id
stringlengths 9
18
| pid
stringlengths 11
20
| input
stringlengths 120
17k
| output
stringlengths 127
13.7k
|
|---|---|---|---|
crs_R40684 | crs_R40684_0 | On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion. In response, the UNSC on June 12 unanimously passed Res. 1874, which puts in place a series of sanctions on North Korea's arms sales, luxury goods, and financial transactions related to its weapons programs and calls upon states to inspect North Korean vessels suspected of carrying such shipments. The resolution does allow for shipments of food and nonmilitary goods. As was the case with an earlier resolution, 1718, that was passed in October 2006 after North Korea's first nuclear test, Res. 1874 seeks to curb financial benefits that go to North Korea's regime and its weapons program. This report summarizes and analyzes Resolution 1874. In summary, the economic effect of Resolution 1874 is not likely to be great unless China cooperates extensively and goes beyond the requirements of the resolution and/or the specific financial sanctions cause a ripple effect that causes financial institutions to avoid being "tainted" by handling any DPRK transaction. The resolution "authorizes" seizure of banned items. The Ban on Financial Transactions Related to North Korea's Trade in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Weapons of Mass Destruction Technology
North Korea's state trading companies are key vehicles for transferring WMD and WMD technology to other countries and for transmitting the foreign exchange earnings back to Pyongyang. Governments will have to interpret the financial sanctions ban of the resolution liberally in order to apply sanctions to the bank accounts of the trading corporations. This will be dependent on a number of countries cooperating with the United States, particularly in applying the resolution's provision for searching North Korean ships in their ports and denying provisions of fuel and supplies to North Korean ships that refuse to be searched. Inspecting North Korea's Air Cargo
Resolution 1874 is vague in how its air cargo provisions are to be implemented, in contrast to the specific procedures set forth regarding inspecting sea-borne cargo. The key to inspections of North Korea's air cargo is the air traffic between North Korea and Iran. Thus, this sanction will not be enforced unless China's begins to deny North Korea these lucrative trade credits. After U.N. On the surface, therefore, financial sanctions aimed solely at the DPRK's prohibited activities are not likely to have a large monetary effect. Resolution 1874. DPRK trade in small arms and ammunition is relatively insignificant. China's Exports of Luxury Goods to the DPRK | The United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Res. 1874 on June 12, 2009, in response to North Korea's second nuclear test. The resolution puts in place a series of sanctions on North Korea's arms sales, luxury goods, and financial transactions related to its weapons programs, and calls upon states to inspect North Korean vessels suspected of carrying such shipments. The resolution does allow for shipments of food and nonmilitary goods. As was the case with an earlier U.N. resolution, 1718, that was passed in October 2006 after North Korea's first nuclear test, Resolution 1874 seeks to curb financial benefits that go to North Korea's regime and its weapons program. This report summarizes and analyzes Resolution 1874. In summary, the economic effect of Resolution 1874 is not likely to be great unless China cooperates extensively and goes beyond the requirements of the resolution and/or the specific financial sanctions cause a ripple effect that causes financial institutions to avoid being "tainted" by handling any DPRK transaction.
On the surface, sanctions aimed solely at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, the official name of North Korea) and its prohibited activities are not likely to have a large monetary effect. Governments will have to interpret the financial sanctions ban of the resolution liberally in order to apply sanctions to the bank accounts of North Korean trading corporations. A key to its success will be the extent to which China, North Korea's most important economic partner, implements the resolution. A ban on luxury goods will only be effective if China begins to deny North Korea lucrative trade credits.
Provisions for inspection of banned cargo on aircraft and sea vessels rely on the acquiescence of the shipping state. In the case of North Korean vessels, it is highly unlikely that they would submit to searches. Resolution 1874 is vague about how its air cargo provisions are to be implemented, in contrast to the specific procedures set forth regarding inspecting sea-borne cargo. While procedures are specified for sea interdictions, the authority given is ambiguous and optional. Further, DPRK trade in small arms and ammunition is relatively insignificant, and therefore the ban on those exports is unlikely to have a great impact.
Other CRS Reports may be useful in conducting research on this issue: CRS Report RL30613, North Korea: Terrorism List Removal, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33590, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by [author name scrubbed] and Mary Beth NikitinCRS Report RL32493, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33324, North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34256, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary Beth Nikitin; and CRS Report RL32097, Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation: Legal Issues for Ships and Aircraft, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44562 | crs_R44562_0 | 115-26 , P.L. 115-46 , P.L. 115-96 , and P.L. 115-182 . Table 1 provides major highlights pertaining to the Veterans Choice Program (VCP)―a new, temporary program authorized by Section 101 of the VACAA that allows eligible veterans to receive medical care in the community. Section 101 of this act established a new permanent Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP) that would replace VCP. (The MISSION Act of 2018 stipulates that VCCP must be effective when the VA determines that 75% of the amounts deposited in the Veterans Choice Fund [VCF] have been exhausted, or when regulations are published by the VA, which is no later than one year after the date of enactment of the VA MISSION Act—June 6, 2019.) This report does not discuss the new VCCP program established by Section 101 of the VA MISSION Act of 2018. Veterans may become eligible for care under the VCP through one of four different pathways:
30-d ay w ait l ist (Wait-Time Eligible) : A veteran is eligible for care through the VCP when he or she is informed, by a local VA medical facility, that an appointment cannot be scheduled within 30 days of the clinically determined date of when the veteran's provider determines that he or she needs to be seen (this category also includes care not offered at the veteran's primary VA medical facility and a referral cannot be made to another VA medical facility or federal facility), or within 30 days of the date of when the veteran wishes to be seen. 40 miles or m ore d i stance (Mileage Eligible) : A veteran is eligible for care through the VCP when he or she lives 40 miles or more from a VA medical facility that has a full-time primary care physician. 40 m iles or l ess d istance (Mileage Eligible) : A veteran is eligible for care through the VCP when he or she resides in a location, other than one in Guam, American Samoa, or the Republic of the Philippines, and travels by air, boat, or ferry in order to seek care from his or her local VA facility; or incurs a traveling burden based on environmental factors, geographic challenges, or a medical condition. State or t erritory without a f ull- s ervice VA medical f acility: A veteran is eligible for care through the VCP when his or her residence is more than 20 miles from a VA medical facility and located in either Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire (excluding veterans who live 20 miles from the White River Junction VAMC), or U.S. territory (excluding Puerto Rico). VCP Providers
Under the VCP, several entities and providers are eligible to provide care and services. These include, among others, federally qualified health centers, Department of Defense (DOD) medical facilities, Indian Health Service outpatient health facilities or facilities operated by a tribe or tribal organization, hospitals, physicians, and nonphysician practitioners or entities participating in the Medicare or Medicaid program, an Aging and Disability Resource Center, an area agency on aging, or a state agency or a center for independent living. Third-Party Administrators (TPAs)
In September 2013, the VA awarded contracts to Health Net and TriWest to expand veterans' access to non-VA health care in the communities, under the Patient-Centered Community Care (PC3) initiative. Later, in November 2014, the VA modified those contracts to include support services under the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014 (VACAA, or the Choice Act). Under the Veterans Choice Program (VCP), Health Net and TriWest manage the appointments, counseling services, card distributions, and a call center. End of Contract with Health Net
In March 2018, the VA announced that the VCP contract with Health Net would end by September 30, 2018. Low volume of patients, customer service issues, and delayed payments to community providers were potentially some of the reasons for this decision. The contract with TriWest would continue. Second, a veteran may request a VA community care consult/referral (from his or her VA provider or local VA staff) in order to receive a medical service that is also timely. For urgent VA community care consults/referrals, VA providers are to coordinate the veteran's care directly with the VA Community Care Coordination staff. For nonservice-connected conditions, veterans may also be reimbursed for their out-of-pocket expenses, including those with other health insurance plans. The VA reimburses the TPAs for the care veterans obtain through the VCP, and the TPA then reimburses the community care providers in their networks. Since 2016, the VA has processed payments to the TPA on an aggregated basis known as "bulk payments." When veterans receive care at a VA facility, they do not pay copayments at the time of their medical appointments; copayment rates are determined by the VA after services are furnished—based on if the care was for a service-connected or nonservice-connected condition. Therefore, veterans' out-of-pocket costs under the VCP are the same as if they were receiving care and services from a VA provider in a VA facility—if a veteran does not pay any copayments at VA health care facilities, the veteran will not have to pay any copayments under the VCP. 115-26 , which amended P.L. This change went into effect on April 19, 2017. The VA would coordinate with a veteran's OHI and recover any costs, and bill the veteran for any copayments that the veteran would be responsible for similar to what they would have paid had they received care within a VA medical facility (see Figure 3 ). | Authorized under Section 101 of the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014 (VACAA), the Veterans Choice Program (VCP) is a temporary program that enables eligible veterans to receive medical care in the community. Since the program was first established by VACAA, it has been amended and funded several times. More recently, P.L. 115-26 eliminated the August 7, 2017, expiration date for the VCP and allowed the program to continue until the initial $10 billion deposited in the Veterans Choice Fund (VCF) was expended. P.L. 115-46 authorized and appropriated an additional $2.1 billion to continue the VCP until funds were expended, and when these funds were also nearing their end, Division D of P.L. 115-96 appropriated an additional $2.1 billion to continue the VCP until funds were expended. Lastly, Section 510 of the VA MISSION Act (P.L. 115-182), signed into law on June 6, 2018, authorized and appropriated $5.2 billion for VCP without fiscal year limitation, and Section 143 of this same act imposed a sunset date that is one year after the date of enactment (June 6, 2018) of the VA MISSION Act (i.e., June 6, 2019). Title 101 of the VA MISSION Act also authorized a permanent program known as the Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP), which is to replace VCP when VCCP is established by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) around June 2019 (when regulations are published by the VA no later than one year after the date of enactment [June 6, 2018] of the VA MISSION Act; that is, June 6, 2019, or when the VA determines that 75% of the amounts deposited in the VCF have been exhausted).
Eligibility and Choice of Care
Veterans must be enrolled in the VA health care system to request health services under the VCP. A veteran may request a VA community care consult/referral, or his or her VA provider may submit a VA community care consult/referral to the VA Care Coordination staff within the VA.
Veterans may become eligible for the VCP in one of four ways. First, a veteran is informed by a local VA medical facility that an appointment cannot be scheduled within 30 days of the clinically determined date requested by his or her VA doctor or within 30 days of the date requested by the veteran (this category also includes care not offered at a veteran's primary VA facility and a referral cannot be made to another VA medical facility or other federal facility). Second, the veteran lives 40 miles or more from a VA medical facility that has a full-time primary care physician. Third, the veteran lives 40 miles or less (not residing in Guam, America Samoa, or the Republic of the Philippines) and either travels by air, boat, or ferry to seek care from his or her local facility or incurs a traveling burden of a medical condition, geographic challenge, or an environmental factor. Fourth, the veteran resides 20 miles or more from a VA medical facility located in Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire (excluding those who live 20 miles from the White River Junction VAMC), or a U.S. territory, with the exception of Puerto Rico.
Once found eligible for care through the VCP, veterans may choose to receive care from a VA provider or from an eligible VA community care provider (VCP provider). VCP providers are federally qualified health centers, Department of Defense (DOD) facilities, or Indian Health Service facilities, and hospitals, physicians, and nonphysician practitioners or entities participating in the Medicare or Medicaid program, among others. A veteran has the choice to switch between a VA provider and VCP provider at any time.
Program Administration and Provider Participation
The VCP was administered by two third-party administrators (TPAs): Health Net and TriWest. At the end of September 2018, the VA has announced that it would end its contract with Health Net as a TPA because of low patient volume, customer service issues, and late payments to community providers in its network. TriWest would continue to be a TPA for the areas they manage. Generally, a TPA manages veterans' appointments, counseling services, card distributions, and a call center. The TPA contracts directly with the VA. Then, the TPA contracts with eligible non-VA community care providers interested in participating in the VCP.
Payments
Generally, a veteran's out-of-pocket costs under the VCP are equal to VHA out-of-pocket costs. Veterans do not pay any copayments at the time of their medical appointments. Copayment rates are determined by the VA after services are furnished. Enactment of P.L. 115-26 on April 19, 2017, allowed VA to become the primary payer when certain veterans with other health insurance (OHI) receive care for nonservice-connected conditions under VCP—veterans would not have to pay a copayment under their OHI anymore. The VA would coordinate with a veteran's OHI and bill for any copayments that the veteran would be responsible for similar to what they would have paid had they received care within a VA medical facility. Participating community providers are reimbursed by their respective TPA, and VA pays the TPAs on an aggregated basis, known as bulk payments. |
crs_RL30507 | crs_RL30507_0 | OnOctober 18, H.R. 5483 was introduced in the House, containing the Energy and Water appropriationsprovisions included in the Senate-passedversion. On the same day the conference report to H.R. 4635 was filed, including the provisions of H.R. 5483 . The House and theSenate agreed to the conference report on October 19, and the President signed the bill October 27 ( P.L. 106-377 ). Status of Energy and Water Appropriations,FY2001
* H.R. 4733 was vetoed October 7. 4635 , funding VA/HUD, and passed that bill October 12. Overview
The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil projects of the Army Corpsof Engineers, the Department of the Interior'sBureau of Reclamation (BuRec), most of the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies,including the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). The Administration requested $22.7 billionfor these programs for FY2001, comparedwith $21.2 billion appropriated for FY2000. The final bill appropriated $18.3 billion. Corps Management Reforms. The final version of the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill deleted Section 103 of the original conference reporton H.R. 4733 . The Senate versionof H.R. Science. Nonproliferation and National Security Programs. Thenew program, part of the Administration's Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, is the result of several years ofnegotiations aimed at ending Russia's continuing production of plutonium that can be used to make nuclear weapons. Civilian Nuclear Spent Fuel Temporary Storage Options . | The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil projects of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior'sBureau of Reclamation (BuRec), most of the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies. The Administration requested $22.7 billionfor these programs for FY2001 compared with $21.2 billion appropriated in FY2000. The House bill, H.R. 4733 , passed on June 28, 2000, allocated$21.74 billion. The Senate passed its version of H.R. 4733 September 7, appropriating $22.5 billion. Theconference bill, reported September 27,appropriated a total of $23.3 billion. That bill was vetoed, largely for non-fiscal reasons, and the Senate October12 added a new version of the conference bill,with essentially the same funding but without the veto-drawing measure, to the VA/HUD appropriations measure, H.R. 4635 . On October 18, H.R. 5483 was introduced in the House, containing the Energy and Water appropriations provisions includedin the Senate-passed version. On thesame day the conference report to H.R. 4635 was filed, including the provisions of H.R. 5483 . TheHouse and the Senate agreed to theconference report on October 19, and the President signed the bill October 27 ( P.L. 106-377 ).
Key issues involving Energy and Water Development appropriations programs include:
authorization of appropriations for major water/ecosystem restoration initiatives for the Florida Everglades and California"Bay-Delta";
reform or review of Corps study procedures and agency management practices;
spending for solar and renewable energy to address global climate change issues;
a pending decision by DOE on the electrometallurgical treatment of nuclear spent fuel for storage and disposal, a process that opponentscontend raises nuclear proliferation concerns;
implementation of the new National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA);
an expanded Threat Reduction Initiative aimed at ending Russia's production of plutonium that can be used to make nuclear weapons;and
DOE management of its Spallation Neutron Source Project (SNS).
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviation: RSI = Resources, Science, and Industry. |
crs_RS22717 | crs_RS22717_0 | Background
Most private equity and hedge funds are organized as partnerships. The returns of these partnerships are generally taxed as capital gains. It is characterized as ordinary income for the general partner and is taxed at ordinary income tax rates. Character of Carried Interest
Central to the current debate concerning the tax treatment of carried interest is whether it is compensation for services, or an interest in the partnership's capital. In the United States, debate on the appropriate characterization of carried interest has been brought to the forefront by the President's 2010, 2011, and 2012 Budget Outlines, proposed legislation, and a series of congressional hearings on carried interest. 4213 and H.R. 1935 in the 111 th Congress) would make carried interest taxable as ordinary income, whereas a House-passed amendment in the 111 th Congress to H.R. 4213 , the American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, would have treated a portion of carried interest as ordinary income. The former approach may mirror that taken in the 110 th Congress, H.R. 2834 , H.R. 3996 , and H.R. 6275 , in making carried interest taxable as ordinary income. H.R. Under this view, the limited partners agree to finance the carried interest through a reduction (relative to their capital investment) in their rights to the profits of the partnership. | General partners in most private equity and hedge funds are compensated in two ways. First, to the extent that they contribute their capital in the funds, they share in the appreciation of the assets. Second, they charge the limited partners two kinds of annual fees: a percentage of total fund assets (usually in the 1% to 2% range), and a percentage of the fund's earnings (usually 15% to 25%, once specified benchmarks are met). The latter performance fee is called "carried interest" and is treated, or characterized, as capital gains under current tax rules. In the 112th Congress, the President's Budget Proposal would make carried interest taxable as ordinary income. In the 111th Congress, the House-passed American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, H.R. 4213, would have treated a portion of carried interest as ordinary income, whereas the Tax Extenders Act of 2009, H.R. 4213, H.R. 1935, and the President's 2010 and 2011 Budget Proposals would have made carried interest taxable as ordinary income. In addition, in the 110th Congress, H.R. 6275 would have made carried interest taxable as ordinary income. Other legislation (H.R. 2834 and H.R. 3996) made similar proposals. This report provides background on the issues related to the debate concerning the characterization of carried interest. It will be updated as legislative developments warrant. |
crs_RS21234 | crs_RS21234_0 | RS21234 -- The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust: Background and Current Issues
Updated April 17, 2003
The Emerson Trust
The Africa Seeds of Hope Act of 1998 amended Title III of the Agricultural Act of 1980 by replacing the Food Security Commodity Reserve (FSCR) and itspredecessor, the Food Security Wheat Reserve (FSWR), with the Bill Emerson Trust. (1)
The purpose of the Trust is "solely to meet emergency humanitarianfood needs in developing countries..."(Section 302, 7 U.S.C. The legislation authorizes the Trust to holdup to 4 million metric tons of wheat, corn,sorghum and rice. Taking into account previously unreplenished releases from the Trust and 4 recent releases ofcommodities for use in Africa and Iraq,approximately 1.1 million metric tons of wheat remain in the Trust. 480 foreign food aid programs. A commodity in the Trust may be exchanged for another U.S. commodity ofequal value. 480 funds. The Act allowed wheat from thereserve to be used in the P.L. 480 commitments when supplies were short and threetimes to meet unanticipated emergency needs. Experience with Reimbursement and Replenishment. The 1996 release also was not replenished. With respect to releases from the Trust in FY2002 and FY2003, the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003 ( P.L. | The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust is becoming a critical component of the U.S.response to humanitarian foodemergencies in Africa, Iraq, and elsewhere. The Trust, as presently constituted, was enacted in the 1998 AfricaSeeds of Hope Act (P.L. 105-385). It replacedthe Food Security Commodity Reserve established in 1996 and its predecessor the Food Security Wheat Reserveof 1980. The Trust is a reserve of up to 4million metric tons of wheat, corn, sorghum and rice that can be used to help fulfill P.L. 480 food aid commitmentsto developing countries under twoconditions: (1) to meet unanticipated emergency needs in developing countries, or (2) when U.S. domestic suppliesare short. The Trust can also hold funds. Administration proposals to reduce food aid's reliance on surplus commodities and anticipated demand foremergency food aid have focused renewed attentionon the Emerson Trust, which has been used four times in FY2002 and FY2003 to meet unanticipated food needsin Africa and Iraq. About 1.1 million metrictons of wheat remain in the Trust. As the Trust is drawn down, reimbursement and replenishment of the Trust forcommodities released become importantissues. This report will be updated as developments occur. |
crs_RL34520 | crs_RL34520_0 | A number of congressional proposals to advance programs designed to reduce greenhouse gases have been introduced in the 110 th Congress. Proposed Senate Legislation: Comparison of S. 1766 and S. 2191
S. 1766 . Senators Lieberman and Warner introduced S. 2191 on October 18, 2007. On May 20, Senator Boxer introduced S. 3036 , which is identical to the reported version of S. 2191 except that it contains the above deficit reduction amendment. On June 2, 2008, the Senate invoked cloture on a motion to proceed on S. 3036 . In the case of these alternatives, S. 2191 leans toward the quantity (total emissions) side of the equation; S. 1766 leans toward the price side of the equation. The reduction targets under S. 1766 are not as stringent as the emissions cap under S. 2191 , as discussed earlier. Conclusion
The two proposals— S. 1766 and S. 2191 —would establish market-based systems to limit emissions of greenhouse gases. However, the proposals differ in how those systems would work. S. 2191 would establish an absolute cap on emissions from covered entities, and would allow entities to trade emissions under that cap. S. 1766 would establish emissions targets on covered entities and allow those entities to meet those targets, either through trading program or by making a safety valve payment in lieu of reducing emissions. Under both proposals, short-term U.S. emissions would likely be below a business-as-usual scenario, although reductions under S. 2191 are guaranteed and projected to be larger, particularly over the long-term. In contrast, the cost of S. 1766 is likely to be less and more predictable than S. 2191 . Hence, a major policy question is whether one is more concerned about the possible economic cost of the program and therefore willing to accept some uncertainty about the amount of reduction received (i.e., a safety valve); or one is more concerned about achieving a specific emission reduction level with costs handled efficiently, but not capped (i.e., pure tradeable permits). | Several proposals designed to address greenhouse gases have been introduced in the 110th Congress. Two proposals, S. 1766, introduced by Senators Bingaman and Specter, and S. 2191, introduced by Senators Lieberman and Warner and reported by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works on May 20, 2008, are receiving increased scrutiny in preparation for Senate debate on S. 2191. On May 20, 2008, Senator Boxer introduced S. 3036, which is identical to the reported version of S. 2191 except that it contains a proposed budget amendment to make the bill deficit neutral. On June 2, 2008, the Senate invoked cloture on a motion to proceed on S. 3036, allowing discussion of the bill, but not allowing amendments to be introduced. As of June 4, 2008, it is unclear whether the Senate will agree on the motion to proceed, leading to further discussion and allowing amendments to be introduced.
The two proposals—S. 1766 and S. 2191—would establish market-based systems to limit emissions of greenhouse gases. However, the proposals differ in how those systems would work. S. 2191 would establish an absolute cap on emissions from covered entities and would allow entities to trade emissions under that cap. S. 1766 would establish emissions targets on covered entities and allow those entities to either meet emission reduction targets through a trading program or make a safety valve payment in lieu of reducing emissions. Under both proposals, short-term U.S. emissions would likely be below a business-as-usual scenario, although reductions under S. 2191 are guaranteed by the cap and are projected to be larger, particularly over the long-term. In contrast, costs under S. 1766 are likely to be lower and more predictable than under S. 2191.
A major policy question is whether one is more concerned about the possible economic cost of the program and therefore willing to accept some uncertainty about the amount of reduction received (i.e., favoring a "safety valve" like S. 1766); or one is more concerned about achieving a specific emission reduction level with costs handled efficiently, but not capped (i.e., pure tradeable permits as in S. 2191). S. 2191 leans toward the quantity (total emissions) side of the equation; S. 1766 leans toward the price side of the equation. |
crs_R45313 | crs_R45313_0 | Introduction
Immigration law has long contained exclusion and removal provisions designed to limit government spending on indigent non-U.S. nationals (aliens). In current law, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) renders an alien inadmissible to the United States if he or she "is likely at any time to become a public charge." The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State (DOS) have primary responsibility for implementing the INA's public charge provisions. DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration and Services (USCIS) may make a public charge determination when an alien applies to adjust to LPR status. Abroad, DOS consular officers may make a public charge determination when an alien applies for a visa. In addition, in January 2018, DOS revised the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) to instruct consular officers to consider a wider range of public benefits when determining whether visa applicants who have received or are currently receiving benefits are inadmissible on public charge grounds. But the statute does not define the term "public charge" or establish what it means to "become a public charge." USCIS, the agency within DHS that adjudicates applications for adjustment to LPR status of certain aliens in the United States, defines "public charge" for inadmissibility purposes as covering "an individual who is likely to become 'primarily dependent on the government for subsistence, as demonstrated by either the receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance, or institutionalization for long-term care at government expense.'" Who is subject to a public charge determination of inadmissibility? Some categories of aliens are not subject to the public charge determination when applying for visas, seeking admission to the United States, or applying for adjustment of status. What factors do officials consider in their determination of inadmissibility based on public charge grounds? | Immigration law in the United States has long contained exclusion and removal provisions designed to limit government spending on indigent non-U.S. nationals (aliens). Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an alien may be denied admission into the United States or adjustment to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status if he or she is "likely at any time to become a public charge." An admitted alien may also be subject to removal from the United States based on a separate public charge ground of deportability, but this ground is rarely employed. Certain categories of aliens, such as refugees and asylees, are exempted from application of the public charge grounds.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State (DOS) have primary responsibility for implementing the INA's public charge provisions. DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration and Services may make a public charge determination when an alien applies to adjust to LPR status. Abroad, DOS consular officers may make a public charge determination when an alien applies for a visa.
Although the INA does not explicitly define the term "public charge," since 1999, agency guidance has defined it to mean a person who is or is likely to become "primarily dependent" on "public cash assistance for income maintenance" or "institutionaliz[ed] for long-term care at government expense." However, new public charge rules for DHS are expected to be published in the Federal Register, according to the Unified Agenda of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). In addition, in January 2018, DOS revised the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) to instruct consular officers to consider a wider range of public benefits when determining whether visa applicants who have received or are currently receiving benefits are inadmissible on public charge grounds.
This report provides answers to frequently asked questions about current public charge policy, including the sources of laws that govern public charge determinations, who is subject to determinations, factors that are considered in determinations, and the consequences of determinations. |
crs_RL30349 | crs_RL30349_0 | Introduction
The Government Accountability Office (GAO)—with more than 3,100 staff positions and an annual budget exceeding $507 million in FY2008—is the largest of several support agencies that provide research, review, and analysis for Congress; and it is the only one with a nationwide field structure. GAO, which had been titled the General Accounting Office until 2004, operates under the control and direction of the Comptroller General of the United States (CG). The head is appointed by the President—after receiving recommendations from a special bicameral congressional commission—by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a 15-year nonrenewable term. The post is now vacant with Mr. Walker's resignation on March 12, 2008. GAO was established as an independent auditor of government agencies and activities by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (42 Stat. The office was designed to be "independent of the executive departments," which were placed under its audit and review powers (31 U.S.C. Sometimes characterized as "Congress's watchdog" and the "investigative arm of Congress," the GAO provides a variety of services to Congress, largely connected to the oversight, investigation, and evaluation of executive operations, activities, and programs. The evolution of the office's authority, functions, and mandates over time, along with new pay and personnel powers for the Comptroller General, prompted him to request a change in its name: from the General Accounting Office to the Government Accountability Office ( P.L. GAO's current activities and services include:
auditing and evaluating federal programs and operations; conducting special investigations (through a small office) of alleged violations of federal criminal law, particularly conflict of interest or procurement and contract fraud; providing various legal services to Congress, including advice on legal issues involving government programs and activities; resolving bid protests that challenge government contract awards; prescribing accounting principles and standards for the executive branch, advising federal agencies on fiscal and other policies and procedures, and setting standards for auditing government programs; assisting the professional audit/evaluation community in improving and keeping abreast of ongoing developments in such matters as audit methodology and approaches; and detailing GAO staff to work directly for congressional committees (in these temporary transfers, the assigned staffs represent the committees and not GAO itself). Since 1994, GAO has been the subject of congressional hearings, studies, and proposals for change connected with its mission, roles, capabilities, and personnel system. After a lengthy period of growth—in its powers, duties, and resources—the office experienced reductions in these areas in the mid-1990s. Since then, however, its budget authority has increased, from a low of $358 million in FY1998 to a high of $507.2 million for FY2008. Legislation ( H.R. Furthermore, H.R. 5683 , has passed the House and Senate and has been sent to the White House. Another modification, in H.R. Since then, GAO's budget level has risen each year. 108-271 ) granted the Comptroller General additional authority over pay and personnel. These developments contributed, in 2007, to the establishment of an employee union with collective bargaining rights; in 2008, to a new contract for eligible employees; and in the same year, to legislative proposals to modify the CG's powers over such personnel matters and provide reimbursements for certain staff who did not receive pay increases in 2006 and 2007. Changes—in progress or proposed—have been prompted by a vacancy in the office of the Comptroller General; the nearly 30-year absence of an official Deputy CG; conflicts over a new personnel system and its implementation; the perceived need for certain new arrangements and organizations within GAO, such as a statutory inspector general; and restrictions on its independent access to executive branch information and its auditing of the intelligence community. | On July 7, 2004, an old congressional support agency was given a new name, while keeping the same initials (GAO): at that time, the General Accounting Office, established in 1921, was re-designated the Government Accountability Office (P.L. 108-271). The renaming, which came at the request of its head, the Comptroller General (CG) of the United States, was designed to reflect the agency's evolution and additional duties since its creation more than eight decades before.
The Government Accountability Office is the largest of three agencies that provide staff support, research, review, and analysis for Congress. GAO operates under the control and direction of the Comptroller General, who is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a 15-year nonrenewable term. A unique arrangement begins the process with a special bicameral commission of legislators from both parties making recommendations to the President. The CG post is currently vacant, with the resignation of David Walker on March 12, 2008.
GAO was established in 1921 as an independent auditor of government agencies and activities by the Budget and Accounting Act. The office was intended to be "independent of the executive departments," the entities it would audit and review. Sometimes called "Congress's watchdog" and its "investigative arm," GAO now provides a variety of services to Congress that extend beyond its original functions and duties, including oversight, investigation, review, and evaluation of executive programs, operations, and activities. Several proposals in the 110th Congress are seen as augmenting GAO's capabilities. These include clarifying its audit authority over the Intelligence Community (H.R. 978 and S. 82) and enhancing its powers to gain access to executive documents (H.R. 6388). In a separate matter, personnel flexibilities powers granted to the Comptroller General in 2004 have generated some controversy in Congress and among GAO employees. As an outgrowth of this and other considerations, GAO staff have set up a new bargaining unit, the first union in the office's history. Legislation has also been proposed that would, among other things, amend GAO's basic authority over personnel and pay matters for employees, provide pay adjustments and reimbursements for certain employees who had not received pay increases in 2006 and 2007, and establish an office of inspector general (H.R. 5683, which has passed the House and Senate and been sent to the President).
Throughout much of its history, the office has experienced growth in its powers, duties, and resources. In the mid-1990s, however, it was the subject of congressional hearings, studies, and proposals for change, connected with its mission, roles, and capabilities; these reviews were generated in part by criticisms of its perceived orientation. As a result, GAO's budget and personnel levels were reduced and certain of the "executive powers" of the Comptroller General. In comparison to these earlier budget reductions, however, the office's funding has since risen, from $358 million in FY1998 to $507.2 million in FY2008. Nonetheless, GAO's staff size (at 3,100 in FY2008) has remained lower than in earlier years.
This report will be updated as developments dictate. |
crs_R44024 | crs_R44024_0 | Introduction
In 1976, President Gerald Ford signed into law the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA; P.L. Since 2005, a number of bills have been introduced to revise the chemical evaluation process for determining whether regulatory controls are warranted and to address certain other related purposes. This report tracks the legislative status in the 114 th Congress of bills that would amend Title I of TSCA and includes a discussion of selected issues that have received more attention. This report does not present a comprehensive analysis of all provisions of relevant legislation, nor is this report intended to provide a detailed analysis of specific language and its legal or regulatory interpretation. On March 10, 2015, the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21 st Century Act ( S. 697 ) was introduced and referred to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (Senate EPW). Two days later, the Alan Reinstein and Trevor Schaefer Toxic Chemical Protection Act ( S. 725 ) was introduced and also referred to Senate EPW. On April 28, 2015, Senate EPW marked up an amendment in the nature of a substitute for S. 697 , which was ordered to be reported out of the committee for Senate floor consideration on a 15-5 vote. On June 18, 2015, Senate EPW filed the report ( S.Rept. On April 7, 2015, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy, announced a discussion draft that takes a more targeted approach to amending Title I of TSCA than either Senate bill. The discussion draft is called the TSCA Modernization Act of 2015 and hereinafter is referred to as the House discussion draft. The committee's report for the bill is H.Rept. On June 23, 2015, the House passed H.R. 2576 , as amended, under suspension of the rules on a 398-1 vote. Selected Issues for Congress
Among the various issues regarding the federal role in regulating chemical substances under Title I of TSCA, the following topic areas are among the more debated:
The prioritization of existing chemical substances for the evaluation of risks; The regulatory threshold criteria under which EPA would be authorized to restrict a chemical substance; The regulatory options available to EPA in restricting a chemical substance found to warrant regulation; The authority of EPA to require the development of new information regarding a chemical substance; The preemption of state laws concerning the regulation of chemicals; The disclosure and protection from disclosure of information submitted to EPA; and The resources that may be available for EPA to administer the act. 2576 , as passed by the House, in amending Title I of TSCA to address these key issues. Regulatory Threshold for Restricting a Chemical Substance
The current TSCA establishes as a standard for regulation of chemical substances that the chemical presents or will present "an unreasonable risk of injury to [human] health or the environment." In contrast to the Senate bills, H.R. With regard to the authority to collect fees under Section 26(b) of TSCA, all three bills would revise this authority to differing degrees. 114-176 . | Enacted in 1976, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) is the primary federal law that governs the regulation of chemicals in commerce. TSCA authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to determine whether regulatory control of a chemical substance is necessary to provide protection against "unreasonable risks" to those who are potentially exposed or to the environment. For several years leading up to the 114th Congress, there have been various legislative proposals to amend Title I of TSCA to revise the chemical evaluation process and the criteria by which chemical substances would be regulated and to address certain other related purposes.
On June 23, 2015, the TSCA Modernization Act of 2015 (H.R. 2576) was passed by the House under suspension of the rules on a 398-1 vote. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce had previously reported the bill. The report is H.Rept. 114-176. On April 28, 2015, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (Senate EPW) ordered that the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act (S. 697) be reported for Senate floor consideration on a 15-5 vote. On June 18, 2015, the Senate EPW filed the report (S.Rept. 114-67). Another bill introduced in the Senate, the Alan Reinstein and Trevor Schaefer Toxic Chemical Protection Act (S. 725), has not been reported out of committee. The Senate bills present fairly broad approaches to revising the evaluation process of chemical substances to determine whether regulatory control is warranted and propose various other changes to the TSCA framework, while H.R. 2576 takes a more targeted approach in amending specific provisions of Title I of TSCA.
All three bills would address many key issues regarding the federal role in regulating chemical substances. This report discusses selected issues that have received considerable attention and provides a comparison of the current proposals' differing approaches to revise Title I of TSCA. This report does not present a comprehensive analysis of all provisions of relevant legislation, nor is this report intended to provide a detailed analysis of specific language and its legal or regulatory interpretation.
The following selected issues are described in more detail in the report and in the context of current TSCA and the three bills:
The prioritization of existing chemical substances for the evaluation of risks; The regulatory threshold criteria under which EPA would be authorized to restrict a chemical substance; The regulatory options available to EPA in restricting a chemical substance found to warrant regulation; The authority of EPA to require the development of new information regarding a chemical substance; The preemption of state laws concerning the regulation of chemicals; The disclosure and protection from disclosure of information submitted to EPA; and The resources that may be available for EPA to administer the act.
This report was updated to reflect legislative actions in Congress as of July 7, 2015. The report will be updated as necessary as the debate and consideration of legislation continues. |
crs_R41718 | crs_R41718_0 | Introduction
The federal deposit insurance system in the United States, which was established in the 1930s, protects depositors from losses that may result from at least two causes. Second, a financial institution may find itself unable to repay depositors if its customers suddenly and simultaneously withdraw their deposits based upon speculation or knowledge about the health of similar or neighboring institutions. This phenomenon is generally known as a bank run. Hence, deposit insurance has arguably promoted and helped to sustain public confidence in the U.S. financial system, particularly at times when depositories have suffered large losses. Funds used to reimburse depositors when banks fail are maintained in the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF), which is managed by the FDIC. In addition, five corporate credit unions, which provide financial services for retail credit unions, saw severe liquidity pressures and were eventually placed under conservatorship by the NCUA. Funds to reimburse credit union members are maintained in the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF), which is managed by the NCUA. For example, regulators increased deposit insurance assessments on member institutions. This report provides an overview of the FDIC and the NCUA, the status of the DIF and NCUSIF, and the resolution procedures that are implemented when depository institutions fail. Deposit Insurance for Banks
The FDIC was established as an independent government corporation under the authority of the Banking Act of 1933, also known as the Glass-Steagall Act, to insure bank deposits. When a bank becomes insolvent or fails, the FDIC assumes responsibility for repayment of the principal balance in depositor accounts up to the deposit insurance limits. To cover losses or costs associated with bank failures, the FDIC collects insurance premiums from member depository institutions and places the monies in the DIF. A well-capitalized DIF arguably would help maintain public confidence in the FDIC's ability to protect deposits. The Federal Credit Union Act of 1934 formed a national system to charter, supervise, and examine federal credit unions; the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) became an independent federal agency in 1970. Premiums are used to pay the fund's operating expenses, cover losses, and build reserves. 91-468 at a minimum 1.2%. The FDIC and NCUA resolution procedures are described below. Credit Union Failures and the NCUA
The NCUA, similar to the FDIC, uses a net worth-asset ratio to determine the solvency of a credit union. Insurance Fund(s) Insolvency and Taxpayer Risk
The risk to U.S. taxpayers to bear the losses of failed institutions increases when one or both of the insurance funds become depleted or insolvent. On February 8, 2006, the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 (Reform Act; P.L. Data for the large depository institutions and the highly complex institutions, which are collected during examinations, are evaluated using a scorecard with variables from the following categories:
a weighted average CAMELS rating; variables that represent the ability to withstand a decline in asset holdings or an increase in credit or default risk, such as risk-based capital-to-asset ratios; variables that represent the ability to withstand an increase in liquidity or funding risk, such as the ratio of core deposits to total liabilities; and a loss severity score that measures the relative magnitude of potential losses to the FDIC, which is computed as a ratio of possible losses to the total domestic deposits, averaged over three quarters. | The federal deposit insurance system in the United States protects depositors from losses that would occur in the event that a financial institution becomes insolvent, meaning that the institution's lending activities did not generate enough revenue to repay depositors their principal and interest. By guaranteeing depositor accounts up to a set limit, deposit insurance may also help prevent "runs," which occur when bank customers lose confidence in the ability of a financial institution to repay its depositors and rush to withdraw deposits. A bank run, or panic, can spread and threaten the solvency of other financial institutions should the public also doubt their soundness, thus suddenly and simultaneously withdrawing deposits from those institutions as well. In other words, deposit insurance aims to promote and help maintain public confidence in the U.S. financial system, particularly at times when some depository entities suffer large losses or become insolvent.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was established to insure bank deposits as an independent government corporation under the authority of the Banking Act of 1933, also known as the Glass-Steagall Act (48 Stat. 162, 12 U.S.C.). The FDIC is not funded by appropriations; it is funded through insurance assessments collected from its member depository institutions and held in what is now known as the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). The proceeds in the DIF are used to pay depositors if member institutions fail.
The Federal Credit Union Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1216) formed a national system to charter and supervise federal credit unions. The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), which administers deposit insurance for credit unions, became an independent federal agency in 1970 (P.L. 91-468, 84 Stat. 994). The NCUA is not funded by appropriations, but through insurance assessments collected from its member credit union institutions and held in what is now known as the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF). Proceeds from the NCUSIF are used to pay share depositors if member institutions fail.
Beginning in 2008, the number of bank failures increased substantially, and the DIF fell below its statutory minimum requirement. Credit union failures also increased, and five large corporate credit unions were placed under conservatorship by the NCUA. The 111th Congress subsequently provided both the FDIC and the NCUA with greater ability to replenish the insurance funds and stabilize liquidity among depository institutions through a variety of measures. Should insurance claims (resulting from failures) exceed the sizes of the insurance fund reserves, additional legislative action may be necessary for one or both agencies to continue to resolve failed institutions.
Current congressional interest in deposit insurance relates to oversight of how the FDIC and the NCUA protect deposits and address solvency issues associated with their insurance funds. This report provides an overview of the FDIC and NCUA, the status of both the DIF and NCUSIF, and describes the procedures followed to resolve failed depository institutions. Appendixes to this report describe measures taken to reduce the loss exposure and total risks to the funds. |
crs_RS21387 | crs_RS21387_0 | On November 4, 2002, United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert B. Zoellick notified Congress of the Administration's intention to launch negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA) with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), comprised of Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland. This agreement would be the first U.S. FTA with a Sub-Saharan African country. The first round of negotiations for the SACU FTA began on June 3, 2003, in Johannesburg, South Africa. Others representing service industries and recycled clothing favored negotiations to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers in the SACU market. Progress of the Negotiations
After nearly three years of slow-moving and stalled negotiations, U.S. and SACU trade officials called off the FTA negotiations in April 2006 in favor of a longer term trade and investment work plan. | Negotiations to launch a free trade agreement (FTA) between the United States and the five members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland) began on June 3, 2003. In April 2006, negotiators suspended FTA negotiations, launching a new work program on intensifying the trade and investment relationship with an FTA as a long term goal. A potential FTA would eliminate tariffs over time, reduce or eliminate non-tariff barriers, liberalize service trade, protect intellectual property rights, and provide technical assistance to help SACU nations achieve the goals of the agreement. This potential agreement would be subject to congressional approval. This report will be updated as negotiations progress. |
crs_R40597 | crs_R40597_0 | Introduction
A discussion draft of broad legislation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions was released March 31, 2009, by Representative Waxman, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, and Representative Markey, Chairman of the Energy and Environment Subcommittee. The draft legislation, titled the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, proposes a "cap and trade" system to control carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that have been associated with global climate change. The proposed cap-and-trade system would cover electric utilities and other entities that together are responsible for 85% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Covered entities would need permits (called allowances) to emit carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, and unused allowances could be banked for future use or sold. The number of allowances issued each year would be gradually reduced until greenhouse gas emissions from covered entities were cut 83% below 2005 levels in 2050. To address concerns that greenhouse gas controls could place U.S. manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage, the draft bill authorizes compensation to certain industrial sectors. The draft bill would require retail electricity suppliers to meet a certain percentage of their power load with electricity generated from renewable resources, starting at 6% in 2012 and gradually rising to 25% in 2025. Several major issues are not addressed by the draft bill and are still under discussion, such as how to allocate emission allowances and how to assist workers and consumers affected by the cap-and-trade system. Substantial controversy is also continuing over the draft bill's renewable energy mandate on electricity suppliers. Federal Renewable Electricity Standard
Establishes a federal Renewable Electricity Standard to promote renewable energy production. 611 of the draft. Federal training and funding assistance is provided to states that adopt advanced building efficiency codes. The goal is to encourage owners and occupants to reduce energy use. Emission allowances." Amounts of allowances auctioned "to be supplied." State programs." | A discussion draft of legislation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions was released March 31, 2009, by Representative Waxman, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, and Representative Markey, Chairman of the Energy and Environment Subcommittee. The draft legislation, titled the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, proposes a "cap and trade" system to control carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that have been associated with global climate change.
The proposed cap-and-trade system would cover electric utilities and other entities that together are responsible for 85% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Covered entities would need permits (called allowances) to emit carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, and unused allowances could be banked for future use or sold. The number of allowances issued each year would be gradually reduced until greenhouse gas emissions from covered entities were cut 83% below 2005 levels in 2050.
To address concerns that greenhouse gas controls could place U.S. manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage, the draft bill authorizes compensation to certain industrial sectors. The discussion draft indicates that provisions to assist workers and consumers affected by the cap-and-trade system remain to be written.
The draft bill would require retail electricity suppliers to meet a certain percentage of their power load with electricity generated from renewable resources, starting at 6% in 2012 and gradually rising to 25% in 2025. A state could meet up to one-fifth of that requirement with energy efficiency measures. Deployment of "smart grid" technologies would be encouraged, as would technologies to capture and sequester carbon emissions. Standards would be required to reduce carbon emissions from motor vehicle fuel, and federal support for building electric vehicles would be authorized.
Energy efficiency provisions in the draft bill include state incentives for adopting advanced building efficiency codes, codification of appliance efficiency standards, and transportation efficiency goals.
Several major issues are not addressed by the draft bill and are still under discussion. A key unanswered question is how to allocate emission allowances. Industry groups contend that allowances should initially be provided at no cost, to reduce economic disruption. Others have proposed that allowances be auctioned to raise revenue for consumer protection, industry rebates, and other transitional programs.
Substantial controversy is also continuing over the draft bill's renewable energy mandate on electricity suppliers. Regional differences in renewable energy resources have prompted criticism that a national renewable electricity standard would be unworkable, or that the goal of 25% renewables by 2025 is unrealistic. |
crs_RS21201 | crs_RS21201_0 | In 1984, Congress responded to this public health and environmental threat and established a leak prevention, detection, and cleanup program for USTs containing chemicals or petroleum by establishing an underground storage tank regulatory program in Subtitle I of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, also known as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). LUST Trust Fund: Funding and Uses
The LUST Trust Fund is funded primarily through a 0.1 cent-per-gallon motor fuels tax which began in 1987. 110-161 ), Congress provided $105.8 million from the fund, including roughly $72 million for the cleanup program and $33.8 million for the UST leak prevention program, reflecting the broadened range of authorized uses of the fund under EPAct. EPAct ( P.L. EPA provided another $34.4 million from the trust fund for state and tribal grants to implement and enforce the UST leak prevention program. Program Status and Issues
EPA reports that since the federal underground storage tank program began, more than 1.7 million substandard underground storage tanks subject to regulation have been closed and, overall, the frequency and severity of leaks from UST systems have been reduced significantly. To address some of the program weaknesses and to improve leak prevention, Congress added new requirements to the UST regulatory program for EPA, states, and UST owners and operators, under the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Because of its mobility, MTBE is more likely to reach drinking water supplies, and it often is more difficult and costly to remediate than conventional gasoline. 109-58 repealed the Clean Air Act oxygenated fuel requirement that had prompted extensive use of MTBE, and imposed a renewable fuels mandate. For cleanup purposes, the USTCA authorized trust fund appropriations of $200 million annually for FY2006 through FY2011 for EPA and states to administer the LUST cleanup program, and another $200 million annually for FY2006 through FY2011, specifically for addressing MTBE and other oxygenated fuels leaks (such as ethanol). The 110th Congress
To increase state program resources and facilitate cleanups, Congress provided the new funding authorities under EPAct (including the authority to use the LUST Trust Fund for prevention activities in addition to cleanup activities). In the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act ( P.L. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. For FY2010, the Administration and Congress looked to the trust fund to support both LUST and UST program activities. 111-88 approved $113.1 million from the LUST Trust Fund, including $78.67 million for cleanup activities and $34.43 million for most other Subtitle I leak prevention and detection provisions. The appropriations from the LUST Trust Fund have increased since the enactment of EPAct, as states had urged. Emerging Issue: Ethanol and Biofuels Compatibility
An emerging UST issue concerns the impact that ethanol and other biofuels may have on storage tank infrastructure. Ethanol, for example, is more corrosive than gasoline, thus increasing the risk of fuel leaks in tank systems. The renewable fuel mandates in EPAct and, subsequently, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA; P.L. EPA estimates that half the tanks in the ground are 20 years old and have never been tested for compatibility with higher ethanol blends. Tank owners, EPA, states, and the motor fuels industry are concerned that a new wave of leaks could occur as the amount of ethanol blended in gasoline increases to meet the EISA renewable fuel standards. EISA did include an amendment to section 211(c) of the Clean Air Act to allow EPA to regulate fuels and fuel additives to protect water quality, as well as air quality. S. 1666 would authorize the EPA Administrator to allow the introduction of mid-level ethanol blends into commerce only after the agency met several conditions, including responding to Science Advisory Board recommendations on mitigating materials compatibility and consumer safety issues associated with the use of those higher blends. | To address a nationwide water pollution problem caused by leaking underground storage tanks (USTs), Congress authorized a leak prevention, detection, and cleanup program in 1984, under Subtitle I of the Solid Waste Disposal Act. In 1986, Congress established the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Trust Fund to provide a source of funds to support the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and states in remediating leaks from petroleum USTs. The LUST Trust Fund is funded primarily through a 0.1 cent-per-gallon motor fuels tax. Historically, EPA and states primarily have used LUST fund appropriations to oversee LUST cleanup activities by responsible parties and to clean up sites where owners fail to do so.
Since the program began, the frequency and severity of releases from USTs have declined markedly. Through FY2009, cleanup had been initiated or completed at nearly 80% of the 488,000 confirmed release sites, while a backlog of some 100,000 contaminated sites remained.
Despite much progress in the program, challenges have remained. A key issue has been that state resources have not met the demands of administering the UST leak prevention program. States have long sought larger appropriations from the trust fund to support the LUST cleanup program, and some also sought flexibility to use fund resources to administer and enforce the UST leak prevention program. Another issue has concerned the detection of methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) in groundwater at many LUST sites and in some drinking water supplies. This gas additive was used widely to meet Clean Air Act requirements to reduce auto emissions. However, MTBE is very water-soluble, and, once released, it is more likely to reach water supplies and often is more costly to remediate than conventional gasoline leaks.
In the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct; P.L. 109-58), the 109th Congress expanded the leak prevention provisions in the UST program, imposed new program responsibilities on EPA and states, and authorized use of the LUST Trust Fund for prevention as well as cleanup purposes. The law also repealed the Clean Air Act oxygenated fuel requirement that had prompted the extensive use of MTBE. In the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA; P.L. 110-140), the 110th Congress amended the Clean Air Act to authorize EPA to regulate fuels and fuel additives for the purpose of protecting water quality, as well as air quality.
EISA also increased the renewable fuel standard (RFS), and an emerging issue concerns the compatibility of ethanol and biofuels with storage tank infrastructure. Ethanol is more corrosive than gasoline, and EPA estimates that half the tanks in the ground have not been tested for compatibility with ethanol blends greater than 10%. The RFS is likely to push blending beyond 10% in a few years. The concern is that a new wave of leaks could occur as the amount of ethanol in gasoline increases to meet the RFS. S. 1666 would direct EPA to allow the use of mid-level ethanol blends only after infrastructure compatibility and consumer safety issues are addressed.
Congress has increased program funding since the enactment of EPAct. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) appropriated $200 million from the trust fund for the LUST cleanup program, and Congress provided another $112.6 million from the fund for cleanup and leak prevention and detection activities in regular FY2009 appropriations. For FY2010, in P.L. 111-88, Congress provided $113.1 million from the fund, including $78.7 million for LUST cleanup activities, and $34.4 million for UST leak prevention, detection, and other program responsibilities added by the EPAct. The Administration has requested similar amounts for FY2011. This report reviews UST and LUST programs and related issues and developments. |
crs_R44186 | crs_R44186_0 | Introduction
This report is part of a suite of reports tha t discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2016. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the first title of the homeland security appropriations bill—the Office of the Secretary and Executive Management, the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, the DHS headquarters consolidation project, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, the Office of the Chief Information Officer, Analysis and Operations, and the Office of Inspector General for the department. Collectively, Congress has labeled these components in recent years as "Departmental Management and Operations." The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2016 request for Departmental Management and Operations, the appropriations proposed by Congress in response, and those enacted thus far. Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the first title, the report includes information on provisions throughout the proposed bills and reports that directly affect these functions. Departmental Management and Operations components made up about 3% of the discretionary appropriations requested for DHS for FY2016. The Administration requested $1,396 million in total budgetary resources for these accounts in FY2016, an increase of $255 million (22.3%) above the FY2015 enacted level. The Senate-reported bill would have provided $1,346 million, a decrease of $73 million (5.2%) from the request and $182 million (16.0%) above FY2015. The House-reported bill would have provided $1,217 million, a decrease of $178 million (12.8%) from the request, but $76 million (6.7%) above FY2015. On December 18, 2015, the President signed into law P.L. 114-113 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Division F of which was the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016. The act included $1,546 million for Title I components in FY2016, $405 million (35.5%) more than was provided for FY2015, and $150 million (10.7%) more than was requested. The Administration has usually requested funding for the consolidation of its headquarters here as well, although this report treats that project separately, and does not include it in the totals in this section. 114-113 (the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016) provided $265 million in appropriations for Analysis and Operations, $4 million below the amount requested by the Administration, $2 million more than Senate-reported S. 1619 , and the same as House-reported H.R. | This report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2016. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the first title of the homeland security appropriations bill—the Office of the Secretary and Executive Management, the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, the DHS headquarters consolidation project, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, the Office of the Chief Information Officer, Analysis and Operations, and the Office of Inspector General for the department. Collectively, Congress has labeled these components in recent years as "Departmental Management and Operations."
The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2016 request for Departmental Management and Operations, the appropriations proposed by Congress in response, and those enacted thus far. Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the first title, the report includes information on provisions throughout the proposed bills and reports that directly affect these functions.
Departmental Management and Operations is the smallest of the four titles that carry the bulk of the funding in the bill. The Administration requested $1,396 million in total budgetary resources for these components in FY2016, $255 million more than was provided for FY2015. Although only 3.4% of the Administration's $41.4 billion request for the department, the proposed additional funding was 17.8% of the total net increase requested. While the Administration proposed increasing the budget of every component of Departmental Management and Operations, the largest increase, both in dollars ($167 million) and by percentage terms (441%), was to fund a revised plan for consolidation of DHS headquarters offices in the National Capital Region.
Senate-reported S. 1619 would have provided $1,346 million, a decrease of $50 million (3.6%) from the request and $205 million (18.0%) above FY2015.
House-reported H.R. 3128 would have provided $1,217 million, a $179 million (12.8%) decrease from the request and $76 million (6.7%) above FY2015.
On December 18, 2015, the President signed into law P.L. 114-113, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Division F of which was the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016. The act included $1,546 million for these components in FY2016, $405 million more than was provided for FY2015, and $150 million more than was requested.
Additional information on the broader subject of FY2016 funding for the department can be found in CRS Report R44053, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2016, as well as links to analytical overviews and details regarding appropriations for other components.
This report will be updated if supplemental appropriations are provided for any of these components for FY2016. |
crs_RL31733 | crs_RL31733_0 | Introduction
This report (1) provides background information and discusses potential issues for Congress on the topic of portsecurity, which has emerged as a significant part of the overall debate on U.S. homelandsecurity. (2) The terroristattacks of September 11, 2001 heightened awareness about the vulnerability to terrorist attack ofU.S. 107-295 on November 25, 2002. There is continuing debate about whether current efforts to improve port security areadequate in addressing the threat. While many agree that Coast Guard and CBP initiatives to addressthe threat are strengthening the security of the maritime transportation system, they contend thatthese initiatives represent only a framework for building a maritime security regime, and thatsignificant gaps in security still remain. The U.S. maritime system includesmore than 300 sea and river ports with more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals and more than1,000 harbor channels spread along thousands of miles of coastline. (8) Most ships calling at U.S.ports are foreign owned and foreign crewed; less than 3% of U.S. overseas trade is carried onU.S.-flag vessels. Container ships are a growingsegment of maritime commerce -- and the focus of much of the attention on seaport security. (10)
More than 9 million cargo containers enter U.S. sea ports each year. Only a small portion have theircontents physically inspected by CBP. Among other things, they are concerned that terrorists could:
use commercial cargo containers to smuggle terrorists, nuclear, chemical, orbiological weapons, components thereof, or other dangerous materials into the UnitedStates;
seize control of a large commercial cargo ship and use it as a collision weaponfor destroying a bridge or refinery located on the waterfront;
sink a large commercial cargo ship in a major shipping channel, therebyblocking all traffic to and from the port;
attack a large ship carrying a volatile fuel (such as liquefied natural gas) anddetonate the fuel so as to cause a massive in-port explosion;
attack an oil tanker in a port or at an offshore discharge facility (19) so as to disrupt the worldoil trade and cause large-scale environmental damage;
seize control of a ferry (which can carry hundreds of passengers) or a cruiseship (which can carry more than 3,000 passengers, of whom about 90% are usually U.S. citizens)and threaten the deaths of the passengers if a demand is not met;
attack U.S. Navy ships in an attempt to kill U.S. military personnel, damageor destroy a valuable U.S. military asset, and (in the case of nuclear-powered ships) cause aradiological release. TheCoast Guard and CBP are the two federal agencies with the strongest presence at seaports. TheBureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the federal agency with principal responsibilityfor inspecting cargoes, including cargo containers, that commercial ships bring into U.S. ports andfor the examination and inspection of ship crews and cruise ship passengers for ships arriving in U.S.ports from any foreign port. Port Security Initiatives by Federal Agencies
Coast Guard. In response to the terrorist attacksof September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard created the largest port-security operation since World WarII. The former 24-hour advance Notice of Arrival (NOA) has been extendedto a 96-hour NOA. The Coast Guard has also developed the concept of maritime domain awareness (MDA). Among the programs CBP has initiated to counter the terrorist threat are the Container SecurityInitiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). (38)
C-TPAT, initiated in April 2002, offers importers expedited processing of cargo if theycomply with CBP guidelines for securing their entire supply chain. Transportation Security Administration. The Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. The GAO investigated how the CSI and C-TPAT programs were being implemented andfound several shortcomings that need correction. (55) The GAO found that C-TPAT participants were benefitting fromreduced scrutiny of their imported cargo after they had been certified into the program but beforeCBP had validated that the participants were indeed carrying out the promised security measures. The GAO also found that not all containers that CBP had targeted for inspection at the overseasloading port were being inspected by the host customs administration. | The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 heightened awareness about the vulnerability toterrorist attack of all modes of transportation. Port security has emerged as a significant part of theoverall debate on U.S. homeland security. The overarching issues for Congress are providingoversight on current port security programs and making or responding to proposals to improve portsecurity.
The U.S. maritime system consists of more than 300 sea and river ports with more than 3,700cargo and passenger terminals. However, a large fraction of maritime cargo is concentrated at a fewmajor ports. Most ships calling at U.S. ports are foreign owned with foreign crews. Container shipshave been the focus of much of the attention on seaport security because they are seen as vulnerableto terrorist infiltration. More than 9 million marine containers enter U.S. ports each year. While theBureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) analyzes cargo and other information to targetspecific shipments for closer inspection, it physically inspects only a small fraction of the containers.
The Coast Guard and CBP are the federal agencies with the strongest presence in seaports. In response to September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard created the largest port-security operation sinceWorld War II. The Coast Guard has advanced its 24-hour Notice of Arrival (NOA) for ships to a96-hour NOA. The NOA allows Coast Guard officials to select high risk ships for boarding upontheir arrival at the entrance to a harbor. CBP has also advanced the timing of cargo information itreceives from ocean carriers. Through the Container Security Initiative (CSI) program, CBPinspectors pre-screen U.S.-bound marine containers at foreign ports of loading. The Customs TradePartnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) offers importers expedited processing of their cargo if theycomply with CBP measures for securing their entire supply chain.
To raise port security standards, Congress passed the Maritime Transportation Security Actof 2002 ( P.L. 107-295 ) in November 2002. The focus of debate in Congress has been about whethercurrent efforts to improve port security are adequate in addressing the threat. While many agree thatCoast Guard and CBP programs to address the threat are sound, they contend that these programsrepresent only a framework for building a maritime security regime, and that significant gaps insecurity still remain. The GAO has investigated how the CSI and C-TPAT programs are beingimplemented and found several shortcomings that need correction. The GAO found that C-TPATparticipants were benefitting from reduced scrutiny of their imported cargo after they had beencertified into the program but before CBP had validated that the participants were indeed carryingout the promised security measures. The GAO also found that not all containers that CBP hadtargeted for inspection at the overseas loading port were being inspected by the host customsadministration. This report will be updated periodically.
Key Policy Staff: Port and Maritime Security |
crs_R45418 | crs_R45418_0 | Introduction
The Federal Pell Grant program, authorized by Title IV-A-1 of the Higher Education Act of 1965, (HEA; P.L. 89-329), as amended, is the single largest source of federal grant aid supporting undergraduate students. The program provided approximately $29 billion in aid to approximately 7.2 million undergraduate students in FY2017. Pell Grants are need-based aid that is intended to be the foundation for all federal need-based student aid awarded to undergraduates. When the FAFSA is processed, the individual's expected family contribution (EFC) is calculated. The EFC is the amount expected to be contributed by the student and the student's family toward postsecondary education expenses for the upcoming academic year. In addition, the Pell Grant program is often referred to as a quasi-entitlement because for the most part eligible students receive the Pell Grant award level calculated for them without regard to available appropriations (for more on program funding, see the " Program Funding " section). Among the requirements generally applicable to the HEA Title IV student aid programs for award year (AY) 2018-2019 are the following:
Students must be accepted for enrollment or enrolled in an eligible program at an eligible institution for the purpose of earning a certificate or degree. Academic Year
The HEA Title IV academic year is an IHE-determined instructional unit. Total Maximum Award
The total maximum award amount is the maximum Pell Grant amount that a student may receive in an academic year. The total maximum award is the sum of the discretionary base maximum award and the mandatory add-on award. In accordance with the HEA, the scheduled award is the least of (1) the total maximum Pell Grant minus the student's EFC, or (2) Cost of Attendance (COA) minus EFC. Most students are awarded Pell Grant aid based on the first condition of this rule (i.e., Pell Grant Award = Total Maximum Pell Grant – EFC), since the total maximum Pell Grant award available to a student in an award year is typically less than the student's COA at the attending institution. Annual Award Rule
The annual award is the maximum Pell Grant aid a full-academic-year student can receive at the student's enrollment rate. Year-Round (Summer) Pell Grants
Since award year 2017-2018, qualified students may receive up to 1½ scheduled Pell Grants, or up to 150% of the scheduled award, in each award year. Over her lifetime, a student may receive the value of no more than 12 full-time semesters (or the equivalent) of Pell Grant awards or six scheduled awards. Income of Recipients
Since Pell Grant awards are heavily dependent on EFC levels and the complex EFC formula can yield different EFCs for students with similar incomes, there is no absolute income threshold that determines who is eligible or ineligible for a Pell Grant award. In AY2016-2017, an estimated 95% of Pell Grant recipients had a total family income at or below $60,000. Receipt of Pell Grants and Other Aid
The Pell Grant is intended to be the foundation of federal need-based student aid from Title IV of the HEA. The smaller mandatory funding stream augments the discretionary appropriations to fund the discretionary award level. This multiyear availability allows the discretionary appropriation to operate at a surplus or shortfall in any given year. Permanent, Indefinite Mandatory Appropriations for the Add-On Award
The SAFRA Act also established permanent, indefinite mandatory appropriations for the program to provide for the mandatory add-on award amount in FY2010 and beyond. An appropriated entitlement is a program that receives mandatory funding in the annual appropriations acts, but the level of spending is not controlled through the annual appropriations process. The Pell Grant program is not an entitlement because the program is primarily funded through discretionary appropriations. The discretionary maximum award level has been reduced or not increased. Supplementary mandatory appropriations have been provided for general use in the program, often by generating savings in the Direct Loan program that is funded by mandatory budget authority. There are several approaches for investing the surplus into the program. Student eligibility for Pell Grants may be expanded. | The federal Pell Grant program, authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA; P.L. 89-329), is the single largest source of federal grant aid supporting postsecondary education students. Pell Grants, and their predecessor, Basic Education Opportunity Grants, have been awarded since 1973. The program provided approximately $29 billion in aid to approximately 7.2 million undergraduate students in FY2017. Pell Grants are need-based aid that is intended to be the foundation for all need-based federal student aid awarded to undergraduates.
To be eligible for a Pell Grant, an undergraduate student must meet several requirements. One key requirement is that the student and his or her family demonstrate financial need. Financial need is determined through the calculation of an expected family contribution (EFC), which is based on applicable family financial information provided on the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). Although there is no absolute income threshold that determines who is eligible or ineligible for Pell Grants, an estimated 95% of Pell Grant recipients had a total family income at or below $60,000 in academic year 2015-2016. Other requirements include, but are not limited to, the student not having earned a bachelor's degree and being enrolled in an eligible program at an HEA Title IV-participating institution of higher education for the purpose of earning a certificate or degree.
The maximum annual award a student may receive during an academic year is calculated in accordance with the Pell Grant award rules. The student's scheduled award is the least of (1) the total maximum Pell Grant minus the student's EFC, or (2) Cost of Attendance (COA) minus EFC. For a student who enrolls on a less-than-full-time basis, the student's maximum annual award is the scheduled award ratably reduced. For FY2019 (academic year 2019-2020), the total maximum Pell Grant is $6,195. The COA is a measure of a student's educational expenses for the academic year. Qualified students who exhaust their scheduled award and remain enrolled beyond the academic year (e.g., enroll in a summer semester) during an award year receive a year-round or summer Pell Grant. With year-round Pell Grants, qualified students may receive up to 1½ scheduled grants in each award year. Finally, a student may receive the value of no more than 12 full-time semesters (or the equivalent) of Pell Grant awards over a lifetime.
The program is funded primarily through annual discretionary appropriations, although in recent years mandatory appropriations have played an increasing role in the program. The total maximum Pell Grant is the sum of two components: the discretionary maximum award and the mandatory add-on award. The discretionary maximum award amount is funded by discretionary appropriations enacted in annual appropriations acts, and augmented by permanent and definite mandatory appropriations provided for in the HEA. For FY2019, the discretionary appropriation is $22.475 billion and the augmenting mandatory funds total $1.370 billion. The mandatory add-on award amount is funded entirely by a permanent and indefinite mandatory appropriation of such sums as necessary, as authorized in the HEA. The mandatory add-on is estimated to require $6.077 billion in FY2019. Funding provided for the Pell Grant program is exempt from sequestration.
The Pell Grant program is often referred to as a quasi-entitlement because for the most part eligible students receive the Pell Grant award level calculated for them without regard to available appropriations. In a given year, the discretionary appropriation level may be smaller or larger than the actual cost to fund the discretionary maximum award, despite the augmenting mandatory appropriation. When the discretionary appropriation is too small, the program carries a shortfall into the subsequent fiscal year. When the discretionary appropriation is too large, the program carries a surplus into the following fiscal year. Since FY2012, the program has maintained a surplus. The surplus has variably been used to increase Pell Grant awards, expand eligibility, and either fund other programs or reduce the national deficit. |
crs_RL31690 | crs_RL31690_0 | Background
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the U.N. agency dedicated to the protection of refugees and other populations displaced by conflict, famine, and natural disasters. This report describes the mandate, operations, and budget of UNHCR. UNHCR provides legal protection, implements long-term solutions, and coordinates emergency humanitarian relief for refugees and other displaced persons. Issues of particular concern to Congress are funding shortages at UNHCR, burdensharing, and avenues for U.S. influence within UNHCR. Current Situation
Persons of Concern
UNHCR estimates as of January 1, 2002, indicate that there are 19.8 million persons of concern worldwide. | Established in 1950, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provides legal protection, implements long-term solutions, and coordinates emergency humanitarian relief for refugees and other displaced persons around the world. At the beginning of 2002, the populations of concern to UNHCR totaled 19.8 million people, which included 12 million refugees. Currently, UNHCR faces a series of challenges: the protection of displaced populations that are not technically refugees and thus fall outside the mandate of UNHCR; availability of resources; a worldwide asylum crisis; accusations of misconduct by UNHCR employees; and the security of refugees and U.N. workers. Issues of particular concern to Congress are funding shortages at UNHCR, burdensharing, and avenues for U.S. influence within UNHCR. This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_94-511 | crs_94-511_0 | Introduction
Hedge funds are essentially unregulated mutual funds. Large numbers of funds have closed as a result of severe losses in the bear markets of 2008; George Soros, one of the best-known hedge fund managers, has estimated that the value of capital under management may shrink by 75%. The Long-Term Capital Management Case
Hedge funds are understood to be high-risk/high-return operations, where investors must be prepared for losses. The systemic risk concerns may be summarized as follows:
failing funds may sell billions of dollars of securities at a time when the liquidity to absorb them is not present, causing markets to "seize up"; lenders to hedge funds, including federally insured banks, may suffer serious losses when funds default—LTCM raised questions about their ability to evaluate the risks lending to hedge funds; default on derivatives contracts may disrupt markets and may threaten hedge fund counterparties in ways that are hard to predict, given the lack of comprehensive regulatory supervision over derivative instruments; and since little information about hedge fund portfolios and trading strategies is publicly available, uncertainty regarding the solvency of hedge funds or their lenders and trading partners may exacerbate panic in the markets. The rule took effect on February 1, 2006, and some basic information on registering hedge funds appeared on the SEC website. On December 13, 2006, the SEC proposed a regulation that would raise the accredited investor threshold from $1 million to $2.5 million in assets (excluding the value of the investor's home). The SEC has yet to adopt a final rule raising the accredited investor standard. The Senate did not act on the bill. S. 1276 would require managers of hedge funds to register as investment advisers, private equity firms, and venture capital funds, and would authorize the SEC to collect systemic risk data from them. Hedge funds are not seen as a principal cause of the financial crisis that erupted in 2007. They are, however, widely viewed as part of the "shadow" financial system that includes over-the-counter derivatives, non-bank lending, and other lightly regulated or non-regulated financial sectors. As part of sweeping regulatory reform legislation before the House and Senate in the 111 th Congress, certain hedge funds would be required to register with the SEC and to provide information about their positions and trading strategies to be shared with the systemic risk authorities. Under H.R. 4173 , passed by the House on December 11, 2009, managers of funds with more than $150 million under management would be required to register as investment advisers with the SEC. They would be required to report (on a confidential basis) certain portfolio information of interest to the Federal Reserve or other systemic risk authorities. The bill provides exemptions for advisers to venture capital funds and small business investment corporations (SBICs). Senator Dodd's Restoring American Financial Stability Act, as ordered reported by the Senate Banking Committee on March 22, 2010, includes similar provisions regarding registration and reporting of systemic risk data. The Senate version also exempts venture capital funds, private equity funds, and SBICs. It sets the SEC registration threshold for all investment advisers at $100 million in assets under management. Advisers below that figure would register with the states. | In an echo of the Robber Baron Era, the late 20th century saw the rise of a new elite class, who made their fortunes not in steel, oil, or railroads, but in financial speculation. These gilded few are the managers of a group of private, unregulated investment partnerships, called hedge funds. Deploying their own capital and that of well-to-do investors, successful hedge fund managers frequently (but not consistently) outperform public mutual funds. Hedge funds use many different investment strategies, but the largest and best-known funds engage in high-risk speculation in markets around the world. Wherever there is financial volatility, the hedge funds will probably be there.
Hedge funds can also lose money very quickly. In 1998, one fund—Long-Term Capital Management—saw its capital shrink from about $4 billion to a few hundred million in a matter of weeks. To prevent default, the Federal Reserve engineered a rescue by 13 large commercial and investment banks. Intervention was thought necessary because the fund's failure might have caused widespread disruption in financial markets—the feared scenario then closely resembled what actually occurred in 2008 (except that large, regulated financial institutions took the place of hedge funds). Despite the risks, investors poured money into hedge funds in recent years, until stock market losses in 2008 prompted a wave of redemption requests.
In view of the growing impact of hedge funds on a variety of financial markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in October 2004 adopted a regulation that required hedge funds to register as investment advisers, disclose basic information about their operations, and open their books for inspection. The regulation took effect in February 2006, but on June 23, 2006, a court challenge was upheld and the rule was vacated. In December 2006, the SEC proposed raising the "accredited investor" standard—to be permitted to invest in hedge funds, an investor would need $2.5 million in assets, instead of $1 million. In the face of opposition from individuals who did not want to be protected from high-risk, unregulated investment opportunities, the SEC did not adopt a final rule.
Hedge funds are not seen as a principal cause of the financial crisis that erupted in 2007. They are, however, widely viewed as part of the "shadow" financial system that includes over-the-counter derivatives, non-bank lending, and other lightly regulated or non-regulated financial sectors. As part of sweeping regulatory reform legislation before the House and Senate in the 111th Congress, certain hedge funds would be required to register with the SEC and to provide information about their positions and trading strategies to be shared with the systemic risk authorities.
Under H.R. 4173, passed by the House on December 11, 2009, managers of funds with more than $150 million under management would be required to register as investment advisers with the SEC. They would be required to report (on a confidential basis) certain portfolio information of interest to the Federal Reserve or other systemic risk authorities. The bill provides exemptions for advisers to venture capital funds and small business investment corporations.
The Restoring American Financial Stability Act, as ordered reported by the Senate Banking Committee on March 22, 2010, includes similar provisions regarding registration and reporting of systemic risk data. The Senate version exempts venture capital funds and private equity funds. It sets the SEC registration threshold for all investment advisers at $100 million in assets under management. Advisers below that figure would be regulated by the states. |
crs_R40487 | crs_R40487_0 | Introduction
Natural gas markets in North America had a tumultuous year in 2008. In the summer, supply area spot prices went much higher than in the past, then decreased through the rest of the year to end lower than at the start of the year. Natural gas remains an important and environmentally attractive energy source for the United States and supplied approximately 24% of total U.S. energy in 2008. In 2008, liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports decreased 54% from the record levels of 2007, decreasing already low utilization factors at import facilities. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved two more major import terminals in 2008. Briefly, important developments in natural gas markets during 2008 include the following:
Domestic natural gas production increased to 20.5 trillion cubic feet, the most since 1974. There was an unusual price pattern in the first half of 2008, with citygate (delivered) prices lower than Henry Hub spot prices. The natural gas spot price at Henry Hub peaked on July 3, 2008, at $13.32 per million Btu and declined to under $6 by end of year. During the 2007-2008 heating season (October to March), average wellhead prices increased more than 30%, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates. FERC approved 2 import facilities in 2008, with an import capacity increase of 2 billion cubic feet per day. The price then decreased to $5.83 per MMBtu by the end of December 2008, ending the year about 28% below the start-of-year price. This average was about 5% increase from 2007. An Anomalous Price Pattern
The spot price of natural gas is a key indicator of the price that producers or LNG importers are receiving for spot sales in the major producing area of the Gulf of Mexico. The spot price at Henry Hub appears to have increased quickly in the first half of 2008, and this price at Henry Hub (a supply area price benchmark) actually exceeded the EIA estimated average citygate (the "delivery points" in consumption areas) price. EIA forecasts an increase of less than 20 Bcf of LNG for 2009 to 369 Bcf. They include:
strong lower-48 onshore production a decrease in seasonal demand swings strong gas-for-power use changing international trade in LNG continuing progress in natural gas infrastructure development
Strong Production
The natural gas supply picture for the lower-48 improved during 2008. Advances in unconventional gas production led to a 7.7% increase in lower-48 production, even though outer continental shelf (OCS) production lost almost 350 billion cubic feet due to hurricanes Gustav and Ike. Gas-for-Power Use
From 2006 to 2007 deliveries to electric power customers increased by 615 Bcf, more than 45% of the consumption growth for the year. 2). | In 2008, the United States natural gas market experienced a tumultuous year, and market forces appeared to guide consumers, producers and investors through rapidly changing circumstances. Natural gas continues to be a major fuel supply for the United States, supplying about 24% of total energy in 2008.
The year began with a relatively tight demand/supply balance, and this generated upward spot price movement. For the 2007-2008 heating season, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported a price increase of more than 30% (beginning to end of season). The key "benchmark" price for the United States, the Henry Hub spot price, generally rose through the first half of 2008 to a peak of $13.32 per million British thermal units (Btu) on July 3, 2008. By the end of 2008, the Henry Hub spot price had decreased 56% to $5.83 per million Btu, lower than the $7.83 per million Btu price on January 2, 2008.
Closer to consumers, the EIA average citygate price increased 47% from January to $12.08 per million Btu in July and then decreased to $7.94 per million Btu as of December, a 2% drop from the start of 2008. Residential consumers saw a 68% increase through July and then a decline that had December 5% above January's average price.
The supply outlook for the lower-48 states began a potentially important change in 2008. Onshore production in Texas and the Rocky Mountain region increased by 15%, especially because of the production of unconventional natural gas (e.g., deep shale gas).
Noteworthy events in 2008:
The national natural gas market experienced an unusual price pattern in the first half of the year, with EIA reporting average citygate (delivery area) prices lower than Henry Hub (supply area) spot prices. The normal pattern is the prices in delivery areas, which include transportation costs, are higher than supply area prices. Lower-48 onshore natural gas production increased 10% to reach more than 20.5 trillion cubic feet, a level not achieved since 1974. This production, along with other factors such as the weakened economy, appears to have prevented the 350 Bcf of lost gas production due to Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in the Gulf of Mexico from increasing prices. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports decreased 54% from the record level in 2007. Average use was less than 10% of reported capacity at operational LNG import facilities. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved another 2 Bcf per day of new import facilities in 2008. Gas for power use decreased 2.4% from 2007 and electric power remained the largest end use category for natural gas consumption for a second year.
Going forward, current economic turbulence may contribute to natural gas market challenges, in terms of investment or attempts at market mischief. Vigilance in market oversight could grow in importance. |
crs_R40519 | crs_R40519_0 | In response to concerns about U.S. competitiveness, the act provides for investments in science and engineering research and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education to foster U.S. competitiveness. The act authorizes funding increases through FY2010 for the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) laboratories, and the Department of Energy Office of Science (DOE SC). The act also authorizes within DOE the establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency – Energy (ARPA-E) and Discovery Science and Engineering Innovation Institutes. In addition, the act authorizes new STEM education programs at DOE, the Department of Education (ED), and NSF, and increases the authorization levels for several existing NSF STEM education programs. New programs authorized by the act will not be established unless funded through subsequent appropriations acts. Although America COMPETES Act programs were not funded at their FY2008 authorized levels, the 110 th Congress did provide FY2008 appropriations to establish ED's Teachers for a Competitive Tomorrow program, and NIST's Technology Improvement Program (TIP), which replaced the agency's Advanced Technology Program. The 111 th Congress provided funding in FY2009 for R&D and STEM education through the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. The acts funded the establishment of DOE's ARPA-E and NSF's PSM program. No FY2010 funding was requested for NSF's Professional Science Master's (PSM) program, newly established in FY2009 through ARRA funding. Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Education
President Obama did not request funding in FY2010 to establish the new STEM education programs authorized in the America COMPETES Act. Also, although the appropriation levels requested by the President for these agencies were below that authorized in the America COMPETES Act for FY2010, some analysts noted that the total funds appropriated in FY2008 (regular and supplemental) and FY2009 (regular and ARRA) and requested for FY2010 by the President for NSF and the NIST laboratories and construction accounts exceed the aggregate funding authorized for these agencies/accounts during this period under the America COMPETES Act. It is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) the Congress should provide sufficient investments to enable our Nation to continue to be the world leader in education ,innovation, and economic growth as envisioned in the goals of the America COMPETES Act;
(2) this resolution builds on significant funding provided in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act for scientific research and education in Function 250 (General Science, Space and Technology), Function 270 (Energy), Function 300 (Natural Resources and Environment), Function 500 (Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services), and Function 550(Health);
(3) the Congress also should pursue policies designed to ensure that American students, teachers, businesses, and workers are prepared to continue leading the world in innovation, research, and technology well into the future; and
(4) this resolution recognizes the importance of the extension of investments and tax policies that promote research and development and encourage innovation and future technologies that will ensure American economic competitiveness. Ultimately, regular appropriations for FY2010 for activities funded in the CJS Appropriations Act were included as Division B in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. Technology Innovation Program. National Science Foundation
Research and Related Activities. P.L. 111-117 only specifies the funding level for the Robert Noyce Teacher Scholarship Program, the conference report ( H.Rept. 111-85 , the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010, was signed into law on October 28, 2009. Department of Energy
Office of Science. Other Department of Energy Programs Authorized Under the America COMPETES Act. Teachers for a Competitive Tomorrow . Several new programs authorized in the act have never been funded. | The America COMPETES Act (P.L. 110-69) became law on August 9, 2007. The act is intended to increase the nation's investment in research and development (R&D), and in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education. It is intended to address two concerns believed to influence U.S. competitiveness: the adequacy of R&D funding to generate sufficient technological progress, and the adequacy of the number of American students proficient in STEM or interested in STEM careers relative to other countries.
The act authorizes funding increases for the National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) laboratories, and the Department of Energy Office of Science (DOE SC) over FY2008-FY2010. If the rate of increase provided for in the act were maintained, funding for these agencies would double, in nominal terms, in seven years. The act establishes the Advanced Research Projects Agency – Energy (ARPA-E) within DOE to support transformational energy technology research projects to enhance U.S. economic and energy security. A new program, Discovery Science and Engineering Innovation Institutes, is intended to support the establishment of multidisciplinary institutes at DOE national laboratories to apply fundamental science and engineering discoveries to technological innovations.
Among the act's education activities, many of which are focused on high-need school districts, are programs to recruit new K-12 STEM teachers, enhance existing STEM teacher skills, and provide more STEM education opportunities for students. The new Department of Education (ED) Teachers for a Competitive Tomorrow and the existing NSF Robert Noyce Teacher Scholarship programs provide opportunities, through institutional grants, for students pursuing STEM degrees and STEM professionals to gain teaching skills and teacher certification, and for current STEM teachers to enhance their teaching skills and STEM knowledge. The act also authorizes a new program at NSF that would provide grants to create or improve professional science master's degree (PSM) programs that emphasize practical training and preparation for the workforce in high-need fields.
The America COMPETES Act provides authorization levels through FY2010. New programs established by the act will not be initiated, and authorized increases in appropriations for existing programs will not occur, unless funded through appropriation acts. The 110th Congress provided FY2008 appropriations to establish ED's Teachers for a Competitive Tomorrow program, and NIST's Technology Improvement Program (TIP), which replaced the agency's Advanced Technology Program. The 111th Congress provided FY2009 appropriations, supplemented by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), to establish DOE's ARPA-E and NSF's PSM program.
Congress has completed action on the regular FY2010 appropriations acts, providing funding for some programs authorized under the American COMPETES Act through two acts. Some America COMPETES Act research and STEM education programs received appropriations at authorized levels in FY2010, others did not. FY2010 funding for programs at the Department of Commerce, National Science Foundation, and Department of Education is provided by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117). Funding for Department of Energy programs is provided by the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-85). Several programs newly authorized in the act have never been appropriated funds, nor did President Obama seek funding for them in his FY2010 budget request. Congress is considering reauthorizing the America COMPETES Act. |
crs_RL31618 | crs_RL31618_0 | Introduction
Three postsecondary student financial aid programs authorized under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) are collectively referred to as the campus-based programs—the Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant (FSEOG) program, the Federal Work-Study (FWS) program, and the Federal Perkins Loan program. The campus-based programs are unique among the need-based federal student aid programs in that federal funds are awarded to institutions of higher education (IHEs) according to formulas that take into account past institutional awards and the aggregate financial need of students attending the institutions. The mix and amount of aid students receive under the programs are determined by each institution's financial aid administrator according to institution-specific award criteria, rather than according to nondiscretionary award criteria, such as that applicable for Pell Grants and Direct Subsidized Loans. The FSEOG and FWS programs were most recently amended and extended under the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA; P.L. 110-315 ), which reauthorized the programs that are part of the HEA. The campus-based programs' authorization of appropriations, along with many other provisions under the HEA, expired at the end of FY2014. However, Section 422 of the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) automatically extended the programs' authorizations through FY2015. Congress provided appropriations for the FSEOG and FWS programs beyond FY2015 under a series of appropriations measures, most recently through March 23, 2018, under the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ). The Perkins Loan program was amended and extended through FY2017 under the Federal Perkins Loan Program Extension Act of 2015 (Extension Act; P.L. 114-105 ). The authority for institutions to make new Perkins Loans expired on September 30, 2017. Program Descriptions
This part of the report provides a description of each of the three HEA campus-based financial aid programs—the FSEOG program, the FWS program, and the Federal Perkins Loan program. Program descriptions explain the purpose of each program and the terms under which aid is provided to students. This is referred to as their base guarantee. These institutions receive an allocation greater than their base guarantee, which is called their fair share increase. Federal Work-Study Programs19
The purpose of Federal Work Student programs (FWS) is to provide part-time employment to undergraduate, graduate, and professional students in need of earnings to pursue their course of study and to encourage student participation in community service activities. An institution's financial aid administrator is responsible for awarding FWS aid to eligible students. Unlike the FSEOG and Perkins Loan programs, in which aid is required to be awarded first to students with exceptional financial need, FWS aid may be provided to any student demonstrating financial need. Funding for the Campus-Based Programs
Appropriation figures for the campus-based programs are presented in Table 5 for the past decade. Because of the matching requirements, the campus-based programs leverage federal funding to provide an amount of student financial aid that is greater than the amount of federal funds appropriated for each program. | Three Higher Education Act (HEA) student financial aid programs—the Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant (FSEOG) program, the Federal Work-Study (FWS) program, and the Federal Perkins Loan program—collectively are referred to as the campus-based programs. The campus-based programs were reauthorized under the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA; P.L. 110-315), which amended and extended authorization for programs funded under the HEA. The campus-based programs' authorizations of appropriations, along with many other provisions under the HEA, were set to expire at the end of FY2014 and were automatically extended through FY2015 under Section 422 of the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA). Congress provided appropriations for the FSEOG and FWS programs beyond FY2015 under a series of appropriations measures, most recently through March 23, 2018, under the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-123). The Perkins Loan program was amended and extended through FY2017 under the Federal Perkins Loan Program Extension Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-105). The authority for institutions to make new Perkins Loans expired on September 30, 2017.
Under the campus-based programs, federal funding is provided to institutions of higher education for the provision of need-based financial aid to students. Institutions participating in the programs are required to provide matching funds equal to approximately one-third of the federal funds they receive. The campus-based programs are unique among the need-based federal student aid programs in that the mix and amount of aid awarded to students are determined by each institution's financial aid administrator according to institution-specific award criteria (which must be consistent with federal program requirements), rather than according to nondiscretionary award criteria, such as those applicable for Pell Grants and Direct Subsidized Loans.
Each program provides students with a distinct type of aid. The FSEOG program provides grant aid only to undergraduate students. The FWS program provides undergraduate, graduate, and professional students the opportunity for paid employment in a field related to their course of study or in community service. The Perkins Loan program provided low-interest loans with favorable terms and conditions to undergraduate, graduate, and professional students.
For FSEOG and FWS, funding is provided to institutions separately for each program according to formulas that take into account both the allocation institutions received in past years (their base guarantee) and their proportionate share of eligible students' need that is in excess of their base guarantee (their fair share increase). From these funds, institutions' financial aid administrators award aid to eligible students who have financial need. The Perkins Loan program operated in a similar manner.
The programs are among the oldest of the federal postsecondary aid programs; however, they now operate amid a host of other aid programs and tax benefits, some of which are not need-based. At present, a relatively small proportion of all students receive campus-based financial aid.
This report describes the FSEOG, FWS, and Federal Perkins Loan programs. It also presents historical information on appropriations provided for the programs and the federal student aid that has been made available to students through the programs. |
crs_R43619 | crs_R43619_0 | Background
Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, insurance covering terrorism losses was normally included in general insurance policies without additional cost to the policyholders. Following the attacks, both primary insurers and reinsurers pulled back from offering terrorism coverage. Because insurance is required for a variety of economic transactions, particularly borrowing for commercial development, it was feared that a lack of insurance against terrorism loss would have a wider economic impact. Congress responded to the disruption in the insurance market by passing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA). TRIA created a temporary three-year Terrorism Insurance Program to calm the insurance markets through a government reinsurance backstop sharing in terrorism losses. The idea was to give the private industry time to gather the data and create the structures and capacity necessary for private insurance to cover terrorism risk. TRIA requires insurers to offer terrorism coverage, but does not require commercial policyholders to purchase the coverage. This program was extended in 2005 and 2007. In 2005, the extension legislation focused on reducing the government's exposure from TRIA by increasing the minimum covered event size, increasing the insurer deductible, reducing the government share of losses, and increasing the post-event mandatory recoupment. The TRIA program expired at the end of 2014, as provided for in the 2007 extension. The initial thresholds of the current program are as follows:
1. Under current law, all mandatory recoupment must be completed by the end of FY2017. Legislation in the 113th Congress
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 Reauthorization Act of 2013 (H.R. H.R. 1945 has been referred to the House Committee on Financial Services and the House Committee on Homeland Security. Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2013 (H.R. 4871 . It also specifically supported Senate passage of S. 2244 . The House took up S. 2244 as amended under H.Res. The House and the Senate adjourned on December 16, 2014, without further action on S. 2244 or other legislation to extend TRIA. TRIA Reform Act of 2014 (H.R. 4871)
H.R. The provisions include
a gradual reduction of federal share of losses from 85% to 80%; a gradual increase in program trigger from $100 million to $500 million and removal of the $5 million minimum certification amount; a separate treatment of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Radiological (NBCR) terrorist attacks with lower trigger ($100 million) and higher federal loss sharing (85%); a requirement that certification occur within 90 days of an attack; an increase in the maximum of the mandatory recoupment amount to the total of insurer deductibles under the program (currently approximately $36 billion) and removal of a provision that decreases mandatory recoupment in the case of very large attacks; an increase of the mandatory recoupment from 133% to 150% of the federal share of losses; an allowance for small insurers to opt out of the TRIA requirement to make terrorism coverage available if it would create financial hardship or be financially infeasible; a requirement that additional data on the terrorism insurance market be collected by the Treasury and included in an annual report by the Treasury; and a requirement for a GAO study on the possible effects of instituting insurer premiums for the TRIA coverage and requiring capital reserve funds for terrorism, Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and OMB studies regarding budgeting and costs of federal insurance programs, and a Treasury study on small insurer market competitiveness. | Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, insurance covering terrorism losses was normally included in commercial insurance policies without additional cost to the policyholders. Following the attacks, this ceased to be the case as insurers and reinsurers pulled back from offering terrorism coverage. It was feared that a lack of insurance against terrorism loss would have a wider economic impact, particularly because insurance coverage can be a significant factor in lending decisions.
Congress responded to the disruption in the insurance market by passing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA; P.L. 107-297). TRIA created a temporary program, expiring at the end of 2005, to calm the insurance markets through a government reinsurance backstop sharing in terrorism losses. The intent was that this would give the industry time to gather the data and create the structures and capacity necessary for private insurance to cover terrorism risk. TRIA did not require premiums to be paid for the government coverage. Instead, TRIA required private insurers to offer commercial insurance for terrorism risk with the government then recouping some or all federal payments under the act in the years following government coverage of insurer losses.
Under TRIA, terrorism insurance became widely available and largely affordable, and the insurance industry greatly expanded its financial capacity. There has been, however, little apparent success on developing a longer-term private solution, and fears have persisted about wider economic consequences if insurance were not available. Congress passed two extensions to the program, in 2005 (P.L. 109-144) and 2007 (P.L. 110-160). The 2005 extension was primarily focused on reducing the government's upfront financial exposure under the act, whereas the 2007 extension left most of the upfront aspect of the TRIA program unchanged, while accelerating the post-event recoupment provisions. The 2007 legislation also included the only expansion of the TRIA program since initial enactment; it extended the program to cover any acts of terrorism, as opposed to only foreign acts of terrorism.
The current TRIA program expires at the end of 2014. Although insurance industry capacity has increased since 2002, terrorism is still seen by many as essentially uninsurable. Without TRIA, the insurance industry has indicated that terrorism insurance will again become unavailable or unaffordable and fears are again being expressed that lack of terrorism insurance may slow down other sectors of the economy. Several bills (H.R. 508, H.R. 1945, H.R. 2146, S. 2244, and H.R. 4871) were introduced to extend TRIA and change different aspects of the program. The House and the Senate adjourned on December 16, 2014, without passing legislation to extend TRIA.
This report briefly outlines the issues involved with terrorism insurance, summarizes extension legislation in the 113th Congress, and includes a side-by-side of TRIA law and bills that were passed by the Senate (S. 2244), reported by the House Committee on Financial Services (H.R. 4871), and passed by the House (S. 2244 with a substitute amendment). For more a more in-depth treatment of the issues surrounding TRIA, please see CRS Report R42716, Terrorism Risk Insurance: Issue Analysis and Overview of Current Program, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44272 | crs_R44272_0 | High rates of obesity and chronic disease have prompted various state and local nutrition labeling initiatives, in addition to other tactics and strategies. The 1990 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA, P.L. 101-535 ) authorized the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to require nutrition labeling of most foods and dietary supplements, but it did not require the labeling of food sold in restaurants. Section 4205 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. However, variable state and local regulations had resulted in a patchwork of labeling requirements, making compliance more challenging for chain food establishments. This report discusses the role of nutrition labeling in obesity management and prevention; the research on the effectiveness of restaurant menu calorie labeling; FDA's authority to regulate nutrition labeling; and the FDA's final rules on restaurant menu and vending machine labeling. This voluntary action by large chain restaurants may have been in anticipation of the ACA's federal menu-labeling provisions which will be in effect May 7, 2018. FDA had proposed two options for clarifying which restaurants and similar retail food establishments would be covered by the rule. Covered entities under the final rule include restaurants and SRFEs with 20 or more locations, as well as supermarkets and convenience stores, and entertainment venues such as bowling alleys and movie theaters. In tandem with the restaurant menu labeling rule, FDA issued a final rule regarding calorie labeling for food items sold in covered vending machines. Compliance and Enforcement
As previously noted, in 2011, FDA published two proposed rules establishing calorie labeling requirements for food items sold in restaurants and vending machines. The two rules were finalized and published in the Federal Register on December 1, 2014, and were to take effect one year from publication (December 1, 2015) for restaurants and two years (December 1, 2016) for vending machines. Compliance with the regulations was delayed again as a result of language included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ), which prohibited the use of any funds for implementation, administration, or enforcement of the menu labeling requirements until the later of December 1, 2016, or until one year from the date that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issues final, Level 1 guidance on compliance with specified requirements for menu labeling contained in the final menu labeling rule. In issuing the final guidance, FDA announced that enforcement of the final rule would commence on May 5, 2017. However, in response to continued concerns from certain sectors of the affected industry and some Members of Congress, FDA announced that it was further extending the compliance date to May 7, 2018. FDA has also extended the compliance date for calorie labeling of certain food products sold in vending machines to July 26, 2018. Opponents of the extension have argued that many chains are successfully complying with the labeling requirements and that consumers want menu labeling. | High rates of obesity and chronic diseases have prompted various federal, state, and local nutrition labeling initiatives. The 1990 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (P.L. 101-535) required nutrition labeling of most foods and dietary supplements, but it did not require labeling of food sold in restaurants. However, consumption data indicate that Americans consume more than one-third of their calories outside the home, and frequent eating out is associated with increased caloric intake.
In 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148) into law, with Section 4205 mandating nutrition labeling in certain restaurants and similar retail food establishments (SRFEs). This provision also required calorie labeling of certain vending machine items. In 2011, as required by the ACA, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) published two proposed rules establishing calorie labeling requirements for food items sold in certain restaurants and vending machines; both rules were finalized and published in the Federal Register on December 1, 2014. The labeling rules were to take effect one year later (December 1, 2015) for restaurants and two years later (December 1, 2016) for vending machines. The compliance date was extended following language included in the FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113), which prohibited the use of any funds for implementation, administration, or enforcement of the menu labeling requirements until the later of December 1, 2016, or until one year from the date that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issues Level 1 guidance on compliance with specified requirements for menu labeling contained in the final menu labeling rule. FDA issued such final guidance on May 5, 2016, and stated that the agency would not begin enforcing the final rule until May 5, 2017. In response to continuing concerns from certain sectors of the affected industry and some Members of Congress, on May 1, 2017, FDA announced that it was extending the compliance date to May 7, 2018. FDA has also extended the compliance date for calorie labeling of certain food products sold in vending machines to July 26, 2018.
In addition to requiring calorie labeling for food sold in certain restaurants and vending machines, labeling will also be required for prepared foods sold at supermarkets, grocery and convenience stores, and entertainment venues (e.g., movie theaters and amusement parks). Calorie counts will have to be listed on menus and menu boards for all standard items, including alcoholic drinks and salad bar items.
Prior to the federal rule, state and local menu labeling regulations had resulted in a patchwork of labeling requirements, making compliance challenging for chain food establishments. Several restaurant chains (e.g., McDonald's, Panera Bread, and Starbucks) had moved forward with nationwide nutrition labeling prior to FDA's final rule, expressing support for a federal menu labeling standard.
Opponents of the final menu labeling regulation have questioned FDA's interpretation of the ACA provision, arguing that the final rule is more stringent than the regulation initially proposed by FDA or intended by Congress. For example, as mentioned above, the final rule requires grocery stores and delivery establishments (e.g., pizza places) to meet the labeling requirements. Opponents of the extension have argued that many chains are successfully complying with the labeling requirements and that consumers want menu labeling. This rule takes effect May 7, 2018, and some have asked FDA for additional guidance to address opponents' concerns. |
crs_RL33517 | crs_RL33517_0 | 297), the President may propose to rescind funding provided in an appropriationsact by transmitting a special message to Congress and obtaining the support of both houses within45 days of continuous session. (1) An Administration draft bill, titled the Legislative Line Item VetoAct of 2006 (LLIVA), was transmitted to Congress on March 6, 2006. Instead of allowing Congress to ignore presidential recommendations for rescissions,"expedited rescission" requires at least one house to vote on the proposals. Expedited Rescission Bills in the 1990s
The expedited rescission approach has attracted support over the years, because it is generallyregarded as transferring less power from Congress to the President than most other approaches thatwould modify the ICA framework. H.R. Overview of Provisions in the Administration's Proposal
On March 7, 2006, a draft expedited rescission bill from the White House, titled theLegislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006, was introduced as H.R. Other Expedited Rescission Bills in the 109th Congress
In addition to the administration's proposal (the LLIVA, H.R. H.R. (8) The next day the Rules Committee held a markup and voted 8-4to report an amended version in effectively the same form as that approved by the BudgetCommittee. (9) On June 22,the House approved H.R. 4890, as amended, by vote of 247-172. (10)
Meanwhile, on June 14, 2006, Senator Judd Gregg, the chair of the Senate BudgetCommittee, and others held a press conference to unveil the Stop Over Spending Act, which containsa modified version of the Legislative Line Item Veto Act in Title I, as well as other budget processreforms. On June 20, the Senate Budget Committee marked up S. 3521 and voted 12-10 to reportthe bill, as amended, favorably. Table 1 , at the end of this report, provides a comparative overview of some major featuresin three expedited rescission bills: (1) H.R. 4890 / S. 2381 as introduced,(2) H.R. 4890 as passed by the House (House approved), and (3) Title I of S. 3521 , as amended and ordered to be reported by the Senate Budget Committee (Senate reported). H.R 4890/ S. 2381 , as introduced, and S. 3521 , as ordered to be reported, would amend Title X of the ICA by striking Part C(Line Item Veto Act of 1996) and inserting the text of the bill. 5667 , contains such provisions. | Under current law, the President may propose to rescind funding provided in anappropriations act by transmitting a special message to Congress. If Congress ignores thepresidential rescission request, or if either house rejects the request, the funds must be released after45 days of continuous session. Instead of allowing Congress to ignore such requests, "expeditedrescission" requires at least one house to vote on presidential proposals. Expedited rescission billshave attracted supporters over the years, because the approach is generally regarded as transferringless power from Congress to the President than most other ways of altering the rescission framework.For three consecutive years in the early 1990s, the House passed an expedited rescission bill.
President George W. Bush has repeatedly called for granting line item veto authority to thePresident, and an Administration draft bill incorporating the expedited rescission approach was sentto Congress on March 6, 2006. That bill, the Legislative Line Item Veto Act (LLIVA) of 2006, wasintroduced the following day as S. 2381 and H.R. 4890 . Other expeditedrescission measures pending in the 109th Congress contain similar provisions, including H.R. 2290 (Section 311), H.R. 4699 , H.R. 5667 (Title I), S. 2372 , and S. 3521 (Title I).
On June 14, 2006, the House Budget Committee voted 24-9 to report H.R. 4890 ,as amended, favorably. The next day the Rules Committee voted 8-4 to report an amended versionin effectively the same form as that approved by the Budget Committee. On June 22, 2006, theHouse approved H.R. 4890 by a vote of 247-172.
Meanwhile, on June 14, 2006, Senator Judd Gregg, the chair of the Senate BudgetCommittee, and others held a press conference to unveil the Stop Over Spending Act, whichcontained a modified version of the LLIVA in Title I, as well as other budget process reforms. OnJune 15, 2006, the bill was introduced as S. 3521 , and on June 20, the Senate BudgetCommittee voted 12-10 to report the bill, as amended, favorably.
This report provides a comparative overview of some major features in three versions of theLLIVA -- H.R. 4890 / S. 2381 as introduced, H.R. 4890 as passedby the House, and Title I of S. 3521 , as ordered to be reported by the Senate BudgetCommittee -- with provisions in the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-130 ), which the SupremeCourt held unconstitutional in 1998.
This report will be updated when action is taken regarding any of the relevant bills or as otherevents warrant. |
crs_RL33418 | crs_RL33418_0 | 109-171 , S. 1932 ), a budget spending reconciliation bill signed into law February 8, 2006, included a scaled-back version of welfare reform reauthorization. The act extended funding for the basic Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant through FY2010, increased the percentage of TANF families who will be required to participate in work or work activities, increased funding for child care, revised the Child Support Enforcement program, and established healthy marriage promotion grants and responsible fatherhood initiatives. President Bush submitted his welfare reauthorization proposals to Congress in February 2002. As in previous years, efforts to pass comprehensive free-standing welfare legislation in the first session of the 109 th Congress were unsuccessful. However, a scaled-back version of welfare reauthorization legislation was ultimately included in broader budget spending reconciliation legislation, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. In crafting the DRA ( S. 1932 / P.L. Although the full Senate had failed to act on welfare reauthorization legislation prior to assembling and considering the DRA, early in the 109 th Congress, the Senate Finance Committee did approve a welfare reauthorization measure ( S. 667 ). Further, previous welfare reauthorization proposals had included $200 million per year in grants for healthy marriage promotion—$100 million per year for matching grants to states and tribes and a second $100 million per year in research and demonstration funding controlled by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). The level of mandatory child care funding has been a contentious point of debate over the past four years. The Deficit Reduction Act includes an increase of $200 million per year (from $2.717 billion to $2.917 billion per year) in federal mandatory child care funding, or a total increase of $1 billion over five years. The increase reflects twice that proposed earlier in the House-passed budget reconciliation bill ($0.5 billion), mirroring the funding level passed by the House in welfare reauthorization measures of both 2002 and 2003. The $1 billion increase stands in contrast to the proposed increase of $6 billion over five years included in the bill reported out of the Senate Finance Committee early in 2005 ( S. 667 ). The Deficit Reduction Act's $1 billion in additional federal child care funds requires state matching. However, a number of factors are likely to limit TANF's ability to contribute more child care funds, specifically: (1) the block grant will remain frozen at the same levels as it was in FY1997 ($16.5 billion) and inflation continues to erode the purchasing power of those dollars; (2) the DRA will have the likely effect of increasing the percentage of TANF families that will have to participate in work activities, increasing the TANF work costs in addition to child care costs; and (3) allocating additional funding to child care would mean cutting back on other initiatives that have been funded with TANF dollars, for instance TANF's contribution to funding child welfare benefits and services for children who have been subject to, or are at risk of, abuse, neglect, or family breakup. The Finance Committee approach was to generally expand the activities that count toward the participation standards, in part by increasing the amount of education that would have been countable under TANF work standards. Responsible Fatherhood Initiatives
Enforcement of child support orders is only one dimension of current efforts to connect noncustodial parents (usually fathers) with their children. | Enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005 (P.L. 109-171, S. 1932) on February 8, 2006 concluded a four-year saga of legislative attempts to reauthorize Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and related programs. The original 1996 TANF law authorized five years of funding, through September 2002. Between October 1, 2002 and the DRA's passage, the program operated under a series of 12 "temporary extension" measures. Efforts to pass comprehensive free-standing welfare legislation during that period failed to reach fruition.
Instead, a scaled-back version of welfare reauthorization legislation was ultimately included in broader budget spending reconciliation legislation. The DRA of 2005 extends and maintains the basic TANF block grant at a funding level of $16.5 billion annually through FY2010; increases the share of TANF families required to participate in work activities; increases child care funding by $200 million per year over the FY2005 level of $2.7 billion, for FY2006-FY2010 (i.e., a total increase of $1 billion); provides federal cost-sharing for child support passed through to TANF and former TANF families, but prevents federal matching of child support incentive payments reinvested in the program; provides up to $100 million per year in demonstration grants for the promotion of "healthy marriages"; and establishes $50 million per year for "responsible fatherhood" initiatives.
The Administration originally proposed its welfare reauthorization plan in February 2002. The debate that ensued was dominated by controversy over child care funding levels and the Administration's proposed changes to TANF work participation standards. The reauthorization debate also reflected a renewed focus on noncustodial parents (usually fathers) and on family formation issues. The DRA includes responsible fatherhood initiatives and a scaled-back version of the President's initiative to promote healthy marriages.
The DRA ultimately included the same child care funding increase that was proposed in earlier House-passed welfare reauthorization measures in 2002 and 2003 ($1 billion in additional mandatory child care funding over five years). In the 108th Congress, legislation introduced in the Senate likewise proposed a $1 billion increase over five years (down from the $5.5 billion increase approved by the Senate Finance Committee in the 107th Congress); however, Senator Snowe led efforts pressing for a larger increase. The bill approved by the 109th Congress's Finance Committee (S. 667) reflected those efforts, with a proposed increase of $6 billion over five years. However, S. 667 was one of the free-standing welfare measures that was not taken up by the full Senate, and the child care funding increase was set at $1 billion in the final passage of the DRA.
With respect to the work requirement issue, while the DRA requires states to increase the share of their families participating in TANF work activities, it does not include the Administration's original proposal to set a 40-hour workweek standard or revise the activities that count toward it. This marks the final version of this report; it will not be updated. |
crs_R43359 | crs_R43359_0 | Aereo and FilmOn X were also created to stream television programming over the Internet for a monthly subscription fee. Unlike the other companies, however, the technology of Aereo and FilmOn permitted subscribers to watch both live broadcast television and already-aired programming without licenses. This development in technology triggered multiple lawsuits alleging copyright violations by these companies. The litigation revealed not only multiple interpretations of copyright law and its application to new and developing technologies, but also a possible "loophole" in the law, which some accused Aereo and FilmOn of exploiting. The Copyright Act of 1976 provides copyright holders with the exclusive right to control how their work is reproduced, adapted, distributed, publicly displayed, or publicly performed. The issue before the courts in the lawsuits against Aereo and FilmOn X is whether a retransmission of copyrighted broadcasts over the Internet without a prior agreement with the copyright holder violated the copyright holder's right of public performance. The Second Circuit, in a split appellate panel, affirmed the district court decision ruling that the transmissions by Aereo did not infringe the plaintiffs' public performance right. In the 2012 case Fox Television Stations v. BarryDriller Content Systems , the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California found that FilmOn's retransmission of certain television programs violated the copyrights of several broadcasters. In 2013, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found, in Fox Television Stations v. FilmOn X , that FilmOn's retransmission of the plaintiffs' copyrighted programs over the Internet violated their right of public performance because FilmOn retransmitted copyrighted works to members of the public without the plaintiffs' prior permission. In a 2014 decision in ABC v. Aereo , the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Second Circuit ruling in WNET v. Aereo and held that Aereo infringed upon the broadcasters' exclusive right of public performance when it retransmitted a broadcast of a program to paid subscribers over the Internet. Following the Supreme Court's decision, Aereo suspended its service, and in November 2014, filed for bankruptcy. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that these transmissions were public performances. While the Court in those earlier cases found cable television providers did not qualify as "public performers" under the Copyright Act, Congress, in response to these decisions, amended the Copyright Act in 1976 to include these technologies specifically within the scope of public performance. The Television Consumer Freedom Act of 2013, introduced by Senator John McCain, would have impacted the market in which companies such as Aereo, FilmOn, and the broadcasters are competing. As of the date of this report, it remains to be seen whether these or similar bills will be introduced in the 114 th Congress. | Aereo and FilmOn X were created to stream television programming over the Internet for a monthly subscription fee. Aereo and FilmOn's technology permitted subscribers to watch both live broadcast television in addition to already-aired programming. Their use of this development in technology triggered multiple lawsuits from broadcasting companies alleging copyright violations. These cases revealed not only multiple interpretations of copyright law and its application to new and developing technologies, but also a possible "loophole" in the law, which some accused Aereo and FilmOn of exploiting.
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides copyright holders with the exclusive right to control how certain creative content is publicly performed. Of particular interest to courts in recent cases against Aereo and FilmOn was the meaning of the Copyright Act's "transmit clause" that determines whether a performance is private or public and within the scope of the public performance right. Specifically, the courts have been divided as to what constitutes a "performance to members of the public" for the purposes of the transmit clause.
During the past several years, groups of broadcasters have filed lawsuits against Aereo and FilmOn alleging that the retransmissions of their programs by these companies have violated their right of public performance. While both FilmOn and Aereo use similar technology, the courts have disagreed about whether this technology infringes upon the copyright holder's right of public performance. District courts in the District of Columbia (Fox Television Stations v. FilmOn X) and California (Fox Television Stations v. BarryDriller Content Systems) held that FilmOn's retransmissions did violate the right of public performance. In 2013, the U.S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in WNET v. Aereo affirmed the lower court decision ruling that the transmissions by Aereo did not infringe the plaintiffs' public performance right. However, the U.S. Supreme Court in its 2014 decision in ABC v. Aereo overturned the Second Circuit's ruling and held that Aereo's transmissions served as a public performance of the plaintiffs' works within the meaning of the transmit clause, violating the plaintiffs' exclusive rights to control such performances. A few months after the Supreme Court ruling, Aereo, having already suspended its service, filed for bankruptcy.
Contemporaneous to these decisions, two bills in the 113th Congress addressed issues related to Internet television streaming. These bills, the Television Consumer Freedom Act of 2013 (S. 912) and the Consumer Choice in Online Video Act (S. 1680), would have enhanced consumer choice regarding online television programming, a service marketed by both Aereo and FilmOn. As of the date of this report, it remains to be seen whether these or similar bills will be introduced in the 114th Congress. |
crs_RL33437 | crs_RL33437_0 | On the basis of this recommendation, the State Department, in its annual International Religious Freedom Report (November 2005), designated China as a CPC for the sixth consecutive year, noting: "The arrest, detention, and imprisonment of Falun Gong practitioners continued; those who refused to recant their beliefs were sometimes subjected to harsh treatment in prisons and reeducation-through-labor camps, and there were credible reports of deaths due to torture and abuse." The PRC government appears to have been largely successful in not only suppressing FLG activity in China but also discrediting Falun Gong in the eyes of PRC citizens and preventing linkages between Falun Gong and other social protest movements. The largest memberships and severest human rights abuses have been reported in China's northeastern provinces. According to another expert, there are between 15,000 and 25,000 political or religious prisoners in China, half of whom are linked to the Falun Gong movement. On May 19, 2003, U.S. citizen Charles Li was sentenced to three years in prison for "intending to sabotage" Chinese television broadcasts. Alleged Concentration Camps and Organ Harvesting
In March 2006, U.S. Falun Gong representatives claimed that thousands of practitioners had been sent to 36 concentration camps throughout the PRC, particularly in the northeast, and that many of them were killed for profit through the harvesting and sale of their organs. American officials from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. consulate in Shenyang visited the area as well as the hospital site on two occasions—the first time unannounced and the second with the cooperation of PRC officials—and after investigating the facility "found no evidence that the site is being used for any function other than as a normal public hospital." The movement has become highly public in the United States. Members regularly stage demonstrations, distribute flyers, and sponsor cultural events. In addition, FLG followers are affiliated with several mass media outlets, including Internet sites. U.S. Government Actions
Since 1999, some Members of the United States Congress have made many public pronouncements and introduced several resolutions in support of Falun Gong. In the 109 th Congress, H.Res. 608 , agreed to in the House on June 12, 2006, condemns the "escalating levels of religious persecution" in China, including the "brutal campaign to eradicate Falun Gong." H.Res. 794 , passed by the House on June 12, 2006, calls upon the PRC to end its most egregious human rights abuses, including the persecution of Falun Gong. | In 1999, the "Falun Gong" movement gave rise to the largest and most protracted public demonstrations in China since the democracy movement of a decade earlier. The People's Republic of China (PRC) government, fearful of a political challenge and the spread of social unrest, outlawed Falun Gong and carried out an intensive, comprehensive, and unforgiving campaign against the movement. Since 2003, Falun Gong has been largely suppressed or pushed deep underground in China while it has thrived in overseas Chinese communities and Hong Kong. The spiritual exercise group has become highly visible in the United States since 1999, staging demonstrations, distributing flyers, and sponsoring cultural events. In addition, Falun Gong followers are affiliated with several mass media outlets. Despite the group's tenacity and political activities overseas, it has not formed the basis of a dissident movement encompassing other social and political groups from China.
The State Department, in its annual International Religious Freedom Report (November 2005), designated China as a "country of particular concern" (CPC) for the sixth consecutive year, noting: "The arrest, detention, and imprisonment of Falun Gong practitioners continued; those who refused to recant their beliefs were sometimes subjected to harsh treatment in prisons and reeducation-through-labor camps, and there were credible reports of deaths due to torture and abuse." In March 2006, U.S. Falun Gong representatives claimed that thousands of practitioners had been sent to 36 concentration camps throughout the PRC. According to their allegations, at one such site in Sujiatun, near the city of Shenyang, a hospital has been used as a detention center for 6,000 Falun Gong prisoners, three-fourths of whom are said to have been killed and had their organs harvested for profit. American officials from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. consulate in Shenyang visited the area as well as inspected the hospital on two occasions and "found no evidence that the site is being used for any function other than as a normal public hospital."
Since 1999, some Members of the United States Congress have made many public pronouncements and introduced several resolutions in support of Falun Gong and criticizing China's human rights record. In the 109th Congress, H.Res. 608, agreed to in the House on June 12, 2006, condemns the "escalating levels of religious persecution" in China, including the "brutal campaign to eradicate Falun Gong." H.Res. 794, passed by the House on June 12, 2006, calls upon the PRC to end its most egregious human rights abuses, including the persecution of Falun Gong. In January 2006, U.S. citizen Charles Li was released from a PRC prison after serving a three-year term for "intending to sabotage" broadcasting equipment in China on behalf of Falun Gong.
This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R42763 | crs_R42763_0 | On January 2, 2013—absent congressional action—largely across-the-board spending cuts will be automatically imposed as stipulated in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ). The approaching fiscal cliff has led to forecasts of a possible recession in 2013, and concern among policymakers about the impact of sequestration on employers and their employees. Several studies have estimated the potential effect on employment of cutting the budgets of different agencies and programs. The BCA also limits cuts in Medicare payments to 2%. A Review of Empirical Estimates of the Employment Effect of Sequestration
Spending by the federal government supports (creates or maintains) jobs in three ways. It does so directly by paying the salaries of federal employees and by contracting with firms in various industries (e.g., shipbuilding) to produce final products (e.g., an aircraft carrier). Jobs supported in this way are referred to as direct jobs . Federal government spending also supports jobs indirectly when contractors use a portion of their federal awards to buy outputs from businesses in other industries (e.g., navigational instruments manufacturing) that are incorporated in the finished products of prime contractors. The jobs supported by (dependent on) the purchases of prime contractors are referred to as indirect jobs . Lastly, when workers in direct jobs (e.g., federal employees and employees of shipbuilders) and indirect jobs (e.g., employees of navigational equipment manufacturers) spend their paychecks (e.g., at grocery stores and doctors' offices), additional jobs are supported by federal spending. These are referred to as induced jobs . The study estimated a small difference between the number of direct, indirect, and induced job losses due to a $56.7 billion reduction in FY2012-FY2013 in DOD spending (1,090,000) and the number of direct, indirect, and induced job losses due to a $59.0 billion reduction in spending by nondefense agencies (1,047,000). Using its Long-Term Interindustry Forecasting Tool (LIFT), Inforum estimated that the largest adverse employment impact of cuts from 2012-2022 baseline budgets for DOD would occur in calendar years 2013 and 2014:
A $48 billion nominal decrease (6.7%) in defense expenditures compared with LIFT's baseline budget for 2013 was estimated to reduce defense-dependent employment in the calendar year by 907,000 jobs. Job losses were estimated to decrease thereafter relative to the baseline as the economy adjusts to reduced federal spending (demand). Laid-off workers are predicted to find new jobs because, as is usual after a demand shock, spending is predicted to increase in sectors of the economy other than the federal government and overall employment is predicted to recover to the baseline for 2022. Job losses might total 80,500 among early childhood personnel, elementary and secondary school (K-12) educators, postsecondary faculty, and other support personnel in FY2013, if the budget reduction for non-exempt nondefense discretionary agencies is 8.4%. In 2013, a cut of $10.7 billion from the baseline was estimated to produce 500,000 fewer direct, indirect and induced jobs. Of that total, almost 212,000 were direct jobs in such occupations as nurses, housekeepers, independent contractors, and medical residents. Achieving deficit reduction by some means other than the BCA's about equal split of automatic budget reductions between non-exempt defense and nondefense programs might alter the composition of employers and employees who bear the burden of the cuts, but the impact on total U.S. employment may be similar. | Policymakers and economists have expressed concern that spending cuts and tax increases (commonly referred to as the "fiscal cliff") may push a slowly growing economy into recession in 2013. In summer 2012, policymakers particularly focused on how sequestration as delineated in the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) might affect employment in the near term. (Sequestration refers to an automatic cancellation of a portion of federal agencies' budgetary resources.) Effective on January 2, 2013, the BCA imposes across-the-board spending cuts split about equally (in dollar terms) between the budgets of non-exempt defense and nondefense discretionary and mandatory programs, a 2% limit is placed on cuts to Medicare's budget as well.
This report reviews several studies that have estimated the potential effect of the sequestration process on employment. Their findings indicate that reduced federal spending would create or maintain fewer jobs than otherwise would have existed, and that cuts in the budgets of different agencies affect the pattern of job loss by occupation, industry, and state. These results suggest that achieving deficit reduction by means other than the BCA's about equal split of automatic budget reductions between non-exempt defense and nondefense programs might alter the composition of employers and employees most adversely affected, but the impact on total U.S. employment may be similar.
The expenditures of federal agencies create or maintain jobs in three ways. Direct jobs result from paying the salaries of their employees and contracting with firms in various industries (e.g., shipbuilding) to produce goods (e.g., aircraft carriers). The contractors use a portion of their federal awards to buy products from firms in other industries (e.g., navigational instruments manufacturing) that the recipients of federal funds use in their finished products. The jobs supported by the purchases of federal contractors are referred to as indirect jobs. When the workers in direct jobs (e.g., employees of shipbuilders) and indirect jobs (e.g., employees of navigational equipment manufacturers) spend their paychecks on final goods and services (e.g., at grocery store and doctors' offices), additional jobs are supported by federal spending. These are referred to as induced jobs.
One study estimated that a $48 billion sequester of Defense Department funds in 2013, compared with a baseline budget (without BCA cuts) for the calendar year, might support 907,000 fewer direct, indirect, and induced jobs. Job losses were forecast to diminish relative to the baseline after peaking in 2014 at about 1.2 million, with laid-off workers predicted to find new jobs in other industries as the economy adjusts to lower federal spending and employment recovers to the baseline forecast for 2022. Another analysis applied a 7.8% reduction to the National Institutes of Health budget for extramural awards, which are made to universities and other nongovernmental research facilities. It estimated that almost 34,000 direct, indirect, and induced job losses might result from such a program cut in FY2013. A third study, which reduced the budgets of Education Department and Head Start programs by 8.4%, put direct job loss among early childhood support personnel, elementary and secondary school educators, postsecondary faculty, and other support personnel at 80,500. Another analysis projected that a 2% reduction in Medicare's budget ($10.7 billion) in 2013, compared with a baseline budget, might support 500,000 fewer direct, indirect, and induced jobs. Of that total, almost 212,000 are direct jobs in such occupations as nurses, housekeepers, independent contractors, and medical residents. |
crs_RS21689 | crs_RS21689_0 | The scheduled January 2004 pay adjustment, based on the ECI, is 2.2%. Effect of Delayed Passage
GS pay adjustment in January 2004, pending presidential approval of the FY2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act, is limited to 1.5% forbasic pay and an average of 0.5% for locality. The pay adjustment for officials has been limited to 1.5%. Salaries of officials will increase to the2.2% rate,retroactively. | Federal pay adjustment rates going into effect in January 2004, under Executive Order13322 (69 Federal Register231) were less than those in the pending Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 (H.R. 2673). The GeneralSchedule (GS) and related salarysystems were limited to 2.0%, as opposed to the 4.1% subsequently passed. Salaries of officials in the threebranches were temporarily limited, due to the lowerGS rate, to 1.5%, rather than the scheduled 2.2%, which upon Presidential approval of H.R. 2673, will go into effectretroactively. |
crs_RL34701 | crs_RL34701_0 | Introduction1
On April 2-4, 2008, NATO held a summit in Bucharest, Romania. A principal issue was consideration of the candidacies for membership of Albania, Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Greece blocked an invitation to Macedonia because of a dispute over Macedonia's name. Albania and Croatia are small countries, with correspondingly small militaries. The two countries had aspirations to join both the European Union and NATO. Process
The Washington Treaty of 1949, NATO's founding instrument, does not describe detailed qualifications for membership. Each country's MAP is classified, as is its evaluation by the allies. After issuing official invitations to Albania and Croatia at the April Bucharest summit, on July 9, 2008, the allies signed accession protocols for their entry into NATO. The protocols outlined NATO's expectations of the two prospective members. On April 1, 2009, in a ceremony at the Department of State, the Ambassadors of Albania and Croatia deposited the ratified documents with the United States and officially became the 27 th and 28 th members of the Alliance. In a ceremony at the NATO summit in Strasbourg, France on April 4, the two newest members took their seats at the NATO table. The United States Senate has the constitutional authority to give its advice and consent by a two-thirds majority to the amendment of any treaty. In the case of NATO enlargement, it must decide whether to amend the Washington Treaty to commit the United States to defend additional geographic territory. On September 10, 2008, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the accession of Albania and Croatia to NATO. On September 25, 2008 the Senate, by division vote (Treaty Number 110-20), ratified the accession protocols. Future Candidates for Future Rounds? 439 (sponsored by Senator Lugar), which urged NATO to award a MAP to Georgia and Ukraine as soon as possible. Some observers in Georgia and the west have argued that NATO's failure to offer Georgia a Membership Action Plan at the April 2008 NATO summit emboldened Russia's aggressiveness toward Georgia and may have been an enabling factor in Russia's August 2008 invasion of Georgia. However, Ukraine's future MAP candidacy faces several challenges. In unprecedented language, the alliance pledged that Georgia and Ukraine would eventually become members of NATO without specifying when that might happen. Conclusion
Most allies seem to believe that although Albania's and Croatia's militaries and resources are modest, both countries' membership in the alliance could lead to greater stability in southeastern Europe, especially given the independence of Kosovo and the enduring hostility to NATO of important political factions in Serbia. Specifically, these reports are to include an evaluation of how a country being actively considered for NATO membership will further the principles of NATO and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area; an evaluation of the country's eligibility for membership, including military readiness; an explanation of how an invitation to the country would affect the national security interests of the United States; a U.S. government analysis of common-funded military requirements and costs associated with integrating the country into NATO and an analysis of the shares of those costs to be borne by NATO members; and a preliminary analysis of the budgetary implications for the United States of integrating that country into NATO. President Bush signed it into law ( P.L. 110 - 17 ) April 9, 2007. The NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007 reaffirmed the United States' "commitment to further enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include European democracies that are able and willing to meet the responsibilities of membership..." The act called for the "timely admission" of Albania, Croatia, Georgia, the "Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)," and Ukraine to NATO, recognizes progress made by Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia on their Membership Action Plans (MAPs), and applauds political and military advances made by Georgia and Ukraine while signaling regret that the alliance has not entered into a MAP with either country. Both the Senate and House expressed further support for a strengthening of Allied relations with Georgia and Ukraine, passing companion resolutions expressing strong support "for [NATO] to enter into a Membership Action Plan with Georgia and Ukraine." | At the April 2-4, 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, a principal issue was consideration of the candidacies for membership of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia. The allies agreed to extend invitations to Albania and Croatia. Although the alliance determined that Macedonia met the qualifications for NATO membership, Greece blocked the invitation due to an enduring dispute over Macedonia's name. After formal accession talks, on July 9, 2008, the foreign ministers of Albania and Croatia and the permanent representatives of the 26 NATO allies signed accession protocols amending the North Atlantic Treaty to permit Albania and Croatia's membership in NATO. To take effect, the protocols had to be ratified, first by current NATO members, then by Albania and Croatia. On April 1, 2009, the two countries formally became the 27th and 28th members of the Alliance when the Ambassadors of the two nations deposited the ratified instruments of accession at the State Department. On April 4, 2009, Albania and Croatia were welcomed to the NATO table at a ceremony held at the NATO summit in Strasbourg, France. Both nations are small states with correspondingly small militaries, and their inclusion in NATO cannot be considered militarily strategic. However, it is possible that their membership could play a political role in helping to stabilize southeastern Europe.
Over the past 15 years, Congress has passed legislation indicating its support for NATO enlargement, as long as candidate states meet qualifications for alliance membership. On April 9, 2007, former President Bush signed into law the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-17), expressing support for further NATO enlargement. On September 10, 2008, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the accession of Albania and Croatia as a prelude to Senate ratification. For states to be admitted, the Senate must pass a resolution of ratification by a two-thirds majority to amend NATO's founding treaty and commit the United States to defend new geographic space. On September 25, 2008, the Senate by division vote (Treaty Number 110-20) ratified the accession protocols. The potential cost of enlargement had been a factor in the debate over NATO enlargement in the mid-and late-1990s. However, the costs of the current round were expected to be minimal.
Another issue debated at the Bucharest summit was NATO's future enlargement and the question of offering Membership Action Plans (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine. The MAP is generally viewed by allies and aspiring alliance members as a way station to membership. However, it is not an invitation to join NATO, and it does not formally guarantee future membership. The former Bush Administration supported granting MAPs to Georgia and Ukraine. Both the Senate and House passed resolutions in the 110th Congress urging NATO to enter into MAPs with Georgia and Ukraine (S.Res. 439 and H.Res. 997, respectively). However, despite strong U.S. support, the allies decided after much debate not to offer MAPs to Georgia and Ukraine at Bucharest. Opponents cited internal separatist conflicts in Georgia, public opposition to membership in Ukraine, and Russia's strong objection to the two countries' membership as factors influencing their opposition. The allies pledged that Georgia and Ukraine would eventually become NATO members but did not specify when this might happen. The August 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia seemed to place the membership prospects of Georgia and Ukraine aside for the immediate future.
This report will be updated as needed. See also CRS Report RL31915, NATO Enlargement: Senate Advice and Consent, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43203 | crs_R43203_0 | Introduction
An administrative agency may generally only exercise that authority which is provided to it by Congress. Often, however, congressional delegations of authority are imprecise, and, as a result, agencies must construe ambiguous terms and make interpretive decisions in order to implement Congress's delegation. The Supreme Court, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council , outlined a limited role for courts in reviewing these types of agency interpretations. This report will discuss the Chevron decision; explain when Chevron deference applies; highlight common agency statutory interpretations that generally do not receive deference under Chevron ; and review the recent Supreme Court opinion in City of Arlington v. FCC which clarified the applicability of Chevron deference to circumstances in which an agency is interpreting the scope of its own jurisdiction. The Court noted that because Congress has expressly delegated to the administrative agency the authority to interpret the statute through regulation, a judge must not substitute his own interpretation of the statute in question when the agency has provided a permissible construction of the statute. How should courts review statutory language to determine whether Congress has been clear? Chevron Step Two
If a court determines that the statutory language is ambiguous or silent on the particular issue in question, the court must then consider whether the agency's construction of the statute is a "permissible" one. However, the Supreme Court has provided little guidance as to how a court should evaluate whether the agency's interpretation is "permissible" or "reasonable" under Chevron step two. First, the court noted that the language of the statute was "confusing." First, the Chevron decision made clear that a court need only accord deference to an agency interpretation of a statute the agency "administers." An Agency's Interpretation of Its Own Jurisdiction: City of Arlington v. FCC
The Supreme Court recently clarified a long-running dispute over whether an agency's interpretation of the reach of its own jurisdiction (i.e., its power to act) is a type of interpretation that qualifies for Chevron deference. According to the Court, the appropriate way to answer this question is by applying the now famous " Chevron two-step" test. | An administrative agency may generally only exercise that authority which is provided to it by Congress. Often, however, congressional delegations of authority are imprecise, and, as a result, agencies must construe ambiguous terms and make interpretive decisions in order to implement Congress's delegation. The Supreme Court, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, outlined a limited role for courts in reviewing these types of agency interpretations. The now famous "Chevron two-step" test has been arguably the most important pillar of administrative law since the decision was handed down in 1984.
When evaluating whether an agency's interpretation of a statute is valid a court must first look to the language of the statute. If the statutory language is clear, the test stops—the agency must follow, and the court must enforce, the clear and unambiguous commands that Congress provides through statute. However, if a court determines that the statutory language is "silent or ambiguous," then the court may proceed to step two of the Chevron test. Step two requires a reviewing court to determine whether the agency's interpretation "is based on a permissible construction of the statute." The Supreme Court noted that a reviewing court should not impose its own construction of a statute in place of a reasonable interpretation provided by the agency, but should grant the agency's interpretation deference under step two of the Chevron test.
Recently the Supreme Court ruled on the scope of Chevron deference in City of Arlington v. FCC. The Court established that a court must provide an agency with Chevron deference even when the agency is determining the scope of its own jurisdiction to take regulatory action under a statute.
This report will discuss the Chevron decision; explain when Chevron deference applies; highlight common agency statutory interpretations that generally do not receive deference under Chevron; and review the recent Supreme Court opinion in City of Arlington v. FCC which clarified the applicability of Chevron deference to circumstances in which an agency is interpreting the scope of its own jurisdiction. |
crs_RL31687 | crs_RL31687_0 | The legislation creates a roughly 90-day period during which theCorporation will name the list of countries that will compete for MCA selection in the first year("candidate countries"), publish the methodology that will be used for identifying best performingcountries, seek public comment on the initiative, and consult with Congress. Introduction
In a speech on March 14, 2002, at the Inter-American Development Bank, President Bushoutlined a proposal for the United States to increase foreign economic assistance beginning inFY2004 so that by FY2006 American aid would be $5 billion higher than three years earlier. The fundswould be placed in a new Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and be available on a competitivebasis to a few countries that have demonstrated a commitment to sound development policies andwhere U.S. support will have the best opportunities for achieving the intended results. Congress plays a key role in the approval of the initiative by way of considering authorization and funding legislation, and in confirming the head, or CEO, of the Millennium ChallengeCorporation that manages the MCA under the President's plan. initiative. Selection criteria and performance indicators. MCA participants will be selected based on their performance measured by 16 economic and political indicators. Program development and submission. The Administration asked and Congress approved the creation of a new entity -- the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)-- that will be supervised by a Board of Directors chaired by the Secretary ofState. FY2004 funding. Number of countries participating. As enacted in Division D of P.L. Beginning in FY2006, low-middle income nations, with per-capita income above $1,415,may also participate, but they can only receive 25% of the amount appropriated for the MCA in thatyear. To qualify, a country must score above the median on half of the indicators in each policy area; in other words, a country's ranking must beabove the median of all 75 countries in the first year on three of the six indicators for ruling justlyand economic freedom, and two of the four for investing in people. Importantly, one indicator -- control of corruption -- will be a "pass-fail" test, in which any country scoring at or below the median on this measure will be disqualified regardless ofperformance on any of the other 15 indicators. (22)
Congressional proposals to modify Board of Directors discretion. Instead, S. 1160 placed the MCA within the StateDepartment under the authority of the Secretary of State and gave the Secretary thepower to determine eligible countries through the evaluation of a government'scommitment to several factors in the three areas of ruling justly, economic freedom,and investing in people. Foremost may be funding tradeoffs, especiallygiven rising budget deficits and the costs of fighting the war on terrorism. a. | In a speech on March 14, 2002, at the Inter-American Development Bank, President Bush outlined a proposal for the United States to increase foreign economic assistance beginning inFY2004 so that by FY2006 American aid would be $5 billion higher than three years earlier. Thenew funds, which would supplement the roughly $16.3 billion economic aid budget for FY2003,would be placed in a separate fund -- Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) -- and be availableon a competitive basis to a few countries that have demonstrated a commitment to sounddevelopment policies and where U.S. support is believed to have the best opportunities for achievingthe intended results. These "best-performers" would be selected based on their records in three areas -- ruling justly, investing in people, and pursuing sound economic policies.
Development of a new foreign aid initiative by the Bush Administration was influenced by a number of factors, including the widely perceived poor track record of past aid programs, recentevidence that the existence of certain policies by aid recipients may be more important for successthan the amount of resources invested, the war on terrorism, and the March 2002 U.N.-sponsoredInternational Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico.
The MCA initiative is limited to countries with per capita incomes below $2,935, although in the first two years -- FY2004 and FY2005 -- only countries below the $1,415 level would competefor MCA resources. Participants will be selected based on a transparent evaluation of a country'sperformance on 16 economic and political indicators, divided into three clusters corresponding tothe three policy areas of governance, economic policy, and investment in people. Eligible countriesmust score above the median on half of the indicators in each area. One indicator -- control ofcorruption -- is a pass/fail measure: a country must score above the median on this single measureor be excluded from further consideration.
The Administration proposed to create a new entity -- the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) -- to manage the initiative. The MCC would be supervised by a Board of Directors chairedby the Secretary of State. Several other key issues, including the number of participating countriesand monitoring mechanisms, have yet to be determined.
Congress plays a key role in the policy initiative by considering authorization and funding legislation, and confirming the head of the proposed MCC. A number of issues have been addressedin the congressional debate, including country eligibility criteria, performance indicators used toselect participants, creation of the new MCC, and budget considerations. Congress approvedlegislation (Division D of P.L. 108-199 ) authorizing the new program and appropriating $994million for the first year. The measure creates a Corporation, as proposed, but alters the compositionand size of the Board of Directors. It further limits the extent to which lower-middle incomecountries in FY2006 and beyond can participate in the MCA so that more resources will be availablefor the poorest nations. The legislation creates a roughly 90-day period after the Corporation isestablished for consultation and public comment before selecting MCA participants for FY2004. It is expected that the Board will name the initial MCA eligible countries in May 2004. |
crs_RL33998 | crs_RL33998_0 | Most Recent Developments
On June 28, 2007, the House approved $43.8 billion for agencies funded through the Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill ( H.R. 2829 ), a $3.1 billion increase over FY2007 enacted funding and $101 million above the President's FY2008 request. Discretionary spending in the bill totaled $21.4 billion, a decrease of $245 million from the President's request, but $1.9 billion more than was enacted in FY2007. The Senate appropriations FSGG subcommittee marked up its version of the bill July 10, and the full committee reported it July 12. The Senate bill recommended $44.2 billion in appropriations, a $3.4 billion increase over FY2007 enacted funding and $414 million above the President's FY2008 request. Discretionary spending in the Senate bill totaled $21.8 billion, approximately $20 million above the President's request and $2.3 billion more than was enacted in FY2007. The Senate took no further action on H.R. FSGG appropriations were ultimately included in a consolidated appropriations bill, H.R. 2764 , which passed the Senate, as amended, on December 18, and passed the House on December 19, 2007. 2764 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. Division D of the act provides a total of $43.3 billion for FSGG agencies, $2.6 billion more than enacted in FY2007, but $421 million less than requested by the President. Compared with H.R. 2829 , the act provides $583 million less than approved by the House, and $829 million less than approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee. Discretionary spending in the act totals $20.6 billion, which is $1.1 billion more than enacted in FY2007, but $1.1 billion less than the amount requested by the President. Compared with H.R. 2829 , discretionary funding in the act is $1.1 billion below the amount recommended by the Senate Appropriations Committee, and $883 million less than the amount approved by the House. The agencies included in the FSGG appropriations bill were funded from the start of FY2007 until December 31, 2007, by a series of continuing resolutions. Under the continuing resolutions, FSGG agencies were generally funded at FY2007 rates, although the District of Columbia had special funding provisions. The FSGG agencies were ultimately funded through H.R. The bill was signed by President Bush on December 26, 2007, becoming P.L. Department of the Treasury. Executive Office of the President (EOP). The Judiciary. Independent Agencies. H.R. 2829 . 2829 . On October 10, 2007, the legal director of the Government Accountability Project and the executive directors of Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility and the Project on Government Oversight sent letters to the chairman and ranking members of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform; the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia and the House Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia; and the Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees on Financial Services and General Government, urging them to deny the Special Counsel's request for an additional appropriation of $3 million for FY2008, until an investigation of the Special Counsel being conducted by OPM's inspector general is completed. 110-161 ). | FY2008 appropriations for Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) agencies were originally proposed in H.R. 2829. The bill included funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and 20 independent agencies. Among the independent agencies funded by the bill are the General Services Administration (GSA), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the United States Postal Service (USPS).
On June 28, 2007, the House approved $43.8 billion for H.R. 2829, a $3.1 billion increase over FY2007 enacted funding and $101 million above the President's FY2008 request. Discretionary spending in the House bill totaled $21.4 billion, a decrease of $245 million from the President's request, but $1.9 billion more than was enacted in FY2007. The Senate appropriations FSGG subcommittee marked up its version of the bill July 10, and the full committee reported it July 12. The Senate bill recommended $44.2 billion in appropriations, a $3.4 billion increase over FY2007 enacted funding and $414 million above the President's FY2008 request. Discretionary spending in the Senate bill totaled $21.8 billion, approximately $20 million above the President's request and $2.3 billion more than was enacted in FY2007. The Senate took no further action on H.R. 2829. The agencies included in the FSGG appropriations bill were funded from the start of the 2007 fiscal year until December 31, 2007, by a series of continuing resolutions. Under the continuing resolutions, FSGG agencies were generally funded at FY2007 rates, although the District of Columbia had special funding provisions.
FSGG appropriations were ultimately included in a consolidated appropriations bill, H.R. 2764, which was approved by the Senate, as amended, on December 18, and passed by the House on December 19. President Bush signed H.R. 2764, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), on December 26, 2007. The act provides a total of $43.3 billion for FSGG agencies, $2.6 billion more than enacted in FY2007, but $421 million less than requested by the President. Compared with H.R. 2829, the act provides $583 million less than the amount approved by the House, and $829 million less than the amount approved by the Senate. Discretionary spending in the act totals $20.6 billion, which is $1.1 billion more than enacted in FY2007, but $1.1 billion less than the amount requested by the President. Compared with H.R. 2829, discretionary funding in the act is $1.1 billion below the amount approved by the Senate, and $833 million less than the amount approved by the House. Emergency appropriations totaling $1.21 billion were also provided to FSGG agencies through P.L. 110-185. |
crs_RL33204 | crs_RL33204_0 | Introduction
This report focuses on the major factors affecting price formation for the five largest U.S.program crops -- wheat, rice, corn, soybeans, and cotton. What's Behind Market Price Differences
The general price level of an agricultural commodity, whether at a major terminal, port, orcommodity futures exchange, is influenced by a variety of market forces that can alter the currentor expected balance between supply and demand. Many of these forces emanate from domesticfood, feed, and industrial-use markets and include consumer preferences and the changing needs ofend users; factors affecting the production processes (e.g., weather, input costs, pests, diseases, etc. );relative prices of crops that can substitute in either production or consumption; government policies;and factors affecting storage and transportation. International market conditions are also importantdepending on the "openness" of a country's domestic market to international competition, and thedegree to which a country engages in international trade. Product Characteristics. Agricultural Commodity Futures Markets. U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Commodity Futures Markets
Overview
A distinguishing feature of the U.S. and international commodity markets is the importanceof futures markets. Unlike cash markets which deal with the immediate transfer of goods, a futuresmarket is based on buying (or selling) commodity contracts at a fixed price for potential physicaldelivery at some future date. (10)
A futures exchange provides the facilities for buyers and sellers to trade commodity futurescontracts openly, then reports any market transactions to the public. (11)
As a result of this activity, futures markets function as a central exchange for domestic andinternational market information and as a primary mechanism for price discovery. Commodity markets rely heavily onUSDA reports for guidance on supply and demand conditions. The release of USDA supply and demandestimates has the potential to substantially alter market expectations about current and futurecommodity market conditions and are, therefore, closely watched by market participants. However, certain characteristics of agricultural product marketsset them apart from most non-agricultural products and tend to make agricultural product prices morevolatile than are the prices of most nonfarm goods and services. (49) Three such noteworthycharacteristics of agricultural crops include the seasonality of production, the derived nature of theirdemand, and generally price-inelastic demand and supply functions. Asa result, local and international market conditions for these substitutes play a role in U.S. andinternational cotton price formation. | This report provides a general description of price determination in major U.S. agriculturalcommodity markets for wheat, rice, corn, soybeans, and cotton. Understanding the fundamentalsof commodity market price formation is critical to evaluating the potential effects of governmentpolicies and programs (existing or proposed), as well as of trade agreements that may open U.S.borders to foreign competitors. In addition, an understanding of the interplay of market forces overtime contributes to flexibility in making policy for what may be short-term market phenomena. Thegeneral price level of an agricultural commodity, whether at a major terminal, port, or commodityfutures exchange, is influenced by a variety of market forces that can alter the current or expectedbalance between supply and demand. Many of these forces emanate from domestic food, feed, andindustrial-use markets and include consumer preferences and the changing needs of end users;factors affecting the production processes (e.g., weather, input costs, pests, diseases, etc.); relativeprices of crops that can substitute in either production or consumption; government policies; andfactors affecting storage and transportation. International market conditions are also importantdepending on the "openness" of a country's domestic market to international competition, and thedegree to which a country engages in international trade.
A distinguishing feature of U.S. commodity markets is the importance of futures markets. Unlike cash markets which deal with the immediate transfer of goods, a futures market is based onbuying (or selling) commodity contracts at a fixed price for potential physical delivery at some futuredate. A futures exchange provides the facilities for buyers and sellers to trade commodity futurescontracts openly, and reports any market transactions to the public. As a result of this activity,futures markets function as a central exchange for domestic and international market information andas a primary mechanism for price discovery, particularly for storable agricultural commodities withseasonal production patterns.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) plays a critical role in monitoring anddisseminating agricultural market information. Commodity markets rely heavily on USDA reportsfor guidance on U.S. and international supply and demand conditions. The release of USDA supplyand demand estimates has the potential to substantially alter market expectations about current andfuture commodity market conditions and are, therefore, closely watched by market participants.
In general, certain characteristics of agricultural product markets set them apart from mostnon-agricultural product markets and tend to make agricultural product prices more volatile than arethe prices of most nonfarm goods and services. Three such noteworthy characteristics of agriculturalcrops include the seasonality of production, the derived nature of their demand, and generallyprice-inelastic demand and supply functions. In addition, wheat, rice, corn, soybeans, and cottoneach have certain unique structural characteristics that further differentiate the nature of market priceformation from each other. This report will be updated as conditions warrant. |
crs_R43970 | crs_R43970_0 | Introduction
This report tracks and provides an overview of actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2016 appropriations for trade-related agencies under the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations process. It also provides an overview of the enacted FY2015 appropriations for the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the Office of the United States Representative (USTR), as a part of the annual appropriation for CJS. FY2015 and FY2016 Appropriations for Trade-Related Agencies
On December 16, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ). For the three trade-related agencies, the Administration requested $684.6 million for FY2016, an increase of 13.9% over the FY2015 amount. The House recommended $597.8 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies for FY2016, an amount 12.7% less than the Administration's request and 0.5% less than the enacted amount for FY2015. The Senate committee-reported bill recommended $601.8 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies, an amount 0.2% greater than the FY2015 enacted amount, 12.1% less than the Administration's FY2016 request, and 0.7% greater than the House-passed amount. On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ). Division B of the act (the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016) provides $626.0 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies, an amount 4.2% greater than the FY2015 appropriation, but 8.6% less than the Administration's request. The FY2016 appropriation for ITA is $483.0 million, with an additional $10.0 million in user fees, for a total of $493 million in available funds. USITC received $84.5 million for FY2015. The Senate committee-reported bill recommended $54.3 million for USTR, an amount equal to the FY2015 enacted amount and the House recommended amount for USTR. The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended that USTR be consolidated into the Department of Commerce and that USTR funding be moved under the Department of Commerce heading. Overview of Issues
Issues that Congress may have considered while debating the FY2016 funding levels for the three CJS trade-related agencies may have included the following:
Whether to approve a one-time 55.6% increase in funding for USITC for costs associated with securing office space for the agency following the expiration of its current lease in August 2017. | This report tracks and describes actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2016 appropriations for the International Trade Administration (ITA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). These three trade-related agencies are part of the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations process. The report also provides an overview of three trade-related programs that are administered by ITA, USITC, and USTR.
The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) provided a total of $600.8 million for the three agencies, including $462.0 million for ITA, $84.5 million for USITC, and $54.3 million for USTR. For FY2016, the Administration requested $684.6 million for FY2016 for the three agencies, an amount 13.9% greater than what Congress appropriated for FY2015. The request included a one-time increase of $83.8 million (55.6%) in funding for USITC for costs associated with securing space for the agency following the expiration of its current lease in August 2017.
The House passed the FY2016 CJS appropriations bill (H.R. 2578) on June 3, 2015. The House-passed bill included $597.8 million for CJS trade-related agencies, an amount 0.5% less than the FY2015 enacted amount and 12.7% less than the Administration's FY2016 request. The Senate Committee on Appropriations approved its FY2016 CJS appropriations bill, which was offered as an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 2578, on June 16, 2015. The Senate committee-reported bill recommended $601.8 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies, an amount 0.2% greater than the FY2015 enacted amount, 12.1% less than the Administration's FY2016 request, and 0.7% greater than the House-passed amount. The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended that USTR be consolidated into the Department of Commerce and that funding for this agency be moved to the Department of Commerce heading.
On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113). Division B of the act provides $483.0 million for ITA, $88.5 for USITC, and $54.5 million for USTR. The FY2016 appropriation for the three CJS trade-related agencies is $626.0 million, an amount 4.2% greater than the FY2015 appropriation, but 8.6% less than the Administration's request. |
crs_RL32014 | crs_RL32014_0 | Although the United States has complied with adverse rulings in many past WTO disputes, there are 14 pending cases in which the United States is facing compliance deadlines in 2012; deadlines have expired but the United States has not yet fully implemented the WTO decisions involved; or the United States has taken action, including the enactment of legislation, but the prevailing parties in the dispute continue to question whether the United States has fully complied and, as in one case, continue to impose WTO-authorized trade sanctions. If it is impracticable for the Member to comply immediately, the Member will be allowed a "reasonable period of time" to do so. A WTO Member found to have violated WTO obligations is expected to comply by withdrawing the offending measure by the end of the established compliance period, with compensation and temporary retaliation available to the prevailing party as alternative remedies. The United States took administrative action to resolve its antidumping dispute with Japan, but has yet to amend a statutory provision at issue in the case. As the result of a compliance panel proceeding, the United States was found not to have fully complied in Brazil's challenge to U.S. cotton subsidies and continues to face the possibility of retaliation by Brazil against U.S. goods and possibly U.S. services or intellectual property interests. Two long-standing disputes involve intellectual property rights, each of these brought by the European Union (EU). While bills have been introduced in past and current Congresses aimed at resolving the trademark dispute, none has been enacted. The United States has yet to fully comply with the WTO decisions in this case, the cases initiated by Japan (DS322) and Mexico (DS344), and the second EU challenge (DS350), to the extent that the WTO decisions involve the use of zeroing in other phases of U.S. antidumping proceedings. The sanctions arbitrations are to be terminated once the Section 129 proceedings are completed, that is, on the date the USTR directs DOC to implement the new determinations. The panel has not yet publicly circulated its report. The United States was expected to comply by March 17, 2012, in Brazil's zeroing challenge (DS382), but it is unclear if recent actions taken by the United States will resolve the dispute. A deadline of July 2, 2012, is set in the dispute with Vietnam (DS404). Although the statute was held WTO-inconsistent in January 2003 and repealed, effective October 2005, by P.L. 109-171 , it remains the target of authorized sanctions by complainants European Union and Japan due to continued payments to U.S. firms under the CDSOA program. These tariffs surcharges have not been reimposed. U.S. Recent Developments
On February 6, 2012, the United States and the EU signed a Memorandum providing a "roadmap" for conclusively resolving both DS294 and the EU's subsequent zeroing dispute, DS350. While the subsequent U.S. objection sent Japan's request to arbitration, the disputing parties entered into a procedural agreement in March 2008 under which Japan was permitted to request a compliance panel without first seeking consultations and, if it made such a request, its retaliation request would be suspended. Among other claims, China alleged the following:
(1) that in connection with U.S. findings that the alleged provision of goods for less than adequate remuneration fulfilled the definition of a subsidy under the SCM Agreement, DOC erroneously determined that certain state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were public bodies for purposes of the definition, that DOC failed to find that the alleged benefits that trading companies had received from SOE-provided goods were passed on to the producers of the merchandise that was the subject of the CVD investigations, and, in an argument analogous to that used in challenges to the use of "zeroing" in antidumping cases, that DOC improperly included in subsidy benefit calculations only those transactions that produced a positive benefit, while excluding transactions that yielded no benefit;
(2) that the United States had failed to demonstrate that the alleged provision of land and land use rights for less than adequate remuneration was specific to an industry or group of industries;
(3) that in connection with finding that the government had provided loans on preferential terms, that the United States had erroneously determined that certain state-owned commercial banks were public bodies, and also failed to find specificity;
(4) that in each case where the United States chose a benchmark outside of China in order to determine the existence and amount of any subsidy benefit, an action permitted under Article 15 of China's Accession Protocol, the United States had improperly rejected the prevailing terms and conditions in China as the basis for making its determinations;
(5) that in using its non-market economy (NME) methodology for determining dumping and imposing antidumping duties simultaneously with a determination of subsidization and the imposition of CVDs on the same product, the United States levied CVDs in excess of the subsidy found to exist in violation of the SCM Agreement, that is, an impermissible "double remedy"; that the levied antidumping and countervailing duties were in excess of the "appropriate" amounts, as called for in Article 9.2 of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement; that the United States failed to make a "fair comparison" between export price and normal value in its antidumping determination as required under the WTO Antidumping Agreement; that the United States imposed antidumping duties in excess of the amount of dumping found to exist; and that the United States failed to grant China the most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment required under Article I of the GATT by not according it "the same unconditional entitlement to the avoidance of a double remedy for the same unfair trade practice that it accords to imports of like products from the territories of other WTO Members." The new statute, P.L. Section 3101 of the act made statutory changes affecting U.S. export credit guarantee programs, changes that the bill Managers believed "satisfy U.S. commitments to comply with the Brazil cotton case with regard to the export credit programs." On June 25, 2010, the United States and Brazil signed a framework agreement aimed at permanently settling the cotton dispute, including a pledge by Brazil not to impose authorized countermeasures during the life of the agreement and an understanding that the dispute may be legislatively resolved in the 2012 farm bill. Panel and Appellate Body reports in the U.S. challenge were adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) on June 1, 2011, with those in the EU challenge adopted on March 23, 2012. No agreement on resolving the dispute has yet been announced. | Although the United States has complied with adverse rulings in many past World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes, there are currently 14 cases in which rulings have not yet been implemented or the United States has acted and the dispute has not been fully resolved. Under WTO dispute settlement rules, a WTO Member will generally be given a reasonable period of time to comply. While the Member is expected to remove the offending measure by the end of this period, compensation and temporary retaliation are available if the Member has not acted or not taken adequate remedial action by this time. Either disputing party may request a compliance panel if there is disagreement over whether a Member has complied in a case.
Nine unresolved cases involve trade remedies, including a long-standing dispute with Japan over a provision of U.S. antidumping (AD) law and another with various WTO Members over the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000. The Offset Act was repealed as of October 2005, but remains the target of sanctions by the European Union (EU) and Japan due to continued payments to U.S. firms authorized under the repealer (P.L. 109-171). Six of these cases involve "zeroing," a practice under which the Department of Commerce (DOC), in calculating dumping margins in AD proceedings, disregards non-dumped sales. The practice was challenged by the EU (DS294/DS350), Japan (DS322), and Mexico (DS344), resulting in broad prohibitions on its use. The United States administratively resolved one aspect of DS294 by abandoning zeroing in original AD investigations, but has yet to comply fully either in this case or in DS350, 322, or 344, leading the EU (in DS294) and Japan to request the WTO to authorize sanctions. Under memoranda signed by the United States with each complainant on February 6, 2012, however, U.S.-requested arbitration of the two sanctions proposals has been suspended while the United States makes new dumping determinations in challenged AD proceedings using a methodology finalized in March 2012 that eliminates zeroing in later stages of AD cases. The sanctions arbitrations will be terminated once implementation of the new determinations is complete. A compliance panel report in Mexico's zeroing dispute has not yet been publicly circulated. The United States was expected to comply by March 17, 2012, in Brazil's zeroing challenge (DS382), but it is unclear if recent U.S. action will resolve the dispute. A July 2, 2012, deadline is in place in the dispute with Vietnam (DS404). The United States is expected to comply by April 25, 2012, in China's challenge to U.S. countervailing duties imposed on Chinese goods (DS379).
Panel and Appellate Body reports were adopted in the EU's successful challenge of U.S. aircraft subsidies on March 23, 2012 (DS353) ("Boeing" case), and the United States is expected to comply by September 23, 2012. In Brazil's dispute over U.S. cotton subsidies (DS267), Congress repealed a WTO-inconsistent cotton program in 2006 (P.L. 109-171), but other programs were also successfully challenged and the United States was found not to have fully complied. The United States later made statutory and administrative changes to the export credit guarantee program faulted in the case. While the WTO has authorized Brazil to retaliate, the United States and Brazil signed an agreement in June 2010 aimed at permanently resolving the dispute. It includes Brazil's pledge not to impose sanctions during the life of the agreement and foresees possible legislative resolution of the dispute in the 2012 farm bill. The United States and Antigua have been consulting on outstanding issues in Antigua's challenge of U.S. online gambling restrictions (DS285); compensation agreements between the United States and various WTO Members in exchange for U.S. withdrawal of its WTO gambling commitments, an action taken to resolve the case, will not enter into effect until issues with Antigua are settled. Also unsettled are long-pending disputes with the European Union (EU) over a music copyright law (DS160) and a statutory trademark provision affecting property confiscated by Cuba (DS176). |
crs_R42504 | crs_R42504_0 | The specific ways in which the VA assists veterans include (1) guaranteeing home mortgages from private lenders (through the Loan Guaranty Program, a form of insurance) to help veterans obtain financing for home purchases, improvements, or refinancing; (2) providing direct loans for home purchases to Native American veterans and to purchasers of homes that are in the VA inventory due to default and foreclosure; and (3) extending grants and loans to veterans with service-connected disabilities so that they can adapt housing to fit their needs through the Specially Adapted Housing Program. While the VA also provides housing assistance for homeless veterans, this report does not address these programs. The VA Loan Guaranty Program
The VA Loan Guaranty Program is a mortgage insurance program through which eligible veterans enter into mortgages with private lenders, and the VA guarantees that it will pay lenders a portion of losses that may be suffered as a result of borrower default. Over time, the loan guaranty has been expanded to include all veterans who served on active duty from World War II on, with varying length of service requirements, as well as those who served in the selected reserves; the amount of the guaranty has grown; business purchases are no longer eligible and farm purchases have been limited; and the uses have expanded to include refinancing, energy efficiency improvements, and the purchase of manufactured homes. This section of the report describes eligibility for the loan guaranty (" Borrower Eligibility "), ways in which it can be used (" Uses of the Loan Guaranty "), coverage (" Amount of Coverage Provided by the Loan Guaranty "), and how the VA loan guaranty differs from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance program (" How the VA Loan Guaranty Differs from FHA Insurance "). Veterans who served or are serving on active duty . See Table 1 for more details. Construction
In addition to purchasing property, an eligible veteran may enter into a guaranteed loan for the construction of housing. In most cases, the VA guaranty covers at least 25% of the principal balance of a loan. Down Payment: Veteran borrowers who participate in the VA loan guaranty program are not required to make a down payment. The Original Direct Loan for Veterans in Rural Areas, Now Limited to Veterans with Disabilities
The VA first made direct housing loans available to veterans who were unable to obtain mortgages through private lenders and were therefore unable to participate in the loan guaranty program. Direct Loans Resulting from Borrower Delinquency or Default (Acquired and Vendee Loans)
The VA may also enter into a direct loan arrangement in two situations involving a veteran's delinquency and/or default on a guaranteed loan. Acquired Loans: In situations where a veteran borrower with a guaranteed loan has difficulty making payments, the VA may purchase the loan from the lender (or current servicer) and continue to hold and service the loan. In addition, the number of VA acquired loans has fallen in recent years. Factors Determining VA Loan Fee: The amount of a borrower's fee is based on several factors: the amount of down payment, if any; whether the loan is extended through the loan guaranty or direct loan program; whether the borrower had active duty service or was a reservist; when the loan closed; whether the loan is purchase money or a refinance; whether the borrower is accessing the guaranty for the first time or entering into a subsequent loan; and whether the property is purchased under the manufactured housing portion of the loan guaranty statute. (See Table 6 .) Waiver of VA Loan Fee: Fees may be waived for veterans receiving compensation for a service-connected disability, for the surviving spouse of a servicemember who died of a service-connected disability, or for the surviving spouse of a veteran who died while receiving (or was entitled to receive) compensation for certain service-connected disabilities. The Specially Adapted Housing Program
The Specially Adapted Housing Program provides grants to veterans and servicemembers with certain service-connected disabilities to assist them in constructing, purchasing, or remodeling homes to fit their needs. Use of Grants to Modify the Home of a Family Member
The law provides that veterans may use the Special Housing Adaptation grant (§2101(b)) to modify homes of family members in cases where a veteran or servicemember plans to continue living there. | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has assisted veterans with homeownership since 1944, when Congress enacted the loan guaranty program to help veterans returning from World War II purchase homes. The loan guaranty program assists veterans by insuring mortgages made by private lenders, and is available for the purchase or construction of homes as well as to refinance existing loans.
The loan guaranty has expanded over the years so that it is available to (1) all veterans who fulfill specific duration of service requirements or who were released from active duty due to service-connected disabilities, (2) members of the reserves who completed at least six years of service, and (3) spouses of veterans who died in action, of service-connected disabilities, or who died while receiving (or were entitled to receive) benefits for certain service-connected disabilities (see Table 1). Under the loan guaranty, the VA agrees to reimburse lenders for a portion of losses if borrowers default. Unlike insurance provided through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance program, the VA does not insure 100% of the loan, and instead the percentage of the loan that is guaranteed is based on the principal balance of the loan (see Table 3).
Veterans who enter into VA-guaranteed loans must pay an up-front fee based on a number of factors that include the type of loan entered into (for example, purchase or refinance), whether service was active duty or in the reserves, whether the loan is the first or subsequent VA loan a borrower has entered into, and the amount of down payment (see Table 6). Borrowers are not required to make a down payment for a VA-guaranteed loan, but the up-front fee is reduced if there is a down payment of 5% or more. Most borrowers (80% of purchasers in FY2017) do not make a down payment.
In addition to guaranteeing loans from private lenders, the VA also makes direct loans to borrowers in certain circumstances. The original VA direct loan, which was targeted to veterans in rural areas, is now available only to veterans or servicemembers with certain service-connected disabilities. Another direct loan program, originally enacted as a demonstration program in 1992, serves Native American veterans, including veterans living in American Samoa, Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. In addition, the VA may enter into direct loans in cases where a borrower is delinquent or defaults on a VA-guaranteed loan. The VA may either acquire a loan from a lender and continue servicing the loan itself (called acquired loans) or, in cases of foreclosure, the VA may purchase the property and resell it. In these cases, the VA may enter into a loan with a purchaser whether or not he or she is a veteran (called vendee loans).
A third way in which the VA provides housing assistance to both veterans and active duty servicemembers is through the Specially Adapted Housing (SAH) Program. Through the SAH program, veterans with certain service-connected disabilities may obtain grants from the VA to purchase or remodel homes to fit their needs. The amount of a grant depends on the disability, and in some cases grants can be used to modify the homes of family members with whom veterans or servicemembers are staying (see Table 7).
This report discusses these three types of housing assistance—the loan guaranty program, direct loan programs, and Specially Adapted Housing program—their origins, how they operate, and how they are funded. The report also briefly describes a home rehabilitation pilot program designed to help veterans who have low incomes or disabilities repair or modify their homes, and has a section that discusses the default and foreclosure of VA-guaranteed loans. |
crs_RL33587 | crs_RL33587_0 | Introduction
Medicare is a federal program that covers medical services for qualified beneficiaries. Medicare now consists of four parts (A-D) that cover hospitalizations, physician services, prescription drugs, skilled nursing facility care, home health visits, hospice care, and other treatments. If an enrollee has other insurance, the beneficiary, physician, or other supplier can bill that insurance only after Medicare is billed to fill in possible gaps in Medicare coverage. The 1980 OBRA made Medicare a secondary payer for medical claims involving non-group health insurance such as liability and no-fault insurance. In 1981, Congress expanded MSP to cover certain Medicare beneficiaries in employer-sponsored group health plans. In general, Medicare is now the secondary payer for an item or service when payment has been made, or can reasonably be expected to be made, by responsible third-party payers. Medicare also does not cover services paid for by another government entity, such as the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). In certain cases where Medicare is the secondary payer but primary payment is delayed, Medicare may step in to pay claims, thereby ensuring that beneficiaries do not have a break in coverage. Title II of the legislation (The SMART Act) creates a new process for resolving MSP conditional payment claims to speed up resolution of liability, no-fault and similar cases. 1845 by unanimous consent on December 28, 2012, and President Obama signed the measure into law on January 10, 2013 ( P.L. 112-242 ). The law requires HHS to create a password-protected website that beneficiaries and their representatives can access to view information on conditional payments relating to a potential settlement, judgment, or award. Working Aged
Under MSP rules, employer-sponsored health insurance is the primary payer (with some exceptions) for Medicare-eligible individuals who have group coverage due to their own or a spouse's current employment. MSP and Non-Group Insurance
No-Fault and Liability Insurance
Medicare is the secondary payer when payment has been made, or can reasonably be expected to be made, under automobile medical insurance, and other forms of no-fault and liability insurance. In addition, Medicare has other recovery rights. Medicare does not pay for services covered under the Federal Black Lung Program for Medicare beneficiaries who are entitled to Black Lung medical benefits, in accordance with the Federal Coal Mine Act (P.L. 2007 MMSEA Mandatory Reporting
In addition to the general data reporting requirements, Section 111 of the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007, ( P.L. 110-173 , MMSEA) requires Responsible Reporting Entities (RRE) that include group health plans and what CMS calls non-group health plans such as liability, no-fault, and workers' compensation insurers, to provide information regarding health insurance status of employees, as well as judgments, payments, or settlements involving Medicare beneficiaries. The SMART Act ( P.L. The Medicare secondary payment amount is subject to certain limits. Medicare will not make conditional payments under the following conditions: (1) a third-party payer plan alleges that it is secondary to Medicare; (2) a plan limits payment when the individual is entitled to Medicare; (3) a plan provides covered services for younger employees and spouses, but not for employees and spouses who are 65 and older; (4) a proper claim is not filed, or is not filed in a timely manner, for any reason other than the physical or mental incapacity of the beneficiary; or (5) a group health plan fails to furnish needed information to CMS to determine whether or not an employer plan is primary to Medicare. Payments are expected to reach about $8 billion in FY2012 as well. Issues for Congress
During the past several decades, Congress has expanded the scope of the MSP program in order to ensure that other insurers make contractually required payments, reduce Medicare expenditures, and extend the life of the Medicare Trust Fund. The act's provisions make substantive and procedural changes to the MSP statute and current CMS procedures, including provisions relating to Medicare conditional payments, MMSEA Section 111 reporting requirements, appeal rights, use of Social Security numbers, and statutes of limitations. | Medicare is a federal program that covers medical services for qualified beneficiaries. Established in 1965 to provide health insurance to individuals age 65 and older, Medicare has been expanded to include disabled individuals under 65. Medicare now consists of four parts (A-D) that cover hospitalizations, physician services, prescription drugs, skilled nursing facility care, home health visits, hospice care, and other treatments. Generally, Medicare is the "primary payer" for medical services, meaning that it pays health claims first. If a beneficiary has other health insurance, that insurance is billed after Medicare has made payments, to fill all, or some, of any gaps in Medicare coverage. In certain situations, however, federal Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) law prohibits Medicare from making payments for an item or service when payment has been made, or can reasonably be expected to be made, by another insurer such as an employer-sponsored group health plan. Congress initiated MSP in 1980 to ensure that certain insurers met their contractual obligations to beneficiaries and to reduce Medicare expenditures, thus extending the life of the Medicare Trust Fund. According to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), private insurers designated legally primary to Medicare now pay about $8 billion in claims from Medicare recipients each year.
In general, Medicare is the secondary payer for beneficiaries who are also covered through (1) a group health plan based on their own or their spouse's current employment; (2) auto and other liability insurance; (3) no-fault liability insurance; and (4) workers' compensation programs, including the Federal Black Lung Program. Additionally, Medicare is prohibited from covering items and services paid for directly, or indirectly, by another government entity, such as the Department of Veterans Affairs (subject to certain limitations), although Medicaid is always secondary to Medicare. In cases when Medicare is the secondary payer but primary payment is delayed or in dispute—for example, a medical liability lawsuit—Medicare can step in to cover claims to ensure that beneficiaries do not experience a gap in coverage. Medicare must be reimbursed for these conditional payments when a primary insurer makes payment.
To identify cases where Medicare is the secondary payer and prevent improper Medicare payments, HHS matches information about Medicare recipients against data from the Social Security Administration and Internal Revenue Service. The Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-173) requires private insurers such as group health plans, liability insurers, no-fault insurers, and workers' compensation plans to regularly submit coverage information to HHS regarding Medicare beneficiaries. In December 2012, Congress approved, H.R. 1845 (the SMART Act, P.L. 112-242), which includes provisions designed to speed up the process for settling Medicare conditional claims in liability, no-fault, and similar cases. President Obama signed the act into law in January 2013. Title II of P.L. 112-242 requires HHS to establish a secure website that beneficiaries and their representatives can access to view information on conditional payments relating to a potential settlement, judgment, or award. The law made additional changes to the MSP statute and current HHS procedures, including data reporting requirements, appeal rights, use of Social Security numbers, and statutes of limitations. Separately, HHS has been attempting to create streamlined processes for settling smaller-dollar liability and workers' compensation cases involving Medicare beneficiaries. In September 2013, HHS published interim final regulations to implement the SMART Act. This report examines the MSP system, reporting requirements, liability issues, and issues for Congress. |
crs_R42544 | crs_R42544_0 | Introduction
On January 27, 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) voted to provide an interpretive guidance, the Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change (the Guidance), which technically does not create new legal obligations, but clarifies how publicly traded corporations should apply existing SEC disclosure rules to certain mandatory financial filings with the SEC regarding the risk that climate change developments may have on their businesses. The Guidance's release was controversial and prompted legislation in the 112 th Congress to repeal it. His stance significantly derived from his view that a clear consensus had been established on the reality of climate change. At the time, his view was also informed by the belief that, given the salience of climate change and the various related legislative and regulatory responses to it, the Guidance would help foster a better understanding of how the SEC's existing disclosure requirements applied to climate change. Ms. Casey argued that her opposition largely stemmed from her view that (1) the state of the science and the law underlying the idea of global change lacked certainty; (2) existing SEC disclosure rules were adequate with respect to corporate reporting on environmental change; and (3) while certain interest groups had advocated for such climate change disclosure guidance, the usefulness of the information to most investors from the Guidance was questionable:
I believe that the release is premised on the false notion that registrants may not recognize that disclosure related to "climate change" issues may be required. To date, in the 113 th Congress, no legislation involving the climate change guidance has been introduced. In the 112 th Congress, Senator John Barrasso and Representative Bill Posey introduced identical bills ( S. 1393 and H.R. 2603 , respectively) that would prohibit the enforcement of the SEC's climate change disclosure guidance. Several studies examined its impact for the initial year. The Quality of Disclosures After the Guidance, from an Investor's Perspective
One impact study after the Guidance's first year was done by Ceres, a nonprofit coalition of institutional investors, environmental organizations, and other public interest groups. Ceres has also been responsible for several reports that examined public company disclosures after the Guidance went into effect. The study's central conclusion was that most corporate filers needed more experience at communicating the risks associated with climate change. Overall, it found that large public companies have improved their climate change risk disclosures in recent years, but recommended that more work be done. New disclosures emerged on potential changes in demand for products and services and on increases in fuel prices. There was relatively little disclosure of actual or potential reputational harm that may result from climate change. In addition, in its survey of how various corporations and finance professionals thought about the disclosures, the article also reported the following:
Many companies saw little upside and even less downside in climate change disclosures. Many companies saw no meaningful business opportunities coming from climate change disclosures, but felt that they carried a potential for creating risks. Many companies appeared to believe that there were few, if any, penalties from the SEC for nondisclosure of climate change matters, a perception that was reinforced by observations that also characterized the SEC's level of enforcement in this area as negligible. | Publicly traded companies are required to transparently disclose material business risks to investors through regular filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On January 27, 2010, the SEC voted to publish Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change (the Guidance), which clarifies how publicly traded corporations should apply existing SEC disclosure rules to certain mandatory financial filings with the SEC regarding the risk that climate change developments may have on their businesses. The Guidance has been controversial and prompted legislation in the 112th Congress to repeal it.
Proponents of the Guidance, including several union and public pension funds, argued that it was necessary because a consensus has been established on the reality of climate change and that, given the salience of climate change and the various related legislative and regulatory responses to it, the Guidance would help foster a better understanding of how the SEC's existing disclosure requirements applied to it. Some that oppose the Guidance, including several business interests, have argued that the current state of the science and the law underlying the idea of global climate change remains uncertain; existing SEC disclosure rules are adequate with respect to corporate reporting on environmental change; and while certain interest groups had advocated for such climate change disclosure guidance, the climate change disclosure guidance's usefulness for most investors is unclear.
In the 112th Congress, Senator John Barrasso and Representative Bill Posey introduced identical bills (S. 1393 and H.R. 2603, respectively) that would prohibit the enforcement of the SEC's climate change disclosure guidance. To date, in the 113th Congress, no bills involving the Guidance have been introduced.
Since the Guidance went into effect on February 8, 2010, there have been several attempts to gauge its impact. For example, a 2011 report from Ceres, a nonprofit coalition of institutional investors, environmental organizations, and other public interest groups, concluded that most corporate filers needed more experience at communicating the risks associated with climate change. Although it found that large public companies had improved their climate-change risk disclosures in recent years, the report concluded that there was more work to be done in this area.
A report from the law firm of Davis Polk & Wardwell found that the Guidance did not appear to have had as significant an impact on disclosure as some had expected; that new disclosures emerged involving potential changes in demand for products and services and increases in fuel prices; and that there was little disclosure of actual or potential reputational harm that might result from climate change.
A study published for the American Bar Association found that many companies reported seeing little upside and even less downside in climate change disclosures. It also found that many companies reported few meaningful business opportunities resulting from climate change disclosures, which instead carried a potential for creating risks. In addition, many companies indicated that disclosing frequently uncertain climate change-related information was often a very speculative process and that there were few, if any, penalties from the SEC for nondisclosure of climate change matters. This perception was underscored by other observations that characterized the SEC's level of enforcement in this area as negligible.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44498 | crs_R44498_0 | Introduction
The EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle) program stands at a crossroads today. Factors that prompted the initial EELV effort in 1994 are once again manifest—significant increases in launch costs, procurement concerns, and concerns about competition. In addition, a long-standing undercurrent of concern over U.S. reliance on a Russian rocket engine (RD-180) for critical national security space launches on one of the primary EELV rockets was exacerbated by the Russian backlash over U.S. sanctions against Russian actions in Ukraine. Moreover, significant overall EELV program cost increases and unresolved questions over individual launch costs, along with legal challenges to the Air Force EELV program by SpaceX, have contributed to Congress recently taking legislative action that has significantly affected the EELV program. Efforts by the Obama Administration and the Air Force to work with Congress on changing the EELV strategy have been deemed insufficient by those in Congress eager to proceed more quickly and definitively. The commission did not recommend co-producing the RD-180 in the United States, but instead recommended spending $141 million to begin development of a new U.S. liquid rocket engine to be available by 2022, to coincide with the end of Phase 2 in the current EELV acquisition strategy. The recurring theme since the start of the EELV program has been how best to pursue this requirement while driving down costs through competition and ensuring launch reliability and performance. Efforts to transition away from the RD-180 to a domestic U.S. alternative engine or launch vehicle are not without technical, program, or schedule risks. A combination of factors over the next several years, as a worst-case scenario, could leave the United States in a situation where some of its national security space payloads will not have a certified launcher available. Even with a smooth, on-schedule transition away from the RD-180 to an alternative engine or launch vehicle, the performance and reliability record achieved with the RD-180 to date would likely not be replicated until well beyond 2030 because the RD-180 has had 68 consecutive successful civil, commercial, and NSS launches since 2000. | The United States is in the midst of making significant changes in how best to pursue an acquisition strategy that would ensure continued access to space for national security missions. The current strategy for the EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle) program dates from the 1990s and has since been revised a few times. The program has been dogged by perennial concerns over cost and competition. Those same concerns are a major impetus for change today.
The EELV program stands at a crossroads today. Factors that prompted the initial EELV effort in 1994 are once again manifest—significant increases in launch costs, procurement concerns, and concerns about competition. In addition, a long-standing undercurrent of concern over U.S. reliance on a Russian rocket engine (RD-180) for critical national security space launches on one of the primary EELV rockets was exacerbated by the Russian backlash over U.S. sanctions against Russian actions in Ukraine. Moreover, significant overall EELV program cost increases and unresolved questions over individual launch costs, along with legal challenges to the Air Force EELV program by SpaceX, have contributed to Congress recently taking legislative action that has significantly affected the EELV program. Efforts by the Obama Administration and the Air Force to work with Congress on changing the EELV strategy have been deemed insufficient by those in Congress eager to proceed more quickly and definitively.
The Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) have argued for a slower, more measured transition to replace the RD-180. Although some in Congress have pressed for a more flexible transition to replace the RD-180 and possibly allow for development of a new launch vehicle, others in Congress have sought legislation that would move the transition process forward more quickly with a focus on developing an alternative U.S. rocket engine. This debate over how best to proceed with NSS launch has been a leading legislative priority in the defense bills over the past few years and is likely to continue to be so throughout the coming year.
Transitioning away from the RD-180 to a domestic U.S. alternative would likely involve technical, program, and schedule risk. A combination of factors over the next several years, as a worst-case scenario, could leave the United States in a situation where some of its national security space payloads would not have a certified launcher available. Even with a smooth, on-schedule transition away from the RD-180 to an alternative engine or launch vehicle, the performance and reliability record achieved with the RD-180 to date would not likely be replicated until well beyond 2030 because the RD-180 has had 68 consecutive successful civil, commercial, and NSS launches since 2000. |
crs_R42385 | crs_R42385_0 | Introduction
In accordance with United States law, the U.S. Government places conditions on the use of defense articles and defense services transferred by it to foreign recipients. Violation of these conditions can lead to the suspension of deliveries or termination of the contracts for such defense items, among other things. On occasion, the President has indicated that such violations by foreign countries "may" have occurred, raising the prospect that termination of deliveries to or imposition of other penalties on such nations might take place. However, since the major revision of U.S. arms export law in 1976, neither the President nor the Congress have actually determined that a "substantial violation" did occur thus necessitating the termination of deliveries or sales or other penalties set out in Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act. Section 3(a) of the Arms Export Control Act sets the general standards for countries or international organizations to be eligible to receive United States defense articles and defense services provided under this act. It also sets express conditions on the uses to which these defense items may be put. This section of the act states that defense articles and defense services shall be sold to friendly countries "solely for":
"internal security" "legitimate self-defense" enabling the recipient to participate in "regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations" enabling the recipient to participate in "collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security" enabling the foreign military forces "in less developed countries to construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries." Presidential Report to Congress on Possible Violations
Section 3(c)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act requires the President to report promptly to the Congress upon the receipt of information that a "substantial violation" described in Section 3(c)(1) of the AECA "may have occurred." This Presidential report need not reach any conclusion regarding the possible violation or provide any particular data other than that necessary to illustrate that the President has received information indicating a specific country may have engaged in a "substantial violation" of an applicable agreement with the United States that governs the sale of U.S. defense articles or services. Procedures for Making Foreign Countries Ineligible for Receipt of U.S. Defense Articles and Services
Should the President determine and report in writing to Congress or if Congress determines by joint resolution pursuant to Section 3(c)(3)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act that a "substantial violation" by a foreign country of an applicable agreement governing an arms sale has occurred, then that country becomes ineligible for further U.S. military sales under the AECA. This action would terminate provision of credits, loan guarantees, cash sales, and deliveries pursuant to previous sales. Suspension or Cancellation of Contracts and/or Deliveries by the United States
It should be noted that the United States has additional options to prevent transfer of defense articles and services for which valid contracts exist short of finding a foreign country in violation of an applicable agreement with the United States. | In accordance with United States law, the U.S. Government places conditions on the use of defense articles and defense services transferred by it to foreign recipients. Violation of these conditions can lead to the suspension of deliveries or termination of the contracts for such defense items, among other things. On occasion, the President has indicated that such violations by foreign countries "may" have occurred, raising the prospect that termination of deliveries to or imposition of other penalties on such nations might take place. Section 3(a) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) sets the general standards for countries or international organizations to be eligible to receive United States defense articles and defense services provided under this act. It also sets express conditions on the uses to which these defense items may be put. Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act states that U.S. defense articles and defense services shall be sold to friendly countries "solely" for use in "internal security," for use in "legitimate self-defense," to enable the recipient to participate in "regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations," to enable the recipient to participate in "collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security," and to enable the foreign military forces "in less developed countries to construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries."
Section 3(c)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act requires the President to report promptly to the Congress upon the receipt of information that a "substantial violation" described in Section 3(c)(1) of the AECA "may have occurred." This Presidential report need not reach any conclusion regarding the possible violation or provide any particular data other than that necessary to illustrate that the President has received information indicating a specific country may have engaged in a "substantial violation" of an applicable agreement with the United States that governs the sale of U.S. defense articles or services. Should the President determine and report in writing to Congress or if Congress determines through enactment of a joint resolution pursuant to Section 3(c)(3)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act that a "substantial violation" by a foreign country of an applicable agreement governing an arms sale has occurred, then that country becomes ineligible for further U.S. military sales under the AECA. This action would terminate provision of credits, loan guarantees, cash sales, and deliveries pursuant to previous sales. Since the major revision of U.S. arms export law in 1976, neither the President nor the Congress have actually determined that a violation did occur thus necessitating the termination of deliveries or sales or other penalties set out in Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act. The United States Government has other options under the Arms Export Control Act to prevent transfer of defense articles and services for which valid contracts exist short of finding a foreign country in violation of an applicable agreement with the United States. These options include suspension of deliveries of defense items already ordered and refusal to allow new arms orders. The United States has utilized at least one such option against Argentina, Israel, Indonesia, and Turkey. |
crs_RL34234 | crs_RL34234_0 | After languishing for several decades, nuclear power in the United States appears poised for new growth, with license applications announced for up to 30 new commercial reactors. Two new U.S. uranium enrichment plants are currently under development in anticipation of an increased demand for nuclear fuel, and two others have been proposed. In the 1970s, efforts to limit or manage the spread of nuclear fuel cycle technologies for nonproliferation reasons foundered for technical and political reasons, but many states were nevertheless deterred from enrichment and reprocessing simply by the high technical and financial costs of developing sensitive nuclear technologies, as well as by a slump in the nuclear market. Several developments may now make efforts to limit access to the nuclear fuel cycle more feasible and timely: a growing concern about the spread of enrichment technology (specifically via the A.Q. Khan black market network, as well as Iran's enrichment program); a growing consensus that the world must seek alternatives to polluting fossil fuels; and optimism about new nuclear technologies that may offer more proliferation-resistant systems. Central to the debate is developing proposals attractive enough to compel states to forgo what they see as their inalienable right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The U.S. Department of Energy has been developing processes that could produce hydrogen in a high-temperature reactor, an effort that has continued under the Obama Administration. Nuclear interest has been further increased in the United States by incentives in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. The expected long-term trend toward tightening supplies has sparked plans for new fuel cycle facilities around the world and also renewed concerns about controls over the spread of nuclear fuel technology. Proposals on the Fuel Cycle
Proposals addressing access to the full nuclear fuel cycle have ranged from seeking a formal commitment to forswear enrichment and reprocessing technology, to a de facto approach in which a state does not operate fuel cycle facilities but makes no explicit commitment to give them up, to no restrictions at all. First, he would place all enrichment and reprocessing facilities under multinational control. Russia's "Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure"
In January 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed the Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure initiative that would include four kinds of cooperation: creation of international uranium-enrichment centers (IUECs), international centers for reprocessing and storing spent nuclear fuel, international centers for training and certifying nuclear power plant staff, and an international research effort on proliferation-resistant nuclear energy technology. By offering incentives for the back end of the fuel cycle, GNEP was designed to attract states to participate in the fuel supply assurances part of the framework. Congress also expressed significant concerns about GNEP, particularly over the Bush Administration's ambitious schedule for developing fuel cycle demonstration facilities by FY2020. Issues for Congress
Congress would have a considerable role in at least four areas of oversight related to fuel cycle proposals. The first is providing funding and oversight of U.S. domestic programs related to expanding nuclear energy in the United States. The second area is policy direction and/or funding for international measures to assure supply. A third set of policy issues may arise in the context of development of the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation. A fourth area in which Congress plays a key role is with the approval of nuclear cooperation agreements. | After several decades of widespread stagnation, nuclear power has attracted renewed interest in recent years. New license applications for 30 reactors have been announced in the United States, and another 548 are under construction, planned, or proposed around the world. In the United States, interest appears driven, in part, by tax credits, loan guarantees, and other incentives in the 2005 Energy Policy Act, as well as by concerns about carbon emissions from competing fossil fuel technologies.
A major concern about the global expansion of nuclear power is the potential spread of nuclear fuel cycle technology—particularly uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing—that could be used for nuclear weapons. Despite 30 years of effort to limit access to uranium enrichment, several undeterred states pursued clandestine nuclear programs, the A.Q. Khan black market network's sales to Iran and North Korea representing the most egregious examples. However, concern over the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies may be offset by support for nuclear power as a cleaner and more secure alternative to fossil fuels. The Obama Administration has expressed optimism that advanced nuclear technologies being developed by the Department of Energy may offer proliferation resistance. The Administration has also pursued international incentives and agreements intended to minimize the spread of fuel cycle facilities.
Proposals offering countries access to nuclear power and thus the fuel cycle have ranged from requesting formal commitments by these countries to forswear sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology, to a de facto approach in which states would not operate fuel cycle facilities but make no explicit commitments, to no restrictions at all. Countries joining the U.S.-led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), now the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC), signed a statement of principles that represented a shift in U.S. policy by not requiring participants to forgo domestic fuel cycle programs. Whether developing states will find existing proposals attractive enough to forgo what they see as their "inalienable" right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes remains to be seen.
GNEP was transformed into IFNEC under the Obama Administration and has continued as an international fuel cycle forum, but the Bush Administration's plans for constructing nuclear fuel reprocessing and recycling facilities in the United States have been halted. Instead, the Obama Administration is supporting fundamental research on a variety of potential waste management technologies. Other ideas addressing the potential global expansion of nuclear fuel cycle facilities include placing all enrichment and reprocessing facilities under multinational control, developing new nuclear technologies that would not produce weapons-usable fissile material, and developing a multinational waste management system. Various systems of international fuel supply guarantees, multilateral uranium enrichment centers, and nuclear fuel reserves have also been proposed.
Congress will have a considerable role in at least four areas of oversight related to fuel cycle proposals. The first is providing funding and oversight of U.S. domestic programs related to expanding nuclear energy in the United States. The second area is policy direction and/or funding for international measures to assure supply. A third set of policy issues may arise in the context of U.S. participation in IFNEC or related initiatives. A fourth area in which Congress plays a key role is in the approval of nuclear cooperation agreements. Significant interest in these issues is expected to continue in the 112th Congress. |
crs_R43218 | crs_R43218_0 | The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not expressly allow these injured individuals to bring such a claim, and, accordingly, someone injured by a medical device or drug may be limited to bringing a suit under state tort law in order to obtain compensation for the resulting injuries. The Supreme Court has evaluated medical device and drug preemption cases on a number of occasions over the past two decades, and the results have been mixed: in some instances a person injured by an allegedly dangerous drug or device is barred from suing a manufacturer, whereas in other cases, the Court has allowed a suit to go forward. Specifically, the report addresses the types of state-law tort claims that are commonly brought against drug and medical device manufacturers. With the background on the general subjects of preemption, tort law, and federal regulation of drugs and devices in mind, the report concludes by examining the major Supreme Court FDCA preemption cases and analyzing possible judicial and legislative developments that may affect this complicated and ever-changing area of law. With respect to express preemption, the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) added a provision to FDCA which states,
... no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement—
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this Act to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this Act. The Supreme Court has generally found that under the provision, the ability of an individual to bring a state tort lawsuit alleging certain defects with a medical device can hinge on, among other things, how that device received marketing approval from the FDA. Riegel v. Medtronic
In 2008, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the MDA preemption provision for the second time in Riegel v . Medtronic , holding that state tort law claims for injuries related to a medical device that received premarket approval were preempted by federal law. In 2001, the Supreme Court in Buckman v. Plaintiff's Legal Committee examined whether federal law preempted state-law tort claims that alleged fraud on the FDA. Finally, the Court distinguished the Buckman case from its decision in Lohr . While the Supreme Court has generally found that under the MDA preemption provision, the ability of an individual to bring a state-law tort suit alleging certain defects with a medical device can turn on how that device received marketing approval from the FDA, (i.e., through either the § 510(k) process or premarket approval), the inquiry is not this straightforward, and questions remain about which state-law tort claims brought against medical device manufacturers are preempted by federal law. The current NDA holder of a brand-name drug may change a drug's labeling, but a generic drug manufacturer cannot and must ensure that its labeling remains the same as the labeling for the listed drug. Preemption and Prescription Drugs
In contrast to its provisions on medical devices, the FDCA does not contain an express preemption clause with respect to its prescription drug mandates. Nonetheless, the elaborate premarket approval scheme for drugs created by the FDCA has the potential to clash with state tort law, raising questions as to whether federal drug law preempts state tort law. The Court, beginning in 2009, handed down three landmark rulings that clarified when the FDCA's drug requirements preempt state tort law. The pharmaceutical company argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that Ms. Bartlett's strict liability claims, just like the failure-to-warn claims in Mensing , were preempted by the federal sameness requirement for generic drugs. However, the addition of language that explicitly states that state tort claims are not preempted by the FDCA may do little to alter the results of Mensing and Bartlett , as the Court has held that the existence of an express preemption clause or a savings clause does not prevent the Court from examining whether a law impliedly preempts state law. | The interaction between state tort laws and the federal regulation of medical devices and drugs has been a source of constant litigation in recent years. In the last two decades, the Supreme Court has issued several decisions concerning whether the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) preempts state tort law. The results have been mixed: in some cases a person injured by an allegedly defective drug or device is barred from suing a manufacturer, whereas in other cases, the Supreme Court has allowed a lawsuit to proceed. Following these decisions, ambiguities exist concerning the scope of federal preemption in these medical device and drug cases.
With respect to medical devices, state-law tort claims brought against device makers are restricted by a provision of the FDCA that expressly preempts state "requirements" that are "different from, or in addition to" federal requirements applicable to a device and that "relate[] to the safety or effectiveness of the device." The Supreme Court has generally found that under this provision, the ability of an individual to bring a state-law tort suit alleging certain defects with a medical device can hinge on, among other things, how that device received marketing approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In Medtronic v. Lohr, the Court found that state-law claims involving "substantially equivalent" medical devices cleared through the § 510(k) process were not barred by the FDCA's express preemption provision. However, in Riegel v. Medtronic, the Court concluded that if the FDA grants approval to a medical device under its more rigorous premarket approval process, the device manufacturer is immune from certain suits under state tort law. The Court has also found in Buckman v. Plaintiff's Legal Committee that state-law tort claims stemming from violations of the FDCA may be impliedly preempted by federal law. Despite these three decisions, questions remain about what state-law tort claims survive federal preemption.
In contrast to its provisions on medical devices, the FDCA does not contain an express preemption clause with respect to its prescription drug mandates. Nonetheless, the elaborate premarket approval scheme for drugs created by the FDCA has the potential to clash with state tort law, raising questions as to whether these laws may be preempted. The Court has recently handed down three landmark rulings that clarify when the FDCA's drug requirements preempt state tort law. In 2009, the Supreme Court, in Wyeth v. Levine, held that a person hurt by a brand name drug could sue the manufacturer under state tort law for a failure to properly warn about the dangers of the drug. However, in a second case, PLIVA v. Mensing, the Supreme Court ruled that a person hurt by a generic drug could not bring the same failure-to-warn claim because changing the labeling of a generic drug would conflict with federal law that requires a generic drug to be the "same" as its branded equivalent in all material respects, including its labeling. Finally, in Mutual Pharmaceutical v. Bartlett, the question for the Court was whether a person harmed by a generic drug could obtain relief on a theory other than a failure-to-warn claim. The Court held that such claims, much like the failure-to-warn claims in Mensing, by imposing heightened duties that would conflict with the "sameness" requirements of federal law regarding generic drugs, were preempted by the FDCA.
This report provides background on the doctrine of preemption and the types of state-law tort claims that have been brought against medical device and prescription drug manufacturers. The report also addresses the federal regulation of medical devices and drugs under the FDCA. With that background in mind, the report discusses the major FDCA preemption cases that have been recently issued by the Supreme Court. Finally, the report covers possible judicial and legislative developments that may affect this dynamic area of law. |
crs_RL32040 | crs_RL32040_0 | They circumscribe judicial sentencing discretion, although they impose few limitations upon prosecutorial discretion, or upon the President's power to pardon. The most widely recognized are those that demand that offenders be sentenced to imprisonment for "not less than" a designated term of imprisonment. The piggyback statutes are not themselves mandatory minimums but sentence offenders by reference to underlying statutes including those that impose mandatory minimums. Constitutional Boundaries
Defendants sentenced to mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment have challenged them on a number of constitutional grounds beginning with Congress's legislative authority and ranging from cruel and unusual punishment through ex post facto and double jeopardy to equal protection and due process. Although the case law is somewhat uncertain, it seems to condemn punishment that is "grossly disproportionate" to the misconduct for which it is imposed, a standard which a sentence imposed under a mandatory minimum statute may breach under extreme circumstances. Individualized consideration . Some eliminated discretion; others provided guidance. Disqualification requires the threat of violence or possession of a firearm "in connection with the offense." Predicate Offenses
The drug trafficking predicates include any felony violation of the Controlled Substances Act, the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act. Defendants at one time argued that the mandatory minimums of section 924(c) become inapplicable, if they are subject to a higher mandatory minimum under the predicate drug trafficking offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C. The Supreme Court rejected the argument in Abbott . Chapter 110 outlaws child pornography. Other changes have occurred over the years, but that essential distinction remains. As in the case of other mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, a court may sentence a defendant convicted of aggravated identity theft to a term of less than two years pursuant to subsection 3553(e). The prosecution must seek the exception, which is only available on the basis of the defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of a federal crime. Three Strikes (18 U.S.C. Here too, their arguments have been largely unavailing. 36 American Criminal Law Review 1279 (1999)
Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883)
Stewart, Sentencing in the States: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly , 39 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 413 (2001)
Stith & Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts (1998)
__, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines , 91 Northwestern University Law Review 1247 (1997)
Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code , 23 Law and Contemporary Problems 528 (1958)
Tonry, Sentencing Matters (1996)
Turnbladh, A Critique of the Model Penal Code Sentencing Proposals , 23 Law and Contemporary Problems 544 (1958)
United States General Accounting Office, Federal Drug Offenses: Departures from Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimum Sentences, Fiscal Years 1999-2001 , GAO-04-105 (Oct. 2003)[GAO is now known as the United States Government Accountability Office]
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (2012)
__, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (2011)
__, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (1997)
__, Special Report to the Congress: Downward Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (2003)
__, Special Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (1991)
Villa, Retooling Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Fixing the Federal "Statutory Safety Valve" to Act as an Effective Mechanism for Clemency in Appropriate Cases , 21 Hamline Law Review 109 (1997)
Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing , 40 American Criminal Law Review 87 (2003)
Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limiting Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment , 24 Stanford Law Review 838 (1972)
Whiteside, The Reality of Federal Sentencing: Beyond the Criticism , 91 Northwestern University Law Review 1574 (1997)
Wilkins, Newton & Steer, Competing Sentencing Policies in a "War on Drugs" Era , 28 Wake Forest Law Review 305 (1993)
Zalman, The Rise and Fall of the Indeterminate Sentence , 24 Wayne Law Review 45 (1977)
Notes and Comments
Do Judicial "Scarlet Letters" Violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment , 16 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 115 (1988)
The Eighth Amendment, Becarria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine , 24 Buffalo Law Review 783 (1975)
Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment—Rummel, Solem and the Venerable Case of Weems v. United States , 1984 Duke Law Journal 789
Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Exemplifying the Law of Unintended Consequences , 28 Florida State University Law Review 935 (2001)
Rethinking Mandatory Minimums After Apprendi , 96 Northwestern University Law Review 811 (2002)
The "Safety Valve" Provision: Should the Government Get an Automatic Shut-Off Valve? | Federal mandatory minimum sentencing statutes limit the discretion of a sentencing court to impose a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment or the death penalty. They have a long history and come in several varieties: the not-less-than, the flat sentence, and piggyback versions. Federal courts may refrain from imposing an otherwise required statutory mandatory minimum sentence when requested by the prosecution on the basis of substantial assistance toward the prosecution of others. First-time, low-level, non-violent offenders may be able to avoid the mandatory minimums under the Controlled Substances Acts, if they are completely forthcoming.
The most common imposed federal mandatory minimum sentences arise under the Controlled Substance and Controlled Substance Import and Export Acts, the provisions punishing the presence of a firearm in connection with a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense, the Armed Career Criminal Act, various sex crimes including child pornography, and aggravated identity theft.
Critics argue that mandatory minimums undermine the rationale and operation of the federal sentencing guidelines which are designed to eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparity. Counter arguments suggest that the guidelines themselves operate to undermine individual sentencing discretion and that the ills attributed to other mandatory minimums are more appropriately assigned to prosecutorial discretion or other sources.
State and federal mandatory minimums have come under constitutional attack on several grounds over the years, and have generally survived. The Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause does bar mandatory capital punishment, and apparently bans any term of imprisonment that is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime for which it is imposed. The Supreme Court, however, has declined to overturn sentences imposed under the California three strikes law and challenged as cruel and unusual. Double jeopardy, ex post facto, due process, separation of powers, and equal protection challenges have been generally unavailing.
The United States Sentencing Commission's Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (2011) recommends consideration of amendments to several of the statutes under which federal mandatory minimum sentences are most often imposed.
Lists of the various federal mandatory minimum sentencing statutes are appended, as is a bibliography of legal materials. This report is available in an abridged version as CRS Report RS21598, Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Statutes: An Abbreviated Overview, without the citations to authority, footnotes, or appendixes that appear here. |
crs_RL32851 | crs_RL32851_0 | The Challenge and Reality
Introduction
Hundreds of thousands of trucks and rail tank cars transport tons of hazardous materials(hazmat) daily. Many in the public and private sectors seek to reduce risk byestablishing a "layered" or reinforcing system of measures affecting companies, drivers, andshipments. This system involves incident prevention, preparedness, and response. A major challenge is to cost effectively increase the security of theseshipments, especially those that pose the most danger to the public, while still meeting, to the extentpossible, the transportation requirements of commerce. More specifically, thereport outlines illustrative key actions taken by the DOT and the Department of Homeland Security(DHS) to promote hazmat security in surface transportation. Theory and Reality
There is virtually an unlimited number of ways that the hazmat transportation system is atrisk from attack by terrorists. Through these and other actions described in detail later in this report, DOTand DHS, working with industry, are creating a layered system of security measures. Whether thescope, rigor, and pace of these actions is adequate or not is subject to debate. (8)
PHMSA also requires that security awareness training must be provided by a specified dateto all hazmat employees, and that employees of companies required to prepare a security plan mustreceive training on the plan. (10) PHMSA also administers a grant program that provides trainingto emergency responders dealing with spills of hazmat. TSA uses a variety of different approaches seeking to improve the security of hazmatshipments. Severalbills introduced in the109th Congress, including H.R. 153 and H.R. 1109 ,include provisions that would require the DHS to prepare a vulnerability assessment of freight railtransportation and to identify security risks that are specific to the transportation of hazmats by rail. This provision seeks to reduce some of the securityrisks associated with hazmat transportation by requiring a security threat assessment of drivers witha hazmat endorsement on their commercial drivers license (CDL). This provision is included in H.R. 3 , which the House passed. Adequacy or Impact of Some Federal Hazmat Transportation Security Efforts
Despite the efforts and accomplishments of the DOT and DHS that were noted in theprevious section, many vulnerabilities remain in the current layered system of hazmat transportationsecurity. For example, H.R. H.R. 153 and H.R. 1109 both authorize a research program that would, inpart, be intended to: "...support enhanced security for transportation of hazardous materials by rail..."
Policy Options and Legislative Initiatives
Policy Options
The federal role in promoting the security of hazmat transportation is evolving. There aremany additional measures that could be taken to enhance security, but each of these poses its ownset of benefits and costs that need to be considered within the context of many policy factors, suchas alternative uses of federal and industry resources, likelihood of effectively reducing the risks fromterrorist attacks, and impacts on the operational efficiency and productivity of the surfacetransportation system. | Hundreds of thousands of trucks and railroad tank cars transport tons of hazardous materials(hazmat) daily. There is virtually an unlimited number of ways that these shipments are at risk fromattack by terrorists. By implementing a "layered" system of measures affecting shippers, carriers,and drivers, many in the public and private sectors seek to reduce associated security risks. Thissystem involves incident prevention, preparedness, and response. A major challenge is to increasecost effectively the security of these shipments, especially those that pose the most danger to thepublic, while still meeting, to the extent possible, the transportation requirements of commerce. The109th Congress is considering legislation, such as H.R. 3 , H.R. 153 , H.R. 909 , H.R. 1109 , and H.R. 1414 , and S. 230 ,which includes provisions intended to promote hazmat transportation security.
The Departments of Transportation (DOT) and Homeland Security (DHS) have takennumerous actions to enhance the security of hazmat transportation. For example, DOT requiresshippers and carriers to implement security plans regarding specified hazmat transportation. DOTgrants encourage states to conduct inspections of trucks transporting hazmat. Also, DOT hascontacted thousands of companies seeking to improve their security programs, and also hasestablished communication links with industry. DHS conveys threat information to law enforcementand industry, and conducts vulnerability assessments. DHS administers a grant that provides trainingand the communications infrastructure which facilitates truck drivers and others to report safety andpotential security concerns. DHS seeks to determine whether commercial drivers pose a securitythreat necessitating denial of their hazmat endorsement on their commercial drivers licenses. Despite these efforts, there remain many vulnerabilities in the current layered system of hazmattransportation security measures. At a cost, much more could be done to expand the scope,strengthen the rigor, and accelerate the pace of the federal role in this area.
H.R. 153 and H.R. 1109 include a provision that would require theDHS to prepare a vulnerability assessment of freight rail transportation and to identify security risksthat are specific to the transportation of hazmats by rail. H.R. 153 would provide grantsto address threats pertaining to the security of hazmat transportation by rail. H.R. 909 would establish a research program intended to advance security measures for hazmat transportation. H.R. 3 , which the House has passed, includes a provision intended to ensure thatMexican- and Canadian-domiciled truck drivers transporting specified hazmat loads in the UnitedStates are subject to a background check similar to that required of U.S. drivers. Other optionsinclude increased security awareness training for state truck inspectors and certain employees oftruck leasing companies, and requiring enhanced security plans and communication systems forcarriers of high hazard materials shipments beyond those now required. Each of these options posescosts that need to be evaluated within the context of other investments. This report deals only withhazmat security in surface transportation and will not be updated. |
crs_R42832 | crs_R42832_0 | Introduction
Choice and mobility are key aspects of the of the nation's largest federal housing assistance program, the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV, or voucher) program. The choice aspect of the program—that eligible families can use their federal subsidies to rent the housing they choose in the private market—differentiates it from the other major federal housing assistance programs, including public housing and project-based Section 8 rental assistance. However, these aspects of the program may be of greater interest to policymakers going forward, as new research findings have questioned the effectiveness of current policies in promoting mobility and improving family well-being. This report explores the concept of choice and mobility in federal housing policy, particularly in the Section 8 HCV program. It begins by describing the origins of choice and mobility in federal housing policy, followed by a discussion of choice and mobility in today's Section 8 HCV program. The report then provides an overview of relevant research on the effects of choice and mobility policies. It concludes with a discussion of considerations for policymakers. However, many public housing developments, particularly in urban areas, remained racially segregated. The other is to promote racial desegregation and poverty deconcentration, by providing low-income families with the option to move to low-poverty and racially integrated areas. This is a particularly relevant consideration in recent years, when funding for per-voucher administrative fees has been at reduced levels. (4) Aspects of the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program and the way it is administered may facilitate families' choices to stay in areas with concentrated poverty . Review of Mobility Research
While the hypotheses and research discussed in the previous section of this report consider what choices families make given the options and constraints of the HCV program, another set of studies have considered what happens when families' choices are explicitly constrained for the purpose of promoting poverty deconcentration and racial desegregation. Taken together, the research to-date has not shown convincing evidence that programs designed to move low-income families to neighborhoods with lower concentrations of poverty and lower concentrations of minority households have resulted in families remaining in low-poverty communities. Studies have shown that families given vouchers with mobility goals have struggled to make initial moves to areas that would be considered "areas of opportunity," (i.e., those with very low concentrations of poverty or racial/ethnic minorities). Further, with the exception of the first Gautreaux program, those families that did initially relocate to lower-poverty and more racially integrated neighborhoods, over time and with subsequent moves, often ended up living in neighborhoods with higher concentrations of poverty and less racial integration than the lower-poverty neighborhoods to which they had initially moved. Looking beyond locational outcomes, the studies have not found evidence that mobility moves have had major positive impacts on families' economic and children's educational outcomes. Among those families that stayed in lower-poverty neighborhoods (Gautreaux), initial limited employment and earnings impacts were found and impacts were mixed regarding children's outcomes, although later research has called those findings into question. Some positive impacts were found in MTO around health, housing and neighborhood satisfaction, and perceived safety, but in other areas of interest to policymakers, such as family economic well-being, employment, and children's educational outcomes, positive impacts have not been found. The resulting Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program was active from 1976 until 1998. Implications and Policy Considerations
The HCV program is designed to offer program participants choice about where they live. A study of the moves of families participating in Chicago's Section 8 program found that, when controlling for differences between families, mobility assistance (which included a wide array of services such as housing search counseling and unit referrals, free credit reports and budget counseling, transportation to view units in opportunity neighborhoods, post-move support, and a security deposit loan fund) did help families move to "opportunity" neighborhoods (defined as neighborhoods with poverty rates less than 23.9%) by approximately 6%; the researchers concluded that targeting the mobility assistance to economically stable families may have increased moves to opportunity neighborhoods. There have been several housing policy initiatives intended to invest in disadvantaged communities. To the extent other program outcomes—such as promoting affordability or serving more families—are of primary concern to policymakers, they may choose not to make changes to increase mobility and choice in the HCV program, particularly if such changes lead to increased costs that could come at the expense of, for example, providing vouchers to additional families. Some of the findings from the MTO demonstration point to positive impacts for families of receiving voucher in terms of physical and mental health improvements and increased satisfaction, perceived safety, and self-reported well-being. Much of the growth in the program in recent years is attributable to decisions by policymakers to replace other forms of housing assistance with vouchers, in part because of the choice and mobility aspects of the program. One question is the extent to which choice and mobility continue to be among the primary goals of federal housing assistance. If they are, then how can the existing suite of federal housing assistance programs, including the Housing Choice Voucher program, be improved to better promote these goals? | As is evidenced by the name of the program, "choice" is one of the key components of the nation's largest federal housing assistance program, the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV, or voucher) program. The choice aspect of the program—that eligible families can use their federal subsidies to rent the housing they choose in the private market—differentiates it from the other major federal housing assistance programs, including public housing and project-based Section 8 rental assistance, which offer assistance tied to specific units of housing. Those programs have long been criticized for isolating and concentrating poor families, particularly minority families, in high-poverty communities with limited opportunities, particularly in urban areas. Thus, the HCV program was designed, in part, to promote "mobility," or make more areas accessible to low-income families and encourage them to move to areas with greater opportunities. Further, courts have directed communities to use vouchers as a remedy for racial segregation in public housing.
Despite these goals, most families participating in the Section 8 HCV program live in racially segregated communities that have medium or high levels of poverty. There is little consensus on why this occurs, as the housing choice a family makes may reflect the many constraints a family faces in using its voucher, the understanding the family has of the choices to be made, and/or the family's own preferences.
A number of demonstrations and studies have looked at how vouchers can be used to deconcentrate poverty and the effects of moving families out of areas of concentrated poverty. Taken together, the research to-date has not shown convincing evidence that programs designed to move low-income families to neighborhoods with low-poverty and racially/ethnically integrated neighborhoods have resulted in families successfully and permanently moving to such communities. Most studies have shown that families given vouchers with mobility goals have struggled to make initial moves to areas that would be considered "areas of opportunity" (i.e., those with very low concentrations of poverty). Further, those families that did initially relocate to low-poverty and more racially integrated neighborhoods, over time and with subsequent moves, often ended up living in neighborhoods with higher concentrations of poverty and less racial integration than the low-poverty neighborhoods to which they had initially moved.
Researchers have also looked beyond families' locational outcomes at the effects of moving on various measures of family well-being. While one of the motivating goals behind these mobility policies and demonstrations has been to improve families' economic well-being and their children's educational outcomes, studies have not found evidence that the tested mobility policies have had major positive impacts in these areas. Early studies found some initial employment and earnings impacts and some mixed findings regarding children's outcomes, although later research has called those initial findings into question. Some positive impacts were found in the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) demonstration involving physical and mental health, housing satisfaction, neighborhood satisfaction, perceived safety, and overall perceived well-being. But in other areas of interest to policymakers, such as family economic well-being—employment and children's educational outcomes—no impacts were found from MTO.
The fact that many families with vouchers continue to live in high or medium-poverty, racially segregated neighborhoods, paired with the research findings to-date about the limited impacts of tested mobility programs, leads to several questions and considerations policymakers may choose to explore. One question is whether policy changes to the voucher program, or to other federal assisted housing programs, could help to better achieve the goals of poverty deconcentration and reducing racial or ethnic segregation. Another question is whether these goals are of the same, greater, or less importance than other program goals, such as promoting affordability and housing stability. The way policymakers choose to answer these questions could have implications for the direction of federal housing policy.
These questions are particularly relevant now for several reasons. One reason is the current fiscal climate. In a constrained budget environment, policymakers face difficult tradeoffs in funding federal programs. In determining priorities for limited federal funding, the effectiveness and efficiency of all federal housing assistance programs, including the largest—the HCV program—may be reexamined. In fact, reforms to the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program have been considered every year for at least the last decade. While the choice and mobility aspects of the program have not been a primary driver of those reform efforts, these aspects of the program may receive more attention, especially given recently-released research findings. The results of the final evaluation of the MTO demonstration have only been published in the last couple of years and are being considered and debated by social science researchers as well as housing policy advocates.
This report explores the concept of choice and mobility in federal housing policy, particularly in the Section 8 HCV program. It begins by describing the origins of choice and mobility in federal housing policy, followed by a discussion of choice and mobility in today's Section 8 HCV program. The report then provides an overview of relevant research on the effects of choice and mobility policies. It concludes with a discussion of options and considerations for policymakers. |
crs_RS22028 | crs_RS22028_0 | These are the basic questions for congressional oversight of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA)
In several respects, the CFMA was a fundamental rethinking of the government's role in derivatives markets. Reauthorization in the 110th Congress
Given the CFTC's satisfaction with its role under the CFMA, the growth of trading volumes, and continued innovation in the markets, few in the Congress saw the need for another thorough overhaul of the CEA. Several of these issues were addressed by the reauthorization legislation enacted by the 110 th Congress—title XIII of the Farm Bill ( P.L. 110-234 , H.R. 2419 ), enacted over the President's veto on May 22, 2008, and authorizing appropriations for the CFTC through FY2012. Security Futures
Security futures are futures contracts based on single stocks or narrow-based stock indexes. Trading volumes in security futures trading remain very low relative to the stock option market. (At present, margins are set at 20% of the underlying stocks' value, a figure that was determined by the SEC and CFTC to be comparable to margin requirements on stock options, as the CFMA requires, but which is much higher than most futures margins, which generally are in the range of 3%-8% of the value of the underlying commodity.) There has been some dispute over whether this prohibition applies to contracts based on foreign currency rates. | Authorization for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), a "sunset" agency established in 1974, expired on September 30, 2005. In the past, Congress has used the reauthorization process to consider amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), which provides the basis for federal regulation of commodity futures trading. The last reauthorization resulted in the enactment of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), the most significant amendments to the CEA since the CFTC was created in 1974. Both chambers considered reauthorization bills in the 109th Congress, but none was enacted.
In the 110th Congress, CFTC reauthorization provisions were added to the Farm Bill (H.R. 2419) and enacted over the President's veto on May 22, 2008, as P.L. 110-234. This report provides brief summaries of the issues addressed in that law, including (1) regulation of energy derivatives markets, where some blame excessive price volatility on a lack of effective regulation, (2) the legality of futures-like contracts based on foreign currency prices offered to retail investors, and (3) the market in security futures, or futures contracts based on single stocks, which were authorized by the CFMA, but trade in much lower volumes than their proponents expected.
This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_97-865 | crs_97-865_0 | This process supplements other House and Senate procedures for considering spending and revenue legislation by allowing Congress to establish and enforce parameters with which those separate pieces of budgetary legislation must be consistent. The overall levels and allocations are then enforced through the use of points of order, and through implementing legislation, such as that enacted through the reconciliation process. Points of order are prohibitions against certain types of legislation or congressional actions. These prohibitions are enforced when a Member raises a point of order against legislation that is alleged to violate these rules when it is considered by the House or Senate. The tables below list the points of order included in the Congressional Budget Act, as amended through the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 ( P.L. 113-67 ) ( Table 1 ), as well as related points of order established in various other measures. These points of order include provisions in the FY2010 budget resolution ( Table 3 ); the FY2008 budget resolution ( Table 4 ); the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 ( Table 5 ); the rules of the House and separate orders adopted under H.Res. This section applies to matter "contained in any title or provision" in a reconciliation bill or resolution (or conference report thereon), as well as any amendment or motion. The three-fifths threshold has also been required for the Senate to waive the application of many of the related points of order established in budget resolutions and other measures, such as the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010. | The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Titles I-IX of P.L. 93-344, as amended) created a process that Congress uses each year to establish and enforce the parameters for budgetary legislation. Enforcement of budgetary decisions is accomplished through the use of points of order, and through the reconciliation process. Points of order are prohibitions against certain types of legislation or congressional actions. These prohibitions are enforced when a Member raises a point of order against legislation that may violate these rules when it is considered by the House or Senate.
This report summarizes the points of order currently in effect under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended, as well as related points of order established in various other measures that have a direct impact on budget enforcement. These related measures include the budget resolution adopted by Congress in 2015 (S.Con.Res. 11, 114th Congress), as well as earlier related provisions. These include the budget resolution adopted by Congress in 2009 (S.Con.Res. 13, 111th Congress), as well as selected provisions in the Rules of the House and separate orders for the 114th Congress (H.Res. 5, 114th Congress), the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508), and the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-139). In addition, the report describes how points of order are applied and the processes used for their waiver in the House and Senate.
These provisions have been adopted pursuant to the constitutional authority of each chamber to determine its rules of proceeding. This report will be updated to reflect any additions or further changes to these points of order. |
crs_RL34208 | crs_RL34208_0 | Diverse governmental and non-governmental organizations have publicly expressed their support or reservations about increased comparative clinical effectiveness research. Related Legislation in the 110th Congress
A number of bills have been introduced that support comparative clinical effectiveness research, including several in the 110 th Congress. Similarly, H.R. The Healthy Americans Act, S. 334 and H.R. To help inform the discussion surrounding comparative clinical effectiveness research, this report provides an overview and discusses past and current comparative clinical effectiveness research and other forms of technology assessment in the United States. This report also briefly discusses the use of technology assessment in the U.S. and other countries, and the potential role of a new comparative effectiveness research entity. Past and Current Research Efforts
In order to determine whether and what type of comparative effectiveness research is needed, the scope and scale of current comparative effectiveness research efforts must be understood. Federal Funding of Technology Assessments
Health technology assessment, including comparative clinical effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and cost-benefit analysis, has been conducted for decades in the United States through both public and private initiatives. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are currently the largest federal funders of extramural health technology assessments. Unlike AHRQ and the NIH, the Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) Pharmacy Benefits Management Strategic Healthcare Group (PBMSHG) and the Department of Defense (DOD) PharmacoEconomic Center (PEC) do not out-source their health technology assessments. AHRQ previously sponsored research through its Medical Treatment Effectiveness Program (MEDTEP). The OTA was a nonpartisan congressional agency that conducted health and non-health technology assessments for Congress. Some organizations that have used these assessments include the Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy (AMCP), Consumer Reports' Best Buy Drugs project, the DOD PEC, for-profit firms (including consulting firms, private insurers, and pharmaceutical manufacturers), the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Oregon Health Plan, and the VHA PBMSHG. The entity could also arguably improve researchers' independence and scientific integrity, or spawn the genesis of research not currently being conducted on drugs, other health technologies, or services. These include the Centers for Education and Research on Therapeutics (CERTs), the Developing Evidence to Inform Decisions about Effectiveness (DEcIDE) Program, the Evidence-based Practice Centers (EPCs), and the Research Initiative in Clinical Economics (RICE), which conduct technology assessments, comparative effectiveness research, pharmaceutical outcomes research, and economic valuations of health care services and treatments, respectively. Evidence-based Practice Centers Program. Cost-effectiveness analysis has been used as a research tool in some of the reports. | Comparative clinical effectiveness research has been discussed as a source of information for health care decision makers that may aid them in reaching evidence-based decisions. The premise that "what is newest is not always the best" is the core of the rationale behind comparative effectiveness research. Diverse governmental and non-governmental organizations have publicly expressed their support and reservations about comparative effectiveness research. Many bills have been introduced in the 110th Congress that support comparative effectiveness research, including S. 3, H.R. 2184, H.R. 3162 (CHAMP Act), and the Healthy Americans Act (S. 334 and H.R. 3163). Although publicly supported by many governmental and non-governmental entities in the abstract, controversy about comparative clinical effectiveness research lies in its practice and implementation.
Health technology assessment tools (e.g., comparative clinical effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and cost-benefit analysis) have been used for decades in the United States. To determine whether and what type of research is needed, the scope and scale of current comparative effectiveness research efforts must be understood. This report summarizes research efforts that have been funded and conducted.
Both the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) provide extramural research funding for health technology assessments. AHRQ's ongoing health technology assessment program includes the Centers for Education and Research on Therapeutics (CERTs), the Developing Evidence to Inform Decisions about Effectiveness (DEcIDE) Program, Evidence-based Practice Centers (EPCs), and the Research Initiative in Clinical Economics (RICE). The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) also have centers that conduct health technology assessments to help the agencies make formulary and pricing decisions. Health technology assessments by AHRQ's Medical Treatment Effectiveness Program (MEDTEP) and the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) were terminated in 1995.
Some organizations that have used these assessments include the Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy (AMCP), Consumer Reports' Best Buy Drugs project, the DOD, for-profit firms (including consulting firms, private insurers, and pharmaceutical manufacturers), the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Oregon Health Plan, and the VHA. Some other countries have given comparative clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness more explicit roles in their health care systems.
Proponents maintain that a new comparative clinical effectiveness research entity in the United States could have the potential to increase the efficiency and coordination of research, boost the perceived independence and scientific integrity of the research, or generate research not currently being conducted. Realizing such anticipated gains could depend on many factors. This report will be updated upon legislative activity. |
crs_R40830 | crs_R40830_0 | Introduction
The federal government has long played a role in helping vulnerable young people secure employment and achieve academic success through job training and employment programs, including summer youth employment opportunities. In some years, hundreds of thousands of youth have participated in the programs. The enactment of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA, P.L. However, the law requires that local areas funded under its Youth Activities (Youth) program provide summer employment opportunities as one of 10 elements available to low-income youth with barriers to employment. The economic downturn that began in December 2007 increased focus on the summer employment component, especially given recent evidence that employment for youth during the summer is at record lows. In February 2009, President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 , ARRA, Recovery Act). One of the stated purposes of ARRA was to preserve existing jobs and create new jobs. To this end, the law appropriated $1.2 billion for the Youth program. This report provides an overview of efforts to employ youth during the summer months, particularly under the Recovery Act, and the issues surrounding these efforts. WIA Youth Activities Program
The Youth Activities program is authorized by WIA and is the primary source of federal funding for youth employment and job training activities, including summer employment opportunities, targeted to vulnerable youth. Authorization for funding WIA programs expired with the end of FY2003; however, Congress has continued to appropriate funds for the programs since this time. In the accompanying conference report to ARRA, Congress specified that funds should be used for summer youth employment and to expand year-round employment opportunities for youth up to age 24 (from age 21, as generally required under WIA). States are not required to report costs related to summer youth employment; however, according to an audit by the DOL Inspector General, approximately 40% of ARRA funds expended through September 30, 2010, was for summer employment opportunities. A 2004 report on the implementation of WIA found that local areas appeared to use three approaches to carry out summer opportunities: (1) many local areas maintained a fairly traditional summer youth program, although on a smaller scale than in the past, with a new emphasis on academic and occupational learning, such as competency-based instruction provided at the work site; (2) a smaller number of local areas substantially revamped their summer program by linking summer and year-round activities that are similar; and (3) several local areas decided to supplement their WIA summer opportunities with non-WIA funding to compensate for the loss of a large-scale program. Differences Between Implementation Under WIA and ARRA
The March 2009 TEGL on ARRA emphasized that local areas had flexibility in carrying out certain aspects of summer employment models. First, local areas could determine whether follow-up would be required for youth served with ARRA funds during the summer months only. The state plan was to address specific questions related to youth services provided with ARRA funds, including
(1) Describe the anticipated program design for the WIA Youth funds provided under the Recovery Act. GAO Oversight
In addition to oversight by agencies that administer ARRA funds, the law directs GAO to conduct bimonthly reviews on the use of funds by selected states and localities. One of the nine programs is WIA Youth Activities, which accounted for 1% of all ARRA dollars appropriated to these programs. With increased focus on the summer jobs program, policymakers may consider, as part of any efforts to reauthorize WIA, whether the law should place greater emphasis on summer employment, as predecessor legislation did. The enactment of WIA in 1998 marked the first time since 1964 that states and localities did not receive funding for stand-alone summer employment programs for vulnerable youth. Nearly 375,000 youth participated in summer employment, and they worked in a variety of settings in the public and private sectors. | For decades, the federal government has played a role in helping vulnerable young people secure employment and achieve academic success through job training and employment programs, including summer youth employment opportunities. The enactment of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA, P.L. 105-220) in 1998 marked the first time since 1964 that states and localities did not receive funding specifically designated for summer employment programs for vulnerable youth. Although WIA does not authorize a stand-alone summer program, the law requires that local areas funded under its Youth Activities (Youth) program provide summer employment opportunities as one of 10 elements available to eligible low-income youth with barriers to employment. Together, these elements are intended to provide a comprehensive year-round job training and employment program for youth. Approximately one-quarter of youth in the program participate in summer employment activities, which are required to be directly linked to academic and occupational learning. Funding authorization for WIA expired in FY2003, but Congress has continued to appropriate funds for WIA, including the Youth program.
The December 2007 to June 2009 economic recession increased focus on the role of the summer employment element, particularly given recent evidence that summer youth employment is at record lows. On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5, ARRA, or Recovery Act). One of the stated purposes of ARRA was to preserve existing jobs and create new jobs. To this end, the law appropriated $1.2 billion for grants for the WIA Youth program. In the accompanying conference report, Congress specified that funds should be used for both summer youth employment and year-round employment opportunities, particularly for youth up to age 24. ARRA additionally established a role for the Inspectors General of various federal agencies and the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in overseeing use of ARRA funding.
Under ARRA, a total of 374,489 youth participated in summer employment opportunities, and approximately 40% of ARRA dollars for the Youth Activities program was used for employment during the summer months. In its guidance on funding provided for the Youth Activities program, the Department of Labor (DOL) emphasized that local areas had flexibility in carrying out certain aspects of the summer employment component as funded under ARRA. For example, local areas could determine whether follow-up was required for youth served with ARRA funds during the summer months only. This is compared to WIA's normal requirement that all youth receive follow-up services. As part of its ARRA oversight efforts, GAO conducted reviews on the use of funds for select federal programs by selected states, including the WIA Youth program. According to GAO, localities in these states used Youth Activities funds to expand summer employment opportunities for youth, both in the public sector and private sector, and in nonprofit organizations.
This report provides an overview of efforts under ARRA to secure job training and employment for youth during the summer months, and addresses issues related to these efforts. For example, some of DOL guidance on ARRA is distinct from previous guidance provided under WIA, in that it is tailored to the requirements of the Recovery Act. Further, with increased focus on the summer jobs component, policymakers may consider, as part of any efforts to reauthorize WIA, whether the law should place greater emphasis on summer employment. Past evaluations of federally funded programs have shown mixed results in the achievement of goals, although these programs are not necessarily comparable to the summer youth opportunities currently offered by states and localities. |
crs_R44687 | crs_R44687_0 | Introduction
Beginning with President Theodore Roosevelt, Presidents have protected well over 100 areas under the Antiquities Act of 1906. These protected areas, totaling hundreds of millions of acres of land as well as large marine areas, are known as national monuments. However, it appears that presidential authority may be more constrained, although it remains unresolved whether a President could lawfully abolish, or the extent to which a President could significantly diminish, a previously proclaimed national monument. The act provides, in part:
(a) Presidential Declaration.—The President may, in the President's discretion, declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated on land owned or controlled by the Federal Government to be national monuments. However, a number of legal analyses, since at least the Franklin Roosevelt Administration, have agreed that a presidential proclamation of a national monument under the Antiquities Act may be undone only by Congress. Some more modern analysts also have asserted that the President lacks authority to undo a national monument proclamation under the Antiquities Act. However, given the silence of the Antiquities Act on this specific question, as well as the potential analogy to other presidential executive orders and proclamations, the existence or scope of a President's authority to abolish national monuments is still a matter of debate that has not been squarely resolved. However, the 1938 Attorney General opinion discussed above contemplates reduction of monuments in size pursuant to the "smallest area" language:
While the President from time to time has diminished the area of national monuments established under the Antiquities Act by removing or excluding lands therefrom, under that part of the act which provides that the limits of the monuments "in all cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected," it does not follow from his power so to confine that area that he has the power to abolish a monument entirely. On the other hand, not all management details are contained in a national monument proclamation. FLPMA expressly prohibits the Secretary of the Interior from modifying or revoking any withdrawal creating national monuments under the Antiquities Act. Congressional Authority Over National Monuments
Congress can establish national monuments on federal land primarily pursuant to its authority under the Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." | The Antiquities Act of 1906 authorizes the President to declare, by proclamation, that objects of historic or scientific interest on federal lands are designated as national monuments. Over the course of more than a century, Presidents have cited the Antiquities Act as authority for protecting well over 100 land and marine areas, totaling hundreds of millions of acres, as national monuments. National monuments generally are reserved and protected from certain uses such as mineral leasing or mining, although management terms may vary by monument. Partly because of such restrictions, some presidential proclamations of national monuments—and proposals for such proclamations—have led to controversy.
Once a President has proclaimed a national monument on federal land, later Presidents or Congresses may want to abolish, diminish, or otherwise change the monument. Congress has clear authority to do so, largely under the Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that "Congress shall have Power to ... make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." Congress has used its authority to abolish or to remove acreage from national monuments on several occasions.
It appears that presidential authority may be more constrained. No President has ever abolished or revoked a national monument proclamation, so the existence or scope of any such authority has not been tested in courts. However, some legal analyses since at least the 1930s have concluded that the Antiquities Act, by its terms, does not authorize the President to repeal proclamations, and that the President also lacks implied authority to do so. Under this view, once a President has applied the Antiquities Act to protect objects of historic or scientific interest, only Congress can undo that protection. On the other hand, Presidents have deleted acres from national monuments, proclaiming that the deleted acres do not meet the Antiquities Act's standard that the protected area be the "smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected." Presidents also can modify the management of national monuments, although the outer boundaries of this authority, too, appear to be untested. Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), executive branch officials other than the President are barred from modifying or revoking any withdrawal creating national monuments under the Antiquities Act. |
crs_R40789 | crs_R40789_0 | The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA; P.L. 89-329), as amended, authorizes a broad array of federal student aid programs that assist students and their families with paying for or financing the costs of obtaining a postsecondary education. These federal student aid programs are authorized under Title IV of the HEA. Requirements applicable to the administration of Title IV federal student aid programs are specified in Title I of the HEA, as well as in Title IV. The HEA also authorizes many other types of programs, including programs that make federal aid and support available to institutions of higher education (IHEs). The Department of Education (ED) administers programs authorized under the HEA. In 2008, the HEA was reauthorized under the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA; P.L. 110-315 ); and in 2009 technical amendments to the HEA were made under P.L. 111-39 . Institutions that participate in one or more Title IV programs, or that seek to begin participating in these programs, are subject to a wide range of requirements under the act to report or disclose information to the Secretary of Education (the Secretary), to students, to the public, or to other entities. As part of the amendments made to the HEA, the HEOA added numerous additional requirements for the reporting and disclosure of information, many of which are applicable to IHEs. This has resulted in a sizable expansion of reporting and disclosure requirements with which IHEs must comply as a condition of their participation in HEA, Title IV federal student aid programs. This report responds to requests by Members of Congress for an in-depth examination of the reporting and disclosure requirements applicable to IHEs that participate in Title IV federal student aid programs. Specifically, it identifies and describes the reporting and disclosure requirements specified under Title I and Title IV of the HEA that applied to institutions prior to the enactment of the HEOA and those that were amended or newly established by the HEOA. It has been prepared to serve as a resource to assist Members of Congress and their staff in overseeing the Department of Education's implementation of amendments to the HEA made by the HEOA. This report attempts to be comprehensive, but not necessarily exhaustive, in its scope. | The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA; P.L. 89-329), as amended, authorizes a broad array of federal student aid programs that assist students and their families with paying for or financing the costs of obtaining a postsecondary education. These federal student aid programs are authorized under Title IV of the HEA. Requirements applicable to the administration of Title IV federal student aid programs are specified in Title I of the HEA, as well as in Title IV. The HEA also authorizes many other types of programs, including programs that make federal aid and support available to institutions of higher education (IHEs). The Department of Education administers programs authorized under the HEA. In 2008, the HEA was reauthorized under the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA; P.L. 110-315); and in 2009 technical amendments to the HEA were made under P.L. 111-39.
Institutions that participate in one or more Title IV programs, or that seek to begin participating in these programs, are subject to a wide range of requirements under the act to report or disclose information to the Secretary of Education, to students, to the public, or to other entities. As part of the amendments made to the HEA, the HEOA added numerous additional requirements for the reporting and disclosure of information, many of which are applicable to IHEs. This has resulted in a sizable expansion of the reporting and disclosure requirements with which IHEs must comply as a condition of their participation in HEA, Title IV federal student aid programs.
This report responds to requests by Members of Congress for an in-depth examination of the reporting and disclosure requirements applicable to IHEs that participate in Title IV federal student aid programs. Specifically, it identifies and describes the reporting and disclosure requirements specified under Title I and Title IV of the HEA that applied to institutions prior to the enactment of the HEOA and those that were amended or newly established by the HEOA. It has been prepared to serve as a resource to assist Members of Congress and their staff in overseeing the Department of Education's implementation of amendments to the HEA made by the HEOA. It is designed to be comprehensive, though not necessarily exhaustive, in scope. It will not be updated. |
crs_RL30533 | crs_RL30533_0 | Instead, their preference has often been to assign administrative responsibilities to newly created independent agencies or to hybrid organizations possessing legal characteristics of both the governmental and private sectors. Hybrid organizations attract both support and criticism. The one common characteristic to this melange of entities in the quasi government is that they are not agencies of the United States as that term is defined in Title 5 of the U.S. Code . This report follows the linear spectrum approach in describing the elements within the quasi government. It is possible to begin with what are referred to in the U.S. Government Manual as "Quasi Official Agencies," those entities, arguably, closest to the executive branch, and move on to the other end of the spectrum, "congressionally chartered nonprofit organizations," those entities, arguably, the furthest from the executive branch. For the purpose of budgetary treatment, Congress defined the term "government-sponsored enterprise" in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990 to refer to
a corporate entity created by a law of the United States that—
(A) (i) has a Federal charter authorized by law;
(ii) is privately owned, as evidenced by capital stock owned by private entities or individuals;
(iii) is under the direction of a board of directors, a majority of which is elected by private owners;
(iv) is a financial institution with power to—
(I) make loans or loan guarantees for limited purposes such as to provide credit for specific borrowers or one sector; and
(II) raise funds by borrowing (which does not carry the full faith and credit of the Federal Government) or to guarantee the debt of others in unlimited amounts; and
(B) (i) does not exercise powers that are reserved to the Government as sovereign (such as the power to tax or to regulate interstate commerce);
(ii) does not have the power to commit the Government financially (but it may be a recipient of a loan guarantee commitment made by the Government); and
(iii) has employees whose salaries and expenses are paid by the enterprise and are not Federal employees subject to title 5. While these distinctions have an arbitrary character imposed after the fact, there is nonetheless some utility in beginning the review of the agency-related nonprofit organization category within the quasi government as being of three essential types. In the past decade, venture capital funds have been established to fund research into technology. In-Q-Tel is not the only domestic entity of this type. Instrumentalities of Indeterminate Character
Not all the hybrid organizations fit into categories within the quasi government. Illustrative of quasi governmental entities are three examples that arguably merit discrete review. In their view, the issues are not economic in their fundamentals, but constitutional and legal. The underlying premise of the entrepreneurial management paradigm is that the governmental and private sectors are essentially alike in the fundamentals, and thus subject to many of the same economically derived behavioral norms. They see political accountability and due process being superseded by the primacy of performance and results, however defined. | To assist Congress in its oversight, this report provides an overview of federally related entities that possess legal characteristics of both the governmental and private sectors. These hybrid organizations (e.g., Fannie Mae, National Park Foundation, In-Q-Tel), collectively referred to in this report as the "quasi government," have grown in number, size, and importance in recent decades.
A brief review of executive branch organizational history is followed by a description of entities with ties to the executive branch, although they are not "agencies" of the United States as defined in Title 5 of the U.S. Code. Several categories of quasi governmental entities are defined and discussed: (1) quasi official agencies; (2) government-sponsored enterprises (GSE); (3) federally funded research and development corporations; (4) agency-related nonprofit organizations; (5) venture capital funds; (6) congressionally chartered nonprofit organizations; and (7) instrumentalities of indeterminate character.
The quasi government, not surprisingly, is a controversial subject. To supporters of this trend toward greater reliance upon hybrid organizations, the proper objective of governmental management is to maximize performance and results, however defined. In their view, the private and governmental sectors are alike in their essentials, and thus subject to the same economically derived behavioral norms. They tend to welcome this trend toward greater use of quasi governmental entities.
Critics of the quasi government, on the other hand, tend to view hybrid organizations as contributing to a weakened capacity of government to perform its fundamental constitutional duties, and to an erosion in political accountability, a crucial element in democratic governance. They tend to consider the governmental and private sectors as being legally distinct, with relatively little overlap in behavioral norms.
There is nothing modest about the size, scope, and impact of the quasi government. Quasi governmental entities run the gamut, from not-for-profit organizations that raise funds for the upkeep of parks to venture capital entities that fund the development of new technologies of use by federal agencies.
This report will be updated in the event of a significant development. |
crs_RL32941 | crs_RL32941_0 | Introduction
Arguably, the three most important homeland security public laws enacted following the terrorist attacks on September 2001 are: P.L. 107-56 , "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act)"; P.L. 107-296 , "Homeland Security Act of 2002"; and P.L. 108-458 , "Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004." The PATRIOT Act focused on enhancing domestic security through anti-terrorism measures, specifically, law enforcement and legal responses to terrorism. The Homeland Security Act established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act restructured the U.S. intelligence community to better assist in terrorism preparedness and response. These key laws not withstanding, a host of important state and local homeland security policy issues remain, which the 109 th Congress might address. Some of the issues include reportedly unmet emergency responder needs; the proposed reduction in appropriations for federal homeland security assistance; the determination of state and local homeland security risk assessment factors; the absence of emergency responder equipment standards; the development of state and local homeland security strategies; and the limited number of state and local officials with security clearances. One could argue that the primary state and local homeland security issue is the widely reported unfair and inadequate distribution of federal homeland security assistance; this report, however, does not address that issue. For information concerning FY2006 homeland security grant allocations, a discussion of federal homeland security assistance distribution formulas, risk factors, and state and urban area homeland security strategies see CRS Report RL33583, Homeland Security Grants: FY2003 - FY2006 Evolution of Program Guidance and Grant Allocation Methods , by [author name scrubbed] . H.R. | Arguably, the three most important homeland security public laws enacted following the terrorist attacks on September 2001 are: P.L. 107-56 , "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act)"; P.L. 107-296 , "Homeland Security Act of 2002"; and P.L. 108-458 , "Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004." The PATRIOT Act focused on enhancing domestic security through anti-terrorism measures, specifically, law enforcement and legal responses to terrorism. The Homeland Security Act established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act restructured the U.S. intelligence community to better assist in terrorism preparedness and response.
These key laws not withstanding, a host of important state and local homeland security policy issues remain, which the 109 th Congress might address. Some of the issues include reportedly unmet emergency responder needs, the proposed reduction in appropriations for federal homeland security assistance, the determination of state and local homeland security risk assessment factors, the absence of emergency responder equipment standards, the development of state and local homeland security strategies, and the limited number of state and local officials with security clearances.
A case could be made that the primary state and local homeland security issue is the reportedly unfair and inadequate distribution of federal homeland security assistance; this report, however, does not address that issue. For information concerning FY2005 homeland security grant allocations and a discussion of federal homeland security assistance distribution formulas, see CRS Report RL32696, Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program: State Allocations and Issues for Congressional Oversight , by [author name scrubbed] . For a comparison of current legislative actions on homeland security distribution formulas, see CRS Report (archived) RL32892, Homeland Security Grant Formulas: A Comparison of Formula Provisions in S. 21 and H.R. 1544, 109 th Congress , available upon request from the author.
The report will be updated as congressional actions warrant. |
crs_R43231 | crs_R43231_0 | This new interest in exporting natural gas has also produced renewed interest in the laws and regulations governing the export of other fossil fuels, including crude oil and coal. The regulations further provide that BIS will issue licenses for certain crude oil exports that fall under one of the listed exemptions, including (i) exports from Alaska's Cook Inlet; (ii) exports to Canada for consumption or use therein; (iii) exports in connection with refining or exchange of strategic petroleum reserve oil; (iv) exports of heavy California crude oil up to an average volume not to exceed 25,000 barrels per day; (v) exports that are consistent with certain international agreements; (vi) exports that are consistent with findings made by the President under certain statutes; and (vii) exports of foreign origin crude oil where, based on satisfactory written documentation, the exporter can demonstrate that the oil is not of U.S. origin and has not been commingled with oil of U.S. origin. These exports do not require a license from BIS. However, in 1977 the Federal Power Commission was dissolved and its responsibilities were transferred to the Department of Energy (DOE) as well as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an independent agency operating within DOE, pursuant to the Department of Energy Organization Act. Natural gas exporting responsibilities are handled by the Office of Fossil Energy within DOE. Export Facility Authorization
The previous section of this report discusses federal authorization of the export of natural resources, not the construction and operation of export facilities. If an oil pipeline crosses the border with Canada or Mexico, the border crossing facility must be authorized by the federal government. Thus, it seems unlikely that licensing procedures could constitute a subsidy under WTO rules, even if they lead to restrictions on exports. Articles XX and XIII—General Exceptions
Article XX of the GATT provides for certain exceptions that a member country may invoke if it is found to be in violation of any GATT obligations. While there is currently no WTO case law on the use of Article XXI of the GATT 1994, some scholars have speculated that, in the future, a WTO panel or the Appellate Body may decline to defer to a WTO member's judgment that its use of Article XXI is appropriate and, instead, may subject a member's use of the exception to scrutiny. The bills would amend Section 3 of the NGA to provide that expedited approval of LNG exports would be granted to four different categories of foreign countries: (1) nations for which there is in effect a free trade agreement (FTA) requiring national treatment for trade in natural gas; (2) a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); (3) Japan, so long as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of January 19, 1960, between Japan and the United States remains in effect; and (4) "any other foreign country if the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines that exportation of natural gas to that foreign country would promote the national security interests of the United States." Under international trade rules, restrictions on exports of fossil fuels could potentially be difficult to reconcile with Articles I and XI of the GATT 1994. Article XXI, the exception for essential security interests, may be cited in order to justify potential violations of GATT Articles I and XI. The United States has traditionally considered this exception to be self-judging. However, it is possible that a panel or the Appellate Body might scrutinize the United States' use of the exception. However, Article XIII potentially requires that if an otherwise GATT inconsistent measure is permitted to remain in force due to an Article XX exception, the measure must be administered in a nondiscriminatory manner. Export restrictions that treat WTO members differently would appear not to satisfy the potential nondiscriminatory requirements of Article XIII. | Recent technological developments have led to an increase in domestic production of natural gas and crude oil. As a result, there is interest among some parties in exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) and crude oil to take advantage of international markets. This has placed new attention on the laws and regulations governing, and in many cases restricting, the export of fossil fuels.
In most cases, export of fossil fuels requires federal authorization of both the act of exporting the fuel and the facility that will be employed to export the fuel. For example, the export of natural gas is permitted by the Department of Energy's Office of Fossil Energy, while the construction and operation of the export facility must be authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Oil exports are restricted, but an export that falls under one of several exemptions can be authorized by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security. Oil pipelines that cross international borders must be permitted by the State Department. Coal exports do not require special authorization specific to the commodity; however, as with natural gas and crude oil, other generally applicable federal statutes and regulations may apply to the export of coal.
Restrictions on exports of fossil fuels could potentially have implications under international trade rules. They may possibly be inconsistent with the most favored nation requirement of Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) if certain World Trade Organization (WTO) members are treated differently than others. Limits on exports could also potentially violate the prohibition on export restrictions contained in Article XI of the GATT 1994 if they prescribe vague and unspecified criteria for export licensing. However, an export licensing regime does not appear to constitute a "subsidy" to downstream users of fossil fuels under WTO rules.
Article XXI, the exception for essential security interests, may provide justification for potential violations of GATT Articles I and XI. The United States has traditionally considered this exception to be self-judging. However, it is possible that a panel or the Appellate Body might scrutinize the United States' use of the exception.
Article XX of the GATT provides additional exceptions that a member country may invoke if it is found to be in violation of any GATT obligations. For example, WTO members may maintain an otherwise GATT inconsistent measure if it is necessary to protect an exhaustible natural resource or necessary to protect human health or the environment. Article XIII potentially requires that if an otherwise GATT inconsistent measure is permitted to remain in force due to an Article XX exception, the measure must be administered in a nondiscriminatory manner. Export restrictions that treat WTO members differently would appear not to satisfy the potential nondiscriminatory requirements of Article XIII. |
crs_R40834 | crs_R40834_0 | Introduction
In March 2010, after more than a year of legislative deliberation, Congress passed a pair of measures designed to reform the U.S. health care system and address the twin challenges of constraining rapid growth of health care costs and expanding access to high-quality health care. On March 21, the House passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; H.R. 3590 ), which the Senate had approved on Christmas Eve, as well as the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 ( H.R. 4872 ). President Obama signed the first measure ( P.L. 111-148 ) on March 23 and the second on March 30 ( P.L. 111-152 ). 3596 ), which would limit antitrust exemptions provided by the McCarran-Ferguson Act (P.L. Concerns about concentration in health insurance markets are linked to wider concerns about the cost, quality, and availability of health care. The market structure of the health insurance and hospital industries may have played a role in rising health care costs and in limiting access to affordable health insurance and health care. This report discusses whether or not the current health insurance market structure hinders the U.S. health system's ability to reach the policy goals of expanding health insurance coverage and containing health care costs. How the Health Insurance Industry Developed
The market structure of the modern U.S. health insurance industry not only reflects the complexities and uncertainties of health care, but also its origins in the 1930s and its evolution in succeeding decades. Commercial Insurers Enter
Before World War II, many commercial insurers doubted that hospital or medical costs were an insurable risk. After the rapid spread of Blue Cross plans in the mid-1930s, however, several commercial insurers began to offer similar health coverage. By the 1950s, commercial health insurers had become potent competitors and began to cut into Blue Cross's market share in many parts of the country. Health insurers are intermediaries in the transaction of the provision of health care between patients and providers—health insurers are a third-party who reimburse providers on behalf of patients. Health insurers not only reimburse providers, but also typically have some control over the number and types of services covered and negotiate contracts with providers on the payments for health services—most health insurance plans are managed care plans (HMOs, PPOs) rather than indemnity or traditional health insurance plans that provide unlimited reimbursement for a fixed premium. Competitive Environment
The nature of competition in the health insurance market may also affect market structure. On November 2, 2009, the House Judiciary Committee reported out the Health Insurance Industry Antitrust Enforcement Act ( H.R. 79-15). On February 24, 2010, the House passed the Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act ( H.R. Concluding Remarks
Evidence suggests that health insurance markets in many local areas are highly concentrated. Many large firms have reacted to market conditions by self-insuring, which may provide some competitive pressure on insurers, although this is unlikely to improve market conditions for other consumers. The exercise of market power by firms in concentrated markets generally leads to higher prices and reduced output—high premiums and limited access to health insurance—combined with high profits. Many other characteristics of the health insurance markets, however, also contribute to rising costs and limited access to affordable health insurance. Health costs appear to have increased over time in large part because of complex interactions among health insurance, health care providers, employers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, tax policy, and the medical technology industry. Reducing the growth trajectory of health care costs may require policies that affect these interactions. Policies focused on health insurance sector reform may yield some results, but are unlikely to solve larger cost growth and problems of limited access to health care if other parts of the health are left unchanged. | In March 2010, Congress passed a pair of measures designed to reform the U.S. health care system and address the twin challenges of constraining rapid growth of health care costs and expanding access to high-quality health care. On March 21, the House passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590), which the Senate had approved on Christmas Eve, as well as the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (H.R. 4872). President Obama signed the first measure (P.L. 111-148) on March 23 and the second on March 30 (P.L. 111-152). On November 2, 2009, the House Judiciary Committee reported out the Health Insurance Industry Antitrust Enforcement Act (H.R. 3596), which would limit antitrust exemptions provided by the McCarran-Ferguson Act (P.L. 79-15). The House passed the Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act (H.R. 4626) on February 24, 2010.
This report discusses how the current health insurance market structure affects the two policy goals of expanding health insurance coverage and containing health care costs. Concerns about concentration in health insurance markets are linked to wider concerns about the cost, quality, and availability of health care. The market structure of the health insurance and hospital industries may have contributed to rising health care costs and deteriorating access to affordable health insurance and health care. Many features of the health insurance market and the ways it links to other parts of the health care system can hinder competition, lead to concentrated markets, and produce inefficient outcomes. Health insurers are intermediaries in the transaction of the provision of health care between patients and providers: reimbursing providers on behalf of patients, exercising some control over the number and types of services covered, and negotiating contracts with providers on the payments for health services. Consequently, policies affecting health insurers will likely affect the other parts of the health care sector.
The market structure of the U.S. health insurance industry not only reflects the nature of health care, but also its origins in the 1930s and its evolution in succeeding decades. Before World War II, many commercial insurers doubted that hospital or medical costs were an insurable risk. But after the rapid spread of Blue Cross plans in the mid-1930s, several commercial insurers began to offer health coverage. By the 1950s, commercial health insurers had become potent competitors and began to cut into Blue Cross's market share in many regions, changing the competitive environment of the health insurance market.
Evidence suggests that health insurance markets are highly concentrated in many local areas. Many large firms that offer health insurance benefits to their employees have self-insured, which may put some competitive pressure on insurers, although this is unlikely to improve market conditions for other consumers. The exercise of market power by firms in concentrated markets generally leads to higher prices and reduced output—high premiums and limited access to health insurance—combined with high profits. Many other characteristics of the health insurance markets, however, also contribute to rising costs and limited access to affordable health insurance. Rising health care costs, in particular, play a key role in rising health insurance costs.
Complex interactions among health insurance, health care providers, employers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, tax policy, and the medical technology industry have helped increase health costs over time. Reducing the growth trajectory of health care costs may require policies that affect these interactions. Policies focused only on health insurance sector reform may yield some results, but are unlikely to solve larger cost growth and limited access problems. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44432 | crs_R44432_0 | P roduction of natural gas and crude oil from shales and other unconventional formations in the United States has expanded significantly due to new technologies such as hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. This boom in production has increased investment in new pipeline infrastructure to gather and transport these resources from producing regions to domestic and foreign consumers. Pipelines represent a relatively safe means of transporting oil and gas as compared to other modes of transportation, but have the potential to cause harm to public health and the environment because of the hazardous materials they carry and the proximity of some pipelines to highly populated areas. Construction of new pipelines and related facilities may prompt congressional interest in the relationship between federal and state authority over siting and safety of pipeline infrastructure. Siting of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines
Siting, construction, and operation of interstate natural gas pipelines require specific approval from the federal government. In the past, FERC has apparently taken the view that state or local laws that affect siting of an interstate natural gas pipeline facility might not be preempted unless they conflict with FERC's exercise of its jurisdiction under federal law or would pose an obstacle to the facility's construction. As discussed further below, the NGA also contains a savings clause preserving states' "rights" under three federal laws: the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), Clean Air Act (CAA), and Clean Water Act (CWA). Federal laws and regulations also provide several avenues for a state to provide input into FERC's siting review of an interstate natural gas pipeline. Siting of Crude Oil Pipelines
In contrast to siting review of proposed interstate natural gas pipelines under the NGA, no federal law establishes a specific approval process for the siting of pipelines that would transport crude oil within the borders of the United States. However, state or local laws may establish requirements for siting a pipeline, provided such requirements are not preempted by federal law (e.g., federal pipeline safety laws). For example, no federal law broadly preempts state and local siting requirements for these pipelines, and thus pipeline companies must obtain approval of the pipeline route on a state-by-state basis. Additional Federal Authorizations and Review
In addition to obtaining certificate authority from FERC (for siting, construction, and operation of interstate natural gas pipelines) and complying with any nonpreempted state or local siting requirements, an entity seeking to build, operate, or maintain an oil or gas pipeline may have to obtain additional federal authorizations, depending on the pipeline's proposed route and its potential impact on environmental, natural, historical, and cultural resources. While states play a minimal role with respect to applications for ROW over federal lands or permission to cross an international border, states retain broad authority to regulate to control pollution, as well as to protect and conserve natural, cultural, and historical resources. Section 60105 of the PSA establishes a state pipeline safety program certification process by which states may become authorized to administer and enforce PHMSA's baseline safety standards for intra state pipeline facilities and pipeline transportation. This provision prohibits, with certain exceptions, PHMSA from prescribing or enforcing safety standards for an intrastate pipeline facility "to the extent that the safety standards and practices are regulated by a State authority ... that submits to the Secretary annually a certification for the facilities and transportation...." However, for a state's certification to be valid, the state must certify that it has adopted, by the date of certification, "each applicable standard prescribed [by PHMSA under the PSA] or, if a standard under [49 U.S.C. | New technologies such as hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling have dramatically increased U.S. production of natural gas and crude oil from shales and other unconventional formations. As a result, companies have invested in new pipeline infrastructure to transport these resources from producing regions to domestic and foreign consuming markets. Siting, construction, operation, and maintenance of this infrastructure may raise environmental, health, and safety concerns, particularly when oil or gas moves by pipeline through heavily populated areas. Such concerns may prompt congressional interest in the relationship between federal and state authority over the siting and safety of pipeline infrastructure.
Under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), siting of interstate natural gas pipelines and related facilities requires specific approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). When the pipeline company receives a certificate of public convenience and necessity from FERC, state or local laws that conflict with FERC's exercise of its jurisdiction under federal law or would pose an obstacle to construction of the pipeline (e.g., local zoning laws) are preempted unless FERC requires the company to comply with them as a condition of granting the certificate. The NGA specifically preserves state authority over pipeline projects under the federal Clean Air Act (CAA), Clean Water Act (CWA), and Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). However, state authority under these laws remains subject to federal administrative and judicial oversight and review. Federal law also provides several avenues for a state to provide input into FERC's siting and environmental reviews of a proposed interstate natural gas pipeline.
In contrast to siting review of proposed interstate natural gas pipelines, interstate crude oil pipelines undergo a state-by-state siting approval process. No federal law broadly preempts state and local siting requirements for these pipelines. Construction or operation of any oil or gas pipeline, whether interstate or intrastate, may require additional federal or state authorizations or consultations, depending on the proposed route of the pipeline and its potential to discharge pollutants or affect natural, cultural, or historical resources. States retain broad authority to regulate to control pollution, as well as to protect and conserve natural, cultural, and historical resources. States play a significantly reduced role, however, with respect to applications for pipeline rights-of-way over federal lands or permission to cross an international border, which implicate powers of the federal government over federal lands, foreign trade, and/or foreign affairs.
Although pipelines represent a relatively safe form of transporting oil and gas as compared to other modes of transportation, the presence of new pipelines in populated areas, including gathering lines, has increased interest in federal and state oversight of pipeline safety. The Pipeline Safety and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMSA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT) has broad authority to promulgate minimum federal safety standards for pipeline facilities and transportation. States may also become authorized to administer and enforce PHMSA's baseline safety standards for intrastate pipeline facilities and transportation; adopt and enforce stricter state standards for intrastate facilities compatible with DOT standards; and inspect interstate facilities for compliance with DOT regulations. Federal pipeline safety provisions specifically preempt state "safety standards" for interstate oil or gas pipelines. Generally, federal courts have held that federal pipeline safety laws do not preempt a state or local siting law that only incidentally affects safety. However, the NGA could potentially preempt a state's or locality's application of such a law to an interstate natural gas pipeline facility. |
crs_R43628 | crs_R43628_0 | Introduction
In the past several years, and in the past year in particular, the number of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) seeking to enter the United States along the U.S.-Mexico border has surged to unusually high levels. It discusses several factors widely associated with out-migration from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, three countries accounting for much of the recent surge of unaccompanied child migrants. The report then discusses three broad factors that may be attracting migrants to the United States: economic and educational opportunity, family reunification, and U.S. immigration policies. In FY2008, the number apprehended by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) totaled 8,041. In the first 8½ months of FY2014, apprehensions climbed to 52,000 ( Figure 1 ). Nationals of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico, have accounted for almost all unaccompanied alien children apprehended at the Mexico-U.S. border during this period. The similarity of the trends characterizing apprehensions of unaccompanied alien children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and their stark divergence from those characterizing unaccompanied Mexican children suggests that factors specific to Central America's "northern triangle" underlies the sudden surge in total unaccompanied child apprehensions. High violent crime rates, poor economic conditions fueled by relatively low economic growth rates, relatively high poverty rates, and the presence of transnational gangs appear to be some of the main distinguishing factors between these three northern triangle countries and other countries in the region. Unaccompanied child migrants' motives for emigrating appear to be multifaceted. Nearly half of the children (48%) said they had experienced serious harm or had been threatened by organized criminal groups or state actors, and more than 20% had been subject to domestic abuse. El Salvador posted an economic growth rate of just 1.6% in 2013, the lowest of any country in Central America. Central American countries are also vulnerable to other types of natural disasters. According to the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), about 45% of Salvadorans, 55% of Guatemalans, and 67% of Hondurans live in poverty. According to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, in 2012 (the most recent year for which comparable data are available), the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants stood at 90.4 in Honduras, 41.2 in El Salvador, and 39.9 in Guatemala (see Table 2 ). According to many migration experts, implementation of Mexico's 2011 migration law has been uneven. Given endemic poverty in northern triangle countries, slow economic growth, and the large and long-standing income disparity between the triangle countries and the United States, it remains unclear the extent to which fluctuations in economic conditions in the United States actually affect children's migration decisions. Labor market conditions for low-skilled workers are especially challenging. According to DHS, the estimated unauthorized populations in 2012 of Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans living in the United States was 690,000, 560,000, and 360,000, respectively, representing 55%, 64%, and 67% of all foreign-born residents from those three countries living in the United States. U.S. Immigration Policies
The possible relationship between U.S. immigration policies (actual policies as well as perceptions of policies) and the surge in arrivals of unaccompanied children has been the subject of heated discussion among immigration observers and policy makers. The Administration has stated, however, that misinformation about U.S. policies has been a contributing factor. As these policies on humanitarian relief have been in place for many years, it is difficult to make a causal link between them and the recent surge in unaccompanied children from Central America. The only notable and recent revisions to the policies on humanitarian relief for unaccompanied children were included in the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2008, as discussed below. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Legalization Proposals
Some observers have singled out the Obama Administration's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative and legalization provisions in proposed comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) legislation as possible factors in the surge of unaccompanied child arrivals. Although new arrivals would not be eligible for DACA, some argue that unaccompanied children and their families falsely believe that they would be covered. Conclusion
This report has conceptualized possible factors contributing to the recent and sizable increase in unaccompanied children into "push" and "pull" forces. | Since FY2008, the growth in the number of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras seeking to enter the United States has increased substantially. Total unaccompanied child apprehensions increased from about 8,000 in FY2008 to 52,000 in the first 8 ½ months of FY2014. Since 2012, children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Central America's "northern triangle") account for almost all of this increase. Apprehension trends for these three countries are similar and diverge sharply from those for Mexican children. Unaccompanied child migrants' motives for migrating to the United States are often multifaceted and difficult to measure analytically.
Four recent out-migration-related factors distinguishing northern triangle Central American countries are high violent crime rates, poor economic conditions fueled by relatively low economic growth rates, high rates of poverty, and the presence of transnational gangs. In 2012, the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants stood at 90.4 in Honduras (the highest in the world), 41.2 in El Salvador, and 39.9 in Guatemala. International Monetary Fund reports show economic growth rates in the northern triangle countries in 2013 ranging from 1.6% to 3.5%, relatively low compared with other Central American countries. About 45% of Salvadorans, 55% of Guatemalans, and 67% of Hondurans live in poverty. Surveys in 2013 indicate that almost half of all unaccompanied children experienced serious harm or threats by organized criminal groups or state actors, and one-fifth experienced domestic abuse.
In 2011, Mexico passed legislation to improve migration management and ensure the rights of migrants transiting the country. According to many migration experts, implementation of the laws has been uneven. Some have questioned whether passage of such legislation has affected in some way the recent flows of unaccompanied children. However, the impact of such laws remains unclear.
Although economic opportunity may motivate some unaccompanied children to migrate to the United States, labor market conditions for low-skilled minority youth have worsened in recent years, even as industrial sectors employing low-skilled workers enjoy improved economic prospects. Educational opportunities may also provide a motivating factor to migration as perceptions of free and safe education may be widespread among the young. Family reunification is reported to be one of the key motives of unaccompanied children. Many have family members among the sizable Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran foreign-born populations residing in the United States.
While the impacts of actual and perceived U.S. immigration policies have been widely debated, it remains unclear if, and how, specific immigration policies have motivated children to migrate to the United States. Misperceptions about U.S. policies may be a contributing factor. The existence of long-standing humanitarian relief policies confounds causal links between them and the recent surge in unaccompanied children. A notable and recent exception is revised humanitarian relief provisions for unaccompanied children included in the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2008, which affects asylum claims, trafficking victim protections, and eligibility for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status. Some argue that unaccompanied children and their families falsely believe they would be covered under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative and legalization provisions in proposed comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) legislation.
A separate report, CRS Report R43599, Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed], discusses the recent surge in the number of UACs encountered at the U.S. border with Mexico, as well as the processing and treatment of UACs who are apprehended by immigration officials. Another report provides answers to frequently asked questions, CRS Report R43623, Unaccompanied Alien Children—Legal Issues: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. For information on country conditions, security conditions, U.S. policy in Central America, and circumstances that may be contributing to the increase in unaccompanied alien children migrating to the United States, see CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43616, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R42580, Guatemala: Political, Security, and Socio-Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL34027, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34152 | crs_RL34152_0 | First, however, the report offers an overview of the current system. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), which is part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), together compose the majority of both the total funding and the total staffing of the government's food regulatory system. The broader of the two covers the safety of most imports for consumers, including but not limited to food. Legislation
The Senate-passed version of the omnibus farm bill ( H.R. 2419 ) would establish a Congressional Bipartisan Food Safety Commission to recommend statutory changes to modernize the food safety system and ways to harmonize food safety requirements across agencies. They also include a certification system for imports, and a mandatory national system for tracing food and food animals from their point of origin to retail sale, which are described elsewhere in this CRS report. Improve Oversight of Food Imports
Issue
Concerns about perceived gaps in import safeguards, including what many believe have been insufficient funds, are not new. At issue is whether U.S. safeguards, which generally were created at a time when most foods were supplied domestically, can protect public health in a global marketplace. Legislation
As of late 2007, at least a dozen food safety bills were pending that contain provisions addressing some aspect of food import safety. A number of the bills would require that importing establishments, and/or the foreign countries in which they are located, first receive formal certification from U.S. authorities that their food safety systems demonstrably provide at least the same level of safety assurances as the U.S. system. 3580 ; signed into law as P.L. Strengthen Authorities for Notification, Recall, and Product Tracing
Issue
Currently, neither FDA nor FSIS has explicit statutory authority to order a recall of adulterated foods, require a company to notify them when it has distributed such foods, or impose penalties if recall requirements are violated. 110-85 , which was signed into law on September 27, 2007, requires FDA, within one year, to establish a "Reportable Food Registry." Before passing its version of the omnibus farm bill ( H.R. Allow State-Inspected Meat and Poultry in Interstate Commerce
Issue
Federal law currently prohibits meat and poultry plants that operate under one of the 27 state inspection programs from shipping their products across state lines. Legislation
Both the House- and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 2419 , the omnibus farm bill, would amend the meat and poultry inspection acts to permit interstate shipment of state-inspected products—but under divergent approaches. | A series of widely publicized incidents—from adulterated Chinese seafood imports to bacteria-tainted spinach, meat, and poultry produced domestically—have made food safety an issue in the 110th Congress. Numerous proposals were introduced in 2007 that would alter aspects of the current U.S. food safety system; some of these bills could receive consideration in 2008. This report provides an overview of the current system, highlights major issues in the debate to improve it, and describes the bills.
Reorganization of Food Safety Responsibilities. Critics believe that the current system is fragmented and inefficient, threatening food safety; others believe that, while improvements could be made, reorganization is not the most appropriate response. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 2419, the omnibus farm bill, would establish a commission to recommend changes.
Food Import Oversight. U.S. food imports have been increasing significantly, raising questions about whether U.S. safeguards, generally established at a time when most Americans obtained their foods domestically, sufficiently protect public health. Pending proposals would variously require foreign countries and establishments to seek U.S. certification before importing into the United States; expand oversight of food imports; and/or charge fees on such imports to cover oversight costs.
Notification and Recall Authority; Traceability. Generally, neither the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) nor USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has explicit statutory authority to order a recall of adulterated foods, to require a company to notify them when it has distributed such foods, or to impose penalties if recall requirements are violated. P.L. 110-85, which comprises wide-ranging FDA amendments, includes a requirement that FDA establish a registry for reporting potentially adulterated foods. The Senate-passed version of the farm bill contains a similar requirement for FSIS-regulated foods. Still pending are numerous bills containing provisions for mandatory recall authority. Several bills also would require agencies to set up systems for tracing foods from their source of production to final sale.
State-Inspected Meat and Poultry. Federally but not state-inspected meat and poultry may be shipped across state lines. Both the Senate- and House-passed versions of the pending farm bill would allow state-inspected products into interstate commerce, but under very different approaches.
Other Proposals. Other pending food safety-related measures would curtail the non-medical use of antibiotics in animal feeds; address the labeling of products from cloned animals; and provide incentives aimed at improving the safety of fresh fruits and vegetables. |
crs_R40990 | crs_R40990_0 | Deforestation releases about 1.6 GtCO 2 (gigatons or billion metric tons of CO 2 ) annually, about 17% of all annual anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Critics object to relying heavily on REDD for GHG reductions. The allowance value could be used in two ways: (1) to build capacity (e.g., develop a deforestation baseline and acquire monitoring technology) for countries to reduce deforestation and to participate in markets for international offset credits, and (2) to directly reduce deforestation emissions and supplement emissions reductions from non-REDD activities. The bills differ in (1) which agency is assigned to administer REDD provisions; (2) the conditions placed on developing countries eligible for capacity building and supplemental emissions reductions; and (3) the types of activities, the implementation standards, and the monitoring and reporting requirements. S. 1733 contains similar requirements for carbon offsets, but not for supplemental emissions reductions. Types of Activities
The types of REDD activities that can be funded with allowances are defined in H.R. 2454 , but not in S. 1733 . H.R. H.R. H.R. (There are provisions that discuss penalties for offset reversals.) Overall, both H.R. 2454 . 2454 , but several criteria are the same. Types of Activities Authorized
For international offsets associated with REDD, three categories of activities would qualify in both bills: (1) national level activities under developing countries that meet eligibility requirements; (2) state or province level activities within developing countries that meet certain requirements; and (3) program and project level activities in a developing country that is responsible for less than 1% of global GHG emissions, and less than 3% of global forest-sector and land use change emissions. 2454 . Eligibility requirements for these activities vary between the bills, although both would require that eligible states or provinces follow guidelines for REDD offsets set under national level emissions. H.R. Both bills would phase out the project or program level activities after a certain period. Under the offset program, both bills would direct EPA to ensure the establishment and enforcement of legal regimes, processes, standards, and safeguards that (1) give due regard to the rights and interests of local communities, indigenous peoples, forest-dependent communities, and vulnerable social groups; (2) promote consultations with, and full participation of, forest-dependent communities and indigenous peoples during the design, planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of activities; and (3) encourage equitable sharing of profits and benefits derived from international offset credits with local communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-dependent communities. Potential Issues Affecting REDD Offsets in Both Bills
There are numerous concerns about REDD offsets. These concerns include verifiability (measuring, monitoring, and reporting), additionality, leakage, and permanence. Some developing countries may not have the capacity to address concerns about REDD offsets—particularly the ability to enforce laws and land tenure (ownership), to prevent illegal logging and other activities, and to measure and monitor forest carbon levels. While the REDD allowances described above can be used to build capacity, allowance funding might be focused on achieving the supplemental emissions reductions, and not provide sufficient funding to build governance capacity in developing countries to allow them to participate in the REDD offset markets. The two primary climate change bills, H.R. 2454 and S. 1733 , generally include similar processes to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD). Both would use allowances for capacity building in developing countries and for supplemental emissions reductions. Both contain a reserve to stabilize carbon offset prices and possibly supplement REDD efforts. 2454 generally contains more details on the implementation of these programs; S. 1733 leaves more of the details to be determined in regulation. 2454 would use the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as the primary federal administrator of these REDD-related programs; S. 1733 would rely substantially on the U.S. Agency for International Development for implementation. However, concerns persist about offsets generally and about REDD offsets in particular. In addition, the bills allow for project level or state level REDD activities, with a transition to national programs, but the process for making the transition is largely undefined. | Deforestation releases substantial amounts of carbon dioxide, about 17% of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Legislation has been proposed for U.S. targets to reduce GHG emissions. The two primary bills, H.R. 2454 and S. 1733, include provisions that would reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation; these activities are referred to as REDD. Both bills would use allowances to build capacity in developing countries and supplement U.S. emissions reductions; both would allow offsets for U.S. industries; and both contain a reserve to stabilize carbon prices.
The bills are generally similar on allowances for REDD activities, but significant differences exist. H.R. 2454 would rely on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for implementation; S. 1733 would use the U.S. Agency for International Development. H.R. 2454 contains eligibility criteria and implementation standards for the supplemental emissions reductions, and identifies the types of activities that could be funded. S. 1733 would rely on federal agencies to issue regulations for these details. H.R. 2454 also contains more details on monitoring and reporting.
The bills are similar on REDD offsets, although H.R. 2454 generally contains more details for implementation. Both would limit the quantity of international offsets—1 gigaton or billion metric tons (GtCO2) in H.R. 2454, and 0.5 GtCO2 in S. 1733—but would allow some additional international offsets if domestic offsets are insufficient. Both contain guidelines that require agreements with the developing country, and national baselines and strategic forest plans by the developing country. However, neither defines the types of REDD activities that qualify. Both would allow project level and state or regional level REDD offsets, and both would phase-out such offsets to encourage national level REDD offsets, but neither bill describes how the transition from project level or state level REDD offsets to national offsets is to proceed. Both bills also address the rights and needs of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities, requiring due regard to indigenous and local rights and directing consultations with and the participation of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities.
There are several concerns about REDD allowances in the bills. H.R. 2454 provides significant details for supplemental emissions reductions, but eligible forests are undefined and the criteria and standards might be insufficient for effective implementation. The bills contain no penalties or consequences for failures to achieve the overall anticipated reductions in carbon release or to measure and monitor the activities. Both bills would use allowances for building capacity (e.g., personnel and equipment) to measure, monitor, and enforce REDD activities in developing countries, but neither bill defines capacity-building activities that could be funded, nor allocates funds between capacity building and supplemental emissions reductions.
There are also concerns about REDD carbon offsets. There are issues for carbon offsets generally—their verification (measuring, monitoring, and reporting carbon sequestration), their additionality (activities not already occurring or required), their permanence, and leakage (merely shifting deforestation to other locations). These issues are exacerbated for REDD offsets, because many developing countries do not have the capacity to address these concerns. In addition, many are concerned that REDD offsets may inhibit developing countries from committing to GHG reductions and from evolving to low-carbon economies. |
crs_R44010 | crs_R44010_0 | Introduction
The Department of Defense (DOD) has long relied on contractors to provide the U.S. military with a wide range of goods and services, including weapons, vehicles, food, uniforms, and operational support. Without contractor support, the United States would not be able to arm and field an effective fighting force. Costs and trends associated with contractor support provide Congress more information upon which to make budget decisions and weigh the relative costs and benefits of different force structures and different military operations—including contingency operations and maintaining bases around the world. Obligations occur when agencies enter into contracts, submit purchase orders, employ personnel, or otherwise legally commit to spending money. As noted in Figure 1 , in FY2017 DOD obligated more money on federal contracts ($320 billion) than all other federal agencies combined. DOD's obligations were equal to 8% of all federal spending. Trends in DOD Contract Obligations
From FY2000 to FY2017, adjusted for inflation (FY2017 dollars), DOD contract obligations increased from $189 billion to $320 billion. However, the increase in spending has not been steady. For example, DOD total obligation authority (including contracts as well as all other obligations) increased significantly from FY2000 to FY2008, and decreased from FY2008 to FY2015, and then increased again from FY2015-FY2017 (see Figure 3 ). What DOD Buys
In FY2017, 41% of total DOD contract obligations were for services, 51% for goods, and 8% for research and development (R&D). This is in contrast to the rest of the federal government (excluding DOD), which obligated a significantly larger portion of contracting dollars on services (71%) than on goods (21%) or research and development (8%). For almost 20 years, DOD has dedicated an ever-smaller share of contracting dollars to R&D, with such contracts dropping from 17% of total contract obligations in FY1999 to 8% in FY2017. Reliability of Data on Contract Obligations
The GAO, CRS, and other organizations have raised some concerns about the accuracy of procurement data retrieved from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). Analysts and the public rely on the data in FPDS to conduct analysis and gain visibility into government operations. Data reliability is essential to the utility of FPDS. FPDS data are used by other federal-spending information resources, including USASpending.gov . Despite the limitations of FPDS, imperfect data may be better than no data. Some observers say that despite its shortcomings, FPDS is one of the world's leading systems for tracking government procurement data. FPDS data can be used to identify some broad trends and rough estimations, or to gather information about specific contracts. Understanding the limitations of data—knowing when, how, and to what extent to rely on data—could help policymakers incorporate FPDS data more effectively into their decisionmaking process. | The Department of Defense (DOD) has long relied on contractors to provide the U.S. military with a wide range of goods and services, including weapons, vehicles, food, uniforms, and operational support. Without contractor support, the United States would be currently unable to arm and field an effective fighting force. Costs and trends associated with contractor support provides Congress more information upon which to make budget decisions and weigh the relative costs and benefits of different military operations—including contingency operations and maintaining bases around the world.
Total DOD Contract Obligations
Obligations occur when agencies enter into contracts, employ personnel, or otherwise commit to spending money. The federal government tracks money obligated on federal contracts through a database called the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (referred to as FPDS). There is no public database that tracks DOD contract outlays (money expended from the Treasury) as comprehensively as FPDS tracks obligations.
In FY2017, DOD obligated more money on federal contracts ($320 billion in current dollars) than all other government agencies combined. DOD's contract obligations were equal to 8% of all mandatory and discretionary federal spending. Services accounted for 41% of total DOD contract obligations, goods for 51%, and research and development (R&D) for 8%. This distribution is in contrast to the rest of the federal government, which obligated a larger portion of contracting dollars on services (71%), than on goods (21%) or research and development (8%).
According to FPDS data, from FY2000 to FY2017, DOD contract obligations increased from $189 billion to $320 billion (FY2017 dollars). The increase in spending, however, has not been steady. DOD contract obligations over the last 17 years were marked by an annualized increase of 11.5% between FY2000 and FY2008, followed by an annualized decrease of 6.5% from FY2008 to FY2015, and then increased again from FY2015 to FY2017 by 6.5% annually. Some say the steep rise, fall, and rise of DOD contract spending makes it difficult for DOD to pursue a strategic approach to budgeting.
For almost 20 years, DOD has dedicated an ever-smaller share of its contracting dollars to R&D, with such contracts dropping from 15% of total contract obligations in 2000, to 8% in 2017.
Understanding the Limitation of FPDS Data
Decisionmakers should be cautious when using obligation data from FPDS to develop policy or otherwise draw conclusions. In some cases, the data itself may not be reliable. In some instances, a query for particular data may return differing results, depending on the parameters and timing.
All data have imperfections and limitations. FPDS data can be used to identify broad trends and produce rough estimates, or to gather information about specific contracts. Some observers say that despite its shortcomings, FPDS data are substantially more comprehensive than what is available in most other countries in the world. Understanding the limitations of data—knowing when, how, and to what extent to rely on data—helps policymakers incorporate FPDS data more effectively into their decisionmaking process.
The General Services Administration (GSA) is undertaking a multi-year effort to improve the reliability, precision, retrieval, and utility of the information contained in FPDS and other federal government information systems. This effort, if successful, could significantly improve DOD's ability to engage in evidence- and data-based decisionmaking. |
crs_R44377 | crs_R44377_0 | Agencies are required to dispose of real property that they no longer need, but many continue to hold onto unneeded building space. It then examines key provisions of five real property reform bills introduced in the 114 th Congress: the Civilian Property Realignment Act (CPRA, S. 1750 ); the Federal Asset Sale and Transfer Act (FAST Act, S. 2375 ); the Federal Assets Sale and Transfer Act ( H.R. 4465 ); the Federal Property Management Reform Act (Reform Act, S. 2509 ); and the Public Buildings Reform and Savings Act ( H.R. Statutory Disposal Requirements
The steps in the real property disposal process are set by statute. The poor condition of these properties, however, may deter potential buyers or lessees, particularly if they must cover the cost of required improvements as a condition of acquiring the properties. The quality of the FRPP data has also been questioned. These recommendations would need approval by the President and Congress in order to be implemented. The OMB Director would then submit the revised recommendations, along with the criteria, to a newly established Civilian Property Realignment Commission. Implementation
Under CPRA , if a joint resolution of disapproval were not enacted, agencies would be required to complete implementation no later than three years from the date the President submitted his list of approved recommendations to Congress. Properties disposed of pursuant to a recommendation would be exempt from several statutory requirements that would otherwise apply, primarily related to screening for public benefit conveyance. This restriction would not apply to the U.S. CPRA would also require GSA to ensure that the FRPP includes the following information for each property:
the age and condition of the property; the size of the property in square feet and acreage; the geographic location of each property, including a physical address and description; the extent to which the property is being utilized; the actual annual operating costs associated with the property; the total cost of capital expenditures associated with the property; sustainability metrics associated with each property; the number of federal employees and functions housed at the property; the extent to which the mission of the federal agency is dependent on the property; and the estimated amount of capital expenditures projected to maintain and operate the property for each of the five calendar years after the date of enactment of CPRA. In addition, certain public lands would not be covered. If the Director does not submit a report within 30 days of the receipt of the commission's original or revised recommendations, then the process terminates and agencies are not required to dispose of any properties under the FAST Act. Real Property Database
H.R. Federal Real Property Management Reform Act of 2016 (S. 2509)
The Federal Real Property Management Reform Act (Property Reform Act) would not establish a new process for identifying and disposing of unneeded real property in the manner of CPRA or the FAST Act. Postal Service. It would also incentivize the disposal of unneeded property by providing agencies with the authority to retain the proceeds from the transfer, sale, or lease of surplus property. Postal Service to the council. The FRPC would also be required to
develop utilization rates for each type of federal building; develop a strategy to reduce the government's reliance on long-term leases; provide guidance on eliminating inefficient practices in agency leasing processes; compile a list of field offices that are suitable for collocation; issue "best practices" guidance regarding the use of public-private partnerships to manage properties; issue recommendations on how the State Agencies for Surplus Property program could be improved to ensure accountability and increase efficiencies in the personal property disposal process; and issue a report that contains a list of the underutilized, excess, and surplus property at each agency; progress made by each agency towards the goals set in the annual plan; and any recommendations for legislation that would advance the goals of the council. Public Buildings Reform and Savings Act of 2016 (H.R. Prospectus Requirements
The Public Buildings Act would require GSA to include new information in its prospectuses: first, the prospectus must include a cost comparison between leasing and constructing space; second, the prospectus must include an explanation of why such space could not be consolidated or collocated into other owned or leased space. Congress would have less than seven weeks to review all of the recommendations—of which there may be hundreds—before deciding whether to pass a joint resolution of disapproval. This could reduce oversight of major real property actions. | Real property disposal is the process by which federal agencies identify and then transfer, donate, or sell real property they no longer need. Disposition is an important asset management function because the costs of maintaining unneeded properties can be substantial, consuming financial resources that might be applied to long-standing real property needs, such as repairing existing facilities, or other pressing policy issues, such as reducing the national debt.
Despite the expense, federal agencies hold thousands of unneeded and underutilized properties. Agencies have argued that they are unable to dispose of these properties for several reasons. First, there are statutorily prescribed steps in the disposal process that can take months to complete. Second, properties may not be appealing to potential buyers or lessees if they require major repairs or environmental remediation—steps for which agencies lack funding to complete before bringing a property to market. Third, key stakeholders in the disposal process—including local governments, non-profit organizations, and businesses—are often at odds over how to dispose of properties.
In addition, Congress may be limited in its capacity to conduct oversight of the disposal process because it currently lacks access to reliable, comprehensive real property data. The General Services Administration (GSA) maintains a database with information on most federal buildings, but those data are provided to Congress on a limited basis. Moreover, the quality of the information in the database has been questioned, in part because of inconsistent reporting of key data elements, such as how much space within a given building is unneeded.
Five bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress that would enact broad reforms in the real property disposal process—the Civilian Property Realignment Act (CPRA, S. 1750); the Federal Asset Sale and Transfer Act (FAST Act, S. 2375); the Federal Assets Sale and Transfer Act (H.R. 4465); the Federal Property Management Reform Act of 2016 (Property Reform Act, S. 2509); and the Public Buildings Reform and Savings Act of 2016 (Public Buildings Act, H.R. 4487).
Under CPRA, agencies would develop a list of disposal recommendations, which could include the sale, transfer, conveyance, consolidation, or outlease of any unneeded space, among other options. These recommendations would be vetted by a newly established Civilian Property Realignment Commission, and then submitted to the President. If the President approved the recommendations, then they would be sent to Congress for review. If Congress passed a joint resolution of disapproval, then the recommendations would not be implemented; if a joint resolution of disapproval was not passed, then implementation would proceed. In many cases, disposal would be expedited by exempting properties on the recommendation list from certain statutory requirements, such as screening for public benefit.
Under the FAST Act, agency recommendations would be sent to a newly established real property board for vetting, and then submitted to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget for approval or disapproval. The FAST Act does not provide Congress with an opportunity to vote for or against the list of recommendations.
The Property Reform Act seeks to improve the management of federal real property by establishing additional disposal guidance, allowing agencies to retain the proceeds from the disposal of their properties, and requiring the U.S. Postal Service to increase the amount of underutilized space it leases to other federal agencies.
The Public Buildings Act would establish a streamlined leasing pilot program, mandate lactation rooms in many public buildings, require GSA to notify Congress of cost overruns, and require real property prospectuses to include a comparison of costs between leasing and renting space. |
crs_RL30764 | crs_RL30764_0 | Only since the 1960s has each chamber systematically undertaken self-discipline related to conduct. This report examines the creation and evolution of the House and Senate ethics committees and the formalization of the House and Senate ethics processes. Subsequently, the Senate created the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct in 1964, and the House established the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct in 1967. The Senate has not established a comparable office. The Committee on Ethics was initially created in 1967, as the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, with the adoption of H.Res. In 2008, the House created the Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE) to serve as an external review body for ethics complaints against Members, officers, and employees of the House. House Committee on Ethics
In the 114 th Congress, the Committee on Ethics is comprised of 10 Members, five from each party. The new adopted rules
changed the way individuals who are not Members of the House file complaints with the committee by requiring them to have a Member certify in writing that the information was submitted in good faith and warrants consideration by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct; decreased the size of the committee to 10 members from 14; established a 20-person pool of Members (10 from each party) to participate in the work of the committee as potential appointees to any investigative subcommittee that the committee might establish; required the chair and ranking minority Member of the committee to determine within 14 calendar days or five legislative days, whichever comes first, if the information offered as a complaint meets the committee's requirements; allowed an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the committee or approval of the full House to refer evidence of violations of law disclosed in a committee investigation to the appropriate state or federal law enforcement authorities; provided for a nonpartisan, professional committee staff; and allowed the ranking minority Member on the committee to place matters on the committee's agenda. 113th Congress
At the beginning of the 113 th Congress (2013-2014), the House amended the process for releasing an Office of Congressional Ethics report to the Committee on Ethics and made modifications to the Code of Conduct to clarify the hiring of relatives of Members and employees, retention of oaths (or affirmations) by the Clerk of the House and the Sergeant at Arms, and the use of official funds for personal and charter aircraft, when it adopted the rules for the 113 th Congress ( H.Res. 895 . The first OCE board members were appointed in July 2008. Senate
Initially created in 1964, the Senate Committee on Standards and Conduct was renamed the Select Committee on Ethics in 1977. | The Constitution vests Congress with broad authority to discipline its Members. Only since 1967, however, have both houses established formal rules of conduct and disciplinary procedures whereby allegations of illegal or unethical conduct may be investigated and punished.
In 1964, the Senate established its first permanent ethics committee, the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct, which was renamed the Select Committee on Ethics in 1977. In 1967, the House first established a permanent ethics committee, the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, which was renamed the Committee on Ethics in 2011. A year after being established, each chamber adopted rules of conduct. Previously, Congress had dealt case by case with misconduct and relied on election results as the ultimate arbiter in questions of wrongdoing.
In 2008, with the adoption of H.Res. 895, the House created the Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE) to review allegations of impropriety by Members, officers, and employees of the House and, when appropriate, to refer "findings of fact" to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. The OCE board of directors comprises six board members and two alternates. Current Members of the House, federal employees, and lobbyists are not eligible to serve on the board. The OCE was reauthorized at the beginning of the 113th Congress. The Senate has not established a comparable office.
This report describes the evolution of enforcement by Congress of its rules of conduct for the House and Senate and summarizes the disciplinary options available to the House Committee on Ethics and the Senate Select Committee on Ethics.
For additional information, please refer to CRS Report RL30650, Senate Select Committee on Ethics: A Brief History of Its Evolution and Jurisdiction, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report 98-15, House Committee on Ethics: A Brief History of Its Evolution and Jurisdiction, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R40760, House Office of Congressional Ethics: History, Authority, and Procedures, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL31382, Expulsion, Censure, Reprimand, and Fine: Legislative Discipline in the House of Representatives, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42933 | crs_R42933_0 | Introduction
Each year, Congress considers appropriations measures that provide funding for various federal government activities. Such measures are commonly referred to as "regular" appropriations bills. In recent years, the House has typically considered a regular appropriations bill only after first reaching agreement on the procedural terms of its consideration. Rarely have regular appropriations bills been considered under their status as privileged business. House Rule XIII allows a motion to be made to provide for consideration of a general appropriations bill. This report examines the terms under which the regular appropriations bills are typically brought up and initially considered on the House floor, as well as the practices of the House with regard to amendment opportunities and waivers, for FY1996 to FY2015 (104 th -114 th Congresses). Amending Regular Appropriations Bills in the House
When a regular appropriations bill is considered as a privileged measure, this procedure generally permits consideration of any amendments to the bill that comply with the rules of the House (called an "open" amending process). Providing for consideration by a special rule or UCA, however, allows this amending process to be altered. Such alterations can place preconditions on the offering of amendments, directly prescribe the specific amendments that will be in order, waive points of order against amendments, or place time limits on their consideration. For FY1996 to FY2015, the means used for consideration of most regular appropriations bills provided for some type of "open" amending process allowing an unrestricted number of amendments to be offered that comply with House rules. Such processes often waived points of order against certain amendments and, less frequently, required that amendments be preprinted in the Congressional Record in advance of consideration. On all but one occasion during this period, the means used for initiating consideration of Legislative Branch bills provided for a "structured" amendment process, which specified a list of amendments that could be offered and waived points of order against those amendments. Structured processes were used for other types of bills on 3 occasions through the 110 th Congress, 13 occasions during the 111 th Congress, and one occasion during each of the 113 th and 114 th Congresses. A closed process, which allowed no amendments, was used on only one occasion, for consideration of the FY2004 Legislative Branch appropriations bill. 5. Waiving House Rules Prior to Consideration of Regular Appropriations Bills
The standing rules of the House place certain restrictions on when a measure is eligible for consideration and what content may be considered. The House sometimes chooses to "waive" or set aside its standing rules or restrictions in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Titles I-IX of P.L. 601-688) during the consideration of certain measures though a special rule or UCA. During this period, the practice of providing broad waivers for "points of order against consideration" evolved—from providing no waivers or waivers only for specific rules to providing blanket waivers of all points of order against consideration or blanket waivers with exceptions. This change in procedural practice, however, does not necessarily reflect changes in the content of the bills. The practice of providing waivers for Rule XXI, clause 2, with exceptions for specified language in the bill increased during this period until the FY2008 regular appropriations bills. For the FY2008 to FY2011 bills, only waivers that covered the entire measure were used. Most recently, waivers with specified exceptions were provided on five occasions in the 112 th and 113 th Congresses for the consideration of FY2012, FY2013, and FY2014 measures. | Each year, Congress considers appropriations measures that provide funding for various federal government activities. Such measures are commonly referred to as "regular" appropriations bills. In recent years, the House has typically considered a regular appropriations bill after first reaching agreement on the procedural terms of its consideration, most frequently through the adoption of a special rule or occasionally through a unanimous consent agreement (UCA). Rarely have regular appropriations bills been considered as privileged business.
This report examines the terms under which the regular appropriations bills are typically brought up and initially considered on the House floor, as well as the practices of the House with regard to amendment opportunities and the waiver of points of order, for FY1996 to FY2015 (104th-114th Congresses).
House Rule XIII, clause 5(a), allows a motion to be made to provide for consideration of a general appropriations measure. When a regular appropriations bill is considered as a privileged measure by this method, this procedure generally permits any amendments thereto that comply with the rules of the House to be considered. Providing for consideration by a special rule or UCA, however, allows this amending process to be altered. Such alterations can place preconditions on the offering of amendments, directly prescribe the amendments that will be in order, waive points of order against amendments, or place time limits on consideration.
For FY1996 to FY2015, the means used for initiating consideration of most regular appropriations bills established an "open" amending process, allowing an unrestricted number of amendments to be offered that comply with House rules. Such processes also often waived points of order against certain amendments and, less frequently, required that amendments be preprinted in advance of consideration or placed a time cap on their consideration. The Legislative Branch Appropriations bill was the one most frequently considered under a "structured" amendment process. On all but one occasion, the means used for initiating consideration of such bills during this period specified a list of amendments that could be offered and waived points of order against those amendments. Structured processes were used for other types of bills on three occasions through the 110th Congress, 13 occasions during the 111th Congress, and one occasion during each of the 113th and 114th Congresses. A "closed" process allowing no amendments was used on only one occasion, for consideration of the FY2004 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill.
The standing rules of the House place certain restrictions on when a measure is eligible for consideration and what content may be considered. The House sometimes chooses to "waive" or set aside its standing rules during the consideration of certain measures or matters through a special rule or UCA. For FY1996 to FY2015, the practice of providing broad waivers for "points of order against consideration" evolved considerably—from providing no waivers or only waivers of specific rules to providing blanket waivers of all points of order against consideration or blanket waivers with exceptions. This change in procedural practice, however, does not necessarily reflect changes in the content of the bills. The practice of providing waivers for Rule XXI, clause 2, with exceptions for specified language in the bill, often referred to as the "Armey Protocol," steadily increased during this period until the FY2008 regular appropriations bills. For the FY2008 to FY2011 bills, only waivers that covered the entire measure were used. Most recently, waivers with specified exceptions were provided on five occasions in the 112th and 113th Congresses. |
crs_R42446 | crs_R42446_0 | Introduction
The Federal Pell Grant program, authorized by Title IV-A-1 of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA; P.L. 89-329), is the single largest source of federal grant aid supporting postsecondary education students. The program provided approximately $31 billion to approximately 8.2 million undergraduate students in FY2015. Pell Grants are need-based aid that is intended to be the foundation for all federal need-based student aid awarded to undergraduates. The statutory authority for the Pell Grant program was most recently reauthorized through FY2017 by the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 (HEOA; P.L. 110-315 ). 111-8 ), also established a $619 increase in the Pell Grant maximum award for award year (AY) 2009-2010; The SAFRA Act (enacted as part of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010; P.L. Pell Grants must be paid out in installments over the academic year. Income of Recipients
There is no absolute income threshold that determines who is eligible or ineligible for a Pell Grant award. Nevertheless, Pell Grant recipients are primarily low-income. In AY2013-2014, an estimated 61% of dependent Pell Grant recipients had a total family income at or below $30,000. Program Costs
Costs for the Pell Grant program are award year-specific and are primarily affected by the number of students who apply for and receive aid under the program's eligibility parameters and award rules. Some of the legislative changes to the need analysis calculation enacted prior to the FY2011 Continuing Appropriations Act that resulted in higher discretionary costs include, but are not limited to, (1) expansion of the automatic zero EFC qualification in both the Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2005 (HERA) and the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 (CCRAA); (2) the increase in the income protection allowance levels for all students in the HERA and the CCRAA; (3) the elimination of certain untaxed income and benefits in the CCRAA; and (4) a variety of exclusions and benefits regarding the treatment of veterans education benefits, and military benefits and allowances enacted under the HEOA. Additionally, this section provides insight into how funding shortfalls in the program have been addressed in the past. Increasing Role of Mandatory Funding
Specified Mandatory Appropriations to Augment Discretionary Funding
The SAFRA Act, the FY2011 Continuing Appropriations Act, the Budget Control Act of FY2011, and most recently the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act amended the HEA to provide specified mandatory appropriations for the Pell Grant program to augment current and future discretionary appropriations. Most recent funding shortfalls in the Pell Grant program have not directly impacted eligible students' awards. In December 2011, the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act provided $22.8 billion in discretionary funding for the program for FY2012. | The federal Pell Grant program, authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA; P.L. 89-329), is the single largest source of federal grant aid supporting postsecondary education students. The program provided approximately $31 billion to approximately 8.2 million undergraduate students in FY2015. For FY2015, the total maximum Pell Grant was funded at $5,775. The program is funded primarily through annual discretionary appropriations, although in recent years mandatory appropriations have played a smaller yet increasing role in the program. The statutory authority for the Pell Grant program was most recently reauthorized by the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 (HEOA; P.L. 110-315).
Pell Grants are need-based aid that is intended to be the foundation for all federal student aid awarded to undergraduates. There is no absolute income threshold that determines who is eligible or ineligible for Pell Grants. Eligibility may be based on a combination of familial circumstance, income, and assets. Nevertheless, Pell Grant recipients are primarily low-income. In FY2011, an estimated 74% of all Pell Grant recipients had a total family income at or below $30,000. In the same year, over half of Pell Grant recipients attended public schools, and approximately two-thirds of Pell Grant assistance was received by public schools.
The Pell Grant program has garnered considerable attention over the past several years as Congress has tried to balance program funding with changes in eligibility and award rules. Legislative changes to eligibility and award rules in combination with changes in the number of students enrolling in college and applying for Pell Grant aid have led to anticipated and unanticipated changes in Pell Grant receipt and program costs. These changes have in different years resulted in funding shortfalls or surpluses. Congress has responded to recent funding needs through numerous legislative efforts in FY2010 through FY2012 by providing additional mandatory funding to augment discretionary funding for current and future years.
Most recently, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) provided $22.5 billion in discretionary funding for the program in FY2016. This funding is augmented by mandatory appropriations provided by the SAFRA Act (enacted as part of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010; P.L. 111-152). Funding provided for the Pell Grant program is exempt from sequestration, pursuant to provisions included in Section 255(h) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA, Title II of P.L. 99-177), as amended. |
crs_R43473 | crs_R43473_0 | Bolivia has been a major producer of coca leaf, the main ingredient in the production of cocaine. Opposition to forced eradication policies led to the rise of coca growers' trade unions and an associated political party, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS). Political and Economic Conditions
Since taking power in January 2006, Evo Morales and his leftist Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party have presided over a period of relative political stability and economic expansion. President Morales has expanded state control over the economy by renegotiating contracts with some companies to increase the taxes and royalties they pay, and by expropriating other companies. These policies have angered foreign investors, but have brought the government substantial revenue. Buoyed by record prices for its gas and mineral exports, economic growth in Bolivia has averaged 4.5% per year during the Morales Administration, according to the World Bank. U.S. Relations
From the late 1980s through the mid-2000s, U.S. relations with Bolivia centered largely on controlling the production of coca leaf and coca paste, much of which was usually shipped to Colombia to be processed into cocaine. In support of Bolivia's counternarcotics efforts, the United States provided significant interdiction and alternative development assistance, and forgave all of Bolivia's debt for development assistance projects and most of the debt for food assistance. The U.S. government responded by expelling Bolivia's Ambassador to the United States. That decision was closely followed by the suspension of Bolivia's trade preferences under the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) for a lack of counternarcotics cooperation. The Peace Corps also suspended operations in Bolivia that fall due to "growing instability" in the country and has since closed the program. President Morales then said in February 2013 that he no longer had an interest in exchanging Ambassadors. In May 2013, President Morales asked the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to end its operations in Bolivia after 52 years in the country. As the United States criticized Bolivia's handling of the Ostreicher case, Bolivia protested the U.S. government's 2012 denial of its request for former President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, currently living in the United States, to be extradited to Bolivia to stand trial for civilian deaths that occurred when he ordered government security forces to respond to violent civilian protests in the fall of 2003. U.S. Foreign Aid
When Evo Morales took office, Bolivia was among the top recipients of U.S. aid in Latin America. Although other donors, such as the European Union (EU), support development assistance, health, and alternative development programs in Bolivia, they have not traditionally provided the same types of surveillance and interdiction programs that the U.S. government supported through the State Department and DEA. From 1991 through 2008, Bolivia received U.S. trade preferences under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA; Title II of P.L. 102-182 ). | In the last decade, Bolivia has transformed from a country plagued by political volatility and economic instability that was closely aligned with the United States to a relatively stable country with a growing economy that now has strained relations with the U.S. government. Located in the Andean region of South America, Bolivia, like Peru and Colombia, has been a major producer of coca leaf, the main ingredient in the production of cocaine. Since 2006, Bolivia has enjoyed a period of relative political stability and steady economic growth during the two presidential terms of populist President Evo Morales, the country's first indigenous leader and head of the country's coca growers' union. Buoyed by a booming natural gas industry, Morales and his party, the leftist Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party, have decriminalized coca cultivation, increased state control over the economy, expanded social programs, and enacted a new constitution favoring the rights of indigenous peoples.
U.S. interest in Bolivia has traditionally centered on counternarcotics, trade, and development matters. From the late 1980s through the mid-2000s, successive Bolivian governments, with financial and technical assistance from the United States, tried various strategies to combat illicit coca production, including forced eradication. In support of Bolivia's counternarcotics efforts, the United States has provided significant interdiction and alternative development assistance, and has forgiven all of Bolivia's debt for development assistance projects and most of the debt for food assistance. From 1991 through November 2008, Bolivia also received U.S. trade preferences in exchange for its counternarcotics cooperation under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA; Title II of P.L. 102-182). Bolivia also received U.S. development, democracy, and health assistance provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) from 1961 through 2013.
Although President Morales' policies have proven popular with his supporters, they have worried foreign investors and strained U.S. relations, particularly in the realm of drug control. With an antagonistic foreign policy closely aligned with that of Venezuela, Bolivian-U.S. relations have been more tense during the Morales Administrations than they have been in decades. Despite significant strains in the bilateral relationship, the two countries have not formally severed diplomatic or consular relations, even though they have not exchanged Ambassadors since President Morales expelled the U.S. Ambassador in the fall of 2008. Due to actions taken by the Morales government (including the 2013 expulsion of USAID from the country) and a lack of counterdrug cooperation with the United States, Bolivia has lost U.S. trade preferences and no longer receives U.S. foreign aid.
This report provides background information on Bolivia, an analysis of its current political and economic situation, and an assessment of some key issues in Bolivian-U.S. relations. |
crs_R44728 | crs_R44728_0 | In general, the benefits provide payments to eligible veterans and servicemembers and their families enrolled in approved programs of education to help them afford postsecondary education. In FY2017, the VA is estimated to distribute over $14 billion in GI Bill benefits to over 1 million eligible participants. Since 1947, State Approving Agencies (SAAs) have been an important component in the administration of GI Bill benefits, along with the VA, educational institutions, and training establishments. The SAA role was originally intended to ascertain the quality of on-the-job training establishments and has now expanded to ensuring that veterans and other GI Bill participants have access to a range of high-quality education and training programs at which to use their GI Bill benefits. Designation and Control of SAAs
Statutory provisions "request" that each state create or designate a state department or agency as its SAA. The VA contracts (or enters into agreement) with each SAA annually to provide approval, oversight, training, and outreach activities by qualified personnel as specified in the contract to ensure the quality of programs of education and proper administration of GI Bill benefits. Statutory provisions prevent the VA and any other federal entity or individual from exercising any supervision or control over SAAs except in specified incidences. The VA oversees the processes for approving and reviewing approved programs of education, educating the entities and individuals involved in GI Bill claims processing, and increasing awareness among potential GI Bill participants. Once the SAA or the VA completes the initial approval review in accordance with the program of education approval standards (see Appendix ), the SAA or VA issues an approval or disapproval letter to the facility naming the approved or disapproved programs of education and any specific requirements or limitations. The VA maintains the compiled list of approved programs of education. The SAA will often conduct a site visit to verify the application and that the approval requirements may be met. Compliance Surveys
Compliance surveys are designed to ensure that each facility and its approved programs are in compliance with all applicable statutory, regulatory, and policy provisions and that the facility understands the provisions. Per statute, the compliance survey is intended to assure that each facility and each program of education meets all statutory requirements. In addition to reviewing student records, compliance surveys also include student interviews (as applicable), various verifications, and a review of additional documents and areas outlined on the compliance survey checklist. Inspection Visits and Other Visits
In addition to visits to complete compliance surveys, the SAA may conduct
technical assistance visits to provide information on the facility's responsibilities, help the facility provide services to veterans and GI Bill participants, and provide information on non-GI Bill veterans' benefits; inspection visits within approximately 30 days of the initial approval of a program at a new facility to train the SCO and ensure the facility and program may remain approved; visits, at the request of the VA, to investigate third party information (e.g, media, GI Bill participant complaint, ED, or other state agency) that suggests noncompliance with the approval standards; and visits motivated by SAA professional judgment. Statutory provisions also provide specific circumstances in which the VA may suspend GI Bill payments to those enrolled or pursuing an approved program of education, disapprove new enrollments in a program of education, or disapprove one or more programs of education:
The VA may disapprove new GI Bill enrollments at a facility if the facility charges a GI Bill participant more than another similarly circumstanced individual. If the institution/establishment fails to resolve the issue during the suspension, the SAA will disapprove the program(s) of education. The VA must take into consideration the annual evaluation of each SAA when negotiating a new contract, but not necessarily the JPRG rating. Program of Education Approval and Compliance Standards
The standards that facilities and programs of education must meet to receive and maintain GI Bill approval are specified in 38 U.S.C., Chapter 36, regulations, and Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) policies. The SAA may require such evidence of compliance as is deemed necessary; The institution is financially sound and capable of fulfilling its commitments for training; The institution does not exceed its enrollment limitations as established by the SAA; The institution's administrators, directors, owners, and instructors are of good reputation and character; Unless waived, the institution has and maintains a policy for the refund of the unused portion of tuition, fees, and other charges in the event the eligible person fails to enter the course or withdraws or is discontinued therefrom at any time before completion and 1. in the case of a private institution, such policy provides that the amount charged to the eligible person for a portion of the course shall not exceed the approximate pro rata portion of the total charges for tuition, fees, and other charges that the length of the completed portion of the course bears to its total length; or 2. in the case of a nonaccredited public educational institution, the institution has and maintains a refund policy regarding the unused portion of charges that is substantially the same as the refund policy followed by accredited public educational institutions located within the same state as such institution; and The institution publicly discloses any additional conditions required to obtain licensure, certification, or approval for unaccredited courses designed to lead to state licensure or certification or to prepare an individual for an occupation that requires such approval or licensure. | State Approving Agencies (SAAs) play an important role in the administration of GI Bill® benefits. GI Bill benefits provide educational assistance payments to eligible veterans and servicemembers and their families enrolled in approved programs of education. The SAA role is intended to ensure that veterans and other GI Bill participants have access to a range of high-quality education and training programs at which to use their GI Bill benefits. In FY2017, the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) is estimated to distribute over $14 billion in GI Bill benefits to over 1 million eligible participants.
Statutory provisions provide for the establishment of SAAs and describe their role in administering GI Bill benefits. Each state is "requested" to create or designate a state department or agency as its SAA. The VA contracts (or enters into agreement) with each SAA annually to provide approval, oversight, training, and outreach activities by qualified personnel as specified in the contract to ensure the quality of programs of education and proper administration of GI Bill benefits. The VA oversees the processes for approving and reviewing approved programs of education, educating the entities and individuals involved in GI Bill claims processing, and increasing awareness among potential GI Bill participants. The VA and any other federal entity or individual is prohibited from exercising any supervision or control over SAAs except as specifically provided in statutory provisions. For example, 38 U.S.C. §3674 requires the VA take into consideration an annual evaluation of each SAA's performance on its contractual standards when negotiating a new contract.
One of the key SAA roles is to initially approve programs of education for GI Bill purposes. Each sponsoring facility (e.g., educational institutions and training establishments) must submit an application to its SAA. Approval is intended to ensure that each program of education and sponsoring facility meets all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, including proper benefit administration and program of education quality. The approval process and requirements vary depending on the program's educational objective (e.g., non-college degree or flight training) and existing government oversight. For example, some programs that are approved by other government programs or processes are "deemed approved" and require a less in-depth review. The remaining programs undergo more comprehensive approval processes that may include the SAA reviewing institutional policies, staff qualifications, and academic curriculum. The SAA may conduct a site visit. Once the SAA completes the initial approval review in accordance with the approval standards, the SAA issues an approval or disapproval letter to the facility. The VA maintains the compiled list of all approved programs of education.
Another key SAA role is to conduct compliance surveys. Compliance surveys are designed to ensure that the facility and approved programs are in compliance with all applicable statutory, regulatory, and policy provisions and the facility understands the provisions. Statutory provisions establish the number of institutions requiring annual compliance surveys. The VA conducts compliance surveys but also assigns some of the required compliance surveys to SAAs. During the onsite compliance survey visit, the SAA reviews student files to verify that GI Bill payments have been made properly, conducts student interviews, verifies institutional operations, and reviews additional documents and areas as outlined on the compliance survey checklist. Discrepancies uncovered during the compliance survey may be resolved immediately, may result in the creation of a GI Bill debt or payment, or may result in the suspension or disapproval of a program of education. The SAA may suspend a program of education from new enrollments for up to 60 days while the SAA provides assistance to help the facility resolve the issue. The SAA may disapprove the program of education such that no GI Bill payments may be made based on an individual's pursuit of the program of education. |
crs_RS22223 | crs_RS22223_0 | This report analyzes the Court's holdings in the Ten Commandments cases and the distinctions the Court made in reaching divergent decisions. It also briefly addresses other relevant cases in which the Court evaluated constitutional issues related to religious displays on public property, including holiday displays. Finally, the report discusses related Court decisions regarding public displays, including Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum and Salazar v. Buono . Public Displays of the Ten Commandments
In 1980, the Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of public displays of the Ten Commandments. In 2005, the Supreme Court issued two decisions involving public displays of the Ten Commandments. Stone v. Graham
In Stone v. Graham , the Court struck down a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of a privately funded copy of the Ten Commandments on the wall of each public school classroom in the state. The Court determined that the statute had no secular purpose, failing the Lemon test's first prong, and therefore was unconstitutional. | Over the past few decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued several decisions regarding public displays of religious symbols. Although a few of these cases have involved temporary religious holiday displays, the more recent cases have involved permanent monuments of religious symbols, specifically the Ten Commandments. In 1980, the Supreme Court held in Stone v. Graham that a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on the wall of each public school classroom in the state had no secular legislative purpose and was therefore unconstitutional. The Court did not address the constitutionality of public displays of the Ten Commandments again until 2005. In McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Van Orden v. Perry, the Court reached differing conclusions regarding displays of the Ten Commandments in different contexts.
This report analyzes the Court's holdings in Stone, McCreary, and Van Orden, and the distinctions the Court made in reaching the divergent decisions. It also briefly addresses other relevant cases in which the Court evaluated constitutional issues related to religious displays on public property, including holiday displays. Finally, the report discusses related Court decisions regarding other types of public displays, including Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum and Salazar v. Buono. |
crs_RL34217 | crs_RL34217_0 | As the agency responsible for administering Medicare, CMS contracts with a number of private entities to conduct program integrity activities. Reviewing claims for medical necessity. Once these contractors identify suspected fraud, they refer the cases to Medicare administrative contractors (MACs) to recover overpayments and, where appropriate, to the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General (HHS/OIG) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) for further investigation and prosecution. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA, P.L. Beginning in FY2009, Congress approved additional discretionary investments of $198 million for FY2009, $311 million for FY2010, and $311 million for FY2011 to further enhance Medicare's program integrity efforts. This report presents an overview of Medicare program integrity activities including the following major areas: an introduction to Medicare health care fraud; a description of CMS's program integrity activities; a discussion of the roles played by private contractors and federal law enforcement agencies in maintaining Medicare program integrity; details on federal anti-fraud funding; analysis of CMS's Medicare program integrity activities; and a summary of recent program integrity initiatives. Although some program management activities, such as provider enrollment and information technology infrastructure, can affect program integrity, in general program management does not include program integrity. Estimates of the dollar amount lost just to health care fraud vary. Medicare Program Integrity Overview
In Medicare, program integrity typically encompasses two types of activities: (1) processes directed at reducing abuse, such as payment errors or improper payments; and (2) activities designed to prevent, detect, investigate, and ultimately prosecute fraud. Since 1990, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has designated Medicare as a federal program at high risk for fraud and abuse due to its size, complexity, scope, and decentralized administrative structure. Since 2004, GAO has issued 12 products (including reports and testimony) that have identified strategies to reduce Medicare fraud and abuse. Medicare Vulnerability to Fraud and Abuse
As GAO and other analysts have noted, several Medicare characteristics make the program particularly vulnerable to fraud and abuse. Pay and Chase
The need to pay a large number of claims quickly, sets up what has been described as a pay and chase dynamic. Cost reports contain information on providers' service cost allocations. Program Integrity Funding
Medicare program integrity and anti-fraud activities are funded through the HCFAC and MIP programs. Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control (HCFAC) Program
The HCFAC program is jointly administered by the Secretary and the Attorney General and has the following purposes:
1. coordinate federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts directed at controlling health care fraud and abuse; 2. conduct investigations, audits, evaluations, and inspections related to health care delivery and payment; 3. facilitate the enforcement of criminal and civil monetary penalties applicable to health care fraud; 4. provide for the establishment of safe harbors, advisory opinions, and fraud alerts; and 5. support the reporting and disclosure of adverse actions against health care providers. Other Program Integrity Activity Funding Sources
In addition to HCFAC and MIP mandatory and discretionary funds, each year Congress appropriates other discretionary funds to support administration and oversight of Medicare, Medicaid, and the state Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). 111-148)
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. As shown in Table 8 , PPACA increased appropriations for HCFAC by a total of $350 million over the period FY2011-FY2020. Congressional Action, Proposed Legislation: Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25 ). The implementation of HCFAC and MIP in 1996 provided CMS and Medicare enforcement agencies with dedicated funding to coordinate health care fraud-fighting activities. | Since 1990, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has identified the Medicare program as at risk for improper payments and fraud, and, since 2004, has issued 12 products documenting various program vulnerabilities. As noted by GAO and other public and private analysts, Medicare's vulnerability to fraud and abuse arises from the program's size, complexity, decentralization, and administrative requirements. Although a good estimate of the dollar amount lost to Medicare fraud and abuse is open to discussion, analysts agree that billions of dollars are lost. Administering the volume of claims (more than 4.5 million per work day) from Medicare's many providers and suppliers (over 1 million) is a daunting task. Requirements to process and pay provider reimbursement claims quickly have set up a "pay and chase" approach that complicates program integrity efforts.
In general, initiatives designed to fight fraud and abuse are considered program integrity activities. These include processes directed at reducing payment errors as well as activities to prevent, detect, investigate, and ultimately prosecute health care fraud. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) responsible for Medicare administration and program integrity, oversees private contractors that perform activities such as provider audits, reviewing claims for medical necessity, and conducting investigations. These contractors develop and refer suspected fraud cases to the HHS Office of the Inspector General (HHS/OIG) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) for further investigation and prosecution.
CMS has made considerable progress in improving program integrity oversight as well as in reporting on Medicare program integrity. With increased mandatory and discretionary funding, CMS's ability to wage a consistent, coordinated program integrity campaign has improved. Nonetheless, some issues remain, including the need to further improve the identification, monitoring, and reporting of fraud and abuse, and to provide more information on program integrity resource allocation decisions and results.
Medicare program integrity activities are funded in statute, largely through the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control (HCFAC) and Medicare Integrity Programs (MIP), which were both established by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA, P.L. 104-191). HIPAA provided CMS and federal law enforcement agencies with dedicated funds to coordinate federal, state, and local activities to fight health care fraud. Beginning in FY2009, Congress approved additional discretionary funds to enhance these efforts. Further HCFAC funding was provided under health care reform—the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148 as amended). PPACA increased HCFAC mandatory funding by $350 million over the period from FY2011 to FY2020. PPACA also strengthened and added a number of new tools for CMS to help bolster Medicare's program integrity activities.
This report provides an overview of Medicare program integrity. A description of key program integrity activities is presented as well as a discussion of the role that private contractors and law enforcement agencies play in maintaining Medicare's integrity. Detailed information on federal funding for program integrity efforts also is presented. The report concludes with a summary and analysis of Medicare's program integrity oversight and a discussion of recent initiatives, including program integrity provisions in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25), which became law on August 2, 2011. |
crs_RL32564 | crs_RL32564_0 | The report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) contended that "[t]here were opportunities for intelligence and law enforcement to exploit al Qaeda's travel vulnerabilities." The 9/11 Commission maintained that border security was not considered a national security matter prior to September 11, and as a result the consular and immigration officers were not treated as full partners in counterterrorism efforts. The 9/11 Commission's monograph, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel , underscored the importance of the border security functions of immigration law and policy. In September 2001, Congress enacted S. 1424 ( P.L. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. An alien is inadmissible or deportable on terrorism-related grounds if he
has engaged in a terrorist activity; is known or reasonably believed by a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of Homeland Security to be engaged in or likely to engage in terrorist activity upon entry into the United States; has, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily harm, incited terrorist activity; is a representative of (1) a designated or non-designated terrorist organization; or (2) any political, social, or other group that endorses or espouses terrorist activity; is a member of (1) any designated terrorist organization (i.e., a Tier I or Tier II organization); or (2) any non-designated terrorist organization (i.e., a Tier III organization), unless the alien can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alien did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization; is an officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization; endorses or espouses terrorist activity or persuades others to endorse or espouse terrorist activity or support a terrorist organization; is the spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible on terror-related grounds, if the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible occurred within the last five years, unless the spouse or child (1) did not and should not have reasonably known about the terrorist activity or (2) in the reasonable belief of the consular officer or Attorney General, has renounced the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible under this section; or has received military-type training, from or on behalf of any organization that, at the time the training was received, was a terrorist organization. Screening Aliens for Admissibility
Visa Issuance
Personal interviews are required for all prospective legal permanent residents and are generally required for foreign nationals seeking nonimmigrant visas. Latest Legislative Actions
Legislation was enacted in the 110 th Congress to modify the terrorism-related grounds for inadmissibility and removal, as well as the impact that these grounds have upon alien eligibility for relief from removal. 110-161 ), enacted in December 2007, modified certain terrorism-related provisions of the INA, including by exempting specified groups from the INA's definition of "terrorist organization" and significantly expanding immigration authorities' waiver authority over the terrorism-related grounds for exclusion. 110-257 expressly exempts the ANC from the INA's definition of "terrorist organization." The act also provides the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the other and the Attorney General, with authority to exempt most of the terrorism-related and criminal grounds for inadmissibility from applying to aliens with respect to activities undertaken in opposition to apartheid rule in South Africa. Immigration reform is an issue in the 111 th Congress, and legislative proposals may contain provisions modifying the immigration consequences of terrorism-related activity. Recent Concerns
Case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
The case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who allegedly tried to take down Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, has refocused attention on terrorist screening during the visa issuance process. State Department officials have reported that the father came into the Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria, on November 19, 2009, to express his concerns about his son and that the consular officials at the Embassy in Abuja sent a cable to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). | The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) spells out a strict set of admissions criteria and exclusion rules for all foreign nationals who come permanently to the United States as immigrants (i.e., legal permanent residents) or temporarily as nonimmigrants. Notably, any alien who engages in terrorist activity, or is a representative or member of a designated foreign terrorist organization, is generally inadmissible. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the INA was broadened to deny entry to representatives of groups that endorse terrorism, prominent individuals who endorse terrorism, and (in certain circumstances) the spouses and children of aliens who are removable on terrorism grounds. The INA also contains grounds for inadmissibility based on foreign policy concerns.
The report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) concluded that the key officials responsible for determining alien admissions (consular officers abroad and immigration inspectors in the United States) were not considered full partners in counterterrorism efforts prior to September 11, 2001, and as a result, opportunities to intercept the September 11 terrorists were missed. The 9/11 Commission's monograph, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, underscored the importance of the border security functions of immigration law and policy.
In the 110th Congress, legislation was enacted to modify the terrorism-related grounds for inadmissibility and removal, as well as the impact that these grounds have upon alien eligibility for relief from removal. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161) modified certain terrorism-related provisions of the INA, including exempting specified groups from the INA's definition of "terrorist organization" and expanding immigration authorities' waiver authority over the terrorism-related grounds for exclusion. P.L. 110-257 expressly excludes the African National Congress (ANC) from being considered a terrorist organization, and provides immigration authorities the ability to exempt most terrorism-related and criminal grounds for inadmissibility from applying to aliens with respect to activities undertaken in opposition to apartheid rule in South Africa. Immigration reform is an issue in the 111th Congress, and legislative proposals may contain provisions modifying the immigration consequences of terrorism-related activity.
The case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who allegedly attempted to ignite an explosive device on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, has refocused attention on terrorist screening during the visa process. He was traveling on a multi-year, multiple-entry tourist visa issued to him in June 2008. State Department officials have acknowledged that Abdulmutallab's father came into the Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria, on November 19, 2009, to express his concerns about his son, and that those officials at the Embassy in Abuja sent a cable to the National Counterterrorism Center. State Department officials maintain they had insufficient information to revoke his visa at that time. |
crs_R41276 | crs_R41276_0 | Justice Stevens has had a critical role in the Supreme Court's resolution of that question, in several respects. Second, along with Justice Scalia, in early cases reviewing sentencing enhancements, he indicated his broad interpretation of the jury trial and due process rights. Third, having persuaded five of the Court's nine justices of his views, he authored the opinion for the Court in a Apprendi v. New Jersey , the leading case in which the Court announced a broad reading of the constitutional rights at issue. Justice Scalia has been the other justice arguing in agreement with Justice Stevens in many of the cases addressing a jury's role in criminal sentencing. One year later, Justice Stevens wrote one of two majority opinions for the Court in United States v. Booker , in which the Court addressed the question whether the Blakely holding applied to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Although it remains permissible for judges to take relevant facts into consideration when rendering criminal sentences, they now may not increase sentences beyond the prescribed statutory maximum unless the facts supporting such an increase are found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. | Justice Stevens has played a critical role in the Supreme Court's interpretation of a jury's role in criminal sentencing. In 2000, he wrote the majority opinion for the Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, a landmark case in which the Court held that a judge typically may not increase a sentence beyond the range prescribed by statute unless the increase is based on facts determined by a jury "beyond a reasonable doubt." In 2005, he wrote one of two majority opinions in United States v. Booker, in which the Court applied the Apprendi rule to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In those two cases and in several other cases on this issue during the past few decades, Justice Stevens has been a leading voice, articulating a broad interpretation of the jury trial and due process rights at issue. |
crs_RL34593 | crs_RL34593_0 | The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, with limited exceptions, bars an individual from suing a state under federal law without the state's consent. While states may consent to suit by waiving the privilege of sovereign immunity, in limited circumstances Congress may also abrogate, or overrule, that immunity by passing a statute pursuant to the enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In these situations, an individual is barred from suing a state for monetary damages for a violation of federal law. The Eleventh Amendment states, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State." Though the language of the amendment appears to bar only suits against a state by non-residents, the Supreme Court has interpreted the doctrine of sovereign immunity to also bar suits by citizens against their own state. The Court expanded the purview of the amendment in Alden v. Maine to include immunity from suit under federal law within a state's own court system. As a result of Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank , the Eleventh Amendment currently bars an individual from successfully seeking damages from a state for federal patentâand likely copyright and trademarkâinfringement, unless the state has clearly consented to the suit through waiver, or Congress has successfully abrogated state sovereign immunity pursuant to a valid use of its legislative power under the Fourteenth Amendment. A state must clearly submit itself to federal jurisdiction and cannot constructively or impliedly waive its sovereign immunity. The Federal Circuit and other federal district courts have interpreted this rule to validate waiver where a state voluntarily removes a case to federal court; where a state voluntarily initiates and participates in the litigation; where the case is part of one continuous action in which the state previously waived its immunity; where a state enacts legislation waiving its sovereign immunity; or where a state enters a contract containing a provision in which the state specifically submits to federal court jurisdiction in the case of a dispute. Absent these forms of clear waiver, a state does not relinquish its privilege of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. In Ex Parte Young , the Supreme Court established this prospective remedy in order to mitigate wrongs resulting from the state sovereign immunity defense, and to prevent continued violations of federal law by state officials. Plaintiffs could not show a sufficient causal connection between the named officials and the violation of federal patent law. The Legislative Response
In the years following Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank , Congress repeatedly attempted to provide individuals with ways to recover from the states for intellectual property infringement. The Act never made it out of committee. It thus remains to be seen whether there will be further changes by the Supreme Court in the area of state sovereign immunity and intellectual property law. | The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]he Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Although the amendment appears to be focused on preventing suits against a state by non-residents in federal courts, the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded the concept of state sovereign immunity to reach much further than the literal text of the amendment, to include immunity from suits by the states' own citizens and immunity from suits under federal law within a state's own court system.
As a result of two landmark Supreme Court decisions in 1999, Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, the Eleventh Amendment currently bars an individual from successfully seeking damages from a state for violations of federal intellectual property laws unless the state clearly consents to being sued through waiver, or Congress legitimately abrogates state sovereign immunity. Valid waiver exists only where a state has clearly submitted itself to federal jurisdiction. Courts have interpreted this rule to validate waiver in several scenarios: where a state voluntarily removes a case to federal court; where a state voluntarily initiates and participates in the litigation; where the case is part of one continuous action in which the state previously waived its immunity; where a state enacts legislation waiving its sovereign immunity; or where a state enters a contract containing a provision in which the state specifically submits to federal court jurisdiction in the case of a dispute. Absent these forms of clear waiver, a state does not relinquish its privilege of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Congress may limit state sovereign immunity to suit under federal intellectual property laws only by passing a law pursuant to its enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. A valid statute passed pursuant to § 5 will be limited in scope and remedy a pervasive and unredressed constitutional violation. The Supreme Court has previously invalidated congressional attempts to abrogate state sovereign immunity in intellectual property lawsuits against state governments.
Where there has been no clear waiver by the state, nor abrogation of state sovereignty by Congress, a party cannot obtain damages from a state under federal law. The injured party may, however, sue the individual official responsible for the violation for prospective injunctive relief under the Ex Parte Young doctrine . In order to obtain this kind of non-monetary relief, the party must show a continued violation of federal law and an adequate connection between the named official and the actual violation.
In response to Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, various bills have been introduced in previous sessions of Congress in an attempt to hold states accountable for violations of intellectual property rights. These proposals, however, never made it out of committee. |
crs_RL31653 | crs_RL31653_0 | Introduction
Supervised release is the successor to parole in the federal criminal justice system. In its place, Congress instituted a system of supervised release, which applies to all federal crimes committed after November 1, 1987. Sentencing courts determine the terms and conditions of supervised release at the same time that they determine other components of a defendant's sentence, and "[t]he duration, as well as the conditions of supervised release are components of a sentence." Sentencing courts are said to have broad discretion when imposing the conditions for supervised release, although such discretion must be understood within the confines established for mandatory conditions, the scope of permissible standard discretionary conditions and special conditions, and the deference that must be afforded the Sentencing Guidelines. In any event, the court may terminate a defendant's term of supervised release at any time after the defendant has served a year on supervised release, based on the defendant's conduct, the interests of justice, and consideration of several of the general sentencing factors. When determining applicable conditions, courts consider both federal statutory requirements and federal Sentencing Guidelines. Finally, it allows a court to impose any other appropriate condition as long as the condition is reasonably related to one of several sentencing goals and as long as it involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to accommodate those goals. Courts regularly impose the Sentencing Guidelines' standard conditions as a matter of practice. The so-called "special" discretionary conditions address case-specific factors, such as the nature of an offense, the defendant's character, or another condition contained in a defendant's sentence. Factors to which the condition must be "reasonably related" include (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the defendant's history and character; (2) deterrence of crime; (3) protection of the public; and (4) the defendant's rehabilitation. In addition to earlier termination of a defendant's term of supervised release, a court may modify supervised release conditions at any time, may revoke a defendant's term of supervised release, require him to return to prison for an addition term of imprisonment, and impose an additional term of supervised release to be served thereafter. They declare that a court must revoke a defendant's supervised release for the commission of any federal or state crime punishable by imprisonment for more than a year. Upon revocation of a term of supervised release, a defendant may be imprisoned for a term ranging from one to five years depending upon the seriousness of the original crime, and upon release from imprisonment may be subject to a new term of supervised release. Constitutional Considerations
The Constitution limits the range of permissible conditions. On the other hand, a condition which raises constitutional concerns is likely to offend statutory norms as well and can be resolved on those grounds. In crafting the conditions for a particular defendant, a sentencing court will often delegate initial implementing responsibilities to a probation officer. | Supervised release replaces parole for federal crimes committed after November 1, 1987. Like parole, supervised release is a term of restricted freedom following a defendant's release from prison. The nature of supervision and the conditions imposed during supervised release are also similar to those that applied in the old system of parole. However, whereas parole functions in lieu of a remaining prison term, supervised release begins only after a defendant has completed his full prison sentence. Where revocation of parole could lead to a return to prison to finish out a defendant's original sentence, revocation of supervised release can lead to a return to prison for a term in addition to that imposed for the defendant's original sentence.
A sentencing court determines the duration and conditions for a defendant's supervised release term at the time of initial sentencing. As a general rule, federal law limits the maximum duration to five years, although it permits, and in some cases mandates, longer durations for relatively serious drug, sex, and terrorism-related offenses. A sentencing court retains jurisdiction to modify the terms of a defendant's supervised release and to revoke the term and return a defendant to prison for violation of the conditions.
Several conditions are standard features of supervised release. Some conditions, such as a ban on the commission of further crimes, are mandatory. Other conditions, such as an obligation to report to a probation officer, have become standard practice by the operation of the federal Sentencing Guidelines, which courts must consider along with other statutorily designated considerations. Together with these regularly imposed conditions, the Sentencing Guidelines recommend additional conditions appropriate for specific circumstances. A sentencing court may impose any of these discretion conditions, as long as they offend no constitutional limitations and as long as they involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary and "reasonably relate" to the nature of the offense; the defendant's crime-related history; deterrence of crime; protection of the public; or the defendant's rehabilitation.
Both a defendant's constitutional rights and federalism concerns create outer limits for the application and scope of supervised release conditions. By nature, such conditions restrict a releasee's freedom, and some conditions involve systems, such as child support orders, ordinarily governed by the states. Nonetheless, federal courts have upheld a wide range of such conditions against constitutional challenges.
The conditions of supervised release have been a source of constitutional challenges. Yet a constitutionally suspect condition is also likely to run afoul of statutory demands. In which case, the courts often resolve the issue on statutory grounds.
This report is available in an abridged form, without footnotes or citations to authority, as CRS Report RS21364, Supervised Release: An Abbreviated Outline of Federal Law. |
crs_RL33872 | crs_RL33872_0 | At the heart of the debate is a part of the Refuge that has potentially significant oil and natural gas resources and also serves as habitat for numerous species, such as polar bears, caribou, waterfowl, and others. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), within the Department of the Interior (DOI), manages the Refuge and has periodically updated plans to guide its management. 115-97 , which establishes an oil and gas program in the Refuge's Coastal Plain, to be administered by DOI's Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Surface development is limited to 2,000 acres, which need not be concentrated in a single area. The Congressional Budget Office estimated the state and federal revenue from the first two lease sales at approximately $2.2 billion over 10 years (with 50% of revenues—$1.1 billion—going to the State of Alaska and 50% to the federal government). The oil and gas program mandated by P.L. 115-97 is similar but not identical to ANWR oil and gas leasing programs proposed in two other bills in the 115 th Congress, H.R. 49 and S. 49 . In addition to conducting oversight of the oil and gas program's implementation, Congress could choose to address some of these other issues—such as issues related to environmental compliance, judicial review, and special management areas within the Coastal Plain—in future legislation, or it could decide that the provisions of P.L. 115-97 provide sufficient guidance for the program. 1889 and S. 820 , would establish the Coastal Plain as wilderness, meaning there would be no commercial development, except to meet the minimum requirements for managing the area as wilderness. This report discusses the Refuge's legislative history (including Native claims and congressional actions from the 109 th to the 115 th Congresses), energy resources (including relevant market forces and potential oil and gas resources), Native interests and subsistence uses, and biological resources, as well as issues for Congress related to development under P.L. Background
ANWR, established by the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA; P.L. 96-487 , 43 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq. ), consists of 19 million acres in northeast Alaska. Development proponents view its 1.57-million-acre Coastal Plain—also known as the 1002 Area—as a promising onshore oil prospect. 115-97 to open the federal lands on ANWR's Coastal Plain to energy development also opens the Coastal Plain's Native lands, based on current law. The history of ANWR (and its energy development restrictions) is intertwined with congressional efforts to settle land claims of Native Alaskans. As part of those efforts, some ANWR property was transferred to Native corporations. The 1002 report recommended full energy development. Actions in the 115th Congress
On December 22, 2017, President Trump signed into law P.L. Other bills to promote development in the 1002 Area ( H.R. Native Interests and Subsistence Uses
The Native community, both between and within its villages and organizations, is divided on the question of energy development in the Refuge, but some patterns can be discerned. Supporters also contend that improvements in production technology will result in significantly reduced environmental impacts, helping to minimize the footprint of oil and gas production activities. Under P.L. Issues for Congress
The basic and most contentious ANWR question for Congress has been whether to permit energy development in the Coastal Plain. Earlier legislative proposals had ranged from those to designate the Coastal Plain as wilderness or a national monument to those to allow partial or full development. In the context of oversight of the implementation of the ANWR provisions in P.L. 115-97 . Under authorities for the management of national wildlife refuges in general and Alaskan refuges specifically, an activity may be allowed in a refuge only if it is compatible with the purposes of the particular refuge and with those of the National Wildlife Refuge System as a whole. 115-97 authorizes an oil and gas program for the 1002 Area, other bills in the 115 th Congress— H.R. 115-97 . Conclusion
Enactment of P.L. 115-97 in December 2017 culminated a decades-long debate over whether to allow oil and gas development in ANWR in northeastern Alaska. | In the ongoing energy debate in Congress, one recurring issue has been whether to allow oil and gas development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR, or the Refuge) in northeastern Alaska. ANWR is rich in fauna and flora and also has significant oil and natural gas potential. Energy development in the Refuge has been debated for more than 50 years. On December 22, 2017, President Trump signed into law P.L. 115-97, which provides for an oil and gas program on ANWR's Coastal Plain. The Congressional Budget Office estimated federal revenue from the program's first two lease sales at $1.1 billion, but actual revenues may be higher or lower depending on market conditions and other factors. This report discusses the oil and gas program in the context of the Refuge's history, its energy and biological resources, Native interests and subsistence uses, energy market conditions, and debates over protection and development.
ANWR is managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in the Department of the Interior (DOI). Under P.L. 115-97, DOI's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is to administer the oil and gas program in a portion of the 19-million-acre Refuge: the 1.57-million-acre Coastal Plain, also known as the 1002 Area. This area is viewed as a promising onshore oil prospect and is also a center of activity for caribou and other wildlife. It is designated as critical habitat for polar bears under the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544). A 1987 study of the area by DOI had recommended energy development, but the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA; 43 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq.) prohibited development unless authorized by an act of Congress. (Development was thus barred prior to the December 2017 enactment of P.L. 115-97.) The conflict between oil and natural gas potential and valued natural habitat in the Refuge has created dilemmas for Congress, with the most contentious question being whether to permit energy development in the 1002 Area. Previous legislative proposals ranged from those to designate the 1002 Area as wilderness or a national monument (with energy development prohibited) to those to allow partial or full development. Related questions have concerned the extent to which Congress should legislate special management to guide the manner of any development—for example, by limiting the footprint of energy activities. Under P.L. 115-97, surface development is limited to 2,000 acres, which need not be concentrated in a single area. Some contend that newer technologies will help to consolidate oil and gas operations and reduce the environmental impacts of development, whereas others maintain that facilities will likely spread out in the 1002 Area and significantly change the character of the Coastal Plain.
The history of ANWR is intertwined with congressional efforts to settle land claims of Native Alaskans. As part of those efforts, some property in the Refuge was transferred to Native corporations, including surface lands and subsurface rights within the 1002 Area. The opening of federal lands in ANWR to development under P.L. 115-97 also opens adjacent Native lands. The Native community, both between and within its villages and organizations, is divided on the question of energy development in the Refuge.
Other legislation related to ANWR's Coastal Plain was introduced in the 115th Congress prior to the enactment of P.L. 115-97. H.R. 1889 and S. 820 would establish the Coastal Plain as wilderness, meaning there would be no commercial development, except to meet the minimum requirements for managing the area as wilderness. Such a designation would be consistent with recommendations made by the Obama Administration in its planning documents for the Refuge. By contrast, H.R. 49 and S. 49 proposed oil and gas leasing programs for the Coastal Plain, which are similar but not identical to the program mandated by P.L. 115-97. These bills address some issues that were not addressed in P.L. 115-97, such as environmental compliance, judicial review, and exports of ANWR oil. Congress could choose to consider some of these other issues in future legislation and oversight. |
crs_R41358 | crs_R41358_0 | Introduction
This report explores the nexus between the environment and security in Pakistan in order to assess how environmental stress in Pakistan can lead to security issues that affect American security and foreign policy interests in the region. The security environment within and around Pakistan is of significant concern to the United States. During the Cold War, the United States worked with Pakistan to meet common security challenges in Afghanistan and the region. Pakistan's limited and tenuous control of much of its territory, the growing strength of radical Islamist groups in Pakistan, the poor state of Pakistan's economy, and ongoing political turmoil among Pakistani political elites all undermine Pakistan's ability to effectively control radical Islamist elements and to ameliorate growing environmental, economic, and other stresses. Pakistan's status as a nuclear weapon state, its traditional enmity with India, and proximity to Afghanistan all heighten its importance to U.S. strategic interests. Existing environmental stress and potential future stress from climate change in Pakistan may undermine American interests in the region by leading to further socio-political instability in Pakistan. Alone, environmental stress might not become a geopolitical concern, but when added to existing political and socio-economic stresses, it has the potential to be geopolitically important due to the instability that it could create. Environmental scarcity is not the sole or sufficient cause of these social effects. The combination of environmental degradation, anticipated future impacts of climate change, and increasing demographic pressure are likely to place significant stress on many developing nations across the globe in the years ahead. This demonstrates that the issues under consideration in this report on Pakistan are in various ways relevant to other parts of the globe as well. In recent years, however, agricultural production has been declining. If these conditions worsen, they could act as a threat multiplier in combination with other threats to the state such as expanding population and food insecurity, strife among political-military elites, poor economic resources, Islamist extremism, secessionism, inter-provincial competition for resources, and/or cross border conflict with Afghanistan or India. Such a situation could also lead to a return to military rule. Food production in Pakistan is a key factor for development because of the limited carrying capacity of arable land and state resources relative to Pakistan's population. Some reasons for this status are economic. The food security situation is considered to be the worst in Pakistan's northern and western border areas. Further, environmental stress, such as food scarcity and limited water supplies, exacerbates the effect of refugees and lead to protests, crime, and potentially recruiting by militants. Natural disasters leading to a weak government response has the potential to create discord among displaced populations. A deteriorating environment due to increased stress on the land that could come about as a result of potential demographic pressure could further weaken central government control over these areas. The Indus Water Treaty has allowed water sharing between India and Pakistan for many years. Tensions over the water resources may place more emphasis on Pakistani support of insurgents that are trying to break Kashmir away from India, which could potentially escalate to war given the history of conflict between India and Pakistan. U.S. interests are primarily focused on Pakistan's ability to control its territory to prevent it from being used as a haven for anti-American terrorists and prevent inter-state conflict with India that would be regionally destabilizing or worse, given their nuclear weapons. (For an in-depth discussion of U.S. assistance to Pakistan see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed].) | This report focuses on the nexus between security and environmental concerns in Pakistan that have the potential to affect American security and foreign policy interests. Environmental concerns include, but are not limited to, water and food scarcity, natural disasters, and the effects of climate change. Environmental stresses, when combined with the other socio-economic and political stresses on Pakistan, have the potential to further weaken an already weak Pakistani state. Such a scenario would make it more difficult to achieve the U.S. goal of neutralizing anti-Western terrorists in Pakistan. Some analysts argue that disagreements over water could also exacerbate existing tensions between India and Pakistan. Given the importance of this region to U.S. interests for many reasons, the report identifies an issue that may be of increasing concern for Congress in the years ahead.
The report examines the potentially destabilizing effect that, when combined with Pakistan's demographic trends and limited economic development, water scarcity, limited arable land, and food security may have on an already radicalized internal and destabilized international political-security environment. The report considers the especially important hypothesis that the combination of these factors could contribute to Pakistan's decline as a fully functioning state, creating new, or expanding existing, largely ungoverned areas. The creation, or expansion, of ungoverned areas, or areas of limited control by the government of Pakistan, is viewed as not in U.S. strategic interests given the recent history of such areas being used by the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups as a base for operations against U.S. interests in the region. In this sense, environmental stress is viewed as a potential "threat multiplier" to existing sources of conflict.
Environmental factors could also expand the ranks of the dispossessed in Pakistan, which could lead to greater recruitment for radical Islamist groups operating in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Larger numbers of dispossessed people in Pakistan could also destabilize the current political regime. This could add pressure on the Pakistani political system and possibly add impetus to a return to military rule or a more bellicose posture towards India. This issue has added significant importance to regional security and American interests in Afghanistan.
The potential for environmental factors to stoke conflict between the nuclear armed states of India and Pakistan is also a concern. These two historical enemies have repeatedly fought across their international frontier and have yet to resolve their territorial dispute over Kashmir. Further, a longstanding dispute over cross-border water resource sharing between India and Pakistan has resurfaced, possibly exacerbating existing tensions between the two states. Should the two countries wish, however, this dispute also offers a renewed opportunity for cooperation, as has been seen in past negotiations.
Preliminary findings by experts seem to indicate that existing environmental problems in Pakistan are sufficiently significant to warrant a close watch, especially when combined with Pakistan's limited resilience due to mounting demographic stresses, internal political instability, security challenges, and limited economic resources. For more detailed information on Pakistan see the work of Alan Kronstadt and others including CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, and CRS Report RL34763, Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy. |
crs_RL34415 | crs_RL34415_0 | Introduction
NATO held a summit in Bucharest, Romania, on April 2-4, 2008. A principal issue was consideration of the candidacies for membership of Albania, Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). At Bucharest, the allies issued invitations to Albania and Croatia to join the alliance. Greece blocked an invitation to Macedonia due to a dispute over Macedonia's name. Albania and Croatia are small countries, with correspondingly small militaries. There will then follow an analysis of current conditions in the two states nominated to join, as well as in Macedonia. The allies were divided over the MAP for Georgia and Ukraine, and they were not extended the MAP at Bucharest. The protocol will then be deposited with each allied government. The United States Senate has the constitutional authority to give its advice and consent by a two-thirds majority to the amendment of any treaty. During the previous two rounds of enlargement, House and Senate committees held hearings on enlargement. In the past, committees have also discussed such issues as the costs of enlargement, the qualifications of the candidate states, regional security implications of enlargement, implications for relations with Russia, and new issues in NATO's future, such as the viability of new missions. The Bush Administration supports the idea of a "NATO with global partners." Beyond the qualifications achieved by a candidate state in the MAP process, such matters as the stabilization of southeastern Europe, Russia's voice in European security, and bilateral relations between a member state and a candidate state also come into play. After a protocol of accession is concluded, which is expected to occur by the end of July 2008, each NATO country will follow its constitutional process to admit Croatia to the Alliance. Future Candidates in Future Rounds? Other criteria include the resolution of internal separatist conflicts and international disputes. NATO, as a military alliance, is viewed with particular suspicion. Enlargement is only tangentially related to this issue. Albania's and Croatia's militaries and resources are modest. Strategically, one of the most important is energy security. Specifically, these reports are to include an evaluation of how a country being actively considered for NATO membership will further the principles of NATO and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area; an evaluation of the country's eligibility for membership, including military readiness; an explanation of how an invitation to the country would affect the national security interests of the United States; a U.S. government analysis of common-funded military requirements and costs associated with integrating the country into NATO and an analysis of the shares of those costs to be borne by NATO members; and a preliminary analysis of the budgetary implications for the United States of integrating that country into NATO. In the 110 th Congress, both the Senate and House passed successor bills to the bill that passed the Senate in the 109 th Congress. President Bush signed the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007 into law ( P.L. 110-17 ) on April 9, 2007. The NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007 reaffirms the United States "commitment to further enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include European democracies that are able and willing to meet the responsibilities of membership..." The act calls for the "timely admission" of Albania, Croatia, Georgia, the "Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)," and Ukraine to NATO, recognizes progress made by Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia on their Membership Action Plans (MAPs), and applauds political and military advances made by Georgia and Ukraine while signaling regret that the alliance has not entered into a MAP with either country. Both the Senate and House have expressed further support for a strengthening of Allied relations with Georgia and Ukraine passing companion resolutions expressing strong support "for [NATO] to enter into a Membership Action Plan with Georgia and Ukraine." | NATO held a summit in Bucharest on April 2-4, 2008. A principal issue was consideration of the candidacies for membership of Albania, Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM, or the Republic of Macedonia). These states are small, with correspondingly small militaries, and their inclusion in the alliance cannot be considered strategic in a military sense. However, it is possible that they could play a role in the stabilization of southeastern Europe. The allies issued invitations only to Albania and Croatia.
At Bucharest NATO decided not to offer a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine. The MAP is a viewed as a way station to membership. Russia's strong objection to the two countries' eventual membership, as well as internal separatist conflicts in Georgia and public opposition to allied membership in Ukraine were among factors leading to the two governments' failure to enter the MAP. Energy security for candidate states in a future round of enlargement may also prove to be an important issue. The Bush Administration supported the MAP for Georgia and Ukraine, but a number of allies opposed the idea. Both the Senate and House passed resolutions in the second session of the 110th Congress urging NATO to enter into a MAP with Georgia and Ukraine (S.Res. 439 and H.Res. 997, respectively).
An enduring dispute with Greece over Macedonia's formal name delayed Macedonia's entry. The allies expressed clear support for Macedonia's entry once the name dispute is resolved.
Process is important in Albania's and Croatia's efforts to join the alliance. Each of the current 26 allies agreed at Bucharest to extend invitations. By the end of July 2008, NATO will send a protocol on each successful candidate to all allied governments, which will follow their respective constitutional processes to admit a candidate. Again, unanimity is required for a state ultimately to join the alliance. In Congress, hearings will be held in the House and Senate. For states to be admitted, the Senate must pass a resolution of ratification by a two-thirds majority to amend NATO's founding treaty and commit the United States to defend new geographic space.
Costs of enlargement were a factor in the debate over NATO enlargement in the mid and late 1990s. The issue is less controversial today. Congress has passed legislation over the past 15 years, including in the 110th Congress, indicating its support for enlargement, as long as candidate states meet qualifications for allied membership. On April 9, 2007 President Bush signed into law the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-17), expressing support for further NATO enlargement. House and Senate committees have recently held hearings to begin assessment of the qualifications of the candidate states. This report will be updated as needed. See also CRS Report RL31915, NATO Enlargement: Senate Advice and Consent, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40848 | crs_R40848_0 | The Speaker of the House and the Senate majority leader pledged to take up immigration reform legislation in the 111 th Congress. Although the 111 th Congress did not take up a comprehensive reform bill, it did consider a narrower DREAM Act bill to legalize the status of certain unauthorized alien students. On December 8, 2010, the House approved a version of the DREAM Act as an amendment to an unrelated bill, the Removal Clarification Act of 2010 ( H.R. The 111 th Congress considered various other immigration-related measures and enacted a number of targeted immigration provisions. It passed legislation ( P.L. 111-8 , P.L. 111-9 , P.L. 111-68 , P.L. 111-83 ) to extend the life of several immigration programs—the E-Verify electronic employment eligibility verification system, the Immigrant Investor Regional Center Program, the Conrad State J-1 Waiver Program, and the special immigrant visa for religious workers—until September 30, 2012. Among the other subjects of legislation enacted by the 111 th Congress were border security ( P.L. 111-5 , P.L. 111-32 , P.L. 111-83 , P.L. 111-230 , P.L. 111-281 , P.L. 111-376 ), refugees ( P.L. 111-8 , P.L. 111-117 ), and Haitian migrants ( P.L. 111-212 , P.L. 111-293 ). This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that received legislative action or were of significant congressional interest in the 111 th Congress. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations are addressed in a separate report and, for the most part, are not covered here. A cloture motion in the Senate to agree to the House DREAM Act amendment failed on a 55-41 vote on December 18, 2010. | The Speaker of the House and the Senate majority leader of the 111th Congress pledged to take up comprehensive immigration reform legislation, the most controversial piece of which concerns unauthorized aliens in the United States. Although the 111th Congress did not take up a comprehensive immigration bill, it did consider a narrower DREAM Act proposal to legalize the status of certain unauthorized alien students. On December 8, 2010, the House approved a version of the DREAM Act as an amendment to an unrelated bill, the Removal Clarification Act of 2010 (H.R. 5281). A cloture motion in the Senate to agree to the House DREAM Act amendment failed on a 55-41 vote on December 18, 2010.
The 111th Congress also considered other immigration issues and enacted a number of targeted immigration provisions. It passed legislation (P.L. 111-8, P.L. 111-9, P.L. 111-68, P.L. 111-83) to extend the life of several immigration programs—the E-Verify electronic employment eligibility verification system, the Immigrant Investor Regional Center Program, the Conrad State J-1 Waiver Program, and the special immigrant visa for religious workers—until September 30, 2012. Among the other subjects of legislation enacted by the 111th Congress were border security (P.L. 111-5, P.L. 111-32, P.L. 111-83, P.L. 111-230, P.L. 111-281, P.L. 111-376), refugees (P.L. 111-8, P.L. 111-117), and Haitian migrants (P.L. 111-212, P.L. 111-293).
This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that have received legislative action or are of significant congressional interest. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations are addressed in CRS Report R40642, Homeland Security Department: FY2010 Appropriations, and, for the most part, are not covered here. |
crs_R43366 | crs_R43366_0 | Introduction
Naturalization is the process by which an immigrant attains U.S. citizenship after he or she fulfills requirements established by Congress and outlined in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). U.S. immigration policy gives all lawful permanent residents who meet the naturalization requirements the opportunity to become citizens. Applying for citizenship is a voluntary act and represents an important milestone for immigrants. Naturalization and citizenship are generally viewed as a measure of immigrants' assimilation and socioeconomic integration to the United States. Naturalization requirements include U.S. residence (typically five years), the possession of good moral character, demonstrated English proficiency, and a basic knowledge of U.S. civics and history. Practically, naturalized immigrants gain important benefits, including the right to vote, security from deportation, access to certain public-sector jobs, and the ability to travel abroad on a U.S. passport. U.S. citizens are also advantaged over lawful permanent residents (LPRs) for sponsoring relatives to immigrate to the United States. Despite the benefits of U.S. citizenship status over lawful permanent residence status, substantial numbers of LPRs who are eligible to naturalize have not done so. Congress is currently considering extensive reforms to U.S. immigration laws which, if enacted in some form, could affect naturalization policy and the number of persons who naturalize each year. However, only U.S. citizens may
vote in federal, state, and most local elections; receive U.S. citizenship for their minor children born abroad; travel with a U.S. passport and receive diplomatic protection from the U.S. government while abroad; receive full protection from deportation and loss of residence rights; meet the citizenship requirement for federal and many state and local civil service employment, including jobs with law enforcement agencies and Defense Department contractors; receive the full range of federal public benefits and certain state benefits; participate in a jury; and run for elective office where citizenship is required. Naturalization Oath of Allegiance
An alien seeking to become a naturalized citizen must take the Naturalization Oath of Allegiance to the United States of America before citizenship can be granted:
I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God. Recent Naturalization Trends
Naturalization Petitions
The number of persons petitioning to naturalize has increased over the past two decades, from just over 200,000 in FY1991 to just under 900,000 in FY2012 ( Figure 1 and Appendix A ). Naturalization petition volume peaked in FY1997 and FY2007. Legislatively, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) legalized about 2.8 million LPRs between 1986 and 1989 who then became eligible to naturalize in the mid-1990s. Four years later, the Immigration Act of 1990 increased the limits on legal immigration to the United States, among other provisions, which also resulted in increased numbers of persons petitioning for naturalization by the mid-1990s. Foreign born from Mexico and several other Latin American countries have among the lowest naturalized percentages. Immigrants from Asian, European, and English-speaking countries are more likely to naturalize than immigrants from elsewhere. Immigrants in professional, managerial, and other occupations correlated with higher education levels appear more likely to naturalize than less educated immigrants. Concerns regarding USCIS' total petition processing capability sometimes receive attention when events transpire to cause large numbers of foreign nationals to petition for immigration benefits. Streamlining Military Naturalizations
Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, Congress has expressed interest in streamlining and expediting naturalizations for military personnel and in providing immigration benefits for their immediate relatives. English Proficiency Requirement
Some in Congress have expressed interest in facilitating language and civics instruction as a means to promote naturalization. Those opposing such expenditures argue that English language proficiency as well as civics education is the responsibility of immigrant s and not U.S. taxpayer s . They contend that the acquisition of citizenship is a choice that is not imposed upon LPRs who enjoy many of the same benefits of living in the United States as citizens. | Naturalization is the process that grants U.S. citizenship to lawful permanent residents (LPRs) who fulfill requirements established by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). In general, U.S. immigration policy gives all LPRs the opportunity to naturalize, and doing so is a voluntary act. LPRs in most cases must have resided continuously in the United States for five years, show they possess good moral character, demonstrate English competency, and pass a U.S. government and history examination as part of their naturalization interview. The INA waives some of these requirements for applicants over age 50 with 20 years of U.S. residency, those with mental or physical disabilities, and those who have served in the U.S. military.
Naturalization is often viewed as a milestone for immigrants and a measure of their assimilation and socioeconomic integration to the United States. Practically, naturalized immigrants gain important benefits, including the right to vote, security from deportation in most cases, access to certain public-sector jobs, and the ability to travel with a U.S. passport. U.S. citizens are also advantaged over LPRs for sponsoring relatives to immigrate to the United States. Despite the clear benefits of U.S. citizenship status over LPR status, millions of LPRs who are eligible to naturalize do not do so.
In the past two decades, the number of LPRs who submitted petitions to naturalize has increased more than four-fold, from about 207,000 in FY1991 to 899,000 in FY2012. Since 2003, the number of denied petitions has declined. Naturalization petition volume spiked to roughly 1.4 million in FY1997 and FY2007 due primarily to passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which legalized many unauthorized foreign born, and the Immigration Act of 1990, which increased statutory limits on the numbers of legal immigrants admitted.
Research on determinants of naturalization suggests that the propensity to naturalize is positively associated with youth and educational attainment. Those who immigrate as refugees and asylees are more likely to naturalize than those who immigrate as relatives of U.S. residents. Immigrants from countries with less democratic or more oppressive political systems are more likely to naturalize than those from more democratic nations. Immigrants from Mexico or other nearby countries in Central America have among the lowest percentages of naturalized foreign born.
Congress is currently considering extensive reforms to U.S. immigration laws, which could affect naturalization policy and the number of persons who naturalize each year. Although concerns regarding U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) petition processing capabilities sometimes arise when large numbers of foreign nationals petition for immigration benefits, the agency's capacity and recent modernization efforts have minimized excessive processing delays.
Several issues for Congress center on facilitating naturalization. Immigrant advocacy organizations contend that the current level of naturalization fees discourages immigrants from seeking U.S. citizenship. Other immigration policy observers argue that current fees recover the full cost of a process that is intended to be self-financing. Some in Congress have repeatedly expressed interest in facilitating language and civics instruction as a means to promote naturalization. Others argue that English language proficiency as well as civics education is the responsibility of immigrants and not the federal government. Recent efforts have focused on further streamlining and expediting naturalizations for military personnel and in providing immigration benefits for their relatives. Proposals have also been introduced that would revise the naturalization oath to place greater emphasis on allegiance to the United States. |
crs_R41986 | crs_R41986_0 | Introduction
High oil prices affect nearly every household and business in the United States. Figure 1 illustrates that during the course of 2008, oil prices doubled to more than $145 per barrel and then rapidly fell by 80%. In early 2011, there was a run-up of about 20%, sending gasoline prices near 2008 highs. Few would rule out the possibility of similar price swings in the months to come. What explains oil price volatility? The first looks to the fundamentals of oil production and energy consumption. Rapid global economic growth has led to rising demand for oil, and supply could not keep up at previous oil prices. But oil supply and demand are inelastic to price changes, at least in the near-term, which some would argue means that relatively small shifts in supply or demand can be expected to trigger significant price movements. Others consider price movements such as those of 2008 and early 2011 to be more extreme than warranted by the fundamentals of supply and demand. The second explanation for unstable commodity prices focuses on financial markets for derivatives contracts that are linked to the price of oil—futures, options, and swaps. Many market participants are pure financial speculators, who never deal in physical oil, but seek to profit from correctly forecasting price trends. Critics claim that speculators can drive oil prices above fundamental levels, resulting in a "speculative premium" that imposes unjustified costs on consumers. Although the relationship between speculation and commodity prices has been studied extensively, there is no consensus among academics and regulators as to whether speculative trading causes episodes of unusual price volatility. This report provides background on the oil derivatives markets and the different types of firms that trade in those markets. It reviews the concepts of manipulation and excessive speculation. It includes a brief section describing the fundamental factors that affect oil prices. Why should money managers be better forecasters of oil price movements than other speculators or commercial hedgers? For example, Figure 6 shows changes in money manager positions and price changes four weeks later. In 2008, an Interagency Task Force formed by the CFTC studied price movements in crude oil, and reached a similar conclusion:
The Task Force's preliminary assessment is that current oil prices and the increase in oil prices between January 2003 and June 2008 are largely due to fundamental supply and demand factors. This view is supported by studies from the staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, which found that excessive speculation has had "undue" influence on wheat price movements and in the natural gas market. Also, a 2011 report by the minority staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform argues that "addressing excessive speculation offers the single most significant opportunity to reduce the price of gas for American consumers." Congressional Action
Legislation before the 112 th Congress ( S. 1200 and H.R. 2328 , both entitled End Excessive Oil Speculation Now Act of 2011) would authorize and direct the CFTC to take certain actions to reduce the volume of speculation in oil and related energy commodities. H.R. 2003 , the Taxing Speculators Out of the Oil Market Act, would impose a tax on oil futures, swaps, and options transactions, except for those hedging commercial risk. | High oil prices affect nearly every household and business in the United States. During the course of 2008, oil prices doubled to more than $145 per barrel and then fell by 80%. In early 2011, there was a run-up of about 20%, sending gasoline prices to near 2008 highs. Few would rule out the possibility of similar price swings in the months to come. What explains oil price volatility?
Some consider price movements such as those of 2008 and early 2011 to be more extreme than warranted by the fundamentals of supply and demand. Their explanation for unstable commodity prices focuses on financial markets for derivatives contracts linked to the price of oil—futures, options, and swaps. Many market participants are pure financial speculators, who never deal in physical oil, but earn large profits if they can correctly forecast price trends. Critics claim that such traders can drive oil prices above fundamental levels, resulting in a "speculative premium" that imposes unjustified costs on consumers. Although the relationship between speculation and commodity prices has been studied extensively, consensus has not emerged as to whether speculative trading causes unusual oil price volatility.
An examination of Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) data reveals a strong correlation between weekly changes in positions held by "money managers" (a category of speculators that includes hedge funds) and weekly changes in the price of oil. Price falls, conversely, have tended to coincide with reductions in money managers' long positions. This statistical relationship is weaker for other classes of speculators and for commercial hedgers. However, the existence of a correlation does not imply causation—money managers could be price-followers rather than price-setters.
Another explanation for oil price volatility looks to the fundamentals of oil production and energy consumption. Rapid global economic growth led to rising demand for oil, and supply could not keep up at previous oil prices. Because oil supply and demand do not respond much to price changes, at least in the short-term, some argue that relatively small changes in supply or demand can trigger significant price movements. An interagency task force led by the CFTC found that the 2003-2008 increase in oil prices was largely due to fundamental supply and demand factors.
The role of speculators in oil and other commodity markets has attracted congressional interest. Staff reports by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs found that excessive speculation has had "undue" influence on wheat price movements and in the natural gas market. A 2011 report by the minority staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform argues that "addressing excessive speculation offers the single most significant opportunity to reduce the price of gas for American consumers." Legislation before the 112th Congress (S. 1200 and H.R. 2328) would authorize and direct the CFTC to take certain actions to reduce the volume of speculation in oil and related energy commodities. Another bill, H.R. 2003, would impose a tax on oil futures, swaps, and options that were not used for hedging commercial risk.
This report provides background on financial speculation in oil, the workings of oil derivatives markets, and the different types of firms that trade in those markets. It reviews the concepts of manipulation and excessive speculation, and it briefly describes the fundamental factors that affect oil prices. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33664 | crs_RL33664_0 | The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution governs all searches and seizures conducted by government agents. The Amendment contains two separate clauses: a prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and a requirement that probable cause support each warrant issued. The Court has found warrantless searches to be "reasonable" under some circumstances, including those in which consent was given and in which exigent circumstances existed. During the October 2005 term, the Court addressed some of the lingering questions regarding the "reasonableness" of warrantless searches. In Georgia v. Randolph , the Court held that the warrantless search of a defendant's residence based on his wife's consent to the police was unreasonable and invalid as to the defendant, who was physically present and expressly refused to consent. In Brigham City Utah v. Stuart , the Court clarified the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency situation by holding that police officers may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such an injury. In Samson v. California , the Court found that a parolee has a reduced expectation of privacy, which fails to outweigh the State's interests in protecting the community. Finally, in United States v. Grubbs , the Court addressed the issue of anticipatory search warrants when it found that an anticipatory search warrant authorizing the search of the defendant's residence on the basis of an affidavit stating that the warrant would be executed upon delivery of a videotape containing child pornography was supported by probable cause. However, the Court's decision in Knights did not address the reasonableness of a search solely predicated on the probation condition regardless of reasonable suspicion. In addition, the Court held that the particularity requirement in the Fourth Amendment does not require that the warrant itself state the condition precedent. The Court also found that the warrant at issue did not violate the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement because the Fourth Amendment requires that the warrant particularly describe only two things: the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. | The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The Supreme Court has interpreted this language as imposing a presumptive warrant requirement on all searches and seizures predicated on governmental authority.
However, the Court has carved out exceptions to the warrant requirement when obtaining such would be impractical or unnecessary. In crafting these exceptions, the Court has analyzed the "reasonableness" of the circumstances that gave rise to the warrantless search. During the October 2005 term, the Court addressed the "reasonableness" of such warrantless searches based on third-party consent, exigent circumstances, and parolee status. In Georgia v. Randolph (126 S.Ct. 1515 [2006]), the Court held that the warrantless search of a defendant's residence based on his wife's consent to the police was unreasonable and invalid as to the defendant, who was physically present and expressly refused to consent. The Court clarified the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency situation in Brigham City Utah v. Stuart (126 S.Ct. 1943 [2006]), holding that the police officers may enter a home without a warrant when there exists an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. Also, in Samson v. California (126 S.Ct. 2193 [2006]), the Court ruled that the a parolee's reduced expectation of privacy fails to outweigh the State's interests in protecting the community.
In addition, the Court resolved two fundamental issues concerning the lawfulness of searches pursuant to anticipatory search warrants. In United States v. Grubbs (126 S.Ct. 1494 [2006]), the Court found that such warrants do not categorically violate the Fourth Amendment. Also, the Court held that an anticipatory search warrant authorizing the search of the defendant's residence on the occurrence of a condition precedent stated in an affidavit but not in the warrant itself was proper and supported by probable cause. This report summarizes the Court's decisions addressing these issues and will not be updated. |
crs_R42496 | crs_R42496_0 | Introduction
Carbon capture and sequestration (or storage)—known as CCS—is a physical process that involves capturing manmade carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) at its source and storing it before its release to the atmosphere. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has pursued research and development of aspects of the three main steps leading to an integrated CCS system since 1997. Congress has appropriated nearly $7 billion in total since FY2008 for CCS research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) at DOE's Office of Fossil Energy: nearly $3.5 billion in total annual appropriations (including FY2015) and $3.4 billion from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ( P.L. The large and rapid influx of funding for industrial-scale CCS projects from the Recovery Act was intended to accelerate development and demonstration of CCS in the United States. EPA Proposed Rule: Limiting CO2 Emissions from Power Plants5
In 2014, EPA proposed emission standards for new and existing fossil-fueled electric generating units under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act. New Power Plants
According to EPA, new natural gas-fired stationary power plants should be able to meet the proposed standard without additional cost and without the need for add-on control technology. However, the only apparent technical way for new coal-fired plants to meet the standard would be to install CCS technology to capture about 40% of the CO 2 they typically produce. Implications for CCS Research, Development, and Deployment
Given the pending EPA rule, congressional interest in the future of coal as a domestic energy source also appears to be linked to the future of CCS. The debate has been mixed as to whether the proposed rule for new plants would spur development and deployment of CCS for new coal-fired power plants or have the opposite effect. (The second BSER determination is for gas-fired power plants.) 114th Congress
On February 26, 2015, Senators Heitkamp and Kaine introduced S. 601 , the Advanced Clean Technology Investment in Our Nation Act of 2015, which would promote CCS for coal-fired utilities by a combination of loan guarantees, tax credits, and support for the DOE R&D effort in its coal program, among other things. The challenge of reducing the costs of CCS technology is difficult to quantify. From the budgetary perspective, the Recovery Act funding shifted the emphasis of CCS RD&D to large, industrial demonstration projects for carbon capture. First U.S. Commercial operation of the Kemper County Project has been delayed several times since construction began in 2010. It is likely that the plant will attract increased scrutiny in the wake of the EPA proposed rule on CO 2 emissions, and its cost and schedule overruns evaluated against the promised environmental benefits due to CCS technology. To date, there are no commercial ventures in the United States that capture, transport, and inject large quantities of CO 2 (e.g., 1 million tons per year or more) solely for the purposes of carbon sequestration. The success of these demonstration projects will likely bear heavily on the future outlook for widespread deployment of CCS technologies as a strategy for preventing large quantities of CO 2 from reaching the atmosphere while plants continue to burn fossil fuels, mainly coal. Congress may wish to carefully review the CCS R&D program and particularly the results from the demonstration projects as they progress. Such a review could help Congress evaluate whether DOE is on track to meet its goal of allowing for an advanced CCS technology portfolio to be ready by 2020 for large-scale demonstration and deployment in the United States. | Carbon capture and sequestration (or storage)—known as CCS—is a physical process that involves capturing manmade carbon dioxide (CO2) at its source and storing it before its release to the atmosphere. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has pursued research and development (R&D) of aspects of the three main steps leading to an integrated CCS system since 1997. Congress has appropriated nearly $7 billion in total since FY2008 for CCS research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) at DOE's Office of Fossil Energy: nearly $3.5 billion in total annual appropriations (including FY2015) and $3.4 billion from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act; P.L. 111-5). The large influx of Recovery Act funding for industrial-scale CCS projects was intended to accelerate development and deployment of CCS in the United States. Since enactment of the Recovery Act, DOE has shifted its RD&D emphasis to the demonstration phase of carbon capture technology. To date, however, there are no commercial ventures in the United States that capture, transport, and inject industrial-scale quantities of CO2 solely for the purpose of carbon sequestration.
The success of DOE CCS demonstration projects likely will influence the outlook for widespread deployment of CCS technologies as a strategy for preventing large quantities of CO2 from reaching the atmosphere while U.S. power plants continue to burn fossil fuels, mainly coal. One project, the Kemper County Facility, has received $270 million from DOE under its Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI) Round 2 program and is slated to begin commercial operation in 2016. The 582 megawatt-capacity facility anticipates capturing 65% of its CO2 emissions, making it equivalent to a new natural gas-fired combined cycle power plant. Cost and schedule overruns at the Kemper Plant, however, have raised questions over the relative value of environmental benefits from CCS technology compared with construction costs of the facility and its effect on ratepayers.
In 2014, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed emission standards for new and existing fossil-fueled electric generating units under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act. New natural gas-fired stationary power plants should be able to meet the proposed standard for new plants without additional cost and without the need for add-on control technology. However, the only apparent technical way for new coal-fired plants to meet the standard would be to install CCS technology. The proposed rule has sparked increased scrutiny of the future of CCS as a viable technology for reducing CO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants.
Given the pending EPA rule, congressional interest in the future of coal as a domestic energy source appears directly linked to the future of CCS. Debate has been mixed as to whether the rule would spur development and deployment of CCS for new coal-fired power plants or have the opposite effect. Congressional oversight of the CCS RD&D program could help inform decisions about the level of support for the program and help Congress gauge whether it is on track to meet its goals. In the 114th Congress, a bill has been introduced (S. 601) that would promote CCS for coal-fired utilities by a combination of loan guarantees, tax credits, and supporting the DOE R&D effort in its coal program, among other things. A similar bill was introduced in the 113th Congress but was not enacted.
One issue is whether congressional oversight is needed of the CCS R&D program, particularly of the results from the demonstration projects as they progress. Such a review could help Congress evaluate whether DOE is on track to meet its goal of allowing for an advanced CCS technology portfolio to be ready by 2020 for large-scale demonstration and deployment in the United States. |
crs_RL33548 | crs_RL33548_0 | History
While the CTBT was opened for signature in 1996, it has not entered into force, leaving a ban on nuclear testing as the oldest item on the arms control agenda. President George H. W. Bush signed the bill into law ( P.L. As of August 2016, 183 states had signed it and 164 had ratified. On September 22, 1997, President Clinton submitted the CTBT to the Senate. The Obama Administration and the CTBT : In a speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, President Obama said, "my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, "The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an integral part of our non-proliferation and arms control agenda, and we will work in the months ahead both to seek the advice and consent of the United States Senate to ratify the treaty, and to secure ratification by others so that the treaty can enter into force." Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy; 3. United Kingdom: The United Kingdom cannot test because it held its nuclear tests for several decades at the Nevada Test Site and does not have its own test site. Claiming that Britain and France have ratified the treaty but do not have a moratorium on testing, that the reverse is the case for China and the United States, that India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan have done neither, and that only Russia has ratified the treaty and has a moratorium on testing, he argued that
if the treaty has not been in force for fifteen years [i.e., since it was opened for signature in 1996], it is difficult for Russia to be the only nuclear power which complies with its terms and conditions in full. (See CRS Report R42948, U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].) As of August 2016, Pakistan had not signed the CTBT. Of the 44, as of August 2016, India, North Korea, and Pakistan had not signed the treaty and China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States had signed but not ratified it. In practice, these conferences (often called Article XIV conferences) have been held every second year beginning in 1999. In September 2012, the Sixth Ministerial Meeting on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty issued a statement reaffirming their "strongest support for the early entry into force" of the CTBT, called on states that have not done so to sign and ratify the treaty, noted that with the exception of North Korea, "the voluntary nuclear test moratorium has become a de facto international norm in the 21 st Century," and pointed to advances made by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission in building the verification regime for the treaty. The Seventh Ministerial Meeting on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was held on September 26, 2014. For a discussion of stockpile stewardship programs and budgets, see CRS Report R43948, Energy and Water Development: FY2016 Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship , by [author name scrubbed]. The FY2015-enacted amount was $8.180 billion, and the FY2016-enacted amount was $8.846 billion. The FY2017 request for Weapons Activities was $9.24 billion. Beginning with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the United States has implemented "safeguards," or unilateral steps to maintain nuclear security consistent with treaty limitations. These safeguards are: Safeguard A: "conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to insure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile"; Safeguard B: "maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs"; Safeguard C: "maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT"; Safeguard D: "a comprehensive research and development program to improve our treaty monitoring"; Safeguard E: intelligence programs for "information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and related nuclear programs"; and Safeguard F: the understanding that if the Secretaries of Defense and Energy inform the President "that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type which the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard 'supreme national interests' clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required." For a discussion of the possible role of updated safeguards in a future CTBT debate, see CRS Report R40612, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated "Safeguards" and Net Assessments , by [author name scrubbed]. The FY2016 budget request included out-year figures for Weapons Activities. For FY2013, there were 13 experiments at JASPER, 7 of which used plutonium. The National Defense Authorization Act and the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act provided the funds requested. CTBT Pros and Cons
The CTBT is contentious. For a detailed analysis of the case for and against the treaty, see CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments , by [author name scrubbed]. Council on Foreign Relations. U.S. Congress. Senate. National Nuclear Security Administration. U.S. Department of Energy. 05/28/98— Pakistan announced that it conducted five nuclear tests. | A ban on all nuclear tests is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. Three treaties that entered into force between 1963 and 1990 limit, but do not ban, such tests. In 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions. In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate, which rejected it in October 1999. In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama said, "My administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." However, while the Administration has indicated it wants to begin a CTBT "education" campaign with a goal of securing Senate advice and consent to ratification, it has not pressed for a vote on the treaty and there were no hearings on it in the 111th, 112th, or 113th Congresses. There will be at least one hearing in the 114th Congress—a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the CTBT planned for September 7, 2016.
As of August 2016, 183 states had signed the CTBT and 164, including Russia, had ratified it. However, entry into force requires ratification by 44 states specified in the treaty, of which 41 had signed the treaty and 36 had ratified. India, North Korea, and Pakistan have not signed the treaty. Nine conferences have been held to facilitate entry into force, every other year, most recently on September 29, 2015. In years between these conferences, some foreign ministers meet to promote entry into force of the CTBT. A ministerial meeting was held on June 13, 2016, to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the signing of the CTBT.
Nuclear testing has a long history, beginning in 1945. The Natural Resources Defense Council states that the United States conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, the Soviet Union 715, the United Kingdom 45, France 210, and China 45. (Of the U.K. tests, 24 were held jointly with the United States and are not included in the foregoing U.S. total.) Congress passed and President George H.W. Bush signed legislation in 1992 that established a unilateral moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing. Russia claims it has not tested since 1990. In 1998, India and Pakistan announced several nuclear tests. Each declared a test moratorium; neither has signed the CTBT. North Korea announced that it conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016. Since 1997, the United States has held 28 "subcritical experiments" at the Nevada National Security Site, most recently in August 2014, to study how plutonium behaves under pressures generated by explosives. It asserts these experiments do not violate the CTBT because they cannot produce a self-sustaining chain reaction. Russia reportedly held some such experiments since 1998.
The Stockpile Stewardship Program seeks to maintain confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. Its budget is listed as "Weapons Activities" within the request of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous component of the Department of Energy. Congress addresses nuclear weapon issues in the annual National Defense Authorization Act and the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. The FY2017 request for Weapons Activities was $9.243 billion; on a comparable basis, the FY2016-enacted amount was $8.846 billion. Congress also considers a U.S. contribution to a global system to monitor possible nuclear tests, operated by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The FY2016 request for the contribution was $33.0 million.
This report will be updated occasionally. This update reflects the FY2017 budget request and developments through August 2016. CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, by [author name scrubbed], presents pros and cons in detail. CRS Report R40612, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated "Safeguards" and Net Assessments, by [author name scrubbed], discusses safeguards—unilateral steps to maintain U.S. nuclear security consistent with nuclear testing treaties—and their relationship to the CTBT. CRS Report R43948, Energy and Water Development: FY2016 Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R44442, Energy and Water Development: FY2017 Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Activities, by [author name scrubbed], provide details on stockpile stewardship. |
crs_RL33288 | crs_RL33288_0 | By providing individuals withexclusive rights in their inventions for a limited time, the patent system allows inventors to realizefinancial benefits from their inventions. The FDA maintains the test data incorporated into a NDA in confidence. An ANDA allows a generic drug manufacturer torely upon the safety and efficacy data of the original manufacturer. The federal food and drug laws establish several different sorts of marketing exclusivities, relatingto new chemical entities, new clinical studies, orphan drugs, and pediatric studies. (96) Issueshave also arisen with respect to the use of marketing exclusivities to encourage the private sector todevelop bioterrorism countermeasures, as well as whether other nations are obligated by WorldTrade Organization (WTO) agreements to grant marketing exclusivities similar to U.S. law. Thisreport reviews these issues in turn. As a result, the practical effect of these marketing exclusivities is to awardexclusive rights for discoveries that could not fulfill the requirements of the Patent Act. (99)
On the other hand, some commentators believe that NCE and new clinical study exclusivitieshave an important policy role to play in pharmaceutical innovation. (107)
The Term of Marketing Exclusivities
Although some commentators believe that marketing exclusivities are inappropriate orunnecessary, others assert that current U.S. terms of marketing exclusivity fall short of internationalstandards and should be lengthened. Expansion of Marketing Exclusivities
The 109th Congress is currently considering the use of marketing exclusivity mechanisms inorder to encourage the private sector to develop bioterrorism countermeasures. (123) Forexample, the Australia-United States FTA provides in part:
With respect to pharmaceutical products, if a Partyrequires the submission of: (a) new clinical information (other than information related tobioequivalency) or (b) evidence of prior approval of the product in another territory that requiressuch new information, which is essential to the approval of a pharmaceutical product, the Party shallnot permit third persons not having the consent of the person providing the information to marketthe same or a similar pharmaceutical product on the basis of the marketing approval granted to aperson submitting the information for a period of at least three years from the date of the marketingapproval by the Party or the other territory, whichever is later. Concluding Observations
In combination, patents and marketing exclusivities provide the fundamental framework ofintellectual property incentives for pharmaceutical innovation in the United States. Due to theTRIPS Agreement's obligation of technological neutrality with respect to the patent system, (127) marketing exclusivitiesprovide Congress with a more flexible option for stimulating specific sorts of desirable privateactivity than do patents. In the United States, marketing exclusivities are viewed primarily assupplementing patent protection, in that they provide more limited protections for inventions thatdo not meet Patent Act requirements, or effectively delay the onset of patent litigation for inventionsthat do. Finally, policy makers may appreciate that general patent reform legislation has been thesubject of significant discussion during the 109th Congress. (129) Current legislativeproposals do not appear to impact the fundamental landscape of patents and marketing exclusivitieswithin the pharmaceutical industry. Because legislative reform efforts are still underway, however,congressional attention to the impact of broadly oriented patent reforms upon the pharmaceuticalindustry may be appropriate. | In combination, patents and marketing exclusivities provide the fundamental framework ofintellectual property incentives for pharmaceutical innovation in the United States. Patents, whichare administered by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), provide their ownerwith the ability to exclude others from practicing the claimed invention for a limited time. Incontrast, marketing exclusivities are administered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Alternatively known as "data exclusivity" or "data protection," a marketing exclusivity preventsgeneric competitors from referencing the preclinical and clinical test data that manufacturers ofbrand-name pharmaceuticals generated in order to demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of theirproducts. The FDA currently awards qualifying innovators with marketing exclusivities for thedevelopment of new chemical entities or orphan drugs, as well as for the performance of new clinicalstudies and pediatric studies.
Although patents and marketing exclusivities are separate entitlements that are administeredby different federal administrative agencies and that depend upon distinct criteria, they both createproprietary rights in pharmaceutical innovation. These rights in turn allow innovators to receive areturn on the expenditure of resources leading to the discovery. Once these rights expire, themarketplace for that drug is open to generic competition.
Several innovation policy issues have arisen concerning the relationship of patents andmarketing exclusivities. Some observers believe that marketing exclusivities are unnecessarybecause patents are generally available for pharmaceutical innovation. On the other hand, someobservers believe that the terms of the marketing exclusivities established by U.S. law are too short. In particular, they note that comparable European standards are often considerably longer than theirU.S. counterparts.
International agreements require each World Trade Organization (WTO) member state totreat all patented inventions in the same manner. As a result, marketing exclusivities provideCongress with a more flexible option for stimulating specific sorts of desirable private activity thando patents. Indeed, the 109th Congress is currently considering expanding upon existing marketingexclusivities in order to encourage the development of bioterrorism countermeasures. WTOAgreements, as well as recent Free Trade Agreements to which the United States is a signatory, alsooblige nations to provide some manner of protection to pharmaceutical test data.
Although general patent reform legislation has been the subject of significant discussionduring the 109th Congress, current legislative proposals do not appear particularly to impact therelationship between patents and marketing exclusivities. Some maintain that continued attentionto the impact of broadly oriented patent reforms upon the pharmaceutical industry is appropriate. |
crs_R41233 | crs_R41233_0 | Introduction to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
Most of the funding for the activities of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in the annual appropriations acts enacted by Congress. Surplus FHA funds have been used to offset the cost of the HUD budget. As a result, part of the increase in net non-emergency budget authority from FY2002-FY2010 is attributable to decreases in the amount available in offsetting receipts and collections and the amount of rescissions taken. As shown in Table 2 , for FY2011 the President's budget requested about $45.6 billion in net new budget authority for HUD, a decrease of about 1% from the FY2010 enacted level. However, the requested decrease in net new budget authority would actually represent a 3% increase in appropriations for HUD programs in aggregate. The President's budget proposed to more than offset the overall increase in appropriations with a substantial increase in offsetting collections and receipts, which are estimated to come from proposed changes to the FHA mortgage insurance programs (see " The Federal Housing Administration Reforms and Funding Levels " later in this report). The President's budget requested the largest funding increases for the two Section 8 programs, followed by programs for the homeless and for HUD's research and technology needs. Senate Action
As shown in Table 2 , like the House bill, the FY2011 HUD funding bill approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 23, 2010 ( S. 3644 ), would have provided about $1 billion more for HUD than requested by the President. The Senate bill also would have rejected the President's proposed cuts to housing programs for persons who are elderly and persons with disabilities, public housing capital funding, and the brownfields program, and would have provided funding for the President's Transforming Rental Assistance initiative. Continuing Resolutions
Because no FY2011 appropriations legislation was enacted before the beginning of the fiscal year (October 1, 2010), the 111 th Congress enacted a series of continuing resolutions (CRs) that continue funding at the FY2010 level for most accounts in the federal budget (including all of the accounts in HUD's budget). to H.R. Actions in 112th Congress
H.R. 1
On February 18, 2011, the House approved a year-long continuing resolution to fund the federal government through the end of FY2011. On March 9, 2011, the Senate considered, but failed to pass, both H.R. 1 would have increased funding for HUD, compared to H.R. A final short-term CR, P.L. 112-10
On April 15, 2011, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011 was signed into law ( P.L. The act also included an across-the-board 0.2% rescission from all non-defense discretionary accounts, including those in HUD's budget. However, the requested decrease in net new budget authority would only represent a 4% decrease in appropriations for HUD programs in aggregate, due to a substantial increase in offsetting collections and receipts from the FHA mortgage insurance programs (see " The Federal Housing Administration Reforms and Funding Levels " later in this report). The final FY2011 appropriations law ( P.L. Neither the House-passed nor the Senate Committee-passed bills included funding for the program. Congress has increased its appropriation for HUD's Housing Counseling Assistance Program in each of the last few years. (NeighborWorks is not part of HUD and is therefore not funded through the HUD budget, but it is usually funded as a related agency in the Transportation-HUD funding bill.) | The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is the federal agency charged with administering a number of programs designed to promote the availability of safe, decent, and affordable housing and community development. The agency submits a budget as a part of the President's formal budget request each year, and then Congress, through the appropriations process, decides how much funding to provide to the agency. Funding for HUD is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies subcommittees of the House and the Senate appropriations committees.
Regular appropriations for HUD (not including emergency supplemental funding) have increased by 57% in the nine years prior to FY2011. This increase in the HUD budget has been partly attributable to increased funding for HUD programs, particularly the Section 8 programs, which have had a 70% increase in funding over this period and have grown to account for well over half of HUD's total budget. The increase in funding has also resulted from a decrease in the amount of rescissions, collections, and receipts available to offset the cost of the HUD budget.
For FY2011, the President's budget requested about $45.57 billion in net new budget authority for HUD, a decrease of about 1% from the FY2010 enacted level. However, the requested decrease in net new budget authority would actually include a 3% increase in appropriations for HUD programs in aggregate. The overall increase in appropriations requested would be more than offset by a substantial increase in offsetting collections and receipts, which are estimated to come from proposed changes to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance programs. The two Section 8 rental assistance programs were requested to receive the largest increases, followed by increases for programs for the homeless and for HUD's research and technology needs. The President's budget proposed decreased funding for other programs, such as programs providing housing for persons who are elderly or disabled and capital repairs in public housing, and the brownfields redevelopment program would no longer be funded.
The House Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2011 HUD funding bill on July 26, 2010 (H.R. 5850, 111th Congress), and it passed the full House on July 29, 2010. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version (S. 3644, 111th Congress) on July 23, 2010. The House-passed version would have provided $46.55 billion for HUD in FY2011 and the Senate committee-reported version would have provided $46.59 billion, about $1 billion more than the President's request.
When no appropriations legislation was enacted before the beginning of FY2011, the 111th Congress enacted a series of continuing resolutions (CR) to continue funding at the FY2010 level for most accounts in the federal budget, including all of the accounts in HUD's budget. The last CR of the 111th Congress extended funding into the 112th Congress. On February 18, 2011, the House approved H.R. 1, a year-long CR which would have resulted in an overall reduction in funding for HUD. H.R. 1 was rejected by the Senate on March 9, 2011. The 112th Congress approved three short-term CRs before enacting a final year-long CR that was signed into law (P.L. 112-10) on April 15, 2011. The final FY2011 appropriations law cut funding for HUD, relative to FY2010, but not as deeply as proposed in H.R. 1. The act also included a 0.2% across-the-board rescission for all discretionary accounts, including those in HUD's budget. |
crs_R45254 | crs_R45254_0 | In addition, the FSGG bill funds the Department of the Treasury (Title I), the Executive Office of the President (EOP; Title II), the judiciary (Title III), and the District of Columbia (Title IV). The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate. Administration and Congressional Action
On May 23, 2017, President Trump submitted his FY2018 budget request, with a total of approximately $3.1 billion for the independent agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $330 million for the CFTC. On July 18, 2017, the House Committee on Appropriations reported the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2018 ( H.R. 3280 , H.Rept. 115-234 ). FY2018 funding for the FSGG independent agencies in the reported bill would have been $253 million, with another $248 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 3268 , H.Rept. 115-232 ). The combined total of $501 million would have been about $2.6 billion below the President's FY2018 request with most of this difference in the funding for the General Services Administration (GSA). The text of nearly all of H.R. 3280 was included as Division D of H.R. The bill was amended numerous times, with the FSGG independent agencies totaling $488 million after the amendments. 3354 passed the House on September 14, 2017. The Senate Committee on Appropriations released an FY2018 chairmen's recommended FSGG draft bill along with an explanatory statement on November 20, 2017. Funding in the recommended bill totaled $593 million for the FSGG independent agencies, about $2.5 billion below the President's FY2018 request with most of this difference in funding for the GSA. 115-56 . Four additional CRs were enacted—on December 8, 2017 ( P.L. 115-90 ), December 22, 2017 ( P.L. 115-96 ), January 22, 2018 ( P.L. 115-120 ), and February 9, 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ). 115-123 also included an additional $127 million for the GSA and $1.66 billion for the SBA, largely to address disaster costs from hurricanes in 2017. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( H.R. 1625 / P.L. 115-141 ) was enacted on March 23, 2018. FY2018 enacted appropriations in both P.L. 115-123 totaled $4.7 billion for the FSGG agencies, $1.6 billion above the original request, with much of this difference resulting from the emergency funding for the SBA. The GSA, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) also had substantial funding differences between requested and enacted amounts. Independent Agencies
The FSGG appropriations bill provides funding for more than two dozen independent agencies, performing a wide range of functions. 115-141 and P.L. H.R. P.L. In addition to the regular FY2018 appropriations in P.L. Independent Agencies Related to Personnel Management Appropriations
The FSGG appropriations bill includes funding for four agencies with personnel management functions: the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). | The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bills include funding for more than two dozen independent agencies in addition to the larger entities in the bill (Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President, the District of Columbia, and the judiciary). Among these are
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Election Assistance Commission (EAC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Election Commission (FEC), Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), General Services Administration (GSA), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Selective Service System, Small Business Administration (SBA), and United States Postal Service (USPS).
The House and Senate FSGG bills include funding for the same agencies, with one exception. Funding for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is considered in the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate.
President Trump submitted his FY2018 budget request on May 23, 2017. The request totaled approximately $3.1 billion for the independent agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $330 million for the CFTC.
The House Committee on Appropriations reported the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 3280, H.Rept. 115-234) on July 18, 2017. Combined total FY2018 funding for the FSGG independent agencies in the reported bill was $253 million, with another $248 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 3268, H.Rept. 115-232). The resulting total of $501 million would have been about $2.6 billion below the President's FY2018 request, with most of this difference in the funding for the GSA.
The text of nearly all of H.R. 3280 was included as Division D of H.R. 3354, an omnibus appropriations bill. The bill was amended numerous times on the floor of the House, shifting funding among FSGG agencies, with the FSGG independent agencies totaling $488 million after the amendments. H.R. 3354 passed the House on September 14, 2017.
The Senate Committee on Appropriations did not act on an FY2018 FSGG appropriations bill. A draft FY2018 chairmen's recommended FSGG bill and explanatory statement was released on November 20, 2017. Funding in the draft bill totaled approximately $539 million, $2.5 billion below the President's FY2018 request, with most of this difference in funding for the GSA.
No appropriations bills were passed prior to the start of FY2018. Five separate continuing resolutions (CRs) were enacted—on September 8, 2017 (P.L. 115-56), December 8, 2017 (P.L. 115-90), December 22, 2017 (P.L. 115-96), January 22, 2018 (P.L. 115-120), and February 9, 2018 (P.L. 115-123). The CRs generally maintained FSGG funding based on FY2017 levels, with P.L. 115-123 also adding supplemental emergency funding for the GSA ($127 million) and the SBA ($1.66 billion) largely to address natural disasters.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 1625, P.L. 115-141) was enacted on March 23, 2018. FY2018 enacted appropriations in P.L. 115-141 and P.L. 115-123 combined totaled $4.7 billion for the FSGG agencies, $1.6 billion above the original request, with much of this difference resulting from the emergency funding for the SBA. |
crs_R44740 | crs_R44740_0 | Introduction
The National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF) was chartered by Congress in 1984. Although many of NFWF's projects involve work with federal agencies, under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 501(c)(3), it is a "charitable and nonprofit corporation and is not an agency or establishment of the United States." This broad mission is specified in the purposes of the foundation:
(1) to encourage, accept, and administer private gifts of property for the benefit of, or in connection with, the activities and services of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, to further the conservation and management of fish, wildlife, plants, and other natural resources;
(2) to undertake and conduct such other activities as will further the conservation and management of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources of the United States, and its territories and possessions, for present and future generations of Americans; and
(3) to participate with, and otherwise assist, foreign governments, entities, and individuals in undertaking and conducting activities that will further the conservation and management of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources of other countries. In addition to FWS, two other federal land agencies have associated foundations. The fourth federal land management agency, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM, in DOI) has no associated foundation. NFWF Projects and Partners: Recent Examples
The range of projects sponsored by NFWF is broad. As these examples illustrate, some grants have no direct federal funding involvement, although federal lands may benefit from NFWF projects. NFWF also may receive funds that are settlements or penalties resulting from lawsuits that find damage to fish and wildlife resources. The remaining two purposes are not tied to these agencies or to any other federal agency. Congress may consider legislation to create additional foundations for other agencies. NFWF and the other two existing foundations offer three different models for such an effort. | The National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF) was chartered by Congress in 1984 to aid in the conservation of plants, animals, and ecosystems; many of its projects involve work with federal agencies. By statute, NFWF is a "charitable and nonprofit corporation and is not an agency or establishment of the United States." Registered under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 501(c)(3), NFWF is not a part of the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS, Department of the Interior), though it does have certain links to that agency, as well as to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
NFWF offers opportunities to individuals and corporations to make tax-deductible contributions to promote plant, animal, and ecosystem conservation in peer-reviewed projects. It also allows federal agencies to seek partners who wish to aid in such projects, and it sometimes serves as a conduit for the management of fines or funds resulting from court settlements to mitigate damage to fish and wildlife. NFWF projects may benefit conservation on federal lands, but other ownerships also may receive benefits. NFWF differs from such other federal foundations as the National Park Foundation and the National Forest Foundation in having much more tenuous links to federal agencies; many NFWF projects have no link to any federal agency.
If Congress considers legislation to create additional foundations associated with the missions of other federal land agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)—or for other purposes, such as Indian education—NFWF and the two foundations noted above offer three different models for such an effort. |
crs_R40689 | crs_R40689_0 | S hort-time compensation (STC), sometimes called work sharing, is a program within the federal-state unemployment compensation (UC) system. The reasons for this seem to be a combination of difficulty the U.S. Department of Labor (U.S. DOL) has had in implementing the 1992 authorizing legislation, lack of awareness on the part of employers, unsuitability of work sharing arrangements for some firms or workers, and costs of the program. Despite these changes, the proportion of UC claimants participating in STC remains low. The terms short-time compensation and work sharing are sometimes used interchangeably, however the term work sharing also refers more broadly to any arrangement under which a firm chooses to reduce work hours across the board for many or all workers instead of permanently laying off a smaller number of workers. In a typical example of work sharing, a firm that must temporarily reduce its 100-person workforce by 20% would accomplish this by reducing the work hours of the entire workforce by 20%—from five to four days a week—in lieu of laying off 20 workers. Workers whose hours are reduced are sometimes compensated with STC, which is equivalent to regular unemployment benefits that have been pro-rated for the partial work reduction. 112-96 , the term short-time compensation program means a program under which
employers participate on a voluntary basis and submit a written plan to the appropriate state agency; an employer reduces the number of hours worked by employees in lieu of layoffs; employees' workweeks have been reduced by at least 10% and by no more than the percentage determined by the state (if any, but in no case by more than 60%); STC is paid as a pro rata portion of the unemployment compensation that would otherwise be payable to the employee if such employee were employed; eligible employees are not required to meet the "able, available and actively seeking work" requirement of regular unemployment compensation, but they must be available for their normal workweeks; eligible employees may participate in a state-approved, employer-sponsored, or Workforce Investment Act training program; and employers who provide health or retirement benefits (defined benefit or defined contribution pension plans) must certify to the appropriate state agency that such benefits will continue to be provided to STC participants under the same terms and conditions as though the workweek of such employee had not been reduced or to the same extent as other employees not participating in the STC program. Currently, over half of the states and the District of Columbia have enacted STC programs. The administrative costs of STC programs have been a concern for state labor agencies. In addition, STC may increase processing costs for the state agency relative to layoffs because, for a given firm, work sharing affects a larger number of workers than if the firm were to lay off workers. Massachusetts has offered to make its software available at no cost to other states. Work sharing and STC arrangements can also reduce recruitment and training costs for employers. Work sharing and STC arrangements may help sustain employee morale and productivity compared to layoffs. The STC firms, however, also continued to lay off workers. In addition, production technologies may make it expensive or impossible to shorten the work week. Employees
Work sharing helps workers who would have faced layoffs avoid significant hardship, while spreading more moderate earnings reductions across more working individuals and families. When work sharing is combined with STC, the income loss to work sharing employees is reduced. Many state STC programs also require that employers continue to provide health insurance and retirement benefits to work sharing employees as if they were working a full schedule. STC cannot forestall what may be an inevitable layoff, however. Temporary Federal Financing
P.L. Administrative Grants
Under P.L. 112-96 in February 2012 to promote state adoption and implementation of STC programs; however, STC remains a little-used program. | Short-time compensation (STC) is a program within the federal-state unemployment insurance system. In states that have STC programs, workers whose hours are reduced under a formal work sharing plan may be compensated with STC, which is a regular unemployment benefit that has been pro-rated for the partial work reduction.
Although the terms work sharing and short-time compensation are sometimes used interchangeably, work sharing refers to any arrangement under which workers' hours are reduced in lieu of a layoff. Under a work sharing arrangement, a firm faced with the need to downsize temporarily chooses to reduce work hours across the board for all workers instead of laying off a smaller number of workers. For example, an employer might reduce the work hours of the entire workforce by 20%, from five to four days a week, in lieu of laying off 20% of the workforce.
Employers have used STC combined with work sharing arrangements to reduce labor costs, sustain morale compared to layoffs, and retain highly skilled workers. Work sharing can also reduce employers' recruitment and training costs by eliminating the need to recruit new employees when business improves. On the employee's side, work sharing spreads more moderate earnings reductions across more employees—especially if work sharing is combined with STC—as opposed to imposing significant hardship on a few. Many states also require that employers who participate in STC programs continue to provide health insurance and retirement benefits to work sharing employees as if they were working a full schedule.
Work sharing and STC cannot, however, avert layoffs or plant closings if a company's financial situation is dire. In addition, some employers may choose not to adopt work sharing because laying off workers may be a less expensive alternative. This may be the case for firms whose production technologies make it expensive or impossible to shorten the work week. For other firms, it may be cheaper to lay off workers than to continue paying health and pension benefits on a full-time equivalent basis. Work sharing arrangements in general also redistribute the burden of unemployment from younger to older employees, and for this reason the arrangements may be opposed by workers with seniority who are less likely to be laid off.
From the perspective of state governments, concerns about the STC program have included the program's high administrative costs. Massachusetts has made significant strides in automating STC systems and reducing costs, but many other states still manage much of the STC program on paper.
Currently, approximately half of the states and the District of Columbia have enacted STC programs to support work sharing arrangements. However, few UC beneficiaries are STC participants. At the peak of its use in 2010, the STC beneficiaries totaled nearly 3% of regular unemployment compensation first payments. The reasons for low take-up of the STC program are not completely clear, but key causes include lack of awareness of the program, administrative complexity for employers, and employer costs. P.L. 112-96, passed in February 2012, offered grants to states to help bring attention to the states' STC laws. In addition, P.L. 112-96 provided temporary federal funding to states that have existing STC programs or to create a new one. Despite these changes, the proportion of UC claimants receiving funds from STC remains low relative to overall UC claims. |
crs_RL34590 | crs_RL34590_0 | The House amended this final version into the Senate-passed version of S. 3001 , and adopted it on September 24, 2008. The Senate then approved the bill on September 27 th , clearing it for Presidential consideration. This report highlights those personnel-related issues that seem to generate the most intense congressional and constituent interest, and tracks their status in the FY2009 House and Senate versions of the NDAA. 110-652 ), and passed by the House on May 22, 2008. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, S. 3001 , was introduced on May 12, 2008, reported by the Senate Committee on Armed Services on that same day ( S.Rept. 110-335 ), and passed the Senate on September 17, 2008. Where appropriate, other CRS products are identified to provide more detailed background information and analysis of the issue. For each issue, a CRS analyst is identified and contact information is provided. Note: some issues were addressed in the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act and discussed in CRS Report RL34169 concerning that legislation. Those issues that were previously considered in CRS Report RL34169 are designated with a " * " in the relevant section titles of this report. *Military Pay Raise
Background: Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with end strength increases and recruiting challenges, continue to highlight the military pay issue. Discussion: The amendments contained in Section 591 of the H.R. Reference(s): CRS Report RL34169, The FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues, p. 7-8. Discussion: The administrative discharge of a sole survivor is considered a voluntary separation. | Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of what the Bush Administration terms the Global War on Terror, along with the emerging operational role of the Reserve Components, further heighten interest and support for a wide range of military personnel policies and issues.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) selected a number of the military personnel issues that Congress considered as it deliberated the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009. In each case, this report provides a brief synopsis of sections that pertain to personnel policy. It includes background information and a discussion of the issue, along with a table that contains a comparison of the bill (H.R. 5658) passed by the House on May 22, 2008, the bill (S. 3001) passed by the Senate on September 17, 2008, and the final version (S. 3001) passed by the House on September 24, 2008 and by the Senate on September 27, 2008. Where appropriate, other CRS products are identified to provide more detailed background information and analysis of the issue. For each issue, a CRS analyst is identified and contact information is provided. Note: some issues were addressed in the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act and discussed in CRS Report RL34169 concerning that legislation. Those issues that were previously considered in CRS Report RL34169 are designated with a "*" in the relevant section titles of this report.
This report focuses exclusively on the annual defense authorization process. It does not include appropriations, veterans' affairs, tax implications of policy choices or any discussion of separately introduced legislation.
This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R40631 | crs_R40631_0 | Concentrating Solar Power and Its Water Use
Large-scale deployment of concentrating solar power (CSP), a renewable energy technology for generating electricity, has the potential to affect the availability of water resources in the Southwest for other uses. Because the water demand of CSP is highly dependent on the type of CSP facilities constructed (e.g., whether thermal storage is included and whether wet cooling is used) and their locations, and because the data for these evolving technologies are preliminary, there remains much uncertainty about the impacts of CSP on Southwest water use. Water resource constraints are likely to prompt adoption of more freshwater-efficient technologies, or decisions not to site CSP facilities in certain locations. However, water constraints do not necessarily preclude CSP in the Southwest, given the ability to reduce the freshwater use at CSP facilities. The quantity of electricity produced at these facilities, the water intensity per unit of electricity generated, and the local and regional constraints on freshwater will shape the cumulative effect of CSP deployment on southwestern water resources, and the long-term sustainability of CSP as a renewable energy technology. Site-specific and cumulative water resource implications are among many factors (e.g., cost, climate and air pollution emissions, land and ocean impacts, wildlife and the environment impacts) to be weighed when judging the tradeoffs between different energy options. Convergence of Solar Abundance and Water Constraints
In arid and semi-arid regions like the Southwest, or other areas with intense water demand, water supply is an issue for locating any thermoelectric power plant, not only CSP. The cumulative impact of installing multiple thermoelectric power plants in a region with existing water constraints raises numerous policy questions. This concentration of CSP in a region of the country with water constraints has raised questions about whether, and how, to invest in large-scale deployment of CSP. Why is there concern specifically about the CSP water footprint? The water intensity of electricity from a CSP plant with wet cooling generally is higher than that of fossil fuel facilities with wet cooling. Options exist for reducing the water consumed by thermoelectric facilities, including CSP facilities; however, with current technology, these options reduce the quantity of energy produced and increase the energy production cost. A Trend Toward More Freshwater-Efficient Cooling
The trend for new thermoelectric generation, including CSP, in water-constrained areas is toward more freshwater-efficient cooling. Water-Efficient Cooling Technologies
Alternatives to wet cooling can significantly reduce the freshwater footprint of CSP. Most electricity siting and water planning, management, and allocation decisions are delegated to the states. Whether and how the federal government should promote water conservation, efficiency, markets, and regional- and state-level planning and collaboration is a matter of debate, and actions in these areas often occur on a piecemeal or ad hoc basis. At the same time, federal policies (e.g., energy, agriculture, and tax policies) can affect water-related investments and water use, and operations of federal facilities can affect the water available for allocation. | As the 111th Congress considers energy and climate legislation, the land and water impacts of renewable technologies are receiving greater attention. The cumulative impact of installing numerous thermoelectric power plants on the water resources of the Southwest, a region with existing water constraints, raises policy questions.
Solar Abundance and Water Constraints Converge. Many Southwest counties are premium locations for siting solar electricity facilities, but have constrained water supplies. One policy question for local, state, and federal decision-makers is whether and how to promote renewable electricity development in the face of competing water demands. A principal renewable energy technology being considered for the Southwest is concentrating solar power (CSP), which uses ground-based arrays of mirrors to concentrate thermal solar energy and convert it into electricity. The steam turbines at CSP facilities are generally cooled using water, in a process known as wet cooling. The potential cumulative impact of CSP in a region with freshwater constraints has raised questions about whether, and how, to invest in large-scale deployment of CSP. Much uncertainty about the water use impacts of CSP remains because its water demand is highly dependent on the location and type of CSP facilities constructed (e.g., whether thermal storage is included and whether wet cooling is used), and because the data for these evolving technologies are preliminary.
Water Consumption and Electricity Generation Tradeoffs. In arid and semi-arid regions like the Southwest or in other areas with intense water demand, water supply is an issue for locating any thermoelectric power plant, not only CSP. The trend is toward more freshwater-efficient cooling technologies for CSP and other thermoelectric generation. Why is there concern specifically about the CSP water footprint? CSP facilities using wet cooling can consume more water per unit of electricity generated than traditional fossil fuel facilities with wet cooling. Options exist for reducing the freshwater consumed by CSP and other thermoelectric facilities. Available freshwater-efficient cooling options, however, often reduce the quantity of electricity produced and increase electricity production costs, and generally do not eliminate water resource impacts.
The quantity of electricity produced at these facilities, the water intensity per unit of electricity generated, and the local and regional constraints on freshwater will shape the cumulative effect of CSP deployment on southwestern water resources and the long-term sustainability of CSP as a renewable energy technology. Water resource constraints may prompt adoption of more freshwater-efficient technologies or decisions not to site CSP facilities in certain locations.
Next Steps. Water constraints do not necessarily preclude CSP in the Southwest, given the alternatives available to reduce the freshwater use at CSP facilities. Moreover, water impacts are one of many factors (e.g., cost, climate and air pollution emissions, land and ocean impacts, wildlife and the environmental impacts) to be weighed when judging the tradeoffs between different energy options. States are responsible for most water planning, management, and allocation decisions and electricity siting decisions. Whether and how the federal government should promote water conservation, efficiency, markets, and regional- and state-level planning and collaboration is a matter of debate. At the same time, federal policies (e.g., energy, agriculture, and tax policy) can affect water-related investments and water use, and operations of federal facilities can affect the water available for allocation. |
crs_R43490 | crs_R43490_0 | Background
There are two primary ways for a household to receive broadcast television signals: (1) by using an individual antenna that receives broadcast signals directly over the air from a television station, or (2) by subscribing to a multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD), which brings the retransmitted signals of broadcast stations to homes through a copper wire, a fiber optic cable, or a satellite dish installed on the premises. In 2014, approximately 86% of the 116.4 million U.S. television households subscribed to MVPD services ( Table 1 ). With the rise of cable and satellite television since the 1970s, Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) constructed a regulatory framework for the retransmission of broadcast television signals by both cable and satellite television operators. 100-667 ) and most recently amended by the 2014 Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act Reauthorization Act (2014 STELA Reauthorization Act; P.L. Renewed Provisions of STELA
Certain provisions in STELA are set to expire on December 31, 2019. Consequently, the FCC's rules related to violations of good faith standards, including its prohibition on joint retransmission consent negotiations between two separately owned top-four stations within the same market, would become moot if Congress does not extend this section beyond December 31, 2019. It recommended that
Congress permit copyright owners to develop marketplace licensing options to replace the compulsory provisions of Sections 111, 119, and 122; Congress provide a date-specific trigger for the phase-out and eventual repeal of the distant signal licenses, but delay repeal of the local signal licenses in order to provide stakeholders (including copyright owners and professionals in broadcast, cable, and satellite industries) with an opportunity to test new business models with the least likelihood of disruption to consumers; Congress evaluate the concerns of stakeholders who operate with limited resources in the broadcast programming distribution chain, such as public television stations, small cable operators, and independent program producers, and determine whether special consideration is advisable; before determining the date-specific trigger and transition period for the phase-out of distant signal licenses, and during the transition period, Congress refrain from applying the statutory licenses to any broadcast station that 1) elects retransmission consent (instead of must-carry or carry one, carry all), and 2) has obtained the rights to retransmit all of the content carried on its signal. Additional Provisions Impacting Cable Operators
Administrative Reforms to Effective Competition Petitions
Section 111 directs the FCC to develop a streamlined process for the filing of "effective competition" petitions by small cable operators within 180 days of the law's enactment. 113-200 . Section 102 of the 2014 STELA Reauthorization Act extends the market modification process to satellite carriers. It directs the FCC to pay particular attention to "the value of localism," by taking into account whether modifying the local market of the television station would promote consumers' access to television broadcast signals originating in their state of residence. This provision might enable the FCC to provide viewers in orphan counties access to more in-state programming. While providing consumers with information about the market modification process, this provision may not necessarily enable them to directly participate. It is possible that the FCC, when issuing new rules to carry out the STELA Reauthorization Act, will allow only broadcast stations and satellite operators to petition to modify a market for satellite service. | One hundred sixteen million U.S. households watch television. Approximately 86% of those households subscribe to a service that carries the retransmitted signals of broadcast stations over fiber optic cables, telephone lines, or through satellite dishes on the premises. Such services, known as multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs), retransmit broadcast television signals pursuant to a regulatory framework constructed by Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The remaining households generally use an individual antenna that receives broadcast signals directly over the air from a television station.
On December 4, 2014, President Barack Obama signed the Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act Reauthorization Act (STELA Reauthorization Act; P.L. 113-200), extending legal provisions governing retransmission of distant network broadcast signals via satellite. In addition, the law both extends and changes rules for retransmission consent negotiations between television station owners and operators of satellite and cable systems. These portions of the regulatory framework are scheduled to expire on December 31, 2019.
The STELA Reauthorization Act limits the ability of separately owned broadcasters to jointly enter retransmission consent negotiations (applying FCC rules to more stations), but extends their ability to jointly sell advertising time (delaying enforcement of FCC rules). The act also eliminates FCC rules barring satellite and cable operators from deleting broadcasters' programming or changing their channel assignments during certain periods. In addition, it repeals the FCC's ban on integrating the security and navigation functions of cable set-top boxes on December 5, 2015, one year after the law's enactment. The act directs the FCC to develop a streamlined process for small cable operators to file "effective competition" petitions that would free them from FCC rate regulation of their basic tiers of service.
The act also has provisions to facilitate viewers' access to in-state programming. It directs the FCC, when considering whether to modify the local market of a television station to enable it to be carried on an MVPD, to consider whether doing so would promote consumers' access to in-state programming. The act directs the FCC to post information about the market modification process on its website. The act also extends the market modification process, previously applicable only to cable operators, to satellite operators as well. Finally, the act directs the FCC to issue a report to Congress analyzing alternatives to its current definition of local television markets. |
crs_RL33749 | crs_RL33749_0 | Most programs of federal aid to K-12 education are authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). The ESEA was most recently amended and reauthorized by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. The authorization for ESEA programs expired at the end of FY2008, although ESEA programs continue to operate as long as appropriations are provided, and the 111 th Congress is expected to consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA. Debates over reauthorization of the ESEA have thus far focused on the following overarching issues: (1) What has been the impact of the substantial expansion of standards-based assessments of pupil achievement required under the ESEA, and should these requirements be expanded further to include additional subjects or grade levels? (2) Are adequate yearly progress (AYP) requirements appropriately focused on improving education for disadvantaged pupil groups and identifying low-performing schools? (3) Have the program improvement, corrective actions, and restructuring required under the ESEA for schools and local educational agencies (LEAs) that fail to meet AYP standards for two consecutive years or more been effectively implemented, and have they significantly improved achievement levels among pupils in the affected schools? (4) What has been the impact of the requirements that all public school teachers (and many paraprofessionals) be highly qualified and that well-qualified teachers be equitably distributed across schools and LEAs? (5) Should ESEA programs be funded at levels closer to the maximum authorized amounts, and at what levels, if any, should authorizations be set for future years? (6) Should the ESEA place greater emphasis on enhancing the nation's international competitiveness in science, mathematics, and foreign language achievement? Should the active federal role in K-12 education embodied in the NCLB be maintained? Federal Role
The NCLB, with its numerous new or substantially expanded requirements for participating states and LEAs, initiated a major increase in federal involvement in basic aspects of public K-12 education. | Most programs of federal aid to K-12 education are authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). The ESEA was most recently amended and reauthorized by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB). The authorization for ESEA programs expired at the end of FY2008, although ESEA programs continue to operate as long as appropriations are provided, and the 111th Congress is expected to consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA.
Debates over reauthorization of the ESEA have thus far focused on the following overarching issues: (1) What has been the impact of the substantial expansion of standards-based assessments of pupil achievement required under the ESEA, and should these requirements be expanded further to include additional subjects or grade levels? (2) Are adequate yearly progress (AYP) requirements appropriately focused on improving education for disadvantaged pupil groups and identifying low-performing schools? (3) Have the program improvement, corrective actions, and restructuring required under the ESEA for schools and local educational agencies (LEAs) that fail to meet AYP standards for two consecutive years or more been effectively implemented, and have they significantly improved achievement levels among pupils in the affected schools? (4) What has been the impact of the requirements that all public school teachers (and many paraprofessionals) be highly qualified and that well-qualified teachers be equitably distributed across schools and LEAs? (5) Should ESEA programs be funded at levels closer to the maximum authorized amounts, and at what levels, if any, should authorizations be set for years beyond FY2008? (6) Should the ESEA place greater emphasis on enhancing the nation's international competitiveness in science, mathematics, and foreign language achievement? (7) The NCLB, with its numerous new or substantially expanded requirements for participating states and LEAs, initiated a major increase in federal involvement in basic aspects of public K-12 education. Should the active federal role in K-12 education embodied in the NCLB be maintained?
This report will be updated regularly. |
crs_RL31357 | crs_RL31357_0 | The devices and arrangements, which have proliferated and gained prominence recently, range from the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) to the National Security Council (NSC), the "drug czar," and a multiplicity of joint operational task forces. These entities, numbering in the hundreds, can be categorized among seven different types, which vary in significant ways. Councils consisting of the President, who is the chairman, the Vice President, and specified department and/or agency heads, with only three in existence: the National Security Council, created by public law in 1947, and the Homeland Security Council and the USA Freedom Corps Council, each created by executive order, in 2001 and 2002, respectively. Specially created positions or offices , with their own authority and resources, to cover a policy area that crosses a number of separate and independent agencies (e.g., Council on Environmental Quality and the directors of the offices of National Drug Control Policy, of Homeland Security, and of USA Freedom Corps). Agency heads or other officers with qualified authority over other entities , particularly the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Secret Service, and inspectors general, who can enlist the assistance of or task other organizations in carrying out specific duties and assignments. Sub-cabinet boards, committees, and councils , such as the NSC and HSC deputies committees, two inspector general coordinating councils, and the chief financial officers coordinating council. Examples of Coordinative Mechanisms
Examples of federal interagency coordinative mechanisms, interspersed among the seven categories, are manifold. They are the heads of the departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Health and Human Services; Director of Central Intelligence; Director of FEMA; Administrator of General Services; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; along with other officials from the Executive Office of the President, including his chief of staff, the Vice President's chief of staff, Director of OMB, Director of Office of Science and Technology, Director of the National Economic Council, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Transfers of Personnel and Resources
Another type of coordinative arrangement is manifested in the temporary transfer of personnel from one department or agency to an existing or new organization; such changes usually occur through setting up task forces and working groups and through detailing and redeploying staff to other agencies. These efforts are instituted under a wide range of authority: public laws, executive orders, administrative directives, interagency memoranda of understanding, or agency-head delegations. These differ in terms of their location and membership, powers and responsibilities, enabling authority and permanency, and establishment and evolution. | Interagency coordinative mechanisms at the federal level have become more prominent and prevalent recently. The Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and the companion Homeland Security Council (HSC), along with proposals for change, are the most visible. Other examples not only include such well-known entities as the National Security Council (NSC) and the so-called "drug czar" but also extend to a multiplicity of nearly anonymous working groups and task forces. Some of them have short life spans, while others have remained in place for long periods.
Seven different types of interagency coordinators are described here. They cross a broad spectrum of categories and cover a large number and wide variety of specific mechanisms and arrangements, established by public law, executive orders, administrative directives, and other legal instruments:
councils chaired by the President and consisting of the Vice President and the heads of certain departments and agencies, with the NSC, HSC, and the USA Freedom Corps Council being the only three; committees whose members are department and agency heads, including ones connected to the NSC and to the HSC; specially created offices and positions, especially the offices of Homeland Security, National Drug Control Policy, and USA Freedom Corps, along with their directors; specified agency heads and other officers—notably, the Director of Central Intelligence (head of the CIA), Director of the Secret Service, and inspectors general—with qualified authority to enlist the assistance of organizations outside their own establishments; sub-cabinet boards, committees, and councils, such as those associated with inspectors general and with chief financial officers; transfers of personnel and resources among new or existing entities, by way of operational task forces, working groups, staff details, and redeployments; and transfers of authority between and among agencies, through cross-designation and special deputation of personnel.
The diverse arrangements and devices, collectively numbering in the hundreds, extend across a broad range of policy areas; exist in a wide variety of institutional locations; consist of different echelons of members and categories of leaders; carry out different types of responsibilities; perform different operations and activities; and vary in terms of their capabilities, resources, and powers. |
crs_R43083 | crs_R43083_0 | The SBA's Missions
The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including the 7(a), 504/CDC, and Microloan lending programs to enhance small business access to capital; the Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) program to enhance small business access to venture capital; contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in federal contracting; direct loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to assist their recovery from natural disasters; and small business management and technical assistance training programs to assist business formation and expansion. Congressional interest in these programs, and the SBA's assistance to small business startups in particular (defined as new businesses that meet the SBA's criteria as small), has increased in recent years, primarily because these programs are viewed by many as a means to stimulate economic activity and create jobs. Economists generally do not view job creation as a justification for providing federal assistance to small businesses. They argue that in the long term such assistance will likely reallocate jobs within the economy, not increase them. In their view, jobs arise primarily from the size of the labor force, which depends largely on population, demographics, and factors that affect the choice of home versus market production (e.g., the entry of women in the workforce). However, economic research does suggest that increased federal spending on small business assistance programs may result in additional jobs in the short term. Although there is a consensus that startups have an important role in job creation and retention, economic research suggests that startups have a more limited effect on net job creation over time because fewer than half of all startups are still in business after five years. That research also suggests that the influence of startups on net job creation varies by firm size. Startups with fewer than 20 employees tend to have a negligible effect on net job creation over time whereas startups with 20-499 employees tend to have a positive employment effect, as do surviving younger businesses of all sizes (in operation for one year to five years). Report Overview
This report examines startups' experiences with the SBA's management and technical assistance training programs, focusing on Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs); Women Business Centers (WBCs); SCORE (formerly the Service Corps of Retired Executives); the SBA's 7(a), 504/CDC, and Microloan lending programs; and the SBA's SBIC venture capital program. The SBA's growth accelerators initiative, which targets entrepreneurs looking to "start and scale their business" by helping them access "seed capital, mentors, and networking opportunities for customers and partners," and the recently sunset SBIC early stage debenture program, which focused on providing venture capital to startups, are also discussed. Although the data collected by the SBA concerning these programs' impact on economic activity and job creation are somewhat limited and subject to methodological challenges concerning their validity as reliable performance measures, most small business owners who have participated in these programs report in surveys sponsored by the SBA that the programs were useful. Given the data limitations, however, it is difficult to determine the cost effectiveness of these programs. | The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty and venture capital programs to enhance small business access to capital; contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in federal contracting; direct loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to assist their recovery from natural disasters; and small business management and technical assistance training programs to assist business formation and expansion.
Congressional interest in these programs, and the SBA's assistance provided to small business startups in particular (defined as new businesses that meet the SBA's criteria as small), has increased in recent years, primarily because these programs are viewed by many as a means to stimulate economic activity and create jobs.
Economists generally do not view job creation as a justification for providing federal assistance to small businesses. They argue that in the long term such assistance will likely reallocate jobs within the economy, not increase them. In their view, jobs arise primarily from the size of the labor force, which depends largely on population, demographics, and factors that affect the choice of home versus market production (e.g., the entry of women in the workforce). However, economic theory does suggest that increased federal spending on small business assistance programs may result in additional jobs in the short term.
Congressional interest in assistance to business startups is derived primarily from economic research suggesting that startups play a very important role in job creation. That research suggests that business startups create many new jobs, but have a more limited effect on net job creation over time because fewer than half of all startups remain in business after five years. However, that research also suggests that the influence of small business startups on net job creation varies by firm size. Startups with fewer than 20 employees tend to have a negligible effect on net job creation over time whereas startups with 20-499 employees tend to have a positive employment effect, as do surviving younger businesses of all sizes (in operation for one year to five years).
This report examines small business startups' experiences with the SBA's management and technical assistance training programs, focusing on Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs), Women Business Centers (WBCs), and SCORE (formerly the Service Corps of Retired Executives); the SBA's 7(a), 504/CDC, and Microloan lending programs; and the SBA's Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) venture capital program. Although data collected by the SBA concerning these programs' impact on economic activity and job creation are somewhat limited and subject to methodological challenges concerning their validity as reliable performance measures, most small business owners who have participated in these programs report in surveys sponsored by the SBA that the programs were useful. Given the data limitations, however, it is difficult to determine the cost effectiveness of these programs.
The report also discusses the SBA's growth accelerators initiative, which targets entrepreneurs looking to "start and scale their business" by helping them access "seed capital, mentors, and networking opportunities for customers and partners," and the recently sunset SBIC early stage debenture program, which focused on providing venture capital to startups. |
crs_R43935 | crs_R43935_0 | This report provides an overview of the history of science and technology (S&T) advice to the President and discusses selected recurrent issues for Congress regarding OSTP's Director, OSTP management and operations, the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 ( P.L. Office of Science and Technology Policy
Overview
Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy as an office within the EOP to, among other things, "serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government." 94-282 establishes the position of OSTP Director, whose primary function is
to provide, within the Executive Office of the President, advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government. In addition, the statute, as amended, directs the OSTP Director to
advise the President of scientific and technological considerations involved in areas of national concern including, but not limited to, the economy, national security, homeland security, health, foreign relations, the environment, and the technological recovery and use of resources;
evaluate the scale, quality, and effectiveness of the federal effort in science and technology and advise on appropriate actions;
advise the President on scientific and technological considerations with regard to federal budgets, assist the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with an annual review and analysis of funding proposed for research and development in budgets of all federal agencies, and aid [OMB] and the agencies throughout the budget development process; and
assist the President in providing general leadership and coordination of the research and development programs of the Federal Government. Some Presidents have appointed their science advisors not only to the Senate-confirmed position of OSTP Director, but also as Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (APST). Congress can require the OSTP Director to testify before Congress. The APST manages the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), established by Executive Order 12881, which is charged with coordinating S&T policy across the federal government, establishing national goals for federal S&T investments, and preparing coordinated R&D strategies. PCAST was last extended by Executive Order 13708 through September 30, 2017. These issues include the titles, roles, and responsibilities of the President's science advisor; the number and policy foci of OSTP Associate Directors; OSTP funding and staffing levels; the participation of OSTP and NSTC in federal agency coordination, priority-setting, and budget allocation; and the stature and influence of PCAST. Some experts in the S&T community have proposed that the OSTP Director always be given the title of APST or be given Cabinet rank. However, an APST may assert the right not to testify before Congress in accordance with the principles of separation of powers or executive privilege. Cabinet Rank
Some members of the S&T community have expressed their desire for the OSTP Director to have a greater role and influence in the development of Administration policy. When holding the APST title, the OSTP Director manages the NSTC and co-chairs PCAST. | Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states, "The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government." Further, "The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government."
The President nominates the OSTP Director, who is subject to confirmation by the Senate. In many Administrations, the President has concurrently appointed the OSTP Director to the position of Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (APST), a position which allows for the provision of confidential advice to the President on matters of science and technology. While Congress can require the OSTP Director to testify, the APST may decline requests to testify on the basis of separation of powers or executive privilege. The APST manages the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), an interagency body established by Executive Order 12881 that coordinates science and technology (S&T) policy across the federal government. The APST also co-chairs the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), a council of external advisors established by Executive Order 13539 that provides advice to the President. Executive Order 13708 continued PCAST through September 30, 2017. As of August 2017, President Trump had not named a director of OSTP or an APST.
Several recurrent OSTP issues face Congress: the need for science advice within the EOP; the title, rank, and responsibilities of the OSTP Director; the policy areas for OSTP focus; the funding and staffing for OSTP; the roles and functions of OSTP and NSTC in setting federal science and technology policy; and the status and influence of PCAST. Some in the S&T community support raising the OSTP Director to Cabinet rank, contending that this would imbue the position with greater influence within the EOP. Others have proposed that the OSTP Director play a greater role in federal agency coordination, priority setting, and budget allocation. Both the Administration and Congress have identified areas of policy focus for OSTP staff, raising questions of prioritization and oversight. Some experts say NSTC has insufficient authority over federal agencies engaged in science and technology activities and that PCAST has insufficient influence on S&T policy; they question the overall coordination of federal science and technology activities. Finally, some in the scientific community support increasing the authority of the OSTP Director in the budget process to bring greater science and technology expertise to federal investment decision making. |
crs_R44906 | crs_R44906_0 | Introduction
The Rural Education Achievement Program (REAP) is authorized by Part B of Title V of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), as amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA, P.L. 114-95 ) in 2015. To compensate for the challenges facing rural schools, REAP awards two types of formula grants. The Small, Rural School Achievement (SRSA) program provides funds to rural local educational agencies (LEAs) that serve small numbers of students. The Rural and Low-Income School (RLIS) program provides funds to rural LEAs that serve high concentrations of low-income students, regardless of the LEA's size. Funds appropriated for REAP are divided equally between the SRSA and RLIS programs. The ESSA reauthorization of the REAP statute made major changes to the program by
1. updating the locale codes used for determining the eligibility of LEAs, 2. clarifying that LEAs within educational service agencies are to be considered for SRSA eligibility, 3. extending to RLIS the alternative state certification option for meeting the rural criterion that already existed for SRSA, and 4. giving LEAs the option to choose which program to receive funds under if eligible for both SRSA and RLIS. ESSA provided new authority allowing an LEA eligible under both the SRSA and RLIS programs to choose the program from which they prefer to receive funds. In FY2016, the average per pupil grant amount was $78 for SRSA, compared to $23 for RLIS. | The Rural Education Achievement Program (REAP) is authorized by Part B of Title V of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA, P.L. 114-95) in 2015. To compensate for the challenges facing rural schools, REAP awards two types of formula grants. The Small, Rural School Achievement (SRSA) program provides funds to rural local educational agencies (LEAs) that serve small numbers of students. The Rural and Low-Income School (RLIS) program provides funds to rural LEAs that serve high concentrations of low-income students, regardless of the LEA's size.
The ESSA reauthorization of the REAP statute made several major changes to the way funds are allocated to rural LEAs. Most notably, ESSA amended the scheme used to identify rural LEAs that may be eligible for REAP funds and gave LEAs the option to choose which program to receive funds under if eligible for both SRSA and RLIS.
REAP funds are divided equally between the SRSA and RLIS programs at the national level, but at the local level, award amounts to LEAs under each program vary widely. In FY2016, the average per pupil grant amount was $77 for SRSA awards, compared to $22 for RLIS awards. Given that final award amounts under each program depend greatly on the number of LEAs eligible for funds, the new option to choose the program from which to receive funds may raise important implementation issues.
This report provides a detailed description of eligibility rules and formula allocation procedures for SRSA and RLIS and discusses issues that may arise as ESSA amendments are implemented. |
crs_R40778 | crs_R40778_0 | In August 2009, the Obama Administration notified Congress that four African countries—Ghana, Liberia, Tanzania, and Zambia—would benefit from funds appropriated by Congress in 2009 for "assistance for vulnerable populations in developing countries severely affected by the global financial crisis," with various eligibility requirements. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the global economy would contract by 1.1% in 2009, but that it could rebound to 3.1% growth in 2010. Additional revenue streams such as tourism and remittances from African workers abroad are also expected to fall, and foreign aid is predicted to decrease, particularly if the crisis persists. In its most recent regional economic analysis on Africa, the IMF estimated that average economic growth in Africa would slow from an average of 6.5% per year between 2002 and 2007—a historic high—to 1% in 2009, before recovering to 4% in 2010. Congressional Interest
The impact of the global economic crisis threatens to undermine long-term U.S. foreign policy goals in Africa, including regional stability, increased trade, the alleviation of poverty and hunger, and socioeconomic development. 111-32 ), included $255.6 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for "assistance for vulnerable populations in developing countries severely affected by the global financial crisis." How the Crisis Is Affecting Africa
The global recession has affected most African countries through a variety of mechanisms, or channels, including a decline in global trade, a drop in investment, falling remittances from overseas workers, and possible cuts in foreign aid. At the same time, average growth rates for the region largely reflect Africa's largest economies, including oil exporters and middle-income countries (of which South Africa is the largest), where the impact of the crisis has been strongest. This scenario has led some observers to speak of Africa's underlying economic "resilience," pointing toward robust domestic demand and the lasting effects of macroeconomic reforms. Nigeria and Angola have been strongly affected because much of their economies depend on oil exports, while South Africa, by far Africa's largest economy, is already experiencing a recession, its first in 17 years. International Efforts to Address the Impact of the Crisis on Africa
Developed Countries
At the Group of 20 (G-20) summit in London in April 2009, member states agreed to inject $1 trillion into the world economy in order to combat the effects of the global crisis. This included a commitment to support growth in emerging market and developing countries. Recent loans explicitly linked to fallout from the crisis include a $1.5 billion loan for Botswana designed to help address a budget deficit estimated at 13.5% of GDP, the first such loan to Botswana from the AfDB in 17 years (June 2009); and a $97.18 million grant to the Democratic Republic of Congo to finance the country's Emergency Program to Mitigate the Impacts of the International Financial Crisis (May 2009). Finance ministers and central bank governors have met several times since then to discuss the impact of the crisis and possible policy responses. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. However, while an initial House report on the legislation provided that five African countries—Ghana, Liberia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia—should "receive priority consideration," along with several other countries outside the region, the subsequent conference report did not include such specifications. U.S. responses to date have focused on support for multilateral lending and grant initiatives. | Sub-Saharan Africa has been strongly affected by the global recession, despite initial optimism that the global financial system would have few spillover effects on the continent. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated in 2009 that average economic growth in Africa would slow to 1%, from an annual average of over 6% to 1% over the previous five years, before rebounding to 4% in 2010. As a region, Africa is not thought to have undergone a recession in 2009. However, most African countries are thought to require high rates of economic growth in order to outpace population growth and make progress in alleviating poverty.
The mechanisms through which the crisis has affected Africa include a contraction in global trade and a related collapse in primary commodity exports, on which many countries are dependent. Foreign investment and migrant worker remittances are also expected to decrease significantly, and some analysts predict cuts in foreign aid in the medium term if the crisis persists. Africa's most powerful economies have proven particularly vulnerable to the downturn: South Africa has experienced a recession for the first time in nearly two decades, and Nigeria and Angola have reported revenue shortfalls due to the fall in global oil prices. Several countries seen as having solid macroeconomic governance, notably Botswana, have sought international financial assistance to cope with the impact of the crisis. At the same time, a number of low-income African countries are projected to experience relatively robust growth in 2009 and 2010, leading some economists to talk of Africa's underlying economic resilience.
The 111th Congress has monitored the impact of the global economic crisis worldwide. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32), provided $255.6 million for assistance to vulnerable populations in developing countries affected by the crisis. While an initial House report indicated several countries, including five in Africa, should receive priority consideration, the subsequent conference report did not specify recipients. In August 2009, the Obama Administration notified Congress that four African countries—Ghana, Liberia, Tanzania, and Zambia—would benefit from the funds appropriated in the supplemental. More broadly, U.S. policy responses to the impact of the crisis overseas have focused on supporting the policies of multilateral organizations, including the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank (AfDB). These organizations have increased their lending commitments and created new facilities to help mitigate the impact of the global crisis on emerging market and developing countries worldwide.
This report analyzes Africa's vulnerability to the global crisis and potential implications for economic growth, poverty alleviation, fiscal balances, and political stability. The report describes channels through which the crisis is affecting Africa, and provides information on international efforts to address the impact, including U.S. policies and those of multilateral institutions in which the United States plays a major role. For further background and analysis, see CRS Report RL34742, The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34069 | crs_RL34069_0 | Agricultural conservation technical assistance has taken on a number of dimensions over its long and continuously evolving history. Congress continues to take interest in conservation technical assistance given its complexities and impact on the distribution of conservation financial assistance to producers. Frequently, technical assistance for agriculture is discussed in the context of omnibus farm legislation (referred to as farm bills), although most technical assistance is discretionary and funded through the annual agricultural appropriations bill rather than mandatory spending authorized in the farm bill. Questions concerning the current and future capacity of the technical assistance system are highlighted by a perceived lack of boundaries and understanding of what technical assistance is and is not. Defining Technical Assistance
In the most general terms, technical assistance is a technical service. It is a basic service that provides conservation knowledge to producers and landowners. ), and a delivery system for assisting landowners and users to conserve and use natural resources. Increasingly, this service is not only provided through the federal government by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), but also by other public and private experts. NRCS is the current federal provider of technical assistance for agriculture conservation. Through this amendment, technical assistance is currently defined by law as:
"(2) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—
"(A) IN GENERAL.—The term 'technical assistance' means technical expertise, information, and tools necessary for the conservation of natural resources on land active in agricultural, forestry, or related uses. Technical Assistance for Discretionary Programs
Conservation Operations (CO) is the largest discretionary account, and also provides the greatest amount of technical assistance through the Conservation Technical Assistance (CTA) program. Congress, however, continues to fund many of these programs through annual appropriations. Despite the transition of program leadership, some functions continue to be maintained by each agency. Role of Third Party Providers
The 2002 farm bill allowed producers to retain approved third party providers for technical assistance as a way of maintaining and expanding the technical capacity for agricultural conservation programs. Current Issues
Understanding how conservation technical assistance works and is funded addresses only a portion of the misconceptions and questions about this topic. The confusion surrounding two terms— technical assistance and administrative support —is also discussed, as well as the current impact of congressional directives on technical assistance and the Administration's technical assistance streamlining initiative. Much of the debate surrounding technical assistance has shifted to defining the different aspects of administrative support and who (meaning which agency within USDA) should be providing the support. Multiple factors contribute to the capacity to provide technical assistance: human capital, technology, mission goals, and funding. How will this effort improve the delivery of conservation programs? Technical assistance has expanded in both scope and funding recently, and has been brought to the forefront of the debate for both implementation and funding levels. Technical assistance has fluctuated between addressing a limited number of resources and most or all natural resources on agricultural lands. Along with this additional increase in responsibility and an expanding list of natural resource concerns came a significant increase in funding authority. | Agricultural conservation technical assistance has taken on a number of dimensions over its long and continuously evolving history. In the most general terms, technical assistance is a service assisting landowners and agricultural producers in conserving natural resources. Addressing natural resource concerns across different landscapes frequently requires multiple disciplines working together to provide a collective pool of conservation knowledge. The current federal framework for applying this conservation knowledge lies with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Several agencies within USDA support conservation technical assistance, however, the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) is the federal lead.
NRCS provides conservation technical assistance to producers through various programs using field staff located across the country. Some level of technical assistance is required for participation in all of USDA's conservation programs; however, there is no single overarching description of technical assistance for all programs. Similarly, there is no single method of providing technical assistance. The full scope of technical assistance is best understood by examining how it operates within each conservation program. Some see the lack of technical assistance as the foremost barrier to adoption of conservation practices and enrollment in federal conservation programs.
While most technical assistance work is funded through annually appropriated programs, an increasing amount is funded through mandatory programs authorized through omnibus, multi-year, farm bills. The seemingly complex manner in which USDA implements and pays for technical assistance through its conservation programs has created general confusion on the subject. Congress continues to take interest in conservation technical assistance given its complexities and impact on the distribution of conservation financial assistance to producers.
Technical assistance has been discussed extensively at congressional hearings on agriculture conservation. Producers, ranchers, environmentalists, and wildlife advocates continue to raise the issue of technical assistance and the need or desire for additional support. The question of which federal agency should be involved with administering technical assistance and how this relates to the administration of conservation programs continues to be of interest. The expanding use of non-federal, third party providers of technical assistance is also of interest, especially when addressing the demand for additional capacity without an expansion of the federal workforce. A broader perspective on technical assistance raises questions about the capacity of the current technical assistance structure as well as future limitations.
Historically, technical assistance has evolved in the range of topics addressed; it currently addresses a wide variety of natural resource concerns. Recent farm bills have repeatedly added natural resource concerns to the conservation mission, leaving many to question whether the current technical assistance delivery system has retained the capacity to function effectively. Demands on available capital (both human and financial), combined with additional questions for technological capacity and an ever-expanding list of natural resource concerns, have generated an ongoing discussion in the current congressional debate. |
crs_R43124 | crs_R43124_0 | Introduction
Dozens of temporary tax provisions expired at the end of 2013, and several other temporary tax provisions are scheduled to expire at the end of 2014. The American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA; P.L. Collectively, temporary tax provisions that are regularly extended by Congress rather than being allowed to expire as scheduled are often referred to as "tax extenders." The 113 th Congress has considered legislation that would extend selected expired or expiring tax provisions. The Expiring Provisions Improvement Reform and Efficiency (EXPIRE) Act ( S. 2260 ), which would extend most expired and soon-to-expire tax provisions through 2015, was reported by the Senate Finance Committee on April 28, 2014. The act subsequently became an amendment to H.R. 3474 which did not advance in the Senate, as a motion to end debate on H.R. 3474 was voted down on May 15, 2014. In contrast to the Senate, the House has voted to permanently extend certain expired tax provisions as part of the Jobs for America Act ( H.R. 4 ), which passed the House on September 18, 2014. Several expired charitable-related provisions would be made permanent as part of the America Gives More Act of 2014 ( H.R. 4719 ), which passed the House on July 17, 2014. The President's FY2015 Budget proposal would permanently extend or modify certain expired provisions, while temporarily extending others. Proposals that would be permanently extended (and in some cases modified) include (1) the enhanced deduction for conservation easements; (2) increased expensing under Section 179; (3) the exclusion for qualified small business stock; (4) the new markets tax credit (NMTC); (5) the renewable electricity production tax credit (PTC); (6) the deduction for energy-efficient commercial property; (7) the research and experimentation (R&D) tax credit; and (8) the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC). The President's FY2015 Budget also assumes that the American opportunity tax credit (AOTC), the earned income tax credit (EITC) expansions, and the child tax credit (CTC) expansions, that were extended through 2017 as part of ARTA, are made permanent. Temporary tax provisions may also be used to provide relief during times of economic weakness or following a natural disaster. Examining the reason why a certain provision is temporary rather than permanent may be part of evaluating whether a provision should be extended. Reasons for Temporary Tax Provisions
There are several reasons why Congress may choose to enact tax provisions on a temporary basis. Enacting provisions on a temporary basis provides an opportunity to evaluate effectiveness before expiration or extension. Congress may also choose to enact tax policies on a temporary basis for budgetary reasons. Other individual provisions that have been extended more than once include the deduction for state and local sales taxes, the above-the-line deduction for tuition and related expenses, the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums, and the parity for the exclusion of employer-provided mass transit and parking benefits. Long-standing provisions that are scheduled for expiration include the research tax credit, the rum excise tax cover-over, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, and the active financing exception under Subpart F. Bonus depreciation and enhanced expensing allowances, which are often viewed as economic stimulus measures, are also scheduled to expire at the end of 2013. Several of the temporary energy-related tax provisions that are scheduled to expire at the end of 2011 were first enacted as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05; P.L. Tax Provisions Expiring in 2014
In addition to the provisions that expired at the end of 2013, six tax provisions are scheduled to expire at the end of 2014. | Dozens of temporary tax provisions expired at the end of 2013, and several other temporary tax provisions are scheduled to expire at the end of 2014. Most of the provisions that expired at the end of 2013 have been part of past temporary tax extension legislation. Most recently, many temporary tax provisions were extended as part of the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA; P.L. 112-240). Collectively, temporary tax provisions that are regularly extended by Congress—often for one to two years—rather than being allowed to expire as scheduled are often referred to as "tax extenders."
The 113th Congress has considered legislation that would extend selected expired or expiring tax provisions. The Expiring Provisions Improvement Reform and Efficiency (EXPIRE) Act (S. 2260), which would extend most expired and soon-to-expire tax provisions through 2015, was reported by the Senate Finance Committee on April 28, 2014. The act subsequently became an amendment to H.R. 3474 which did not advance in the Senate, as a motion to end debate on H.R. 3474 was voted down on May 15, 2014. In contrast to the Senate, the House has voted to permanently extend certain expired tax provisions as part of the Jobs for America Act (H.R. 4), which passed the House on September 18, 2014. Several expired charitable-related provisions would be made permanent as part of the America Gives More Act of 2014 (H.R. 4719), which passed the House on July 17, 2014.
The President's FY2015 Budget identifies several expiring provisions that should be permanently extended (and in some cases substantially modified), including the research and experimentation (R&D) tax credit, enhanced expensing for small businesses, the renewable energy production tax credit (PTC), and the new markets tax credit (NMTC). Several other expired provisions would be temporarily extended. The President's FY2015 Budget also assumes that the American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC), the earned income tax credit (EITC) expansions, and the child tax credit (CTC) expansions, that were extended through 2017 as part of ARTA, are made permanent.
There are several reasons why Congress may choose to enact tax provisions on a temporary basis. Enacting provisions on a temporary basis provides legislators with an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of tax policies prior to expiration or extension. Temporary tax provisions may also be used to provide temporary economic stimulus or disaster relief. Congress may also choose to enact tax provisions on a temporary rather than permanent basis due to budgetary considerations, as the foregone revenue from a temporary provision will generally be less than if it was permanent.
The provisions that expired at the end of 2013 are diverse in purpose, including provisions for individuals, businesses, the charitable sector, energy, community assistance, and disaster relief. Among the individual provisions that expired are deductions for teachers' out-of-pocket expenses, state and local sales taxes, qualified tuition and related expenses, and mortgage insurance premiums. On the business side, under current law, the R&D tax credit, the WOTC, the active financing exceptions under Subpart F, and increased expensing and bonus depreciation allowances will not be available for taxpayers after 2013. Expired charitable provisions include the enhanced deduction for contributions of food inventory and provisions allowing for tax-free distributions from retirement accounts for charitable purposes. The renewable energy production tax credit (PTC) expired at the end of 2013, along with a number of other incentives for energy efficiency and renewable and alternative fuels. The new markets tax credit, a community assistance program, also expired at the end of 2013. |
crs_R41626 | crs_R41626_0 | 76-432 in 1940. Since its authorization, the Veterans Beneficiary Travel Program has undergone a number of significant legislative and regulatory changes affecting eligibility and the type of transportation covered, as well as the cost to VA for the benefit. Congress has changed mileage reimbursement rates and veteran deductible costs for this program. The most recent changes to the program were made by the Caregivers and Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-163 ). Questions and Answers
Not all veterans are eligible for travel benefits, and not all travel costs are covered by the Veterans Beneficiary Travel Program. VA determines eligibility for Veterans Beneficiary Travel Program benefits based on the characteristics of the veteran, the type of medical appointment, or a combination of the two. Time limits also apply for requesting reimbursement. Non-veteran Eligibility
A limited group of non-veterans is also eligible for reimbursement of some travel costs related to medical appointments at VA facilities:
an attendant of a veteran, if a VA provider determines the attendant is required; donors or potential donors of tissue, organs, or parts to a veteran receiving VA-authorized care; veterans' immediate family members traveling for bereavement counseling related to the death of the veteran in the active line of duty; veterans' immediate family members, guardians, or those in whose home a veteran lives if traveling for consultation, counseling, training, or mental health services relating to a veteran receiving care for a service-connected disability; allied beneficiaries, if the travel and reimbursement have been authorized by the appropriate foreign government agency; and beneficiaries of other federal agencies, when authorized by that agency. Travel by Car
Eligible veterans who drive in private cars to appointments are reimbursed at a per-mile rate for travel both to the appointment and back home. Special Mode Transportation
"Special mode" transportation refers to travel in an ambulance, wheelchair van, or other vehicle specially designed for transporting people with disabilities. How Are Benefits Calculated? Are There Circumstances Under Which Eligible Veterans' Benefits Are Not Paid? Appendix A. As shown in Table B -1 , spending for the Beneficiary Travel Program increased by approximately 285% between FY2006 and FY2010. | The Department of Veterans Affairs administers a Travel Beneficiary Program to help alleviate the costs of travel to medical appointments for eligible veterans. Travel benefit eligibility for veterans is based on either the characteristics of the veteran, the type of medical appointment, or a combination of the two. Certain people who are not veterans, including family members or others accompanying veterans to appointments and organ donors, are also eligible for the benefit. Travel costs are reimbursed to beneficiaries, usually after a deductible. Costs covered by the program include a per-mile rate for travel in private vehicles, "special mode" (e.g., ambulance) travel in certain circumstances, and in some cases airfare and meals and lodging.
This report offers an overview of the benefit and includes a question-and-answer section with basic information about eligibility, the types of travel covered and how benefits are calculated, and how to apply for the benefit. The report also includes an appendix containing a review of major legislative and regulatory changes to the benefit since its inception in 1940 (P.L. 76-432) through the most recent changes enacted in 2010 (P.L. 111-163). Recent changes are primarily related to mileage reimbursement rates and deductibles. Another appendix details funding for the program between FY2006 and FY2011. Spending for the program has increased by 285% between FY2006 and FY2010, and the number of veterans claiming travel reimbursement has increased by 30% during that time. |
crs_R44928 | crs_R44928_0 | Introduction
Article II Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, as modified by the 12 th Amendment, provides for an indirect election of the President and Vice President by presidential electors. In order to win, candidates must win a majority of the electoral votes. In 2016, however, for the second time in 16 years, and for the fourth time in the nation's history, a President and Vice President were elected who won a majority of electoral votes, but fewer popular votes than their principal opponents. This outcome occurred because the system requires a majority of electoral votes, rather than of popular votes, to win the presidency. If no candidate receives a majority of electoral votes, then the President is elected by the House of Representatives and the Vice President by the Senate in a process known as contingent election. Why Reform the Electoral College?6
Critics of the electoral college have offered proposals for its reform or replacement since the early days of government under the Constitution. It can, they assert, result in (1) the election of candidates who win the electoral college but receive fewer popular votes than their opponents, an eventuality referred to by reform advocates as "wrong winner" or an electoral college "misfire"; and (2) contingent election in Congress if no candidate wins an electoral college majority. Moving beyond "reform" of the system, the most popular proposal since the late 20 th century has been to eliminate the electoral college system entirely and replace it with direct popular election of the President and Vice President, with either a plurality or majority of the popular vote necessary to win. Since that time, amendments have been introduced to reform or replace it with direct popular election in almost every session of Congress. This decline was reflected by the number of constitutional amendments to reform or abolish the electoral college introduced in the House or Senate during the ensuing three decades. Proposals to reform the electoral college system or adopt direct election declined from 26 in the 96 th Congress (1979-1981) and an average of eight per Congress for the 101 st (1989-1991) through 110 th (2007-2009) Congresses, to none in the 113 th Congress (2013-2015). Electoral College Reform: Proposals in the 114th and 115th Congresses
Following the presidential election of November 8, 2016, proposals to establish direct popular election of the President and Vice President were introduced in Congress for the first time since 2011. The second category would establish direct popular election, and would also enable Congress to provide by law for additional federal authority over a range of election-related issues. Analysis
H.J.Res. Analysis
H.J.Res. 104
This resolution was introduced by Representative Steve Cohen on December 1, 2016. These noted the evolution of democratic government since the Constitution was drafted in 1787; cited constitutional amendments that guarantee universal suffrage and the right to vote; noted the spread of modern information technology that ensures nationwide availability of information on the presidential candidates and the election process; quoted Thomas Jefferson's assertion that "as new truths are discovered and manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times.... "; and traced the growth of the right to vote and the development of universal suffrage in the United States. 102 , the Every Vote Counts Amendment, including direct election on a plurality basis, joint tickets, congressional authority over voter qualifications, "times, places, and manner" of holding presidential elections, and instances in which candidates may have died or been disqualified before the election. 115th Congress
Two amendments to establish direct popular election have been introduced to date in the 115 th Congress, both in the House of Representatives. Section 4 would implicitly set a plurality requirement for the popular vote winners. 19 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on January 5, 2017, and to its Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice on January 11. 65—The 'Every Vote Counts Amendment'
The proposal was introduced on February 7, 2017, by Representative Gene Green, who has been joined by 23 co-sponsors at the time of this writing. They are identified and analyzed in CRS Report R43824, Electoral College Reform: Contemporary Issues for Congress . | American voters elect the President and Vice President of the United States indirectly, through presidential electors chosen by voters in the states—the electoral college. For further information see CRS Report RL32611, The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Presidential Elections. Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, as revised by the 12th Amendment in 1804, requires winning candidates for President and Vice President to gain a majority of electoral votes. Since 1804, Presidents who won a majority of electoral votes and at least a plurality of popular votes were elected in 49 of 54 presidential elections. In four elections, however—1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016—candidates were elected with a majority of electoral votes, but fewer popular votes than their principal opponents. In the presidential election of 1824, none of the four major candidates won a majority of electoral votes (or popular votes); the President, therefore, was chosen by contingent election in the House of Representatives. For information on contingent election, see CRS Report R40504, Contingent Election of the President and Vice President by Congress: Perspectives and Contemporary Analysis.
The election of Presidents who won a majority of electoral votes but fewer popular votes than their opponents is sometimes referred to, particularly by reform advocates, as an "electoral college misfire." This is possible because the Constitution requires a majority of electoral votes to elect the President, but it does not require a majority or plurality of popular votes to be elected. Critics of the electoral college have called for its reform or abolition since the earliest days of government under the Constitution. Proponents of reform, especially of direct popular election, claim the built-in potential for so-called misfires is undemocratic and cite it as a principal argument for change. For additional information on electoral college reform, see CRS Report R43824, Electoral College Reform: Contemporary Issues for Congress.
Although reform of the electoral college by constitutional amendment was proposed in Congress through the 1960s, the focus later turned to amendments that would replace it with direct popular election, which proponents claim would ensure that future Presidents received a popular vote majority or plurality. Reform or replacement proposals were once familiar items on the congressional agenda; for instance, 26 amendments were introduced to abolish or reform the electoral college in the 96th Congress (1979-1980). In recent years, however, the number of related constitutional amendments introduced in the House or Senate dropped from an average of eight per Congress for the 101st through 110th Congresses, to none in the 113th Congress (2013-2014). Moreover, none of the measures introduced received consideration beyond committee referral.
Following the 2016 election, however, four constitutional amendments introduced late in the 114th Congress proposed eliminating the electoral college and replacing it with direct election. To date in the 115th Congress, two amendments to establish direct popular election have been introduced: H.J.Res. 19, offered on January 5, 2017, by Representative Steve Cohen, would replace the electoral college with direct popular election of the President and Vice President by plurality vote. It would also authorize Congress to set voter qualifications, times, places, and manner of holding presidential elections, and other election-related policies. H.J.Res. 65, the "Every Vote Counts Amendment," introduced by Representative Gene Green on February 7, 2017, provides for direct popular election by plurality, and also provides Congress with additional authority over related activities. Both resolutions have been referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and to its Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice. This report provides an analysis of these measures in the 115th Congress. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.