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crs_RL34231 | crs_RL34231_0 | On April 21, 2005, Ambassador John Negroponte was confirmed as the first DNI, a position established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108 - 458 ; hereinafter, the Intelligence Reform Act). Retired Admiral Dennis C. Blair became the third individual to serve as DNI when he was confirmed on January 28, 2009. Historically, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had three primary responsibilities that were codified in the National Security Act, as amended. Some also asserted that DCIs lacked adequate legal authorities to establish priorities and to ensure compliance by intelligence agencies beyond the CIA. Rather, the act establishes the new position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA), who will report to the DNI. The act also restates the major responsibilities of the DCIA, which include (1) collecting intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means (but with no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions); (2) correlating and evaluating intelligence related to the national security and providing appropriate dissemination of such intelligence; (3) providing overall direction for and coordination of collection by human sources outside the U.S., in coordination with other government departments; (4) performing other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or DNI may direct (a formulation that, some observers believe, is intended to encompass the planning and carrying out of covert actions); and (5) under the DNI's direction, coordinating relationships between U.S. intelligence services and those of other countries. During Senate confirmation proceedings in January 2009, DNI Blair said he would withhold judgment as to whether the DNI's authorities were sufficient until he had been confirmed and been able to exercise his authorities. But he stated that he would exercise those authorities to the fullest and would advise the President and Congress if he concluded that he needed more. Senate Intelligence Committee Approves New DNI Authorities
The Senate FY2009 bill would have given the DNI several new authorities, including the authority to
increase employee compensation; expand from one year to up to three years the length of time the U.S. government personnel may be detailed to the DNI's office on a non-reimbursable basis; convert competitive service positions and incumbents within the intelligence community to excepted positions; provide enhanced pay authority for critical position in portions of the intelligence community where that authority does not exist; authorize intelligence community elements, under certain circumstances, to adopt compensation, performance management, and scholarship authorities that have been authorized for any other intelligence community element; conduct accountability reviews of significant failures or deficiencies within the intelligence community; use National Intelligence Program funds to address deficiencies or needs that arise in intelligence information access or sharing capabilities; delegate to certain senior officials the authority to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure; and approve interagency financing of national intelligence centers. Intelligence Authorization Legislation for FY2010
In September 2010 both the House and Senate passed intelligence authorization legislation for FY2010 and the bill was signed by President Obama on October 7 th . He is to conduct initial vulnerability assessments of each major new system, review changes in acquisition costs, and terminate programs unless they are essential as set forth in assessment forwarded to Congress. 2004 Intelligence Reform Act Strengthened DNI Authorities
To strengthen the DNI's authority, Congress in 2004 approved the Intelligence Reform Act, providing the DNI additional powers in certain areas, including in those of personnel, tasking, and acquisition. Fifth, the DNI is authorized to provide budget guidance to those elements of the intelligence community not falling within the NIP. DCI appointment authorities were more limited, both in terms of the degree of concurrence authority and with regard to the number of positions over which the DCI exercised such authority. Whether the DNI's authorities under the act are sufficient to meet the responsibilities set forth in the 2004 act is subject to differing assessments. Among them: (1) will the DNI aggressively assert the new authorities? | In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) in 2004, Congress approved the most comprehensive reform of the U.S. intelligence community since it was created over 50 years ago. Principal among enacted changes was the establishment of a new position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to serve as head of the intelligence community (IC) and principal adviser to the President on intelligence matters related to the national security and to oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.
Some observers have questioned whether the act provides the DNI the authority necessary to effectively carry out these responsibilities. Others assert that the DNI's authorities are significantly stronger than those of the former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), but suggest that DNIs have failed to aggressively assert the authorities they have been provided.
During his Senate confirmation proceeding in January 2009, DNI Dennis C. Blair said that he would withhold judgment as to whether his authorities were sufficient but over time would advise the President and Congress if he concluded they were not. He also assured Senators that he would exercise his authorities to the fullest. The abrupt announcement of his resignation in May 2010 suggested to some that he had been unable to exercise his authorities to meet his responsibilities and, for some, raised questions about the viability of the DNI position.
In 2007, Admiral Blair's predecessor, DNI Michael McConnell, acknowledged his authorities were stronger than those of the DCI and conceded that he had not issued certain guidance to the IC clarifying the new authorities (the subsequent 2008 revisions to EO 12333, initiated by DNI McConnell, were intended to provide such guidance). Nevertheless, he argued that effectively managing the IC would require authorities in addition to the ones Congress approved in 2004.
The FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 111-259), signed by President Obama on October 7, 2010, provided a number of enhancements to the DNI's authorities. He is required to assess personnel levels at all intelligence agencies and forward them to Congress at the same time as the President's budget submission. He is also required to undertake initial vulnerability assessments of each major system and is provided with authority to assess critical cost growth in major systems and terminate programs unless Congress is provided with an explanation. The DNI is further granted authority to conduct accountability reviews of elements of the Intelligence Community. These new authorities enhance those included in the Intelligence Reform Act and provide the DNI with additional tools to coordinate all intelligence agencies.
While the DNI's authorities are stronger than those that were available to the DCI, whether they are sufficient to implement the 2004 intelligence reforms mandated by Congress, it has been argued, will continue to depend on several factors, including the degree to which the authorities themselves are adequate, the DNI's willingness to assert those authorities, and the extent to which the DNI receives presidential and congressional support. The provisions in the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act permit more extensive congressional oversight in the 112th Congress. |
crs_RS22345 | crs_RS22345_0 | Cattle Prices
Domestic cattle and beef prices had reached record highs in 2003 due to a tight supply-demand situation. In Congress
A major issue for Congress has been how best to regain lost markets like Japan and Korea. Among other issues have been whether expanded federal actions are needed to further protect the public and the cattle herd; the validity of the evolving science behind such actions; and the costs and benefits of such actions for consumers, taxpayers, and industry. For More Information
CRS Reports
CRS Report RL32199, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or "Mad Cow Disease"): Current and Proposed Safeguards , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report RL32932, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or "Mad Cow Disease") in North America: A Chronology of Selected Events , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report RS21709, Mad Cow Disease and U.S. | The appearance of BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy or "mad cow disease") in North America in 2003 raised meat safety concerns and disrupted trade for cattle and beef producers. A major issue for Congress has been how to rebuild foreign markets for U.S. beef. Other issues include whether additional measures are needed to further protect the public and cattle herd, and concerns over the relative costs and benefits of such measures for consumers, taxpayers and industry.
This report summarizes and updates information found in other CRS reports; see " For More Information ." Sources for facts and citation to reports and studies can be found in those CRS reports. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R41032 | crs_R41032_0 | Introduction: South Korea's New World Role
The December 2009 contract by a South Korean consortium to provide four commercial nuclear reactors to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signaled a new role for South Korea in the world nuclear energy market. The $20 billion deal indicates that South Korea (the Republic of Korea, ROK) has completed the transition from passive purchaser of turn-key nuclear plants in the 1970s to major nuclear technology supplier, now capable of competing with the largest and most experienced nuclear technology companies in the world. Because the plants being exported by South Korea are based on a U.S. design, U.S. export controls will continue to apply. With time running out to address the fundamental U.S. and Korean differences over reprocessing, the two countries announced on April 24, 2013, that they would extend the existing 123 agreement by two years to allow for additional negotiations. In the UAE deal, the South Korean consortium is headed by government-owned Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) and includes other major Korean industrial companies that are involved in Korea's rapidly growing domestic nuclear power plant construction program. The consortium also includes Pittsburgh-based Westinghouse Electric Company, which currently owns the U.S. design on which the Korean design is based, and the Japanese industrial conglomerate Toshiba, now the majority owner of Westinghouse. South Korea launched its nuclear power program through the government-owned Korea Electric Company (now Korea Electric Power Corporation, KEPCO), which purchased the country's first nuclear power units from Westinghouse. Those first plants were ordered on a turn-key basis, in which the foreign supplier delivered a completed plant with minimal Korean industry input. Westinghouse supplied the reactor and other components of the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) and constructed the plant, and other western firms provided the turbine-generator and architect/engineering services. After those first three units, Korean firms took over the construction work on subsequent plants, beginning with Kori 3, which began commercial operation in 1985. In 1987, KEPCO embarked on an effort to establish a standard Korean design, selecting the System 80 design from the U.S. firm Combustion Engineering (C-E) as the basis. Combustion Engineering won the competition for the Korean standard design contract by agreeing to full technology transfer, according to KEPCO. Renewal of U.S.-ROK 123 Agreement
Under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. The current U.S.-Korea 123 agreement was signed in 1973 and will expire on March 19, 2014. A new 123 agreement does not require congressional approval, but it must lie before Congress for 90 days of continuous session before going into effect. Because of the 90-day requirement, a new U.S.-Korea 123 agreement would probably have to be presented to Congress sometime in spring 2013 to avoid a lapse in March 2014. As with most U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements, the existing Korean agreement requires U.S. consent for any reprocessing or enrichment activities related to U.S.-supplied materials and technology. Korea is requesting that the new 123 agreement include U.S. advance consent for future Korean civilian reprocessing and enrichment activities. The United States has reacted skeptically to the idea, on grounds of general nonproliferation policy and the complications that such activities might pose for other security issues on the Korean peninsula. Legislation to authorize the two-year extension was introduced by Representative Royce on June 20, 2013 ( H.R. | A South Korean consortium signed a contract in December 2009 to provide four commercial nuclear reactors to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), signaling a new role for South Korea in the world nuclear energy market. The $20 billion deal indicates that South Korea has completed the transition from passive purchaser of turn-key nuclear plants in the 1970s to major nuclear technology supplier, capable of competing with the largest and most experienced nuclear technology companies in the world.
In the 1970s, South Korea launched its nuclear power program through the government-owned Korea Electric Company (now Korea Electric Power Corporation, KEPCO), which purchased the country's first nuclear power units from Westinghouse. In the early years of the Korean nuclear program, Westinghouse and other foreign suppliers delivered completed plants with minimal Korean industry input. After the first three units, Korean firms took over the construction work on subsequent plants, although the reactor systems, turbine-generators, and architect/engineering services continued to be provided primarily by non-Korean companies. In 1987, KEPCO embarked on an effort to establish a standard Korean design, selecting the System 80 design from the U.S. firm Combustion Engineering as the basis. Combustion Engineering won the competition for the Korean standard design contract by agreeing to full technology transfer, according to KEPCO. The technology transfer program resulted in the development of the APR-1400 power plant, which is the design purchased by the UAE.
In the UAE deal, the South Korean consortium is headed by KEPCO and includes other major Korean industrial companies that are involved in Korea's rapidly growing domestic nuclear power plant construction program. The consortium also includes Pittsburgh-based Westinghouse Electric Company, which currently owns the U.S. design on which the Korean design is based, and the Japanese industrial conglomerate Toshiba, which now owns most of Westinghouse. Because the AP-1400 is based on a U.S. design, U.S. export controls will continue to apply.
U.S.-Korean nuclear energy cooperation is conducted under a "123 agreement" required by Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The current agreement was signed in 1973 and will expire on March 19, 2014. A new 123 agreement does not require congressional approval, but it must lie before Congress for 90 days of continuous session before going into effect.
As with most U.S. 123 agreements, the existing U.S.-Korean agreement requires U.S. consent for any reprocessing or enrichment activities related to U.S.-supplied materials and technology. Korea is requesting that the new 123 agreement include U.S. advance consent for future Korean civilian reprocessing and enrichment activities. The United States has opposed the idea, on grounds of general nonproliferation policy and the complications that such activities might pose for other security issues on the Korean peninsula. To comply with the 90-day congressional review requirement, a new agreement probably would need to have been submitted to Congress by spring 2013. Any lapse in the agreement could affect exports of U.S. nuclear materials and reactor components to Korea, potentially affecting ongoing construction of the UAE project.
With time running out to address the fundamental U.S. and Korean differences over reprocessing, the two countries announced on April 24, 2013, that they would extend the existing agreement by two years to allow for additional negotiations. Legislation to authorize the two-year extension was introduced by Representative Royce on June 20, 2013 (H.R. 2449). |
crs_RL30302 | crs_RL30302_0 | Legislative History and Rationale
A history of the federal excise tax on tires shows that initial adoption occurred as a result ofthe revenue needs of World War I with the inclusion of the tax in the Revenue Act of 1918. At the conclusion of the war, certain fiscalproblems of the United States remained and because of revenue needs, the excise tax was extendedat the same rate by the Revenue Act of 1921. The reintroduction of the excise tax and increase in rate wasprimarily brought about to make up for the reduction in revenues from income taxes caused by theGreat Depression. At that time, the excise tax on tires and tubes was not viewed as a hardship onbusiness. The act provided fora rate reduction in 1972, which was rescheduled because the interstate highway system was stillunder construction. Thus, as the Highway Trust Fund was extended, so too were the excise taxes that financed thenational highway system. Excise Tax Rates on Tires Under the SurfaceTransportation Assistance Act of 1982
Source: H.Rept. The tire excise tax is based on weight rather than as atax on the retail selling price (18) In addition to the federal tax on tires, there is afederal retail excise tax (12%) imposed on heavy highway trucks, trailers, andtractors. (20)
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (21) changed themethod of taxing tires from the graduated weight structure of prior law to a tax basedon the load capacity of the tire. The American Jobs CreationAct of 2004 also provided that tires sold for the exclusive use of the Department ofDefense or the Coast Guard would be exempt from the tax. The tire excise tax is currently scheduled to expire on October 1, 2011. The second reason for basing the tax on weight or load capacity is that it isa manufacturer's excise tax that is assumed to be passed forward to the eventualconsumer. It is generally held that heavier vehicles such as truckscause greater damage to both roadways and bridges. Thus, the tax on heavy tires fortrucks resembles a pricing mechanism with the tax viewed as a proxy for highwaywear-and-tear charges. The repeal of tire excise taxes would require additional taxes to be imposed on othersources in order to provide equivalent amounts of income for the Highway TrustFund. In its current form, this excise tax is easy to administer and, therefore,collection costs are kept to a minimum for the IRS. Several arguments have been advanced against the continued imposition ofthis excise tax. In this case, the commercial trucking industry must pay thisexcise tax while the chief competitors of truck transportation, namely the railroadsand waterways, have no corresponding excise tax. To theextent that the excise tax on truck tires is passed forward in the cost of goods sold,it places the greatest burden on lower income individuals because individuals withlower incomes tend to spend a larger portion of their income on these goods incontrast to individuals with higher incomes. | The excise tax on tires was first levied in 1918 mainly because of revenue needs broughtabout by World War I. The tax was reduced after the war and then repealed in 1926. The levy wasreintroduced during the Great Depression at a time when federal individual income tax revenueswere plummeting and was increased to help finance World War II. A general reduction in rates wasin the offing just before the outbreak of the Korean conflict but revenue needs brought about by thatwar prevented the lowering of rates. More recent history shows that in 1956 the rate of the tax wasraised in response to legislation enacted to build the interstate highway system and to create theHighway Trust Fund. Scheduled reductions did not occur after the construction of the interstatehighway system had been extended. A goal of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982was to redistribute highway costs between car and truck users. At that time, the tax structure waschanged so that the tax was imposed only on heavy tires with tax rates that are graduated, andincreased along with the tire's weight. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 repealed the exclusion ofthe value of the tires from the 12% retail excise tax on heavy highway trucks, trailers, and tractors,but provided a credit offset to the retail tax for the tire tax paid. Under the American Jobs CreationAct of 2004 the tax based on tire weight was replaced with rates based on the load capacity of thetire. The federal excise tax imposed on tires is now scheduled to expire on October 1, 2011.
Today, the premise for the excise tax on tires is that heavier vehicles cause greater damageto both roadways and bridges, and that the excise tax on tires resembles a pricing mechanism thatis a proxy for highway wear-and-tear charges. This premise still holds true as load capacity mustexceed 3,500 pounds before the tax is imposed, thus exempting tires on lighter vehicles. Tire excisetaxes still produce revenues for the Highway Trust Fund and repeal of the existing tax would requireadditional taxes to be imposed on other sources so as to provide an equivalent amount of revenuesto build and maintain roadways. This excise tax is said to be easy to administer with minimal federalcollection costs.
Several arguments are advanced against the imposition of the tire tax. First, some view thisselective excise tax as discriminating against the tire and related industries whose products are taxedand also the trucking industry, which depends on the product. The commercial truck transportationindustry pays this tax while competitors such as railroads and waterways have no correspondingexcise tax, thus creating an intermodal equity issue. Second, to the extent that the excise tax on tiresis passed forward into the cost of goods sold, it places a burden on lower income individuals sinceindividuals with lower incomes, relative to those with higher incomes, tend to spend a larger portionof their income for the same consumption amount (thus, to the extent that the tax is passed forwardto consumers, the tax is regressive).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44897 | crs_R44897_0 | Introduction
Human rights conditions in the People's Republic of China (PRC) long have been a central issue in U.S.-China relations. China's weak rule of law and restrictions on the Internet affect U.S. companies doing business in the PRC. They criticized Secretary of State Rex Tillerson for not appearing in person as his predecessors had done to publicly announce the release of the Department of State's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in March 2017, and the Trump Administration for not signing a joint letter, signed by 11 other countries, that denounced China over its alleged torture of detained human rights lawyers and activists. In a speech to State Department employees on May 3, 2017, Tillerson stated that "guiding all of our foreign policy actions are our fundamental values: our values around freedom, human dignity, the way people are treated." He also stated, "If we condition too heavily that others must adopt this value that we've come to over a long history of our own, it really creates obstacles to our ability to advance our national security interests, our economic interests." The U.S. government has employed an array of efforts and tactics aimed at promoting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in China. Another high-profile practice is the issuance of congressionally mandated country reports, including reports on human rights, religious freedom, and trafficking in persons. In recent years, the PRC government has implemented some legal and institutional reforms aimed at preventing some rights abuses and making the government more transparent and responsive. How do such efforts relate to and advance U.S. interests and policy objectives? Include civil society representatives in human rights discussions. Arrests of Rights Lawyers and Activists
Since July 2015, over 250 human rights lawyers and activists have been detained, arrested, or placed under surveillance or house arrest in what is known as the "7-09 Crackdown." Civil Society
In the past decade, the impact of nongovernmental organizations, also known in China as "social organizations" or "civil society organizations," has grown. The National People's Congress (NPC) has passed new laws that appear to strengthen the role of the state over a wide range of social activities in the name of national security, place additional restrictions on defense lawyers, and authorize greater government controls over the Internet and ethnic minority groups. For more detailed descriptions of human rights topics, see the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 201 6 and the Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 . These numbers include practitioners of Falun Gong and many Tibetans and Uyghurs. Roughly 900 practitioners reportedly have been sentenced to prison terms since Xi Jinping assumed power. U.S. Efforts to Advance Human Rights in China
Congress and successive Administrations have developed an array of means for promoting human rights and democracy in China, often deploying them simultaneously. Principal policy tools include open criticism of PRC human rights policies and practices; quiet diplomacy; hearings; foreign assistance; support for dissident and prodemocracy groups in China and the United States; sanctions; bilateral dialogue; Internet freedom efforts; public diplomacy; and the coordination of international pressure. The CECC, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, and other congressional and congressionally mandated bodies and fora investigated, publicized, and reported on human rights conditions in the PRC. Some human rights activists state that some U.S. stakeholders involved in assistance programs may refrain from supporting tougher U.S. approaches toward China's human rights abuses in order to protect their programs and policy interests. The Obama Administration provided funding to the UNFPA under the Kemp-Kasten amendment. The issue of human rights is not among the "four pillars" of the new U.S.-China Comprehensive Dialogue that was established during talks between President Trump and President Xi in April 2017. They argued that separating the human rights dialogue from the main U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue marginalized human rights issues, and reduced opportunities for linking human rights to other areas of the bilateral relationship. | This report examines human rights conditions in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and policy options for Congress. The PRC government under the leadership of Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and State President Xi Jinping has implemented a clampdown on political dissent, civil society, human rights activists and lawyers, and the religious, cultural, and linguistic practices of Tibetans and Uyghurs. Other major human rights violations in China include the practice of incommunicado detention, torture of persons in custody, censorship of the Internet, and restrictions on the freedoms of religion, association, and assembly.
The era of Hu Jintao, Xi's predecessor, who was China's leader from 2002 to 2012, was marked by serious human rights abuses, but also by an emerging civil society of nongovernmental organizations and advocacy groups, a growing number of human rights activists and lawyers, and the rise of limited investigative reporting and public discourse on social media platforms. Despite moving forward with some policies aimed at reducing rights abuses and making the government more transparent and responsive, Xi has implemented new laws that appear to strengthen the role of the Communist Party and the state over a wide range of social and civil society activities in the name of national security, and instated greater government controls over the media and the Internet. Since July 2015, over 250 human rights lawyers and activists have been temporarily detained, arrested, sentenced to prison terms, or placed under heavy surveillance in what is known as the "7-09 Crackdown."
Human rights conditions in the PRC long have been a central issue in U.S.-China ties. According to some analysts, the Trump Administration has indicated a partial departure from the Obama Administration's approach toward human rights in China, which some analysts say suggests less emphasis on human rights in U.S. dealings with Beijing. The issue of human rights is not among the "four pillars" of the new U.S.-China Comprehensive Dialogue that was established during discussions between President Trump and President Xi at Mar-a-Lago in April 2017. In a speech to State Department employees in May 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that "guiding all of our foreign policy actions are our fundamental values: our values around freedom, human dignity, the way people are treated." He also said, "If we condition too heavily that others must adopt this value that we've come to over a long history of our own, it really creates obstacles to our ability to advance our national security interests, our economic interests."
Congress and successive Administrations have developed an array of means for promoting human rights and democracy in China, often deployed simultaneously. Policy tools include open censure of China; quiet diplomacy; congressional hearings and legislation; funding for rule of law and civil society programs in the PRC; support for dissidents and prodemocracy groups in China and the United States; sanctions; bilateral dialogue; Internet freedom efforts; public diplomacy; and coordinating international pressure. Another high-profile policy practice is the U.S. government issuance of congressionally mandated country reports, including reports on human rights, religious freedom, and trafficking in persons.
Many experts and policymakers have sharply disagreed over the best policy approaches and methods to apply toward human rights issues in China. Possible approaches range from supporting incremental progress and promoting human rights through bilateral and international engagement, to conditioning the further development of bilateral ties on improvements in human rights in China. Some approaches attempt to balance U.S. values and human rights concerns with other U.S. interests in the bilateral relationship. Other approaches challenge the underlying assumption that U.S. human rights values and policies may involve trade-offs with other U.S. interests, arguing instead that human rights are fundamental to other U.S. objectives.
For additional information, including policy recommendations, see CRS Report R41007, Understanding China's Political System; the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's Annual Report 2016; the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016; and other resources cited in the report. |
crs_R42494 | crs_R42494_0 | It is the only federal education program exclusively focused on homeless children and youth. Federal education funding for homeless children and youth is provided by EHCY and through required set-asides for homeless children and youth from Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) Title I-A funds received by local educational agencies (LEAs). Reauthorization of EHCY may be considered by the 113 th Congress as part of the reauthorization of ESEA. This report provides an overview of the purposes and program structure of EHCY; the history of the program's funding; issues that have arisen regarding the implementation of ESEA Title I-A set-asides for homeless students; data on the number of LEAs receiving EHCY grants and on the characteristics of homeless students; and a discussion of proposed changes to EHCY included in bills introduced in the 112 th Congress to reauthorize the ESEA. Education for Homeless Children and Youth Program: McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, Title VII, Part B
Program Overview
EHCY provides grants to state educational agencies (SEAs) to help ensure that all homeless children and youth have equal access to the same free and appropriate public education, including public preschool education that is provided to other children and youth. SEAs competitively subgrant funds to local educational agencies. Not all LEAs receive EHCY grants. In school year (SY) 2010-2011, 3,651 LEAs, out of a total of 16,290, received awards. 107-110 . Program and Related Data
LEA and Participant Data
All states are required to report data to ED on the number of homeless students enrolled in school each year, regardless of whether or not they receive an EHCY grant. Although only 22% of LEAs received EHCY grants in SY20010-2011, they accounted for 71% of all enrolled homeless students in that year. In SY2008-2009, 956,914 homeless students were reported enrolled; in SY2009-2010, the number of enrolled homeless students reported was 939,903; and in SY2010-2011, 1,056,794 homeless students were reported enrolled (see Figure 1 ). The total number of homeless students enrolled declined by 2% between SY2008-SY2009 and SY2009-2010, but it increased by 13% between SY2009-2010 and SY2010-2011. Four states accounted for 42% of the total number of students enrolled in both LEAs with EHCY subgrants and those without in SY2010-2011. Those states, and their percentages of total homeless student enrollment, were California (21%), New York (9%), Texas (8%), and Florida (5%). Reauthorization of EHCY may be considered by the 113 th Congress as part of ESEA reauthorization. The EHCY issues discussed in this section include:
funding; transportation of homeless students to their school of origin; ESEA Title I-A set asides; separate schools for homeless students; clarifying the "best interest" school selection process; enhancing the ability of LEA homeless liaisons and state coordinators to meet the needs of homeless students; improving identification and services for preschool students and unaccompanied youth; increasing access to education and related services for homeless students; the definition of homeless children and youth in EHCY and other federal programs; and additional issues. National level estimates of the costs of transporting homeless students are not available. Separate Schools for Homeless Students
The most recent reauthorization of the ESEA ( P.L. | The Education for Homeless Children and Youth program (EHCY) provides formula grants to state educational agencies (SEAs) to help ensure that all homeless children and youth have equal access to the same free and appropriate public education, including public preschool education that is provided to other children and youth. It is the only federal education program exclusively focused on homeless children and youth. SEAs competitively subgrant funds to local educational agencies (LEAs). Not all LEAs receive EHCY grants. In school year (SY) 2010-2011, 3,651 LEAs, out of a total of 16,290, received awards. Although only 22% of LEAs received EHCY grants in SY2010-2011, they enrolled 71% of all homeless students in that year. Education and related services for homeless children and youth are also funded through required set-asides from Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. National data on the amount of funding set aside are not available.
The EHCY program was most recently reauthorized as part of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA, P.L. 107-110). Reauthorization of EHCY may be considered by the 113th Congress as part of the reauthorization of ESEA. EHCY received $65.2 million in funding for FY2012. EHCY is currently funded through March 27, 2013, by a government-wide Continuing Resolution (P.L. 112-175) at the FY2012 level plus 0.612%.
All LEAs are required to report data to the Department of Education on the number of homeless students enrolled in school each year, regardless of whether or not they receive an EHCY grant. In SY2008-2009, 956,914 homeless students were reported enrolled in school; in SY2009-2010, 939,903 homeless students were reported enrolled; and in SY2010-2011, the number of enrolled homeless students reported was 1,065,794. The total number of homeless students enrolled decreased by 2% between SY2008-2009 and SY2009-2010; it increased 13% between SY2009-2010 and SY2010-2011. During the three-year period between SY2008-2009 and SY2010-2011, it increased by 11%. Four states accounted for 42% of the total number of students enrolled in both LEAs with EHCY subgrants and those without in SY2010-2011. Those states, and their percentages of total homeless student enrollment were, California (21%), New York (9%), Texas (8%), and Florida (5%).
Legislation to reauthorize EHCY as part of the reauthorization of ESEA was reported by both House and Senate committees in the 112th Congress, and may be considered in the 113th Congress. Some of the issues that are under consideration include EHCY program funding; costs of transporting homeless students to their school of origin; implementation of the ESEA Title I-A set-aside for EHCY; whether to permit separate schools for homeless students; clarification of the "best interest" school selection process; how to enhance the ability of LEA homeless liaisons and state coordinators to meet the needs of homeless students; how to improve the identification of, and services provided to, preschool students and unaccompanied youth; how to increase access to education and related services for homeless students; and the impact of potential changes to the definition of homeless in EHCY and other legislation. |
crs_R40580 | crs_R40580_0 | The first government travel cards were introduced in the 1980s, but federal employees were not required to use them until passage of the Travel and Transportation Reform Act (TTRA) of 1998 ( P.L. 105-264 ). Since enactment of the TTRA, the dollar volume of travel card transactions has increased 103%, growing from $4.39 billion in FY1999 to $8.93 billion in FY2009. Audits conducted in the decade subsequent to the TTRA's enactment have found evidence of waste, fraud, and abuse in travel card programs at a number of agencies. In response to these findings, Congress has held hearings and introduced legislation that would enhance travel card management and oversight. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has issued government-wide guidance that requires agencies to implement internal controls that are designed to minimize the risk of travel card misuse. This report begins by discussing the structure of agency travel card programs, and then discusses weaknesses in agency controls that have contributed to waste, fraud, and abuse. It then examines travel card legislation introduced or enacted in the 111 th Congress, and concludes with a discussion of potential oversight issues for the 112 th Congress. Audits have also found that agencies have failed to ensure that they claim reimbursement for unused airline tickets, or that their travel card invoices are paid in a timely manner. These findings indicate systemic weaknesses in agency travel card management policies and practices that cost the government millions of dollars annually. Among the many examples of travel card misuse cited by auditors are a Federal Aviation Administration employee who charged $3,700 for laser eye surgery to his travel card, a DOD employee who requested and received reimbursements for 13 airline tickets totaling almost $10,000 that he did not purchase, and a Department of State employee who took an unauthorized trip to Hawaii on a first-class ticket. The Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2009 was introduced by Representative Joe Horn ( H.R. How widespread is the abuse of premium travel? | Since the enactment of the Travel and Transportation Reform Act (TTRA) of 1998 (P.L. 105-264), which required federal employees to use travel charge cards to pay for the expenses of official government travel, the dollar volume of travel card transactions has increased significantly, growing from $4.39 billion in FY1999 to $8.93 billion in FY2009. While the purpose of mandating the use of travel cards was to reduce costs and improve managerial oversight of employee travel expenditures, audits of agency travel card programs conducted since the enactment of the TTRA have found varying degrees of waste, fraud, and abuse at a number of agencies. These findings indicated systemic weaknesses in agency travel card management policies and practices—collectively referred to as internal controls—that cost the government millions of dollars annually.
Among some of the more egregious examples of card misuse identified by auditors are a Federal Aviation Administration employee who charged $3,700 for laser eye surgery to his travel card, a Department of Defense employee who requested and received reimbursements for 13 airline tickets totaling almost $10,000 that he did not purchase, and a Department of State employee who took an unauthorized trip to Hawaii on a first-class ticket. Auditors also determined that certain agencies have not collected reimbursement for millions of dollars worth of unused airline tickets, have repeatedly failed to pay their travel card invoices in a timely manner, and have permitted or failed to prevent abuse of premium-class travel privileges.
In response to these findings, Congress has held hearings and introduced legislation that would enhance travel card management and oversight. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has issued government-wide guidance that requires agencies to implement internal controls that are designed to minimize the risk of travel card misuse. This report begins by discussing the structure of agency travel card programs, and then discusses weaknesses in agency controls that have contributed to waste, fraud, and abuse. It then examines relevant legislation introduced or enacted in the 111th Congress, including the Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2009 (H.R. 2189 and S. 942), and concludes with a discussion of potential oversight issues for the 112th Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33647 | crs_RL33647_0 | The Bush Administration is expected to present a concrete proposal for such a reserve in February 2008 with its FY2009 budget request. On June 1, 2006, the Congressional Research Service held a workshop, entitled Civilian Forces for Stabilization and Reconstruction: U.S. Proposals and International Experience, in order to clarify the issues involved in forming such a reserve. It will not be updated. Mr. Hoh explained current State Department plans for a civilian reserve. They would be chosen for their expertise in the areas needed for "transitional security," rule of law, essential public services, and civil administration. The Recruitment and Outreach Unit is responsible for the screening of candidates and the maintenance of a roster for U.N. peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. There were also speakers from the two largest and most sophisticated national roster systems: Jens Behrendt, Head of Recruitment since 2003 at the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Berlin, a recruitment, training and analysis agency established by the German government, and Christine Vincent, Deputy Executive Director and Director of Operations at CANADEM, the Canadian-government funded recruitment and placement agency which she helped establish in 1997. Neither country has a civilian reserve for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations, such as that contemplated by the Bush Administration or by a Senate bill passed shortly before the workshop was held. (The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2006, S. 3322 , passed by the Senate on May 26, 2006, but never considered in the House, would have provided for the continued development of an extensive expert civilian response capability for S&R activities as a core mission of the State Department and USAID.) While these agencies are not equivalent to the civilian reserve proposals currently under study in the United States, the recruitment and other problems they face may well have implications for the issues that the United States will confront in forming a civilian reserve. Participants discussed their organizations' experiences and methods for obtaining and retaining well-qualified people. A sizable roster with some depth in each specialty was recommended by participants. Whether a roster is of adequate size to fulfill the needs of a particular nation or organization will depend on the number of those sent abroad. See the Table 1 at the end of this report for details on CANADEM, ZIF, and U.N. screening processes.) Training
The United Nations, ZIF, and CANADEM all offer some level of training to those going on missions. Facilitating Deployment and Mission Success
Sufficient Deployment Length
According to the workshop discussion, determining the appropriate length for a deployment is critical. Screening and Training
The emphasis placed by participants on the need to screen personnel, with special observation of their reaction to stress, raises the question as to whether the ZIF model might be more appropriate than the less extensive Bearing Point model. A one-year deployment length is consistent with current Administration thinking, which views the civilian reserve as an add-on to the force of permanent employees that fill the gap before contractors can be mobilized. According to the current civilian S&R deployment concept for the United States outlined by Mr. Hoh, federalized reservists would be deployed to cover the time "gap" before contractors could be deployed. | The Bush Administration is expected to submit a proposal for a civilian reserve with the February 2008 budget request. On June 1, 2006, CRS gathered a group of experts on the recruitment and deployment of civilians to peacekeeping operations, now generally referred to by the broader term "stabilization and reconstruction" operations. The purpose of the three-hour workshop was to clarify issues that might be involved in the formation of a civilian reserve force for such operations. The Bush Administration is developing proposals for a civilian reserve. Shortly before the workshop was held, the Senate passed the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2006 (S. 3322) to establish such a civilian reserve.
The workshop began with a presentation by State Department official, Christopher J. Hoh, who explained Administration plans for a civilian reserve. As outlined by Mr. Hoh, these plans called for the creation of a reserve of civilians from the private and public sector to deploy with or soon after permanent government employees and before contractors. Reservists would train together with U.S. military and civilian government personnel before deployments, and would be mobilized as federal employees. They would be provided a range of benefits and incentives.
The workshop included speakers from the U.N. and from two national agencies that recruit civilians for peacekeeping and related missions: the German Center for International Peace Operations (known by its German acronym, ZIF) and Canada's CANADEM, as well as from the Alexandria, VA-based Institute for Defense Analysis. The U.N., ZIF, and CANADEM all have rosters of professionals in rule of law and civil administration to send on missions. The rosters are not equivalent to the reserve force proposed by the Bush Administration or by a Senate bill (S. 3322), the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2006, but all candidates are pre-screened and provided predeployment training. The recruitment and other problems they have faced may be similar to those that the United States may encounter if it forms a reserve.
Participants pointed to several needs to attract and retain highly qualified people: (1) proactive recruitment methods; (2) in-depth screening; (3) sufficient training; and (4) retention incentives. To meet the needs of requester organizations, participants agreed on the need for (1) sizable rosters, (2) sophisticated databases, and (3) insulation from political pressures. To enhance the prospects for mission success, participants agreed that deployments should be set for at least a year in order to provide continuity. The workshop discussion raised several questions about the desirability of Bush Administration plans. Among the questions are whether recent plans and proposals on roster size and recommendations by a private firm regarding the screening process and deployment length are adequate.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44321 | crs_R44321_0 | Military manpower requirements derive from National Military Strategy and are determined by the military services based on the workload required to deliver essential capabilities. In this regard, DOD's pursuit of a diversity management program is one means to broaden the potential pool of high-quality recruits and to retain those individuals who can best fill required roles at every level. DOD's definitions of diversity and equal opportunity have changed over time, as have its policies towards inclusion of various demographic groups in military service and occupational assignments. Under Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the authority to raise and support armies; provide and maintain a navy, and to provide for organizing, disciplining, and regulating them. Throughout the history of the armed services, Congress has established some of these criteria based on demographic characteristics such as race, sex, and sexual orientation. The gradual integration of different demographic groups into the military has continued since the 19 th century; however, in the past decade there have been rapid changes to laws and policies with regard to diversity, inclusion, and equal opportunity in the Armed Forces. Since 2009, DOD policy changes and congressional actions have allowed individuals who are gay to serve openly and recognized their same-sex spouses as dependents , opened all combat assignments to women , and, as of June 30, 2016, changed policies that restricted transgender troops from serving. How Does DOD Define Diversity, Inclusion, and Equal Opportunity? Although the three terms are often used interchangeably, there are some key differences in how they are interpreted and applied. Table 2 shows a comparison of DOD's equal opportunity definitions for civilian employees and military servicemembers. Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity (ODMEO)
The Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity (ODMEO) is the DOD organization responsible for promoting diversity in the DOD workforce, and it is overseen by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Is the Gender Mix in the Military Representative of the Nation? Military Diversity and Equal Opportunity Issues for Congress
In the past, Congress has used its constitutional authority to establish criteria and standards that must be met for individuals to be recruited into the military, to advance through promotion, and to be separated or retired from military service. In recent years, Congress and the Administration have taken actions to build a more diverse and representative military workforce in parallel with efforts to diversify the federal civilian workforce. Proponents of expanding diversity initiatives contend that a more diverse force has the potential to be a better performing and more efficient force. They point out that the nature of modern warfare has been shifting, requiring a range of new skills and competencies, and that these skills have to be developed from a shrinking pool of eligible candidates. Many believe that it has always been in the best interest of the military to recruit and retain a military force that is representative of the nation as a "broadly representative military force is more likely to uphold national values and to be loyal to the government—and country—that raised it." In this regard, some say, in order to reflect the nation it serves the military should strive for diversity that mirrors the shifting demographic composition of civil society. Those who advocate for continued focus on equal opportunity initiatives in the military contend that historically underrepresented or discriminated-against demographic groups are still at a disadvantage, particularly in their ability to ascend to the highest leadership positions. Proponents of equal opportunity protections argue that if the military is to remain competitive with private sector employers in recruiting a skilled workforce, DOD should offer the same level of rights and protections as civilian employers. Some are concerned about how diversity and equal-opportunity initiatives might be implemented and whether they could harm military effectiveness. Others contend that a military that is representative of the nation should also reflect the social and cultural norms of the nation. In this regard, they argue that the popular will for social change should be the driving factor for DOD policies. Some express concerns that that the inclusion of some demographic groups is antithetical to military culture and could affect unit cohesion, morale, and readiness—particularly in elite combat units. | Under Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the authority to raise and support armies; provide and maintain a navy; and provide for organizing, disciplining, and regulating them. Congress has used this authority to establish criteria and standards that must be met for individuals to be recruited into the military, to advance through promotion, and to be separated or retired from military service. Throughout the history of the armed services, Congress has established some of these criteria based on demographic characteristics such as race, sex, and sexual orientation. Actions by prior congresses and administrations to build a more diverse and representative military workforce have often paralleled efforts to diversify the federal civilian workforce.
Diversity, inclusion, and equal opportunity are three terms that are often used interchangeably; however, there are some differences in how they are interpreted and applied between the Department of Defense (DOD) and civilian organizations. DOD's definitions of diversity and equal opportunity have changed over time, as have its policies toward inclusion of various demographic groups. These changes have often paralleled social and legal change in the civilian sector. The gradual integration of previously excluded groups into the military has been ongoing since the 19th century. In the past few decades there have been rapid changes to certain laws and policies regarding diversity, inclusion, and equal opportunity in the Armed Forces. Since 2009, DOD policy changes and congressional actions have allowed individuals who are gay to serve openly with recognition for their same-sex spouses as dependents for the purpose of military benefits and opened all combat assignments to women. On June 30, 2016, DOD announced the end of restrictions on service for those transgender troops already openly serving. However, in August of 2017, President Donald J. Trump directed DOD to (1) continue to prohibit new transgender recruits, (2) review policies on existing transgender sevicemembers, and (3) restrict spending on surgical procedures related to gender transition.
Military manpower requirements derive from National Military Strategy and are determined by the military services based on the workload required to deliver essential capabilities. Some argue that to effectively deliver these capabilities a workforce with a range of backgrounds, skills and knowledge is required. In this regard, DOD's pursuit of diversity is one means to acquire those necessary capabilities by broadening the potential pool of high-quality recruits and ensuring equal opportunities for advancement and promotion for qualified individuals throughout a military career. DOD has used diversity and equal opportunity programs and policies to encourage the recruitment, retention, and promotion of a diverse force that is representative of the nation.
Those who support broader diversity and equal-opportunity initiatives in the military contend that a more diverse force is a better performing and more efficient force. They point out that the nature of modern warfare has been shifting, requiring a range of new skills and competencies, and that these skills may be found in a more diverse cross-section of American youth. Many believe that it has always been in the best interest of the military to recruit and retain a military force that is representative of the nation as a "broadly representative military force is more likely to uphold national values and to be loyal to the government—and country—that raised it." They contend that in order to reflect the nation it serves the military should strive for diversity that mirrors the shifting demographic composition of civil society.
Some argue that historically underrepresented demographic groups continue to be at a disadvantage within the military and that efforts should be intensified to ensure equal opportunity for individuals in those groups. Some also contend that if the military is to remain competitive with private-sector employers in recruiting a skilled workforce, DOD should offer the same equal-opportunity rights and protections that civilian employees have.
Some who oppose the expansion of diversity and equal-opportunity initiatives have concerns about how these initiatives might be implemented and how they might impact military readiness. Some believe that diversity initiatives could harm the military's merit-based system, leading to accessions and promotions that prioritize demographic targets ahead of performance criteria. Some contend that a military that is representative of the nation should also reflect the social and cultural norms of the nation. In this regard, they argue that the popular will for social change should be the driving factor for DOD policies. Others express concern that that the inclusion of some demographic groups is antithetical to military culture and could affect unit cohesion, morale, and readiness—particularly in elite combat units. In terms of equal opportunity and inclusion, some argue that the military has a unique mission that requires the exclusion of some individuals based on, for example, physical fitness level, education attainment, or social characteristics. |
crs_RL30935 | crs_RL30935_0 | FTAA's statedobjective is to reduce and eliminate barriers to trade in goods (including agricultural commoditiesand food products) and services, and facilitate cross-border investment, allowing all countries totrade and invest with each other under the same rules. Following the timetable agreed upon in Quebec City, FTAA countries during 2003 have exchanged detailed offers and counteroffers designed to reduce and eliminate tariffs and quotas ontraded goods. In November 2002, trade ministers released the second draft consolidated text of anFTAA agreement covering all issue areas. Substantial differences in viewpoints continue to bereflected in the FTAA's chapter on agriculture, particularly on the issue of domestic farm subsidies. Many note that negotiating free trade in agricultural products could prove to be one of severaldifficult issues in the FTAA talks, as was the case in the negotiations between the United States andMexico on the agricultural provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Agricultural Trade in the Western Hemisphere
Hemispheric trade liberalization would directly affect U.S. agricultural trade with the countrieslocated in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean (except Cuba). These sales represented 8% of worldwide U.S.agricultural exports, or 21% of farm exports to the region. Entries accounted for 17% of all U.S. agricultural imports, or 31% ofimports from the region. The pertinent objectives call for:
eliminating those measures that countries use to restrict the entry of agricultural products into their markets,
developing disciplines on the use of export subsidies and other mechanisms that can distort trade in agricultural products, and
ensuring that rules to protect food safety and plant and animal health will be based on science, and not applied on a discriminatory basis or as a disguised trade restriction. FTAA's Possible Impact on U.S. Agriculture
U.S. agriculture would benefit to some degree from U.S. participation in an FTAA thateliminates tariffs throughout the Western Hemisphere, according to a USDA analysis. (12) It found thaton an annual basis U.S. farm income (in 1992 dollars) would be $180 million higher (0.08%), totalagricultural exports would increase by $580 million (1%), and total agricultural imports would riseby $830 million (3%). According to this analysis, completetrade liberalization under an FTAA would mean increased competition for U.S. sugar and orangejuice. (14) It requires USTR to:
consult with the House Agriculture and Ways and Means Committees, and the Senate Agriculture and Finance Committees, on whether any further tariff reductions on anyidentified product "should be appropriate, taking into account the impact of any such tariff reductionon the United States industry producing the product," on whether any covered product faces"unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary restrictions, including those not based on scientific principlesin contravention of the Uruguay Round Agreements," and on whether countries in the negotiationsuse export subsidies or other trade-distorting measures on products that affect U.S. producers of suchproducts,
request the International Trade Commission to "prepare an assessment of the probable economic effects of any such tariff reduction on the U.S. industry producing the productconcerned and on the U.S. economy as a whole," and
upon completing these steps, notify the four above-identified congressional committees of those products identified in the first step "for which the Trade Representative intendsto seek tariff liberalization in the negotiations and the reasons for seeking such tariffreductions." Thereis a widely held view that U.S. agriculture expects to benefit more, or would have less to lose, froma comprehensive multilateral WTO agreement compared to an FTAA agreement,
If an FTAA agreement is reached that reflects the objectives agreed to by trade ministers in 1998, U.S. farm policymakers may have to contend with the repercussions of opening the U.S.market to import-sensitive farm products. | Leaders of Western Hemisphere countries have agreed to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement by 2005. FTAA's objective is to promote economic growth anddemocracy by eliminating barriers to trade in all goods (including agricultural and food products)and services, and to facilitate investment. If diplomats reach agreement, free trade in the hemispherecould occur by 2020.
Negotiations on FTAA's agriculture component have become contentious. FTAA's negotiating objectives for agriculture call for removing tariffs and other barriers to agricultural imports in eachcountry, developing disciplines on the use of export subsidies and other mechanisms that distortagricultural trade, and ensuring that rules on food safety and animal and plant health are not used asdisguised trade barriers. Following an agreed-upon timetable, FTAA countries during 2003exchanged detailed offers and counteroffers designed to reduce and eliminate tariffs and quotas onall traded goods. The agriculture chapter in the second draft consolidated text of an FTAAagreement issued in November 2002 continues to reflect differences in viewpoints among countrieson substantive agricultural issues. Strong differences currently exist between the United States andBrazil over how to address in the FTAA the issue of domestic farm subsidies and agricultural exportsubsidies. This issue has become pivotal in efforts to reach an agreement on FTAA's scope(comprehensive or scaled back) in the period leading up to the FTAA Ministerial in Miami onNovember 17-21.
Much of U.S. agricultural trade with Canada and Mexico already occurs free of barriers under the North American Free Trade Agreement. Accordingly, an FTAA would primarily affect U.S.agricultural trade with the countries of South America, Central America, and the Caribbean. Salesto these three markets currently account for a small share (8%) of U.S. farm product exports. Agricultural imports from these three regions, by contrast, account for 17% of all such U.S. imports.
A 1998 U.S. Department of Agriculture analysis finds that U.S. agriculture would benefit to some degree with U.S. participation in an FTAA that eliminates all tariffs throughout the region. According to this analysis, U.S. farm income would be $180 million (1%) higher than without anagreement, U.S. agricultural exports would increase by $580 million (1%), and U.S. agriculturalimports would rise by $830 million (3%).
Some agricultural product sectors expecting to gain from increased sales are supportive of the FTAA initiative. Others appear to be ambivalent, preferring instead that the Bush Administrationplace more emphasis on liberalizing agricultural trade on a multilateral basis under the WTO. Producers of import-sensitive food products (i.e., sugar and orange juice) are concerned aboutincreased competition. They seek to be excluded from FTAA coverage or be covered by the longesttransition periods possible. Under trade law, the Executive Branch must follow special consultationprocedures with Congress on import-sensitive agricultural products covered by the FTAA agreement. This report will be updated periodically . |
crs_R40838 | crs_R40838_0 | Introduction: The Rising Drug Trafficking Threat
A rise in illicit drug trafficking in Africa in recent years has drawn the attention of U.S. policy makers. 110-417 , requiring the Department of Defense (DOD) to author a report to Congress laying out a counternarcotics strategy for the region, among other related goals. On June 23, 2009, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) held a hearing entitled Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa , and other recent hearings, such as a late 2009 SFRC hearing on U.S. counterterrorism activities in Africa's Sahel region, have also referenced this issue. In 2009, U.S. government agencies continued to formulate and refine Africa-specific counternarcotics programs and assistance plans. Notable in this regard was the completion of several interagency country assessments, which are used to evaluate needs and program counternarcotics assistance for countries and regions in Africa. Confluence of Transnational Drug Syndicates and Other Security Threats
The growth of drug trafficking through Africa poses new challenges to international counternarcotics efforts, as well as a variety of emergent threats to the United States. These trends suggest that novel strategies or adaptations of existing ones may be required to track emergent drug flow patterns, dismantle major criminal syndicates involved in such trafficking, and prevent future hotspots from emerging. This represents a significant rise over impoundment levels in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when total drug seizures rarely exceeded more than 1 metric ton per year for the entire continent. In recent years, the proportion of Latin American cocaine moving through West Africa en route to Europe has increased. Based on reported drug usage levels in Europe and extrapolations based on drug seizure data, various U.S., European, and international agency estimates suggest that between 46 tons and as much as 300 metric tons of cocaine consumed in Europe may transit West Africa annually. Driving Factors
West Africa's increasing use as a trafficking nexus appears to have resulted from changes in the mix of disincentives and incentives, or "push" and "pull" factors, that have traditionally structured international drug trafficking patterns. A fundamental challenge confronting policy makers is how to develop a strategy and find the resources to both stem the rising flow of drug trafficking through Africa—particularly West Africa—in the short term, through such means as effective interdiction operations, and simultaneously address the underlying, long-term law enforcement capacity weaknesses that make the region vulnerable to drug trafficking. The Obama Administration requested $7.5 million for such purposes in Africa in FY2010. P.L. Levels of funding for counternarcotics efforts in Africa remain small compared to some other regions, but there are indications that greater policy attention—in terms of strategy development, programming, resources, and international cooperation—is being devoted to combating the illegal drug trade in West Africa and elsewhere on the continent. Required components in the requested report include a description of the overall U.S. counternarcotics policy for Africa and DOD's roles and missions, including the U.S. Combatant Command for Africa, AFRICOM, in support of overall U.S. counternarcotics policy in Africa. Multilateral and Regional Efforts to Combat Drug Trafficking in Africa
In addition to the United States, multiple African and donor governments and multilateral organizations are involved in combating drug trafficking in Africa. Congress may also respond to increasing executive branch prioritization of counternarcotics assistance efforts in Africa, as previously discussed. Short-Term, Targeted Counternarcotics Assistance Versus Long-Term Law Enforcement Capacity Building
Given that many African countries lack effective law enforcement agencies and judicial systems and resources to fund them, many observers have argued that donor countries, including the United States, should consider scaling up and expanding existing counternarcotics capacity-building assistance programs in Africa. A related question pertains to the emerging role of the U.S. military, particularly with respect to the role of the regional combatant command for Africa, AFRICOM—and the proportion of African counternarcotics assistance currently provided by DOD (approximately $19.3 million in FY2009 compared to the State Department's approximately $1.6 million in FY2009). Cocaine Seizures and African Membership in Illicit Drug Conventions | Africa has historically held a peripheral role in the transnational illicit drug trade, but in recent years has increasingly become a locus for drug trafficking, particularly of cocaine. Recent estimates suggest that in recent years, apart from late 2008 and 2009, between 46 and 300 metric tons of South American cocaine may have transited West Africa en route to Europe. Recent cocaine seizure levels are sharply higher than those in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which in all of Africa rarely exceeded 1 metric ton a year. Africa's emergence as a trafficking nexus appears to have resulted from structural shifts in international drug trafficking patterns, including heighted European demand for cocaine, international counternarcotics pressure driving drug traffickers away from traditional trafficking routes, and the operational allure for traffickers of low levels of law enforcement capacity and high rates of corruption in many African countries.
The growth of drug trafficking through Africa poses new challenges to international counternarcotics efforts, as well as a variety of emergent threats to the United States. Novel strategies and adaptations of existing efforts may be required to track emergent drug flow patterns, dismantle major criminal syndicates involved in such trafficking, and prevent future hotspots from emerging. While most of the cocaine transiting Africa is destined for Europe, and little of it enters the United States, other illicit substances trafficked through the region, notably heroin and illegally traded chemical precursors used to produce illicit drugs, do enter the United States. The growing drug trade in Africa also poses other threats to U.S. interests. These include the reported involvement of Latin American criminal groups, including elements of at least one U.S.-designated terrorist organization, which are targets of U.S. counternarcotics or military operations. Other challenges include threats to U.S. policy interests and assistance programs in Africa, such as efforts to advance good governance, political stability, rule of law, and human rights, and programs to build African law enforcement and counternarcotics capacities.
U.S. counternarcotics policy responses to the rise in trans-Africa drug trafficking are in the formative stages. Several U.S. agencies are evaluating the scope of the problem and identifying short-term remedies, such as efforts to expand drug monitoring and interdiction in Africa, and long-term efforts designed to strengthen local capacity to combat drugs in the region. In recent years, U.S. agencies have begun to devote greater resources to combating the drug trade in Africa. The State Department requested $7.5 million for counternarcotics assistance in Africa in FY2010, up from about $0.5 million in FY2006, while the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to allocate $19.3 million in FY2009 and $28 million in FY2010 to counternarcotics programs in Africa.
The threat of drug trafficking in Africa has drawn attention in recent Congresses. P.L. 110-417, for instance, required that DOD submit a report to Congress laying out a counternarcotics strategy for the region. On June 23, 2009, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing entitled Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa. In responding to recent and ongoing executive branch efforts to devote increased resources and attention to this problem, Congress may choose to review existing authorities and funding levels for counternarcotics programs in Africa. Key policy questions that may arise in this respect include how best to reduce gaps in intelligence and data collection relating to the drug trade in Africa, how to balance short-term and long-term counternarcotics goals and strategies, how various U.S. civilian and military and international agency counternarcotics roles and responsibilities in Africa should be defined, and what types and levels of resources these efforts may require. |
crs_R42054 | crs_R42054_0 | Introduction
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) provided food assistance to a monthly average of 40.3 million persons in 20.1 million households in FY2018. While much of the FY2007 to FY2013 increase in participation and costs was attributable to the poor economy, states during this period also increasingly adopted more expansive "categorical eligibility" rules—a set of policies that make a SNAP applicant eligible based on the applicant's involvement with other low-income assistance programs: benefits from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and state-financed General Assistance (GA) programs. The Agriculture Act of 2014 (2014 Farm Bill, P.L. 113-79 ) made no changes to SNAP categorical eligibility rules. The House-passed version of the bill that became the 2014 Farm Bill would have eliminated "narrow" and "broad-based categorical eligibility," retaining only "traditional" categorical eligibility for recipients of cash assistance. However, the House-passed provision was not included in the bill's conference agreement. The most recent farm bill, Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 ("2018 Farm Bill," P.L. 115-334 ) made no changes to SNAP categorical eligibility rules. The House-passed version of the bill would have made changes to limit but not eliminate broad-based categorical eligibility. These changes were not included in the conference agreement. There are two basic pathways to gain financial eligibility for SNAP: (1) having income and resources below specified levels set out in federal SNAP law; and (2) being "categorically," or automatically, eligible based on receiving benefits from other specified low-income assistance programs. They then have their SNAP benefits determined. A household's SNAP benefit amount is based on the maximum benefit (which varies by household size) and its net countable income after deductions for certain expenses. The Food Security Act of 1985 conveyed categorical eligibility to all households receiving cash aid from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), SSI, or state-run GA programs. That law ended AFDC, replacing it with TANF. AFDC was a traditional cash assistance program. This expansion of authority under TANF had major implications for categorical eligibility, allowing states to convey categorical eligibility based on receipt of a wide range of human services rather than simply cash welfare. However, the 1996 welfare reform law's creation of TANF as a broad-based block grant has allowed for a state option to include a long list of benefits/services that can convey SNAP eligibility. This section discusses state choices in this area as of October 2018. These states have expanded categorical eligibility beyond just traditional categorical eligibility, but in a way to limit the number of households made eligible for SNAP. "Broad-Based" Categorical Eligibility Practices
Broad-based categorical eligibility is a policy that makes most households with incomes below a certain threshold categorically eligible for SNAP. Typically, households are made categorically eligible through receiving or being authorized to receive a minimal TANF- or MOE-funded benefit or service, such as being given a brochure or being referred to a social services "800" telephone number (see Table 1 ). Note, though, currently in 13 of these jurisdictions, households with an elderly and disabled member with incomes in excess of 200% of the federal poverty guidelines have to meet the regular SNAP asset tests of $3,500 for households of that type); 6 states (Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, and Texas) apply an asset test for all households); and 33 have a gross income limit above 130% of the federal poverty guidelines. (As discussed above, it is still possible to be categorically eligible but receive no benefit because net income is too high. ) In the Fall 2018 Unified Agenda, the Administration stated that it plans to publish a proposed rule "pertaining to categorically eligible TANF households by limiting categorical eligibility to households that receive cash TANF or other substantial assistance from TANF." As of the date of this report, the proposed rule has not yet been published. | The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) provides benefits to low-income, eligible households on an electronic benefit transfer (EBT) card; benefits can then be exchanged for foods at authorized retailers. SNAP reaches a large share of low-income households. In FY2018, a monthly average of 40.3 million persons in 20.1 million households participated in SNAP.
Federal SNAP law provides two basic pathways for financial eligibility to the program: (1) meeting program-specific federal eligibility requirements; or (2) being automatically or "categorically" eligible for SNAP based on being eligible for or receiving benefits from other specified low-income assistance programs. Categorical eligibility eliminated the requirement that households who already met financial eligibility rules in one specified low-income program go through another financial eligibility determination in SNAP.
In its traditional form, categorical eligibility conveys SNAP eligibility based on household receipt of cash assistance from Supplemental Security Income (SSI), the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, or state-run General Assistance (GA) programs. However, since the 1996 welfare reform law, states have been able to expand categorical eligibility beyond its traditional bounds. That law created TANF to replace the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which was a traditional cash assistance program. TANF is a broad-purpose block grant that finances a wide range of social and human services. TANF gives states flexibility in meeting its goals, resulting in a wide variation of benefits and services offered among the states. SNAP allows states to convey categorical eligibility based on receipt of a TANF "benefit," not just TANF cash welfare. This provides states with the ability to convey categorical eligibility based on a wide range of benefits and services. TANF benefits other than cash assistance typically are available to a broader range of households and at higher levels of income than are TANF cash assistance benefits.
As of October 2018, 43 jurisdictions have implemented what the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has called "broad-based" categorical eligibility. These jurisdictions generally make all households with incomes below a state-determined income threshold eligible for SNAP. States do this by providing households with a low-cost TANF-funded benefit or service such as a brochure or referral to a telephone hotline. There are varying income eligibility thresholds within states that convey "broad-based" categorical eligibility, though no state has a gross income limit above 200% of the federal poverty guidelines. In all but six of these jurisdictions, there is no asset test required for SNAP eligibility. Categorically eligible families bypass the regular SNAP asset limits. However, their net incomes (income after deductions for expenses) must still be low enough to qualify for a SNAP benefit. That is, it is possible to be categorically eligible for SNAP but have net income too high to actually receive a benefit. The exception to this is one- or two-person households that would still receive the minimum benefit.
Neither the Agriculture Act of 2014 ("2014 Farm Bill," P.L. 113-79) nor the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 ("2018 Farm Bill," P.L. 115-334) made changes to SNAP categorical eligibility rules. In the 113th Congress, the House-passed version of the 2014 law would have eliminated broad-based categorical eligibility, but that change was not included in the conference agreement. In the 115th Congress, the House-passed version of the 2018 law would have made changes to limit but not eliminate broad-based categorical eligibility; these changes were not included in the conference agreement.
In the Fall 2018 Unified Agenda, the Trump Administration included plans to publish a proposed rule that would amend SNAP categorical eligibility rules. As of the date this report, this proposed rule has not yet been published. |
crs_RL30957 | crs_RL30957_0 | U.S. Policy
This CRS Report discusses U.S. security assistance for Taiwan, formally called the Republic of China (ROC), particularly policy issues for Congress. Role of Congress
Congress passed and exercises oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8 , the law that has governed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Section 3(a) states that "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." The Pentagon reported that, despite closer cross-strait ties, the PLA has continued to develop and deploy capabilities for action against Taiwan. President Bush approved four decommissioned Kidd-class destroyers for sale as Excess Defense Articles (EDA). Taiwan's Decisions
After the U.S. response to Taiwan's requests in 2001, attention turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and competing political parties in a newly assertive legislature (Legislative Yuan, or LY) have debated contentious issues. The department also noted that Taiwan has not requested technical assistance for its own submarine program. P-3C ASW Aircraft
After the United States approved Taiwan's request for 12 P-3C planes, the two sides negotiated the proposed sale. In the end, Taiwan's LY deleted the defense ministry's request of about $347 million (out of a total program cost of $3.6 billion) to procure PAC-3 missiles in the 2007 defense budget passed on June 15, 2007, and opted to fund about $110 million for PAC-2 upgrades (out of a total program cost of $603 million). In September 1992, President George H. W. Bush notified Congress of the sale of 150 F-16A/B fighters with a value of $5.8 billion. Other Possible Future Arms Sales to Taiwan's Military
In addition to the major systems discussed above, possible future arms sales to Taiwan include:
signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft (perhaps from Gulfstream, Raytheon, or Cessna) for which Taiwan requested price and availability data in 2002; C-27J Spartan medium transport aircraft (sold by L3 Communications); F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF), particularly the short take-off/vertical landing (STOVL) version, produced by Lockheed Martin and foreign partners; Stryker armored wheeled vehicles (sold by General Dynamics); upgraded engines for F-16s (Pratt & Whitney or General Electric); CH-53X minesweeping helicopters (developed by Sikorsky); T-6C trainer aircraft to replace T-34C trainers (sold by Beechcraft); Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) (sold by Raytheon); Sensor Fuse Weapon for the Air Force (sold by Textron Systems); Armor Security Vehicle for the Military Police (sold by Textron Systems); Upgrades of Lafayette-class frigates, other ships, and Sea Dragon submarines; Air traffic control system for Taiwan's Air Force (sold by ITT); Perry-class frigates (as Excess Defense Articles from the U.S. Navy); Newport-class landing ship tank (as Excess Defense Articles); Athena C4ISR situational awareness system (sold by Raytheon); Aegis Ashore, land-based missile defense system (sold by Lockheed Martin); Sky Warrior tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (sold by General Atomics); MH-60R Seahawk ASW helicopters (sold by Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin); Combat management system for mine-hunters (sold by Lockheed Martin). Policy considerations include the TRA, the 1982 Joint Communique (which discussed reductions in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan premised on the PRC's "peaceful unification" policy), and the 1982 "Six Assurances" to Taiwan (including one of not holding prior consultations with the PRC on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan). Gregson also urged Taiwan to stress "asymmetrical advantages" in its defense. In October 2009, Shuai Hua-ming, a key KMT Member of the Legislative Yuan in Taipei who is a retired Lieutenant General of the Army, questioned the U.S. commitment to help Taiwan's self-defense under the TRA (with delays and cost increases in arms programs), the push by some in Taiwan to build trust through triangular talks among Taiwan, China, and the United States (rather than traditional trust between Taiwan and the United States), and the will of Taiwan's military leadership to reform with new concepts of training, jointness, warfighting, and strategy (not simply using defensive weapons with no combat experience for decades). On May 24, 2005, the LY's Procedure Committee failed to place the Special Budget on the legislative calendar, blocking consideration before the session's end on May 31. After the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou became president in May 2008, he retained the goal of defense budgets at 3% of GDP, a commitment reaffirmed in Taiwan's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of March 2009 and the National Defense Report of October 2009. The budget included amounts to support requests for F-16C/D fighters and a submarine design. However, MND also is cutting personnel. However, President Bush submitted only six of the eight pending sales for a total value of $6.5 billion, or about half of the pending total. Despite concerns raised by President Bush's decision-making, President Obama repeated that process since 2008 to decide on submissions to Congress all at one time (no notifications for FMS programs after October 3, 2008, until his first notifications on January 29, 2010 ). On one day, he notified Congress of five programs (not a "package") with a total value of $6.4 billion that involved PAC-3 missile defense systems (a sale that was broken up into two parts with notification of one part in 2008), Black Hawk utility helicopters, Harpoon anti-ship training missiles, follow-on technical support for the Po Sheng joint command and control project, and Osprey-class minehunters (that Congress authorized for sale in P.L. Like Bush, President Obama did not advance the submarine design program (the only one pending for notification to Congress stemming from decisions in 2001) and has not accepted Taiwan's formal request for F-16C/D fighters (pending for submission since 2006). 419 (Ros-Lehtinen), the Taiwan Policy Act of 2013. On April 7, 2014, the House agreed by voice vote to pass H.R. 4435 ( H.Rept. Thus, H.R. H.R. 113-291 on December 19. S. 1683 became P.L. 113-276 on December 18. | This report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan (calling itself Republic of China (ROC)), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, which has governed arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. The U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty terminated in 1979. Two other relevant parts of the "one China" policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the "Six Assurances" to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. The United States also expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996.
At the last U.S.-Taiwan annual arms sales talks on April 24, 2001, President George W. Bush approved for possible sale diesel-electric submarines, P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the submarine sale), four decommissioned U.S. Kidd-class destroyers, and other items. Bush also deferred decisions on Aegis-equipped destroyers and other items, while denying other requests. Afterward, attention turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and legislators from competing political parties debated contentious issues about how much to spend on defense and which U.S. weapons to acquire, despite the increasing threat (including a missile buildup) from the PRC's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The Pentagon also has broadened its concern from Taiwan's arms purchases to its defense spending, seriousness in self-defense and protection of secrets, joint capabilities, deterrence, operational readiness, critical infrastructure protection, and innovative, asymmetrical advantages. Blocked by the Kuomintang (KMT) party in the Legislative Yuan (LY) that opposed the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP's) president (2000-2008), the Special Budget (not passed) for submarines, P-3C ASW aircraft, and PAC-3 missile defense systems was cut from $18 billion in 2004 to $9 billion (for submarines only) in 2005. In March 2006, Taiwan's defense minister requested a Supplemental Defense Budget (not passed) in part for submarine procurement, P-3Cs, and PAC-2 upgrades (not new PAC-3 missiles). In June 2007, the LY passed Taiwan's 2007 defense budget with funds for P-3C planes, PAC-2 upgrades, and F-16C/D fighters. In December 2007, the LY approved $62 million to start the submarine design phase. After the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou became President in May 2008, he resumed cross-strait talks, reduced tension, and retained the arms requests. However, Ma has failed to invest in defense at the bipartisan goal of budgeting at 3% of GDP. On June 5, 2014, the Pentagon reported to Congress that the PLA remains focused on Taiwan.
In 2008, congressional concerns mounted about a suspected "freeze" in President Bush's notifications on arms sales. On October 3, 2008, Bush finally notified Congress. However, he submitted six of the eight pending programs (not a "package") for a combined value of $6.5 billion. Despite those concerns, President Obama repeated that cycle to wait to submit formal notifications for congressional review all on one day (on January 29, 2010) of five major programs with a total value of $6.4 billion and again (on September 21, 2011) of three major programs with a total value of $5.9 billion, including upgrades for Taiwan's existing F-16A/B fighters. Like Bush, President Obama has not notified a diesel-electric submarine design program (the only one pending from decisions in 2001) and has not accepted Taiwan's formal request for new F-16C/D fighters (pending since 2006). An issue for oversight is whether the President is adhering to the TRA in making available defense articles and defense services in such quantity as necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a "sufficient" self-defense capability. By 2014, an issue arose about whether to approve technical assistance to Taiwan's indigenous submarine program. Also, Congress authorized the transfer of U.S. Navy excess Perry-class frigates to Taiwan. Legislation in the 113th Congress includes H.R. 419 (Ros-Lehtinen), S. 12 (Coats), H.R. 1960 (McKeon), H.R. 3470 (Royce), S. 1197 (Levin), S. 1683 (Menendez)/P.L. 113-276, H.R. 4435 (McKeon), H.R. 4495 (Forbes), S. 2410 (Levin), and H.R. 3979 (Barletta)/P.L. 113-291. |
crs_R40929 | crs_R40929_0 | Introduction
In an increasingly competitive economy, and with retirement underway for the Baby Boomer generation, Congress has indicated a strong interest in ensuring that today's young people have the educational attainment and employment experience necessary to become highly skilled workers, contributing taxpayers, and successful participants in civic life. Challenges in the economy and among vulnerable youth populations, however, have heightened concern among policymakers that many young people may not be prepared to fill these roles. Certain young people in particular—including those from low-income families, high school dropouts, foster youth, and other at-risk populations—face b arriers to completing school and entering the workforce. Since the 1960s, federal job training programs and policies have sought to connect these youth to education and employment pathways. The programs were previously authorized under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 ( P.L. 105-220 ). On July 22, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA, P.L. 113-128 ). Changes made by WIOA generally went into effect on July 1, 2015. These contemporary programs also emphasize leadership development and community service. Generally, these young people have been defined as being vulnerable in some way—either because they are economically disadvantaged and/or have a barrier to securing employment or completing their education. During the Great Depression, the focus was on employing idle young men in public works and other projects. The employment programs from this era included an educational component to encourage youth to obtain their high school diplomas. Beginning in the 1960s, the federal government started funding programs for low-income youth, such as Job Corps, that address their multiple needs, including job training, educational services, housing, and supportive services. Separately, the School-to-Work Opportunities Act of 1994 (STWOA, P.L. Funding was authorized for the program through FY2003, and Congress continued to appropriate funding for the programs in subsequent years. The major job training programs for youth and other workers are authorized in Title I.
Overview of Youth Programs Authorized Under Title I of WIOA
WIOA authorizes, and Congress has funded, three job training and employment services for youth:
Youth Workforce Investment Activities Program (hereinafter, Youth Activities Program), a formula grant program for state and local workforce development boards (WDBs) that includes employment and other services that are provided year-round; Job Corps , a program that provides job training and related services primarily at residential centers maintained by contractor organizations; and YouthBuild , a competitive grant program that emphasizes job training and education in the construction trades. WIOA does not explicitly authorize the program, now known as the Reentry Employment Opportunities (REO) program; however, Congress appropriated funding in FY2016 ( P.L. Section 169 authorizes evaluations and research. DOL's Employment and Training Administration (ETA) administers the four programs. All of the programs offer employment, job training, and educational services. Job Corps has generally received the largest appropriation each year, followed by the Youth program, YouthBuild, and the youth component of the Reintegration of Ex-Offenders (although in two years, YouthBuild received less funding than the ReXO youth component). 114-113 ) to fund the Department of Labor and other agencies. Following the enactment of WIOA, Congress has appropriated funding for the program, now known as the Reentry Employment Opportunities program, under the authority of Section 169 of WIOA and the Second Chance Act. | In an increasingly global economy, and with retirement underway for the Baby Boomer generation, Congress has indicated a strong interest in ensuring that today's young people have the educational attainment and employment experience needed to become highly skilled workers, contributing taxpayers, and successful participants in civic life. Challenges in the economy and among certain youth populations, however, have heightened concern among policymakers that some young people may not be prepared to fill these roles. The employment levels for youth under age 25 have declined markedly in recent years, including in the wake of the 2007-2009 recession. Certain young people—such as high school dropouts, current and former foster youth, and other at-risk populations—face challenges in completing school and entering the workforce.
Since the 1930s, federal job training and employment programs and policies have sought to connect vulnerable youth to work and school. Generally, these young people have been defined as being at-risk because they are economically disadvantaged and have a barrier to employment. During the Great Depression, the focus was on employing young men who were idle through public works and other projects. The employment programs from this era included an educational component to encourage youth to obtain their high school diplomas. Beginning in the 1960s, the federal government started funding programs for low-income youth that address their multiple needs through job training, educational services, and supportive services.
Currently, there are four major federal youth employment and job training programs, all of which are administered by the Department of Labor's (DOL's) Employment and Training Administration (ETA). Although these programs have varying eligibility requirements and are carried out under different funding arrangements, they generally have a common purpose—to provide vulnerable youth with educational and employment opportunities and access to leadership development and community service activities. The Youth Activities program offers job training and other services through what are known as local workforce development boards, whose members are appointed by the chief local elected official(s). The program was funded at $873.4 million in FY2016. The Job Corps program provides career and technical training in a number of trades at 125 residential centers throughout the country. The program received FY2016 appropriations of $1.7 billion. Another program, YouthBuild, engages youth in educational services and job training that focus on the construction trades. YouthBuild received FY2016 appropriations of $84.5 million. Separately, the Reentry Employment Opportunities program, formerly known as the Reintegration of Ex-Offenders program, includes job training and other services for juvenile and adult offenders. The youth component of the program was funded at $39.5 million in FY2016.
The four programs were authorized under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA, P.L. 105-220) through FY2003, and Congress continued to appropriate funding for the programs in subsequent years. On July 22, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA, P.L. 113-128). WIOA amended these programs, particularly the Youth Activities program and Job Corps. Like WIA, WIOA does not explicitly authorize the Reentry Employment Opportunities program; however, Congress appropriated funding for the program in FY2016 (P.L. 114-113) under the authority of Section 169 of WIOA and the Second Chance Act. Section 169 authorizes evaluations and research. The amendments made by WIOA generally went into effect on July 1, 2015. |
crs_R40228 | crs_R40228_0 | B id protests—or written objections to certain actions, described below, taken by federal agencies when acquiring supplies or services for their direct use or benefit—are of perennial interest to Congress. In other cases, congressional interest can be prompted by notable protests, or by agency determinations not to follow any nonbinding recommendations made to federal agencies by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in bid protest decisions. GAO is not the only forum with authority to hear bid protests involving federal acquisitions. The procuring agency and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims can also hear bid protests. However, GAO hears more protests than the Court of Federal Claims, the only other forum for which data are readily available. Thus, its protest procedures—which can differ somewhat from those of the procuring agencies and the Court of Federal Claims—are the focus of this report. It provides an overview of the time frames and procedures in a GAO bid protest, including (1) what issues can be protested with GAO; (2) who can file or be a party to a GAO protest; (3) the procedures for bringing and resolving GAO protests; (4) the time frames involved in GAO protests; (5) the automatic stay of contract award or performance triggered by a GAO protest, as well as the basis for agency overrides of automatic stays and judicial review of agency override determinations; (6) the basis and effects of GAO decisions; and (7) reconsideration and "appeal" of GAO decisions. Under CICA, disappointed bidders or offerors can protest to GAO about an "alleged violation of ... procurement statute or regulation" by a federal agency in (1) soliciting or otherwise requesting offers; (2) cancelling such solicitations or requests; (3) awarding or proposing to award a contract; (4) terminating or cancelling a contract due to improprieties involving its award; or (5) converting functions performed by government employees to private sector performance. By statute, a GAO bid protest may be filed by any interested party , or any "actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract." Time Frames for the "Expeditious Resolution" of Protests
Federal statutes and regulations also provide for the "expeditious" resolution of protests by requiring GAO to adhere to strict time frames, including resolving protests within 65 to 100 days after they are filed. A protester who files a bid protest with the Court of Federal Claims, in contrast, could potentially wait over 100 days before the court hears the case, and would not necessarily have the award or performance of the contract stayed for the duration of the protest, as generally happens with GAO protests. Agency Override of Bid-Protest Stays
CICA expressly authorizes agencies to override the automatic stay of contract award or performance that may be triggered by the filing of a GAO protest when
"urgent and compelling circumstances which significantly affect interests of the United States will not permit waiting for the decision of the Comptroller General"; or "performance of the contract is in the best interests of the United States." Legal Effect of GAO Recommendations
Even when GAO finds that the agency violated federal procurement law and sustains the protest, however, the agency is not legally required to implement the recommendations in GAO's decision. This is because GAO is a legislative branch agency and cannot constitutionally compel executive branch agencies to implement its recommendations because of the separation of powers doctrine. Any agency that does not do so is required by statute to promptly notify GAO, which is then to notify four congressional committees. | For purposes of federal law, a bid protest involves a written objection to the conduct of government agencies in acquiring supplies and services for their direct use or benefit. Such conduct can include (1) soliciting or otherwise requesting offers; (2) cancelling such solicitations or requests; (3) awarding or proposing to award a contract; (4) terminating or cancelling a contract due to improprieties involving its award; or (5) converting functions performed by government employees to private sector performance. Bid protests are of perennial interest to Congress, in part, because of the effects of protests on agency missions and operations. Congressional interest can also be prompted by notable protests, as well as by agency determinations not to follow any nonbinding recommendations made by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in deciding protests.
GAO is not the only forum with authority to hear bid protests involving federal acquisitions. The procuring agency and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims can also hear bid protests. However, GAO hears more protests than the Court of Federal Claims, the only other forum for which data are readily available. Thus, its protest procedures—which can differ somewhat from those of the procuring agencies and the Court of Federal Claims—are the focus of this report.
Legislation and regulations establish what issues may be protested with GAO and who may bring a protest. As previously noted, by statute, GAO may hear complaints alleging violations of federal procurement law in federal acquisitions. However, it is expressly barred by regulation from hearing certain issues, such as challenges to small business size certifications. Any interested party—an actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of, or failure to award, a contract—may file a protest.
GAO is required by statute to provide for the "inexpensive and expeditious" resolution of protests, "[t]o the maximum extent practicable." Its practices permit "inexpensive" resolution, in part, by enabling interested parties to represent themselves, rather than rely on attorneys. For example, GAO does not require "formal briefs" or "other technical forms" of pleadings or motions. It is also subject to statutory mandates that promote "expeditious" resolution, in part, by requiring GAO to issue final decisions within 65 to 100 days after the protest was filed.
Filing a GAO protest may trigger an automatic stay of contract award or performance that lasts for the duration of the protest. Such automatic stays are unique to bid protests filed with GAO and help account for GAO's popularity as a protest forum. Agencies may, however, override these stays upon determining that urgent and compelling circumstances will not permit waiting for GAO's decision, or performance of the contract is in the best interests of the United States.
GAO may dismiss, deny, or sustain a protest. When a protest is dismissed or denied, the procuring agency may generally proceed with the challenged action. In contrast, when a protest is sustained, GAO may recommend specific actions (e.g., amending the solicitation, reevaluating proposals). Such recommendations are not legally binding because the separation of powers doctrine precludes legislative branch agencies, such as GAO, from controlling the actions of executive branch agencies. However, the procuring agency is required by statute to notify GAO if GAO's recommendations are not fully implemented, and GAO, in turn, must notify Congress.
Protesters disappointed with GAO's decision can seek reconsideration from GAO. They can also effectively appeal GAO's decision by filing a bid protest with the Court of Federal Claims. |
crs_R41901 | crs_R41901_0 | Between 1985 and 2002, several statutory budget controls were enacted to reduce the budget deficit. Chief among these were the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. The mechanisms included in these acts sought to supplement and modify the existing budget process, and also added statutory budget controls, in some cases seeking to require future deficit reduction legislation, and in some cases seeking to preserve deficit reduction achieved in accompanying legislation. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings)
The Balanced Budget And Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act; P.L. The Establishment of Statutory Deficit Limits and Enforcement
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act established a requirement for the gradual reduction and elimination of budget deficits over a six-year period by specifying annual deficit limits ( Table 1 ), and by creating a means of developing and enforcing a budget within these established limits. To enforce the specified deficit limits, the act set forth a specific process for the cancellation of spending by executive order, known as a sequester order, in the event that the deficit limits were breached. This meant that no automatic mechanism was in effect to enforce the deficit targets. BEA replaced the focus on deficit targets under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings with a two-pronged procedural approach to budgetary enforcement: the implementation of pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) procedures to control new direct spending and revenue legislation and discretionary spending limits to control the level of discretionary spending. Title XIII of the act is referred to as the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, or BEA. Extensions of BEA Included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
In 1993, Congress passed H.R. The changes set forth in the BEA of 1997 were intended to extend existing budget enforcement procedures to ensure compliance with the multi-year budget policies established in the legislation, preserving the deficit reduction achieved in the two reconciliation bills. | Between 1985 and 2002, several statutory budget controls were enacted to reduce the budget deficit. Chief among these were the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. The mechanisms included in these acts sought to supplement and modify the existing budget process, and also added statutory budget controls, in some cases seeking to require future deficit reduction legislation, and in some cases seeking to preserve deficit reduction achieved in accompanying legislation.
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, was passed during a period of growing deficits, as part of legislation to increase the debt limit. The act did not include legislation that reduced the deficit, but instead established a statutory requirement for the gradual reduction and elimination of budget deficits over a six-year period. The act specified annual deficit limits and set forth a specific process for the cancellation of spending by executive order, known as a sequester order, to enforce the annual deficit limit in the event that compliance was not achieved through legislation. The deficit targets and timetable were modified and extended in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987.
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 was enacted as part of a budget reconciliation bill that reduced the deficit. The act replaced the focus on deficit targets under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings with a two-pronged procedural approach to budgetary enforcement: (1) the implementation of pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) procedures to control new direct spending and revenue legislation and (2) discretionary spending limits to control the level of discretionary spending. In contrast to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, these budget control mechanisms sought to preserve the deficit reduction achieved in the accompanying legislation rather than force subsequent legislation. As originally enacted, these mechanisms were to be in force for a period of five years, but they were modified and extended twice. In 1993, they were extended through 1998 in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, and in 1997, they were extended through 2002 in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997.
This report provides information on the basic operation of the budgetary controls and will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R40533 | crs_R40533_0 | Introduction
The National Health Service Corps (NHSC) was established in the Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-623) to improve the distribution of health workers in underserved rural areas by providing scholarship support to students in qualified medical professions in exchange for a period of service in a Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA). In FY2007, the NHSC placed more than 4,000 trained health professionals to serve in HPSAs. The NHSC is a health safety net program that aims to (1) add to the supply of primary health care workers through its recruitment programs, (2) retain primary health care workers in underserved areas, and (3) increase access to primary health care for underserved populations. In 2008, Congress passed the Health Care Safety Net (HCSN) Act ( P.L. The NHSC is authorized in the Public Health Service (PHS) Act, Sections 331-338A, 338B, and 338I. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers the NHSC through the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), Bureau of Clinician Recruitment and Service. This report provides (1) a descriptive summary of the NHSC; (2) appropriation trends; (3) a profile of NHSC programs; (4) a review of selected program goals and outcomes; (5) a survey of the NHSC's workforce capacity; (6) a description of the NHSC National Advisory Committee; and (7) an analysis of policy issues that may be of interest to Congress. It will be updated to report changes in the appropriation and legislation. Structure of the NHSC
The HCSN Act of 2008 reauthorized the NHSC through FY2012. The legislation reauthorized and appropriated funds for the NHSC Recruitment and Field Programs, and reauthorized the NHSC Advisory Council. NHSC Appropriations
Each year, Congress appropriates funds for NHSC programs in the annual appropriations bill for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (Labor-HHS-Ed). For FY2009, Congress appropriated a total of $300 million in the economic stimulus package (in the ARRA). In the HCSN Amendments of 2002 ( P.L. | The National Health Service Corps (NHSC) was established in the Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-623) to improve the distribution of health workers in underserved rural areas by providing scholarship support to students in qualified medical professions in exchange for a period of service in a Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA). The NHSC is authorized in the Public Health Service (PHS) Act, Sections 331, 338A, 338B, and 338I and codified in 42 USC §234. Over the years, Congress has amended and reauthorized these authorities. In 2008, Congress reauthorized the NHSC in the Health Care Safety Net (HCSN) Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-355). Funding for the NHSC is provided in the annual appropriation bill for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies. For the FY2009 annual appropriation, Congress appropriated $134.9 million for NHSC programs. Also, Congress appropriated a total of $300 million for the NHSC in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5).
The Health Resources and Services Administration, which is in the Department of Health and Human Services, oversees NHSC programs. Now in its 38th year, the NHSC consists of a Recruitment Program, which supports scholarships and loan repayments for NHSC recruits, and a Field Program, which oversees recruitment efforts and field placement. In 2008, the NHSC placed nearly 4,000 physicians, nurse practitioners, physician assistants, mental and behavioral health professionals, and others into underserved areas. Public and private health providers describe the NHSC as a significant force in bolstering the supply of primary health care workers. As well, they identify the role of the NHSC as a significant health safety net provider for underserved populations. Some suggest a significant role for the NHSC in plans for health care reform.
This report provides (1) a descriptive summary of the NHSC; (2) appropriation trends; (3) a profile of NHSC programs; (4) a review of selected program goals and outcomes; (5) a survey of the NHSC's workforce capacity; (6) a description of the NHSC National Advisory Committee; and (7) an analysis of policy issues that may be of interest to Congress. It will be updated to report changes in the appropriation and legislation. |
crs_R41994 | crs_R41994_0 | In this respect the June 9, 2011, decision of the United States Supreme Court in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership et al. In that decision, the Court retained current legal standards by holding that patents must be proved invalid by "clear and convincing evidence." The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the "preponderance of the evidence" s tandard, which would have made patents more vulnerable to challenge, applied in this situation. | The June 9, 2011, decision of the United States Supreme Court in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership et al. rained current legal standards by holding that patents must be proved invalid by "clear and convincing evidence." The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, which would have made patents more vulnerable to challenge, applied in this situation. The decision arguably holds a number of potential implications for U.S. innovation policy, including incentives to innovate, invest, and assert patents, and leaves the question of the appropriate presumption of validity for patents squarely before Congress. |
crs_R41925 | crs_R41925_0 | Challenge to the Boeing-Airbus Duopoly in Civil Aircraft: Issues for Competitiveness
The importance of a successful aerospace industry to the United States economy has been repeatedly acknowledged by President Obama and members of his Cabinet, many Members of Congress, and by all concerned with the competitive fortunes of the U.S. aircraft manufacturing industry. The U.S. aerospace industry is highly competitive and global in scope. Numerous U.S. firms manufacture a wide range of products for civil and defense purposes. In 2010, the value of aerospace industry shipments was estimated at $171 billion, of which civil aircraft and aircraft parts accounted for approximately half ($85 billion) of all U.S. aerospace shipments. In 2010, the U.S. aerospace industry exported nearly $78 billion in products, of which $67 billion (or 86% of total exports) were civil aircraft, engines, equipment, and parts. The only U.S. manufacturer of large civil aircraft is Boeing. Civil aircraft engines are manufactured by General Electric (GE) in partnership with Safran (of France) and by Pratt & Whitney. Numerous firms manufacture sections and parts of the airframe, as well as original equipment for both domestic and foreign airframe manufacturers. The U.S. trade surplus (net exports) in aerospace products in 2010 was $43.6 billion—higher than for any other manufacturing industry. In 2010, the aerospace sector employed 477,000 workers, of which 228,400 were engaged in the manufacture of aircraft, 76,400 in the manufacture of engines and engine parts, and 97,600 in the manufacture of other parts and equipment. According to the International Trade Administration (ITA), "more jobs in the United States were supported by exports of U.S. aerospace products than of any other manufacturing or service industry." A major issue for policymakers is whether the United States can sustain its preeminent position in aerospace, given the intentions of numerous foreign manufacturers to enter the small commercial jet aircraft segment by 2016. That segment accounts for nearly half of commercial aircraft revenues and for more than 60% of commercial aircraft deliveries. Boeing and Airbus are, at present, the premier manufacturers of large civil aircraft of all sizes, but the importance of narrow-body aircraft to both companies cannot be overstated. Boeing is the sole U.S. producer of large commercial aircraft. Unlike many other manufacturers of aircraft, Boeing and Airbus are the only companies that produce a complete range of mainline commercial aircraft (small narrow-body to very large aircraft). The single-aisle, narrow-body aircraft segment of the market is directly affected by larger and smaller aircraft programs, which influence investment decisions and competition among aircraft manufacturers. Bombardier and Embraer have established themselves as successful aircraft manufacturers and the Chinese appear to be determined to build a civil aviation industry that competes directly with Boeing and Airbus. It is clear that the United States, the European Union, Russia, China, Japan, Brazil, and Canada all consider the aerospace to be commercially and militarily strategic. | The importance of a successful aerospace industry to the United States economy has been repeatedly acknowledged by President Obama and members of his Cabinet, many Members of Congress, and by all concerned with the competitive fortunes of the U.S. aircraft manufacturing industry. The U.S. aerospace industry is highly competitive and global in scope. U.S. firms manufacture a wide range of products for civil and defense purposes and, in 2010, the value of aerospace industry shipments was estimated at $171 billion, of which civil aircraft and aircraft parts accounted for over half of all U.S. aerospace shipments. In 2010, the U.S. aerospace industry exported nearly $78 billion in products, of which $67 billion (or 86% of total exports) were civil aircraft, engines, equipment, and parts. The U.S. trade surplus (net exports) in aerospace products in 2010 was $43.6 billion—higher than for any other manufacturing industry. Aerospace employment totaled 477,000 workers, of which 228,400 were engaged in the manufacture of aircraft, 76,400 in the manufacture of engines and engine parts, and 97,600 in the manufacture of other parts and equipment. According to the International Trade Administration, "more jobs in the United States were supported by exports of U.S. aerospace products than of any other manufacturing or service industry."
Boeing is the only U.S. manufacturer of large civil aircraft. Civil aircraft engines are manufactured by General Electric (GE), in partnership with Safran (of France), and by Pratt & Whitney. Numerous firms manufacture sections and parts of the airframe, as well as original equipment for both domestic and foreign airframe manufacturers. The civil and military aerospace sectors are complementary in that many firms manufacture products for both. Although the products tend to be dissimilar, workforce skills are transferable, so a decline in military aerospace budgets or private sector spending on civil aircraft have significant economic and competitive effects for the United States.
A major issue for policymakers is whether the United States can sustain its preeminent position in aerospace, given the intentions of numerous foreign manufacturers to enter the small commercial jet aircraft segment by 2016. That segment accounts for nearly half of all commercial aircraft revenues and for more than 60% of commercial aircraft deliveries. It is also the gateway to building larger commercial aircraft. Boeing and Airbus are the sole rivals across all segments of large commercial aircraft manufacturing, but during the next decade both will confront a potentially serious challenge in one of the most important segments of their business, small commercial jets (which are also referred to as narrow-body or single-aisle aircraft). The CEOs of Boeing and Airbus have both agreed that their duopoly over small commercial jets is nearly at an end.
Boeing and Airbus will face competition from government-owned and subsidized firms in Russia and China, as well as companies in Canada, Brazil, and Japan. Several factors will determine the outcome of the coming competition in small commercial jets, including the openness of markets to foreign commercial aircraft and aircraft engines and parts; whether state-owned aircraft manufacturers continue to receive substantial government subsidies; whether the challengers to Boeing and Airbus achieve their goal of building innovative, efficient aircraft that establish excellent safety and service records; whether airlines will buy aircraft from companies that have no track record; and the effect of collaborative partnerships with other aircraft manufacturers and suppliers as a strategy for success. Boeing and Airbus are engaged in a struggle to be the world's preeminent manufacturer of civil aircraft and both have a depth of resources unmatched elsewhere. The competitive stakes for both companies will be very high during the next decade. |
crs_R42074 | crs_R42074_0 | Historically, the United States has also exported liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Alaska—almost exclusively to Japan—but the volumes of those shipments have been relatively small and Alaska's natural gas market has been isolated from the rest of the United States. Natural gas companies are now considering exporting greater quantities of U.S. LNG by tanker ship to a number of other countries. The Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Fossil Energy and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) must authorize the export of the commodity and related facilities, respectively. This overarching federal role in the expansion of U.S. natural gas exports has been the subject of ongoing oversight and debate in Congress. Developers of natural gas export projects and natural gas producers argue that domestic gas prices will not rise significantly if U.S. natural gas exports increase because the United States has ample gas resources to meet both export and domestic demand. DOE has used the results of several studies it commissioned about the impact on domestic natural gas prices of exports and the effect on the U.S. economy to justify the approval of LNG export proposals. Other issues have also been raised regarding natural gas exports. The prospect of growing U.S. natural gas exports, particularly LNG, continues to be a factor as Congress debates the economy, energy independence, climate change, and energy security. 351 and S. 33 ), the American Job Creation and Strategic Alliances LNG Act ( H.R. 89 ), and the Export American Natural Gas Act of 2015 ( H.R. What effect exporting natural gas will have on U.S. prices and the overall U.S. economy are central questions in the debate over whether to export. In 2013 LNG trade accounted for 31% of all natural gas traded internationally. Added U.S. LNG exports, and associated investment, result in higher levels of real gross domestic product (GDP), which more than offsets the adverse impact of somewhat higher energy prices when the export scenarios are applied. With regard to actions it is authorized to approve under Section 3 of the NGA, DOE identifies—
a ctions that require an EIS to include export approvals that would require construction of major new natural gas pipelines/related facilities, significant expansions and modifications of existing pipelines/related facilities, or major operational changes; a ctions that require EA and result in a FONSI to include export approvals that would require minor new construction (e.g., adding new connections to an existing LNG pipeline); a ctions approved as a CE to include export approvals that would require minor operational changes (e.g., changes in natural gas throughput or storage operations), but not new construction. Both the House and Senate versions of the LNG Permitting Certainty and Transparency Act ( H.R. The Domestic Prosperity and Global Freedom Act ( H.R. 89 ) would impose a similar 30-day deadline on DOE permit decisions. 287 ) would extend FTA nation treatment to World Trade Organization member nations with respect to LNG export permitting by DOE. The Crude Oil Export Act ( H.R. 156 ) would repeal limitations on export of Outer Continental Shelf natural gas under Section 28 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. Other bills, such as the Natural Gas Pipeline Permitting Reform Act ( H.R. 161 ), would also affect natural gas production and infrastructure affecting LNG exports. Environmental groups differ on the desirability of greater natural gas use in general. Some environmental groups see natural gas exports raising domestic natural gas prices, making renewables more viable. | As estimates for the amount of U.S. natural gas resources have grown, so have the prospects of rising U.S. natural gas exports. The United States is expected to go from a net importer of natural gas to a net exporter by 2016. With recent natural gas prices relatively low compared to global prices and historically low for the United States, producers are looking for new markets for their natural gas. Projects to export liquefied natural gas (LNG) by tanker ship have been proposed—cumulatively accounting for over 60% of current gross U.S. natural gas production. Pipeline exports, which accounted for 99% of all exports of U.S. natural gas in 2013, are also likely to continue rising. However, under the Natural Gas Act, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) must authorize the export of the natural gas commodity and related facilities, respectively. This overarching federal role in the expansion of U.S. natural gas exports has been the subject of ongoing oversight and debate in Congress.
What effect exporting natural gas will have on U.S. domestic prices is a central question in the debate over whether to export. A significant rise in U.S. natural gas exports would likely put upwards pressure on domestic prices, but the magnitude of any rise is uncertain. There are numerous factors that will affect prices: export volumes, economic growth, differences in local markets, and government regulations, among others. Producers contend that increased exports will not raise prices significantly as there is ample supply to meet domestic demand, and there will be the added benefits of increased revenues, trade, and jobs, and less flaring. Consumers of natural gas, who also benefit from the current low prices, fear prices will rise if natural gas is exported. The DOE's most recent price study concluded that greater LNG exports "result in higher levels of real gross domestic product (GDP), which more than offsets the adverse impact of somewhat higher energy prices." Export opponents have been critical of DOE's conclusions.
Environmental groups are split regarding natural gas use, with some favoring increased use to curb emissions of certain pollutants, while others oppose expanded use of natural gas because it is not as clean as renewable forms of energy, such as wind or solar. The use of hydraulic fracturing to produce shale gas for export markets has also raised concerns among environmental groups particularly concerned with its possible impacts on groundwater quality. The possibility of a significant increase in U.S. natural gas exports will factor into ongoing debates on the economy, energy independence, climate change, and energy security.
Congressional interest has focused on the DOE's process and criteria for approving LNG commodity exports to non-free trade agreement (FTA) countries. Several bills in the 114th Congress would facilitate the approval of such permits. Both the House and Senate versions of the LNG Permitting Certainty and Transparency Act (H.R. 351 and S. 33), the Domestic Prosperity and Global Freedom Act (H.R. 89), and the Export American Natural Gas Act of 2015 (H.R. 428) would impose various deadlines on DOE export permit decisions. The American Job Creation and Strategic Alliances LNG Act (H.R. 287) would extend free trade treatment to World Trade Organization member nations with respect to LNG export permitting by DOE. The Crude Oil Export Act (H.R. 156) would repeal limitations on export of Outer Continental Shelf natural gas under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1354). Other bills have been introduced that would affect natural gas production and infrastructure. |
crs_R43493 | crs_R43493_0 | Introduction
Charter schools are public schools of choice that are created in accordance with state laws and are publicly funded and tuition free. They are operated according to the terms of charters or contracts granted by public chartering agencies, such as local educational agencies (LEAs) or state boards of education. The terms of charters typically provide charter school operators with increased autonomy over the operation of schools, often including exemption from, or flexibility in the application of, many of the state or local regulations otherwise applicable to public schools. As opposed to having neighborhood school catchment areas, enrollment in charter schools is normally open to applicants on an LEA-wide or even statewide basis, and parents must actively choose to enroll their children in charter schools. Under Title V-B-1 and V-B-2 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), federal support is provided to assist with the opening of new charter schools and for the funding of charter school facilities. During the 112 th and 113 th Congresses, Congress has actively pursued both a comprehensive reauthorization of the ESEA, which would include amending and reauthorizing the Title V-B charter school programs, and stand alone legislation to amend and reauthorize the Title V-B programs independent of a comprehensive ESEA reauthorization. Most recently, the House Education and Workforce Committee ordered reported the Success and Opportunity through Quality Charter Schools Act ( H.R. 10 ) by a vote of 36-3 on April 8, 2014. The bill would amend and reauthorize the Title V-B charter school programs. The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB; P.L. Title V-B-2 authorizes the Credit Enhancement Program. Title V-B-1 Charter School Programs
Several charter school programs and activities are authorized under Title V-B-1. The Charter Schools Program, which provides grants to state educational agencies (SEAs) or, if a state's SEA chooses not to apply for a grant, charter school developers, to support the planning, program design, and initial implementation of public charter schools. Funds may also be used to provide dissemination grants to successful charter schools. The Secretary of Education is authorized to reserve funds for national activities, such as evaluation, technical assistance, and dissemination of best practices. Under the Per-Pupil Facilities Aid Program (more commonly referred to as the State Charter School Facilities Incentive Grants Program), the Secretary provides competitive grants to states to pay the federal share of establishing or enhancing, and administering, a program which will provide facilities assistance to charter schools on a per-pupil basis. For the purposes of the program, Section 5210 defines a charter school as a public school that
is exempt from significant state and local rules that inhibit autonomy; is created by a developer as a public school or converted from a traditional public school, and is operated under public direction; operates in pursuit of a specific set of educational objectives established by the school and agreed to by the chartering agency; provides elementary and/or secondary education; is nonsectarian; does not charge tuition; complies with various federal laws, including the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and civil rights laws; uses a lottery to admit students if oversubscribed; agrees to comply with federal and state audit requirements that apply to other public schools; meets federal, state, and local health and safety requirements; operates in accordance with state law; and has a written performance contract that addresses student performance and state assessments. Beginning in FY2010, the acts have also permitted or required to the Secretary to use funds to make multiple awards to nonprofit charter management organizations (CMOs) and other nonprofit entities for the replication and expansion of successful charter school models. 10 Would Make to Current Law
H.R. 107-110 ) in 2002, which provided for a comprehensive reauthorization of the ESEA. The second program, Credit Enhancement Initiatives to Assist Charter School Facility Acquisition, Construction, and Renovation (more commonly known as the Credit Enhancement for Charter School Facilities Program; Title V-B-2), authorizes ED to make grants to three or more entities to help charter schools improve their credit in order to obtain private sector capital to acquire, lease, renovate, or construct appropriate facilities. Substantive Changes to the Charter School Programs Made through Appropriations Acts
Substantive changes have been made to the charter school programs through the annual Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED) appropriations acts since FY2010. | Charter schools are public schools of choice that are created in accordance with state laws and are publicly funded and tuition free. They are operated according to the terms of charters or contracts granted by public chartering agencies. The terms of charters typically provide charter school operators with increased autonomy over the operation of schools, often including exemptions from, or flexibility in the application of, many of the state or local regulations otherwise applicable to public schools. Enrollment in charter schools is normally open to applicants on a local educational agency (LEA)-wide or even statewide basis, and parents must actively choose to enroll their children in charter schools.
Under Title V-B-1 and V-B-2 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), federal support is provided to assist with the opening of new charter schools and for the funding of charter school facilities.
ESEA Title V-B-1 authorizes the Charter Schools Program, which provides grants to state educational agencies (SEAs), or charter school developers if a state's SEA chooses not to apply for a grant, to support the planning, program design, and initial implementation of public charter schools. Funds may also be used to provide dissemination grants to successful charter schools. ESEA Title V-B-1 authorizes the Secretary of Education to reserve funds for national activities, such as evaluation, technical assistance, and dissemination of best practices. ESEA Title V-B-1 authorizes the Per-Pupil Facilities Aid Program (more commonly referred to as the State Charter School Facilities Incentive Grants Program). Under this program, the Secretary provides competitive grants to states to pay the federal share of establishing or enhancing, and administering, a program that will provide facilities assistance to charter schools on a per-pupil basis. ESEA Title V-B-2 authorizes the Credit Enhancement Initiatives to Assist Charter School Facility Acquisition, Construction, and Renovation program (more commonly known as the Credit Enhancement program). Under this program, ED awards competitive grants to public or private nonprofit entities to demonstrate innovative ways to help charter schools acquire appropriate facilities.
While the charter school programs have not been reauthorized since the enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB; P.L. 107-110) in 2002, they continue to receive funding through the annual appropriations process. In addition, since FY2010, substantive changes have been made to the programs through annual appropriations acts, including allowing or requiring the Secretary to make grants to nonprofit charter management organizations (CMOs) and other nonprofit entities for the replication and expansion of successful charter school models.
During the 112th and 113th Congresses, Congress has actively pursued both a comprehensive reauthorization of the ESEA, which would include amending and reauthorizing the Title V-B charter school programs, and stand alone legislation to reauthorize and amend the Title V-B programs independent of a comprehensive ESEA reauthorization. Most recently, the House Education and Workforce Committee ordered reported the Success and Opportunity through Quality Charter Schools Act (H.R. 10) by a vote of 36-3 on April 8, 2014. The bill would provide for a reauthorization of the Title V-B charter school programs and make numerous changes to the current programs. While a brief discussion of the changes that H.R. 10 would make to the charter school programs is included, it is generally beyond the scope of this report to discuss amendments that would be made to the charter school programs by these reauthorization bills. |
crs_RS22991 | crs_RS22991_0 | General Guidelines
Under House rules and precedents, opportunities to speak on the House floor about pending legislation are restricted and highly structured. Each floor manager usually, but not necessarily, yields to Members on his or her side of the aisle. Gaining Recognition to Speak Under Controlled Time
If a Member is not the floor manager but wishes to speak, the Member informs the floor manager on his or her side. Any time consumed by the Member yielded to is charged against the portion of time yielded originally by the manager to the Member who has been recognized. Debate When Time Is Not Controlled
In some procedural circumstances, debate time is not controlled by floor managers. Instead, Members gain time to speak by seeking recognition directly from the presiding officer. Most prominently, time for debating amendments can take place in the Committee of the Whole under what is known as the "five minute rule." Another Member (sometimes the floor manager defending the version of the bill reported by the committee of jurisdiction) can then be recognized for five minutes to speak against the amendment by standing and stating
I rise in opposition to the amendment. | House rules and precedents structure Members' opportunities to speak on the floor about pending legislation. Under some circumstances, Members arrange to speak on legislation by communicating with the leaders of the committee that reported the bill. Sometimes the arrangements can be made on the floor during the debate, and at other times they are made prior to floor consideration. The committee leaders from both sides of the aisle manage the consideration of a bill on the floor, under what is known as controlled time, by allocating the debate time among several Members.
In certain other procedural circumstances, most often when the House is amending legislation under an "open" special rule, legislators instead seek recognition to speak, usually for up to five minutes, directly from the presiding officer. A Member who has been recognized can yield to another during debate but continues to hold the floor; the time used by the Member yielded to is taken from the time allocated to the Member holding the floor. |
crs_R43697 | crs_R43697_0 | In March 2014, an EVD outbreak was reported in Guinea, West Africa. The outbreak is the first in West Africa and has become the largest, most persistent ever documented. The outbreak is continuing to spread in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia ("affected countries") and has ended in Nigeria and Senegal, after having infected 20 people in Nigeria and one in Senegal. As of late October, nearly 10,000 people have contracted EVD, of whom almost 5,000 have died ( Figure 1 ). Due to inadequate disease surveillance capacities in the region, WHO estimates that actual cases may be two to four times higher than reported. Simultaneous multi-country outbreaks. Until October, no EVD cases outside of Africa resulted in secondary cases. In that month, health workers in the United States and Spain contracted EVD while caring for EVD patients. No additional cases have been reported from the health workers. Scale and pace of transmission . Unrelated, Ongoing Ebola Outbreak
A separate Ebola outbreak that is unrelated to the ongoing West Africa outbreak was detected in the DRC on August 24, 2014. To meet the health and secondary effects of the outbreak, the United Nations estimates that it will cost Guinea $194 million, Liberia, $473 million, and Sierra Leone $220 million. In order to stop the spread of EVD, WHO estimated at the end of August 2014 that the affected countries would need more than 13,000 health workers to provide health care, contact tracing, and safe burial. Safe disposal of dead bodies is also improving in Liberia, where roughly 90% of dead bodies are being removed within 24 hours of being reported to the National Call Center. In September, the United Nations (U.N.) established the U.N. Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) to coordinate the international response to the outbreak. WHO Ebola Response Roadmap
As indicated above, roughly half of the U.N. request for tackling the outbreak is aimed at addressing direct health impacts. The World Health Organization is leading that component and has outlined measures the international community would need to take to contain the outbreak by January 2014. U.S. Responses to Pandemic Threats and Ebola
The United States is the leading funder of the international Ebola response and its financial support is continuing to rise. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reports that as of October 22, U.S. humanitarian funding for EVD responses totaled $344.6 million. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) is planning to spend more than $1 billion on containing the outbreak in support of U.S. EVD activities in West Africa, as described below. On October 17, President Obama established an Ebola Czar to coordinate U.S. domestic and global responses to the Ebola outbreak. As of October 25, nearly 900 U.S. Government personnel are stationed in the region, more than 700 of which are among the 4,000 military personnel who will be deployed to the region. Related activities in 18 countries in East and Central Africa and South and Southeast Asia focus on:
viral detection —identification of viruses in wildlife, livestock, and human populations that may be public health threats; risk determination —characterization of the potential risk and method of transmission for specific viruses of animal origin; institutionalization of a "one health" approach —integration of a multi-sector approach to public health (including animal health and environment); outbreak response capacity —support for sustainable, country-level response to include preparedness and coordination; and risk reduction —promotion of actions that minimize or eliminate the potential for the emergence and spread of new viral threats. This section describes issues Congress may consider as it assesses U.S. and international responses. Leadership of the International Outbreak Response
Observers have criticized WHO leadership over the global Ebola response. An accounting of broader health and development needs will likely ensue and may rekindle debate over how U.S. global health assistance funds are apportioned. Prospects for future Ebola outbreaks in urban areas and in countries with limited pandemic preparedness capacity raise several questions, including:
Is the U.S. response to the Ebola outbreak effective? | In March 2014, an Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak was reported in Guinea, West Africa. The outbreak is the first in West Africa and has caused an unprecedented number of cases and deaths. The outbreak is continuing to spread in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia (the "affected countries"); it has been contained in Nigeria and Senegal, and has been detected in Mali. As of October 22, 2014, more than 10,000 people have contracted EVD, more than half of whom have died.
Until October 2014, no secondary EVD cases had occurred outside of Africa. That month, health workers in Spain and the United States contracted EVD cases while providing care for Ebola patients. Other factors make this outbreak unique, including
its introduction into West Africa; multi-country outbreaks occurring simultaneously; disease transmission within urban areas; and an unprecedented scale and pace of transmission.
In the aggregate, between 1976, when Ebola was first identified, through 2012, there were 2,387 cases, including 1,590 deaths, all in Central and East Africa. The number of Ebola cases in this outbreak is four times higher than the combined total of all prior outbreaks, and the number of cases is doubling monthly. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) have projected an exponential increase in cases. WHO estimated that by the end of November, some 20,000 people may contract Ebola; CDC estimated that "without additional interventions or changes in community behavior," up to 1.4 million could contract EVD in Liberia and Sierra Leone by January 2015. CDC indicates, however, that the outbreak may not reach such proportions since responses are intensifying. In Liberia, for example, improvements in burial practices have resulted in roughly 85% of all bodies being collected within 24 hours of being reported to national officials.
In an August 2014 report, WHO estimated that it would cost roughly $500 million to contain the outbreak by January. In September, international responses accelerated. The United Nations (U.N.) established the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) "to utilize the assets of all relevant U.N. agencies" to address the health and broader social impacts of the outbreak. A proposed U.N. response would cost roughly $1 billion, about half of which would be aimed at addressing health impacts.
The United States is the leading funder of the international Ebola response, and its financial support is growing. As of October 25, almost 900 U.S. government personnel had deployed to the region, and some 4,000 military personnel will be deployed to the region. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reports that as of October 22, U.S. funding for EVD responses totaled $344.6 million. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) is planning to spend more than $1 billion on EVD activities in West Africa. On October 17, President Obama established an Ebola Czar to coordinate U.S. domestic and global responses to the Ebola outbreak.
Some global health experts have criticized the U.S. and international response to the Ebola outbreak, decrying the pace and scale of assistance. The limited impact of U.S. and international responses to the Ebola outbreak has raised several questions regarding global health governance structures, international commitment to bolstering pandemic preparedness and response capacity in poor countries, and global support for strengthening health systems. The international community lacks a rapid response team of health professionals prepared to address health emergencies like the ongoing West African Ebola outbreak. Debates about whether WHO should have such capacity have been at the heart of recent WHO reform debates.
While deliberating the appropriate response to ongoing Ebola outbreak, Congress is likely to discuss the breadth of health, social, economic, development, and security challenges that this outbreak is causing, as well as how U.S. global health aid is apportioned. This report focuses on the health impacts of the outbreak and discusses U.S. and international responses to those health challenges. |
crs_RL33795 | crs_RL33795_0 | Avian flu is an Influenza A virus that infects both wild and domestic birds, and certain strains have been known to infect both animals and humans. Status of Avian Influenza Outbreaks
A strain of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) has spread throughout Asia since 2003, and has subsequently moved into Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. It has infected mostly poultry and wild birds, but a limited number of humans have contracted the disease through close domestic poultry-to-human contact. Over 250 million poultry have died or been destroyed internationally. Since wild birds can carry the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of the Interior (DOI) have increased surveillance of wild and migratory birds. Surveillance is particularly high in Alaska, where Asian and American flyways overlap. Migrating birds from Asia could carry the virus to Alaska, and infect birds from the Americas on shared nesting grounds. The newly infected birds could carry the virus down North American flyways. The H5N1 outbreak in poultry and birds has grown in scale, causing massive international government responses, and economic, food, and trade impacts due to the animal disease and public health concerns. In wild populations, avian flu is not typically fatal—or even apparent. To reduce the possibility that highly pathogenic H5N1 enters the United States accidentally or intentionally, the USDA has blocked imports of poultry and poultry products (such as feathers, meat, or eggs) from affected countries, and increased smuggling interdiction efforts. Despite the attention given to migratory bird surveillance in North America, some believe that poultry imports into Central and South America are a more likely pathway for the virus to enter the Western Hemisphere. If the virus spreads from poultry to wild birds, subsequent wild bird migration could bring the virus north into the United States. Fatality rates are high; over 55% of the more than 275 people infected with highly pathogenic H5N1 (mostly in Asia) have died. Officials worry that the virus could mutate or combine with human flu viruses to allow efficient human-to-human transmission, which could lead to a human flu pandemic. If highly pathogenic H5N1 is found in the Americas, it does not signal the onset of a global human pandemic. The virus has not yet mutated to allow human-to-human transmission, and scientists disagree on the likelihood of this happening. Thus, FAO and WHO developed a strategy calling for the swift and coordinated control of avian flu in poultry as the best way to prevent or delay a human pandemic from developing, by reducing the number of animal hosts in which the virus may evolve. As discussed earlier in this report, federal and state agencies have increased surveillance of wild birds for H5N1. In 2006, USDA began a new indemnity plan for low pathogenicity avian flu. | Avian influenza is a viral disease that primarily infects birds, both domestic and wild. Certain strains of bird flu break the avian barrier and have been known to infect other animals and humans. Avian flu viruses are common among wild bird populations, which act as a reservoir for the disease. While rarely fatal in wild birds, avian flu is highly contagious and often fatal in domestic poultry, prompting strict biosecurity measures on farms. International trade restrictions imposed by countries to counter avian flu can have large economic effects.
The H5N1 strain of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) has spread throughout Asia since 2003, infecting mostly poultry, some wild birds, and a limited number of humans through close domestic poultry-to-human contact. The virus has spread beyond Asia, reaching Europe in 2005 and the Middle East and Africa in 2006. Over 250 million poultry have died or been destroyed internationally. Human mortality among the more than 275 people infected exceeds 55%. Fears that the virus could mutate to allow efficient human-to-human transmission and cause a human pandemic have prompted a massive political and public health response.
Since wild birds can carry the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus, federal, state, and other agencies have increased surveillance of wild and migratory birds. Surveillance is particularly high in Alaska, where Asian and American flyways overlap. Migrating birds from Asia could carry the virus to Alaska and infect birds from the Americas on shared nesting grounds. The newly infected birds could carry the virus down North American flyways. Alternatively, imports into Central and South America could introduce the virus to the Western Hemisphere, and subsequent wild bird migration could bring the virus north into the United States. The United States also has blocked imports of poultry and poultry products from H5N1-infected countries.
The highly pathogenic H5N1 strain has not yet been detected in the United States. But surveillance has detected different, low pathogenicity strains in wild bird populations, including a low pathogenicity H5N1. The low pathogenicity strain does not pose the same threat as highly pathogenic H5N1. Even if highly pathogenic H5N1 is found in the Americas, it does not signal the onset of a global human pandemic. The virus apparently has not yet mutated to allow efficient human-to-human transmission, and scientists disagree whether or when this may happen.
Controlling avian flu in poultry, and to the extent possible in wild birds, is seen as the best way to prevent a human pandemic from developing—by reducing the number of animal hosts in which the virus may evolve. Indemnity payments to compensate farmers for birds destroyed in eradication efforts are seen as an important element of increasing success to control the disease.
Congressional agriculture committees have held hearings on avian influenza preparedness, and appropriators have increased funding for surveillance and other preparedness activities for poultry and wild birds.
This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R43444 | crs_R43444_0 | Until recently, it was very difficult for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to detect such evasion. More recently, Congress enacted a separate provision in the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) that has reporting requirements that in some cases may result in the same account being reported on two different forms, but which includes reporting requirements for assets not covered by the earlier act. In some cases, withholding tax requirements may be imposed on these entities. Reporting by U.S. Tax Entities
In addition to being required, generally, to report all income from accounts and assets even if located outside the United States, certain persons are required to report the existence of such foreign assets either via Form 8938, which is filed along with their tax returns, or by electronically filing FinCEN Form 114 (FBAR) with the Department of the Treasury. Reporting by Foreign Entities
Tax evasion through offshore accounts can be facilitated by foreign financial institutions (FFIs) or other financial intermediaries. Although they may not be complicit in the tax evasion, these entities can play a part in curbing offshore tax evasion by reporting information on assets owned or controlled by entities subject to U.S. income tax. FATCA imposes reporting requirements on FFIs regarding their U.S. account holders, as well as obligations on non-financial foreign entities (NFFEs). If the FFI requirements are not met, then a withholding agent making a withholdable payment to an FFI must withhold tax from the payment at a rate of 30%. Questions have been raised about such things as whether FATCA's requirements are inconsistent with existing U.S. treaty obligations; how to handle potential conflict of law issues arising when an FFI is faced with complying with FATCA or its home country's domestic (e.g., banking and privacy) laws; and whether the United States has intruded into other countries' sovereignty. The Treasury Department and IRS have reached out to other countries and entered into bilateral intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) with some of them. In general, the agreements provide that the other country's FFIs will be deemed to comply with FATCA's requirements if they follow the agreement, which means they would not be subject to withholding on payments received or the requirements related to recalcitrant account holders (i.e., withholding or closing the account). Deadline Extensions
FATCA's FFI and NFFE requirements have also been criticized as overly burdensome, and stakeholders have indicated they have insufficient time to prepare for the new reporting regime. The IRS has responded by extending various deadlines under FATCA. The 2010 law enacting FATCA's FFI and NFFE requirements provides that, in general, "the amendments made by this section shall apply to payments made after December 31, 2012." The provision would also create two rebuttable presumptions for purposes of any U.S. civil judicial or administrative proceeding to determine or collect tax involving non-FATCA institutions (i.e., FFIs that did not meet FATCA's reporting requirements):
that a U.S. person exercised control over an entity holding an account or having assets in a non-FATCA institution if the person directly or indirectly formed, transferred assets to, was a beneficiary of, had a beneficial interest in, or received money or property or the use thereof from the entity, and that any amount or thing of value received by a U.S. person from an account or an entity holding an account or assets in a non-FATCA institution constitutes income taxable in the year of receipt and any amount or thing of value paid or transferred by or on behalf of a U.S. person directly or indirectly to such an account or entity represents previously unreported income taxable in the year of transfer. Finally, the Commission on Americans Living Abroad Act ( H.R. | All citizens of the United States as well as U.S. resident aliens are required to report their world-wide income for U.S. federal income tax purposes. However, where foreign assets are involved, this is an area in which taxpayers, knowingly or unknowingly, may fail to comply with the law. There are numerous information reporting requirements involving foreign assets that may assist the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in recognizing a failure to report foreign income; however, both taxpayers and tax preparers may not be fully compliant with filing these forms. Again, this may be more a matter of ignorance of the requirements than any intent to skirt the law.
Neither the reporting requirement imposed by the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) nor the Foreign Bank Account Reporting (FBAR) imposed by the older Bank Secrecy Act directly involves reporting income for tax purposes. Instead, each involves reporting the existence of financial assets or accounts located outside of the United States. Although in some cases the same accounts or assets may be reported on each information-reporting form, both forms may be required. Failure to file either form if required may result in significant penalties, in some cases amounting to the entire balance of the unreported account or more.
Tax evasion through offshore accounts can be facilitated by foreign financial institutions (FFIs) or other financial intermediaries. Although they may not be complicit in the tax evasion, these entities can play a part in curbing offshore tax evasion by reporting information on assets owned or controlled by entities subject to U.S. income tax. FATCA imposes reporting requirements on FFIs regarding their U.S. account holders, as well as obligations on non-financial foreign entities (NFFEs) regarding their U.S. owners. If the requirements are not met, then any withholdable payment to the entity is subject to withholding of tax at a rate of 30%.
Since FATCA's passage, there has been criticism of the FFI and NFFE provisions and how they relate to other countries, including whether FATCA's requirements are inconsistent with existing U.S. treaty obligations and what happens when the requirements conflict with another country's domestic (e.g., banking or privacy) laws. The Treasury Department and IRS have reached out to other countries and entered into bilateral intergovernmental agreements with 24 of them. In general, these provide that the other country's FFIs will be deemed compliant with FATCA's requirements if they comply with the agreement. FATCA's requirements have also been criticized as overly burdensome and stakeholders have indicated they have insufficient time to prepare for them. The IRS has responded by extending various deadlines under FATCA—while the 2010 law enacting FATCA provides that, in general, its provisions "apply to payments made after December 31, 2012," the IRS has on several occasions extended various deadlines, with many provisions scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 2014.
Finally, legislation has been introduced in the 113th Congress that would repeal much of FATCA (S. 887); modify FATCA with the intent of "strengthening" it (H.R. 1554, H.R. 3666, S. 1533, and S. 268); or require that its effects on U.S. citizens living abroad be studied (H.R. 597). |
crs_R41914 | crs_R41914_0 | Introduction
Given the central role of electric power in the nation's economy, and the importance of coal in power production, concerns have been raised about the cost and potential impact of numerous regulatory actions that would impose new requirements on coal-fired power plants. Using color-coded categories, the chart identified rules under development at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and depicted a schedule for development and implementation of the rules between 2008 and 2017. Some of them are expected to be expensive; the costs of others are likely to be moderate or limited, or they are unknown at this point because a rule has not yet been proposed. Some may question why EPA is undertaking so many regulatory actions at once, but it is the decades of regulatory inaction that led to this point that strike other observers. The inaction stemmed in large part from special consideration given electric utilities by Congress: both the Clean Air Act and the Solid Waste Disposal Act required special studies and reports to Congress before EPA could set standards for certain pollutants emitted or wastes disposed by electric utilities. The following sections of this report describe seven rules or categories of rules that are the core of the "train wreck" debate, with background on the rule, information on its requirements (for those rules that have been proposed or promulgated), and where possible, a discussion of the rule's potential costs and benefits. Circuit Court of Appeals for further agency action, and others are being challenged in court. If necessary, as shown in Figure 6 , the industry is capable of adding new generating capacity in a short time. The primary impacts of many of the rules discussed here will be on coal-fired plants more than 40 years old that have not, until now, installed state-of-the-art pollution controls. The low prices apparently reflect recent reports that future supplies of gas are projected to be abundant. Resolutions critical of EPA's actions have been introduced in several state legislatures this year. Concluding Thoughts About the "Train Wreck" Analyses
EEI, NERC, and other recent reports describe scenarios and potential impacts of EPA rules, including projected need for additional power plant capacity or potential reliability problems, that depend on a number of assumptions such as the stringency of the rules or expected tight compliance deadlines, many of which differ greatly from what EPA has actually proposed or promulgated. Rules when actually proposed or issued may well differ enough that investment or retirement decisions look entirely different. Although much of the current critical attention to EPA's regulations has focused on rules affecting power plants, especially coal-fired power plants, the rules discussed here are only part of EPA's statutory mandate and regulatory agenda, and there are controversies about many of these other rules, as well, such as a MACT rule to control toxic air pollutants from commercial and industrial boilers and several Clean Water Act rules concerning water quality standards and permits. Many of these plants are inefficient, and are being replaced by more efficient combined cycle natural gas plants. Promulgation of standards is not the end of the road. Virtually all major EPA regulatory actions are subjected to court challenge, frequently delaying implementation for years. In many cases, EPA rules must be adopted by states to which the relevant program has been delegated. | Given the central role of electric power in the nation's economy, and the importance of coal in power production, concerns have been raised recently about the cost and potential impact of regulations under development at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that would impose new requirements on coal-fired power plants. Six of the rules, which have drawn much of the recent attention, are Clean Air Act regulations. Two others are Clean Water Act rules, and one is a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act rule. The majority are expected to be promulgated over the next 18 months. All together, these rules have been characterized by critics as a regulatory "train wreck" that would impose excessive costs and lead to plant retirements that could threaten the adequacy of electricity capacity (i.e., reliability of supply) across the country, especially from now through 2017.
Although some question why EPA is undertaking so many regulatory actions in such a short time-frame, supporters of the regulations assert that it is decades of regulatory delays and court decisions that have led to this point, resulting in part from special consideration given electric utilities by Congress under several statutes. Further, several of the current regulatory developments have been under consideration for a decade or longer, or are being reevaluated after an earlier action was vacated or remanded to EPA by the courts. The regulations are supported by proponents and EPA as having substantial benefits for public health and the environment.
Recent reports by industry trade associations and others have discussed potential harm of EPA's prospective regulations to U.S. electricity generating capacity, with emphasis on coal-fired generation. One of these reports, by the Edison Electric Institute, which represents investor-owned utilities, has attracted considerable attention by depicting a timeline in which multiple rules would take effect more or less simultaneously over the next five years. Congress has shown significant interest in these issues, and bills have been introduced that would de-fund or restrict EPA's ability to develop rules, and which would legislate new regulatory analytic requirements. This report describes nine rules in seven categories that are at the core of recent critical analyses, with background on the rule and its requirements and, where possible, a discussion of the rule's potential costs and benefits.
The EEI and other analyses discussed here generally predate EPA's actual proposals and reflect assumptions about stringency and timing (especially for implementation) that differ significantly from what EPA actually may propose or has promulgated. Some of the rules are expected to be expensive; costs of others are likely to be moderate or limited, or they are unknown at this point because a rule has not yet been proposed. Rules when actually proposed or issued may well differ enough that a plant operator's decision about investing in pollution controls or facility retirement will look entirely different from what these analyses project. Further, promulgation of standards is not the end of the road: court challenges are likely, potentially delaying implementation for years, and even when final, EPA rules must be adopted by states and implemented over time through state-issued permits.
The primary impacts of many of the rules will largely be on coal-fired plants more than 40 years old that have not, until now, installed state-of-the-art pollution controls. Many of these plants are inefficient and are being replaced by more efficient combined cycle natural gas plants, a development likely to be encouraged if the price of competing fuel—natural gas—continues to be low, almost regardless of EPA rules. |
crs_R41081 | crs_R41081_0 | Congress enacted the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 (WSRA) as part of a myriad of environmental conservation legislation enacted in the 1960s and 1970s. The act provides protection to certain rivers within the United States in order to balance the tendency toward development of the nation's rivers for industry or recreation. The act declares it to be the policy of the United States that certain rivers that possess "outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values, shall be preserved in free-flowing condition." The act further provides that "the established national policy of dam and other construction be complemented by a policy that would preserve other selected rivers ... in their free-flowing condition to protect the water quality of such rivers and to fulfill other vital national conservation purposes." In order to protect rivers according to the purpose of the act, the WSRA uses water rights to maintain flows and restrictions on development of federal projects to preserve the natural path of the rivers. This report analyzes the federal government's authority under the WSRA to maintain and preserve designated rivers. It examines the use of federal water rights under the act to ensure instream flows and the prohibitions on development of rivers for federal projects. Overview of the WSRA
The WSRA created a national wild and scenic rivers system comprised of rivers meeting certain criteria outlined by the act. | Congress enacted the WSRA as part of a myriad of environmental conservation legislation enacted in the 1960s and 1970s. The act provides protection to certain rivers within the United States in order to balance the tendency toward development of the nation's rivers for industry or recreation. The act declares it to be the policy of the United States that certain rivers that possess "outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values, shall be preserved in free-flowing condition." The act further provides that "the established national policy of dam and other construction be complemented by a policy that would preserve other selected rivers ... in their free-flowing condition to protect the water quality of such rivers and to fulfill other vital national conservation purposes."
Under the act, rivers meeting certain criteria may be designated for inclusion in a national rivers system and classified for specific protections. A river may be classified as wild (the most primitive rivers with the most restrictive protections), scenic (rivers with some access with intermediate protections), or recreational (rivers with some development with the most lenient protections). Designated federal agencies issue comprehensive management plans to ensure the protected values of the river. In order to accomplish the goals of the act, the WSRA uses two main methods of protection: water rights to maintain flows and restrictions on development for federal projects to preserve the natural path of the rivers.
This report analyzes the federal government's authority under the WSRA to maintain and preserve designated rivers. It provides an overview of the WSRA and the process by which rivers are designated and administered under the act. It also examines the use of federal water rights under the act to ensure instream flows and the prohibitions on development of rivers for federal projects. |
crs_R41298 | crs_R41298_0 | Introduction
In 1933, during the first 100 days of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) were enacted, setting up a pervasive regulatory scheme for the public offering of securities and generally prohibiting commercial banks from underwriting and dealing in those securities. One of the benefits of being a bank, and thus being subjected to heavy, expensive regulation, is access to what is referred to as the "federal safety net," which includes the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC's) deposit insurance, the Federal Reserve's discount window lending facility, and the Federal Reserve's payment system. Rather than regulating for safety and soundness, the SEC's regulatory regime is predominately built around registration, disclosure of risk, and the prevention and prosecution of insider trading and other forms of fraud. While there are two distinct regulatory systems, the distinguishing lines between the traditional activities engaged in by commercial and investment banks became increasingly difficult to discern as a result of competition, financial innovation, and technological advances in combination with permissive agency and judicial interpretation. In the wake of the Great Recession of 2008, there have been calls to reexamine the activities that should be permissible for commercial banks in light of the fact that they receive governmental benefits through access to the federal safety net. Some have called for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of the GSA, which is discussed in greater detail in another CRS report. While neither the House- nor the Senate-passed version of H.R. 4173 , the comprehensive financial regulatory reform proposals of the 111 th Congress, includes provisions that would reenact the GSA, both bills do propose curbs on "proprietary trading" by banking institutions. The bills would limit the ability of commercial banking institutions and their affiliated companies and subsidiaries to engage in trading unrelated to customer needs and investing in and sponsoring hedge funds or private equity funds. Such an approach has been referred to as the "Volcker Rule," having been urged upon Congress by Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the FRB and current Chairman of the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board. This report briefly discusses the permissible proprietary trading activities of commercial banks and their subsidiaries under current law. It then analyzes the Volcker Rule proposals under both the House- and Senate-passed financial reform bills. Appendix A , Appendix B , and Appendix C of the report provide the full legislative language from both bills. (g) Council Study and Rulemaking-
(1) STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS- Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Council —
(A) shall complete a study of the definitions under subsection (a) and the other provisions under subsections (b) through (f), to assess the extent to which the definitions under subsection (a) and the implementation of subsections (a) through (f) would —
(i) promote and enhance the safety and soundness of depository institutions and the affiliates of depository institutions;
(ii) protect taxpayers and enhance financial stability by minimizing the risk that depository institutions and the affiliates of depository institutions will engage in unsafe and unsound activities;
(iii) limit the inappropriate transfer of Federal subsidies from institutions that benefit from deposit insurance and liquidity facilities of the Federal Government to unregulated entities;
(iv) reduce inappropriate conflicts of interest between the self-interest of depository institutions, affiliates of depository institutions, and financial companies supervised by the Board, and the interests of the customers of such institutions and companies;
(v) raise the cost of credit or other financial services, reduce the availability of credit or other financial services, or impose other costs on households and businesses in the United States ;
(vi) limit activities that have caused undue risk or loss in depository institutions, affiliates of depository institutions, and financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors, or that might reasonably be expected to create undue risk or loss in such institutions, affiliates, and companies; and
(vii) appropriately accommodates the business of insurance within an insurance company subject to regulation in accordance with State insurance company investment laws;
(B) shall make recommendations regarding the definitions under subsection (a) and the implementation of other provisions under subsections (b) through (f), including any modifications to the definitions, prohibitions, requirements, and limitations contained therein that the Council determines would more effectively implement the purposes of this section; and
(C) may make recommendations for prohibiting the conduct of the activities described in subsections (b) and (c) above a specific threshold amount and imposing additional capital requirements on activities conducted below such threshold amount. | In 1933, during the first 100 days of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) were enacted, setting up a pervasive regulatory scheme for the public offering of securities and generally prohibiting commercial banks from underwriting and dealing in those securities. Banks are subject to heavy, expensive prudential regulation, while the regulation of securities firms is predominately built around registration, disclosure of risk, and the prevention and prosecution of insider trading and other forms of fraud.
While there are two distinct regulatory systems, the distinguishing lines between the traditional activities engaged in by commercial and investment banks became increasingly difficult to discern as a result of competition, financial innovation, and technological advances in combination with permissive agency and judicial interpretation.
One of the benefits of being a bank, and thus being subject to more extensive regulation, is access to what is referred to as the "federal safety net," which includes the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC's) deposit insurance, the Federal Reserve's discount window lending facility, and the Federal Reserve's payment system.
In the wake of the Great Recession of 2008, there have been calls to reexamine the activities that should be permissible for commercial banks in light of the fact that they receive governmental benefits through access to the federal safety net. Some have called for the reenactment of the provisions of the GSA that imposed affiliation restrictions between banks and securities firms, which were repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) in 1999.
While neither the House- nor the Senate-passed version of H.R. 4173, the comprehensive financial regulatory reform proposals of the 111th Congress, includes provisions that would reenact the GSA, both bills do propose curbs on "proprietary trading" by banking institutions. H.R. 4173, newly titled the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which is modeled on the Senate version, would limit the ability of commercial banking institutions and their affiliated companies and subsidiaries to engage in trading unrelated to customer needs and investing in and sponsoring hedge funds or private equity funds. Such an approach has been referred to as the "Volcker Rule," having been urged upon Congress by Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System and current Chairman of the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board.
This report briefly discusses the permissible proprietary trading activities of commercial banks and their subsidiaries under current law. It then analyzes the Volcker Rule proposals under the House- and Senate-passed financial reform bills and under the Conference Report. Appendix A, Appendix B, and Appendix C of the report provide the full legislative language in each. |
crs_RS21004 | crs_RS21004_0 | This act also had a provision under which Congress would consider implementing bills for trade agreements under expedited congressional procedures, known as fast-track. Although TPA expired on July 1, 2007, four proposed U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) were signed in time to be considered by Congress under TPA procedures in the 110 th Congress; the U.S. FTAs were negotiated separately with the countries of Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. The implementing legislation for the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement was passed by Congress and signed by the President on December 14, 2007 ( P.L. 110-138 ). In Table 1 , some of the listed bills focus solely on fast-track trade negotiating authority or TPA. In the 109 th Congress, implementing legislation for three free trade agreements was passed under fast-track procedures on three separate bills:
H.R. CRS Report R41544, Trade Promotion Authority and the Korea Free Trade Agreement , by [author name scrubbed]. | This report profiles significant legislation, including floor votes, that authorized the use of presidential Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)—previously known as fast-track trade negotiating authority—since its inception in 1974. The report also includes a list of floor votes since 1979 on implementing legislation for trade agreements that were passed under TPA fast-track procedures. Although TPA expired on July 1, 2007, four free trade agreements (FTAs) were signed in time to be considered under TPA expedited procedures in the 110th Congress. The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act was passed by Congress (H.R. 3688) and signed into law as P.L. 110-138 on December 14, 2007. The legislative future of three proposed U.S FTAs (with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea) is uncertain. For further discussions of TPA or fast-track legislative activity, the report lists CRS reports and Internet resources.
This report will be updated as events warrant in the 112th Congress. |
crs_R41864 | crs_R41864_0 | Introduction and Recent Developments
After the recent financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, P.L. 111-203 , which overhauled financial sector regulation. The 112 th Congress is actively involved in overseeing the act's implementation, including provisions involving corporate governance, the framework of rules and practices by which a board of directors ensures accountability, fairness, and transparency in the firm's relationship with its stakeholders. Substantive corporate governance matters have traditionally been delegated to the states. Proxy materials and proxy statements are used to inform shareholders and to solicit votes for corporate decisions (such as the election of directors) and other corporate actions (including official management and shareholder corporate proposals for shareholder consideration). Shareholders interested in fellow shareholders consideration of an alternative slate of board nominees outside of inclusion in proxy materials must bear the distribution and printing costs of getting their slate to the dispersed corporate shareholders. In September 2011, shortly after the SEC rulemaking, two major business trade groups, the Business Roundtable (Roundtable) and the United States Chamber of Commerce (Chamber) filed a petition for review of the new but yet to be implemented SEC rulemaking under which proxy access would be provided to large investors meeting minimum continuous stock ownership requirements and ownership thresholds with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on the grounds, among other things, that the rule was arbitrary and capricious. On July 22, 2011, in Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce v. Securities and Exchange Commission , No. This report examines: key aspects and the potential impact of the proxy access rules that the SEC adopted in August 2010; a provision in the Dodd-Frank Act that affirms the SEC's authority to make proxy access rules; congressional opposition to that provision; and the aforementioned court case that resulted in the SEC tabling the implementation of a key part of its proxy access rules. The SEC's August 2010 Proxy Access Rules
The proxy access rules adopted by the SEC involved two basic initiatives under Regulation 14, which the SEC adopted in 1935 pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act: (1) the creation of a new rule, Rule 14a-11, which would permit individual investors or investor groups with a certain threshold percentage of the total voting power of a company's securities to put forward board nominees on a company's proxy materials; and (2) a new amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) which would loosen historical limits on the ability of shareholders to make proposals related to contested director elections. To nominate directors under the rule, a shareholder would be required to own and have continuously held for at least three years, at least 3% of the total voting power of the company's voting securities during its annual meetings to elect directors. An eligible shareholder would be able to include only one director nominee, or several nominees who represent no more than 25% of the members of a company's board, whichever is greater. If a board has eight members, up to two shareholder nominees could be included in the proxy materials.) The Exchange Act permits companies to exclude shareholder proposals regarding elections. Several derive from labor unions and pension fund groups that have advocated for proxy access for many years. A major concern of critics of proxy access, including the Chamber and the Roundtable, was that the reform will enable select numbers of large shareholders with particular agendas to use the threat of proxy access as a bargaining tool to pressure companies into pursuing parochial interests that may have little to do with the goal of maximizing shareholder returns. The SEC Decides Not to Appeal the Court's Ruling
On September 6, 2011, the SEC announced that it would not be pursuing an appeal of the court's ruling to vacate Rule 14a-11. It is a process that helps make boards more accountable for the risks undertaken by the companies they manage. | In response to the financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protections Act (P.L. 111-203) overhauled the nation's financial sector regulation. The 112th Congress is actively involved in overseeing the act's implementation, including provisions involving corporate governance such as expanding the role played by shareholders in the selection of public company corporate boards. While some regarded this as a change that would help make boards more sensitive to market developments and thus shareholder interests, others see it as a change that would place too much potentially abusable power in the hands of large shareholders.
Members of public company boards are supposed to play key fiduciary and management watchdog roles for the shareholders. At annual public company shareholder meetings, incumbent boards submit slates of board nominees for shareholder consideration as part of the official corporate proxy materials and statement sent to shareholders in advance of the meeting. Whereas states like Delaware (the state of incorporation for a large proportion of sizeable public firms) have largely governed substantive corporate matters for firms that they incorporate, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversees matters related to the content of proxy materials.
Historically, the SEC has interpreted applicable federal securities laws as allowing companies to exclude from their proxy materials shareholder proposals involving the nomination of persons to their boards. Shareholders interested in pushing an alternative slate of nominees for fellow shareholder consideration must bear the printing and distribution costs themselves, which many believe poses a significant obstacle. Proxy access would reduce these cost barriers by allowing shareholder nominations to be included in the corporate proxy materials.
A provision in the Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) enacted on July 21, 2010, explicitly authorizes the SEC to adopt proxy access rules. In August 2010, with the Republican commissioners dissenting, the SEC did so. The central and most controversial change, the adoption of Rule 14a-11 under Regulation 14, which the agency adopted in 1935 pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, would permit individual investors or investor groups with at least 3% of the total voting power of a company's securities to put forward no more than one nominee, or several that will constitute up to one-fourth of a company's board, whichever is greater, via the company's proxy material at the annual meeting. Shareholders would also be required to have held their shares for at least three years and will not be eligible to use the proxy access rule if their securities are held for the purpose of changing corporate control. Some longtime advocates of proxy access, including various labor unions such as the AFL-CIO and pension fund groups such as the Council of Institutional Investors, claim that the rules should help improve management as well as enhance investor returns. Some opponents of proxy access as formulated, including various business interests such as the Business Roundtable and the United States Chamber of Commerce, criticized the access rulemaking. A major criticism was that the SEC's rules would empower large investors, such as unions, at the expense of the small investors, giving them unfair leverage over corporate activities.
On September 29, 2010, the Chamber and the Roundtable jointly filed a petition with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit alleging that Rule 14a-11 violated several federal statutes. On October 4, 2010, pending a judicial decision, the SEC agreed to stay implementation of the rule. On July 22, 2011, calling the rule arbitrary and capricious, the appeals court voted to vacate Rule 14a-11, a ruling that the SEC decided not to appeal. This report will be updated as events dictate. |
crs_RS22715 | crs_RS22715_0 | Background1
Peru has had a turbulent political history, alternating between periods of democratic and authoritarian rule. Current Political and Economic Issues
Political Situation
On June 4, 2006, former President Alan GarcÃa defeated populist Ollanta Humala 53% to 47% in a close election. Economic Issues
President GarcÃa has continued the pro-market economic policies of his predecessor, Alejandro Toledo, who presided over one of the highest economic growth rates in Latin America throughout his term, with 8% growth in 2006. GarcÃa has embraced the U.S.- Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA), appointed a fiscally conservative finance minister, and cut government pay. U.S. - Peru Trade Promotion Agreement
The United States is Peru's largest trading partner. President Bush notified the Congress of the United States' intention to enter into the PTPA on January 6, 2006, and the agreement was signed on April 12, 2006. The PTPA was ratified by the Peruvian legislature in June 2006. PTPA implementing legislation ( H.R. 3688 ) passed the House on November 8, 2007, by a vote of 285 to 132; the Senate on December 4 by a vote of 77 to 18; and was signed by President Bush on December 14, ( P.L. 110-138 ). | Peru, a coca-producing country in the Andean region of South America, has had a turbulent political history. Despite its tumultuous past, Peru has recently taken steps to consolidate its democracy and pursue market-friendly economic policies. For the past seven years, Peru, a leading mineral exporter, has posted some of the fastest economic growth rates in Latin America. GDP growth reached 8% in 2007. In June 2006, former president Alan GarcÃa (1985-1990) was elected president in a close race. After taking office, GarcÃa embraced the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA), which the two countries signed on April 12, 2006 and the Peruvian legislature ratified in June 2006. PTPA implementing legislation ( H.R. 3688 ) passed the House on November 8, 2007, by a vote of 285 to 132; the Senate on December 4 by a vote of 77 to 18; and was signed by President Bush on December 14, ( P.L. 110-138 ). In addition to trade matters, congressional interest in Peru focuses on human rights issues and counternarcotics cooperation. See CRS Report RL34108, U.S.-Peru Economic Relations and the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement and CRS Report RS22521, Peru Trade Promotion Agreement: Labor Issues . This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R40605 | crs_R40605_0 | Thailand's Political Situation
Bangkok has been rocked by political turmoil since 2005, and particularly since a military coup deposed popularly-elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in September 2006. The cancellation was also a poor reflection on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the sponsoring organization, and therefore diminished Thailand's standing among its regional neighbors. Intra-military rivalries and turf wars, as well as competition between the armed forces and the police, further complicate the politics of the security forces. Since the turmoil started in 2006, the military has usurped power, governed the country, run elections, turned power back over to an elected government, and, generally, has exercised restraint in controlling the demonstrations that have rocked Bangkok and other areas of Thailand. However, analysts generally agree that the military still holds a strong influence over the course of current events. Thaksin's Role and Future
Thaksin remains a constant presence during the period of turmoil. The Royal Family
The role of the palace in Thai politics is complicated and exceedingly sensitive as an issue to the Thais. Implications for the United States
Thailand has been a significant partner for the United States and an important element of the U.S. strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific. All these issues have raised the question among many of how dependable Thailand is as a U.S. ally. In addition, Thailand's leadership of the region is challenged by the emergence of Indonesia as a compelling example of democratic success, particularly as the United States looks to capitalize on Obama's personal connection to the largest Muslim nation in the world. | Thailand has been destabilized by years of political turmoil since a military coup deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in September 2006. Mass demonstrations on both sides of the political divide have disrupted tourism and business in the kingdom, and twice forced the postponement of an international Asian leaders' summit. Since late 2008, a new coalition government has struggled to hold on to power by offering conciliatory gestures to the opposition and avoiding a violent military crackdown. This report examines the government's performance, the role of the military, Thaksin's impact on the situation, and the royal family's influence. It assesses the prospects for more elections, the degree of control exercised by the army over the civilian government, Thaksin's activities and possible future in Bangkok, and the role of the palace in current Thai politics.
As a formal U.S. treaty ally, Thailand's situation holds implications for the United States. The instability of the past several years has made many question the reliability of Thailand as a major regional partner as well as cast doubt on Bangkok's commitment to democratic governance. Others argue that, despite the political turmoil, the well-established defense relationship remains very valuable to the United States, even as opportunities emerge with other Southeast Asian countries. The relevance of competition with China in the region and the impact of Thailand's difficulties on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also examined.
This report will not be updated. Tracking of current events in Thailand can be found in CRS Report RL32593, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33551 | crs_RL33551_0 | 20 , the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY2007, the fourth in a series of continuing resolutions; it was signed into law on February 15, 2007 ( P.L. 110-5 provided funding for the remainder of FY2007 for most federal agencies, including the Departments of Transportation, the Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, and the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, the Executive Office of the President, and Independent Agencies. On July 26, 2006, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out H.R. The Committee recommended an overall net funding level of $141.2 billion (after budgetary scorekeeping adjustments), an increase of $3.6 billion (3%) over the amount in the FY2006 Act, $3.3 billion (2%) over the Administration request, and $2.5 billion (2%) over the House-passed amount. 5576 . The House approved an overall funding level of $139.6 billion (after budgetary scorekeeping adjustments), a $2 billion (1%) increase over the amount in the FY2006 Act and a $1 billion (less than 1%) increase over the Administration's request. Overview
The President's FY2007 request for the programs covered by this appropriations bill was $138.5 billion. This was $2.3 billion (2%) over the total in the FY2006 Act (after a 1.0% across-the-board rescission applied to the FY2006 funding). 5576 , the FY2007 Departments of Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, The Judiciary, District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations bill, provided $139.6 billion, $1.1 billion (less than 1%) over the Administration's request. H.R. This legislation provided funding for most federal agencies for the remainder for FY2007, generally at the level provided to agencies in FY2006, except where otherwise stated in the legislation. Among the agencies that received increases over their FY2006 levels were DOT and HUD. appropriations bill. Congress did not enact the majority of FY2007 appropriations bills before the end of the 2006 fiscal year. 109-289 , P.L. 109-369 , P.L. 109-383 ) which funded HUD programs at the lower of the House-passed or FY2006 enacted funding level. With some exceptions, the act funds accounts at their FY2006 levels. The Senate committee-passed version of H.R. 110-5 ) did not specify a funding level for elderly housing, which therefore received its FY2006 level of $734.6 million for FY2007. 5576 . For FY2007, P.L. For FY2006, P.L. 5576 . The FY2007 appropriations for GSA enacted in P.L. Not included in the House bill. In 2006, both the House-passed and Senate Appropriations Committee-reported versions of the FY2007 Transportation-Treasury-Housing appropriations bill, H.R. | The Bush Administration requested $138.5 billion (after scorekeeping adjustments) for these agencies for FY2007, an increase of $2.3 billion over the $136.2 billion Congress provided in the agencies' FY2006 appropriations act (this FY2006 figure reflects a 1.0% across-the-board rescission that was included in the FY2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. 109-148). The total FY2006 funding (after scorekeeping adjustments) for the agencies in this bill was $146.3 billion, due to emergency supplemental funding provided to deal with the effects of the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005.
In the appropriations process during the 109th Congress, the House-passed version of H.R. 5576, the FY2007 Departments of Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies appropriations bill provided a net total of $139.6 billion for FY2007, $3.4 billion (2%) over the amount provided in the FY2006 act and $1.1 billion (less than 1%) over the Administration's request (after scorekeeping adjustments). The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out H.R. 5576 on July 26, 2006, recommending a net total of $141.2 billion, $3.6 billion (3%) over the amount provided in the FY2006 Act and $2.6 billion (2%) over the Administration request. Both the House-passed and Senate-reported bills provided significant increases over the requested levels of funding for aviation programs and Amtrak, for a number of programs under the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and for the Executive Office of the President. H.R. 5576 expired with the close of the 109th Congress.
The Senate did not consider H.R. 5576, and Congress did not enact a regular FY2007 TTHUD appropriations bill (nor most other FY2007 appropriations bills). Instead, FY2007 funds were provided in a series of continuing resolutions (P.L. 109-289, P.L. 109-369, and P.L. 109-383), which funded agencies at the lower of the House- or Senate-passed levels or their FY2006 levels (since the Senate had not passed an FY2007 TTHUD appropriations bill, TTHUD agencies were funded at the lower of the House-passed or FY2006 levels). On February 15, 2007, President Bush signed the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY2007 (P.L. 110-5), which provided funding for most federal agencies for the remainder of FY2007. The law provided agencies with funding for FY2007 essentially at their FY2006 levels, except where otherwise statedi. Both DOT and HUD received increases over their regular FY2006 levels (excluding FY2006 supplemental funding). FY2007 funding levels for programs, projects, and activities were not specified in P.L. 110-5. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33941 | crs_RL33941_0 | Congress has addressed the regulations. A provision of the omnibus appropriations bill of 2009 ( H.R. 1105 ) would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw or reissue the regulation "without regard to any provision of statute or regulation." highlights the intersection of two significant issues currently before Congress—climate change and species protection. Listing decisions must rest solely on the best available scientific understanding of the species. For this species, a major threat is loss of its primary habitat on the Arctic sea ice, an ecosystem that is changing rapidly. Globally, less than one-third of the world's 19 polar bear populations are known to be declining, and more than one-third are increasing or stable. In the remaining third, data are insufficient to estimate population trends and their status has not been assessed. Scientists have observed that, in recent decades, the extent of Arctic sea ice has declined significantly, and indicate that the reduction results from climate warming: annual ice break-up in many areas is occurring earlier and freeze-up later. Arctic sea ice is experiencing a continuing decline that, it is thought, may not easily be reversed, and some models project that Arctic late summer (September) sea ice could disappear completely by mid-century. Although some scientists predict the extinction of polar bears under potential climate change scenarios, not all sea-ice changes would harm polar bears. Contaminants
Three main groups of contaminants are implicated as potentially threatening polar bears—petroleum hydrocarbons, persistent organic pollutants, and heavy metals. Subsistence and Sport Harvest
The United States allows limited subsistence harvest of polar bears by Alaska Natives. In Canada, Native Inuit hunters are permitted to allocate a limited portion of the subsistence harvest to sport hunters. Under 1994 amendments to the MMPA, U.S. citizens may obtain permits to import sport-harvested polar bear trophies from Canada, if taken under quotas scientifically designed to ensure the maintenance of the affected population at a sustainable level. The U.S. permit issuance fee for sport-hunted polar bear trophies is $1,000. The Listing Decision: Continuing Controversy
On May 14, 2008, in response to a court-ordered deadline, Interior Secretary Kempthorne announced a decision to list polar bears as threatened under the ESA. The listing decision itself was supported by environmental groups and various scientific societies; others, including the state of Alaska, opposed it, arguing that the science supporting listing was weak. This proposed rule did not designate critical habitat for the polar bear. Critics of the special rule argue that polar bear conservation cannot be addressed without addressing climate change, since loss of Arctic sea ice is acknowledged as one of the chief threats to the species. Alternative special rules might be promulgated later. The Secretary stated at the press conference announcing the decision that "polar bears are already protected under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, which has more stringent protections for polar bears than the Endangered Species Act does.... Critics, however, counter that polar bears today are not coping with changing climate alone, but also face a host of other human-induced factors—including shipping, oil and gas exploration, contaminants, and reduced prey populations—that compound the threat to their continued existence. | On May 14, 2008, Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthorne announced the listing of polar bears as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The controversial decision highlights the intersection of two significant issues currently before Congress—climate change and species protection. Under the ESA, a listing decision must rest solely on the best available scientific information concerning the species. Habitat loss has been a major reason for many decisions to add species to the list—in this case, loss of Arctic sea ice. The listing itself was praised by some environmentalists, who nonetheless deplored interim protective regulations for the polar bear as being too weak. Other parties, who opposed the listing itself, argued that the science supporting listing was weak, but felt that the regulations mitigated some of the economic impacts of the listing.
Congress is addressing the regulations. A provision in the 2009 omnibus appropriations bill (H.R. 1105) would allow the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce to withdraw the regulations without any administrative steps, effectively eliminating the special rules that were promulgated for this species.
Polar bears depend on Arctic sea ice, which most scientists acknowledge will be affected by climate change causing, at minimum, an earlier annual or seasonal thaw and a later freeze of coastal sea ice. Scientists generally agree that in recent decades, the observed extent of Arctic sea ice has declined significantly as the result of climate warming: annual ice break-up in many areas is occurring earlier and freeze-up later. Globally, less than one-third of the 19 known or recognized polar bear populations are declining, more than one-third are increasing or stable. For the remaining one-third there is insufficient data to estimate population trends. Two polar bear populations occur within U.S. jurisdiction. There is considerable uncertainty in estimates of polar bear population numbers and trends as well as in our understanding of polar bear habitat.
Polar bears are affected by climate change, environmental contaminants, and subsistence and sport hunting. Arctic sea ice is experiencing a continuing decline that may not be reversed easily, and some models project that late summer (September) sea ice could even disappear completely by mid-century. Controversy exists over how great a threat the changing climate might be to polar bears and whether they might be able to adapt to these changing conditions.
Some point out that polar bears today are not coping with changing climate alone, but also face a host of other human-induced factors—including oil and gas exploration, shipping, contaminants, and reduced prey populations—that compound the threat to their continued existence. Three main groups of contaminants threaten polar bears—petroleum hydrocarbons, persistent organic pollutants, and heavy metals. The United States has allowed limited subsistence harvest of polar bears by Alaska Natives. In Canada, Native hunters are permitted to allocate a limited portion of the subsistence harvest to sport hunters. Under 1994 amendments to the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), U.S. citizens may obtain permits to import sport-harvested polar bear trophies from Canada. However, with ESA listing, polar bear populations are defined as depleted under MMPA, and therefore entry of these trophies is prohibited by MMPA. |
crs_RL30341 | crs_RL30341_0 | Since 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. Paying particular attention to congressional influence on policy, Part I of this CRS Report discusses the U.S. "one China" policy concerning Taiwan since the United States (under President Nixon) began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People's Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing, which has insisted on its "one China" principle . In July 2007, Representative Tom Lantos, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that it was impractical for Taiwan to seek membership in the U.N.
A convergence emerged rhetorically among the PRC, Taiwan, and the United States on cross-strait "peaceful development" after Ma Ying-jeou became president in Taiwan in May 2008 and cross-strait tension reduced (partly due to a resumption of dialogue). On the 20 th anniversary of the Taiwan Policy Review of 1994, Representative Ed Royce, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, led a total of 29 Members to send a letter, on September 23, 2014, to Secretary of State John Kerry, calling for expanding engagement with Taiwan. Since the early 1990s, U.S. interests in the military balance as well as Taiwan's security and democracy have faced continued challenges due to the PRC's military modernization, moves perceived by Beijing as promoting de jure independence under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)'s president (2000-2008), and resistance in Taiwan by the Kuomintang (KMT) party to raising defense spending and strengthening self-defense. Peaceful Settlement
Third, the questions of the PRC's possible use of force, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and possible U.S. help in Taiwan's self-defense were left contentious and critical for U.S. interests. The U.S. "one China" policy has differed from the PRC's principle on "one China," and there have been questions about whether U.S. policy is one of support, non-support, or opposition to unification or independence. The United States did not explicitly state its own position on the status of Taiwan in the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques. After termination of the treaty, Congress passed and President Carter signed the TRA of 1979, adding U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan's self-defense and a potential U.S. role in maintaining peace in the strait. Reagan also gave "Six Assurances" to Taiwan. Overview of Issues
In short, since 1971, U.S. Presidents—both secretly and publicly—have continued to articulate a "one China" policy in understandings with the PRC. Nonetheless, policy makers have continued to face unresolved issues, while the political and strategic context of the policy has changed dramatically since the early 1970s. Congressional oversight of successive Presidents has watched for any new agreements with Beijing and any shift in the U.S. stance closer to that of Beijing's "one China" principle —on questions of sovereignty, arms sales, or dialogue. Not recognizing the PRC's claim over Taiwan or Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled. U.S. policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of the strait: a "peaceful resolution" with the assent of Taiwan's people and without unilateral changes. In other words, U.S. policy focuses on the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome. 96-8
Enacted April 10, 1979
Section 2(b) It is the policy of the United States
(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area;
(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States , and are matters of international concern;
(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;
(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. | Despite broadly consistent statements, the U.S. "one China" policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, analyzes the "one China" policy since U.S. Presidents began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan calls itself the Republic of China (ROC) and does not recognize the PRC. There are three sets of issues: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan; and cross-strait dialogue. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained non-diplomatic engagement with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC in 1979. The State Department claims an "unofficial" relationship with Taiwan. The United States did not explicitly state Taiwan's status in the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States "acknowledged" the "one China" position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Since 1971, U.S. Presidents—both secretly and publicly—have articulated a "one China" policy in understandings with the PRC. Congressional oversight has watched for any new agreements and any shift in the U.S. stance closer to that of Beijing's "one China" principle—on questions of sovereignty, arms sales, or dialogue. Not recognizing the PRC's claim over Taiwan or Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled. With added conditions, U.S. policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of the strait: a "peaceful resolution" with the assent of Taiwan's people and without unilateral changes. In short, U.S. policy focuses on the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome.
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. The TRA stipulates the expectation that the future of Taiwan "will be determined" by peaceful means. The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy, among the stipulations: to consider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan's future "a threat" to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of "grave concern" to the United States; "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;" and "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion" jeopardizing the security, or social or economic system of Taiwan's people. The TRA provides a congressional role in determining security assistance "necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." President Reagan also offered "Six Assurances" to Taipei in 1982, partly to continue arms sales.
Policy makers have continued to face unresolved issues, while the political and strategic context of the policy has changed dramatically since the 1970s. Since the early 1990s, U.S. interests in the military balance as well as Taiwan's security and democracy have been challenged by the PRC's military buildup (particularly in missiles) and potential coercion, moves perceived by Beijing for Taiwan's de jure independence under the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP's) president (2000-2008), and resistance in Taiwan by the Kuomintang (KMT) party to investing in self-defense. After the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou became President in May 2008, Taipei and Beijing reduced tension and resumed talks—beyond seeking detente. With President Obama since 2009, a rhetorical convergence emerged about "peaceful development" of cross-strait ties. However, disagreements remain about the PRC's goal of political talks for unification, Taiwan's status, Taiwan's self-defense, and U.S. arms sales and other cooperation with Taiwan. On September 23, 2014, 29 Members of the House sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry, calling for a new Taiwan Policy Review (after 20 years) to examine expanded engagement with Taiwan. |
crs_R43103 | crs_R43103_0 | Background
The United States has approximately 608,000 bridges on public roads subject to the National Bridge Inspection Standards mandated by Congress. In 2013, approximately 64,000 bridges, or 10% of the total number of bridges, were classified as structurally deficient, as compared to 138,000 in 1990. The share of bridges classified as functionally obsolete in 2013 was 14%. The funding increase was largely due to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ; ARRA). According to FHWA, to keep the backlog at the 2010 level through 2030 would require $8.9 billion annually (in 2010 dollars), less than the level of spending in 2010. FHWA, however, does not make the determination as to which bridges should benefit from federal funding. The 2012 surface transportation reauthorization, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21, P.L. Bridge improvements remain eligible for funding under two programs created by MAP-21 that distribute funds to the states under formulas specified in the law, the National Highway Performance Program (NHPP) and the Surface Transportation Program (STP). FHWA is involved in the project decision-making process in two significant ways. Under MAP-21, which eliminated the HBP, the states have even more freedom to decide how much of their federal surface transportation grants to spend on bridges. States may use this information to identify which bridges need replacement or repair. The condition of roads has not experienced the same degree of improvement as the condition of bridges. The terms "structurally deficient" and "functionally obsolete" are not synonymous with "unsafe." Under MAP-21, FHWA is to develop performance measures in regard to bridges. Federal Pressure for State Bridge Spending
To encourage state spending on structurally deficient bridges, MAP-21 sets a penalty threshold under the NHPP: any state whose structurally deficient bridge deck area on the National Highway System within the state's borders exceeds 10% of its total National Highway System bridge deck area for three years in a row must devote NHPP funds equal to 50% of the state's FY2009 Highway Bridge program apportionment to improve bridge conditions during the following fiscal year and each year thereafter until the deck area of structurally deficient bridges falls to 10% or below. Even if a state were required to spend more of its federal highway funding on bridges (and therefore less on roadway projects) due to this penalty, its mandated spending on deficient bridges would be less than was required prior to the enactment of MAP-21. Emphasize public-private partnerships (P3s) as a mechanism to help reduce the number of structurally deficient bridges, for example, by allowing states to offer long-term leases of toll facilities to private investors in return for large up-front payments that could be used to supplement normal state and federal spending on bridge replacement and repair. Redirect Spending Away from Off-System Bridges
Historically, nearly all federal highway funding was restricted to roads and bridges on the federal-aid highway system. | Of the 608,000 public road bridges in the United States, about 64,000 (10%) were classified as structurally deficient in 2013, and another 84,000 (14%) were classified as functionally obsolete. The number of structurally deficient and functionally obsolete bridges has been declining steadily for more than two decades, and those that remain are not necessarily unsafe. Nonetheless, several high-profile bridge failures, including the 2013 collapse of a bridge on Interstate 5 in Washington State, have drawn public attention to the condition of bridges on federal-aid highways.
As it debates reauthorization of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141), the 2012 law which reauthorized federal surface transportation programs, Congress may consider mandating increased spending on bridge improvements. The choice Congress makes will largely determine how quickly deficient and obsolete bridges will be replaced or improved. At the spending level of 2010, which included a significant amount of money provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) estimates that the bridge investment backlog (in dollar terms) would be reduced by 93% by 2030. Reducing the backlog to near zero during the same period is estimated to require an annual spending rate about 2% higher than the 2010 level.
MAP-21 eliminated the former Highway Bridge Program, which distributed federal money specifically for bridge improvements. States may use funds received under two major FHWA programs, the National Highway Performance Program and the Surface Transportation Program, for bridge repairs or construction, but the decision about how much of its funding to devote to bridges rather than roadway needs is up to each state. FHWA enforces certain planning requirements and performance standards established in MAP-21, but it does not make the determination as to which bridges should benefit from federal funding.
Congressional issues regarding the nation's highway bridge infrastructure include
Given the steady decline in the number of structurally deficient bridges during recent decades, should Congress accelerate work on the remaining deficient bridges? Should Congress encourage the states to spend more of their federal funds on their deficient bridges, potentially reducing the flexibility states were granted under MAP-21? Given large projected shortfalls in highway trust fund revenues relative to authorized spending, should Congress encourage increased use of tolling and public-private partnerships (P3s) to improve bridges? Should Congress redirect spending away from off-system bridges to more heavily used bridges on the designated federal-aid highways? Congressional oversight of bridge conditions could be complicated by the absence of a freestanding program. How quickly can FHWA develop the MAP-21 performance measures to report to Congress on progress on bridge conditions?
A brief CRS video on this subject may be viewed at http://www.crs.gov/video/detail.aspx?PRODCODE=WVB00009&Source=search. |
crs_R43293 | crs_R43293_0 | Introduction
Under federal law, corporations or most other legal entities may be criminally liable for the crimes of their employees and agents. Prosecutorial Discretion
Generally
The decision to prosecute a corporation or its culpable employees or both is vested in the Justice Department. Here perhaps the most easily assessed factor is the strength of the case against the defendant or defendants. Federal Interests
Whether to proceed with a prosecutable case ordinarily turns on the nature and seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the defendants. The factors identified in the business organization guidelines include
pervasiveness of the wrongdoing within the corporation; the corporation's history of misconduct; the existence and performance of compliance programs; the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing; the corporation's cooperation; absence of obstruction; collateral consequences; restitution. Alternatives to Criminal Trial
Prosecutors have several alternatives to criminal trial. They also discourage agreements that shield individual corporate officers, employees, or agents from liability. Constitutional Rights
During a criminal investigation and throughout the course of criminal proceedings, corporations and other legal entities enjoy many, but not all, of the constitutional rights implicated in the criminal investigation or prosecution of an individual. First Amendment
The Supreme Court has stated often that corporations are entitled to First Amendment protections. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment condemns unreasonable searches and seizures. "[A] corporation has no Fifth Amendment privilege" against self-incrimination, nor does it have a right to grand jury indictment. Of the others, two—Due Process, and Double Jeopardy—either have been said to protect corporations or have been construed to protect corporations. Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment guarantees anyone accused of a federal crime several rights: the right to notice of the charges, to the assistance of counsel, to a public and speedy trial before a jury where the crime occurred, to call witnesses, and to confront his accusers. Sentencing Guidelines
Corporations cannot be incarcerated. Otherwise, corporations and individuals face many of the same consequences following conviction. Corporations can be fined. They can be placed on probation. They can be ordered to pay restitution. Their property can be confiscated. They can be barred from engaging in various types of commercial activity. Corporations and individuals alike are sentenced in the shadow of the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Fines
The corporate fine Guidelines begin with the premise that a totally corrupt corporation should be fined out of existence, if the statutory maximum permits. A corporation operated for criminal purposes or by criminal means should be fined at a level sufficient to strip it of all of its assets. Consequently, the Guidelines recommend that the fine level be set so as to disgorge any illegally gotten gains that would otherwise be left to a corporation after the payment of its fine, compliance with the restitution order, or other remedial costs. | A corporation is criminally liable for the federal crimes its employees or agents commit in its interest. Corporate officers, employees, and agents are individually liable for the crimes they commit, for the crimes they conspire to commit, for the foreseeable crimes their coconspirators commit, for the crimes whose commission they aid and abet, and for the crimes whose perpetrators they assist after the fact.
The decision whether to prosecute a corporation rests with the Justice Department. Internal guidelines identify the factors that are to be weighed: the strength of the case against the corporation; the extent and history of misconduct; the existence of a compliance program; the corporation's cooperation with the investigation; the collateral consequences; whether the corporation has made restitution or taken other remedial measures; and the alternatives to federal prosecution. As in the case of individual defendants, corporation prosecutions rarely result in a criminal trial. More often, the corporation pleads guilty or enters into a deferred or delayed prosecution agreement.
During a criminal investigation and throughout the course of criminal proceedings, corporations enjoy many, but not all, of the constitutional rights implicated in the criminal investigation or prosecution of an individual. Corporations have no Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On the other hand, the courts have recognized or have assumed that corporations have a First Amendment right to free speech; a Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures; a Fifth Amendment right to due process and protection against double jeopardy; Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, jury trial, speedy trial, and to confront accusers, and to subpoena witnesses; and Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines.
Corporations cannot be jailed. Otherwise, corporations and individuals face many of the same consequences following conviction. The federal Sentencing Guidelines influence the sentencing consequences of conviction in many instances. Corporations can be fined. They can be placed on probation. They can be ordered to pay restitution. Their property can be confiscated. They can be barred from engaging in various types of commercial activity. The Guidelines speak to all of these.
For example, the corporate fine Guidelines begin with the premise that a totally corrupt corporation should be fined out of existence, if the statutory maximum permits. A corporation operated for criminal purposes or by criminal means should be fined at a level sufficient to strip it of all of its assets. In other cases, the Guidelines recommend fines and other sentencing features that reflect the nature and seriousness of the crime of conviction and the level of corporate culpability.
This report is available in an abbreviated form without the footnotes or citations and attributions to authorities that appear here. The abridged report is entitled CRS Report R43294, Corporate Criminal Liability: An Abbreviated Overview of Federal Law. |
crs_RS22269 | crs_RS22269_0 | The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, P.L. 109-73 , provides tax relief that is intended to assist the victims of Hurricane Katrina. The act also suspends the overall limitation on itemized deductions for individuals. Section 402 waives the $100 and 10% floors for casualty losses from Hurricane Katrina. | On September 23, 2005, President Bush signed the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA; H.R. 3768 ) into law, P.L. 109-73 . It primarily contains temporary tax relief intended to directly and indirectly assist individuals in recovering from Hurricane Katrina. The provisions cover a variety of areas, including work credits, charitable giving, and casualty losses. This report summarizes the act. |
crs_R43253 | crs_R43253_0 | The Administration's proposed budget included $676.3 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia, which is $2.2 million more than the District's FY2013 appropriation of $674.1 million. Approximately 80% ($543.4 million) of the President's proposed budget request for the District would be targeted to the courts and criminal justice system. On May 22, 2013, the council approved an FY2014 budget that included $12.2 billion in operating funds and $2.2 billion in capital outlays. The mayor signed the measure (A20-0127) on July 24, 2013. Congressional Action
Senate Committee Bill, S. 1371
On July 25, 2013, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 1371 , its version of the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act for FY2014, with an accompanying report ( S.Rept. The bill also included changes in three provisions that city officials have sought to eliminate or modify. The bill would have
continued the prohibition against the use of federal funds to provide abortion services; prohibited the use of federal funds to regulate and decriminalize the medical use of marijuana; and maintained the current prohibition on the use of federal funds to support a needle exchange program. The Senate measure would have granted the city budget autonomy over the expenditure of locally raised funds, an action long sought by District officials. 2786
On July 17, 2013, the House Appropriations Committee approved the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 2014, H.R. The bill included $635.8 million in special federal payments to the District. The House committee bill also included several general provisions relating to statehood or congressional representation for the District, including provisions that would have continued prohibiting the use of federal funds to
support or defeat any legislation being considered by Congress or a state legislature; cover salaries, expenses, and other costs associated with the office of Statehood Representative and Statehood Senator for the District of Columbia; and support efforts by the District of Columbia Attorney General or any other officer of the District government to provide assistance for any petition drive or civil action seeking voting representation in Congress for citizens of the District. 113-76, prohibits the use of both District and federal funds for abortion services, except in cases involving rape, incest, or a threat to the life of the pregnant woman if the fetus was carried to term. The Senate committee bill recommended $674.8 million in special federal payments for the District of Columbia. 113-76 , which includes $673 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia. Congress was unable to reach agreement on any of the 12 regular appropriations, including FSGG, before the beginning of the 2014 federal fiscal year on October 1, 2013, resulting in a 16-day government shutdown. On October 16, 2013, Congress passed an amended version of H.R. 2775 , a bill providing continuing appropriations through January 15, 2014, with some exceptions. 2775 , was signed into law as P.L. 113-46 on October 17, 2013. Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 113-76
On January 17, 2014, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014, P P.L. Both the House and Senate committee bills ( H.R. The Obama Administration's FY2014 budget request included a provision that would have prohibited the use of federal funds for abortion services except in cases of rape, incest, or when the woman's life would be endangered if the pregnancy were carried to term, but did not include language that would restrict the use of District funds for abortion services. P.L. P.L. Specifically, the bill would have
allowed the District to decouple its fiscal year from the federal fiscal year allowing the District to establish when its local fiscal year would start; permitted District officials to obligate and expend local funds upon enactment by the District of its local annual budget; and granted the District the authority to spend local funds if Congress did not enacted a federal appropriation authorizing the expenditure of local funds before the start of the District's fiscal year. 2775 , a bill providing continuing appropriations through January 15, 2014. 113-46 on October 17, 2013, included a provision—Section 127—releasing the District of Columbia General Fund Budget (operating budget) for FY2014 from further congressional review and approval and allowing the District of Columbia to expend locally raised revenues as outlined in the its Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-0127). | On April 10, 2013, the Obama Administration released its budget request for FY2014. The Administration's proposed budget included $676.3 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia. Approximately 80% ($543.4 million) of the President's proposed budget request for the District would be targeted to the courts and criminal justice system. The President's budget request also includes $87.2 million in support of education initiatives.
On May 22, 2013, the District of Columbia Council approved an FY2014 budget that included $12.1 billion in total operating funds and $2.1 billion in capital outlays. The mayor signed the measure (A20-0127) on July 24, 2013. Included in the act were provisions that would have granted the District significant autonomy over its budgetary and legislative affairs. Specifically, the act would have repealed portions of the District's code governing congressional review of all acts passed by the District of Columbia Council.
On July 25, 2013, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 1371, its version of the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act for FY2014. The bill recommended $674.8 million in special federal payments to the District. This was $700,000 more than appropriated for FY2013. On July 17, 2013, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 2014, H.R. 2786. The bill included $635.8 million in special federal payments to the District.
The Senate and House committee bills included several general provisions that city officials had sought to eliminate or modify. The Senate committee bill would have lifted the prohibition on the use of District funds to provide abortion services, but would have continued the prohibition against the use of federal funds for the same services. The House committee bill would have restricted the use of both District and federal funds for abortion services to instances involving rape, incest, or a health threat to the life of the pregnant woman. Both the House and Senate committee bills would have (1) continued to prohibit the use of federal funds to regulate and decriminalize the medical use of marijuana, (2) continued to prohibit the District from using federal funds for a needle exchange program to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS, and (3) provided funding for a school voucher program. The Senate committee measure included provisions that would have granted the city budget autonomy over the expenditure of locally raised funds. In an effort to mitigate the impact of a federal shutdown because of a failure to pass FY2014 appropriations for the District of Columbia, the House approved H. J. Res., 71, a measure that would have allowed the District to spend its local tax revenues to fund District operations through December 15, 2013. The Senate did not taken up consideration of the bill.
Congress was unable to reach agreement on any of the 12 regular appropriations, including FSGG, before the beginning of the 2014 federal fiscal year, resulting in a 16-day government shutdown. On October 16, 2013, Congress passed an amended version of H.R. 2775, a bill providing continuing appropriations through January 15, 2014, with some exceptions. One of those exceptions—Section 127—released the District's operating budget for FY2014 from further congressional review and allowed the District to expend locally raised revenues as outlined in the city's Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-0127). The bill was signed into law as P.L. 113-46 on October 17, 2013.
Before the expiration of P.L. 113-46 on January 15, 2014, Congress approved a short-term appropriation act, P.L. 113-73, before approving the Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 113-76, appropriating funds for the remainder the 2014 fiscal year. In addition to $673 million in special federal payments for the District, P.L. 113-76 also prohibited the use of District and federal funds for abortion services, except in cases of rape, incest, or the life of the pregnant woman is jeopardized. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43555 | crs_R43555_0 | TIP is believed to be one of the most prolific areas of contemporary criminal activity and is of significant interest to the United States as a serious human rights concern. TIP is both an international and domestic crime that involves violations of labor, public health, and human rights standards, as well as criminal law. Domestically, anti-TIP efforts include protection for victims, education of the public, and the investigation and prosecution of trafficking offenses. 113-4 ). This report discusses domestic human-trafficking-related issues that have received legislative action or are of significant congressional interest in the 113 th Congress. This report accompanies CRS Report RL34317, Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and Liana Rosen and CRS Report R41878, Sex Trafficking of Children in the United States: Overview and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. The legislation includes the following:
The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2013 (Title XII of P.L. The Fraudulent Overseas Recruitment and Trafficking Elimination Act ( H.R. 3344 ). The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2013 ( H.R. The Stop Exploitation Through Trafficking Act of 2013 ( H.R. 3610 ), as passed by the House on May 20, 2014. The Preventing Sex Trafficking and Improving Opportunities for Youth in Foster Care Act ( H.R. 4058 ), as passed by the House on May 20, 2014. The SAVE Act of 2014 ( H.R. 4225 ), as passed by the House on May 20, 2014. International Megan's Law to Prevent Demand for Child Sex Trafficking ( H.R. 4573 ), as passed by the House on May 20, 2014. The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act ( S. 744 ), as passed by the Senate on June 27, 2013. The Supporting At-Risk Children Act ( S. 1870 ), as ordered reported by the Senate Finance Committee on December 12, 2013. 3610 / S. 1733 and H.R. For example, the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act ( P.L. S. 744 , as passed by the Senate, and H.R. In addition to expanding law enforcement's "toolbox" for investigating sex trafficking, S. 1738 would enhance penalties for certain crimes involving human trafficking, child exploitation, and repeat sex offenders. The legislation touches on a variety of policy areas (e.g., the child welfare system, juvenile justice, runaway and homeless youth). The bills would require state child welfare agencies to develop and implement policies and procedures to identify, screen, and determine appropriate state actions and services for any child believed to be a victim of sex trafficking or at risk of being a sex trafficking victim. 113-4 created a discretionary new grant program for child sex trafficking victims. 3610 would incentivize states to enact "safe harbor laws" that would (1) treat each minor involved in commercial sexual activity as a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons, (2) discourage the charging and prosecution of these minors for prostitution or sex trafficking offenses, and (3) encourage the diversion of these minors to child protection services. In addition, S. 1733 would require the Attorney General, as part of the annual report to Congress on U.S. government trafficking activities, to report the number of human trafficking investigations opened by FBI, DHS, DOL or the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center; and the number of such investigations that were reported to the U.S. attorneys, the DOJ Human Trafficking and Prosecution Division, or the DOJ Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section. | Legislation aimed at preventing trafficking in persons (TIP) is unambiguously part of the legislative agenda of the 113th Congress. TIP is believed to be one of the most prolific areas of contemporary criminal activity and is of significant interest to the United States as a serious human rights concern. TIP is both an international and domestic crime that involves violations of labor, public health, and human rights standards, as well as criminal law. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) is the primary law that addresses human trafficking. Domestically, anti-TIP efforts provided under the TVPA include protection for victims, the investigation and prosecution of trafficking offenses, and education of the public. Congress reauthorized the TVPA in March 2013 (Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act; Title XII of P.L. 113-4). While this report covers P.L. 113-4, a more complete treatment of that bill can be found in CRS Report RL34317, Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress. This report discusses TIP issues that have received legislative action or are of significant congressional interest in the 113th Congress.
The House and Senate have acted on other TIP-related bills in the 113th Congress. Since human trafficking issues intersect with many different policy areas (e.g., immigration, child welfare, the criminal justice system, missing and exploited youth), legislation to address human trafficking is varied. For example, the Fraudulent Overseas Recruitment and Trafficking Elimination Act (H.R. 3344) and Title III subsection F of the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744), as passed by the Senate, would make changes to immigration policy altering how foreign labor contractors operate to help prevent trafficking of noncitizen workers. The Preventing Sex Trafficking and Improving Opportunities for Youth in Foster Care Act (H.R. 4058), as passed by the House, and the Supporting At-Risk Children Act (S. 1870), as reported by Senate Finance, would address trafficking prevention through the child welfare system. In addition to other provisions, the bills would require state child welfare agencies to develop and implement policies to identify, screen, and determine appropriate state actions and services for children believed to be victims of sex trafficking or at risk of being victims.
The Stop Exploitation Through Trafficking Act (H.R. 3610/S. 1733) and the SAVE (Stop Advertising Victims of Exploitation) Act of 2014 (H.R. 4225) would amend criminal justice policy in an attempt to obstruct human trafficking. H.R. 3610, as passed by the House, and S. 1733 would incentivize states to enact safe harbor legislation—legislation providing that children who were found in prostitution would be treated as victims rather than perpetrators—and increase restitution amounts for victims. H.R. 4225, as passed by the House, would additionally provide penalties for knowingly advertising or knowingly selling advertising that offers certain commercial sex acts. Other bills adopt a multi-prong approach to anti-TIP efforts. The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2013 (H.R. 3530, as passed by the House, and S. 1738) would create new grant programs for law enforcement and victims services, and would amend the criminal code (Title 18 of the U.S. Code) to create new crimes and enhance criminal penalties for certain trafficking-related activities. The International Megan's Law (H.R. 4573), as passed by the House, would create a new center in DHS that would be responsible for possibly notifying the destination country of international travel by child-sex offenders.
The report accompanies CRS Report RL34317, Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and Liana Rosen and CRS Report R41878, Sex Trafficking of Children in the United States: Overview and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40896 | crs_R40896_0 | Background
On June 26, 2009, the House passed H.R. In addition to establishing a cap-and-trade system to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, the bill addresses energy efficiency, renewable energy, and other energy topics. On September 30, 2009, Senator Kerry introduced S. 1733 , the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, which was referred to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. The committee held hearings on the bill starting October 27, 2009, and markup of the bill began November 3. On November 5, the committee approved Senator Boxer's "Manager's Amendment" as a substitute, and ordered S. 1733 reported. Although there are significant differences in some portions of the House and Senate bills, both bills would require major reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from entities comprising roughly 85% of current U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Covered sectors would include electricity production, natural gas distribution, petroleum refining, and industrial sectors. Both bills would also grant the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to set greenhouse gas performance standards for some entities not covered by the cap-and-trade system. Through the cap-and-trade system and other programs, both bills aim to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions to 83% below 2005 levels by 2050. Key Differences Between the Cap-and-Trade Provisions of H.R. There are six key differences between the two bills, which are discussed below:
The Senate bill contains a more stringent (i.e., lower) emissions cap between 2017 and 2029; Although the two bills allocate allowances and auction revenues to many of the same recipients, the amounts of those allocations are in some cases larger or smaller; The bills' treatment of offsets differs significantly; The House bill contains substantial provisions on regulating the carbon market. The Senate bill currently has a placeholder awaiting action by other Senate committees. The Senate bill currently has a placeholder awaiting action by other Senate committees. 2454 . Both bills contain provisions to limit EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions as criteria air pollutants, hazardous air pollutants, or under the international pollution provisions of the Clean Air Act. Appendix. Comparison of the Cap-and-Trade Provisions in the American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. | On June 26, 2009, the House passed H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. In addition to establishing a cap-and-trade system to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, the bill addresses energy efficiency, renewable energy, and other energy topics. On September 30, 2009, Senator Kerry introduced S. 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, which was referred to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. The committee held hearings on the bill starting October 27, 2009, and markup of the bill began November 3. On November 5, the committee approved Senator Boxer's "Manager's Amendment" as a substitute, and ordered S. 1733 reported.
Although there are significant differences in some portions of the House and Senate bills, both bills would require major reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from entities comprising roughly 85% of current U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Covered sectors would include electricity production, natural gas distribution, petroleum refining, and industrial sectors. Both bills would also grant the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to set greenhouse gas performance standards for some entities not covered by the cap-and-trade system. Through the cap-and-trade system and other programs, both bills aim to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions to 20% below 2005 levels by 2020 and 83% below 2005 levels by 2050.
This report provides a comparison of the cap-and-trade provisions of these two bills. Most notably, there are six key differences between the bills: (1) the Senate bill has a more stringent emissions cap between 2017 and 2029; (2) the two bills allocate emissions allowances and auction revenue to different recipients at different levels; (3) the bills would treat offsets differently; (4) the House bill would establish extensive carbon market regulation (the Senate bill currently has a placeholder for this topic); (5) the House bill would establish a requirement that importers purchase special emission allowances for certain imports from countries without greenhouse gas controls (the Senate bill currently has a placeholder for this topic); and (6) both bills would limit the Environmental Protection Agency's authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, although in different ways. The Appendix contains a section-by-section comparison of the cap-and-trade provisions in the two bills. |
crs_RL33364 | crs_RL33364_0 | This report shows how the deduction of Medicare Part B and Part D premiums affects Social Security beneficiaries. Annual Cost-of-Living Adjustment
After a person becomes eligible to receive Social Security benefits, his or her monthly benefit amount is increased annually to maintain purchasing power over time. COLAs for 2010 and 2011
SSA has announced that there will be no Social Security COLA in 2010, and both SSA and the Congressional Budget Office predict that there will be no COLA in 2011. Unless they qualify for low-income assistance, Part D participants must pay monthly premiums; they must also pay other out-of-pocket costs when they use Part D services. Over the same period, total Medicare Part B program costs and premiums are expected to increase. In a typical year, the hold harmless provision affects a small fraction of beneficiaries and has a limited impact on program finances. However, in a scenario where Medicare Part B premiums increase but Social Security benefits do not, the effects of the hold harmless provision are larger and more complex. For more information on this issue, please see CRS Report R40561, The Effect of No Social Security COLA on Medicare Part B Premiums , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. In particular, for monthly Social Security benefit amounts below these thresholds, the dollar amount of the Part B premium increase was greater than the dollar amount of the Social Security benefit increase (which in turn is the previous year's Social Security benefit times the COLA), so that the net Social Security benefit would have fallen relative to the previous year's benefit in the absence of the hold harmless provision. Medicare Part D participants may choose to have their Part D premiums deducted from their benefits or to pay them directly to their prescription drug plan sponsors. By 2010, after 11 years of retirement, the Part B premium absorbed about 8.5% of the medium earner's benefits. Lower earners need a greater fraction of their Social Security benefits to pay the Part B premium than do higher earners. Some low earners may be protected by Medicaid's Part B premium subsidies for low-income beneficiaries. For example, in 2011 it is projected that the Part B premium will absorb 11% of the average initial Social Security benefit in the first year of retirement, and the combined Parts B and D premiums will absorb 14% of the average initial benefit. In 2078 premiums are projected to absorb more than twice that share, with 22% going to pay the Part B premium in the first year of retirement, and 31% of the average initial benefit in the first year of retirement going to pay combined Parts B and D premiums. Conclusion
Rising Medicare premiums are consuming a growing share of beneficiaries' Social Security benefits. Most beneficiaries are likely to have some income apart from their Social Security benefits. Finally, it is important to remember that Social Security beneficiaries gain from their participation in the Medicare program. Together, Medicare and Medicaid cover a majority of participating Social Security beneficiaries' health care expenses. Although Social Security beneficiaries are affected by rising health care costs, the benefits of participating in Medicare are substantially greater than the costs. | Most Social Security beneficiaries pay Medicare premiums. Beneficiaries who participate in Medicare Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance) or Part D (prescription drugs) must pay monthly premiums, unless they qualify for low-income assistance. Part B participants who also receive Social Security must have the Part B premiums automatically deducted from their Social Security checks. Part D participants may choose to have their premiums deducted from their Social Security checks.
Medicare premiums are absorbing a growing share of Social Security benefits. To see the effect of growing premiums, consider a Social Security beneficiary who earned the average wage throughout his or her career. If this retiree chose to participate in Part B—as the vast majority of Social Security beneficiaries do—the standard Part B premium would have absorbed almost 5% of benefits upon retirement in 2000 and about 8.5% in 2010 after over a decade of retirement. For a new retiree in 2010, the Part B premium absorbs about 9% of the Social Security benefit, and combined premiums for both Part B and Part D absorb about 12% of the average initial Social Security benefit check. Medicare's trustees project that premiums for Parts B and D will grow at a faster rate than average Social Security benefits in the future, thus consuming a greater proportion of benefits over time. In 2078, a retired worker receiving the average initial Social Security benefit amount is projected to need 22% of benefits to pay the Part B premium and 31% of initial benefits to pay combined Parts B and D premiums.
The deduction of Medicare premiums affects beneficiaries differently, depending on their Social Security benefit amounts and total incomes. Medicare premiums absorb a greater fraction of lower earners' Social Security benefits than of higher earners' benefits, because although benefit amounts are progressive, low earners tend to have lower dollar amounts of benefits. However, some low-income beneficiaries are eligible for subsidies that cover their Medicare premiums and other out-of-pocket costs. Other beneficiaries may be protected by a hold harmless provision that prevents a beneficiary's Social Security check from declining due to Part B premium increases.
The Social Security Administration (SSA) has announced that there will be no Social Security cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) in 2010, and both SSA and the Congressional Budget Office predict that there will be no COLA in 2011. Over the same period, total Medicare Part B program costs and premiums are expected to increase. In a typical year, the hold harmless provision affects a small fraction of beneficiaries. However, in a scenario where there is no Social Security COLA, the effects of the hold harmless provision are larger and more complex. For more information on this issue, please see CRS Report R40561, The Effect of No Social Security COLA on Medicare Part B Premiums, by [author name scrubbed] and Alison Shelton.
Finally, it is important to note that although Social Security beneficiaries are affected by rising health care costs, the benefits of participating in Medicare are substantially greater than the costs. |
crs_R41763 | crs_R41763_0 | Some policy makers have expressed an interest in measuring total regulatory costs and benefits. For example, the Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis Creation and Sunset and Review Act of 2011 ( H.R. However, measuring total regulatory costs and benefits is inherently difficult. The Crain and Crain Report
In September 2010, the Office of Advocacy within the Small Business Administration (SBA) released a report prepared for the office by Nicole V. Crain and W. Mark Crain entitled "The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms." How Crain and Crain Developed the $1.75 Trillion Estimate of Regulatory Costs
Crain and Crain developed their $1.75 trillion estimate of total regulatory costs by adding together cost estimates for each of four categories or types of regulation: economic regulations ($1.236 trillion); environmental regulations ($281 billion); tax compliance ($160 billion); and regulations involving occupational safety and health, and homeland security ($75 billion). Comments Regarding the Estimate of the Cost of Economic Regulations
The validity and accuracy of Crain and Crain's estimate of the cost of economic regulations depends on at least two factors: (1) whether the WGI index of "regulatory quality" can be used as part of a formula to measure the cost of economic regulations, and (2) whether the authors interpreted the regulatory quality index in the way it was intended. OMB does not include tax paperwork in its annual reports to Congress on the costs and benefits of federal regulations. Other commenters (including one of the peer reviewers of the Crain and Crain study) raised similar concerns about whether the regulatory quality index could be used to measure the cost of economic regulations, and about the regression analysis used to produce the cost estimate. Crain and Crain's estimates for environmental, occupational safety and health, and homeland security regulations were developed by mixing together academic studies (some of which were more than 30 years old) with agencies' estimates of regulatory costs that were developed before the rules were issued (some of which are now 20 years old). The agency estimates that Crain and Crain used were drawn from OMB reports to Congress on the estimated costs and benefits of regulations, which were typically presented as low-to-high ranges. However, Crain and Crain used only the highest cost estimates from these reports, stating that they did so because the OMB estimates did not cover all regulations, and because they believe "government agencies tend to be conservative in estimating regulatory costs." Also, OMB has concluded that estimates of the costs and benefits of regulations issued more than 10 years earlier are of "questionable relevance." Crain and Crain's estimate for the cost of tax paperwork was reportedly based on data from the IRS and the Tax Foundation, but data in OMB's annual Information Collection Budget suggests that the number of hours of tax paperwork may be much higher than the authors used in their report. However, a threshold question is whether tax paperwork should be considered in the same category as regulatory costs. However, Crain and Crain told CRS that their report was "not meant to be a decision-making tool for lawmakers or federal regulatory agencies to use in choosing the 'right' level of regulation. | Some policy makers have expressed an interest in measuring total regulatory costs and benefits (e.g., the Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis Creation and Sunset and Review Act of 2011, H.R. 214, 112th Congress), and estimates of total regulatory costs have been cited in support of regulatory reform legislation (e.g., H.R. 10, the Regulations from the Executive In Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act, H.R. 10, 112th Congress). However, measuring total costs and benefits is inherently difficult. This report examines one such study to illustrate the complexities of this type of analysis.
A September 2010 report prepared by Nicole V. Crain and W. Mark Crain for the Office of Advocacy within the Small Business Administration (SBA) stated that the annual cost of federal regulations was about $1.75 trillion in 2008. This cost estimate was developed by adding together the estimated costs of four categories or types of regulation: economic regulations (estimated at $1.236 trillion); environmental regulations ($281 billion); tax compliance ($160 billion); and regulations involving occupational safety and health, and homeland security ($75 billion). Some commenters have raised questions about the validity and reliability of this estimate.
For example, Crain and Crain's estimate for economic regulations (which comprises more than 70% of the $1.75 trillion estimate) was developed by using an index of "regulatory quality." One of the authors of the regulatory quality index said that Crain and Crain misinterpreted and misused the index, resulting in an erroneous and overstated cost estimate. Other commenters have also raised concerns about using the index to estimate regulatory costs, and about the regression analysis that the authors used to produce the cost estimate. Crain and Crain said that they believe they interpreted and used the regulatory quality index correctly.
Crain and Crain's estimates for environmental, occupational safety and health, and homeland security regulations were developed by blending together academic studies (some of which are now more than 30 years old) with agencies' estimates of regulatory costs that were developed before the rules were issued (some of which are now 20 years old). Although the agency estimates were typically presented as low-to-high ranges, Crain and Crain used only the highest cost estimates in their report. The Office of Management and Budget has said that estimates of the costs and benefits of regulations issued more than 10 years earlier are of "questionable relevance."
Crain and Crain's estimate for the cost of tax paperwork was based on data from the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Foundation, but OMB data indicate that the number of hours of tax paperwork may be much higher than Crain and Crain's estimate. On the other hand, the authors' assumptions regarding the cost of completing the paperwork may be too high. A threshold question, however, is whether tax paperwork should be considered in the same category as regulatory costs. OMB does not include tax paperwork in its annual reports to Congress.
Crain and Crain said they did not provide estimates of the benefits of regulations, even when the information was readily available, because the SBA Office of Advocacy did not ask them to do so. OMB's reports to Congress have generally indicated that regulatory benefits exceed costs. Crain and Crain said their report was not meant to be a decision-making tool for lawmakers or federal regulatory agencies to use in choosing the "right" level of regulation. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RS22392 | crs_RS22392_0 | Religious Freedom Restoration Act
The genesis of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) lies in the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith . Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV) is a religious sect with origins in the Amazon Rainforest in which members of the church receive communion by drinking a sacramental tea containing a hallucinogen ( hoasca ) regulated under the Controlled Substances Act by the federal government. The Court made it clear that the government could not establish a compelling interest in simply enforcing an existing statute; there must be some other justification for the burden on religious expression. | On February 21, 2006, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV), a case addressing the use of an hallucinogenic tea in the context of religious ceremonies conducted by a religious sect in New Mexico. In its decision, the Court determined that under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the federal government could not prohibit the sect's use of the tea absent a compelling government interest in doing so, and that the federal government had failed to establish a compelling interest. This report provides an overview of RFRA and the O Centro Espirita case. |
crs_RL33407 | crs_RL33407_0 | On March 16 and 20, after Russia moved to annex Crimea, the Administration issued two additional Executive Orders expanding the scope of sanctions. On March 20, the State Duma (lower legislative chamber) almost unanimously approved the annexation treaty and the constitutional changes. The president and prime minister appoint government ministers and other officials. Putin's September 2011 Announcement of Candidacy for the Presidency
In late September 2011, at the annual convention of the ruling United Russia Party, then-Prime Minister Putin announced that he would run in the March 2012 presidential election. The provisions on gubernatorial elections were considered only semi-progressive by many observers (see below). Most observers viewed the law as a further threat to freedom of assembly in Russia. H.R. The bill was signed into law on December 14, 2012 ( P.L. 112-208 ). According to the Open Source Center, there were 527 terrorist incidents in Russia in 2008, 1,381 in 2009, 1,217 in 2010, 1,117 in 2011, 1,016 in 2012, and 741 in 2013. Under this agreement, training and other support was provided for combating terrorism and terrorist financing (but see below). President Obama and newly re-elected Russian President Vladimir Putin pledged further counter-terrorism cooperation at their June 2012 summit meeting. Such cooperation has faced various challenges, including new tensions in U.S.-Russia relations. The improvement of Russia's economy since 1999, fueled in large part by the cash inflow from rising world oil and gas prices, enabled Russia to reverse the budgetary starvation of the military during the 1990s. The total size of the armed forces would be reduced from 1.2 million to 1 million, according to this plan. U.S. Perspectives
As part of the Obama Administration's "reset" in U.S.-Russia relations, at the July 2009 U.S.-Russia Summit, the two sides agreed to the resumption of military-to-military activities—which had been suspended since the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict—by setting up a Military Cooperation Working Group as part of the Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC; see below, " The Obama Administration's 2009-2014 Attempt to Improve Bilateral Relations "). From 1999 to 2008, Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) increased 6.9% on average per year. The Russian government's reassertion of control over major industries, especially in the energy sector, has also contributed to an underachieving economy. Foreign Policy
Russia and the West
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the turmoil associated with the Yeltsin period, a consensus emerged as the Putin era began on reestablishing Russia's global prestige as a "great power" and its dominance in "the former Soviet space." Energy, trade, and economics have conditioned debates in Europe about sanctions and other ways of responding to Russia's actions in Ukraine. Others have argued that sanctions risk antagonizing Russia and escalating tensions. Common security challenges identified include ongoing instability in Afghanistan; terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; piracy; and natural and man-made disasters. The international community condemned Russia's military incursion into Georgia in early August 2008 and President Medvedev's August 26, 2008, decree officially recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Responding to the granting of asylum, Senator John McCain termed it a "deliberate effort to embarrass the United States," and called for "a more realistic approach to our relations with Russia," including by expanding the Magnitsky list, pushing for Georgia's quick admission to NATO, moving forward with all phases of missile defense deployment in Europe, and denouncing human rights abuses in Russia. On December 17, 2013, President Barack Obama announced the names of members of the presidential delegations for the opening and closing ceremonies for the upcoming Sochi Olympic Games in February 2014. U.S.-Russia Relations after the Occupation and Annexation of Crimea
U.S.-Russia relations appeared to sharply deteriorate following Russia's deployment of military forces to Ukraine's Crimea region at the end of February 2014. President Obama canceled plans to attend a G-8 (Group of eight industrialized nations) meeting to be hosted by Russia in Sochi in June 2014, some bilateral trade talks were halted, the Defense Department suspended planned military-to-military contacts, a visa ban and asset freeze were imposed on persons involved with violating Ukraine's sovereignty, and the Administration and Congress undertook other sanctions against Russia. He averred that successive U.S. administrations had attempted to strengthen U.S.-Russian relations and Russian engagement with the world, including backing for Russian membership in the WTO and the enlargement of the G-7 to the G-8, and that the world had benefitted from times when Russia chose to cooperate on such issues as Syria's chemical weapons and the reduction of nuclear weapons. Some policy makers have criticized the Obama Administration's "reset," pointing out that it was implemented in the months after Russia's August 2008 military operation in Georgia and Moscow's recognition of two Georgian regions as independent, and that Russia has again invaded and (this time) formally annexed a region of Ukraine. Although religious freedom generally was respected in recent years, successive administrations issued waivers to overcome the restrictions on aid because of ongoing problems of democratization and other human rights. The Ouster of the U.S. Agency for International Development
During a September 8, 2012, meeting between then-Secretary Clinton, Russian President Putin, and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov (a meeting that took place on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, or APEC, summit in Vladivostok), Clinton was informed that Russia was planning to end USAID programs in the country by October 1, 2012. 113-76 ) loan guarantees for Ukraine, authorizes $50 million for FY2015 to be appropriated for democracy and economic reforms in Ukraine and Eastern Partnership countries, authorizes $100 million for FY2015-FY2017 to be appropriated for additional security assistance for Central and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, calls for a visa ban and asset freeze on persons responsible for violence, gross human rights violations, or acts undermining stability and territorial integrity in Ukraine, calls for a visa ban and asset freeze on officials of the Russian government responsible for corruption in Ukraine or Russia, and appropriates an increase in the U.S. quota in the IMF the dollar equivalent of 40.8718 billion in special drawing rights. | Russia made uneven progress in democratization during the 1990s, but this limited progress was reversed after Vladimir Putin rose to power in 1999-2000, according to many observers. During this period, the State Duma (lower legislative chamber) became dominated by government-approved parties, gubernatorial elections were abolished, and the government consolidated ownership or control over major media and industries, including the energy sector. The Putin government showed low regard for the rule of law and human rights in suppressing insurgency in the North Caucasus, according to critics. Dmitry Medvedev, Putin's longtime protégé, was elected president in 2008; President Medvedev immediately designated Putin as prime minister and continued Putin's policies. In August 2008, the Medvedev-Putin "tandem" directed military operations against Georgia and recognized the independence of Georgia's separatist South Ossetia and Abkhazia, actions condemned by most of the international community. In March 2012, Putin was (re)elected president by a wide margin. The day after Putin's inauguration in May 2012, the legislature confirmed Medvedev as prime minister. Since then, Putin has tightened restrictions on freedom of assembly and other human rights.
Russia's Economy
Russia's economy began to recover from the Soviet collapse in 1999, led mainly by oil and gas exports, but the decline in oil and gas prices and other aspects of the global economic downturn beginning in 2008 contributed to an 8% drop in gross domestic product in 2009. Since then, rising world oil prices have bolstered the economy, although reduced energy exports, faltering investment and consumer demand have contributed to slow economic growth in 2013. Other factors that retard economic growth include unreformed healthcare and educational institutions and high rates of crime, corruption, capital flight, and unemployment.
Russia's Armed Forces
Russia's armed forces now number less than 1 million, down from 4.3 million Soviet troops in 1986. In the 1990s and much of the 2000s, troop readiness, training, morale, and discipline suffered, and most arms industries became antiquated. Russia's economic growth in recent years has supported greatly increased defense spending to restructure the armed forces and improve their quality. Mismanagement, changes in plans, corruption, manning issues, and economic constraints have complicated this restructuring.
U.S.—Russia Relations
After the Soviet Union's collapse, the United States sought a cooperative relationship with Moscow and supplied almost $19 billion in aid for Russia from FY1992 through FY2010 to encourage democracy and market reforms and in particular to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the past, U.S.-Russia tensions on issues such as NATO enlargement and proposed U.S. missile defenses in Eastern Europe were accompanied by some cooperation between the two countries on anti-terrorism and nonproliferation. Russia's 2008 conflict with Georgia, however, threatened such cooperation. The Obama Administration worked to "re-set" relations with Russia and hailed such steps as the signing of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in April 2010; the approval of new sanctions against Iran by Russia and other members of the U.N. Security Council in June 2010; the accession of Russia to the World Trade Organization in August 2012; and the cooperation of Russia in Afghanistan as signifying the successful "re-set" of bilateral relations.
Many observers argued that the Obama Administration's efforts to foster improved U.S.-Russia relations faced challenges during election cycles and from legislative and other actions in both countries in 2012-2013. In late 2012, Russia ousted the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) from the country and criticized the help that USAID had provided over the years as unnecessary and intrusive. Russia also declined to renew a long-time bilateral accord on nonproliferation assistance (although a new more limited agreement was concluded in June 2013). H.R. 6156 (Camp), authorizing permanent normal trade relations for Russia, was signed into law on December 14, 2012 (P.L. 112-208). The bill includes provisions sanctioning those responsible for the detention and death of lawyer Sergey Magnitsky and for other gross human rights abuses in Russia. A Russian bill ending U.S. adoptions of Russian children appeared to be a reaction to the Magnitsky Act. President Obama canceled a U.S.-Russia summit meeting planned for early September 2013 on the grounds of lack of progress by Russia on bilateral cooperation, and the Administration announced in December 2013 that lower-level delegations would attend the opening and closing of the Olympic Winter Games in Sochi, Russia, in February 2014.
U.S.-Russia relations sharply deteriorated following Russia's deployment of military forces to Ukraine's Crimea region at the end of February 2014. President Obama canceled plans to attend a G-8 (Group of eight industrialized nations) meeting to be hosted by Russia in Sochi in June 2014, some bilateral trade talks were halted, the Defense Department suspended planned military-to-military contacts, a visa ban and asset freeze were imposed, and the Administration and Congress explored other sanctions against Russia. After pro-Russian Crimean elements staged a referendum on March 16, 2014, that approved joining Russia, the Russian legislature and President Putin quickly approved formal annexation. Russia's military forces also massed on its borders with the rest of Ukraine, threatening further incursions. As Russia moved to annex Crimea, President Obama issued further executive orders sanctioning individuals and one Russian bank. A revised G-7 meeting on March 24, 2014, announced that Russia was suspended from further proceedings. |
crs_RL34334 | crs_RL34334_0 | Introduction
There is growing debate about whether the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has the ability to accomplish its mission with the resources provided by congressional appropriations and industry user fees. They warn that the agency is at risk of being unable to adequately fulfill the many statutory responsibilities that Congress has assigned it. In general, former FDA Commissioners and interest groups argue that FDA is underfunded for its mission. Calls for cutting the FDA budget or maintaining it at the current level come from organizations, like CATO and the Hoover Institute, that propose limitations on FDA's authority and, therefore, the need for funding. The main voices in support of FDA budget levels, past and present, have been representatives of the various presidential administrations. This report examines FDA's appropriations history and traces the evolution of the agency's statutory responsibilities. The information is presented to help inform the ongoing discussion about FDA. The report first provides an overview of FDA's budget and personnel levels from FY1980 through FY2007. That is followed by a more detailed examination of the budget and personnel level over the same period in each of the agency's major activity areas. Agency Scope and Congressional Jurisdiction
FDA regulates a wide range of products valued at more than $1 trillion in the U.S. economy. As one of the agencies within HHS that comprise the Public Health Service, FDA is responsible for the safety of most foods (human and animal) and cosmetics. FDA also regulates both the safety and the effectiveness of human drugs, biologics (e.g., vaccines), medical devices, and animal drugs. Another indicator of agency resources is personnel, available in the Justification documents as the number of full-time equivalent employees (FTEs). For FDA as a whole, comparing FY2006, the most recent year for which we have parallel data sources for both dollars and FTEs, to FY1980 yields these inflation-adjusted findings (see Figure 1 ):
FDA Budget:
almost a doubling of direct congressional appropriations (budget authority); more than an 10-fold increase in other funds, mostly user fees; resulting in an overall budget in FY2006 almost 2-1/2 times that in FY1980. FDA FTEs:
less than a 1% increase in budget authority-funded FTEs; an almost fourfold increase in FTEs funded by other sources, mostly user fees; resulting in an overall 19% increase from FY1980 to FY2006. The budget authority funded FTEs decreased by 14%, but the overall human drug FTE level increased by 40% because of user fee funding. Activity Area Budgets
This report follows the order in the FY2008 Justification document in presenting information on FDA's five major activity areas: Foods, Human Drugs, Biologics, Animal Drugs and Feeds, and Medical Devices and Radiological Health. | Considerable attention has been focused on the ability of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to accomplish its mission with the funds provided by congressional appropriations and user fees. FDA regulates a wide range of products valued at more than $1 trillion in the U.S. economy. The agency plays a key public health role. FDA is responsible for the safety of most foods (human and animal) and cosmetics, and it regulates both the safety and the effectiveness of human drugs, biologics (e.g., vaccines), medical devices, and animal drugs.
In congressional hearing testimony and at other public venues, former FDA Commissioners, interest group representatives, and former high-ranking individuals in the agency or in the Department of Health and Human Services have argued that FDA is underfunded and at risk of being unable to fulfill all the statutory responsibilities assigned by Congress. Reports by the Institute of Medicine, the Government Accountability Office, and the FDA Science Board have made similar observations. The main voices in support of FDA budget levels, past and present, have been representatives of the various presidential administrations. Calls for cutting the FDA budget or maintaining it at the current level come from organizations, such as CATO and the Hoover Institute, that propose limitations on the agency's authority and, therefore, its need for funding. Some agency critics have expressed concerns about inefficiencies within FDA and its ability to manage its resources.
In order to inform the ongoing discussion about FDA, this report presents FDA's appropriations history and traces the evolution of the agency's statutory responsibility. It first provides a 28-year budget history for the agency along with personnel levels as shown by the number of full-time equivalent employees (FTEs). This report found that direct congressional inflation-adjusted appropriations (budget authority) to FDA doubled, and that the contribution of other funds, mostly user fees, increased more than 12-fold, resulting in an overall budget in FY2007 almost 2½ times that in FY1980. Between FY1980 and FY2006, the latest year with final FTE data, the agency's FTE level increased 19% overall, from a less than 1% increase in budget authority-funded FTEs and an almost fourfold increase in FTEs funded by other sources (mostly user fees).
The report also provides a more detailed examination of the budget and personnel levels for each of FDA's major activity areas: Foods, Human Drugs, Biologics, Animal Drugs and Feeds, and Devices and Radiological Health. Findings include the relationship of user fees to budget authority, declining funding of research, and summaries of the major laws enacted since FY1980. |
crs_RL33710 | crs_RL33710_0 | In 1993, Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") to "balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families." When the FMLA was enacted, it supplemented approximately 30 state statutes that provided some form of family and medical leave to employees who worked in those states. Although the FMLA and state family and medical leave laws are generally similar with regard to the availability of leave, they differ both in terms of coverage and scope. Forty-five states and the District of Columbia now appear to have family and medical leave laws. Code. Law. | In 1993, Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") to "balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families." When the FMLA was enacted, it supplemented approximately 30 state statutes that provided some form of family and medical leave to employees who worked in those states. Although the FMLA and state family and medical leave laws are generally similar with regard to the availability of leave, they differ both in terms of coverage and scope. This report includes summaries of the family and medical leave laws of forty-five states and the District of Columbia. Laws pertaining to family and medical leave and maternity leave were not found in the codes of all 50 states. Summaries of the relevant leave statutes and regulations are organized in alphabetical order. |
crs_RS21703 | crs_RS21703_0 | RS21703 -- Croatia: 2003 Elections and New Government
January 6, 2004
Introduction
The November 2003 elections were Croatia's fourth parliamentary contest since the country became independent in 1991. In the lastvote of January 2000, a coalition of center-left parties soundly defeated the incumbent Croatian Democratic Union(HDZ)government, weeks after the death of Franjo Tudjman, the longstanding leader of the HDZ and President of thecountry. Top partner prospects appeared to be thePeasant Party (HSS), part of the outgoing coalition, and the right-wing Party of Rights (HSP). In December, Prime Minister-designate Sanader announced that he had secured enough votes to support a minority government. The Sanader government mayhave to grant concessions on a regular basis in exchange for parliamentary support from small parties and individualdeputies. | In parliamentary elections held on November 23, 2003, the Croatian Democratic Union(HDZ), a right-wing party of the late former wartime President Franjo Tudjman, won a plurality of the vote. TheHDZ haddominated Croatia's political scene from 1990 until its defeat in the 2000 elections. Ivo Sanader, who succeededTudjman as HDZparty leader and refashioned the party along more moderate, less nationalistic lines, became Prime Minister of aminoritygovernment in December 2003. The Sanader government will likely face significant domestic challenges as wellas closeinternational scrutiny over its performance in a number of issue areas. This report analyzes the elections and keyissues facing thenew government. It will not be updated. For additional information, see also CRS Report RL32136, Futureof the Balkans and U.S.Policy Concerns. |
crs_94-953 | crs_94-953_0 | Introduction
The Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) is permanently authorized by Title XX, Subtitle A, of the Social Security Act as a "capped" entitlement to states. Since FY2002, annual appropriations laws have funded the SSBG at its authorized level of $1.7 billion. However, starting in FY2013, SSBG appropriations have been subject to sequestration, a spending reduction process by which budgetary resources are canceled to enforce budget policy goals. Instead, temporary funding for the SSBG has been provided through December 9, 2016, by a continuing resolution ( P.L. 114-223 , Division C). The continuing resolution (CR) maintained SSBG funding at current-law levels ($1.7 billion, less sequestration). Annual appropriations laws since FY2001 have included a provision allowing states to transfer up to 10% of their Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grants to the SSBG. In addition to annual appropriations, the SSBG occasionally receives supplemental appropriations to assist states and territories in responding to natural disasters, including in FY2006, FY2008, and FY2013 (for more information, see Appendix B ). Services
States have broad discretion in spending SSBG funds to support these broad goals. Funds cannot be used for the following: (1) purchase of land, construction, or major capital improvements; (2) cash payments as a service or for costs of subsistence or room and board (other than costs of subsistence during rehabilitation, temporary emergency shelter provided as a protective service, or in the case of vouchers for certain families as allowed under welfare reform); (3) payment of wages as a social service (except wages of welfare recipients employed in child day care); (4) most medical care (except family planning, rehabilitation services, initial detoxification of certain individuals, or medical care provided as an "integral but subordinate component of a social service"); (5) social services for residents of institutions (including hospitals, nursing homes, and prisons); (6) educational services generally provided by public schools; (7) child care that does not meet applicable state or local standards; (8) services provided by anyone excluded from participation in Medicare or certain other Social Security Act programs; or (9) items or services related to assisted suicide (this provision was added in 1997, under P.L. The FY2017 CR maintains the authorities and conditions placed on appropriations in FY2016. The sequester reduced SSBG funding by 6.8% in FY2016, resulting in an estimated operating level of $1.584 billion. Both bills included $1.700 billion for the SSBG, pre-sequester. In addition to annual appropriations, the SSBG occasionally receives supplemental appropriations, including in FY2006, FY2008, and FY2013. Recent Expenditures
Table 3 shows national SSBG expenditures for FY2014, the most recent year for which SSBG data are available. In FY2014, the largest expenditures for services under the SSBG were for foster care services for children (16%), protective services for children (12%), child care (11%), and special services for the disabled (10%). 3590 ) were introduced in the 111 th Congress that sought to amend Title XX of the Social Security Act (SSA)—the authorizing statute for the SSBG—to establish new programs to address the prevention, detection, and treatment of elder abuse or elder justice. On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law a comprehensive health care reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 ). This law included three provisions that amended the SSBG's authorizing legislation, Title XX of the SSA. New Subtitle on Elder Justice
The health reform law re-titled Title XX as Block Grants to States for Social Services and Elder Justice (formerly, Title XX was entitled Block Grants to States for Social Services ). The first created two demonstration projects related to the health care workforce. The second called for HHS to establish a competitive grant program for the early detection of medical conditions related to environmental health hazards. This law reserved roughly $500 million ($474.5 million when accounting for sequestration) for the SSBG. | The Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) is a flexible source of funds that states use to support a wide variety of social services activities. States have broad discretion over the use of these funds. In FY2014, the most recent year for which expenditure data are available, the largest expenditures for services under the SSBG were for foster care, child protective services, child care, and special services for the disabled.
Since FY2002, annual appropriations laws have funded the SSBG at its authorized level of $1.700 billion. However, starting in FY2013, SSBG appropriations have been subject to sequestration, a spending reduction process by which budgetary resources are canceled to enforce budget policy goals. Most recently, temporary FY2017 funding for the SSBG has been provided through December 9, 2016, by a continuing resolution (P.L. 114-223, Division C). The FY2017 continuing resolution provided funding for the SSBG at current-law levels ($1.7 billion, less sequestration) under the same authorities and conditions as in FY2016. The FY2016 operating level for the SSBG was roughly $1.584 billion post-sequester. This is roughly $116 million (7%) less than the SSBG's FY2016 pre-sequester funding level of $1.700 billion and $9 million (0.5%) more than the SSBG's FY2015 post-sequester operating level of $1.576 billion.
In addition to annual appropriations, the SSBG occasionally receives supplemental appropriations to assist states and territories in responding to natural disasters. Most recently, the SSBG received supplemental funding of $474.5 million (post-sequester) in FY2013 to support states affected by Hurricane Sandy. (These funds were in addition to the $1.613 billion, post-sequester, appropriated in the FY2013 annual appropriations law.)
Annual appropriations laws since FY2001 have included a provision allowing states to transfer up to 10% of their Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grants to the SSBG.
The SSBG is permanently authorized in Title XX, Subtitle A, of the Social Security Act (SSA). The 111th Congress amended Title XX of the SSA in the health care reform legislation signed into law by President Obama on March 23, 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148). This law inserted a new subtitle on elder justice into Title XX, which was itself re-titled as Block Grants to States for Social Services and Elder Justice. The health reform law also amended Title XX by establishing two demonstration projects to address the workforce needs of health care professionals and a new competitive grant program to support the early detection of medical conditions related to environmental health hazards. The purpose of this report is to provide background and funding information about the SSBG; the report does not provide detailed information on other programs authorized within Title XX of the SSA. |
crs_RL33808 | crs_RL33808_0 | Introduction
Along with the United States, Germany is widely considered one of Israel's closest allies. Given Germany's long-standing support of Israel and close ties to the United States, Israeli and Bush administration officials have generally welcomed the idea of increased German engagement in the Middle East. On the other hand, the presence of German troops in Lebanon, growing public opposition to Israeli policies and Germany's commitment to a common European approach prompt others to emphasize an increasing potential for divergence between German policy on the one hand and Israeli and U.S. policies on the other. Current German-Israeli Relations
German reparations and compensation for crimes committed during the Holocaust and long-standing defense and scientific cooperation continue to represent the cornerstone of a robust German-Israeli bilateral relationship. Implications for German Middle East Policy
Successive German governments have prioritized support for Israel as a cornerstone of German policy in the Middle East. During Israel's July 2006 conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Germany and the United Kingdom were the only two EU member states officially opposed to an immediate cease-fire. Current Middle East Policy Issues
Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier took office in November 2005 promising continuity in a German Middle East policy based on a commitment to protect Israel's right to exist; support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; a commitment to a European framework for peace; and a belief that U.S. engagement in the region is essential. Since the historic deployment of German troops to the Lebanese coast in October 2006, Merkel and Steinmeier have increased their calls for revived U.S. and Quartet engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, joining other European leaders in asserting that the conflict lies at the root of many of the other challenges in the Middle East. While Israeli and U.S. officials appear to welcome increased German engagement in the region, both Israel and the United States have expressed disapproval of German efforts to engage Syria in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and have reacted skeptically to German-supported proposals to link the resolution of other major disputes in the region to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict37
Chancellor Merkel has announced her intention to revive Quartet efforts to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process while Germany acts as the EU's representative to the Quartet during its EU presidency in the first half of 2007. Transatlantic Implications
The United States and Germany share several national security interests and policy priorities in the Middle East. On the other hand, German officials and politicians consistently assert that Germany's commitment to Israel and a common transatlantic approach to the Arab-Israeli peace process will continue to remain the paramount drivers of German policy in the region. As noted previously, Germany has been one of the largest donors to the PA, and has provided direct assistance to the Palestinian people through the EU's Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) since July 2006. | Most observers agree that moral considerations surrounding the Holocaust continue to compel German leaders to make support for Israel a policy priority. Since 1949, successive German governments have placed this support at the forefront of their Middle East policy and today, Germany, along with the United States, is widely considered one of Israel's closest allies. Germany ranks as Israel's second largest trading partner and long-standing defense and scientific cooperation, people-to-people exchanges and cultural ties between the two countries continue to grow. On the other hand, public criticism of Israel in Germany, and particularly of its policies with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, appears to be on the rise.
Since the mid-1990s, German policy toward Israel has become progressively influenced by Germany's commitment to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Germany has been one of the single largest contributors to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and an increasingly vocal advocate for European Union (EU) engagement in the Middle East. Germany's September 2006 decision to send a naval contingent to the Lebanese coast as part of an expanded United Nations mission after Israel's July 2006 war with Hezbollah is considered to have significantly raised German interest in a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and sparked widespread debate within Germany regarding the evolution of the German-Israeli relationship and Germany's role in the region. Stating that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies at the root of other challenges in the Middle East, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has announced her intention to revive international engagement in the peace process while Germany holds the EU's rotating presidency during the first half of 2007.
Given Germany's long-standing support of Israel and close ties to the United States, Israeli and Bush Administration officials have generally welcomed the idea of increased German engagement in the region. For their part, German officials and politicians assert that their commitment to Israel and active U.S. involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process remain the paramount drivers of German policy in the Middle East. However, most experts indicate that Germany will be hard-pressed to overcome both U.S. inattention stemming from a perceived preoccupation with Iraq, and diminished support for Israel and the United States among other EU member states, to forge a revived transatlantic approach to the peace process. Furthermore, the presence of German troops in Lebanon, growing public opposition to Israeli policies and Germany's commitment to a European approach lead others to highlight a growing potential for divergence between German policy on the one hand and Israeli and U.S. policies on the other.
This report will be updated as events warrant. For related information, see CRS Report RL31956, European Views and Policies Toward the Middle East, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and Relations with the United States, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33530, Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42766 | crs_R42766_0 | The Emergency Food and Shelter National Board Program (EFS) is administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), making the program somewhat unique in that its purpose is outside of the agency's traditional focus on preparedness and disaster recovery for individual disaster events. For most of its history, the program's funding has generally increased during times of high unemployment and decreased as the unemployment rate declined. However, in recent years, the program's funding has been reduced. In FY2008, the program received an appropriation of $200 million. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 , ARRA) temporarily increased the EFS program's funding to $300 million for FY2009. Since then, the program has received an appropriation of $200 million for FY2010, $120 million for FY2012, and $120 million for FY2012. Congressional interest in the EFS program has increased in recent years, primarily because the program's authorization expired in 1994 and it has been operating under authority provided by appropriations. Also, delays in distributing funds over the last two fiscal years have caused uncertainty among recipient organizations. This report opens with a legislative history of the EFS program. It then examines the program's current structure and operations, including the composition and responsibilities of the EFS National Board (hereinafter National Board), which is chaired by FEMA, the formula the National Board uses to allocate available funds to eligible local jurisdictions, and the composition and responsibilities of EFS local boards. The bill was similar in structure to the charities' proposal, and included the establishment of a National Board chaired by FEMA (FEMA was then an independent agency and is now within the Department of Homeland Security) and comprised of representatives from six non-governmental organizations associated with the provision of homeless services: the American Red Cross; Catholic Charities USA; the National Council of the Churches of Christ; The Salvation Army; the Council of Jewish Federations; and United Way of America. States would then determine how to distribute the funds among its local jurisdictions. EFS program funds were, and continue to be, used to supplement mass sheltering and feeding facilities, to provide one month's rent or mortgage to prevent evictions and foreclosures, and to provide one month's utility payments to prevent the cut-offs of utility services. Given the absence of reliable counts of the homeless and the lack of consensus concerning how to measure the need for assistance among the homeless and hungry, the EFS National Board created a formula, using unemployment and poverty statistics, to determine the amount of funding to be awarded directly to communities across the nation. The EFS program received statutory authorization in 1987 ( P.L. 100-77 , the Stewart B. McKinney-Bruce Vento Homeless Assistance Act, Title III ─ McKinney-Vento Act). Since then, the program has received an appropriation of $200 million for FY2010, $120 million for FY2012, and $120 million for FY2012 (see Table A -1 for annual amounts). The law also requires Local Boards to include a homeless or formally homeless representative on the Local Board. The EFS program has provided funding to social service providers for many years, but its funding has not focused on any one social services agency, or group of agencies. Also, if that state has not received the statutorily required minimum award of $250,000 through the direct award process, that state's SSA Committee may receive an amount to bring that state up to the minimum figure. The National Board announced its FY2012 awards on August 15, 2012, more than seven months after the final appropriations act for FY2102 ( P.L. Because the program's funding declined in FY2011, and the unemployment formula changed, some large jurisdictions did not receive a direct award for the first time in many years. These significant delays in distributing funds are in contravention of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act which requires:
Not later than 30 days following the date on which appropriations become available to carry out this part, the Director shall award a grant for the full amount that the Congress appropriates for the program under this part to the National Board for the purpose of providing emergency food and shelter to needy individuals through private nonprofit organizations and local governments in accordance with section 11343 of this title. EFS Administrative Budget
As mentioned previously, the EFS program is currently operating under authority provided by annual appropriations acts and those acts have limited the program's administrative budget to no more than 3.5% of available funding, compared to no more than 5% under the McKinney-Vento Act. | The Emergency Food and Shelter National Board (EFS) Program provides supplemental funding to homeless services providers across the nation. EFS was first authorized by P.L. 100-77, the Stewart B. McKinney-Bruce Vento Homeless Assistance Act (Title III, McKinney-Vento Act), which became law in 1987. Eligible services include the provision of overnight shelter and served meals, assistance to food banks and pantries, one month's rental or mortgage assistance to prevent evictions, and one month's utility payments to prevent service cut-offs.
Since its inception, the program's recipient organizations have provided over 2 billion meals, 241 million nights of shelter, 4.3 million rent and mortgage payments, and 5.9 million utility payments. The program is administered by the EFS National Board, which is chaired by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and is comprised of representatives from the American Red Cross, Catholic Charities USA, the National Council of Churches, the Salvation Army, the Jewish Federations of North America, and United Way Worldwide. Two of the program's distinguishing features are its focus on local decision-making, and its relatively modest administrative costs.
The program was last authorized in 1994, and has been operating under authority provided by annual appropriations acts. In the past, its funding has generally increased during times of high unemployment and decreased as the unemployment rate declined. For example, in FY2009, the program received an appropriation of $200 million. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5, ARRA) then temporarily increased the EFS program's funding to $300 million for FY2009. In more recent years, the program's funding has declined. The program received an appropriation of $200 million for FY2010, $120 million for FY2011, and $120 million for FY2012. Under the full-year Continuing Resolution (CR, P.L. 113-6) for FY2013, the EFS program is scheduled to receive just under $120 million; however, with sequester amounts not yet confirmed the final amount could be less than that.
Although legislation providing EFS an appropriation of $120 million for FY2012 was signed into law on December 23, 2011, the distribution of the program's funds did not begin until August 15, 2012, the latest award distribution date in the program's history. FY2011 was also a notable year for the program because the EFS National Board changed its distribution formulas, resulting in some large jurisdictions not receiving direct funding for the first time.
The National Board's distribution formula uses unemployment and poverty statistics to determine amounts awarded directly to communities across the nation. After notifying jurisdictions of the amount that they will be receiving, EFS Local Boards, comprised of local affiliates of the organizations represented on the National Board, at least one homeless or previously homeless person, and representatives of local government, are convened. Local Boards advertise the availability of funds, accept applications for funding, and determine which local agencies to fund and how the funds are to be used. The National Board also provides funding to State Set-aside Committees (SSA) which provide funding to jurisdictions with significant needs that may not have qualified under the National Board's formula, or to further supplement funding to jurisdictions that received a direct award. Each state, through direct awards and SSA, receives a minimum of $250,000.
EFS, originally envisioned as a one-time emergency program, has distributed more than $3.9 billion to over 2,500 local jurisdictions and more than 12,000 local service organizations (both non-profit and governmental).
The EFS program's rules and processes emphasize fast response, local decision-making, and local accountability. Some federal programs have emulated its local board approach for decision-making on the use of resources for programs for the homeless. Over the last decade, congressional oversight has occurred through annual appropriations hearings on FEMA in general.
This report examines the administrative history of the program, the evolution of its award process, and the issues that Congress may consider as the EFS program approaches its fourth decade. In particular, the report highlights recent program delays in funding and, in general, how the EFS program and its emphasis on emergency services fit into the context of the federal government's approach to addressing homelessness. |
crs_R44965 | crs_R44965_0 | P rivatization is a broad term that generally refers to the transfer of public or governmental functions or services to private entities. Other types of privatization include government-funded voucher programs or other subsidies that allow individuals to purchase private goods or services. In other contexts, Congress has empowered private entities or created entities in a variety of forms to (1) deliver services or perform functions previously provided by governmental entities or (2) advance legislative objectives. Congress has created numerous corporations, including Amtrak and the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT). More recently, in the 114th and 115th Congresses, legislation was proposed to create a nonprofit corporation to provide air traffic control services that are currently administered by the Federal Aviation Administration. While the federal government employs various forms of privatization, the transfer of government functions and services to other entities has its constitutional limits. Judicial Review of Privatization
To define what constitutional limits could apply when Congress delegates authority to an entity to perform a governmental function, courts must first determine whether the entity in question is a private or governmental entity. For example, constitutional provisions, such as the Due Process Clause, apply only to governmental entities, while the private nondelegation doctrine that prohibits the delegation of governmental functions to nongovernmental entities is relevant only if Congress improperly delegates authority to private entities. While certain entities such as federal agencies can be readily characterized as governmental entities, the distinction between a public and a private entity is often unclear for government-created corporations. Courts cannot rely on the legislative origins of these corporate entities because the Supreme Court has held that a legislative declaration that an entity is either a private or governmental entity is not dispositive for purposes of determining the entity's status. Applying Constitutional Principles to Privatization
Congress's authority to delegate and privatize governmental functions and services is potentially limited by constitutional principles, including the nondelegation doctrine, the Due Process Clause, and the Appointments Clause. The "nondelegation doctrine" has traditionally been applied to limit Congress's authority to delegate "legislative power" to the other governmental entities. Delegations to Private Entities
In contrast to the relative latitude given to delegations to official governmental entities under the "intelligible principle" test, the Supreme Court has limited the types of authority and functions that Congress can delegate to a purely private entity. The increased use of corporations that have both public and private aspects has complicated how courts have analyzed challenges to the authority delegated to these entities. The court then focused its review on whether the delegation of authority to Amtrak as a "public-private enterprise" violates the Due Process Clause. Appointments Clause
Privatization of government services and functions may also implicate the Constitution's requirements regarding the appointment of certain federal officials under the Appointments Clause. The Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution requires "Officers of the United States" to be appointed by the President "with the Advice and Consent of the Senate," although Congress may vest the appointment of "inferior" officers "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." In contrast, non-officers are not subject to any constitutionally required method of appointment. Accordingly, a crucial threshold question respecting the Appointments Clause is thus who constitutes an "officer" of the United States. | Privatization is a broad term that encompasses various types of public-private arrangements, including contractual relationships with private entities for goods or services and government-funded voucher programs that allow individuals to purchase private goods or services. In other contexts, Congress has empowered private entities or chartered corporations to deliver services previously provided by governmental entities or to advance legislative objectives. Congress has created various corporations, including Amtrak and the Communications Satellite Corporation. More recently, in the 114th and 115th Congresses, legislation was proposed to create a corporation to provide air traffic control services that are currently administered by the Federal Aviation Administration.
While the federal government employs various forms of privatization, Congress's authority to delegate governmental functions and services to other entities has its constitutional limits. Constitutional principles, such as the nondelegation doctrine, the Due Process Clause, and the Appointments Clause, may constrain Congress's authority to delegate federal authority to private, governmental, or quasi-governmental entities.
Courts have defined these constitutional limits when reviewing Congress's efforts to privatize public services or functions. When reviewing privatization issues, a court must first determine whether the entity in question is a private or governmental entity. While certain entities such as traditional federal agencies can be readily characterized as governmental entities, the distinction between a public and a private entity can be unclear. For example, corporations established by Congress are not always treated as private entities by the courts. The Supreme Court has held that a legislative declaration that an entity is either a private or governmental actor is not dispositive for purposes of determining the entity's status. Therefore, courts have weighed various factors in making this threshold determination.
The court's determination of an entity's governmental or private status typically guides its review of delegations of authority. Courts have applied different tests for private versus governmental entities in reviewing challenges under the "nondelegation doctrine." This doctrine, as interpreted by the courts, limits Congress's authority to delegate its legislative power to the other entities. In general, courts have upheld delegations of authority to governmental entities such as federal agencies. However, courts have subjected private entities to a higher level of scrutiny and limited the types of services and functions that Congress can delegate to them.
Congressional delegations of power to government entities, including government-created corporations, may implicate other provisions of the Constitution. For instance, case law has explored whether delegation of power to quasi-governmental actors violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The increased use of corporations that have both public and private aspects has complicated how courts have analyzed due process challenges to the authority delegated to these entities. Further, the Constitution's requirements regarding the appointment of certain federal officials under the Appointments Clause may be relevant to government privatization efforts. The Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution generally requires "officers of the United States" to be appointed by the President "with the Advice and Consent of the Senate," although Congress may vest the appointment of "inferior" officers "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." In contrast, non-officers are not subject to any constitutionally required method of appointment. A crucial threshold question respecting the Appointments Clause is who constitutes an "officer" of the United States.
This report focuses on the constitutional principles and judicial decisions that may constrain certain types of privatization that involve private and government-created entities. |
crs_98-958 | crs_98-958_0 | Introduction
"'Extradition' is the formal surrender of a person by a State to another State for prosecution or punishment." Extradition to or from the United States is a creature of treaty. The United States has extradition treaties with over a hundred of the nations of the world, although there are many with which the United States has no extradition treaty. International terrorism and drug trafficking have made extradition an increasingly important law enforcement tool. Bars to Extradition
Extradition treaties are in the nature of a contract, and by operation of international law,
[a] state party to an extradition treaty is obligated to comply with the request of another state party to that treaty to arrest and deliver a person duly shown to be sought by that state (a) for trial on a charge of having committed a crime covered by the treaty within the jurisdiction of the requesting state, or (b) for punishment after conviction of such a crime and flight from that state, provided that none of the grounds for refusal to extradite set forth in [the treaty] is applicable. Military and Political Offenses
In addition to an explicit list of crimes for which extradition may be granted, most modern extradition treaties also identify various classes of offenses for which extradition may or must be denied. Common among these are provisions excluding purely military and political offenses. When a foreign country seeks to extradite a fugitive from the United States, dual criminality may be satisfied by reference to either federal or state law. The purpose of the hearing is in part to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the individual committed an offense covered by the extradition treaty. Extradition for Trial or Punishment in the United States
The laws of the country of refuge and the applicable extradition treaty govern extradition back to the United States of a fugitive located overseas. If the United States has no extradition treaty with the country of refuge, extradition is not a likely option. Although treaty requirements vary, the Justice Department suggests that prosecutors supply formal documentation in the form of an original and four copies of
a prosecutor's affidavit describing the facts of the case, including dates, names, docket numbers and citations, and preferably executed before a judge or magistrate (particularly if extradition is sought from a civil law country) copies of the statutes the fugitive is said to have violated, the statutes governing the penalties that may be imposed upon conviction, and the applicable statute of limitations if the fugitive has been convicted and sentenced: identification evidence; certified documentation of conviction, sentence, and the amount of time served and remaining to be served; copies of the statutes of conviction; and a statement that the service of the remaining sentence is not barred by a statute of limitations if the fugitive is being sought for prosecution or sentencing: certified copies of the arrest warrant (preferably signed by the court or a magistrate) and of the indictment or complaint if the fugitive is being sought for prosecution or sentencing: evidence of the identity of the individual sought (fingerprints/photographs) and of the evidence upon which the charges are based and of the fugitive's guilt in the form of witness affidavits (preferably avoiding the use grand jury transcripts and, particularly in the case of extradition from a common law country, the use of hearsay). The treaty issue most likely to arise after extradition and the fugitive's return to this country is whether the fugitive was surrendered subject to any limitations such as those posed by the doctrine of specialty. Regardless of their view of fugitive standing, reviewing courts have agreed that the surrendering State may subsequently consent to trial for crimes other than those for which extradition was had. | "Extradition" is the formal surrender of a person by a State to another State for prosecution or punishment. Extradition to or from the United States is a creature of treaty. The United States has extradition treaties with over a hundred nations, although there are many countries with which it has no extradition treaty. International terrorism and drug trafficking have made extradition an increasingly important law enforcement tool. This is a brief overview of the adjustments made in recent treaties to accommodate American law enforcement interests, and then a nutshell overview of the federal law governing foreign requests to extradite a fugitive found in this country and a United States request for extradition of a fugitive found in a foreign country.
Extradition treaties are in the nature of a contract and generate the most controversy with respect to those matters for which extradition may not be had. In addition to an explicit list of crimes for which extradition may be granted, most modern extradition treaties also identify various classes of offenses for which extradition may or must be denied. Common among these are provisions excluding purely military and political offenses; capital offenses; crimes that are punishable under only the laws of one of the parties to the treaty; crimes committed outside the country seeking extradition; crimes where the fugitive is a national of the country of refuge; and crimes barred by double jeopardy or a statute of limitations.
Extradition is triggered by a request submitted through diplomatic channels. In this country, it proceeds through the Departments of Justice and State and may be presented to a federal magistrate to order a hearing to determine whether the request is in compliance with an applicable treaty, whether it provides sufficient evidence to satisfy probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed the identified treaty offense(s), and whether other treaty requirements have been met. If so, the magistrate certifies the case for extradition at the discretion of the Secretary of State. Except as provided by treaty, the magistrate does not inquire into the nature of foreign proceedings likely to follow extradition.
The laws of the country of refuge and the applicable extradition treaty govern extradition back to the United States of a fugitive located overseas. Requests travel through diplomatic channels, and the treaty issue most likely to arise after extradition to this country is whether the extraditee has been tried for crimes other than those for which he or she was extradited. The fact that extradition was ignored and a fugitive forcibly returned to the United States for trial constitutes no jurisdictional impediment to trial or punishment. Federal and foreign immigration laws sometimes serve as an alternative to extradition to and from the United States.
This report is available in an abbreviated version, CRS Report RS22702, An Abridged Sketch of Extradition To and From the United States, by [author name scrubbed], which appears without the citations to authority, footnotes, or appendices found here. |
crs_R40810 | crs_R40810_0 | Introduction
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ( P.L. But while the Katrina experience was not a "normal" or "average" disaster, it tested every form of housing assistance offered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Post-Disaster Housing
In the wake of a disaster, local and state governments and charitable organizations take immediate steps to shelter families and individuals whose housing has been made uninhabitable by the disaster event. As previously noted, states can be victims of an event that can greatly diminish their ability to assist in housing victims of major disasters or emergencies. Given the scope of the problem, Congress has begun work on legislation to address the issue through legislation that would
require the Federal Emergency Management Agency to determine how many temporary units it needs in stock to respond to major disasters and to develop criteria to establish whether the stored housing units are usable. 109-295 , the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA), removed that cap and now repairs can be made for the full amount available under IHP. The narrative of the strategy is, at most points, thematically reinforcing FEMA's work of recent years: to emphasize the federal role as acting in collaboration with the state and local governments, as well as emergency managers at those levels, to establish both professional standards and operational principles to enhance cooperation and the efficiency of disaster operations. While offering plaudits to the strategy for incorporating comments from stakeholders and providing a comprehensive listing of federal assets, a report by a Senate ad hoc subcommittee noted:
(1) the Agency's failure to develop and implement a catastrophic disaster housing response plan was a major contributing factor in the inadequate housing response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita; (2) the final Strategy released by FEMA in January of 2009 is a considerable improvement over FEMA's initial Strategy, however, many of the constructive proposals in the plan must still be developed; (3) the Strategy delivered on the final working day of the last Administration leaves the new Administration without essential operational housing plans, including plans directed toward post-catastrophic response; and (4) in leaving these essential catastrophic planning response components for a yet unformed Task Force, FEMA has ignored its own advice and recommendations on housing, including its recognition of the need for such a plan and its acknowledgement that its programs are insufficient for catastrophic response. Similarly, other emergency management practitioners, including the new Administrator of FEMA, also felt the strategy report left a number of unanswered questions regarding the future outline of temporary housing following a disaster. Congress may wish to pursue the fundamental questions of housing, both its authorities and its operational reality, with the new leadership at FEMA
Directions
In its introduction, the National Disaster Housing Strategy refers to a vision that will "point the nation in new directions to meet the disaster housing needs of individuals and communities." An indication of the direction of the strategy, and how it will be translated into policy and practice, may come in FEMA's operational implementation plan which is discussed in the Disaster Housing Strategy. This period has also seen a burgeoning FEMA-HUD relationship to potentially develop new ways to provide disaster housing for those displaced by those events. | For over three decades the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has provided temporary housing assistance to eligible victims of natural disasters. FEMA has responded to more than a thousand disaster and emergency events over this period, employing a number of options for meeting the needs of people who have lost their primary housing as a result of a disaster declared by the President. The cycle of help from sheltering provided by local organizations in the immediate aftermath, to the eventual repair and rebuilding or replacement of private homes and rental units, is the focus of this report.
Because of the historic nature of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, much of FEMA's work has been defined and measured by its response to that event. Katrina was an outlier in scope and not representative of disasters declared, on almost a weekly basis, over the last 30 years. But Katrina highlighted the gaps in FEMA's housing authorities, raised questions regarding the agency's leadership in exercising existing authorities, and provoked an examination of the flexibility, or lack thereof, in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act and its implementing regulations.
The congressional response to Katrina increased FEMA's authority and ability to address many housing issues in the post-disaster environment. Further, subsequent analysis of the Katrina response has also directed attention to the authorities of other federal agencies charged with federal housing responsibilities.
In the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, P.L. 109-295, enacted in October of 2006, Congress directed FEMA to prepare a National Disaster Housing Strategy. While FEMA was directed to deliver the strategy within nine months, a final version was not delivered to Congress until January 16, 2009. The final product contains a comprehensive summary of previous disaster housing policy and highlights innovative approaches taken at the state and local level, by both governmental and non-governmental organizations responding to disaster housing needs.
The Obama Administration, and the 111th Congress, have the opportunity to review and, if inclined, adjust the strategy and consider other alternatives discussed in the report. Congress may also wish to exercise oversight over the implementation of the strategy and to suggest, through legislation, the future direction of the federal disaster housing mission.
This report reviews standard disaster housing procedures as well as options that could be taken to improve disaster housing including increased FEMA/HUD cooperation, the use of the case management authority, the repair and renovation of private rental housing units, and the use of alternative manufactured housing. It will be updated as warranted by events and legislative action. |
crs_R42880 | crs_R42880_0 | During the past several years, however, physician practices appear to be changing, as a number of doctors merge their offices into larger practices; sell their practices to hospitals, insurance companies, and physician management firms; contract to provide exclusive services to providers such as hospitals; or go to work for larger providers as salaried employees. Lifestyle preferences are at play, with younger doctors more willing than their predecessors to work for an outside institution to secure a set schedule and salary; about half of doctors hired out of residencies or fellowships in 2010 took jobs at hospitals. At the same time, hospitals and insurers are eager to hire doctors, given forecasts of a pending physician shortage by the end of the decade (see " Physician Supply "). The shortfall is predicted to occur in the midst of rising demand for medical services by aging baby boomers and millions of Americans who could gain insurance coverage under the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as amended). Hundreds of physician practices, insurers, and hospitals have announced financial and clinical integration to quality as ACOs. Congress is playing dual roles regarding the consolidation. On the one hand, lawmakers designed the ACA in part to reduce health delivery fragmentation and help control government and private spending. In addition, Congress and federal regulators have been monitoring, and continue to monitor, the health care system for signs that mergers and acquisitions may be having negative effects on costs, competition, and consumer access such as distorting prices or creating conflicts of interest in provision of services. Analysts and lawmakers are aware that the health care sector went through a similar round of restructuring during the 1980s and 1990s, as physicians sold their practices and managed care insurance plans expanded. In contrast to the previous round of consolidation, where doctors were seen as gatekeepers for managed care plans that attempted to limit services, the ACA envisions "patient-centered" care where doctors and other providers are rewarded for necessary treatment that improves quality of outcomes. Still, it is not clear how the new round of changes ultimately will play out. This report provides background on factors contributing to changes in physician practice organization, including physician supply, lifestyle changes, and government incentives. Next it examines different types of integration, the legal intricacies of affiliation, and the possible implications for consumer and federal policy. A quarter of U.S. doctors are graduates of international medical schools. Practice Consolidation
Historically, physicians have operated in small or solo practices, with a number of factors limiting integration with other health care providers. Delivery Reforms
Physician practices, hospitals, and other health care providers in recent months have announced affiliations to qualify as accountable care organizations (ACOs) under the ACA. Concierge Practices
While the main trends appear to be consolidation, a small but growing number of doctors are responding to pressures to change health care delivery and reimbursement by creating concierge practices, where physicians see fewer patients who pay an annual fee to receive care. Physician practice operating costs have not been declining in concert with real compensation, according to the MGMA. | A growing number of U.S. physicians are combining their practices; affiliating with hospitals, insurance companies, and specialty management firms; or going to work directly for such organizations. The moves are part of a broader trend toward consolidation in health care, with the overall number of mergers and acquisitions in the sector at the highest level in a decade.
Alterations in physician practice appear to be a response to a number of factors. Younger doctors are more eager than their predecessors to work for an outside institution, such as a hospital, to secure a set schedule and salary. Private practices have become more complex to manage, even as physician compensation has been declining. Doctors see financial advantages to building larger practices, in terms of ability to control expenses and negotiate higher fees with insurers. Further, not all trends are toward consolidation. A small but growing number of doctors are reacting to market incentives by moving in a different direction: creating concierge practices in which they see a limited number of patients who pay an annual retainer.
According to experts, physician practices also may be affected, in part, by provisions of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended), designed to spur closer financial and clinical affiliation among health care providers. For example, the ACA creates health care delivery systems called Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), under which providers contract to oversee a patient's total course of care in a bid to manage costs and improve quality. A number of physician practices, insurers, and hospitals have announced affiliations to qualify as ACOs. In another move partly spurred by the ACA, hospitals and health plans have been hiring physicians to ensure they will have adequate staff to treat the millions of Americans projected to gain insurance during the next few years. Several major studies have warned of a looming shortage of physicians, particularly primary care doctors.
Congress is playing dual roles regarding the consolidation. On the one hand, the ACA was designed, in part, to prompt affiliation among doctors and other health care providers in order to reduce fragmentation and help control government and private health spending. At the same time, lawmakers are monitoring the health care system for signs that consolidation is having negative effects on consumer access, prices, and competition. The health care sector went through a similar round of restructuring during the 1980s and 1990s, including mergers and acquisitions of physician practices, ultimately prompting a backlash from some consumers who complained they were being blocked from specialists and procedures. The ACA envisions a different system of "patient-centered care," where doctors and other providers are given incentives to improve quality and efficiency, rather than to limit services. Still, it remains to be seen how the current round of changes will play out as physicians and other providers form larger organizations. This report provides background on factors contributing to changes in physician practice organization, including physician supply, sources of revenue, operating costs, and government incentives. It also examines the different types of integration, the legal intricacies of affiliation, and the possible implications for consumer and federal policy. |
crs_R40899 | crs_R40899_0 | Overview
Child abuse and neglect is a significant social concern. Children who experience abuse or neglect are more likely to have developmental delays and impaired language or cognitive skills; be identified as "problem" children (with attention difficulties or challenging behaviors); be arrested for delinquency, adult criminality, and violent criminal behavior; experience depression, anxiety, or other mental health problems as adults; engage in more health-risk behaviors as adults; and have poorer health outcomes as adults. In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA, P.L. Since its enactment 35 years ago, the law has been reauthorized and amended numerous times, most recently by the Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003 ( P.L. 108-36 ). Currently, CAPTA authorizes:
State Grants : Formula grants to states and territories to help improve their child protective service (CPS) systems, in exchange for which states must comply with various requirements related to the reporting, investigation, and treatment of child maltreatment cases. Community-Based Grants: Formula grants to each state and territory for support of community-based activities and services to prevent child abuse and neglect. Funding authorization for most grants or activities authorized under CAPTA expired with FY2008. 111-8 ) provided roughly $110 million out of the general treasury for CAPTA grants and activities in FY2009. In addition, as required by the Victims of Crime Act ( P.L. 93-247 , as amended), $20 million was set aside from the Crime Victims Fund for grants to improve the investigation, prosecution, and handling of child abuse and neglect cases (commonly referred to as "Children's Justice Act grants"). This first part of this report includes a discussion of definitions of child abuse and neglect and a description of how CPS agencies receive and respond to allegations of child abuse and neglect. Definition of Child Abuse and Neglect
Child abuse and neglect is defined in CAPTA as "at a minimum, any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or failure to act which presents an imminent risk of serious harm." Caseworkers reported that more than half of the families (54%) included in the nationally representative survey of children in families investigated for abuse or neglect had only one supportive caregiver in the home, close to one-third (31%) were assessed as having low social support, and nearly one-quarter had trouble paying for basic necessities. Risk Factors Among Children
Children in families investigated for abuse or neglect exhibit a greater risk for developmental delays and behavior problems than do children in the general population. Specifically, these data are (1) the number of children who were reported to the state during the year as abused or neglected and, of those children, the number for whom the report was substantiated, unsubstantiated, or determined to be false; (2) the number of children reported as abused or neglect who received services under CAPTA (or an equivalent state program) during the year, the number who did not, and the number who were removed from their families; (3) the number of children reunited with their families, or receiving family preservation services, that within five years were the subject of a subsequent substantiated report of child abuse or neglect (including death); (4) the number of deaths in the state during the year that were the result of child abuse or neglect and the number of those deaths that involved children in foster care; (5) the number of children for whom individuals were appointed by the court to represent the children's best interests and the average number of out-of-court contacts between the appointed representatives and these children; (6) the number of children "under the care of the state child protection system" whose custody is transferred to the state juvenile justice system; (7) the number of families that received preventive services during the year; (8) the number of CPS workers responsible for intake and screening of child abuse and neglect reports, and the number of those same CPS workers, as well as the number of CPS investigators, relative to the number of reports investigated; and (9) the agency response time with respect to initial investigation of child abuse or neglect and the response time with respect to the provision of services to families where an allegation of abuse or neglect has been made. Funding Authorized and Appropriated Under CAPTA
The final section of this report discusses funding authorized by CAPTA and includes a table showing a history of funding appropriated under that authority (beginning with FY1992). 111-8 ), and legislation pending in Congress ( H.R. 3293 ) would appropriate a similar amount for FY2010. | Child abuse and neglect is a significant social concern. Children who experience abuse and/or neglect are more likely to have developmental delays and impaired language or cognitive skills; be identified as "problem" children (with attention difficulties or challenging behaviors); be arrested for delinquency, adult criminality, and violent criminal behavior; experience depression, anxiety, or other mental health problems as adults; engage in more health-risk behaviors as adults; and have poorer health outcomes as adults. Further, data from a nationally representative sample of children in families investigated for abuse or neglect show that as a whole—and without regard to whether a child protective services (CPS) investigator determines that abuse or neglect has occurred—children in families who come into contact with CPS agencies are at higher risk for poor development and behavior outcomes than children in the general population. In addition, that survey shows that these children live in families that often face challenges to their ability to care for and nurture their children, including trouble paying for basic necessities, low social support, and only one supportive caregiver in the family. In FY2007, states reported an estimated 3.5 million children were in families investigated or assessed by CPS workers and some 794,000 were identified as victims of abuse or neglect.
In 1974, Congress enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA, P.L. 93-247) to create a single federal focus for preventing and responding to child abuse and neglect. As a condition of receiving state grant funds under that act, states are required to have procedures in place for receiving and responding to allegations of abuse or neglect and for ensuring children's safety. Further, they must define child abuse and neglect in a way that is consistent with CAPTA, which defines the term as " at a minimum, any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or failure to act which presents an imminent risk of serious harm."
Since its enactment, CAPTA has been reauthorized numerous times, most recently by the Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-36). Currently, it authorizes formula grants to states to help improve their child protective services; competitive grants and contracts for research, demonstration, and other activities related to better identifying, preventing, and treating child abuse and neglect; and formula grants to states for support of community-based child abuse and neglect prevention services. Funding authorization for these CAPTA programs expired with FY2008. However, Congress appropriated $110 million for CAPTA in FY2009 (P.L. 111-8) and a similar amount has been proposed for FY2010 (H.R. 3293). In addition, CAPTA authorizes grants to improve the prosecution and handling of child abuse and neglect cases. These formula grants to states, commonly referred to as Children's Justice Act grants, are funded via an annual set-aside of up to $20 million from the Crime Victims fund.
This report begins with discussion of the issue and scope of child abuse and neglect, followed by a discussion of the manner and scope of the work of the CPS agency in receiving and responding to allegations of child abuse or neglect, and then looks at some identified risk factors for poor child and family outcomes among all children in families investigated for abuse or neglect. Finally, it provides a detailed description of the current programs and activities authorized under CAPTA and discusses funding authorized and provided under CAPTA. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R45047 | crs_R45047_0 | Generally, the VA is funded through the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies (MILCON-VA) Appropriations Act. The VA provides a range of benefits and services to veterans and eligible dependents who meet certain criteria as authorized by law. These benefits include medical care, disability compensation and pensions, education, vocational rehabilitation and employment services, assistance to homeless veterans, home loan guarantees, administration of life insurance and traumatic injury protection insurance for servicemembers, and death benefits that cover burial expenses. 113-146 , as amended by P.L. The act also provided mandatory funding for the Veterans Choice Program (VCP), by establishing the Veterans Choice Fund (Section 802 (a) of P.L. 115-96 ) another $2.1 billion to remain available until expended. The Choice Act mandatory funds are not part of the regular annual appropriations provided in the House-passed FY2018 MILCON-VA bill (Division K of H.R. The President's Budget Request for FY2018 and Advance Appropriations for FY2019 and Congressional Action
The President's Request
On May 23, 2017, the President submitted his budget request to Congress for FY2018 and for the advance appropriations accounts for FY2019. The President's FY2018 budget request for the VA is $182.66 billion. Compared with the FY2017-enacted amount of $176.94 billion, this is a 3.23% (or $5.72 billion) increase. The FY2018-requested amount includes $103.95 billion in mandatory budget authority and $78.71 billion in discretionary budget authority (see Table 3 ). The Administration's budget request of $106.97 billion for FY2018 also includes $12.44 million for veterans insurance and indemnities over the FY2018 advance appropriations of $107.90 million provided in the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act ( P.L. Compared with the FY2017-enacted amount of $65.32 billion, this is a 6.66% increase, and it includes additional funding of $2.65 billion over the FY2018 advance appropriations of $66.39 billion provided in P.L. The House passed H.R. 3354 and which was passed by the House on September 14, 2017. 3354 ) provides $182.28 billion for the VA. This includes $103.95 billion in mandatory funding and $78.33 billion in discretionary funding (see Table 3 ). Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA)
For the VBA, the House-passed measure provides $107.03 billion. Veterans Health Administration (VHA)
The House-passed bill provides $69.74 billion (without collections) for the VHA for FY2018 (see Table 4 ). This amount includes $66.39 billion provided as advance appropriations in P.L. 114-223 for FY2018 for the four accounts—medical services, medical community care, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities—and $2.65 billion in additional funding for FY2018 for those same four accounts. The total VHA amount also includes $698.23 million for the medical and prosthetic research account. Senate Appropriations Committee Action
On July 13, 2017, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2018 MILCON-VA Appropriations bill ( S. 1557 ; S.Rept. The committee-reported version would provide $182.37 billion for the VA for FY2018 (see Table 3 ). This amount includes $103.95 billion in mandatory benefits and $78.42 billion in discretionary funding. A majority of this funding will be for mandatory benefits such as disability compensation, readjustment benefits, and veterans insurance programs. 115-130 ), as reported, recommends $70.09 billion (without collections) for the VHA for FY2018 (see Table 4 ). This amount includes $66.39 billion provided as advance appropriations in P.L. 114-223 for FY2018 for the four accounts—medical services, medical community care, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities—and $2.98 billion in additional funding for FY2018 for those same four accounts. The total VHA amount also includes $722.26 million for the medical and prosthetic research account. The Senate Appropriations Committee does not address the President's proposal of $2.9 billion in mandatory funding for the continuation of the VCP in FY2018 and $3.5 billion in mandatory funding for VCP in FY2019. Continuing Appropriations for FY201831
Since none of the 12 regular appropriations bills were enacted prior to the start of FY2018 (October 1, 2017), Congress passed and the President signed several continuing resolutions (CRs) into law ( P.L. 115-56 , P.L. 115-90 , P.L. 115-96 , and P.L. 115-120 ). 115-123 ) would fund some accounts of the VA for FY2018, through March 23, 2018, through a formula based on the FY2017 level of appropriations provided in the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017 minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.6791%. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. Division B of this act contained supplemental appropriations for disaster relief related to the consequences of hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a range of benefits and services to veterans and eligible dependents who meet certain criteria as authorized by law. These benefits include medical care, disability compensation and pensions, education, vocational rehabilitation and employment services, assistance to homeless veterans, home loan guarantees, administration of life insurance and traumatic injury protection insurance for servicemembers, and death benefits that cover burial expenses. The VA is funded through the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies (MILCON-VA) appropriations bill.
On May 23, 2017, the President submitted his budget request to Congress for FY2018 and for the advance appropriations accounts for FY2019. The President's FY2018 budget request for the VA is $182.66 billion. Compared with the FY2017-enacted amount of $176.94 billion, this would be a 3.23% (or $5.72 billion) increase. The FY2018-requested amount includes $103.95 billion in mandatory budget authority and $78.71 billion in discretionary budget authority. For the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), the President's budget request includes $106.97 billion for FY2018. For the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) the President's budget request includes $69.67 billion for FY2018, without collections. Compared with the FY2017-enacted amount of $65.32 billion, this would be a 6.66% increase, and the amount includes additional funding of $2.65 billion over the FY2018 advance appropriations of $66.39 billion provided in P.L. 114-223.
Although the Veterans Choice Program (VCP) is not part of the annual appropriations for the VA health care programs, the President is requesting $2.9 billion in mandatory funding for FY2018 and $3.5 billion for FY2019 to continue the program. In the meantime, P.L. 115-46 provided $2.1 billion in mandatory appropriations in 2017 for the Veterans Choice Fund (which funds VCP), and in 2018, P.L. 115-96 provided another $2.1 billion in mandatory appropriations. In total, Congress has provided $14.2 billion in mandatory appropriations for VCP since the program was established on August 7, 2014, including the initial $10 billion in mandatory funding provided through 2017 in P.L. 113-146, as amended.
On September 14, 2017, the House passed its version of the FY2018 MILCON-VA appropriations bill (Division K—Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations, bill, 2018 in H.R. 3354). The House-passed measure (H.R. 3354) provides $182.28 billion for the VA. This amount includes $103.95 billion in mandatory funding and $78.33 billion in discretionary funding. For the VBA, the House-passed measure provides $107.03 billion. A majority of this funding is for mandatory benefits such as disability compensation, readjustment benefits, and veterans insurance programs. For VHA, the House-passed bill provides $69.74 billion (without collections) for FY2018. This amount includes $66.39 billion provided as advance appropriations in P.L. 114-223 for FY2018 for the four accounts—medical services, medical community care, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities—and $2.65 billion in additional funding for FY2018 for those same four accounts. The total VHA amount also includes $698.23 million for the medical and prosthetic research account.
On July 13, 2017, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2018 MILCON-VA Appropriations bill (S. 1557; S.Rept. 115-130). The committee-reported version would provide $182.37 billion for the VA for FY2018. This amount includes $103.95 billion in mandatory funding and $78.42 billion in discretionary funding. For the VBA, the Senate-reported bill recommends $107.04 billion for FY2018. For VHA, the committee recommends $70.09 billion (without collections) for FY2018. This amount includes $66.39 billion provided as advance appropriations in P.L. 114-223 for FY2018 for the four accounts—medical services, medical community care, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities—and $2.98 billion in additional funding for FY2018 for those same four accounts. The total VHA amount also includes $722.26 million for the medical and prosthetic research account.
Since none of the 12 regular appropriations bills were enacted prior to the start of FY2018 (October 1, 2017), Congress passed and the President signed into law several continuing resolutions (CRs) (P.L. 115-56, P.L. 115-90, P.L. 115-96, and P.L. 115-120). The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123) funds some VA accounts for FY2018 through March 23, 2018, at the FY2017 level and provides $93.5 million in supplemental appropriations for the VA for expenses related to the consequences of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, among other things. |
crs_RL33167 | crs_RL33167_0 | Internet Development and Use in China(3)
In the early stages of its development, the Internet presented a challenge to Chinesegovernment control over information flows and public opinion. As in the United States, the Internet has already transformed the daily lives of many peoplein China. (9) Chinese studies have found that the majority of Internet users in China use the Internet forentertainment purposes. (11)
An often cited empirical study by the OpenNet Initiative (a collaboration between HarvardLaw School, University of Toronto Citizen Lab, and Cambridge Security Program) found that Chinahas the most sophisticated content-filtering Internet regime in the world. (13) However, many observers are concerned about the pervasive filtering of any content that theCommunist Party of China views as politically objectionable. First, the Chinese government employs a complex system of regulations,surveillance, and punitive action to promote self-censorship among the public. Legal Regulations
Since the commercialization of the Internet in 1995, the PRC government has issuedextensive regulations regarding Internet usage. (42)
In addition to U.S. companies, such as Cisco, that provide hardware, a number of U.S.software and Internet service providers, such as Yahoo and Microsoft, have been accused ofcomplying with censorship in China. (49)
U.S. Government Efforts to Promote Unrestricted Internet Access in China
Some U.S. officials have expressed their belief that the growth of the Internet and otherinformation technologies will help bring about wide-scale democratization abroad. Congressional Action
In the 108th Congress, Representatives Christopher Cox and Tom Lantos and other Membersintroduced The Global Internet Freedom Act ( H.R. In the 109th Congress, Representative Coxreintroduced the Global Internet Freedom Act as H.R. On February 1, 2006, the Congressional HumanRights Caucus held a hearing entitled, "Human Rights and the Internet -- The People's Republic ofChina." On February 15, 2006, the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and InternationalOperations of the House International Relations Committee will hold a joint hearing with theSubcommittee on Asia and the Pacific regarding the Internet and censorship in China. The U.S.Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which oversees the International Broadcasting Bureau(IBB), has promoted Internet freedom in China by focusing on its Voice of America (VOA) andRadio Free Asia (RFA) websites, which are regularly blocked by Chinese authorities. According to the company, users' identities would also be protected from online tracking andmonitoring by the PRC government. These policy suggestions includeenacting legal prohibitions on U.S. companies that would aid PRC government censorship efforts;creating U.S. governmental institutions for promoting global Internet freedom; funding thedevelopment of counter-censorship technologies; applying greater pressure at thegovernment-to-government level; and establishing codes of conduct for U.S. Internet companies inChina that promote free expression within the confines of PRC political and business realities. | Since its founding in 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has exerted great effort inmanipulating the flow of information and prohibiting the dissemination of viewpoints that criticizethe government or stray from the official Communist party view. The introduction of Internettechnology in the mid-1990's presented a challenge to government control over news sources, andby extension, over public opinion. While the Internet has developed rapidly, broadened access tonews, and facilitated mass communications in China, many forms of expression online, as in othermass media, are still significantly stifled.
Empirical studies have found that China has one of the most sophisticated content-filteringInternet regimes in the world. The Chinese government employs increasingly sophisticated methodsto limit content online, including a combination of legal regulation, surveillance, and punishmentto promote self-censorship, as well as technical controls. U.S. government efforts to defeat Internet"jamming" include funding through the Broadcasting Board of Governors to providecounter-censorship software to Chinese Internet users to access Voice of America (VOA) and RadioFree Asia (RFA) in China.
As U.S. investments in China and bilateral trade have surged in the past several years andChina has developed its communications infrastructure, Chinese society has undergone rapidchanges while the PRC government has continued to repress political dissent. Many U.S. observers,including government officials, have argued that economic openness and the growth of the Internetin China would help bring about political liberalization in China. However, contrary to facilitatingfreedom, some private U.S. companies have been charged with aiding or complying with ChineseInternet censorship. Private U.S. companies that provide Internet hardware, such as routers, as wellas those that provide Internet services such as Web-log (blog) hosting or search portals, have beenaccused of ignoring international standards for freedom of expression when pursuing businessopportunities in the PRC market.
In the 108th Congress, the provisions of the "Global Internet Freedom Act" ( H.R. 48 ) were subsumed into the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2004-05 ( H.R. 1950 ) and passed by the House on July 16, 2003. Christopher Cox reintroduced the bill( H.R. 2216 ) to the 109th Congress in May 2005. If passed, the act would authorize $50million for FY2006 and FY2007 to develop and implement a global Internet freedom policy. Theact would also establish an office within the International Broadcasting Bureau with the sole missionof countering Internet jamming by repressive governments. On February 1, 2006, the CongressionalHuman Rights Caucus held a hearing entitled, "Human Rights and the Internet -- The People'sRepublic of China." On February 15, 2006, the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights andInternational Operations of the House International Relations Committee will hold a joint hearingwith the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific regarding the Internet and censorship in China.
This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R44249 | crs_R44249_0 | It is the latest stage in a process of European integration begun after World War II, initially by six Western European countries, to promote peace and economic recovery. The EU currently consists of 28 member states, including most of the formerly communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (see map in the Appendix ). Over the years, member states have sought to harmonize laws and adopt common policies on an increasing number of issues. Currently, however, the EU faces a range of political and economic pressures—including successful populist, antiestablishment political parties in many EU countries—and multiple internal and external challenges, which have raised questions about the EU's future shape and character. Perhaps the most prominent challenge for the EU is the United Kingdom's (UK's) expected exit from the EU (known as "Brexit"). Today, the United States and the EU share a dynamic political partnership and a huge trade and investment relationship. Many in the EU are concerned about the future trajectory of U.S.-EU relations under the Trump Administration and about whether the United States will continue to be a reliable partner in the years ahead. President Trump's reported questioning of the EU's value and utility is largely unprecedented and in contrast to long-standing U.S. support for the European integration project. Some analysts suggest that managing relations with the United States under the Trump Administration has emerged as another, somewhat unexpected, challenge for the EU. At the same time, the EU hopes to preserve close U.S.-EU ties, and EU policymakers continue to seek to cooperate with the Trump Administration where possible on issues of common interest and concern. As a result, some EU countries have "opted out" of certain aspects of integration, including the eurozone and the Schengen area. At the same time, opinion polls indicate that a majority of EU citizens remain supportive of the EU. Democracy and Rule-of-Law Concerns
Concerns have grown over the last few years about what many EU officials and observers view as democratic backsliding in some member states, particularly Poland and Hungary. Although most experts consider a complete dissolution of the EU unlikely, advocates worry that for the first time in the EU's history, some aspects of integration could be stopped or reversed. Others contend that the multiple crises currently facing the EU could produce some beneficial reforms and ultimately transform the bloc into a more effective and cohesive entity. Regardless of a formal decision to move toward a multispeed EU, the EU appears to be pursuing greater integration in certain areas, with varying degrees of success. Issues for the United States
U.S. Policy Considerations
The United States has resolutely supported the European integration project since its inception in the 1950s as a way to help keep European nationalism in check, promote political reconciliation and economic interdependence, and encourage stability and security on the European continent. Successive Administrations and many Members of Congress have long viewed the EU (and its predecessors) as fostering democratic allies and strong trading partners in Europe. Some U.S. policymakers, analysts, and Members of Congress have expressed concern that the various challenges currently facing the EU could have negative implications for the EU's ability to be a robust, effective U.S. partner. Many EU officials are uneasy with elements of the Trump Administration's "America First" foreign policy and with U.S. positions on a range of international challenges—including relations with Russia and China, the nuclear deal with Iran, the Middle East peace process, migration, and climate change. | The European Union (EU) is a unique partnership in which member states have pooled sovereignty in certain policy areas and harmonized laws on a wide range of economic and political issues. The EU is the latest stage in a process of European integration begun after World War II, initially by six Western European countries, to promote peace, security, and economic development. The EU currently consists of 28 member states, including most of the formerly communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
The EU is largely viewed as a cornerstone of European stability and prosperity. For much of the last decade, however, many EU countries have faced considerable economic difficulties. Despite an improved economic situation in the EU since 2017, economic pressures and societal changes have contributed to the rise of populist and antiestablishment political parties, at least some of which harbor anti-EU or "euroskeptic" sentiments. Such trends have complicated the EU's ability to deal with multiple internal and external challenges. Among the most prominent challenges are
the pending departure of the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU ("Brexit"); democracy and rule-of-law concerns in Poland, Hungary, and other EU members; migration and related societal integration concerns; a resurgent Russia; and a heightened terrorism threat.
Amid these difficult issues, some are questioning the future shape and character of the EU. Supporters of the EU worry that certain aspects of EU integration could be stopped or reversed. Others contend that the multiple crises could produce some beneficial reforms and ultimately transform the EU into a more effective, cohesive entity. Recently, considerable attention has focused on developing a "multispeed EU," in which some EU members could pursue greater integration in specified areas while others could opt out.
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have supported the European integration project since its inception, viewing it as crucial to European peace and security and as a way to foster strong U.S. allies and trading partners. Despite some tensions over the years, the United States and the EU share a dynamic political partnership on various foreign policy issues and an extensive trade and investment relationship. How the EU evolves in the years ahead may have strategic and economic repercussions for the United States.
At the same time, some EU leaders are concerned about President Trump's apparent skepticism of the EU and his reported assessment of the bloc as an economic competitor. Those of this view also worry that elements of the Trump Administration's "America First" foreign policy—such as the U.S. decision to withdraw from the 2015 multilateral nuclear deal with Iran—pit the United States against the EU. A number of European officials and analysts question whether traditional U.S. support for close U.S.-EU relations may be shifting and whether the United States will remain a reliable international partner. Some observers suggest that managing relations with the United States under the Trump Administration has emerged as another, somewhat unexpected, challenge for the EU. At the same time, many in the EU hope to preserve close U.S.-EU ties and EU policymakers continue to seek to cooperate with the Trump Administration where possible on issues of common interest and concern.
This report provides a brief history of the EU and the major challenges confronting the bloc. It also discusses the potential implications for the EU and for U.S.-EU relations. Also see CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by Kristin Archick. |
crs_R44661 | crs_R44661_0 | T his report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2017. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the first title of the homeland security appropriations bill—the Office of the Secretary and Executive Management, the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, the DHS headquarters consolidation project, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, the Office of the Chief Information Officer, Analysis and Operations, and the Office of Inspector General for the department. Collectively, Congress has labeled these components in recent years as "Departmental Management and Operations," although this year, the House Appropriations Committee chose to rename the title "Departmental Management, Operations, Intelligence, and Oversight." The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2017 request for these components, the appropriations proposed by the appropriations committees in response, and those enacted in Division F of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ). Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the first titles of the bills, the report includes information on provisions throughout the bills and report that directly affect these components. Departmental Management and Operations is the smallest of the four titles that carry the bulk of funding in the bill. The Obama Administration requested $1.46 billion for these components in FY2017, $37 million less than was provided for FY2016. The amount requested for these components was 3% of the Obama Administration's $47.7 billion request in net discretionary budget authority and disaster relief funding for DHS. Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S. 3001 would have provided the components included in this title $1.41 billion in net discretionary budget authority in FY2017. This would have been $24 million (1.7%) less than requested, and $62 million (4.2%) less than was provided in FY2016. 5634 would have provided the components included in this title $1.31 billion in net discretionary budget authority in FY2017. This would have been $126 million (8.6%) less than requested, and $163 million (10.8%) less than was provided in FY2016. On September 29, 2016, the President signed into law P.L. 114-223 , which contained a continuing resolution that funds the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.496%, through December 9, 2016. For details on these continuing resolutions and their impact on DHS, see CRS Report R44621, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2017 . On March 16, 2017, the Trump Administration submitted an amendment to the FY2017 budget request, which included a request for $3 billion in additional funding for DHS. Congress addressed this request at the same time as it resolved annual appropriations for the federal government, through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (signed into law as P.L. 115-31 on May 5, 2017). The act included both annual and supplemental appropriations for DHS as Division F. It provided $41.3 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority in annual appropriations, as well as $6.7 billion in funding for the costs of major disasters under the Stafford Act and $163 million in funding for overseas contingency operations. House Appropriations Committee-reported H.R. This was the funding level requested by the Administration, and $20 million (14.3%) more than was provided in FY2016. | This report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2017. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the first title of the homeland security appropriations bill—the Office of the Secretary and Executive Management, the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, the DHS headquarters consolidation project, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, the Office of the Chief Information Officer, Analysis and Operations, and the Office of Inspector General for the department. Collectively, Congress has labeled these components in recent years as "Departmental Management and Operations," although this year, the House Appropriations Committee chose to rename the title "Departmental Management, Operations, Intelligence, and Oversight"—a name change that was carried forward in the FY2017 act.
The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2017 request for these components, the appropriations proposed by the appropriations committees in response, and those enacted in Division F of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31). The report includes information on provisions throughout the bills and reports that directly affect these components.
Departmental Management and Operations is the smallest of the four titles that carry the bulk of funding in the bill. The Obama Administration requested almost $1.5 billion for these components in FY2017, $37 million less than was provided for FY2016. The amount requested for these components is 3% of the Administration's $47.7 billion request in net discretionary budget authority and disaster relief funding for DHS.
Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S. 3001 would have provided the components included in this title more than $1.4 billion in net discretionary budget authority in FY2017. This would have been $24 million (1.7%) less than requested, and $62 million (4.2%) less than was provided in FY2016.
House Appropriations Committee-reported H.R. 5634 would have provided the components included in this title more than $1.3 billion in net discretionary budget authority in FY2017. This would have been $126 million (8.6%) less than requested, and $163 million (10.8%) less than was provided in FY2016.
On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed into law P.L. 114-223, which contained a continuing resolution that funds the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.496% through December 9, 2016. This was the first of a series of continuing resolutions that funded DHS until its annual appropriations were finalized.
On March 16, 2017, the Trump Administration submitted an amendment to the FY2017 budget request, which included a request for $3 billion in additional funding for DHS.
Congress chose to address this request in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (signed into law as P.L. 115-31 on May 5, 2017). Division F of the act included both annual and supplemental appropriations for DHS. The act provided the components included in this title $1.25 billion in net discretionary budget authority. This was $209 million (14.3%) less than requested by the Obama Administration, and $246 million (16.5%) less than was provided in FY2016.
For information on the broader subject of FY2017 funding for DHS, details on the continuing resolutions, links to analytical overviews, and details regarding components in other titles, see CRS Report R44621, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2017.
This report will be updated if further supplemental appropriations are provided for DHS for FY2017. |
crs_R44286 | crs_R44286_0 | Congressional oversight has focused in large part on four building management issues identified by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which has put real property on its annual "high-risk list" since 2003. In recent testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, David Wise, the Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues for GAO, identified three key challenges that agencies face when managing their real property portfolios:
Maintaining more real property than it needs (including unutilized and underutilized buildings); Relying on leasing when ownership of new space would be more cost efficient; and Making real property management decisions using unreliable data. This report focuses on the challenges to effective oversight posed by the lack of accurate and reliable real property data, particularly as it relates to the disposal of unneeded buildings and the government's overreliance on costly leases. The first section analyzes potential weaknesses in the data available to Congress on unutilized and underutilized buildings. Unutilized and Underutilized Building Data
As noted, the federal executive branch agencies hold more than 250,000 buildings with a range of purposes, suited to the unique mission of each agency. The primary source of real property data available to Congress is the Federal Real Property Report (FRPR), an annual report that provides aggregate data on agency real property portfolios. Under the latest space utilization definitions, the number of buildings categorized as unutilized decreased by 54%, and the number categorized as underutilized decreased by 97%. The amount of funding spent operating and maintaining buildings that are empty or only partially occupied may help policymakers determine whether addressing the problem should be a priority. The FRPR does provide some data specific to the disposal of federal buildings, such as the number of buildings disposed of by each agency. Limitations on the Data Available for Oversight of Leased Space
The FRPR, the primary source for government-wide information on leased space, may not provide accurate data on the amount and cost of leased space. In particular, the FRPR does not include data on high-value leases and long-term leases, which represent the greatest fiscal exposure to the government. Moreover, the FY2014 FRPR provided revised figures for previous years, including FY2013 leased space data. GSA does, however, report data on individual leases in monthly spreadsheets, which are available to the public online, and that data could be aggregated and reported in the FRPR. Transparency might be further increased if similar data on high-value leases at agencies with independent leasing authority were also included in the FRPR, although it is not clear whether those data are currently available, or would require new collection methods. Long-Term Leases
Research has shown that long-term operating leases are especially likely, among all high-value leases, to expose the government to unnecessary costs. A relatively high prevalence of long-term leases in an agency's real property portfolio is considered by GAO a management weakness, as it is an indication that the agency's capital planning strategy has not "systematically prioritized which high-value leases have the most cost-saving potential" as construction projects. The FRPR no longer contains, for example, the annual operating costs of unutilized and underutilized buildings—it only provides the annual operating costs of disposed assets, thereby providing the "good news" of future costs avoided through disposition while omitting the "bad news" of the ongoing operating costs associated with unneeded properties the government maintains. GAO might also be able to assess the validity of GSA's revision of prior year lease data, which resulted in a significant decline in the total amount of leased space reported in the FRPR. Database Access
Obtaining direct access to the FRPP might enhance congressional oversight of agency real property activities. The usefulness of the prospectus approval process as an oversight tool, however, may be limited by the fact that GSA is not required to present data that directly compare the cost of leasing versus owning space. This means that Congress is unable to determine whether it is being asked to approve the most cost-effective option for meeting an agency's real property needs. | The federal executive branch owns and leases more than 275,000 buildings, with annual operating costs in excess of $21 billion. Oversight of this portfolio of buildings has been a priority for recent congresses, particularly since real property management has been identified as a "high-risk" area by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), every year since 2003. Key potential weaknesses in real property management include agencies holding empty or only partially occupied buildings; relying on leases for new space even when ownership would be cheaper; and making decisions using real property data of questionable quality. This report examines the challenges to oversight posed by the lack of accurate and reliable real property data, particularly as it relates to the disposal of unneeded building space and the government's overreliance on costly leasing.
The primary source of real property data available to Congress is the Federal Real Property Report (FRPR), which provides aggregate data on executive branch agency portfolios. The data, which are drawn from a database managed by the General Services Administration (GSA), can be unreliable and incomplete, which limits the effectiveness of the FRPR as an oversight tool. After building utilization definitions were revised in FY2013, for example, the number of properties categorized as "unutilized" declined 54% and the number of properties categorized as "underutilized" declined 97%. The FRPR also discontinued reporting the annual operating costs of underutilized and unutilized buildings after FY2010—data that could help Congress understand the full costs of inefficiencies in the building disposal process. GSA does not permit Congress direct access to its real property database, so there is currently no way to obtain that data should GSA opt not to report it in the FRPR.
The FRPR is also the primary source of data available to Congress on real property leases. The data on leased space, however, can also be unreliable and incomplete. In FY2014, for example, GSA reported a 45% decline in the amount of leased space held by the executive branch, and it revised data from FY2013, so that the new figures showed the government held 44% less leased space than it had previously reported for that year. Similarly, while long-term operating leases are most likely to expose the government to financial loss, the FRPR does not provide any data specifically on them. Neither does the FRPR provide data on high-value leases—those leases which, although small in number, often account for a disproportionately large percentage of an agency's operating costs. Key components of agency real property portfolios—notably their long-term and high-value leases—are subject to limited scrutiny from Congress due to the lack of accessible data.
Some of the weaknesses in real property data may be mitigated by congressional action. The FRPR could be expanded to include data Congress believes has important oversight value, such as, perhaps, data on the annual operating costs of unutilized and underutilized buildings, and data on long-term and high-value leases. In addition, obtaining access to GSA's real property database would enable Congress to look at all of the information GSA collects, and to analyze it in a variety of ways—in aggregate, by agency, or by individual building—as policy needs dictate. Agency lease prospectuses—detailed descriptions of the size, cost, and need for high-value leases that must be authorized by Congress—might be required to include the cost of constructing or buying the space which an agency proposed leasing, so that Congress knows if it is being asked to approve the most cost-effective method of space acquisition. |
crs_R42595 | crs_R42595_0 | Congress has long been concerned with ensuring that contributions for which tax deductions are claimed directly benefit charitable activities. Grants are paid out of earnings on donated assets held by the foundation. DAFs have become increasingly popular in recent years, partly due to commercial fund sponsors (e.g., Fidelity and Vanguard) with limited traditional charitable interests. 109-280 ). The Treasury Department's study was released in 2011. The Treasury Report was criticized by Senator Chuck Grassley, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee in 2006, as being "disappointing and nonresponsive." There are no minimum payout requirements (which could require a certain percentage of assets be paid out in grants each year) or excise taxes. Evidence suggests, however, that donors to DAFs have effective control over grants, and to some extent investments, because sponsoring organizations typically follow the donor's advice. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 ( P.L. 4. In accordance with that policy, Fidelity Charitable reserves the right to perform additional due diligence and to decline to make a recommended grant to a charitable organization, including, without limitation, (i) where the grant will confer a more than incidental benefit on an Account Holder, other person with grant recommendation privileges, or other third party; (ii) where the grant will be used for lobbying, for political contributions, or to support political campaign activities; (iii) where the grant will be used for improper purposes; (iv) where the Account Holder and related persons control the organization; (v) where Fidelity Charitable provides a substantial portion of the organization's public support; and (vi) for other reasons in accordance with Fidelity Charitable policies. Essentially in each of the other issues the Treasury addressed for this question, including whether there should be restrictions on the donation of appreciated property and on the timing of deductions (allow deductions without ensuring that the money will be spent in a reasonable period for a charitable purpose) the Treasury Report reverts to this same argument: that contributions to DAFs are no different from contributions to other charities (as opposed to private foundations) because the donor does not retain legal control over the donation. Private foundations are typically established to exist in perpetuity and to make grants out of their earnings. This report analyzes the 2008 DAF sample, examining not only the payout rates of the sponsoring organizations, but also the rates for those organizations with only one DAF account, which might provide some insight into the characteristics of individual DAF accounts that cannot be observed. In 2008, there were roughly 1,818 organizations maintaining at least one DAF account. More than 121,000 of all DAF accounts (or two-thirds of all DAF accounts) are maintained by institutions that have 500 or more individual accounts. The majority of DAF assets are held by organizations that sponsor a large number of DAFs—87% of all DAF assets are held by sponsoring organizations that maintain 100 or more individual DAF accounts. DAF Payout Rate
Since data on DAFs are reported at the sponsoring organization level, data on individual account payouts are not available. DAF sponsoring organizations paid out $7.0 billion in grants from DAF accounts in 2008. Total DAF assets were $29.5 billion at the end of 2008. The Treasury Report found that the average payout rate across DAF sponsoring organizations was 9.3% in 2006. While the Treasury did not report the share with no payout or with less than 5%, more than 25% had no payout and more than 50% had a payout rate of less than 5%. If individual DAF account payout rates mirror payout rates as reported by sponsoring organizations that maintain a single account, it is likely that a large share individual DAF accounts do not pay out grants in any given year and that most of them pay less than 5%. This compares to an average payout rate of 13.1% across all DAF sponsoring organizations. Further, a substantial fraction of sponsoring organizations made no payouts or payouts less than the foundation minimum of 5% in both 2006 and 2008. For sponsoring organizations maintaining a single DAF account, the average payout rate was 10.6% (twice that required of private foundations). However, the different objectives of DAF accounts (year to year tax planning versus accumulating assets in the nature of a private foundation) that likely gave rise to the differential payout rates amongst DAF sponsoring organizations maintaining a single account also occur within sponsoring organizations with multiple accounts. As noted below, some comments suggested applying minimum distributions only to commercial DAF sponsors or national DAFs in general, applying higher distribution requirements to them, or exempting traditional DAF sponsors (such as community foundations) from distribution requirements. | Congress has long been concerned with ensuring that contributions for which tax deductions are claimed directly benefit charitable activities. Private foundations, a traditional arrangement that allows donations to non-active charitable entities, typically pay grants out of earnings on donated assets. Another arrangement that is growing rapidly is the donor advised fund (DAF). A taxpayer contributes to a DAF, taking a tax deduction. The fund sponsor makes grants to active charities, advised by the donor. Unlike private foundations, DAFs are not required to pay out a certain proportion of assets as grants each year. DAFs have become increasingly popular in recent years, partly due to commercial funds (e.g., Fidelity) with limited traditional charitable interests.
Provisions enacted in the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-280) required DAF sponsors to report data on grants. The data are reported at the sponsoring organization level, where sponsoring organizations may maintain multiple individual DAF accounts. The 2006 act also directed the Treasury Department to study DAFs, with Congress expressing particular interest in issues relating to potential restrictions on deductions and minimum payout requirements. The Treasury study was released in 2011. Senator Chuck Grassley, Senate Finance chairman at the time of the 2006 legislation, has criticized the study as being "disappointing and nonresponsive."
The Treasury did not recommend restrictions on deductions (such as those that apply to private foundations where grants are typically made out of earnings), appealing to the lack of legal control by the donor. However, evidence from public comments in the report and sponsor websites indicate that sponsoring organizations typically follow the donor's advice, thus suggesting that donors have effective control over donations and, in some cases, investments.
Private foundations have a 5% minimum payout rate (and actual payouts are only slightly above that amount). The Treasury also did not recommend a minimum payout for DAFs, indicating that more years of data are needed. The Treasury also appealed to the higher estimated average payout rate of DAF sponsoring organizations (9.3% in 2006) as compared to foundations.
This report uses 2008 data to examine the minimum payout requirement, finding results similar to those found by Treasury. The average payout rate was 13.1%. More than 181,000 individual DAF accounts were maintained by roughly 1,800 DAF sponsoring organizations. Most individual accounts were maintained by institutions with a large number of accounts (two-thirds of all DAF accounts were held by sponsoring organizations that maintained at least 500 accounts; nearly half of all DAF accounts were held by commercial DAF institutions). Assets in DAF accounts were $29.5 billion, contributions were $7.1 billion, and DAF accounts paid out $7.0 billion in grants.
Because DAF accounts have heterogeneous objectives, in some cases to manage giving with high payout rates and in others to establish an asset base, a DAF sponsor can have a high average payout rate although many accounts have little or no payout. In both 2006 and 2008, a substantial share of DAF sponsoring organizations paid out less than 5% of assets each year. To provide some insight into the payout behavior of individual DAF accounts, sponsoring organizations that reportedly maintained only one DAF account in 2008 are analyzed separately. Although the average payout rate was over 10%, more than 70% of DAF sponsoring organizations with a single DAF account paid out less than 5%, and 53% had no grants. In contrast, less than 4% of sponsors with 100 or more accounts, accounting for 87% of DAF accounts, have a payout rate of less than 5%. This suggests that a minimum payout rate for sponsors would not be effective; an effective minimum payout requirement would need to be applied to individual DAF accounts. |
crs_RL34556 | crs_RL34556_0 | Introduction
Congressional hearings and press coverage critical of the medical care received by noncitizens in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have increased congressional interest in the subject, including the introduction of legislation related to detainee health care. The medical care required to be provided to detainees is outlined in ICE's National Detention Standards, and the Division of Immigrant Health Services (DIHS), which is detailed from the U.S. Public Health Service to ICE is ultimately responsible for the health care of noncitizens detained by ICE. However, the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center has reported that problems with access to medical care is one of the chief complaints of aliens in detention. The report does not investigate the veracity of claims of substandard medical care made in the press or ICE's rebuttals. Overview of Noncitizen Detention
The law provides broad authority to detain aliens while awaiting a determination of whether they should be removed from the United States, and mandates that certain categories of aliens are subject to mandatory detention (i.e., the aliens must be detained) by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Aliens not subjected to mandatory detention can be paroled, released on bond, or continue to be detained. The Detention Operations Manual contains a section on health services, which addresses standards for medical care; hunger strikes; suicide prevention and intervention; and terminal illness, advanced directives, and death. According to the Detention Operations Manual, every facility has to provide detainees with initial medical screening, primary medical care, and emergency care. Although the medical care that is supposed to be received is detailed in the Detention Standards Manual, one stated concern is that the procedures and standards are not followed. Another concern focuses on the covered benefits package (discussed below) and whether that and the Detention Standards allow for the provision of adequate services to the detained populations. In October 2007, DIHS was detailed indefinitely to ICE. Additional Health Care Services/Treatment Authorization Requests
ICE has established a covered benefits package that delineates the health care services available to detainees in ICE custody, in addition to the minimum scope of services provided by the detention facilities. Detainees who require non-emergency medical care beyond that which can be provided at the detention facilities must get preauthorization. They submit a Treatment Authorization Request (TAR), which is evaluated by the DIHS Managed Care Program. TAR reviews for care are conducted by DIHS nurses in Washington, DC, who review the paperwork submitted by physicians. ICE also asserted that the mortality rate in its facilities is lower than in U.S. prisons and jails and the general U.S. population. | Congressional hearings and press coverage critical of the medical care received by those in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have raised interest in the subject. The law provides broad authority to detain aliens while awaiting a determination of whether they should be removed from the United States and mandates that certain categories of aliens are subject to mandatory detention by DHS. Aliens not subject to mandatory detention may be detained, paroled, or released on bond.
The medical care required to be provided to aliens detained in ICE custody is outlined in ICE's National Detention Standards, which address standards for medical care; hunger strikes; suicide prevention and intervention; and terminal illness, advanced directives, and death. According to ICE's Detention Standards, "All detainees shall have access to medical services that promote detainee health and general well-being." In addition, every facility has to provide detainees with initial medical screening, "cost-effective" primary medical care, and emergency care.
The Division of Immigrant Health Services (DIHS), which is detailed indefinitely from the U.S. Public Health Service to ICE, is responsible for the health care of noncitizens detained by ICE. In some detention facilities, DIHS provides all medical care; in others, DIHS is responsible only for approving medical services that are not provided by the detention facility. ICE has established a covered benefits package that delineates the health care services available to detainees in ICE custody. Detainees who require non-emergency medical care beyond that which can be provided at the detention facilities must submit a Treatment Authorization Request (TAR) to the DIHS Managed Care Program. TARs are reviewed by DIHS nurses in Washington, DC, who review the paperwork submitted by physicians and decide whether to allow the treatment.
There have been press reports and congressional testimony of individuals in ICE custody who apparently received inadequate medical care. In addition, problems with access to medical care is one of the chief complaints of aliens in detention. However, others state that immigration detainees may receive better health care than some U.S. citizens, and assert that the death rate in ICE custody is lower than that of the prison and general populations. Overall, there seem to be two major policy questions: (1) do the Detention Standards and the covered benefits package allow for the provision of adequate services to the detained populations; and (2) are the procedures and standards for the provision of medical care being followed?
The report does not investigate the veracity of claims of substandard medical care made in the press, or ICE's rebuttals of such claims. This report will be updated to reflect legislative activity. |
crs_RS22097 | crs_RS22097_0 | Concerns
The European Union (EU) and NATO have long tied their enlargement policies with respect to their western Balkan states with assessments of their cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established in 1993 to address serious violations of international humanitarian law that occurred during the violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. A key U.S. goal for the Balkan region is to secure its integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions such as the European Union and NATO. Full cooperation with ICTY has long been held up by U.S. and other international officials as a pre-condition to further Euro-Atlantic integration, although the degree to which this conditionality should be observed has been subject to debate with respect to EU and NATO association and partnership affiliations. In annual appropriations bills, Congress has conditioned some bilateral U.S. assistance to Serbia on the Administration's certification of ICTY cooperation. The second session of the 110 th Congress may again consider certification requirements for Serbia in foreign aid legislation. Summary of Recent Transfers
On July 21, 2008, the Serbian government announced that its security services in Belgrade had arrested former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, one of the top two fugitives who had eluded capture for 13 years. Karadzic was indicted in 1995 by ICTY on 11 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including genocide. | Balkan cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague has long been an issue of ongoing U.S. and international concern. On July 21, 2008, the Serbian government announced the peaceful arrest in Belgrade of former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, a longtime high-target fugitive who had eluded capture for 13 years. Only two other ICTY indicted individuals are still at large, including Gen. Ratko Mladic, who along with Karadzic is under indictment for genocide and crimes against humanity occurring during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war. Full cooperation with ICTY has long been a key prerequisite to advancing the shared goal of closer association with and eventual membership in the European Union and NATO for the western Balkan countries. This policy of conditionality has occasionally come under criticism, although the recent arrest of Karadzic appears to have affirmed the strategy. ICTY is scheduled to conclude its work and close its doors in 2010 or 2011. The second session of the 110th Congress may consider foreign aid legislation that includes recurring provisions linking U.S. assistance to Serbia with ICTY cooperation; many Members also maintain an interest in NATO and EU enlargement processes. This report may be updated as events warrant. For related information, see CRS Report RS21686, Conditions on U.S. Aid to Serbia, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41458 | crs_R41458_0 | Overview
Market and technological changes are creating challenges to the long-standing business models employed by broadcast television networks and local television stations, but at the same time generating potential opportunities for those networks and stations. These changes generally are strengthening the position of parties that control popular program content in their negotiations with distributors of that programming. The changes also may be affecting the three pillars of U.S. government media policy—localism, diversity of voices, and competition—and damping the effectiveness of existing regulations intended to foster them. Other commenters claim that such consolidation would harm, rather than foster, diversity of voices, competition, and localism. The FCC is seeking comment on a petition for rulemaking, submitted by a coalition of multichannel video distributors (cable operators, satellite operators, and telephone companies) and consumer organizations, requesting that the commission amend its retransmission consent rules to include dispute resolution mechanisms and mandatory interim carriage while disputes are being resolved. Thus, they are both strengthened and weakened by recent market changes. Most notably, the successful entry of hundreds of cable networks and the proliferation of social networking and video Internet websites have fragmented audiences and provided advertisers with alternative avenues for reaching consumers. This presents a significant challenge to broadcast networks and stations, which traditionally have relied upon advertising for more than 90% of their revenues. For example, competition has developed among the companies that deliver multiple channels of video programming to subscribers—cable operators, satellite operators, and some telephone companies. If a multichannel video distributor fails to obtain the retransmission rights to national and local broadcast television programming, which many households consider "must-have" programming, it risks losing some of its subscribers to a competitor that does offer the programming. As a result, broadcast networks and stations are able to demand higher cash payments from these multichannel video distributors for the retransmission rights. This has created a second revenue stream for broadcasters that is projected by SNL Kagan, a media research firm, to grow from $762 million in 2009 to $1.09 billion in 2010, $1.36 billion in 2011, and more than $2.6 billion in 2016. A report prepared for the National Association of Broadcasters, based on an April 2010 survey of 53 television stations that originate local news programming, concludes:
As the Commission examines the Future of the Media and considers ways to bolster the provision of local news, it should adopt policies that allow (and to rescind, or at least not adopt, policies that hinder) local broadcasters to (1) pursue opportunities for non-advertising revenue, such as that derived from retransmission consent, and (2) benefit from economies of scale and allocate their news resources in the most efficient ways, such as through modifications to the Commission's structural ownership rules. But some broadcasters claim that cooperative activity and sharing does not provide the cost savings or generate the additional revenues attainable if they could combine with other newsgathering organizations. They have reduced the amount of "breaking news" coverage, increasingly leaving that to 24-hour cable news networks. That decline has been greatest recently. Sports Programming Is of High Value to Video Distributors Even if Not Profitable
Program networks and multichannel video providers have long utilized major sports programming to promote their own brand identities, and major sports entities have been able to take advantage of that to generate competitive bidding for the rights to their sports programming:
In 1987, ESPN obtained rights to offer ESPN Sunday Night Football, on the condition that it simulcast the games on local broadcast stations in the participating markets. The fixed costs of production will be shared across more hours of programming. "Free" broadcasts. | Market and technological changes are creating challenges to the long-standing business models employed by broadcast television networks and local television stations, but at the same time generating potential opportunities. The changes also may be affecting the three pillars of U.S. government media policy—localism, diversity of voices, and competition—and damping the effectiveness of existing regulations intended to foster them. These changes generally are strengthening the position of parties that own or control popular content in their negotiations with distributors of video programming. Broadcast networks and stations, alike, both own content and distribute programming, so they have been strengthened and weakened by these changes.
The successful entry of hundreds of cable networks and the proliferation of social networking and video Internet websites have fragmented audiences and provided advertisers with alternative avenues for reaching consumers. This presents a significant challenge to broadcast networks and stations, which traditionally have relied on advertising for more than 90% of their revenues. As audiences have declined for both national and local news programming, networks and stations alike have reduced costs by sharing the fixed costs of newsgathering over multiple platforms and undertaking cooperative newsgathering with other outlets. Some broadcasters have sought to generate additional cost savings or revenue by combining with other newsgathering organizations, and urge modifications to the Federal Communications Commission's broadcast media ownership rules that restrict such combinations. Policymakers will have to weigh whether allowing such consolidation will, on net, benefit the public by improving the financial viability of newsgathering firms or harm the public by reducing diversity of voices and competition.
At the same time, competition has developed among the companies that deliver multiple channels of video programming to subscribers—cable operators, satellite operators, and some telephone companies. If a multichannel video distributor fails to obtain the retransmission rights to popular national and local broadcast television programs, it risks losing subscribers to a competitor that does offer the programming. As a result, broadcast networks and stations are able to demand higher payments from these multichannel video distributors for the retransmission rights. This has created a second revenue stream for broadcasters that is projected to reach $2.6 billion in 2016. It also occasionally results in subscribers losing access to broadcast programming when their video provider and the broadcaster reach an impasse in retransmission negotiations. A coalition of video distributors and consumer organizations has petitioned the FCC to modify its retransmission consent rules by adding dispute resolution mechanisms and mandatory interim carriage.
The amount of local broadcast news programming has been increasing despite declining audiences and does not appear to be threatened by stations' revenue declines. Many stations are broadcasting more news because local news programs can be cheaper to provide than purchased programming. In addition, local news provides a way for stations to develop strong brand identities as they compete for local advertising dollars.
The production and distribution of major sports programming is largely controlled by the sports entities that control the events. If it benefits them to distribute their programming through pay venues, such as cable networks that they own, rather than over-the-air broadcast, they will do so. This is likely to result in more events being televised, though many will only be available to subscribers to pay television services. |
crs_R43401 | crs_R43401_0 | Introduction
The dramatic increase in U.S. and Canadian crude oil production in recent years, coupled with the increase in crude oil transport by rail, has raised questions about whether properties (e.g., flammability) of these crude types—particularly Bakken crude oil from North Dakota and Canada's oil sands—differ sufficiently from other crude oils to warrant any additional handling considerations. The U.S. PHMSA has issued a Safety Alert to notify emergency responders, shippers, carriers, and the public that recent derailments and resulting fires indicate that the type of crude oil transported from the Bakken region of North Dakota may be more flammable than traditional heavy crude oil. The PHMSA alert reminds emergency responders that light sweet crude oil, such as that coming from the Bakken region, poses significant fire risk if released from the package (tank car) in an incident. All crude oils are flammable, to a varying degree. Further, crude oils exhibit other potentially hazardous characteristics as well. The growing perception is that light volatile crude oil, like Bakken crude, is a root cause for catastrophic incidents and thus may be too hazardous to ship by rail. However, equally hazardous and flammable liquids from other sources are routinely transported by rail, tanker truck, barge, and pipeline, though not without incident. A key question for Congress is whether the characteristics of Bakken crude oil make it particularly hazardous. Conversely, does focusing so much attention on the commodity distract from other causes of transport incidents, such as maintenance practices, safety standards and human error? | The dramatic increase in U.S. crude oil production, coupled with the increase in crude oil transport by rail, has raised questions about whether properties (e.g., flammability) of these crude types—particularly Bakken crude oil from North Dakota—differ sufficiently from other crude oils to warrant any additional handling considerations. The U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued a Safety Alert to notify emergency responders, shippers, carriers, and the public that recent derailments and resulting fires indicate that the type of crude oil transported from the Bakken region of North Dakota may be more flammable than traditional heavy crude oil. The alert reminds emergency responders that light sweet crude oil, such as that coming from the Bakken region, pose significant fire risk if released from the package (tank car) in an accident. PHMSA has expanded the scope of lab testing to include other factors that affect proper characterization and classification of crude oil such as volatility, corrosivity, hydrogen sulfide content and composition/concentration of the entrained gases in the material.
All crude oils are flammable, to a varying degree. Further, crude oils exhibit other potentially hazardous characteristics as well. The growing perception is that light volatile crude oil, like Bakken crude, is a root cause for catastrophic incidents and thus may be too hazardous to ship by rail. However, equally hazardous and flammable liquids from other sources are routinely transported by rail, tanker truck, barge, and pipeline, though not without accident.
A key question for Congress is whether the characteristics of Bakken crude oil make it particularly hazardous to ship by rail, or are there other causes of transport incidents, such as poor maintenance practices, inadequate safety standards, or human error. |
crs_R41987 | crs_R41987_0 | Some examples of social media include blogs, discussion forums, chat rooms, wikis, YouTube channels, LinkedIn, Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter. Social media can be accessed by computers, tablets, smart and cellular telephones, and mobile telephone text messaging (SMS). Rapid changes in communication technologies in the past decade have enabled people to interact and share information through media that were non-existent or widely unavailable as recently as 15 years ago. In the last 10 years social media has played an increasing role in emergencies and disasters in both the public and private sectors. Facebook hosts numerous emergency-related organizations, including Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (ISCRAM), and the Humanitarian Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) Project. Other examples of community and household use of the media include warning others of unsafe areas or situations, creating ad hoc volunteer response groups, and raising funds for disaster relief and recovery efforts. The use of social media for emergencies and disasters can be conceptualized as two broad categories of usage. First, social media can be used as an output to disseminate public safety related information. Second, social media can be used as an emergency management tool through the use of inputs. Some examples of using social media as an emergency management tool include
using the medium to conduct emergency communications and issue real time warnings; using social media to receive requests for assistance; monitoring user activities and postings to establish situational awareness; using uploaded images to create damage estimates; and using social media to conduct investigations and post-incident analysis. Congressional Hearings and Legislation
Within the past decade, reports on successful use of social media during emergencies and disasters have spurred congressional interest and policy discussions concerning how to better incorporate social media at the federal level. The law requires the social media group to submit an annual report to Congress that includes
a review of current and emerging social media technologies being used to support preparedness and response activities related to terrorist attacks and other emergencies; a review of best practices and lessons learned on the use of social media during the response to terrorist attacks and other emergencies that occurred during the period covered by the report; recommendations to improve DHS's use of social media for emergency management purposes, to improve public awareness of the type of information being disseminated through social media and how to access such information during a terrorist attack or other emergency, and to improve information sharing among DHS and its components and among state and local governments; a review of available training for government officials on the use of social media in response to a terrorist attack or other emergency; and a summary of coordination efforts with the private sector to discuss and resolve legal, operational, technical, privacy, and security concerns. Federal Social Media: Selected Examples37
The following section describes how some federal entities use social media for emergencies and disasters. They may further argue that some jurisdictions do not have the capabilities to effectively monitor social media for incoming requests for assistance. Congress could also investigate the use of a pilot program that would allow people to request assistance through social media. By and large, the federal government uses social media as an output to disseminate information. Some might argue that the federal role in social media efforts should be limited because the decentralized nature of social media makes the medium too unwieldy for large, centralized organizations to control in a manner similar to smaller organizations or emergent groups. They may therefore conclude that state and locals should take the lead with social media with the support of the federal government. | Since the mid-1990s, new technologies have emerged that allow people to interact and share information through the Internet. Often called "social media," these platforms enable people to connect in ways that were non-existent, or widely unavailable 15 years ago. Examples of social media include blogs, chat rooms, discussion forums, wikis, YouTube channels, LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter. Social media can be accessed by computers, tablets, smart and cellular telephones, and mobile telephone text messaging (SMS).
In recent years social media has played an increasing role in emergencies and disasters. Social media sites now rank as the fourth most popular source to access emergency information. They have been used by individuals and communities to warn others of unsafe areas or situations, inform friends and family that someone is safe, and raise funds for disaster relief. Facebook supports numerous emergency-related organizations, including Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (ISCRAM), the Humanitarian Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) Project, as well as numerous universities with disaster-related academic programs.
The use of social media for emergencies and disasters may be conceptualized as two broad categories. First, social media can be used as an output to disseminate information and issue warnings. Second, it can be used as an emergency management tool through the systematic use of inputs (typically through incoming communication). Examples of systematic usage of social media include using the medium to conduct emergency communications; using social media to receive victim requests for assistance; monitoring user activities to establish situational awareness; and using uploaded images to create damage estimates; conduct investigations; monitor search queries to anticipate flu outbreaks and detect terrorist activity; among others. Federal entities, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency, use social media in both manners, although primarily as an output to disseminate information.
Recent stories and reports describing how a wide range of international, state, and local organizations have successfully used social media during emergencies and disasters have spurred congressional interest and discussion about how to harness social media capabilities to improve federal response and recovery efforts. Based on these favorable stories and reports, some may argue that the federal government should take the lead in developing social media as a tool for emergencies and disasters.
Others might argue that it would be difficult for the federal government to replicate state and local success because the decentralized nature of social media may make the medium too unwieldy for large, centralized organizations to control in a manner similar to smaller organizations or emergent groups. They may, therefore, argue it would be more appropriate for state and local governments to take the lead with the federal government playing a supporting role. If that is the case, Congress could, for example, provide grants to further its development at the state and local level. Congress could also explore policy options that could enhance social media usage at the state and local level. These policy options include public-private partnerships, and social media pilot programs.
This report provides selected examples of how social media has been used by emergency management officials and agencies, and examines the potential uses and benefits of using social media in the context of emergencies and disasters. The report also provides additional perspectives and reviews some of the policy implications of using social media for emergencies and disasters. These include
the use of social media to make individual requests for assistance; the use of private-public partnerships to develop social media tools for emergencies and disasters; the accuracy of social media information and the challenge of information overload; malicious use of social media during disasters; the technological implications of social media; administrative costs considerations; and privacy concerns.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44884 | crs_R44884_0 | Overview
On April 8, 2016, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a final rule (2016 final rule) that expanded the definition of investment advice within employer-sponsored private-sector pension plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). Individuals who provide recommendations that meet the definition of investment advice are held to a fiduciary standard , which is a higher standard of conduct than for individuals who provide recommendations that do not meet the definition. On April 7, 2017, DOL delayed two aspects of the rule's applicability date by 60 days, from April 10, 2017, to June 9, 2017: (1) the expanded definition of investment advice and (2) the impartial conduct standard of the best interest contract (BIC) exemption. While these two aspects of the rule are currently in place, other aspects of the exemption, such as requirements to make specific disclosures and warrant policies and procedures and to execute written contracts, are to become applicable on January 1, 2018. Regulations for Pension Plans and IRAs
To protect the interests of pension plan participants and beneficiaries, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA; P.L. 93-406 ). Securities brokers and dealers are not covered by the act if the advice they provide is incidental to the transaction and they do not receive a fee for the advice. Individuals who transact with a pension plan may be required to meet certain standards. For example, an individual providing investment advice is subject to the high fiduciary standard, whereas an individual who is acting on the direction of the plan participant to buy or sell a particular security or mutual fund may have a lower standard of duty. Investment Advice
As noted above in the section under Fiduciary Duty, ERISA Section 3(21)(a) established situations in which a person qualifies as a fiduciary. DOL issued regulations that created a five-part test to determine whether an individual provided investment advice and thus was subject to the fiduciary standard. To have been held to the 1975 fiduciary standard with respect to his or her advice, an individual must have (1) made recommendations on investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property or give advice as to the value (2) on a regular basis, (3) pursuant to a mutual understanding that the advice (4) would serve as a primary basis for investment decisions and (5) would be individualized to the particular needs of the plan regarding such matters as, among other things, investment policies or strategy, overall portfolio composition, or diversification of plan investments. The 2010 proposed rule generated considerable controversy. DOL issued the 2016 final rule on April 8, 2016, with an effective date of June 7, 2016. To allow retirement plans and financial services providers time to adjust to the new rule, the 2016 final rule had an applicability date of April 10, 2017. On February 3, 2017, President Trump issued a memorandum on the fiduciary rule directing DOL to (1) review the rule to determine whether it adversely affects access to retirement information and financial advice, and if it finds that it does so then (2) publish a proposed rule to rescind or revise the rule. On March 2, 2017, DOL proposed a 60-day delay of the rule's applicability date. On March 10, 2017, DOL issued a Temporary Enforcement Policy indicating that DOL would not initiate enforcement actions against financial advisers or institutions that failed to satisfy the conditions of the rule or PTEs in the period between the applicability date and when DOL decides to either delay or not delay the applicability date of the 2016 final rule and PTEs. On April 7, 2017, DOL issued a delay of the 2016 final rule's applicability date while it reviews the effects of the rule pursuant to the presidential memorandum. Best Interest Contract (BIC) Exemption
Under the 1975 rule, broker-dealers generally were not providing investment advice and could receive commissions and other forms of compensation that are prohibited to fiduciaries. Comparison of 1975 Rule and 2016 Final Rule
Table 1 compares the definition of investment advice under DOL's 1975 regulation and under the 2016 final regulation. Changes from 2015 Proposed Rule to 2016 Final Rule
In response to the 2015 proposed rule, DOL received more than 6,000 public comments and held four days of public hearings. However, purchasing these annuity contracts were generally one-time events that would not have met the requirement for advice to be provided on a regular basis. The report also identified several factors that encouraged them to roll over their 401(k) account balances to IRAs. | Regulations issued in 1975 (called the 1975 rule in this report) defined investment advice using a five-part test. To be held to ERISA's fiduciary standard with respect to his or her advice, an individual had to (1) make recommendations on investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property, or give advice as to the value (2) on a regular basis (3) pursuant to a mutual understanding that the advice (4) will serve as a primary basis for investment decisions, and (5) will be individualized to the particular needs of the plan regarding such matters as, among other things, investment policies or strategy, overall portfolio composition, or diversification of plan investments.
On April 8, 2016, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a final regulation (called the 2016 final rule in this report) that redefined the term investment advice within pension and retirement plans. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA; P.L. 93-406), a person who provides investment advice has a fiduciary obligation, which means that the person must provide the advice in the sole interest of plan participants. Thus, redefining the term investment advice could affect who is subject to this fiduciary standard. With the 2016 rule, DOL broadened the term's definition to capture activities that currently occur within pension and retirement plans, but did not meet the 1975 definition of investment advice.
The 2016 final rule replaced the five-part test of the 1975 rule with a more inclusive definition. (Table 1 compares the prior and current definitions.) For example, under the prior regulation, an individual had to provide advice on a regular basis to be a fiduciary, which generally would not have included recommendations on whether to roll over a 401(k) account balance to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). The expanded definition removed the requirement that advice be given on a regular basis.
Under the prior regulation, securities brokers and dealers who provided services to retirement plans and who were not fiduciaries were not required to act in the sole interests of plan participants. Rather, their recommendations had to meet a suitability standard, which requires that recommendations be suitable for the plan participant, given factors such as an individual's income, risk tolerance, and investment objectives. The suitability standard is a lower standard than a fiduciary standard. Under DOL's 2016 regulation, brokers and dealers are generally considered to be fiduciaries when they provide recommendations to participants in retirement plans.
In addition to broadening the definition of investment advice, the rule provides carve-outs for situations that are not considered to be investment advice. For example, providing generalized investment or retirement education is not considered investment advice under the final rule.
The 2016 final rule is accompanied by new prohibited transaction exemptions (PTEs) and amendments to existing PTEs. These allow fiduciaries to continue to engage in certain practices that would otherwise be prohibited (such as charging commissions for products they recommend or having revenue-sharing agreements with third parties).
DOL first proposed broadening the definition of investment advice in October 2010. The proposed regulation generated much controversy and was withdrawn in September 2011. The revised proposals issued in April 2015 also generated considerable controversy. Following the release of the proposals, DOL received public comments and held three-and-a-half days of public hearings on the proposals. DOL issued the 2016 final rule on April 8, 2016, with an effective date June 7, 2016, and an applicability date of April 10, 2017.
On February 3, 2017, President Trump issued a memorandum on the fiduciary rule that directed DOL to (1) review the rule to determine whether it adversely affects access to retirement information and financial advice, and if it finds that it does so then (2) publish a proposed rule to rescind or revise the rule.
On March 2, 2017, DOL proposed delaying the rule's applicability date by 60 days. On March 10, 2017, DOL issued a Temporary Enforcement Policy indicating it will not initiate enforcement actions against financial advisers or financial institutions that fail to satisfy the conditions of the rule or PTEs in the period between the applicability date and when DOL decides to either delay or not delay the applicability date of the 2016 final rule and PTEs.
On April 7, 2017, DOL issued a 60-day delay of the 2016 final rule's applicability date while it reviews the effects of the rule pursuant to the presidential memorandum of February 3, 2017. DOL delayed the applicability date by 60 days from April 10, 2017, to June 9, 2017, of (1) the expanded definition of investment advice and (2) the Impartial Conduct Standard of the Best Interest Contract (BIC) exemption. While these two aspects of the rule are currently in place, other aspects of the exemption, such as requirements to make specific disclosures and warrant policies and procedures and to execute written contracts are to become applicable on January 1, 2018. |
crs_RL33863 | crs_RL33863_0 | Introduction
Immigration reform has been hotly debated in recent years. Historically less controversial has been legislation known as the "DREAM Act" that proposes a more targeted legalization program to enable certain unauthorized students to obtain legal immigration status. The name DREAM Act derives from the bill title, Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, but it refers more broadly to a class of measures to provide immigration relief to unauthorized alien students, whether or not particular bills carry that name. While living in the United States, unauthorized alien children are able to receive free public education through high school. More broadly, as unauthorized aliens, they typically are unable to work legally and are subject to removal from the United States. 5281 died at the end of the 111 th Congress. Bills to legalize the status of unauthorized alien students were again introduced in the 112 th Congress. In the 113 th Congress, DREAM Act provisions were incorporated into larger comprehensive immigration reform bills, including the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act ( S. 744 ), and were integrated with other legalization provisions in these bills. As of this writing, no DREAM Act bills have been introduced in the 114 th Congress. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
On June 15, 2012, in the absence of congressional action on DREAM Act bills, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a memorandum announcing that certain individuals who were brought to the United States as children and meet other criteria would be considered for deferred action for two years, subject to renewal. Aliens granted deferred action can apply for employment authorization. The program is administered by DHS's U.S. Under the House bill, as under the Senate bill, an alien would have needed to demonstrate that he or she had been continuously physically present in the United States for not less than five years immediately preceding the date of enactment of the act; was age 15 or younger at the time of initial entry; had been a person of good moral character since the time of initial entry; and had been admitted to an institution of higher education in the United States or had earned a high school diploma or the equivalent in the United States. Aliens granted cancellation of removal under H.R. 5869 contained no provisions on the eligibility of aliens who were granted relief under its provisions for federal student financial aid. 15 ), as introduced in the House, included the same DREAM Act language. 15 proposed to establish a general legalization program for unauthorized aliens in the United States, with a special "DREAM Act" pathway to LPR status for certain aliens who entered the country as children. On December 8, 2010, the House approved DREAM Act language as part of an unrelated bill, the Removal Clarification Act of 2010 ( H.R. On December 18, 2010, the Senate failed to invoke cloture on a motion to agree to the House-passed DREAM Act amendment. 5281 was the same as the text of the DREAM Act of 2010 ( H.R. Unlike some other DREAM Act bills introduced in the 111 th Congress, the House-approved DREAM Act language would not have repealed IIRIRA Section 505 and thus would not have eliminated this statutory restriction on state provision of postsecondary educational benefits to unlawfully present aliens (see " 1996 Provision "). | Immigration reform has been hotly debated in recent years. Broadly construed, it encompasses a range of issues, including the highly controversial question of legalizing large numbers of unauthorized immigrants in the United States. A historically less controversial, more targeted legalization proposal has been included in "DREAM Act" legislation, which seeks to enable certain unauthorized aliens who entered the United States as children to obtain legal immigration status. The name DREAM Act derives from the bill title, Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, but it refers more broadly to a class of measures to provide immigration relief to unauthorized students, whether or not particular bills carry that name.
Unauthorized aliens in the United States are able to receive free public education through high school. They may experience difficulty obtaining higher education, however, for several reasons. Among these reasons is a provision enacted in 1996 that places restrictions on state provision of certain postsecondary educational benefits on the basis of state residence to aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, unless equal benefits are made available to all U.S. citizens. This language is commonly understood to apply to the granting of "in-state" residency status for tuition purposes. In addition, unauthorized alien students are not eligible for federal student financial aid. More broadly, as unauthorized aliens, they typically are not legally allowed to work and are subject to being removed from the country.
Multiple DREAM Act bills have been introduced in recent Congresses to address the unauthorized student population. Most have proposed a two-prong approach of repealing the 1996 provision and enabling some unauthorized alien students to become U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs) through an immigration procedure known as cancellation of removal. While there are other options for dealing with this population, this report deals exclusively with the DREAM Act approach in light of the considerable congressional interest in it.
In the 111th Congress, the House approved DREAM Act language as part of an unrelated bill, the Removal Clarification Act of 2010 (H.R. 5281). The Senate, however, failed to invoke cloture on a motion to agree to the House-passed DREAM Act amendment, and the bill died at the end of the Congress. The House-approved language differed in key respects from earlier versions of the DREAM Act. Bills to legalize the status of unauthorized alien students were again introduced in the 112th Congress.
In 2012, in the absence of congressional action on DREAM Act legislation, the Obama Administration announced that certain individuals who entered the United States as children and meet other criteria would be considered for relief from removal. Under a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) memorandum, these individuals can apply for consideration of deferred action for childhood arrivals (or DACA, as the program is known) and for employment authorization.
DREAM Act language was considered in the 113th Congress as part of comprehensive immigration reform legislation. The Senate-passed Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744) included DREAM Act provisions. The same DREAM Act language was included in a related bill with the same name introduced in the House (H.R. 15). The DREAM Act provisions were integrated with the broader legalization provisions in these bills. As of this writing, no DREAM Act bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress. |
crs_RS22584 | crs_RS22584_0 | This report focuses on those IMGs who are foreign nationals, hereafter referred to as foreign medical graduates (FMGs). Many FMGs first entered the United States to receive graduate medical education and training as cultural exchange visitors through the J-1 cultural exchange program. After that time, they are required to return to their home country for at least two years before they can apply to change to another nonimmigrant status or legal permanent resident (LPR) status. Under current law, a J-1 physician can receive a waiver of the two-year home residency requirement in several ways:
the waiver is requested by an interested government agency (IGA) or state department of health; the FMG's return would cause extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen or LPR spouse or child; or the FMG fears persecution in the home country based on race, religion, or political opinion. ARC will submit a request for a waiver at the request of a state in its jurisdiction. The waiver must be recommended by the governor of the sponsoring state. The program is commonly referred to as the "Conrad State Program" program after him. To date, this provision has been extended several times. In 1996, the program was extended until 2002. FMGs who are sponsored for a J-1 visa waiver by a state agree to practice medicine in designated shortage areas in the sponsoring state for a period of three to four years. Ultimately, P.L. This law extends the waiver provision until September 30, 2009. | The Educational and Cultural Exchange Visitor program has become a gateway for foreign medical graduates (FMGs) to gain admission to the United States as nonimmigrants for the purpose of graduate medical education and training. The visa most of these physicians enter under is the J-1 nonimmigrant visa. Under the J-1 visa program, participants must return to their home country after completing their education or training for a period of at least two years before they can apply for another nonimmigrant visa or legal permanent resident (LPR) status, unless they are granted a waiver of the requirement.
To qualify for a waiver, a request must be submitted on behalf of the FMG, by an Interested Government Agency (IGA), or a state Department of Health. In exchange, the FMG must agree to work in a designated healthcare professional shortage area for a minimum of three years. The ability of states to request a waiver is known as the "Conrad State Program," and was added temporarily to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1994. The "Conrad State Program" has been extended by the past several Congresses. Most recently, the program was extended until September 30, 2009, by P.L. 111-9. This report will be updated as warranted by legislative developments. |
crs_R44723 | crs_R44723_0 | None of the FY2017 regular appropriations bills was enacted prior to the enactment of the first CR for FY2017 ( H.R. 5325 ). As enacted, Division C of that measure provides continuing appropriations for projects and activities covered by 11 of the 12 regular appropriations bills for the period covering the beginning of the fiscal year, October 1, 2016, through December 9, 2016. H.R. The purpose of this report is to provide an analysis of the additional provisions in Division A concerning continuing appropriations added to those from Division C of P.L. For general information on the content of CRs and historical data on CRs enacted between FY1977 and FY2016, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices , by James V. Saturno and Jessica Tollestrup. Coverage
Division A provides further continuing budget authority for projects and activities funded in the first continuing appropriations measure for FY2017. 114-113 ), with some exceptions. Duration
Section 101 provides that funding in the CR is effective through April 28, 2017—a period extending funding for FY2017 for an additional 20 weeks. Rate
The CR provides budget authority for projects and activities funded in the 11 FY2016 appropriations acts covered by the CR at a rate based on the amount of funding provided in those acts for the duration of the CR (through April 28). FY2017
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the budgetary effects of interim CRs on an "annualized" basis, meaning that the effects are measured as if the CR were providing budget authority for the remainder of the fiscal year. According to CBO, when the funding provided in Division A of P.L. 114-223 (the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act) is added to the annualized amount for the 11 appropriations acts covered by continuing appropriations provisions, the total amount of annualized discretionary budget authority for regular appropriations subject to the BCA limits (including projects and activities funded at the rate for operations and anomalies) is $1,069.599 billion, approximately the amount of the combined statutory discretionary spending limits for FY2017. Agency-, Account-, and Program-Specific Provisions
In addition to the general provisions that establish the coverage, duration, and rate, CRs typically include provisions that are specific to certain agencies, accounts, or programs. First, certain provisions designate exceptions to the formula and purpose for which any referenced funding is extended. These are often referred to as "anomalies." Second, certain provisions may have the effect of creating new law or changing existing law. Most typically, these provisions are used to renew expiring provisions of law or extend the scope of certain existing statutory requirements to the funds provided in the CR. In some cases they include additional information, such as whether a provision was requested by the President or included in prior year CRs. | This report is an analysis of the provisions in H.R. 2028, which provides further continuing appropriations for FY2017 through April 28, 2017. The measure also included appropriations for the remainder of the fiscal year for Overseas Contingency Operations in the Security Assistance Appropriations Act (Division B). On December 10, 2016, the President signed H.R. 2028 into law (P.L. 114-254).
Division A of H.R. 2028 was termed a "continuing resolution" (CR) because it provided temporary authority for federal agencies and programs to continue spending in FY2017 in the same manner as a separately enacted CR. It provides temporary funding for the programs and activities covered by the remaining 11 regular appropriations bills that had not been enacted previously. These provisions provide continuing budget authority for projects and activities funded in FY2016 by that fiscal year's regular appropriations acts, with some exceptions. Funding under the terms of the CR is effective from enactment on December 10, 2016, through April 28, 2017—a period of 20 weeks.
The CR generally provides budget authority for FY2017 for projects and activities at the rate at which they were funded during FY2016. Most projects and activities funded by the CR, however, are also subject to an across-the-board decrease of 0.1901% for the period covered (pursuant to Section 101(2) of Division A).
According to the cost estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the total amount annualized budget authority for the 11 regular appropriations covered in Division A that are subject to the statutory discretionary spending limits totals to approximately $987,273 million. When spending in the act that is effectively not subject to those limits (Overseas Contingency Operations, disaster relief, emergency requirements and program integrity adjustments) is included in the CBO estimate, the annualized total is $1,083,798 million.
In addition to the general provisions that establish the coverage, duration, and rate of spending, CRs usually include provisions that are specific to certain agencies, accounts, or programs. These include provisions that designate exceptions to the formula and purpose for which any referenced funding is extended (referred to as "anomalies") as well as provisions that have the effect of creating new law or changing existing law (often used to renew expiring provisions of law). The CR includes a number of such provisions, each of which is briefly summarized in this report. CRS appropriations process experts for each of these provisions are listed in Table 1.
For information on the first CR for FY2017, see CRS Report R44653, Overview of Continuing Appropriations for FY2017 (H.R. 5325), coordinated by James V. Saturno. For general information on the content of CRs and historical data on CRs enacted between FY1977 and FY2016, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices, by James V. Saturno and Jessica Tollestrup. |
crs_RL31130 | crs_RL31130_0 | Racial profiling is the practice of targeting individuals for police or security detention based on their race or ethnicity in the belief that certain minority groups are more likely to engage in unlawful behavior. Examples of racial profiling by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies are illustrated in recent legal settlements and data collected by governmental agencies and private groups, suggesting that minorities are disproportionately the subject of routine traffic stops. The issue has periodically attracted congressional interest, particularly with regard to existing and proposed legislative safeguards, which include the proposed End Racial Profiling Act of 2011 ( H.R. 3618 / S. 1670 ) in the 112 th Congress. Several courts have also considered constitutional ramifications of the practice as an "unreasonable search and seizure" under the Fourth Amendment and, more recently, as a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. | Racial profiling is the practice of targeting individuals for police or security detention based on their race or ethnicity in the belief that certain minority groups are more likely to engage in unlawful behavior. Examples of racial profiling by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies are illustrated in legal settlements and data collected by governmental agencies and private groups, suggesting that minorities are disproportionately the subject of routine traffic stops and other security-related practices. The issue has periodically attracted congressional interest, particularly with regard to existing and proposed legislative safeguards, which include the proposed End Racial Profiling Act of 2011 (H.R. 3618/S. 1670) in the 112th Congress. Several courts have considered the constitutional ramifications of the practice as an "unreasonable search and seizure" under the Fourth Amendment and, more recently, as a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. A variety of federal and state statutes provide potential relief to individuals who claim that their rights are violated by race-based law enforcement practices and policies. |
crs_RL33410 | crs_RL33410_0 | Background
Beginning with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) (1) and the Illegal ImmigrationReform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), (2) legislation and administrativeactions have focused on reducing immigration litigation by limiting and streamlining bothadministrative appeal and judicial review procedures and by rendering aliens in certain categoriesineligible for certain types of relief from removal. (3)
Despite these efforts, other changes made by the 1996 Acts increased litigation by expandingthe scope of the grounds for inadmissibility and deportation and the definition of aggravated felony,which effectively further expanded the grounds for deportation. Increased enforcement effortscoupled with the increasing numbers of illegal aliens present in the country have also increasedlitigation as more aliens are placed in removal proceedings. In 2002, then-Attorney General Ashcroft implemented procedural reforms in the Board ofImmigration Appeals [BIA], the administrative body with jurisdiction to review decisions ofimmigration judges and, at times, other immigration officers. (5) Since the changes,there has been a shift of the backlog and the number of appeals to the federal appellate courts. 4437. H.R. Proposed Changes. S. 2454 , S.Amdt. 3192 , and S. 2611 / S. 2612 do not contain similar provisions. In 2002, then-Attorney General Ashcroftimplemented new BIA procedural reforms intended to eliminate the existing BIA backlog of casesand to provide for current efficient disposition of cases. | Beginning with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and theIllegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), legislation andadministrative actions have focused on reducing immigration litigation by limiting and streamliningboth administrative appeal and judicial review procedures and by rendering aliens in certaincategories ineligible for certain types of relief from removal.
Despite these efforts, other changes made by the 1996 Acts increased litigation by expandingthe scope of the grounds for inadmissibility and deportation and the definition of aggravated felony,which effectively further expanded the grounds for deportation. Increased enforcement effortscoupled with the increasing numbers of illegal aliens present in the country have also increasedlitigation as more aliens are placed in removal proceedings.
In 2002, then-Attorney General Ashcroft implemented procedural reforms in the Board ofImmigration Appeals [BIA] intended to eliminate the existing BIA backlog of cases and to providefor current efficient disposition of cases. These changes have resulted in a shift of the backlog andthe number of appeals to the federal appellate courts.
Changes proposed by H.R. 4437 , S. 2454 , S.Amdt. 3192 , and S. 2611 / S. 2612 , among other bills, would continue the trendof streamlining procedures and limiting immigration litigation, appeals to the Board of ImmigrationAppeals and judicial review. |
crs_RL33931 | crs_RL33931_0 | Operating as an independent federal agency, the CNCS oversees all national and community service programs authorized by the National and Community Service Act of 1990 (NCSA) and the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973 (DVSA). The NCSA and DVSA were last reauthorized by the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act ( P.L. 111-13 ). Although authorization of appropriations under the Serve America Act expired in FY2014, NCSA and DVSA programs have continued to receive funding through the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Labor-HHS-ED). Most Recent Developments
CNCS programs are funded through the end of FY2018 under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ). The final enacted appropriations law for FY2018 included $1.064 billion for CNCS. The overall FY2018 funding level for CNCS is 3% above the FY2017 level of $1.030 billion. Program-by-Program Overview and Funding
NCSA Programs and Funding
The purpose of the NCSA is to address unmet human, educational, environmental, and public safety needs and to renew an ethic of civil responsibility and community spirit in the United States by encouraging citizens to participate in national service programs. NCSA programs include AmeriCorps State and National Grants, the National Service Trust, the National Civilian Community Corps (NCCC), and Learn and Serve America (LSA). P.L. 93-113 . The purpose of DVSA is to foster and expand voluntary citizen service throughout the nation. DVSA programs are designed to help the poor, the disadvantaged, the vulnerable, and the elderly. Administered by the CNCS, DVSA programs include VISTA and the National Senior Volunteer Corps. National Senior Service Corps (Title II)
The National Senior Service Corps consists of three programs, summarized below: the Retired Senior Volunteer Program (RSVP), the Foster Grandparent Program (FGP), and the Senior Companion Program (SCP). | The Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) is an independent federal agency that administers the programs authorized by two statutes: the National and Community Service Act of 1990 (NCSA; P.L. 101-610), as amended, and the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973 (DVSA; P.L. 93-113), as amended. NCSA and DVSA programs were most recently reauthorized by the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act (P.L. 111-13). This report describes programs authorized by these laws and compares CNCS funding for FY2015, FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018.
The NCSA is designed to meet unmet human, educational, environmental, and public safety needs and to renew an ethic of civic responsibility by encouraging citizens to participate in national service programs. The major programs authorized by NCSA include AmeriCorps State and National Grants and the National Civilian Community Corps (NCCC). The NCSA also authorizes the National Service Trust, which funds educational awards for community service participants.
A central purpose of the DVSA, which authorizes the Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) program and the National Senior Volunteer Corps, is to foster and expand voluntary service in communities while helping the vulnerable, the disadvantaged, the elderly, and the poor. The DVSA also authorizes the National Senior Volunteer Corps, which includes three programs for senior citizens: the Foster Grandparent Program, the Senior Companion Program, and the Retired and Senior Volunteer Program (RSVP).
Appropriations for the DVSA and the NCSA programs are made annually through the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Labor-HHS-ED). CNCS programs are funded through FY2018 under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141). The FY2018 appropriations amount for CNCS is $1.064 billion, which is $34 million more than the FY2017 amount of $1.030 billion.
This report will be updated as warranted by legislative developments. |
crs_R42351 | crs_R42351_0 | What Is Internet Governance? How Is the Internet Currently Governed? First, the Internet is inherently international and cannot in its totality be governed by national governments whose authority ends at national borders. Key organizations in the private sector include the following:
Internet Corporation for As signed Names and Numbers (ICANN )— ICANN was created in 1998 through a Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Commerce (see the following section of this report, " Role of U.S. Government "). Directed by an internationally constituted Board of Directors, ICANN is a private, not-for-profit organization based in Los Angeles, CA, which manages and oversees the critical technical underpinnings of the Internet such as the domain name system (DNS) and IP addressing (see the Appendix for more background information on ICANN). Governmental entities involved in Internet governance include the following:
Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) —As part of ICANN's multistakeholder process, the GAC provides advice to the ICANN Board on matters of public policy, especially in cases where ICANN activities and policies may interact with national laws or international agreements related to issues such as intellectual property, law enforcement, and privacy. On March 14, 2014, NTIA announced its intention to transition its stewardship role and procedural authority over key domain name functions to the global Internet multistakeholder community. NTIA asked ICANN to convene interested global Internet stakeholders (both from the private sector and governments) to develop a proposal to achieve the transition; NTIA stated that it will not accept any transition proposal that would replace the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution and that the transition proposal must have broad community support and address the following four principles:
support and enhance the multistakeholder model; maintain the security, stability, and resilience of the Internet DNS; meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services; and maintain the openness of the Internet. On March 10, 2016, the ICANN Board formally accepted the IANA Stewardship Transition proposal and the Enhancing ICANN Accountability report. The Board formally transmitted the transition and accountability plans to NTIA for approval. On June 9, 2016, NTIA issued its IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal Assessment Report . Finally, on September 30, 2016, NTIA let its contract with ICANN expire, and the transition was complete. The other criticism has been fueled by concerns of many nations that the U.S. government has held undue legacy influence and control over ICANN and the domain name system. Proposed Models for Internet Governance
As discussed above, ICANN is a working example of a multistakeholder model of Internet governance, whereby a bottom-up collaborative process is used to provide Internet stakeholders with access to the policymaking process. 1580 stated that "It is the policy of the United States to preserve and advance the successful multistakeholder model that governs the Internet." With the transition now complete, Congress may continue assessing how effectively NTIA is advancing U.S. government positions within the Governmental Advisory Committee. Of particular interest may be to what extent ongoing and future intergovernmental telecommunications conferences constitute an opportunity for some nations to increase intergovernmental control over the Internet—at the expense of the multistakeholder system of Internet governance—and how effectively NTIA and other government agencies (such as the State Department) are working to counteract that threat. | The Internet is often described as a "network of networks" because it is not a single physical entity, but hundreds of thousands of interconnected networks linking hundreds of millions of computers around the world. As such, the Internet is international, decentralized, and comprised of networks and infrastructure largely owned and operated by private sector entities. As the Internet grows and becomes more pervasive in all aspects of modern society, the question of how it should be governed becomes more pressing.
Currently, an important aspect of the Internet is governed by a private sector, international organization based in California called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). ICANN manages and oversees some of the critical technical underpinnings of the Internet such as the domain name system and Internet Protocol (IP) addressing. ICANN makes its policy decisions using a multistakeholder model of governance, in which a "bottom-up" collaborative process is open to all constituencies of Internet stakeholders.
National governments have recognized an increasing stake in ICANN policy decisions, especially in cases where Internet policy intersects with national laws addressing such issues as intellectual property, privacy, law enforcement, and cybersecurity. Some governments around the world are advocating increased intergovernmental influence over the way the Internet is governed. For example, specific proposals have been advanced that would create an Internet governance entity within the United Nations (U.N.). Other governments (including the United States), as well as many other Internet stakeholders, oppose these proposals and argue that ICANN's multistakeholder model is the most appropriate way to govern the Internet.
Previously, the U.S. government, through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) at the Department of Commerce, held a "stewardship" role over the domain name system by virtue of a contractual relationship with ICANN. On March 14, 2014, NTIA announced its intention to transition its stewardship role and procedural authority over key domain name functions to the global Internet multistakeholder community. NTIA also stated that it would not accept any transition proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution.
For two years, Internet stakeholders were engaged in a process to develop a transition proposal that would meet NTIA's criteria. On March 10, 2016, the ICANN Board formally accepted the multistakeholder community's transition plan and transmitted that plan to NTIA for approval. On June 9, 2016, NTIA announced its determination that the transition plan met NTIA's criteria and that the plan was approved. On September 30, 2016, the contract between NTIA and ICANN expired, thus completing and implementing the transition.
With the transition now complete, Congress may continue assessing how effectively NTIA is advancing U.S. government positions within the Governmental Advisory Committee. Of particular interest may be to what extent ongoing and future intergovernmental telecommunications conferences constitute an opportunity for some nations to increase intergovernmental control over the Internet—at the expense of the multistakeholder system of Internet governance—and how effectively NTIA and other government agencies (such as the State Department) are working to counteract that threat. |
crs_RS22862 | crs_RS22862_0 | Statutory Cleanup Authorities
For many years, DOD addressed potential risks from munitions on former training ranges and disposal sites without a consolidated effort in place to track progress and costs. Numerous factors determine the degree of risks at an individual site, such as the type of munitions present, whether munitions are located at or below the surface, the accessibility of a site, the proximity of munitions to populated areas, human health and environmental risks from potential exposure to munitions contaminants, and whether cultural or ecological resources are present. (See CRS Report RS22065, Military Base Closures: Cleanup of Contaminated Properties for Civilian Reuse , by [author name scrubbed].) Issues for Congress
Members of Congress, states, communities, and environmental organizations have expressed concern about the adequacy and pace of the cleanup of munitions and related contamination at the current inventory of sites, and have questioned whether munitions may be present at other sites not yet identified. Many of these properties ceased to be used for military purposes decades ago and have been put to a variety of civilian uses, including residential use in some cases. There has been less concern among the public about munitions sites on active installations, primarily because these sites pose little, if any, immediate safety risks to the general civilian population. | How to address safety, health, and environmental risks from potential exposure to abandoned or discarded military munitions has been a long-standing issue. There has been particular concern among the public about such risks at older decommissioned military properties that have been in civilian use for many years, and at closed military bases still awaiting redevelopment. Many of these properties contain former training ranges and munitions disposal sites where the extent of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and related environmental contamination is not fully understood. The approval of another round of military base closings in 2005 raised additional concerns about munitions risks on certain bases, and whether cleanup challenges may limit their civilian reuse. This report discusses the potential hazards of military munitions and related contamination, the authorities of the Department of Defense (DOD) to address these hazards, the status and costs of cleanup efforts, and issues for Congress. |
crs_RL31008 | crs_RL31008_0 | Most Recent Developments
On December 18, 2001, President Bush signed the FY2002 Department of Transportation andRelated Agencies conference agreement ( H.Rept. 107-87 ) appropriating a total of$59.588 billion (a 2.5% increase above the FY2001 enacted level). The enacted bill provides $507million more than in the House bill and $391 million less than the Senate bill. The other major agencies all get increases. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) budgetincreases roughly 6% to $13.295 billion; the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) budget increases8% to $6.747 billion; and the Coast Guard budget receives an increase of 12% to $5.031 billion. Congress responded to the terrorist attacks by passingthe 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to TerroristAttacks on the United States ( P.L. As of this writing, roughly $1.9billion has been approved for transfer to the Department of Transportation (DOT). The Conference Agreement (H.Rept. Twoagencies get slightly less than in FY2001: at $32.895 billion, the Federal HighwayAdministration (FHWA) receives slightly less than in FY 2001; the Federal RailroadAdministration (FRA) is funded at $734 million, $21 million less than enacted inFY2001. The FY2002 Act also provides $1.25 billion (to be offset by newlyauthorized user and airline fees) for the Transportation Security Administration,recently created by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act ( P.L. More controversial is FY2002 Act's redirection of $423 million of the RABA revenues that under TEA21 are added to the formula funds distributed to the states. 107-308 . The extent of earmarking, especially of RABA funds, continues to becontroversial. The modifications were sufficientto overcome Bush Administration concerns that the Senate-passed version of the bill might violate NAFTA. The bill provides $40 billion to pay the costs ofa variety of responses including "providing increased transportation security." Railroad Safety and Research andDevelopment. FTA Program Structure and Funding. 107-38). It does, however provide $20 million for SCASD . The Administration requested, and the FY2002 Act provides, $223 million, a 5%increase over the enacted level of $213 million for FY2001. NHTSA Program Responsibilities. The FY2002 Senate-passed billdiffered significantly from this provision and would require that various inspection,infrastructure, and administrative conditions be met before any Mexican carriersreceive operating authority to go beyond the border zones. North American Free Trade Agreement: Truck Safety Considerations , by Paul Rothberg. | On December 18, 2001, the President Bush signed the FY2002 Department of Transportation (DOT) and Related Agencies conference agreement ( H.Rept. 107-308 ), appropriating a total of$59.588 billion for DOT, a 2.5% increase over the FY2001 enacted level. The enacted bill provides$507 million more than the House-passed version and $391 million less than the Senate-passed bill. At $32.895 billion, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) will receive slightly less than inFY2001. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) will receive $734 million, $21 million lessthan in FY2001. The other major agencies all get increases. The Federal Aviation Administration(FAA) budget will increase roughly 6% to $13.295 billion; the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)budget will increase 8% to $6.747 billion; and the Coast Guard will receive an increase of 12% to$5.031 billion. The Act also includes $1.25 billion (to be offset by user fee collections) for the newTransportation Security Administration (TSA).
The enacted conference agreement mandates significant safety and inspection requirements be met by Mexico-domiciled trucks before DOT begins processing Mexican applications for operating authorityin the U.S. beyond the commercial zones along the border. It does, however, include a number ofmodifications in response to Administration concerns that the original Senate bill (as well as the Housebill) violated provisions of the North American Free Trade Association agreement (NAFTA).
The conference agreement created a controversy when the conferees redirected and earmarked $997.6 million of Revenue Aligned Budget Authority (RABA) funds. The RABA mechanismadjusts DOT program authorization and obligation levels to reflect recent fuel tax revenues (byincreasing or decreasing both the authorization and the obligation limitation). For FY2002, thisadded $4.5 billion to DOT programs. This redirection of RABA funds reduces the RABA portionof the states' formula funding by 10.7% from what they otherwise would have received. Authorizerssee this action as a usurpation of their authority, and some vowed to oppose this sort of action in thefuture.
Congress responded to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, by passing the 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attackson the United States ( P.L.107-38 ). That Act provides $40 billion, government-wide, to pay the costsof a variety of responses, including "providing increased transportation security." As of this writing,roughly $1.9 billion of these emergency supplemental funds have been approved for transfer to DOT.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: RSI = Resources, Science, and Industry Division. |
crs_RL30509 | crs_RL30509_0 | The House Appropriations Committee approveditsversion of the bill on June 14, 2000 ( H.R. Introduction and Overview
This report tracks legislative action by the second session of the 106th Congress on FY2001 appropriations fortheDepartments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and other related agencies (often referred to as CJSappropriations). The President Clinton's FY2001 budget requested about $39.6 billion for these agencies, about the same level as that appropriated for FY2000. It approved total funding of $36.7billion which is about $700 million below the House version and about $2.9 billion below both the President'srequest andthe actual FY2000 appropriation ( S.Rept. Department of Commerce:
Progress made in the streamlining and downsizing of Department programs and operations. Other Agencies:
Adequacy of funding for the Legal Services Corporation. 5548 . Major issues or concerns included: building more prisons; extending the 1994 Crime Act fundingauthorizationbeyond September 30, 2000; increasing funding for drug-related efforts among the Department of Justice (DOJ)agencies;increasing funding for community law enforcement; combating cybercrime; funding of DOJ's legal action againstthetobacco industry; changing the focus and levels of appropriations for DOJ's Office of Juvenile Justice andDelinquencyPrevention; providing funding for programs that would reduce gun and youth violence; reducing pending caseloadsinimmigration-related claims, particularly green card and naturalization applications; meeting the statutory mandatethat theBorder Patrol be increased by 1,000 agents in FY2001, and accounting for the shortfall in hiring in FY1999;determiningthe level of detention capacity necessary to comply with the statutory mandate that certain criminal aliens bedetained untildeported; and restructuring INS internally as proposed by the Administration or dismantling or restructuring theagency bylegislation; the downsizing of Commerce Department programs, processing and releasing the 2000 decennial censusresults, the use of federal funds to support industrial technology, implementing the modernization of the NationalWeatherService, and the monitoring of foreign compliance with trade agreements and U.S. trade laws; improving embassysecuritythrough a doubling of funding as well as a request for an advance appropriation to cover the period FY2002 toFY2005;whether to lift a statutory ban on judges receiving honoraria; whether to increase funding to compensatecourt-appointeddefense attorneys in federal criminal cases; how to contain the growing costs of the Judiciary's Defender Servicesaccount;and the merits of providing a cost-of-living pay increase for federal judges. On June 26, 2000, the House passed H.R. 106-113 . P.L. 4690 . The Small Business Administration (SBA). The House passed bill approved the Committee's request. It recommended fundingtotaling $37.4 billion-$2.2 billion below the President's request and about $2.2 billion below the FY2000appropriation. On July 18, 2000, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the bill. On October 27, 2000, Congress approved total funding of $40.0 billion which was about $400 million abovebothPresident's request and the total enacted for FY2000. 106-553 ). This bill was signed into law by the President on December 21, 2000 ( P.L.106-554 ). | This report tracks action by the 106th Congress on FY2001 appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, andState, the Judiciary, and other related agencies (often referred to as CJS appropriations). P.L. 106-113 appropriated $39.6 billion for these agencies for FY2000. President Clinton's FY2001 budget requested $39.6billion forthese agencies. On June 14, 2000, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of the CJSappropriations bill( H.R. 4690 ) It recommended funding totaling $37.4 billion-$2.2 billion below the President's request and$2.2 billion below the FY2000 appropriation. The House-passed bill on June 26, approved the same overall fundingtotalrecommended by the Committee. On July 18, 2000, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved total fundingof $36.7billion-about $700 million below the House version and $2.9 billion below both the President's request and theactualFY2000 appropriation. On October 27, 2000, Congress approved total funding of $40.0 billion-about $400 millionaboveboth President's request and the total enacted for FY2000 ( H.R. 5548 ). The measure was signed into law bythe President on December 21, 2000 ( P.L. 106-553 ).
The major CJS appropriations issues and concerns that received attention in both the Senate and the House include thefollowing. Department of Justice: building more prisons; extending the 1994 Crime Act fundingauthorization beyondSeptember 30, 2000; increasing funding for drug-related efforts among the Department of Justice (DOJ) agencies;increasing funding for community law enforcement; combating cybercrime; changing the focus and levels ofappropriationsfor DOJ's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention; providing funding for programs that would reducegunand youth violence; funding of DOJ's legal action against the tobacco industry; reducing pending caseloads inimmigration-related claims, particularly green card and naturalization applications; meeting the statutory mandatethat theBorder Patrol be increased by 1,000 agents in FY2001, and accounting for the shortfall in hiring in FY1999;determiningthe level of detention capacity necessary to comply with the statutory mandate that certain criminal aliens bedetained untildeported; and restructuring INS internally as proposed by the Administration or dismantling or restructuring theagency bylegislation. Department of Commerce: the progress made in streamlining and downsizing Departmentprograms;implementation of the decennial census including followup operations; federal financial support of industrialtechnologydevelopment programs; monitoring foreign compliance with trade agreements and U.S. trade laws; andimplementing newWhite House environmental initiatives at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Departmentof State: improving embassy security through a doubling of funding as well as a request for an advance appropriationto cover theperiod FY2002 to FY2005. The Judiciary : whether the salaries of judges and justices should receivea cost-of-livingincrease and whether a statutory ban on judges receiving honoraria should be lifted. Other Related Agencies: adequacy offunding levels for the Legal Services Corporation, Small Business Administration, and the Equal EmploymentOpportunity Commission.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: A = American Law; G&F = Government and Finance; RSI = Resources; Science, and IndustryDivision, DSP = Domestic Social Policy Division; FTD = Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade. |
crs_RL33324 | crs_RL33324_0 | The United States has accused the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) of counterfeiting U.S. $100 Federal Reserve notes (Supernotes) and passing them off in various countries. There is considerable doubt, however, that the DPRK is capable of creating Supernotes of the quality found. It is thought that the alleged counterfeiting activity in the DPRK is government sponsored (not criminal activity). What has been confirmed is that the DPRK has passed off such bills in various countries and that the counterfeit bills circulate both within North Korea and around its border with China. In June 2009, press reports claimed that the DPRK produced counterfeit U.S. bills even after 2007. Although Pyongyang denies complicity in any counterfeiting operation, estimates are that at least $45 million in such Supernotes of North Korean origin are in circulation and that the country has earned from $15 to $25 million per year over several years from counterfeiting. South Korean intelligence has corroborated information on past production of forged currency—at least until 1998—and several U.S. court indictments indicate that certain individuals have been accused of distributing such forged currency. In 2009, the State Department reported that counterfeit $100 U.S. notes (Supernotes) continue to turn up in various countries, including in the United States, although it is not clear whether these notes are new or from existing stocks Counterfeiting is considered to be one of several illicit activities by the DPRK apparently done to generate foreign exchange that is used to support the ruling regime, purchase imports, and finance government activities abroad. It also is a direct attack on a protected asset of the United States and a violation of U.S. and other laws. U.S. policy toward the alleged counterfeiting is split between law enforcement efforts and political and diplomatic pressures. On the law enforcement side, individuals have been indicted, and in September 2005, the U.S. Treasury named Banco Delta Asia (BDA), bank in the Chinese territory of Macao, as a primary money laundering concern under the Patriot Act, Section 311. At the time, Pyongyang promised that it would punish the counterfeiters and destroy their equipment. Following the BDA case, law enforcement efforts at the national level have become entwined with diplomatic efforts and pressures to resolve the issue of the North Korean nuclear weapons and potential ballistic missiles. Hence, open source information on the scope and scale of DPRK counterfeiting and distribution operations is largely incomplete. Moreover, media reports on January 20, 2006, stated that Chinese investigators have independently confirmed allegations of DPRK counterfeiting. On February 13, 2007, a new six-party agreement on North Korea's nuclear program and energy needs was concluded. | The United States has accused the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) of counterfeiting U.S. $100 Federal Reserve notes (Supernotes) and passing them off in various countries, although there is some doubt by observers and other governments that the DPRK is capable of creating Supernotes of the quality found. What has been confirmed is that the DPRK has passed off such bills in various countries and that the counterfeit bills circulate both within North Korea and around its border with China. Defectors from North Korea also have provided information on Pyongyang's counterfeiting operation, although those statements have not been corroborated. Whether the DPRK is responsible for the actual production or not, trafficking in counterfeit has been one of several illicit activities by North Korea apparently done to generate foreign exchange that is used to purchase imports or finance government activities abroad.
Although Pyongyang denies complicity in any counterfeiting operation, at least $45 million in such Supernotes thought to be of North Korean origin have been detected in circulation, and estimates are that the country has earned from $15 to $25 million per year over several years from counterfeiting. The illegal nature of any counterfeiting activity makes open-source information on the scope and scale of DPRK counterfeiting and distribution operations incomplete. South Korean intelligence has corroborated information on North Korean production of forged currency prior to 1998, and certain individuals have been indicted in U.S. courts for distributing such forged currency. Media reports in January 2006 state that Chinese investigators had independently confirmed allegations of DPRK counterfeiting. In June 2009, press reports claimed that the DPRK produced counterfeit U.S. bills even after 2007.
For the United States, the alleged North Korean counterfeiting represents a direct attack on a protected U.S. national asset and may provide a rationale to impose financial sanctions on the DPRK. The earnings from counterfeiting and related activities also could be important to Pyongyang's finances. Profits from any counterfeiting also may be laundered through banks or other financial institutions.
U.S. policy toward the alleged counterfeiting is split between law enforcement efforts and political and diplomatic pressures. On the law enforcement side, individuals have been indicted and the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) bank in Macao (a territory of China) was named as a primary money laundering concern under the Patriot Act. In June 2007, the BDA issue was resolved and the Six-Party Talks resumed. At the time, Pyongyang promised that it would punish the counterfeiters and destroy their equipment. The law enforcement effort has become entwined with diplomatic efforts and pressures to resolve the North Korean nuclear and missile issues. Following North Korea's second nuclear test and several missile launches in May 2009, the United States reportedly has been considering further financial sanctions on the DPRK based partly on its alleged counterfeiting. |
crs_R43446 | crs_R43446_0 | Introduction
Federal law requires the President to submit an annual budget to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. The budget informs Congress of the President's overall federal fiscal policy based on proposed spending levels, revenues, and deficit (or surplus) levels. The budget request lays out the President's relative priorities for federal programs, such as how much should be spent on defense, education, health, and other federal programs. The President's budget may also include legislative proposals for spending and tax policy changes. While the President is not required to propose legislative changes for those parts of the budget that are governed by permanent law (i.e., mandatory spending), such changes are generally included in the budget. President Obama submitted his FY2015 budget to Congress on March 4, 2014. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the division of the Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) that is responsible for administering Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and the private health insurance programs. CMS is the largest purchaser of health care in the United States with Medicare and federal Medicaid expenditures accounting for 29.0% of the total national health expenditures in 2012. This report summarizes the President's budget estimates for each section of the CMS budget. Then, for each legislative proposal included in the President's budget, this report provides a description of current law and the President's proposal. The explanations of the President's legislative proposals are grouped by the following program areas: Medicare, Medicaid, program integrity, CHIP, state grants and demonstrations, private health insurance programs, and program management. Budget Summary
The CMS budget includes a mixture of both mandatory and discretionary spending. However, a vast majority of the CMS budget is mandatory spending, such as Medicare benefits and grants to states for Medicaid. With the Medicare physician payment adjustment, the estimated impact of the legislative proposals, and the estimated savings from program integrity activities ($0.6 billion), the President's budget estimates CMS's net outlays will be $897.4 billion in FY2015, which is an increase of $53.8 billion, or 6.4%, over the net outlays for FY2014. For budgetary purposes, CMS is divided into the following sections: Medicare, Medicaid, program integrity, CHIP, state grants and demonstrations, private health insurance, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI), and program management. Authorization and funding for CHIP has been extended a number of times, and most recently, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as amended) extended federal funding for CHIP through FY2015. Legislative Proposals
The President's FY2015 budget contains a number of proposals that would impact the CMS budget. Some are program expansions, and others are designed to reduce federal spending. At the end of each of these sections, there is a table summarizing the costs or savings for each legislative proposal as estimated by the Administration, and the tables classify each proposal as new, modified from the President's FY2014 budget, or repeated from the President's FY2014 budget. | Federal law requires the President to submit an annual budget to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. The budget informs Congress of the President's overall federal fiscal policy based on proposed spending levels, revenues, and deficit (or surplus) levels. The budget request lays out the President's relative priorities for federal programs, such as how much should be spent on defense, education, health, and other federal programs. The President's budget may also include legislative proposals for spending and tax policy changes. While the President is not required to propose legislative changes for those parts of the budget that are governed by permanent law (i.e., mandatory spending), such changes are generally included in the budget. President Obama submitted his FY2015 budget to Congress on March 4, 2014.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the division of the Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) that is responsible for administering Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and the private health insurance programs. CMS is the largest purchaser of health care in the United States, with expenditures from CMS programs accounting for roughly one-third of the nation's health expenditures. In FY2015, it is estimated that more than one in three Americans will be provided coverage through Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP. CMS is also responsible for administering the private health insurance programs established in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as amended).
The CMS budget includes a mixture of both mandatory and discretionary spending. However, the vast majority of the CMS budget is mandatory spending, such as Medicare benefits and grants to states for Medicaid.
For budgetary purposes, CMS is divided into the following sections: Medicare, Medicaid, program integrity, CHIP, state grants and demonstrations, private health insurance protections and programs, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, and program management. The President's FY2015 budget contains a number of legislative proposals that would affect the CMS budget. Some are program expansions, and others are designed to reduce federal spending.
The President's proposed budget for CMS would be $897.4 billion in net mandatory and discretionary outlays for FY2015. This would be an increase of $53.8 billion, or 6.4%, over the net outlays for FY2014. This estimate includes the cost of the Medicare physician payment adjustment ($13.7 billion), the net cost of legislative proposals ($2.5 billion), and the estimated savings from program integrity investments (-$0.2 billion).
This report summarizes the President's budget estimates for each section of the CMS budget. Then, for each legislative proposal included in the President's budget, this report provides a description of current law and the President's proposal. The explanations of the President's legislative proposals are grouped by the following program areas: Medicare, Medicaid, program integrity, CHIP, state grants and demonstrations, private health insurance programs, and program management. A table summarizing the estimated costs or savings for each legislative proposal is at the end of each of these sections. |
crs_RL33675 | crs_RL33675_0 | This report provides an overview of the potential effects of marriage on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility and benefits. It includes an overview of the SSI program, information on the SSI resource limits, and a discussion of how the marriage of an SSI beneficiary to either another beneficiary or an ineligible person can affect his or her eligibility for benefits or monthly benefit level. In some cases, marriage may result in a person being denied SSI benefits or having his or her monthly SSI benefit level reduced. This situation has been called a "marriage penalty" by the National Council on Disability. SSI Resource Limits
Individuals and couples must have limited assets or resources in order to qualify for SSI benefits. Excluded resources include an individual's home, a single car used for essential transportation and other assets specified by law and regulation. As a result, they are entitled to a federal benefit of up to $1,011 per month and may have countable resources valued at up to $3,000. Resource Limitations
Single SSI beneficiaries can have countable resources valued at up to $2,000. Generally, the income and assets of both persons in a marriage are considered shared and equally available to either person, which can result in an increase in the beneficiary's countable income or resources after marriage. Deeming of Income
When an SSI beneficiary marries a person who does not receive SSI benefits, a portion of the ineligible spouse's income is assigned, or deemed, to the SSI beneficiary and is counted as income for the purposes of determining benefit eligibility and the amount of monthly benefits. If, however, the final countable income of the ineligible spouse is greater than the difference between the monthly federal SSI benefit rate for a couple and the monthly federal SSI benefit rate for an individual, then the beneficiary and his or her spouse are considered a couple and eligible to receive SSI benefits at the level for a couple. The income of the ineligible spouse is not considered when determining the benefit amount in this case. | Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a major benefit program for low-income persons with disabilities and senior citizens. As a means tested program, SSI places income and resource limits on individuals and married couples for the purposes of determining their eligibility and level of benefits. To become and remain eligible to receive SSI benefits, single individuals may not have countable resources valued at more than $2,000 and married couples may not have countable resources valued at more than $3,000. Although a person's home and car are excluded from these calculations, most other assets owned by a person or married couple are counted and in most cases, the assets of both partners in a marriage are considered shared and equally available to both the husband and the wife.
A person's countable income must be below SSI program guidelines to qualify for benefits and a person's monthly benefit level is reduced by a portion of his or her earned and unearned income. The income of a person ineligible for SSI can be considered when calculating the benefit amount of that person's spouse. A complicated process of deeming is used to determine how much of the ineligible person's income is to be considered when calculating his or her spouse's monthly SSI benefits.
In some cases marriage may result in a person being denied SSI benefits or seeing his or her SSI benefit level reduced because of the increase in family income or assets that results from the marriage. This can occur if an SSI beneficiary marries another SSI beneficiary or a person not in the SSI program. This potential effect of marriage on the SSI eligibility and benefits of SSI beneficiaries has been called a "marriage penalty" by the National Council on Disability.
This report provides an overview of the potential effect of a marriage to another SSI recipient or an ineligible person on an individual's eligibility for and level of SSI benefits. Examples of cases in which a marriage can reduce a person's SSI benefits are provided. This report will be updated to reflect any legislative changes. |
crs_RL34680 | crs_RL34680_0 | The options include
coming to agreement on regular appropriations acts by October 1, the beginning of a new fiscal year; using one or more interim continuing resolutions (CRs) to extend temporary funding beyond the beginning of a fiscal year, until a point in time when negotiators make final decisions about full-year funding levels; or not agreeing on full-year or interim appropriations acts, resulting in a temporary funding gap and a corresponding shutdown of affected federal government activities. The criteria for determining which activities are affected are complex, as discussed later in this report. This report discusses the causes of funding gaps and shutdowns of the federal government, processes that are associated with shutdowns, and how agency operations may be affected by shutdowns. The report concludes with a discussion of potential issues for Congress. A funding gap and shutdown are distinct events, however (see Box 1 ). Experience from FY1977 to Present
Funding gaps and government shutdowns have occurred in the past when Congress and the President did not enact regular appropriations bills by the beginning of the fiscal year. Two funding gaps and corresponding shutdowns of affected activities ensued, amounting to five full days during November 1995 and 21 full days during December 1995-January 1996. Nevertheless, another relatively long funding gap began on October 1, 2013, the first day of FY2014, after funding for FY2013 expired at the end of September. A 16-full-day shutdown of affected activities followed. Subsequently, in FY2018, two brief shutdowns occurred. OMB directed agencies to execute plans for an orderly shutdown, and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) indicated that a lapse in appropriations could affect agency operations with implications for whether employees should report to work on Saturday, January 20, 2018. These plans sometimes also have been called "contingency plans." Among other things, a shutdown plan is required to include
a summary of agency activities that will continue and those that will cease; an estimate of the time to complete the shutdown, to the nearest half-day; the number of employees expected to be on-board (i.e., filled positions) before implementation of the plan; and the total number of employees to be retained (i.e., not furloughed), broken out into five categories of exceptions to the Antideficiency Act, including employees (1) who are paid from a resource other than annual appropriations; (2) who are necessary to perform activities expressly authorized by law; (3) who are necessary to perform activities necessarily implied by law; (4) who are necessary to the discharge of the President's constitutional duties and powers; and (5) who are necessary to protect life and property. Documents also addressed availability of government services, unemployment compensation for federal employees, union concerns, and information about past shutdowns. Effects of a Federal Government Shutdown on Government Operations
Effects of a shutdown may occur at various times, including in anticipation of a potential funding gap (e.g., planning), during an actual gap (e.g., furlough and curtailed operations), and afterwards (e.g., addressing backlogs of work). A graphical depiction of the FY1996 appropriations process, including the two funding gaps, is available in another CRS report. The FY2014 Shutdown
After the second FY1996 shutdown, no shutdowns occurred until over 17 years later, in FY2014. In this case, a funding gap began on October 1, 2013, the first day of FY2014, after funding from the previous fiscal year expired at the end of the day on September 30. The memorandum, which still was in effect for the FY1996 shutdowns and posted online by OPM as a reference for agencies for the FY2014 shutdown, explained:
Beginning [on the first day of the appropriations hiatus], agencies may continue activities otherwise authorized by law, those that protect life and property and those necessary to begin phasedown of other activities. More detailed discussion of some topics may be found in other CRS products. During the shutdown, agency contingency plans stated that several grant-related activities would be disrupted. Across the legislative branch, the impact of the FY2014 shutdown varied. The April and December 2011 releases of agency shutdown plans on the Internet—on OMB's website and on agency websites—brought a new level of transparency to agency shutdown planning. For example, when there is a gap in federal funding for state-administered programs during a federal government shutdown, states must decide whether to fill the gap with state funding to continue program operations or to cease program activities until the federal funding is restored. | When federal agencies and programs lack funding after the expiration of full-year or interim appropriations, the agencies and programs experience a funding gap. If funding does not resume in time to continue government operations, then, under the Antideficiency Act, an agency must cease operations, except in certain situations when law authorizes continued activity. Funding gaps are distinct from shutdowns, and the criteria that flow from the Antideficiency Act for determining which activities are affected by a shutdown are complex.
Failure of the President and Congress to reach agreement on full-year or interim funding measures occasionally has caused shutdowns of affected federal government activities. The longest such shutdown lasted 21 full days during FY1996, from December 16, 1995, to January 6, 1996. More recently, a relatively long funding gap commenced on October 1, 2013, the first day of FY2014, after funding for the previous fiscal year expired. Because funding did not resume on October 1, affected agencies began to cease operations and furlough personnel that day. A 16-full-day shutdown ensued, the first to occur in over 17 years. Subsequently, two comparatively brief shutdowns occurred during FY2018, in January and February 2018, respectively.
Government shutdowns have necessitated furloughs of several hundred thousand federal employees, required cessation or reduction of many government activities, and affected numerous sectors of the economy. This report discusses
causes of shutdowns, including the legal framework under which they may occur; processes related to how agencies may plan for the contingency of a shutdown; effects of shutdowns, focusing especially on federal personnel and government operations; and issues related to shutdowns that may be of interest to Congress.
This CRS report is intended to address questions that arise frequently related to the topic of government shutdowns. However, the report does not closely track developments related to the appropriations process for a given fiscal year. For links to CRS resources related to annual appropriations, see the "CRS Appropriations Status Table," at http://www.crs.gov/AppropriationsStatusTable/Index.
Additional resources related to funding gaps and shutdowns are identified below.
Agency Shutdown Plans
For links to agency shutdown plans (also sometimes called "contingency plans") of varying dates, see the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) website, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-for-agencies/agency-contingency-plans/.
CRS Written Products
Listing of CRS written products related to FY2014 shutdown. For an annotated list of CRS products that relate to the FY2014 funding gap, shutdown, and related status of appropriations, see CRS Report R43250, CRS Resources on the FY2014 Funding Gap, Shutdown, and Status of Appropriations, by [author name scrubbed]. Funding gaps history. For discussion of funding gaps in recent decades and a more detailed chronology of legislative actions and funding gaps that led to the two shutdowns of FY1996 and the shutdown of FY2014, see CRS Report RS20348, Federal Funding Gaps: A Brief Overview, by [author name scrubbed]. Past government shutdowns. For an annotated list of historical documents and other resources related to past government shutdowns, see CRS Report R41759, Past Government Shutdowns: Key Resources, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
CRS Services
For questions concerning the impact of a shutdown on a specific agency or program in the executive branch, legislative branch operations, or judicial branch operations,
see the contact information for CRS subject matter experts who are listed in CRS Report R41723, Funding Gaps and Government Shutdowns: CRS Experts; use the "place a request" function on the CRS website; call CRS at [phone number scrubbed]; or see the "Key Policy Staff" table at the end of this report. |
crs_R44663 | crs_R44663_0 | In general, economists have observed an inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate, i.e., the rate at which prices rise. Alternatively, when the unemployment rate rises above the natural rate, inflation will tend to decelerate. Economist A. W. Phillips found that between 1861 and 1957, there was a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the rate of change in wages in the United Kingdom, showing wages tended to grow faster when the unemployment rate was lower, and vice versa. The natural rate model suggests that there is a certain level of unemployment that is consistent with a stable inflation rate, known as the natural rate of unemployment. When the unemployment rate falls below the natural rate of unemployment, referred to as a negative unemployment gap, the inflation rate is expected to accelerate. Within the natural rate model, the natural rate of unemployment is the level of unemployment consistent with actual output equaling potential output, and therefore stable inflation. However, as wages increase, upward pressure is placed on the price of all goods and services because labor costs make up a large portion of the total cost of goods and services. Over time, the average price of goods and services rises to reflect the increased cost of wages. Productivity growth, and 4. As the characteristics of the labor force change—for example, with respect to age, educational attainment, and work experience—and alter the productive capacity of the economy, the natural rate is also expected to shift. An increase in the expected rate of inflation will be translated into an actual increase in the rate of inflation as wages and prices are set by individuals within the economy. Economic events that impact the supply of goods or services within the economy, known as supply shocks, can also impact the rate of inflation. This leads to a spike in the overall price level in the economy, namely, inflation. As a result of the global financial crisis and the U.S. 2007-2009 recession, the unemployment rate rose above 10% and remained significantly elevated compared with estimates of the natural rate of unemployment for multiple years, as shown in Figure 1 . Numerous competing hypotheses exist for why a significant decrease in the inflation rate failed to materialize. Limited empirical work has found evidence of this behavior by businesses during the 2007-2009 recession, and therefore may help to explain the unexpectedly modest decrease in inflation following the recession. Increased Inflation Anchoring
Changes in how individuals form inflation expectations, as a result of broad changes in how the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy, may also help to explain the unexpectedly moderate decrease in the rate of inflation after the 2007-2009 recession. This change in how economic actors formed inflation expectations is thought to have reduced the volatility of changes in the rate of inflation during economic shocks. Results of this research suggest that when considering the effects of monetary or fiscal policy on inflation, policymakers would benefit from using a measure of the unemployment gap that weights the unemployment rate for the short-term unemployed more heavily than the long-term unemployed. According to the natural rate model, if government attempts to maintain an unemployment rate below the natural rate of unemployment, inflation will increase and continuously rise until unemployment returns to its natural rate. As discussed in the " Time Varying Natural Rate of Unemployment " section, four main factors determine the natural rate of unemployment, (1) the makeup of the labor force, (2) labor market institutions and public policy, (3) growth in productivity, and (4) contemporaneous and previous levels of long-term unemployment. | The unemployment rate is a vital measure of economic performance. A falling unemployment rate generally occurs alongside rising gross domestic product (GDP), higher wages, and higher industrial production. The government can generally achieve a lower unemployment rate using expansionary fiscal or monetary policy, so it might be assumed that policymakers would consistently target a lower unemployment rate using these policies. Part of the reason policymakers do not revolves around the relationship between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate.
In general, economists have found that when the unemployment rate drops below a certain level, referred to as the natural rate, the inflation rate will tend to increase and continue to rise until the unemployment rate returns to its natural rate. Alternatively, when the unemployment rate rises above the natural rate, the inflation rate will tend to decelerate. The natural rate of unemployment is the level of unemployment consistent with sustainable economic growth. An unemployment rate below the natural rate suggests that the economy is growing faster than its maximum sustainable rate, which places upward pressure on wages and prices in general leading to increased inflation. The opposite is true if the unemployment rate rises above the natural rate, downward pressure is placed on wages and prices in general leading to decreased inflation. Wages make up a significant portion of the costs of goods and services, therefore upward or downward pressure on wages pushes average prices in the same direction.
Two other sources of variation in the rate of inflation are inflation expectations and unexpected changes in the supply of goods and services. Inflation expectations play a significant role in the actual level of inflation, because individuals incorporate their inflation expectations when making price-setting decisions or when bargaining for wages. A change in the availability of goods and services used as inputs in the production process (e.g., oil) generally impacts the final price of goods and services in the economy, and therefore changing the rate of inflation.
The natural rate of unemployment is not immutable and fluctuates alongside changes within the economy. For example, the natural rate of unemployment is affected by
changes in the demographics, educational attainment, and work experience of the labor force; institutions (e.g., apprenticeship programs) and public policies (e.g., unemployment insurance); changes in productivity growth; and contemporaneous and previous level of long-term unemployment.
Following the 2007-2009 recession, the actual unemployment rate remained significantly elevated compared with estimates of the natural rate of unemployment for multiple years. However, the average inflation rate decreased by less than one percentage point during this period despite predictions of negative inflation rates based on the natural rate model. Likewise, inflation has recently shown no sign of accelerating as unemployment has approached the natural rate. Some economists have used this as evidence to abandon the concept of a natural rate of unemployment in favor of other alternative indicators to explain fluctuations in inflation.
Some researchers have largely upheld the natural rate model while looking at broader changes in the economy and the specific consequences of the 2007-2009 recession to explain the modest decrease in inflation after the recession. One potential explanation involves the limited supply of financing available to businesses after the breakdown of the financial sector. Another explanation cites changes in how inflation expectations are formed following changes in how the Federal Reserve responds to economic shocks and the establishment of an unofficial inflation target. Others researchers have cited the unprecedented increase in long-term unemployment that followed the recession, which significantly decreased bargaining power among workers. |
crs_RL34134 | crs_RL34134_0 | Because of the import sensitivity of some U.S. commodity sectors (e.g., beef, dairy, and sugar, among others) to the prospect of increased competition from foreign suppliers, the executive branch has had to take the concerns of producers of these commodities into account during negotiations, in order to secure congressional approval of concluded trade agreements. FTAs with three other countries (Costa Rica, Oman, and Peru) have been approved by Congress but not yet implemented for various reasons. Other stated U.S. objectives pertinent to negotiating bilateral FTAs are:
to 'seek to' eliminate 'on the broadest possible basis' tariffs and other charges on agricultural trade; to 'seek to' eliminate non-tariff barriers to U.S. exports, including licensing barriers on agricultural products, restrictive administration of tariff-rate quotas, unjustified trade restrictions that affect new U.S. technologies (i.e., biotechnology), and other trade restrictive measures that U.S. exporters identify; to provide adequate transition periods and relief mechanisms for the U.S. agricultural sector to adjust to increased imports of sensitive products; to seek to eliminate partner government practices that adversely affect U.S. exports of perishable or cyclical agricultural products; to eliminate any unjustified sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) restrictions imposed by the prospective partner and seek its affirmation of its WTO commitments on SPS measures; and to develop a mechanism with each partner to support the U.S. objective to eliminate all agricultural export subsidies in the WTO negotiations. Market Access for Import-Sensitive Agricultural Products
One U.S. objective in negotiations is that bilateral free trade agreements be comprehensive (i.e., cover all products). Recently negotiated FTAs, though, provide for indefinite protection for a few commodities. The three exceptions because of political sensitivities for the United States or its partners are the outright exclusions for tobacco in the Jordan FTA (2001), sugar in the Australia FTA (2005), and rice in the FTA with South Korea (2007). Even though they are not technically on the agenda, two SPS issues have concerned U.S. negotiators in recent FTA talks with several countries. The share of two-way agricultural trade covered by U.S. free trade agreements increased from $329 million (just under 1%) in 1986 (under the FTA with Israel) to $54 billion (41%) in 2006 (when FTAs with 13 countries were in effect) ( Figure 1 and Figure 2 , and Table 5 ). Agricultural Trade
Two-way agricultural trade with the 13 countries with which the United States has approved FTAs since 2004 and with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea, whose FTAs await congressional consideration, could be an estimated 4.1% to 4.3% higher than would occur without these trade agreements. Australia and Chile would account for most of the increase in agricultural imports under the FTAs analyzed by the USITC. Agriculture in Current U.S. FTAs
Of the 10 U.S. FTAs now in effect, only three have operated for more than 10 years (those with Israel, Canada and Mexico). Provisions with the Dominican Republic took effect on March 1, 2007. Jordan35
The U.S.-Jordan FTA went into effect in December 2001. Sugar will be treated uniquely. This is expected to occur infrequently, because Peru varies between being a net sugar exporter and importer from year to year. | Trade in agricultural products frequently is one of the more difficult issues negotiators face in concluding free trade agreements (FTAs). While U.S. negotiators seek to eliminate barriers to U.S. agricultural exports, they also face pressures to protect U.S. producers of import sensitive commodities (i.e., beef, dairy products, sugar, among others). FTA partner country negotiators face similar pressures. One U.S. objective is for FTAs be comprehensive (i.e., cover all products). For the more import-sensitive agricultural commodities, negotiators have agreed on long transition periods, or compromised to allow for indefinite protection of a few commodities. In addition, because of political sensitivities for the United States or its partners, negotiators excluded sugar in the Australia FTA, tobacco in the Jordan FTA, and rice in the Korea FTA.
Though food safety and animal/plant health matters technically are not part of FTAs, resolving outstanding disputes and reaching common understanding on the application of science-based rules to bilateral trade have directly affected the dynamics of concluding recent FTAs and/or the process of subsequent congressional consideration. One example has been the high U.S. priority to secure assurances that prospective FTA partners allow imports of U.S. beef in accordance with internationally recognized scientifically based rules.
Most of the U.S. agricultural export gains under FTAs have occurred with Canada and Mexico, the top two U.S. agricultural trading partners. Though U.S. sales to overseas markets were expected to increase anyway because of population growth and income gains, analyses suggest that the FTAs recently put into effect or concluded since 2004 could boost U.S. agricultural exports by an additional 3.9% to 7.2%. Because of the reciprocity introduced into the agricultural trading relationship in those FTAs concluded with several developing countries that protect their farm sectors with high tariffs and restrictive quotas, U.S. exporters will benefit from increased sales. Net U.S. agricultural imports under these FTAs could be 1.5% higher than forecast.
The share of two-way U.S. agricultural trade (exports and imports) covered by FTAs has increased from 1% in 1985 (when the first FTA took effect) to 41% in 2006 (reflecting FTAs with 13 countries). Ranked in order, they are Canada, Mexico, Australia, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, El Salvador, Singapore, Morocco, Nicaragua, Jordan, and Bahrain. If trade is included with nine other countries with which FTAs have been: approved but are not yet in effect (Costa Rica, Oman, and Peru); concluded and awaiting consideration in the 110th Congress (Colombia, Panama, and South Korea); took effect in 2007 (Dominican Republic); and may be concluded (Thailand and Malaysia)—another 9% of U.S. agricultural trade would be covered.
This report will be updated to reflect developments. |
crs_R42119 | crs_R42119_0 | The Lacey Act regulates the trade of wildlife and plants and creates penalties for a broad spectrum of violations. In 2008, the Lacey Act was amended to include nonindigenous plants and violations of foreign laws pertaining to certain conservation actions and other activities involving plants and plant products. In addition, the Lacey Act makes it unlawful to falsify or submit falsified documents related to any plant or plant product covered by the act, and to import certain plants and plant products without an import declaration. The primary aims of the 2008 amendments were to reduce illegal logging and to increase the value of U.S. wood exports. Some have estimated that 15% to 30% of the volume of all forestry is attributable to illegal logging. The economic value of global illegal logging is estimated to be between $50 billion and $100 billion of the global wood trade. If there were no illegally logged wood in the global market, it has been projected that the value of U.S. exports of roundwood, sawnwood, and panels could increase by an average of approximately $460 million each year. Further, if increases in value for domestic wood production if illegal logging is halted are taken into account, then the increase in value of wood products in the United States each year could be approximately $1.0 billion, according to the study. Policy Issues Associated with the 2008 Amendments
A raid on Gibson Guitar Corporation (see box below) brought to light several existing policy and legal issues related to the 2008 amendments to the Lacey Act. In broad terms, some question why U.S. importers should be held responsible for violations of foreign law potentially committed by foreign entities (i.e., not U.S. importers). The 113 th Congress has addressed the 2008 amendments with proposed legislation. H.R. Further, the bill would amend the rulemaking authority of the Secretary to give more flexibility for specifying the applicability of declaration requirements. H.R. 3280 would amend the Lacey Act to exempt plants and plant products imported before May 22, 2008, from the Lacey Act. The report is to contain:
an evaluation of the effectiveness of the declaration requirements in assisting enforcement of the requirements and efforts to integrate the requirements with other import regulations; recommendations for legislation that would assist in the identification of plants that are imported into the United States illegally; and an analysis of the effect of prohibitions and declaration requirements on the cost of legal plant imports and the effect on illegal logging practices and trafficking. Enforcement of the Lacey Act
The Lacey Act states that the provisions and subsequent regulations under the act are to be enforced by the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce, and in the case of plants, also the Secretary of Agriculture. 3324 would amend the Lacey Act so that importers would need to possess and make available certain information about the plant or plant products being imported. Currently, importers are required to file this information. Excluding Plants and Plant Products Imported or Compiled Before 2008
Some contend that the 2008 amendments should not apply to plants imported or plant products created or imported before 2008. | The Lacey Act regulates the trade of wildlife and plants and creates penalties for a broad spectrum of violations. In 2008, the Lacey Act was amended to include protections for foreign plants and to require adherence to foreign laws as they pertain to certain conservation and other activities involving plants. Further, the 2008 amendments make it unlawful to submit falsified documents related to any plant or plant product covered by the act, and to import certain plants and plant products without an import declaration.
The primary drivers behind the Lacey Act amendments of 2008 (2008 amendments) were to reduce illegal logging globally and increase the value of U.S. wood exports. Illegal logging is a pervasive problem with economic and environmental consequences. Some estimate that illegal logging accounts for 15%-30% of the volume of all forest extraction activities globally, and has an estimated worth of $30 billion-$100 billion of the global wood trade. Further, if there were no illegally logged wood in the global market, it has been projected that the value of U.S. exports of roundwood, sawnwood, and panels could increase by an average of approximately $460 million each year. A halt to illegal logging would also raise the value of domestic wood production. If this is added to exports, some estimate the increase in revenue for companies in the United States at approximately $1.0 billion annually.
A highly publicized raid on Gibson Guitar Corporation brought to light several existing policy issues related to the 2008 amendments to the Lacey Act. Some issues are broad and address the intent of the act. For example, some question why U.S. importers should be held responsible for violations of foreign law or if the requirements under the Lacey Act actually reduce illegal logging. Other issues are narrow and address certain requirements in the act. For example, several suggest that the declaration requirements for importing plants and plant products are cumbersome and cannot be met in some cases. Further, some contend that the 2008 amendments should not apply to plants harvested or plant products fabricated before the 2008 amendments were enacted. In contrast, some reiterate the benefits of the 2008 amendments, primarily reducing illegal logging and increasing the value of legally obtained plants and plant products on the market.
The 113th Congress is attempting to address some of these issues in proposed legislation. H.R. 3324 would amend the Lacey Act so that importers would need to possess and make available certain information about the plant or plant products being imported. Currently, importers are required to file this information. Further, the bill would amend the rulemaking authority of the Secretary to give more flexibility for specifying the applicability of declaration requirements. H.R. 3280 would amend the Lacey Act to exempt plants and plant products imported before May 22, 2008, from the Lacey Act.
Efforts to address implementation issues could also be pursued through regulations. The law requires a review of the implementation of the Lacey Act by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and a report evaluating and analyzing some implementation requirements and providing recommendations to improve plant identification. Further, the Secretary (e.g., Secretary of Interior, Commerce, or Agriculture) may promulgate regulations that aim to improve implementation as discussed in the review. |
crs_RL34672 | crs_RL34672_0 | Introduction
Auction-rate securities (ARSs) coupled long-term maturity borrowing with interest rates linked to short-term money markets by periodic auctions, and thus combine features of short- and long-term securities. Municipalities and public authorities, student loan providers, and other institutional borrowers raised funds using auction-rate securities since they were first created in the mid-1980s. The credit crunch of 2007-2008, however, exposed major vulnerabilities in the design of ARSs, and new issues of ARS debt have effectively ceased. Following the extraordinary turmoil in global financial markets that erupted in August 2007, several interest-rate auctions for ARSs failed, which temporarily left investors unable to sell their ARS holdings. While ARS markets appeared to return to normalcy that fall, some large institutional investors had begun to withdraw funds from ARS markets. Congressional Concerns
In the past, Congress has expressed concern that the collapse of the ARS market could elevate costs of state and local government borrowing, disrupt higher education finance, and raise important questions about federal financial regulation and oversight. After widespread ARS auction failures in February 2008, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing to examine how financial market developments may have increased borrowing costs to state and local governments. On May 1, 2008, Congress passed the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008 (ECASLA, H.R. 5715 , P.L. ECASLA allows the Secretary of Education to provide capital to student lenders, whose ability to borrow in some cases could have been constricted by ARS failures. Structure of the Auction-Rate Securities Market
Market Composition
Municipal bonds and bonds backed by student loans have been the most prominent parts of the ARS market. Efforts to avoid auction failures put mounting pressures on investment bank balance sheets. A much smaller volume of student loan ARSs (or SLARSs) issues have been refinanced. Many issuers, such as municipalities, universities, and student lenders, were faced with steeply higher interest costs. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also reached several settlements with major broker-dealers. Most major investment banks active in the ARS market have reached agreements with state attorneys general and financial regulators to buy back ARSs from some classes of investors. Fidelity, a mutual fund group, did not originate ARSs, but sold some ARSs to clients. Some municipalities have restructured auction-rate securities debt and other issuers have redeemed portions of security issues. Interest Rate Hedges and LIBOR
Some municipal borrowers that used ARSs attempted to hedge interest rate risks through interest rate swaps linked to LIBOR (London InterBank Offer Rate). During 2008, however, that type of hedge generally performed poorly. The City of Baltimore, Maryland has sued banks involved in setting LIBOR rates, claiming that those rates were kept artificially low. In addition, ARSs created major liquidity problems for many holders of ARS debt. Issues for Congress
Recent turmoil in ARS markets has affected several policy areas of Congressional concern. State attorneys general in New York, Massachusetts and other states have filed suits alleging that investment banks active in the ARS market failed to inform clients about rising liquidity risks, especially between when the global credit crunch emerged in August 2007 and when the ARS market collapsed in February 2008. In addition, some bond contracts may restrict issuers' ability to repurchase their own ARSs. One proposed Senate amendment submitted by Senator Sherrod Brown on May 26, 2010 ( S.Amdt. 4261 ) to a supplemental appropriations measure (Disaster Relief and Summer Jobs Act, H.R. 4899 ) would let the government buy certain federally guaranteed loans, which could affect the SLARS market. 110-227 ). | Many municipalities, student loan providers, and other debt issuers borrowed funds using auction-rate securities (ARSs), whose interest rates are set periodically by auctions. ARSs combine features of short- and long-term securities. ARSs are typically long-maturity bonds with interest rates linked to short-term money markets. ARS issuance volumes grew rapidly since they were introduced in the mid-1980s. By 2007, ARSs comprised a $330 billion market. The credit crunch of 2007-2008, however, exposed major vulnerabilities in the design of ARSs.
Turmoil in global financial markets that erupted in summer 2007, combined with vulnerabilities in the structure of ARSs, put mounting pressure on the ARS market. In addition, downgrades of some bond insurers increased stress on segments of the ARS market. In early February 2008, major ARS dealers withdrew their support for ARS auctions, most of which then failed. Widespread auction failures in the ARS market left many investors with illiquid holdings and sharply increased interest costs for many issuers, such as student lending agencies, cities, and public authorities. In particular, ARS failures, according to some, have made it more difficult for student lenders that had used ARSs to raise funds.
Many major investment banks, in the wake of lawsuits filed by state attorneys general as well as pressure from state and federal regulators, have announced plans to repurchase outstanding ARSs for certain relatively smaller investors and to make efforts to liquidate ARS holdings of larger and institutional investors. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reached several settlements with broker-dealers in late 2008 and early 2009. Lawsuits alleged that some investment banks sold ARS products as cash equivalents, but failed to disclose liquidity risks and the extent of bank support for auctions—the main liquidity channel for ARSs. Many major investment banks involved in the ARS market reached settlements and agreements to buy back ARSs from some investors, typically certain individual investors, non-profit organizations, and small businesses. Some large firms and high-wealth individuals, however, have not been covered by these settlements. Some large firms have called for federal help to sell their ARS holdings.
Some municipal borrowers that used ARSs attempted to hedge interest rate risks through interest rate swaps linked to LIBOR (London InterBank Offer Rate). During 2008, however, that type of hedge generally performed poorly. The City of Baltimore, Maryland has sued banks involved in setting LIBOR rates, claiming that those rates were kept artificially low. Some parts of the ARS market, such as municipal issues and closed-end mutual funds, have restructured much of their debt, as issuers have redeemed ARS securities and switched to other financing strategies. A much smaller portion of existing student-loan-backed ARS (SLARS) debt issues have been refinanced.
In the past, Congress has expressed concern about policy areas that the ARS market's collapse has affected. For example, the House Financial Services Committee held a March 2008 hearing to examine how financial market developments may have increased interest and other financing costs of state and local governments, followed by another hearing in September 2008 on ARSs. In April 2008, Congress passed the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008 (H.R. 5715, P.L. 110-227) to allow the Secretary of Education to provide capital to student lenders, whose ability to borrow in some cases had been constricted by ARS failures. One proposed Senate amendment (S.Amdt. 4261) to a supplemental appropriations measure (Disaster Relief and Summer Jobs Act, H.R. 4899) would let the government buy certain federally guaranteed loans, which could affect the SLARS market. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41322 | crs_R41322_0 | They are rare in the United States, although variations of covered bonds have been used in Europe for centuries. Although covered bonds are not a prohibited form of debt contract in the United States, some observers believe that legislation and agency rulemaking is required to facilitate the growth of a larger domestic covered bond market. In other countries, covered bonds conforming to statutorily prescribed features may receive enhanced protections. For such statutorily protected covered bonds, according to the European Central Bank (ECB), the closest thing to a shared definition is European Covered Bond Council's "essential features of covered bonds," which includes four elements: (1) the bond is issued by (or bondholders otherwise have full recourse to) a credit institution which is subject to public supervision and regulation; (2) bondholders have a claim against a cover pool of financial assets in priority to the unsecured creditors of the credit institution; (3) the credit institution has the ongoing obligation to maintain sufficient assets in the cover pool to satisfy the claims of covered bondholders at all times; and (4) the obligations of the credit institution in respect of the cover pool are supervised by public or other independent bodies. Therefore, covered bonds typically tie up more capital than typical securitizations. Covered bonds might be less subject to investor loss of confidence than securitization because covered bond issuers maintain a long-term interest in the underlying loans and because the exposure of banks to covered bonds remains recorded on their balance sheets. If the underlying loans default, the financial institution is still responsible for payments to the holders of the covered bonds. Policymakers could change the relative capital treatment of securitized assets and covered bonds. Agency Actions on Covered Bonds
In response to mortgage market turmoil in 2007 and 2008, the Treasury Department and the FDIC considered rulemaking to encourage the use of covered bonds as an alternative to mortgage securitization. FDIC Financial Institution Letters
In the United States, the FDIC resolves financial problems of failing banks with insured deposits. 940 would have created a statutory framework for covered bonds in the United States similar to programs in Europe that distinguish contractual from statutory covered bonds. 940 , the term covered bond would have meant any recourse debt obligation of an eligible issuer that (1) has an original term to maturity of not less than one year; (2) is secured by a perfected security interest in or other lien on a cover pool that is owned directly or indirectly by the issuer of the obligation; (3) is issued under a covered bond program that has been approved by the applicable covered bond regulator; (4) is identified in a register of covered bonds that is maintained by the Secretary; and (5) is not a deposit (as defined in section 3(l) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. There may be instances in which an issuer of covered bonds is placed in receivership or conservatorship before the issuer defaults on any covered bond payments. | Covered bonds are a relatively common method of funding mortgages in Europe, but uncommon in the United States. A covered bond is a recourse debt obligation that is secured by a pool of assets, often mortgages. The holders of the bond are given additional protection in the event of bankruptcy or insolvency of the issuing lender. Covered bonds have some features, such as pooled mortgages, that resemble securitization, but the original lenders maintain a continuing interest in the performance of the loans. Because some believe that the subprime mortgage turmoil may have been influenced by poor incentives for lenders using the securitization process, some policymakers have recommended covered bonds as an alternative for U.S. mortgage markets. Although covered bond contracts are not prohibited in the United States, some policymakers believe that legislation and agency rulemaking could facilitate the growth of a domestic covered bond market.
In some countries, covered bonds conforming to statutorily prescribed features may receive enhanced protections or greater regulatory certainty. A statutory framework for covered bonds often includes four elements: (1) the bond is issued by (or bondholders otherwise have full recourse to) a credit institution that is subject to public supervision and regulation; (2) bondholders have a claim against a cover pool of financial assets in priority to the unsecured creditors of the credit institution; (3) the credit institution has the ongoing obligation to maintain sufficient assets in the cover pool to satisfy the claims of covered bondholders at all times; and (4) in addition to general supervision of the issuing institution, public or other independent bodies supervise the institution's specific obligations to the covered bonds. Some analysts include the presence of such a statutory framework in the definition of a covered bond, in which case there have not been any covered bonds issued in the United States (and many so-called covered bonds issued elsewhere would also no longer be rightfully called covered bonds).
Compared with securitization, covered bonds may be less susceptible to poor underwriting standards because issuers maintain risk exposure or "skin in the game," perhaps minimizing problems of the "originate to distribute" model of lending. Institutions that issue covered bonds may be less susceptible to investor panic because the status of covered bonds on their balance sheet is transparent. On the other hand, reliance on covered bonds may reduce aggregate lending because it ties up more capital than does securitization.
Potentially, there could be some regulatory uncertainty on the treatment of holders of covered bonds when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) places banks in receivership or conservatorship. To address some of these concerns, the FDIC issued two policy statements in 2008 clarifying its obligations to the holders of covered bonds if an FDIC-insured institution is placed in FDIC receivership or conservatorship. Because the use of covered bonds in the United States is rare, there is still little experience in actually resolving a covered bond.
This report will be updated as conditions warrant. |
crs_R40421 | crs_R40421_0 | The 17 th Amendment, which provided for direct election of the Senate, also gave states the option of filling Senate vacancies by election or by temporary gubernatorial appointment:
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. This report reviews the constitutional origins of the appointments provision and its incorporation in the 17 th Amendment. Latest Developments in Senate Vacancies
Two Senate vacancies occurred late in the 112 th Congress, due to the death of Senator Daniel K. Inouye of Hawaii, and the resignation of Senator Jim DeMint of South Carolina. Two more have occurred to date 113 th Congress, due to the resignation of Massachusetts Senator John F. Kerry and the death of New Jersey Senator Frank R. Lautenberg. Detailed information on these vacancies follows below in alphabetical order. Senator Inouye, who had served since 1963, was also President pro tempore of the Senate at the time of his death. In accord with Hawaiian law, Governor Neil Abercrombie announced on December 26 that he would appoint Lieutenant Governor Brian E. Schatz to serve in his place until the vacancy is filled by a special election in 2014. Senator Schatz was sworn in on December 27, 2012. The winner of the special election will serve until the term expires in 2017. On January 30, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick announced the appointment of William (Mo) Cowan, and advisor and former chief counsel and chief of staff to the governor, as interim Senator. Senator Cowan, who was sworn in on February 7, 2013, and served until the special election winner was certified and sworn in. In accordance with Massachusetts law, which requires a special election to fill the seat for the balance of the term between 145 and 160 days following the original vacancy, Secretary of the Commonwealth William F. Galvin scheduled a special primary election for April 30, followed by a special general election on June 25. Representative Markey won the special election, and was sworn in on July 16. He will serve the balance of the term, which expires in 2015. The New Jersey Statutes Annotated vests the governor with authority to make temporary appointments to fill Senate vacancies, with the appointed incumbent serving until a general or special election. On June 6, the governor announced his appointment of New Jersey Attorney General Jeffrey S. Chiesa to fill the vacancy and serve until the special election. The winner of the special election will serve the balance of the term, which expires in 2015. In accord with South Carolina law, Governor Nikki Haley announced on December 17 that she would appoint Representative Tim Scott to serve in his place until the vacancy is filled by a special election in 2014. The winner of the special election will serve until the term expires in 2017. Senator DeMint resigned effective January 1, 2013, and Senator Scott was sworn in on January 3. At the time of this writing, the Senate's records currently identify 193 appointments to the office of U.S. Filling Vacancies by Special Election
Oregon, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin currently provide that Senate vacancies be filled only by special elections. Rhode Island in 2009 required that any Senate vacancy be filled by special election only. These provisions are intended to ensure that the appointing governors respect the results of the previous election by selecting a temporary replacement who will either be of the same political party as the prior incumbent, or who has been endorsed or "nominated" by the prior incumbent's party apparatus. State Legislation Since 2009
Following controversies that arose in connection with appointments to fill Senate vacancies in 2008 and 2009, particularly with respect to the Illinois Senate vacancy, proposals to eliminate or curtail gubernatorial power to fill Senate vacancies by appointment were introduced in a number of state legislatures. Rhode Island in 2009 eliminated the governor's appointment authority, and provided expedited procedures for special elections. The special election was ultimately held on January 19, 2010, and state Senator Scott Brown was chosen to serve for the balance of the term, which expired on January 3, 2013. 21 would have required that all Senate vacancies be filled by special election. | United States Senators serve a term of six years. Vacancies occur when an incumbent Senator leaves office prematurely for any reason; they may be caused by death or resignation of the incumbent, by expulsion or declination (refusal to serve), or by refusal of the Senate to seat a Senator-elect or -designate.
This report provides information on current vacancies in the Senate, the constitutional origins of the Senate vacancy clause, the appointment process by which most vacancies are filled, and related contemporary issues. It will be revised and updated to reflect current developments in vacancies, appointments, and special elections.
Since December 2012, four vacancies have occurred in the Senate. They are identified below in alphabetical order by state.
In Hawaii, Senator Daniel K. Inouye, who was also President pro tempore of the Senate, died on December 17, 2012. Hawaii Governor Neil Abercrombie appointed Lieutenant Governor Brian E. Schatz to serve in his place until the vacancy is filled by a special election in 2014. Senator Schatz was sworn in on December 27, 2012. The winner of the special election will serve until the term expires in 2017.
In Massachusetts, Senator John F. Kerry resigned from the Senate on February 1, 2013, to assume the office of U.S. Secretary of State. The vacancy was filled by expedited special election procedures enacted in connection with the 2009 death of Senator Edward M. Kennedy. On January 30, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick announced the appointment of William (Mo) Cowan, to serve until the special election, which was scheduled for June 25. Senator Cowan was sworn in on February 7 and served until the winner of the special election was sworn in. Representative Edward J. Markey won the special election; he was sworn in on July 16, and will serve for the balance of the term, which expires in 2015.
In New Jersey, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg died June 3, 2013. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie set a special primary election for August 13, and a special general election for October 16. On June 6, the governor announced his appointment of New Jersey Attorney General Jeffrey S. Chiesa to fill the vacancy and serve until the special general election is held. The winner of the special election will serve for the balance of the term, which expires in 2015.
In South Carolina, Senator Jim DeMint resigned from the Senate on January 1, 2013, to assume the presidency of The Heritage Foundation. South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley appointed Representative Tim Scott to serve in his place until the vacancy is filled by a special election in 2014. Senator Scott was sworn in on January 3. The winner of the special election will serve until the term expires in 2017.
The use of temporary appointments to fill Senate vacancies is an original provision of the U.S. Constitution, found in Article I, Section 3, clause 2. The practice was revised in 1913 by the 17th Amendment, which provided for direct popular election of Senators, replacing election by state legislatures; it specifically directed state governors to "issue writs of election to fill such vacancies." The amendment also preserved the appointment option by authorizing state legislatures to empower governors to make temporary appointments pending a special election."
Since 1913, most states have exercised this option, authorizing their governors to fill Senate vacancies by temporary appointments. Some, however, limit the governor's power: appointed Senators in Arizona must be of the same political party as the prior incumbent, while in Hawaii, Utah, and Wyoming, the governor must choose a replacement from names submitted by the prior incumbent's party. In Connecticut and Oklahoma, the governor may make a temporary appointment in limited circumstances, and Oregon, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin require vacancies to be filled only by special election.
As a result of controversies that arose concerning appointments to Senate vacancies following the 2008 presidential election, legislation and a constitutional amendment that would have required all Senate vacancies to be filled by special election were introduced in the 111th Congress. None of these measures reached the floor of either chamber, however, and no comparable measures have been introduced since that time.
Since 2009, three states have substantially modified their vacancy procedures. Connecticut significantly restricted the governor's appointment power in such instances; Rhode Island eliminated it entirely, requiring that all future Senate vacancies be filled by special election; and Massachusetts modified its election-only requirement to reinstate gubernatorial appointment within an expedited special election process. |
crs_R41193 | crs_R41193_0 | Perhaps the most contentious transmission financing issue is cost allocation for new interstate transmission lines—that is, determining which customers must bear the costs of building and operating new transmission lines that cross several states. This report provides background and analysis of current transmission cost allocation policy and issues. A review of the transmission planning and cost allocation reforms in Order No. Background and History
The Federal Power Act
The authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to regulate interstate electricity transmission is derived primarily from Sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA). Development of the Interstate Transmission Grid and FERC Oversight Prior to Order No. FERC Order No. 890, issued by FERC in February 2007. The processes were usually accepted by FERC as filed or accepted with requirements for amendment to ensure compliance with Order 890's planning principles. First, there is no uniformity in the cost allocation procedures, and at least to date FERC has declined to go beyond establishing general principles. In Illinois Commerce Commission v. FERC , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit heard a challenge to FERC's approval of a cost allocation proposal for certain new transmission facilities in the PJM Interconnection. However, in recent years Members of Congress have introduced legislation intended to provide a tighter framework for FERC's transmission cost allocation policy. The Commission noted that its "best remaining opportunity to eliminate barriers to new transmission construction may therefore be to provide greater certainty in its policies for allocating the cost of new transmission facilities, particularly for facilities that cross multiple transmission systems ." 1000 on July 21, 2011. 1000 further requires that each transmission provider participate in a regional transmission planning process that includes both a regional cost allocation method for the cost of new transmission facilities selected in a regional transmission plan and an interregional cost allocation method for the cost of certain new transmission facilities located in two or more neighboring transmission planning regions. 1000 establishes three additional requirements for transmission cost allocation:
Regional transmission planning process must have a regional cost allocation method for a new transmission facility selected in the regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation. 1000, FERC has issued regulations which seek to add state and federal public policies as a factor in the decision-making process concerning which transmission projects emerge from planning processes as construction projects. Such entities could also be impacted by aspects of requirements from the Final Rule. General Comments
Order No. The Final Order comes as state renewable portfolio requirements and the upcoming U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations for coal power plants may increase demand for new transmission lines. The uncertainty regarding the implications for generation resources of upcoming EPA regulations has caused some utilities to delay decisions on building new generation, with plans to satisfy (at least interim) power needs from power markets until the regulatory clarity they seek is provided. FERC acknowledges that some key questions may only be answered in the compliance filing process. | Perhaps the most contentious electricity transmission financing issue is cost allocation for new interstate transmission lines—that is, deciding which electricity customers pay how much of the cost of building and operating a new transmission line that crosses several states. This report provides background and analysis of current transmission cost allocation policy and issues.
For many years, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) declined to go beyond establishing general principles as set forth in its Order No. 890, which addressed "undue discrimination and preference" in the providing of transmission services. Transmission cost allocation proposals made by transmission service providers were therefore reviewed by FERC to ensure compliance with the general principles outlined in Order No. 890 and the Federal Power Act (FPA). However, there were calls for FERC to provide a clearer framework for cost allocation. The decision of the Seventh Circuit in Illinois Commerce Commission v. FERC, to reject a cost allocation plan approved by FERC which would have permitted "socialization" of the costs for some new transmission projects (i.e., allowing the costs to be spread widely among ratepayers in the PJM Interconnection, even those who do not substantially or clearly benefit from a project) encouraged FERC to seek more clarity with respect to cost allocation. Congress also entered the fray in the form of legislative proposals that would amend the Federal Power Act to include new transmission cost allocation guidelines that FERC would be required to follow.
In 2009 FERC decided to take an in-depth look at cost allocation and other transmission planning issues as part of a new docket. FERC observed that its "best remaining opportunity to eliminate barriers to new transmission construction may therefore be to provide greater certainty in its policies for allocating the cost of new transmission facilities, particularly for facilities that cross multiple transmission systems." FERC requested comments from stakeholders on transmission planning issues.
After receiving and reviewing comments from stakeholders and offering a proposed rule in 2010, FERC published Order No. 1000, a final rule reforming FERC's transmission planning and cost allocation requirements for transmission service providers, on July 21, 2011. The final rule required transmission service providers to (1) participate in a regional transmission planning process; (2) amend their transmission tariffs to provide for consideration of public policy; (3) remove from their tariffs a federal right of first refusal for certain new transmission facilities; and (4) improve coordination between neighboring transmission planning regions.
The Final Order comes as state renewable portfolio standards and the upcoming U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations for coal power plants may drive demand for new transmission lines. The uncertainty regarding the implications for generation resources of upcoming EPA regulations has caused some utilities to delay decisions on building new generation, with plans to satisfy (at least interim) power needs from power markets until the regulatory clarity they seek is provided.
This report analyzes recent developments concerning transmission cost allocation leading up to Order No. 1000, as well as the contents of the order and their potential impact on the transmission planning process in the future. FERC acknowledges that some key questions may only be answered in the compliance filing process. |
crs_RL33603 | crs_RL33603_0 | Background and Analysis
The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission have made numerous recommendations for changing U.S. ocean policy and management. To address the findings and recommendations of the ocean commissions and the President's response, Congress may consider comprehensive bills encompassing a broad array of cross-cutting concerns, including federal organization and administrative structure, regional approaches to ecosystem management, and funding strategies. It was not until the 106 th Congress in 2000 that legislation was enacted to establish a 16-member U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy ( P.L. 106-256 ). U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy
The Oceans Act of 2000 ( P.L. 11. The Pew Oceans Commission
The Pew Oceans Commission, an independent group of 18 authorities in ocean-related issues and government, was established in April 2000 and funded by a $5.5 million grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts to conduct a national dialogue on the policies needed to restore and protect living marine resources in U.S. waters. This commission released its final report, America ' s Living Oceans: Charting a Course for Sea Change , on June 4, 2003, outlining a national agenda for protecting and restoring the oceans. 9. On December 17, 2004, President Bush submitted to Congress a U.S. On July 19, 2010, the CEQ released the Final Recommendations of the Ocean Pol icy Task Forc e. The recommendations are divided into four main sections that focus on the following areas:
a national policy for the ocean, the coasts, and the Great Lakes; a governance structure to provide sustained, high-level, and coordinated attention to ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes issues; a targeted implementation strategy that identifies and prioritizes nine categories for action; and a framework for coastal and marine spatial planning. Joint Ocean Commission Initiative
The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission identified complementary recommendations for a number of key areas in their respective reports. A collaborative Joint Ocean Commission Initiative was initiated in early 2005 to maintain the momentum generated by the two commissions. According to the plan, the 10 steps are:
adopt a statement of national ocean policy; pass an organic act to establish NOAA in law and work with the Administration to identify and act upon opportunities to improve federal agency coordination on ocean and coastal issues; foster ecosystem-based regional governance; reauthorize an improved Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act; enact legislation to support innovation and competition in ocean-related research and education consistent with key initiatives in the Bush Administration's Ocean Research Priorities Plan and Implementation Strategy (discussed in the following section on "Administration Response and Implementation"); enact legislation to authorize and fund the Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS); accede to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea; establish an Ocean Trust Fund in the U.S. Treasury as a dedicated source of funds for improved management and understanding of ocean and coastal resources by federal and state governments; increase base funding for core ocean and coastal programs and direct development of an integrated ocean budget; and enact ocean and coastal legislation that progressed significantly in the 109 th Congress. Issues for Congress
The 111 th Congress will continue to consider whether and how to respond to the findings and recommendations of the Pew Oceans Commission report, America ' s Living Oceans: Charting a Course for Sea Change , and the report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21 st Century . 109-479 ), incorporating provisions reflecting many recommendations made by both commissions. Only one bill was enacted, the Marine Debris Research, Prevention, and Reduction Act ( P.L. 109-449 ). The Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 ( P.L. Title XII includes sections that address ocean exploration, ocean and coastal mapping, ocean and coastal integrated observation, ocean acidification research and monitoring, and coastal and estuarine land conservation. 21 , the Oceans, Conservation, Education, and National Strategy for the 21 st Century Act, and a similar bill, S. 858 , the National Oceans Protection Act of 2009, were introduced. H.R. | In 2003 and 2004, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission made numerous recommendations for changing U.S. ocean policy and management. The 109th Congress reauthorized the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (P.L. 109-479), incorporating provisions recommended by both commissions, and authorized the Marine Debris Research, Prevention, and Reduction Act (P.L. 109-449). Several bills encompassing a broad array of cross-cutting concerns such as ocean exploration; ocean and coastal observing systems; federal organization and administrative structure; and ocean and coastal mapping were considered, but not acted on during the 110th Congress.
Identification of the need for a comprehensive national ocean policy can be traced back to 1966, when a presidential Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources was established (called the Stratton Commission). In 1969, the commission provided recommendations that led to reorganizing federal ocean programs and establishing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). By the late 1980s, a number of influential voices had concluded that U.S. ocean management remained fragmented and was characterized by a confusing array of laws, regulations, and practices. After repeated attempts, the 106th Congress enacted legislation to establish a U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy (P.L. 106-256). Earlier in 2000, the Pew Oceans Commission, an independent group, was established by the Pew Charitable Trusts to conduct a national dialogue on restoring and protecting living marine resources in U.S. waters.
In June 2003, the Pew Commission released its final report, America's Living Oceans: Charting a Course for Sea Change, outlining a national agenda for protecting and restoring the oceans. In September 2004, the U.S. Commission published, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century, its final report with 212 recommendations on a coordinated and comprehensive national ocean policy. On December 17, 2004, the Bush Administration submitted to Congress the U.S. Ocean Action Plan, its formal response to the recommendations of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy. The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission established the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative in early 2005 to collaborate on a number of key recommendations of both reports. The Joint Ocean Commission has remained active in advancing these recommendations to Congress and the Administration.
In June 2009, the Obama Administration established an Ocean Policy Task Force to develop a national ocean policy. On September 10, 2009, the task force released the Interim Report of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force, which includes national ocean policy priorities, a governance structure for interagency coordination, and an implementation strategy. On December 9, 2009, the task force released the Interim Framework for Effective Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning, which recommends a regional approach to marine spatial planning.
The 111th Congress is continuing to consider ocean policy and management recommendations of the two commission reports. Comprehensive changes in ocean governance and administrative structure are proposed in the Oceans Conservation, Education, and National Strategy for the 21st Century Act (H.R. 21) and the National Oceans Protection Act of 2009 (S. 858). However, most congressional activity has focused on specific topics. Title XII of the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-11) included subtitles that address ocean exploration, ocean and coastal mapping, ocean and coastal integrated observation, ocean acidification research and monitoring, and coastal and estuarine land conservation. |
crs_RL32561 | crs_RL32561_0 | Introduction
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and other Administration documents have assigned the Department of Homeland Security specific duties associated with coordinating the nation's efforts to protect its critical infrastructure. Many of these duties were delegated to the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate. Therefore, this report also discusses to some extent the Directorate's role in coordinating and/or integrating these activities. A Generic Model for Assessing and Integrating Threat, Vulnerability, and Risk
Many models/methodologies have been developed by which threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences are assessed and then used to inform the cost-effective allocation of resources to reduce risks. The elements are performed, more or less, in the following sequence:
Assessments
identify assets and identify which are most critical identify, characterize, and assess threats assess the vulnerability of critical assets to specific threats determine the risk (i.e., the expected consequences of specific types of attacks on specific assets)
Using Assessments to Identify and Prioritize Risk Reduction Activities
identify and characterize ways to reduce those risks prioritize risk reduction activities based on a risk reduction strategy
Assessments
Identifying Assets and Determining Criticality
The infrastructure of a facility, a company, or an economic sector, consists of an array of assets which are necessary for the production and/or delivery of a good or service. "Likelihood" is defined as "a function of: the attractiveness of the target to the adversary [based on the adversary's intent and the target's perceived value to the adversary], degree of threat [based on adversary's capabilities], and degree of vulnerability of the asset." Decision makers would have to come to a consensus on which risk reduction strategy to use to set priorities. Directorate's Internal Activity
While it has been developing the NIPP, the Directorate has been engaged in its own risk management activities. The Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, Robert Stephan, in July 2006, wrote that DHS had a list of more than 600 high-priority sites that it uses to focus its efforts. The risk management process described in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) contains all of the elements described above. The General Threat Environment will be updated as needed based on Specific Threat Information. It is unlikely that earlier risk management activities benefitted from this analysis. Expanding on this, the Directorate should be able to tell Congress what criteria it has used to select assets of national importance, the basic strategy it uses to determine which assets warrant additional protective measures, by how much these measures could reduce the risk to the nation, and how much these additional measures might cost. Department of Homeland Security. June 2006. | The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) and other Administration documents have assigned the Department of Homeland Security specific duties associated with coordinating the nation's efforts to protect its critical infrastructure, including using a risk management approach to set priorities. Many of these duties have been delegated to what is now called the National Protection and Programs Directorate.
Risk assessment involves the integration of threat, vulnerability, and consequence information. Risk management involves deciding which risk reduction measures to take based on an agreed upon risk reduction strategy. Many models/methodologies have been developed by which threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences are integrated to determine risks and then used to inform the allocation of resources to reduce those risks. For the most part, these methodologies consist of the following elements, performed, more or less, in the following order.
identify assets and identify which are most critical identify, characterize, and assess threats assess the vulnerability of critical assets to specific threats determine the risk (i.e., the expected consequences of specific types of attacks on specific assets) identify ways to reduce those risks prioritize risk reduction measures based on a strategy
Beginning in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security has been accumulating a list of infrastructure assets (specific sites and facilities). From this list the Department selects high-priority assets that it judges to be critical from a national point of view, based on the potential consequences associated with their loss. The Department intends to assess the vulnerability of all the high-priority assets it has identified. Department officials have described, in very general terms, that these vulnerability and consequence assessments are used to determine the risk each asset poses to the nation. This risk assessment is then used to prioritize subsequent additional protection activities. While these statements allude to some of the steps mentioned above, they do so only in a most general way. With its release of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan in June 2006, the Department has laid out a much more detailed discussion of the risk management methodology it intends to use (or is using). The Department's efforts, to date, still raise several questions, ranging from the process and criteria used to populate its lists of assets, its prioritization strategy, and the extent to which the Department is coordinating its efforts with the intelligence community and other agencies both internal and external to the Department. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R44359 | crs_R44359_0 | Cars and trucks are the primary means of transportation on these lands, although airplanes, public transportation vans and buses, snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles, boats, and other conveyances are important in some areas. Most of this support is provided through the Tribal Transportation Program (TTP) that is jointly administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in the Department of the Interior (DOI). This report discusses the TTP and other highway programs relevant to the tribes, such as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA's) State Highway Safety Program. The Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act ( P.L. 114-94 ), enacted in 2015, reauthorized the TTP and NHTSA's safety programs from FY2016 through FY2020. There are also other types of Indian lands, including state-authorized Indian reservations. The FAST Act did not authorize funding for the THPP. Indian tribes also receive funding from NHTSA's State Highway Safety Program, commonly referred to as Section 402 safety grants. Policy Issues
Funding
Because of the generally poor condition of highways on Indian lands and the problem with highway safety, there have been proposals for large increases in funding for programs that directly fund the construction and maintenance of highways on Indian lands. The FAST Act requires two studies by the Secretary of Transportation pertaining to highway safety on tribal lands: one on the quality of transportation safety data collected on tribal lands and the other on identifying and evaluating "options for improving safety on public roads on Indian reservations" (§1117 (c)(1)). FHWA and BIA have different requirements for projects that involve similar right-of-way circumstances, and a tribe needs approval from BIA on BIA-owned or trust land even if the tribe has an agreement with FHWA. In certain situations, BIA will require a more resource-intensive environmental assessment when FHWA will process the request as a less resource-intensive categorical exclusion. A legislative option would be to require BIA to apply DOT regulations when implementing NEPA. There have also been calls for the authorization of $10 million per year from the Highway Trust Fund for BIA to develop a comprehensive computerized national database of rights-of-way. | Cars and trucks are the primary means of transportation on Indian lands, mostly rural areas that cover about 56 million acres. There are about 145,000 miles of roads, owned variously by tribal, federal, state, and local governments, which provide access to and within these areas. Although comprehensive data are not available, roads on Indian lands are typically rudimentary and in poor condition.
A large share of federal funding for highways on Indian lands is provided through the Tribal Transportation Program (TTP), which is jointly administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in the Department of the Interior (DOI). The TTP was authorized at an average of $465 million per year from FY2016 through FY2020 as part of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act (P.L. 114-94).
Other programs that provide funding for highways and highway safety on Indian reservations include BIA's Road Maintenance Program and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA's) State Highway Safety Program (§402 safety grants). Indian tribes may also receive federal aid for projects from funding apportioned to a state department of transportation. Moreover, tribes have had some success competing for discretionary funding. For example, Indian tribes have received discretionary Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) grants from DOT.
Tribal advocates, citing the poor and unsafe condition of tribal roads, argue for a much larger tribal transportation program and more funds for highway safety programs. The FAST Act provided modest increases in funding in nominal dollars. The FAST Act also requires two safety-related reports, one on the quality of transportation safety data collected on tribal lands and the other to provide options for improving highway safety on Indian reservations.
DOT and BIA have different requirements for projects that involve similar right-of-way circumstances, and a tribe needs to have approval from BIA on BIA-owned or trust land even if the tribe has an agreement with FHWA. In certain situations, BIA will require a more resource-intensive environmental assessment when DOT will process the request as a less resource-intensive categorical exclusion. A legislative option would be to require BIA to apply DOT regulations when implementing the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Others have suggested improving the documentation of rights-of-way on Indian reservations. |
crs_RL34459 | crs_RL34459_0 | It established a new requirement, effective in FY2004, for FDA to collect fees from sponsors of brand-name animal drugs in order to reduce the backlog of reviews for those products, decrease the time required for future reviews, and improve the predictability of the review process. Animal drug user fee authority sunsets October 1, 2008. If the program were not reauthorized by then, FDA would have been prohibited at that time from collecting user fees, and would have to lay off animal drug review staff. On July 8, 2008, bills were introduced in the House to reauthorize ADUFA ( H.R. Both bills were forwarded without amendment to the full committee by the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health the following day, and were marked up by the full committee on July 16, 2008. 6432 , as amended, under suspension. The engrossed bill incorporated an amended version of H.R. On August 1, 2008, the Senate took up the House-passed measure and passed it by unanimous consent. Reauthorization of the existing user fee program was supported by animal drug research and development companies, livestock producers, and the American Veterinary Medical Association. Because a sunset of program authority would have been highly disruptive to the animal drug review process, many supporters felt that ADUFA reauthorization was "must pass" legislation in the 110 th Congress. A coalition of consumer groups opposed the user fee program and its reauthorization, however, citing concerns about the safety of animal drugs approved for livestock production. This report discusses aspects of ADUFA I, including funding and program performance; FDA's proposed changes for ADUFA II; FDA's proposal for a new generic animal drug user fee program; congressional activity; and relevant issues. Appendix A provides a summary of ADUFA I. Appendix B describes the FDA process for approval of animal drugs. This report will be updated to incorporate legislative actions and other events as they unfold. Overview of ADUFA I
Legislative History
The Animal Drug User Fee Act of 2003 (ADUFA I, P.L. The bills that were ultimately enacted in the 108 th Congress were H.R. FDA Proposal for Generic Animal Drug User Fees
Though ADUFA I required FDA to take steps to ensure that the user fee program did not compromise the timeliness of generic animal drug reviews, FDA has had difficulty keeping up with these reviews, and has not generally met the statutory requirement to act on ANADAs within 180 days. Both bills were forwarded without amendment to the full committee by the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health on July 9, and marked up and passed by the full committee on July 16. 6432 (ADUFA reauthorization) as reported, and H.R. 6433 (AGDUFA), as reported. 6433 , the Animal Generic Drug User Fee Act of 2008, as introduced, would establish a new animal generic drug user fee program, largely in line with FDA's proposal. On July 30, 2008, the House passed an amended version of H.R. The measure has been sent to the President, who is expected to sign it. | The Animal Drug User Fee Act of 2003 (ADUFA I, P.L. 108-130) gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) initial authority to collect user fees from sponsors for the review of animal drug applications. ADUFA mirrors fee programs for human drugs and medical devices. Program authority sunsets October 1, 2008, and FDA would have to lay off staff in its review program if the program were not reauthorized by then. ADUFA supporters—including companies that make brand-name animal drugs, and livestock producer groups—considered ADUFA reauthorization to be "must pass" legislation in the 110th Congress. A coalition of consumer groups opposed the program and its reauthorization, citing, in particular, concerns about the safety of animal drugs used in livestock production.
After negotiations with brand-name animal drug companies, FDA made several proposals for the reauthorization of ADUFA (ADUFA II), including a near-doubling of the total amount of fees to be collected in the future. The proposed increase would support continued enhancements of FDA's review program, further improvements in the timeliness of reviews, and the elimination of a backlog of pre-approval inspections of foreign manufacturing facilities. FDA presented draft reauthorizing legislation to Congress in April 2008. H.R. 6432, the Animal Drug User Fee Amendments of 2008, a bill to reauthorize the program, was introduced on July 8, 2008. Subsequently, the bill was forwarded without amendment to the full committee by the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health, and was marked up by the full committee on July 16, 2008.
ADUFA does not cover generic animal drugs. FDA has not been able to maintain the statutory requirement for timeliness of generic animal drug reviews since ADUFA was enacted. FDA presented a draft Animal Generic Drug User Fee Act (AGDUFA) to Congress in April 2008, separate from the ADUFA II draft bill. H.R. 6433, the Animal Generic Drug User Fee Act of 2008, was introduced on July 8, 2008. Subsequently, the bill was forwarded without amendment to the full committee by the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health, and was marked up by the full committee on July 16, 2008.
On July 30, 2008, the House passed H.R. 6432, as amended, under suspension. The engrossed (House-passed) bill incorporated an amended version of H.R. 6432 (ADUFA reauthorization), as reported, and H.R. 6433 (AGDUFA), as reported, without amendment. On August 1, 2008, the Senate took up the House-passed measure and passed it by unanimous consent. The measure has been sent to the President, who is expected to sign it.
This report discusses aspects of ADUFA I, including funding and program performance; FDA's ADUFA II and AGDUFA proposals; congressional activity; and relevant issues. Appendix A provides a summary of ADUFA I. Appendix B describes the FDA process for approval of animal drugs. This report will be updated to incorporate legislative actions and other events as they unfold. |
crs_R44106 | crs_R44106_0 | On July 31, 2014, President Obama issued Executive Order 13673, Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces, with the stated intent of "increas[ing] efficiency and cost savings in the work performed by parties who contract with the Federal Government by ensuring that they understand and comply with labor laws." The order requires that executive branch procurement contractors disclose information about their compliance with 14 specified federal labor laws and their state equivalents as part of the award process. It also requires that agency contracting officers take these disclosures into consideration when assessing whether prospective vendors have a "satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics" as part of the responsibility determination process. Agencies generally cannot award a procurement contract without determining that the prospective vendor is "affirmatively responsible" for purposes of the contract. In addition, the order imposes certain requirements intended to promote "paycheck transparency" for contractor employees and limit mandatory arbitration of employee claims. Then, on May 28, 2015, DOL issued proposed guidance regarding the specific labor law violations to be considered when assessing vendors' responsibility, and the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR Council) proposed amendments to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to implement Executive Order 13673. Executive Order 13673 and its proposed implementing guidance and regulations have prompted debate about both the specific labor and employment policies they seek to promote, as well as the general practice of using the federal procurement process to further social and economic objectives that some have described as "only indirectly related to conventional procurement considerations." In particular, there have been questions about the President's authority to impose the requirements of Executive Order 13673; how the requirements of the order compare to preexisting law; and whether the order will result in blacklisting or the de facto debarment of government contractors. The term blacklisting is sometimes used to describe a practice of formally or informally identifying—sometimes through the compilation of lists—disfavored vendors with whom the government will not do business. The term de facto debarment describes the effective exclusion of vendors from the procurement process without the procedural protections afforded to them in formal debarment and suspension proceedings. Depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, both blacklisting and de facto debarment could, if they occur, be found to have deprived contractors of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This report provides the answers to these and other questions about Executive Order 13673 and its proposed implementing guidance and regulations. The questions and answers are organized into three sections. The first provides an overview of the executive order and related materials; the second discusses the order's relationship to existing law; and the third addresses other questions, including the President's authority to issue the order. In considering these questions and answers, note that certain DOL guidance and the proposed FAR amendments have not been finalized, and the order is not scheduled to be implemented until 2016, at the earliest. Overview of the Order and Related Materials
The questions and answers in this section provide an overview of Executive Order 13673 and related guidance and regulations, including (1) the basic requirements of the order; (2) the 14 federal labor laws to be considered in assessing vendors' responsibility; (3) what state laws are to be seen as equivalent to the specified federal laws; and (4) the responsibilities of the labor compliance advisors whom the order requires to be appointed within procuring agencies. | On July 31, 2014, President Obama issued Executive Order 13673, Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces, with the stated intent of "increas[ing] efficiency and cost savings in the work performed by parties who contract with the Federal Government by ensuring that they understand and comply with labor laws." The order requires that executive branch procurement contractors disclose information about their compliance with 14 specified federal labor laws and their state equivalents as part of the award process. It also requires that agency contracting officers take these disclosures into consideration when assessing whether prospective vendors have a "satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics" as part of the responsibility determination process. Agencies generally cannot award a procurement contract without determining that the prospective vendor is "affirmatively responsible" for purposes of the contract. In addition, the order imposes certain requirements intended to promote "paycheck transparency" for contractor employees and limit mandatory arbitration of employee claims.
Subsequently, on March 6, 2015, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued guidance regarding the roles and responsibilities of the labor compliance advisors whom the order requires to be appointed within procuring agencies. Then, on May 28, 2015, DOL issued proposed guidance regarding the specific labor law violations to be considered when assessing vendors' responsibility, and the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR Council) proposed amendments to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to implement Executive Order 13673.
Executive Order 13673 and its proposed implementing guidance and regulations have prompted debate about both the specific labor and employment policies they seek to promote, as well as the general practice of using the federal procurement process to further social and economic objectives that some have described as "only indirectly related to conventional procurement considerations." In particular, there have been questions about the President's authority to impose the requirements of Executive Order 13673; how the requirements of the order compare to preexisting law; and whether the order will result in blacklisting or the de facto debarment of government contractors. The term blacklisting is sometimes used to describe a practice of formally or informally identifying—sometimes through the compilation of lists—disfavored vendors with whom the government will not do business. The term de facto debarment describes the effective exclusion of vendors from the procurement process without the procedural protections afforded to them in formal debarment and suspension proceedings. Depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, both blacklisting and de facto debarment could, if they occur, be found to have deprived contractors of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
This report provides the answers to these and other questions about Executive Order 13673 and its proposed implementing guidance and regulations. The questions and answers are organized into three sections. The first section provides an overview of the executive order and related materials; the second discusses the order's relationship to existing law; and the third addresses other questions, including the President's authority to issue the order. In considering these questions and answers, note that certain DOL guidance and the proposed FAR amendments implementing Executive Order 13673 have not been finalized, and the order is not scheduled to be implemented until 2016, at the earliest. |
crs_RS22019 | crs_RS22019_0 | Description of Tax Treatment
Several types of investments are preferentially treated under the individual income tax, including Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), pensions, capital gains, dividends, owner occupied housing, and life insurance policy earnings. IRAs resulted in a loss of $18.5 billion. There are other savings and investments that receive favorable treatment under the individual income tax. Dividends are also now eligible for lower tax rates. These tax benefits are significant as well. There has been considerable debate among economists about the effect of IRAs on savings. Although the dollar contribution ceilings and income limits on IRAs keep the provision from providing benefits to very high income individuals, IRAs do generally benefit well-off individuals who are more likely to save. | Several types of savings are eligible for beneficial treatment under the individual income tax, and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) have received considerable attention. Pension savings are actually more important in terms of revenue loss. There are other investments that are treated favorably as well. The President has proposed in a succession of budgets to significantly expand IRAs. Effects of these provisions on savings are uncertain, and, despite dollar limits on contributions and income phase outs, IRAs tend to benefit higher income individuals. |
crs_R40917 | crs_R40917_0 | Also known as "stockpiling," "layering," "life-cycle management," or "line extension," evergreening generally consists of obtaining multiple patents that cover different aspects of the same product. Critics of evergreening assert that the ability to obtain multiple patents on a product, over a period of many years, effectively extends the term of exclusivity that the patent holder obtains. They further assert that this practice is abusive, impedes the introduction of generic medications, and has a negative effect upon public health in the United States. Other observers believe that the term "evergreening" is perjorative and misdescribes long-standing intellectual property policy that allows innovators to obtain patents on improvement inventions. Although the phenomenon of evergreeening may be most visible in the pharmaceutical industry, it is not necessarily limited to that industry. Continuation Application Practice
Some observers believe that the practice of patent evergreening is promoted by the availability of "continuation applications." The Hatch-Waxman Act
To the extent discussion over patent evergreening focuses upon the pharmaceutical industry, legislation commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act bears mention. Legislative amendments introduced in 2003 may have mitigated this effect, however. The brand-name drug company may then commence litigation against the generic firm. Other experts believe that the patent system appropriately allows for patents to issue on improvement technologies. They explain that the patent laws promote both original and improvement inventions, that most technological advance occurs incrementally, that improvements may be developed by competitors of the original innovator, that many improvement patents cover advances that are of considerable medical significance, and that patents on improvements may not impede the ability of competitors to market products that were covered by expired patents on original technologies. Observers also note that the developer of the "original" product is not always the same entity as the developer of "improvement" technologies. The ability of any innovator to obtain a patent is said to encourage competition among different firms, both in innovation and in the marketplace. Should Congress choose to address the issue of evergreening, however, a number of options exist. The USPTO recently promulgated controversial rules that would have limited the availability of continuation applications. Second, no provision of the U.S. Patent Act is specifically directed towards evergreening issues. More generalized reform of the patent system presents a third possibility for dealing with concerns over evergreening. Current bills before the 111 th Congress would potentially introduce a broad range of reforms in an effort to improve the patent system, and would perhaps respond to criticisms of evergreening practices. | "Patent evergreening" is a potentially perjorative term that generally refers to the strategy of obtaining multiple patents that cover different aspects of the same product, typically by obtaining patents on improved versions of existing products. Although the patent system allows improvement patents to be obtained in any industry, evergreening is said to be most common in the pharmaceutical industry.
Some observers believe that the availability of so-called continuation applications at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) may promote evergreening practices. USPTO regulations that would have restricted the availability of continuation applications have been struck down by the courts on the grounds that the regulations exceeded the agency's statutory authority to promulgate. Others believe that the Hatch-Waxman Act, specialized legislation that governs the resolution of patent disputes between brand-name and generic drug companies, may also encourage evergreening in the pharmaceutical industry. However, 2003 amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act may have mitigated some of these concerns.
Critics of evergreening assert that the ability to obtain multiple patents on a product, over a period of many years, effectively extends the term of exclusivity that the patent holder obtains. They further assert that this practice is abusive, impedes the introduction of generic medications, and has a negative effect upon public health in the United States.
Other observers believe that the term "evergreening" is itself inappropriate. In their view, sound intellectual property policy allows innovators to obtain patents on improvement inventions. Most technological advance occurs incrementally, they observe, and many improvement patents cover advances that are of considerable practical significance to patients and other consumers. In addition, patents on improvements may not impede the ability of competitors to market products that were covered by expired patents on original technologies. Finally, the developer of the "original" product is not always the same entity as the developer of "improvement" technologies. The ability of any innovator to obtain a patent upon an improvement invention is said to promote competition.
Should Congress conclude that the current situation is satisfactory, then no action need be taken. If Congress wishes to intervene, however, a number of options present themselves. Congress may wish to consider the regulation of continuation applications or the introduction of statutory provisions that more directly address the perceived problem of evergreening. In addition, more generalized reform of the patent system may address concerns over evergreening. Current bills before the 111th Congress would potentially introduce a broad range of reforms in an effort to improve the patent system, and would perhaps respond to criticisms of evergreening practices. |
crs_RL30541 | crs_RL30541_0 | As of FY2000, more is being provided to the military. Plan Colombia Proposals and Legislation
The Clinton Administration's "Plan Colombia" Proposal
As presented to the 106th Congress, initially on January 11, 2000, and then with the annual budget request on February 7, 2000, the Clinton Administration aidproposal to support the Colombian government's "Plan Colombia" contained over $954 million in supplementalFY2000 funding and over $318 million forFY2001 spending. (This was in addition to about $150 million allocated and planned for existing programs in eachfiscal year.) Thecore of the Southern Colombia programincluded training and equipping two new army CN battalions, and purchasing Blackhawk and Huey helicopters totransport them. The remaining proposedassistance, to be administered by six agencies, was divided into five other categories: (1) drug traffickinginterdiction, (2) improving CNP eradication capabilities,(3) economic development, (4) "boosting government capacity," i.e., funding to support human rights monitors andimprove the justice system and the rule of law;and (5) other economic assistance and assistance for the peace process. According to Administration sources, the Push into Southern Colombia program was the first part of a planned six-year counternarcotics effort. On March 9, 2000, the House Appropriations Committee approved an emergency supplementalappropriations act ( H.R. 106-521 ), that included some $1.418 billion infunding for FY2000 and FY2001counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, its neighbors, and other parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. On May 9, the Senate Appropriations Committee included Plan Colombia funding in itsversions of the FY2001 Military Construction ( S. 2521 , S.Rept. The Senate appropriations committee version of the Foreign Operations bill placed extensive conditions on funding. Senate Action on S. 2522. 4425, P.L. 106-246
Some $1.289 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations was included for Plan Colombia in the conference version of H.R. 4425 ( H.Rept.106-710 , filed June 29,) Military Construction appropriations for FY2001. On the most controversial issues or disparate points, the conference report:
Provided a total of $294.0 million for helicopter procurement and sustainment for the Army counternarcotics battalions and police, comparedto the Administration request and House action of $388.0 million and the Senate action of $118.5;
Fully funded House and Senate increases in funding for human rights in Colombia, but cuts funding for other governanceaccounts;
Contained the Senate's human rights conditionality on funding, but also provides a national security waiver; and
Earmarked in regional funding $110 million for Bolivia, of which at least $85.0 million is to be used for alternative development, and $20million for Ecuador, of which at least $8.0 million is to be used for regional development but provides no earmarkedfunding for Peru, unlike the House andSenate bills. The Presidentcan waive this condition on national interest grounds. In January 2001, the Clinton Administration determined that a second certification was not required. The President waived this requirement in his August 22 action on Plan Colombia. ( H.Rept. Regional Counternarcotics Strategy. counternarcotics assistance for Colombia and neighboring countries. Two others were due February 1, 2001 . 4811 , signed into law November 16, 2000). TRAINING AND OTHER PROGRAMS. The Bush Administration's Andean Initiatives
On April 9, 2001, the Bush Administration requested $731 million in FY2002 funding for a broader regionalstrategy called the Andean Counterdrug Initiative(ACI) that would include funding from the International Narcotics Control account (INC) for not only Colombia,but also Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru,and Venezuela. Hearing on Colombia Supplemental Request. Hearing on Proposed EmergencyAnti-Drug Assistance to Colombia. | On February 7, 2000, the Clinton Administration, as part of its annual budget request, asked Congress for FY2000 supplemental appropriations of $954 millionfor assistance to Colombia and other Andean counternarcotics efforts. FY2000 allocated funding for Colombia,from appropriations made in 1999, already totalssome $164.0 million. At the same time, the Administration requested $318 million for FY2001 assistance toColombia and other regional efforts, in addition tothe $150 million that it previously indicated it had planned to allocate to Colombia in FY2001.
The Clinton Administration's "Plan Colombia" program, as it became known, was intended to substantially increase the assistance provided to Colombia. Theproposal's centerpiece was funding for the "Push into Southern Colombia" program, which would include trainingand equipping two new army CN battalions,and providing funding to purchase new and sustain existing Blackhawk and Huey helicopters to transport them.Other assistance was included for interdiction,resettlement of displaced persons, economic development, and programs to improve Colombian National Police(CNP) eradication capabilities and to supporthuman rights monitors, improve the justice system and strengthen the rule of law.
The 106th Congress commenced action on the request on March 9, 2000, when the House Appropriations Committee approved an emergency supplementalappropriations bill ( H.R. 3908 , H.Rept. 106-521 ) that included some $1.4 billion in funding for FY2000 andFY2001 counternarcotics efforts inColombia, its neighbors, and other parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. On March 30, the House approvedthat amount, placing conditions on the militaryassistance. On May 9, the Senate Appropriations Committee included $1.1 billion in FY2000 emergencysupplemental Plan Colombia funding in its FY2001Military Construction ( S. 2521 ) and Foreign Operations ( S. 2522 ) bills, placing extensive conditionson the assistance in both bills. These three measures were dealt with in the conference on the military construction appropriations bill ( H.R. 4425 , H.Rept. 106-710 ) with some $1.3billion in emergency supplemental appropriations for Plan Colombia. As approved and signed into law ( P.L.106-246 ) on July 13, the bill included five humanrights and two other conditions on aid to Colombia. Certification that these conditions had been met was required before the obligation of FY2000 and FY2001funds, but the President could waive them on national security grounds. President Clinton waived six of the sevencertification criteria on August 22, 2000, andhe determined a second certification was not required on January 19, 2001, but submitted a report on progressregarding certification criteria.
On April 9, 2001, the Bush Administration requested $731 million in FY2002 funding for a broader regional strategy called the Andean Counterdrug Initiativethat would include funding from the International Narcotics Control account (INC) for not only Colombia, but alsoBolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, andVenezuela. In later references, the Bush Administration included other funding for those countries in a AndeanRegional Initiative. As a result, total funding forthe regional initiative, including the ACI, now stands at some $882.29 million. |
crs_RL32821 | crs_RL32821_0 | Introduction
The appointment of the Chief Justice of the United States is an infrequent event of majorsignificance in American politics. The appointment of each Justice to the Supreme Court issignificant because of the enormous judicial power that the Court exercises as the highest appellatecourt in the federal judiciary. The Chief Justice, like each of the Court's other eight Justices, castsone vote when the Court rules on cases. Chief Justice appointments occur infrequently, with only 16 individuals having served in thatposition since 1789 -- an average tenure of 13½ years per Chief Justice. Under any circumstances, it will command the attention of Congress,especially the Senate, which votes on whether to confirm judicial nominations. Even more attentionis expected in the current political environment, in light of the controversy that has recentlysurrounded the judicial appointment process and the importance that the President and Senators ofboth parties have attached to upcoming Supreme Court appointments. In thiscapacity, the Chief Justice:
presides at the private conference during which the Court decides which lowercourt decisions to accept from the large number received on appeal;
presides over the public sessions, or hearings of cases, that come before theCourt;
chairs the private conference at which cases are discussed among the ninemembers of the Court and eventually decided by a vote of the Justices; and
assigns, when in the majority, the writing of the Court's opinion on the caseeither to himself or to one of the Associate Justices. The Chief Justice, too, is the head of the federal judicial branch of government. The modern-day process for appointing a Chief Justice is the same as that for appointing AssociateJustices to the Court. A Chief Justice appointment may be made only when there is, or isscheduled to be, a vacancy in the position of Chief Justice; the President may not use the occasionof an Associate Justice vacancy to appoint someone to replace a sitting Chief Justice. Then the committee votes onwhether to report the nomination to the Senate and, if so, whether to report it favorably, unfavorably,or without recommendation. A vacancy could occur, as well, upon the expiration of the term of a Justice whoreceived a recess appointment from the President. President's Selection of a Nominee
Criteria for Selecting a Nominee. The precisecriteria used in selecting a Supreme Court nominee will vary from President to President. (76)
The Role of Senate Advice. Historically,Presidents have varied in the degree to which they have sought or used advice from Senators inselecting Supreme Court nominees. (85)
Selecting from Within or Outside the Court. Some Senators, however, also will be concerned with the nominee's judicialphilosophy or views on constitutional issues and how, in their view, the appointment might affectthe Court's future direction on major legal and constitutional questions. Nominees for Chief Justice of the United States, 1789 to the Present: Dates of Nomination, FinalAction bythe Senate or President, Judicial Oath and Termination of Service, and Ages at Times of Appointment and Termination of Service
Sources : William D. Bader and Roy M. Mersky , The First One Hundred Justices, (Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 2004 ); Artemus Ward, Deciding to Leave, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003); Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States ofAmerica (various volumes); The Supreme Court of the United States (an undated pamphlet published by the United States Supreme Court); and MaevaMarcus and James R. Perry, editors, The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800 (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1985). | The lifetime appointment of the Chief Justice of the United States is an event of majorsignificance in American politics because of the enormous power that the Supreme Court exercisesas the highest appellate court in the federal judiciary. The Chief Justice, like each of the Court'sother eight Justices, casts one vote when the Court rules on cases. However, the Chief Justice is also"first among equals" and exercises a unique leadership role as the presiding officer of the Court, asthe manager of the Court's overall operations, and as head of the federal judicial branch ofgovernment. There is no formal list of qualifications for the job; the Constitution's only mention ofthe Chief Justice is as presiding officer of the Senate during an impeachment trial of the President. Chief Justice appointments occur infrequently, with only 16 individuals having served in thatposition since 1789 -- an average tenure of 13½ years per Chief Justice.
The process for appointing a Chief Justice is the same as for appointing Associate Justicesand typically involves a sharing of responsibilities between the President, who nominates theJustices, and the Senate, which provides "advice and consent." (Exceptions to this have been rareinstances when the President has made temporary "recess appointments" to the Court, which do notrequire the Senate's approval.) Vacancies on the Court can occur as a result of death, retirement, orresignation of a Justice. Chief Justice nominees may be selected from the ranks of sitting AssociateJustices (as three of the 16 Chief Justices were) or from outside the Court, with each approach, fromthe perspective of the President, having certain advantages and disadvantages. The criteria thatPresidents use in selecting a Supreme Court nominee vary, but typically involve policy and politicalconsiderations as well as a desire to select a person with outstanding professional qualifications andunquestioned integrity. Leadership qualities may also be important when the Chief Justice positionis involved. Presidents have also varied in the degree to which they have sought or used advice fromSenators in selecting Supreme Court nominees.
As part of Senate consideration, the Judiciary Committee holds hearings on the nominee andvotes on whether to report the nomination favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation. Regardless of the outcome of that vote, the reporting of a Supreme Court nomination sends it to thefull Senate for debate and a vote. Like the President, Senators may evaluate the nominee by suchstandards as professional excellence, integrity, and leadership qualities, but may also (again, as thePresident is free to do) focus on the nominee's judicial philosophy, views on constitutional issues,or how they believe the appointment might affect the Court's future direction on major legal andconstitutional issues.
Under any circumstances, the appointment of a new Chief Justice will command the attentionof Congress, especially the Senate, which votes on whether to confirm judicial nominations. Evenmore attention could be expected concerning such an event in the current political environment, inlight of the controversy that has recently surrounded the judicial appointment process and theimportance the President and Senators of both parties have attached to upcoming Supreme Courtappointments. |
crs_R41416 | crs_R41416_0 | Executive Summary
This report analyzes homegrown violent jihadist plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. It discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It examines post-9/11 law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorists: The Problem
"Homegrown" is the term that describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, lawful permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term "violent jihadist" describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate—a jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph—via violent means. In Appendix A that follows, details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist plots and attacks are provided in reverse chronological order. | This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. For this report, "homegrown" describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, lawful permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term "jihadist" describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term "violent jihadist" characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity.
The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. Appendix A provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks.
There is an "executive summary" at the beginning that summarizes the report's findings. |
crs_R41878 | crs_R41878_0 | The trafficking of individuals within U.S borders is commonly referred to as domestic human trafficking, and it occurs in every state in the nation. Of those individuals who are victims of sex trafficking, research indicates that most victims coming into and within the United States are women and children, and the victims include U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike. Congress has focused recent attention on domestic sex trafficking of children, which includes commercial sex acts involving children under the age of 18. 113-4 ), has been the primary legislative vehicle authorizing services to victims of trafficking. U.S. citizen victims may be eligible for certain crime victim benefits and public benefit entitlement programs, though these services are not tailored to trafficking victims. Another issue Congress may consider is the lack of specialized support for minor victims of sex trafficking in the United States. Other facilities, such as runaway and homeless youth shelters as well as foster care homes, do not appear to be adequate for meeting the needs of victims or keeping them secure from pimps/traffickers and other abusers. Conceptualizing Sex Trafficking of Children
Federal law does not define sex trafficking per se. However, the term "severe forms of trafficking in persons," as defined in the TVPA, includes sex trafficking. "Severe forms of trafficking in persons" refers to
(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or
(B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. Sex Trafficking of Children: Vulnerable Populations
As mentioned, the exact number of children who are victims of sex trafficking does not exist because comprehensive research is lacking. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, P.L. The majority of programs appear to be able to address the trafficking of U.S. citizen, LPR, and noncitizen victims alike. In addition, the act also created a new grant program to be administered jointly by the Secretary of HHS and the Attorney General to provide services to U.S. citizen victims of severe forms of trafficking. It has been suggested that victims of child sexual exploitation—even though these children are too young to consent to sexual activity with adults—may at times be labeled as child prostitutes or juvenile delinquents and treated as criminals rather than being labeled and treated as victims. These children who are arrested may then be placed in juvenile detention facilities with juveniles who have committed serious crimes instead of in environments where they can receive needed social and protective services. In addition, the Attorney General is required to promulgate a model state trafficking statute; the most recent TVPA reauthorization in 2013 updated this requirement to note that this model statute should include the following safe harbor provisions:
(A) treat an individual under 18 years of age who has been arrested for engaging in, or attempting to engage in, a sexual act with another person in exchange for monetary compensation as a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons;
(B) prohibit the charging or prosecution of an individual described in subparagraph (A) for a prostitution offense;
(C) require the referral of an individual described in subparagraph (A) to appropriate service providers, including comprehensive service or community-based programs that provide assistance to child victims of commercial sexual exploitation; and
(D) provide that an individual described in subparagraph (A) shall not be required to prove fraud, force, or coercion in order to receive the protections described under this paragraph;
A number of states have started adopting specialized courts that would help divert at-risk youth (particularly girls at risk of prostitution) from the justice system and instead provide them with specialized services. Reducing Demand for Minor Sex Trafficking in the United States
It is widely agreed upon that any efforts to reduce the prevalence of child sex trafficking—as well as other forms of trafficking—must include efforts to reduce not only the supply, but also the demand . Experts have also provided recommendations for demand reduction strategies that involve increasing public awareness and prevention as well as bolstering investigations and prosecutions of those buying illegal commercial sex. | The trafficking of individuals within U.S borders is commonly referred to as domestic human trafficking, and it occurs in every state of the nation. One form of domestic human trafficking is sex trafficking. Research indicates that most victims of sex trafficking into and within the United States are women and children, and the victims include U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike. Recently, Congress has focused attention on domestic sex trafficking, including the prostitution of children, which is the focus of this report.
Federal law does not define sex trafficking per se. However, the term "severe forms of trafficking in persons," as defined in the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, P.L. 106-386) encompasses sex trafficking. "Severe forms of trafficking in persons" refers, in part, to "[s]ex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age.... " Experts generally agree that the trafficking term applies to minors whether the child's actions were forced or appear to be voluntary.
The exact number of child victims of sex trafficking in the United States is unknown because comprehensive research and scientific data are lacking. Sex trafficking of children appears to be fueled by a variety of environmental and situational variables ranging from poverty or the use of prostitution by runaway and "thrown-away" children to provide for their subsistence needs to the recruitment of children by organized crime units for prostitution.
The TVPA has been the primary vehicle authorizing services to victims of trafficking. Several agencies have programs or administer grants to other entities to provide specific services to trafficking victims. Despite language that authorizes services for citizen, lawful permanent resident, and noncitizen victims, appropriations for trafficking victims' services have primarily been used to serve noncitizen victims. U.S. citizen victims are also eligible for certain crime victim benefits and public benefit entitlement programs, though these services are not tailored to trafficking victims. Of note, specialized services and support for minor victims of sex trafficking are limited. Organizations specializing in support for these victims may have fewer beds than might be needed to serve all victims. Other facilities, such as runaway and homeless youth shelters and foster care homes, may not be able to adequately meet the needs of victims or keep them from pimps/traffickers and other abusers.
In addition, it has been suggested that minor victims of sex trafficking—while too young to consent to sexual activity with adults—may at times be labeled as prostitutes or juvenile delinquents and treated as criminals rather than being identified and treated as trafficking victims. These children who are arrested may be placed in juvenile detention facilities instead of environments where they can receive needed social and protective services.
Finally, experts widely agree that any efforts to reduce the prevalence of child sex trafficking—as well as other forms of trafficking—should address not only the supply, but also the demand. Congress may consider demand reduction strategies such as increasing public awareness and prevention as well as bolstering investigations and prosecutions of those who buy illegal commercial sex ("johns"). In addition, policy makers may deliberate enhancing services for victims of trafficking. The most recent reauthorization of the TVPA, in March 2013, reauthorized some existing provisions, created a new grant program to combat child sex trafficking, and authorized appropriations through FY2017. |
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