rate cut with a set of base-broadening measures.
In early 2008, Congress focused on stimulating the economy and renewing general farm legislation. In February, Congress enacted the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008. The act's two business investment provisions provided for a temporary increase of small business expensing and temporary "bonus" depreciation limits. In May, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-234) was enacted and modified several alternative fuel production tax credits.
Currently, other congressional deliberations regarding business taxation involve energy taxation and the extenders (H.R. 6049, S. 3098, S. 2886, etc.). This report will be updated in the event of significant legislative activity. |
crs_94-459 | crs_94-459_0 | By the end of 1915, the marine presence was reduced to 100officers and some 1,600 enlisted men. After the 1922 congressional investigation criticized lack of coordination among U.S. officials in Haiti, U.S. civilian and military authority was consolidated. (4) After several weeks in the country during whichtestimony was taken from all sectors of the society, the commission submitted a report that argued that the UnitedStates could not relinquish its responsibilities for ensuring the financial stability of Haiti, but made several proposalsforchanges, especially the separation of civil and military responsibilities, increasing the number of Haitians in thegovernment, and, in general, for less intervention in Haitian domestic affairs. Washington was nonetheless determined to pull out of Haiti at an earlier date. Accomplishments and Shortcomings of the Occupation
The U.S. occupation in large measure accomplished its goals of stabilizing Haitian finances. Most important was the construction of roads and bridges throughout the country (some of which wascompleted through ahighly unpopular system of forced labor or corvée ). The United States undertook a major effort to provide access to modern health care to the mass of the Haitian population that in some cases had never come into contact with trained doctors and nurses. | In 1915, the United States undertook a military occupation of Haiti to preempt anyEuropean intervention, to establish order out of civil strife, and to stabilize Haitian finances. Duringthe nineteen-year occupation, U.S. military and civilian officials, numbering less than 2,500 for the most part,supervised the collection of taxes and the disbursement of revenues, maintained public order, and initiated a programofpublic works. The Haitian government remained in place, but was subject to U.S. guidance. The Haitian peoplebenefitted from the end of endemic political violence and from the construction of roads, bridges, and ports as wellas from improved access to health care. The U.S. occupation was, nonetheless, deeply resented throughout Haitiansociety, and many of its accomplishments did not long endure its termination in 1934. |
crs_R44994 | crs_R44994_0 | In July 2017, North Korea apparently successfully tested its first intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Combined with the long-standing use of aggressive rhetoric toward the United States by successive Kim regimes, these events appear to have fundamentally altered U.S. perceptions of the threat the Kim Jong-un regime poses, and have escalated the standoff on the Korean Peninsula to levels that have arguably not been seen since at least 1994. To a greater degree than their predecessors, however, Trump Administration officials have publicly emphasized that "all options are on the table," including the use of military force, to contend with the threat North Korea may pose to the United States and its allies. If the Trump Administration chooses to pursue military options, key questions for Congress include whether, and how, to best employ the military to accomplish denuclearization, and whether using military force on its own or in combination with other tools might result in miscalculation on either side and lead to conflict escalation. Some analysts contend, however, that the risk of allowing the Kim Jong-un regime to acquire a nuclear weapon capable of targeting the U.S. homeland is of even greater concern than the risks associated with the outbreak of war, especially given Pyongyang's long history of threats and aggressive action toward the United States and its allies and the regime's long-stated interest in unifying the Korean Peninsula on its terms. Many students of the regional military balance contend that an overall advantage over North Korea rests with the United States and its ally, the Republic of Korea (or, ROK, commonly known as South Korea), and that U.S./ROK forces would likely prevail in any conflict within a matter of weeks. Those analyses, however, also generally assume that neither China nor Russia would become engaged in the conflict. Should China or Russia do so, the conflict would likely become significantly more complicated, costly, and lengthy. As a result, Congress may consider whether to support increased U.S. military activities—possibly including combat operations—to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, or whether instead to support efforts to contain and deter North Korean aggression primarily through other means. For this reason, few analysts believe that North Korea would launch an unprovoked attack on U.S. territory or U.S. overseas bases; the consequences for doing so could include a possible overwhelming U.S. military response that could result in the end of the Kim Jong-un regime, and possibly the end of the DPRK as a sovereign state. The Republic of Korea, by contrast, has emphasized quality over quantity and maintains a highly skilled, well-trained, and capable conventional force. Pyongyang could also escalate to attacking Japan with ballistic missiles. China's Reaction
A significant factor likely affecting policymakers' deliberations regarding the use of military force on the Korean Peninsula is the question of whether a military conflict between the DPRK and the U.S./ROK runs the risk of a direct military clash with China, as occurred during the 1950-1953 Korean War. Implications for East Asia
The use of U.S. military force on the Korean Peninsula would likely have far-reaching implications for U.S. alliances and partnerships in the region, for great power politics and rivalries, and for the overall security landscape in the Asia-Pacific, and perhaps more broadly. Not all of these options are mutually exclusive, nor do they represent a complete list of possible options, implications, and risks. The following discussion is based entirely on open-source materials. CRS cannot verify whether any of these potential options are currently being considered by U.S. and ROK leaders. Opponents might also argue that maintaining the status quo may create time for sanctions to work, but also creates time for North Korea to develop a nuclear-tipped ICBM capable of reaching the U.S. homeland and for North Korea to expand the size of that capability. Deny DPRK Acquisition of Delivery Systems Capable of Threatening the United States
Pursuing this option may mean deemphasizing, at least for the immediate future, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and instead focusing on mitigating, or even negating, the means of delivery of nuclear devices, in particular nuclear-tipped ICBMs. These operations are considered to be high-risk—and could incur significant military casualties—compared with attacking targets with aerial assets. If so, what actions, under what circumstances, ought to be covered by such an authorization? Applied to a postconflict situation on the Korean Peninsula, the United States military might have to respond to a number of issues in both North and South Korea. Availability of Forces for Other Contingencies
Particularly should hostilities escalate into a full-scale war between the DPRK and the U.S./ROK, the force for conducting such a military campaign and then managing its aftermath could be considerable. First, whether or not it believes the United States could or should manage and deter a nuclear-armed North Korea if it becomes capable of attacking the U.S. homeland. Second, whether taking decisive action to prevent the emergence of such a DPRK capability, including the use of military forces, might be necessary. Such determinations potentially carry considerable risks for the United States, its allies, regional stability, and global order. In Detail: The Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula
Estimating the military balance in the region, and how military forces might be employed during wartime, requires accounting for numerous variables and as such is an inherently imprecise endeavor. As an overall strategic approach, the DPRK has emphasized quantity over quality, as well as asymmetric capabilities including weapons of mass destruction and special operations forces, in building and maintaining its military. Forces Korea, U.S. | North Korea's apparently successful July 2017 tests of its intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, along with the possibility that North Korea (DPRK) may have successfully miniaturized a nuclear warhead, have led analysts and policymakers to conclude that the window for preventing the DPRK from acquiring a nuclear missile capable of reaching the United States is closing. These events appear to have fundamentally altered U.S. perceptions of the threat the Kim Jong-un regime poses to the continental United States and the international community, and escalated the standoff on the Korean Peninsula to levels that have arguably not been seen since 1994.
A key issue is whether or not the United States could manage and deter a nuclear-armed North Korea if it were to become capable of attacking targets in the U.S. homeland, and whether taking decisive military action to prevent the emergence of such a DPRK capability might be necessary. Either choice would bring with it considerable risk for the United States, its allies, regional stability, and global order. Trump Administration officials have stated that "all options are on the table," to include the use of military force to "denuclearize"—generally interpreted to mean eliminating nuclear weapons and related capabilities from that area.
One potential question for Congress is whether, and how, to employ the U.S. military to accomplish denuclearization, and whether using the military might result in miscalculation on either side, or perhaps even conflict escalation. Questions also exist as to whether denuclearization is the right strategic goal for the United States. This is perhaps because eliminating DPRK nuclear or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities outside of voluntary denuclearization, and employing military forces and assets to do so, would likely entail significant risks. In particular, any move involving military forces by either the United States/Republic of Korea (U.S./ROK) or the DPRK might provoke an escalation of conflict that could have catastrophic consequences for the Korean Peninsula, Japan, and the East Asia region.
In this report, CRS identifies seven possible options, with their implications and attendant risks, for the employment of the military to denuclearize North Korea. These options are
maintaining the military status quo, enhanced containment and deterrence, denying DPRK acquisition of delivery systems capable of threatening the United States, eliminating ICBM facilities and launch pads, eliminating DPRK nuclear facilities, DPRK regime change, and withdrawing U.S. military forces.
These options are based entirely on open-source materials, and do not represent a complete list of possibilities. CRS cannot verify whether any of these potential options are currently being considered by U.S. and ROK leaders. CRS does not advocate for or against a military response to the current situation.
Conservative estimates anticipate that in the first hours of a renewed military conflict, North Korean conventional artillery situated along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) could cause tens of thousands of casualties in South Korea, where at least 100,000 (and possibly as many as 500,000) U.S. soldiers and citizens reside. A protracted conflict—particularly one in which North Korea uses its nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons—could cause enormous casualties on a greater scale, and might expand to include Japan and U.S. territories in the region. Such a conflict could also involve a massive mobilization of U.S. forces onto the Korean Peninsula, and high military casualty rates. Complicating matters, should China choose to join the conflict, those casualty rates could grow further, and could potentially lead to military conflict beyond the peninsula. Some analysts contend, however, that the risk of allowing the Kim Jong-un regime to acquire a nuclear weapon capable of targeting the U.S. homeland is of even greater concern than the risks associated with the outbreak of regional war, especially given Pyongyang's long history of bombastic threats and aggressive action toward the United States and its allies and the regime's long-stated interest in unifying the Korean Peninsula on its terms.
Estimating the military balance on the peninsula, and how military forces might be employed during wartime, requires accounting for a variety of variables and, as such, is an inherently imprecise endeavor. As an overall approach to building and maintaining its forces, the DPRK has emphasized quantity over quality, and asymmetric capabilities including weapons of mass destruction and its special operations forces. The Republic of Korea, by contrast, has emphasized quality over quantity, and maintains a highly skilled, well-trained, and capable conventional force. Most students of the regional military balance contend that overall advantage is with the U.S./ROK, assuming that neither China nor Russia become involved militarily. Should they do so, the conflict would likely become exponentially more complicated.
As the situation on the Korean Peninsula continues to evolve, Congress may consider whether, and if so under what circumstances, it might support U.S. military action. Congress could also consider
the risks associated with the possible employment of military force on the Korean Peninsula against North Korea; the efficacy of the use of force to accomplish the Trump Administration's strategic goals; whether and when a statutory authorization for the use of U.S. forces might be necessary, and whether to support such an authorization; what the costs might be of conducting military operations and postconflict reconstruction operations, particularly should a conflict on the Korean Peninsula escalate significantly; the consequences for regional security, regional alliances, and U.S. security presence in the region more broadly; and the impact that renewed hostilities on the Korean Peninsula might have for the availability of forces for other theaters and contingencies. |
crs_R42336 | crs_R42336_0 | Recent Developments
The April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon bombing that killed 3 people and wounded 264 could generate renewed interest in terrorist watchlist screening and background checks for firearms, because at least one of the alleged perpetrators was reportedly watch-listed as a suspected terrorist. And, on April 18, 2013, the alleged bombers—brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev—are also alleged to have shot a police officer to death, high-jacked an automobile and taken its driver hostage at gunpoint, and engaged in a subsequent shootout with police. This pistol was reportedly recovered at the scene of the subsequent shootout with police, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is tracing this pistol. In the 113 th Congress, even before the Boston bombing, Senator Frank Lautenberg and Representative Peter King had reintroduced their similar, but not identical, bills, the Denying Firearms and Explosives to Dangerous Terrorist Act of 2013 ( S. 34 and H.R. Also, in April 2013 when the Senate considered the Safe Communities, Safe Schools Act of 2013 ( S. 649 ), Senator Lautenberg filed an amendment ( S.Amdt. While the Senate leadership has set S. 649 aside, if the Senate reconsiders this bill, it might also consider S.Amdt. 734 . In addition, Representative James Moran has included similar provisions in the NRA Members' Gun Safety Act of 2013 ( H.R. 21 ). Those modified procedures became effective in February 2004. 2074 ). In the 111 th Congress, the November 2009 Fort Hood shooting renewed interest in this proposal, which Senator Lautenberg and Representative King had previously reintroduced ( S. 1317 / H.R. For context, a basic overview of the U.S. government's post-9/11 terrorist watchlist procedures is provided, as well as an analysis of the Terror Gap proposal, which has been reintroduced in the 113 th Congress ( S. 34 and H.R. What form of redress and remedy would be provided for misidentifications, improper watch-listing, and wrongful denial? Would the Terror Gap proposal draw unwanted public attention to terrorist watchlists and related screening procedures, possibly undermining the effectiveness of those measures by making terrorists and other adversaries aware of them, and possibly setting a judicial review precedent for other terrorist watchlist screening processes? Initially, the FBI did not conduct terrorist watchlist queries through NICS as part of Brady background checks for firearms because being a known or suspected terrorist was not, and is not, a legally disqualifying factor for firearms possession eligibility under federal law. Conducting terrorist watchlist checks as part of Brady background checks for firearms raises three possible issues for Congress:
Should terrorist watchlist checks be incorporated statutorily into the Brady background check processes? Given certain statutory restrictions prohibiting a permanent or temporary registry of firearms or firearms owners, should approved firearm transfer records be maintained on a temporary basis to determine whether persons of interest in counterterrorism investigations had or have obtained firearms? Should the Attorney General be granted authority to deny a firearms transfer based solely on a terrorist watchlist match? When a private person (non-licensee) seeks to acquire a firearm (long gun or handgun) from a federally licensed gun dealer, he and the gun dealer are required to fill out ATF Form 4473. Under current law, there are 10 classes of prohibited persons. The transferee's information is crosschecked against three computerized databases/systems to determine firearms transfer/possession eligibility. In addition, individuals who believe they have been denied boarding or unduly scrutinized in secondary screening/inspections, because they believe they have been misidentified as a terrorist while being screened by TSA or CBP, have another avenue for relief. DOJ-FBI Modified NICS Procedures (February 2004)
In November 2003, DOJ directed the FBI to reassess its NICS procedures to include measures to screen prospective firearms transferees and permittees against terrorist watchlist records. While the NICS records are eventually destroyed for approved firearms transfers, it is unknown what happens to the information generated by NICS-related terrorist watchlist hits that are passed on to the FBI Counterterrorism Division and investigative personnel in the field, who are usually assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Forces. Although these proposals would have addressed the issue of record retention, they would not have provided the Attorney General with a specific statutory authority to conduct terrorist watchlist checks, nor would they have authorized the Attorney General to deny a firearms transfer based solely on a terrorist watchlist match. 1195 ) that would have barred anyone on the "No Fly" list from possessing a firearm. In the 110 th Congress, Senator Lautenberg and Representative King introduced this proposal ( S. 1237 / H.R. GAO also recommended that if Congress were to move forward with legislation providing the Attorney General with the discretionary authority to deny a firearms transfer or permit or an explosives license/permit based on a terrorist watchlist hit, then it should consider including a provision in that legislation that would require the Attorney General to promulgate guidelines that would delineate under what circumstances that authority could be exercised. 2159 and S. 1317 ), which supporters dubbed the "Terror Gap" proposal. 1506/S. 720 ). Acronyms and Abbreviations
ATF: Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
CA: Bureau of Consular Affairs
CTD: Counterterrorism Division
CBP: Customs and Border Protection
DHS: Department of Homeland Security
DOJ: Department of Justice
DOS: Department of State
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
FFL: Federal Firearms Licensee
GAO: Government Accountability Office
GCA: Gun Control Act
HSPD-6: Homeland Security Presidential Directive Six
IC: Intelligence Community
JTTF: Joint Terrorism Task Force
KST File: Known or Suspected Terrorists File
NCIC: National Crime Information Center
NCTC: National Counterterrorism Center
NICS: National Instant Criminal Background Check System
NTN: NICS Transaction Number
POC: Point-of-contact
TIDE: Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment
TRIP: Traveler Redress and Inquiry Program
TSA: Transportation Security Administration
TSC: Terrorist Screening Center
TSDB: Terrorist Screening Database
TSOU: Terrorist Screening Operations Unit
VAF: NICS Voluntary Appeals File
VGTOF: Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File | The November 2009 shooting at Fort Hood, TX, renewed interest in terrorist watchlist screening and background checks for firearms through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). Pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (P.L. 103-159), in November 1998 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activated NICS for the purposes of determining an individual's firearms transfer and possession eligibility whenever a private person seeks to acquire a firearm from a federally licensed gun dealer. Prior to February 2004, however, the FBI did not conduct terrorist watchlist queries as part of firearms background checks because being a known or suspected terrorist was not a disqualifying factor for firearms transfer and possession eligibility; nor is it today under current law.
Similarly, the April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon bombing could generate renewed interest in terrorist watchlist screening, because at least one of the alleged perpetrators was possibly entered into the National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC's) Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). As a consequence, he was possibly watch-listed in the FBI-led Terrorist Screening Center's Terrorist Screening Database—the U.S. government's master watchlist of known and suspected terrorists. In addition, on April 18, 2013, both alleged perpetrators—Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev—are further alleged to have shot and killed a police officer, high-jacked an automobile and taken its owner hostage at gunpoint, and engaged in a subsequent shootout with police. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is tracing a pistol recovered at the scene of the shootout. If the watch-listed brother, Tamerlan, had acquired the pistol from a federally licensed gun dealer, it might have generated a terrorist watchlist hit through NICS. Critics could argue that watchlist hits through NICS, or border and aviation security screening systems, might have prompted federal investigators to scrutinize Tamerlan Tsarnaev's travels and activities more closely prior to the bombing. As described in this report, moreover, a NICS-generated watchlist match might have prevented him from acquiring the pistol.
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government reevaluated its terrorist screening procedures. As part of this process, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and FBI modified the Brady background check procedures and recalibrated NICS to query an additional file in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) that included terrorist watchlist records. Since February 2004, information related to the subjects of NICS-generated terrorist watchlist matches have been passed on to the FBI Counterterrorism Division and special agents in the field, who are usually members of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). These FBI agents, in turn, verify the match between the individual and the watchlist record, and they check for information that would prohibit that individual, the prospective transferee, licensee, or permittee, from possessing firearms or explosives (e.g., illegal immigration or fugitive status).
While the modified NICS procedures initially generated little public opposition, those procedures called three possible issues into question. One, should terrorist watchlist checks be incorporated statutorily into the firearms- and explosives-related background check processes? Two, given certain statutory prohibitions related to prohibiting a firearms registry, should approved firearm transfer records be maintained on a temporary basis to determine whether persons of interest in counterterrorism investigations have obtained firearms? Three, should the Attorney General be granted authority to deny a firearms transfer based solely on a terrorist watchlist match? Since the 109th Congress, several related legislative proposals have been introduced. Several of those bills would have addressed the retention of firearms-related transfer records. Another proposal would have prohibited persons watch-listed as terrorists for aviation security purposes on the "No Fly" list from firearms transfer or possession eligibility.
In the 110th Congress, Senator Frank Lautenberg and Representative Peter King introduced a bill based on a legislative proposal developed by DOJ that would have authorized the Attorney General to deny the transfer of firearms or the issuance of firearms (and explosives) licenses/permits to "dangerous terrorists" (S. 1237/H.R. 2074). In the 111th Congress, they reintroduced this bill (S. 1317/H.R. 2159), which supporters dubbed the "Terror Gap" proposal. In the 112th Congress, they introduced similar bills (S. 34 and H.R. 1506). And, in the 113th Congress they reintroduced their bills (S. 34 and H.R. 720) once more. When the Senate considered the Safe Communities, Safe Schools Act of 2013 (S. 649) in April 2013, Senator Lautenberg also filed an amendment (S.Amdt. 734) to that bill, which is nearly identical to S. 34. While the Senate leadership set S. 649 aside, if the Senate reconsiders this bill, it might also consider S.Amdt. 734. In addition, Representative James Moran has included similar provisions in the NRA Members' Gun Safety Act of 2013 (H.R. 21).
The Terror Gap proposal raises several potential issues for Congress. One, should the Attorney General notify watch-listed individuals who have been deemed to be "dangerous terrorists" for the purposes of gun control? Two, what form of redress and/or remedy would be provided to individuals wrongfully denied a firearm transfer because they were misidentified, or improperly watch-listed, and then deemed to be a "dangerous terrorist"? Three, if enacted, would such a law draw unwanted attention to related terrorist screening procedures, possibly undermining the effectiveness of these procedures by making terrorists and other adversaries aware of them, and possibly setting a judicial review precedent for other terrorist watchlist screening processes? |
crs_R45186 | crs_R45186_0 | O ne of the major motivations for the 2017 tax revision was concern about the international tax system. Issues associated with these rules involved the allocation of investment between the United States and other countries, the loss of revenue due to the artificial shifting of profit out of the United States by multinational firms (both U.S. and foreign), the penalties for repatriating income earned by foreign subsidiaries that led to the accumulation of deferred earnings abroad, and inversions (U.S. firms shifting their headquarters to other countries for tax reasons). In addition to changes in a variety of rules determining the degree to which foreign income of U.S. persons is subject to U.S. tax, the tax change lowered the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%. The provisions that introduced territorial features into a system that was nominally a worldwide system were deferral of income of foreign subsidiaries and cross-crediting of foreign taxes. Foreign Tax Credits
The U.S. tax system allowed a credit against U.S. tax due on foreign-source income subject to tax for foreign income taxes paid. Foreign-source income is also affected by deductions. The system nevertheless remains a hybrid, albeit a different one, of worldwide and territorial approaches. With respect to other income (primarily income from intangible assets) the system moves toward a current inclusion in income but at a lower rate, a minimum worldwide tax. Foreign-Derived Intangible Income (FDII)
The new law also allows a deduction aimed at providing a lower tax rate on intangible income produced in the United States but derived from abroad. New Law: BEAT, Modifications to Subpart F, Transfer Pricing Changes, Stricter Thin Capitalization Rules
Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT)
The new law introduces a general anti-abuse provision whose focus is primarily on U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents, although it applies in general to related parties (although as noted below, it may also affect U.S. multinationals with foreign-source income from higher-tax locations). Although BEAT appears to be aimed at profit shifting out of the United States through royalty payments and interest payments, presumably to a foreign parent, BEAT is calculated in a way that allows the tax to be reduced by the research credit and 80% of the sum of three credits (the low-income housing credit, the renewable electricity production credit in Section 45(a) of the code, and credits for renewable energy, such as wind), but not other credits. U.S. Tax Rates Compared to Other Countries Before the Revision
The U.S. corporate tax rate (combining federal and average state and local taxes, and accounting for the deductibility of state and local taxes) of 39% was higher than the statutory rate in any other major country, including the countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the G-20. The tax on tangible investment is much larger than the tax on intangible investment. Equity investment in tangible assets, especially the temporary investments for equipment, could increase. Moreover, it is not clear that the capital stock in the United States would increase. Effects on Efficiency and Optimality
Will the tax change lead to a more efficient or optimal system? Profit shifting would likely be reduced with a lower tax rate. Overall, it appears the new provisions have taken significant steps to reduce the incentives for profit shifting. Other provisions in the new law would also make U.S. headquarters more attractive, including the lower corporate rate, the move to a territorial tax to the extent of the dividend exclusion, and FDII, although GILTI and BEAT would make a U.S. location less attractive. According to Douglas Poms, Treasury's international tax counsel, the OECD's Forum on Harmful Tax Practices will soon assess whether FDII violates the minimum standard for preferential regimes. Some other, more technical issues have also been raised about GILTI. Thus, royalties will be taxed only if separated, or for firms that do not keep inventory. | One of the major motivations for the 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97) was concern about the international tax system. Issues associated with these rules involved the allocation of investment between the United States and other countries, the loss of revenue due to the artificial shifting of profit out of the United States by multinational firms (both U.S. and foreign), the penalties for repatriating income earned by foreign subsidiaries that led to the accumulation of deferred earnings abroad, and inversions (U.S. firms shifting their headquarters to other countries for tax reasons). In addition to lowering the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21% and providing some other benefits for domestic investment (such as temporary expensing of equipment), the 2017 tax bill also substantially changed the international tax regime.
The tax change moved the system from a nominal worldwide tax on all foreign-source income, with a credit against U.S. tax for foreign taxes due, to a nominal territorial system that does not tax foreign-source income. Nevertheless, both systems could be considered a hybrid of a worldwide and territorial system. Prior law reduced the tax on foreign-source income by allowing deferral (taxing income of foreign subsidiaries only if it was repatriated, or paid as a dividend to the U.S. parent) and cross-crediting of foreign taxes (so the credit for high taxes paid in one country could offset U.S. tax on income from a low-tax country). The new system exempts dividends, but also imposes a current worldwide tax on global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI), but at a lower rate. It also introduces a corresponding lower rate on intangible income derived from abroad from assets in the United States (foreign-derived intangible income, or FDII). The new law adds the base erosion and anti-abuse tax (BEAT) to existing anti-abuse measures aimed at artificial profit shifting. BEAT imposes a minimum tax on ordinary income plus certain payments to related foreign companies.
Despite the lower corporate tax rate, it is not clear that capital will be shifted into the United States from abroad; although a lower rate reduces the tax rate on equity-financed investments, it decreases the subsidy to debt-financed investments. Whether the capital stock increases or decreases depends on the magnitude of the tax changes (which appear largely offsetting) and the international mobility of debt versus equity. It is also not clear whether the capital stock will be allocated more efficiently or in a way more optimal for U.S. welfare, although economic theory suggests that reducing the tax subsidy for debt is a clear improvement.
Although a territorial tax may make profit shifting more attractive, overall, given other elements of the new system, it appears to make profit shifting less important. GILTI and FDII bring the tax treatment of income from intangibles in the United States and abroad closer together, and BEAT and stricter thin capitalization rules (rules limiting interest deductions) also limit profit shifting, including shifting through leveraging.
The new system ends the penalties (except for portfolio investment in foreign firms) for repatriating earnings and thus eliminates the prior incentives to retain earnings abroad. A series of measures aimed at inversions appears to make inversions much less attractive.
Some of the measures may violate international agreements such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), bilateral tax treaties, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) minimum standards to prevent harmful tax practices.
There have been a number of concerns about design features in the new regime, including the dividend deduction, GILTI, FDII, BEAT, and other features. A variety of options might be considered to address these issues. |
crs_RS22220 | crs_RS22220_0 | The Five-Month Waiting Period for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits
Title II of the Social Security Act provides that certain individuals may be entitled to Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits under the federal Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program if they meet the following statutory requirements:
The individual's medical condition meets the definition of disability as specified in Section 216 of the act; The individual has filed a claim for disability benefits; The individual is insured, generally requiring either a work history or the work history of a parent or spouse, as specified in Section 214 of the act; The individual has not reached normal retirement age as provided in Section 216 of the act; and The individual has completed a five-month waiting period. Workers are encouraged by the Social Security Administration (SSA) to apply for benefits at the onset of their disability. The first month counted as part of the waiting period can be no more than 17 months before the month of application and thus, retroactive benefits are limited to 12 months from the date of application. The first change eliminated the waiting period for disabled workers who were previous SSDI recipients or who had a previous disabling condition in the five years prior to the onset of their current disability. The six TDI programs provide temporary benefits, with maximum durations of between 26 and 52 weeks, for those with an earnings history who are unable to work because of a disability and who are not receiving workers' compensation or SSDI benefits. Private Disability Insurance
Private disability insurance programs offered by employers can be used to provide wage replacement benefits during the five-month waiting period for SSDI benefits. One impact that may not be as clear, however, is the role that the waiting period plays in discouraging possible beneficiaries from applying for benefits. | Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is authorized by Title II of the Social Security Act and provides income replacement for eligible individuals who are unable to work due to a long-term injury or illness that is expected to last at least one year or result in death. Current eligibility requirements include (1) verification of an applicant's disability, (2) filing a claim, (3) a "recent work" and "duration of work" test, (4) verification that an individual has not reached normal retirement age, and (5) a five-month waiting period from disability-onset.
In implementing the five-month waiting period for SSDI benefits, Congress sought to set a time frame that would be long enough for a short-term injury or illness to be corrected, but would also deter individuals who can work from applying for benefits. The first month counted as part of the waiting period can be no more than 17 months before the month of application, and benefits can be applied retroactively for up to 12 months. The Social Security Administration (SSA) encourages eligible individuals to apply for benefits as soon as possible after the onset of a disabling condition.
The waiting period does not apply to individuals who have been previous recipients of SSDI in the five years prior to any current disability. Several other programs, such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI), temporary disability insurance, workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, and private disability insurance, can provide funds for eligible SSDI applicants facing financial hardship during the five-month wait period. |
crs_RL32964 | crs_RL32964_0 | Some observers refer to the net of this investment position (or the difference between the value of U.S.-owned assets abroad and the value of foreign-owned assets in the United States) as a debt, or that it indicates that the United States is in a net debtor position, because the value of foreign-owned assets in the United States is greater than the value of U.S.-owned assets abroad. In fact, the nation's international investment position is not a measure of the nation's indebtedness similar to the debt borrowed by some developing countries, but it is an accounting of assets. Foreign currency holdings account for a relatively small share of the total foreign investment position. Indeed economists generally argue that it is this interplay between the demand for and the supply of credit in the economy that drives the broad inflows and outflows of capital. Some observers are particularly concerned about the long-term impact of the U.S. position as a net international investment debtor on the pattern of U.S. international income receipts and payments. Indeed, successive Congresses and Administrations have led international efforts to eliminate or reduce restraints on the international flow of capital. | The international investment position of the United States is an annual measure of the assets Americans own abroad and the assets foreigners own in the United States. The net position, or the difference between the two, sometimes is referred to as a measure of U.S. international indebtedness. This designation is not strictly correct, because the net international investment position reveals the difference between the total assets Americans own abroad and the total amount of assets foreigners own in the United States. These assets generate flows of capital into and out of the economy that have important implications for the value of the dollar in international exchange markets. Some Members of Congress and some in the public have expressed concerns about the U.S. net international investment position because of the role foreign investors are playing in U.S. capital markets and the potential for large outflows of income and services payments. Some observers also argue that the U.S. reliance on foreign capital inflows places the economy in a vulnerable position. |
crs_RL32167 | crs_RL32167_0 | Since 1976, there have been at least 50 arrests and drug seizures involving North Koreans in more than 20 countries around the world. The report, in circumspect language common to such U.N. documents, notes that "The Board has received disquieting reports on the drug control situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A significant number of these cases has involved arrest or detention of North Korean diplomats or officials. Issues for Decisionmakers
At least fifty documented drug trafficking incidents coupled with allegations of large scale North Korean state sponsorship of opium poppy cultivation, and heroin and methamphetamine production and trafficking, raise significant issues for the United States and America's allies in combating international drug trafficking. The challenge to policy makers, is how to pursue sound counter-drug policy and comply with U.S. law which may require cutting off aid to North Korea while effectively pursuing other high priority U.S. foreign policy objectives including (1) limiting possession and production of weapons of mass destruction; (2) limiting ballistic missile production and export; (3) curbing terrorism, counterfeiting and international crime; and (4) addressing humanitarian needs. Reports that North Korea may be limiting some of its food crop production in favor of drug crop production are particularly disturbing, though the acreage in question is comparatively small. Another issue of rising concern is the use of profits from any North Korean drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and other crime-for-profit enterprises to underwrite the costs of maintaining or expanding North Korean nuclear and missile programs. The case of the "Pong Su," arguably, is demonstrative of such joint venture activity—reportedly Southeast Asian non-DPRK origin heroin carried by a North Korean crew on a North Korean vessel. However the report speculates that increasingly seizures of DPRK source methamphetamine may be mistakenly identified as "Chinese source" given growing links of Chinese criminal elements to North Korea's drug production/trafficking activities. Notwithstanding lack of hard evidence of any recent seizures involving illicit drugs of confirmed DPRK origin or drugs being trafficked by DPRK nationals with confirmed or likely links to DPRK officials, press reports in early 2007 cite earlier arrests in China of North Korean nationals involved with Chinese criminals in the trafficking of methamphetamine. An alternative explanation would be that North Korea has cut back on, if not dramatically curbed, its drug trafficking activity and is compensating from the loss of income in this arena by beefing up its production and trafficking of counterfeit brand cigarettes. The result is a situation in which criminal activity is seen as playing an increasingly pivotal role in supporting North Korea's fragile economy. | At least 50 documented incidents in more than 20 countries around the world, many involving arrest or detention of North Korean diplomats, link North Korea to drug trafficking. Such events, in the context of credible, but unproven, allegations of large scale state sponsorship of drug production and trafficking, raise important issues for the United States and its allies in combating international drug trafficking. The challenge to policy makers is how to pursue an effective counter drug policy and comply with U.S. law which may require cutting off aid to North Korea while pursuing other high-priority U.S. foreign policy objectives including (1) limiting possession and production of weapons of mass destruction; (2) limiting ballistic missile production and export; (3) curbing terrorism, counterfeiting, and international crime; and (4) addressing humanitarian needs.
Reports that the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK) may be limiting some of its food crop production in favor of drug crop production are particularly disturbing given the country's chronic food shortages, though the acreage in question is comparatively small. Another issue of rising concern is the degree to which profits from any North Korean drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and other crime-for-profit enterprises may be used to underwrite the costs of maintaining or expanding North Korean nuclear and missile programs. As the DPRK's drug trade becomes increasingly entrenched, and arguably decentralized, analysts question whether the Pyongyang regime (or any subsequent government) would have the ability to effectively restrain such activity, should it so desire.
Since 2003, overall seizures of North Korean-linked methamphetamine and heroin are generally down, arguably in response to enhanced international attention paid to such activity in the wake of the April 2003 seizure of heroin carried on the North Korean Vessel the "Pong Su." Some suggest that this decline in seizures being identified as DPRK origin is because North Korean source methamphetamine is now regularly being mistakenly identified as "Chinese source" given growing links of Chinese criminal elements to North Korea's drug production/trafficking activities. In line with such a conclusion are press reports in late 2006 of the arrests in differing locations in China of North Korean nationals involved with Chinese criminals in the trafficking of methamphetamine. However, it is not clear from the reports whether the drugs were of DPRK origin or whether the North Koreans arrested had links with DPRK officials. Reduction of illicit drug seizures linked to the DPRK has also given rise to speculation that North Korea has cut back on, if not dramatically curbed, its drug trafficking activity, and is compensating from the loss of income in this arena by beefing up its production and trafficking of counterfeit brand cigarettes.
It remains clear, however, that regardless of the mix of DPRK criminal activities at any particular given point in time, income from DPRK criminal activity continues to play a pivotal role in overall DPRK finances. |
crs_R42750 | crs_R42750_0 | Policy Background
A long-standing challenge for aviation security is the need to reliably detect explosives and bomb-making components concealed under clothing. In 2004, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Congress give priority to improving the detection of explosives on passengers. History and Development
Since 2007, TSA has been procuring and deploying two competing AIT technologies for screening airline passengers: X-ray backscatter and millimeter wave imaging systems. TSA is currently retrofitting deployed units, and all future millimeter wave systems procured by TSA will come with ATR. TSA currently plans to acquire and deploy a total of 1,800 units throughout the country by the end of FY2014. However, this figure does not reflect the cost per scan because only a small percentage of passengers undergo a whole body scan. Public perceptions of possible health risks associated with X-ray backscatter systems, coupled with technological advances in second-generation millimeter wave systems that will replace human observers with automated threat detection capabilities, may have influenced TSA toward favoring millimeter wave systems over X-ray backscatter systems. The polling data indicate that about 75% to 80% of Americans support the use of AIT at airport checkpoints. Concerns have also been raised over screening individuals with special needs, the effectiveness of the technology, screener staffing requirements, and TSA's deployment strategy. Privacy Concerns
TSA use of AIT has met with objections from privacy advocates, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), that have urged Congress to ban the use of whole body imaging technologies as a method for primary screening on the basis that "[p]assengers expect privacy underneath their clothing and should not be required to display highly personal details of their bodies." In FY2011, TSA began installing Automated Target Recognition (ATR) software in its deployed millimeter wave machines, both to allay continuing concerns regarding privacy and to improve screening efficiency. With the introduction of ATR, TSA is working toward the eventual elimination of human image viewers. TSA has not announced whether a similar system will be developed or implemented for X-ray backscatter imagers. This could reduce system-wide operational staffing for AIT systems by as much as one-third. Related Legislation
Although TSA has put in place policies and procedures to address concerns regarding AIT scanning, these measures are not tied to specific statutory mandates and could be modified in the future without legislative action. The Aircraft Passenger Whole-Body Imaging Limitations Act of 2011 ( H.R. The Checkpoint Images Protection Act of 2011 ( H.R. 685 ) would establish penalties for the unauthorized recording or distribution of security screening images, while the Transportation Security Administration Authorization Act of 2011 ( H.R. 3011 ) would require TSA to certify that ATR software is installed on all deployed AIT machines, and that image retention capabilities on all such machines are disabled. Also, the Traveler Screening Act, or the "RIGHTS Act" ( S. 2207 ), would require the TSA Ombudsman's office to better track public complaints about screening, determine best practices to resolve frequent passenger complaints, resolve passenger complaints, and field advance notification calls from individuals with special needs to arrange for accommodation at screening checkpoints. | Responding to the need to reliably detect explosives, bomb-making components, and other potential security threats concealed by airline passengers, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has focused on the deployment of whole body scanners as a core element of its strategy for airport checkpoint screening. TSA has deployed about 700 of these scanners, known as whole body imagers (WBI) or advanced imaging technology (AIT), at airports throughout the United States, and plans to have 1,800 in place by the end of FY2014. AIT systems include two technologies: millimeter wave systems and X-ray backscatter systems.
AIT directly addresses specific recommendations and mandates to improve the detection of explosives on passengers. However, the deployment of these systems has generated a number of concerns. Although polling data indicate that the American public generally accepts the use of body scanners for passenger screening, various stakeholders have expressed concerns over privacy, potential health risks, and delays in getting through security. Concerns have also been raised regarding screening individuals with special needs, the overall effectiveness of current technology, screener staffing requirements, and TSA's deployment strategy.
While TSA voluntarily applies a number of privacy measures (such as viewing AIT images remotely and providing alternative pat-down screenings on request), U.S. law does not specifically require these actions. Beyond these existing procedural measures to protect privacy, TSA is working toward the eventual elimination of human image viewers, replacing them with automated target recognition (ATR) technology to detect potential threats. If ATR eliminates the need for most image viewers, as expected, this could reduce TSA staffing requirements. However, this depends to an extent on the alarm rate for ATR, since TSA procedures require alarms to be resolved by labor-intensive pat-down searches.
ATR is currently being deployed on all newly acquired millimeter wave systems and is being retrofitted into already deployed millimeter wave systems. It has not been announced whether a similar system will be implemented for X-ray backscatter imagers. The availability of ATR on millimeter wave units, coupled with continued public perceptions of potential health concerns associated with X-ray backscatter systems, appear to be key factors influencing TSA's approach to focus future acquisitions and deployments on millimeter wave systems.
Bills under consideration in the 112th Congress, including the Aircraft Passenger Whole-Body Imaging Limitations Act of 2011 (H.R. 1279) and the Checkpoint Images Protection Act of 2011 (H.R. 685), address privacy and health safety concerns. Additionally, the Transportation Security Administration Authorization Act of 2011 (H.R. 3011) contains a provision that would require all deployed AIT systems to have ATR capabilities and any image retention capabilities to be disabled. Lastly, the Restoring Integrity and Good-Heartedness in Traveler Screening Act, or the "RIGHTS Act" (S. 2207), would address concerns over the processing of passenger complaints regarding TSA procedures and improve assistance to passengers needing special accommodations at screening checkpoints. |
crs_R43161 | crs_R43161_0 | Introduction
Foreign temporary workers, also known as guest workers, have a long history of performing agricultural labor in the United States. Some proposals would have reformed the H-2A program, while others would have established new guest worker programs for agricultural workers. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Bringing workers into the United States under the H-2A program is a multi-agency process involving DOL, DHS, and the Department of State (DOS). An interested employer must first apply to DOL for a certification that (1) there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are qualified and available to perform the work; and (2) the employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers who are similarly employed. Legislative Activity in the 113th Congress
Over the years, both growers and labor advocates have criticized the H-2A program. Growers complain that the program is administratively cumbersome, expensive, and ineffective in meeting their labor needs. Labor advocates argue that it provides too few protections for workers. The House Judiciary Committee ordered reported the Agricultural Guest Worker Act, or the AG Act ( H.R. 1773 ), which would create a new H-2C nonimmigrant agricultural worker visa, and the Senate passed a comprehensive immigration reform bill, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act ( S. 744 ), which would establish new W-3 and W-4 nonimmigrant visas for agricultural workers. While the new agricultural worker visas proposed in the House and the Senate measures are different from one another, they share some similarities that distinguish them from both the existing H-2A visa and the reforms to the H-2A visa proposed in AgJOBS legislation considered in past Congresses. Among the new features of the House-proposed and the Senate-proposed replacement agricultural worker visa programs, these visas, unlike the H-2A visa, would not be limited to temporary or seasonal agricultural work and would not require prospective employers to apply to the Department of Labor for labor certification or to meet all existing certification requirements. Both programs also would provide for at-will employment by agricultural workers. In addition, both the House and the Senate agricultural worker proposals include provisions to enable certain unauthorized aliens to obtain legal temporary or permanent immigration status. To import an H-2C worker, the employer would file a petition with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) containing specified attestations concerning U.S. worker recruitment, worker benefits and wages, and other issues. With respect to wages, an employer petitioning for H-2C workers would have to pay the greater of the prevailing wage rate or the applicable federal, state, or local minimum wage. The H-2C program would have a numerical cap of 500,000, subject to adjustment by USDA. H.R. S. 744
S. 744 , as passed by the Senate, would create a W-3 visa for contract agricultural workers and a W-4 visa for at-will agricultural workers as part of a new W nonimmigrant visa category for lower-skilled workers. To import a W-3 or W-4 worker, a DAE would submit a petition to DHS containing specified attestations, including attestations about contracts, U.S. worker recruitment, and compliance with other employer requirements. Required wages would be defined based on six standard agricultural occupational classifications, with certain wages specified and others to be determined by USDA, in consultation with DOL. W-3 and W-4 visas would be capped at 112,333 total visas per year during the first five years, with provisions for USDA, in consultation with DOL, to adjust these caps and to set visa limits for subsequent years. | Foreign temporary workers, also known as guest workers, have long performed legal agricultural labor in the United States through different temporary worker programs. Today, agricultural guest workers may perform farm work of a temporary or seasonal nature through the H-2A visa program.
Bringing in H-2A workers is a multi-agency process involving the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the U.S. Department of State (DOS). As a first step, interested employers must apply to DOL for a certification that (1) there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are qualified and available to perform the work; and (2) the employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. Among the H-2A labor certification requirements, employers must pay the highest of several wage rates and must provide workers with housing, transportation, and other benefits. The H-2A program is not subject to a numerical limit. Over the years, both growers and labor advocates have criticized the program. Growers complain that it is administratively cumbersome, expensive, and ineffective in meeting their labor needs. Labor advocates argue that the H-2A program provides too few protections for workers.
The House Judiciary Committee and the Senate have acted on separate bills that would establish new temporary agricultural worker visas to replace the H-2A visa. The House Judiciary Committee ordered reported the Agricultural Guest Worker Act (H.R. 1773) and the Senate passed the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744). While the new visa programs proposed in these bills are different, they share some similarities that distinguish them from the H-2A program. For example, unlike the H-2A visa, the new visas would not be limited to temporary or seasonal work, would not require prospective employers to apply to DOL for labor certification or to meet all existing certification requirements, and would provide for at-will employment by agricultural workers.
H.R. 1773 would establish an H-2C agricultural worker visa. After undertaking to recruit U.S. workers, a prospective H-2C employer would file a petition with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) containing attestations concerning U.S. worker recruitment, worker benefits and wages, and other issues. With respect to wages, an employer petitioning for H-2C workers would have to pay the greater of the prevailing wage rate or the applicable minimum wage. The H-2C program would have a numerical cap of 500,000, subject to adjustment by USDA.
S. 744, a comprehensive immigration reform bill that addresses a wide range of immigration issues, would create a W-3 visa for contract agricultural workers and a W-4 visa for at-will agricultural workers. A prospective W-3 or W-4 employer would have to engage in U.S. worker recruitment. To import a W-3 or W-4 worker, an employer would submit a petition to DHS containing specified attestations, including attestations about contracts, U.S. worker recruitment, and compliance with other employer requirements. Required wages would be defined based on six standard agricultural occupational classifications, with certain wages specified and others to be determined by USDA, in consultation with DOL. W-3 and W-4 visas would be capped initially at 112,333 total visas per year, with provisions for USDA, in consultation with DOL, to adjust these caps and to set visa limits for later years.
In addition to establishing new agricultural worker visas, both the House and the Senate proposals would enable certain unauthorized aliens to obtain legal temporary or permanent immigration status in the United States. |
crs_R43942 | crs_R43942_0 | Introduction
In June 2014, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a proposed rule that would require states to address carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric generating units. The proposal creates CO 2 emission rate goals—measured in pounds of CO 2 emissions per megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity generation—for each state to achieve by 2030 and an interim goal in 2029, based on the average of a state's emission rates between 2020 and 2029. A state might consider using a mass-based target for a variety of reasons, including the opportunity to link with existing mass-based programs (e.g., the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative) or to continue existing, state emission reduction goals. This report indicates that the mass-based reduction requirements may be less stringent in some states than the emission rate requirements. Conversion to Mass-Based Targets
EPA's November 2014 support document describes two approaches states could use to convert their emission rate targets to mass-based targets. With each approach, EPA prepared state-specific mass-based targets, which, according to EPA, "could be considered equivalent to the proposed rate-based goals." To convert a rate target to a mass-based target, a state would need an annual estimate of its electricity generation in future years (i.e., 2020-2029). Approach 1: Existing Sources
EPA's first mass-based conversion approach uses (1) the 2012 baseline data—emissions and electricity generation—for each state's fossil fuel fleet and (2) specific results from parts of the emission rate building blocks to calculate future electricity generation. The example provided below demonstrates how EPA projected the state-specific electricity generation levels for 2029.
i. EPA determined the electricity generation from "affected electric generating units" in 2012; in general, an "affected EGU" is a fossil fuel-fired unit that was in operation or had commenced construction as of January 8, 2014, has a generating capacity above a certain threshold, and sells a certain amount of its electricity generation to the grid; this value serves as the electricity generation baseline; EPA used the same data that were provided with the emission rate methodology supporting materials;
ii. Approach 2: Existing and New Sources
EPA's second mass-based conversion approach is based on both historical emissions from existing sources (i.e., approach 1) and projected emissions from certain new, fossil fuel-fired electricity generation sources, particularly NGCC units. As with the emission rate reduction requirements, the mass-based reduction targets (calculated by EPA) vary by state. Emission Rate Targets
For the vast majority of states, the percentage reductions (between the 2012 baseline and 2030 targets) required by the emission rates match those required by the mass-based targets EPA created using approach 1 (existing sources). However, in some cases the percentage reductions differ. The reason for the percentage differences in these states relates to EPA's treatment of NGCC units that are under construction. In EPA's mass-based conversion methodology, the agency includes under-construction NGCC units in the 2012 fossil fuel-fired generation baseline. However, in the emission rate methodology the generation from these units is not included in the 2012 baseline. All of the states have lower percentage reduction requirements than those in approach 1 (existing sources only), because approach 2 includes projected increases of electricity generation. However, the range of percentage reduction requirements varies considerably. Several factors help explain the range of percentage reduction requirements that result from approach 2. First, as discussed above, the methodology in this approach uses a regional growth factor to project electricity demand in future years. These growth factors vary significantly—from 0.29% in the Northeast region to 1.31% in the Southwest region. Second, EPA uses electricity sales data in 2012 to calculate future electricity demand. The 2012 sales data include electricity generation from all sources, including hydroelectricity. The different accounting mechanisms appear to have an impact in states that generate a significant percentage of electricity generation from hydropower (e.g., Idaho, Washington, Oregon). | The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed a rule in June 2014 that would require states to address carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric generating units. The proposal would create CO2 emission rate goals—measured in pounds of CO2 emissions per megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity generation—for each state to achieve by 2030 and an interim goal in 2029, based on the average of a state's emission rates between 2020 and 2029.
EPA's proposal would allow a state to establish its emission reduction requirements by converting the interim (2029) and final (2030) emission rate targets to mass-based targets—measured in metric tons of CO2. A state might consider using a mass-based target for a variety of reasons, including the opportunity to link with existing mass-based programs or to continue existing, state emission reduction goals. In addition, this report indicates that the mass-based reduction requirements may be less stringent in some states than the emission rate requirements.
In November 2014, EPA provided technical information to help states with this conversion process. Converting to a mass-based target requires an estimate of electricity generation in future years (i.e., 2020-2029). EPA's November 2014 support document provides two possible approaches for creating such estimates. With each approach, EPA prepared state-specific mass-based targets, which, according to EPA, "could be considered equivalent to the proposed rate-based goals."
The first approach uses (1) 2012 baseline data—emissions and electricity generation—for each state's fossil fuel fleet and (2) specific results from parts of the emission rate methodology to calculate future electricity generation. The second approach is based on both historical emissions from existing sources and projected emissions from new, fossil fuel-fired electricity generation sources. To project emissions from new sources, EPA applied specific regional growth factors prepared by the Energy Information Administration.
This report compares the required percentage reductions (between the 2012 baseline and 2030 targets) using the emission rate targets to the percentage reductions using the mass-based targets (approach 1). As with the emission rate reduction requirements, the mass-based reduction targets vary by state. For the majority of states, the percentage reductions required by the emission rates match those required by the mass-based approach. However, the required reductions differ in some cases.
This report examines the reasons for these differences. For example, in nine states the differences relate to EPA's treatment of natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) units that are under construction. In EPA's mass-based conversion methodology, the agency includes under-construction NGCC units in the 2012 fossil fuel-fired generation baseline. However, in the emission rate methodology the generation from these units is not included in the 2012 baseline. This leads to different percentage reduction requirements. In four other states, the differences are related to EPA's treatment of renewable energy in its emission rate methodology.
In addition, this report compares the percentage reduction requirements resulting from mass-based approaches 1 and 2. As one might expect, all of the states have lower percentage reduction requirements in approach 2 than in approach 1, because approach 2 includes projected increases in electricity generation. However, the range of requirements varies considerably. Several factors may explain this outcome. For instance, the regional growth factors used to project electricity demand in future years vary significantly—from 0.29% in the Northeast region to 1.31% in the Southwest region. In addition, EPA uses electricity sales data in 2012 to calculate future electricity demand, and the sales data contain electricity generation from all sources, including hydroelectric power. Including hydroelectric power appears to have a substantial impact in states that use it to generate a significant percentage of their electricity. |
crs_R41678 | crs_R41678_0 | Introduction
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a grants and civil rights statute which provides federal funding to the states to help provide education for children with disabilities. If a state receives funds under IDEA, it must make available a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) for all children with disabilities in the state. Education for children with disabilities in private schools is included in IDEA, but the requirements of the statute for children in private schools are not always the same as the requirements for children with disabilities in public schools. Current Law on Private School Placement
Types of Private School Placement
Under current law, there are several ways a child with a disability may be placed in a private school, and the LEA's responsibilities under IDEA vary depending on the type of placement. A child with a disability may be placed in a private school by the LEA or state educational agency (SEA) as a means of fulfilling the FAPE requirement for the child. In this situation, the full cost is paid for by the LEA or the SEA. A child with a disability may also be unilaterally placed in a private school by his or her parents. In this situation, the cost of the private school placement is not paid by the LEA unless a hearing officer or a court makes certain findings. IDEA states in part,
(ii) REIMBURSEMENT FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL PLACEMENT.—If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or secondary school without the consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of the enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment. However, IDEA does require some services for children in private schools, even if they are unilaterally placed there by their parents, and there is no finding that FAPE was not made available to the child. In this situation, IDEA requires that a proportionate amount of the federal funds shall be made available. | The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a grants and civil rights statute which provides federal funding to the states to help provide education for children with disabilities. If a state receives funds under IDEA, it must make available a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) for all children with disabilities in the state. Education for children with disabilities in private schools is included in IDEA, but the requirements of the statute for children in private schools are not always the same as the requirements for children with disabilities in public schools.
Under current law, there are several ways a child with a disability may be placed in a private school, and the LEA's responsibilities under IDEA vary depending on the type of placement. A child with a disability may be placed in a private school by the local education agency (LEA) or state educational agency (SEA) as a means of fulfilling the FAPE requirement for the child. In this situation, the full cost is paid for by the LEA or the SEA. A child with a disability may also be unilaterally placed in a private school by his or her parents. In this situation, the cost of the private school placement is not paid by the LEA unless a hearing officer or a court makes certain findings. However, IDEA does require some services for children in private schools, even if they are unilaterally placed there by their parents, and there is no finding that FAPE was not made available to the child. In this situation, IDEA requires that a proportionate amount of the federal funds shall be made available. |
crs_R43789 | crs_R43789_0 | Background
Under the authorization of the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA), the federal government makes grants to states to support services to improve literacy and other basic skills among adults who are not enrolled in school. Commonly called "adult education," the activities funded by AEFLA provide educational services to adults at the secondary level and below, as well as English language training. AEFLA-supported adult education services are typically provided by local entities. Legislative History and 2014 Reauthorization
AEFLA was originally enacted as Title II of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA, P.L. 105-220 ). After this extension expired, the programs authorized by the act continued to be funded through the annual appropriations process. In July 2014, AEFLA was reauthorized as Title II of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014 (WIOA, P.L. 113-128 ). WIOA authorizes appropriations through FY2020. Major Changes to AEFLA in WIOA
The AEFLA provisions of WIOA maintained the general program structure established by the AEFLA provisions of WIA in 1998: the large majority of funding under the act is granted to state agencies that are required to subgrant the bulk of their federal funds to local agencies that provide the actual services. Smaller portions of the funds support activities of statewide and national significance. WIOA authorizes AEFLA appropriations from FY2015 through FY2020. The authorization level for FY2015 is $577,667,000. Purpose of AEFLA and Definition of Adult Education
Under the WIOA provisions, Section 202 of AEFLA specifies that the purpose of the legislation is to create a partnership between the federal government, states, and localities to provide services to
(1) assist adults to become literate and obtain the knowledge and skills necessary for employment and economic self-sufficiency;
(2) assist adults who are parents or family members to obtain the education and skills that-
(A) are necessary to becoming full partners in the educational development of their children; and
(B) lead to sustainable improvements in the economic opportunities for their family;
(3) assist adults in attaining a secondary school diploma and in the transition to postsecondary education and training, including through career pathways; and
(4) assist immigrants and other individuals who are English language learners in-
(A) improving their-
(i) reading, writing, speaking, and comprehension skills in English; and
(ii) mathematics skills; and
(B) acquiring an understanding of the American system of Government, individual freedom, and the responsibilities of citizenship. Total Appropriation
Reservation for National Leadership Activities (2% of total appropriation) Unreserved funds (98% of total appropriation) English Literacy and Civics Education State Grants (12% of unreserved funds) Adult education state grant funds (88% of unreserved funds) Subgrants to local providers (at least 82.5% of adult education state grant funds) State leadership activities (up to 12.5% of adult education state grant funds) Administrative costs (up to 5% of adult education state grant)
As noted in Table 1 , the AEFLA provisions of WIOA repealed two reservations that were enacted in the AEFLA provisions of WIA. EL-Civics grant funds are allotted to the states by formula on the basis of each's state relative share of recent immigrants admitted for legal permanent residence (LPR). State Plans and Performance Accountability Metrics
To be eligible for AEFLA grant funds, a state must have an approved state plan. Unified State Plans
Under WIOA, each state must submit a unified state plan (USP) that establishes a four-year strategy for the core WIOA-authorized programs in the state, including adult education. Each state must identify an expected level of performance for each indicator for each core WIOA program. | The Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA) is the primary federal legislation that supports basic education for out-of-school adults. Commonly called "adult education," the programs and activities funded by AEFLA typically support educational services at the secondary level and below, as well as English language training. Actual educational services are typically provided by local entities.
AEFLA was created by Title II of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA; P.L. 105-220). The authorization of appropriations under WIA lapsed after FY2003, though the program continued to be funded through the appropriations process. In 2014, AEFLA was reauthorized by Title II of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014 (WIOA, P.L. 113-128). This report will discuss AEFLA as amended by WIOA.
WIOA made a number of changes to the authorizing law but maintained the program's primary function of authorizing federal grants to state agencies for adult education activities. State agencies may use a portion of federal funds for statewide activities, but the bulk of their grants must be subgranted to local providers. Eligible local providers include local educational agencies, institutions of higher education, community-based organizations, and other qualified entities.
Under WIOA, federal AEFLA grants are allotted to states via two formula grants:
88% of state grant funds are allotted to the states based on a formula that considers each state's relative share of adults who do not have a high school diploma or equivalent and who are not enrolled in school. These funds may support basic education services, coursework toward a secondary school diploma or equivalent, English language training or other adult education services. 12% of funds are allotted to the states based on a formula that considers each state's relative share of immigrants who were admitted for legal permanent residence in past years. These funds support "integrated English literacy and civics education" for English language learners.
WIOA requires that state agency grantees submit and have an approved unified state plan that aligns adult education with other core WIOA programs to meet local labor force needs. State grantees must also report on program performance using a set of metrics that applies across core WIOA programs, including adult education.
While the large majority of annual appropriations support grants to state agencies, statute reserves 2% of annual AEFLA appropriations for National Leadership Activities. These national activities include technical support for state agencies and assistance in meeting the performance accountability requirements of WIOA.
Congress appropriated $578 million for AEFLA-authorized activities in FY2014. WIOA authorizes the same appropriation level for FY2015. Between FY2015 and FY2020, WIOA authorizes annual increases in AEFLA appropriations, with an authorization level of $679 million in FY2020. |
crs_RL34387 | crs_RL34387_0 | Overview
In 2009, the war in Iraq appears to be winding down, as security gains made since the height of the insurgency in 2006 and 2007 continue to be sustained, and as Iraqis increasingly seek management of their own affairs. A new U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement that went into effect on January 1, which confirmed the Iraqis' responsibility for their own security, introduced a new era in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—the US-led coalition military operation in Iraq—and in US-Iraqi bilateral relations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called the Agreement a "watershed, a firm indication that American military involvement in Iraq is winding down." U.S. military commanders on the ground have indicated that in most parts of Iraq, the focus of U.S. military efforts has shifted from counterinsurgency (COIN) to stability operations, including advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and supporting security, economic, and governance capacity-building. On February 27, 2009, at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, President Obama delivered a speech addressing "how the war in Iraq will end," in which he announced the drawdown of U.S. combat forces by August 2010 and the transition of the rest of the military mission to training and advising Iraq security forces, conducting counter-terrorism, and providing force protection for U.S. personnel. The United States begins this transition from a position of significant commitment – including some 140,000 U.S. troops deployed in Iraq as of March 2009, in addition to civilian experts and U.S. contractors, who provide substantial support to their Iraqi counterparts in the fields of security, governance, and development. Senior U.S. officials, including outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, and Secretary Gates, have suggested that lasting change in Iraq will require substantially more time, and that while the U.S. military presence will diminish, U.S. engagement with Iraq is likely to continue. The Government of Iraq (GoI), for its part, still faces challenges at the operational level, in countering the lingering threads of the insurgency; and at the strategic level, in achieving a single, shared vision of the Iraqi state, and in improving its capacity to provide good governance, ensure security, and foster economic development for the Iraqi people. Key policy issues the Obama Administration may choose to address, with oversight from the 111 th Congress, include identifying which U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; monitoring and evaluating the impact of the changes in the U.S. presence and role in Iraq; and laying the groundwork for a future, more traditional bilateral relationship. Background
OIF was launched on March 20, 2003. The immediate goal, as stated by the George W. Bush Administration, was to remove Saddam Hussein's regime, including destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. After the initial combat operations, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more open-ended mission of helping an emerging new Iraqi leadership improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. The report will be updated as events warrant. The U.S. | Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq, was launched on March 20, 2003, with the immediate stated goal of removing Saddam Hussein's regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. Over time, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more open-ended mission of helping the Government of Iraq (GoI) improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development.
In 2009, the war in Iraq appears to be winding down, as security gains made since the height of the insurgency in 2006 and 2007 continue to be sustained, and as Iraqis increasingly seek management of their own affairs. A new U.S.-Iraqi security agreement that went into effect on January 1, 2009, which confirmed the Iraqis' responsibility for their own security, introduced a new era in OIF and in US-Iraqi bilateral relations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called the agreement a "watershed, a firm indication that American military involvement in Iraq is winding down." U.S. military commanders on the ground have indicated that in most parts of Iraq, the focus of U.S. military efforts has shifted from counterinsurgency (COIN) to stability operations, including advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and supporting security, economic, and governance capacity-building. On February 27, 2009, at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, President Obama delivered a speech addressing "how the war in Iraq will end," in which he announced the drawdown of U.S. combat forces by August 2010 and the transition of the rest of the military mission to training and advising Iraq security forces, conducting counter-terrorism operations, and providing force protection for U.S. personnel.
The United States begins this transition from a position of significant commitment – including some 140,000 U.S. troops deployed in Iraq, in addition to civilian experts and U.S. contractors, who provide substantial support to their Iraqi counterparts in the fields of security, governance, and development. Senior U.S. officials, including outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, and Secretary Gates, have suggested that lasting change in Iraq will require substantially more time, and that while the U.S. military presence will diminish, U.S. engagement with Iraq is likely to continue. The Government of Iraq (GoI), for its part, still faces challenges at the operational level, in countering the lingering strands of the insurgency; and at the strategic level, in achieving a single, shared vision of the Iraqi state, and in improving its capacity to provide good governance, ensure security, and foster economic development for the Iraqi people.
Key policy issues the Obama Administration may choose to address, with oversight from the 111th Congress, include identifying how U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; monitoring and evaluating the impact of the changes in the U.S. presence and role in Iraq; and laying the groundwork for a future, more traditional bilateral relationship.
This report is intended to provide background and analysis of current developments and options, and will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41145 | crs_R41145_0 | The 112 th Congress and the Obama Administration face a range of trade issues. Many of these issues, such as pending free trade agreements and trade negotiations, trade preferences for developing countries, trade enforcement and compliance, and renewal of trade promotion authority, are legacies of previous administrations and congresses. The Current Economic and Political Climate for Trade Policy
A number of political factors and economic conditions will influence the shape, direction, and content of U.S. trade policy in the next few years. Political Factors
Public Opinion
One factor that will likely affect the direction of U.S. trade policy is American public opinion, including the views of major stakeholders, such as businesses, labor, farmers, and non-government organizations(NGOs), on trade liberalization and trade agreements. Within the executive-legislative relationship on trade policy exists inherent institutional tension even if the two branches are controlled by the same party. The role of trade in the U.S. economy has increased substantially over the years. Emergence of Developing Countries
The emergence of developing countries, particularly emerging economies such as Brazil, China, and India as major trading powers, is affecting U.S. trade policy. Preferential Trade Arrangements
Along with the development of global supply chains, the surge in free trade agreements (FTAs), customs unions, and other preferential trade arrangements has significantly altered the shape of the international trading system. The United States is at a crossroads in terms of trade policy. The future direction of trade policy and how the issues are addressed is unclear at this time and the subject of sharp debate within Congress, the Administration, and the trade policy community at large. While a number of issues are related to trade policy, a fundamental question that is the subject of this debate is which trade policy, if any, will promote the highest possible standard of living for U.S. residents. The debate on trade is influenced by the views of three groups. One group, who might be called "trade liberalizers," asserts that on a net basis the benefits to the United States of trade liberalization are greater than the costs and, therefore, should be encouraged through the reduction of trade barriers. A second group, often labeled "fair traders," acknowledges the benefits of trade liberalization but assert that U.S. firms and workers may be forced to compete under conditions they deem unfair. They support trade agreements but only those with provisions that "level the playing field." Where policymakers fit on this continuum of views could help to determine how they decide to address the outstanding and emerging trade issues before Congress. In many cases, the trade policy positions of policymakers and other experts cannot be readily categorized as belonging to one group or another, but the categories provide a mechanism to analyze the major concepts in trade policy and their potential implications. | U.S. trade policy is at a cross-roads as the Obama Administration and the 112th Congress face a range of policy issues and challenges. The future direction of trade policy and how the issues will be addressed are unclear at this time and the subject of sharp debate within Congress, the Administration, and the trade policy community at large. While a number of issues are related to trade policy, the fundamental question that is the subject of this debate is which trade policy, if any, will maximize the benefits of trade and boost U.S. living standards.
Among the trade issues facing Congress and the Administration are pending free trade agreements (FTAs) and negotiations on new FTAs; the stalled Doha Development Agenda (DDA) multilateral trade negotiations; the possible renewal of trade promotion authority (TPA); the review and reauthorization of trade preference programs for developing countries; the enforcement of U.S. trade laws and rights under existing trade agreements; the role of export promotion in the U.S. economic recovery; and the growing link between foreign direct investment and trade and, with it, the increasing use of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and investment provisions in trade agreements.
The current trade policy environment is affected by a number of political and economic forces. The political forces involve the opinions of the American public, including major stakeholders—business, labor, agriculture, and non-government organizations—on trade; congressional perspectives; presidential perspectives; and tension in the congressional/executive relationship as the two branches play their respective trade policy roles. The economic forces include the global economic downturn; the rise of developing countries, including the emerging markets of Brazil, China, and India as major trading powers; the growth of global production networks; the proliferation of free trade agreements and other preferential trade arrangements; the inherent limitations of trade policy as a tool in economic policy; the growth of "behind the border" trade barriers; and the long-standing U.S. trade deficits.
The debate on trade is framed by three groups of views. One group, who might be called "trade liberalizers," assert that on a net basis the benefits to the United States of trade liberalization are greater than the costs and, therefore, should be encouraged through trade barrier reductions. A second group—"fair traders"—acknowledge the benefits of trade liberalization but assert that U.S. firms and workers are often forced to compete under unfair conditions. They support trade agreements, but only if the agreements provide for a "level playing field." A third group—"trade skeptics"—tends to argue that the costs of trade liberalization outweigh the benefits for the United States, and therefore, reject unrestricted trade liberalization. Where policymakers fit on this continuum of views could help to determine how they decide to address the outstanding and emerging trade issues before Congress
In many cases, the trade policy positions of policymakers and other experts cannot be readily categorized as belonging to one group or another, but the categories provide a mechanism to analyze the major concepts in trade policy and their potential implications. |
crs_98-170 | crs_98-170_0 | This report reviews some effective means for the rhetoric of persuasive communication in speeches written by congressional staff for Senators and Representatives. Such speeches are often prepared under the pressure of deadlines that leave minimal time for extensive revision. Writing For The Spoken Word: The Distinctive Task of The Speechwriter
Writing effective speeches requires a constant awareness of the distinction between the written and the spoken word: the speechwriter must learn to "write aloud." One of the first rules of the speechwriting profession is that a sentence written to be heard should be simple, direct, and short. Its "rules" are meant to foster clarity of expression, whatever the occasion and purpose of any given speech. Demographics
Bates and others list a number of criteria useful in audience analysis, including, among others: age; gender; culture; education; profession ; size of the audience; and affiliation. Draft remarks should be familiar, sympathetic, and topical, without being condescending. They do not need proof of their importance. The Member's role as a community leader and spokesperson on these occasions should not be underestimated; it is a great honor for him or her to deliver remarks at these community rites, and a congressional speechwriter should devote talent and originality to them. Speechwriting Resources
Congressional speechwriters often consult the Congressional Research Service first when preparing a draft statement or an address for a Member. They are available exclusively to congressional staff from the CRS Home Page and provide a ready resource to the congressional speechwriter. A speech outline generally is not nearly as detailed as an outline for an academic work, such as a journal article, or even a research paper. Structure
Three-Part Structure
Nearly every speech will have a basic three-part structure of introduction, body, and conclusion. Contemporary Style and Tone
The accepted style of contemporary oratory is generally low key, casual without being offensively familiar, and delivered directly to the audience in a conversational tone and volume. It puts the audience at ease and helps promote psychological bonding between listeners and speaker. One writer has further distinguished three methods of punctuating:
by structure or logic to indicate the sense of what is being said; by the rhythm of word order and intended meaning—a subtle use best avoided by novice speech writers; and by respiration—that is, by the physical ease of natural speech, which assumes that what is read is really spoken. Speech Presentation
Effective delivery can transform a weak speech and make it sound very good. | The frequent delivery of public remarks by Senators and Representatives is an important element of their roles as community leaders, spokespersons, and freely elected legislators. Congressional staff are often called on to help prepare draft remarks for such purposes.
Writing for the spoken word is a special discipline; it requires that congressional speechwriters' products be written primarily, although not exclusively, to be heard, not read. Speeches are better cast in simple, direct, and often short sentences that can be easily understood by listeners. Rhetorical devices such as repetition, variation, cadence, and balance are available to, and should be used by, the speechwriter.
It is important for speechwriters to analyze audiences according to factors such as age; gender; culture; profession; size of audience; political affiliation, if any; and the occasion for, and purpose of, the speech. Most effective speeches do not exceed 20 minutes in length.
After researching a topic, speechwriters should prepare an outline from which the speech will be developed. They should strive to maintain a clear theme throughout the speech. Most speeches will have a three-part structure consisting of an introduction, a body, and a conclusion.
The accepted style of contemporary American public address is natural, direct, low key, casual, and conversational. This puts listeners at ease and promotes a sense of community between audience and speaker.
Punctuation should reflect the sound structure of the speech, reinforcing the rhythm and pace of actual speech. Clarity of expression is as important a consideration in speech grammar as rigid adherence to rules for written language.
Effective delivery can greatly improve a speech. Congressional speechwriters should make every effort to become familiar with the speaking style of the Member for whom they are writing, and adjust their drafts accordingly.
A wide range of speechwriting resources are available for congressional staff from the Congressional Research Service and other sources. |
crs_R44222 | crs_R44222_0 | Recently, congressional attention has been directed towards two practices within the pharmaceutical industry. The first pertains to "reverse payment" or "pay-for-delay" settlements of patent litigation. Under this scenario, a generic firm agrees to neither challenge the brand-name company's patents nor sell a generic version of the patented drug for a period of time. In exchange, the brand-name drug company agrees to compensate the generic firm, often with substantial monetary payments over a number of years. Because the payment flows counterintuitively, from the patent owner to the accused infringer, this compensation has been termed a "reverse" payment. Another widely followed practice has been termed "product hopping." The introduction of new medicines ordinarily serves the public interest. However, some stakeholders have accused brand-name firms of releasing new, patent-protected versions of existing drugs—while simultaneously discontinuing an earlier drug that is near patent expiration—with the primary goal of delaying generic entry into the marketplace. Because the Hatch-Waxman Act presupposes the existence of a brand-name drug in order for a generic version to enter the market, product hopping can potentially delay generic competition. Two notable judicial opinions have subjected these practices to antitrust scrutiny. In its 2013 decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. , the U.S. Supreme Court held that the legality of reverse payment settlements should be evaluated under the "rule of reason" approach. Under this approach, courts consider whether conduct was reasonable by balancing the anticompetitive consequences of a challenged practice against its business justifications and potentially procompetitive impact. The 2015 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC applied the rule of reason to product hopping, concluding that this activity may indeed violate the antitrust laws. It then addresses judicial developments with respect to reverse payment settlements and product hopping. One possibility is to await further judicial developments in view of the Actavis and Namenda decisions. Another option is to regulate the settlement of pharmaceutical patent litigation in some manner. | Congressional attention has recently been directed towards two practices within the pharmaceutical industry. The first pertains to "reverse payment" or "pay-for-delay" settlements of patent litigation. Under this scenario, a generic firm agrees to neither challenge the brand-name company's patents nor sell a generic version of the patented drug for a period of time. In exchange, the brand-name drug company agrees to compensate the generic firm, sometimes with substantial monetary payments over a number of years. Because the payment flows counterintuitively, from the patent owner to the accused infringer, this compensation has been termed a "reverse" payment. Although the private settlement of disputes is usually encouraged, some observers believe that these arrangements are anticompetitive.
Another widely followed practice has been termed "product hopping." Most observers would agree that the introduction of new medicines lies in the public interest. However, some stakeholders have accused brand-name firms of releasing new, patent-protected versions of existing drugs—while simultaneously discontinuing an earlier drug that is near patent expiration—with the primary goal of delaying generic entry into the marketplace. Because the Hatch-Waxman Act presupposes the existence of a brand-name drug in order for a generic version to enter the market, product hopping can potentially delay generic competition.
Two notable judicial opinions have subjected these practices to antitrust scrutiny. In its 2013 decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that the legality of reverse payment settlements should be evaluated under the "rule of reason" approach. Under this approach, courts consider whether conduct was reasonable by balancing the anticompetitive consequences of a challenged practice against its business justifications and potentially procompetitive impact. The 2015 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC applied the rule of reason to product hopping, concluding that this activity may indeed violate the antitrust laws.
Congress possesses a number of alternatives for addressing reverse payment settlements and product hopping. One possibility is to await further judicial developments. Another option is to stipulate antitrust standards that courts and antitrust enforcement agencies would follow in the future. Congress could also alter incentives for generic firms to settle with brand-name firms under the food and drug laws. |
crs_R41822 | crs_R41822_0 | The two entities are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)—congressionally chartered, stockholder-owned companies with special legal privileges and special obligations to facilitate the flow of mortgage funds. In recent years, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together were responsible for nearly half of the nation's outstanding residential mortgage debt. To support the mortgage markets during the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and to keep these enterprises in business, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has purchased more than $175 billion of special preferred stock. In addition, Treasury and the Federal Reserve (the Fed) have provided mortgage market support by purchasing nearly $1.4 trillion in MBS from investors in the open market. Based on their past histories, it is not clear that the enterprises could survive without Treasury's continued support. 1222 ). 1225 ). 1182 / S. 693 ). H.R. 1859 and H.R. 2413 ). Table 1 summarizes and illustrates differences in provisions of the various bills introduced in the 112 th Congress. In September 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac separately agreed to enter voluntary conservatorship, which entailed giving their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), management and control of the enterprises. Homeowners and potential homeowners indirectly depend on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a source of mortgage money. If and when legislation is introduced, it will be incorporated into this report. H.R. 31 , Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Accountability and Transparency for Taxpayers Act of 2011, would require the director of FHFA to make quarterly reports on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 12 specific areas:
1. total liabilities and the risk to the federal government; 2. executive compensation and bonuses; 3. the impact of reducing the conforming loan limits at the end of FY2011; 4. foreclosure mitigation efforts; 5. mortgage fraud prevention efforts; 6. communications with the Federal Reserve and Treasury regarding the purchase or sale of enterprise securities; 7. enterprise investments outside of their mission; 8. reasons for equity (preferred stock) investments by Treasury; 9. capital levels, portfolio size and their impacts on the safety and soundness of the enterprises; 10. underwriting standards; 11. mortgage buyback policies; and 12. the enterprises' actions that affected enterprise securities, in particular, preferred stock issued before September 6, 2008. H.R. 463 . H.R. H.R. As conservator or receiver, FHFA has the authority to implement these provisions. H.R. H.R. The companion bills H.R. 1224 . The companion bills H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. Unless the housing goals are repealed, the enterprises will continue to be required to meet them. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. FHFA would submit to Congress a plan to sell these assets. H.R. 1221 through H.R. 1227 . 1859 and H.R. 2413 would replace the enterprises. H.R. This is similar to H.R. 1226 . 408 and S. 178 would
end the enterprises' conservatorship in 24 months (without the option for FHFA to grant a six month extension) (Section 3); start the phase-out the enterprises' charters as pertains to new business three years after they leave conservatorship (Section 5); repeal the enterprises' exemption from SEC registration as pertains to MBS and subordinated debt (Section 4(b)(4)); lower the conforming loan limit to $417,000, eliminate the high-cost areas limit, and increase in future years to reflect increasing house prices (Section 4(a)(3)); direct FHFA to increase the minimum capital required of the enterprises (Section 4(b)(1)); increase borrower downpayment requirements (Section 4(b)(2)); and require the enterprises to pay all state and local taxes (Section 4(b)(3)). H.R. 2413 , Secondary Market Facility for Residential Mortgages Act of 2011, would create a federal corporation to purchase and securitize mortgages that meet certain underwriting standards. The facility would be prohibited from originating mortgages and would charge a guarantee fee and a reinsurance fee for purchasing mortgages. | As households and taxpayers, Americans have a large stake in the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Homeowners and potential homeowners indirectly depend on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which in recent years backed and guaranteed home loans accounting for nearly half of the outstanding home mortgages in the nation.
Taxpayers have a large investment in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Department of the Treasury kept the two insolvent companies in business by providing more than $175 billion in support. Based on past performance, it is not clear how the enterprises will be able to repay Treasury out of future earnings. In addition to the $175 billion in direct support, Treasury and the Federal Reserve (the Fed) purchased nearly $1.4 trillion in GSE-issued and guaranteed mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
These two entities are stockholder-owned, congressionally chartered companies that purchase home mortgages, commonly called government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). In 2008, increasing mortgage delinquencies and the general financial crisis weakened the two enterprises to the point that they agreed to a voluntary takeover by the federal government known as conservatorship.
This report summarizes and analyzes bills introduced in the 112th Congress that seek to enhance the public accountability of the two enterprises. The bills covered are H.R. 31, H.R. 408, H.R. 463, H.R. 1182, H.R. 1221, H.R. 1222, H.R. 1223, H.R. 1224, H.R. 1225, H.R. 1226, H.R. 1227, H.R. 1859, H.R. 2413, H.R. 2425, H.R. 2428, H.R. 2436, H.R. 2439, H.R. 2440, H.R. 2441, H.R. 2462, S. 178, and S. 693. Some seek to reduce the cost to the government, while others seek to change the enterprises' charters if or when they leave conservatorship. None of the above bills introduced proposes government actions to replace the two enterprises.
To date, two bills, H.R. 1859 and H.R. 2413, propose creating a replacement for the two enterprises. H.R. 1859 would authorize the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to charter special purpose associations to support the secondary mortgage market by issuing MBS with an explicit federal catastrophic guarantee. The associations would be charged for this guarantee. H.R. 1859 would require FHFA to develop a plan to transition from enterprise support for the secondary mortgage market to support by these new associations.
The second bill, H.R. 2413, would create a government corporation (the Secondary Market Facility for Residential Mortgages) to purchase and to securitize mortgages. Those selling mortgages to the facility would be required to pay guarantee and reinsurance fees for an explicit federal guarantee on the securities.
Because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are under conservatorship, Congress has unusual leverage to direct FHFA, which is both their regulator and conservator, to implement policy changes. Currently, FHFA has unusual control in that it both regulates and manages Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R44575 | crs_R44575_0 | The selection of Rio de Janeiro to host the 2016 games marks the first time a South American city has been selected to host an Olympics. The Olympic Games will be held August 5-21, 2016. It is expected that 10,500 athletes from 206 countries will participate in 42 sports, including 555 athletes on the U.S. Olympic team. In addition to Rio de Janeiro (which has two soccer stadiums), soccer matches will be held in the cities of Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Manaus, São Paulo, and Salvador. Separately or collectively, a variety of issues might pose risks to the health, safety, and general well-being of athletes and their families, team personnel, and spectators participating in or attending the 2016 Games. Chief among these are the Zika virus, public safety threats, security concerns, and environmental conditions. Each candidate city for the 2016 Games was required to address 14 themes in its bid—such as environment and meteorology, finance, security, medical services, and doping control. However, in 2009 no one could have foreseen the outbreak of the mosquito-borne Zika virus in 2016. The U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) has stated publicly that the decision to participate in the 2016 Games is up to each member of the U.S. Olympic team, which will include approximately 550 athletes. The Rio 2016 Organising Committee for the Olympic Games described, in the candidature file it submitted to the IOC, the exiting health care resources that could be used in support of the Games and committed to providing a series of Games-specific health services. However, shortages of health care workers and supplies might compromise the medical services available. Public safety is also a key concern, given the prevalence of criminal activity in and around Rio de Janeiro. Hosting the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games may have implications for Brazil that extend beyond the actual events. Although the Brazilian government viewed hosting the Olympics as an opportunity to showcase the country's progress, its international stature has generally declined in recent years and Olympics-related problems that have emerged, or may emerge, could adversely affect the country's standing. If Brazil's efforts are successful, the country may regain some of the prestige it may have lost in recent years, and, turning to politics, a successful Games might improve the standing of the interim president. Doping, which is a perennial concern, has taken on added importance in the year leading up to the Rio Games because of revelations regarding Russia's national governing body (NGB) for track and field. A second WADA report, released in July 2016, documents Russian doping practices during the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and a multi-year doping methodology that involved the Russian Ministry of Sport. In July 2016, researchers at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and their collaborators published a model of the contribution of the Olympics to the international spread of the Zika virus. For the Zika outbreak, the CDC has not advised against all travel to Brazil (or other areas with active Zika transmission). Despite concerns about health worker shortages, Brazil has committed to ensure that
an on-site medical response team will be in place at all Olympic and Paralympic venues to provide first response and medical transfer; at least two ambulance units will be stationed at each competition venue, as well as in many non-competition venues including the Olympic and Paralympic Village, training sites, and the Games Family hotels; well-equipped disaster response teams are trained to respond to a range of possible emergencies, including dangerous weather conditions, multiple casualty situations, and incidents involving biological, chemical, or radiological hazards; and each Games venue will have its own mass casualty response plan with a pre-deployed, fully equipped mass casualty response team remaining on standby. The International Olympic Committee also indicated that "Rio 2016 is ready to welcome the world." When the country hosted the 2014 World Cup, thieves engaged in opportunistic street crime, targeting tourists near stadiums, on public transportation, and in other gathering locations. Rio de Janeiro has experienced significant improvements in security conditions over the past decade. The Terrorist Threat to the Rio Games64
In April 2016, Brazil's Director of Counterterrorism, Brazilian Intelligence Agency, Luiz Alberto Sallaberry, was reported as noting that the threat of terrorism had increased in recent months due to attacks in other countries and a rise in what he described as the number of Brazilian nationals suspected of sympathizing with Islamic State militants. Brazil's Security Preparations for the Games
Securing Olympic venues, athletes, and visitors to the Games and the surrounding area takes a great deal of effort and planning. In the event a security incident does arise that is the cause of significant concerns and the host government is perceived as incapable of safeguarding visitors to the Games, the United States may be of assistance to its citizens located in Rio de Janeiro. Sustainable design and construction 7. Solid waste management. This concern led to fear that high levels of water pollution could harm the health of tourists and athletes, in addition to impacting the competitions themselves. Implementing the Environmental Commitments
Although the 2013 Sustainability Management Plan stated that updates would be provided during the seven-year life of the Rio Olympics project (from winning the bid in 2009 to dissolution after the Games in late 2016), only one update has been issued. Brazil's international image has been battered in recent years, however, as the country has struggled to address deepening economic and political crises. Other costs related to the Summer Games, such as additional security personnel, have yet to be determined. Economic analysts assert that the Summer Games may deliver a temporary boost in tax revenues for Rio de Janeiro's local government but are unlikely to have much of an impact on the broader Brazilian economy. Prompting this surge of concern were revelations that the Russian track and field team engaged in a doping scheme orchestrated by the Russian Athletic Federation (RusAF; Russia's national governing body [NGB] for track and field) and the perception, if not reality, that the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was slow to respond when first made aware of the allegations in 2010, as reported by both the New York Times and the television show 60 Minutes . Ramifications of the IC Report and IP Report
Russian Athletes
In the aftermath of the release of the IC Report and the IP Report, on July 24, 2016, the IOC issued conditions Russian athletes must meet to be eligible to compete in Rio de Janeiro. The IOC will accept a Russian athlete for participation in the Rio Games only if the relevant IF "is satisfied that the evidence provided" meets the IOC's conditions and the IF's determination is "upheld by an expert from the CAS list of arbitrators.... " Russian athletes who have been sanctioned previously for doping, or who are unable to meet the IOC's criteria, will not be allowed to compete in the 2016 Games. | The 2016 Olympic Games will be held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, August 5-21, 2016, and will be followed by the Paralympic Games, September 7-18, 2016. Notably, these are the first games to be hosted by a South American city. Reportedly, 10,500 athletes from 206 countries will participate in the Olympics, including 555 athletes from the United States. Most Olympic events will take place in and around Rio de Janeiro. In addition to Rio de Janeiro, soccer matches will be held in the cities of Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Manaus, São Paulo, and Salvador.
Host countries and cities often have to deal with a variety of questions or issues, which is also true for Brazil and Rio de Janeiro. The list of issues or potential problems that might have implications for athletes, team personnel, and spectators participating in or attending the 2016 Rio Games includes the Zika virus, public safety threats, security concerns, and environmental conditions. It also bears noting that the act of hosting the Olympics may have implications for Brazil. Finally, doping is of particular concern this year because of revelations regarding a state-orchestrated doping scheme perpetrated by Russian authorities and sports organizations.
Each candidate city for the 2016 Games was required to address 14 themes in its bid, such as environment and meteorology, finance, security, medical services, and doping control. However, no one in 2009 could have foreseen the outbreak of the mosquito-borne Zika virus in late 2015, when Brazilian health officials noticed an increase in the number of infants born with microcephaly. Although some have called for the Games to be postponed or cancelled, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) have indicated the risk of international transmission due to the Olympic and Paralympic Games is low. The CDC has published specific recommendations for pregnant women, and the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) has taken steps to safeguard the U.S. Olympic team.
In the candidature file it submitted to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Rio 2016 Organising Committee for the Olympic Games stated that visitors to the country would be provided free health care. Additionally, Brazil committed to providing medical response teams and units at Olympic facilities. However, shortages of health care workers and supplies might compromise the medical services available.
Public safety and security are key concerns for visitors to Brazil, including Olympic competitors and spectators. The Department of State has noted that crime is a significant threat, and, during the 2014 World Cup, thieves targeted visitors near sports venues and other locales frequented by tourists. Although Rio de Janeiro has experienced significant improvement in public safety in recent years, some criminal activity has increased in the first half of 2016. With respect to security concerns and, specifically, terrorist threats, Brazil's Director of Counterterrorism reportedly has noted that the threat of terrorism has increased in recent months. In July 2016, the Brazilian police arrested 10 Brazilian nationals suspected of planning an attack during the Games. The national government, which is in charge of security for the Olympic Games, plans to muster a force of 85,000 personnel to provide security. U.S. citizens requiring assistance may reach out to the State Department.
Organizers of the Rio 2016 Summer Olympics and Paralympics have made many commitments to host Games in which environmental sustainability is integral to design and planning through implementation, review, and post-event activities. These commitments address issues such as impacts of public transportation, construction, and waste management, and needed water quality improvements. For some time, concern has focused on pollution of waters at venues that will host sailing, rowing, triathlon, and similar events, leading to fear that high levels of water pollution could harm the health of tourists and athletes, in addition to impacting the competitions themselves. Organizers of the Games acknowledge that commitments related to sanitation and water quality will not be met before the Games begin.
The Brazilian government campaigned hard to win the right to host the 2016 Olympics, viewing the Games as an opportunity to showcase Brazil's economic and social progress and reinforce the country's image as a rising power. Brazil's international stature has generally declined in recent years, however, as the country has struggled to address deepening economic and political crises. While the Olympics could allow Brazil to highlight its potential and regain some of the prestige it may have lost in recent years, any problems that emerge are likely to reinforce negative perceptions some have of the country. The Games are unlikely to have much of an effect on Brazil's domestic political situation or economy. Nevertheless, a successful Olympics could strengthen the current government's hold on power and provide a temporary boost to Rio de Janeiro's economy. Most Brazilians are relatively pessimistic about the Olympics and believe they have brought more costs than benefits to the country.
While doping is a perennial concern, it has been, and is, of particular concern in the months leading up to the 2016 Rio Games. The release of two World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) reports, in November 2015 and July 2016, has shown that Russian authorities and sports organizations engaged in doping schemes involving the Russian track and field team and Russian athletes competing in 2014 at the Winter Games in Sochi, Russia. The latter report also revealed a multi-year operation implicating, among other organizations, the Russian Ministry of Sport. The consequences of these reports include, among other actions and decisions taken by the appropriate international sports organizations, a ban on Russia's track and field team, which means the team will not be allowed to participate in the 2016 Games. Additionally, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) stated that the presumption of innocence does not apply to Russian athletes and established conditions other Russian athletes must meet to demonstrate they have clean doping records and thus be eligible to compete in Rio de Janeiro. |
crs_R43465 | crs_R43465_0 | 113-79 ), which was signed into law on February 7, 2014, makes significant changes to the structure of U.S. dairy support programs including the elimination of several major price and income support program provisions from the 2008 farm bill (the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246 ), the extension of several smaller dairy programs, and the addition of two new programs. Programs Repealed
The three major price and income support programs from the 2008 farm bill are eliminated. Programs Extended
Certain other programs that were reauthorized by the expired 2008 farm bill ( P.L. Dairy Import Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) are a system of product-specific import quotas—with low in-quota tariffs and high, often-prohibitive above-quota tariffs—designed to protect higher-priced domestic dairy products by limiting the importation of lower-priced foreign dairy products. The Dairy Price Support Program is authorized under "permanent farm law" contained in the 1949 Agricultural Act, but is suspended by periodic passage of new farm legislation. Gross margin is the market value of milk minus feed costs. New Programs
The 2014 farm bill replaced the repealed price support programs—DPPSP, MILC, and DEIP—with two new support programs that are authorized for the five-year period of the 2014 farm bill, FY2014-FY2018—the Margin Protection Program (MPP) and the Dairy Product Donation Program (DPDP). and PH coverage in a range from 25% to 90%. Producers who sign up for MPP are ineligible to sign up for the Livestock Gross Margin for Dairy Cattle program (LGM-D) offered by USDA's Risk Management Agency (RMA). MPP Payments
Whenever the calculated Actual Dairy Production Margin (ADPM) falls below the selected MPP margin threshold for a consecutive two-month period, a payment will be made on the selected coverage-level portion of a participating producer's PH—referred to as the covered production history or CPH. represents 93% of the national average ADPM. MPP Premiums
Participating producers must pay premiums that start at the $4.50/cwt. margin protection level and rise with higher coverage levels up to the $8.00/cwt. No premium is charged for the minimum $4.00/cwt. In addition, a special 25% discount is available for premiums on the first 4 million pounds of CPH during each of calendar 2014 and 2015. Annual premiums are calculated as the product of the premium rate per cwt. Thus, the premium rate varies with the volume of covered production history (CPH) of the participating dairy operation (i.e., whether it has greater or less than 4 million lbs. of CPH), and the level of margin protection selected (from $4.00/cwt. to $8.00/cwt. in $0.50/cwt. increments). would be charged the lower premium rate on the first 4 million lbs. The Dairy Product Donation Program (DPDP)
According to the 2014 farm bill, USDA shall establish and administer a Dairy Product Donation Program (DPDP) to (1) address low dairy operating margins, and (2) provide nutrition assistance to individuals in low-income groups. After three consecutive months of purchases, the DPDP purchases are required to cease, even if the margin remains < $4.00/cwt. , if the U.S. price for dairy products is significantly above world market prices. First and foremost, by repealing the Dairy Product Price Support Program (DPPSP) and the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP), U.S. dairy programs have made a significant step in better complying with its domestic support commitments under the World Trade Organization (WTO). The two proposed margin programs were similar in many respects; however, the Senate bill (but not the House bill) also included an accompanying market stabilization program—the Dairy Market Stabilization Program (DMSP), which, under certain conditions, would reduce payments to participating producers for their milk marketings when the margin falls below proposed statutory thresholds. | The 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79), which was signed into law on February 7, 2014, makes significant changes to the structure of U.S. dairy support programs, including the elimination of several major price and income support programs from the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246), the extension of several smaller dairy programs, and the addition of two new programs.
Three of the principal dairy support programs under the 2008 farm bill—the Dairy Product Price Support Program (DPPSP), the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program, and the Dairy Export Incentives Program (DEIP)—are eliminated. These programs are replaced by two new support programs that are authorized for the five-year period of the 2014 farm bill, FY2014-FY2018—the Margin Protection Program (MPP) and the Dairy Product Donation Program (DPDP).
The MPP is a voluntary program that makes a payment to participating farmers when a formula-based national margin—referred to as the Actual Dairy Production Margin (ADPM) and calculated as the national average farm price for all milk minus a national-average feed cost ration—falls below a producer-selected insured margin that can range from $4.00 per hundredweight (cwt.) to $8.00/cwt. in $0.50/cwt. increments. According to USDA final rules (released August 29, 2014), MPP payments are based on a farm-level production history and a producer-selected coverage level that ranges from 25% to 90%—the product of these two items yields the covered production history (CPH). Producers must pay an annual administrative fee of $100 for each participating dairy operation, and a premium that rises steadily for higher margin protection levels starting at the $4.50/cwt. margin level. The minimum $4.00/cwt. margin is fully subsidized and has no farmer-paid premium. The premium structure is further divided based on the volume of CPH—lower premiums are charged for the first 4 million pounds (lbs.) of CPH, higher premiums are charged on CPH above 4 million lbs. As an incentive to encourage participation by smaller dairy operations (with CPH under 4 million lbs.), premiums will be reduced by 25% across the board for all margin protection levels except the $8.00/cwt. level during calendar 2014 and 2015.
The DPDP requires USDA to procure and distribute certain dairy products when the ADPM falls below $4.00/cwt. for two consecutive months. DPDP dairy product distribution is required to target individuals from low-income groups and not be allowed for resale into commercial markets. Purchases and distribution under the DPDP end after three months or if the U.S. price for certain dairy products is significantly above world prices.
Several programs from the 2008 farm bill were extended through FY2018 including the Dairy Forward Pricing Program, the Dairy Indemnity Program, and certain provisions to augment the development of export markets under the National Dairy Promotion and Research Program (i.e., the dairy check off program). In addition, the final bill adopted a provision that requires USDA to adhere to standard rulemaking procedures.
Separately, federal milk marketing orders have permanent statutory authority and continue intact, as does the Livestock Gross Margin for Dairy Cattle program (LGM-D) and the suite of Dairy Import Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) that limit access to the U.S. domestic market by lower-priced foreign dairy products. The permanent Dairy Price Support Program contained in the Agricultural Act of 1949 (P.L. 81-439) is suspended but would be reactivated should MPP expire at the end of FY2018 without replacement or extension. |
crs_RS21772 | crs_RS21772_0 | RS21772 -- AGOA III: Amendment to the African Growth and Opportunity Act
Updated January 19, 2005
Background: The African Growth and Opportunity Act
After two decades of economic stagnation and decline, some African countries began to show signs of renewed economic growth in the early 1990s. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) ( P.L.106-200 - Title I) was enacted to encouragetrade as a way to further economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and to help integrate the region into the worldeconomy. AGOA provided trade preferencesand other benefits to countries that were making progress in economic, legal, and human rights reforms. Various U.S.government agencies carry out trade-related technical assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa. phytosanitary regulations; and strategies for further benefiting from AGOA. This provision was dueto expire on September 30, 2004. 108-429 ). AGOA was first amended in the Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-210 ), which doubled a pre-existing cap set on allowable duty-free apparel imports. regulatory and market standards. Provisions from the AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004 | On July 13, 2004, the "AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004" was signed by the Presidentand became P.L.108-274. This legislation amends the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA; P.L. 106-200, Title I), extending it to2015. AGOA seeks to spur economicdevelopment and help integrate Africa into the world trading system by granting trade preferences and other benefitsto Sub-Saharan African countries that meetcertain criteria relating to market reform and human rights. Congress first amended AGOA in 2002 (P.L. 107-210)by increasing a cap on duty-free apparelimports and clarifying other provisions. The new AGOA amendment, commonly referred to as "AGOA III," extendsthe legislation beyond its currentexpiration date of 2008 and otherwise amends existing AGOA provisions. For further information on AGOA, seeCRS Report RL31772, U.S. Trade andInvestment Relationship with Sub- Saharan Africa: The African Growth and Opportunity Act and Beyond. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL33090 | crs_RL33090_0 | The Declaration Process
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, 42U.S.C. § 5121 et seq. Procedure fordeclaration
All requests for a declaration by the President that amajor disaster exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected State. (14)
Once a declaration of an emergency or a major disaster is made by the President, the Directorof FEMA, or, in his absence the Deputy Director or the Director, Recovery Division, must appointa Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) who shall immediately initiate action to assure that federalassistance is provided in accordance with the declaration, applicable laws and regulations, and theFEMA-state agreement entered into pursuant to 44 C.F.R. §206.44. (16)
If the Governor so requests, the Director of the Recovery Division of FEMA (17) may lend or advance to thestate, either for its own use or for the use of public or private nonprofit applicants for disasterassistance under the Stafford Act, the portion of assistance for which the state or other eligibledisaster assistance applicant is responsible under the cost-sharing provisions (18) in any case in which:
(1) The State or other eligible disaster assistanceapplicant is unable to assume their financial responsibility under such cost sharing provisions:
(i) As a resultof concurrent,multiple majordisasters in ajurisdiction, or
(ii) Afterincurringextraordinarycosts as aresult of aparticulardisaster;
(2) The damagescaused by such disasters or disaster are so overwhelming and severe that it is not possible for theState or other eligible disaster assistance applicant to immediately assume their financialresponsibility under the Act; and
(3) The State and theother eligible disaster applicants are not delinquent in payment of any debts to FEMA incurred asa result of Presidentially declared major disasters or emergencies. § 5187; and timber sharingcontracts, 42 U.S.C. § 5188. | The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, P.L. 93-288 , asamended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206, and implementing regulations in 44 C.F.R. §§ 206.31-206.48,provide the statutory framework for a Presidential declaration of an emergency or a declaration ofa major disaster. Such declarations open the way for a wide range of federal resources to be madeavailable to assist in dealing with the emergency or major disaster involved. The Stafford Actstructure for the declaration process reflects the fact that federal resources under this act supplementstate and local resources for disaster relief and recovery. Except in the case of an emergencyinvolving a subject area that is exclusively or preeminently in the federal purview, the Governor ofan affected state, or Acting Governor if the Governor is not available, must request such adeclaration by the President. This report will review the statutory and regulatory requirementsapplicable to the affected state seeking the declaration and to the Presidential declaration, and willnote the different types of resources that may be made available in the response to the two types ofdeclarations. This report will updated as needed. |
crs_R41803 | crs_R41803_0 | Introduction
Interagency coordinative arrangements and activities—called for in public laws, executive orders, and administrative directives—appear to be growing in number, prominence, and proposals throughout virtually all individual policy areas and across-the-board. This report examines formal interagency collaborative arrangements and activities, which are intended to enhance joint efforts and cooperation among independent federal agencies with shared responsibilities and overlapping jurisdictions. That compilation identifies analyses of different subject and policy areas as well as different types of arrangements used among agencies. Various Types and Understandings of Collaboration
Interagency collaboration—as a way to enhance cooperation among agencies with shared responsibilities and overlapping jurisdictions—has been used in at least two different ways: to mean a distinct type of activity and arrangement, or broadly to cover one or more other related types (coordination, networking, integration, mergers, and partnerships). Even though lacking agreed-upon, hard-and-fast, detailed definitions of these, generalized operational understandings or working definitions can be developed for the principal interagency activities and arrangements, separate from collaboration as a broadly encompassing concept. Federal medical care programs have also relied on interagency mechanisms. At least in some cases, it is difficult to assess and compare the success or failure of such enterprises. Included are:
transformations in governmental responsibilities and broad-scale, wide-ranging public policies; significant changes in the political and governmental environment surrounding a (potential) collaborative effort, including the substance and direction of the policy area, electoral developments, officials in government, and organizational characteristics of the agencies involved; the urgency, scope, scale, and complexity of the problem being addressed; expectations of what is to be accomplished and determining how extensive and demanding these expectations are, for the project and for the participants; extent of a merger, realignment, or reorganization; selection of which agencies or parts thereof are to be incorporated, in what capacity, and to what extent and degree; location of a new structure that merges or integrates different agencies; selection of a lead agency or officer in coordinative arrangements; powers and resources available to a lead officer in a cross-agency arrangement, including those which already exist across-the-board, which apply to a specific project or program, or which are anticipated; autonomy of the individual components; organizational cultures within the agencies; bureaucratic and administrative cultures within the agencies; competition of a collaborative enterprise with other missions, mandates, responsibilities, strategic plans, and policy priorities among and within the participating agencies; jurisdictional rivalries or "turf battles" among the agencies; support for interagency collaboration versus support for agency autonomy, from power-brokers both inside and outside of government; regularity, frequency, intensity, and direction of oversight by Congress and the executive; incentives for and benefits of participation (mutual and reciprocal among agencies, agency-centered, or individual); disincentives and costs of participation; level and type of involvement, with policy and process formulation at one end of the spectrum and field operations at the other end; capacity, capabilities, heritage, experience, and expertise of the agencies involved in a joint venture; leadership skills and practices of the participants; and confidence in the professionalism, competency, and integrity of the participants. In 2011, President Barack Obama, expanding on his State of the Union address, emphasized that
We live and do business in the information age, but the organization of the Federal Government has not kept pace. The House of Representatives added a section to its Rules for the 112 th Congress, to require committees, during the development of their oversight plans, to "include proposals to cut or eliminate programs, including spending programs, that are inefficient, duplicative, outdated, or more appropriately administered by State or local governments." Previously, in 2010, Congress directed the Government Accountability Office to look into a similar phenomenon annually: to identify "areas of potential duplication, overlap, and fragmentation, which, if effectively addressed, could provide financial and other benefits." As these legislative and executive reviews reflect, the concerns raised decades ago have been heightened in the contemporary era, because of the further growth in government responsibilities, cross-cutting programs, and complexities in public policies. Added to this are certain crises which demonstrated the inadequacies of existing structures and arrangements, along with increased pressures to reduce federal programs and budgets. Current rationales extend to a number and variety of objectives. These include reducing policy fragmentation, improving effectiveness, increasing economy and efficiency, mitigating conflict and competition among agencies, enhancing agency productivity, developing an awareness of different perspectives and orientations, changing organizational and administrative cultures, and streamlining and improving executive and congressional oversight. Consequently, the terms have sometimes been employed interchangeably, inconsistently, or ambiguously. Despite the large and increasing adoption and promotion of interagency arrangements, questions arise over their rationales and underlying assumptions. S. Rept. 2010. M.E. S. Prt. Final Report . | Interagency collaboration among federal agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and shared responsibilities is not a new phenomenon. Attempts to foster cooperation among agencies, reduce their number in particular policy areas, or clarify the division of labor among them date to the early days of the republic. Such arrangements are increasing in the contemporary era in number, prominence, and proposals across virtually all policy areas. The reasons for the current upsurge are the growth in government responsibilities, cross-cutting programs, and their complexity; certain crises which showed severe limitations of existing structures; and heightened pressure to reduce the size of federal programs and expenditures.
Recent congressional action reflects these considerations. In 2010, Congress directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) (P.L. 111-139, 124 Stat. 29) to
conduct routine investigations to identify programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals and activities within Departments and governmentwide and report annually to Congress on the findings, including the cost of such duplication.
GAO identified 34 such programs. The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-352) provides that the Office of Management and Budget's government-wide priority goals include "outcome-oriented goals covering a limited number of crosscutting policy areas." Legislative initiatives in the 112th Congress have also advanced across-the-board reviews (e.g., H.R. 155) or recognize shared jurisdictions and responsibilities among agencies. And House Rules for the 112th Congress call on its standing committees to include proposals in their oversight plans to eliminate "programs that are inefficient, duplicative, outdated, or more appropriately administered by State or local governments." President Barack Obama has taken similar stands regarding overlapping programs—in his 2011 State of the Union Address, subsequent memoranda, and recent budget requests—and the executive has continued ongoing arrangements or added new ones.
The broad concept of interagency collaboration contains at least six types of various activities and arrangements: collaboration (an exchange among relatively equal entities or peers, separate from collaboration's broad use), coordination, mergers, integration, networks, and partnerships. These categories often overlap with, supplement, or reinforce one another; and several different types may occur in the same organizational structure and endeavor. Complicating matters, the different types are not defined in public laws or executive directives, even though required in some. Because of this and other reasons, the terms have sometimes lacked consistency and precision, have been used interchangeably, or have been applied to more than one category.
Nonetheless, working definitions can be developed for the different types. All of these are surrounded by a number of rationales, intended to enhance collaboration, improve coordination, or clarify responsibilities and jurisdictions among agencies. The underlying objectives and expectations range from reducing policy fragmentation and mitigating competition among agencies, to enhancing efficiency and effectiveness, changing organizational and administrative cultures, and streamlining and improving congressional and executive oversight. Despite these appeals, concerns and questions have arisen over some of the rationales and their underlying assumptions as well as determining the success or failure of interagency efforts. This report—which will be updated as conditions dictate—examines the burgeoning field of interagency collaboration and presents a bibliography at the end, highlighting the broad subject as well as specific areas. |
crs_R43377 | crs_R43377_0 | Overview
The Central African Republic (CAR) has struggled to emerge from conflict and state collapse since 2013, when a rebel movement known as the Seleka seized control of the government. Faustin Archange Touadéra, a former prime minister who had cultivated a discreet public profile, was elected president. As during past crises in CAR, international forces have deployed since 2013 in an effort to stabilize the country. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a small but brutal Ugandan-led militia, is active in the east, where it appears to have benefitted from CAR's recent instability. Current Issues for Policymakers
U.S. and other international policymakers are currently considering a range of questions regarding the response to the situation in CAR, including:
To what extent should donors transition from emergency humanitarian assistance toward development aid for CAR? (See " U.S. Policy and Aid ," below.) To improve U.N. efforts to prevent and punish sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers in CAR? The United States has also provided funding for assistance to communities in LRA-affected areas, including humanitarian aid, early warning efforts, and reconciliation programs. U.S. Policy and Aid
U.S. engagement in CAR has historically been limited. As the crisis erupted in 2013, the Obama Administration significantly scaled up U.S. aid and diplomatic efforts to stem the surge of violence. The President issued Executive Order 13667 (2014) authorizing targeted sanctions against actors fueling the conflict; the State Department and Defense Department provided substantial support to African peacekeepers and French troops deploying to CAR; the President and other Administration officials engaged in public diplomacy outreach to the people of CAR; the State Department and USAID identified new funding for conflict mitigation, reconciliation, justice, and governance programs; and in the U.N. Security Council, the Administration supported the establishment of MINUSCA. The United States is also the top financial contributor to MINUSCA's budget (as with all U.N. peacekeeping operations), under the system of assessed contributions for U.N. peacekeeping. For FY2017, the State Department also requested $18.1 million in bilateral aid for CAR: $8 million in Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds for continuing voluntary support to African troop contributors to MINUSCA and for bilateral support to security sector reform; $5.7 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds to continue efforts to establish a functioning criminal justice system; $4.3 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF) for peacebuilding programs; and $150,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) for military professionalization and to promote bilateral military ties. The CAR aid figures reported in the State Department's annual Congressional Budget Justification also do not include substantial funding that has been allocated through regionally- and centrally-managed programs, including for conflict-mitigation, security sector reform, and other special initiatives. In particular, Congress provided unspecified levels of funding for reconciliation and peacebuilding programs in CAR (most recently, §7042[a], Division K of P.L. 114-113 , the FY2016 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act) and for programs to assist civilians in areas affected by the LRA (§7042[f]). Similar provisions were included in the House version of the FY2017 foreign aid appropriations bill ( H.R. Other relevant legislation enacted in the 114 th Congress included the Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-231 ). 211 (regarding genocide and mass atrocities), S.Res. Outlook and Issues for Congress
Some observers assert that U.S. response to the conflict in CAR helped avert a much larger crisis. Congress may also weigh the relative priority of the CAR crisis in the context of competing priorities elsewhere in Africa and beyond. | The Central African Republic (CAR) is emerging from a crisis that began when rebels overthrew the national government in 2013, ushering in a chaotic and violent period. A new president, Faustin Archange Touadéra, was elected in 2016, but gains remain fragile. Militias that have targeted civilians on the basis of religious and ethnic identity continue to operate in much of the country, posing challenges to governance, reconciliation, and accountability. Violence has caused large population displacements, weakening an already tiny economy and placing strains on finite international aid and peacekeeping resources.
U.S. responses to the crisis in CAR have included:
humanitarian assistance; aid funding for conflict mitigation, peacebuilding, and rule-of-law programs; diplomatic and financial support for a U.N. peacekeeping operation, MINUSCA; additional support for African and French troops that have deployed to CAR; public diplomacy initiatives; and targeted financial and travel sanctions against actors viewed as fueling conflict.
Key issues for the 115th Congress include the authorization, appropriation, and oversight of U.S. aid and peacekeeping funding and of U.S. policy toward CAR. The context for these considerations will depend to some extent on the approach of the incoming Donald Trump Administration to CAR and regional issues. The situation in CAR also has implications for several broad policy challenges in which Congress has displayed interest:
political stability in the wider central Africa region; U.S. efforts to counter the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a small but brutal militia active in eastern CAR and neighboring countries; the U.S. role in preventing and addressing "mass atrocities" in foreign countries; trends in wildlife poaching and other cross-border criminal activity in the region; religious freedom in Africa; and the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping and responses to peacekeeper abuses.
The FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113) provided that funding appropriated for aid to CAR "shall be made available for reconciliation and peacebuilding programs, including activities to promote inter-faith dialogue at the national and local levels, and for programs to prevent crimes against humanity." A similar provision is included in H.R. 5912 (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017), and similar provisions were enacted in prior foreign aid appropriations measures. The FY2016 Act also provided funding for assisting civilians in LRA-affected areas, such as southeastern CAR, as did prior aid appropriations measures. Other relevant legislation enacted in the 114th Congress includes the Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-231). The 113th Congress held several hearings on CAR in the House and Senate.
The Obama Administration allocated an estimated $14 million in bilateral aid for CAR in FY2016 and requested $18 million for FY2017—not including emergency humanitarian aid and other regionally- and centrally-managed funds, such as conflict-mitigation and LRA-related assistance. The Administration also allocated an estimated $287 million from FY2016 appropriations for U.S. assessed contributions to MINUSCA's budget. The United States is by far the largest bilateral humanitarian donor in CAR, with over $99 million in funding provided in FY2016. |
crs_RL30371 | crs_RL30371_0 | Political Background
Despite defeats in wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, international isolation and theimpoverishment of his people, Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic remained in power for morethan a decade. His reign came to an end on October 5, 2000, when he wasdeposed from power by a popular revolt after he refused to concede defeat in an election for the postof President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) won by his opponent, Vojislav Kostunicaon September 24, 2000. (1) Milosevic's party, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) was also trounced in simultaneous electionsto the federal parliament and local governments. Organized crime, extremists within the Serbian military and security apparatus, and thelinks between them continue to post a threat to Serbia's democratic development and Euro-Atlanticintegration. The monarchist and moderate nationalist Serbian RenewalMovement, in coalition with the New Serbia party, won 22 seats. The mostcontroversial aspect of the Serbian government is its dependence on support from the SPS, whichdoes not have ministers in the government but provides it with a majority in parliament. On June 13, 2004, Serbia held a presidential election. These results confirmed the growing strength of Tadic's pro-WesternDemocratic Party but also continued strong support for the Radicals. In October 1997, Djukanovic was elected President ofMontenegro. After Milosevic's fall, efforts by Montenegrin leaders to push forward with independencefrom Yugoslavia were stalled by international opposition, particularly from the European Union. On May 21, 2006, Montenegro held a referendum on independence from the Serbia andMontenegro union. A series of corruption scandals have marred privatization efforts. U.S. Policy
In its policy toward Serbia and Montenegro, the Administration has supported the country'sdemocratic transition and integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. On June 13, 2006, theUnited States recognized Montenegro as an independent country. Cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal
The fate of Milosevic and other persons indicted by ICTY has been a controversial issue inSerbia's relations with the United States. In each of the past six fiscal years (FY2001-FY2006),Congress has conditioned U.S. aid to Serbia after a certain date in the Spring of that year on apresidential certification that Serbia has met certain conditions, especially cooperation with theICTY. The committee report for theHouse-passed version of the FY2007 foreign aid bill ( H.R. The law said that the United States should support the membership of the FRY to regionaland international organizations subject to a certification by the President that the FRY has appliedfor membership on the same basis of other former Yugoslav republics, and has taken steps to settleissues related to state liabilities, assets and property. On March 5, 2003, the House passed H.R. The provisionconditioned U.S. aid to Serbia after May 31, 2006, on "(1) cooperating with the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, including access for investigators, the provision of documents,and the surrender and transfer of indictees or assistance in their apprehension, including making allpracticable efforts to apprehend and transfer Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, unless theSecretary of State determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that these individualsare no longer residing in Serbia; (2) taking steps that are consistent with the Dayton Accords to endSerbian financial, political, security and other support which has served to maintain separateRepublika Srpska institutions; and (3) taking steps to implement policies which reflect a respect forminority rights and the rule of law." Figure 1. | Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic's long reign came to an end in October 2000, whenhe was deposed from power by a popular revolt after he refused to concede defeat in an election forthe post of President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) won by his opponent, VojislavKostunica. The new government suffered a great blow in March 2003, when Serbian Prime MinisterZoran Djindjic was murdered by organized crime figures linked to the Serbian security apparatus. Organized crime, extremists within the Serbian military and security apparatus, and the linksbetween them continue to pose a threat to Serbia's democratic development.
On December 28, 2003, the extreme nationalist Serbian Radical Party won a stunning victoryin early Serbian parliamentary elections, but fell short of a majority. In March 2004, a minoritygovernment of democratic parties formed a government without the Radicals. However, thegovernment depends on the parliamentary support of the Socialists (Milosevic's former party), whoare not in the government but are in a position to extract concessions from it. Democratic forces inSerbia received a boost from Serbian presidential elections in June 2004, which resulted in a victoryfor Boris Tadic, a pro-Western, pro-reform figure over a Radical Party candidate.
In a years-long confrontation with Milosevic, Montenegrin leader Milo Djukanovic seizedcontrol of virtually all levers of federal power on the republic's territory. He sought to rapidlyachieve an independent Montenegro, but opposition from the United States, European Union andRussia stymied these efforts. After a largely unsuccessful three-year decentralized union with Serbia,Montenegro voted for independence in a referendum held on May 21, 2006. Montenegro'sindependence has been recognized by Serbia, the United States, the European Union, and othercountries.
The United States and other Western countries have sought to encourage Serbia andMontenegro's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. However, these efforts have been hamperedby controversy over the future status of Serbia's Kosovo province, Serbia's failure to fully cooperatewith the Yugoslavia war crimes tribunal (in particular its failure to arrest former Bosnian Serb armychief Ratko Mladic), and Serbia's fitful progress in such areas as rule of law and military and securitysector reform.
Since Milosevic's downfall, Congress has appropriated significant amounts of aid to Serbiaand Montenegro to promote reforms. In each fiscal year from FY2001 through FY2006, Congressconditioned U.S. aid to Serbia on a certification by the President that a series of conditions had beenmet by Serbia, above all cooperation with the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal. The House has passedsuch a certification provision in its version of the FY2007 foreign aid bill ( H.R. 5522 ).This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41511 | crs_R41511_0 | Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148 , as amended) created the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB, or the Board) to "reduce the per capita rate of growth in Medicare spending." The Board's proposals will be implemented by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) unless Congress acts either by formulating its own proposal to achieve the same savings or by discontinuing the automatic implementation process defined in the statute. Again, the legislation's stated goal of the Board is to reduce the per capita growth in Medicare expenditures, not to reduce overall Medicare expenditures. Therefore, while the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the cumulative impact of the Board's recommendations from 2015 through 2019 will reduce total spending by $15.5 billion, during the same period total Medicare expenditures are projected to be $3.9 trillion with average spending per beneficiary increasing from $13,374 in 2015 to $15,749 in 2019. If the Chief Actuary determines that projected five-year per capita growth rate in Medicare expenditures two years hence exceeds the projected per capita target growth rate, the Chief Actuary needs to establish an applicable savings target—the amount by which the Board must reduce future spending. The Chief Actuary is required to calculate
the Medicare per capita growth rate (the "growth rate"), and the Medicare per capita target growth rate (the "target growth rate"). The IPAB Medicare Proposal Process
If the Chief Actuary makes a determination by April 30 of the DY that the growth rate for an IY is forecast to exceed the target growth rate for that year, the Board is to develop a detailed proposal to reduce the growth rate by the applicable savings target . By March 1 of each PY, the Secretary submits comments to Congress on Board proposals. Scope of Proposals
PPACA directs the Board that its proposal
relate only to the Medicare program; result in a net reduction in total Medicare program expenditures in the IY that are at least equal to the applicable savings target established by the Chief Actuary; not include any recommendation to ration care, raise revenues or Medicare beneficiary premiums, increase cost-sharing, restrict benefits, or alter eligibility; not reduce payments to providers or suppliers scheduled to receive a reduction in payment as the result of productivity adjustments under Section 3401 (see Appendix C ); include, as appropriate, recommendations to reduce Medicare payments under parts C and D, such as reductions in direct subsidy payments to Medicare Advantage and prescription drug plans that are related to administrative expenses (including profits) for basic coverage, denying high bids or removing high bids for prescription drug coverage from the calculation of the national average monthly bid amount and reductions in payments to Medicare Advantage plans that are related to administrative expenses (including profits) and performance bonuses for Medicare Advantage plans; and include recommendations with respect to administrative funding for the Secretary to carry out the Board's recommendations. Other Board-Related Activities
While the Board's principal function is to develop proposals that reduce per capita growth in Medicare spending, this is not its sole activity. "Fast Track" Procedures for Congressional Consideration
The Secretary must implement the Board's proposals unless Congress affirmatively acts to amend or block them within a stated period of time and under circumstances specified in the act. To begin, Section 3403(d) of the act establishes special "fast track" parliamentary procedures governing House and Senate committee consideration, and Senate floor consideration, of legislation implementing the Board or Secretary's proposal. These procedures differ from the parliamentary mechanisms the chambers usually use to consider most legislation, and are designed to ensure that Congress can act promptly on the implementing legislation should it choose to do so. 111-148 establishes a second "fast track" parliamentary mechanism for consideration of legislation discontinuing the automatic implementation process for the recommendations of the Independent Payment Advisory Board described above. The President's FY2013 Budget
The President's FY2013 budget, as submitted to Congress on February 13, 2012, includes a proposal to strengthen the IPAB. 452 , the Medicare Decisions Accountability Act of 2011, introduced on January 26, 2011, would repeal the Independent Payment Advisory Board. 452 was combined with the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2011 ( H.R. On March 22, 2012, the House passed the combined version of H.R. 5 . | In response, in part, to overall growth in Medicare program expenditures and growth in expenditures per Medicare beneficiary, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) created the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB, or the Board) and charged the Board with developing proposals to "reduce the per capita rate of growth in Medicare spending." The Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) is directed to implement the Board's proposals automatically unless Congress affirmatively acts to alter the Board's proposals or to discontinue the automatic implementation of such proposals.
The annual IPAB sequence of events begins each year, starting April 30, 2013, with the Chief Actuary of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services calculating a Medicare per capita growth rate and a Medicare per capita target growth rate. If the Chief Actuary determines that the Medicare per capita growth rate exceeds the Medicare per capita target growth rate, the Chief Actuary would establish an applicable savings target—the amount by which the Board must reduce future spending. This determination by the Chief Actuary also triggers a requirement that the Board prepare a proposal to reduce the growth in the Medicare per capita growth rate by the applicable savings target. The Board cannot ration care, raise premiums, increase cost sharing, or otherwise restrict benefits or modify eligibility. In generating its proposals, the Board is directed to consider, among other things, Medicare solvency, quality and access to care, the effects of changes in payments to providers, and those dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid. If the Board fails to act, the Secretary is directed to prepare a proposal.
Board proposals must be submitted to the Secretary by September 1 of each year and to the President and Congress by January 15 of the following year. Board proposals are "fast-tracked" in Congress, and IPAB proposals go into force automatically unless Congress affirmatively acts to amend or block them within a stated period of time and under circumstances specified in the act. Section 3403(d) of the act establishes special "fast track" parliamentary procedures governing House and Senate committee consideration, and Senate floor consideration, of legislation implementing the Board or Secretary's proposal. These procedures differ from the parliamentary mechanisms the chambers usually use to consider most legislation and are designed to ensure that Congress can act promptly on the implementing legislation should it choose to do so. PPACA also established a second "fast track" parliamentary mechanism for consideration of legislation discontinuing the automatic implementation process for the recommendations of the Board.
The Board's charge is to develop proposals for the Secretary to implement that reduce the per capita growth in Medicare expenditures, not to reduce Medicare expenditures. Therefore, while the CBO projects that the cumulative impact of the Board's recommendations from 2015 through 2019 will reduce total spending by $15.5 billion, during the same period, Medicare expenditures will total $3.9 trillion with average spending per beneficiary forecast to increase from $13,374 to $15,749. While the Board's potential impact on total expenditures is likely to be relatively small compared to overall Medicare expenditures, its impact on particular Medicare providers or suppliers may be significant, particularly if the Board alters payment mechanisms.
The President's FY2013 budget, as submitted to Congress on February 13, 2012, includes a proposal to strengthen the IPAB. On March 22, 2012, the House passed a combined version of the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2011 (H.R. 5) that contained provisions from H.R. 452, the Medicare Decisions Accountability Act of 2011, which would repeal the IPAB. |
crs_R41063 | crs_R41063_0 | Introduction
The proposed combination of Comcast, the largest distributor of video services in the United States, and NBC Universal (NBCU), a major producer and aggregator of video content, would create a huge, vertically integrated entity with potentially enormous negotiating power at a time when market forces already are altering traditional content provider/distributor relationships. Despite the size and reach that Comcast would be afforded if the deal is completed, there is so much uncertainty in the video market that the proposed combination has elicited a wide range of predictions about (1) how it would affect that market; (2) how it would affect the long-standing public policy goals of competition, diversity of voices, and localism; and (3) whether the merger would prove beneficial to Comcast's shareholders. From one perspective, the scope of the combined entity would be so broad that, in addition to requiring careful scrutiny of its competitive effects, it potentially could affect market structure and relationships in ways that have implications for a wide range of media rules, regulations, and policies, including program carriage rules, program access requirements, retransmission consent rules, long-standing policy supporting free over-the-air broadcast television, and even network neutrality and open access policies. From another perspective, the recent history of failed mega-mergers in the communications sector suggests that the vertically integrated post-merger entity may have so many pieces with conflicting market incentives that it proves impossible for executives to craft an internally consistent profit-maximizing business strategy, much less exploit market power to undermine competition. There is consensus that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) are likely to approve the combination subject to merger conditions and/or license conditions—intended to protect competition, diversity of voices, and localism—that may significantly affect the impact of the combination. It is possible, however, that such conditions might have the effect both of protecting the public against significant harms created by the combination and of limiting potential benefits created by the combination. Changes in Traditional Video Business Models
The traditional business models of just about every participant in the video market are potentially challenged by these structural market changes and as a result the current environment is characterized by very contentious programmer-distributor negotiations and a multitude of novel new ways to distribute content as participants experiment with new business models. Claim: Comcast Would Be Able to Use its Vertically Integrated Position to Deny Rival Distributors Access to Programming or to Raise the Cost of That Programming
Comcast faces two sets of rival distributors—(1) the satellite and telephone companies that compete as MVPDs employing largely the same business model as Comcast, and (2) new entrants offering a variety of video streaming services over the Internet and "over the top" services that bring Internet video directly to the television. Claim: Comcast Would Be Able to Use Its Vertically Integrated Position to Favor the Programming of NBCU at the Expense of Independent Programmers
Given the high level of upfront fixed costs associated with program production and with constructing program networks, financial viability and success depends on reaching a threshold level of households. | The proposed combination of Comcast, the largest distributor of video services in the United States, and NBC Universal (NBCU), a major producer and aggregator of video content, would create a huge, vertically integrated entity with potentially enormous negotiating power at a time when market forces already are altering traditional content provider/distributor relationships. Comcast would own or control media and entertainment properties of significant scope and scale.
Despite the size and reach that Comcast would be afforded, there is so much uncertainty in the video market that the proposed combination has elicited a wide range of predictions about (1) how it would affect that market; (2) how it would affect the long-standing public policy goals of competition, diversity of voices, and localism; and (3) whether the merger would prove beneficial to Comcast's shareholders.
From one perspective, the scope of the combination would be so broad that, in addition to requiring careful scrutiny of its competitive effects, it potentially could affect market structure and relationships in ways that have implications for a wide range of media rules, regulations, and policies, including program carriage rules, program access requirements, retransmission consent rules, long-standing policy supporting free over-the-air broadcast television, and even network neutrality and open access policies. From another perspective, the recent history of failed mega-mergers in the communications sector suggests that the vertically integrated post-merger entity may have so many parts with conflicting market incentives that it proves impossible to craft an internally consistent profit-maximizing business strategy, no less exploit market power to undermine competition.
There is consensus that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) are likely to approve the combination subject to merger conditions and/or license conditions—intended to protect competition, diversity of voices, and localism—that may significantly affect the impact of the combination. It is possible, however, that such conditions might have the effect both of protecting the public against significant harms created by the combination and of limiting potential benefits created by the combination.
The traditional business models of just about every participant in the video market are potentially challenged by structural market changes and as a result the current environment is characterized by very contentious programmer-distributor negotiations and a multitude of novel new ways to distribute content as incumbents and new entrants experiment with new business models.
The issues likely to require the most attention of the DOJ and the FCC include whether Comcast would be able to use its vertically integrated position to deny rival distributors (including independent Internet video distributors and over the top service providers) access to programming or to raise the cost of that programming; whether Comcast would be able to use its vertically integrated position to favor the programming of NBCU at the expense of independent programmers; whether Comcast would have the incentive to use the merger to change NBC into a cable network, at the expense of local programming; and whether a combined Comcast-NBCU might have the unique ability to craft new business models that benefit consumers. |
crs_R42993 | crs_R42993_0 | The two nations, which fought together in many of America's wars and established the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) alliance in 1951, are once again close security partners in the Asia Pacific and beyond. Several organizations and groups, some involving Members of Congress, help promote bilateral ties between the United States and New Zealand, including the United States-New Zealand Council in Washington, DC, and its counterpart, the New Zealand-United States Council in Wellington; the Friends of New Zealand Congressional Caucus and its New Zealand parliamentary counterpart; and the more recent Pacific Partnership Forum. The degree to which the Wellington Declaration was able to move the relationship forward is attested to by the 2012 Washington Declaration on Defense Cooperation, which consolidated the developing relationship and opened the way for further enhanced strategic dialogue and defense cooperation. New Zealand has also joined the United States in the annual U.S.-led Pacific Partnership exercise. Also articulated in New Zealand's National Security System document of May 2011 are concerns with structural shifts in global economic power. In articulating New Zealand's interests in the South Pacific, the White Paper states:
It is in New Zealand's interest to play a leadership role in the South Pacific for the foreseeable future, acting in concert with our South Pacific neighbours. This has in part been influenced, as noted above, by New Zealand's increasing Pacifika population as well as by New Zealand's national interests in the region. New Zealand and the Asia Pacific
Recent New Zealand governments have concluded that the country must invest more time and energy into strengthening its ties with Asia and that it needs to look to new ways to build a shared future in the Asia Pacific region and increase trade and investment linkages. There are a range of views in New Zealand on the rise of China, its implications for New Zealand, and the way New Zealand should position itself within the shifting geopolitical and trade dynamics of the region. In recent years, it appears that China has increased its aid to and engagement with the Pacific to pursue other interests as well. –Prime Minister John Key
If the United States and New Zealand have largely common values, then why did these two nations, in the period after 1984, have such distance in their relationship? The two nations' values, and from these their national identities, have, however, evolved differently over time. Attention to these differences can also lead to better understanding of both nations. The government's desire to return to closer ties with the United States coincided with, and was facilitated by, the Obama's Administration's move to rebalance U.S. involvement in the Indo-Pacific region. As a result, New Zealand will likely focus its efforts in the South Pacific as its primary area of strategic interest. By agreeing to let past differences over nuclear policy no longer define the relationship, the United States shifted its approach to New Zealand in a way that demonstrates respect for New Zealand's nuclear policy and its independence in foreign affairs and opened the way for a resumption of closer security cooperation. The above discussion of developing security cooperation between the United States and New Zealand raises a number of questions that may be of interest to Members of Congress interested in oversight of the Administration's rebalancing to Asia strategy. | As part of its strategy to rebalance toward Asia the Obama Administration has greatly expanded cooperation and reestablished close ties with New Zealand. Changes in the security realm have been particularly notable as the two sides have restored close defense cooperation, which was suspended in the mid-1980s due to differences over nuclear policy. The two nations are now working together increasingly closely in the area of defense and security cooperation while also seeking to coordinate efforts in the South Pacific. The United States and New Zealand are also working together to help shape emerging architectures in the Asia-Pacific such as the 11-nation Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement negotiation in which New Zealand has played a key role.
Members of Congress interested in oversight of the Obama Administration's rebalancing to Asia strategy and the United States' presence in the South Pacific as well as Members associated with the Friends of New Zealand Congressional Caucus may be interested in these new developments in the bilateral relationship. Congressional interest has also been demonstrated through Members' participation in the Pacific Partnership Forum with New Zealand.
In discussing how the United States is updating alliances to address new demands and "building new partnerships," then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton cited in November 2011 the outreach effort to New Zealand, among other countries, as "part of a broader effort to ensure a more comprehensive approach to American strategy and engagement in the region." She added that "We are asking these emerging partners to join us in shaping and participating in a rules-based regional and global order." It is of interest to note that New Zealand, a nation that like Australia has fought alongside the United States in most of its wars, is now being reconceived as a "new" partner.
While the current right-of-center government of Prime Minister John Key has moved forward in restoring bilateral ties with the United States, some analysts in New Zealand are concerned that if this trend is taken too far it may threaten New Zealand's trade interests with China. Others in New Zealand are also concerned that moving too far too fast with the United States may jeopardize New Zealand's independence in foreign policy.
The Obama Administration's move away from old restrictions on bilateral ties, as demonstrated by the opening of U.S. naval ports to New Zealand ships, will likely continue to move bilateral ties forward. This desire on both sides to continue to strengthen relations was demonstrated by the 2010 Wellington Declaration and the 2012 Washington Declaration. In the view of many, the improvement in bilateral relations marked by these two agreements will better enable both nations to navigate the shifting geopolitical dynamics of both the South Pacific and the larger the Asia Pacific region, including the rise of China. New Zealand's national identity, values, and economic interests will all likely influence its external engagement in the years ahead. Values, as well as interests, have played a role in explaining past differences between the United States and New Zealand and why the two nations are once again close Pacific partners. |
crs_RL34292 | crs_RL34292_0 | Over time, IPR protection and enforcement have come to the forefront as a key international trade issue for the United States—largely due to the role of intellectual property in an innovative U.S. economy and competitive advantage—and figure prominently in the multilateral trade policy arena and in regional and bilateral U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs). Congress has legislative, oversight, and appropriations responsibilities related to IPR and trade policy. This report discusses the different types of IPR and IPR infringement; the role of IPR in the U.S. economy; estimated losses associated with IPR infringement; the organizational structure of IPR protection and U.S. trade policy; and issues for Congress regarding IPR and international trade. IPR Definitions
Types of IPR
IPR are legal rights granted by governments to encourage innovation and creative output. They ensure that creators reap the benefits of their inventions or works and may take forms such as patents, trade secrets, copyrights, trademarks, or geographical indications. Although the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) provides minimum standards for IPR protections, such rights are granted on a national basis and are, in general, enforceable only in the country in which they are granted. U.S. economic impact . Sources of data. U.S. Trade Promotion Authority and Negotiating Objectives
On June 29, 2015, President Obama signed the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, also known as Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). The objectives include
Furthering adequate and effective protection of IPR through accelerated full implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and by ensuring FTAs negotiated by the United States "reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in U.S. law"; Protecting IPR related to new technologies and new methods of transmission and distribution in a manner that "facilitates legitimate trade"; Eliminating discriminatory treatment in the use and enforcement of IPR; Ensuring adequate rights holder protection through digital rights management practices; Providing strong enforcement of IPR; Negotiating the prevention and elimination of government involvement in violations of IPR such as cybertheft or piracy (a related protection of trade secrets and proprietary information collected by governments in the furtherance of regulations was contained in the negotiating objective on regulatory coherence); and Reaffirming the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, with additional language to "ensure that trade agreements foster innovation and access to medicine"—an objective that did not specifically refer to the patent protection provisions found in the May 10, 2007, Bipartisan Trade Agreement (discussed above), and where the added language seemingly could have been used to justify including or excluding those provisions in future FTAs. To date, the United States has entered into 14 FTAs with 20 countries. Stakeholders on both sides could raise issues about how to balance IPR protection and enforcement with other public policy goals, such as access to medicines in poor or developing countries and the free flow of information. New and Evolving Issues
U.S. trade policy also increasingly is focused on addressing new and evolving issues in international IPR protection and enforcement. The IPR landscape is changing, both due to the growing role of emerging markets in the global marketplace and the increased level of international trade taking place in the digital environment. U.S. Trade Law
Special 301
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 ( P.L. The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act ( P.L. However, placement on one of the lists is country-specific and takes into consideration a host of factors, including the level and scope of the country's IPR infringement and their impact on the U.S. economy, the strength of the country's IPR laws and enforcement of IPR laws, progress made by the country in improving IPR protection and enforcement in the past year, and the sincerity of the country's commitment to multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) administers section 337 proceedings. Generalized System of Preferences
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is a program that provides preferential duty-free entry to certain products from designated developing countries. U.S. Efforts to Promote IPR Through Trade Policy
Since the inclusion of IPR provisions in NAFTA and the TRIPS Agreement, IPR protection and enforcement have been major U.S. trade policy negotiating objectives. Beyond this, Congress could explore other options for advancing U.S. IPR trade policy objectives in emerging economies, including in the following areas:
U.S. FTA negotiations. The TPP and T-TIP negotiations are intended to help shape global rules addressing challenges in third countries, such as with respect to localization barriers to trade—issues relevant to emerging economies. Congress may also examine the enforcement of U.S. IPR through existing trade agreements, as well as the effectiveness of U.S. trade policy tools such as Special 301. Currently, the USTR is leading free trade agreement negotiations for the United States for the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), among other negotiations. Office of the U.S. | This report provides background on intellectual property rights (IPR) and discusses the role of U.S. international trade policy in enhancing IPR protection and enforcement abroad. IPR are legal rights granted by governments to encourage innovation and creative output by ensuring that creators reap the benefits of their inventions or works. They may take forms such as patents, trade secrets, copyrights, trademarks, or geographical indications. Congress has constitutional responsibility for legislating and overseeing IPR and international trade policy. Responsibility for developing IPR policy, engaging in IPR-related international negotiations, and enforcing IPR laws cuts across multiple U.S. government agencies.
The protection and enforcement of IPR is an important and longstanding component of U.S. international trade policy and U.S. trade negotiating objectives. U.S. trade policy also seeks to address new and evolving issues in the IPR landscape related to the growing role of emerging markets in the global market place and the increased level of digital trade.
Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 1995 World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) at the, trade policy has been used to advance IPR rules internationally. The TRIPS Agreement set minimum standards for IPR protection and enforcement. The United States engages in efforts with other trading partners to build on the TRIPS Agreement, particularly through the negotiation of regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). To date, the United States has entered into 14 FTAs with 20 countries, which generally include IPR commitments exceeding obligations under the TRIPS Agreement ("TRIPS-plus"). IPR issues are prominent in the ongoing U.S. FTA negotiations of the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). On June 29, 2015, President Obama signed the Bipartisan Trade Promotion and Accountability Act (P.L. 114-26), known as Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), setting forth negotiating objectives on IPR. Many of these objectives are to seek to negotiate TRIPS-plus provisions in U.S. FTAs.
Other trade policy tools also are available to advance U.S. international IPR objectives. Pursuant to Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974 as amended (P.L. 93-618), the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) identifies countries providing inadequate IPR protection in its annual "Special 301" report. Section 337 of the amended Tariff Act of 1930 authorizes the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to prohibit U.S. imports that infringe on U.S. IPR. Additionally, under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the United States may consider a developing country's IPR policies and practices as a basis for offering or suspending preferential duty-free entry to certain products from the country.
IPR issues related to international trade policy may figure prominently in the 114th congressional agenda. Congress may:
examine the role of IPR in U.S. trade policy, including the implications of IPR trade negotiating objectives in Trade Promotion Authority (TPA); conduct oversight of implementation of the IPR commitments in existing trade agreements, as well as in the current U.S. trade negotiations on TPP and T-TIP; conduct oversight of the role of IPR in U.S. economic growth and innovation, and how the protection and enforcement of IPR relates to other public policy goals, such as access to medicines in poor or developing countries and the free flow of data; consider the possibility of additional policy options to address IPR concerns in emerging economies that are not a part of existing U.S. FTAs or included in current U.S. FTA negotiations, as well as new and evolving IPR issues, such as with respect to indigenous innovation, "forced" localization barriers to trade, and trade secret theft through cybercrime; and examine the effectiveness of the current U.S. coordinating structure and the adequacy of current federal resources for promoting international IPR support. |
crs_RL32746 | crs_RL32746_0 | Introduction
U.S. farmers grow more than 250 types of fruit, vegetable, tree nut, flower, ornamental nursery, and turfgrass crops in addition to the major bulk commodity crops. Government programs affecting the sector are not limited to USDA. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA, within the Department of Health and Human Services) is responsible for assuring the safety of specialty crops for human consumption, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates the safety of pesticides used on specialty crops and sets tolerances for permissible residues (which are enforced by FDA). Crop Insurance and Noninsured Disaster Assistance
The Risk Management Agency administers the federal crop insurance program, which Congress reformed most recently in P.L. Annual USDA appropriations acts provide funding for RMA salaries and expenses to operate the program. Protection for Sellers
The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930 (PACA) and the Produce Agency Act of 1937 (7 U.S.C. Under these acts, the Agricultural Marketing Service administers a program to protect producers, shippers, distributors, and retailers from loss due to unfair or fraudulent practices in the marketing of fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables. Trade Remedies
In the event of suspected unfair competition from foreign imports, U.S. law makes available certain remedies that the specialty crop industry can pursue, not within USDA, but from the Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission . Disease and Pest Protection for U.S. These data provide the basis for more than 70 periodical reports (some issued daily) that provide real-time production and market information for the U.S. agricultural sector and USDA program administrators. The state agricultural experiment stations also conduct research on this subject. The Department of Labor (DOL), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of State are involved in administering the system generally referred to as the H-2A program (after the name of the authorizing section in the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952; (Sec.101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)). Employers must demonstrate to DOL that sufficient domestic workers are not available and that employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect U.S. workers who are similarly employed. | U.S. farmers grow more than 250 types of fruit, vegetable, tree nut, flower, ornamental nursery, and turfgrass crops in addition to the major bulk commodity crops. Although specialty crops are ineligible for the federal commodity price and income support programs, they are eligible for other types of U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) support, such as crop insurance, disaster assistance, and, under certain conditions, ad hoc market loss assistance payments.
The industry also benefits generally from USDA programs to enhance marketing opportunities; protect sellers from fraudulent practices in the marketplace; support and stabilize markets through purchases for USDA feeding programs; promote and facilitate exports; protect domestic production from foreign pests and diseases; and conduct research on related horticultural and economic subjects. The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930 (PACA), the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, periodic omnibus legislation authorizing USDA programs, and annual and supplemental appropriations acts are the primary laws that govern the USDA programs affecting specialty crops.
Other federal agencies also play important roles. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA, in the Department of Health and Human Services) is responsible for assuring that fresh, frozen, canned, and imported fruits, vegetables, and nuts are safe for human consumption. The Environmental Protection Agency sets the safe limits for pesticide residues on produce, which FDA enforces. The Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission are responsible for investigating instances of suspected "dumping" of foreign goods on the U.S. market and levying antidumping taxes. The Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services of the Department of Homeland Security jointly administer a system for temporarily admitting foreign workers to provide seasonal labor, provided that U.S. workers are not available.
This report describes the federal programs of importance to the specialty crop sector, and provides the most recent funding information available for them. It will be updated periodically. |
crs_R42124 | crs_R42124_0 | Background
In September 2008, TransCanada Corp., a Canadian company, applied to the U.S. Department of State (State Department) for a permit to cross the U.S.-Canada international border with the Keystone XL pipeline project. As originally proposed, the pipeline would carry crude oil produced from the oil sands region of Alberta, Canada, to U.S. Gulf Coast refineries. As required by Title V of the act, on January 18, 2012, the State Department recommended that "the presidential permit for the proposed Keystone XL pipeline be denied and, that at this time, the TransCanada Keystone XL Pipeline be determined not to serve the national interest." The same day, the President stated his determination that the Keystone XL pipeline project "would not serve the national interest." This legislative interest has not abated in the 113 th Congress, as multiple bills have been introduced that would effectively supersede the State Department's permitting authority and grant a presidential permit for TransCanada to construct and operate the border-crossing facility of the Keystone XL pipeline, including H.R. Meanwhile, on March 1, 2013, the State Department issued a Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (draft SEIS) as required by NEPA, evaluating the environmental impacts of the revised proposal. After the comment period ends, the State Department may issue the Final EIS, and subsequently a decision on whether to issue the presidential permit. This recent legislative activity intended to direct action on the two Keystone XL presidential permit applications appears to represent the first congressional efforts to amend the established executive branch procedure for the permitting of cross-border pipeline facilities, and there is some question as to whether this raises constitutional issues related to the jurisdiction of the two branches over such facilities. Additionally, as states considered taking action with respect to the pipeline, questions arose regarding whether state siting of a federally approved pipeline is preempted by federal law. Another question was whether a state's dictating the route of the pipeline was a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which prohibits one state from acting to protect its own interests to the detriment of other states. This report reviews those legal issues, observing generally that legislation altering the pipeline border crossing approval process appears likely to be a legitimate exercise of Congress's constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce and that state oversight of pipeline siting decisions does not appear to violate existing federal law or the Constitution. The report also suggests that the State Department's implementation of its authority to issue presidential permits appears to allow for judicial review of its NEPA determinations. A companion report from CRS focusing on policy issues associated with the proposal, CRS Report R41668, Keystone XL Pipeline Project: Key Issues , by [author name scrubbed] et al., is also available. Executive Order 13337 is a modification of Executive Order No. Keystone XL NEPA Background
The Keystone XL project has had a series of environmental reviews under NEPA initiated by the January 28, 2009, State Department announcement that it would prepare an EIS:
With respect to the application submitted by Keystone, the Department of State has concluded that the issuance of the Presidential permit would constitute a major Federal action that may have a significant impact upon the environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. | In 2008, TransCanada Corp. applied for a presidential permit from the State Department to construct and operate an oil pipeline across the U.S.-Canada border in a project known as Keystone XL. The Keystone XL pipeline would transport oil produced from oil sands in Alberta, Canada, to Gulf Coast refineries. The permit application was subjected to review by the State Department pursuant to executive branch authority over cross-border pipeline facilities as articulated in Executive Order 13337, and subsequently denied by the State Department. Pursuant to the requirements of legislation passed in the 112th Congress which directed a decision on the application within a particular time frame, on January 18, 2012, the State Department recommended that "the presidential permit for the proposed Keystone XL pipeline be denied and, that at this time, the TransCanada Keystone XL Pipeline be determined not to serve the national interest." The same day, the President stated his determination that the Keystone XL pipeline project "would not serve the national interest."
Following this initial denial, TransCanada Corp. reapplied to the State Department for the presidential permit needed for the border-crossing Keystone XL pipeline proposal on May 4, 2012. On March 1, 2013, the agency released a draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (draft SEIS) on the new presidential permit application, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). A final decision from the State Department and the Administration on whether to grant the presidential permit is expected after expiration of the comment period for the draft SEIS in late April 2013.
Legislative activity in the 112th Congress and sustained interest in the 113th Congress with respect to the permitting of the Keystone XL pipeline and similar border-crossing facilities, a subject previously handled exclusively by the executive branch, has triggered inquiries as to whether this raises constitutional issues related to the jurisdiction of the two branches over such facilities. Additionally, as states contemplated taking action with respect to the pipeline siting, some questioned whether state siting of a pipeline is preempted by federal law. Others argued that states dictating the route of the pipeline violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution which, among other things, prohibits one state from acting to protect its own interests to the detriment of other states.
This report reviews these legal issues raised during the ongoing debate over the Keystone XL project. First, it suggests that legislation related to cross-border facility permitting is unlikely to raise significant constitutional questions, despite the fact that such permits have traditionally been handled by the executive branch alone pursuant to its constitutional "foreign affairs" authority. Next, it observes generally that state oversight of pipeline siting decisions does not appear to violate existing federal law or the Constitution. Finally, the report suggests that State Department's implementation of the existing authority to issue presidential permits appears to allow for judicial review of its National Environmental Policy Act determinations.
A companion report from CRS focusing on policy issues associated with the proposal, CRS Report R41668, Keystone XL Pipeline Project: Key Issues, by [author name scrubbed] et al., is also available. |
crs_R44219 | crs_R44219_0 | Introduction
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was last comprehensively reauthorized by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110 ). During the 114 th Congress, the House Education and the Workforce Committee reported the Student Success Act ( H.R. 5 ), which would provide for a comprehensive reauthorization of the ESEA. The bill was subsequently passed on the House floor on July 7, 2015. The Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee reported the Every Child Achieves Act of 2015 (ECAA; S. 1177 ), which was subsequently passed on the Senate floor on July 16, 2015. 5 and S. 1177 would both make changes to the formulas used to allocate funds under Title I-A of the ESEA. Under S. 1177 , an Equity Grant formula would be added to the existing formulas used to distribute Title I-A funds to state educational agencies (SEAs) and local educational agencies (LEAs). S. 1177 would also modify the process by which Title I-A funds are allocated from LEAs to schools. Under H.R. 5 , a new option for distributing funds from the state level to LEAs and from LEAs to schools would be available. This option is often referred to as the "state option" or "Title I portability." 5 would also make changes to the determination of weighted child counts under two of the four Title I-A formulas included in current law. This report begins with a detailed discussion of the four Title I-A formulas used to determine grants under current law. It then discusses changes to these formulas proposed by S. 1177 and H.R. 5 . Table A-1 in Appendix A provides an overview of the key elements included in the four current formulas and the Equity Grant formula that would be added by S. 1177 . Title I-A grants provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. Title I-A has also become a vehicle to which a number of requirements affecting broad aspects of public K-12 education for all students have been attached as conditions for receiving Title I-A grants. It is the largest program authorized under the ESEA and was funded at $14.4 billion for FY2015. Under Title I-A, funds are allocated to LEAs via states using four different allocation formulas specified in statute: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). Annual appropriations bills specify that portions of each year's appropriation be allocated under each of these different formulas. Under three of the formulas—Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, and Targeted Grants—funds are initially calculated at the LEA level. State grants are the total of allocations for all LEAs in the state adjusted for state minimum grant provisions. Under EFIG, grants are first calculated for each state overall and then are subsequently suballocated to LEAs within a state using a different formula. Once funds reach LEAs, the amounts allocated under the four formulas are combined and used jointly. Conversely, arguments against an expenditure factor that varies by state include the following:
the expenditure factor may not compensate for differences in education costs as it is based on levels of state and local spending (rather than costs); as the Title I-A expenditure factor is the same for all LEAs in each state, it does not account for the potentially large differences in the education costs among LEAs within each state; the expenditure factor may provide little incentive for increased spending as (1) an increase in spending would only result in higher grant amounts if a state's APPE increased relative to that of other states, (2) an increase in spending might not result in an increase in a state's expenditure factor in a very high- or very low-spending state due to the bounds placed on APPE in determining the expenditure factor, (3) the increase in Title I-A funding would likely be small in comparison to the increase in state and local spending, and (4) an increase in spending by an individual LEA may have little impact on the aggregate spending per pupil used to determine the expenditure factor; states with relatively high concentrations of formula children (e.g., California, New Mexico, Mississippi) tend to have relatively low APPEs and thus receive less Title I-A funding as a result of the expenditure factor included in current law; and the expenditure factor might not provide the appropriate adjustment for poverty data as there is no widely accepted measure of variation in state or local costs of living and those costs may not be closely associated with variations in state APPE. H.R. Under H.R. | The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was last comprehensively reauthorized by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110). During the 114th Congress, the House Education and the Workforce Committee reported the Student Success Act (H.R. 5), which would provide for a comprehensive reauthorization of the ESEA. The bill was subsequently passed on the House floor on July 7, 2015. The Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee reported the Every Child Achieves Act of 2015 (ECAA; S. 1177), which was subsequently passed on the Senate floor on July 16, 2015.
Title I-A of the ESEA authorizes aid to local educational agencies (LEAs) for the education of disadvantaged children. Title I-A grants provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. Title I-A has also become a vehicle to which a number of requirements affecting broad aspects of public K-12 education for all students have been attached as conditions for receiving Title I-A grants. It is the largest program authorized under the ESEA and was funded at $14.4 billion for FY2015.
Under Title I-A, funds are allocated to LEAs via states using four different allocation formulas specified in statute: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). Annual appropriations bills specify that portions of each year's appropriation be allocated under each of these different formulas. Under three of the formulas—Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, and Targeted Grants—funds are initially calculated at the LEA level. State grants are the total of allocations for all LEAs in the state adjusted for state minimum grant provisions. Under EFIG, grants are first calculated for each state overall and are subsequently suballocated to LEAs within a state using a different formula. Once funds reach LEAs, the amounts allocated under the four formulas are combined and used jointly.
H.R. 5 and S. 1177 would both make changes to the formulas used to allocate funds under Title I-A. Under S. 1177, an Equity Grant formula would be added to the existing formulas used to distribute Title I-A funds to state educational agencies (SEAs) and LEAs. S. 1177 would also modify the process by which Title I-A funds are allocated from LEAs to schools. Under H.R. 5, a new option for distributing funds from the state level to LEAs and from LEAs to schools would be available. This option is often referred to as the "state option" or "Title I portability." H.R. 5 would also make changes to the determination of weighted child counts under two of the four Title I-A formulas included in current law.
This report begins with a detailed discussion of how Title I-A grants are determined under current law. It then discusses the changes to these formulas that have been proposed by S. 1177 and H.R. 5. Table A-1 in Appendix A provides an overview of the key elements included in the four Title I-A formulas authorized under current law and the Equity Grant formula that would be added by S. 1177. |
crs_R44615 | crs_R44615_0 | Introduction
On March 28, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13783, which aims to promote the development or use of domestically produced energy resources. The order specifically requires the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to review the revised volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and GHG (namely methane) emission standards for new, modified, and reconstructed equipment, processes, and activities of the oil and natural gas sector issued by the Obama Administration in June 2016. EPA issued these emission standards pursuant to Section 111 of the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Methane Strategy. Although the methane emission standards and guidelines for new and existing municipal solid waste (MSW) landfills are not specifically mentioned in Executive Order 13783, EPA has also reviewed and is currently reconsidering several requirements of the MSW landfill emission standards and guidelines that the Obama Administration updated in August 2016. EPA's review of the oil and natural gas sector and landfill methane rules has influenced several judicial challenges to the Obama-era rules. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) granted EPA's requests to pause the judicial challenges to allow EPA to complete its review of the regulations. In addition, EPA has attempted to stay the requirements that are being reconsidered by the agency, but courts have restricted the agency's ability to stay such requirements. This report examines the statutory authority for issuing the various methane regulations, legal challenges to the standards, and legal issues related to the reconsideration and stay of these regulations. Judicial review of EPA's attempts to stay rules already in effect could have broader effects on the Trump Administration's efforts to similarly stay or postpone requirements in other rules that are under reconsideration. Petitions for Judicial Review
Although EPA is reconsidering the 2016 Oil and Gas NSPSs, the underlying rule is also being challenged in court. The agency also revised the 1996 emission guidelines for existing landfills operating prior to that date. The updated NSPSs aimed to further decrease methane emissions from MSW landfills. Both rules became effective on October 28, 2016 and remain in effect unless EPA finalizes a stay or revises the rules. At this time, EPA has not formally proposed a longer stay of the rules or initiated the public comment period for issues under reconsideration. | On March 28, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 13783, directing federal agencies to review existing regulations and policies that potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources. Acting pursuant to the order, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is reviewing and reconsidering several regulations issued during the Obama Administration that address methane emissions from various industrial sectors. Methane is a short-lived greenhouse gas (GHG) with a Global Warming Potential of more than 25 times carbon dioxide that is emitted from various industrial activities.
President Trump's executive order specifically requires EPA to review the revised emission standards for new, modified, and reconstructed equipment, processes, and activities of the oil and natural gas sector issued by the Obama Administration in June 2016. EPA issued these standards for methane and volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions pursuant to Section 111 of the Clean Air Act (CAA). Based on its review and in response to several administrative petitions for reconsideration, EPA is now reconsidering certain emission requirements from the June 2016 rule, which remain in effect unless EPA finalizes a proposed two-year stay of these requirements or otherwise repeals those requirements.
In addition, EPA is reconsidering the emission standards and guidelines for new and existing municipal solid waste (MSW) landfills updated by the Obama Administration in August 2016. In those rules, EPA issued the updated and revised emission standards for MSW landfills built after 2014 to further reduce emissions, including methane emissions. The agency also revised emission guidelines established in 1996 for existing landfills operating prior to that date. At this time, the 2016 landfill rules are in effect. EPA has not formally proposed any revisions to the 2016 rules or initiated a public comment period for any issues under reconsideration.
EPA's review of the oil and natural gas sector and landfill methane rules has influenced the pending judicial challenges to the various 2016 rules. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted EPA's requests to pause the judicial challenges of both rules to allow EPA to complete its review of them. In addition, stakeholders have successfully challenged in court EPA's attempts to stay the various requirements that the agency is currently reconsidering. Judicial review of EPA's attempts to stay rules in effect could more broadly impact the Trump Administration's efforts to similarly stay other rules that are under reconsideration.
This report examines the statutory authority for issuing the methane regulations, legal challenges to the standards, and legal issues related to the reconsideration and stay of the regulations. |
crs_R45197 | crs_R45197_0 | Over these decades, the breadth of policy areas addressed through such farm bills has expanded beyond providing support for a limited number of agricultural commodities to include establishing programs and policies that address a spectrum of related areas, such as agricultural conservation, credit, rural development, domestic nutrition assistance, trade and international food aid, organic agriculture, and support for beginning and veteran farmers and ranchers, among others. On June 21, 2018, the House voted 213-211 to approve H.R. 2 , the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018, an omnibus farm bill that would establish farm and food policy for the next five years, covering FY2019-FY2023. The vote to approve H.R. 2 followed a failed vote of 198-213 on the same bill on May 18, 2018. The final passage vote on June 21 followed a vote of 233-191 approving a motion to reconsider, which was made after the unsuccessful vote on final passage of May 18. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected that spending on mandatory programs under H.R. 113-79 , many of which will expire in 2018 unless Congress acts to reauthorize them or to extend them. 75-430) and Agricultural Act of 1949 (P.L. It projects that, if current law were extended, farm bill programs would cost $867 billion over the next 10 years, FY2019-FY2028, 77% of which is in the nutrition title for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Bioenergy programs, which had their own title in recent farm bills, are addressed in the rural development title of H.R. For several of the subset of programs in the 2014 farm bill that received mandatory funding but do not have a baseline beyond the end of FY2018, H.R. 2 also amends both payment limits and the AGI limit to expand the list of producer exemptions from payment and income limits under certain conditions. 2 includes an escalator provision that would raise a covered commodity's effective reference price (used in the PLC payment formula) by as much as 115% of the statutory PLC reference price based on 85% of the five-year Olympic average of farm prices. Payment limits would also be affected by H.R. 2 expands producer coverage choices under the current Margin Protection Program (MPP) and renames it the Dairy Risk Management Program (DRMP). 2 would also repeal the Dairy Product Donation Program; extend through FY2023 the Dairy Forward Pricing Program, the Dairy Indemnity Program, and the Dairy Promotion and Research Program; and eliminate the provision prohibiting dairy producers from participating in both the DRMP and the Livestock Gross Margin-Dairy insurance program, although dual coverage cannot be on the same milk production. The two largest working lands programs—Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and CSP—account for more than half of all conservation program funding. 2 repeals CSP, which currently has an enrollment of more than 70 million acres. The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the largest land retirement program, is reauthorized and amended by H.R. Unlike the current law time limit, the proposal requires states to offer employment or training opportunities to those individuals subject to the requirements. The bill proposes some changes to SNAP-related grants. The Emergency Food Assistance Program would receive an increase of approximately $45 million (adjusted annually for inflation) each year and would also include authority for a "Farm to Food Bank Fund." 2 would make several permanent changes and reauthorize provisions in the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act that governs the USDA farm loan programs, make several permanent changes to the Farm Credit Act that governs the Farm Credit System, and reauthorize the State Agricultural Loan Mediation Program through FY2023. 2 authorizes only discretionary funding. Whereas the 2014 farm bill provided $30 million in mandatory CCC funding for each of FY2014 through FY2018 for the Farmers Market Promotion Program and Local Food Promotion Program, H.R. According to CBO, the crop insurance title of H.R. 2 would also create a Food Loss and Waste Reduction Liaison within the Office of the Secretary, a Century Farms Program under the Secretary that recognizes farms in continuous operation for at least 100 years, and a National Agriculture Imagery Program within the Farm Service Agency. | Congress sets national food and agriculture policy through periodic omnibus farm bills. The 115th Congress has the opportunity to establish the future direction of farm and food policy because many of the provisions in the current farm bill (the Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79) expire in 2018. The 2014 farm bill addresses a broad range of farm and food programs and policies, including commodity support, crop insurance, conservation, domestic food assistance, trade and food aid, credit, rural development, research, horticulture, forestry, and bioenergy, among others.
On June 21, 2018, the House voted 213-211 to approve H.R. 2, the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018, an omnibus farm bill that would establish farm and food policy for the next five years, covering FY2019-FY2023. The vote to approve H.R. 2 followed a failed vote of 198-213 on the same bill on May 18, 2018. The final passage vote of June 21 occurred after a vote of 233-191 approving a motion to reconsider, which was made following the unsuccessful vote on final passage of May 18.
In terms of cost, the most recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) score of the programs in the bill with mandatory spending, such as nutrition programs, commodity support programs, major conservation programs, and crop insurance, amounts to $867 billion over a 10-year budget window (FY2019-FY2028). This amount is equivalent to CBO's baseline scenario in which existing farm bill programs would be extended with no changes.
H.R. 2 would reauthorize most existing programs for five years through FY2023. Overall, the bill provides continuity with the existing framework of farm and food programs even as it modifies numerous programs, alters the amount and type of program funding certain programs receive, and exercises the committee's discretion not to reauthorize others.
Among its many policy provisions, H.R. 2 would make changes to the eligibility requirements for individuals participating in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), including expanding the population that is subject to work requirements, while requiring states to offer employment or training opportunities and increasing funding to the states for those purposes. Among the changes to commodity programs, an escalator provision could raise the effective reference price for crops enrolled in the Price Loss Coverage program (PLC) under certain market conditions. H.R. 2 would also amend payment limits and the adjusted gross income limit on eligibility for farm program payments to expand the list of producer exemptions from payment and income limits. Payment limits on certain disaster assistance programs would also be raised. The Dairy Margin Protection Program for milk producers is recast as the Dairy Risk Management Program, featuring an expanded range of coverage choices and lower premium rates on the first 5 million pounds of annual milk production.
Within the conservation title, H.R. 2 would repeal the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), which has an enrollment of 70 million acres, and uses some of the savings to increase funding for the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP). It also raises the acreage enrollment limit under the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The bill further increases the loan limits for guaranteed farm ownership and operating loans. Bioenergy programs that comprise a separate title in the 2014 farm bill are included in a title on rural infrastructure and economic development. Also, while many of these bioenergy programs are currently authorized for mandatory funding in addition to being authorized for discretionary funds, H.R. 2 authorizes only discretionary funding.
For rural communities, the bill authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to reprioritize certain loan and grant programs to respond to specific health emergencies and to develop prevention, treatment, and recovery services. It would also require the Secretary to promulgate minimum acceptable standards for broadband service from the present day up to 30 years into the future. |
crs_R44213 | crs_R44213_0 | Introduction
The United States Constitution vests Congress with broad authority to discipline its Members. Of these 16 cases, seven (43%) have included attempts to alter the sanction recommendation, and three (42% of the seven cases and 18% of all cases) have been successful. While not a majority of cases, the offering (and sometimes adoption) of an alternate sanction illustrates that altering a sanction recommendation is possible. A resolution recommending expulsion, censure, or reprimand of a Member presents a question of privilege. Since the establishment of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, now the Committee on Ethics, it has been the practice of the House to take action on resolutions sanctioning Members or officers upon the recommendation of the committee. These options include offering a motion to recommit, an amendment to the committee's sanction resolution, and a separate resolution with the alternative desired punishment. Amendment
Another option that has been used to attempt to alter an Ethics Committee sanction recommendation is to offer an amendment to the House Ethics Committee's sanction resolution. Since the committee's creation in 1967, only 16 ethics cases have been brought to the House floor. These include: the unique relationship between the House and the Ethics Committee, the perceived benefits of Ethics Committee service, cooperation between the Ethics Committee and other House committees, and the way sanction recommendations are considered by the House. | The Constitution provides Congress with the power to punish and discipline its Members. Since the House Committee on Ethics was created during the 90th Congress, it has been authorized to investigate allegations of misconduct against Members and staff, and if necessary, recommend sanctions that are then considered by the whole House. This report examines instances when the House Ethics Committee has recommended a sanction, and amendments or alternatives have been considered on the House floor. Since the committee's creation, the House has attempted to amend sanction recommendations only a handful of times. These instances, however, are instructive of the overall approach to discipline and the relationship between the Ethics Committee and the House floor.
When a sanction recommendation—expulsion, censure, or reprimand—is brought to the floor, three options have been used to attempt to offer an alternative to that sanction. These are (1) offering a motion to recommit with amendatory instructions, (2) offering an amendment to the sanctions resolution, or (3) offering a separate resolution.
Since the House Ethics Committee was created (as the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct) in 1967, 16 ethics cases have been brought to the House floor to impose a sanction. Of these 16 cases, seven (43%) have included attempts to alter the sanction recommendation, and three (42% of the seven cases and 18% of all cases) have been successful. While not a majority of cases, the offering (and sometimes adoption) of an alternate sanction illustrates that altering a sanction recommendation, although a difficult process, can be done. |
crs_R44061 | crs_R44061_0 | The report next sets out earlier action on FY2016 funding for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. Overview of Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies
The annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for agencies and programs in three separate federal departments as well as numerous related agencies. Title II contains appropriations for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Title III funds about 20 agencies in other departments, such as the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service in the Department of Health and Human Services; arts and cultural agencies, such as the Smithsonian Institution; and various other entities. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, enacted December 18, 2015, provided $32.23 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. The total included $452.0 million for the Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) program, which compensates counties and local governments for nontaxable lands within their jurisdictions. Although the enacted appropriation included additional funding for Wildland Fire Management as compared with FY2015, it did not provide for either a new cap adjustment to the discretionary spending limits in law or emergency funding for this purpose, as had been proposed. Agencies received varying amounts of the $32.23 billion total appropriation. For EPA, appropriations were $8.14 billion, or 25.3% of the total. For agencies and other entities in Title III, appropriations were $12.07 billion, or 37.5% of the total. The FY2016 total enacted appropriation was a $1.75 billion increase (5.7%) over the FY2015 enacted appropriation of $30.48 billion. FY2016 enacted appropriations for all DOI agencies increased by $925.5 million (8.3%), with all 10 DOI agencies receiving additional funding above the FY2015 levels. FY2016 enacted appropriations for Related Agencies increased by $822.3 million (7.3%) from the FY2015 level. 114-113 ). Of the total proposed adjustment, $200.0 million was for DOI Wildland Fire Management, and $854.6 million was for Forest Service Wildland Fire Management. FY2016 President's Request Compared with FY2015 Enacted Appropriations
The President's request of $33.32 billion for FY2016 would have been an increase of $2.85 billion (9.3%) over the total FY2015 enacted appropriations of $30.48 billion. The FY2015 appropriation included $372.0 million for PILT, as noted above, whereas the President did not seek discretionary funding for PILT for FY2016. 2822 , as reported by the House Appropriations Committee on June 18, 2015, would have provided $30.23 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for FY2016. The total included $452.0 million for PILT. During three days of floor debate, the House considered dozens of amendments to H.R. S. 1645 was not considered by the Senate. The Senate committee-reported bill was $899.6 million (3.0%) more than the House committee-reported bill. The largest dollar difference was for Wildland Fire Management. 2822 , the Senate bill did not include discretionary appropriations for PILT. With regard to the House bill, the $30.23 billion for FY2016 was $246.0 million (0.8%) less than the FY2015 appropriation of $30.48 billion (including FY2015 PILT funding). For EPA, H.R. FY2016 Committee-Reported Bills Compared to FY2016 President's Request
Both the House and Senate committee-reported bills had recommended lower funding for FY2016 than sought by the President. The $31.13 billion in S. 1645 as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee for FY2016 was $2.19 billion (6.6%) less than the President's request. Unlike the President's request, the FY2016 House committee-reported bill did not include a cap adjustment for Wildland Fire Management. | The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for most of the Department of the Interior (DOI) and for agencies within other departments—including the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service within the Department of Health and Human Services. It also provides funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), arts and cultural agencies, and numerous other entities.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), provided $32.23 billion for FY2016 for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. The total included $452.0 million for the Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) program, which compensates counties and local governments for nontaxable lands within their jurisdictions. It also included additional funding for Wildland Fire Management, but it did not provide for either a new adjustment to the discretionary spending limits in law or emergency funding for this purpose, both of which had been proposed. The FY2016 enacted total was a $1.75 billion increase (5.7%) over the FY2015 total of $30.48 billion. Compared to FY2015, FY2016 funding for all DOI agencies increased by $925.5 million (8.3%), for EPA remained the same, and for Related Agencies increased by $822.3 million (7.3%).
Agencies received varying amounts of the $32.23 billion for FY2016. The appropriations were $12.02 billion (37.3% of total) for DOI agencies, $8.14 billion (25.3% of total) for EPA, and $12.07 billion (37.5% of total) for other agencies and entities in Title III of the bill.
In earlier action, the President had requested $33.32 billion in FY2016 Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations. The President had sought an increase of $2.85 billion (9.3%) compared to the FY2015 total appropriation of $30.48 billion. The President's request for FY2016 did not include funding for PILT, whereas the FY2015 appropriation included $372.0 million for the program. For Wildland Fire Management in FY2016, the President proposed a new $1.05 billion discretionary cap adjustment.
H.R. 2822, as reported by the House Appropriations Committee on June 18, 2015, contained $30.23 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for FY2016. The bill included $452.0 million for PILT but did not include a new cap adjustment for wildfires. The House considered many amendments during three days of floor debate, but no vote on final passage occurred. S. 1645, as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on June 23, 2015, contained $31.13 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. The total did not include discretionary funding for PILT, but it reflected $1.05 billion in emergency appropriations for Wildland Fire Management. S. 1645 was not considered on the Senate floor.
The Senate committee-reported bill included $899.6 million (3.0%) more than the House committee-reported bill. The largest dollar difference was for Wildland Fire Management. The Senate bill also was $653.6 million (2.1%) more than FY2015 appropriations, whereas the House bill was $246.0 million (0.8%) less than FY2015. Both the Senate and House committee-reported bills contained lower funding for FY2016 than sought by the President; S. 1645 was $2.19 billion (6.6%) less than the President's request, while H.R. 2822 was $3.09 billion (9.3%) less. |
crs_R44949 | crs_R44949_0 | T he Supreme Court term that began on October 3, 2016, was notably different from recent terms at the High Court. Perhaps most conspicuously, the October 2016 term was the first term in three decades to begin without Justice Antonin Scalia on the Court. And, with the appointment and confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court in April 2017, the October 2016 term was also notable in that it marked the first term since 2010 in which a new Justice joined the High Court. Court observers have suggested that the lack of a fully staffed Supreme Court for the bulk of the last term likely had an impact on the Court's work. The Court issued seventy written opinions during the October 2016 term and heard oral arguments in sixty-four cases. These numbers constitute the lightest docket for the Court since at least the Civil War era. Notwithstanding the volume and nature of the docket for its most recent term, the October 2016 term featured consideration of numerous cases on matters of potential significance to Congress's work, especially in several discrete areas of law. Of note, of the seventy opinions issued during the last term, more than 10% were on matters related to intellectual property law. While a full discussion of every ruling from the last Supreme Court term is beyond the scope of this report, Table 1 provides brief summaries of the Court's written opinions issued during the October 2016 term. The bulk of this report highlights four particularly notable cases the Court heard and ruled on during the October 2016 term: (1) Matal v. Tam , which examines the interplay between the First Amendment and trademark law; (2) Sessions v. Morales -Santana , a case exploring the relationship between immigration law and the Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence; (3) Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer , the latest chapter in the Court's Free Exercise jurisprudence; and (4) Ziglar v. Abbasi , a case limiting the types of damages claims that can be asserted against federal officers for alleged constitutional violations under the Bivens doctrine. Each case is addressed in a separate section below, which (1) provides background information on the case; (2) summarizes the arguments that were presented to the Court; (3) explains the Court's ultimate ruling; and (4) examines the implications that the Court's ruling could have for Congress, including broader ramifications for jurisprudence in a given area of law. According to the Supreme Court's opinion in Tam , a federal law prohibiting the registration of trademarks that "may disparage" any "persons, living or dead" violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. In Morales-Santana , however, the Court ruled that a gender-based distinction in the derivative citizenship rules—under which persons born abroad to a U.S. parent may have U.S. citizenship automatically conferred at birth—violated equal protection requirements. Religious Freedom: Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer
In its final decision of the term, the Supreme Court decided Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer , a case examining the constitutionality of a state policy that prohibited the distribution of public funds to religious entities. Federal Courts and Civil Rights: Ziglar v. Abbasi
In Ziglar v. Abbasi , a consolidated case in which only two-thirds of the bench participated, the Supreme Court, using language that may curb a wide range of damages lawsuits against government actors, ruled 4-2 against extending the judicially created Bivens remedy to certain claims brought by unlawfully present aliens challenging their detention following the September 11, 2001, terror attacks. | The Supreme Court term that began on October 3, 2016, was notably different from recent terms at the High Court. It was the first term (1) in thirty years to begin without Justice Antonin Scalia on the Court; (2) since 1987 to commence with a Court made up of fewer than nine active Justices; and (3) since 2010 in which a new member (Justice Neil Gorsuch) joined the High Court. Court observers have suggested that the lack of a fully staffed Supreme Court for the bulk of the last term likely had an impact on the Court's work both with regard to the volume of cases that the Court heard and the nature of those cases. The Court issued seventy written opinions during the October 2016 term and heard oral arguments in sixty-four cases, numbers that constitute the lightest docket for the Court since at least the Civil War era. Moreover, unlike in recent terms where the Court issued opinions on matters related to abortion and affirmative action, the Court's docket for the October 2016 term had comparatively very few high-profile issues.
Nonetheless, the October 2016 term featured a number of cases on matters of potential significance to Congress's work, especially with respect to discrete areas of law. In particular, the Court issued several notable opinions in the areas of intellectual property law, criminal law and procedure, and redistricting. While a full discussion of every ruling from the October 2016 term is beyond the scope of this report, Table 1 provides brief summaries of the written opinions issued by the Court during the last term. Instead, this report focuses its discussion on four particularly notable cases the Court ruled on during the October 2016 term: (1) Matal v. Tam; (2) Sessions v. Morales-Santana; (3) Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer; and (4) Ziglar v. Abbasi.
In Matal v. Tam, a dispute at the intersection of First Amendment and trademark law, the Court concluded that a federal law prohibiting the registration of trademarks that "may disparage" any "persons, living or dead" violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. In a case with potentially significant implications for immigration law, the Supreme Court, in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, ruled that a gender-based distinction in the derivative citizenship rules—under which persons born abroad to a U.S. parent may have U.S. citizenship automatically conferred at birth—violated equal protection requirements. In one of the most closely watched cases of the term, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, the Court invalidated on free exercise grounds a state grant policy that strictly prohibited the distribution of public funds to religious entities on free exercise grounds. Finally, in Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Supreme Court ruled against extending the judicially created Bivens remedy to certain unlawfully present aliens challenging their detention during investigations following the September 11, 2001, terror attacks. The discussion of each of these cases (1) provides background information on the case being discussed; (2) summarizes the arguments that were presented to the Court; (3) explains the Court's ultimate ruling; and (4) examines the potential implications that the Court's ruling could have for Congress, including the ramifications for the jurisprudence in a given area of law. |
crs_RS22856 | crs_RS22856_0 | Civil Service Retirement System
A state court decree of divorce, annulment, or legal separation can award a former spouse of a federal employee either a share of the employee's retirement annuity, a survivor annuity, or both types of annuity. Former Spouse Survivor Annuity Under FERS
Section 8445 of Title 5 allows a federal employee to elect a FERS survivor annuity for a former spouse, and it permits a state court to award a former spouse of a federal employee a survivor annuity in the event that the employee predeceases the former spouse. A state court can block this refund if a former spouse has been awarded a share of the employee's FERS retirement annuity or a FERS survivor annuity. | A former spouse of a federal employee may be entitled to a share of the employee's retirement annuity under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) or the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) if this has been authorized by a state court decree of divorce, annulment, or legal separation. An employee also may voluntarily elect a survivor annuity for a former spouse. A state court can award a former spouse a share of the employee's retirement annuity, a survivor annuity, or both. A court also can award a former spouse of a federal employee a portion of the employee's Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account balance as part of a divorce settlement. |
crs_R43790 | crs_R43790_0 | Since the late 1970s, Vietnam-era veterans have voiced concerns about how exposure to Agent Orange may have affected their health and caused certain disabilities, including birth defects in their children, and now their grandchildren. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) received the first claims asserting conditions related to Agent Orange in 1977. Likewise, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) consistently took the position that because the long-term exposure to Agent Orange was unclear, and because of scientific uncertainty of the evidence linking Agent Orange to specific illnesses, it could not compensate veterans who alleged that exposure to Agent Orange had caused their diseases. In December 1979, Congress passed the Veterans Health Programs Extension and Improvement Act of 1979 ( P.L. In 1981, Congress passed the Veterans' Health Care, Training, and Small Business Loan Act of 1981 ( P.L. 97-72 ). The Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act of 1984 ( P.L. 98-542 ) required the VA to develop regulations for disability compensation to Vietnam veterans who may have been exposed to Agent Orange. P.L. In 1991, the Agent Orange Act ( P.L. 102-4 ) established a presumption of service connection for diseases associated with herbicide exposure (see text box "What is Presumption of Service Connection ?"). In making this determination, P.L. 102-4 authorized the VA to contract with the Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to review and summarize the scientific evidence concerning the association between exposure to herbicides used in support of military operations in Vietnam during the Vietnam era and each disease suspected to be associated with such exposure. P.L. Within 90 days of issuing the proposed regulations, the VA must issue final regulations establishing a presumption of service connection for any disease for which there is scientific evidence of a positive association with herbicide exposure. Based on the most recent IOM report, "Veterans and Agent Orange: Update 2012," the VA decided not to establish any new presumptions. Both the VA Regional Office and the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA) denied Mr. Haas the presumption of service connection, stating that a veteran must have actually "set foot on land in the Republic of Vietnam" to qualify for a presumption of service connection for exposure to Agent Orange. Current Issues
Currently, three major issues pertain to Vietnam-era veterans and their exposure to Agent Orange: (1) providing presumptive service-connected disability compensation for those who served in the waters surrounding Vietnam and in other areas that Agent Orange may have been stored or used; (2) providing disability compensation and health care for paternally mediated birth defects; and (3) researching and providing disability compensation and health care services to biological grandchildren and later generations of Vietnam-era veterans. As discussed under the " Blue Water Veteran Litigation " section, some veterans of the Vietnam era who served aboard deep-water naval vessels off the coast of Vietnam—referred to as "Blue Water Navy" veterans—have been pressing Congress and the judicial system to expand the definition of service in Vietnam, thereby qualifying this group to receive disability compensation for diseases or conditions presumed to be associated with Agent Orange. The VA is reviewing all these claims on a case-by-case basis. However, some veteran service organizations have asserted that more research should be done regarding paternally mediated birth defects and that eventually disability compensation policies should be developed for disabilities and health conditions that appear in later generations. However, beginning with the 2010 review, the IOM extended its focus to include all types of medical conditions occurring in Vietnam-era veterans' children, regardless of age, and to include such conditions in successive generations. | The U.S. Armed Forces used a variety of chemical defoliants to clear dense jungle land in Vietnam during the war. Agent Orange (named for the orange-colored identifying stripes on the barrels) was by far the most widely used herbicide during the Vietnam War. Many Vietnam-era veterans believe that their exposure to Agent Orange caused them to contract several diseases and caused certain disabilities, including birth defects in their children, and now their grandchildren.
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) received the first claims asserting conditions related to Agent Orange in 1977. Since then, Vietnam-era veterans have sought relief from Congress and through the judicial system. Beginning in 1979, Congress enacted several laws to determine whether exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam was associated with possible long-term health effects and certain disabilities. The Veterans' Health Care, Training and Small Business Loan Act (P.L. 97-72) elevated Vietnam veterans' priority status for health care at VA facilities by recognizing a veteran's own report of exposure as sufficient proof to receive medical care, absent evidence to the contrary. The Veterans' Health Care Eligibility Reform Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-262) completely restructured the VA medical care eligibility requirements for all veterans. Under P.L. 104-262, a veteran does not have to demonstrate a link between a certain health condition and exposure to Agent Orange; instead, medical care is provided unless the VA determines that the condition did not result from exposure to Agent Orange. This authority was permanently authorized by the Caregivers and Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-163).
Likewise, Congress passed several measures to address disability compensation issues affecting Vietnam veterans. The Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-542) required the VA to develop regulations for disability compensation to Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange. In 1991, the Agent Orange Act (P.L. 102-4) established a presumption of service connection for diseases associated with herbicide exposure. P.L. 102-4 authorized the VA to contract with the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to conduct scientific reviews of the evidence linking certain medical conditions to herbicide exposure. Under this law, the VA is required to review the reports of the IOM and issue regulations, establishing a presumption of service connection for any disease for which there is scientific evidence of a positive association with herbicide exposure. Based on these IOM reports, currently 15 health conditions are presumptively service-connected.
Under current regulations, a servicemember must have actually set foot on Vietnamese soil or served on a craft in its rivers (also known as "brown water" veterans) to be entitled to the presumption of exposure to Agent Orange. Those who served aboard deep-water naval vessels (commonly referred to as "Blue Water Navy" veterans) do not qualify for presumption of service connections for herbicide-related conditions unless they can prove that the veteran's service included duty or visitation within the country of Vietnam itself, or on its inland waterways.
Recently, Vietnam-era veterans have increasingly expressed concerns about all types of medical issues occurring in their children, regardless of age, and in successive generations. Furthermore, they have asserted that more research should be done on paternally mediated birth effects, so that compensation policies might be developed similar to those that address maternally mediated birth effects of Vietnam-era progeny. |
crs_RS22211 | crs_RS22211_0 | Islamist Extremists in Europe and Links to Terrorist Groups
Although the vast majority of Muslims in Europe are not involved in radical activities, Islamist extremists and fringe communities that advocate terrorism exist and reportedly have provided cover for terrorist cells. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Germany and Spain were identified as key planning bases; numerous terrorist arrests were also made in Belgium, France, Italy, and the UK. The March 11, 2004, bombings of commuter trains in Madrid, Spain that killed 191 people were carried out by an Al Qaeda-inspired group of North Africans, mostly Moroccans resident in Spain. UK authorities have named four young British Muslims as the perpetrators of the July 7, 2005 London attacks that killed 52 people, plus the four bombers, and injured over 700. And in August 2006, British police arrested several British Muslims suspected of involvement in a plot to detonate liquid explosives on airliners flying from the UK to the United States. Law enforcement challenges remain throughout Europe, as elsewhere. | Although the vast majority of Muslims in Europe are not involved in radical activities, Islamist extremists and vocal fringe communities that advocate terrorism exist and reportedly have provided cover for terrorist cells. Germany and Spain were identified as key logistical and planning bases for the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. The March 2004 terrorist bombings in Madrid have been attributed to an Al Qaeda-inspired group of North Africans. UK authorities have named four British Muslims as the perpetrators of the July 2005 terrorist attacks on London; in August 2006, British law enforcement arrested several British Muslims suspected of plotting to blow up airliners flying from the UK to the United States. This report provides an overview of Islamist extremism in Europe, possible terrorist links, European responses, and implications for the United States. It will be updated as needed. See also CRS Report RL31612, European Counterterrorist Efforts: Political Will and Diverse Responses in the First Year After September 11, by [author name scrubbed] (pdf), and CRS Report RL33166, Muslims in Europe: Integration in Selected Countries, by [author name scrubbed] et al. |
crs_RL31696 | crs_RL31696_0 | Background
U.S. Economic Sanctions Against North Korea
The United States imposes economic sanctions on North Korea for five primary reasons: (1) North Korea poses a threat to U.S. national security, as determined by the President and renewed annually under the terms of the Trading with the Enemy Act and National Emergencies Act; (2) North Korea is designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor or supporter of international terrorism, pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979; (3) North Korea is a Marxist-Leninist state, with a Communist government, and stated as such in the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, and further restricted under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; (4) North Korea has been found by the State Department to have engaged in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act of 1979, and Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2000; and (5) the President has determined that North Korea has detonated a nuclear explosive device, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and the Atomic Energy Act. The U.S. action led to Macau seizing Banco Delta Asia and closing North Korea's accounts. In October 2002, it came to light in negotiations between U.S. and North Korean government officials that North Korea was pursuing nuclear weapons capability. North Korea officially withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on January 10, 2003 (effective three months hence), the first signatory country to do so. The United States is required by law to oppose membership in the international financial institutions of, or financial support to, terrorist states. The United States discussed the matter with South Korea and Japan in 2000. At the President's discretion, North Korea would also be subject to the economic sanctions provided in three provisions of law addressing human rights conditions: the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, under which North Korea is annually castigated for its human rights record; the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, under which the administration has identified North Korea as a "country of particular concern" since 2001; and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, under which the administration has, since 2003, classified North Korea as a Tier 3 (most severe) offender of standards pertaining to the trafficking of persons for slavery or sex trade. | This paper explains the U.S. economic sanctions in place up to the point when North Korea was delisted as a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism.
Until June 2008, U.S. economic sanctions were imposed against North Korea for five primary reasons: (1) North Korea is seen as posing a threat to U.S. national security; (2) North Korea is designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor or supporter of international terrorism; (3) North Korea is a Marxist-Leninist state, with a Communist government; (4) North Korea has been found by the State Department to have engaged in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and (5) North Korea has been found by the President to have detonated a nuclear explosive device. The United States has also taken steps to isolate the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia for counterfeiting and money-laundering activities, actions North Korea has characterized as attacks against it. In accordance with U.S. law, the United States limits some trade, denies trade in dual-use goods and services, limits foreign aid, and opposes entry into or support from international financial institutions. At the President's discretion, North Korea would also be subject to the economic sanctions pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, under which the administration has identified North Korea as a "country of particular concern" since 2001, and pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, under which the administration has classified North Korea in the category of most severe offender (Tier 3) since 2003.
In October 2002, after meetings between high-level U.S. and North Korean government officials, the United States reported that North Korea had confirmed suspicions that it had reactivated its nuclear weapons development program. An international crisis ensued, with North Korea expelling International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and declaring that it would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Participants in the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO)—including United States, Japan, South Korea and European Union—in turn suspended shipments of fuel oil. KEDO also suspended construction of the light-water reactors, the completion of which had been planned for 2003. North Korea officially withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on January 10, 2003 (effective three months hence), the first signatory country to do so. |
crs_R44145 | crs_R44145_0 | Introduction
On August 3, 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized regulations to address carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions—or CO 2 emission rates—at existing electricity generating units (EGUs). EPA estimates that in 2030, the CPP will result in a 32% reduction in CO 2 emissions from the electric power sector in the United States compared to 2005 levels. The CPP is the subject of ongoing litigation in which a number of states and other entities have challenged the rule, while other states and entities have intervened in support of the rule. Opponents of the rule applied to the Supreme Court in late January 2016 for an immediate stay of the CPP final rule. Therefore, the CPP deadlines (discussed below) do not have legal effect and will likely be delayed if the rule is ultimately upheld. CRS Report R44265, EPA's Clean Power Plan: Implications for the Electric Power Sector , by [author name scrubbed]. The final rule requires states to submit to EPA either an initial plan or final plan by September 6, 2016. By comparison, the proposed rule would have allowed states to receive a one-year extension for submitting their final plan and a two-year extension if states submitted a multi-state plan. If a state fails to submit a satisfactory plan by EPA's regulatory deadline, CAA Section 111(d) directs EPA to prescribe a plan for the state, often described as a federal implementation plan (FIP). The final rule establishes uniform national CO 2 emission performance rates (measured in pounds of CO 2 per MWh of electricity generation) for each of the two subcategories of EGUs—fossil-fuel-fired electric steam generating units (e.g., coal, oil, or natural gas units) and stationary combustion turbines (e.g., natural gas combined cycle units)—affected by the rule. These standards are the underpinnings for the state-specific emission rates and mass-based targets. The interim and final targets, however, differ from the ones in the proposed rule. The final rule implies lower percentage reduction requirements for some states and implies higher percentage reduction requirements for others compared to the proposed rule. EPA's Methodology
The methodology (i.e., underlying calculations and assumptions) in the final rule that EPA used to create (1) the national CO 2 emission performance rates and (2) the state-specific emission rate and mass-based targets is considerably different from EPA's methodology in its proposed rule. Building Blocks
Both the final and proposed rules included "building blocks" in the underlying calculations. As a result, some of the states' 2030 mass-based targets are higher than their 2012 emission baselines. However, EPA made several state-specific adjustments in the final rule to address some of the concerns. This program would provide incentives to states to develop renewable energy projects in 2020 and 2021 (discussed below). Nuclear Power Treatment
EPA modified its treatment of nuclear power in the final rule. EPA clarified that the final rule would allow the generation from under-construction units, new nuclear units, and capacity upgrades to help sources meet emission rate or mass-based targets. Biomass Treatment30
In its final rule, EPA would allow states to use "qualified biomass" as a means of meeting state-specific reduction requirements. This appears to be a narrower approach than was taken in the proposed rule. Energy efficiency and solar renewable energy projects in low-income communities, and 2. In particular, the final rule contains a provision for a reliability "safety valve" for individual power plants. The reliability safety valve allows for a 90-day reprieve from carbon emissions limits. | On August 3, 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized regulations that address carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the electric power sector. The Clean Power Plan (CPP) final rule requires states to submit plans that would reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions or emission rates—measured in pounds of CO2 emissions per megawatt-hour of electricity generation—from existing fossil fuel electricity generating units. EPA estimates that in 2030, the CPP will result in CO2 emission levels from the electric power sector that are 32% below 2005 levels.
The CPP is the subject of ongoing litigation in which a number of states and other entities have challenged the rule. On February 9, 2016, the Supreme Court stayed the CPP for the duration of the litigation. The CPP therefore currently lacks enforceability or legal effect, and if the rule is ultimately upheld, at least some of the deadlines would have to be delayed.
For example, the final rule established a deadline of September 6, 2016, for states to submit to EPA plans to comply with the rule with the option for a two-year extension (September 6, 2018). If a state fails to submit a satisfactory plan by EPA's regulatory deadline, the Clean Air Act directs EPA to prescribe a plan for the state, often described as a federal implementation plan.
Emission reductions are scheduled to begin in 2022, giving the states two additional years (compared to the proposed rule) before their plans must go into effect.
The 2015 final rule's state-specific targets are substantially different from those in the 2014 EPA proposed rule. For example, EPA's final rule establishes uniform national CO2 emission performance rates for each of the two subcategories of electricity generating units—fossil-fuel-fired electric steam generating units (whether coal, oil, or natural gas) and stationary combustion turbines (natural gas combined cycle)—affected by the rule. These standards are the underpinnings for the state-specific emission rate and mass-based targets, which, as a result, are considerably different from the proposed rule.
The final rule's state targets imply lower percentage reductions for some states, while implied percentage reductions are higher for others states compared to the proposed rule. The state-specific targets differ, because EPA altered its methodology (i.e., underlying calculations and assumptions) compared to the proposed rule. For example, EPA eliminated "building block" 4 (energy efficiency improvements) and other "building blocks."
In the final rule, EPA continues to use 2012 data as the baseline for calculated state targets. However, the agency made several state-specific adjustments to address concerns raised by stakeholders.
EPA also modified its treatment of nuclear power in the final rule, removing both "at risk" and under-construction nuclear power from the emission rate calculations. EPA clarified that the final rule would allow the generation from under-construction units, new nuclear units, and capacity upgrades to help states meet their compliance objectives.
EPA would allow states to use "qualified biomass" as a means of meeting state-specific reduction requirements. This appears to be a narrower approach to biomass than in the proposed rule.
The final rule contains a provision for a reliability "safety valve" for individual power plants. This mechanism would allow for a 90-day reprieve from emissions limits in an emergency situation.
In addition, EPA created a new program to encourage states to support renewable energy and energy efficiency projects (in low-income communities) in 2020 and 2021. |
crs_R42959 | crs_R42959_0 | Introduction
The estate and gift tax is imposed on bequests at death and on inter-vivos (during lifetime) gifts. The rate of the tax and the level of exemption have been under discussion for some time, with temporary provisions in place for a number of years. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-240 ) established permanent rules for the estate and gift tax for 2013 going forward. Although details of the tax structure are addressed in the following section, the principal rules are as follows:
In 2011, estates and lifetime gifts had a combined exemption of $5 million in asset value, indexed for inflation. Transfers to spouses remain exempt, but spouses can inherit any unused portion of the exemption from each other, so that the combined exemption for a couple was $10 million in 2011. A number of special rules for farms and small businesses are retained. A doubling of the exemption level was adopted in the 2017 tax revision ( P.L. Other Exemptions and Deductions
Transfers between spouses are exempt. Estates are allowed to take deductions for charitable contributions and administrative expenses; a deduction for taxes paid on estates and inheritances imposed by states; and to exempt up to $5.49 million for 2017 ($11.2 million in 2018) in remaining assets from the tax. Differences in the Treatment of Bequests and Gifts
Aside from the different exemption levels in some estate tax rules, there are other differences between the taxation of gifts and bequests. In addition, the gift tax is tax exclusive (i.e., the tax is imposed on the gift net of the tax), whereas the estate tax is tax inclusive (i.e., the tax is applied to the estate inclusive of the tax). Brief History of Recent Developments
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16 ) provided for a gradual reduction in the estate tax. Under EGTRRA, the estate tax exemption rose from $675,000 in 2001 to $3.5 million in 2009, and the top tax rate fell from 55% to 45%. President Obama proposed a permanent extension of the 2009 rules (a $3.5 million exemption and a 45% tax rate), and the House provided for that permanent extension on December 3, 2009 ( H.R. The Senate Democratic leadership indicated a plan to retroactively reinstate the 2009 rules for 2010 and beyond. A similar proposal for a $5 million exemption and a 35% rate, which also included the ability of the surviving spouse to inherit any unused exemption of the decedent, is often referred to as Lincoln-Kyl (named after the two Senators who supported it). These provisions provided for estate tax rules through 2012, and absent legislation, the provisions would have reverted to the pre-EGTRRA rules ($1 million exemption, 55% top rate). 115-97 ) doubled the exemptions for the years 2018 through 2025. This change reduced total projected revenue from the estate tax by about two-thirds. Only a small portion of high-income decedents are affected by the tax under a $5 million exemption. The estate tax would have affected less than 0.2% of decedents over the next decade under the permanent rules. About 0.2% of estates with half or more of their assets in businesses will be subject to the estate tax under the permanent rules, and less with the higher exemption levels. If the number of farm estates fall in proportion to the number of estates in general, around 25 farm estates (one estate every two years per state) would be taxable with the higher exemption level enacted in 2017. Making the Higher Exemption Levels Permanent
The 2017 increase in exemption level was estimated to lose $83 billion in revenue. 1 would have first increased the exemption levels and repealed the estate tax after 2023. Proposal to Return to 2009 Rates and Exemptions
The Obama Administration's FY2016 budget proposals to restore the 2009 higher rates and lower exemptions were estimated to raise $189 billion over 10 years. Most of those laws have been eliminated. | The American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA; P.L. 112-240) established permanent rules for the estate and gift tax for 2013 going forward. The tax revision of 2017 (P.L. 115-97) doubled the exemption levels. This increase expires after 2025.
The estate tax is imposed on bequests at death as well as inter-vivos (during life) gifts. A certain amount of each estate, $5 million in 2011, indexed for inflation, is exempted from taxation by the federal government. With indexation, the value was $5.49 million in 2017 and with the temporary doubling of the exemption and inflation adjustments, is $11.2 million in 2018. The taxable estate is taxed at 40%. The exemption applies to total bequests and gifts (separate from the annual inter-vivos gift exemption of $15,000 per donee for 2018). Transfers between spouses are exempted, and any unused exemption can be inherited by a surviving spouse. Other elements of the tax remain, including deductions for charitable bequests and a number of special provisions for farms and small businesses.
The permanent tax treatment of estates and gifts had been uncertain for some time. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16), among other tax cuts, provided for a gradual reduction and elimination of the estate tax. Under EGTRRA, the estate tax exemption rose from $675,000 in 2001 to $3.5 million in 2009, and the rate fell from 55% to 45%. In 2010, the estate tax was eliminated. There was general agreement that some sort of estate tax would be retained. A proposal to make the 2009 rules ($3.5 million exemption and 45% rate) permanent was included in President Obama's 2010 and 2011 budget outlines and was passed by the House in December 2009. In addition, in 2009, Senate Democratic leaders supported the plan to enact the 2009 rules permanently. The Senate Republican leadership proposed a $5 million exemption and 35% rate. This latter provision was eventually adopted for a two-year period, through 2012. For estates of decedents in 2010, either the 2010 or 2011 rules could have been elected. Spouses can inherit unused exemptions. The permanent provisions retain most of the rules adopted for 2011 and 2012, but with a higher rate.
Compared with the $1 million exemption and 55% rate under pre-EGTRRA law, the 2013 permanent rules were estimated to lose an average of about $37 billion over the next 10 years, a two-thirds reduction in estate tax revenues. The increase in the exemption level costs around $10 billion per year, a further reduction of about 40% of projected revenues.
Regardless of the exemption levels considered, few estates are affected by the tax. The estate tax is a highly progressive tax, with about three-fourths collected from estates in which decedents are in the top 1% of the income distribution. At a $5 million exemption, less than 0.2% of estates will be subject to the tax. Although concerns have been raised about the effects of the tax on small businesses and farmers, estimates indicate that only a small share of these decedents are affected.
Budget proposals during the Obama Administration proposed a return to the 2009 rates and exemptions. They also proposed a variety of structural reforms, including restricting Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts (GRATs), providing consistent valuation for estate tax and basis for capital gains, limiting the duration of generation-skipping trusts, and providing consistent treatment of grantor trusts along with some other minor changes. Prior provisions would have disallowed minority discounts (for estates left to a family partnership) and addressed other aspects of GRATs. During the recent 2017 tax reform deliberations, the House proposed to increase the higher exemption temporarily, and repeal the estate tax after 2024. |
crs_R41980 | crs_R41980_0 | Introduction
Relatively high default and foreclosure rates in the housing market have led some to question whether borrowers were fully informed about the terms of their mortgage loans. It has been argued that transparent mortgage terms could enhance consumer shopping and discourage predatory, discriminatory, and fraudulent lending practices. The issue of adequate disclosure of mortgage terms is longstanding. The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) of 1968, which was previously implemented by the Federal Reserve Board via Regulation Z, requires lenders to disclose the cost of credit and repayment terms of mortgage loans before borrowers enter into any transactions. The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) of 1974 is another element of the consumer disclosure regime. In addition, RESPA, which was implemented by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), includes the following provisions: (1) providers of settlement services are required to provide a good faith estimate (GFE) of the settlement service costs borrowers should expect at the closing of their mortgage loans; (2) a list of the actual closing costs must be provided to borrowers at the time of closing, which are typically listed on the HUD-1 settlement statement; and (3) RESPA prohibits "referral fees" or "kickbacks" among settlement service providers to prevent settlement fees from increasing unnecessarily. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203 ) transferred general rulemaking authority for various provisions of TILA and RESPA to a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) effective July 21, 2011. Lenders currently present borrowers with both TILA and RESPA disclosures, but the Dodd-Frank Act has directed the CFPB to create a single disclosure form that satisfies both disclosure requirements. TILA was amended in 1980 to require the Federal Reserve to publish APR disclosure forms. This makes it difficult for lenders to generate "costs" or fees that could not be easily justified. The inability to understand a loan offer makes a borrower more vulnerable to predatory lending. Recent CFPB Proposals
As required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFPB has proposed various prototypes of a standardized Loan Estimate form to combine the TILA Disclosure Statement and HUD's GFE into a single document. The first two sections itemize the various expenses associated with closing. | High default and foreclosure rates in the housing market have resulted in questions as to whether borrowers were fully informed about the terms of their mortgage loans. A lack of transparency with respect to loan terms and settlement costs can make it difficult for consumers to make well-informed decisions when choosing mortgage products. In addition, inadequate disclosures can make some borrowers more vulnerable to predatory lending or discriminatory practices.
The adequate disclosure of mortgage terms is a longstanding issue that has prompted several congressional actions. For example, the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) of 1968 and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) of 1974 were enacted to require disclosures of credit costs and terms to borrowers. The Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-208) directed the Federal Reserve Board and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to propose a single form that satisfied the requirements of RESPA and TILA. However, the Federal Reserve Board and HUD concluded that regulatory changes would not be sufficient and that further statutory changes would be required for the forms to be consolidated. More recently, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203), which established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), mandated the new agency revisit disclosure stipulations for mortgage loans. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the CFPB to consolidate mandatory TILA and RESPA disclosures into one Loan Estimate form.
The 112th Congress has been closely monitoring the subsequent rulemaking associated with the Dodd-Frank Act, as well as the performance and effectiveness of the CFPB. Consequently, this report examines one of the first major actions undertaken by the new agency. Specifically, efforts by the CFPB to create an effective mortgage disclosure form for borrowers are discussed. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_97-291 | crs_97-291_0 | Despite the inclusion of the above provisions, some in Congress remained concerned that NAFTA's effect on environmental lawscould be unpredictable. In October 1993, the United States and Mexico agreed to a new institutional structure to promote borderenvironmental cleanup. TheBorder Environmental Cooperation Agreement authorized the establishment of the North American Development Bank (NADB) andthe Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) to assist bordercommunities in financing environmental infrastructureprojects. The NADB is authorized to make only market-rate loans, however, and this hasbeen a major obstacleto the Bank's ability to finance projects in low-income border communities. 254 ( P.L.108-215 ),enacted in April 2004, authorizes several operational reforms to the NADB. Assessing NAFTA's Environmental Impacts
The NAFTA Implementation Act directed the President to report to Congress in 1997 on the effects of NAFTA and implementationof the side agreements. Congressional Activity and Issues
In the 107th Congress, the environment-related provisions of NAFTA and its side accord received attention during consideration oftrade promotion authority legislation and the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA); both adapted environmentalprovisions fromthe NAAEC and NAFTA. In the 108th Congress, efforts to reform the BECC and NADB continued, and in April 2004, the President signed into law P.L.108-215 ( H.R. The U.S.-Central America FTA (CAFTA), which the President has signed but which requiresimplementing legislation,includes similar provisions and also adapts the NAAEC provisions that allow citizens to file submissions concerninga party's failureto effectively enforce its environmental laws. | The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) includes severalenvironment-related provisions, that while limited, were unprecedented for their inclusion in a trade agreement. However, furtherenvironmental (and labor) assurances were needed to secure passage of NAFTA, and ultimately, the negotiatingparties agreed to aside accord that promotes cooperation on environmental matters and includes provisions to address a party's failureto enforceenvironmental laws. Additionally, the United States and Mexico entered into the Border EnvironmentalCooperation Agreement(BECA), which authorized the establishment of the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) and theNorth AmericanDevelopment Bank (NADB) to help border communities finance environmental infrastructure projects.
In the 108th Congress, NAFTA's environmental provisions and related institutions have continuedto receive attention. A key issuehas concerned the effectiveness of the NADB and the BECC, and especially the Bank's ability to finance projects.Enacted on April5, 2004, P.L. 108-215 (H.R. 254) authorizes several operational reforms to the NADB. Other issues involvetheenvironmental impact of NAFTA, and the effect that NAFTA and its environmental side agreement have had onthe negotiation ofother U.S. trade agreements, including the U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and U.S.-ChileFTA. This reportbriefly reviews NAFTA's environmental provisions, associated agreements, and related issues and congressionalactions. It will beupdated. |
crs_RL33833 | crs_RL33833_0 | Such an investigation of a U.S. person may not be conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution. This report discusses the creation and structure of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review and their respective jurisdictions. Membership and Structure of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended, 50 U.S.C. The Chief Justice publicly designates one of the FISC judges to be presiding judge. 2002), which is the first opinion the court has issued. Jurisdiction of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
Electronic Surveillance and Physical Searches
The FISC has jurisdiction to hear applications for and to grant court orders approving electronic surveillance or physical searches anywhere in the United States to obtain foreign intelligence information under FISA. | The national debate regarding the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) focused congressional attention on the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Congressional interest in these courts has been heightened by the January 17, 2007, letter from Attorney General Gonzales to Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter advising them that a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judge had "issued orders authorizing the Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization," stating that all surveillance previously occurring under the TSP will now be conducted subject to the approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and noting that the President has determined not to reauthorize the TSP when the current authorization expires. This report examines the creation, membership, structure, and jurisdiction of these courts. It will be updated as subsequent events may require. |
crs_RL33640 | crs_RL33640_0 | Introduction
During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, including short-range missiles and artillery for use on the battlefield, medium-range missiles and aircraft that could strike targets beyond the theater of battle, short- and medium-range systems based on surface ships, long-range missiles based on U.S. territory and submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United States. The long-range missiles and heavy bombers are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The report not only reaffirms the basic contours of the current U.S. force structure and the ongoing modernization programs, it also calls for the development of a new low-yield warhead for deployment on Trident II (D-5) missiles. This report reviews the ongoing programs that will affect the expected size and shape of the U.S. strategic nuclear force structure. Current and Future Force Structure and Size
The Obama Administration indicated in the 2010 NPR that the United States would retain a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers as the United States reduced its forces to the limits in the 2010 New START Treaty. The Trump Administration has continued to adjust the U.S. nuclear force to meet this planned force structure. However, with the signing of the New START Treaty in 2010, these silos added to the U.S. total of nondeployed ICBM launchers. 5122 , §139), Congress stated that DOD could not spend any money to begin the withdrawal of these missiles from the active force until the Secretary of Defense submitted a report that addressed a number of issues, including (1) a detailed justification for the proposal to reduce the force from 500 to 450 missiles; (2) a detailed analysis of the strategic ramifications of continuing to equip a portion of the force with multiple independent warheads rather than single warheads; (3) an assessment of the test assets and spares required to maintain a force of 500 missiles and a force of 450 missiles through 2030; (4) an assessment of whether halting upgrades to the missiles withdrawn from the deployed force would compromise their ability to serve as test assets; and (5) a description of the plan for extending the life of the Minuteman III missile force beyond FY2030. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed this deployment, with each Minuteman III missile deployed with one warhead under the New START Treaty. Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
The U.S. fleet of ballistic missile submarines consists of 14 Trident (Ohio-class) submarines, each originally equipped to carry 24 Trident missiles. To comply with the launcher limits in New START, each of the submarines can now carry only 20 missiles. All the Trident submarines currently in the U.S. fleet now carry the Trident II missile. Under the terms of the original START Treaty, which was in force from 1994 to 2009, the United States could remove warheads from Trident missiles, and reduce the number listed in the database, a process known as downloading, to comply with the treaty's limit of 6,000 warheads. The Navy is also pursuing a life extension program for the Trident II missiles, so that they will remain capable and reliable throughout the 42-year life of the Trident submarines; they will also serve as the initial missile on the new Columbia class submarine. At the same time, it will continue to support the joint U.S./U.K. This process was completed in 1997 and the B-1 bomber is no longer equipped to carry nuclear weapons. The Air Force is also designing a new tail kit for the B61 bomb. Congress also stated that no funds could be spent to retire any B-52 aircraft until the Secretary of the Air Force submitted a report to Congress that described the Air Force plan for the modernization of the B-52, B-1, and B-2 bomber fleets; how many bombers would be assigned two nuclear and conventional missions if the United States had to execute "two overlapping 'swift defeat' campaigns"; a justification of the cost and projected savings of any reductions to the B-52H bomber aircraft fleet; and the life expectancy of each bomber aircraft to remain in the bomber force structure and the capabilities of the bomber force structure that would be replaced by a new bomber aircraft. Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) Weapons
At the end of the Cold War, the B-52 bomber was equipped to carry both the Air-Launched cruise missile (ALCM) and Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM). It is then planning to replace the ALCM with a new advanced long range standoff (LRSO) cruise missile. The Trump Administration did not directly address questions about the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. It indicated that it would continue to support the implementation of New START, at least through 2021, and that it would continue to pursue the nuclear modernization programs that began during the Obama Administration. Analysts outside government have also questioned the Administration's plans to replace the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) with the new long-range strike missile (LRSO) in the 2020s. | Even though the United States has reduced the number of warheads deployed on its long-range missiles and bombers, consistent with the terms of the 2010 New START Treaty, it also plans to develop new delivery systems for deployment over the next 10-30 years. The 116th Congress will continue to review these programs, and the funding requested for them, during the annual authorization and appropriations process.
During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. The longer-range systems, which included long-range missiles based on U.S. territory, long-range missiles based on submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United States, are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the United States deployed more than 10,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles. With the implementation of New START completed in February 2018, the United States is limited to 1,550 accountable warheads on these delivery vehicles, a restriction that will remain in place at least through 2021, while New START Treaty remains in force.
At the present time, the U.S. land-based ballistic missile force (ICBMs) consists of 400 land-based Minuteman III ICBMs, each deployed with one warhead, spread among a total of 450 operational launchers. This force is consistent with the New START Treaty. The Air Force is also modernizing the Minuteman missiles, replacing and upgrading their rocket motors, guidance systems, and other components, so that they can remain in the force through 2030. It plans to replace the missiles with a new Ground-based Strategic Deterrent around 2029.
The U.S. ballistic missile submarine fleet currently consists of 14 Trident submarines. Each has been modified to carry 20 Trident II (D-5) missiles—a reduction from 24 missiles per submarine—to meet the launcher limits in the New START Treaty. The Navy converted 4 of the original 18 Trident submarines to carry non-nuclear cruise missiles. Nine of the submarines are deployed in the Pacific Ocean and five are in the Atlantic. The Navy also has undertaken efforts to extend the life of the missiles and warheads so that they and the submarines can remain in the fleet past 2020. It is designing a new Columbia class submarine that will replace the existing fleet beginning in 2031.
The U.S. fleet of heavy bombers includes 20 B-2 bombers and 40 nuclear-capable B-52 bombers. The B-1 bomber is no longer equipped for nuclear missions. This fleet of 60 nuclear-capable aircraft is consistent with the U.S. obligations under New START. The Air Force has also begun to retire the nuclear-armed cruise missiles carried by B-52 bombers, leaving only about half the B-52 fleet equipped to carry nuclear weapons. The Air Force plans to procure both a new long-range bomber, known as the B-21, and a new long-range standoff (LRSO) cruise missile during the 2020s. DOE is also modifying and extending the life of the B61 bomb carried on B-2 bombers and fighter aircraft and the W80 warhead for cruise missiles.
The Obama Administration completed a review of the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear force, and a review of U.S. nuclear employment policy, in June 2013. This review advised the force structure that the United States will deploy under the New START Treaty. The Trump Administration completed its review of U.S. nuclear forces in February 2018, and reaffirmed the basic contours of the current U.S. force structure and the ongoing modernization programs. The Trump Administration has also called for the development of a new low-yield warhead for deployment on Trident II (D-5) missiles. Congress will review the Administration's plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces during the annual authorization and appropriations process, and as it assesses the costs of these plans in the current fiscal environment. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL32953 | crs_RL32953_0 | Introduction
Climate change is generally viewed as a global issue, but proposed responses generallyrequire action at the national level. In 1992, the United States ratified the United Nations'Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which called on industrialized countries totake the lead in reducing the six primary greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the year 2000. (1) Over the past decade, a varietyof voluntary and regulatory actions have been proposed or undertaken in the United States, includingmonitoring of power plant carbon dioxide emissions, improved appliance efficiency, and incentivesfor developing renewable energy sources. But carbon dioxide emissions have continued to increase. A number of congressional proposals to advance programs designed to reduce greenhousegases have been introduced in the 109th Congress. Proposed Senate Legislation: A Comparison of Two Proposals
In February 2005, Senators McCain and Lieberman introduced S. 342 , theClimate Stewardship Act of 2005. 826 and defeated on a 38-60 vote. In 2004, The Energy Information Administration (EIA) analyzed an earlier version of S. 1151 . (13) Under EIA's analysis, S. 1151 would achieve a 6.7% reduction in overall greenhouse gasemissions in 2010 compared with its projected business-as-usual scenario, but would not returngreenhouse gas emissions to their 2000 or 1990 levels. This result contrasts with CRS's estimate thatthe draft amendment would result in a 2.5% reduction in overall greenhouse gas emissions in 2010compared with EIA's business-as-usual scenario. S.Amdt. Analysis: Addressing the Price versus Quantity Issue
Uncertainty in Emission Reductions
The projected emission reductions under the draft amendment are more uncertain than under S. 1151 . (20) In general, market-based mechanisms to reduce CO 2 emissionsfocus on specifying either the acceptable emissions level (quantity), or compliance costs (price), andallowing the marketplace to determine the economically efficient solution for the other variable. Hence, a major policy question is whether one is more concerned about the possibleeconomic cost of the program and therefore willing to accept some uncertainty about the amount ofreduction received (i.e., a safety valve); or one is more concerned about achieving a specific emissionreduction level with costs handled efficiently, but not capped (i.e., pure tradeable permits). S. 1151 leans toward the quantity (total emissions) side of the equation; the draftamendment leans more toward the price side. Conclusion
The two proposals -- S. 1151 and the draft amendment -- would establishmarket-based systems to limit emissions of greenhouse gases. However, the proposals differ in howthose systems would work. S. 1151 would establish an absolute cap on emissions fromcovered entities, and would allow entities to trade emissions under that cap. The draft amendmentwould limit greenhouse gas emissions intensity and establish a cost-limiting safety valve to protectagainst high compliance costs. | Climate change is generally viewed as a global issue, but proposed responses generallyrequire action at the national level. In 1992, the United States ratified the United Nations'Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which called on industrialized countries totake the lead in reducing greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Over the past decade,a variety of voluntary and regulatory actions have been proposed or undertaken in the United States,but carbon dioxide emissions have continued to increase.
Several proposals designed to address greenhouse gases have been introduced in the 109thCongress. Two proposals, S. 1151 , introduced by Senators McCain and Lieberman, anda draft alternative, announced by Senator Bingaman, received increased scrutiny in preparation forthe Senate's debate on comprehensive energy legislation. During that debate, S. 1151,introduced as S.Amdt. 826 , was defeated on a 38-60 vote. In contrast, the draftalternative remains a work-in-progress and has yet to be introduced. This report compares these twoproposals.
Both proposals would establish market-based systems to limit emissions of greenhouse gases. However, the proposals differ in how those systems would work. S. 1151 wouldestablish an absolute cap on emissions from covered entities, and would allow entities to tradeemissions under that cap. The draft amendment would limit emissions intensity (greenhouse gasemissions per unit of GDP), and establish a cost-limiting safety valve to protect against highcompliance costs. Each would set up a tradeable permit program to begin addressing emissions bythe year 2010.
In 2004, the Energy Information Administration analyzed an earlier version of S. 1151 . Under EIA's analysis, S. 1151 would achieve a 6.7% reduction in overallgreenhouse gas emissions in 2010 compared with its projected business-as-usual scenario, but wouldnot return emissions to their 2000 or 1990 levels. This contrasts with the CRS estimate that thedraft amendment would reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions 2.5% in 2010 compared with EIA'sbusiness-as-usual scenario.
The two proposals represent different answers to the price-versus-quantity issue in reducinggreenhouse gases. In general, market-based mechanisms to reduce CO 2 emissions focus onspecifying either the acceptable emissions level (quantity) or compliance costs (price) and allowingthe marketplace to determine the economically efficient solution for the other variable. If one is moreconcerned about the possible economic cost (price) of the program, then use of a safety valve to limitcosts could appear to some more appropriate, even through it introduces some uncertainty about theamount of reduction achieved (quantity). In contrast, if one is more concerned about achieving aspecific emission reduction level (quantity), with costs handled efficiently, but not capped, atradeable permit program without a safety valve may be viewed as more appropriate. In the case ofthese alternatives, S. 1151 leans toward the quantity (total emissions) side of theequation; the draft amendment leans more toward the price side. This report will be updated asevents warrant. |
crs_R43123 | crs_R43123_0 | Background
The Medicare Supplementary Medical Insurance Program (Part B) currently covers a wide variety of durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and other medical supplies (DMEPOS) if they are medically necessary and are prescribed by a physician. Durable medical equipment (DME) is equipment that (1) can withstand repeated use, (2) has an expected life of at least three years (effective with respect to items classified as DME after January 1, 2012), (3) is used to serve a medical purpose, (4) generally is not useful in the absence of an illness or injury, and (5) is appropriate for use in the home. Examples include hospital beds, blood glucose monitors, and wheelchairs. Prosthetics (P) replace all or part of a body organ, such as colostomy bags, pacemakers, and breast prostheses for post-mastectomy patients. Medicare also covers some items or supplies (S), such as disposable surgical dressings when used in conjunction with DMEPOS. Medicare generally pays for most DMEPOS on the basis of fee schedules. Medicare pays 80% of the fee schedule amount, while the beneficiary is responsible for paying the remaining 20% (co-insurance), in addition to any unmet deductible. Unless otherwise specified by Congress, fee schedule amounts are updated each year by a measure of price inflation and economy-wide productivity. However, investigations by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have shown that Medicare pays above-market prices for certain items of DME. Such overpayments may be due partly to the fee schedule mechanism of payment, which does not reflect market changes, such as new and less-expensive technologies, changes in production or supplier costs, or variations in prices in comparable localities. 108-173 , MMA) required the Secretary of HHS to establish a competitive acquisition program (also known as competitive bidding) under which prices for selected DMEPOS sold in specified areas would be determined not by a fee schedule, but by suppliers' bids. The first round of the competitive bidding program began on July 1, 2008, but was suspended, contracts dissolved, and a rebid required due to implementation concerns. Between October and December 2009, DMEPOS suppliers submitted new bids for nine categories of equipment in nine competitive bidding areas; payments based on the bids of winning suppliers went into effect on January 1, 2011 (referred to in this report as Round 1 Rebid). Payments based on the re-compete are expected to go into effect on January 1, 2014. The Secretary is required to extend the program or apply competitively bid rates to remaining areas by 2016. Competitive Bidding Areas (CBAs) for Round 1 were determined through a multi-step process. In limited circumstances, non-winning suppliers are allowed to sell competitively bid items, and certain suppliers are exempt from the program, as discussed below. (Outside of the competitive bidding program, assignment is optional for Medicare-participating DMEPOS suppliers. The final rule for the Competitive Bidding Program also established additional safeguards and payment adjustments. MIPPA expanded the scope of the study to include an analysis of (1) beneficiary access to items and services including the impact on access of awarding contracts to bidders that did not have a physical presence in the area where they received the contract or had not previously provided the product category they were contracted to provide; (2) beneficiary satisfaction with the program and cost savings; (3) costs to the suppliers of participating in the program and recommendations on ways to reduce those costs without compromising quality standards or savings to Medicare; (4) the impact of the program on small businesses; (5) the impact on use of different items and services within the same Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) code; (6) the costs to CMS, including payments to contractors, for administering the program compared to administration of the fee schedule, in comparison with relative savings of the program; (7) the impact on access, Medicare spending, and beneficiary spending of any difference in treatment for diabetic testing supplies depending on how the supplies are furnished; and, (8) other topics as the GAO determines appropriate. | The Medicare Supplementary Medical Insurance Program (Part B) currently covers a wide variety of durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and other medical supplies (DMEPOS) if they are medically necessary and are prescribed by a physician.
Durable medical equipment (DME) is equipment that (1) can withstand repeated use, (2) has an expected life of at least three years (effective for items classified as DME after January 1, 2012), (3) is used to serve a medical purpose, (4) generally is not useful in the absence of an illness or injury, and (5) is appropriate for use in the home. Examples include hospital beds, blood glucose monitors, and wheelchairs. Prosthetic and orthotic devices (PO) are items that replace all or part of an internal body organ, such as colostomy bags, as well as such items as leg braces and artificial legs, arms, and eyes. Medicare also covers some items or supplies (S), such as disposable surgical dressings that do not meet the definition of DME or PO.
Medicare generally pays for most DMEPOS on the basis of fee schedules. Medicare pays 80% of the fee schedule amount, while the beneficiary is responsible for the remaining 20%, plus any unmet deductible. Unless otherwise specified by Congress, fee schedule amounts are updated yearly by a measure of inflation and economy-wide productivity. However, studies by federal agencies have shown that Medicare pays above-market prices for certain items of DME. Such overpayments may be due partly to the fee schedule mechanism of payment, which does not reflect market changes, such as new and less-expensive technologies, changes in production or supplier costs, or geographic price variations.
Congress enacted legislation to establish a Medicare competitive acquisition program (competitive bidding) under which prices for selected DMEPOS sold in specified areas are determined by suppliers' bids rather than fee schedules. The first round of the program began on July 1, 2008, but was suspended due to implementation concerns. Suppliers submitted new bids for the first round "rebid," and payments based on winning suppliers' bids went into place in the first nine areas on January 1, 2011. Round 2 is set to begin in 91 additional areas on July 1, 2013. The process for re-competing the contracts for Round 1 has started, and payments based on winning bids are expected to be in place on January 1, 2014. Starting in 2016, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) is required to either expand competitive bidding to additional areas, or apply information gained from the program to adjust fee schedule amounts in remaining areas.
Competitive bidding has been shown to decrease Medicare payments for DMEPOS, leading to savings for Medicare and lower beneficiary cost sharing. Evidence from the competitive bidding demonstration and the Round 1 Rebid also suggests, based on evaluations of the program thus far, that competition did not deteriorate beneficiary access to DMEPOS, or the quality and product selection available to them.
In general, the technical implementation concerns that halted the 2008 competition appear to have been addressed, however, concerns over the auction methodology have been raised, drawing into question whether the competitively bid payments are an accurate reflection of the market for DMEPOS. Finally, the competitive bidding program will result in fewer suppliers being allowed to sell competitively bid items to Medicare beneficiaries, though all suppliers may continue to sell non-competitively bid items to beneficiaries and may repair competitively bid and non-competitively bid DMEPOS. |
crs_RL32173 | crs_RL32173_0 | Legislative activity by the 108 th Congress expanded the scope of debate to include the ways in which federal tax policy affects the demand for heavy-duty SUVs. In passing the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA, P.L. The provision made the expensing allowance under section 179 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) more generous in 2003 through 2005. This report examines how the federal tax code treats the purchase of heavy-duty SUVs for business use and discusses proposals in the 109 th Congress that would further change this treatment. The enormous growth in domestic ownership of SUVs since the early 1990s has fueled a lively debate over their effects on highway safety, air quality, and U.S. reliance on foreign sources of crude oil and petroleum products, among other concerns. Depreciation of Motor Vehicles Under the Federal Tax Code
A logical starting point for an examination of how the federal tax code affects the purchase of heavy-duty SUVs is the tax treatment of depreciation for motor vehicles in general and passenger cars in particular. Although the depreciation of motor vehicles in general is governed by the rules of the MACRS and the expensing allowance, the cost of so-called luxury passenger cars used primarily for business is recovered under a different set of rules. SUVs, trucks, vans, and minivans built on a truck chassis with a gross vehicle weight of more than 6,000 pounds are considered light trucks for tax purposes and thus exempt from the depreciation limitations for luxury passenger cars under IRC section 280F. It can be seen in a comparison of the maximum first-year depreciation deductions and the present value of total depreciation allowances (in 2005 dollars)—and the present value of the tax savings associated with these allowances—a non-corporate business taxpayer is allowed to claim as a result of placing in service in 2005 a new SUV weighing over 6,000 pounds but not more than 14,000 pounds, or a new passenger car of equal value. After all, AJCA reduced the maximum expensing allowance for heavy-duty SUVs from over $100,000 to $25,000. Gas Guzzler Excise Tax
The tax treatment of depreciation for heavy-duty SUVs is not the only way in which the federal tax code encourages the purchase of these vehicles. It applies to domestic sales of automobiles by manufacturers and importers, who are required to pay the tax. Legislative Initiatives in the 109th Congress to Curtail or Eliminate SUV Tax Preferences
Several bills to curtail—directly and indirectly—current tax preferences for heavy-duty SUVs have been introduced in the 109 th Congress. Four such bills would erase the tax preference for heavy-duty SUVs in current depreciation rules by subjecting all SUVs with a gross weight of over 6,000 pounds to 14,000 pounds to the annual depreciation limits for passenger cars under IRC section 280F. The bills are H.R. H.R. By contrast, H.R. 4409 , S. 1852 , and S. 2025 appear to contain no such exclusion, but they would exempt "vehicles used in a farming business" from the depreciation limits. | The surge in domestic popularity of large sport utility vehicles (SUVs) since the early 1990s has stirred a debate over what steps the federal government should take, if any, to mitigate their effects on the environment, highway safety, traffic congestion, and U.S. dependence on foreign sources of oil. Legislative activity in the 108th Congress expanded the scope of the debate to include the ways in which the federal tax code encourages the purchase of heavy-duty SUVs, primarily for business use. In May 2003, Congress passed a measure (the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003) that raised the maximum expensing allowance under section 179 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) for these vehicles to $100,000 from May 2003 through the end of 2005; the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 lowered the allowance to $25,000, as of October 22, 2004.
This report examines current federal tax preferences for SUVs and legislation in the 109th Congress that would alter them. It will be updated to reflect subsequent legislative activity addressing the preferences.
One way in which the federal tax code can influence the purchase of heavy-duty SUVs for business use is through the tax treatment of depreciation for these vehicles. Under current tax law, the depreciation of passenger cars is treated less generously than that of light trucks (including many SUVs). Passenger cars, which are defined as motor vehicles weighing 6,000 pounds or less, are considered so-called listed property—and thus subject to annual limits on depreciation allowances. By contrast, light trucks, which are defined as motor vehicles weighing more than 6,000 pounds (with some exceptions), are generally depreciated under a different and more favorable set of rules. For example, SUVs considered light trucks are eligible for a maximum expensing allowance of $25,000 in the 2005 tax year, but the maximum first-year depreciation allowance in the same year for a passenger car under IRC section 280F is $2,960. As a result, a business taxpayer can realize a greater reduction in the after-tax cost of a vehicle by purchasing a heavy-duty SUV instead of a passenger car of comparable value.
The federal tax code also encourages the purchase of heavy-duty SUVs by excluding them from the gas guzzler excise tax. The tax is levied on domestic sales of new automobiles with relatively poor fuel economy ratings. It is paid by manufacturers and importers. All light trucks, including all SUVs, are exempt from the tax.
Several legislative proposals in the 109th Congress would curtail the tax preference for heavy-duty SUVs embedded in current depreciation rules. Specifically, four bills—H.R. 4384, H.R. 4409, S. 1852, and S. 2025—would erase this preference by subjecting all SUVs with a gross weight of more than 6,000 pounds to 14,000 pounds to the annual depreciation limits for passenger cars under IRC section 280F. Two other bills—H.R. 2070 and S. 2345—take an indirect approach to lessening this tax preference. |
crs_RL31753 | crs_RL31753_0 | Introduction
Noncitizen eligibility varies among the needs-based housing programs administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). There is uncertainty surrounding how the eligibility requirements of PRWORA and Section 214 interact, leading to conflicting interpretations of the categories of noncitizens eligible for certain housing programs. Also, the documentation requirements for establishing eligible immigration status reflect the differing eligibility rules and are dependent on (1) the housing program, (2) the citizenship status of the applicant, and (3) the age of the applicant. Laws and Regulations Governing Alien Eligibility
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) which established new restrictions on the eligibility of noncitizens for public benefits. PRWORA explicitly states that aliens, unless they are qualified aliens, are not eligible for "federal public benefits," a term defined in the law to include public and assisted housing. However, PRWORA did not make those who had been receiving housing benefits before the date of enactment (August 22, 1996) ineligible for housing benefits. Likewise, PRWORA exempted certain types of programs that are usually thought of as emergency programs from the eligibility restrictions. Thus, nonimmigrants and unauthorized aliens (i.e., aliens who do not meet the definition of qualified aliens) are eligible for emergency programs. Section 214 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1980
Section 214 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, as amended, states that only certain categories of noncitizens are eligible for benefits under specified housing programs. Under Section 214, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development may not make financial assistance available to an alien unless the alien both is a resident of the United States and is
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence as an immigrant ... excluding, among others, alien visitors, tourists, diplomats, and students who enter the United States temporarily with no intention of abandoning their residence in a foreign country; an alien who ... is deemed to be lawfully admitted for permanent residence [under the registry provisions of the INA]; an alien who has qualified ... [as a refugee or asylee]; an alien who is lawfully present in the United States as a result of an exercise [of the Attorney General's parole authority] ...; an alien within the United States as to whom the Attorney General has withheld deportation [on the basis of prospective persecution] ...; or an alien lawfully admitted for temporary or permanent residence under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Comparison of PRWORA and Section 214
The aliens eligible for housing assistance under Section 214 are similar to those eligible for federal public benefits under PRWORA (i.e., those who are not prohibited from eligibility), with some exceptions. Examples of other HUD needs-based housing programs include the Section 202 Housing for the Elderly program, the Section 811 Housing for the Disabled program, the Community Development Block Grant program and the HOME Investment Partnerships program. HUD has not issued guidance defining which types of assistance under the other needs-based housing programs are "federal public benefits" and subject to PRWORA's noncitizen eligibility restrictions. | The issue of noncitizen eligibility for federally funded programs, including needs-based housing programs, is a perennial issue in Congress. Noncitizen eligibility varies among the needs-based housing programs administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), such as Public Housing, Section 8 vouchers and project-based rental assistance, homeless assistance programs, housing for the elderly (§202) and the disabled (§811), the HOME program, and the Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) program. Two laws govern noncitizen eligibility for housing programs: Title IV of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Welfare Reform) and Section 214 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, as amended.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) explicitly states that aliens, unless they are qualified aliens, are not eligible for "federal public benefits," a term defined in the law to include public and assisted housing. Under the statute, unauthorized (illegal) aliens do not meet the definition of qualified aliens, and as a result, they are ineligible for "federal public benefits." However, PRWORA did not make those who had been receiving housing benefits before the date of enactment (August 22, 1996) ineligible for housing benefits. Likewise, PRWORA exempts certain types of programs that are usually thought of as emergency programs from the alien eligibility restrictions. HUD has not issued guidance implementing the PRWORA provisions.
Section 214 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1980 states that only certain categories of noncitizens are eligible for benefits under the housing programs covered by Section 214. Unauthorized aliens are not eligible for benefits under Section 214. The aliens eligible for housing assistance under Section 214 are similar to those eligible for federal public benefits under PRWORA, with some exceptions.
There is uncertainty surrounding how the eligibility requirements of PRWORA and Section 214 interact, leading to conflicting interpretations of the categories of noncitizens eligible for housing programs. A provision addressing this issue was considered during the FY2003 appropriations debate, but not included in the final bill.
There has been congressional interest regarding the implementation of the eligibility requirements for housing programs. Specifically, questions have been raised as to the documentation requirements placed on both citizens and noncitizens in determining eligibility for housing programs. The documentation requirements are dependent on (1) the housing program, (2) the citizenship status of the applicant, and (3) the age of the applicant. |
crs_RL32093 | crs_RL32093_0 | Note that the World Bank's WDI data does not appear to include adjustmentsfor 1991 war-related population loss as is done by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in their population series for Iraq. (back) In the early 1990s, cultivated areatemporarily expanded to nearly 5.5 million hectares, due primarily to government incentives (seesection "Iraq's Agriculture in the post-gulf War Era: 1001-2002" of this report), before returning to under 4 million. (back) U.N. AQUASTAT, "Country Profile:Iraq," -- FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture, Food and Water DevelopmentDivision, 1997 version. (back) Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empirefrom the mid-1500s until 1920 when it became a British Mandate. Independence was achieved by Iraq in 1932, but Britain retained a role in defense and foreignaffairs. "World Agriculture and Trade: Iraq," Agricultural Outlook , November 1980, pp. (back) USDA. The Economy of Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991," from Iraq's EconomicPredicament , Kamil Mahdi, Editor. "AgriculturalPolicy Issues and Challenges in Iraq" Short- and Medium-term Options," from Iraq's EconomicPredicament , Kamil Mahdi, Editor. (back) For a discussion of Security Councilresolutions and requirements on Iraq, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Programs,U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy . (back) For a discussion of Security Councilresolutions related to the Oil-For-Food Program in Iraq, see CRS Report RL30472 , Iraq: Oil-For-FoodProgram, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade ; and United Nations, Office of the Iraq Program -- Oil forFood; "About theProgram: In Brief." ; and USDA "PSD online database." (back) U.S. General Accounting Office. Iraq's Participation in U.S. (back) A later section, "Agricultural Situationin Northern Iraq: 1991-2002," describes the agricultural sector in the 3 governorates of Kurdish-controlled northernIraq during the post-Gulf War period. Although they are from FAOSTAT, they reflect the data officially reported by the Iraqigovernment to the FAO. Thisfell to 177 kg/capita/year in the 1970s, and 130 in the 1980s, but had regained ground to 155 during the 1990-94period. "HumanitarianNeeds and International Assistance in Iraq after the Gulf War," from Iraq's EconomicPredicament , Kamil Mahdi, Editor. (back) The Iraqi government had refused toagree to an earlier offer by the U.N. Security Council to establish a similar OFFP (Resolution 706;Aug. 15, 1991). For more information on the U.N. Oil-For-Food Program and trade during the decade of the 1990ssee CRS Report RL30472 , Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade . 88. The black market rate has shown considerable variation over the past decade, often in relationto the U.N. sanctionsstatus and international petroleum prices. During 1996 the dinar rose from its lowest value of ID3,000 per U.S.dollar to ID1,000, reportedlyin anticipation of the adoption and implementation of the OFFP. In March 2003, the blackmarket rate wasestimated to be U.S. $1 = 2,700 ID. (back) U.N. Office of the Iraq Program,Oil-for-Food, Humanitarian Imports, "Status of ESB account on 31 Dec.2002." (back) Most of the information in this sectionrelevant to the agricultural sector of northern Iraq (unless otherwise indicated) is fromLeezenberg's chapter "Refugee Camp or Free Trade Zone? Return to CONTENTS section of this Long Report. | Iraq's agricultural sector represents a small but vital component of Iraq's economy. Over the past several decades agriculture's role in the economy has been heavily influenced by Iraq'sinvolvement in military conflicts, particularly the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, the 1991 Gulf War, andthe 2003 Iraq War, and by varying degrees of government effort to promote and/or controlagricultural production.
Rapid population growth coupled with limited arable land and a general stagnation in agricultural productivity has steadily increased dependence on imports to meet domestic food needssince the mid-1960s. Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq was a major trading partner with the U.S. Iraqbenefitted from substantial USDA agricultural export credit during the 1980s to purchase largequantities of U.S. agricultural commodities. By the mid-1980s Iraq was the major destination forU.S. rice exports. Iraq was also an important purchaser of U.S. wheat, corn, soymeal, and cotton. After the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. agricultural export credit to Iraq was ended and USDA was left with$2 billion in unpaid credit. U.S. agricultural trade with Iraq remained negligible through 2002.
Present-day Iraqi agriculture and trade have been heavily shaped by the 1990 U.N. sanctions and the Iraqi government's response to them. From 1991 to 1996, prior to the startup of the U.N.'sOil-For-Food program (OFFP), Iraq's agricultural imports averaged $958 million or less than halfof the pre-war level. Under the OFFP, the value of Iraq's agricultural imports rebounded to average$1.5 billion (during the 1997-2002 period).
In early 2003, just prior to the U.S. -- Iraq War, the country's agricultural sector remained beset by the legacy of past mis-management, unresolved disputes over land and water rights, and thelingering effects of a severe drought during 1999-2001. Clearly, Iraq will be dependent on importsfor fully meeting domestic food demand for several years to come. In the near term, food aidshipments are likely to play a major role in determining the share of Iraq's agricultural imports, andmay influence the evolution of future commercial imports.
This report is an extension of CRS Report RS21516 , "Iraq's Agriculture: Background and Status." It provides a brief description of Iraq's agro-climatic setting and the history of agriculturalpolicy, production, and trade leading up to the period just prior to the 2003 Gulf War; it reviewsissues likely to affect the long-term outlook for Iraq's agricultural production and trade; and itprovides several tables of historical data relevant to understanding the evolution of Iraq's agriculturalproduction and trade. This report will be updated as events warrant. For detailed discussion on thestatus of humanitarian aid efforts, see CRS Report RL31833 , Iraq: Recent Developments inHumanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance . For discussion on the U.N. Oil-For-Food Programand trade during the decade of the 1990s see CRS Report RL30472 , Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program,International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade . |
crs_RL34342 | crs_RL34342_0 | Introduction
This report outlines the organizational structure of United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), explains how NORTHCOM contributes to homeland security through the interagency process, and summarizes NORTHCOM's international relationships with Canada and Mexico. Some issues for Congress involving NORTHCOM include DOD reorganization and the Unified Command Plan, improving interagency relationships, NORTHCOM's increased reliance on reserve component service members, the ongoing Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center realignment, and the allocation of resources necessary for NORTHCOM to successfully plan for and execute its assigned missions. Background
In 2002, President Bush signed a new Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishing NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM is a regional combatant command with an area of responsibility (AOR) that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and surrounding waters out to approximately 500 nautical miles, including the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida. The NORTHCOM Commander also commands North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a bi-national U.S. and Canadian organization charged with air and maritime warning and airspace control. Organization
NORTHCOM, headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, employs approximately 1,200 DOD civilians, contractors, and service members from each service component. Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps components are assigned to NORTHCOM, while Navy Fleet Forces Command is a supporting component. Interagency Relationships
NORTHCOM's linkage to homeland security is through Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission. As such, NORTHCOM participates in the Joint Interagency Coordination Group and maintains strong relationships with the Department of Homeland Security and the National Guard. The conference report for the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) ( P.L. | In 2002, President Bush signed a new Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishing United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to provide command and control of the Department of Defense's (DOD's) homeland defense efforts and to coordinate military support to civil authorities. As a geographical combatant command, NORTHCOM has an area of responsibility that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and surrounding waters out to approximately 500 nautical miles, including the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida. The NORTHCOM Commander also commands North American Aerospace Defense Command.
NORTHCOM, headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, employs approximately 1,200 DOD civilians, contractors, and service members from each service component. The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps have service components assigned to NORTHCOM, while Navy Fleet Forces Command is a supporting component. Additionally, NORTHCOM maintains five subordinate joint headquarters to carry out assigned missions.
One of NORTHCOM's key charters is to build ongoing relationships with government agencies that play a role in homeland security and defense. To ensure integration of homeland security and defense efforts, NORTHCOM participates in the Joint Interagency Coordination Group while also working closely with both the Department of Homeland Security and the National Guard Bureau. To exercise these important relationships, NORTHCOM participates in the National Exercise Program. Further, as a geographical combatant command, NORTHCOM also plays a key role in facilitating military cooperation with both Canada and Mexico.
During deliberations for the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act, some issues for Congress involving NORTHCOM may include DOD reorganization and the Unified Command Plan, improving interagency relationships, NORTHCOM's increased reliance on reserve component service members, the ongoing Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center realignment, and the allocation of resources necessary for NORTHCOM to successfully plan for and execute its assigned missions.
This report will be updated as conditions require. |
crs_R45267 | crs_R45267_0 | Introduction
The United States exports agricultural products to nearly every country in the world. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that U.S. agricultural exports reached nearly $139 billion in FY2017 ( Figure 1 ). USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is the U.S. government authority tasked with regulating most animal and plant product exports. Export health certificates are commonly necessary for the export of horticultural products (e.g., fruits and vegetables) and livestock, which represent over one-third ($53 billion) of U.S. agricultural exports in FY2017 ( Figure 2 ). To meet the health standards required by U.S. trading partners, APHIS and other U.S. federal agencies negotiate "export health certificates" with each partner country ( Figure 3 ). Export health certificates are also part of broader agreements between the United States and its trading partners on the World Trade Organization's (WTO) established "sanitary and phytosanitary" (SPS) measures. These measures protect against diseases, pests, toxins, and other contaminants. Without these certificates, shipments could be delayed or rejected. This report discusses APHIS's role in export health certificate issuance to facilitate agricultural trade. APHIS is not the sole issuer of export health certificates; many food and agricultural products (i.e., that are not horticultural products or livestock) have oversight by other federal agencies that are outside the scope of this report. An APHIS export health certificate informs the importing country that the U.S. product is free of certain diseases, and it includes additional information required by the importer. In FY2017, APHIS issued close to 675,000 federal export health certificates for international agricultural shipments. For example, the Department of Commerce has jurisdiction over the administration of health certificates for fish and seafood. For example, an importing country may require two certificates from a U.S. exporter of hatching eggs, including one requiring the exporter to participate in the Agricultural Marketing Service's "export verification program" and a second requiring the exporter to obtain an APHIS export health certificate. Other Certificates and Programs
APHIS export health certificates do not apply to certain food and agricultural products. The following list describes the most common types of certificates and programs—outside of the APHIS export health certificates—that facilitate agricultural exports. These certificates verify that the accompanying products have been inspected by FSIS at official FSIS slaughter and processing establishments and approved cold storage facilities. Animal Health Certificates
VS is the authority for issuing export animal health certificates for live animals (including semen and embryos), pets, animal products, and biologics (vaccines, bacterins, antisera, diagnostic kits, and other products of biological origin). The President's FY2019 budget proposes to reduce the overall APHIS budget by 25%, which could impact the resources available to process the current volume of APHIS export health certificates. How Export Health Certificates Facilitate Trade
Export health certificates facilitate trade by verifying that U.S. agricultural exports meet importers' health and safety standards. APHIS, in collaboration with the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), is primarily responsible for resolving disputes that arise between U.S. exporters and importing countries over health-certificate-related issues. In particular, export health certificate discussions among scientific authorities contributed to opening markets for beef to China, poultry to Korea, and potatoes to Japan in FY2017. Export health certificates and the process underlying them may help facilitate trade in certain animal health situations. Considerations for Congress
Congress has direct interest in export health certificates—both through annual appropriations for APHIS activities and through congressional oversight. Examples of potential oversight issues include preparation for animal disease outbreaks, export-market openings, and potential U.S. agricultural trade barriers. The Safeguarding and Emergency Preparedness/Response portion of the APHIS budget is responsible for monitoring animal and plant health in the United States and throughout the world, representing roughly 85% of APHIS's budget. The FY2019 APHIS proposed budget totaled $742 million, down 25% from FY2018 funding. This proposed reduction would affect all major area activities, particularly Safeguarding and Emergency Preparedness/Response. This proposed budget reduction for FY2019 could affect APHIS's ability to issue health certificates for both exports and imports of agricultural products. Limiting APHIS's ability to issue export health certificates could negatively impact U.S. agricultural exports. Likewise, APHIS funding for this budget line item also supports APHIS's ability to enforce animal and/or plant health requirements that protect the United States against the unintended introduction of animal and/or plant pests and diseases. In contrast to the President's budget proposal for FY2019, both the House and the Senate proposed roughly $1 billion for the FY2019 APHIS budget, or roughly $260 million over the Administration's request and an increase from FY2018 ( Table 2 ). Finally, as the United States has entered into, or is currently negotiating or renegotiating, certain regional and bilateral free trade agreements that address agricultural trade, APHIS's health certificates would be expected to be a component of any SPS chapter included as part of a free trade agreement or trade negotiation that includes agriculture. Each importing country is allowed to have different import requirements—and some are stricter than others—which sometimes result in "non-tariff measures," as explained in the text box below. SPS requirements by individual countries can become the source of a trade dispute and may be used by some countries as a way to protect local markets, thereby discouraging U.S. exports. | An agricultural export health certificate verifies that agricultural products are prepared or raised in accordance with requirements of the importing country. In the United States, export health certificates are issued primarily by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) for live animals, raw fruits and vegetables, and some grain products. APHIS ensures that U.S. exporters have met animal and plant health requirements for export. Other federal agencies, not discussed here, have authority over agricultural products outside of APHIS's jurisdiction, such as oversight of processed foods and processed meats.
APHIS serves as the principal U.S. scientific authority on verification of the animal and plant export health certificates when communicating with foreign governments. Animal and plant export health certificates assure foreign countries that their health requirements (e.g., disease-free livestock and plants) have been met and aim to keep diseases from crossing international borders.
In FY2017, APHIS issued almost 675,000 export health certificates that helped facilitate more than $50 billion in plant and animal product exports. A major driver of the volume of agricultural exports was meeting key "sanitary and phytosanitary" (SPS) measures established by international organizations such as the World Trade Organization. SPS measures are the rules that governments employ to protect against diseases, pests, toxins, and other contaminants. These SPS measures are verified in animal and plant health certificates, which in turn help to facilitate agricultural trade. Failure to meet export health certificate requirements can result in shipments being rejected or delayed, resulting in additional expense to the exporter. Therefore, export health certification allows both parties to agree to mutual trade terms and in so doing facilitates agricultural trade.
Congress has direct interest in export health certificates through annual appropriations for APHIS activities. The President's proposed FY2019 budget for APHIS is $742 million (including building and facility costs), down 25% from FY2018 appropriations (P.L. 115-141). This proposed reduction decreases APHIS funding for "Safeguarding and Emergency Preparedness/Response," which provides technical support for both exported and imported agricultural products. In addition to facilitating U.S. agricultural exports, this item also supports APHIS enforcement of animal and/or plant health requirements that protect the United States against the unintended introduction of animal and/or plant pests and diseases. Limiting APHIS's ability to issue export health certificates could negatively impact U.S. agricultural exports. In May 2018, both the House and the Senate proposed roughly $1 billion for the APHIS FY2019 appropriations, an increase from FY2018, or roughly $260 million over the Administration's request.
Potential issues for congressional oversight include preparation for animal disease outbreaks, opening export markets, and potential U.S. agricultural trade barriers. The Trump Administration has entered into, or is currently negotiating, regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) that address SPS measures and export health certificates. Each importing country can have different import requirements—which sometimes result in "non-tariff measures" (NTMs). SPS requirements by individual countries can become the source of a trade dispute and may be used by some countries as a way to protect local markets, thereby discouraging U.S. exports.
An agricultural export health certificate verifies that agricultural products are prepared or raised in accordance with requirements of the importing country. In the United States, export health certificates are issued primarily by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) for live animals, raw fruits and vegetables, and some grain products. APHIS ensures that U.S. exporters have met animal and plant health requirements for export. Other federal agencies, not discussed here, have authority over agricultural products outside of APHIS's jurisdiction, such as oversight of processed foods and processed meats.
APHIS serves as the principal U.S. scientific authority on verification of the animal and plant export health certificates when communicating with foreign governments. Animal and plant export health certificates assure foreign countries that their health requirements (e.g., disease-free livestock and plants) have been met and aim to keep diseases from crossing international borders.
In FY2017, APHIS issued almost 675,000 export health certificates that helped facilitate more than $50 billion in plant and animal product exports. A major driver of the volume of agricultural exports was meeting key "sanitary and phytosanitary" (SPS) measures established by international organizations such as the World Trade Organization. SPS measures are the rules that governments employ to protect against diseases, pests, toxins, and other contaminants. These SPS measures are verified in animal and plant health certificates, which in turn help to facilitate agricultural trade. Failure to meet export health certificate requirements can result in shipments being rejected or delayed, resulting in additional expense to the exporter. Therefore, export health certification allows both parties to agree to mutual trade terms and in so doing facilitates agricultural trade.
Congress has direct interest in export health certificates through annual appropriations for APHIS activities. The President's proposed FY2019 budget for APHIS is $742 million (including building and facility costs), down 25% from FY2018 appropriations (P.L. 115-141). This proposed reduction decreases APHIS funding for "Safeguarding and Emergency Preparedness/Response," which provides technical support for both exported and imported agricultural products. In addition to facilitating U.S. agricultural exports, this item also supports APHIS enforcement of animal and/or plant health requirements that protect the United States against the unintended introduction of animal and/or plant pests and diseases. Limiting APHIS's ability to issue export health certificates could negatively impact U.S. agricultural exports. In May 2018, both the House and the Senate proposed roughly $1 billion for the APHIS FY2019 appropriations, an increase from FY2018, or roughly $260 million over the Administration's request.
Potential issues for congressional oversight include preparation for animal disease outbreaks, opening export markets, and potential U.S. agricultural trade barriers. The Trump Administration has entered into, or is currently negotiating, regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) that address SPS measures and export health certificates. Each importing country can have different import requirements—which sometimes result in "non-tariff measures" (NTMs). SPS requirements by individual countries can become the source of a trade dispute and may be used by some countries as a way to protect local markets, thereby discouraging U.S. exports. |
crs_R41162 | crs_R41162_0 | Introduction
The 112 th Congress may consider legislation to fund, reauthorize, and amend the Public Works and Economic Development Act (PWEDA) of 1965, P.L. 89-136 (79 Stat. 552, 42 U.S.C. §3121). It will do so within the context of the more prominent policy debates regarding efforts to reduce federal spending to address growing budget deficits and the national debt; concerns about the duplication, fragmentation, and effectiveness of federal economic development assistance; and efforts to support economic recovery and job creation following the worst economic recession since the Great Depression. The PWEDA, whose statutory authority expired at the end of September 2008, authorized the creation of the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration (EDA). EDA's primary focus is to help regions experiencing long-term economic distress or sudden economic dislocation through grants in public infrastructure, the provision of technical assistance and research, and the development and implementation of comprehensive economic development strategies. Program Reauthorization Issues
As Congress debates legislation to reauthorize and appropriate funding for the programs of EDA, it may consider questions such as the following:
Should grantees administering Revolving Loan Funds (RLFs) be granted greater flexibility in the management and conversion of RLF assets for other EDA-eligible activities? Should Congress change the current requirements governing the transfer of federal interest in EDA-financed construction projects in an effort to encourage local flexibility in the use of EDA funds? Legislative Activity in the 112th Congress
On May 2, 2011, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works reported S. 782 , the Economic Development Revitalization Act of 2011. In addition to recognizing business incubators as a key strategy for developing high-skill, high-wage jobs, and fostering regional cooperation through the planning process, the bill proposes to
add outmigration and job losses in specific industry sectors (manufacturing and information technology) to the definition of economic distress; adjust the relative need measures used to calculate the federal-local cost share of EDA-financed projects; allow greater flexibility in the conversion and management of EAA financed RLFs; modify the rules governing the transfer or buyout of the federal interest in property financed with EDA Public Works or Economic Adjustment Assistance; target assistance to communities with the greatest need as measured by economic distressed; encourage regional and interagency cooperation in carrying out economic development strategies; and authorize $500 million in funding for each of the next five fiscal years for EDA activities, including an annual minimum allocation for planning assistance grants. Consideration of S. 782 in the Senate
The Senate began consideration of S. 782 on June 8, 2011. For six days—over a two-week period that ended on June 21, 2011—the Senate debated the bill. A cloture motion was filed on June 16, 2011. Successful adoption of the cloture motion would have limited time for debate on the bill, prohibited consideration of non-germane amendments, and allowed the Senate to vote on passage of S. 782 . On June 21, 2011, the chamber rejected the cloture motion, 49-51. The bill has been set aside and may be considered at a future date in the 112 th Congress. The bill was approved by both houses on November 17, 2011, and signed into law by the President on November 18, 2011 ( P.L. 112-55 appropriates $457.5 million in EDA assistance and salaries and expenses, including $200 million in supplemental disaster assistance for states and communities in presidentially-declared disaster areas, and $37.5 million for EDA salaries and expenses. The bill includes $220 million for EDA programs and salaries and expenses. The House bill recommends $182 million for EDA programs. | The primary focus of the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration (EDA) is to help regions experiencing long-term economic distress or sudden economic dislocation attract private-sector capital and create higher-skill, higher-wage jobs through investments in public infrastructure, the provision of technical assistance and research, and the development and implementation of Comprehensive Economic Development Strategies (CEDS). EDA was created with the passage of the Public Works and Economic Development Act (PWEDA) of 1965, P.L. 89-136 (79 Stat. 552, 42 U.S.C. §3121).
The 112th Congress may consider legislation to reauthorize and amend PWEDA, whose statutory authority expired on September 30, 2008. As part of those deliberations, Congress may consider a number of changes in the structure of EDA assistance programs. At least one bill, S. 782, the Economic Development Revitalization Act, has been reported by a congressional committee. The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works reported the bill on May 2, 2011. The bill includes several provisions intended to encourage regional and interagency cooperation, expand the role of regional Economic Development Districts, and modify the factors used to determine the federal share of EDA-funded projects and activities. The bill also includes proposals that would address a number of programmatic concerns raised by grant recipients, including provisions that would
grant eligible entities, including EDDs, administering revolving loan funds (RLF) greater flexibility in the management and conversion of RLF assets for other EDA-eligible activities; and change the current requirements governing the transfer of federal interest in EDA-financed construction projects in an effort to encourage local flexibility in the use of EDA funds.
The Senate began consideration of S. 782 on June 8, 2011. For six days—over a two-week period that ended on June 21, 2011—the Senate debated the bill. In an effort to end debate and bring the bill to a floor vote, a cloture motion was filed on June 16, 2011. Successful adoption of the cloture motion would have limited time for debate on the bill, prohibited consideration of non-germane amendments, and allowed the Senate to vote on passage of S. 782. On June 21, 2011, the chamber rejected the cloture motion, 49-51. Currently, the bill has been set aside and may be considered at a future date in the 112th Congress.
The reauthorization of EDA and its programs will take place within the context of more prominent policy debates regarding efforts to reduce federal spending to address growing budget deficits and the national debt; concerns about the duplication, fragmentation, and effectiveness of federal economic development assistance; and efforts to support economic recovery and job creation following the worst economic recession since the Great Depression. On November 18, 2011, the President signed into law P.L. 112-55, which appropriated $457.5 million in EDA assistance and salaries and expenses, including $200 million in supplemental disaster assistance for states and communities in presidentially declared disaster areas. For FY2013, excluding supplemental disaster assistance, the President has proposed to reduce program funds by $38 million to $220 million, including $182 million for program activities and $38 million for salaries and expenses. A bill, S. 2323, reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee recommends $200 million for EDA activities while a bill reported by the House would appropriate $182 million for EDA programs for FY2013. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33240 | crs_RL33240_0 | Introduction
The U.S. effort to develop and deploy ballistic missile defenses (BMD) based on the concept of hit-to-kill or kinetic energy kill began three decades ago. This effort gained momentum as the primary focus of the U.S. BMD program in the mid-1980s with the announcement of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). These test results and some very limited operational experience in wartime provide sufficient data for at least some conclusions regarding the decades-long U.S. investment in hit-to-kill as a concept for BMD. This overview report examines the U.S. investment in that concept, what that investment has produced, and raises various questions that might be considered. Therefore, this report will review and distinguish between the program results of theater missile defense (TMD) and national missile defense (NMD). Summary of Analysis
Analysis of flight test data shows that the U.S. effort to develop, test, and deploy effective BMD systems based on this concept has produced mixed and ambiguous results. Nor is there conclusive evidence of a learning curve, such as increased success over time relative to the first tests of the concept 20 years ago. Critics of the flight test effort to date, whether they support missile defense or not in general, can raise questions about the success rate and the realism of the testing effort, given a generation of U.S. investment in its development. Can kinetic energy interceptor technologies for use against long-range ballistic missiles be developed successfully and deployed as an effective part of the U.S. military posture? The answer appears to be ambiguous at this juncture. Still other observers could argue that in general the United States needs to make a more concerted effort to increase developmental testing across the board, before these systems are ready for more realistic testing regimes. They could argue that almost all the testing to date is of a developmental nature and that an operational testing regimen has not been developed, but remains essential. | For some time, U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs have focused primarily on developing kinetic energy interceptors to destroy attacking ballistic missiles. These efforts have evolved over 30 years and have produced a significant amount of test data from which much can be learned. This report provides a broad overview of the U.S. investment in this approach to BMD.
The data on the U.S. flight test effort to develop a national missile defense (NMD) system remains mixed and ambiguous. There is no recognizable pattern to explain this record nor is there conclusive evidence of a learning curve over more than two decades of developmental testing. In addition, the test scenarios are considered by some not to be operational tests and could be more realistic in nature; they see these tests as more of a laboratory or developmental effort. Success and failure rates (and their technical causes) have shown relative consistency through this period.
The U.S. flight test effort to develop theater missile defense (TMD) systems appears more promising. In relative terms, developmental and operational testing of TMD systems has been more successful than the NMD effort. Nonetheless, TMD systems that evolved from mature, existing ground and sea-based air-defense systems have demonstrated greater test success than other TMD programs.
How effective has the U.S. investment been in developing kinetic energy BMD systems? Observers could make any number of arguments as to what the record means and what could be done to improve the effectiveness of systems under development and of those deployed. Some observers have suggested that the 110th Congress might review the U.S. investment in the kinetic energy concept to date to determine how best to proceed with the U.S. BMD effort in the coming years. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41747 | crs_R41747_0 | Background
The purpose of the diversity immigrant visa lottery is, as the name suggests, to encourage legal immigration from countries other than the major sending countries of current immigrants to the United States. Current law weights the allocation of immigrant visas heavily toward aliens with close family in the United States and, to a lesser extent, toward aliens who meet particular employment needs. The diversity immigrant category was added to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by the Immigration Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-649 ) to stimulate "new seed" immigration (i.e., to foster new, more varied, migration from other parts of the world). Eligibility Criteria
To be eligible for a diversity visa, the INA requires that an alien must have a high school education or the equivalent, or two years experience in an occupation which requires at least two years of training or experience. The alien or the alien's spouse must be a native of one of the countries listed as a foreign state qualified for the diversity visa lottery. Diversity lottery winners, like all other aliens wishing to come to the United States, must undergo reviews performed by Department of State consular officers abroad and DHS inspectors upon entry to the United States. These reviews are intended to ensure that they are not ineligible for visas or admission under the grounds for inadmissibility spelled out in the INA. Trends in Source Countries
The diversity lottery makes 50,000 visas available annually to natives of countries from which immigrant admissions were lower than a total of 50,000 over the preceding five years. USCIS generates the formula for allocating visas according to the statutory specifications; visas are divided among six global geographic regions according to the relative populations of the regions, with their allocation weighted in favor of countries in regions that were under-represented among immigrant admissions to the United States during the past five years. The INA limits each country to 7%, or 3,850, of the total and provides that Northern Ireland be treated as a separate foreign state. As Figure 1 depicts, the regional distribution of the source countries for diversity immigrants has shifted over time in the four years selected for comparison (FY1994, FY1999, FY2004 and FY2009). Foreign nationals from Europe garnered the overwhelming share of the diversity visas in FY1994 and maintained a plurality share in FY1999. By FY2004, foreign nationals from Africa received a share comparable to those from Europe. In FY2009, the latest year for which we have data, foreign nationals from Africa gained the plurality share. They might advocate that the 50,000 diversity visas would be better used for backlog reduction of the other visa categories. Is the diversity visa lottery more vulnerable to fraud and misuse than other immigration pathways? Some might assert that the difficulties of performing background checks in many of the countries currently qualifying for the diversity lottery, as well as broader concerns about terrorism, justify the elimination of the category. Some might point to the immigration dominance of nationals from a handful of countries and argue that the diversity visa fosters new and more varied migration to counterbalance an immigration system weighted disproportionately to family-based immigrants. | The purpose of the diversity immigrant visa lottery is, as the name suggests, to encourage legal immigration from countries other than the major sending countries of current immigrants to the United States. Current law weights the allocation of immigrant visas heavily toward aliens with close family in the United States and, to a lesser extent, toward aliens who meet particular employment needs. The diversity immigrant category was added to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by the Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649) to stimulate "new seed" immigration (i.e., to foster new, more varied migration from other parts of the world).
To be eligible for a diversity visa, the INA requires that the foreign national must have a high school education or the equivalent, or two years experience in an occupation that requires at least two years of training or experience. The foreign national or the foreign national's spouse must be a native of one of the countries listed as a foreign state qualified for the diversity visa lottery. Diversity lottery winners, like all other aliens wishing to come to the United States, must undergo reviews performed by Department of State consular officers abroad and Department of Homeland Security immigration officers upon entry to the United States. These reviews are intended to ensure that the aliens are not ineligible for visas or admission under the grounds for inadmissibility spelled out in the INA.
The diversity lottery currently makes 50,000 visas available annually to natives of countries from which immigrant admissions were lower than a total of 50,000 over the preceding five years. The formula for allocating visas is based upon the statutory specifications; visas are divided among six global geographic regions according to the relative populations of the regions, with their allocation weighted in favor of countries in regions that were under-represented among immigrant admissions to the United States during the past five years. The INA limits each country to 7%, or 3,850, of the total and provides that Northern Ireland be treated as a separate foreign state.
The regional distribution of the source countries for diversity immigrants has shifted over time in the four years selected for comparison (FY1994, FY1999, FY2004, and FY2009). Foreign nationals from Europe garnered the overwhelming share of the diversity visas in FY1994 and maintained a plurality share in FY1999. By FY2004, foreign nationals from Africa received a share comparable to those from Europe. In FY2009, foreign nationals from Africa gained the plurality share.
Some argue that the diversity lottery should be eliminated and its visas used for backlog reduction in other visa categories. Supporters of the diversity visa, however, argue that the diversity visa provides "new seed" immigrants for an immigration system weighted disproportionately to family-based immigrants from a handful of countries. Critics of the diversity lottery warn that it is vulnerable to fraud and misuse and is potentially an avenue for terrorists, citing the difficulties of performing background checks in many of the countries eligible for the diversity lottery. Supporters respond that background checks for criminal and national security matters are performed on all prospective immigrants seeking to come to the United States, including those winning diversity visas. |
crs_RL31351 | crs_RL31351_0 | Since the beginning of the federal government, Presidents have called upon executive branch officials to provide them with advice regarding matters of policy and administration. Presidential Adviser Growth
The creation of the Executive Office of the President contributed to an increase in the number of presidential advisers for several reasons. With their growing number and influence, senior staff members of the White House Office and certain other Executive Office agencies began to become of interest to congressional committees when accountability for policymaking and administrative or managerial actions prompted requests for their testimony. Because these consultations with the President by such an official may be considered by the President to be privileged and constitutionally protectable, examples are also provided of instances when invited congressional committee or subcommittee testimony by a presidential adviser was refused. Weighing Congress's Right to Executive Branch Information with Executive Claims of Absolute Immunity
Congress has a constitutionally rooted right of access to the information it needs to perform its Article I legislative and oversight functions. Generally, a congressional committee with jurisdiction over the subject matter, which is conducting an authorized investigation for legislative or oversight purposes, has a right to information held by the executive branch in the absence of either a valid claim of constitutional privilege by the executive or a statutory provision whereby Congress has limited its constitutional right to information. Procedure for Obtaining Executive Branch Testimony
A congressional committee may request (informally or by a letter from the committee chair, perhaps cosigned by the ranking Member) or demand (pursuant to subpoena ) the testimony of a presidential adviser. However, Congress may encounter legal and political problems in attempting to enforce a subpoena to a presidential adviser. Conflicts concerning congressional requests or demands for executive branch testimony or documents often involve extensive negotiations, and may be resolved by some form of compromise as to, inter alia, the scope of the testimony or information to be provided to Congress. | Since the beginning of the federal government, Presidents have called upon executive branch officials to provide them with advice regarding matters of policy and administration. While Cabinet members were among the first to play such a role, the creation of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) in 1939 and the various agencies located within that structure resulted in a large increase in the number and variety of presidential advisers. All senior staff members of the White House Office and the leaders of the various EOP agencies and instrumentalities could be said to serve as advisers to the President.
Occasionally, these executive branch officials playing a presidential advisory role have been called upon to testify before congressional committees and subcommittees. Sometimes, such invited appearances have been prompted by allegations of personal misconduct on the part of the official, but they have also included instances when accountability for policymaking and administrative or managerial actions have instigated the request for testimony. Because such appearances before congressional committees or subcommittees seemingly could result in demands for advice proffered to the President, or the disclosure—inadvertent or otherwise—of such advice, there has been resistance, from time to time, by the Chief Executive to allowing such testimony.
Congress has a constitutionally rooted right of access to the information it needs to perform its Article I legislative and oversight functions. Generally, a congressional committee with jurisdiction over the subject matter, which is conducting an authorized investigation for legislative or oversight purposes, has a right to information held by the executive branch in the absence of either a valid claim of constitutional privilege by the executive or a statutory provision whereby Congress has limited its constitutional right to information.
A congressional committee may request (informally or by a letter from the committee chair, perhaps co-signed by the ranking Member) or demand (pursuant to subpoena) the testimony of a presidential adviser. However, Congress may encounter legal and political problems in attempting to enforce a subpoena to a presidential adviser. Conflicts concerning congressional requests or demands for executive branch testimony or documents often involve extensive negotiations and may be resolved by some form of compromise as to, inter alia, the scope of the testimony or information to be provided to Congress. |
crs_R41831 | crs_R41831_0 | Introduction
The March 2011 Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami struck the northeast coast of Japan. As a result, the motor vehicle supply chain differs in important ways from supply chains for other manufactured products, such as electronics and apparel. In turn, the absence of industry-wide standards has led to the widespread customization of parts and vehicles. Suppliers are often the sole source for specific parts." Electronic ignition was one of the first major innovations. Impact on the Parts Suppliers
A number of automotive products have been affected by the Japan disasters, especially certain microprocessors and a unique paint pigment, which are produced mainly in the earthquake-stricken region. Xirallic pigments were among the first automotive inputs to be affected by the Japan disasters because the only plant in the world that makes them, owned by Merck Chemicals International of Germany, is near the Fukushima nuclear reactor. Other Parts Issues. An example of this domino effect is Keihin Corp., which supplies Honda with manifolds, engine control units, and other components. Impact on Automakers
The March 11 disasters temporarily closed the plants that make 17 of the top 20 models of Japanese vehicles sold in the United States and prompted General Motors to close a plant in Louisiana and Peugeot a plant in Europe. Of the coastal area affected by the natural disasters, Nissan and Toyota operate assembly plants in Fukushima and Miyagi prefectures, respectively. The Chubu plant is more strategically located in Japan's auto-producing region southwest of Tokyo. IHS Global Insight, an international economic and financial consulting firm, has forecast the impact of the disasters on auto production. The shortages in the Japanese automaking supply chain may be new opportunities for the Detroit 3 and South Korean automakers, all of which have been affected far less. Honda, which builds about 26% of its vehicles in Japan, expects its global production to return to normal by the end of this year. Ford had planned to idle some of these plants later in 2011, but moved up the schedule because of a shortage of undisclosed Japan-origin parts. IHS Global Insight forecasts that of the 4.2 million vehicles that IHS believes will now not be built in 2011 based on their pre-earthquake projections, 90% of the lost volume will stem from Japanese OEMs in their global operations, including the United States. In the United States, the loss of production will be felt over the summer most keenly at the Japanese transplant facilities and suppliers, primarily in the Midwest and South, where Japanese OEMs operate their manufacturing facilities. Congress is interested in the global motor vehicle supply chain for several reasons. Japan is a major trading partner and ally in Asia, and the restoration of its industrial production is central to strengthening the world economic recovery. | The March 2011 Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami devastated the northeast coast of Japan with the most powerful natural disaster in Japan's modern history. Compounding the challenge for Japanese government, businesses, and communities was the resulting destruction of several nuclear reactors in the region which supplied electricity for homes and industry. Not only was electricity unavailable, but a large area was temporarily evacuated, making rapid reopening of affected industries impossible.
Located in the disaster region and adversely affected by these forces are a number of manufacturing facilities which are integral to the global motor vehicle supply chain. They include plants that assemble automobiles and many suppliers which build parts and components for vehicles. Some of the Japanese factories that were forced to close provide parts and chemicals not easily available elsewhere. This is particularly true of automotive electronics, a major producer of which was located near the center of the destruction.
The effect of these disasters has been first and foremost borne by Japanese automakers, which closed many of their Japanese assembly plants for several weeks as they assessed their supply chain issues and impact on their Tier 1, 2, and 3 suppliers. Japanese motor vehicle plants in other parts of the world have also been affected, including facilities owned by Toyota, Nissan, Honda, and other manufacturers in the Midwest and South of the United States. Detroit 3 automakers, by contrast, are less affected, although they, too, have taken extraordinary steps to keep production moving, including visiting suppliers in Japan to help them rebuild, locating alternative sources for some parts and chemicals, and shifting plants' summer vacations to accommodate the loss of parts.
IHS Global Insight, a global consulting firm, forecasts that over 4 million units of vehicle production will be lost because of the disasters in Japan, with 90% of them from Japanese automakers. It is possible that a shortage of some popular Japanese vehicles may develop over the summer in the United States. The Detroit 3 and South Korean automakers may be able to fill a portion of whatever demand Japanese producers are unable to meet.
Congress has shown an interest in the economic effects of these disasters, and at least one hearing has been planned to examine the effects. Not only is Japan one of the United States' largest trading partners, but it is also an ally in Asia, and its rebuilding is an important step in global economic recovery. In addition, Congress may be interested in evaluating the resilience of global supply chains as a result of new information about the vulnerabilities of supply chains in the automotive sector. |
crs_RL32488 | crs_RL32488_0 | On February 15, 2009, Venezuelans voted in a national referendum to approve a constitutional amendment abolishing term limits for elected local, state, and national officials, including for the President. (See " November 2008 State and Local Elections " below.) On September 11, 2008, President Chávez announced that he was expelling the U.S. Under President Chávez, Venezuela has undergone enormous political changes, with a new constitution in place and even a new name for the country, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, named after the 19 th century South American liberator Simon Bolivar, whom Chávez often invokes. The government benefitted from the rise in world oil prices, which increased government revenues and sparked an economic boom. This would allow him to run for re-election in 2012 and beyond. The Chávez government has also continued to threaten opposition media with closure. Human Rights Concerns
Human rights organizations and U.S. officials have expressed concerns for several years about the deterioration of democratic institutions and threats to freedom of speech and press in Venezuela under the Chávez government. In the 111 th Congress, two resolutions have been introduced that would express concern about anti-Semitism in Venezuela: H.Res. U.S. Policy
Overview of U.S.-Venezuelan Relations
The United States traditionally has had close relations with Venezuela, the fourth major supplier of foreign oil to the United States, but there has been significant friction with the Chávez government. Over the past several years, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about human rights, Venezuela's military arms purchases (largely from Russia), its relations with Cuba and Iran, and its efforts to export its brand of populism to other Latin American countries. Under the Obama Administration, Venezuela and the United States announced an agreement on June 25, 2009, for the return of respective ambassadors. While some observers are hopeful that the return of ambassadors will mark an improvement in relations, others emphasize continued U.S. concerns about the Venezuelan government's treatment of the news media and political opposition and about interference in the affairs of other countries in the region. Ambassador as soon as the United States has a new Administration. As a result, Chávez was able to increase government expenditures on anti-poverty and other social programs associated with his populist agenda. Legislative Initiatives
111th Congress
On July 22, 2009, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 1536 (Martinez) to the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, S. 1390 , that requires the Director of National Intelligence to provide a report on Venezuela to the defense and intelligence committees within 180 days of the enactment of the Act. The required report is to address the following topics: (1) an inventory of all weapons purchases by, and transfers to, the government of Venezuela and Venezuela's transfers to other countries since 1998; (2) the mining and shipping of Venezuelan uranium to Iran, North Korea, and other states suspected of nuclear proliferation; (3) the extent to which Hugo Chávez and other Venezuelan officials and supporters of the Venezuelan government provide political counsel, collaboration financial ties, refuge, and other forms of support, including military materiel, to the FARC; (4) the extent to which Hugo Chávez and other Venezuelan officials provide funding, logistical and political support to the Islamist terrorist organization Hezbollah; (5) deployment of Venezuelan security or intelligence personnel to Bolivia, including any role such personnel have in suppressing opponents of the government of Bolivia; (6) Venezuela's clandestine material support for political movements and individuals throughout the Western Hemisphere with the objective of influencing the internal affairs of Western Hemisphere nations; (7) efforts by Hugo Chávez and other officials or supporters of the Venezuelan government to convert or launder funds that are the property of Venezuelan government agencies, instrumentalities, parastatals, including PdVSA; and (8) covert payments by Hugo Chávez or other officials or supporters of the Venezuelan government to foreign political candidates, government officials, or officials of international organizations for the purpose of influencing the performance of their official duties. Several resolutions and bills related to Venezuela have also been introduced in the 111 th Congress. H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced January 9, 2009 as the Western Hemisphere Counterterrorism and Nonproliferation Act of 2009, would, among its provisions, place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela or Cuba (section 209). H.R. 375 described above that would place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela or Cuba. H.Con.Res. H.R. | Under the populist rule of President Hugo Chávez, first elected in 1998 and reelected to a six-year term in December 2006, Venezuela has undergone enormous political changes, with a new constitution and unicameral legislature, and a new name for the country, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. U.S. officials and human rights organizations have expressed concerns about the deterioration of democratic institutions and threats to freedom of expression under President Chávez, who has survived several attempts to remove him from power. The government benefitted from the rise in world oil prices, which sparked an economic boom and allowed Chávez to increase expenditures on social programs associated with his populist agenda.
After he was reelected, Chávez announced new measures to move the country toward socialism, but his May 2007 closure of a popular Venezuelan television station (RCTV) that was critical of the government sparked protests, and his proposed constitutional amendment package was defeated by a close margin in a December 2007 national referendum. State and local elections held in November 2008 were a mixed picture of support for the government, with the opposition winning several key contests. In February 2009, Venezuelans approved a controversial constitutional referendum that abolished term limits and allows Chávez to run for re-election in 2012 and beyond. In 2009, the government has increased efforts to suppress the political opposition, including elected officials, and is continuing to threaten media critical of the government.
The United States traditionally has had close relations with Venezuela, the fourth major supplier of foreign oil to the United States, but there has been friction with the Chávez government. U.S. officials have expressed concerns about human rights, Venezuela's military arms purchases, its relations with Cuba and Iran, and its efforts to export its brand of populism to other Latin American countries. Declining cooperation on anti-drug and anti-terrorism efforts has also been a concern. In September 2008, bilateral relations worsened when President Chávez expelled the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, and the United States responded in kind. Under the Obama Administration, Venezuela and the United States reached an agreement in late June 2009 for the return of respective ambassadors. While some observers are hopeful that the return of ambassadors will mark an improvement in relations, others emphasize continued U.S. concerns about the Venezuelan government's treatment of the news media and political opposition and about interference in the affairs of other countries in the region.
To date in the 111th Congress, the Senate approved an amendment (S.Amdt. 1536) to the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, S. 1390, that requires the Director of National Intelligence to provide a report on Venezuela's military purchases, potential support for terrorist groups, and other Venezuelan activities. In addition, several resolutions and bills related to Venezuela have been introduced: H.R. 375 would, among its provisions, place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela; H.R. 2475 includes a provision identical to that in H.R. 375 described above that would place restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela; H.Res. 174 and H.Con.Res. 124 would express concern about anti-Semitism in Venezuela.
Note: This report provides background on political changes in Venezuela, U.S. policy, and U.S. legislative initiatives from 2003-July 2009. It will not be updated. |
crs_R43721 | crs_R43721_0 | Introduction
As Congress investigates the issues surrounding the September 11, 2012, attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, some Members have questioned whether security funding was adequate or was a factor that may have contributed to inadequate security at that facility. After several attacks occurred on U.S. facilities and other American interests in Beirut, Lebanon and Kuwait in the early 1980s, Congress passed the Diplomatic Security Act of 1986, further emphasizing the role the Secretary of State plays in providing funding for the security of U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel worldwide (hereinafter referred to in this report as diplomatic/embassy security). Its report, referring to the State Department's need for risk mitigation at U.S. facilities around the world, states:
For many years the State Department has been engaged in a struggle to obtain the resources necessary to carry out its work, with varying degrees of success. This has brought about a deep sense of the importance of husbanding resources to meet the highest priorities, laudable in the extreme in any government department. But it has also had the effect of conditioning a few State Department managers to favor restricting the use of resources as a general orientation. Experienced leadership, close coordination and agility, timely informed decision making, and adequate funding and personnel resources are essential.... One overall conclusion in this [ARB] report is that Congress must do its part to meet this challenge and provide necessary resources to the State Department to address security risks and meet mission imperatives. Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding Data
Congress provides funding for diplomatic/embassy security within the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations. The Appendix presents annual diplomatic/embassy security requests and actual funding levels from FY2008 to the FY2015 request. Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) and Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU) make up the bulk of the diplomatic/embassy security budget and are the only diplomatic/embassy security line-items that appear in the Administration's budget request, the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs House and Senate appropriations legislation, and the enacted appropriations laws. Security Funding for the Benghazi Facility
Complexities surrounding the security funds available for Benghazi include whether the facility was designated as temporary, the date its lease would be up, and the timing of available funding, among other things. Officials at the Department of State may disagree as to what qualifies as a temporary facility and what funds are available to those facilities. A Senate committee report on the Benghazi attack found that because the Benghazi facility was designated as temporary, no security standards applied to it. According to the Benghazi ARB report, "OBO does not fund security upgrades [ESCM/WSU] for 'temporary' facilities." According to one Senate Committee report, a State Department Regional Security Officer (RSO) stated that
Continuing Resolutions had two detrimental effects on efforts to improve security in Benghazi. | Congressional investigations into the September 11, 2012, attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, have focused on a number of issues, including the extent to which overall funding levels may have played a role in the security measures in place at that U.S. facility. While several factors may have been involved in the Benghazi situation, this report focuses only on funding for security of U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities abroad, hereinafter referred to in this report as diplomatic/embassy security. (For other CRS reports on the Benghazi attacks and a list of CRS experts, go to CRS.gov and search "Benghazi.")
The report of the Accountability Review Board for Benghazi (ARB) report highlighted the funding complexities at the Department of State:
For many years the State Department has been engaged in a struggle to obtain the resources necessary to carry out its work, with varying degrees of success. This has brought about a deep sense of the importance of husbanding resources to meet the highest priorities, laudable in the extreme in any government department. But it has also had the effect of conditioning a few State Department managers to favor restricting the use of resources as a general orientation. Experienced leadership, close coordination and agility, timely informed decision making, and adequate funding and personnel resources are essential.... One overall conclusion in this [ARB] report is that Congress must do its part to meet this challenge and provide necessary resources to the State Department to address security risks and meet mission imperatives. (Department of State, Accountability Review Board for Benghazi Attack of September 2012, December 19, 2012, p. 3. Available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization.202446.pdf.)
Other post-Benghazi reports have pointed out how security funding for overseas staff and posts depends on the designation of the facility as office space, warehouse, or residence, and whether a facility is considered by State Department officials as permanent, temporary, or interim. Even the definition of each of those designations may differ within the Department of State. Further, some reports suggest that the inability to get more funds to improve security—whether because Congress does not appropriate enough, delays passing budgets, or because the Department of State is unwilling or unable to fully fund resource requests from its overseas posts—may contribute to an attitude by officials in the field that a combination of elevated threat and restricted resources to meet that threat should not be questioned. In that case, security officers requesting more funds simply may give up.
This report presents a history and analysis of the requested and actual funding for diplomatic/embassy security since FY2008—what actually became available for the Department of State to spend after rescissions, sequestration, and transfers. It also provides funding data that was requested by the Administration, passed by the House of Representatives, passed by the Senate, and enacted by Congress for the two accounts that provide the bulk of the funding: the Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) and Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU). Combined, these two subaccounts in most years comprise more than 90% of the funding available for diplomatic/embassy security.
This report will continue to track diplomatic/embassy security appropriations and will be updated as changes occur. |
crs_R42529 | crs_R42529_0 | Key Agenda Items for the Chicago Summit
NATO's 2012 summit of alliance heads of state and government is scheduled to take place in Chicago on May 20-21. U.S. and NATO officials have outlined what they expect to be the Summit's three main agenda items:
Defining the next phase of formal transition in Afghanistan and shaping a longer term NATO commitment to the country after the planned end of combat operations by the end of 2014; Securing commitments to maintain and develop the military capabilities necessary to meet NATO's defense and security goals, including through a new "Smart Defense" initiative; and Enhancing NATO's partnerships with non-NATO member states. Although NATO is not expected to issue membership invitations to any of the four countries currently seeking NATO membership, they could reaffirm their commitment to do so in the future. Selected Issues for Congress
Congress has played an important role in guiding U.S. policy toward NATO and in shaping NATO's post-Cold War evolution. Proposed companion legislation in the House and the Senate— The NATO Enhancement Act of 2012 ( S. 2177 and H.R. 4243 )—endorses NATO enlargement to the Balkans and Georgia, reaffirms NATO's role as a nuclear alliance, and calls on the U.S. Administration to seek further allied contributions to a NATO territorial missile defense capability, and to urge NATO allies to develop critical military capabilities. In the run-up to and aftermath of the Chicago Summit, Congress may want to consider a range of questions relating to NATO's current operations and activities and its longer term mission. NATO's commitment to Afghanistan, both during the ongoing transition away from a primary emphasis on combat and after the transition. Allied military capabilities and burden-sharing within the alliance. Future NATO operations and allied military readiness. NATO's conventional and nuclear force posture. NATO's relations with non-NATO member states and international organizations. Prospects and conditions for future NATO enlargement. | NATO's 2012 summit of alliance heads of state and government is scheduled to take place in Chicago on May 20-21. U.S. and NATO officials have outlined what they expect to be the Summit's three main agenda items:
Defining the next phase of formal transition in Afghanistan and shaping a longer term NATO commitment to the country after the planned end of combat operations by the end of 2014; Securing commitments to maintain and develop the military capabilities necessary to meet NATO's defense and security goals, including through a new "Smart Defense" initiative; and Enhancing NATO's partnerships with non-NATO member states.
Although NATO is not expected to issue membership invitations to any of the four countries currently seeking NATO membership, it could reaffirm their commitment to do so in the future.
Congress has played an important role in guiding U.S. policy toward NATO and shaping NATO's post-Cold War evolution. Members of the 112th Congress have expressed interest in each of the key agenda items to be discussed in Chicago. For example, proposed companion legislation in the House and Senate—The NATO Enhancement Act of 2012 (S. 2177 and H.R. 4243)—endorses NATO enlargement to the Balkans and Georgia, reaffirms NATO's role as a nuclear alliance, and calls on the U.S. Administration to seek further allied contributions to a NATO territorial missile defense system, and to urge NATO allies to develop critical military capabilities.
In the run-up to and aftermath of the Chicago Summit, Congress may consider a range of issues relating to NATO's current operations and activities and its longer term mission. These include questions pertaining to:
NATO's commitment to Afghanistan, both during the ongoing transition away from a primary emphasis on combat and after the transition; Allied conventional military capabilities and burden-sharing within the alliance; Future NATO operations and allied military readiness; NATO's future as a nuclear alliance; NATO's relations with non-NATO member states and multilateral organizations; and Prospects and conditions for future NATO enlargement. |
crs_RL30567 | crs_RL30567_0 | Introduction and Methodological Notes
Although party divisions sprang up almost from the First Congress, the formally structured party leadership organizations now taken for granted are a relatively modern development. Constitutionally specified leaders, namely the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, can be identified since the first Congress. Other leadership posts, however, were not officially recognized until about the middle of the 19 th century, and some are 20 th century creations. The following tables identify 15 different party leadership posts beginning with the year when each is generally regarded to have been formally established. The tables herein present data on service dates, party affiliation, and other information for the following House and Senate party leadership posts:
House Positions
1. Under this system, the Speaker—who at the time designated the chairmen of the standing committees—would name his principal lieutenant to be chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. Identifying Senate Leaders
The Senate developed an identifiable party leadership later than the House. The few existing records of party conferences in the 19 th -century Senate are held in private collections. Memoirs and other secondary sources reveal the identities of party conference or caucus chairs for some, but not all, Congresses after about 1850; these posts, however, carried very little authority. It was not uncommon for Senators to declare publicly that within the Senate parties there was no single leader. Instead, through the turn of the 20 th century, individuals who led the Senate achieved their position through recognized personal attributes, including persuasion and oratory skills, rather than the current practice of election to most official leadership posts. The development of Senate party floor leaders was one of slow evolution, like the House, but they arose for the most part from the post of conference chair. An Appendix explains the abbreviations used to denote party affiliations in this report. Leadership Posts Excluded
The tables in this report exclude some leadership posts in order to render manageable the amount of data provided. While each party's conference chair posts were the first formal party leadership positions in the Senate, eventually floor leader positions were established as uppermost in each party's leadership hierarchy. Where these have been published, they have been used as a source in this report. Party Leaders in the House of Representatives. House. Political Party Abbreviations | This report briefly describes current responsibilities and selection mechanisms for 15 House and Senate party leadership posts and provides tables with historical data, including service dates, party affiliation, and other information for each. Tables have been updated as of the report's issuance date to reflect leadership changes.
Although party divisions appeared almost from the First Congress, the formally structured party leadership organizations now taken for granted are a relatively modern development. Constitutionally specified leaders, namely the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, can be identified since the First Congress. Other leadership posts, however, were not formally recognized until about the middle of the 19th century, and some are 20th-century creations.
In the earliest Congresses, those House Members who took some role in leading their parties were often designated by the President as his spokesperson in the chamber. By the early 1800s, an informal system developed when the Speaker began naming his lieutenant to chair one of the most influential House committees. Eventually, other Members wielded significant influence via other committee posts (e.g., the post-1880 Committee on Rules). By the end of the 19th century, the formal position of floor leaders had been established in the House.
The Senate was slower than the House to develop formal party leadership positions, and there are similar problems in identifying individual early leaders. For instance, records of party conferences in the 19th century Senate are not available. Memoirs and other secondary sources reveal the identities of party conference or caucus chairs for some, but not all, Congresses after about 1850, but these posts carried very little authority. It was not uncommon for Senators to publicly declare that within the Senate parties, there was no single leader. Rather, through the turn of the 20th century, individuals who led the Senate achieved their positions through recognized personal attributes, including persuasion and oratorical skills, rather than election or appointment to formal leadership posts. The formal positions for Senate party floor leaders eventually arose from the position of conference chair.
Owing to the aforementioned problems in identifying informal party leaders in earlier Congresses, the tables in this report identify each leadership position beginning with the year in which each is generally regarded to have been formally established. The report excludes some leadership posts in order to render the amount of data manageable. A bibliography cites useful references, especially in regard to sources for historical data, and an appendix explains the abbreviations used to denote political parties.
This report will be updated as changes in House and Senate party leadership positions occur. |
crs_R42467 | crs_R42467_0 | Some of the options exist and are well established, but they are under discussion for extension or modification. Other innovative policy options have been proposed in connection with water infrastructure, especially to supplement or complement existing financing tools. Some are intended to encourage private participation in financing of drinking water and wastewater projects. Some are intended to provide robust, long-term revenue to support existing financing programs and mechanisms. This report analyzes six policy options, including their federal budgetary implications, related to financing water infrastructure that were reflected in legislation in the 114 th Congress. Increase funding for the State Revolving Fund (SRF) programs in the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Create a "Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act" Program (WIFIA). Create a federal water infrastructure trust fund. Lift restrictions on private activity bonds for water infrastructure projects. Reinstate authority for the issuance of Build America Bonds (BABs). Since the 112 th Congress, a number of these options have been examined by congressional committees, including the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. A pilot program for one of them—WIFIA—was enacted during the 113 th Congress and is discussed below. Nevertheless, interest in other financing options continues, in part due to long-standing concerns with the costs to repair aging and deteriorated U.S. infrastructure generally, and also in response to events in individual regions and cities, such as Flint, MI, where problems of elevated lead levels in its drinking water distribution system have recently drawn public attention. Another House bill, H.R. P.L. For example, several legislative proposals in the 114 th Congress would have established a similar program for water reclamation and reuse projects in western states. Legislation has been introduced in several Congresses, including H.R. 4468 , H.R. 5313 , and S. 2848 in the 114 th Congress. 3337 and S. 268 ); and the Jobs! An infrastructure bank proposal also was included in the Obama Administration's FY2017 budget. H.R. 413 and H.R. 3555 . H.R. 499 , S. 2606 , and S. 2821 ). Conclusion
Consensus exists among many stakeholders—state and local governments; equipment manufacturers, construction companies, and engineers; and environmental advocates—on the need for more investment in water infrastructure. There is no consensus supporting a preferred option or policy, and many advocate a combination that will expand the financing "toolbox" for projects. Some of the options discussed in this report may be helpful in addressing financing problems, but there is no single method or "silver bullet" that will address needs fully or close the financing gap completely. For example, some, such as a WIFIA or a national infrastructure bank, may be helpful to projects in large urban or multijurisdictional areas, while others, such as expanded SRF programs, may be more beneficial in smaller communities. 113-121 , at least for the near term, most communities will continue to rely on the existing SRF programs, tax-exempt governmental bonds, and available tax-exempt private activity bonds to finance their water infrastructure needs. | This report addresses several options considered by Congress to address the financing needs of local communities for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects and to decrease or close the gap between available funds and projected needs. Some of the options exist and are well established, but they have been under discussion for expansion or modification. Other innovative policy options for water infrastructure have been proposed, especially to supplement or complement existing financing tools. Some are intended to provide robust, long-term revenue to support existing financing programs and mechanisms. Some are intended to encourage private participation in financing of drinking water and wastewater projects.
Six options reflected in legislative proposals in the 114th Congress, including their federal budgetary implications, are discussed.
Increase funding for the State Revolving Fund (SRF) programs in the Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act (S. 2532/S. 2583, H.R. 4653, and H.R. 4954). Create a "Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act" Program, or WIFIA (P.L. 113-121 in the 113th Congress; several bills in the 114th Congress that proposed to establish a similar program for water reclamation and reuse projects in western states are H.R. 291/S. 176, S. 1837, S. 1894, and S. 2533/H.R. 5247). Create a federal water infrastructure trust fund (H.R. 4468, H.R. 5313, and S. 2848). Create a national infrastructure bank (included in the Administration's FY2017 budget request and H.R. 413, H.R. 625, H.R. 3337, H.R. 3555, S. 268, and S. 1589). Lift restrictions on private activity bonds for water infrastructure projects (included in the Administration's FY2017 budget request and H.R. 499, S. 2606, and S. 2821). Reinstate authority for the issuance of Build America Bonds (included in the Administration's FY2017 budget request and H.R. 2676).
A number of these options have been examined by congressional committees since the 112th Congress. A pilot program for one of them—WIFIA—was enacted in 2014. Nevertheless, interest in other financing options continues, in part due to long-standing concerns regarding the costs to repair aging and deteriorated U.S. infrastructure generally, and also in response to events in individual regions and cities, such as Flint, MI, where problems of elevated lead levels in its drinking water distribution system have recently drawn public attention.
Consensus exists among many stakeholders—state and local governments, equipment manufacturers and construction companies, and environmental advocates—on the need for more investment in water infrastructure. There is no consensus supporting a preferred option or policy, and many advocate a combination that will expand the financing "toolbox" for projects. Some of the options discussed in this report may be helpful, but there is no single method that will address needs fully or close the financing gap completely. For example, some may be helpful to projects in large urban or multijurisdictional areas, while others may be more beneficial in smaller communities. At least for the near term, communities will continue to rely on the existing SRF programs, tax-exempt governmental bonds, and tax-exempt private activity bonds to finance their water infrastructure needs. |
crs_R41089 | crs_R41089_0 | Hydropower currently accounts for about 6% of the electricity produced in the United States. Although most of the larger, more traditional hydroelectric resources have already been developed, a clean energy rationale for development of small hydropower (i.e., with a power generation capacity of between 1 and 30 megawatts (MW)) resources may now exist. Run-of-River Plants
Where natural conditions of sufficient water flow and volume exist, electricity can be generated by "run-of-river" hydropower facilities without the need for the creation of a large reservoir. Small and Low-Head Hydropower
In 2006, DOE's Idaho National Laboratory assessed the potential for developing small and low-head hydroelectric generation in the United States. Although the best areas for exploiting small-scale hydropower are those with steep rivers flowing all year round, approximately 5,400 of 100,000 sites were identified with the potential for small hydro projects (i.e., providing between 1 MW and 30 MW of annual mean power). DOE estimated these projects (if developed) could result in a greater than 50% increase in total hydroelectric power generation. Pressure reducing valves (PRVs) are used in water supply systems and industry to reduce the buildup of fluid pressure in a valve, or to reduce pressure to an appropriate level for use by water system customers. PRVs can also be found at distribution points in water conduits, canals, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and pipelines which can all offer additional power generation opportunities. Renewable Energy Definitions in Pending Legislation
Several bills currently pending in Congress for climate change mitigation and clean energy seek to establish a federal renewable energy (or electricity) standard (RES). 2454 , the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, and S. 1462 , the American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009. Under current proposals, the RES would require retail electric suppliers to obtain increasing percentages of renewable electricity for the power they provide to customers. Although hydropower is generally considered to be a clean source of electric power, only limited applications of hydropower would qualify to be included in satisfying the RES, i.e., incremental capacity and energy efficiency improvements to existing dams, and capacity added to existing non-hydroelectric dams. Given the current language in these pending bills, it is unlikely that most new run-of-river low-head and small hydropower projects would meet the requirements for "qualified hydropower" unless these projects are installed at existing non-hydropower dams. Challenges and Issues for Projects
Power generation from rivers and streams is not without controversy, and the capability to produce energy from these sources will have to be balanced against environmental and other public interest concerns. That balance can be aided by research into new technologies and forward-thinking regulations that encourage the development of these resources in cost-effective, environmentally friendly ways which recognize that such facilities, once built, can last for at least 50 years. Given the likely smaller size of projects relative to the costs of development for small and low-head hydro, incentive rates for electricity produced over time may help make a power-based project feasible. As such, with clean energy policy as a driver, government incentives may be needed to help buttress the financial case. Further development of small and low-head hydropower on a wide scale will likely come only as a result of a national policy intended to promote clean energy goals. | Climate change concerns have brought a renewed focus on increased hydropower production as a potential replacement for electricity from fossil fuels. Hydropower currently accounts for about 6% of the electricity produced in the United States, and the generation of electricity from hydropower produces essentially no emissions of carbon. However, since most of the larger, more traditional hydroelectric resources have already been developed, a clean energy rationale for development of small and low-head hydropower resources may now exist.
Power generation from rivers and streams is not without controversy, and the capability to produce energy from these sources will have to be balanced against environmental and other public interest concerns. That balance can be aided by research into new technologies and forward-thinking regulations that encourage the development of these resources in cost-effective, environmentally friendly ways which recognize that such facilities, once built, can last for at least 50 years.
A feasibility study by the Idaho National Laboratory in 2006 presented an assessment of the potential for development of small and low-head power resources for hydroelectric generation in the United States. Approximately 5,400 of 100,000 sites were determined to have potential for small hydro projects (i.e., providing between 1 and 30 Megawatts of annual mean power). The U.S. Department of Energy estimated that these projects (if developed) would result in a greater than 50% increase in total hydroelectric power generation. Low-head hydropower usually refers to sites with a head (i.e., elevation difference) of less than five meters (about 16 feet).
Run-of-river hydropower facilities generally rely on the natural flow of rivers and streams, and are able to utilize smaller water flow volumes without the need to build large reservoirs. Infrastructure designed to move water in conduits such as canals, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and pipelines can also be harnessed to produce electricity. Pressure reducing valves used in water supply systems and industry to reduce the buildup of fluid pressure in a valve or to reduce pressure to a level appropriate for use by water system customers offer additional opportunities for power generation.
Several bills currently pending in Congress for climate change mitigation and clean energy seek to establish a federal renewable energy (or electricity) standard (RES). Foremost among these are H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, and S. 1462, the American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009. Under current proposals, the RES would require retail electric suppliers to obtain increasing percentages of renewable electricity for the power they provide to customers. Although hydropower is generally considered as a clean source of electric power, only hydrokinetic technologies (which rely on moving water) and limited applications of hydropower would qualify for the RES. Given the current language in pending bills, it is unlikely that most new run-of-river low-head and small hydropower projects would meet the requirements for "qualified hydropower" unless these projects are installed at existing non-hydropower dams.
Given the smaller size of projects relative to the costs for development for small and low-head hydropower, incentive rates for electricity produced over time may increase the feasibility of a project based on power sales. As such, with clean energy policy as a driver, government incentives may be helpful. Further development of small and low-head hydropower on a wide scale will likely come only as a result of a national policy intended to promote clean energy goals. |
crs_RS22490 | crs_RS22490_0 | TANF law lists 12 categories of work activities that recipients of assistance may engage in and be counted toward its work participation standards. However, DRA required HHS to issue regulations by June 30, 2006, to define TANF work activities to ensure consistent measurement of work. It also includes "supported employment" programs under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for individuals with disabilities. Job readiness basically comprises two types of activities: (1) preparation necessary to begin a job search, such as preparing a resume or job application, training in interviewing skills, and training in workplace expectation and life skills; and (2) activities to remove barriers to employment, such as substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment, or rehabilitation activities. Hours in monitored study sessions structured by the state count as vocational educational training. Examples of What Does Not Count
Programs leading to a baccalaureate (four-year) degree or advanced degree. Job skills training directly related to employment must be supervised on an ongoing basis no less frequently than daily." This activity is not restricted to education needed for employment. | The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171) included changes to work participation standards under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant that seek to increase the share of the cash welfare caseload engaged in work or job preparation activities. The law also required the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to issue regulations defining TANF work activities to ensure a consistent measurement of work activity across states. Highlights of the regulations (published June 29, 2006) include requiring all activities to be supervised (many on a daily basis); disallowing four-year or advanced college degrees to count as vocational educational training; and explicitly allowing treatment for the removal of certain barriers to employment, such as substance abuse and mental or physical disability to count toward the participation standards, though for a limited period each year as a "job readiness" activity. It also allows "supported employment" for individuals with disabilities to count. Additionally, the definition of job skills training directly related to employment appears to allow a wide range of training and educational activities. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL32968 | crs_RL32968_0 | Introduction
The Child and Family Services Review (CFSR) is the central and most comprehensive component of federal efforts to determine state compliance with federal child welfare policies and, equally, to help ensure that positive outcomes are achieved for the children and families served by state child welfare programs. The review intends to gauge state efforts and ability to achieve the primary goals of safety and permanence for children, along with well-being for children and their families. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) began the first onsite reviews in March 2001 and, as of March 2004, had completed the initial round of the CFSR in all states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. At the same time, the initial round of CFSRs found that no state's child welfare programs met the criteria that HHS established as demonstrating "substantial conformity" with all of federal child welfare policy requirements. Finally, the report concludes with a brief discussion of 1) how penalties for non-compliance are assessed; 2) the requirement that states not in compliance with federal policy develop Program Improvement Plans (PIPs) ( Appendix A shows the status of PIP implementation); 3) some of the criticisms of how the initial CFSR assessed state performance (especially with regard to the national standards); and 4) planning for the second round of CFSRs. The CFSR begins with a state's own assessment of its child welfare programs. This self-assessment is followed by an onsite review conducted by a team of federal and state investigators. These outcomes are:
Children are first and foremost protected from abuse and neglect; Children are maintained in their own homes whenever possible and appropriate; Children have permanence and stability in their living situations; Family relationships and connections are preserved for children; Families have enhanced capacity to provide for their children's needs; Children receive appropriate services to meet their educational needs; and Children receive adequate services to meet their physical and mental health needs. The systems assessed were—
Statewide information system; Case review system; Quality assurance system; Staff training; Service array; Agency responsiveness to community; Foster and adoptive parent licensing, recruitment, and retention. Permanency and Stability in Living Arrangement
In general, states scored relatively poorly on both the case review and data measures used to determine conformity with this outcome and no state was found to be in conformity with this permanency outcome. Table 5 lists each of the case review indicators assessed from those least likely to receive a strength rating to those most likely to receive a strength rating. State System Performance in the Initial CFSR
Reviewers also rated state performance based on the state's policy and practice with regard to seven federally required "systems." A less substantial majority of states were found to have a functioning quality assurance system in place (35) and to adequately meet the federal staff training requirements (34). Of these indicators, states were most successful at limiting re-entries to foster care. Statistical analysis of the relationship between system compliance and achievement of the desired outcomes for children shows that states whose array of available services was determined in substantial compliance with federal policy had a significantly higher percentage of cases in which families were found to have enhanced capacity to meet the needs of their children and in which foster children experienced permanent and stable living arrangements (when compared to states found out of compliance with the service array requirement). | While child welfare programs are a primary responsibility of state and local governments, the federal government appropriates close to $7 billion annually to support these programs (primarily for foster care and adoption assistance) and states are required to meet certain federal policies in order to receive this funding. Child and Family Services Reviews (CFSRs) gauge state efforts and ability to achieve the primary goals of safety and permanence for children, and well-being for children and their families. The review is intended both to measure state compliance with federal child welfare policy and to strengthen and improve state child welfare programs.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) conducted the initial round of onsite reviews between March 2001 and March 2004. No state was found to be in substantial conformity with all of the outcomes and systems assessed. Some critics of the CFSR argue that while the outcomes reviewed are on target, the criteria established to determine state achievement of those outcomes may give misleading information about a state's performance.
Although much attention has focused on states' uniform inability to meet all of the federal criteria, the reviews also showed certain relative strengths. States showed the greatest ability to ensure that children were not exposed to child abuse and neglect and remained safely in their homes whenever appropriate and possible, and in preserving their family relationships and connections. They had the most difficulty in achieving permanent and stable living arrangements for children, enhancing the capacity of families to meet the needs of their children and in seeing that appropriate mental and physical health services were available to children served. Information regarding ensuring provision of educational services to children was more mixed.
In addition to reviewing outcomes, the CFSR assesses state compliance with federal child welfare policy by examining certain federally required systems. States were most likely to be found successful at operating a statewide information system; maintaining foster and adoptive parent licensing, training, recruitment and retention; and responding to community concerns. They were least likely to have a strong service array or case review system in place. Ratings of state quality assurance and training systems were more mixed.
To avoid immediate assessment of penalties for failure to comply with federal policy, each state was required to develop a Program Improvement Plan (PIP). A PIP must address each one of the outcomes or systems with which a state was found to be out of substantial conformity and must describe the state's specific plan for moving toward full conformity with federal policy. A few states have successfully completed their PIPS but most are still in the process of implementing them.
The Children's Bureau is preparing for a second round of CFSRs, and onsite reviews are scheduled to begin in early 2007. This report will describe the origins and design of CFSRs before turning to its primary discussion: state performance in the initial round of CFSRs. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R40903 | crs_R40903_0 | Introduction
A dramatic collapse in farm milk prices late in 2008, which resulted in severe financial stress for many dairy farmers, led to efforts in 2009 by both Congress and the Administration to provide assistance for milk producers. Market dynamics in 2009 have also generated concerns about "dairy pricing" and the adverse effects of milk price volatility on farmers. Dairy pricing is shorthand for the process of establishing the farm value of milk. The federal government plays a prominent role in that process. Among the related issues are (1) how milk producers receive price signals under existing policy and how that affects production decisions, (2) farm milk price variability and managing price risks, and (3) the farm share of retail prices for dairy products and whether retail prices track changes in the farm milk price. Dairy Pricing Mechanics
Dairy pricing in the United States is a unique combination of both market-based and administered (through public dairy policies or programs) prices. Each influences the other to determine the overall level of farm milk prices as well as price movements to some extent. Two characteristics—perishability and production on a daily basis—create challenges for pricing and marketing milk (and the products made from it). Market-Based Pricing
Market-based pricing for milk and dairy products is similar to that for many other agricultural commodities, in that primary mechanisms for price discovery like cash and futures markets, such as those located at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), play key roles. Wholesale cash prices for dairy products (cheese, butter, and nonfat dry milk) are determined daily at the CME. The prices written into contracts nationwide between dairy manufacturers and wholesale or retail buyers of basic dairy products often reflect CME prices. Some dairy producers say that cash market pricing on the CME works to the detriment of producers (see " Potential for Price Manipulation ," below). Administered Pricing
Administered farm milk prices are derived from two government policies: the dairy product price support program (DPPSP) and federal milk marketing orders (FMMOs). The two policies originated at least 60 years ago and operate independently until market prices decline to support levels. The DPPSP simply provides price support for dairy farmers through government purchases of dairy products at legislated minimum prices. In contrast, the FMMO system generally does not support prices but is designed to stabilize market conditions, which had been chaotic in the 1920s and early 1930s, through monthly, market-based minimum prices that processors must pay for farm milk. FMMOs also provide a pricing system for sharing farm revenue across producers in certain geographic areas and for balancing marketing power between milk handlers, who reportedly held an advantage prior to FMMO development, and farmers. Under the DPPSP, the federal government stands ready to purchase unlimited amounts of butter, American cheese, and nonfat dry milk from dairy processors at specified minimum prices. As Congress, the Administration, and the dairy industry consider how possibly to revise the dairy pricing system, two schools of thought appear to be emerging. One is to reduce price volatility through some means of supply control while raising farm prices. The other is to allow the market to fluctuate and help farmers manage the resulting price risk through hedging strategies used by farmers in other parts of the agriculture sector. Outlook
Current policy is set for the dairy product price support program until 2012 under the 2008 farm bill, and federal milk marketing orders are permanently authorized. | A dramatic collapse in farm milk prices late in 2008, which resulted in severe financial stress for many dairy farmers, has generated congressional concerns about "dairy pricing" and the adverse effects of milk price volatility on farmers. Dairy pricing refers to the process of establishing the farm value of milk. The federal government plays a prominent role in that process.
Among the dairy pricing issues are how milk producers receive price signals under existing policy and how that affects their production decisions. Some market participants say that the system does not transmit price signals to milk producers quickly enough, which can delay the response of producers needed to correct market imbalances. Another issue is farm milk price variability and managing price risks, given declines in dairy price supports and increased dependence on exports over the years, which have contributed to greater price volatility. Finally, some observers are concerned about the farm share of retail prices for dairy products and whether retail prices track changes in the farm milk price. The difference between farm and retail prices has declined in recent months after increasing in late 2008.
Dairy pricing in the United States is a unique combination of market-based and administered (through public dairy programs) prices. Each influences the other to determine the overall price level and price movements to some extent. Two characteristics—perishability and production on a daily basis—create challenges for pricing and marketing milk (and the products made from it).
Market-based pricing for milk and dairy products is similar to many other agricultural commodities, in that primary mechanisms for price discovery like cash and futures markets, such as those located at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), play key roles. Wholesale cash prices for dairy products (cheese, butter, and nonfat dry milk) are determined daily at the CME. The prices written into contracts nationwide between dairy manufacturers and wholesale or retail buyers of basic dairy products often reflect CME prices. Some producers have raised concerns about limited trading volumes and the potential for price manipulation at the CME.
Administered farm milk prices are derived from two government policies that originated more than 50 years ago: the dairy product price support program (DPPSP) and federal milk marketing orders (FMMOs). The two policies operate independently until market prices decline to support levels. The DPPSP simply provides price support for dairy farmers through government purchases of butter, American cheese, and nonfat dry milk from dairy processors at legislated prices. In contrast, the FMMO system generally does not support prices but is designed to stabilize market conditions, which had been chaotic in the 1920s and early 1930s, through monthly, market-based minimum prices that processors must pay for farm milk. FMMO prices are based on current wholesale product prices, which are determined largely by prices established on the CME. FMMOs also provide for sharing farm revenue across producers in certain geographic areas and for balancing marketing power between milk handlers, who reportedly held an advantage prior to FMMO development, and farmers.
Current policy is set for DPPSP until 2012 under the 2008 farm bill, and FMMOs are permanently authorized. As Congress, the Administration, and the dairy industry consider how to revise the dairy pricing system, two schools of thought appear to be emerging. One is to reduce price volatility through some means of supply control while raising farm prices. The other is to allow the market to fluctuate and help farmers manage the resulting price risk through hedging strategies used by farmers in other parts of the agriculture sector. |
crs_R40549 | crs_R40549_0 | Introduction
Recent breakdowns in U.S. financial markets have prompted congressional interest in criminal provisions available to federal prosecutors in cases involving mortgages. Because the role of weak mortgage loans in the economic downturn involves complex and systemic factors, criminal prosecution will necessarily be only one part of a broader governmental response. Thus, regulatory reform will likely be an important response to the downturn. This report focuses on federal criminal provisions relevant to prosecutions of mortgage fraud and related criminal actions. However, several federal criminal provisions – most notably mail and wire fraud, financial institutions fraud, and a number of crimes involving false statements – may encompass various fraudulent activities at issue in mortgage fraud cases. Other statutes, such as securities fraud provisions, may apply to fraudulent transactions within the secondary mortgage market. Finally, some provisions criminalize violations of federal regulations, creating an important connection between regulatory reforms and the scope of authorities for federal criminal liability. The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA, S. 386 ), versions of which have been passed by the Senate and House, would, in addition to authorizing funding for prosecution efforts and other measures, expand federal criminal law authorities for combating mortgage fraud and related crimes. Fraud for Housing
Fraud for housing is committed by an individual, usually a borrower, for the purpose of fraudulently obtaining (or maintaining ownership of) a property. S. 386
The role of mortgage fraud in the economic downturn has prompted concerns regarding the adequacy of existing federal criminal statutes. In particular, noting the large role that private (i.e., non-federally-chartered) mortgage lending businesses played in the residential mortgage market during the years preceding the recent financial crisis, some perceive a need for an expansion of federal criminal liability to encompass actions perpetrated to defraud such institutions. The amendments most relevant to mortgage fraud include: (1) expanding the definition of "financial institution," which applies in the context of institutions fraud and other sections, to include a "mortgage lending business," defined as "an organization which finances or refinances any debt secured by an interest in real estate ..."; (2) adding "mortgage lending business whose activities affect interstate or foreign commerce, or any person or entity that makes ... a federally related mortgage loan" to the list of entities to which the crime of false statement on a loan or credit application applies; (3) expanding the crime of major fraud against the United States to apply to grants, loans, subsidies, insurance, and other categories, rather than only contracts received from the government; and (4) expanding the definition of "proceeds" for money laundering to include gross receipts (as discussed infra , courts currently interpret the definition as encompassing only profits and not gross receipts); and (5) amending the federal securities fraud statute to extend to commodities, including derivatives comprised of mortgage-backed securities. In addition, federal money laundering, conspiracy, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations provisions may provide secondary bases for federal criminal liability in some situations. Crimes Involving False Statements
Several federal statutes impose criminal liability for false statements. A final set of provisions impose criminal penalties for failing to comply with federal agencies' investigations and enforcement actions. | Although criminal prosecutions will likely be only one part of a broader governmental response to the recent financial crisis, the perceived role of fraudulent activity in the downturn, and of mortgage fraud in particular, has spurred interest in the criminal provisions available to federal prosecutors. This report analyzes statutory sources of federal criminal liability for fraudulent actions taken in the primary mortgage market – i.e., fraud committed by borrowers, brokers, lenders, or others during the mortgage origination process. It also discusses some statutes implicated by fraudulent actions in the secondary mortgage market.
In general, federal regulation of financial institutions is handled by numerous regulatory agencies. However, criminal liability applies in instances involving criminal intent. Mortgage-related criminal schemes range from fraud committed by an individual borrower for the purpose of obtaining a loan to fraud-for-profit schemes that involve institutions or industry insiders. In general, federal criminal enforcement efforts have focused on schemes involving industry insiders.
Although there is no one federal crime of "mortgage fraud," many federal statutes may impose criminal liability for mortgage fraud and related schemes. Relevant federal provisions include, among others, those criminalizing mail and wire fraud, financial institutions fraud, and false statements, together with those that impose criminal penalties for violations of federal regulations. Money laundering, conspiracy, and racketeering provisions may provide additional bases for federal criminal liability. In addition, to a limited extent, securities fraud and corporate fraud provisions may apply to fraudulent actions taken in the secondary mortgage market.
Looking forward, a debate has emerged regarding the adequacy of existing federal criminal provisions. Some have suggested that existing statutory authorities are sufficiently broad and that regulatory reforms are the most appropriate response. Others have argued that several key federal criminal statutes need to be expanded because they do not cover all mortgage companies. The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA, S. 386), versions of which have been passed by the Senate and House, would expand the scope of existing criminal provisions, for example by expanding the definition of "financial institution" under U.S. criminal law to include mortgage lending businesses. |
crs_R40659 | crs_R40659_0 | Introduction
Each year, the President is required to submit a comprehensive federal budget proposal to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. The House and Senate Budget Committees also develop their respective budget resolutions after reviewing the President's budget, the views of other committees, and information from CBO. Although not binding, the budget resolution provides a framework for subsequent legislative action. This report provides information on Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). It will be updated to reflect relevant legislative activity. The economic conditions that prevailed in January 2009 helped to shape the President's FY2010 budget proposal, as well as major legislation passed by Congress that was aimed at underpinning weak economic segments, boosting overall spending, and helping to prevent further economic deterioration. In the longer-term, the Obama Administration envisions Medicaid cost savings to help fund a $635 billion Health Reform Reserve Fund. With passage of two major health care bills, ARRA and CHIPRA, some budget initiatives (both legislative and administrative) may not be necessary. In the President's FY2010 budget, it was estimated that this proposal would reduce federal Medicaid expenditures by $150 million in FY2010 and $1.3 billion over the period from FY2010 to FY2014. This proposal would eliminate the MIF and reallocate these savings to support the the President's broader health care reform initiative. The House and Senate Budget Committees produced their versions of the budget resolution which incorporated most of the President's budget proposals as submitted in President Obama's budget outline of February 26, 2009. The two houses adopted their respective FY2010 budget resolutions on April 2, 2009. The Senate and House agreed to a Conference Agreement Report on April 29, 2009 ( H.Rept. 13 ). Senate
On March 26, 2009, the Senate Budget Committee reported a budget resolution ( S.Con.Res. House
The House Budget Committee reported a budget resolution ( H.Con.Res. 85 ) on March 25, 2009, which the House passed on April 2, 2009. 111-60 ) to accompany the concurrent budget resolution ( H.Con.Res. Conference Agreement
On March 27, 2009 the Senate and House filed a Conference Agreement Report on the budget resolution ( H.Rept. 13 ). The House budget-neutral reserve fund provisions also included two proposals that could affect Medicaid and CHIP: (1) a deficit-neutral fund for health care reform, and (2) a deficit-neutral fund to improve the well-being of children. | The President is required each year to submit a comprehensive federal budget proposal to Congress before the first Monday in February. The House and Senate Budget Committees then develop their respective budget resolutions. Based on these budget resolutions, House and Senate Appropriations committees reconcile their budget resolutions and file a joint budget agreement. Although not binding, the resolution provides a framework for consideration of the 12 separate appropriations bills that would fund FY2010 federal spending, beginning October 1, 2009.
In presidential transition years, the timeline for the administration to submit a budget proposal is altered. President Obama was inaugurated on January 20, 2009. An outline of the President's first budget was submitted on February 26, 2009. The Obama Administration issued a detailed FY2010 budget appendix May 7, 2009. The remaining budget documents were released May 12, 2009.
President Obama's FY2010 budget outline described five major policy initiatives including economic recovery, health care reform, education, infrastructure improvements, and clean energy. The health care reform and economic recovery initiatives contained provisions that would affect Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Some budget proposals would require legislative action, while others could be implemented administratively (e.g., via regulatory changes, program guidance, or other methods). President Obama has indicted that health care reform will be a major goal for his Administration's first year. The President's FY2010 budget reflects this emphasis, as the Medicaid and CHIP initiatives for FY2010 were aimed primarily at reducing expenditures to help fund a broader health care reform initiative. Medicaid savings, in particular, would help to fund a proposed $635 billion Health Reform Reserve Fund, which is to be available for the next 10 years. The total Medicaid and CHIP savings from the President's legislative and administrative proposals were estimated to exceed $1.45 billion in FY2010, $8.8 billion over the period FY2010 to FY2014.
The Senate Budget Committee approved its budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 13) on March 26, 2009. The House Budget Committee approved its budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 85) on March 25, 2009. The House and Senate agreed to their respective budget resolutions April 2, 2009. A joint conference agreement on the budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 13 accompanied by H.Rept. 111-60) was passed in the House and in the Senate on April 29, 2009. Among other provisions, the conference agreement provides for 20 Senate and 14 House deficit-neutral reserve funds, as well as seven Sense of the Congress provisions. The FY2010 Budget Resolution provides for $2,322 billion in revenue and $3,555 billion in expenditures, which would result in a deficit of $1,233 billion.
This report will be updated to reflect relevant legislative activity. |
crs_R43198 | crs_R43198_0 | Introduction
The current gap between U.S. coal supply and domestic demand may widen as low cost natural gas becomes more attractive to electric power plants, and uncertainties with new environmental regulations discourage investment in new coal plants. Coal producers with excess supply will likely seek to expand their market abroad. Consequently, in the long run (over the next decade and possibly longer), U.S. coal exports are expected to rise. Growth potential in Asian coal markets seems large, but there are potential bottlenecks (e.g., lack of infrastructure, potential rising costs of regulation, competition from other fuels, and transportation), which could slow export growth. The EIA includes coal in its 2013 Annual Energy Outlook Early Release. In its reference case, net exports of coal may increase through 2040, increasing almost 50% from 2011 levels. Increased net exports could improve the U.S. trade balance as well as add government revenue from production on federal lands that might otherwise decline because of falling domestic consumption. Exporting coal may run counter to the current Administration's domestic environmental policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), and affect current U.S. policy goals addressing global climate change and other environmental issues. Depending upon the location of the coal exports, certain parts of the country may benefit economically. Current and projected coal exports, issues associated with infrastructure, and the environment have prompted interest by Congress. U.S. Exports: Trends Point Up
The United States has been exporting coal since the late 1800s. From 2003 to 2012, U.S. coal exports rose over 200%, mainly driven by competitive production costs, global demand, and lower prices, among other factors (see Figure 5 ). Coal exports comprised 12% of U.S. coal production in 2012. In 2011, U.S. coal exports broke 100 MST for the first time since 1992 and in 2012 reached 126 MST, surpassing their previous peak of almost 113 MST in 1981. The value of U.S. coal exports has increased, rising from under $10 billion in 2010 to almost $16 billion in 2011, according to EIA data (see Figure 6 ). The Future of U.S. Coal Exports
There are several key factors likely to influence how much coal will be exported from the United States. Several export terminal projects have been proposed by 2016, such that the United States could be exporting more than double its current coal exports. Projects in the Pacific Northwest have attracted much of the attention, even though the Northeast or Mid- and South Atlantic ports continue to account for most exports. Coal Exports and the Environment
Support and Opposition to Increased PRB Exports
Representatives from state and local agencies along the potential coal transport corridor, particularly in Washington and Oregon, as well as industry, community, and environmental groups, have raised certain concerns over port terminal projects that would allow for increased export of PRB coal through the Pacific Northwest. Opponents, including several environmental groups, have argued that increased train and barge traffic would have significant adverse impacts to the human, natural, and cultural environment. Project supporters have argued that the projects would create or maintain jobs in the construction, mining, and transportation industries and bring increased tax revenue to the states. A Role for NEPA64
Broadly, NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their actions before a final decision is made regarding that action. Additionally, in delineating the project impacts that warrant the preparation of an EIS, EPA identified the potential public health impacts from coal dust and diesel pollution related to the proposed Coyote Island terminal project; the high level of interest and concern among communities, agencies, interest groups, and industries regarding the proposal to transport coal from Wyoming and Montana to Asia; the uncertainty of potential impacts of transporting large quantities of PRB coal, including trans loading activities on the Columbia River; and the proposed and potential future projects' contribution to cumulatively significant impacts to human health and the environment from increases in greenhouse gas emissions, rail traffic, mining activities on public lands, and the transport of particulate matter and mercury from Asia to the United States, among other possible impacts. | The gap between available U.S. coal supply and demand may continue to widen as low cost natural gas becomes more attractive to electric power plants and uncertainties with emission regulations may inhibit new coal plant investments. Coal producers with excess supply will likely seek to expand their market abroad. Consequently, U.S. coal exports are forecast to continue to rise over the next decade and possibly longer. Growth potential in Asian markets seems large, but there are potential bottlenecks, such as infrastructure and potential rising costs of regulation, competition from other fuels, and transportation constraints that could slow export growth.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), in its 2013 Annual Energy Outlook Early Release reference case, projects net exports of coal to trend up through 2040, almost 50% from 2011 levels, with some fluctuations. The significance of this may have short- and long-term ramifications as well as positive and negative consequences. Increased net exports could improve the U.S. trade balance as well as add government revenue from production that may otherwise decline because of falling domestic consumption. Environmentally, exporting coal may run counter to the current Administration's domestic environmental policies and affect U.S. efforts to address global environmental issues. Depending upon the nature of the coal exports, certain parts of the country may benefit economically. Current and projected coal exports, the associated infrastructure, and the environmental consequences have prompted interest by Congress.
The United States has been exporting coal since the late 1800s. From 2003 to 2012, U.S. coal exports have risen over 200%, mainly driven by competitive production costs, global demand, and lower prices, among other factors. Coal exports comprised 12% of U.S. coal production in 2012. In 2011, U.S. coal exports broke 100 million short tons (MST) for the first time since 1992 and in 2012 surpassed their peak of almost 113 MST in 1981. The value of U.S. coal exports has increased, rising from under $10 billion in 2010 to almost $16 billion in 2011, according to U.S. Energy Information Administration data.
Many factors will influence how much coal will be exported from the United States. Enough projects have been proposed that by 2016 the United States could be exporting more than double its current coal exports. Projects in the Pacific Northwest have attracted much of the attention, even though the Northeast continues to be the source for most exports.
Representatives from state and local agencies, particularly in Washington and Oregon, as well as industry, community, and environmental groups, along the potential coal transport corridor, have expressed outright support for or opposition to port terminal projects that would allow for increased export of Powder River Basin coal through the Pacific Northwest. Opponents have argued that increased train and barge traffic will have significant adverse impacts to the human, natural, and cultural environment. Project supporters have argued that the projects would create or maintain jobs in the construction, mining, and transportation industries and bring increased tax revenue to the states.
Broadly, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their actions before a final decision is made regarding that action. |
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