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crs_RL30318 | crs_RL30318_0 | Origin of the SSN and Federal Government Usage
The social security number (SSN) was first introduced as a device for keeping account of contributions to the Social Security program. Through the years, however, the use of this identifying number has been expanded by government entities and the private sector to keep track of many other government and private sector records. There is no single federal law that comprehensively regulates SSN collection and confidentiality. Use of the SSN as a federal government identifier was based on Executive Order 9397, issued by President Franklin Roosevelt, which provided as follows:
Whereas certain Federal agencies from time to time require in the administration of their activities a system of numerical identification of accounts of individual persons; and ... Virtually all tax matters require the disclosure of one's SSN, as does participation in many government programs, and obtaining a driver's license. Congress has recently restricted access to the DMF, which includes Social Security numbers, in an effort to reduce identity theft. Constitutional Challenges to SSN Collection and Dissemination
Constitutional challenges to the collection of social security numbers by government agencies have, for the most part, been unsuccessful. Thus, various courts have held that requiring an SSN on a driver's license application is constitutional, as is the requirement that persons disclose their SSNs as a condition for receiving welfare benefits or food stamps. In cases where an individual's SSN is publicly displayed or disseminated, court challenges in recent years have been more successful, particularly where fundamental rights such as the right to vote or the right to free speech are involved. With regard to the display of SSNs in online public records, or in cases involving requests for SSNs under federal or state open records statutes, the courts have attempted to balance the public's interest in the transparency of government processes with the private individual's interest in the confidentiality of personal identification and security information. Section 7 of the Privacy Act 1974 and related federal statutes do not impose restrictions on private sector use of the SSN. Chronology of Federal Developments Affecting the Social Security Number
The chronology that follows details various federal developments relating to use of the SSN. | While the social security number (SSN) was first introduced as a device for keeping track of contributions to the Social Security program, its use has been expanded by government entities and the private sector to keep track of many other government and private sector records. Use of the SSN as a federal government identifier was based on Executive Order 9397, issued by President Franklin Roosevelt. Beginning in the 1960s, federal agencies started adopting the SSN as a governmental identifier, and its use for keeping track of government records, on both the federal and state levels, greatly increased.
Section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974 provided some limits on compulsory divulgence of the social security number to government entities. However, exceptions in that statute and succeeding statutes resulted in only minimal restrictions on governmental usage of the SSN. Today, an individual needs an SSN to pay taxes, obtain a driver's license, and open a bank account, among other things. The continued use of, and reliance on, SSNs by public and private sector entities and the potential for SSN misuse, including identity theft concerns, has led to increasing efforts by governmental entities to limit the use and disclosure of SSNs. However, no single federal law comprehensively regulates SSN collection and confidentiality.
Constitutional challenges to the collection of social security numbers by government agencies have, for the most part, been unsuccessful. Thus, various courts have held that requiring an SSN on a driver's license application is constitutional, as is the requirement that persons disclose their SSNs as a condition for receiving welfare benefits or food stamps. In cases where an individual's SSN is publicly displayed or disseminated, court challenges in recent years have been more successful, particularly where fundamental rights such as the right to vote or the right to free speech are involved. With regard to the display of SSNs in online public records, or in cases involving requests for SSNs under federal or state open records statutes, the courts have attempted to balance the public's interest in the transparency of government processes with the private individual's interest in the confidentiality of personal identification and security information.
The chronology at the end of this report provides a comprehensive list of federal developments affecting use of the social security number from 1935 to the present. This list includes federal statutes regulating the collection and disclosure of SSNs, as well as specific authorizations for the use of SSNs, confidentiality provisions, and criminal provisions relating to SSN misuse. |
crs_RL32091 | crs_RL32091_0 | The wellhead price of natural gas, as noted in this report, is competitivelydetermined by market forces. The process of natural gas pricederegulation began in 1978 when the Natural Gas Policy Act ( P.L. 95-621 ) became law. The NYMEX future price is determined by the interaction of traderswho have business interests in the real, physical natural gas market, and financial traders whospeculate on the market. (3) The effective capacity utilization rate (ECUR) is the ratio of actual production to effective productivecapacity. Surplus capacity is the difference between effective productive capacity and actualproduction. The correlation betweenhigh values of the ECUR and high prices suggests that when the ECUR is above 90%, conditionsare in place that are consistent with high, volatile natural gas prices. Productive capacity has declined since the late 1980s, but appears to haveremained stable since 1993. All of these alternatives suggest that prices for the consumer are likely to rise. The first run up in prices, from 1973 to the mid 1980s was theresult of price deregulation in a market where supply was not abundant, demand-after years ofregulated prices-was strong, and oil prices were high, as a result of the Arab oil embargo of theUnited States in 1973-74, and the Iranian political upheaval of the late 1970s. (7) Whether the recent increase in drilling activity resultsin large enough supply increases to allow the price of natural gas to fall depends on the explorationsuccess rate, the size of the fields found, and the degree to which existing producing wells showoutput declines. If the ECUR remains high, as is likely, and a cold winter weather pattern repeats, the limited amount of stored gas, as well as the unresponsiveness of both supply and demand to real time pricevariations at the consumer level, could well bring about another price spike in the winter of 2004-05. The nature of this relationship in the natural gas industry can, under some circumstances, lead to a cycle of unstable boom and bust feared by those investing in gas production. As the U.S. natural gas market develops, this restriction will become lessappropriate. If storage volumes are below normal as the winter heating season begins, and the ECURis above 90%, the potential for elevated prices must be considered to be high. High, sustained levels of natural gas prices can act asa drag on economic growth. As with oil price shocks in the past, high natural gas prices canconstitute a classic supply side shock which reduces output and productivity growth. If severeenough, a shock of this type can increase unemployment and cause inflation in the short term. (14)
Much can be done to alter the demand and supply characteristics of the natural gas market in the long term. | Intermittently high, volatile natural gas prices since 2000 have raised concern among all types of consumers. Residential customers have seen gas bills increase dramatically during the heatingseason. Industrial consumers have seen costs increase, which reduces their competitiveness. Because the price of natural gas at the consumer level is a mixture of market forces and regulation,explaining the behavior of price can be difficult.
Debate in the 108th Congress concerning the energy bill ( H.R. 6 ), considered provisions which are intended to improve long term natural gas supplies in the United States. Otherissues are likely to be brought before the 109th Congress for consideration. This paper analyzes theshort term forces which influence the natural gas market.
The Energy Information Administration has developed a metric called the effective capacity utilization rate as a framework for analyzing the economics of the natural gas market. This measurehas been shown to be correlated with the price of natural gas. When as the effective capacityutilization rate attains high levels (90% and above) it becomes increasingly likely that tight marketconditions will yield high prices.
As a result of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 ( P.L. 95-621 ) and subsequent legislation in 1989 and 1992 ( P.L. 101-60 and P.L. 102-486 ) the wellhead price of natural gas is marketdetermined. Pipeline rates are federally monitored and distribution charges are regulated at the statelevel. Price variability centers on the wellhead price as well as the price determined in futuresmarkets.
Price spikes have occurred in two of the past three heating seasons. Whether severe weather causes price increases depends on the tightness of the market as measured by the effective capacityutilization rate. The same level of demand could lead to very different price results if the effectivecapacity utilization rate is high or low.
A variety of factors can affect the effective capacity utilization rate. Since short run supply adjusts to meet demand, the weather will be an important determinant. The relationship betweennatural gas prices and investment in exploration, development and production is an important factorin determining productive capacity. The availability of stored gas and imported gas become vitalto price stability as the effective productive capacity exceeds 90%.
In the very short term there appears to be little that can be done from a policy perspective to alter the fundamental economics of the natural gas market. In the longer term, policies that slowdemand growth and/or encourage the growth of supply, either from domestic or foreign sourcescould be effective.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R45341 | crs_R45341_0 | Farm Bill Expiration: Timing and Effects Vary1
The farm bill is an omnibus, multi-year law that governs an array of agricultural and food programs. It provides an opportunity for policymakers to periodically address a broad range of agricultural and food issue s. The farm bill has typically undergone reauthorization about every five years. Recent farm bills have been subject to various developments, such as insufficient votes to pass the House floor, presidential vetoes, or—as in the case of 2008 and 2014 farm bills—short-term extensions. The current farm bill (the Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79 ) has many provisions that expire in 2018. The 115 th Congress has begun but not finished a new farm bill. An initial House vote on H.R. 2 failed by vote of 198-213, but floor procedures allowed that vote to be reconsidered, and it passed by a second vote of 213-211. The Senate passed its bill as an amendment to H.R. 2 by a vote of 86-11. Conference proceedings officially began on September 5, 2018, but have not reached agreement. Timing of Expiration
The timing and consequences of expiration vary by program across the breadth of the farm bill. There are two principal expiration dates: September 30 and December 31. The 2014 farm bill generally expires either at the end of FY2018 (September 30, 2018), or at the end of the 2018 crop year. Crop years vary by commodity, but the first to be affected by a new crop year is dairy, which has a 2018 crop year that ends on December 31, 2018. Consequences of Expiration
The possible consequences of expiration include minimal disruption (if the program is able to be continued via appropriations), ceasing new activity (if its authorization to use mandatory funding expires), or reverting to permanent laws enacted decades ago (for the farm commodity programs). For example
An appropriations act or a continuing resolution can continue some farm bill programs even though a n authority has expired. Programs using discretionary funding—and programs using appropriated mandatory funding such as those in the SNAP account—can continue to operate via appropriations action. Most farm bill programs with mandatory funding generally cease new operations when they expire (e.g., the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), and Market Assistance Program (MAP)). The mandatory farm commodity programs would begin reverting to permanent law beginning with the 2019 crop year , for which dairy is the first to be affected, beginning on January 1, 2019. Crop insurance is an example of a program with mandatory funding that is permanently authorized outside of the farm bill and does not expire. Among the mandatory-funded programs that are usually the focus of the farm bill, there are two subcategories that may affect congressional action—some have baseline beyond FY2018 and some do not have baseline after FY2018. In an expiration, both categories of mandatory programs face similar disruption when their authorizations expire. But the difference in having or not having a baseline is important as Congress writes a farm bill or if Congress considers an extension to deal with an expiration. Providing funding for those programs without baseline would have made the extension more difficult. Description of Permanent Law
The commodity support provisions of the 1938 and 1949 permanent laws are commonly viewed as being so fundamentally different from current policy and potentially costly to the federal government—and inconsistent with today's farming practices, marketing system, and international trade agreements—that Congress is unlikely to let permanent law take effect. | The farm bill is an omnibus, multi-year law that governs an array of agricultural and food programs. It provides an opportunity for policymakers to periodically address a broad range of agricultural and food issues. The farm bill is typically reauthorized about every five years.
Recent farm bills have been subject to various developments, such as insufficient votes to pass the House floor, presidential vetoes, or—as in the case of 2008 and 2014 farm bills—short-term extensions.
The current farm bill (the Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79) has many provisions that expire in 2018. The 115th Congress has begun but not finished a new farm bill. An initial House vote on H.R. 2 failed by vote of 198-213, but floor procedures allowed that vote to be reconsidered, and it passed by a second vote of 213-211. The Senate passed its bill as an amendment to H.R. 2 by a vote of 86-11. Conference proceedings officially began on September 5, 2018, but have not yet reached agreement.
The timing and consequences of expiration vary by program across the breadth of the farm bill. There are two principal expiration dates: September 30 and December 31. The 2014 farm bill generally expires either at the end of FY2018 (September 30, 2018), or with the 2018 crop year. Crop years vary by commodity, but the first to be affected by a new crop year is dairy, whose 2018 crop year ends on December 31, 2018.
The possible consequences of expiration include minimal disruption (if the program is able to be continued via appropriations), ceasing new activity (if its authorization to use mandatory funding expires), or reverting to permanent laws enacted decades ago (for the farm commodity programs). For example
An appropriations act or a continuing resolution can continue some farm bill programs even though an authority has expired. Programs using discretionary funding—and programs using appropriated mandatory funding like those in the SNAP account—can continue to operate via appropriations action. Most farm bill programs with mandatory funding (except the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the farm commodity programs, and crop insurance) generally cease new operations when they expire (e.g., the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), and Market Assistance Program (MAP)). The mandatory farm commodity programs would begin reverting to permanent law beginning with the 2019 crop year, for which dairy is the first to be affected, beginning on January 1, 2019. Crop insurance is an example of a program with mandatory funding that is permanently authorized outside of the farm bill and does not expire.
"Permanent law" refers to nonexpiring farm commodity programs that are generally from the 1938 and 1949 farm bills. A temporary suspension of permanent law has been included in all recent farm bills, but reverting to permanent law would occur if the suspension expires. The commodity support provisions of permanent law are commonly viewed as being fundamentally different from current policy—and inconsistent with today's farming practices, marketing system, and international trade agreements—as well as potentially costly to the federal government.
Among the mandatory-funded programs that are usually the focus of the farm bill, there are two subcategories that may affect congressional action—some have baseline beyond FY2018 and some do not have baseline after FY2018. In an expiration, both categories of mandatory programs can face similar disruption when their authorizations expire. But the difference in having or not having a baseline is important if Congress considers an extension to deal with an expiration. Providing funding for those programs without baseline could make extension more difficult if budget offsets are needed to keep an extension budget-neutral. |
crs_R44055 | crs_R44055_0 | Introduction
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the employment-population ratio as the ratio of total civilian employment to the civilian noninstitutional population. Simply put, it is the portion of the adult population (16 years and older) that is employed. It is used primarily as a measure of job holders and to track the pace of job creation, relative to the adult population, over time. Recent estimates show that employment as a percentage of the civilian population has not returned to pre-recessionary levels. In November 2007, the employment-population ratio was 62.9%, indicating that 62.9% of the adult population had a job in that month. This rate fell steadily during the recession and several months beyond, before stabilizing around 58.5% in October 2009. Between October 2009 and March 2014, the ratio fluctuated within 0.3 percentage points of 58.5%. Since then, the employment-population rate has climbed slowly to 59.3%, its value in April 2015. Value as a Labor Market Indicator
Several features of the employment-population ratio make it an attractive employment indicator for labor market analysis. It is easy to interpret, and can be used to make meaningful comparisons across time and groups with dissimilar population size. Because it takes into account the impacts of both labor force participation and unemployment, it is a useful summary measure when those forces place countervailing pressures on employment. This can be seen mathematically through a simple decomposition:
That is:
Because the labor force is the sum of all employed and unemployed workers (i.e., labor force = employment + unemployment), the expression can be re-written in terms of the unemployment rate:
That is:
Changes in the employment-population ratio are therefore determined by changes in the labor force participation rate and changes in the unemployment rate (or, equivalently, by changes in the labor force participation rate and the employment rate). Limitations
Like all labor market indicators, the employment-population ratio has limits. It does not provide information about hours of work (i.e., whether jobs held are part-time or full-time), wages and benefits, or job quality. That is, additional information is needed to determine whether a drop in employment represents more people exiting employment or fewer new entrants. Taken together, these similarities and differences suggest that recent labor force participation patterns of young and older individuals have placed downward pressure on the overall employment-population ratio, but age factors do not fully explain its slow recovery. | The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the employment-population ratio as the ratio of total civilian employment to the civilian noninstitutional population. Simply put, it is the portion of the population that is employed. The ratio is used primarily as a measure of job holders and to track the pace of job creation, relative to the adult population, over time.
The employment-population ratio has several properties that make it an attractive indicator for labor market analysis. It is easy to interpret and can be used to make meaningful comparisons across time and groups with dissimilar population size. Because it takes into account both the impacts of labor force participation and unemployment, it is a useful summary measure when those forces place countervailing pressures on employment. Like all labor market indicators, it has limits. For example, it does not distinguish between part-time and full-time employment, and it is silent on wages, benefits, and job conditions. Trends in the employment-population ratio also do not provide information about job flows (i.e., whether a drop in employment represents more people exiting employment or fewer new entrants).
Recent estimates show that employment as a percentage of the civilian population has not returned to pre-recessionary levels. In November 2007, the employment-population ratio was 62.9%, indicating that 62.9% of the adult population had a job in that month. This rate fell steadily during the recession and several months beyond, before stabilizing around 58.5% in October 2009. Between October 2009 and March 2014, the ratio fluctuated within 0.3 percentage points of 58.5%. Since then, the employment-population ratio has climbed slowly to 59.3%, its value in April 2015.
These patterns should be taken in the context of shifting demographics and other recent developments in the United States. Notably, the large baby boomer cohort has started to retire, and younger individuals are spending more time in school or otherwise delaying labor market entry. A comparison of recent employment-population ratio trends for the "prime-age" population (persons in the 25- to 54-year-age group) with those for the full adult population (persons 16 years and older) suggests that recent labor force participation patterns of young and older workers have placed downward pressure on the employment-population ratio, but age factors do not fully explain its slow recovery. |
crs_RL34357 | crs_RL34357_0 | Introduction
Each year, the President is required to submit a comprehensive federal budget proposal to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. The House and Senate Budget Committees then develop their respective budget resolutions after reviewing the President's budget, the views of other committees, and information from CBO. Although it is not binding, the resolution provides a framework for subsequent legislative action. This report provides information on Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). It will be updated to reflect relevant activity until the FY2009 budget is passed and until the next President's FY2010 budget is released. Medicaid and SCHIP in the President's FY2009 Budget
The President's FY2009 budget contains a number of proposals that would affect Medicaid and SCHIP. Legislative Versus Administrative Proposals
As shown in Table 1 , some of the President's proposals would require legislative action, while others would be implemented administratively (e.g., via regulatory changes, issuance of program guidance, etc.). Proposal. HHS estimates that the proposal would save $950 million in FY2009, and approximately $5.5 billion over the FY2009-FY2013 period. On June 26, 2008, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved a $153.1 billion budget for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, as well as the Social Security Administration. The Labor-HHS appropriations bill contained an amendment that would set aside an SCHIP requirements in an August 17, 2007, letter to state health officials that limited SCHIP and Medicaid coverage expansions for children in families with incomes greater than 250% of the FPL or $53,000 for a family of four in 2008. The budget-neutral and sense of the House provisions that would affect Medicaid and SCHIP include the following:
SCHIP. Up to an additional $198 million in FY2009 discretionary funding could be appropriated for the health care fraud and abuse control program. Conference Agreement
On May 20, the House and Senate filed a conference agreement on the budget resolution ( H.Rept. 110-659 accompanying S.Con.Res. 70 ). Medicaid provisions in the Senate and House conference agreement include:
A reserve fund up to $50 billion in outlays over five years for reauthorization of SCHIP that is deficit-neutral in the Senate and House. Sense of the Senate provision on Medicaid administrative regulations. As noted above, the administration's FY2009 budget proposal includes additional funding for SCHIP through FY2013. Other Legislation
A bill, Protecting the Medicaid Safety Net Act of 2008 ( H.R. The House passed an amended version of H.R. 2642 on June 19, 2008. 2642 without changes on June 26, 2008, and the President signed P.L. 110-252 into law on June 30, 2008. The Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 ( S. 3101 ) was introduced in the Senate on June 6, 2008. A similar but alternative bill, Preserving Access to Medicare Act of 2008 ( S. 3118 ), was introduced June 11, 2008. | Each year, the President is required to submit a comprehensive federal budget proposal to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. The House and Senate Budget Committees then develop their respective budget resolutions. House and Senate Appropriations committees then reconcile their budget resolutions and file a joint budget agreement. Although not binding, the resolution provides a framework for consideration of the 12 separate appropriations bills that would fund FY2009 government operations.
The President's FY2009 budget contained a number of proposals that would affect Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). While certain proposals would require legislative action, others could be implemented administratively (e.g., via regulatory changes, issuance of program guidance, or other possible methods). One of the more notable changes from the Bush Administration's previous budget proposal is an increase in SCHIP funding—increasing federal funding for allotments by $1.5 billion in FY2009 and by $19.7 billion over the five-year period from FY2009 to FY2013. The administration's budget proposed spending reductions to other Medicaid components that would offset much of the additional funding proposed for SCHIP, so that total SCHIP and Medicaid spending would increase by $230 million in FY2009 and $1.3 billion from FY2009-FY2013 if the Administration's budget proposal were enacted without changes.
On June 4 and 5, 2008, the Senate and House, respectively, adopted the final version of the budget resolution (H.Rept. 110-659 accompanying S.Con.Res. 70). Among other provisions, the conference agreement provides a deficit-neutral reserve fund of up to $50 billion for SCHIP legislation, a variety of other deficit-neutral reserve funds, up to $198 million for health care fraud and abuse control, and a sense of the Senate provision on delaying Medicaid administrative regulations. On June 26, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved a $153.1 billion budget for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, as well as the Social Security Administration. The Labor-HHS appropriations bill contained an amendment that would set aside requirements in an August 17, 2007, letter to state health officials that limited SCHIP and Medicaid coverage expansions for children in families with income above 250% of the federal poverty level (FPL).
Several legislative initiatives affecting Medicaid were introduced during the second session of the 110th Congress. After the House passed an amended version of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 (H.R. 2642) on June 19, 2008, the Senate approved the measure without amendments on June 26 and the President signed P.L. 110-252 into law on June 30, 2008. Other legislation affecting Medicaid includes the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (S. 3101), which was introduced June 6, 2008, and an alternative bill, the Preserving Access to Medicare Act of 2008 (S. 3118), introduced June 11, 2008.
This report will be updated to reflect relevant activity as the FY2009 budget advances and until the next President's FY2010 budget is released. |
crs_RS21606 | crs_RS21606_0 | RS21606 -- NASA's Space Shuttle Columbia: Synopsis of the Report of the Columbia Accident InvestigationBoard
September 2, 2003
CAIB's Conclusions
The following synopsis focuses on what appear to be the major questions being asked about the CAIB's findings about the tragedy and recommendations on thefuture of the shuttle program. What Caused the Columbia Accident? The Board concluded that "the present Shuttle is not inherently unsafe"but the "observations and recommendations in this report are needed to make the vehicle safe enough to operate inthe coming years." The CAIB report contains 29 recommendations (listed below) -- 23 technical and six organizational -- of which 15 must be implemented before the shuttlereturns to flight status. Adm. Gehman stated at the Board's August 26 press conference that there is no hierarchyin the recommendations -- all have equal weight. | NASA's space shuttle Columbia broke apart on February 1, 2003 as itreturned to Earth from a 16-day sciencemission. All seven astronauts aboard were killed. NASA created the Columbia Accident InvestigationBoard (CAIB), chaired by Adm. (Ret.) Harold Gehman,to investigate the accident. The Board released its report (available at http://www.caib.us) on August 26, 2003,concluding that the tragedy was caused bytechnical and organizational failures. The CAIB report included 29 recommendations, 15 of which the Boardspecified must be completed before the shuttlereturns to flight status. This report provides a brief synopsis of the Board's conclusions, recommendations, andobservations. Further information on Columbiaand issues for Congress are available in CRS Report RS21408. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33248 | crs_RL33248_0 | Introduction
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ), signed by President Bush on August 8, 2005,was the first omnibus energy legislation enacted in more than a decade. Major provisions include taxincentives for domestic energy production and energy efficiency, a mandate to double the nation'suse of biofuels, faster procedures for energy production on federal lands, and authorization ofnumerous federal energy research and development programs. This report describes the electricityprovisions. All ERO standards will beapproved by FERC. Under this title, the ERO can impose penalties on a user, owner, or operator ofa bulk power system that violates any FERC-approved reliability standard. The Secretary of Energy is required to conduct a study of electrictransmission congestion every three years. Based on the findings, the Secretary of Energy maydesignate a geographic area as being congested. Under certain conditions, FERC is authorized toissue construction permits. New FPA Section 216(e) will allow permit holders to petition in U.S. District Court to acquirerights-of-way through the exercise of the right of eminent domain. An applicant for federal authorization to site transmission facilities on federal lands couldrequest that the Department of Energy be the lead agency to coordinate environmental review andother federal authorization. If a federal agency has denied an authorization requiredby a transmission or distribution facility, the denial could be appealed by the applicant or relevantstate to the President. (6) Thissection repeals the mandatory purchase requirement under Section 210 of PURPA for new contractsif FERC finds that a competitive electricity market exists and a qualifying facility has access toindependently administered, auction-based, day-ahead, real-time wholesale markets and long-termwholesale markets. It also federally regulated holding companies ofinvestor-owned utilities and provided for Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulationof mergers and diversification proposals. The Public Utility Holding Company Act and the Federal Power Act of 1935 (Title I andTitle II of the Public Utility Act) established a regime of regulating electric utilities that gave specificand separate powers to the states and the federal government. State Access to Books and Records (Sec. FERC is directed to facilitate price transparency in wholesale electric markets. FERC is directed to rely on existing pricepublishers and providers of trade processing services the maximum extent possible. However,FERC may establish an electronic information system if it determines that existing price informationis not adequate. The FederalPower Act is amended to give FERC approval authority over the acquisition of securities and the merger, sale, lease, or disposition of facilities under FERC's jurisdiction with a value in excess of$10 million. | The Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ), signed by President Bush on August 8, 2005,was the first omnibus energy legislation enacted in more than a decade. Major provisions include taxincentives for domestic energy production and energy efficiency, a mandate to double the nation'suse of biofuels, faster procedures for energy production on federal lands, and authorization ofnumerous federal energy research and development programs. This report describes the electricityprovisions. It will not be updated.
Title XII authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to certify a nationalelectric reliability organization (ERO) to enforce mandatory reliability standards for the bulk powersystem. All ERO standards must be approved by FERC. The ERO can impose penalties on a user,owner, or operator of the bulk power system for violations of any FERC-approved reliabilitystandard.
The Secretary of Energy is required to conduct a study of electric transmission congestionevery three years and may designate a geographic area as being congested. Under certain conditions,FERC is authorized to issue construction permits in congested areas. Permit holders may petitionin U.S. District Court to acquire rights-of-way through eminent domain. An applicant for federalauthorization to site transmission facilities on federal lands could request that the Department ofEnergy be the lead agency to coordinate environmental review and other federal authorization. Ifa federal agency has denied an authorization required by a transmission or distribution facility, thedenial could be appealed by the applicant or relevant state to the President.
Section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) had required utilities topurchase power from all qualifying facilities and small power producers at a rate based on theutilities' avoided cost. The Energy Policy Act repeals the PURPA mandatory purchase requirementfor new contracts if FERC finds that a competitive electricity market exists and a qualifying facilityhas adequate access to wholesale markets.
Also repealed is the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA), which restrictedthe structure of holding companies of investor-owned utilities and provided for Securities andExchange Commission (SEC) regulation of mergers and diversification proposals. FERC and stateregulatory bodies must be given access to utility books and records.
FERC is directed to facilitate price transparency in wholesale electric markets, relying onexisting price publishers and providers of trade processing services to the maximum extent possible. However, FERC may establish an electronic information system if it determines that existing priceinformation is not adequate. FERC is given approval authority over the acquisition of securities andthe merger, sale, lease, or disposition of facilities under FERC's jurisdiction with a value in excessof $10 million. |
crs_R40374 | crs_R40374_0 | Introduction
Medicare Advantage (MA) is an alternative way for Medicare beneficiaries to receive covered benefits. Under MA, private health plans are paid a per-person amount to provide all Medicare covered benefits (except hospice) to beneficiaries who enroll in their plan. Eligible individuals may enroll in an MA plan, if one is available in their area. As of January 2009, all Medicare beneficiaries had access to an MA plan and 23% of beneficiaries enrolled in one. Private plans may use different techniques to influence the medical care used by enrollees. Some plans, such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) may require enrollees to receive care from a restricted network of medical providers; enrollees may be required to see a primary care physician who will coordinate their care and refer them to specialists as necessary. Other types of private plans, such as private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans, may look more like original Medicare, with fewer restrictions on the providers an enrollee can see and minimal coordination of care. In general, Medicare Advantage plans offer additional benefits or require smaller co-payments or deductibles than original Medicare. Sometimes beneficiaries pay for these additional benefits through a higher monthly premium, but sometimes they are financed through plan savings. The extent of extra benefits and reduced cost sharing vary by plan type and geography, creating an inequity that can frustrate some beneficiaries. However, Medicare Advantage plans are seen by some as an attractive alternative to more expensive supplemental insurance policies found in the private market. The 111 th Congress may examine several aspects of the MA program. Though a portion of the higher expenditure results in extra benefits and reduced cost sharing for some enrollees, some argue that private plans should not be paid more than the cost of original Medicare. Second, starting in 2010, the Comparative Cost Adjustment (CCA) Program will test direct competition between MA and original Medicare in selected areas. As such, the Part B premiums of beneficiaries in original Medicare may be increased or decreased depending on the efficiency of original Medicare relative to MA plans in the area. Third, recent studies show that profits in 2005 and 2006 for MA plans were, on average, higher than estimated because of underestimates in medical spending. If plans had more accurately estimated medical spending, they could have offered more generous benefit packages without reducing their profits, though some variability in the accuracy of estimates may be expected. Finally, marketing behaviors of MA plans and their agents or brokers were a concern in the 110 th Congress; it is unclear whether they will continue to be an issue in the 111 th . The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) March 2008 projection of Medicare payments under Part C is $112.8 billion in 2009 for coverage of 11.0 million enrollees, increasing to $221.2 billion in 2018 for 16.6 billion enrollees. According to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MEDPAC), Medicare is expected to pay private plans an average of 14% more per beneficiary in 2009 than it does for beneficiaries enrolled in the original Medicare program. Per Beneficiary Expenditure Differences Between MA and Original Medicare
Medicare-managed care plans may have the potential to provide better quality care at less cost than original Medicare. | Medicare Advantage (MA) is an alternative way for Medicare beneficiaries to receive covered benefits. Under MA, private health plans are paid a per-person amount to provide all Medicare-covered benefits (except hospice) to beneficiaries who enroll in their plan. Eligible individuals may enroll in an MA plan, if one is available in their area. As of January 2009, all Medicare beneficiaries had access to an MA plan and 23% of beneficiaries enrolled in one. Private plans may use different techniques to influence the medical care used by enrollees. Some plans, such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) may require enrollees to receive care from a restricted network of medical providers; enrollees may be required to see a primary care physician who will coordinate their care and refer them to specialists as necessary. Other types of private plans, such as private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans, may look more like original Medicare, with fewer restrictions on the providers an enrollee can see and minimal coordination of care.
In general, Medicare Advantage plans offer additional benefits or require smaller co-payments or deductibles than original Medicare. Sometimes beneficiaries pay for these additional benefits through a higher monthly premium, but sometimes they are financed through plan savings. The extent of extra benefits and reduced cost sharing vary by plan type and geography, creating an inequity that can frustrate some beneficiaries. However, Medicare Advantage plans are seen by some as an attractive alternative to more expensive supplemental insurance policies found in the private market.
Though plans that manage their enrollees' care have the potential to be less expensive than original Medicare, recent analyses by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MEDPAC) find that Medicare is projected to pay private plans an average of 14% more per beneficiary in 2009 than it does for beneficiaries in the original Medicare program. While some support the higher Medicare expenditures for MA enrollees because funds are used to provide reduced cost sharing or additional benefits, others support paying private plans no more than the cost of covered benefits under the original Medicare program, which may result in less generous MA benefit packages, or reduced access to MA plans. With competing health expenditure priorities, Congress is likely to examine the MA program.
Congress may consider additional issues. First, the Comparative Cost Adjustment (CCA) Program is slated to start in 2010. CCA is designed to test direct competition between MA and original Medicare. As such, the Part B premiums of beneficiaries in original Medicare may be increased or decreased depending on the efficiency of original Medicare relative to MA plans in the area. Second, recent studies show that profits in 2005 and 2006 for MA plans were, on average, higher than estimated because of underestimates in medical spending. If plans had more accurately estimated future medical spending, they could have offered more generous benefit packages without reducing their profits, though some variability in the accuracy of estimates may be expected. Third, marketing behaviors of MA plans and their agents or brokers were a concern in the 110th Congress; it is unclear whether they will continue to be an issue in the 111th Congress.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) March 2008 projection of Medicare payments under Medicare Advantage is $112.8 billion in 2009 for coverage of 11.0 million enrollees, increasing to $221.2 billion in 2018 for 16.6 billion enrollees. This report is an overview of the Medicare Advantage program, and includes legislative history and analysis of recent trends. It will be updated to reflect significant changes to the program. |
crs_RS22444 | crs_RS22444_0 | Network Neutrality
As congressional policymakers continue to debate telecommunications reform, a major point of contention is the question of whether action is needed to ensure unfettered access to the Internet. The move to place restrictions on the owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the Internet, to ensure equal access and non-discriminatory treatment, is referred to as "net neutrality." There is no single accepted definition of "net neutrality." However, most agree that any such definition should include the general principles that owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the Internet should not control how consumers lawfully use that network; and should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that network. Despite the FCC's ability to regulate broadband services under its Title I ancillary authority and the issuing of its broadband principles, some policymakers feel that more specific regulatory guidelines may be necessary to protect the marketplace from potential abuses; a consensus on what these should specifically entail, however, has yet to form. Others feel that existing laws and FCC policies regarding competitive behavior are sufficient to deal with potential anti-competitive behavior and that no action is needed and if enacted at this time, could result in harm. A consensus on this issue has not yet formed, and no stand-alone measures addressing net neutrality have been introduced in the 111 th Congress, to date. However, the net neutrality issue has been narrowly addressed within the context of the economic stimulus package. 1 ( P.L. 111-5 ) contains provisions that require the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), in consultation with the FCC, to establish "... nondiscrimination and network interconnection obligations" as a requirement for grant participants in the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP). | As congressional policymakers continue to debate telecommunications reform, a major point of contention is the question of whether action is needed to ensure unfettered access to the Internet. The move to place restrictions on the owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the Internet, to ensure equal access and non-discriminatory treatment, is referred to as "net neutrality." There is no single accepted definition of "net neutrality." However, most agree that any such definition should include the general principles that owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the Internet should not control how consumers lawfully use that network; and should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that network. Concern over whether it is necessary to take steps to ensure access to the Internet for content, services, and applications providers, as well as consumers, and if so, what these should be, is a major focus in the debate over telecommunications reform. Some policymakers contend that more specific regulatory guidelines may be necessary to protect the marketplace from potential abuses which could threaten the net neutrality concept. Others contend that existing laws and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) policies are sufficient to deal with potential anti-competitive behavior and that such regulations would have negative effects on the expansion and future development of the Internet.
A consensus on this issue has not yet formed, and the 111th Congress, to date, has not introduced stand-alone legislation to address this issue. However, the net neutrality issue has been narrowly addressed within the context of the economic stimulus package (P.L. 111-5). Provisions in that law require the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), in consultation with the FCC, to establish " ... nondiscrimination and network interconnection obligations" as a requirement for grant participants in the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP). This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44810 | crs_R44810_0 | Introduction
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) authorizes the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate the safety and effectiveness of drug products sold in the United States. FDA's determination that a drug is safe does not signify an absence of risk but rather that the drug has an appropriate benefit-risk balance for its intended use and population. For most drugs, FDA has generally considered routine risk minimization measures to be sufficient; for example, FDA-approved labeling and postmarket studies. In certain cases, however, FDA has recommended or required additional measures to minimize risk. The statutory standard for FDA approval is that the drug is safe and effective for its intended use. These programs included elements such as education for patients and providers and restrictions on distribution. Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS)
In 2007, FDAAA expanded the risk management authority of FDA, authorizing the agency to require REMS for certain drugs, under specified conditions. REMS is a required risk management plan that uses risk mitigation strategies beyond FDA-approved professional labeling. As part of a REMS, a drug manufacturer may be required to provide certain information to patients (e.g., a medication guide) and health care providers (e.g., a communication plan) or to impose restrictions on distribution or use of the drug via one or more "Elements to Assure Safe Use" (ETASU). A REMS-restricted distribution program controls the chain of supply so that the drugs are provided only to patients with prescriptions from authorized physicians or pharmacies under specified conditions. The law prohibits the holder of an approved application (i.e., the brand company, which is the RLD holder) from using ETASU "to block or delay approval of an application under [FFDCA] section 505(b)(2) or (j)." However, FDA, FTC, the Association for Accessible Medicines (AAM), and others have alleged that some brand companies may be using REMS to delay competition by refusing to sell samples of the brand drug to generic product developers and delaying negotiation of a single, shared system REMS (see the section " Developing a Single, Shared System REMS "). While REMS has allowed FDA to approve certain drugs that otherwise may have been kept off the market due to safety risks, the implementation of REMS, particularly REMS with restricted distribution, has raised some issues. The FDA and generic drug industry have expressed concern that brand companies may be using this requirement to prevent or delay generic drugs from entering the market by impeding development of a single, shared system. In the 115 th Congress, two bills to keep brand companies from using REMS to prevent or delay generic drugs from entering the market were introduced: the Fair Access for Safe and Timely Generics Act of 2017, or the FAST Generics Act of 2017 ( H.R. 2051 ) and the Creating and Restoring Equal Access to Equivalent Samples Act of 2017, or the CREATES Act of 2017 ( S. 974 , H.R. REMS Reform and Cost-Savings
Although legislation aimed at reforming REMS has been discussed as a means of reducing health care spending, CRS is not aware of any formal cost estimates (from CBO or other entities) that indicate how the FAST Generics or the CREATES Act would function as a cost saving measure. A 2014 study sponsored by the Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA; now called the AAM) estimated that misuse of REMS and other restricted distribution programs costs the United States $5.4 billion annually, with the federal government bearing a third of this burden. | The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) authorizes the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate the safety and effectiveness of drug products sold in the United States. The statutory standard for FDA approval is that a drug is safe and effective for its intended use. FDA's determination that a drug is safe does not signify an absence of risk but rather that the drug's clinical benefits outweigh its known and potential risks.
For most drugs, FDA has generally considered routine risk minimization measures to be sufficient; for example, updated labeling based on new information from postmarket surveillance. In certain cases, however, the agency has recommended or required additional measures to minimize drug risk. Early risk management programs at FDA included elements such as education for patients and providers, and restrictions on distribution. In 2007, the FDA Amendments Act (FDAAA) expanded the risk management authority of FDA, authorizing the agency to require for certain drugs, under specified conditions, risk evaluation and mitigation strategies (REMS). REMS is a required risk management plan that uses risk mitigation strategies beyond FDA-approved professional labeling. As part of a REMS, a drug manufacturer may be required to provide certain information to patients (e.g., a medication guide) and health care providers (e.g., a communication plan) or to impose restriction on a drug's distribution or use via one or more "Elements to Assure Safe Use" (ETASU).
A REMS-restricted distribution program controls the chain of supply so that the drugs are provided only to patients with prescriptions from authorized physicians or pharmacies under specified conditions. Although the law prohibits the holder of an approved drug application (generally the brand company) from using ETASU to block or delay approval of a generic drug application, FDA, the Federal Trade Commission, generic drug manufacturers, and some Members of Congress have expressed concern that brand companies are using REMS to prevent or delay generic drugs from entering the market. The Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) at FDA, for example, has testified that some brand pharmaceutical companies have used REMS and distribution restrictions to impede competition by (1) withholding or refusing to sell samples of the brand drug to the generic company for purposes of bioequivalence testing and (2) prolonging negotiations related to developing a single, shared system of REMS. Effectively, withholding samples prevents the generic company from obtaining data necessary to support an application for approval, while prolonging negotiations of a single, shared system REMS delays approval of the generic application. Others argue that REMS are rare, and that FDA requires REMS with restricted distribution only for drugs that would otherwise not be allowed on the market due to safety risks.
A 2014 study sponsored by the Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA; now called the Association for Affordable Medicines [AAM]) estimated that misuse of REMS and other restricted distribution programs costs the United States $5.4 billion annually, with the federal government bearing a third of this burden.
In the 115th Congress, legislation to keep brand companies from using REMS to prevent or delay generic drugs from entering the market has been introduced: the Fair Access for Safe and Timely Generics Act of 2017 (or the FAST Generics Act of 2017 [H.R. 2051]) and the Creating and Restoring Equal Access to Equivalent Samples Act of 2017 (or the CREATES Act of 2017 [S. 974, H.R. 2212]). Legislation aimed at reforming REMS has been discussed as a means of reducing healthcare spending, although CRS is not aware of any formal cost estimates from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) or other entities. |
crs_R41748 | crs_R41748_0 | Introduction
China is the world's most populous country with approximately 1.4 billion people. It has experienced tremendous economic growth over the last three decades with an average annual increase in gross domestic product (GDP) of 9.8% during that period. This rapid economic growth has led to an increasing demand for energy, spurring China to more than double its electric power generating capacity in each of the last three decades, growing from 66 GigaWatts (GW) installed in 1980 to 1,100 GW installed as of 2011. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), coal currently fuels about 66% of China's electricity generation. However, the reduction of air pollution caused in part by the burning of coal for electric power has become a major public policy focus in China. China has ambitious targets for developing both its hydropower and non-hydropower renewable energy resources with a major push of laws, regulations and incentives in the last few years. The wind power sector is illustrative of China's accomplishments, as installed wind power capacity has gone from 567 MegaWatts (MW) in 2003 to 75,000 MW in 2012. While energy development and conservation are both being pursued, energy conservation investment projects are given priority over energy development projects under Article 10, with projects under the central government being selected on "technological, economic and environmental comparisons and validations of the projects." Article 39 focuses on improving energy efficiency in a variety of applications:
The State encourages the development of the following universal energy conservation technologies: (1) promote the wide use of cogeneration of heat and power and district heating, increase the utilization rate of heat and power units, develop heat-cascading technology, combined heat, power and cooling technology and combined heat, power and coal gas technology, and increase the efficiency of thermal energy application in an all-round way; (2) gradually achieve more-efficient operation of electric motors, fans, pumping equipment and systems; develop adjustable speed motor drives for energy conservation and electric-electronic power saving technology; develop, produce and disseminate the use of high-quality and low-cost energy-efficient appliances and equipment; and increase the efficiency of electric power; (3) develop and disseminate the use of clean coal technologies, including fluidized bed combustion, smokeless combustion, and gasification and liquefaction, that are suited to domestic coals in order to increase coal utilization efficiency; and (4) develop and disseminate other universal energy-efficient technologies that are proved mature and yield remarkable benefits. However, the key piece of legislation in recent years for moving renewable energy deployment forward is the Renewable Energy Law of 2005 . The law was based on goals to "promote the development and utilization of renewable energy, improve the energy structure, diversify energy supplies, safeguard energy security, protect the environment, and realize the sustainable development of the economy and society." The 11 th FYP targeted a 20% overall reduction in the energy intensity of the economy. The 12 th FYP builds upon this goal, aiming to reduce energy intensity an additional 16% by 2015. With the lifting of the effective "ban" on large- and medium-scale hydropower development, China now reportedly plans to virtually double its hydropower capacity to 380 MW by 2020. China increased its goals for domestic solar PV capacity, with installed capacity rising to 19 GW in 2013, following through with a policy to move away from coal for electric power generation. Wind
China's installed wind capacity was reported to be 91 GW as of 2013, and plans have been reported to increase wind capacity to 200 GW by 2020. Renewable energy is subsidized by a rate fee charged to all electricity users in China. The fee was originally based on the incremental cost difference between coal and renewable energy (which was estimated in China at $0.044 to $0.059 per kWh). United States
Some observers would argue that the United States does not have a comprehensive national policy in place for promotion of renewable energy technologies. China recognizes that given the growing demand for energy at home, developing its domestic renewable energy industry and building manufacturing capacity can lead to advantages in future export markets. Officially, however, energy efficiency and conservation remain China's top energy priority. These are considered the "low-hanging fruit" in the quest to reduce energy use and cut demand. The 11 th FYP saw China's energy consumption per unit of GDP (i.e., energy intensity) drop by 19.6%. China is the world's largest market for new construction with approximately 2 billion square meters of floor space added annually. New standards have been in development since 2005 with national energy design criteria for residential buildings. Some observers argue that the current higher costs of renewable electricity do not favor market adoption. However, the goals for increased use of renewable energy are several, and include energy security, energy independence, cleaner air, and more recently anthropogenic climate change, sustainability concepts, and economic development. | China is the world's most populous country with approximately 1.4 billion people. It has experienced tremendous economic growth over the last three decades with an average annual increase in gross domestic product (GDP) of 9.8% during that period. This has led to an increasing demand for energy, spurring China to more than double its electric power generating capacity in each of the last three decades, growing from 66 GigaWatts (GW) installed in 1980 to 1,100 GW installed as of 2011. Coal currently fuels about 66% of China's electricity generation. However, the reduction of air pollution (caused in part by the burning of coal for electric power) has become a major public policy focus in China.
China has set ambitious targets for developing its renewable energy resources with a major push of laws, policies, and incentives in the last few years. The wind power sector is illustrative of China's accomplishments, as installed wind power capacity has gone from 0.567 GW in 2003 to 91 GW in 2013; China surpassed the United States in 2010 with over 41 GW of installed wind power capacity. Notably, however, approximately 18% of that capacity was not yet connected to the power grid in 2013. Plans already exist to grow China's wind power capacity to 200 GW by 2020. A similar goal exists for the solar photovoltaic (PV) power sector. Installed solar PV capacity rose from 0.14 GW as of 2009 to over 19 GW in 2013, with goals reported for 50 GW of solar PV capacity by 2020. Also, a hold on large- and medium-scale hydropower project development has been lifted, with a virtual doubling of hydropower capacity from approximately 200 GW of capacity to 380 GW planned by 2020. The 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP) encompassing the years 2011 to 2015 has further formalized the link to green energy with specific deployment goals and investment. China recognizes that developing its domestic renewable energy industry and building its manufacturing capacity will help it meet energy demands at home and potentially win advantages in future export markets.
The key piece of legislation in recent years for advancing renewable electricity in China is the Renewable Energy Law of 2005. The law was designed to "promote the development and utilization of renewable energy, improve the energy structure, diversify energy supplies, safeguard energy security, protect the environment, and realize the sustainable development of the economy and society." Renewable energy is subsidized by a fee charged to all electricity users in China of about 0.029 cents per kiloWatt-hour, and was originally based on the incremental cost difference between coal and renewable energy power generation.
However, energy efficiency and conservation are officially China's top energy priority. These are considered the "low-hanging fruit" in the quest to reduce energy use and cut demand. Energy conservation investment projects have priority over energy development projects under the Energy Conservation Law of 1997, with government-financed projects being selected on "technological, economic and environmental comparisons and validations of the projects." China is the world's largest market for new construction, and new building standards have been in development since 2005 with national energy design criteria for residential buildings. In the power generation sector, many smaller, less efficient coal-fired power plants have been closed. The 11th FYP targeted a 20% overall reduction in the energy intensity (i.e., energy consumption per unit of GDP) of the economy. The 12th FYP builds upon this goal, aiming to reduce energy intensity an additional 16% by 2015.
In contrast to China, some argue that the United States does not have a comprehensive national policy in place for promotion of renewable energy technologies, with some observers saying that the higher costs of renewable electricity are not conducive to market adoption. However, for both countries, the reasons for increasing the use of renewable energy are diverse, and include energy security, energy independence, cleaner air, and more recently anthropogenic climate change, sustainability, and economic development. |
crs_RL33014 | crs_RL33014_0 | Introduction
A variety of interrelated statutes and agency regulations govern leasing and permitting foroil and gas development on federal lands. This report addresses the leasing and permitting of onshore, federal public domain lands. This report first analyzes the legal framework for oil and gas leasing and permitting onfederal public domain lands managed by BLM and the Forest Service. Second, this report assesseshow the recently enacted Energy Policy of 2005 affects these laws. Finally, this report analyzesselected judicial and administrative decisions regarding what steps federal environmental lawsrequire agencies to take before issuing coalbed methane leases. Streamlining and Expediting Oil and Gas Development Processes
The 2005 EPACT requires the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture toenter into a memorandum of understanding regarding issues such as the establishment of proceduresto "ensure timely processing" of oil and gas lease applications, surface use plans of operation, andAPDs. (139)
Recent Litigation Surrounding Coalbed Methane Leasing
Coalbed methane (CBM) is a natural gas that is trapped in coal seams by water pressure. | A variety of statutes and agency regulations govern leasing and permitting for oil and gasdevelopment on federal lands. This report first explains the legal framework for oil and gas leasingand development on federal "public domain" lands, which involves an overview of the following:
laws and regulations affecting which public domain lands are potentiallysubject to oil and gas leasing;
development of Resource Management Plans;
competitive and noncompetitive oil and gas leasingprocesses;
terms and conditions of oil and gas leases; and
the process surrounding applications for permits to drill.
Second, this report assesses how the recently enacted Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L.109-58 ) will affect preexisting oil and gas development laws. The third section of the reportanalyzes selected judicial and administrative decisions regarding what steps federal environmentallaws require agencies to take before issuing leases for coalbed methane leases. Coalbed methane isa type of natural gas that is trapped in coal seams by water pressure.
This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_RL33972 | crs_RL33972_0 | Introduction
Senate Rule XXVI spells out specific requirements for Senate committee procedures. In addition, all Senate committees are required to adopt rules that govern their organization and operation. Those committee rules then elaborate, within Senate rules, how the committee will handle questions of order and procedure. A committee's rules may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate." Committees may add to the basic rules, but they may not add anything that is in conflict with Senate rules. This report analyzes the different approaches Senate committees have taken with their rules, focusing on additions to the overall Senate committee rules structure or unique provisions. A committee's rules can be extensive and detailed or general and short. The tables at the end of this report compare key features of the rules by committee. The tables, however, represent only a portion of each committee's rules. Provisions of the rules which are substantially similar to or which are essentially restatements of the Senate's standing rules are not included. This report will review the requirements contained in Senate rules for committees, then explore how each Senate committee handles 11 specific procedural issues: Meeting Day; Hearing and Meeting Notice Requirements; Scheduling of Witnesses; Hearing Quorum; Business Quorum; Amendment Requirements; Proxy Voting; Polling; Nominations; Investigations; and Subpoenas. Also, the report looks at unique provisions some committees have included in their rules in a "Miscellaneous" category. Rules. (Rule XXVI, paragraph 2) Meetings. | Senate Rule XXVI spells out specific requirements for Senate committee procedures. In addition, all Senate committees are required to adopt rules that govern their organization and operation. Those committee rules then elaborate, within Senate rules, how the committee will handle its business. Rules adopted by a committee may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate" (Senate Rule XXVI, paragraph 2). Committees may add to the basic rules, but they may not add anything that is in conflict with Senate rules.
This report first provides a brief overview of Senate rules as they pertain to committees. The report then compares the different approaches Senate committees have taken when adopting their rules. A committee's rules can be extensive and detailed or general and short. The tables at the end of this report compare selected, key features of the rules by committee. The tables, however, represent only a portion of each committee's rules. Provisions of the rules which are substantially similar to, or which are essentially restatements of, the Senate's standing rules are not included.
This report will review the requirements contained in Senate rules pertaining to committees; it will then explore how each Senate committee addresses 11 specific issues: Meeting Day; Hearing and Meeting Notice Requirements; Scheduling of Witnesses; Hearing Quorum; Business Quorum; Amendment Filing Requirements; Proxy Voting; Polling; Nominations; Investigations; and Subpoenas. In addition, the report looks at the unique provisions some committees have included in their rules in the Miscellaneous category.
This report will be updated during the first session of each Congress after all Senate committees have printed their rules in the Congressional Record. |
crs_RS20058 | crs_RS20058_0 | Overview of UMRA
History of the Act
Enactment of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) culminated years of effort by nonfederal government officials and their advocates to control, if not eliminate, the federal imposition of unfunded mandates. Coverage of the Act
Under UMRA, federal mandates include provisions of law or regulation that impose enforceable duties, including taxes. Exclusions and exemptions outside the reach of the statute are discussed later in this report. These requirements apply to all proposed mandates, both intergovernmental and private sector. Also, the unfunded costs of the mandate are to be determined based on estimates by the Committee on the Budget (which may draw for this purpose on the CBO estimate). However, if an appropriation bill contains legislative provisions that would create unfunded intergovernmental mandates in excess of the threshold, the UMRA point of order may be raised against the provisions themselves. | This summary of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) of 1995 will assist Members of Congress and staff seeking succinct information on the statute. The term "unfunded mandates" generally refers to requirements that a unit of government imposes without providing funds to pay for costs of compliance. UMRA establishes mechanisms to limit federal imposition of unfunded mandates on other levels of government (intergovernmental mandates) and on the private sector. The act establishes points of order against proposed legislation containing an unfunded intergovernmental mandate, requires executive agencies to seek comment on regulations that would constitute a mandate, and establishes a means for judicial enforcement. This report will be updated if the act is amended. |
crs_R43308 | crs_R43308_0 | Only a relatively small proportion is financed through public or private borrowing or private (equity) investment. The federal government supports surface transportation infrastructure financing mainly by providing a tax preference for bonds issued by state and local governments. Other mechanisms include federal loan programs, such as the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program, which can help leverage private investment via public-private partnerships (P3s), and federally authorized state infrastructure banks (SIBs). Nevertheless, none are as costly as federal grant funding. This is because project financing relies more heavily on revenue streams created at the state or local level in order to repay loans or provide a return to private investors. In many cases, revenue to finance a project has been provided by a highway or bridge toll, but it could be, among other possibilities, a pledge of future sales tax or real estate tax revenues. This report outlines current federal programs that support the financing of surface transportation infrastructure investment and the relative impact these have on the federal budget. It goes on to discuss legislative options for modifying the federal role, including provisions related to tax credit bonds, dedicated federal funding for SIBs, and the creation of a national infrastructure bank. Local government provided the most support, followed by passenger fares and other operating income, state government, and the federal government ( Table 3 ). Financing is normally not arranged at the federal level, as the federal government builds few transportation projects directly. P3s and private investment in surface transportation are relatively larger in many other countries, including Portugal, Spain, and Australia. The "public" in public-private partnerships typically refers to a state government, local government, or transit agency. Probably the main way in which the federal government has encouraged P3s and private financing in transportation is through the TIFIA program that provides long-term, low-interest loans and other types of credit to project sponsors. 114-94 ) authorized the creation of a new bureau within DOT to consolidate federal transportation financing programs and support for P3s. Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) Program
Under RRIF (45 U.S.C. State Infrastructure Banks
Another source of financing for surface transportation projects is state infrastructure banks (SIBs). Funding source . | Investment in surface transportation infrastructure is funded mainly with current receipts from taxes, tolls, and fares, but it is financed by public-sector borrowing and, in some cases, private borrowing and private equity investment. Financing is normally not arranged at the federal level, as the federal government builds few transportation projects directly. This report discusses current federal programs that support the use of debt finance and private investment to build and rebuild highways and public transportation. It also considers legislative options intended to encourage greater infrastructure financing in the future.
The federal government's largest source of support for surface transportation infrastructure is the Highway Trust Fund (HTF), which is funded principally by taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel. Funds from the HTF are distributed to state governments and local transit agencies for projects meeting federal standards. State governments, local governments, and transit agencies must also contribute their own resources because grants from the HTF do not meet states' entire surface transportation capital needs. The federal government supports additional infrastructure spending by providing a tax exclusion for owners of municipal bonds, or "munis," issued by state and local governments. The federal government also supports project finance through loan programs, such as the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program and the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) program, which can help leverage private investment via public-private partnerships (P3s), and through federally authorized state infrastructure banks (SIBs).
All of these financing mechanisms impact the federal budget, although none are as costly as federal grant funding. With less federal support, financing places a greater burden on state and local governments to identify revenue sources to repay loans or to provide a return to private investors. In many cases, nonfederal revenue to finance a project is provided by a highway or bridge toll, but it could be a pledge of future sales tax or real estate tax revenue.
There are many legislative options that Congress might consider in modifying the federal role in surface transportation financing. This report considers five:
1. Creation of a new type of bond offering federal tax credits to investors in infrastructure. 2. Changes to the TIFIA and RRIF programs. 3. Greater encouragement for P3s. 4. Creation of a national infrastructure bank to provide low-cost, long-term loans for infrastructure on flexible terms. 5. Enhancement of SIBs that already exist in many states, possibly with dedicated federal funding. |
crs_RL33279 | crs_RL33279_0 | The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program makes federal funds available to metropolitan areas and states to provide a number of health care services for HIV/AIDS patients including medical care, drug treatments, dental care, home health care, and outpatient mental health and substance abuse treatment. The program currently serves more than half a million low-income people with HIV/AIDS in the United States; 29% of those served are uninsured, and an additional 56% are underinsured. The Ryan White program was established in law in 1990 ( P.L. 111-87 ). The program is administered by the HRSA HIV/AIDS Bureau. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-148 , as amended) contains general provisions to increase access to health insurance and which, therefore, should increase coverage for people living with HIV/AIDS. They include prohibitions on the cancellation of coverage by an insurer due to a preexisting condition, elimination of lifetime caps on insurance benefits and annual limits on coverage, and eligibility for tax subsidies to assist low- and middle-income individuals in the purchase of coverage from health insurance exchanges. In addition, at state option, Medicaid eligibility will be broadened to include single adults, and ACA phases out the Medicare Part D so-called doughnut hole for HIV/AIDS individuals who are Medicare eligible. Part D—Women, Infants, Children and Youth
Part D provides grants to public and nonprofit entities for family-centered care for women, infants, children, and youth with HIV/AIDS. Part F—Demonstration and Training
Part F provides support for the AIDS Dental Reimbursement (ADR) Program, the Community-Based Dental Partnership Program, the AIDS Education and Training Centers (AETCs), and the Special Projects of National Significance (SPNS) Program. 109-415 codified the Minority AIDS Initiative (MAI) as part of the Ryan White program under Part F of Title XXVI of the PHS Act. There could be a significant impact on Ryan White ADAP clients in those states that decide to cover the new Medicaid eligible group. These individuals would be eligible to move to Medicaid coverage in 2014 if their states choose to participate in the expansion. Up to 52% of Ryan White ADAP clients may be eligible for such assistance through the exchange. Reauthorization of the Ryan White Program
P.L. The long-range impact of ACA on the Ryan White program—meaning the replacement of health and treatment services provided under Ryan White with access to such services through health coverage via ACA—remains to be determined. If ACA remains intact moving forward, some states may decide not to participate in the Medicaid expansion. In those states, the need for the full range of services under Ryan White would remain. However, even if all states decide to cover the new Medicaid eligible group provided under ACA, there will be gaps that the Ryan White program could continue to fill, such as coverage of those individuals with HIV/AIDS who are undocumented immigrants or legal immigrants within the five-year Medicaid ban. In addition, Ryan White provides dental care and support services, such as transportation, that may not be provided under Medicaid or private health insurance. FY2013
For FY2013, the Obama Administration requested a total of $2.447 billion for the Ryan White program, an increase of $79.594 million compared with FY2012; most of the increase ($66.701 million) would go to ADAP. Congress provided temporary funding, through March 27, 2013, for the Ryan White program in P.L. 112-175 , the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013. Funding is at the FY2012 rate plus a very slight increase (less than 1%). Under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25 ), a sequestration (automatic across-the-board spending cuts) is scheduled to occur on January 2, 2013, unless Congress enacts legislation modifying the BCA. The OMB report indicates that HRSA discretionary programs, such as Ryan White, could receive an 8.2% cut due to the sequestration in FY2013. | The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program makes federal funds available to metropolitan areas and states to assist in health care costs and support services for individuals and families affected by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). The Ryan White program currently serves more than half a million low-income people with HIV/AIDS in the United States; 29% of those served are uninsured, and an additional 56% are underinsured. The program is administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Its statutory authority is Title XXVI of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act, originally enacted in 1990.
The Ryan White program is composed of four major parts and several other components. Part A provides grants to urban areas and mid-sized cities. Part B provides grants to states and territories; it also provides funds for the AIDS Drug Assistance Program (ADAP). Part C provides early intervention grants to public and private nonprofit entities. Part D provides grants to public and private nonprofit entities for family-centered care for women, infants, children, and youth with HIV/AIDS. The other components, sometimes referred to as Part F, include the AIDS Dental Reimbursement (ADR) Program, the Community-Based Dental Partnership Program, the AIDS Education and Training Centers (AETCs), the Special Projects of National Significance (SPNS) Program, and the Minority AIDS Initiative (MAI).
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) contains general provisions to increase access to health insurance and which, therefore, should increase coverage for people living with HIV/AIDS. ACA includes prohibitions on the cancellation of coverage by an insurer due to a preexisting condition, elimination of lifetime caps on insurance benefits and annual limits on coverage, and eligibility for tax subsidies to assist low- and middle-income individuals in the purchase of coverage from state health insurance exchanges. ACA phases out the Medicare Part D doughnut hole for HIV/AIDS individuals who are Medicare eligible, and, at state option, Medicaid eligibility will be broadened to include single adults. There could be a significant impact on Ryan White ADAP clients in those states that decide to cover the new Medicaid eligible group; 56% of ADAP clients served in June 2011 would be eligible for Medicaid in 2014 if their states choose to participate in the expansion, and the remainder would likely receive assistance in purchasing health coverage on the exchange.
In October 2009, the 111th Congress passed and President Obama signed the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-87), which reauthorized the Ryan White program through September 30, 2013. The long-range impact of ACA on the Ryan White program—meaning the replacement of health and treatment services provided under Ryan White with access to such services through health coverage via ACA—remains to be determined. In states that decide not to participate in the Medicaid expansion, the need for the full range of Ryan White services would remain. However, even if all states decide to cover the new Medicaid eligible group, there will be gaps that the Ryan White program could continue to fill, such as coverage of those individuals with HIV/AIDS who are undocumented immigrants. In addition, Ryan White provides dental care and support services, such as transportation, that may not be provided under Medicaid or private health insurance.
For FY2013, the Obama Administration requested a total of $2.447 billion for the Ryan White program, an increase of $80 million compared with FY2012; most of the increase ($66.7 million) would go to the ADAP program. Congress provided temporary funding, through March 27, 2013, for the Ryan White program in P.L. 112-175, the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013. Funding is at the FY2012 rate plus a very slight increase (less than 1%). The Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) sequestration, scheduled to occur on January 2, 2013, could cut HRSA discretionary programs, such as Ryan White, by 8.2%. |
crs_R44526 | crs_R44526_0 | FY2017 Consideration: Overview of Actions
The first section of this report provides an overview of the consideration of FY2017 judiciary appropriations, with subsections covering each major action, including
the initial submission of the request on February 9, 2016; hearings held by the House and Senate Financial Services Subcommittees; the House subcommittee markup on May 25, 2016; the House Appropriations Committee markup on June 9, 2016; the Senate subcommittee markup on June 15, 2016; the Senate Appropriations Committee markup on June 16, 2016; House floor consideration of H.R. By law, the judicial branch request is submitted to the President and included in the budget submission without change. House Floor Consideration
On July 5, the House agreed to a structured rule ( H.Res. 114-639 ) for consideration of the Financial Services and General Government bill ( H.R. 5485 ). One amendment (#60) related to the judiciary was made in order. 1246 ), and was passed by voice vote. H.R. 5485 , as amended, was agreed to on July 7, with a vote of 239-185 (Roll no. 398). Passage of Continuing Appropriations Resolutions and Enactment of the FY2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act
No further action was taken on H.R. 5485 or S. 3067 prior to the start of FY2017 on October 1, 2016. Judicial branch activities were funded through continuing appropriations resolutions ( P.L. 114-223 , P.L. 114-254 , and P.L. 115-30 ) until the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. Division E of this act provides $7.5 billion for the judiciary, an increase of $176.2 million (2.4%) from FY2016 and $63.0 million (-0.8%) less than the request. 114-113 ), which was enacted on December 18, 2015. The Judiciary Budget and Key Issues
Appropriations for the judiciary comprise approximately 0.2% of total budget authority. The remaining judiciary budget is divided among the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (0.4% of FY2016 enacted), U.S. Court of International Trade (0.3%), Fees of Jurors and Commissioners (0.5%), Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (1.2%), Federal Judicial Center (0.4%), U.S. Sentencing Commission (0.2%), and Judicial Retirement Funds (2.1%). Three specialized courts within the federal court system are not funded under the judiciary budget: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (funded in the Department of Defense appropriations bill), the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (funded in the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies appropriations bill), and the U.S. Tax Court (funded under Independent Agencies, Title V, of the FSGG bill). The total represents a 7.0% increase over the FY2016 enacted level. 115-31 . P.L. | Funds for the judicial branch are included annually in the Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) Appropriations bill. The bill provides funding for the Supreme Court; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; the U.S. Court of International Trade; the U.S. Courts of Appeals and District Courts; Defender Services; Court Security; Fees of Jurors and Commissioners; the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; the Federal Judicial Center; the U.S. Sentencing Commission; and Judicial Retirement Funds.
The judiciary's FY2017 budget request of $7.58 billion was submitted on February 9, 2016. By law, the President includes the requests submitted by the judiciary in the annual budget submission without change.
The FY2017 budget request represents a 3.3% increase over the FY2016 enacted level of $7.34 billion provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), Division E, Title III, enacted December 18, 2015.
The House Appropriations Committee held a markup (H.R. 5485) on June 9, 2016, and recommended a total of $7.55 billion. The Senate Appropriations Committee held a markup (S. 3067) on June 16, 2016, and recommended a total of $7.58 billion.
On July 5, the House agreed to a structured rule (H.Res. 794) for consideration of the Financial Services and General Government bill (H.R. 5485). One amendment (#60) related to the judiciary was made in order, and subsequently passed by voice vote. H.R. 5485 was agreed to on July 7, with a vote of 239-185 (Roll no. 398).
No further action was taken on H.R. 5485 or S. 3067 prior to the start of FY2017 on October 1, 2016, and judicial branch activities were funded through continuing appropriations resolutions (P.L. 114-223, P.L. 114-254, and P.L. 115-30) until the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31). Division E of this act provides $7.5 billion for the judiciary, an increase of $176.2 million (2.4%) from FY2016 and $63.0 million (-0.8%) less than the request.
Appropriations for the judiciary comprise approximately 0.2% of total budget authority.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R40763 | crs_R40763_0 | Introduction
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) administers a number of agricultural conservation programs that assist private landowners with natural resource concerns. The differences and number of these programs created general confusion about the purpose, participation, and policies of the programs. Conservation Programs
The tabular presentation that follows provides basic information covering each of the USDA agricultural conservation programs, including
administering agency or agencies within USDA; brief program description; major amendments to the program in the Agricultural Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-79 ), commonly referred to as the 2014 farm bill; national scope and availability, including participation levels and acres enrolled; states with the highest level of funds obligated or acres enrolled; volume of application backlog or public interest in each program; authorized funding levels, whether mandatory spending or discretionary appropriations, and any funding restrictions; FY2018 funding level in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 ( P.L. Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP)
Agricultural Management Assistance (AMA)
Conservation Operations (CO)—Conservation Technical Assistance (CTA)
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)
CRP—Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP)
CRP—Farmable Wetland Program
CRP—Grasslands
Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP)
Emergency Conservation Program (ECP)
Emergency Forest Restoration Program (EFRP)
Emergency Watershed Protection (EWP)
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP)
EQIP—Conservation Innovation Grants (CIG)
Grassroots Source Water Protection Program
Healthy Forests Reserve Program (HFRP)
Regional Conservation Partnership Program (RCPP)
Voluntary Public Access and Habitat Incentive Program
Water Bank Program
Watershed and Flood Prevention Operations
Watershed Rehabilitation Program | The Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) and the Farm Service Agency (FSA) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) currently administer 20 programs and subprograms that are directly or indirectly available to assist producers and landowners who wish to practice conservation on agricultural lands. The differences and number of these programs have created general confusion about the purpose, participation, and policies of the programs. While recent consolidation efforts removed some duplication, a large number of programs remain. The programs discussed in this report are as follows
Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP) Agricultural Management Assistance (AMA) Conservation Operations (CO); Conservation Technical Assistance (CTA) Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) CRP—Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) CRP—Farmable Wetland Program CRP—Grasslands Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP) Emergency Conservation Program (ECP) Emergency Forest Restoration Program (EFRP) Emergency Watershed Protection (EWP) Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) EQIP—Conservation Innovation Grants (CIG) Grassroots Source Water Protection Program Healthy Forests Reserve Program (HFRP) Regional Conservation Partnership Program (RCPP) Voluntary Public Access and Habitat Incentive Program Water Bank Program Watershed and Flood Prevention Operations Watershed Rehabilitation Program
This tabular presentation provides basic information covering each of the programs. In each case, a brief program description is followed by information on major amendments in the Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79, 2014 farm bill), national scope and availability, states with the greatest participation, the backlog of applications or other measures of continuing interest, program funding authority, FY2018 funding, FY2019 Administration budget request, statutory authority, the authorization expiration date, and a link to the program's website. |
crs_R44808 | crs_R44808_0 | Introduction
After a flood event, people are often uncertain about what types of federal assistance they are eligible for, and if their eligibility for federal disaster assistance is linked in any way to whether or not they have flood insurance. Because much of the other disaster assistance that is available to individuals comes from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), there may be confusion between possible claims provided through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP, which is also managed by FEMA) and other disaster assistance programs. This report provides an overview of the assistance available to individuals and households following a flood and provides links to more comprehensive guidance on both flood insurance and disaster assistance. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is the main program intended to provide federal assistance to homeowners and renters recovering from flood losses. In addition to NFIP claims payments to policyholders, homeowners and renters may also access a number of other federal programs aimed at mitigating the impact on individuals and households. Individuals and Households Program
The principal IA program to offer assistance to individuals and families is the Individuals and Households Program (IHP). The total of all assistance to one household cannot exceed $34,000. IHP recipients whose homes are located in a Special Flood Hazard Area and are in a community participating in the NFIP and who receive assistance for repair, replacement, permanent housing construction, and/or personal property as a result of a flood-related disaster must obtain and maintain flood insurance as a condition of accepting disaster assistance. SBA Disaster Loan Program
The Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program provides direct loans to businesses, nonprofit organizations, homeowners, and renters to repair or replace property damaged or destroyed in a federally declared disaster. SBA Personal Property Loans
A Personal Property Loan provides a creditworthy homeowner or renter in a declared disaster area with up to $40,000 to repair or replace personal property owned by the survivor, while Real Property Loans provide creditworthy homeowners with up to $200,000 to repair or restore the homeowners' primary residence to its predisaster condition. SBA Flood Insurance Requirements
Recipients of SBA loans must carry flood insurance for the life of the loan. In some instances that are perceived as catastrophic events, Congress has provided additional resources to states and local governments through the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program (CDBG-DR). The CDBG-DR program is not automatically triggered by a disaster. Due to the block grant nature of the program, local and state officials exercise a great deal of discretion in determining which combination of eligible activities to employ. This allows communities to use CDBG-DR funds to meet disaster-related needs, including short-term disaster relief, mitigation activities, and long-term recovery activities. HUD does not provide CDBG-DR funding directly to individuals; however, individuals and families may benefit from a number of the eligible activities for which CDBG-DR funds can be used. Unless the individual state required homeowners to purchase flood insurance, the recipients of CDBG-DR grants are exempt from the requirement to purchase flood insurance. Considerations for NFIP Reauthorization
NFIP's authorization will expire on November 30, 2018. Separately from, or in conjunction with, NFIP reauthorization, the impacts on other programs may be useful to consider. In particular, Congress may consider revising the requirements associated with the Flood Disaster Protection Act and flood insurance. | After a flood, people are often uncertain if their eligibility for federal disaster assistance is linked in any way to whether or not they have flood insurance. Because much of the other disaster assistance that is available to individuals comes from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), there may be confusion between possible claims provided through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP, which is also managed by FEMA), and other disaster assistance programs. This report provides an overview of the assistance available to individuals and households following a flood and provides links to more comprehensive guidance on both flood insurance and disaster assistance.
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is the main program intended to provide federal assistance to homeowners and renters recovering from flood losses. The maximum coverage for one- to four-family homes is $100,000 for contents and $250,000 for buildings coverage. In addition to NFIP claims payments to policyholders, homeowners and renters may also access a number of other federal programs aimed at mitigating the impact on individuals and households. The principal FEMA program to offer assistance to individuals and families is the Individuals and Households Program (IHP). The total of all IHP assistance to one household cannot exceed $34,000. IHP recipients whose homes are located in a Special Flood Hazard Area, are in a community participating in the NFIP, and who receive assistance for repair, replacement, permanent housing construction, and/or personal property as a result of a flood-related disaster must obtain and maintain flood insurance as a condition of accepting disaster assistance.
The Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program provides direct loans to businesses, nonprofit organizations, homeowners, and renters to repair or replace property destroyed in a federally declared disaster. A Personal Property Loan provides a creditworthy homeowner or renter in a declared disaster area with up to $40,000 to repair or replace personal property owned by the survivor, while Real Property Loans provide creditworthy homeowners with up to $200,000 to repair or restore the homeowners' primary residence to its predisaster condition. Recipients of SBA loans must carry flood insurance for the life of the loan.
In some instances that are perceived as catastrophic events, Congress has provided additional resources to states and local governments through the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program (CDBG-DR); however, the CDBG-DR program is not automatically triggered by a disaster. Due to the block grant nature of the program, local and state officials exercise a great deal of discretion in determining which combination of eligible activities to employ. This allows communities to use CDBG-DR funds to meet disaster-related needs, including short-term disaster relief, mitigation activities, and long-term recovery activities. HUD does not provide CDBG-DR funding directly to individuals; however, individuals and families may benefit from a number of the eligible activities for which CDBG-DR funds can be used. Unless the individual state requires the purchase of flood insurance, the recipients of CDBG-DR grants are exempt from the requirement to purchase flood insurance.
The NFIP's authorization expires on November 30, 2018. If the NFIP is not reauthorized and is allowed to lapse, the authority to provide new flood insurance contracts will expire. If the NFIP were to lapse, the unavailability of NFIP insurance could have an impact on other programs such as IHP, SBA disaster loans, and CDBG-DR. Separately from or in conjunction with NFIP reauthorization, the impacts on such other programs may be useful to consider. In particular, Congress may consider revising the requirements for flood insurance in the Flood Disaster Protection Act. |
crs_R40840 | crs_R40840_0 | President Obama's FY2010 Budget
The FY2010 NOAA budget request of $4.474 billion accounted for nearly 33% of the Department of Commerce's total request of $13.779 billion. The request was $108.6 million (2.5%) more than the FY2009-enacted NOAA budget of $4.365 billion. Table 1 provides FY2009 enacted, FY2010 Administration request, FY2010 House-passed, FY2010 Senate-passed, and FY2010 enacted funding levels for NOAA. National Ocean Service. Oceanic and Atmospheric Research. Highlights of requested NESDIS program funding included:
$873.2 million, an increase of $256.3 million from the FY2009 funding level, to continue the procurement of spacecraft, instruments, launch services, and ground systems equipment for Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES); $382.2 million, an increase of $94.2 million from the FY2009 funding level, to support instrument and spacecraft development of the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS); $20 million to fund NOAA's portion of the Jason-3 satellite mission that will provide continuity of sea surface height measurements for studies of ocean climatology and weather; and increases of $7.0 million for climate data records, $0.9 million for ice satellite imagery for navigation safety, and $2.0 million for NPOESS data exploration. Congressional Action on Appropriations for NOAA
The House recommended funding of $4.603 billion for NOAA. The House-passed version of H.R. The Senate recommended funding of $4.773 billion for NOAA. This represented an increase of 9.3% compared with the FY2009-enacted level and an increase of 6.7% over the Administration's request. On December 16, 2009, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-117 ), which provides NOAA with $4.737 billion for FY2010. This represents an increase of 8.5% compared to the FY2009 enacted level and an increase of 5.9% over the Administration's request. Comparison of FY2010 Funding Provisions
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. Most of the increases were for support of fisheries management and endangered species recovery. For FY2010, President Obama requested $568 million in R&D funding for NOAA. FY2009 Stimulus Bill
On February 13, 2009, the 111 th Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ), also referred to as the stimulus package. Proposed ORF activities include reducing the hydrographic survey backlog, restoring marine and coastal habitat, and repairing and maintaining NOAA research vessels. | On May 11, 2009, President Obama requested $4.474 billion for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) FY2010 budget. This amount was $109 million (2.5%) more than the FY2009 enacted appropriation of $4.365 billion. Administration priorities for the NOAA budget included satellite programs, climate research, endangered species recovery, and fisheries management.
On June 18, 2009, the House passed H.R. 2847 to fund the Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) for FY2010. The House included $4.603 billion for NOAA, which was $238 million (5.5%) more than the FY2009 appropriation and $129 million (2.9%) more than the FY2010 request. On June 25, 2009, the Senate passed the CJS appropriations bill for FY2010 (H.R. 2847) and recommended $4.773 billion for NOAA. This represented an increase of $408 million (9.3%) over the FY2009 enacted funding level, an increase of $299 million (6.7%) over the amount requested by the Administration, and an increase of $170 million (3.7%) over the amount passed by the House. On December 16, 2009, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), which provides NOAA with $4.737 billion for FY2010. This represents an increase of 8.5% compared to the FY2009 enacted level and an increase of 5.9% over the Administration's request.
On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5). The amounts appropriated by Congress in the ARRA are in addition to the funding appropriated in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8). ARRA provided NOAA with $830 million for a variety of activities such as restoring habitat, constructing and maintaining facilities, constructing a research vessel, supporting the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, and other projects. The ARRA funding is not included in comparing FY2010 requested, passed, and recommended levels with FY2009 enacted appropriations because ARRA funds are available in both FY2009 and FY2010. |
crs_RL33589 | crs_RL33589_0 | 109-417 ), which authorizes appropriations through FY2011 to improve bioterrorism and other public health emergency preparedness and response activities, and establishes the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for the advanced research and development of medical countermeasures. Many of these authorities, found principally in the Public Health Service Act and implemented by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), were first explicitly authorized in 2000 ( P.L. The 110 th Congress will likely be interested in the implementation of provisions in P.L. 109-417 , and in the continued evolution of relationships between HHS, DHS, the states, and others among whom coordination is essential in a time of heightened concern about national security. Members of the 110 th Congress may wish to consider legislation to address additional expiring public health authorities, such as the Select Agent program to control access to pathogens that could be used for bioterrorism, which expires at the end of FY2007. Congress may also wish to examine certain permanent emergency response and funding authorities of the Secretary of HHS. 109-417 with preexisting law is provided in Table 1 later in this report. 107-188 , the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. A comparison of provisions in P.L. Both of the earlier bioterrorism laws, P.L. 106-505 and P.L. The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act would require the Secretary of HHS to prepare a quadrennial National Health Security Strategy and implementation plan, to include preparedness goals for federal, state, and local governments in harmony with national preparedness and response efforts at DHS. The 108 th Congress launched the program in the Project BioShield Act of 2004 ( P.L. 107-296 , the Homeland Security Act, effective when the new department was created in 2003. The Bioterrorism Act also established, for the first time, a program of grants to states to prepare hospitals, clinics and other healthcare facilities for bioterrorism and other mass-casualty events, to be administered by HRSA. The Bioterrorism Act contained a number of other provisions for public health preparedness. Major Legislation Prior to the 2001 Terrorist Attacks
Prior to the terrorist attacks of 2001, Congress passed the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000 (Title I of the Public Health Improvement Act, P.L. For more information regarding public health preparedness and response authorities and programs in general, and in the context of specific threats, see:
CRS Report RS22602, Public Health and Medical Preparedness and Response: Issues in the 110th Congress , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33579, The Public Health and Medical Response to Disasters: Federal Authority and Funding , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL31719, An Overview of the U.S. Public Health System in the Context of Emergency Preparedness , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33096, 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes: The Public Health and Medical Response , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33145, Pandemic Influenza: Domestic Preparedness Efforts , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33738, Gulf Coast Hurricanes: Addressing Survivors' Mental Health and Substance Abuse Treatment Needs , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. | Authorities to direct federal preparedness for and response to public health emergencies are found principally in the Public Health Service Act (PHS Act), and are administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). Three recent laws provided the core of these authorities. P.L. 106-505, the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000 (Title I of the Public Health Improvement Act), established a number of new programs and authorities, including grants to states to build public health preparedness. P.L. 107-188, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, was passed in the aftermath of the 2001 terror attacks. It reauthorized several existing programs and established new ones, including grants to states to build hospital and health system preparedness. P.L. 108-276, the Project BioShield Act of 2004, established authorities to encourage the development of specific countermeasures (such as drugs and vaccines for bioterrorism agents) that would not otherwise have a commercial market.
The laws above built upon existing broad authorities allowing or requiring the Secretary of HHS to prepare for or respond to outbreaks of infectious disease and other unanticipated health threats. Other laws—such as P.L. 107-296, creating a new Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—have added to the slate of public health preparedness and response authorities as well. Further, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, administered by DHS), which authorizes federal assistance and other activities in response to presidentially declared emergencies and major disasters, is also, to some extent, a source of federal authority for the response to public health threats.
The 109th Congress passed P.L. 109-417, the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act. The act reauthorized a number of expiring preparedness and response programs in the PHS Act, and established some new authorities, including the creation of a Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), a new office in HHS to support, coordinate, and provide oversight of advanced development of vaccines and biodefense countermeasures. The act's provisions reflected the concerns of Members of the 109th Congress and others regarding the flawed response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the threat of a possible influenza pandemic. A comparison of provisions in P.L. 109-417 with preexisting law is provided in Table 1 later in this report.
The 110th Congress will likely be interested in the implementation of provisions in P.L. 109-417, and in the continued evolution of relationships between HHS, DHS, the states, and others among whom coordination is essential in a time of heightened concern about national security. Members of the 110th Congress may wish to consider legislation to address additional expiring public health authorities, such as the Select Agent program to control access to pathogens that could be used for bioterrorism, which expires at the end of FY2007. Congress may also wish to examine the adequacy of certain permanent emergency response and funding authorities of the Secretary of HHS. |
crs_R41185 | crs_R41185_0 | The United States is one of dozens of countries and multilateral financial institutions providing such aid, together with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and foundations, and alongside private financial flows to developing countries from investors, international corporations, and diaspora communities. The December 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) report includes specific strategies to improve coordination with other aid donors, public and private. This report provides a summary of official development assistance (ODA), discusses coordination goals established by donors at international development policy forums, and provides an overview of U.S. policy and efforts to meet these goals. Furthermore, it does not include several increasingly important donors, such as Brazil, China, Russia, India, and South Africa. Not all foreign aid professionals are concerned about the growing number of donors in many developing countries. In the context of recent international development forums, however, donor and recipient countries alike have expressed widespread agreement on the desirability in principle of greater donor coordination and consolidation of foreign assistance activities to address fragmentation concerns. International Framework for Donor Coordination
The first formal coordination of official development assistance dates to the establishment of the OECD DAC in 1960, a forum created for the major bilateral aid donors, including the United States, to discuss issues and develop guidance related to aid and development. The United States has played a leading role in this process. Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
The final High Level Forum was held in Busan, Korea, in November 2011. Channeling aid through multilateral entities, however, is unlikely to reduce fragmentation or improve coordination while multilateral organizations are proliferating in much the same way as bilateral donors. This type of cooperation has worked both ways. Similarly, the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) was created in 2003 to manage the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) , through legislation that lists coordination among donor governments as an essential part of the global strategy to combat HIV/AIDS and requires a report describing the mechanisms used to coordinate programs between the United States and foreign governments, among other things. Concerns About Direct Budget Support and Funding Pools
Many development experts believe that the most effective means of harmonizing foreign assistance is not by coordinating among donors, but rather by channeling aid through recipient governments as direct budget support. In recent years, USAID has sought to increase the use of host country systems while limiting the associated risks. Agency and Personnel Incentives
Some observers assert that there are disincentives for donor coordination at every level of foreign assistance policy making and implementation. Lack of Inter-agency Coordination
It has long been recognized by analysts and other aid professionals that lack of coordination between the two dozen or so U.S. departments and agencies involved in foreign assistance is an obstacle to coordination with other donors, in addition to a source of inefficiency and incoherency within the U.S. aid structure. Conflicting Strategic Interests
The goal that drives most efforts to improve donor coordination—more efficient and effective development assistance—is only one of many U.S. foreign assistance objectives, some of which conflict with the donor coordination agenda. Participants at the Busan HLF attempted to strengthen the aid effectiveness agenda by incorporating these non-traditional donors and establishing a new Global Partnership to include civil society organizations and emerging donors, though on a voluntary basis. In the meantime, the United States may continue efforts to improve aid effectiveness and efficiency through maintaining strong relationships with bilateral donors that share U.S. interests and objectives in the developing world, building on the significant progress that has been made with respect to aid transparency, and considering how best to use multilateral development entities and partnerships to enhance the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance. | Many experts believe that improved coordination among donor governments and multilateral aid organizations could make global development assistance more efficient and effective. Proliferation of donors in recent decades, and fragmentation of aid among an increasing number of countries and projects, has increased calls for coordination. More than 45 countries and 21 multilateral organizations reported providing official development assistance (ODA) in 2010. An estimated 150 countries received this assistance in 2010, with the United States alone providing aid to 139 countries. Many developing countries host officials from dozens of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies each year. This diffuse aid structure, reformer advocates argue, leads to redundancy, policy incoherence, inefficient use of resources, and unnecessary administrative burdens on host countries.
While some observers argue that there are benefits to pluralism in foreign assistance, donors and recipients alike have expressed support for improved donor coordination and consolidation of aid activities. A series of high-level forums sponsored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, between 2002 and 2011, established widely accepted goals for key aspects of coordination, or harmonization, as well as mechanisms for evaluating progress toward those goals. The United States has supported these donor coordination efforts, both in international forums and within the U.S. foreign assistance structure. Channeling aid through multilateral institutions, posting coordination officers to act as liaisons between U.S. and foreign development agencies, and increasing transparency about U.S. aid flows and objectives are part of this effort. Donor coordination provisions are incorporated into the founding legislation of relatively new U.S. aid entities, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Furthermore, the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) established donor coordination and reduced fragmentation as foreign aid priorities.
Despite the global attention paid to the issue of aid effectiveness, monitoring surveys indicate that limited progress has been made toward coordination goals by the United States or donors in general. Persistent obstacles to increased donor coordination remain. Division of labor problems, political concerns about direct budget support, lack of inter-agency coordination, and personnel disincentives all play a role. Perhaps most important, the goals of official donor coordination efforts are not always consistent with the diverse objectives of U.S. foreign assistance policy or those of other bilateral donors. Nevertheless, traditional donors renewed their commitments at the Busan High Level Forum in November 2011, while at the same time expanding the scope of coordination efforts to include emerging donors, such as China and Brazil, and civil society organizations. A new entity conceived at the Busan forum, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, was established in 2012, with the support of the United States, to embody this new, broader framework for cooperation.
Related CRS reports include CRS Report R40213, Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, by [author name scrubbed] and Marian Leonardo Lawson, and CRS Report R42621, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2013 Budget and Appropriations, by [author name scrubbed], Marian Leonardo Lawson, and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL32829 | crs_RL32829_0 | Placing Trade Issues In Context
A number of economic factors influence U.S. trade policy: domestic economic conditions;growing trade deficits; the impact of trade (exports and imports) on various states, regions, andindustries; the importance of trade to the U.S. economy; and the geographical distribution of U.S.exports and imports; among other factors. It is also influenced by political factors, such as the roleand concerns of Congress in trade policy, the role and agenda of the President, and the differentperspectives that the two branches bring to the trade debate and foreign policy considerations. Trade Issues
The 109th Congess has already faced some trade issues, and will likely confront more,requiring consideration and debate during the second session. participation in the WTO as it does every five years under U.S. law. (8)
The Doha Development Agenda Negotiations. Compliance with WTO Decisions. (11)
Bilateral and Regional Trade Negotiations and Agreements
Following the consideration and approval by 109th Congress of two free trade agreements --the DR-CAFTA and the U.S.-Bahrain FTA -- during the first session, the Bush Administration willlikely ask for consideration of several new bilateral and regional free trade agreements during thesecond session. Furthermore, under the law granting trade promotion authority, the executive branch must consultwith the Congress as trade agreement negotiations proceed. Congressional leadership on trade policy in both political partieshave indicated that trade enforcement will be a priority for the remainder of the 109th Congress. However, allfour countries, as well as others, are seeking accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). (15)
Tariff Preferences. The Congress mightconsider legislation to reauthorize the EAA. In addition, on March 3, 2005 the Senate passed a joint resolution to block the implementation ofthe rule. (26)
China. Each issue or set of issues bears its own implications as Members of Congress weigh the merits anddisadvantages. In most cases, the 109th Congress will be considering and debating each issueseparately. However, the cumulative effect of each debate may have wider implications for U.S.trade policy. As the 109th Congress addresses these issues, its decisions may define U.S. trade policyin the long term. Free Trade or Protectionism? Shaping the International Trade System
The trade issues that the 109th Congress faces and how the Congress deals with them couldhave an impact on the international trading system. In some cases, these areas are interlinked, while in others,they are distinct. | The second session of the 109th Congress is expected to face an extensive trade agendaconsisting of a wide range of issues. In some respects these issues are distinct, each with its ownpolicy and economic implications. In other respects the issues are interrelated. They have emergedfrom common sets of domestic political, foreign policy, and economic factors and affect or areaffected by the concerns of Members of Congress, of other policymakers and of many interestgroups. These issues and how policymakers deal with them will define overall U.S. trade policy.
During the first session, the 109th Congress dealt with a number of critical trade issues. TheBush Administration requested and received a two-year extension of its trade promotion authority. The Congress also debated U.S. participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) as itconsidered, but did not pass, a congressional resolution to withdraw from the WTO. In addition, theAdministration sent and the Congress passed legislation to implement a free trade agreement withfive Central American countries plus the Dominican Republic, the DR-CAFTA, and passedimplementing legislation for a free trade agreement with Bahrain. Furthermore, the 109th Congressrepealed two trade programs that had been declared illegal by the WTO. During the second session,the 109th Congress may be called on to debate more free trade agreements, trade relations with China,and tariff preferences for developing countries, among other issues. The Congress might alsocontinue to monitor the Doha Development Agenda negotiations proceeding in the WTO.
Each issue or set of trade issues bears its own implications as Members of Congress weighthe merits and disadvantages. In most cases, the 109th Congress will be considering and debatingeach issue separately. However, the trade issues as a whole have implications for a wider debate onU.S. trade policy. As the 109th Congress addresses these issues, its decisions will have implicationsfor key questions that help define U.S. trade policy in the long-term.
This report will generally cover the trade issues as they unfold. However, it will not tracklegislation per se. The report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL31724 | crs_RL31724_0 | (15) The Second Circuit held that the President does not have theinherent authority, nor has Congress authorized him to declare U.S. citizens captured on U.S.territory in non-combat circumstances to be enemy combatants and place them under militaryjurisdiction. (35)
U.S. Precedent for Detention of Citizens as Enemy Combatants
The Department of Justice reads the Hamdi decision as supporting its reliance primarily ontwo cases to support its contention that the Constitution permits the detention without criminalcharge of American citizens under certain circumstances. (53) The Supreme Courtrejected a similar contention in the Civil War case of Ex parte Milligan , discussed infra , whereCongress had limited the authority to detain persons in military custody. Inasmuch as the President has determined that Al Qaedais not a state but a criminal organization to which the Geneva Convention does not apply, (54) and inasmuch as the HagueConvention would seem to apply to neither Al Qaeda nor the Taliban for the same reasons that havebeen given to preclude their treatment as prisoners of war, (55) it may be argued that AlQaeda is not directly subject to the law of war and therefore its members may not be detained as"enemy combatants" pursuant to it solely on the basis of their association with Al Qaeda. After the Quirin decision, the Attorney General asked Congress to pass legislation tostrengthen criminal law relating to internal security during wartime. The sole question before the court waswhether a U.S. citizen could lawfully be treated as a prisoner of war under U.S. law and the law ofwar. (183) On remand, the district court ordered the government toprovide additional information to support its conclusion that Hamdi is an enemy combatant. The Authorization to Use Force
The government argues, and the Supreme Court has agreed, that the identification anddetention of enemy combatants is encompassed within Congress' express authorization to thePresident "to use force against those 'nations, organizations, or persons he determines' wereresponsible for the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks." The scope of that authority, however,remains open to debate. (233) It has not been decidedwhether the phrase "in time of war" or reference to "the enemy" in the these articles of the UCMJalso require a declaration of war by Congress; however, the same reasoning applied in Averette (234) and followed in Robb could be found to apply here, at least with respect to persons who may not claim combatant status:
A recognition [that the conflict in Vietnam qualifies asa war in the ordinary sense of the word] should not serve as a shortcut for a formal declaration ofwar, at least in the sensitive area of subjecting civilians to militaryjurisdiction
On the other hand, the Manual for Courts Martial (MCM) defines "time of war" to include declaredwar as well as "a factual determination by the President that the existence of hostilities warrants afinding that a 'time of war'" exists for the punitive portions of the MCM. § 4001(a)
The petitioners in both Hamdi and Padilla asserted that Congress expressly has forbiddenthe detention of U.S. citizens without statutory authority, and that no statutory support for thedetention of U.S. citizens as "enemy combatants" can be found. While it appears thatexpress statutory authorization to detain persons arrested away from any battlefield would clarifyconstitutional separation of powers issues, some constitutional questions may remain. 1076 would authorize the President to detainU.S. citizens and residents who are determined to be "enemy combatants" in accordance withprocedures established by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State andthe Attorney General. Possible Legal Issues
Petitioners on behalf of U.S. citizens held in military custody argue that 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a),which prohibits the detention of U.S. citizens except as authorized by an act of Congress, prohibitsthe military's detention of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants. H.R. Due Process for Non-Resident Aliens. The Supreme Court validated such a program during World War II. (289)
History shows that even during declared wars, additional statutory authority has been seenas necessary to validate the detention of citizens not members of any armed forces. | The Supreme Court in 2004 issued three decisions related to the detention of "enemycombatants," including two that deal with U.S. citizens in military custody on American soil. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , a plurality held that a U.S. citizen allegedly captured during combat inAfghanistan and incarcerated at a Navy brig in South Carolina is entitled to notice and anopportunity to be heard by a neutral decision-maker regarding the government's reasons for detaininghim. The Court in Rumsfeld v. Padilla overturned a lower court's grant of habeas corpus to anotherU.S. citizen in military custody in South Carolina on jurisdictional grounds. The decisions affirmthe President's powers to detain "enemy combatants,"including those who are U.S. citizens, as partof the necessary force authorized by Congress after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. However the Court appears to have limited the scope of individuals who may be treated as enemycombatants pursuant to that authority, and clarified that such detainees have some due process rightsunder the U.S. Constitution. This report, which will be updated as necessary, analyzes the authorityto detain American citizens who are suspected of being members, agents, or associates of Al Qaeda,the Taliban and possibly other terrorist organizations as "enemy combatants."
The Department of Justice argues that the recent decisions, coupled with two World War IIera cases, Ex parte Quirin and In re Territo , support its contention that the President may order thatcertain U.S. citizens as well as non-citizens be held as enemy combatants pursuant to the law of warand Article II of the Constitution. Critics, however, question whether the decisions permit thedetention of U.S. citizens captured away from any actual battlefield, in order to prevent terrorist actsor gather intelligence; and some argue that Congress has prohibited such detention of U.S. citizenswhen it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a).
This report provides background information regarding the cases of two U.S. citizens deemed "enemy combatants," Yaser Esam Hamdi, who has been returned to Saudi Arabia, and JosePadilla, who remains in military custody while the government appeals a district court order tocharge him with a crime or release him. A brief introduction to the law of war pertinent to thedetention of different categories of individuals is offered, followed by brief analyses of the mainlegal precedents invoked to support the President's actions, as well as Ex parte Milligan , which someargue supports the opposite conclusion. A discussion of U.S. practice during wartime to detainpersons deemed dangerous to the national security follows, including legislative history that mayhelp to shed light on Congress' intent in authorizing the use of force to fight terrorism. Finally, thereport briefly analyzes the proposed Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, H.R. 1076 ,which would authorize the President to detain U.S. citizens and residents who are determined to be"enemy combatants" in certain circumstances. The report concludes that historically, even duringdeclared wars, additional statutory authority has been seen as necessary to validate the detention ofcitizens not members of any armed forces, casting in some doubt the argument that the power todetain persons arrested in a context other than actual hostilities is necessarily implied by anauthorization to use force. |
crs_RL34726 | crs_RL34726_0 | Victims, however, have sued numerous individuals and groups with less direct ties to the attackers, including defendants who allegedly provided monetary support to Al Qaeda prior to September 11, 2001. Plaintiffs argued that these Saudi defendants played a "critical role" in the September 11 attacks by giving money to Muslim groups, which in turn funded Al Qaeda. To address some issues involving the interpretation of the FSIA, among other related matters, Congress is considering the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act ( S. 2040 , H.R. 3815 ).This report addresses relevant legislative developments in its final section. Overview of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the FSIA) applies to all foreign states and their "agencies and instrumentalities." The FSIA denies subject matter jurisdiction over claims against foreign defendants entitled to immunity. Personal jurisdiction requires both statutory authority and satisfaction of Fifth Amendment due process standards. U.S. Court of Appeals Decision in In Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 ("Terrorist Attacks III")
In August 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) affirmed dismissals of claims against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a Saudi charity, Saudi princes, and a Saudi banker in In r e Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 . Instead, the court held that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction over the claims against the Saudi defendants. The legal bases for this holding were lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA and lack of personal jurisdiction. In December 2013, the Second Circuit ordered these claims against Saudi Arabia and its agencies or instrumentalities be reinstated in the interest of justice to determine whether the tort exception applies. Charity and Princes as "Agencies and Instrumentalities" of the Kingdom
Because a foreign state's "agency or instrumentality" is entitled to the same immunity to which the state itself is entitled under the FSIA, a key threshold question was whether the SHC and the princes sued in their official capacities qualified as agencies or instrumentalities under the FSIA. Specifically, the court concurred with the district court's finding that the princes sued in their personal capacities lacked sufficient contacts with the forum to permit personal jurisdiction under the constitutional "minimum contacts" standard. In Re Terrorist Attacks on Remand to the District Court
On remand to the district court, Judge Daniels of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the claims against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the SHC, holding the FSIA tort exception does not apply because of the "entire tort" rule, and suggested that the discretionary act exception to the tort exception might otherwise apply to preclude jurisdiction. Consequently, it is insufficient to overcome immunity to allege that an injury or damage occurred within the United States; it must also be demonstrated that the defendant's tortious conduct occurred within the United States. U.S. Court of Appeals' Dismissal of Claims Against Private Banks
In a separate decision in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against five defendants whose cases had been dismissed by the district court for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Plaintiffs brought claims against these defendants under a common-law tort theory as well as the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), and the Torture Victims' Protection Act (TVPA). Circuit for aiding and abetting and conspiracy liability. | Practical and legal hurdles, including the difficulty of locating hidden Al Qaeda members and the infeasibility of enforcing judgments in terrorism cases, hinder victims' attempts to establish liability in U.S. courts against, and recover financially from, those they argue are directly responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks. Instead, victims have sued numerous individuals and entities with only indirect ties to the attacks, including defendants who allegedly provided monetary support to Al Qaeda prior to September 11, 2001. Within the consolidated case In re Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, one such group of defendants was the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, several Saudi princes, a Saudi banker, and a Saudi charity. Plaintiffs argued that these Saudi defendants funded groups that, in turn, assisted the attackers.
A threshold question in In re Terrorist Attacks was whether U.S. courts have the power to try these Saudi defendants. In August 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed dismissals of all claims against the Saudi defendants, holding that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction over the claims. Specifically, the court of appeals held that in this case, U.S. courts lack (1) subject matter jurisdiction over the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, because the Kingdom is entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the FSIA) and no statutory exception to immunity applies; (2) subject matter jurisdiction over the Saudi charity and Saudi princes acting in their official capacities, because they are "agents or instrumentalities" of the Kingdom and thus, under the FSIA, are entitled to immunity to the same extent as the Kingdom itself; and (3) personal jurisdiction over Saudi princes sued in their personal capacities, because the princes had insufficient interactions with the forum to satisfy the "minimum contacts" standard for personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment due process clause.
In 2011, the Second Circuit reversed itself with respect to the immunity of non-terrorist states, finding that the tort exception under the FSIA does not exclude terrorist acts that take place within the United States. In 2013, the court ordered these claims against Saudi Arabia and its agencies or instrumentalities be reinstated in the interest of justice to determine whether the tort exception applies. The district court again dismissed the claims in 2015 on the basis that the "entire tort" defendants were alleged to have committed did not occur within the United States. This decision has been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
In a separate decision, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of claims against private Saudi banks on the basis that the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) does not permit secondary liability under an aiding-and-abetting theory. It also affirmed the dismissal of claims against these defendants brought under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victims Protection Act, as well as claims brought as common law torts.
To address some issues related to the interpretation of the FSIA, among other related matters, Congress is considering the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA; S. 2040, H.R. 3815).This report summarizes the FSIA and jurisdiction in cases against foreign defendants, analyzes the court decisions, and reviews legislative efforts to revise the FSIA and the ATA. |
crs_R41091 | crs_R41091_0 | PGRFA and Global Food Security
Many agricultural scientists and development practitioners believe that PGRFA are the foundation for modern agriculture and are essential for achieving food security. FAO estimates that more than three-quarters of the increased crop productivity of the past 30 years is the result of plant breeding. FAO and other agricultural experts believe that future global food security depends to a large extent on the continued improvement of food crops—for example, developing new varieties that are higher-yielding, resistant to pests and diseases, resistant to extreme weather events such as drought or flood, and/or regionally adapted to different environments and growing conditions. Plant genetic resources serve as the raw material used by plant breeders and farmers to create new crop varieties. PGRFA and Interdependency
All countries are interdependent with respect to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture—each relies on others for the genetic basis of its major food crops and for food security. Interdependence in central Africa ranges from 67% to 84%, and in south Asia ranges from 85% to 100%. The high degree of interdependence argues for continued access by countries to a wide range of plant genetic resources in other regions as essential for crop improvement and the development of modern agriculture. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (the Treaty on PGRFA) provides a general framework for conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources. The treaty sets up a multilateral system of access and benefit sharing, where all members, in exercise of their sovereignty, provide free (or nearly free) access to each other's plant genetic resources for research, breeding, conservation, and training. The multilateral approach allows members access to germplasm to promote food security and improve crop productivity, lowers transaction costs, and redistributes back to the governing body financial benefits derived from the commercial exploitation of the genetic resources. The United States signed the treaty on November 1, 2002, and it was submitted by the Bush Administration to the Senate for advice and ratification on July 7, 2008. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony in support of ratification of the treaty on November 10, 2009, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the treaty on December 14, 2010, but it was not considered by the full Senate before the close of the 111 th Congress. U.S. Financial Commitments
If the United States becomes a party to the treaty, some believe that other countries will expect the United States to contribute greater capacity-building resources for the conservation and use of agricultural biodiversity globally, and for the implementation of the MLS provisions by developing countries. | Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) serve as the raw material used by plant breeders and farmers to create new crop varieties. As such, they are viewed by many as the foundation for modern agriculture and as essential for achieving global food security. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that more than three-quarters of the increased crop productivity of the past 30 years is the result of plant breeding, and that future global food security depends to a large extent on the continued improvement of food crops—for example, developing new varieties that are higher-yielding, resistant to pests and diseases, resistant to extreme weather events such as drought or flood, and/or regionally adapted to different environments and growing conditions. All countries of the world are interdependent when it comes to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture; each relies on others for the genetic basis of its major food crops and for its food security. Interdependence for major food crops—the measure of reliance on nonindigenous staple crop germplasm that comes from other parts of the world—is over 50% for most regions, and ranges from 67% to 84% for countries in central Africa and from 85% to 100% for countries in south Asia. The high degree of interdependence argues for free access by countries to a wide range of plant genetic resources from other regions, in order to ensure future crop improvement and continued gains in agricultural productivity globally.
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (the Treaty on PGRFA) provides a general framework for conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources. The treaty sets up a multilateral system of access and benefit sharing, where all members, in exercise of their sovereignty, provide free (or nearly free) access to each other's plant genetic resources for research, breeding, conservation, and training. The multilateral approach allows members access to germplasm to promote food security and improve crop productivity, lowers transaction costs, and redistributes back to the governing body financial benefits derived from the commercial exploitation of the genetic resources.
Currently, 120 countries are parties to the treaty. The United States signed the treaty on November 1, 2002 (Treaty Doc. 110-19), and it was submitted by the Bush Administration to the Senate for advice and ratification on July 7, 2008. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony in support of ratification on November 10, 2009. On December 14, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted, without objection, the international treaty on plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (Treaty Doc. 110-19), but it was not considered by the entire Senate before the close of the 111th Congress. In the 112th session, Congress may assess several issues related to ratification of the Treaty on PGRFA, including the implications for the United States' position on the Convention for Biological Diversity; the implications for the United States' position on intellectual property rights; the expectations for future financial commitments under the treaty, especially for capacity-building in developing countries; and the potential implications, if any, for congressional proposals related to international agricultural research and development. |
crs_R42840 | crs_R42840_0 | Introduction
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA; P.L. 112-81 , §2824) directs the Secretary of Defense "to establish a policy to maximize savings for the bulk purchase of replacement renewable energy certificates (RECs) in connection with the development of facility energy projects using renewable energy sources." The provision requires that each service acquire replacement RECs through either a centralized purchasing authority within the respective department, or the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The 1978 National Energy Conservation Policy Act (NECPA, P.L. 109-58 , EPAct), in Section 203, established renewable energy goals for federal government agencies. The Department of Energy's Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) has advised, "Because it defines renewable energy broadly, many different REC types can count towards an agency's renewable energy consumption requirement under EPAct 2005." Section 203 of EPAct 2005 specifies that renewable energy must be consumed to be credited toward the renewable energy goal (42 U.S.C. 15852(a)). However, Congress has not provided federal agencies explicit statutory authority to purchase RECs for meeting EPAct goals. RECs became an attractive option for some federal facilities intent on meeting renewable energy mandates, particularly where renewable power was not readily available. Early on, federal agencies purchased RECs without purchasing the associated electricity in order to meet the building energy-intensity reduction goals of NECPA. Presently, 29 states and the District of Columbia have adopted binding RPS policies; 8 states have adopted nonbinding (voluntary) standards. However, the marketplace that evolved reflects the balkanized approach that states have individually taken in creating their own renewable portfolio standards. Essentially, there are two markets for renewable energy—voluntary and compliance. The voluntary market for renewable energy consists of businesses and individuals purchasing renewable energy beyond the amounts present in standard utility service or provided through government requirements. Compliance markets are those where state renewable portfolio standards or other legal mandates require utilities and electricity providers to provide or purchase renewable energy as part of the portfolio offered to their regular customers. The REC Market
RECs, also known as "Green Tags" or "Green Certificates," certify that a renewable power generator has produced a certain amount of power according to set requirements and standards. As an example, the Master Renewable Energy Certificate Purchase and Sale Agreement , which has its basis in state laws of California and New York, defines three REC products:
A standard REC includes all environmental attributes arising from the generation of electricity associated with the REC, whether or not the environmental attributes have been verified or certified and whether or not creditable under any existing applicable program; A basic REC consists solely of a certification of the generation of electricity by a renewable energy source, without any additional environmental attributes; A specified REC includes specified environmental attributes in addition to the generation of electricity by a renewable resource. They can advertise their credits on a tracking system bulletin board, use an aggregator or broker to either purchase the RECs directly or to assist the generator in finding a buyer, or use an auction or exchange platform to sell RECs. Currently, 10 regional REC tracking systems operate across the United State and Canada. In meeting past goals for using renewable-generated electricity, federal agencies were able to purchase RECs without purchasing the associated power. In 2008, GAO reported that federal agencies continued to rely on RECs rather than site-generated renewable energy to meet EPAct goals. However, RECs are not energy, and if DoD purchases them, they are an expenditure that does not contribute to energy security posture. | The Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 2005 established renewable energy goals for federal government agencies. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 directs the Secretary of Defense "to establish a policy to maximize savings for the bulk purchase of replacement renewable energy certificates in connection with the development of facility energy projects using renewable energy sources." This requires that each service purchase replacement renewable energy certificates (RECs) through either a centralized purchasing authority within the respective department, or the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). A REC certifies that a renewable power generator has produced a certain amount of power according to set requirements and standards. In meeting past goals for using renewable-generated electricity, federal agencies purchased RECs without purchasing the associated power. In 2008, GAO reported that federal agencies continued to rely on RECs rather than site-generated renewable energy to meet EPAct goals.
Though no statute has specifically authorized federal agencies to purchase RECs, they have become an attractive option for some federal facilities in meeting renewable energy mandates, particularly where renewable power was not readily available. Early on, federal agencies purchased RECs without purchasing the associated electricity in order to meet the building energy-intensity reduction goals of the National Energy Conservation Policy Act.
The Department of Energy's Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) has advised, "Because it defines renewable energy broadly, many different REC types can count towards an agency's renewable energy consumption requirement under EPAct 2005." Section 203 of EPAct 2005 specifies that renewable energy must be consumed to be credited toward the renewable energy goal (42 U.S.C. 15852(a)). However, Congress has not provided federal agencies explicit statutory authority to purchase RECs for meeting EPAct goals.
Presently, 29 states and the District of Columbia have adopted Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), while nine states and three power authorities have adopted nonbinding (voluntary) standards. There are two markets for RECs: voluntary and compliance. The voluntary market consists of businesses and individuals (and federal agencies) purchasing renewable energy beyond the amounts present in standard utility service contracts. Compliance markets are those where state renewable portfolio standards or other legal mandates require utilities and electricity providers to provide or purchase renewable energy as part of the portfolio offered to their regular customers. Renewable energy generators can sell RECs by advertising on a tracking system bulletin board, using a broker to assist in finding a buyer, or using an auction or exchange platform to sell RECs.
The REC marketplace that continues to evolve reflects a balkanized approach that states have individually taken in creating their own RPS. Ten regional REC tracking systems now operate across the United States and Canada. Purchasing RECs is not the same as purchasing energy, however. In states with an RPS, purchased power already includes a percentage of renewable-generated power that is included in the consumer's utility bill. Purchasing RECs in those states would represent additional costs without the associated power. DOD views such REC purchases as an expenditure that does not contribute to its energy security posture. |
crs_97-868 | crs_97-868_0 | Computers connected to the Internet are identified by a unique Internet Protocol (IP) number that designates their specific location, thereby making it possible to send and receive messages and to access information from computers anywhere on the Internet. The Domain Name System (DNS) is the distributed set of databases residing in computers around the world that contain the address numbers, mapped to corresponding domain names. The proposed new corporation was called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). However, because the Internet evolved from a network infrastructure created by the Department of Defense, the U.S. government originally owned and operated (primarily through private contractors such as the University of Southern California, SRI International, and Network Solutions Inc.) the key components of network architecture that enable the domain name system to function. The 1998 Memorandum of Understanding between ICANN and the Department of Commerce initiated a process intended to transition technical DNS coordination and management functions to a private-sector not-for-profit entity. These are
the Affirmation of Commitments (AoC) between DOC and ICANN, which was signed on September 30, 2009; the contract between IANA/ICANN and DOC to perform various technical functions such as allocating IP address blocks, editing the root zone file, and coordinating the assignment of unique protocol numbers; and the cooperative agreement between DOC and VeriSign to manage and maintain the official DNS root zone file. On March 14, 2014, NTIA announced its intention to transition its stewardship role and procedural authority over key domain name functions to the global Internet multistakeholder community. If a satisfactory transition can be achieved, NTIA will let its IANA functions contract with ICANN expire as early as September 30, 2015. NTIA has stated that it will not accept any transition proposal that would replace the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution. 4435 , the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2015. 113-235 ). Section 1639 of P.L. 113-235 ("Sense of Congress on the Future of the Internet and the .mil Top-Level Domain") states it is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should support the IANA transfer
only if assurances are provided for the protection of the current status of legacy top-level domain names and Internet Protocol address numbers, particularly those used by the Department of Defense and the components of the United States Government for national security purposes; mechanisms are institutionalized to uphold and protect consensus-based decision making in the multi-stakeholder approach; and existing stress-testing scenarios of the accountability process of the multi-stakeholder model can be confidently shown to work transparently, securely, and efficiently to maintain a free, open, and resilient Internet. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. Section 540 provides that during FY2015, NTIA may not use any appropriated funds to relinquish its responsibility with respect to Internet domain name system functions, including its responsibility with respect to the authoritative root zone file and the IANA functions. The DOTCOM Act of 2015 would prohibit NTIA from relinquishing responsibility over the Internet domain name system until GAO submits a report to Congress examining the implications of the proposed transfer. H.R. In the Senate, S.Res. 71 —designating the week of February 8 through February 14, 2015, as "Internet Governance Awareness Week"—was introduced by Senator Hatch on February 5, 2015. S.Res. 71 seeks to increase public awareness regarding NTIA's proposed transition, encourage public education about the importance of the transition process, and call the attention of the participants at the ICANN meeting in Singapore to the importance of designing accountability and governance reforms to best prepare ICANN for executing the responsibilities that it may receive under any transition of the stewardship of the IANA functions. Concluding Observations
Many of the technical, operational, and management decisions regarding the DNS can have significant impacts on Internet-related policy issues such as intellectual property, privacy, Internet freedom, e-commerce, and cybersecurity. The 114 th Congress is likely to closely examine NTIA's March 14, 2014, proposed transitioning of its authority over ICANN and the DNS to a wholly multistakeholder-driven entity. As a transition plan is developed by ICANN and the Internet community, Congress will likely monitor and evaluate that plan, and seek assurances that a DNS free of U.S. government stewardship will remain stable, secure, resilient, and open. As part of its examination, Congress will likely continue assessing to what extent ongoing and future intergovernmental telecommunications conferences constitute an opportunity for some nations to increase intergovernmental control over the Internet, and how effectively NTIA and other government agencies (such as the State Department) are working to counteract that threat. Ultimately, how these issues are addressed could have profound impacts on the continuing evolution of ICANN, the DNS, and the Internet. | Navigating the Internet requires using addresses and corresponding names that identify the location of individual computers. The Domain Name System (DNS) is the distributed set of databases residing in computers around the world that contain address numbers mapped to corresponding domain names, making it possible to send and receive messages and to access information from computers anywhere on the Internet. Many of the technical, operational, and management decisions regarding the DNS can have significant impacts on Internet-related policy issues such as intellectual property, privacy, Internet freedom, e-commerce, and cybersecurity.
The DNS is managed and operated by a not-for-profit public benefit corporation called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Because the Internet evolved from a network infrastructure created by the Department of Defense, the U.S. government originally owned and operated (primarily through private contractors) the key components of network architecture that enable the domain name system to function. A 1998 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between ICANN and the Department of Commerce (DOC) initiated a process intended to transition technical DNS coordination and management functions to a private-sector not-for-profit entity. Additionally, a contract between DOC and ICANN authorizes ICANN to perform various technical functions such as allocating IP address blocks, editing the root zone file, and coordinating the assignment of unique protocol numbers. By virtue of this contract and two other legal agreements, DOC exerts a legacy authority and stewardship over ICANN, and arguably has more influence over ICANN and the DNS than other national governments.
On March 14, 2014, the DOC's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) announced its intention to transition its stewardship role and procedural authority over key domain name functions to the global Internet multistakeholder community. If a satisfactory transition and Internet governance mechanism can be achieved, NTIA stated that it would let its contract with ICANN expire as early as September 30, 2015. NTIA has also stated that it will not accept any transition proposal that would replace the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution.
Legislation was introduced into the 113th Congress seeking to limit NTIA's ability to transfer its authority over certain domain name functions. Ultimately, the 113th Congress enacted two legislative provisions that address NTIA's proposed transition. Section 540 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) provided that during FY2015, NTIA may not use any appropriated funds to relinquish its responsibility with respect to Internet domain name system functions. Meanwhile, Section 1639 of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-235) contained Sense of Congress language on the future of the Internet and the .mil top-level domain.
In the 114th Congress, H.R. 805 (the DOTCOM Act of 2015) would prohibit NTIA from relinquishing responsibility over the Internet domain name system until the Government Accountability Office (GAO) submits a report to Congress examining the implications of the proposed transfer. In the Senate, S.Res. 71 (designating the week of February 8 through February 14, 2015, as "Internet Governance Awareness Week") seeks to increase public awareness regarding NTIA's proposed transition and emphasizes the importance of designing accountability and governance reforms to best prepare ICANN for executing the responsibilities that it may receive under the possible transition. S.Res. 71 was passed by the Senate on February 5, 2015.
The 114th Congress is likely to closely examine the benefits and risks of NTIA's proposed transition of its authority over ICANN. As a transition plan is developed by ICANN and the Internet community, Congress will likely monitor and evaluate that plan, and seek assurances that an Internet and domain name system free of U.S. government stewardship will remain stable, secure, resilient, and open. Congress will also likely continue to monitor ICANN's rollout of the new generic top level domain (gTLD) program, while also assessing to what extent ongoing and future intergovernmental telecommunications conferences constitute an opportunity for some nations to increase intergovernmental control over the Internet. How these and other DNS-related issues (such as intellectual property, cybersecurity, and privacy) are ultimately addressed and resolved could have profound impacts on the continuing evolution of ICANN, the DNS, and the Internet. |
crs_R42373 | crs_R42373_0 | Introduction
Electronic waste (e-waste) is a term that refers loosely to obsolete, broken, or irreparable electronic devices like televisions, computer central processing units (CPUs), computer monitors (flat screen and cathode ray tubes), laptops, printers, scanners, and associated wiring. E-waste has become a concern in the United States in part because of the high volumes in which it is generated and the hazardous ingredients it often contains (such as lead, mercury, and chromium). E-waste is essentially unregulated at the federal level—meaning it can be disposed of with common household garbage in municipal solid waste landfills (the primary disposal method) or incinerators. Although it is difficult to know exactly how much e-waste is exported, developing countries in Asia or Africa appear to be active importers of it. Many of these countries lack, or do not enforce, labor or environmental laws that would mitigate or prevent the harms associated with e-waste processing. The result is that e-waste recycling operations in those countries may pose a significant risk to human health and the environment. Recently, momentum has developed for domestic legislation restricting e-waste exports from the United States. These restrictions could take many forms, including a ban akin to the one proposed by the Ban Amendment to the Basel Convention, an e-waste export licensing system, or a quota on e-waste exports. These restrictions may be difficult to reconcile with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), one of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements, and could be susceptible to challenge before a WTO panel. Possible alternative policies to measures restricting e-waste exports could be, inter alia : increased investments in e-waste recycling infrastructure; policies stimulating greater domestic demand for e-waste; e-waste production restrictions; and the negotiation or participation in international agreements that govern trade in e-waste. The United States is a party to several agreements restricting hazardous waste trade, but it is not a party to the largest multilateral agreement in this field: the Basel Convention. Specifically, these restrictions may be deemed inconsistent with Articles XI:1, XIII:1, and I:1 of the GATT. Nevertheless, a WTO panel will uphold export restrictions that are inconsistent with Articles XI:1, XIII:1, and/or I:1 of the GATT if they fit under one of the exceptions listed in paragraphs (a) to (j) of Article XX and satisfy the requirements imposed by the Article XX chapeau. | Electronic waste (e-waste) is a term that loosely refers to obsolete, broken, or irreparable electronic devices like televisions, computer central processing units (CPUs), computer monitors, laptops, printers, scanners, and associated wiring. Because e-waste is generated in high volumes in the United States and contains hazardous materials like lead, mercury, and chromium, it is a growing area of domestic concern. Currently, e-waste is essentially unregulated at the federal level and can be disposed of with common household garbage in municipal solid waste landfills or incinerators. However, the international trade in e-waste is subject to the international agreements governing the hazardous waste trade. The United States is a party to several of these agreements, but it is not a party to the largest multilateral agreement in this field: the Basel Convention.
Although it is difficult to know exactly how much e-waste is exported from the United States, developing countries in Asia or Africa appear to be active importers of it. Many of these countries lack, or do not enforce, labor or environmental laws that would mitigate or prevent the harms to human and environmental health that are associated with e-waste processing. The result is that some overseas e-waste recycling operations may pose a significant risk to human and environmental well-being.
Recently, momentum has developed for domestic legislation restricting U.S. e-waste exports. These restrictions could take many forms, including a partial or total ban on e-waste exports, an e-waste export licensing system, or a quota on e-waste exports. However, these restrictions may be difficult to reconcile with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), one of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements, and could be susceptible to challenge before a WTO panel.
In particular, e-waste export restrictions may be deemed inconsistent with Articles XI:1, XIII:1, and I:1 of the GATT. If declared a violation of the GATT, e-waste export restrictions could be justified under Article XX of the GATT if they (1) fit under one of the exceptions listed in paragraphs (a) to (j) of Article XX of the GATT and (2) satisfy the requirements imposed by the Article XX chapeau. It would be difficult, however, for U.S. export restrictions on e-waste to meet this standard for justification if they are imposed without serious U.S. engagement in international negotiations on the hazardous waste trade or without the concurrent operation of comparable restrictions on domestic e-waste production. |
crs_R43302 | crs_R43302_0 | This report identifies and examines several of the major postsecondary education policy issues facing the 113 th Congress. For each of the broader issue areas identified, the report provides brief background information and an introduction and discussion of various aspects of the issue. Varied policy options are also identified for further consideration. The federal government affects and influences postsecondary education policy most directly through the programs and policies authorized by the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA; P.L. For example, issues pertaining to the education of noncitizens may be considered as part of legislative efforts related to comprehensive immigration reform (CIR). Issues pertaining to federal tax benefits supportive of postsecondary education may be considered as part of efforts to reform the IRC. Postsecondary Education Issues in the 113th Congress
This report presents an examination of the following postsecondary education issue areas in the sections that follow. College costs and prices. Student loans and personal bankruptcy. Noncitizens and eligibility for federal student aid. Postsecondary education tax benefits. Institutional quality. College completion. Campus safety. Pell Grant Policy Options
The 113 th Congress may explore reform options for the Pell Grant program as part of a cost-savings package to ensure adequate funding is provided in FY2015 to continue current maximum benefits, or it may consider broader policy reforms that have implications for the program over the long term, perhaps as part of reauthorization of the HEA. Some of the options that may garner consideration and factors that might be taken into account when considering potential reform options include the following:
Eligibility for and Targeting of Pell Grant Aid
Should students who enroll on a less-than-half time basis continue to be eligible for reduced Pell Grant aid? While numerous changes have been made to the federal student loan programs in recent years, the 113 th Congress may explore whether current federal student loan policy is optimal or whether additional changes should be considered, such as those that would affect loan terms and conditions, program administration, or program costs. Many of these borrowers are experiencing difficulty repaying their student loans. Adjust Borrowing Limits
The amounts that individuals may borrow in federal student loans are determined according to a complicated set of criteria and factors that differ by loan program, loan type, and class of borrower, and are dependent upon the cost of attendance (COA) of the student's school, the amount of other financial assistance the student receives, and—for need-based loans—the student's expected family contribution (EFC). Interest rate caps limit maximum rates. Should All Student Loans Be Excepted from Discharge in Bankruptcy? What Constitutes "Undue Hardship"? Fourteen tax benefits are currently available for college students and their parents to help pay for postsecondary education. Interaction with Traditional Student Aid
To what extent should postsecondary education tax benefits be coordinated with traditional federal student aid programs or be designed to target certain types of individuals? Should these distinctions be maintained? With the increase in online education, Congress may also address whether accrediting agencies should be required to establish separate standards for distance education. Several potential policy approaches that might be considered as means of supporting further increases in college completion are identified below. Hold institutions accountable for student completion-related outcomes. Enacting federal legislation to explicitly prohibit bullying on college campuses. | The 113th Congress may face an array of policy issues affecting postsecondary education. Many of these postsecondary education issues may be considered as part of efforts to reauthorize the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA). However, postsecondary education issues also may emerge as part of other legislative efforts such as comprehensive immigration reform (CIR), reform of the federal tax code, or the annual appropriations process.
This report identifies and briefly examines several postsecondary education policy issue areas that may be of general interest. For each of these broader issue areas, the report provides a brief background summary and an introduction to and discussion of various aspects of the issue. Varied policy options are also identified for further consideration. The following postsecondary education issue areas are examined in this report.
College costs and prices. What policy approaches are available that may help address concerns about ongoing increases in postsecondary education costs and the escalating prices colleges charge for tuition and fees?
The Federal Pell Grant program. What options might be considered to help ensure sustained funding for the Pell Grant program at current or other levels deemed to be adequate? Should changes be made to Pell Grant eligibility or award criteria to contain costs or otherwise adjust the targeting of aid?
Federal student loans. Are student loan terms and conditions and loan subsidy rates well aligned with program aims? Should policy options be considered that would affect the availability of loans, borrowing limits, interest rates, repayment relief, or the role of institutions of higher education in student borrowing?
Student loans and personal bankruptcy. Should all student loans continue to be excepted from discharge in bankruptcy, except in cases of undue hardship? What should constitute "undue hardship"?
Noncitizens and federal student aid. Should beneficiaries of comprehensive immigration reform legislation be granted eligibility to participate in HEA federal student aid programs?
Postsecondary education tax benefits. Are federal postsecondary education tax benefits appropriately targeted and effective in achieving their intended purposes? How do these benefits interact with traditional federal student aid?
Institutional quality. Should new institutional or programmatic eligibility requirements be considered to help ensure that recipients of federal student aid are obtaining a quality education from the institutions they attend? What would be appropriate standards for measuring or assessing institutional accountability for educational or student outcomes?
College completion. Are students completing college at desirable rates? Should new approaches be considered to further the aim of increasing college completion?
Campus safety. How might efforts to promote safety on college campuses be best supported while balancing the reporting and disclosure of campus safety information with the protection of student privacy? |
crs_R43638 | crs_R43638_0 | In troduction
This report explains the process for filling positions to which the President makes appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate (PAS positions). It also identifies, for the 111 th Congress, all nominations to executive-level full-time positions in the 15 executive departments. It excludes appointments to regulatory boards and commissions and independent and other agencies, which are covered in other CRS reports. Three distinct stages mark the appointment process: selection, clearance, and nomination by the President; consideration by the Senate; and appointment by the President. There are a number of steps in this stage of the process for most Senate-confirmed positions. The President may sign the commission at any time after confirmation, at which point the appointment becomes official. However, the salary prohibition does not apply
(1) if the vacancy arose within 30 days before the end of the session of the Senate;
(2) if, at the end of the session, a nomination for the office, other than the nomination of an individual appointed during the preceding recess of the Senate, was pending before the Senate for its advice and consent; or
(3) if a nomination for the office was rejected by the Senate within 30 days before the end of the session and an individual other than the one whose nomination was rejected thereafter receives a recess appointment. President Barack H. Obama submitted to the Senate 347 nominations to executive department full-time positions. Of these 347 nominations, 293 were confirmed; 16 were withdrawn; and 38 were returned to the President under the provisions of Senate rules. This report provides, for each executive department nomination that was confirmed in the 111 th Congress, the number of days between nomination and confirmation ("days to confirm"). For confirmed nominations, an average (mean) of 73.2 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 52.0. The second table presented, the list of Appointment Action within each department, relies primarily upon the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS). | This report explains the process for filling positions to which the President makes appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate (also referred to as PAS positions). It also identifies, for the 111th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions requiring Senate confirmation in the 15 executive departments. It excludes appointments to regulatory boards and commissions and independent and other agencies, which are covered in other CRS reports.
The appointment process for advice and consent positions consists of three main stages. The first stage is selection, clearance, and nomination by the President. This step includes preliminary vetting, background checks, and ethics checks of potential nominees. At this stage, if the position is located within a state, the President may also consult with Senators who are from his party. The second stage of the process is consideration of the nomination in the Senate, most of which takes place in committee. Finally, if a nomination is approved by the Senate, the President may then present the nominee with a signed commission, making the appointment official.
During the 111th Congress, the President submitted to the Senate 347 nominations to executive department full-time positions. Of these 347 nominations, 293 were confirmed; 16 were withdrawn; and 38 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, an average of 73.2 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 52.0.
The President made 10 recess appointments to full-time positions in executive departments during the 111th Congress.
Information for this report was compiled from data from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) http://www.congress.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2008 "Plum Book" (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL34764 | crs_RL34764_0 | During 2007 and 2008, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that administers Medicaid, issued a number of regulations for this program. 110-252 , Section 7001), six of these seven rules were under a congressional moratorium preventing further administrative action until April 1, 2009. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ) extended the existing moratorium on the final or interim final regulations on case management services, provider taxes, and school-based administration and transportation services until July 1, 2009. In addition, P.L. 111-5 prohibited all administrative actions to implement the final rule on outpatient hospital services until after June 30, 2009. This law included a "sense of Congress" that the Secretary of HHS should not promulgate final regulations for the cost limits on public providers, graduate medical education, and rehabilitation services. Since that time, these rules have been affected by other federal actions (see Table 1 ). The rule on cost limits for public providers was vacated by a federal judge. The Obama Administration has taken additional actions on the remaining six rules. The three rules regarding school-based administration and transportation services, outpatient hospital services, and case management have been rescinded in part or altogether. Enforcement of a portion of the rule on provider taxes has been delayed. Finally, the two proposed rules on rehabilitation services and payments for graduate medical education were withdrawn. This rule was withdrawn by the Obama Administration. P.L. In addition, on June 30, 2009, the Obama Administration issued a final rule that rescinded the school-based administration/transportation rule in its entirety. | This report provides a summary of seven proposed, interim final, and final rules affecting the Medicaid program that were issued by the George W. Bush Administration during 2007 and 2008. These rules addressed Medicaid and graduate medical education, cost limits on public providers, provider taxes, rehabilitation services, case management, school-based administration and transportation services, and outpatient hospital services. Six of the seven rules (excluding the rule on outpatient hospital services) were under a congressional moratorium on further administrative action until April 1, 2009. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) extended the existing moratorium on the final or interim final regulations on case management services, provider taxes, and school-based administration and transportation services until July 1, 2009. In addition, P.L. 111-5 prohibited all administrative actions to implement the final rule on outpatient hospital services until after June 30, 2009. This law also included a "sense of Congress" that the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) should not promulgate final regulations for the cost limit on public providers, graduate medical education, and rehabilitation services.
Other actions regarding these rules have occurred since they were first proposed or issued by the Bush Administration. The final rule affecting cost limits on public providers was vacated by a federal judge in May 2008. The Obama Administration has taken additional actions on the remaining rules. The three rules regarding school-based administration and transportation services, outpatient hospital services, and case management have been rescinded in part or altogether. Enforcement of a portion of the rule on provider taxes was delayed until June 30, 2010. Finally, two other proposed rules on rehabilitation services and payments for graduate medical education were withdrawn. These rules were not affected by the health reform legislation that became law earlier this year—the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148), provisions of which were amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA, P.L. 111-152). |
crs_RL32442 | crs_RL32442_0 | Cotton Production and Market Revenue
Cotton Production
Nationally, according to the Census of Agriculture, there were 24,805 U.S. farms producing cotton in 2002. Domestic Use and Exports of U.S. Cotton
The United States is itself a large user of its own cotton. Efforts to boost economic growth inpoorer regions of the world have contributed to the import competition. U.S. Market Prices and Farm Cash Receipts
U.S. farm-level cotton prices are determined by world supply and demand conditions, which are substantially influenced by U.S. cotton production and U.S.demand for cotton textiles. Over the 13-year period from 1991 through 2003 shown in the graph, farm prices averaged $0.57/lb. Total cotton subsidy payments to farmers averaged $0.21/lb. The practical result of these farm subsidies is that they stabilize the revenue of cotton farmers. Therefore, the combinedannual average value of the market price and the farm subsidy was $0.78/lb., rangingfrom a low of $0.71 to a high of $0.86. However, data published by the International Cotton AdvisoryCommittee (ICAC) (6) indicate that it is one of thelargest. Subsidies per unit werelargest in Spain ($1.04/lb.) While, on average, variable cash costs weremore than covered by market prices, there was not enough to pay for the remainingfixed costs. (10) Also, U.S. costsmay be about double or more than costs in Brazil andsome of the African countries that compete with the United States in export markets. In comparison, annual variable cash costs of production averaged $0.50/lb.,and total economic costs averaged $0.78/lb. Brazil also argues that the "Step 2" provisions of the U.S. cotton program, as well as the favorable terms provided under U.S. export credit programs and theMarket Access Program (MAP), function as export subsidies and are inconsistentwith U.S.-WTO obligations regarding export subsidies. U.S. agricultural subsidies and import barriers in general and for cotton in particular have become a complicating factor in negotiating a Free Trade Area of theAmericas that would encompass 34 countries. U.S. Cotton Support Programs
Price Support Programs
To stabilize and support farm incomes, in the face of highly variable prices caused by fluctuating world supply and demand conditions, major crops produced inthe United States, including cotton, have been subsidized since the 1930s. Counter-cyclical payments are similar, but not identical to target price deficiency payments that were made from 1973 through 1995. The difference is that target pricedeficiency payments were made on each farmer's actual production of cotton eachyear whereas farmers now need not produce cotton to receive cotton counter-cyclicalpayments. From 1991 through 2003, the federal cost of crop insurance annually has covered an average 10.9 million planted cotton acres. Crop Disaster Payments. Thisauthority to reduce the AWP is unique to cotton and creates the opportunity forincreased marketing loan program subsidies, even when the price of upland cottonis higher than the loan rate. Cost of U.S. Cotton Production, Crop Years1991-2003 Est. | While cotton, along with other major crops, has been subsidized by the U.S. federal government since the 1930s, cotton subsidies are now in the focus of an international spotlight. The nature andextent of these subsidies have become a roadblock in negotiating multilateral and bilateral tradeagreements. Sharp criticism came from the West and Central African countries during various DohaRound meetings. Also, efforts to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FAA) foundered at leastpartially over U.S. cotton subsidies. Now, Congress is watching to see if the United States will berequired by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to revise its cotton subsidies in response to adispute lodged by Brazil.
One reason the international spotlight is on U.S. cotton subsidies, in contrast to other subsidizing nations, is the sheer size of U.S. cotton production and exports. The United States is thesecond-largest producer of cotton in the world, and the largest exporter. Therefore, U.S. cottonsubsidies have global repercussions. Domestically, what happens to cotton subsidies is importantto a broad group of interests because grains, oilseeds, and peanuts receive similar support.
U.S. cotton production and export subsidies provide comprehensive support for producers. Farmers with a history of cotton production are eligible for direct and counter-cyclical payments. On their actual production, farmers may utilize the marketing loans and loan deficiency payments. Protection against low yields is available through subsidized crop insurance, and in some yearsCongress has approved additional disaster payments. When U.S. market prices rise, and there is arisk that competitors might capture more of the world export market and even deliver to U.S. yarnand fabric mills, so-called Step 2 user payments are made to U.S. exporters and mills if theypurchase U.S. cotton.
From 1991 through 2003 farm subsidies for cotton production have cost $1.76 billion per year, on average. This is the annual equivalent of $0.21/lb. of U.S. production. While the United Statesis not alone in subsidizing cotton, this level of support is nearly the highest in the world, accordingto the International Cotton Advisory Committee.
When the $0.21/lb. average crop year farm subsidy is added to the $0.57/lb. average market price, it has given producers an average revenue of $0.78/lb. from 1991 through 2003. This levelof revenue is more than enough to cover average variable cash costs of $0.50/lb., and just enoughto cover average total economic costs of $0.78/lb. According to the International Cotton AdvisoryCommittee, variable cash costs of some of the competing cotton exporting nations are about halfthose of the United States.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R45035 | crs_R45035_0 | Introduction
Some policymakers have shown interest in having the federal government offset some of the costs families incur for child care, most recently as part of the tax reform debate in the 115 th Congress. The child and dependent care tax credit (CDCTC or "child care credit") is designed to reimburse taxpayers for a portion of their out-of-pocket child care expenses. The report then turns to an analysis of four selected policy changes to the current credit: (1) making the current credit refundable, (2) converting the credit to a deduction, (3) increasing the credit rate, and (4) increasing the amount of qualifying expenses. Estimates presented in this report are derived using 2014 calendar year data. Hence, estimates reflect 2014 credit amounts as well as the impact of policy options in 2014. Hence, the "bottom" quintile (i.e., quintile 1) represents the 20% of taxpayers with the lowest income, and the top quintile (i.e., quintile 5) represents the 20% of taxpayers with the highest income. Taxpayers in the lowest income quintile have a median out-of-pocket child care expense of $857, with some taxpayers in this quintile incurring an estimated $5,000 in out-of-pocket child care and others incurring no out-of-pocket child care expenses. The current CDCTC is a nonrefundable credit, meaning the value of the credit is limited by the taxpayer's income tax liability. Since many low-income taxpayers have little to no income tax liability, they generally do not benefit from nonrefundable tax credits. Making the credit refundable would benefit lower-income populations. Some taxpayers may receive a smaller benefit in terms of tax savings with a deduction than with a credit. What Is the Impact of Increasing the Amount of Qualifying Expenses? Policymakers may be interested in increasing the maximum amount of expenses that can used to calculate the credit. Once again, the main driver of these estimates is likely that higher-income taxpayers tend to have higher expenses than lower- and moderate- income taxpayers. Lower out-of-pocket child care expenses does not necessarily mean that lower-income population do not have child care needs; rather, it may indicate that these needs are met informally—such as having a neighbor or relative watch a child during the workday. Policy options that increase the amount of allowable expenses, increase the credit rate, or are based on the amount of expenses (such as a deduction) will tend to provide the largest benefit to the higher-income taxpayers who have higher child care expenditures to begin with (see Figure 5 ). Policy Simulation Models
This report examines four options for altering the CDCTC: (1) making the credit refundable, (2) converting the credit to a deduction in determining AGI, (3) raising the credit rate to 50% of qualified child care expenses, and (4) doubling the maximum qualified child care expenses allowed by the credit. | Some policymakers have shown interest in having the federal government offset some of the costs families incur for child care. The child and dependent care tax credit (CDCTC or "child care credit") reimburses some taxpayers for a portion of their out-of-pocket child care expenses. The CDCTC is a nonrefundable tax credit, meaning taxpayers with little or no income tax liability—including many low-income taxpayers—receive little if any credit. Using the TRIM3 model, this report provides estimates of key characteristics of the CDCTC under current law and estimates the distributional effect of selected policy options that would change the credit. Estimates presented in this report are derived using 2014 calendar year data. Hence, estimates reflect 2014 credit amounts as well as the impact of policy options if implemented in 2014.
Analysis of the credit under current law indicates
A significant amount of the benefit goes to higher-income taxpayers. An estimated 35% of the tax units claiming the credit were in the highest-income quintile (top 20%) in 2014. In contrast, 1% of all CDCTC recipient families were in the lowest-income quintile in the same year. Over 7 out of 10 CDCTC families were married couple families where both parents worked, with the remaining being single parents who worked. The typical (median) amount and range of spending on child care increased with income among credit recipients.
This report estimates the distributional impact of four policy options to modify the CDCTC.
1. Making the credit refundable. Refundability would primarily benefit families in the bottom two income quintiles. 2. Convert the credit into a deduction. Converting the credit to an above-the-line deduction would primarily benefit the top 20% of taxpayers. Some taxpayers in the second-lowest income quintile would receive a smaller benefit in terms of tax savings with a deduction than with a credit. 3. Increasing the credit rate. Increasing the credit rate to a uniform 50% would primarily benefit the top 40% of taxpayers. 4. Increase the maximum amount of expenses. Doubling the amount of allowable expenses that could be applied toward the credit would primarily benefit the top 40% of taxpayers.
One major factor driving these estimates is the underlying distribution of out-of-pocket child care expenses. Lower-income families with children tend to have significantly lower out-of-pocket child care expenses than do higher-income taxpayers. Lower out-of-pocket child care expenses do not necessarily mean that lower-income people do not have child care needs; rather, it may indicate that these needs are met informally. In contrast, policy options that increase the amount of allowable expenses, increase the credit rate, or are based on the amount of expenses (like a deduction) will tend to provide the largest benefit to the higher-income taxpayers who have higher child care expenditures to begin with. |
crs_RL30074 | crs_RL30074_0 | The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is probably the most widely used measure of inflation. A number of federal government programs, such as Social Security benefits and civil service retirement, are tied to increases in the CPI. In addition, the personal income tax rate schedule is indexed to the CPI. Thus, the behavior of the CPI has major consequences for a significant portion of the population; but many may be unfamiliar with the details of its calculation. The "all-items" CPI is the index most often referred to and it is a composite index, a weighted average, based on the indexes for all of the goods and services whose prices are collected. Considerable effort is made to ensure that the CPI is a meaningful, reliable measure of changes in the price level. Taking quality changes into account in a price index is difficult, but BLS does attempt to make some adjustments to the CPI for quality improvements in a number of areas, including automobiles, apparel, and a number of consumer electronic goods, personal computers in particular. Since 1983 for the CPI-U and 1985 for the CPI-W, changes in the cost of home ownership have been based on the concept of "rental equivalence." For most of these cities, however, indexes are not published on a monthly basis. CPI Calculations
The CPI is an indicator of changes in the price level. | The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is perhaps the most widely reported measure of inflation. A number of federal government programs are regularly adjusted to account for changes in the CPI, such as Social Security benefits and the personal income tax rate schedule. Thus, the behavior of the CPI has important consequences for a large number of people. Many, however, may be unfamiliar with how the CPI is estimated.
For Congress, the CPI is of particular interest because of its significant effect on the federal budget. Changes in the CPI can have substantial effects on both revenues and outlays, and those changes may either reflect underlying economic conditions or result from methodological changes in the way the CPI is calculated.
The CPI is based on a number of sample surveys. One of these surveys estimates the purchasing patterns of the "typical" household to determine how that household spends its money. Another survey determines where those households shop, and a third survey collects prices on the goods and services purchased by those households.
The CPI measures the price level relative to a particular period. Currently, the CPI number for each month is a measure of the price level relative to what it was between 1982 and 1984. The CPI is available for a number of metropolitan areas but it does not allow comparisons of the cost of living in different cities. |
crs_R40919 | crs_R40919_0 | As this report illustrates, the nonprofit and charitable sector represents a significant, highly diverse component of the U.S. economy. The recent economic downturn increased the demand for many of the goods and services provided by charitable organizations, while simultaneously placing the same organizations under increased financial constraints. Charitable organizations are defined as organizations with 501(c)(3) public charity status, and are a subcategory of the broader nonprofit sector. The second section provides an overview of the charitable sector, focusing specifically on employment within the sector, as well as revenue and assets of charitable organizations. The fourth section reviews the relationship between the charitable sector and government. Finally, the report concludes with policy considerations and options. For purposes of this report, the term "nonprofit sector" is generally intended to include all organizations with federal tax-exempt status. Size and Scope of the Nonprofit and Charitable Sectors
Employment
Measuring employment in the nonprofit and charitable sector is not an easy task. Nearly 10% of America's workforce works in the nonprofit sector, with more than 7% of the workforce employed by charities. Charities reporting as of July 2009 held $2.6 trillion worth of assets. Specifically, health charities hold nearly 36% of assets while only 5.5% of charitable organization filing Form 990 are in the health sector. Contribution of Charities to GDP
To evaluate the contribution of nonprofits and charitable organization to total output, data from the agency charged with measuring the size of the U.S. economy, the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce (BEA), is utilized. How Are Charities Funded? There is substantial attention given to this revenue source, as it is believed that private contributions to charities are likely to fluctuate in response to changes in economic conditions and the tax treatment of contributions. Investment income includes the sales of securities, interest, and dividends. These fee-for-service organizations are much less reliant on private contributions than other types of charities. Overall, understanding what types of charitable organizations have a greater reliance on specific sources of revenue may help policymakers understand the potential for external economic conditions to impact the well-being of the charitable sector. Charities where a larger proportion of revenue come from private contributions, such as arts, culture, and humanities and environment and animals, are more likely to be impacted by changes apt to cause fluctuations in private giving, such as changes to the tax code. Similarly, Figure 5 shows that the share of government grants and payments in total revenue varies substantially across different types of charities. The Charitable Sector's Relationship with Government
Various charitable activities are subsidized by the federal tax code or funded via government grants. First, the government provides grants directly to charitable organizations providing public goods. Health care provision may also have positive external effects. Recently, the federal government has begun undertaking social innovation initiatives involving nonprofits. Policy Considerations
This section considers a variety of policy issues, drawn from a number of sources. Other proposals that more than half of respondents identified as somewhat or extremely useful included
expansion of tax incentives to encourage volunteering; student loan forgiveness for those working in the nonprofit sector; a credit for investment making low-cost private capital available; restoration of the estate tax; a commitment to support research and improve data on the nonprofit sector; expansion of national service programs like Americorps; replacement of the charitable contribution deduction with tax credits; a federal agency to represent and promote the interests of the nonprofit sector; strengthening of government oversight agencies; clarifying the community benefits standard (this issue relates to nonprofit hospitals); eliminating or reducing the limits on lobbying activities; and providing a special category of "hybrid" organizations, such as social enterprises (organizations that operate businesses but with a social mission, such as hiring the hard to employ or using the surplus for a charitable purpose). The Itemized Deduction for Charitable Contributions
A number of proposals have developed over the years relating to the itemized deduction for charitable contributions. | A number of policy issues have direct or indirect consequences for the nonprofit and charitable sector, including the establishment of a social innovation initiative, changes in the tax treatment of charitable donations, responses to the economic downturn, and health care reform. The nonprofit and charitable sector represents a significant portion of the U.S. economy. The sector is also highly diverse. Having a greater understanding of the nonprofit and charitable sector as a whole may help policymakers evaluate proposals that may impact the sector.
The first section of this report provides a formal definition of the nonprofit and charitable sector. The term "nonprofit sector" is generally intended to refer to organizations with federal tax-exempt status; "charitable sector" refers to the subset of these organizations that have 501(c)(3) public charity status.
The next section reports on the size and scope of the charitable sector. Charitable organizations are estimated to employ more than 7% of the U.S. workforce, while the broader nonprofit sector is estimated to employ 10% of the U.S. workforce. In 2009, the charities filing Form 990 with the Internal Revenue Service reported approximately $1.4 trillion in revenue and reported holding nearly $2.6 trillion in assets. Nonprofit institutions serving households (largely charities) constituted more than 5% of GDP in 2008.
The third section of this report examines how charities are funded. Revenue comes from a variety of sources, including private contributions, payments (fees for service), government grants, and investment income. Revenue sources vary significantly across different types of charities: charities involved in health care (including nonprofit hospitals) and educational institutions rely heavily on private payments while arts, culture, and humanities charities and environment and animals charities are more reliant on private contributions. Private contributions to charities are of particular interest as charitable giving may respond to changes in the tax code. As the recent economic downturn has increased the demand for goods and services provided by a number of charities, the impact of the business cycle on funding is also discussed.
The fourth section provides an overview of the charitable sector's relationship with government. From a theoretical perspective, economics suggests that the government should subsidize activities that are either public goods or have positive external effects. It can be argued that some charitable activities possess these qualities. The costs to the government of providing grants, allowing charitable contributions to be tax deductible, exempting investment income of charities from tax, and providing property and sales tax exemptions are presented. The oversight role of the government is also reviewed.
Finally, the report concludes with policy considerations. This section opens by surveying what policy options are considered most important by charitable organizations themselves. Building on this, a number of policy options are examined, including (1) increasing government grants and subsidies to charitable organizations; (2) creating an oversight agency within the federal government to gather data, conduct research, and advocate for the charitable sector; (3) implementing policies designed to help charities and foundations in economic downturns; (4) changing the itemized deduction for charitable contributions by limiting, converting to a credit, or making the deduction more widely available; and (5) a variety of other tax issues. |
crs_R45040 | crs_R45040_0 | The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) establishes the circumstances under which foreign nationals may be admitted temporarily or come to live permanently. The INA provides for the admission of nonimmigrants for designated periods of time and a variety of specific purposes. Achieving an optimal balance among policy priorities—ensuring national security, facilitating trade and commerce, supporting fair labor practices, protecting public health and safety, and fostering international cooperation—remains a challenge. Admission of Nonimmigrants
The Department of State (DOS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Labor (DOL) each play key roles in administering the law and setting policies on the admission of nonimmigrants. A DOS consular officer (at the time of application for a visa) and a CBP immigration inspector (at the time of application for admission) must be satisfied that an alien is entitled to a nonimmigrant status. The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish eligibility for nonimmigrant status and the type of nonimmigrant visa for which the application is made. Nonimmigrants who remain in the United States past their lawful period of admission are known as overstays. Exclusion and Removal
Inadmissibility
DOS consular officers (when the alien is applying abroad), CBP inspectors (when the alien is at a United States port of entry), and USCIS adjudicators (when the alien is applying for an extension or adjustment of status) must confirm that the alien is not ineligible for a visa under the "grounds for inadmissibility" found in §212(a) of the INA. A B-2 visa holder may not engage in any employment in the country. Many foreign nationals on J-1 visas are permitted to work as part of their cultural exchange program participation. These data enumerate arrivals, thus counting frequent travelers multiple times. Notably, Mexican nationals with border crossing cards and Canadian nationals traveling for business or tourist purposes are not required to fill out I-94 forms and are thus not reflected in CBP data tables. Analysis of Nonimmigrants by Visa Category
Temporary Visas Issued45
In FY2016, DOS consular officers issued 10.4 million nonimmigrant visas, down from a peak of 10.9 million in FY2015. Temporary workers (including H visa holders, treaty traders and investors, intracompany transferees, and representatives of foreign media) received 8.5% of all nonimmigrant visas issued in FY2016, followed by students and exchange visitors with 4.9% and 3.7%, respectively (see Figure 1 ). Temporary Admissions46
During FY2015, CBP inspectors granted 181.3 million nonimmigrant admissions to the United States, according to DHS workload estimates. Analysis of Nonimmigrants by Region
Temporary Visas Issued47
Visas issued to foreign nationals from Asia made up 45.3%, or 4.7 million, of the 10.4 million nonimmigrant visas issued in FY2016 (see Figure 7 ). South America accounted for 1.8 million of the nonimmigrant visa issuances. Eleven states and Guam were identified as the destination for 1 million or more nonimmigrant admissions each in FY2015. California and Florida were the top two destination states, with over 10 million admissions each (see Figure 11 ); over 90% of these admissions were tourists and business travelers (B visa holders). In FY2014, USCIS reported that there were 136,617 F-1 foreign students approved for OPT, up from 90,896 in FY2009. Delineating Current Law for Nonimmigrant Visas | U.S. law provides for the temporary admission of foreign nationals, who are known as nonimmigrants. Nonimmigrants are admitted for a designated period of time and a specific purpose. There are 24 major nonimmigrant visa categories, which are commonly referred to by the letter and numeral that denote their subsection in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); for example, B-2 tourists, E-2 treaty investors, F-1 foreign students, H-1B temporary professional workers, J-1 cultural exchange participants, or S-5 law enforcement witnesses and informants.
A U.S. Department of State (DOS) consular officer (at the time of application for a visa) and a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) inspector (at the time of application for admission) must be satisfied that an alien is entitled to nonimmigrant status. The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish eligibility for nonimmigrant status and the type of nonimmigrant visa for which the application is made. Both DOS consular officers (when the alien is applying for nonimmigrant status abroad) and DHS inspectors (when the alien is entering the United States) must also determine that the alien is not ineligible for a visa under the INA's "grounds for inadmissibility," which include criminal, terrorist, and public health grounds for exclusion.
In FY2016, DOS consular officers issued 10.4 million nonimmigrant visas, down from a peak of 10.9 million in FY2015. There were approximately 8 million tourism and business visas, which comprised more than three-quarters of all nonimmigrant visas issued in FY2016. Other notable groups were temporary workers (883,000, or 8.5%), students (513,000, or 4.9%), and cultural exchange visitors (380,000, or 3.7%). Visas issued to foreign nationals from Asia made up 45% of nonimmigrant visas issued in FY2016, followed by North America (20%), South America (17%), Europe (11%), and Africa (5%).
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors approved 181.3 million temporary admissions of foreign nationals to the United States during FY2016. CBP data enumerate arrivals, thus counting frequent travelers multiple times. Mexican nationals with border crossing cards and Canadian nationals traveling for business or tourist purposes accounted for the vast majority of admissions, representing approximately 104.7 million entries in FY2016. In FY2015, California and Florida were the top two destination states for nonimmigrant visa holders, with each state being listed as the destination for more than 10 million nonimmigrant admissions. In addition, 10 other states and the territory of Guam were listed as the destination for more than 1 million nonimmigrant admissions each in that year.
Current law and regulations set terms for nonimmigrant lengths of stay in the United States, typically include foreign residency requirements, and often limit what aliens are permitted to do while in the country (e.g., engage in employment or enroll in school). Some observers assert that the law and regulations are not uniformly or rigorously enforced. Achieving an optimal balance among policy priorities, such as ensuring national security, facilitating trade and commerce, protecting public health and safety, and fostering international cooperation, remains a challenge. |
crs_R45200 | crs_R45200_0 | Introduction
By the end of 2017, the People's Republic of China (PRC) had the world's largest number of internet users, estimated at over 750 million people. At the same time, the country has one of the most sophisticated and aggressive internet censorship and control regimes in the world. PRC officials have argued that internet controls are necessary for social stability, and are intended to "enhance people's cultural taste" and "strengthen spiritual civilization." The PRC government employs a variety of methods to control online content and expression, including website blocking and keyword filtering; regulating and monitoring internet service providers; censoring social media; and arresting "cyber dissidents" and bloggers who broach sensitive social or political issues. The government also monitors the popular mobile app WeChat. WeChat began as a secure messaging app, similar to WhatsApp, but it is now used for much more than just messaging and calling (e.g., mobile payments)—and all the data shared through the app is also shared with the Chinese government. In its 2017 Annual Report, Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontières, RSF) called China the "world's biggest prison for journalists" and warned that the country "continues to improve its arsenal of measures for persecuting journalists and bloggers." China ranks 176 th out of 180 countries in RSF's 2017 World Press Freedom Index, surpassed only by Turkmenistan, Eritrea, and North Korea in restrictions on press freedom. At the end of 2017, RSF asserted that China was holding 52 journalists and bloggers in prison. U.S. Government Activity to Promote Global Internet Freedom
The U.S. government continues to advocate policies to promote internet freedom in China's increasingly restrictive environment and to mitigate the global impact of Chinese government censorship. The Department of State, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and Congress have taken an active role in fighting global internet censorship. These programs support digital safety, policy advocacy, technology, and research to help global internet users overcome barriers to accessing the internet. OIF manages and supports the research, development, deployment, and use of BBG-funded internet freedom (IF) technologies. In 2000, Congress created the CECC to monitor China's compliance with international human rights standards, to encourage the development of the rule of law in the PRC, and to establish and maintain a list of victims of human rights abuses in China. On April 26, 2018, the CECC held a hearing on "digital authoritarianism and the global threat to free speech." No legislation has been introduced in the 115 th Congress related to global internet freedom in authoritarian regimes. U.S. Industry Activity to Promote Internet Freedom: The Global Network Initiative18
In response to criticism, particularly of their operations in China, a group of U.S. information and communications technology (ICT) companies, along with nongovernmental organizations, investors, and universities, formed the Global Network Initiative (GNI) in 2008. The GNI aims to promote best practices related to the conduct of U.S. companies in countries with poor internet freedom records. Congressional interest in the internet in China has been tied to human rights concerns in a number of ways, including
the use of the internet as a U.S. tool for promoting freedom of expression and other rights in China; the use of the internet by political dissidents in the PRC, and the political repression that such use often provokes; and the role of U.S. internet companies in both spreading freedom in China and complying with or enhancing PRC censorship and social control efforts. | By the end of 2017, the People's Republic of China (PRC) had the world's largest number of internet users, estimated at over 750 million people. At the same time, the country has one of the most sophisticated and aggressive internet censorship and control regimes in the world. PRC officials have argued that internet controls are necessary for social stability, and intended to protect and strengthen Chinese culture. However, in its 2017 Annual Report, Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontières, RSF) called China the "world's biggest prison for journalists" and warned that the country "continues to improve its arsenal of measures for persecuting journalists and bloggers." China ranks 176th out of 180 countries in RSF's 2017 World Press Freedom Index, surpassed only by Turkmenistan, Eritrea, and North Korea in the lack of press freedom. At the end of 2017, RSF asserted that China was holding 52 journalists and bloggers in prison.
The PRC government employs a variety of methods to control online content and expression, including website blocking and keyword filtering; regulating and monitoring internet service providers; censoring social media; and arresting "cyber dissidents" and bloggers who broach sensitive social or political issues. The government also monitors the popular mobile app WeChat. WeChat began as a secure messaging app, similar to WhatsApp, but it is now used for much more than just messaging and calling, such as mobile payments, and all the data shared through the app is also shared with the Chinese government. While WeChat users have recently begun to question how their WeChat data is being shared with the Chinese government, there is little indication that any new protections will be offered in the future.
The U.S. government continues to advocate policies to promote internet freedom in China's increasingly restrictive environment and to mitigate the global impact of Chinese government censorship. The Department of State, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and Congress have taken an active role in fighting global internet censorship:
Since 2008, the State Department has created programs that support digital safety, policy advocacy, technology, and research to help global internet users overcome barriers to accessing the internet, including the Freedom Online Coalition. In 2016, the BBG created the Office of Internet Freedom to oversee the efforts of BBG-funded internet freedom projects, including the research, development, deployment, and use of BBG-funded internet freedom technologies. In 2000, Congress created the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) to monitor China's compliance with international human rights standards, to encourage the development of the rule of law in the PRC, and to establish and maintain a list of victims of human rights abuses in China.
Additionally, the U.S. information and communications technology (ICT) industry has taken steps to advance internet freedom. In 2008, a group of U.S. ICT companies, along with nongovernmental organizations, investors, and universities, formed the Global Network Initiative (GNI). The GNI aims to promote best practices related to the conduct of U.S. companies in countries with poor internet freedom records.
In the 115th Congress, the CECC held a hearing on April 26, 2018, on "digital authoritarianism and the global threat to free speech." No legislation has been introduced in the 115th Congress related to global internet freedom in authoritarian regimes. |
crs_RS22259 | crs_RS22259_0 | In spite of the concerns of some that the authority can be used as a means to jail a suspect while authorities seek to discover probable cause sufficient to support a criminal accusation or as a preventive detention measure, the lower courts have denied that the federal material witness statute can be used as a substitute for a criminal arrest warrant. In a literal sense, there are no parties to a grand jury investigation other than the grand jury. Issuance of a section 3144 arrest warrant requires affidavits establishing probable cause to believe (1) that the witness can provide material evidence, and (2) that it will be "impracticable" to secure the witness' attendance at the proceeding simply by subpoenaing him. A material witness need only satisfy the appearance standard. 3199 as reported by the House Judiciary Committee amended section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act by directing periodic review of the exercise of the authority under section 3144. As it is written, this provision would entail wholesale violation of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which protects the secrecy and sanctity of grand jury proceedings." Perhaps because of Administration opposition, the provision was dropped from H.R. S. 1739 : S. 1739 , introduced by Senator Leahy, rewrites section 3144. In lieu of the clear and convincing evidence standard in favor of release and the time limits on detention, the existing statute insists that "no material witness may be detained because of inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice," 18 U.S.C. | The federal material witness statute provides that, "If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding [including a grand jury proceeding], and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person and treat the person in accordance with the provisions of section 3142 of this title [relating to bail]. No material witness may be detained because of inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," 18 U.S.C. 3144.
In response to objections that the authority had been misused, H.R. 3199 as reported by the House Judiciary Committee required Justice Department reports on use of the authority in a grand jury context. The provision was dropped before the bill was taken up. The version sent to the President after passage had no such provision.
S. 1739 would rewrite section 3144, among other things, establishing explicit and more demanding standards for arrest and detention and imposing explicit time limitations on detention.
This is an abridged version of CRS Report RL33077, Arrest and Detention of Material Witnesses: Federal Law In Brief, by [author name scrubbed], without footnotes, most citations to authority, or appendixes. |
crs_RS22837 | crs_RS22837_0 | The Administration requested $500 million for Mexico and $50 million for Central American countries in its FY2008 supplemental appropriations request. In the FY2009 foreign aid request, the Administration requested another $550 million for the Mérida Initiative â $450 million for Mexico and $100 million for Central American countries. On May 14, 2008, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved H.R. 6028 (Berman), the Merida Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics and Reduce Organized Crime Authorization Act of 2008. The bill would authorize $1.6 billion over three years, FY2008-FY2010, for both Mexico and Central America, $200 million more than originally proposed by President Bush. In terms of appropriations legislation, FY2008 supplemental funding for the Mérida Initiative was considered as part of a broader FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2642 , that provides $465 million in FY2008 and FY2009 supplemental assistance for Mexico and Central America. 110-252 ) In the act, Mexico receives $352 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance and $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund supplemental assistance, while Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic receive $65 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance. | In October 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a multi-year proposal for $1.4 billion in U.S. assistance to Mexico and Central America aimed at combating drug trafficking, gangs, and organized crime. On May 14, 2008, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved a bill, H.R. 6028 (Berman), which would authorize $1.6 billion for the Initiative from FY2008 through FY2010. The Bush Administration requested $500 million for Mexico and $50 million for Central American countries in its FY2008 supplemental appropriations request. In late June 2008, Congress appropriated $465 million in FY2008 and FY2009 supplemental assistance for Mexico and Central America in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2642 ( P.L. 110-252 ). In the act, Mexico receives $352 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance and $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund supplemental assistance, while Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic receive $65 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance. The Administration has requested an additional $450 million for Mexico and $100 million for the Central American countries under the Mérida Initiative in its FY2009 budget request. This report will be updated. See also CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America , by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34104 | crs_RL34104_0 | Introduction
This report, State E-Government Strategies: Identifying Best Practices and Applications, is based on research conducted in 2005-2006 under contract by the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs as a Policy Research Project (PRP). This PRP involved nine students from the Masters of Public Affairs Program. Electronic government ("e-government") is currently one of the leading approaches to government reform, with initiatives being carried out at the local, tribal, state, national, and international levels. As a result of independently maturing technologies, there is a risk of creating more so-called "islands of automation" and "stovepipes" within and between levels of government. To address these issues, Congress is actively overseeing e-government initiatives and is attempting to work with OMB and state governments to identify best practices, common standards, and successful strategies. To that end, graduate students from the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin undertook a two semester research program to identify some of the best practices in e-government strategies and management being carried out by state governments. In this report, the students identified several critical factors that influence state e-government programs. They are summarized below:
Strategies are essential to e-government formulation because they provide objectives for state agencies and governments. The report identifies and analyzes numerous types of strategies. Outsourcing is a controversial issue in many states. Funding is an important e-government issue because IT projects are costly and their success is uncertain. Legislatures must choose between multiple programs during the budget process and, in many cases, e-government competes with other needs for funding. State politics and culture can impede or support e-government development. However, IT enhancements do not typically cause agencies to be eliminated. Strong leadership can support e-government programs and drive IT improvements by encouraging and promoting new projects among civil servants and citizens. The degree of centralization or decentralization is a key component in e-government management because it determines the level of interaction between administrative agencies involved in IT projects. Web portal centralization is a common trend among many states, and it is often separate from agency organization and decision making. E-government performance measures are essential in evaluating the success of programs, identifying challenges, and addressing specific formulation and implementation challenges. They sent 51 surveys to all 50 states and the District of Columbia and received back 38 completed surveys. They conducted site visits in six case study states: California, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Texas, Utah, and Washington. A set of core questions was used for each case study interview, along with state-specific questions. | Although electronic government ("e-government") is currently one of the leading approaches to government reform, a lack of coordination or communication between various initiatives increases the risk of creating more so-called "islands of automation" and "stovepipes" within and between levels of government. To address these issues, Congress is actively overseeing e-government initiatives and is attempting to work with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and state governments to identify best practices, standards, and strategies.
This report is based on research conducted under contract by the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs as a Policy Research Project (PRP). For this project, graduate students in the Masters of Public Affairs program at the LBJ School of Public Affairs undertook a two semester research program in 2005-2006 to identify some of the best practices in e-government strategies and management being carried out by state governments. Surveys were sent to all 50 states and the District of Columbia, yielding 38 completed surveys. The study also included site visits to six case study states: California, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Texas, Utah, and Washington. A set of core questions was used for each case study interview along with state-specific questions. Based on the results of the surveys and interviews, the students identified several critical factors that influence state e-government programs. They are summarized below:
Strategies are essential to e-government formulation because they provide objectives for state agencies and governments. The report identifies and analyzes numerous types of strategies. Outsourcing is a controversial issue in many states, with a spectrum of policies represented across the country, ranging from prohibiting outsourcing, to near total adoption of outsourcing. Funding is an important issue because IT projects are costly and success is uncertain. Legislatures must choose between programs and, in many cases, e-government competes with other priorities. State politics and culture can impede or support e-government development. While IT can alter employee and agency functions, such enhancements do not typically cause agencies to be eliminated. Strong leadership can support e-government programs and drive IT improvements by encouraging and promoting new projects. The degree of centralization or decentralization is a key component in e-government management because it affects the level of interaction between agencies. Web portal centralization is a common trend among many states, and it is often separate from agency organization and decision making. E-government performance measures are essential in evaluating the success of programs, identifying challenges, and addressing specific formulation and implementation challenges.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R45416 | crs_R45416_0 | Introduction
U.S. industry has always been involved in spaceflight. Contractors build reconnaissance satellites for the Department of Defense (DOD) and weather satellites for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Increasingly, though, space is becoming commercial. A majority of U.S. satellites are now commercially owned, providing commercial services, and launched by commercial launch providers. Congressional and public interest in space is also becoming more focused on commercial activities, such as companies developing reusable rockets or collecting business data with fleets of small Earth-imaging satellites. Multiple federal agencies regulate the commercial space industry, based on statutory authorities that were enacted separately and have evolved over time. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) licenses commercial launch and reentry vehicles (i.e., rockets and spaceplanes) as well as commercial spaceports. NOAA licenses commercial Earth remote sensing satellites. The Departments of Commerce and State license exports of space technology. In response to industry concerns about the complexity of this regulatory framework, the Administration and Congress have made several reform proposals, including Space Policy Directive–2, Streamlining Regulations on Commercial Use of Space (SPD-2, issued in May 2018); the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act ( H.R. How the federal government makes use of commercial space capabilities is also evolving. NASA used to own and operate the space shuttles that contractors built for it, but since 2012 it has contracted with commercial service providers to deliver cargo into orbit using their own spacecraft. DOD has its own satellite communications capabilities, but it also procures communications bandwidth from commercial satellite companies. Agencies are considering a host of new opportunities, including acquisition of weather data from commercial satellites, acquisition of science data from commercial lunar landers, and expanded commercial utilization of the International Space Station. This report addresses these two distinct but closely related topics: how the federal government regulates, oversees, and promotes the commercial space sector; and how the federal government itself uses (or might in the future use) commercial space capabilities. As Congress considers these topics, some of the questions that may arise include:
Should the federal regulatory framework for commercial space activities be consolidated? How can the commercial space licensing process be made simpler, more timely, and more transparent? Federal Regulation, Oversight, and Promotion
Key federal agencies involved in the regulation, oversight, and promotion of commercial space activities include the Federal Aviation Administration, for regulation of launch and reentry; the Department of Commerce, for regulation of Earth remote sensing from space, promotion of the U.S. space industry, and export controls on space technology; and the Federal Communications Commission, for regulation of satellite communications. Rather, its director is charged with the following:
(1) promoting commercial provider investment in space activities by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information on space markets, and conducting workshops and seminars to increase awareness of commercial space opportunities;
(2) assisting United States commercial providers in the efforts of those providers to conduct business with the United States Government;
(3) acting as an industry advocate within the executive branch of the Federal Government to ensure that the Federal Government meets the space-related requirements of the Federal Government, to the fullest extent feasible, using commercially available space goods and services;
(4) ensuring that the United States Government does not compete with United States commercial providers in the provision of space hardware and services otherwise available from United States commercial providers;
(5) promoting the export of space-related goods and services;
(6) representing the Department of Commerce in the development of United States policies and in negotiations with foreign countries to ensure free and fair trade internationally in the area of space commerce; and
(7) seeking the removal of legal, policy, and institutional impediments to space commerce. There is congressional interest, though, in how other commercial activities in space, not subject to current FAA, NOAA, and FCC regulation, should be authorized and supervised. Proposals for a new civil authority for space situational awareness would place it at an existing agency (either Commerce or the FAA) rather than create a new office. The challenge for that process is balancing industry's need for timeliness and transparency with the government's need to meet national security and foreign policy objectives. How should federal regulatory policies be adjusted as the commercial space industry develops new capabilities and applications? What government space activities can or should be conducted by commercial entities? How can government and industry best work together? As the capabilities of the commercial space industry expand, there may be new opportunities for agencies to execute programs via commercial contracts. | U.S. companies have always been involved in spaceflight as contractors to government agencies. Increasingly, though, space is becoming commercial. A majority of U.S. satellites are now commercially owned, providing commercial services, and launched by commercial launch providers. Congressional and public interest in space is also becoming more focused on commercial activities, such as companies developing reusable rockets or collecting business data with fleets of small Earth-imaging satellites. This report addresses two distinct but closely related topics: how the federal government regulates, oversees, and promotes the commercial space sector; and how the federal government itself uses (or might in the future use) commercial space capabilities.
Multiple federal agencies regulate the commercial space industry, based on statutory authorities that were enacted separately and have evolved over time. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) licenses commercial launch and reentry vehicles (i.e., rockets and spaceplanes) as well as commercial spaceports. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) licenses commercial Earth remote sensing satellites. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licenses commercial satellite communications. The Departments of Commerce and State license exports of space technology. In response to industry concerns about the complexity of this regulatory framework, the Administration and Congress have made several reform proposals, including Space Policy Directive–2, Streamlining Regulations on Commercial Use of Space; the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act (H.R. 2809); and the Space Frontier Act of 2018 (S. 3277).
How the federal government makes use of commercial space capabilities is also evolving. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) used to own and operate the space shuttles that contractors built for it, but since 2012 it has contracted with commercial service providers to deliver cargo to the International Space Station using their own spacecraft. The Department of Defense (DOD) has its own satellite communications capabilities, but it also procures communications bandwidth from commercial satellite companies. Agencies are considering a host of new opportunities, including acquisition of weather data from commercial satellites, acquisition of science data from commercial lunar landers, and expanded commercial utilization of the International Space Station.
As Congress considers these topics, some of the questions that may arise include:
Should the federal regulatory framework for commercial space activities be consolidated? Reorganization proposals include transferring the FAA's licensing responsibilities to the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, consolidating NOAA's licensing responsibilities and other Department of Commerce functions in the Office of the Secretary of Commerce, and creating a new civil authority for space situational awareness in either the FAA or the Department of Commerce. How can the commercial space licensing process be made simpler, more timely, and more transparent? One focus of this discussion has been the process for interagency consultation on license applications for commercial remote sensing satellites. The challenge for that process is balancing industry's need for timeliness and transparency with the government's need to meet national security and foreign policy objectives. How should federal regulatory policies be adjusted as the commercial space industry develops new capabilities and applications? For example, there is currently no clear mechanism for new space applications, not already subject to FAA, NOAA, or FCC regulation, to be authorized and supervised as mandated by the Outer Space Treaty. Current law restricts the FAA's authority to regulate the safety of commercial spacecraft with human occupants. What government space activities can or should be conducted by commercial entities? How can government and industry best work together? As the commercial space industry's capabilities expand, there may be new opportunities for agencies to execute programs via commercial contracts, but stakeholders may not always agree on which programs are suitable for a commercial approach. |
crs_RS20933 | crs_RS20933_0 | It hosts periodic meetings of Senate Republicans and is the primary vehicle for communicating the party's message. It is led by an elected chair, and comprises members of the party leadership, the chairs of selected committees, and members designated by the Republican leader to serve on an executive committee. | Each Congress, Senators meet to organize the chamber and select their party leaders. In addition to the majority and minority leaders and party whips are numerous entities created by the party to assist with the work of the party. |
crs_R44163 | crs_R44163_0 | T he Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) includes many provisions that apply to health plans offered in the private health insurance market. Essential Health Benefits
Since 2014, all non-grandfathered plans in the non-group and small-group markets are required to offer a core package of health care services, known as the EHB. The ACA does not specifically define this core package. The HHS Secretary outlined a process in which each state identified a single plan to serve as a reference plan on which most non-group and small-group market plans must base their benefits packages in terms of the scope of benefits offered (see Figure 2 ). For the 2014-2016 coverage years, the process required each state to select an EHB-benchmark plan based on plans available in the 2012 coverage year. These three categories were pediatric oral and vision services, habilitative services, and mental health and substance use disorder services. Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Services
For non-group and small-group plans to be EHB compliant, the plans must provide mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment services. Nonetheless, in addition to covering the EHB, states may choose to impose additional benefit mandates. Variation in Essential Health Benefits Coverage
Interstate Variation
Because states select their own EHB-benchmark plan there is considerable variation in EHB coverage from state to state. This variation occurs in terms of specific covered services as well as in terms of amount, duration, and scope. For example, some state EHB-benchmark plans may include bariatric surgery as a covered service whereas other state EHB-benchmark plans may not cover bariatric surgery. State benefit mandates also may be considered to be part of that state's EHB and thus add to state-level coverage differences. For example, a plan could offer coverage of up to 10 physical therapy visits and up to 20 occupational therapy visits as a substitute for EHB-benchmark plan coverage of up to 20 physical therapy visits and 10 occupational therapy visits, assuming actuarial equivalence and the other criteria are met. The cost-sharing limits apply only to in-network benefits and must include all co-payments, coinsurance, and deductibles. The ACA prohibited both lifetime and annual limits on the EHB. | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) requires all non-grandfathered health plans in the non-group and small-group private health insurance markets to offer a core package of health care services, known as the essential health benefits (EHB). The ACA does not specifically define this core package but rather lists 10 benefit categories from which benefits and services must be included.
The 10 benefit categories are as follows:
ambulatory patient services; emergency services; hospitalization; maternity and newborn care; mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment; prescription drugs; rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; laboratory services; preventive and wellness and chronic disease management; and pediatric services, including oral and vision care.
For the 2014-2017 coverage years, each state was required to select an EHB-benchmark plan. The benchmark plan serves as a reference plan on which non-group and small-group market plans must substantially base their benefits packages.
Because states select their own EHB-benchmark plans, there is considerable variation in EHB coverage from state to state. This variation occurs in terms of specific covered services as well as in terms of amount, duration, and scope. For example, some state EHB-benchmark plans may include bariatric surgery as a covered service whereas other state EHB-benchmark plans may not cover bariatric surgery. State benefit mandates also may be considered to be part of that state's EHB and thus add to state-level coverage differences.
Furthermore, because states can allow non-group and small-group plans to substitute certain services within the categories, coverage in plans within a state also may vary by benefit amount, duration, and scope. For example, a state's EHB-benchmark plan could offer up to 20 physical therapy visits and 10 occupational therapy visits. Another plan in the state could offer coverage consistent with the EHB-benchmark plan by covering up to 10 physical therapy visits and 20 occupational therapy visits.
In addition to covering the EHB, the ACA imposes a limit on cost sharing (which includes co-payments, coinsurance, and deductibles) for the EHB. The ACA also prohibits plans from applying lifetime and annual dollar limits on the EHB. |
crs_R44686 | crs_R44686_0 | Introduction
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is the lead federal law enforcement agency charged with administering and enforcing federal laws related to firearms and explosives commerce. ATF is also responsible for investigating arson cases with a federal nexus, and criminal cases involving the diversion of alcohol and tobacco from legal channels of commerce. As an agency within the Department of Justice (DOJ), ATF is funded through an annual appropriation in the Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) Appropriations Act. Through this system, the FBI facilitates an electronic background check process to determine the firearms eligibility of unlicensed, private persons seeking to acquire firearms from federally licensed gun dealers, or firearms licenses or permits from state or local authorities. This report also includes a brief discussion of a controversial annual appropriations limitation that Congress has placed on CDC for 20 years that prohibits the use of appropriated funding to "advocate or promote gun control." For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested $1.306 billion for ATF. This amount was $18.6 million above the FY2016 appropriation and $47.5 million below the request. 115-31 . 115-31 ), Congress appropriated $1.259 billion for ATF, about $47 million less than the Obama Administration's budget request. Like the FY2017 continuing resolutions described above, P.L. If appropriated, this amount would have been $66.1 million above the FY2016 appropriation. This amount included $11.8 million and 73 full-time equivalents in technical and base adjustments to anticipate inflation and other variable costs. It also included $54.3 million, 155 full-time equivalents, and 230 permanent positions in budget enhancements. As part of President Barack Obama's gun safety initiative, these budget enhancements included
$35.6 million for ATF to hire 80 additional special agents and 120 industry operations investigators; $4.0 million (including 8 positions) to upgrade the National Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN) and ballistic imaging hardware and software; $5.7 million and 22 positions to help process federal firearms and explosives licenses and National Firearms Act (NFA) applications, and expand the use of firearms trace data by ATF and other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; and $9.0 million to integrate ATF's disparate case management systems into a Next Generation Case Management system. The FY2017 budget request also called for the repeal of two appropriations limitations that have prevented ATF from requiring federal firearms licensees (FFLs) to inventory their gun stocks prior to annual inspections and changing an administrative definition of "curios and relics." In addition, the President Obama's gun safety initiative included
$35.0 million for the FBI to address an increase in firearms background checks through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System; $50.0 million for the National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP); $5.0 million for NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP); and $10.0 million for gun violence research. NICS was established by the FBI in November 1998 to facilitate firearms background checks. Through both NCHIP and NARIP, the DOJ Office of Justice Programs provides grants to states, tribes, and territories to improve NICS accessibility to records on persons prohibited from acquiring firearms under federal or state law. Congress did not accept the Obama Administration's request to repeal these limitations in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. Selected Data Trends That Could Have Affected ATF Workloads
Below is discussion of selected, year-to-year data trends that could have affected and may continue to affect ATF workloads, such as the number and type of federal firearms licensees, growth in the civilian gun stock, and firearms-related violent crime rates. The Explanatory Statement accompanying H.R. 110-180 . Gun Violence Prevention Research
For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested $10 million for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to sponsor research into preventing and ameliorating gun violence. Appendix. 115-31 ), Congress included words of futurity in these two additional provisions. 115-31 ). | The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is the lead federal agency charged with administering and enforcing federal laws related to firearms and explosives commerce. ATF is also responsible for investigating arson cases with a federal nexus, and criminal cases involving the diversion of alcohol and tobacco from legal channels of commerce. As an agency within the Department of Justice (DOJ), ATF is funded through an annual appropriation in the Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) Appropriations Act. For FY2017, Congress has appropriated $1.259 billion for ATF in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), about $47.5 million less than the Obama Administration's budget request and $18.6 million more than the FY2016 appropriation.
This report chronicles the FY2017 appropriations cycle for ATF and other gun control initiatives, including legislative histories for several ATF funding limitations related to firearms. It also includes discussion of year-to-year data trends that could affect ATF workloads, such as the number and type of federal firearms licensees (FFLs), growth in the civilian gun stock, and firearms-related violent crime.
The Obama Administration's FY2017 budget request included $1.306 billion for ATF. This amount was $66.1 million above the FY2016 appropriation. This proposed increase included $11.8 million in technical and base adjustments to anticipate inflation and other variable costs and $54.3 million in budget enhancements. As part of President Barack Obama's gun safety initiative, these budget enhancements included
$35.6 million for ATF to hire 80 additional special agents and 120 industry operations investigators; $4 million (including 8 positions) to upgrade the National Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN) hardware and software; $5.7 million and 22 positions to process firearms and explosives licenses and National Firearms Act (NFA) applications, and expand the use of firearms trace data by ATF and other federal and state law enforcement agencies; and $9 million to integrate ATF's case management systems into a single system.
The FY2017 budget request called for the repeal of two limitations that prevent ATF from (1) requiring FFLs to inventory their gun stocks prior to inspection and (2) changing an administrative definition of "curios and relics." In P.L. 115-31, Congress maintained these and other firearms-related limitations/provisos (appropriations riders) described in an Appendix to this report. Two additional provisos appear to have been made permanent law by the inclusion of "words of futurity," like "hereafter," "henceforward," and "this and any other fiscal year."
In addition, President Obama's gun safety initiative included
$35 million for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to address an increase in firearms background checks through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS); $55 million for grants to state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities under the National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP) and NICS Amendments Record Improvement Program (NARIP; P.L. 110-180); and $10 million for gun violence prevention research.
NICS was established in 1998 by the FBI to facilitate an electronic background check process to determine firearms eligibility of unlicensed, private persons seeking to acquire firearms from FFLs, or firearms permits and licenses from state authorities. Through both NCHIP and NARIP, the DOJ provides grants to states, tribes, and territories to improve NICS access to records on persons prohibited from acquiring firearms under federal or state law. According to the Explanatory Statement accompanying H.R. 244 (P.L. 115-31), Congress provided funding to support NICS fully, and $73 million for NICS improvement grants. However, Congress did not provide the funding requested for gun violence prevention research. In addition, Congress maintained a limitation in P.L. 115-31 that continues to prohibit the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other agencies from using appropriated funding to advocate or promote gun control. |
crs_RL33256 | crs_RL33256_0 | Some in Congress have expressed concern that the U.S.nuclear stockpile and the Complex are becoming increasingly difficult and costly to maintain, thatsecurity costs are rising sharply, and that the Complex is not sufficiently responsive to the needs ofits "customer," the Department of Defense (DOD). The committee's report stated:
During the fiscal year 2005 budget hearings, theCommittee pressed the Secretary on the need for a systematic review of requirements for theweapons complex over the next twenty-five years, and the Secretary committed to conducting sucha review. (1)
In response, the Secretary of Energy in January 2005 had the Secretary of Energy AdvisoryBoard (SEAB) form the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force (hereinafter referredto as the "Task Force" or "TF"). (3)
The Task Force's View of, and Vision for, the Complex
The TF reported that there was no master plan guiding the Complex. Instead, it stated thatthere were redundant facilities within the Complex; excessive competition between the weaponslabs; an imbalance between the labs, with state-of-the-art experimental facilities, and the productionplants, with archaic equipment; and special nuclear material (SNM; see Appendix) at six of the eightComplex sites, increasing vulnerability to terrorist attack and raising security costs. These problems resulted in high costs. (ix) (Throughout this report, numbers inparentheses refer to pages in the Task Force's report.) Governance would be made more effective, in the TF's view, so as to "enablethe transformations needed for the Complex and the Stockpile." Discussion of Task Force Recommendations
In the Task Force scenario, construction of a modernized Complex would be simpler and lesscostly with several facilities built at a single site. Reliable Replacement Warhead programrecommendations. (a) RRWs are supposed to be easier to maintain than current warheads. Forgoing the value of sunk costs. (19)
Implications for the nuclear weapons laboratories. They point out that staffing assumptions based on the more limited range of skillsthat the TF seems to believe may be required by the RRW concept implicitly rest on otherassumptions: that the RRW concept will appear, after study, able to meet its goals; that theAdministration and Congress will choose to replace many current warheads with RRWs; and thatdesigning and engineering such new warheads will require a smaller skill set than is needed tomaintain existing designs. The labs conduct much non-weapons research. Pit production issues. Others would be rejected because of manufacturing defects. Security. Nonproliferation. Now, labs and plants exhibit much more concernabout ease of manufacture. (45)
Supporters of the current Complex maintain that there are many examples tocounter the TF statement that the Complex is unable to solve problems: the ability of the Complexto create scores of warhead designs, and to produce many thousands of units, during the Cold War;the ability of the Complex to increase its understanding of nuclear weapon behavior through the SSP;and the ability of the Complex to maintain the nuclear stockpile after the Cold War so that DOE andDOD could certify its safety and reliability annually for nine years so far. Task Force assumptions. The Task Force recommends that the United States should proceed immediately with RRW. Appendix: Nuclear Weapons and the Nuclear Weapons Complex
This Appendix describes key terms, concepts, sites, and facilities as an aid to readers notfamiliar with them. | Congress annually funds the nuclear weapons complex (the Complex), those sites thatdevelop, maintain, manufacture, and dismantle nuclear weapons. In hearings held in 2004, theHouse Appropriations Committee pressed the Secretary of Energy "for a systematic review ofrequirements for the weapons complex over the next twenty-five years." The committee expressedits concern that the Complex is not well suited to the post-Cold War situation, and should reflectpresidential decisions on the stockpile as well as issues of cost, security, and Complex size. Inresponse, the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force of the Secretary of EnergyAdvisory Board prepared a report, released in final form in October 2005.
The report indicated that the Complex had redundant facilities, security concerns, high cost,excessive competition between the weapons labs, and inadequate equipment for the productionplants. To redress these problems, the Task Force proposed restructuring the Complex. It wouldshift much production and some R&D to a new nuclear production center, probably close one ormore plants, contract out some nonnuclear work, shrink the labs, consolidate facilities, and take stepsto make governance more effective. It was concerned that current warheads, produced during theCold War, are inappropriate for the current situation because they have more yield and efficiencythan is needed, yet are more vulnerable to terrorist threats than is desirable, are hard to manufacture,are designed close to failure points, and will probably become harder to maintain. It recommendsrestructuring the nuclear arsenal by producing new-design Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRWs)with characteristics deemed more suitable to the current environment. The report links Complex andwarheads: in the Task Force's view, RRWs would be easier to produce and maintain, permitting asmaller, more efficient, and less costly Complex.
Observers familiar with the current Complex raise several concerns. From their perspective,closing Complex sites and facilities might meet fatal political opposition. They maintain that thereport seems to downplay the value of investments in Complex facilities over six decades, andprojects large cost savings through 2030 based on questionable assumptions. They fear that shiftingkey tasks that the nuclear weapons labs perform to other sites could disrupt the labs' ability to dotheir work. The recommendation to proceed immediately with RRW deals with restructuringweapons rather than the Complex and, in this view, may go beyond the Task Force's mandate. ADepartment of Defense official stated that a Department of Defense-Department of Energy agencydid not approve the Task Force's proposed 3-step transition to RRW, despite the report's strongimplication to the contrary. While any final decision on deploying RRWs must await completionof studies that might possibly reject RRW, the Task Force assumes RRW will proceed and does notexamine how its restructured Complex would support current warheads. Some express concern thatTask Force recommendations may be at odds with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44429 | crs_R44429_0 | The federal bank supervisory agencies, which have broad general authority to issue regulations, also issue any number of types of guidance documents under a variety of names such as policy statements, supervision and regulatory (SR) letters, financial institution letters (FIL), letters, bulletins, and other forms of communication. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Today, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is the chartering authority and primary federal regulator of national banks and federal savings associations, and it relies on general authority under organic legislation to impose cybersecurity requirements on the institutions it regulates and their service providers. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is the primary regulator of federally insured, state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System and all federally insured, state-chartered thrifts and savings associations. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
The Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFP Act), which is Title X of Dodd-Frank, created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) within the Federal Reserve System. This authority is similar to authority that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has used to bring enforcement actions based on cybersecurity inadequacies. Nonbank Federal Regulators
In addition to federal bank regulators, other federal regulators oversee securities, markets, government-sponsored enterprises in the secondary mortgage market, agricultural credit, and certain aspects of consumer protection. Federal Regulators of Securities and Commodities
There are two federal regulators of securities and commodities: the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). As a consequence of its responsibilities, the SEC oversees financial disclosures of both financial and nonfinancial publicly traded companies, such as large nationwide retailers. Self-Regulatory Organizations
Certain self-regulatory organizations (SROs)—private organizations empowered by law or regulation to create and enforce industry rules—also are concerned about cybersecurity. These include FINRA, which, to protect investors, oversees stock exchanges and those who trade on them. The National Futures Association (NFA) has a similar role for U.S. futures exchanges and in the retail foreign exchange market
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
FINRA is "an independent, not-for-profit organization authorized by Congress to protect America's investors by making sure the securities industry operates fairly and honestly ... by ... writing and enforcing rules governing the activities of more than 3,957 securities firms with approximately 643,322 brokers; examining firms for compliance with those rules; fostering market transparency; and educating investors." FHFA has general safety-and-soundness regulatory authority over the three GSEs. In examining an institution's security, examiners "[d]etermine if the board and management have established and maintained effective security over the institution's facilities, systems, and media that process and store vital information for business operations.... " The examination is based on the FFIEC Examination Handbook and focuses on risk management and assessment, board and management oversight, and internal controls
Selected Financial Services Data Security Laws and Implementing Regulations
Major laws that include data security provisions affecting the financial services industry include Dodd-Frank, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Authority to issue regulations under these provisions has been delegated to the CFPB; enforcement authority is shared among the federal banking regulators, the federal security regulators, the state insurance commissioners, and the CFPB, with respect to the "financial institutions" which they regulate. Bank holding companies, thrift holding companies, and insured depositories are required to file similar reports with their regulators. Executive Orders
Currently, one presidential directive and two executive orders address the critical role of financial services in the national economy. It is beyond the scope of this report to discuss state regulation of financial services. However, the overwhelming majority of the states have enacted laws requiring consumer notification of data breaches compromising PII. New York State
Because Wall Street and many related financial activities are located in New York City, New York State law has notable influence over the national and international financial system. There is every indication that there will be increased attention to cybersecurity at both the federal and state levels. | Multiple federal and state regulators oversee companies in the financial services industry. Regulatory authority is often directed at particular functions or financial services activities rather than at particular entities or companies. It is, therefore, likely that a financial services company with multiple product lines—deposits, securities, insurance—will find that it must answer to different regulators with respect to particular aspects of its operations. Five federal agencies oversee depository institutions, two regulate securities, several agencies have discrete authority over various segments of the financial sector, and several self-regulatory organizations monitor entities in the securities business.
Federal banking regulators (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) are required to promulgate safety and soundness standards for all federally insured depository institutions to protect the stability of the nation's banking system. Some of these standards pertain to cybersecurity issues, including information security, data breaches, and destruction or theft of business records.
The federal securities regulators (the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission) have asserted authority over various aspects of cybersecurity in securities markets and those who trade in them. This includes requiring publicly traded financial and nonfinancial corporations to file annual and quarterly reports that provide investors with material information, a category which could include information about cybersecurity risks or breaches.
In addition, overseeing the securities industry are certain self-regulatory organizations—private organizations empowered by law or regulation to create and enforce industry rules, including those covering cybersecurity. These include the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, which protects investors and oversees stock exchanges and those who trade on them. The National Futures Association has a similar role for U.S. futures exchanges and in the retail foreign exchange market.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issues and enforces federal consumer financial protection regulations, and it has certain consumer financial protection supervisory authority over depositories and consumer finance companies not otherwise federally regulated. The Federal Trade Commission has asserted authority over certain consumer finance operations of nonfinancial companies such as retailers and hotels.
The basic authority that the federal regulators use to establish cybersecurity standards emanates from the organic legislation that established them and delineated the scope of their authority and functions. In addition, certain other laws such as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 include provisions affecting cybersecurity of financial services. Moreover, two executive orders address the critical role of financial services in the national economy. Complementing the laws and regulations, the regulators issue guidance under a variety of names, such as policy statements, supervision and regulatory letters, financial institution letters, bulletins, and other forms of communications.
Not all regulation (or cybersecurity regulation) is done at the federal level. State governments charter and regulate state banks and all insurance companies. State securities regulators oversee securities sold within their state, and many states have laws requiring consumer notification of financial data breaches. In addition, New York State has taken advantage of the fact that the nation's financial center, Wall Street, is located in the state to be very active in certain aspects of cybersecurity regulation. This report focuses on federal laws, regulations, and executive orders. |
crs_R44846 | crs_R44846_0 | In addition to the NAS work ( The Growing Gap in Life Expectancy by Income: Implications for Federal Programs and Policy Responses, 2015 ), in 2016 the Government Accountability Office (GAO; Retirement Security: Shorter Life Expectancy R educes Projected Lifetime Benefits for Lower Earners ), the Brookings Institution ( Later Retirement, Inequality in Old Age, and the Growing Gap in Longevity B etween Rich and Poor ), and Stanford economist Raj Chetty and colleagues ( The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014 ) all published new evidence on the growing gap in life expectancy. Social Security provides monthly benefits to retired and disabled workers and their dependents, and to dependents of deceased workers. The goals of Social Security, a redistributive program, may be compromised by widening gaps in life spans. When Social Security retirement benefits are measured on a lifetime basis, low earners, who show little to no gains in life expectancy over recent decades, are projected to receive relatively smaller benefits when compared with high earners. A commonly discussed Social Security reform proposal in the United States involves increasing the retirement age, which would affect low earners' lifetime benefits disproportionately. Congress may wish to reevaluate this type of reform proposal in light of the growing gap in life expectancy by income and may be interested in policy proposals that protect the interests of lower-earning, shorter-lived workers, for example. This report provides a brief overview of the concept of life expectancy, how it is measured, and how it has changed over time in the United States. While life expectancy may be studied in a variety of contexts, this report focuses on the link between life expectancy and socioeconomic status (SES), as measured by lifetime income. In particular, this report synthesizes recent research on (1) the life expectancy gap by income and (2) the relationship between this gap and Social Security retirement benefits. Finally, this report discusses the implications of this research for one type of Social Security reform proposal: raising the Social Security retirement age. First, life expectancy has increased over time for all groups. Researchers have proposed biological as well as behavioral and social factors to explain this differential in life expectancy by sex. The study finds that men in the bottom income quintile born in 1930 could expect to live an average of 26.6 additional years at age 50 (an expected age of death at 76.6), yet there has been no gain in life expectancy for men in the bottom quintile born in the 1960 cohort (life expectancy at age 50 is 26.1 years, so an expected age of death at 76.1). The NAS authors estimate that the life expectancy gap between the bottom and top income quintiles of women expanded from 3.9 years in the 1930 birth cohort to 13.6 years in the 1960 birth cohort. Social adequacy is a key goal of the Social Security program. For both the 1930 and 1960 cohorts, benefits increase with earnings. Although the Social Security benefit computation formula allows for lower earners to earn a higher replacement rate than higher earners, their dollar value of benefits received is lower because benefits increase with earnings. From Figure 6 , males born in 1930 who are in the bottom earnings quintile receive $126,000 (in 2009 dollars) in lifetime benefits, compared with $229,000 for males in the highest earnings quintile, a difference of $103,000. Males in the highest earnings quintile—who can expect to live about seven years longer than those in the 1930 cohort—can expect to receive $295,000 in benefits, almost $173,000 more than those in the lowest earnings quintile. Like males, the difference in lifetime Social Security benefits for females between the lowest and highest income quintiles is larger for the 1960 cohort than for the 1930 cohort. The authors demonstrate that Social Security is no longer progressive for later birth cohorts (i.e., 1931 and 1939) of men due to increases in mortality inequality, while Social Security remains progressive for women. | Life expectancy is a population-level measure that refers to the average number of years an individual will live. Although life expectancy has generally been increasing over time in the United States, researchers have long documented that it is lower for individuals with lower socioeconomic status (SES) compared with individuals with higher SES. Recent studies provide evidence that this gap has widened in recent decades. For example, a 2015 study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) found that for men born in 1930, individuals in the highest income quintile (top 20%) could expect to live 5.1 years longer at age 50 than men in the lowest income quintile. This gap has increased significantly over time. Among men born in 1960, those in the top income quintile could expect to live 12.7 years longer than men in the bottom income quintile. This NAS study finds similar patterns for women: the life expectancy gap between the bottom and top income quintiles of women expanded from 3.9 years for the 1930 birth cohort to 13.6 years for the 1960 birth cohort.
Gains in life expectancy are generally heralded as good news by lawmakers and others, signifying improved well-being in the population. Yet widening differentials in life expectancy are more troubling. Congress may be interested in recent research on this topic for many reasons, including the implications for Social Security benefits as well as Social Security reform proposals.
Social Security provides monthly benefits to retired and disabled workers and their dependents, and to dependents of deceased workers. A key goal of the Social Security program is redistribution of income from the high earner to the low earner by way of a progressive benefit formula. Widening gaps in life spans by SES pose a challenge to meeting this goal. When Social Security benefits are measured on a lifetime basis, low earners, who show little to no gains in life expectancy over time, are projected to receive increasingly lower benefits than those with high earnings. For instance, in the 2015 NAS study, men in the lowest earnings quintile saw little or no improvement in the value of their lifetime Social Security retirement benefits between the 1930 and 1960 birth cohorts (roughly $125,000 in 2009 dollars in lifetime benefits for both birth cohorts). Due to gains in life expectancy for higher earners, however, men in the highest earnings quintile born in 1930 had lifetime Social Security benefits of $229,000, and men in the highest earnings quintile born in 1960 had estimated lifetime benefits of $295,000. Thus, according to this 2015 NAS analysis, differential gains in life expectancy increased the disparity in the lifetime value of Social Security retirement benefits between the top and bottom earnings quintiles by about $70,000 (in 2009 dollars) for the later birth cohort.
In response to rising life expectancy, some commonly discussed Social Security reform proposals involve increasing the retirement age. Yet these proposals would affect low earners disproportionately (i.e., reductions in their lifetime Social Security benefits would be considerably larger than for high earners). Congress may be interested in policy proposals that mitigate the uneven effects of increasing the retirement age and protect the interests of lower-earning, shorter-lived workers.
This report provides a brief overview of the concept of life expectancy, how it is measured, and how it has changed over time in the United States. While life expectancy may be studied in a variety of contexts, this report focuses on the link between life expectancy and SES, as measured by lifetime income. In particular, this report synthesizes recent research on (1) the life expectancy gap by income and (2) the relationship between this gap and Social Security benefits. Finally, this report discusses the implications of this research for one type of Social Security reform proposal: increasing the Social Security retirement age. |
crs_R43022 | crs_R43022_0 | Deep recession, high unemployment, and social upheaval brought to power a new government, and with it a new direction in economic policy away from market-oriented policies toward greater government control of the economy. Debt repudiation, expropriation, capital and currency controls, trade protectionism, and refusal to abide by judgments made by international organizations are part of the policy mix that has also created tension with foreign governments, international financial institutions, and private sector interests. In the United States, the federal courts and the Obama Administration have taken action against many of Argentina's foreign economic policies. U.S. Economic Interests and the Post-Crisis Political Economy
U.S.-Argentine economic relations have long history of mutually beneficial engagement. Nonetheless, U.S.-Argentina economic relations have been strained at times, in part because of Argentina's struggle to maintain macroeconomic stability, and also because of specific policy choices that have made the business environment difficult to navigate. Intervening presidents (five in twice as many days) oversaw a steep currency devaluation, the largest sovereign default in history, and highly restrictive management of the financial sector. Under Presidents Kirchner and Fernández, these initial policy responses intended to restore order and address the most pressing social problems became permanent programs. In response, Argentina instituted foreign exchange controls and limited currency conversion. Sovereign Default and Private Bondholders44
One of Argentina's first acts during the 2001 financial crisis was to default on its sovereign debt. The Obama Administration invoked financial restrictions against Argentina as defined in U.S. law that include prohibiting official lending and foreign aid and voting against loans to Argentina in the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Outlook
Argentina's economic policies reflect a certain distrust of international institutions and the government's priority for financial independence, social equity, and what may be considered a commitment to "populist" solutions. Rather, even in recognizing that countries can govern themselves well under alternative policy frameworks and priorities, what stands out for many in the case of Argentina is the sense that policy choices have introduced major distortions in the economy and that deteriorating external accounts, among other factors, are increasing the risk of financial crisis, particularly if history is any judge. Trade protection, managed exchange rates, and capital controls are policy adjustments required to address problems that materialize in a constrained economic system (e.g., subsidy-driven fiscal expansion, price controls, inability to borrow internationally) that cannot easily accommodate current account deficits, a market exchange rate, or standard macroeconomic responses to combat high inflation. International stakeholders, both public and private, find themselves challenged by this system, along with many Argentines. One indication of the breadth of dissatisfaction over Argentina's policies is the call for effectively removing Argentina from the G-20, despite the lack of precedent and formal procedure for doing this. Notwithstanding these initiatives, Argentina has not been moved to change course, and the 113 th Congress may decide to consider once again U.S. options for addressing bilateral concerns with Argentina. | U.S.-Argentine economic relations have long history of mutually beneficial engagement. In recent years, however, they have been strained at times, in part because of Argentina's struggle to maintain macroeconomic stability, and also because of specific policy choices that have made the business environment difficult to navigate since the country's 2001 financial crisis. Following a steep currency devaluation and the largest sovereign default in history, Argentina entered a deep recession with high unemployment and social upheaval. It brought to power a new government, and with it a shift in economic policy away from market-oriented policies toward greater government control of the economy in pursuit of "social equity." The initial policy responses intended to restore order and address the most pressing social problems evolved into permanent social programs. Government policies introduced many distortions into the economy, including high inflation, which have required regular adjustments in the international accounts to maintain economic stability. These include managed trade, capital controls, and limited currency conversion, among other policies that have earned the ire of international stakeholders.
Argentina's economic policies reflect priority for financial independence, social equity, and what may be considered a commitment to "populist" macroeconomic solutions. Even in recognizing that countries can govern themselves well under alternative policy frameworks, what stands out for many is the sense that Argentina's policy choices, with attendant economic distortions, increase the risk of a new financial crisis. The resulting spillovers into international economic policy are unavoidable. Trade protection, managed exchange rates, and capital controls, for example, are policy adjustments required to address problems that materialize in a constrained economic system (e.g., subsidy-driven fiscal expansion, price controls, inability to borrow internationally) that cannot easily accommodate current account deficits, a market exchange rate, or standard macroeconomic responses to high inflation.
Congress and private U.S. stakeholders have opposed many of Argentina's policies that include a sovereign default on debt owed to both private investors and countries, including the United States; refusal to pay awards ordered by the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); nationalization of foreign assets; trade protectionism; capital and currency controls; and refusal to abide by International Monetary Fund (IMF) reporting requirements. Some U.S. investors are suing the government of Argentina in U.S. federal courts; the Obama Administration has invoked financial restrictions, revoked trade preferences, voted against loans for Argentina in the development banks, and filed cases before the World Trade Organization (WTO). Some Members of Congress have expressed dissatisfaction in hearings, resolutions, and proposed legislation.
International stakeholders, both public and private, find themselves challenged by this system, along with some Argentines. One indication of the breadth of international dissatisfaction over Argentina's policies is the call for effectively removing Argentina from the G-20, despite the lack of precedent and formal procedure for doing so. Irrespective of these initiatives, Argentina has not been moved to change course, and the 113th Congress may decide to consider once again U.S. options for addressing bilateral concerns with Argentina.
For details on the sovereign debt issue, see CRS Report R41029, Argentina's Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with the "Holdouts," by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RS22847 | crs_RS22847_0 | Background
NATO held a summit in Bucharest, Romania, April 2-4, 2008. The allies agreed to a "strategic vision" statement on Afghanistan. The document did not commit governments to accept a greater share of the combat burden. Missile Defense
NATO is also engaged in a continuing debate over missile defense. The third principal issue at Bucharest was the candidacies of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia for entry into the alliance, and the request by Georgia and Ukraine to be placed in NATO's Membership Action Plan, a significant step on the road to formal candidacy. The allies extended invitations to Croatia and Albania. | NATO held a summit in Bucharest, Romania, April 2-4, 2008. The summit did not become the occasion to adopt major new ideas or initiatives. A "Strategic Vision" paper on Afghanistan clarified several issues but did not lead to a greater sharing of the combat burden among NATO governments. Croatia and Albania, but not Macedonia, were invited to begin accession negotiations for membership. In a contentious debate, neither Georgia nor Ukraine were admitted to the MAP process. The debate over missile defense led to the consolidation of an evolving allied position. See also CRS Report RL34415, Enlargement Issues at NATO ' s Bucharest Summit , by [author name scrubbed] et al. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44463 | crs_R44463_0 | Introduction
On October 27, 2015, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced its intention to award a contract to build the new Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B) to the Northrop Grumman Corporation. Subsequently, the Secretary of the Air Force announced that the bomber would be designated the B-21 "Raider," in honor of the Doolittle Raiders of World War II. A large and flexible payload bay capable of carrying a full range of current and future armament. 2. Few technical details have been revealed. Procuring at least 100 B-21s will also reduce lifecycle ownership costs. The B-21 is intended to initially replace the 20 B-2 and 63 B-1 strategic bombers currently in the fleet. When the B-2 was procured in the 1990s, initial plans called for 132 aircraft. Oversight of Highly Classified Programs43
Like many defense technology programs, most of the B-21 program is designated as a Special Access Program. Due to the size of the B-21 program, its implications for defense budgeting, and other issues like the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy, the B-21 may attract interest from Members not typically involved in such issues. | The Department of Defense is developing a new long-range bomber aircraft, the B-21 Raider (previously known as LRS-B), and proposes to acquire at least 100 of them. B-21s would initially replace the fleets of B-1 and B-2 bombers, and could possibly replace B-52s in the future.
B-21 development was highly classified until the summer of 2015, when the Air Force revealed initial details of the aircraft and the program. Although technical specifications and other data remain out of public view, many details of the budget, acquisition strategy, procurement quantities, and other aspects of the B-21 program are now in the public arena.
The Administration's FY2019 budget request included $2.31 billion for further development of the B-21. As passed, the FY2019 defense appropriations bill funded the program at $2.28 billion.
As a large defense program that involves issues of strategic and nuclear policy, as well as substantial expenditures, the B-21 is likely to be subject to significant congressional interest. |
crs_R44084 | crs_R44084_0 | This report opens with a discussion of the European Commission's decision to recommend the use of a size standard that is very different than the size standard used in the United States. It then examines the Small Business Act for Europe's various provisions and the major programs the European Commission has implemented to achieve the act's objectives. Next, it compares and contrasts the European and American approaches to assisting small- and medium-sized businesses. This report provides information and analysis useful to Congress as it crafts small business policy for the United States. It is a European Commission initiative, endorsed by the Council of the European Union, which provides 10 "guiding principles" for its own policies, and those of its member states. Create an environment in which entrepreneurs and family businesses can thrive and entrepreneurship is rewarded. Design rules according to the "Think Small First" principle. Facilitate SMEs' access to finance and develop a legal and business environment supportive to timely payments in commercial transactions. Comparisons with the United States
The European Commission was very aware of the United States' Small Business Act, the SBA's various programs, and the SBA's definitions used to determine small business eligibility for assistance as it crafted its Small Business Act for Europe and designed its small business programs and size standards. In some instances, the European Commission enacted policies that are relatively similar to those found in the United States. Both the Small Business Act for Europe (2008) and the U.S. Small Business Act (1953) indicate that its primary purposes are to assist small businesses in fostering competitive markets (e.g., by preventing large businesses from forming market oligopolies and monopolies) and to address market failures (e.g., the difficulties faced by small businesses in accessing capital). However, the Small Business Act for Europe and the European Commission's subsequent implementing policies and programs were created during one of Europe's most severe economic recessions in modern times. This may help to explain why the Small Business Act for Europe is much more explicit in its language concerning the need to focus on supporting SMEs as a means to create jobs than the U.S. Small Business Act. In addition, reflecting prevailing economic conditions in Europe, the Small Business Act for Europe has a greater focus on assisting small businesses engaged in specific industries deemed essential to Europe's competitive position in the world, such as international trade, tourism, and technology-related industries, including space exploration and satellite-based telecommunications and global environmental monitoring. Europe also has a greater focus on assisting small businesses offering products and services related to combating climate change, a relatively new issue not on the American political agenda during the 1950s. Concluding Observations
The Small Business Act for Europe was the product of the political and economic context in which it was created. Given Europe's economic circumstances, and lacking the legal authority to impose small business policies on its member states, the European Commission examined the small business policies in other nations, especially in the United States and Japan, and crafted 10 guiding principles it considered to best fit Europe's needs in an increasingly interdependent and global economy—emulating some policies (e.g., access to capital) and taking a different direction in others (e.g., size standards). Of course, given their differing political and economic circumstances, what works well for Europe may not work as well in the United States, and vice versa. Nevertheless, as the Europeans have demonstrated, examining what other developed countries are doing to assist smaller enterprises can be useful as each nation considers which policies may work best for them. | The Small Business Act for Europe (2008) is not an act, per se, as understood in the United States. It is a European Commission initiative, endorsed by the Council of the European Union, that provides 10 "guiding principles" to promote the growth of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Europe (e.g., "Create an environment in which entrepreneurs and family businesses can thrive and entrepreneurship is rewarded," "Design rules according to the 'Think Small First' principle," and "Facilitate SMEs' access to finance and develop a legal and business environment supportive to timely payments in commercial transactions.")
The European Commission was very aware of the United States' Small Business Act, the various programs offered by the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), and the SBA's definitions used to determine small business eligibility for assistance as it crafted its Small Business Act for Europe and designed its small business programs and size standard. It also examined small business policy in other nations, including Japan and China. In some instances, the European Commission enacted policies that are relatively similar to those found in the United States (e.g., both have programs designed to reduce small business regulatory burdens and enhance their access to capital). In others, the European Commission went in a different direction (e.g., size standards).
The Small Business Act for Europe was the product of the political and economic context in which it was created. For example, both the Small Business Act for Europe and the U.S. Small Business Act (1953) indicate that their primary purposes are to assist small businesses in fostering competitive markets (e.g., by preventing large businesses from forming market oligopolies and monopolies) and to address market failures (e.g., the difficulties faced by small businesses in accessing capital). However, the Small Business Act for Europe and the European Commission's subsequent implementing policies and programs were crafted during one of Europe's most severe economic recessions in modern times. This may help to explain why the Small Business Act for Europe (1) is much more explicit in its language concerning the need to focus on supporting SMEs as a means to create jobs than the U.S. Small Business Act; (2) has a greater focus on assisting small businesses engaged in specific industries deemed essential to Europe's economic recovery and its competitive position in the world, such as international trade, tourism, and technology-related industries, including space exploration and satellite-based telecommunications and global environmental monitoring; and (3) has a greater focus on assisting small businesses offering products and services related to combating climate change, a relatively new issue not on the American political agenda during the 1950s.
This report opens with a discussion of the European Commission's decision to use a size standard that is very different than the size standard used in the United States. It then examines the Small Business Act for Europe's various provisions and the major programs the European Commission has implemented to achieve the act's objectives. Next, it compares and contrasts the European and American approaches to assisting SMEs. This report provides information and analysis useful to Congress as it crafts small business policy for the United States.
Given their differing political and economic circumstances, what works well for Europe may not work as well in the United States, and vice versa. Nevertheless, as the Europeans have demonstrated, examining what other developed countries are doing to assist smaller enterprises can be useful as each nation considers which policies may work best for them. |
crs_R44138 | crs_R44138_0 | Frequently Asked Questions
This report addresses frequently asked questions related to the overtime provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the overtime pay exemptions for executive, administrative, and professional employees (the "EAP" or "white collar" exemptions). The FLSA, enacted in 1938, is the main federal legislation that establishes general labor standards for most, but not all, private and public sector employees. In general, unless an employee is specifically exempted in the FLSA, he or she is considered to be a covered "nonexempt" employee and must receive pay at the rate of one-and-a-half times ("time and a half") the regular rate for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. Rather than define the terms executive, administrative, or professional employee, the FLSA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to define and delimit these terms "from time to time" by regulations . The "salary basis" test: employee must be paid a predetermined and fixed salary. The "duties" test: employee must perform executive, administrative, or professional duties. Rather, the Secretary of Labor, through issuance of regulations, specifies the duties that EAP employees must perform to be exempt from overtime pay requirements of the FLSA. The 2016 Final Rule on the EAP Exemptions
What are the main changes to the EAP exemption included in the 2016 final rule? On July 6, 2015, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) was published in the Federal Register to define and delimit EAP exemptions. The final rule was published in the Federal Register on May 23, 2016. The primary changes to the EAP exemption in the 2016 final rule include
an increase in the salary level test from the current $455 per week ($23,660 annually) to $913 per week ($47,476 annually); an increase in the annual salary threshold for the HCE exemption from $100,000 to $134,004; indexation of the salary level to the 40 th percentile of weekly earnings so that it would automatically be updated every three years; and an allowance that up to 10% of the standard salary level may be comprised of nondiscretionary bonuses, incentive payments, and commissions. The 2016 final rule implements a mechanism to automatically update the EAP salary level thresholds. Effective December 1, 2016, the standard salary level for the EAP exemption is $913 per week. Does the 2016 final rule affect independent contractors? With caveats, DOL estimates that approximately 13.1 million workers would be affected by the proposed rule. Specifically, DOL estimates the following:
In the first year under the provisions of the 2016 final rule, about 4.2 million EAP employees would become newly entitled to overtime pay due to the increase in the salary threshold. | The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), enacted in 1938, is the main federal legislation that establishes general wage and hour standards for most, but not all, private and public sector employees. Among other protections, the FLSA establishes that covered nonexempt employees must be compensated at one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for each hour worked over 40 hours in a workweek.
The FLSA also establishes certain exemptions from its general labor market standards. One of the major exemptions to the overtime provisions in the FLSA is for bona fide "executive, administrative, and professional" employees (the "EAP" or "white collar" exemptions). The FLSA grants authority to the Secretary of Labor to define and delimit the EAP exemption "from time to time." To qualify for this exemption from the FLSA's overtime pay requirement, an employee must be salaried (the "salary basis" test), must perform specified executive, administrative, or professional duties (the "duties" test), and must earn above a salary level threshold (the "salary level" test).
In July 2015, the Secretary of Labor published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to make changes to the EAP exemption. After receiving approximately 294,000 comments on the NPRM, the Secretary of Labor published the Final Rule on the EAP exemption on May 23, 2016 (2016 final rule). The 2016 final rule is effective December 1, 2016. The major changes in the 2016 final rule include increasing the salary level threshold from the previous level of $455 per week to $913 per week and providing an automatic update to the salary level every three years. The 2016 final rule does not change the duties and responsibilities that employees must perform to be exempt. Thus, the 2016 final rule will affect EAP employees at salary levels between $455 and $913 per week in 2016. The Department of Labor (DOL) estimates that about 13.1 million workers will be affected in the first year, including about 4.2 million EAP employees who will become newly entitled to overtime pay.
This report answers frequently asked questions about the overtime provisions of the FLSA, the EAP exemptions, and the 2016 final rule that defines and delimits the EAP exemption. |
crs_R41241 | crs_R41241_0 | Created with the enactment of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 (PWEDA; P.L. 89-136), the Economic Development Administration has a 46-year history of supporting job creation and long-term economic recovery efforts in the nation's economically distressed areas. As the 112 th Congress considers these and other legislative proposals that may reauthorize, amend, and fund the agency and its programs, a review of the evolution of the agency's statutory authority may inform Congress in its deliberations. Among the themes and issues that framed the debates authorizing EDA and its predecessor agencies and programs were the following:
the centralization of federal aid in contrast to decentralization and devolution of responsibilities to state and local governments, the allocation of funds to infrastructure development versus direct aid to the unemployed and underemployed, the targeting of federal funds to the most economically depressed areas versus allocation of resources geographically throughout the country, the use of public works as an anti-recession job creation tool, the use of unemployment as the dominant factor to identify counties eligible for assistance in contrast to a matrix of elements, and the level of aid necessary to affect job growth and economic development. The agency evolved from a cluster of programs targeted primarily to depressed rural communities to an agency that was also called upon to direct assistance to urban areas and to address issues confronting communities experiencing sudden and abrupt economic dislocation caused by factory shutdowns, foreign competition, base closures, and disasters. By the end of the decade, Congress had approved legislation that increasingly relied on unemployment rates as the primary factor used to determine EDA eligibility and authorized EDA to provide economic adjustment and trade adjustment assistance to communities experiencing or with the potential for experiencing sudden and abrupt economic dislocation. The amendments tightened eligibility criteria, standardized matching fund requirements, simplified the application process, encouraged regional cooperation, and introduced performance measures. The act limited EDA funds to 50% of a project's cost, but included provisions that allowed EDA to cover an additional 30% of a project's cost based on a community's economic condition. In addition, the act standardized the federal minimum cost share at 50% among the types of EDA assistance provided (i.e., public works grants versus economic adjustment assistance). To receive assistance, states were required to devise comprehensive economic development strategies consistent with local and district plans. The act made no substantive changes to the federal-local cost share requirements for EDA, but it did simplify the language, allowing EDA to consolidate the provisions requiring a minimum federal cost share of 50% of project cost with the provision allowing EDA to award supplemental grants covering an additional 30% of the cost of a project based on the relative need or financial capacity of the assisted area. Concluding Observations
During its 46-year history, EDA has remained relatively unchanged in its mission and the means of achieving it. Congress has acted to refine the programs' components and focus. | As the 112th Congress considers legislation reauthorizing the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 (PWEDA; P.L. 89-136), which created the Economic Development Administration (EDA) and its programs, the PWEDA's statutory evolution may inform Congress in its deliberation. In reviewing the evolution of the PWEDA's statutory authority, several observations are worth making:
Congress has consistently used unemployment as the primary criterion to determine eligibility for EDA assistance, but it has authorized the inclusion of other criteria, resulting in up to 80% of counties being deemed eligible for assistance. Although Congress has cast a wide net in terms of the criteria for EDA eligibility, it has remained focused on a singular mission: supporting private sector job creation in economically depressed areas primarily through the financing of infrastructure projects, including technology enhancements. Congress has continued to promote multi-jurisdictional regional planning as a core activity in support of EDA's job creation mission. The use of EDA public works-based assistance as an anti-recession tool has generally been opposed by some in Congress and viewed as slow and costly in generating jobs for the unemployed during a recession.
During its 46-year history, EDA has evolved from a cluster of programs targeted primarily to rural communities experiencing long-term economic depression to an agency that has also been called upon to target assistance to urban areas and to address issues confronting communities experiencing sudden economic dislocation caused by factory shutdowns, foreign competition, base closures, and disasters. Although Congress initially approved legislation that used unemployment rates as the primary determinant of eligibility, it has also used per capita income and other criteria to qualify areas for assistance. Supporters contend that this allows EDA to be responsive to areas experiencing population outmigration, natural disasters, natural resource depletion, military base closures, the sudden loss of manufacturing jobs, and other special needs, while detractors contend that this broad targeting has diffused the agency's resources.
As the programs of EDA evolved, Congress enacted legislation that standardized matching fund requirements among programs, simplified the application process, encouraged regional cooperation, established performance measures, and provided additional performance-based funding to grant recipients. The 1998 amendments standardized the federal cost share at 50% of a project's cost, but allowed EDA to provide supplemental assistance to increase the EDA contribution to no more than 80% of a project's cost. The 2004 amendments allowed EDA to waive completely the cost share requirements based on an EDA finding of insufficient taxing or borrowing capacity.
In an effort to encourage regional cooperation, Congress conditioned the receipt of public works and economic adjustment assistance on the development and implementation of a Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS) and required each grantee's CEDS to be consistent with local and district plans. Congress also directed EDA to award additional funds for outstanding performance in the execution of grant activities. Most recently, with the passage of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5), Congress returned to the practice of using EDA assistance as a countercyclical tool. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42134 | crs_R42134_0 | Risk Adjustment Generally
"Risk adjustment is the process of adjusting payments to organizations (usually health insurance plans) based on differences in the risk characteristics of people enrolled in each plan." In either of these situations, all other things being the same, insurers should be indifferent between enrolling men or women into their plan. Immediately below, this report describes how the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) pays private health plans under Medicare Advantage (MA or Medicare Part C) and how these payments are risk adjusted. Subsequent sections describe how risk scores for MA enrollees are initially generated and change over time. The report concludes with a discussion of how CMS audits risk-adjusted MA payments and some potential issues associated with risk adjustment and the audits. By contract with CMS, a health plan agrees to provide all required Medicare benefits (except hospice) to a group of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in the plan in return for a capitated monthly payment adjusted for the demographics and health status of the beneficiaries who actually enroll in the plan. Payments to MA plans are based on a comparison of each plan's estimated cost of providing Medicare covered benefits (a bid) relative to the maximum amount the federal government will pay for providing those benefits in the plan's service area (a benchmark). Risk Adjustment Under Medicare Advantage
The current MA risk adjustment methodology relies on demographic, health history, and other factors to adjust payments to plans. In addition, short-term illnesses, even if expensive, are not captured. Risk Adjustment Data Validation (RADV) Audits
Since there can be error in the information that plans provide to CMS to justify risk-adjusted payments as well as error in the updating process, CMS audits Medicare Advantage plans to ensure that the risk-adjusted payments plans are claiming and being paid for are in fact supported by the medical record (referred to as RADV audits). If the medical record does not confirm the underlying diagnosis, the payments based on the diagnosis were considered in error. The FFS adjuster accounts for the fact that the documentation standards used in RADV audits are different from the documentation standards used to develop the risk adjustment model; this adjuster may address a methodological concern raised by the American Academy of Actuaries, as discussed in the " Concerns with CMS Audit Process " section of this report. While the crux of the AAA's position is presented below in full, their position can be summarized as concern that:
the Medicare fee-for-service data used to estimate risk adjustments were never validated and therefore may also contain errors, and the methodology was designed to estimate payment errors not adjust premiums and the resulting premiums may not reflect the risk profiles of actual enrollees:
Our primary concern with the proposed audit process is that it creates an inconsistency between how the risk adjustment factors were developed and how they now would be applied. Others have raised concerns about using Medicare fee-for-services data—which have not been audited for accuracy—to generate the risk adjustment coefficients for Medicare Advantage plans. Some plans have expressed concern that recoveries from RADV audits may place them at substantial financial risk. Payments to individual plans were not adjusted for enrolling very ill beneficiaries. The CMS-HCC takes into account the severity of a beneficiary's illness (and only compensating for the most severe manifestation reported), the accumulated effect of multiple (unrelated) diseases, as well as interactive effects—instances where having two or more specified diseases or characteristics results in expected health care expenditures that are larger than the simple sum of the effects. | According to the American Academy of Actuaries, "[h]ealth risk adjustment is the process of adjusting payments to organizations (usually health insurance plans) based on differences in the risk characteristics of people enrolled in each plan." By adjusting payments to compensate organizations for the relatively higher medical costs associated with an ill individual, plans should, all other things being equal, be indifferent between enrolling the sicker person or the relatively healthier one.
Medicare Advantage (MA) is an alternative way for Medicare beneficiaries to receive covered benefits. Under MA, private health plans are paid a per-person amount to provide all Medicare-covered benefits (except hospice) to beneficiaries who enroll in their plan. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) risk adjusts the payments to MA plans. The size of the adjustment depends on the demographic and health history of each plan enrollee. The payment adjustment takes into account the severity of a beneficiary's illness, the accumulated effect of multiple diseases, as well as interactive effects—instances where having two or more specified diseases or characteristics results in expected health care expenditures that are larger than the simple sum of the effects. The payments are not adjusted for short-term illnesses because they are assumed to be poor predictors of future health spending.
MA plans provide information to CMS to justify the risk-adjusted payments; CMS therefore audits the plans to ensure that the risk-adjusted payments that the plans are claiming are in fact supported by the medical record. Based on the audit findings, plans may have to pay back money when the medical record does not provide evidence for the risk-adjusted payment they had received. Alternatively, the audit may reveal additional illnesses that had not previously been taken into account. Previously, MA plans were only required to pay back money (or receive money) based on the findings from the audited enrollee records. CMS has proposed extrapolating the audit findings to apply to all enrollees in the audited plan.
Some concerns have been raised about risk adjustment under Medicare Advantage and the MA plan audits. First, risk adjustment compensates plans for the average predicted cost of any particular diagnosis. To the extent that MA plans could enroll beneficiaries with below-average expenditures relative to the average for their disease, those plans would be over-compensated by risk adjustment. Second, according to the American Academy of Actuaries, the Medicare fee-for-service data used in the MA risk adjustment model were not audited for accuracy and may contain errors. The audits under MA, however, would apply the risk adjustment factors to data that were validated. The inconsistency of using audited data in one circumstance and non-audited data in another could create uncertainty; however, a for-for-service adjustment factor added by CMS in the final notice of payment methodology may remedy this concern. Third, some plans have expressed concern that recoveries from the audits may place them at substantial financial risk.
This report describes how CMS pays providers under Medicare Advantage and how these payments are risk adjusted. In addition, it describes how risk scores for individual Medicare Advantage enrollees are initially generated and change over time, and it discusses how CMS audits risk-adjusted MA payments. It concludes with a short discussion of several concerns raised with risk adjustment and the audit process. |
crs_RS22631 | crs_RS22631_0 | Examples Of LSIs
Examples of programs being executed with LSIs include the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) and the Coast Guard's Deepwater acquisition program, both of which are multibillion-dollar SOS acquisition programs. Both of these programs have experienced problems, among them costs and schedule overruns, and have been the subject of multiple congressional oversight hearings. Supporters of LSIs argue that LSI arrangements can promote better technical innovation and overall system optimization. Problems with the FCS and Deepwater programs raised concerns regarding the use of private-sector LSIs for executing large, complex defense acquisition programs. Legislative Activity
On September 30, 2010, the House and Senate conferees for the Fiscal Year 2010 and 2011 Coast Guard Authorization Act ( H.R. 3619 ) resolved their differences and the bill was sent to the President on October 4, 2010. One provision in the bill, Section 564, would prohibit the use of lead system integrators within the Coast Guard for all acquisition contracts awarded, task or deliver orders issued after the enactment of this bill, and require the use of full and open competition for any future acquisition contract. P.L. 111-23 , the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, required the Secretary of Defense to revise the DFARS to reflect any organizational conflicts of interest that may arise from the use of private-sector LSIs. | Some in Congress have expressed concern about the government's use of private-sector lead system integrators (LSIs) for executing large, complex, defense-related acquisition programs. LSIs are large, prime contractors hired to manage such programs. Supporters of the LSI concept argue that it is needed to execute such complex acquisition efforts, and can promote better technical oversight and innovation. Two LSI-managed programs—the U.S. Army's Future Combat System (FCS) and the U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater program—have been strongly criticized by some observers because of cost and schedule overruns, and the potential for possible conflicts of interest. The Army cancelled the FCS program in 2009 and the replacement programs do not use an LSI. Public Law (P.L.) 111-23, the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, required the Secretary of Defense to revise the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) to reflect any organizational conflicts of interest that may arise from the use of private-sector LSIs. On September 30, 2010, the House and Senate conferees for the proposed Fiscal Year 2010 and 2011 Coast Guard Authorization Act resolved their differences and the bill was sent to the President on October 4, 2010. One provision in the bill, Section 564, would prohibit the use of lead system integrators within the Coast Guard, with some exceptions, and would require the use of full and open competition for any future acquisition contract. |
crs_RL33284 | crs_RL33284_0 | The objective has largely been pursued through the federal procurement process by allocating federal assistance and contracts to foster disadvantaged business development. Additionally, statutory "set-asides" and other forms of preference for "socially and economically disadvantaged" firms and individuals, following the Small Business Act or other minority group definition, have frequently been added to specific grant or contract authorization programs. "Goals" or "set-asides" for minority groups, women, and other "disadvantaged" individuals have routinely been part of federal funding measures for education, defense, transportation and other activities over much of the last two decades. Recently, however, the Federal Circuit held that DOD's SDB program was unconstitutional. Prior to Adarand , the U.S. Supreme Court had narrowly approved of congressionally mandated racial preferences to allocate the benefits of contracts on federally sponsored public works projects in Fullilove v. Klutznick , while generally condemning similar actions taken by state and local entities to promote public contracting opportunities for minority entrepreneurs in City of Richmond v. J.A. These disputes generated divergent views as to whether state affirmative action measures for the benefit of racial minorities were subject to the same "strict scrutiny" as applied to "invidious" racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, an "intermediate" standard resembling the test for gender-based classifications, or simple rationality. In Croson , a 5 to 4 majority resolved that while "race-conscious" remedies could be legislated in response to proven past discrimination by the affected governmental entities, "racial balancing" untailored to "specific" and "identified" evidence of minority exclusion was impermissible. Until Adarand , however, a different, more lenient standard was thought to apply to use of racial preferences in federally conducted activities. The majority there applied "strict scrutiny" to a federal transportation program of financial incentives for prime contractors who subcontracted to firms owned by socially and economically disadvantaged group members. Although the Court refrained from deciding the constitutional merits of the particular program before it, and remanded for further proceedings below, it determined that all "racial classifications" by government at any level must be justified by a "compelling governmental interest" and "narrowly tailored" to that end. To "dispel the notion," however, that "strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact,'" the Court appeared to reserve a role for the national legislature as architect of remedies for past societal discrimination. In Rothe Development Corporation v. U.S. Department of Defense , a business owned by a non-minority woman, challenged the constitutionality of 10 U.S.C. Meanwhile, courts have also considered challenges to SBA's § 8(a) program for socially and economically disadvantaged businesses. | Since the early 1960s, minority participation "goals" have been an integral part of federal policies to promote racial and gender equality in contracting on federally financed construction projects and in connection with other large federal contracts. Federal contract "set-asides" and minority subcontracting goals evolved from Small Business Administration (SBA) programs to foster participation in the federal procurement process by small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs), or small businesses owned and controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged" individuals. Minority group members and women are presumed to be socially and economically disadvantaged under the Small Business Act, while non-minority contractors must present evidence to prove their eligibility. "Goals" or "set-asides" for minority groups, women, and other "disadvantaged" individuals have also been routinely included in federal funding measures for education, defense, transportation, and other activities over much of the last two decades.
The U.S. Supreme Court has narrowly approved of congressionally mandated racial preferences to allocate the benefits of contracts on federally sponsored public works projects, while generally condemning similar actions taken by state and local entities to promote public contracting opportunities for minority entrepreneurs. Disputes prior to City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson generated divergent views as to whether state affirmative action measures for the benefit of racial minorities were subject to the same "strict scrutiny" as applied to "invidious" racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, an "intermediate" standard resembling the test for gender-based classifications, or simple rationality. In Croson, a 5 to 4 majority resolved that while "race-conscious" remedies could be legislated in response to proven past discrimination by the affected governmental entities, "racial balancing" untailored to "specific" and "identified" evidence of minority exclusion was impermissible.
Until Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, however, a different, more lenient standard was thought to apply to use of racial preferences in federally conducted activities. The majority there applied "strict scrutiny" to a federal transportation program of financial incentives for prime contractors who subcontracted to firms owned by socially and economically disadvantaged group members. Although the Court refrained from deciding the constitutional merits of the particular program before it, and remanded for further proceedings below, it determined that all "racial classifications" by government at any level must be justified by a "compelling governmental interest" and "narrowly tailored" to that end. But the majority opinion, by Justice O'Connor, sought to "dispel the notion" that "strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact,'" by acknowledging a role for Congress as architect of remedies for discrimination nationwide. Bottom line, Adarand and its progeny suggest that racial preferences in federal law or policy are a remedy of last resort, which must be adequately justified and narrowly drawn to pass constitutional muster. In the post-Adarand era, lower federal courts have at times upheld and at other times struck down federal programs that contain minority contracting preferences. For example, in Rothe Development Corporation v. Department of Defense, the Federal Circuit recently held that the Department of Defense's Small Disadvantaged Business program was unconstitutional. |
crs_RL33428 | crs_RL33428_0 | 109-295 Signed into law
On October 4, 2006, P.L. 109-295 provides gross total budget authority of $41.4 billion for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2007. This amounts includes $1.8 billion in emergency funding that was added to the bill during conference. Excluding the emergency funding, P.L. 109-295 provides nearly $33.0 billion in net budget authority for DHS for FY2007. The bill contains a total of $33.2 billion in net budget authority for DHS for FY2007. The annual concurrent resolution on the budget sets forth the congressional budget. The Administration's request includes gross appropriations of $39.8 billion, and a net appropriation of $32.0 billion in budget authority for FY2007, of which $31.0 billion is discretionary budget authority, and $1 billion is mandatory budget authority. 109-295 provides $34.8 billion in net budget authority for DHS in FY2007 (including the emergency funding) and $33.0 billion in net budget authority (not including the emergency funding). The act outlined 19 functions for the IAIP Directorate, to include the following, among others:
To assess, receive, and analyze law enforcement information, intelligence information, and other information from federal, state, and local government agencies, and the private sector to (1) identify and assess the nature and scope of the terrorist threats to the homeland, (2) detect and identify threats of terrorism against the United States, and (3) understand such threats in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities of the homeland; To develop a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States; To review, analyze, and make recommendations for improvements in the policies and procedures governing the sharing of law enforcement information, intelligence information, and intelligence-related information within the federal government and between the federal government and state and local government agencies and authorities. P.L. During consideration of H.R. Title II contains the appropriations for the U.S.-Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator (US-VISIT) program, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the US Coast Guard, and the US Secret Service. 5441
House-passed H.R. 109-699 recommends increased or new funding of
$153.4 million for DRO custody management; $94 million for DRO transportation and removal operations; $76 million for DRO fugitive operations and associated bed space; $20 million for DRO vehicles; $2.5 million for Alternatives to Detention; $4.6 million for internal controls and procurement management; $5 million for the Office of Professional Responsibility; $10 million for Compliance Enforcement Units; $30 million for expanded worksite enforcement efforts; $10 million for additional vehicles for the Office of Investigations; $6.8 million for the Trade Transparency Unit; $2 million for the Criminal Alien Program; and $1 million for the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center. P.L. TSA Issues for Congress
Congress may consider several TSA-related transportation security issues during the FY2007 appropriations process. 109-295 provides a total of $8,316 million for the Coast Guard for FY2007, which is about $136 million more than the President requested. FY2007 Budget Request
For FY2007, the President's budget submission requested an appropriation of $1,265 million for the protection and criminal investigation missions of the Secret Service. 5441
For FY2007, the Senate-passed appropriations for DHS proposed a total appropriation of $1,293 million. Title III: Preparedness and Response
Title III includes appropriations for the Preparedness Directorate and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Table 11 provides summarizes budget request, House- and Senate-passed appropriations bills, and the FY2007 DHS appropriations ( P.L. For FY2007, House-passed H.R. The funding level approved by the Senate, $2,606 million, was $50 million below the amount approved by the House, with the most significant differences between the chambers as follows:
the Senate would have provided $30 million for urban search and rescue funding, whereas the House would have provided almost $20 million; the Senate matched the request for pre-disaster mitigation funding, recommending almost $150 million, compared with the $100 million approved by the House; the Senate would have provided almost $37 million less for the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) than the House; and the Senate would have provided roughly $15 million less than the House for administrative and operating activities. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). 5441 , would have appropriated $162 million for USCIS in FY2007. 5441
House-passed H.R. These include the following:
$24.1 million for CBP's Salaries and Expenses account; $10.4 million for CBP's Construction account; $13 million for ICE's Salaries and Expenses account; $132 million for the Coast Guard's Operating Expenses account; $74.5 million for the Coast Guard's Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements account; $3.6 million for the Secret Service's Salaries and Expenses account; $10.3 million for ODP's State and Local Programs account; and $17.2 million for FEMA's Administrative and Regional Operations account. | The annual consideration of appropriations bills (regular, continuing, and supplemental) by Congress is part of a complex set of budget processes that also encompasses the consideration of budget resolutions, revenue and debt-limit legislation, other spending measures, and reconciliation bills. In addition, the operation of programs and the spending of appropriated funds are subject to constraints established in authorizing statutes. Congressional action on the budget for a fiscal year usually begins following the submission of the President's budget at the beginning of each annual session of Congress. Congressional practices governing the consideration of appropriations and other budgetary measures are rooted in the Constitution, the standing rules of the House and Senate, and statutes, such as the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
This report is a guide to one of the regular appropriations bills that Congress considers each year. It is designed to supplement the information provided by the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security. It summarizes the status of the bill, its scope, major issues, funding levels, and related congressional activity, and is updated as events warrant. The report lists the key CRS staff relevant to the issues covered and related CRS products.
This report describes the FY2007 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). On October 4, 2006, P.L. 109-295 was signed into law. P.L. 109-295 provides gross total budget authority of $41.4 billion for DHS for FY2007. This amounts includes $1.8 billion in emergency funding that was added to the bill during conference. P.L. 109-295 provides net budget authority of $34.8 billion, including the emergency funding. Excluding the emergency funding, P.L. 109-295 provides nearly $33.0 billion in net budget authority for DHS for FY2007. Senate-passed H.R. 5441 would have provided $32.8 billion in net budget authority for DHS for FY2007. House-passed H.R. 5441 would have provided $33.2 billion in net budget authority for DHS in FY2007. The Administration requested a net appropriation of $31.9 billion in net budget authority for FY2007.
P.L. 109-295 provides the following net appropriation for major components of DHS: $8,035 million for Customs and Border Protection (CBP); $3,958 million for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); $3,628 million for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA); $8,316 million for the U.S. Coast Guard; $1,277 million for the Secret Service; $4,018 million for the Preparedness Directorate; $2,511 million for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); $182 million for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); and $973 million for the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T).
The requested net appropriation for major components of the department included the following: $6,574 million for CBP; $3,928 million for ICE; $2,323 million for TSA; $8,181 million for the U.S. Coast Guard; $1,265 million for the Secret Service; $3,420 million for the Preparedness Directorate; $2,964 million for FEMA; $182 million for USCIS; and $1,002 million for the S&T.
House-passed H.R. 5441, contained the following amounts for major components of the department: $6,434 million for CBP; $3,876 million for ICE; $3,618 million for TSA; $8,129 million for the U.S. Coast Guard; $1,293 million for the Secret Service; $4,069 million for the Preparedness Directorate; $2,656 million for the FEMA; $162 million for USCIS; $956 million for S&T; and $500 million for the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO).
Senate-passed H.R. 5441 contained the following amounts for major components of the department: $6,683 million for CBP; $3,919 million for ICE; $3,816 million for TSA; $8,188 million for the U.S. Coast Guard; $1,226 million for the Secret Service; $3,901 million for the Preparedness Directorate; $2,606 million for FEMA; $135 million for USCIS; $818 million for S&T; and $442 million for the DNDO.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43769 | crs_R43769_0 | Introduction
Virtually every federal criminal statute has a hidden feature; helpers and hands-on offenders face the same punishment. This results from 18 U.S.C. 2, which visits the same consequences on anyone who orders or assists in the commission of a federal crime. 2(a). Section 2(a), the aiding and abetting subsection, is more frequently prosecuted than §2(b), the causes subsection. Aiding and abetting means assisting in the commission of someone else's crime. Section 2(a) demands that a defendant embrace the crime of another and consciously do something to contribute to its success. A completed offense is a prerequisite to conviction for aiding and abetting, but the hands-on offender need be neither named nor convicted. It happens most often when there is a substantial culpability gap between the accomplice or co-conspirator and the primary offender. Section 2(b) applies to defendants who work through either witting or unwitting intermediaries, through the guilty or the innocent. Whether the intermediary is a subordinate or an undercover government agent, he may be well aware that his conduct constitutes an element of the underlying offense. On the other hand, whether the intermediary is a dupe or a facilitating governmental official, §2(b) also applies even if he is unaware of the nature of his conduct. When the intermediary is an innocent party, no one but the "causing" individual need commit the underlying offense. Related Matters
Withdrawal Defense
Federal courts sometimes mention a withdrawal defense comparable to one available in conspiracy cases. Aiding and abetting needs a completed offense. Proponents of a general withdrawal defense may claim support from recent dicta in Rosemond . The Supreme Court explained that an accomplice must know of the substantive offense beforehand in order to be shown to have embraced its commission. It did so in a manner suggesting an accomplice might be able to withdraw and escape liability prior to the commission of the substantive offense, even if he had contributed to the crime's ultimate success:
For all that to be true, though, the §924(c) defendant's knowledge of a firearm must be advance knowledge – or otherwise said, knowledge that enables him to make the relevant legal (and indeed, moral) choice. Civil Liability
"Congress has not enacted a general civil aiding and abetting statute. . . . | Virtually every federal criminal statute has a hidden feature; primary offenders and even their most casual accomplices face equal punishment. This results from 18 U.S.C. 2, which visits the same consequences on anyone who orders or assists in the commission of a federal crime.
Aiding and abetting means assisting in the commission of someone else's crime. Section 2(a) demands that the defendant embrace the crime of another and consciously do something to contribute to its success. An accomplice must know the offense is afoot if he is to intentionally contribute to its success. While a completed offense is a prerequisite to conviction for aiding and abetting, the hands-on offender need be neither named nor convicted.
On occasion, an accomplice will escape liability, either by judicial construction or administrative grace. This happens most often when there is a perceived culpability gap between accomplice and primary offender. Such accomplices are usually victims, customers, or subordinates of a primary offender.
Section 2(b)(willfully causing a crime) applies to defendants who work through either witting or unwitting intermediaries, through the guilty or the innocent. Whether the intermediary is a subordinate or an undercover government agent, he may be well aware that his conduct constitutes an element of the underlying offense. On the other hand, whether the intermediary is a dupe or a facilitating governmental official, §2(b) applies even if the intermediary is unaware of the nature of his conduct. Section 2(a) requires two guilty parties, a primary offender and an accomplice. Section 2(b) permits prosecution when there is only one guilty party, a "causing" individual and an innocent agent. Both subsections, however, require a completed offense.
Federal courts sometimes mention, but rarely apply, a withdrawal defense comparable to one available in conspiracy cases. Proponents of a general withdrawal defense in §2 cases may find support in recent Supreme Court dicta. In Rosemond, the Court explained that an accomplice must know of the pending substantive offense in order to be shown to have embraced its commission. It did so in a manner suggesting that an accomplice might be able to withdraw and escape liability prior to the commission of the substantive offense, even if he had contributed to the crime's ultimate success.
There is no general civil aiding and abetting statute. Aiding and abetting a violation of a federal criminal law does not trigger civil liability unless Congress has said so in so many words.
This report is available in an abridged version as CRS Report R43770, Aiding, Abetting, and the Like: An Abbreviated Overview of 18 U.S.C. 2, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R45103 | crs_R45103_0 | Members of Congress routinely introduce legislation and debate issues pertaining to recreational opportunities and access, federal land use, and the federal government's regulatory roles related to sportsperson activities. These issues cut across all of the federal land management agencies—including Department of the Interior (DOI) agencies and the U.S. Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and other land management agencies and departments such as the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Hunting and fishing activities are included in the management plans for many federally owned areas, and are authorized under law for some federal lands (see " Hunting and Fishing on Federal Lands " section below). Proponents of greater access to sportsperson activities on federal lands cite the importance of federal lands for these activities and contend that federal lands should be managed in a way that benefits and provides opportunities for all Americans, including hunters and anglers. Hunting and Fishing on Federal Lands
Federal lands and waters are a significant provider of opportunities for sportspeople to participate in hunting and fishing. The federal government owns approximately 640 million acres of land, accounting for about 28% of land within the United States. For example, although a land management agency may have a policy to allow hunting and fishing, an individual unit within the agency may not allow hunting and fishing in parts of the unit because of a specific purpose or need at the unit level. Although it is not possible to determine the precise percentage of federal acres open to hunting and/or fishing, based on these data, more than 80% of federal lands and waters appear to be open to hunting in some capacity. The below sections provide an overview of hunting and fishing policy for several of the major land management agencies and departments. Not all agencies managing federal lands and waters are included in this report (e.g., U.S. National Park Service
NPS's National Park System contains 417 units with 80.0 million federal acres. These laws outline the purpose and mission of specific agencies and determine whether lands and waters managed by these agencies are open unless closed or closed unless open . This section will focus on the federal statutes applicable to hunting and fishing more generally. Migratory Bird Treaty Act
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (MBTA) implements a bipartite convention between the United States and Great Britain (on behalf of Canada). Migratory Bird Hunting and Conservation Stamp Act
The Migratory Bird Hunting and Conservation Stamp Act of 1934 (the Duck Stamp Act) requires that waterfowl hunters over the age of 16 annually purchase and carry a valid federal hunting stamp (known as a duck stamp ) in addition to any required licenses under state laws for hunting waterfowl. Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act and Federal Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act
The Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act (commonly referred to as the Pittman-Robertson Act) and the Federal Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act (commonly referred to as the Dingell-Johnson Act) are both related to hunting and fishing. Some issues related to hunting and fishing that are deliberated by Congress include establishing what federal lands can be accessed for hunting and fishing; determining what types of land should be open to hunting and fishing; how to regulate the opening and closing of land to hunting and fishing; whether to reauthorize or amend existing laws that are related to hunting and fishing; and regulating the use of ammunition and tackle on federal lands. Whether lands and waters are open to hunting and fishing is determined by authorizing statutes and missions for land management agencies as well as the purpose of individual units within the various land management systems. Although BLM and FS are the focus of these bills, both S. 733 and S. 1460 would also establish that it is the policy of the United States for all agencies and departments, in line with their missions, to facilitate the expansion and enhancement of hunting and fishing. Reauthorizations
Congress routinely considers reauthorizing appropriations and/or programmatic authorities that are either directly or indirectly related to hunting and fishing. H.R. 4489 ), and limitation on acquisition of lands administered by the federal government ( H.R. 3668 ). This issue has been addressed through administrative actions. Summary of Selected Legislation in the 115th Congress Addressing Sportsperson Issues
The following table presents issues addressed within selected hunting and fishing legislation introduced in the 115 th Congress. | This report provides an overview of issues related to hunting and fishing on federal lands. Each year millions of individuals participate in hunting and fishing activities, bringing in billions of dollars for regional and national economies. Due to their popularity, economic value, constituent appeal, and nexus to federal land management issues, hunting and fishing issues are perennially addressed by Congress. Congress addresses these issues through oversight, legislation, and appropriations, which target issues such as access to federal lands and waters for sportsperson activities, and striking the right balance among hunting and fishing and other recreational, commercial, scientific, and conservation uses.
Most federal lands and waters are open to hunting and/or fishing; stakeholders contend that these areas provide many hunters and anglers with their only or best access to hunting and fishing. This is especially the case in the western United States. Federal lands and waters account for nearly 640 million acres (28%) of the 2.3 billion acres in the United States. Federal land management agencies manage recreational activities, including hunting and fishing, on federal lands. Four land management agencies—the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS) within the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the U.S. Forest Service (FS) within the Department of Agriculture (USDA)—manage over 95% of federal lands, while the rest is administered by other agencies within DOI, the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and others.
Federal land management agencies have hunting and fishing policies that are derived from statutes establishing the agencies as well as federal and state laws pertaining to hunting and fishing. In general, federal land management agencies have hunting and fishing policies that are either open unless closed or closed unless open, depending on the mission of the agency. In the case of the former, the default status of lands is open to hunting and fishing unless closed by the relevant agency. For these agencies, recreation, including hunting and fishing, is often included within the mission of the agency. For lands that are closed unless open, hunting and fishing are often a secondary use and allowed only when compatible with the primary purpose or mission of the agency or the federal land unit. Overall, based on CRS analysis of agency data, more than 80% of federal lands and waters appear to be open to hunting in some capacity.
Several federal statutes are applicable to hunting and fishing either directly or indirectly. For example, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 provides the federal government with the authority to regulate the hunting of migratory birds in the United States. Similarly, the Migratory Bird Hunting and Conservation Stamp Act (better known as the Duck Stamp Act) authorizes the requirement for hunters to obtain a federal stamp to hunt migratory birds. Alternatively, federal laws may indirectly relate to hunting and fishing, such as the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act (also known as the Pittman-Robertson Act), which directs tax revenues from certain hunting and fishing equipment to states for wildlife restoration and hunter education.
In the 115th Congress, hunting and fishing issues have been addressed through oversight and proposed legislation. These bills (e.g., H.R. 3668 and H.R. 4489, and S. 733 and S. 1460) reflect some of the key issues being deliberated by Congress. These issues include access to federal lands for hunting and fishing, procedures for closing certain lands to these activities, the transport of firearms on federal lands, and the use of specific ammunition and tackle in hunting and fishing. Although there is general agreement among Members of Congress regarding the importance of balancing sportsperson activities and other activities on federal lands, the question of what the appropriate balance is, and the best means of achieving it, has in some cases been contentious. |
crs_R41260 | crs_R41260_0 | Introduction
One of Justice Stevens's most lasting jurisprudential legacies is his opinion in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council . The 1984 case, a landmark decision in both administrative law and separation of powers, established the legal framework that has largely governed the degree of deference a court will accord a federal agency in interpreting and implementing statutes. What began as an unexceptional case focusing on the meaning of the phrase "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act has developed into one of the most frequently cited cases ever. Although often relied on as an authority, the case has also engendered significant confusion. Questions of when, and how, to apply the two-step Chevron analysis laid out by Justice Stevens, which is simple in theory yet remarkably varied in its application, have consistently challenged federal judges. Moreover, although Justice Stevens has spent the last quarter century working to clarify the Chevron doctrine, as he departs the Court he may find himself outside the majority position on at least one key aspect of the test's application. Stevens's Chevron analysis established what many commentators have considered to be a highly deferential judicial role when faced with a challenge to an agency's interpretation of its own authorizing statute or a statute it administers. At step one, a reviewing court must determine whether Congress has spoken clearly on the issue at hand and give effect to any intent it finds Congress expressed unambiguously. An agency interpretation that is contrary to the clear intent of Congress must be rejected. If, however, Congress's intent is unclear as to the immediate question, including where Congress is silent, at step two the court's role is to defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of the pertinent statutory language. This analysis is commonly referred to as the Chevron "two-step." Inconsistent Application and Unresolved Questions
As much as Justice Stevens's opinion has been cited, major questions remain about when and how to properly apply the Chevron test. The threshold question of what agency interpretations qualify for Chevron deference, for example, remains unclear. A second ongoing dispute, and one in which Justice Stevens has played a leading role, relates to what tools of statutory construction are properly employed at step one of the test as a court determines Congress's "intent." Specifically, should the court be considering legislative intent and legislative purpose or restrict itself to the statutory language alone? | One of Justice John Paul Stevens's most lasting jurisprudential legacies is his opinion in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The 1984 case, a landmark decision in both administrative law and separation of powers, established the legal framework that has largely governed the degree of deference a court will accord a federal agency in interpreting and implementing statutes. What began as an unexceptional case focusing on the meaning of the phrase "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act has developed into one of the most frequently cited cases ever. Although often relied on as an authority, the case has also engendered significant confusion. Questions of when, and how, to apply the two-step Chevron analysis laid out by Justice Stevens, which is simple in theory yet remarkably varied in its application, have consistently challenged federal judges. Moreover, although Justice Stevens has spent the last quarter century working to clarify the Chevron doctrine, as he departs the Court he may find himself outside the majority position on at least one key aspect of the test's application.
Stevens's Chevron analysis established what many commentators have considered to be a highly deferential judicial role when faced with a challenge to an agency's interpretation of its own authorizing statute or a statute it administers. At step one of the analysis, a reviewing court must determine whether Congress has spoken clearly on the issue at hand and give effect to any intent it finds Congress expressed unambiguously. An agency interpretation that is contrary to the clear intent of Congress must be rejected. If, however, Congress's intent is unclear as to the immediate question, including where Congress is silent, at step two the court's role is to defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of the pertinent statutory language. This analysis is commonly referred to as the Chevron "two-step."
As much as Justice Stevens's opinion has been cited, major questions remain about when and how to properly apply the Chevron test. The threshold question of what types of agency interpretations qualify for Chevron deference, for example, has narrowed. A second ongoing dispute, and one in which Justice Stevens has played a leading role, relates to what tools of statutory construction are properly employed at step one of the test as a court determines Congress's "intent." Specifically, should the court be considering legislative intent and legislative purpose or restrict itself to the statutory language alone? |
crs_RL33598 | crs_RL33598_0 | Under these revised rules, states have the option of processing slamming complaints, and numerous states have opted to do so. On March 14, 2002, the FCC initiated a notice of proposed rulemaking to examine primary interexchange (long distance) carrier (PIC) change charges, and in a February 10, 2005 action modified the rate structure that was set in 1984. This unauthorized change can occur for several reasons, ranging from computer or human error to unscrupulous or illegal marketing practices. Regardless of the reason, this unauthorized switching, known as "slamming," has a negative impact on both the consumers and suppliers of telecommunications services. Despite existing regulations to prevent such practices and the overall condemnation of such activities, slamming continues to occur with significant frequency. According to data released by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), slamming continues to be a major consumer concern, with 36,220 inquiries and 1,932 complaints filed in 2005. The FCC's slamming team, which is part of the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, in 2004 resolved approximately 3,500 slamming complaints involving over 300 telephone carriers, resulting in consumer refunds totaling $800,000. The potential for slamming is expected to increase as competition in the provision of intrastate long distance and local telecommunications services becomes more widespread. A significant level of consumer complaints, coupled with the potential for further abuses in an increasingly competitive marketplace, has prompted action to examine and strengthen deterrents to this practice. These include permitting the use of Internet LOAs in compliance with provisions contained in the E-Sign Act ( P.L. Some of the major conclusions reached by the GAO, based on their three-month investigation into slamming practices and regulation, are as follows:
"Neither the FCC, the states, nor the telecommunications industry, have been effective in protecting the consumer from telephone slamming; Information provided by all long distance carriers in compliance with FCC-required tariff filing procedures, is not reviewed and is no deterrent to a slammer; Some states have taken significant action to protect consumers from slamming, but others have taken little action or have no antislamming regulations; The industry approach [to combat slamming] appears to be largely market-driven rather than consumer-oriented; Consumers and the industry itself are becoming increasingly vulnerable as targets for large scale fraud; Given [the present] environment, unscrupulous long-distance providers slam consumers, often with virtual impunity; and The most effective action that consumers can take to eliminate the chance of intentional slamming is to have their local exchange carrier freeze their choice of long distance providers." Whether the FCC's strengthened slamming rules and subsequent enforcement actions will be a sufficient deterrent to stop the practice of slamming, and negate congressional interest to enact legislation remains unclear. The statement also advocated uniformity in state and federal slamming requirements, to lessen consumer confusion, and called for the levying of fines, but solely in cases where it has be proven that the carrier "has engaged in willful and intentional slamming...."
Issues
Although virtually no one supports the practice of intentional slamming, some concerns have been expressed over the approaches being taken to curb this practice. One concern has focused on the necessity for, or concern over specific provisions contained in, legislative proposals. Two other concerns addressed in legislation have also generated controversy: the implementation of primary interexchange carrier (PIC) freeze programs; and the methodology used by the FCC to develop slamming statistics. Legislation in the 105th Congress
H.R. | Changing a consumer's telephone service provider without his/her knowledge or consent is known as "slamming." This unauthorized change can occur for several reasons ranging from computer or human error to unscrupulous or illegal marketing practices. Regardless of the reason, slamming has a negative impact on both consumers and suppliers of telecommunications services. Despite existing regulations to prevent such practices and the overall condemnation of such activities, slamming continues to be a consumer concern. According to data released by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 2005, 1,932 slamming complaints were filed. In 2004 the FCC Consumer Affairs Bureau resolved about 3,500 consumer complaints involving over 300 telephone carriers. The issue of slamming is expected to continue as competition in the provision of intrastate long distance and local telecommunications services becomes more widespread.
A significant level of consumer complaints, coupled with the potential for further abuses in an increasingly competitive marketplace, have prompted action to examine and strengthen deterrents to this practice. The FCC has been actively enforcing existing rules and continues to address outstanding slamming issues. The FCC, in a series of rulemakings, adopted rules that strengthen deterrents to slamming in compliance with provisions contained in the 1996 Telecommunications Act (P.L. 104-104). All of these rules are now in effect. Under these revised rules, states are given the option of processing slamming complaints, and numerous states have chosen to do so. The telecommunications industry has condemned intentional slamming and is also taking steps to eliminate the practice.
Following enactment of P.L. 104-104 and during the FCC's promulgation of rules concerning slamming, Congress considered further legislative action. Both the House and Senate passed bills in the 105th Congress, but did not complete action. Further legislation was introduced in the 106th Congress. Since then, as FCC and state enforcement against slamming has continued, Congress has followed the issue, but not seen the introduction of new legislative initiatives.
Although no one supports the practice of intentional slamming, some concerns have been expressed over the approaches being taken to curb this practice. One concern has focused on the necessity for, or specific provisions contained in, legislative measures, with the implementation of primary interexchange (long distance) carrier (PIC) freeze program among the most contentious. The FCC, on March 14, 2002, adopted a notice of proposed rulemaking to examine the charges imposed by local exchange carriers for PIC changes and in a February 10, 2005 action, modified the rate structure that was set in 1984. Another concern relevant to the slamming debate, that is the methodology used by the FCC to develop slamming statistics, also generated controversy. Whether FCC-adopted slamming rules will be a sufficient deterrent to stop the practice of slamming, and negate congressional interest to enact legislation, remains to be seen. |
crs_R41156 | crs_R41156_0 | As part of the conflict with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the United States has captured and detained numerous persons believed to have been part of or associated with enemy forces. Over the years, federal courts have considered a multitude of petitions by or on behalf of suspected belligerents challenging aspects of U.S. detention policy. The Supreme Court has issued definitive rulings concerning several legal issues raised in the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, including executive authority under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF," P.L. In December 2011, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 ("2012 NDAA," P.L. 112-81 ), which contains a provision largely intended to codify the present understanding of the detention authority conferred by the AUMF, as interpreted and applied by the Executive and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. In any event, the act does not address many of the legal issues involving wartime detention which, while occasioning significant political debate, have not been squarely resolved by the Supreme Court. These issues include the full scope of the Executive's detention authority, including the circumstances in which U.S. citizens may be detained as enemy belligerents; the degree to which noncitizens held at Guantanamo and other locations outside the United States are entitled to protections under the Constitution; the authority of federal habeas courts to compel the release into the United States of detainees determined to be unlawfully held if the Executive cannot effectuate their release to another country; and the ability of detainees to receive advance notice and challenge their proposed transfer to a foreign country. This report briefly summarizes major judicial opinions concerning suspected enemy belligerents detained in the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It discusses all Supreme Court decisions concerning enemy combatants. It also addresses notable appeals court opinions addressing issues of ongoing relevance to U.S. detention policy. The report also discusses a few notable decisions by federal district courts, including criminal cases involving persons who were either involved in the 9/11 attacks or were captured abroad by U.S. forces or allies during operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Many of the rulings discussed in this report are discussed in greater detail in other CRS products, including CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34536, Boumediene v. Bush: Guantanamo Detainees' Right to Habeas Corpus , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS21884, The Supreme Court 2003 Term: Summary and Analysis of Opinions Related to Detainees in the War on Terrorism , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R42337, Detention of U.S. Persons as Enemy Belligerents , by [author name scrubbed]. Since 2009, the appellate court has issued rulings concluding, among other things, that
the Executive may lawfully detain persons who are "part of" Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated groups, and possibly also persons who provide a sufficient degree of support to such entities in their hostilities against the United States and its allies ( Al-Bihani v. Obama ); a functional approach is appropriate when assessing whether a person is "part of" Al Qaeda, meaning that judges should consider the significance of a person's activities in relation to the organization, rather than requiring formal proof of membership, such as evidence the petitioner received orders from the organization's hierarchy ( Awad v. Obama , Bensayah v. Obama , Salahi v. Obama ); the government may satisfy its evidentiary burden in support of a person's detention when its factual claims are supported by a preponderance of evidence ( Al-Bihani v. Obama , Al Odah v. United States ), but a lower standard might be constitutionally permissible ( Al-Adahi v. Obama, Almerfedi v. Obama ); it is proper for a habeas court to assess the cumulative weight and effect of proffered evidence according to a "conditional probability analysis" when determining whether the government has demonstrated factual grounds for detaining a habeas petitioner ( Al-Adahi v. Obama , Salahi v. Obama ); consideration of hearsay evidence in habeas cases is not determined by the Federal Rules of Evidence ( Al Odah v. United States , Al-Madhwani v. Obama ); official government records, including government intelligence reports, are entitled to a presumption of regularity in Guantanamo habeas litigation ( Latif v. Obama ); the writ of habeas affords Guantanamo detainees with a limited right to challenge their proposed transfer to the custody of a foreign government ( Kiyemba II ) as well as matters related to their conditions of confinement ( Aamer v. Obama , Hatim v. Obama ); habeas courts lack authority, absent an authorizing statute, to compel the Executive to release non-citizen detainees into the United States, even if such persons have been determined by the court to be unlawfully detained ( Kiyemba I and III ); it is unlikely that noncitizens who have been transferred to foreign custody may seek judicial review of their designation as enemy combatants by the U.S. government ( Gul v. Obama ); and the constitutional writ of habeas does not presently extend to noncitizen detainees held at U.S.-operated facilities in Afghanistan ( Maqaleh v. Gates ). In the D.C. Circuit. | As part of the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the United States has captured and detained numerous persons believed to have been part of or associated with enemy forces. Over the years, federal courts have considered a multitude of petitions by or on behalf of suspected belligerents challenging aspects of U.S. detention policy. Although the Supreme Court has issued definitive rulings concerning several legal issues raised in the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, many others remain unresolved, with some the subject of ongoing litigation.
This report discusses major judicial opinions concerning suspected enemy belligerents detained in the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The report addresses all Supreme Court decisions concerning enemy combatants. It also discusses notable circuit court opinions addressing issues of ongoing relevance. In particular, it summarizes notable decisions which have (1) addressed whether the Executive may lawfully detain only persons who are "part of" Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated groups, or also those who provide support to such entities in their hostilities against the United States and its allies; (2) adopted a functional approach for assessing whether a person is "part of" Al Qaeda; (3) decided that a preponderance of evidence standard is appropriate for detainee habeas cases, but suggested that a lower standard might be constitutionally permissible, and instructed courts to assess the cumulative weight of evidence rather than each piece of evidence in isolation; (4) determined that Guantanamo detainees have a limited right to challenge their proposed transfer to foreign custody, but denied courts the authority to order detainees released into the United States; (5) held that the constitutional writ of habeas does not extend to noncitizen detainees held at U.S.-operated facilities in Afghanistan; and (6) determined that Guantanamo detainees may challenge conditions of their detention. Finally, the report discusses a few criminal cases involving persons who were either involved in the 9/11 attacks or were captured abroad by U.S. forces or allies during operations against Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated entities, as well as reviews of military commission cases in federal appellate courts.
For over a decade, the primary legal authority governing the detention of enemy belligerents in the conflict with Al Qaeda was the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF," P.L. 107-40). In December 2011, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 ("2012 NDAA," P.L. 112-81), which contains a provision that is largely intended to codify the current understanding of the detention authority conferred by the AUMF, as has been interpreted and applied by the Executive and the D.C. Circuit. In any event, the act does not address many of the legal issues involving wartime detention that have not been squarely resolved by the Supreme Court. Among other things, these unresolved issues include the precise scope of the Executive's wartime detention authority, including the circumstances in which U.S. citizens may be detained; the degree to which noncitizens (or in one case, U.S. citizens) held abroad are entitled to protections under the Constitution; the authority of federal habeas courts to compel the release into the United States of detainees determined to be unlawfully held; and the ability of detainees to receive advance notice and to challenge their proposed transfer to foreign custody.
Several rulings addressed in this report are discussed in greater detail in other CRS products, including CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34536, Boumediene v. Bush: Guantanamo Detainees' Right to Habeas Corpus, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS21884, The Supreme Court 2003 Term: Summary and Analysis of Opinions Related to Detainees in the War on Terrorism, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R42337, Detention of U.S. Persons as Enemy Belligerents, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R45311 | crs_R45311_0 | Multiemployer pension plans are sponsored by employers in the same industry and maintained as part of a collective bargaining agreement. Multiple employer plans are sponsored by more than one employer but are not maintained as part of collective bargaining agreements. With DB plans, participants receive regular monthly benefit payments in retirement (which some refer to as a "traditional" pension). Multiemployer DB pensions are of current concern to Congress because approximately 10% to 15% of participants are in plans that are in critical and declining status and may become insolvent within 19 years. When a multiemployer pension plan becomes insolvent, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a federally-chartered corporation that insures private-sector DB pension benefits, provides financial assistance to the plan so the plan can continue to pay promised benefits, up to a statutory maximum. At the end of FY2017, PBGC reported a deficit of $65.1 billion in the multiemployer insurance program. This report provides an overview of policy options that have been discussed in committee hearings and in the multiemployer pension plan community by policymakers and stakeholders, including options that would provide assistance for financially-troubled multiemployer plans with subsidized loans, direct financial assistance, or partitions (which would transfer some participant's benefits to a newly created plan); changes to the maximum benefit limit imposed on plans when they receive PBGC financial assistance; changes to PBGC's premium structure; and stricter funding rules and alternative pension plan designs. The Joint Select Committee on Solvency of Multiemployer Pension Plans
In response to the increasing concerns of policymakers and stakeholders (such as participants, participating employers, and plans), the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ) created a new joint select committee of the House and Senate: The Joint Select Committee on Solvency of Multiemployer Pension Plans. The committee has 16 Members of the House and Senate—four chosen by each of the chambers' party leaders—and is tasked with formulating recommendations and legislative language that will "significantly improve the solvency of multiemployer pension plans and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation." The committee is required to vote on a report containing findings, conclusions, recommendations, and legislative language to carry out the recommendations by November 30, 2018. Provided the report is agreed to by a majority of committee members from each party, P.L. 115-123 contains procedures for expedited consideration of the legislative text in the Senate, though there are no such provisions for consideration in the House. In the absence of enacted legislation, beginning in 2025 when PBGC is projected to run out of resources, the benefits that are owed to participants in insolvent plans will be far greater than the PBGC's resources. Policy Option: Change PBGC Maximum Benefit
A multiemployer plan that receives financial assistance from PBGC must reduce participants' benefits according to a formula based on the number of years of service in the plan. As the dollar amount of participants' benefits have increased, an increasing number of participants are likely to see their benefits reduced as a result of the maximum guarantee. | Multiemployer defined benefit (DB) pension plans are pensions sponsored by more than one employer and maintained as part of a collective bargaining agreement. In DB pensions, participants receive a monthly benefit in retirement that is based on a formula. In multiemployer DB pensions, the formula typically multiplies a dollar amount by the number of years of service the employee has worked for employers that participate in the DB plan.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a federally-chartered corporation that insures participant benefits in private-sector DB pension plans. Although PBGC is projected to have sufficient resources to provide financial assistance to multiemployer DB plans through 2025, the projected insolvency of many multiemployer DB pension plans will likely result in a substantial strain on PBGC's multiemployer insurance program. In a report released in June 2017, PBGC indicated that the multiemployer insurance program is highly likely to become insolvent in 2025. In the absence of increased financial resources for PBGC, participants in insolvent multiemployer DB pension plans would likely see sharp reductions in their pension benefits.
As a result of a variety of factors—such as the recessions in 2001 and from 2007 to 2009—about 10% to 15% of multiemployer plan participants are in multiemployer DB plans that are likely to become insolvent over the next 19 years and run out of funds from which to pay benefits owed to participants.
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), enacted February 9, 2018, created the Joint Select Committee on Solvency of Multiemployer Pension Plans to address the impending insolvencies of several large multiemployer DB pension plans and PBGC. The committee must provide to Congress no later than November 30, 2018, a report and proposed legislative language to improve the solvency of multiemployer DB plans and the PBGC. The report and proposed legislative language must be approved by (1) a majority of committee members appointed by the Speaker of the House and Majority Leader of the Senate and (2) a majority of committee members appointed by the Minority Leader of the House and Minority Leader of the Senate. P.L. 115-123 provides for expedited procedures in the Senate if the committee approves of the proposed legislative language. There are no provisions that provide any special procedures governing House consideration of such legislation.
Many policy options have been discussed in committee hearings and in the multiemployer pension plan community by policymakers and stakeholders. Not all options directly address the solvency of financially distressed multiemployer plans or PBGC, but they could be considered as part of a comprehensive package of policy options. The options include
assistance for financially troubled multiemployer plans with subsidized loans or partitions; changes to the maximum benefit limit imposed on plans when they receive PBGC financial assistance; changes to PBGC's premium structure; stricter funding rules; and alternative pension plan designs. |
crs_RL34572 | crs_RL34572_0 | Introduction
"Phthalates" refers to a group of chemical compounds that are heavily produced and widely used to make the plastics found in thousands of consumer products. Some (but not all) of these phthalates are known to cause reproductive damage in rodents. The six phthalates are di-(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate (DEHP), dibutyl phthalate (DBP), benzyl butyl phthalate (BBP), diisononyl phthalate (DINP), diisodecyl phthalate (DIDP), and di-n-octyl phthalate (DnOP). 110 - 314 , the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA), prohibits the sale of children's toys and child care articles that contain more than 0.1% of DEHP, DBP, or BBP. Moreover, if administered at sufficient levels and at the appropriate time to pregnant females, some phthalates can cause malformations of the reproductive organs of offspring, especially males. Disruption of hormonal functions in humans is known to result in abnormal reproductive development. Many scientists believe that the phthalates toxic to rats and mice might be able to cause similar malformations in humans, because the male hormones affected by phthalates are important to the normal development of the male reproductive tract in all species of mammals. However, human health effects of phthalate exposure have not been conclusively demonstrated. Very few studies have looked at possible effects in humans, but their results have been consistent with the results of rodent experiments. More research would be needed to determine with certainty the effects of phthalates in humans. OSHA regulates worker exposure to phthalates. Federal agencies have taken several actions, some as early as the mid 1980s, to evaluate and regulate phthalates. To date, however, no phthalate-containing consumer product has been banned outright. or the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA, 15 U.S.C. P.L. First, what is the scientific basis for health concerns about exposure to these chemicals? Scientific Basis for Health Concerns
The scientific basis for concerns about risks to human health appears to be strong in the case of some phthalates, adequate with respect to others, and weak for the remaining chemicals. The strongest evidence with respect to developmental effects has been produced since about the year 2000. Children appear to be most heavily exposed. Data are insufficient to judge exposure for DINP, DIDP, and DnOP. The National Academy of Sciences is evaluating the risk of aggregate human exposure to multiple phthalates, and is expected to report before the end of 2008. Reducing Risks Without Generating Greater Risks
By restricting the use of six phthalates in child-care items and toys, the new law codifies the voluntary agreements reached by CPSC with product manufacturers (to keep DEHP and DINP out of nipples, pacifiers, and teething toys, and DEHP out of toys that might be mouthed) and should reduce exposure to DINP, the only phthalate currently used in the United States to produce toys. | Roughly a dozen chemicals known as phthalates are used to make the plastics found in thousands of consumer products, ranging from medical tubing to automotive dashboards to bath toys. These phthalates are not tightly held by the plastics and are released into the environment over time. Congress is concerned about possible human health effects from exposure to six of these chemicals: di-(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate (DEHP), dibutyl phthalate (DBP), benzyl butyl phthalate (BBP), diisononyl phthalate (DINP), diisodecyl phthalate (DIDP), and di-n-octyl phthalate (DnOP). DEHP, DBP, BBP, and (to less extent) DINP are known to be toxic to the reproductive systems of rodents. Recent rodent experiments demonstrate that pre-natal exposure at a sufficient level to these same phthalates disrupts the normal action of hormones and can cause malformations of the reproductive organs of offspring (especially males).
Disruption of hormonal functions in humans is known to result in abnormal reproductive development. Many scientists believe that the phthalates toxic to rodents might be able to cause similar malformations in humans. However, human health effects of phthalate exposure have not been conclusively demonstrated. Very few studies have looked at possible effects in humans, but their results appear consistent with the results of rodent experiments. More research would be needed to test this hypothesis. Recent U.S. surveys have found almost universal human exposure to phthalates. Individuals may be exposed to high enough levels of phthalates to cause reproductive abnormalities. Scientists at the National Toxicology Program have expressed "serious concern" about human male infants undergoing intensive medical procedures, and "concern" about development of human males less than a year old who are exposed to DEHP. In light of these concerns, the National Academy of Sciences is evaluating the risk of aggregate human exposure to multiple phthalates.
Federal agencies have taken several actions, some as early as the mid 1980s, to evaluate and regulate phthalates, but no consumer product to date has been banned outright. The agency responsible for regulating toys and most other child-care products is the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-314, enacted August 14, 2008) includes a provision intended to ensure protection of children from six phthalates by restricting their use in toys and child-care products.
The scientific basis for concerns about human health risks appears to be strong in the case of some phthalates (such as DEHP), adequate with respect to others (perhaps DINP), and weak for the remaining chemicals (for example, DIDP and DnOP). The strongest evidence with respect to developmental effects has been produced since about the year 2000. The new law codifies voluntary agreements previously reached by CPSC with product manufacturers, and should reduce exposure to one particular phthalate. New formulations for toys and child-care products may pose greater or fewer risks than current formulations. |
crs_RL32191 | crs_RL32191_0 | Although this report is intended to focus on legal analysis, policy issues are also addressed because they are closely linked. For a more complete analysis of policy issues, see CRS Report RL32511, Importing Prescription Drugs: Objectives, Options, and Outlook , by [author name scrubbed]. Issues associated with the risks posed by some online pharmacies and prescription drug sales over the Internet will no longer be addressed in this report, but are rather addressed in CRS Report RS21711, Legal Issues Related to Prescription Drug Sales on the Internet , by [author name scrubbed]. Introduction
High prescription drug prices have increased consumer interest in purchasing less costly medications abroad by means of either commercial or personal (consumer) imports. The debate about drug importation continues. On the one hand, some policymakers remain opposed to allowing prescription drugs to be imported from foreign countries. On the other hand, importation proponents, who claim that importation would result in an increased supply of prescription drugs that could result in significantly lower prices for U.S. consumers, say that safety concerns are overblown and would recede if additional precautions were implemented. Bills introduced in the 110 th Congress include H.R. 194 , H.R. 380 , H.R. 1218 , H.R. 2638 , H.R. 2900 , H.R. 3161 , H.R. 3580 , S. 242 , S. 251 , S. 554 , and S. 1082 . At the state level, state boards of pharmacy regulate pharmacy practice, and state medical boards oversee the practice of medicine. In addition, this section contains a discussion of other legal areas that may affect prescription drug importation, including antitrust law, trade law, and patent law. In response to concerns about the rising costs of prescription drugs, however, Congress adopted importation amendments to the FFDCA in 2000. For further information on the subject, see CRS Report RL32400, Patents and Drug Importation , by [author name scrubbed]. | High prescription drug prices have increased consumer interest in purchasing less costly medications abroad. Policymakers opposed to allowing prescription drugs to be imported from foreign countries argue that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) cannot guarantee the safety or effectiveness of such drugs. Importation proponents, who claim that importation would result in significantly lower prices for U.S. consumers, say that safety concerns are overblown and would recede if additional precautions were implemented. The importation debate continues.
In response to concerns about prescription drug imports, lawmakers have introduced multiple bills in this and previous Congresses. Bills introduced in the 110th Congress include H.R. 194, H.R. 380, H.R. 1218, H.R. 2638, H.R. 2900, H.R. 3161, H.R. 3580, S. 242, S. 251, S. 554, and S. 1082. In recent years, appropriations bills have contained restrictions on the use of funds by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to prevent certain individuals from importing Canadian prescription drugs; however, such provisions appear to have limited effect.
The following federal and state agencies are involved in regulating aspects of prescription drug importation: FDA, CBP, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), state boards of pharmacy, and state medical boards. This report, originally written by [author name scrubbed], Legislative Attorney, CRS, focuses on legal aspects of prescription drug importation, including antitrust law, international trade law, and patent law issues. However, policy issues are also addressed because they are closely linked. For a more complete analysis of policy issues, see CRS Report RL32511, Importing Prescription Drugs: Objectives, Options, and Outlook, by [author name scrubbed]. For more information regarding Internet pharmacies, see CRS Report RS21711, Legal Issues Related to Prescription Drug Sales on the Internet, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40475 | crs_R40475_0 | Introduction
On April 2, 2009, the House passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act ( H.R. 1256 ; H.Rept. 111-58 , part 1 and 2) by a vote of 298-112. H.R. 1256 , introduced by Representative Waxman (D-CA), would give the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) broad new statutory authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) to regulate the manufacture, distribution, advertising, promotion, sale, and use of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco (e.g., snuff and chewing tobacco). S. 982 , which is almost identical to the House-passed measure, was approved with amendments by the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions on May 20 and now awaits Senate floor action. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act would create a new FFDCA Chapter IX solely for the purpose of regulating tobacco products. Among its many provisions, the legislation would:
require all tobacco product manufacturers to register with the FDA and provide the agency with a detailed product list; mandate biennial inspection of all registered establishments; replace the existing health warning labels with more explicit health warnings in bold type occupying at least 30% of the front and back of the product package; require the manufacturer of a new tobacco product to submit a marketing application for FDA approval before entering the market, unless the new product is determined to be substantially equivalent to a tobacco product already on the market or it represents a minor modification of an existing product; require manufacturers seeking FDA approval, in order to market a product with a reduced-risk or reduced-exposure claim (including the use of descriptors such as "light," "mild," and "low"), to provide scientific evidence substantiating that claim and agree to conduct postmarket surveillance; give FDA the authority to regulate the sale, distribution, advertising and promotion of tobacco products in order to protect public health; require FDA to regulate Internet tobacco sales; authorize FDA to establish tobacco product standards requiring changes to the design and characteristics of tobacco products in order to protect public health (e.g., reducing nicotine yields and eliminating other harmful constituents); require FDA to establish good manufacturing practices for tobacco product manufacturers; require FDA to develop new regulations for the testing, reporting, and public disclosure of tobacco product ingredients and smoke constituents; preserve the authority of states and localities to take additional measures to restrict the distribution, advertising, promotion, sale, access to, and use of tobacco products; instruct FDA to issue new recordkeeping requirements to help counter the illicit trade of tobacco products; and assess user fees on manufacturers to pay for the cost of FDA tobacco regulation. 1256 / S. 982 would require FDA to reissue its 1996 tobacco rule, which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down. The language drew extensively on the FFDCA's existing drug and device provisions, but with modifications. Under the new language, FDA would have to demonstrate that any proposed tobacco regulation was appropriate for the protection of public health. Table 1 provides a detailed summary of all the provisions in H.R. A companion report, CRS Report R40196, FDA Tobacco Regulation: History of the 1996 Rule and Related Legislative Activity, 1998-2008 , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], provides some analysis of the 1996 FDA tobacco rule and the industry's successful legal challenge that overturned it. 1256 / S. 982 . Tobacco Product Regulation under H.R. 1256/S. That would place new restrictions on youth access to tobacco products and on tobacco advertising, beyond those included in the MSA (see Appendix ). For example, all remaining brand-name sponsorship of sporting and other entertainment events would come to an end, and advertising in publications with a significant youth readership would be limited to black-on-white text. H.R. 1256 / S. 982 also would give FDA the authority to develop regulations restricting the sale, distribution, advertising, and promotion of tobacco products, to the full extent permitted by the First Amendment. That standard would require FDA to demonstrate that the proposal was appropriate for the protection of the public health, taking into account the risks and benefits to the population as a whole, including users and nonusers of tobacco products. In addition, FDA would have the authority to require changes in the design and characteristics of current and future tobacco products, such as the reduction or elimination of harmful ingredients and additives. Under the legislation, manufacturers would have to obtain FDA approval in order to market a new product. 1256 / S. 982 would prohibit the use of descriptors such as "light" and "mild." H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. | The 111th Congress is considering legislation that would give the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) broad new statutory authority to regulate the manufacture and marketing of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). On April 2, 2009, the House passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (H.R. 1256; H.Rept. 111-58, part 1 and 2). On May 20, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions approved an almost identical bill (S. 982). Similar legislation was first introduced in the 108th Congress and passed the Senate in 2004 and the House in 2008 with strong bipartisan support. The Administration strongly supports H.R. 1256/S. 982.
H.R. 1256/S. 982 would create a new FFDCA Chapter IX solely for the regulation of tobacco products. While the bill's language draws extensively on the FFDCA's existing provisions for regulating pharmaceutical products and medical devices, tobacco products would be regulated under new legal authority based on a public health standard rather than the safety and effectiveness standard by which the FDA regulates drugs and devices. Under the new language, FDA would have to demonstrate that any proposed tobacco product regulation was appropriate for the protection of public health, taking into consideration the risks and benefits to the population as a whole.
Among its many provisions, H.R. 1256/S. 982 would require all tobacco product manufacturers to register with FDA. All registered facilities would be inspected every two years. H.R. 1256/S. 982 would require the FDA to reissue its 1996 tobacco rule, which was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2000. The rule would place new restrictions on youth access to tobacco products, end all remaining brand-name sponsorship of sporting and other entertainment events, and limit tobacco advertising in publications with a significant youth readership to black-on-white text only. In addition, the existing health warnings on tobacco product packaging and advertising would be replaced with more explicit and conspicuous health warnings. H.R. 1256/S. 982 would give FDA the authority to develop regulations restricting the sale, distribution, advertising, and promotion of tobacco products, to the extent permitted by the First Amendment. The agency also would have the authority to require changes in the design and characteristics of current and future tobacco products, such as the reduction or elimination of harmful ingredients and additives. FDA would not have the authority to reduce nicotine yields to zero or ban tobacco products.
Under H.R. 1256/S. 982, manufacturers would have to obtain FDA approval in order to market a new tobacco product, unless FDA determined that it was substantially equivalent to a product already on the market, or a minor modification of an existing product. The bill would prohibit the use of descriptors such as "light" and "mild" and require manufacturers seeking FDA approval to market a product for which they intend to make a reduced-risk claim to provide evidence substantiating that claim. H.R. 1256/S. 982 would require FDA to develop new requirements for testing and reporting tobacco product ingredients and smoke constituents, and to issue new recordkeeping requirements to help counter the illicit trade of tobacco products. FDA's new regulatory activities would be paid for by user fees assessed on the manufacturers. This report provides a detailed summary of the provisions in H.R. 1256/S. 982 and discusses some of the public health and legal issues it raises. A companion report, CRS Report R40196, FDA Tobacco Regulation: History of the 1996 Rule and Related Legislative Activity, 1998-2008, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], provides more background on the FDA rule and past efforts to give the agency the authority to regulate tobacco products. |
crs_R43763 | crs_R43763_0 | Introduction
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit available to eligible low-wage workers. Because the credit is refundable, an EITC recipient need not owe taxes to receive the benefit. The report then summarizes how different legislative proposals modify certain parameters of the credit, starting with modifications that expand the credit for workers without qualifying children , followed by those that expand the EITC for workers with qualifying children . Overview of the EITC
Eligibility for and the amount of the EITC are based on a variety of factors, including residence and taxpayer ID requirements, the presence of qualifying children, age requirements for certain recipients, amount of investment income, and the recipient's earned income. Childless taxpayers under age 25 or older than 64 are not eligible for the EITC. There is no age requirement for tax filers with qualifying children. Legislation That Expands the Credit for Childless Workers
Several bills introduced in the 113 th Congress would expand the EITC for childless workers. 2359 , and the Obama Administration's FY2015 budget—would modify how the credit is calculated, increasing the amount of the credit for childless workers. As illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3 , these changes would generally increase the maximum value of the credit for childless workers from $496 to approximately $1,000 (Administration budget proposal); $1,300 ( H.R. 2359 ); $1,350 ( H.R. 2116 , S. 836 , S. 2162 ); or $1,500 ( H.R. All else being equal, increasing the credit rate would increase the amount of the credit. Changing the Eligibility Age for the Childless EITC
Currently, childless workers must be between the ages of 25 and 64 to be eligible for the childless EITC. 4117 and S. 836 would lower the minimum age requirement for the childless EITC from 25 to 21, leaving the maximum age limitation unchanged. Simplifying the Rules Regarding the Presence of a Qualifying Child to Allow Certain Tax Filers to Claim the Childless EITC
Under current law, for the purposes of the EITC, qualifying children must meet three requirements: (1) they must be relatives of the tax filer, (2) they must live with the tax filer for more than half the year in the United States, and (3) they must be under 19 years old (or 24, if a full-time student). Legislation That Expands the Credit for Workers with Qualifying Children
There are several bills introduced in the 113 th Congress that would expand the EITC for workers with qualifying children. H.R. H.R. 2116 , S. 836 , and the FY2015 Administration budget proposal would make the 45% credit rate for families with three or more children permanent. 2320 would expand the EITC for tax filers with four, five, six, and seven or more qualifying children by increasing the credit rate, as illustrated in Table 3 . Chairman Camp's Tax Reform Proposal
Among its many changes to the income tax code, the House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Camp tax reform proposal (hereinafter referred to as the "Camp proposal") would change the structure of and eligibility for the EITC. Specifically, the Camp proposal would reduce the amount of the EITC for most tax filers by reducing the maximum value of the credit and the credit rates, as well as by eliminating the expanded credit for families with three or more children. | The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit available to eligible workers earning relatively low wages. (Because the credit is refundable, an EITC recipient need not owe taxes to receive the benefit.) Under current law, the EITC is calculated based on a recipient's earnings, using one of eight different formulas, which vary depending on several factors, including the number of qualifying children a tax filer has (zero, one, two, or three or more) and his or her marital status (unmarried or married).
All else being equal, the amount of the credit tends to increase with the number of eligible children the claimant has. For example, the maximum value of the credit in 2014 is $496 for claimants with zero children; $3,305 for claimants with one qualifying child; $5,460 for claimants with two qualifying children; and $6,143 for claimants with three or more qualifying children. In addition, tax filers who have no qualifying children must be between 25 and 64 years of age to be eligible for the EITC. Childless taxpayers under 25 and older than 64 years of age are not eligible for the credit. (There is no age requirement for tax filers with qualifying children.)
This report discusses and analyzes legislative proposals introduced in the 113th Congress that propose modifying the EITC. Some of the bills include provisions to expand the credit for childless workers, by increasing the amount of the credit for these workers (through changes to the formula) and by expanding eligibility. Proposals that expand the credit for childless workers include the following:
H.R. 4117, which would lower the age limit for childless workers to 21 and expand the size of the credit for childless workers, increasing the maximum credit to an estimated $1,500; H.R. 2116, S. 836, and S. 2162, which would lower the age limit for childless workers from 25 to 21 and expand the size of the credit for childless workers, increasing the maximum credit to an estimated $1,350; H.R. 2359, which would increase the size of the credit for childless recipients to an estimated $1,300; and the Obama Administration's FY2015 budget, which would expand eligibility for childless workers to include those 21-67 years of age and expand the size of the credit for childless workers, increasing the maximum credit to an estimated $1,000.
Some bills would also expand the credit for workers with qualifying children. H.R. 2116, S. 836, and the FY2015 Administration budget proposal would make the temporary 45% credit rate for families with three or more children permanent. In addition, H.R. 2320 would expand the EITC for tax filers with four, five, six, and seven or more qualifying children.
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Dave Camp's tax reform proposal would reduce the amount of the EITC for most tax filers, although these reductions could be offset by other tax law changes made by the proposal. |
crs_R41009 | crs_R41009_0 | Introduction
International Social Security agreements are bilateral agreements primarily intended to eliminate dual Social Security taxation based on the same work and provide benefit protection for workers who divide their careers between the United States and a foreign country. In turn, they can affect the competitiveness and profitability of U.S. companies with foreign operations as well as promote investment in the United States by foreign companies. Social Security agreements also affect the application of certain provisions of the Social Security Act, such as the alien nonpayment provision which places restrictions on the payment of U.S. Social Security benefits to noncitizens residing outside the United States, with broad exceptions. Since 1977, the President has had the authority to negotiate Social Security agreements with foreign countries (pursuant to Section 233 of the Social Security Act). Another agreement (with Mexico) has been signed, but is not in force. This report provides an overview of the purpose and operation of international Social Security agreements. It also provides a discussion of the effects of agreements on selected provisions of the Social Security Act and concerns raised by some policymakers about the agreements. As a result, a U.S. worker and his or her employer generally would be required to contribute both to the U.S. Social Security system and the Social Security system of the country where the work is performed. In addition, the Social Security Act extends Social Security coverage to U.S. citizens and residents who are self-employed in a foreign country. International agreements eliminate dual taxation on the same earnings by requiring workers and their employers to contribute to only one Social Security system based on the coverage provisions of the agreements. Filling Gaps in Social Security Coverage
The second main purpose of international Social Security agreements is to allow workers who divide their careers between the United States and a foreign country to fill gaps in Social Security coverage by combining work credits under each country's system to qualify for benefits under one or both systems. If a worker qualifies for benefits based on combined (totalized) work credits, the benefit payable under either system is prorated to take into account the actual period during which the worker was covered by that system. Other Goals
By eliminating dual Social Security taxation, international agreements reduce the cost of doing business abroad. These payment restrictions may be waived for beneficiaries who are residents of a country with which the United States has a Social Security agreement. In December 2007, about $28 million was paid in monthly benefits to about 146,200 recipients under U.S. Social Security agreements (see Table 3 ). As shown in the tables, assuming all other eligibility requirements are met, the existence of a totalization agreement between the United States and a foreign country (1) allows workers and their family members who are residents of the foreign country to receive benefits outside the United States indefinitely (i.e., the alien nonpayment provision is waived) and (2) may allow family members (dependents and survivors of the worker) who are citizens or residents of the foreign country to receive benefits outside the United States without having to meet the U.S. residency requirement (i.e., the five-year U.S. residency requirement that applies to alien dependents and survivors outside the United States is waived). Issues and Concerns
Many observers agree that international Social Security agreements can be beneficial for U.S. companies and workers. The Role of Congress
Some policymakers have expressed concerns about the role of Congress in the approval process for international Social Security agreements. In addition, H.R. Because the agreements impose a cost to the U.S. Social Security system, some policymakers point to the need for greater assurances that data pertaining to noncitizen workers and beneficiaries (including dependents and survivors) relied upon by the United States to administer the agreements are complete and accurate, a condition necessary to protect the Social Security trust funds from improper payments. In addition, some policymakers point to the need for changes in the congressional review process for totalization agreements, enhanced reporting requirements and ongoing evaluation of agreements after they enter into force as reflected in current legislative proposals. | International Social Security agreements are bilateral agreements primarily intended to eliminate dual Social Security taxation based on the same work and provide benefit protection for workers who divide their careers between the United States and a foreign country. Most jobs in the United States are covered by Social Security. In addition, the Social Security Act extends Social Security coverage to U.S. citizens and resident aliens who are employed abroad by U.S. companies as well as those who are self-employed in a foreign country. Generally, a U.S. worker abroad and his or her employer would be required to contribute both to the U.S. Social Security system and the Social Security system of the country where the work is performed based on the same work. International agreements eliminate dual Social Security taxation in these circumstances by allowing workers and their employers to contribute to only one Social Security system (either the U.S. or the foreign system depending on the terms of the agreement). In addition, international agreements allow workers who divide their careers between the United States and a foreign country to fill gaps in Social Security coverage by combining work credits under each country's system to qualify for benefits under one or both systems. If a worker qualifies for benefits based on combined (totalized) work credits, the benefit payable under either system is prorated to take into account the actual period during which the worker was covered by that system.
By eliminating dual Social Security taxation, international agreements reduce the cost of doing business abroad. As a result, they can affect the competitiveness and profitability of U.S. companies with foreign operations and promote investment in the United States by foreign companies. In addition, international agreements affect the application of certain provisions of the Social Security Act, including the alien nonpayment provision. The alien nonpayment provision places restrictions on the payment of U.S. Social Security benefits to noncitizens who reside outside the United States, with broad exceptions. These payment restrictions may be waived for beneficiaries who are residents of a country with which the United States has an agreement.
Since 1977, the President has had the authority to negotiate Social Security agreements with foreign countries. Currently, there are 24 Social Security agreements in force. Another agreement (with Mexico) has been signed, but is not in force. In December 2007, about $28 million was paid in monthly benefits to about 146,200 recipients under U.S. Social Security agreements.
Many observers agree that international Social Security agreements can be beneficial for U.S. companies and workers. However, some policymakers have expressed concerns about the agreements. Because the agreements impose a cost to the U.S. Social Security system, some policymakers point to the need for greater assurances that the data relied upon by the United States to administer the agreements are complete and accurate, a condition necessary to protect the Social Security trust funds from improper payments. In addition, they point to concerns about the role of Congress in the approval process for potential agreements, as well as the need for enhanced reporting requirements and periodic evaluation of agreements in force. These and other concerns are reflected in legislative proposals such as S. 42 and H.R. 132 in the 111th Congress.
This report provides an overview of the purpose and operation of international Social Security agreements. In addition, it provides a discussion of the effects of agreements on selected provisions of the Social Security Act and concerns raised by some policymakers about the agreements. This report will be updated to reflect legislative activity or other developments. |
crs_97-579 | crs_97-579_0 | Pros and Cons
The reason that Congress has sometimes declared private organizations or individuals federal employees for FTCA purposes is generally that it has concluded that potential liability, or the high cost of liability insurance, could discourage an organization, or its employees or volunteers, from doing the work it does. In general, the FTCA makes the United States liable for the torts of its employees to the extent that a private employer would be liable for the torts of its employees, under the law of the state where the tort occurred. The Supreme Court has held that the FTCA makes federal employees immune from suit under state law for torts committed within the scope of employment even when an FTCA exception precludes recovery against the United States. List of Statutes
The following are examples of statutes that make private organizations or individuals federal employees for FTCA purposes, and thus immune from liability under state tort law:
(1) "[T]he Administrative Assistant, with the approval of the Chief Justice, may accept voluntary personal services to assist with public and visitor programs.... No person volunteering personal services under this subsection shall be considered an employee of the United States for any purpose other than for purposes of [the FTCA]." 28 U.S.C. § 12651g(a)(B). | The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 2671-2680, makes the United States liable, in accordance with the law of the state where a tort occurs, for some of the torts of its employees committed within the scope of their employment. It also makes federal employees immune from all lawsuits arising under state law for torts committed within the scope of their employment. (The FTCA does not prevent a federal employee from being sued for violating the Constitution or a federal statute that authorizes suit against an individual.) Sometimes, Congress wishes to immunize a private organization, or its employees or volunteers, from tort liability. One way it may do so is to enact a statute declaring that the organization or its employees or volunteers shall be deemed federal employees for purposes of the FTCA. This report discusses the pros and cons of this type of statute, and then provides examples of more than 50 such statutes. |
crs_R44505 | crs_R44505_0 | Introduction to the PHS Agencies
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has designated 8 of its 11 operating divisions (agencies) as components of the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS). The PHS agencies are (1) the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), (2) the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), (3) the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), (4) the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), (5) the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), (6) the Indian Health Service (IHS), (7) the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and (8) the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). NIH conducts and supports basic, clinical, and translational medical research. AHRQ conducts and supports research on the quality and effectiveness of health care services and systems. IHS supports a health care delivery system for American Indians and Alaska Natives. SAMHSA funds community-based mental health and substance abuse prevention and treatment services. ATSDR, which is headed by the CDC director and included in the discussion of CDC in this report, is tasked with identifying potential public health effects from exposure to hazardous substances. Mandatory Funding, User Fees, and Collections
Although the bulk of PHS agency funding is provided through annual discretionary appropriations, agencies also receive mandatory funding, user fees, and third-party collections. First, the ACA provided a total of $11 billion in annual appropriations over the five-year period FY2011-FY2015 to the Community Health Center Fund (CHCF) . FDA's user fee programs now support the agency's regulation of prescription drugs, animal drugs, medical devices, tobacco products, and some foods, among other activities. Almost all of the CDC accounts, for example, are funded with discretionary appropriations plus amounts from other sources (see Table 5 ). This report is a new edition of an earlier product, which remains available: CRS Report R43304, Public Health Service Agencies: Overview and Funding (FY2010-FY2016) . From FY2003 through FY2014, AHRQ did not receive its own annual discretionary appropriation. In FY2015, AHRQ received its own discretionary appropriation for the first time in more than a decade in lieu of any set-aside funding. Discretionary sources of funding shifted from set-aside transfers to the agency's own discretionary appropriation in both FY2015 and FY2016, and ACA mandatory funds have been a prominent and increasing source of funding for the agency since FY2010. In FDA's annual appropriation, Congress sets both the total amount of appropriated funds and the amount of user fees that the agency is authorized to collect and obligate for that fiscal year. In FY2016, user fees account for 43% of FDA's total funding compared with 24% in FY2010. Recent Trends in Agency Funding
HRSA funding increased from $8.1 billion in FY2010 to $10.8 billion in FY2016 despite a reduction in its discretionary appropriation during that time (see Table 7 ). Recent Trends in Agency Funding
IHS's funding, which includes discretionary appropriations and collections from third-party payers of health care, increased between FY2010 and FY2016 from $5.1 billion to $6.2 billion (see Table 8 ). National Institutes of Health (NIH)66
Agency Overview
NIH is the primary agency of the federal government charged with performing and supporting biomedical and behavioral research. Recent Trends in Agency Funding
Over the past 10 years (FY2007–FY2016), SAMHSA's program-level funding has increased by 12%, from $3.3 billion to $3.7 billion. | Within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), eight agencies are designated components of the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS). The PHS agencies are funded primarily with annual discretionary appropriations. They also receive significant amounts of funding from other sources including mandatory funds from the Affordable Care Act (ACA), user fees, and third-party reimbursements (collections).
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) funds research on improving the quality and delivery of health care. For several years prior to FY2015, AHRQ did not receive its own annual appropriation. Instead, it relied on redistributed ("set-aside") discretionary funds from other PHS agencies for most of its funding, with supplemental amounts from the ACA's mandatory Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF). In FY2015 and FY2016, AHRQ received its own discretionary appropriation in lieu of set-aside funds, with the FY2016 level of $428 million below the FY2015 level of $443 million. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is the federal government's lead public health agency. CDC obtains its funding from multiple sources besides discretionary appropriations. The agency's funding level has fluctuated in the past few years, with the FY2016 level of $11.8 billion above the FY2015 level of $11.2 billion. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) investigates the public health impact of exposure to hazardous substances. ATSDR is headed by the CDC director and included in the discussion of CDC in this report. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates drugs, medical devices, food, and tobacco products, among other consumer products. The agency is funded with annual discretionary appropriations and industry user fees. The FDA's funding level in FY2016 was $4.7 billion—above the FY2015 level of $4.5 billion—with user fees accounting for about 43% of FDA's total funding. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) funds programs and systems that provide health care services to the uninsured and medically underserved. HRSA, like CDC, relies on funding from several different sources. The agency's funding increased from $10.6 billion in FY2015 to $10.8 billion in FY2016. The Indian Health Service (IHS) supports a health care delivery system for Native Americans. IHS's funding, which includes discretionary appropriations and collections from third-party payers of health care, increased between FY2015 and FY2016 from $5.9 billion to $6.2 billion. Appropriations and collections both increased during that period. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) funds basic, clinical, and translational biomedical and behavioral research. NIH gets more than 99% of its funding from discretionary appropriations. Recent increases in NIH's annual appropriations have boosted its funding level to a new high of $32.3 billion in FY2016, compared to $30.3 billion in FY2015. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) funds mental health and substance abuse prevention and treatment services. SAMHSA's funding, about 95% of which comes from discretionary appropriations, was approximately $3.6 billion in FY2015 and $3.7 billion in FY2016.
This report is a new edition of an earlier product, which remains available: CRS Report R43304, Public Health Service Agencies: Overview and Funding (FY2010-FY2016). It will be updated with information on PHS agency funding for FY2017 once legislative action on appropriations for the new fiscal year is completed. |
crs_R42033 | crs_R42033_0 | Introduction
In response to continuing high rates of unemployment and a weak economy, President Obama announced his American Jobs Act on September 8, 2011, before a joint session of Congress, and submitted formal legislation the following week. The President stated the purpose of the legislation was to "put more people back to work and more money in the pockets of those who are working." 12 ). Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid subsequently re-introduced the proposal as S. 1660 , using a different offset to pay for its spending provisions. In the months since its introduction, individual provisions of the American Jobs Act have been considered—and some enacted—as freestanding bills or parts of other legislation. This report describes provisions in the American Jobs Act that fall into three major categories:
provisions intended to promote hiring and prevent layoffs among selected categories of workers, specifically teachers, law enforcement officers, firefighters, veterans, and the long-term unemployed; provisions to assist unemployed workers through unemployment compensation and reemployment services; and provisions to expand workforce development opportunities for low-income adults and youth. The report does not discuss tax provisions (except for specialized tax credits intended as hiring incentives) or proposals related primarily to infrastructure (except for School Modernization grants). These provisions are different in the Administration's version (introduced as S. 1549 and H.R. (These provisions are not discussed in this report.) Promoting Hiring and Preventing Layoffs
The American Jobs Act contains several provisions to promote hiring and prevent layoffs of selected categories of workers, specifically teachers, law enforcement officers, and firefighters, through formula or competitive grant programs to government entities. The act also would promote hiring of veterans and long-term unemployed individuals through tax credits to employers. Finally, the act would prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of an individual's unemployed status. 112-56 . As proposed in the American Jobs Act, and as now enacted in P.L. In addition to provisions that would extend certain temporary programs and expand services for certain EUC08 claimants, the act also would authorize a new Reemployment NOW program, that would provide formula grants to states to address the reemployment needs of eligible individuals, and would expand federal funding for state-administered short-time compensation (or "work sharing") programs. Workforce Development for Low-Income Adults and Youth
Title III, Subtitle C of the American Jobs Act would authorize the Pathways Back to Work Act of 2011 (Pathways Act), which would provide funds for three grant programs to promote the employment of unemployed low-income adults and youth. 2948 ) includes two additional differences:
H.R. | In response to continuing high rates of unemployment and a weak economy, President Obama announced his American Jobs Act on September 8, 2011. As stated by the President, the proposal aims to "put more people back to work and more money in the pockets of those who are working." The proposal was introduced, by request, as S. 1549 and H.R. 12. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid subsequently introduced the proposal with a different spending offset, as S. 1660 on October 6. Since then, individual pieces of the American Jobs Act have been considered—and some provisions enacted—as freestanding bills or parts of other legislation.
This report describes provisions in the American Jobs Act that fall into three major categories:
provisions to promote hiring and prevent layoffs among teachers, law enforcement officers, firefighters, veterans, and the long-term unemployed; provisions to assist unemployed workers through unemployment compensation and reemployment services; and provisions to expand workforce opportunities for low-income adults and youth.
The report does not discuss tax provisions (except for specialized tax credits intended as hiring incentives) or proposals related to infrastructure. (However, the report does discuss proposed School Modernization grants, including related provisions in the Fix America's Schools Today Act, S. 1597 and H.R. 2948.)
The American Jobs Act (and similar provisions in S. 1723) would aim to promote hiring and prevent layoffs of teachers, law enforcement officers, and firefighters, through grants to government entities totaling $35 billion. The act would also promote hiring of veterans and long-term unemployed individuals through tax credits to employers, costing an estimated $8 billion. (The veterans tax credit was enacted separately, on November 21, as part of P.L. 112-56.) The Administration's proposal also would prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of an individual's unemployed status.
The act focuses on the income and reemployment needs of unemployed workers, particularly the long-term unemployed. In addition to provisions that would extend certain temporary compensation programs, the act would authorize a new Reemployment NOW program, to help states address the reemployment needs of eligible individuals, and would expand federal funding for state-administered short-time compensation (or "work sharing") programs. In total, these provisions would cost an estimated $49 billion.
The workforce development needs of low-income adults and youth also are a focus of the act, which would provide a total of $5 billion for three grant programs collectively called the Pathways Back to Work Act.
Although not discussed in this report, tax reductions for employers ($70 billion) and employees ($175 billion)—largely through payroll tax cuts—would form the largest single category of spending under the American Jobs Act. Another $75 billion would go to infrastructure projects, including transportation ($50 billion), an infrastructure bank ($10 billion), and grants to rehabilitate foreclosed or vacant properties ($15 billion), in addition to $30 billion for School Modernization grants. |
crs_R41369 | crs_R41369_0 | President Macky Sall faces challenges in responding to high public expectations that he will alleviate poverty, improve government transparency and accountability, and bring a definitive end to a long-running, low-level separatist conflict in the southern Casamance region. Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Senegal as an anchor of regional stability and a partner in combating transnational security threats such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and maritime piracy. President Obama has cultivated ties with President Sall, inviting him to a meeting at the White House in March 2013 and planning to visit Senegal on an upcoming trip to Africa. Congress has played a role in shaping U.S. policy toward Senegal through its authorization and appropriation of foreign assistance, and via its oversight of executive branch policies and strategies. Bilateral aid administered by the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), totaling $109.6 million in FY2012, is focused on health, food security, democratic governance, economic growth, rural development, conflict resolution in Casamance, and military professionalism. In addition, a five-year, $540 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact, signed in 2009, is funding infrastructure and agricultural projects in the northern Senegal River valley and in Casamance. In 2000, long-time opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade (pronounced "wahd") won presidential elections widely seen as free and fair. Wade's third-term candidacy had been extremely controversial within Senegal, provoking protests in Dakar and sparking concerns over potential political instability. In the end, the election results and Wade's concession were hailed as a victory for democracy in an often troubled region. Another key Sall initiative has been a far-reaching campaign to investigate and prosecute alleged high-level corruption under his predecessor. It is unclear how far Sall can pursue allegations of corruption under his predecessor without implicating himself or close allies, most of whom served in senior positions under Wade. Rights groups have criticized the government for delays in prosecuting former Chadian President Hissène Habré, who lives in Senegal, for crimes committed under his leadership in Chad (1982-1990). Progress toward a trial has since been made under President Sall, after the International Court of Justice ruled that Senegal must either try Habré or else extradite him to Belgium. Sall was one of four African leaders to meet with President Obama at the White House in March 2013, in a gathering that emphasized "shared democratic values and shared interests," and Senegal is one of three African countries scheduled to be visited by President Obama during his second trip to the continent, slated for late June 2013. Administration officials reportedly also privately petitioned Wade to step down, as did some Members of Congress. The conference report accompanying the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 112-74 ) recommended "not less than" $50 million in Development Assistance funding for Senegal. During former President Wade's tenure, some Members of Congress expressed concerns over Senegal's MCC compact in light of perceived democratic backsliding and rising corruption. To the delight of many Senegalese and international observers, the conduct of the elections—and incumbent President Wade's eventual loss to Macky Sall—appeared to prove that, despite widespread concerns over the erosion of democratic institutions in recent years, the system retained the potential for fairness. Events in the turbulent surrounding region—and particularly the political and security crisis in neighboring Mali—may also impact Senegal's trajectory. | Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Senegal as a democratic leader in Africa, an anchor of regional stability, and a partner in addressing development challenges and combating transnational security threats. Senegalese President Macky Sall met with President Barack Obama at the White House in March 2013, and President Obama is expected to visit Senegal in late June. A small, arid nation on West Africa's Atlantic coast, Senegal has struggled with widespread poverty and a long-running, low-level separatist insurgency in its southern Casamance region. Still, the country's democratic continuity and military professionalism have stood in stark contrast to near-state collapse in neighboring Mali (previously also considered a democracy), and to unrest and instability elsewhere in the region. This regional turbulence presents security, political, and economic challenges to Senegal's leadership and population.
President Sall was voted into office in early 2012 in an election widely seen as free and fair, defeating incumbent President Abdoulaye Wade, who had been in office since 2000. Wade's decision to run for what would have been a third term in office was extremely controversial within Senegal, provoking protests and sparking concerns over potential instability. Such concerns prompted officials in the Obama Administration and some Members of Congress to appeal to Wade to withdraw his candidacy. Wade pursued his campaign nonetheless, and criticized what he described as Western interference. In the end, Sall's electoral victory, and Wade's peaceful concession, renewed many Senegalese and international observers' faith in the strength of Senegal's democratic institutions.
Since his election, President Sall has focused on reforming Senegal's bloated civilian administration, pursuing investigations into corrupt practices under his predecessor, and making a renewed push for peace in Casamance. While these initiatives appear to be popular, Sall faces stark challenges, including public expectations that he will deliver rapid economic dividends to Senegal's largely impoverished population. It is also unclear how far Sall can pursue allegations of corruption under his predecessor without implicating himself or close allies, as he and others served in senior positions under former President Wade.
Congress plays a role in shaping U.S. policy toward Senegal through its authorization and appropriation of foreign assistance, and through its oversight of executive branch policies and programs. In addition to bilateral aid totaling $109.6 million in FY2012, Senegal is the beneficiary of a five-year, $540 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact signed in 2009. Some Members of Congress objected to the decision to award Senegal an MCC compact in light of concerns, at the time, over corruption and political trends under then-President Wade. In the conference report accompanying P.L. 112-74, the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act, appropriators directed the Administration to allocate at least $50 million in development aid to Senegal, while also expressing concern over Senegal's failure to bring to justice former Chadian president Hissène Habré, who lives in Senegal and has been accused of crimes against humanity. Some progress has since been made toward a possible trial for Habré. |
crs_RL31796 | crs_RL31796_0 | Introduction
The federal Endangered Species Act (ESA), along with its state counterparts, has long been a major flash point in debates over government interference with property rights. Second, given that restrictions on land uses and other property-related activities are imposed under the ESA, to what extent does the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment demand compensation of the property owner? Sections I and II of the report give background: respectively, the ESA features pertinent to the act's impacts on private property and ESA-relevant principles of Fifth Amendment takings law. Of the 18 decisions reviewed, only one, Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States , found a taking, and as discussed that decision has been undermined by a later decision of the same judge that appears to have survived appeal. However, two other cases have yet to be finally resolved and thus may or may not ultimately find a taking. However, this defense has yet to be addressed in an ESA-based takings decision. Physical takings claims are common in ESA cases—the property owner pointing to a required physical diversion of water to supply a fish ladder for a listed species, listed animals whose physical presence on his/her land must be tolerated, the consumption of livestock by listed predators because the livestock owner was barred by the ESA from taking stronger measures against the marauding animals, or the temporary presence on the owner's property of federal investigators. The landowner's taking claim based on the required mitigation of his development's impact on the salamander is unripe. They assert a Fifth Amendment taking. V. Reductions in Irrigation Water to Preserve Instream Flows
Reduction by United States in irrigation water that water district was allowed to divert from river: Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States , 543 F.3d 1276 ( Fed. | The federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) has long been one of the major flash points in debates over government interference with property rights. This report outlines the ESA provisions most relevant to the act's impacts on private property and surveys the major ESA-relevant principles of Fifth Amendment takings law. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment promises "just compensation" when government actions "take" property.
The report then summarizes the court decisions on whether particular government actions (or inaction) based on the ESA "take" private property under the Fifth Amendment. The cases to date address several kinds of ESA impacts on private property: (1) restrictions on land uses that might adversely affect species listed as endangered or threatened, and mitigation conditions to offset the impacts of development; (2) administrative delays; (3) reductions in water delivery or allowable water diversion to preserve lake levels or instream flows needed by listed fish (currently the most active area of ESA takings litigation); (4) restrictions on the defensive measures a property owner may take to protect his/her property from listed animals; and (5) restrictions on commercial dealings in listed species.
To date, only one of the 18 ESA-based takings cases disclosed by research, Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, has found a taking. However, two cases, Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States and Klamath Irrigation District v. United States, have yet to be finally resolved and may or may not result in holdings that takings occurred. |
crs_R40436 | crs_R40436_0 | The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) provided $7.2 billion primarily for broadband grant programs to be administered by two separate agencies: the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Of the $7.2 billion total, the ARRA provided $4.7 billion to establish a Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP) at NTIA, and $2.5 billion for broadband grant, loan, and loan/grant combination programs at RUS. The ARRA also directed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to develop a national broadband strategy. The unprecedented scale and scope of the ARRA broadband programs, coupled with the short time frame for awarding grants, presents daunting challenges with respect to program implementation as well as Congressional oversight. Total Awards First and Second Round Combined
As of October 1, 2010, all BTOP and BIP award announcements were complete. In total, NTIA and RUS announced awards for 553 projects, constituting $7.5 billion in federal funding. This included 233 BTOP projects (totaling $3.9 billion) and 320 BIP projects (totaling $3.6 billion). Of the $7.5 billion total announced, $6.2 billion was grant funding, and $1.3 billion was loan funding. Grant awards also include funding for state broadband planning. The ARRA addressed broadband data by designating $350 million for funding the Broadband Data Improvement Act ( P.L. 110-385 ) and for the purpose of developing and maintaining a national broadband inventory map. To address this issue, the ARRA:
required the Secretary of Agriculture to submit a report to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on planned spending and actual obligations describing the use of ARRA funds ($2.5 billion) for the RUS broadband programs not later than 90 days after enactment, and quarterly thereafter until all funds are obligated; transferred $10 million to the Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General for audits and oversight of funds provided for the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program; directed NTIA to report every 90 days on the status of BTOP to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation; directed NTIA to require grant recipients to file quarterly reports (which will be publicly available) on the grantee's use of the grant money and progress on fulfilling the objectives for which the funds were granted; authorized NTIA, if it chooses, to establish additional reporting and information requirements for any grant recipient; authorized NTIA, in addition to other authority under applicable law, to deobligate awards to grantees that demonstrate an insufficient level of performance, or wasteful or fraudulent spending, as defined in advance by NTIA, and award these funds competitively to new or existing applicants; and directed NTIA to create and maintain a fully searchable database, accessible on the Internet at no cost to the public, that contains at least a list of each entity that has applied for a grant, a description of each application, the status of each application, the name of each entity receiving funds, the purpose for which the entity is receiving funds, each quarterly report submitted by the entity, and other information sufficient to allow the public to understand and monitor grants awarded under the program. As the 112 th Congress continues to monitor broadband stimulus programs, while considering various additional options for encouraging broadband deployment and adoption, a key issue is how to strike a balance between providing federal assistance for unserved and underserved areas where the private sector may not be providing acceptable levels of broadband service, while at the same time minimizing any deleterious effects that government intervention in the marketplace may have on competition and private sector investment. | The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) provided $7.2 billion primarily for broadband grant programs to be administered by two separate agencies: the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Of the $7.2 billion total, the ARRA provided $4.7 billion to establish a Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP) at NTIA, and $2.5 billion as funding for broadband grant, loan, and loan/grant combination programs at RUS. Broadband grants and loans funded by the ARRA are competitive and applicants must apply directly to NTIA and RUS. The NTIA appropriation also included $350 million for a national broadband inventory map, funding for the Broadband Data Improvement Act (P.L. 110-385), and funding to be transferred to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to develop a national broadband plan.
As of October 1, 2010, all BTOP and BIP award announcements were complete. In total, NTIA and RUS announced awards for 553 projects, constituting $7.5 billion in federal funding. This included 233 BTOP projects (totaling $3.9 billion) and 320 BIP projects (totaling $3.6 billion). Of the $7.5 billion total announced, $6.2 billion was grant funding, and $1.3 billion was loan funding. With the awards phase completed, NTIA and RUS now shift their focus to oversight of the funded projects as they move forward. Additionally, the broadband mapping effort, implemented by the State Broadband Data and Development Grant Program, awarded $293 million to 50 states, 5 territories, and the District of Columbia.
The unprecedented scale and scope of the ARRA broadband programs, coupled with the short time frame for awarding grants, presents daunting challenges with respect to program implementation as well as Congressional oversight. The 112th Congress may monitor how equitably and effectively broadband grants are allocated among states and the various stakeholders, and to what extent the programs fulfill the goals of short term job creation and the longer term economic benefits anticipated from improved broadband availability, access, and adoption. A continuing issue is how to strike a balance between providing federal assistance for unserved and underserved areas where the private sector may not be providing acceptable levels of broadband service, while at the same time minimizing any deleterious effects that government intervention in the marketplace may have on competition and private sector investment. |
crs_R40738 | crs_R40738_0 | Since 1995, legislation that would guarantee collective bargaining rights for state and local public safety officers has been introduced in Congress. The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act (PSEECA)—introduced in the 111 th Congress as H.R. 413 by Representative Dale E. Kildee, S. 1611 by Senator Judd Gregg, and S. 3194 and S. 3991 by Senator Harry Reid—would recognize such rights by requiring compliance with federal regulations and procedures if these rights are not provided under state law. Supporters of the measure maintain that strong partnerships between public safety officers and the cities and states they serve are not only vital to public safety, but are built on bargaining relationships. Opponents argue, however, that the bill infringes on an area that has traditionally been within state control. This report reviews the PSEECA and discusses the possible impact of the legislation. The report also identifies existing state laws that recognize collective bargaining rights for public safety employees, and considers the constitutional concerns raised by the measure. | Since 1995, legislation that would guarantee collective bargaining rights for state and local public safety officers has been introduced in Congress. The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act (PSEECA)—introduced in the 111th Congress as H.R. 413 by Representative Dale E. Kildee, S. 1611 by Senator Judd Gregg, and S. 3194 and S. 3991 by Senator Harry Reid—would recognize such rights by requiring compliance with federal regulations and procedures if these rights are not provided under state law. Supporters of the measure maintain that strong partnerships between public safety officers and the cities and states they serve are not only vital to public safety, but are built on bargaining relationships. Opponents argue, however, that the bill infringes on an area that has traditionally been within state control. This report reviews the PSEECA and discusses the possible impact of the legislation. The report also identifies existing state laws that recognize collective bargaining rights for public safety employees, and considers the constitutional concerns raised by the measure. |
crs_RL32130 | crs_RL32130_0 | (7)
The NPR called for retaining the capability to deter or respond to a variety of contingencies, and for retaining Cold War-era nuclear weapons, at lower levels, to do so. Reducing the time toconduct a nuclear test supports a future decision to test and, to the critics, implies an intent to test. As noted, the Administration completed its congressionally-mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in December 2001. (31)
In action on the FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act, Representative Weldon initially offered an amendment on the House floor that, among other things, would have repealed theSpratt-Furse provision upon presidential certification that another nation conducted a nuclear testfor new or improved nuclear weapons, or that another nation was developing, in undergroundfacilities, WMD that could pose an imminent risk to the United States, or that the repeal "is in thenational security interest of the United States." The President signed the measure into law ( P.L.108-136 ) on November 24. (70)
Advanced Concepts Initiative
Description
For FY2004, the Administration requested $21.0 million for the Advanced Concepts Initiative (ACI). Of this amount, $15.0 million was for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) weapon,discussed in the next section, and $6.0 million ($2.0 million for each of the three weapons labs) wasfor other advanced weapon concepts, discussed here. 108-137 ) on December 1. (98) U.S.nuclear weapons able to hold at risk such targets could be used not only for deterrence but also forcoercion and preemption. Critics citea 1992 letter by the first Bush Administration setting forth a presidential decision "to modify U.S.nuclear testing policy immediately, to impose limits on the number, purpose and yield of our tests. The FY2005 request is $27.6 million. The RNEP study, part of the Advanced Concepts Initiative, is examining the desirability and feasibility of modifying an existing B61 or B83 bomb to enable it to penetrate into the ground beforedetonating. Lower-yield weapons, even EPWs, may not suffice to destroy all buried targets. The FY2003 Energy and Water DevelopmentAppropriations Act included the amount requested for Stockpile R&D, the category within DirectedStockpile Work that includes RNEP. Issues for Congress
Would RNEP promote deterrence? With the end of the Cold War and the start of amoratorium on nuclear tests, the Clinton Administration required a U.S. ability to conduct a nucleartest in at most 24 to 36 months of a presidential order to conduct the test. (223)
In action on the FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. (224)
The required report, with a cover date of April 2003, recommended a test readiness posture of 18 months; estimated that achieving this posture by the end of FY2005 would cost $83 million forthe three-year transition period and that sustaining it would cost $25-$30 million a year thereafterfor resources unique to nuclear testing, vs. about $15 million a year for this purpose for the currentposture; assessed that the erosion of expertise over time due to retirements and the long time sincethe last nuclear test make the 24-36 month posture more likely a 36-month posture, with even that"viewed as increasingly at risk"; and argued that a 6-12 month posture would require "a substantialdiversion of personnel and facilities at the laboratories and production plants," and at the shorter endof that posture "would represent a major redirection of the stockpile stewardship program." Those who would enhance test readiness argue that the current posture is simply too long. Concluding Observations
Debate over the four nuclear initiatives will in all likelihood continue for some years. Supporters argue: lifting the ban on low-yield R&D simply permits scientists to study the full rangeof weapon issues, as is the case for scientists in all other nuclear weapon states; ACI is forearly-stage studies; and RNEP is just a study that at most could lead merely to adding a second typeof earth penetrator weapon to the U.S. inventory. In turn,military requirements for these new weapons will lead to testing, and enhanced test readiness willpermit expedited testing and deployment of these weapons. Nuclear weapons tailored to destroy chemical and biologicalagents may not be needed. | The Bush Administration completed its congressionally-mandated Nuclear Posture Review in December 2001. The review led to major changes in U.S. nuclear policy. It found that the Cold Warrelationship with Russia was "very inappropriate" and that this nation must be able to deal with newthreats. It planned to retain Cold War-era nuclear weapons, which would suffice for manycontingencies, though at reduced numbers. To complement these weapons so as to improve U.S.ability to deal with new, more dispersed threats in various countries, the Administration sought toexplore additional nuclear capabilities.
Accordingly, the FY2004 request included four nuclear weapon initiatives: (1) rescinding the ban that Congress imposed in 1993 on R&D on low-yield nuclear weapons; (2) $6 million for theAdvanced Concepts Initiative (ACI) to begin certain studies of weapon-related science andtechnology; (3) $15 million to continue a study of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), inwhich an existing bomb would be converted into a weapon able to penetrate into the ground beforedetonating to improve its ability to destroy buried targets; and (4) $25 million to enable the UnitedStates to conduct a nuclear test within 18 months of a presidential order to test, and for relatedpurposes, as compared with the current 24-36 month time that was set shortly after the end of theCold War. Congress acted on these requests in the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act( P.L. 108-136 ), and acted on the latter three in the FY2004 Energy and Water DevelopmentAppropriations Act ( P.L. 108-137 ). For FY2005, the Administration requests $9.0 million for ACI,$27.6 million for RNEP, and $30.0 million for improving nuclear test readiness.
These initiatives are controversial. Supporters claim that the first three initiatives would enhance deterrence, thereby reducing the risk of war, and that some weapons that might result fromthe initiatives could enable the United States to destroy key targets in nations that may pose a threat. Critics are concerned that these initiatives would lead to nuclear testing, increase the risk of nuclearproliferation, and make U.S. use of nuclear weapons more likely. Regarding enhanced test readiness,the Administration argues that nuclear testing might be needed, for example, to check fixes toweapon types with defects, and that 24 to 36 months is too long to wait; critics are concerned thatshortening the time to test could signal a U.S. intent to test, and that renewed testing could lead toa renewed interest in testing by other nations.
This report provides the policy context for the four initiatives. For each, it then presents a description, history, FY2004 legislative actions, the FY2005 request (for all but low-yield R&D),and issues for Congress. It is designed for those who want a detailed introduction to the debate,those seeking arguments and counterarguments, and those looking for answers to specific questions. It will track congressional and executive actions on these initiatives through updates as developmentswarrant. |
crs_RL31009 | crs_RL31009_0 | Most Recent Developments
The CJS conferees met on November 8, 2001 and agreed to a total budget authority (after scorekeepingadjustments) of $39.3 billion. In the absence of signed appropriations, the following continuing resolutionshave kept the government running into the new fiscal year: H.J.Res. 65 ( P.L. 107-44 ) which expired October 16th, H.J.Res. 68 ( P.L. 107-48 ) which expiredOctober 23rd, H.J.Res. 69 ( P.L. 107-53 ) which expired October31st, H.J.Res. 107-58 ) which expired November 16th, and H.J.Res. 74 ( P.L.107-70 ) which expired December 7, 2001. 107-77 ) on November 28th, 2001with a total budget authority of $41.6 billion . Overview
This report tracks legislative action by the first session of the 107th Congress on FY2002 appropriations for theDepartments of Commerce, Justice, and State, theJudiciary, and other related agencies (often referred to as CJS appropriations). 5548 ascontained in the conference report on H.R. Congress enacted its CJS appropriation totaling $41.6 billion for FY2002. It is $373million above the FY2001 appropriation which totaled $37.6 billion (after adjustments). Brief Survey of Major Issues
In addition to heightened interest in counter-terrorism and security activities since the September 11th attacks, some other contentious issues and proposals thatsurfaced in the House and Senate debate over CJS appropriations for FY2002 included:
Restructuring the Immigration and Naturalization Service; reducing pending immigration and naturalization caseloads; and increasing borderenforcement. Reducing gun crimes through enforcement of existing laws and other initiatives. Combating drug abuse. Department of State:
Overseas embassy security. Whether, as the Judiciary contended, federal judges and justices should receive a cost-of-living salary increase (as they had the previous twofiscal years);
Whether, or to what extent, to provide funding for the first major renovation of the Supreme Court building since its opening in 1935. The Housepassed the bill ( H.R. 2500 and passed its version of H.R. 2500 , as amended. After numerous continuing resolutions, the CJS appropriations was signed into law( P.L. For DOJ for FY2002, President Bush's budget request was $21.11 billion compared toFY2001 enacted funding of $21.03 billion. In keeping with this funding approach, the FY2002 budget request for the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) was $3.67 billion, about a billion dollars less than thefunding level of $4.7 billion for FY2001. Introduced February 13, 2001;referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. For the Department of Commerce alone, the President requested $5.09 billion, which was about $63 million (1.2%) below the FY2001 appropriation of $5.15billion. Highlights of President Bush's FY2002 budget request for NOAA included: 1) funding for Stellar Sea Lion research ($29 million) - NMFS; 2) full funding for theNational Undersea Research Program (NURP) for FY2002 ($13.9 million) as the centerpiece for a 2002 OceanExploration initiative ($14 million requested) -OAR; 3) decreases in Great Lakes coastal community protection programs (-$30 million) - OAR; 4) restoration ofbase funding for Forecast & Warning Services($16.7 million) - NWS; 5) funding for the Cooperative Weather Observer Program ($2.3 million) - NWS; 6) transferof research data acquisition funding linesfrom NOS, OAR, and NMFS to Marine Services under Program Support ($62.0 million) - PS/OMAO; 7) fundingfor a Telecommunications Gateway Backup andother data communications improvements, under a Critical Infrastructure Protection initiative to provide backupfor critical weather data and information managedby the agency ($73.3 million) - NWS; 8) funding for a Comprehensive Large-Array [data] Stewardship System(CLASS) to expand, coordinate and centralizeclimate services data ($3.6 million) - OAR; and 9) funding increases for Satellite Programs (NPOESS and GOES),including backup hardware and new sensors($712.3 million) - NESDIS. Congress approved $4.61 billion in total FY2002 budgetappropriations for the Judiciary, an 8.4% increase over FY2001 funding of $4.25 billion. The President's FY2002 request of $5,665.8 million for State's administration of foreign affairs was nearly 20% above the FY2001 enacted level. The Senate passed a total of $456.5 million. Department of Justice
Title II. | This report tracks action by the 107th Congress on FY2002 appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and other relatedagencies (often referred to as CJS appropriations). President Bush's FY2002 budget request totals $40.81 billion,about one billion dollars (2.6%) above theFY2001 total. The House agreed to $41.46 billion, the committee total, and passed the bill ( H.R. 2500 ) onJuly 18th. The Senate AppropriationsCommittee recommended a total of $41.53 billion ( S. 1215 ). The Senate passed its version of H.R. 2500 , as amended, on September 13,2001. Conferees met on November 8th and agreed to a total funding level of $39.3 billion. Confereesalso agreed to file the conference report on the followingday. Continuing resolutions have kept the government running into the new fiscal year: H.J.Res. 65 ( P.L.107-44 ) expired October 16th, H.J.Res. 68 ( P.L. 107-48 ) expired October 23rd, H.J.Res. 69 ( P.L. 107-53 ) expiredOctober 31st, H.J.Res. 70 ( P.L. 107-58 )expired November 16th, and H.J.Res. 74 expired December 7, 2001. The bill was signed into law ( P.L.107-77 ) on November 28th, prior to the expiration of thecontinuing resolution.
Department of Justice. The FY2002 request was $21.11 billion, less than 1% above the FY2001 enacted level. Key issues included: addressing terrorism,reducing gun crimes through enforcement of existing laws; combating drug abuse; funding for community policingprograms under the Office of JusticePrograms; restructuring the Immigration and Naturalization Service, reducing pending immigration andnaturalization caseloads, and increasing borderenforcement. Congress passed $21.7 billion for this agency.
Department of Commerce. The FY2002 request was $5.1 billion, 2% below the FY2001 funding level. Congress debated such issues as funding for: NOAA'snext-generation weather satellites, local economic development activities, and the Technology OpportunitiesProgram (TOP) grants. The enacted FY2002 budgetfor Commerce totals $5.4 billion.
Department of State . The FY2002 request was $7.5 billion, nearly 14% above the FY2001 enacted level. The Department had three top priorities in its FY2002budget: hiring about 600 new staff in Foreign and Civil Service, as well as security professionals; continuingincreases in embassy security; and more thandoubling its current funds for information technology improvements worldwide. Congress passed $7.4 billion.
The Judiciary . The FY2002 request was $4.9 billion, 14.5% above the FY2001 funding level. The Judiciary request included funds for cost-of-living salaryincreases for federal judges and justices, as well as $117 million for the first major renovation of the Supreme Courtbuilding since its opening in 1935. Congressapproved $4.61 billion, an 8.4% increase over FY2001, including $37.5 million for the Supreme Court building and$8.6 million for a cost-of-living payadjustment for judges and justices. |
crs_RL33759 | crs_RL33759_0 | The challenge for those who wish to expand the use of market incentives in health care is to design policies that align material incentives facing consumers and providers of health care so that changes in behavior enhance economic efficiency. The report provides an overview of efforts to expand the use of market or market-like institutions in health care and considers effects of these initiatives or proposals on the federal budget. Health Care Costs and Public Spending
Health care costs take up a large and growing part of the economy and of public budgets. The pace of health care costs and the expanding public role in health care have stoked interest in using market incentives to slow or limit costs and to improve quality of outcomes. Market Failure and Health Care
Economists' belief in the efficiency of markets is based on the Invisible Hand Theorem, which states that market outcomes are efficient, so long as certain conditions hold. An externality, or spillover effect, exists when one's consumption or production affects the ability of another to consume or produce. No one has an informational advantage over others. No market power . The Invisible Hand theorem takes the distribution of buying power as given. Informational Advantages and Market Failure
The lack of symmetric information, which occurs when some have informational advantages over others, is the source of many of the key problems in health care. The Federal Budget and Market-Oriented Health Care Reform
The rapid rise in health care costs is straining public budgets at all levels of government, and projected increases in health care costs promise to intensify pressures on public budgets. Even if health care costs moderate, a substantial portion of the gains from economic growth will be directed towards the health care system. In part, this is a consequence of their cost structure. Information asymmetries between patients and physicians as well as between providers and payers stem from the unavoidable need for highly specialized roles. | Health care spending is one of the most rapidly growing portions of the federal budget. Projections suggest if the rapid growth in health care costs is not curtailed, governments at all levels will face an uncomfortable choice between significant cuts in other spending priorities or major tax increases. This report examines the economic justification for government intervention and involvement in health care markets.
Many analysts claim market-oriented policies, in certain instances, could lower costs and enhance efficiency in health care. This report discusses the Invisible Hand Theorem, which states that when certain assumptions hold, market outcomes will be efficient. These assumptions require that no one has an informational advantage over another, that no spillover effects exist in consumption or production, that no one exerts market power, and that no scale economies exist in production.
Many characteristics of health care markets fail to satisfy the assumptions of the Invisible Hand Theorem. Moreover, fundamental characteristics of health care (such as informational asymmetries between patients and health care professionals and between payers and providers, as well as ethical and distributional concerns) complicate efforts to expand the use of market or market-like incentives in health care.
Rising health care costs in part reflect the cost of technological advances, whose benefits exceed their costs, and the aging of the U.S. population. The growing role of third-party reimbursement over the past half century weakened incentives to minimize costs and thus has also led to higher health care costs. Many analysts have called for initiatives which would improve the functioning of health care markets, such as improving consumer information and allowing greater use of bargaining. These initiatives may help reduce or slow the growth of health care costs, but may also have unintended negative consequences. Greater use of market-like incentives can improve the efficiency of the health care system, but only if they take into account the special characteristics of health care. |
crs_RS22613 | crs_RS22613_0 | On January 5, 2007, Adrian Fenty, the mayor of the District Columbia, released a detailed legislative proposal that would transfer administrative, policy making, and budgetary authority for the District of Columbia's public schools from the District of Columbia Board of Education to the mayor. transfer the authority to set the budget for the District of Columbia schools to the mayor. The Home Rule Act gave District voters the right to elect a mayor, a city council, and an independent Board of Education. To the extent that Congress sought to legislate beyond the two issues contemplated in the proposed Education Reform Act, it could pass legislation implementing any or all other aspects of the proposed act itself. | On January 5, 2007, the newly elected mayor of the District of Columbia, Adrian Fenty, released his legislative proposal to transfer administrative and budgetary control of the District's public schools from the Board of Education to the Office of the Mayor. Under the proposed Education Reform Act, the city council would reorganize the city's authority over the schools, while calling on Congress to amend provisions of the Home Rule Act relating to the District of Columbia School Board structure and to restrictions on the school budget authority. To the extent that Congress sought to legislate beyond these two issues, it could pass legislation implementing any or all other aspects of the proposed act itself. This report will examine that option. |
crs_RS22992 | crs_RS22992_0 | Introduction
Presidential transition is generally defined as the period during which an incumbent President who is retiring or who has failed to win reelection prepares to leave office, while the incoming President-elect prepares for inauguration. In modern times, the transition period begins immediately after the general election, which is held on Tuesday after the first Monday in November of every presidential election year, and concludes on the following January 20, when the new chief executive is sworn in. For the purposes of this report, the preceding period, which begins with the national party nominating conventions, which are held in August of the election year, and concludes with the general election, is referred to as the presidential election campaign period. For instance, the period between President Barack H. Obama's election to a second term on November 6, 2012, and his inauguration on January 20, 2013, is not a transition period as defined in this report. Candidate "Succession" During the Presidential Election Campaign Period
Vacancies in a national party ticket during the presidential election campaign period, which falls between the national nominating conventions and general election day, do not technically occur during the transition. Succession Between General Election Day and the Meeting of the Electoral College
The first period in which succession procedures would be invoked in the event a President-elect or Vice President-elect were to die or leave the ticket for any reason includes the time between the election and the date on which the electors meet in December to cast their votes. Most commentators suggest that in this case the political parties would follow their long-established rules, by which their national committees designate a substitute nominee. Presidential electors meet in their respective states to cast their votes on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December in the year of the presidential election, which falls on December 17 in 2012. Federal law sets January 6 of the following year as the date on which Congress convenes in joint session to count the electoral vote and declare the results. The succession process during this period would turn on the issue of when the candidates who received an electoral vote majority actually become President-elect and Vice President-elect. Some commentators doubt that there would be a President- and Vice President-elect before the results are certified. Addressing the question of when there is a President-elect, the report stated:
It will be noted that the committee uses the term "President elect" in its generally accepted sense, as meaning the person who has received the majority of electoral votes, or the person who has been chosen by the House of Representatives in the event that the election is thrown into the House. 380, 3 U.S.C. 19) implements this authority, providing that if, "by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify [emphasis added], there is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as Representative in Congress, act as President." One safeguard would be for some official or officials in the line of presidential succession not to attend the presidential inauguration ceremony. The Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate would arguably be the appropriate candidates for this role: they are, respectively, first and second in the order of succession following the Vice President, ahead of members of the President's cabinet. First, one or more incumbent cabinet officers of the outgoing administration might be retained in office (and, away from the inaugural ceremonies) at least until after the President- and Vice-President elect have been safely installed. Alternatively, one or more cabinet officers of the incoming administration could be nominated by the incumbent President, confirmed, and installed in office before the January 20 inauguration. It was subsequently announced on January 19, 2009, that Secretary Gates would not attend the presidential inauguration ceremonies. With respect to the transition period itself, the 20 th and 25 th Amendments have anticipated most potential contingencies, and could be implemented to address a succession issue during the period between the meetings of the electoral college and inauguration of the President. In the Post-9/11 environment, however, attention has shifted from the prospect of the death, disability, or resignation of a candidate or the President- or Vice President-elect to the potential for a successful terrorist incident that might result in the death or disability of a number of persons in the line of presidential succession, particularly during the public inauguration ceremonies. One option to ensure executive continuity would be for either the Speaker of the House or the President pro tempore of the Senate to be absent from the ceremony. | Presidential transition is usually defined as the period and process that take place when one President prepares to leave office, due to retirement or failure to win reelection, and a successor prepares for inauguration. In modern times, the transition period begins immediately after the general election, which is held on Tuesday after the first Monday in November of every presidential election year, and concludes on the following January 20, when the new chief executive is sworn in. For the purposes of this report, the preceding period, which begins with the national party nominating conventions and concludes with the general election, is referred to as the presidential election campaign period. It should be noted that transition is not generally used to describe the period between the first and second terms of the Presidents who were elected to consecutive terms.
This report identifies and provides analysis of the procedures governing replacement of candidates for the office of President and Vice President during the presidential election campaign period, or replacement of a President- or Vice President-elect during the transition period. These procedures are determined by when they occur. Procedures applicable during the successive stages of the transition and election period are summarized below.
Before Election Day—During the Presidential Election Campaign Period. Between the national party nominating conventions, which generally take place in August of the presidential election year, and general election day (November 6 in 2012), the two major parties' rules provide that replacement candidates would be chosen by their national committees should vacancies occur. Between Election Day and the Meetings of the Electors. At the general election, voters choose members of the electoral college, which formally selects the President- and Vice President-elect several weeks later (December 17 in 2012). Although the transmission period has begun, the political parties' rules still apply: replacement candidates would be chosen by the party national committee. Between the Meetings of the Electors and Inauguration Day. Most, though not all, authorities agree that the President- and Vice President-elect are chosen once the electoral votes are cast on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December (December 17 in 2012). The electoral votes are counted and declared when Congress meets in joint session for this purpose, which is set by law for January 6 of the year following the election, but Congress occasionally sets a different date for the joint session. Since January 6 falls on a Sunday in 2013, it is likely that Congress will set a different date, possibly January 7 or 8. In recent years, the customary legislative vehicle calling for the joint session has been a Senate Concurrent Resolution, introduced in the newly assembled Congress by the Senate Majority Leader. During the period between the date when electoral votes are cast and the January 20 inauguration, the 20th Amendment to the Constitution provides for succession: if the President-elect dies, the Vice President-elect becomes President-elect. Although the 20th Amendment does not specifically address the issues of disability or resignation by a President- or Vice President-elect during this period, the words "failure to qualify" found in the amendment might arguably be interpreted to cover such contingencies. While the 20th Amendment does not address vacancies in the position of Vice President-elect, these would be covered after the inauguration by the 25th Amendment. In the event no person qualifies as President or Vice President, then the Presidential Succession Act (61 Stat. 380, 3 U.S.C. 19) would apply: the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and duly confirmed Cabinet officers, in that order, would act as President. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, observers have expressed concern that an incident during the presidential inauguration ceremony might lead to the death or disability of most or all officials in the line of presidential succession. One potential remedy for this situation would be for an official in the line of succession, such as the Speaker of the House of Representatives or the President pro tempore of the Senate, to be absent from the ceremony. Another might be for a Cabinet secretary-designate of the new Administration to be nominated by the incumbent President, confirmed by the Senate, and installed prior to the inauguration. A third would be for a Cabinet secretary from the outgoing Administration to remain in office until after the inauguration, and away from the ceremony. Due to a convergence of circumstances, this occurred in 2009: Defense Secretary Robert Gates was asked by President-elect Barack Obama to stay on in the new Administration in order to provide continuity in an important Cabinet office. Subsequently, the Obama transition team and the outgoing Administration of President George Bush agreed that, in order to secure continuity in the order of presidential succession, Secretary Gates would not attend the inauguration ceremony. |
crs_RL33253 | crs_RL33253_0 | Andean Counterdrug Initiative
The Andean Counterdrug Initiative was designed to provide assistance to seven countries inthe broadly defined Andean region: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, andVenezuela. Funding for ACI from FY2000 through FY2005 totaled nearly $4.3 billion. The request also included a newcomponent, $40 million for a Critical Flight Safety Program that was described as the firstinstallment of a multi-year program to upgrade and refurbish of State Department aircraft used foreradication and interdiction missions. In the FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act ( H.R. 3057 , P.L.109-102 ), Congress approved the Administration's request of $734.5 million for ACI but changedhow those funds are allocated. Congress provided $14 million for the Air Bridge Denial programinstead of the requested $21 million. Related Funding Programs
Additional funding for the Andean region is provided through the Foreign Military Financing(FMF) program and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, bothmanaged by the State Department. In the FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act( H.R. The three have been designated foreign terroristorganizations by the United States. 109-102 ), which included a numberof longstanding provisions relating to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. 1815 , P.L.109-163 ) authorized funding for Department of Defense drug interdiction activities. Personnel Caps
The FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act changed existing law with regard to the capon the number of U.S. military and civilian contractors that can be deployed in Colombia in supportof Plan Colombia. Demobilization of Illegally Armed Groups in Colombia
The FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act makes $20 million available in FY2006to assist in the demobilization and disarmament of former members of foreign terrorist organizations(FTOs), if the Secretary of State certifies that:
assistance will be provided only for individuals who have verifiably renouncedand terminated any affiliation or involvement with FTOs, and are meeting all the requirements ofthe Colombia Demobilization program;
the Colombian government is fully cooperating with the United States inextraditing FTO leaders and members who have been indicted in the United States for murder,kidnaping, narcotics trafficking, and other violations of U.S. law;
the Colombian government is implementing a concrete and workableframework for dismantling the organizational structures of FTOs; and
funds will not be used to make cash payments to individuals, and funds willonly be available for any of the following activities: verification, reintegration (including trainingand education), vetting, recovery of assets for reparations for victims, and investigations andprosecutions. The Senate passed H.R. The bill also calls for a report from the Secretary of State thatdetails tax code enforcement in Colombia. The Senate has had under consideration its version of the foreign relations authorization bill, S. 600 . The bill authorizes funding for ACI and includes a number of conditions onassistance consistent with current law. Unlike theFY2005 authorization, it did not include provisions relating to Colombia or the Andean CounterdrugInitiative. | In 2005, Congress considered a number of issues relating to the Andean region and drugtrafficking, including continued funding for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and conditionson U.S. assistance. In addition to ACI, Andean countries benefit from Foreign Military Financing(FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds, and other types of economicaid. Congress continues to express concern with the volume of drugs readily available in the UnitedStates and elsewhere in the world. The three largest producers of cocaine are Colombia, Bolivia, andPeru. Ninety percent of the cocaine in the United States originates in, or passes through, Colombia.
The United States has made a significant commitment of funds and material support to helpColombia and the Andean region fight drug trafficking since the development of Plan Colombia in1999. From FY2000 through FY2005, the United States has provided a total of about $5.4 billionfor the region in both State Department and Defense Department counternarcotics funds. The UnitedStates also provides funding for Development Assistance (DA), Child Survival and Health (CSH),and Economic Support Funds (ESF) to some countries in the region. Since 2002, Congress hasgranted expanded authority to use counternarcotics funds for a unified campaign to fight both drugtrafficking and terrorist organizations in Colombia. Three illegally armed groups in Colombiaparticipate in drug production and trafficking, and have been designated foreign terroristorganizations by the State Department. In 2004, Congress also increased the level of U.S. militaryand civilian contractor personnel allowed to be deployed in Colombia, in response to anAdministration request.
For FY2006, Congress approved the Administration's request for $734.5 million for ACI inthe Foreign Operations Appropriations Act ( H.R. 3057 / P.L. 109-102 ). As part of therequested amount for ACI, the Administration had requested $21 million for the Air Bridge DenialProgram; Congress provided $14 million. The request also included $40 million for a Critical FlightSafety Program that is described as the first installment of a multi-year program to upgrade andrefurbish aircraft used for eradication and interdiction missions. Congress provided $30 million.
In the House, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act ( H.R. 2601 ) was passedwith provisions relating to the demobilization process, tax code enforcement in Colombia, and thetransfer of aircraft to the Colombian Navy. The Senate did not finish consideration of its version( S. 600 ). It would authorize funding for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and includesa number of conditions on assistance consistent with current law. The FY2006 National DefenseAuthorization Act ( H.R. 1815 , P.L. 109-163 ) authorized funds for Defense Departmentinterdiction activities.
This report will not be updated. For further information, see CRS Report RL32774 , PlanColombia: A Progress Report ; CRS Report RL32250 , Colombia: Issues for Congress ; and CRS Report RL32337 , Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2005Assistance. |
crs_RL32730 | crs_RL32730_0 | H.Res. Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions. Another component of U.S. policy, a so-called second track, consists of support measures for the Cuban people. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations, medical exports to Cuba under the terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts, and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations
Debate on the Overall Direction of U.S. Policy
Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba—to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island—there have been several schools of thought about how to achieve that objective. Some advocate a policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S. efforts to support the Cuban people. Still others call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo. Fidel Castro's July 31, 2006, announcement that he was ceding political power to his brother Raúl temporarily in order to recover from surgery could foster a re-examination of U.S. policy. (For additional information, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba ' s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches .) H.R. Action on H.R. Among other legislative initiatives in the 109 th Congress, two bills would have specifically lifted overall restrictions on travel to Cuba: S. 894 (Enzi) and H.R. H.Con.Res. 208 (Serrano) and H.R. In contrast, other Members have introduced legislation, H.R. House-passed H.R. Action was not completed on either S. 600 or H.R. 5025 that would have eased Cuba sanctions on family and educational travel and on private commercial sales of agricultural and medical products; and one Senate provision in the committee version S. 2806 that would have prohibited funds from administering or enforcing restrictions on Cuba travel. The House-passed version of H.R. Human Rights Resolutions
H.Res. S.Res. Legislative Initiatives in the 109th Congress
Human Rights and Democracy
P.L. (Also see provisions on " Cuba Broadcasting " and " Anti-Drug Cooperation " below.) H.Con.Res. H.R. S.Res. S. 3769 (Ensign). Encourages multilateral cooperation and authorizes a program of assistance to facilitate a peaceful transition in Cuba. H.R. The bills would provide for a general license by the Secretary of the Treasury for travel-related transactions related to the sales and marketing of agricultural products to Cuba; express the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should issue visas for the temporary entry of Cuban nationals to conduct activities related to purchasing U.S. agricultural goods; clarify the "payment of cash in advance" term used in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) to mean that the payment by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment to the seller occurs prior to the transfer of title of the commodity or product to the purchaser and the release of control of such commodity or product to the purchaser; would prohibit the President from restricting direct transfers from a Cuban financial institution to a U.S. financial institution for U.S. agricultural sales under TSRA; and repeals Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and Relations Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 related to transactions or payments with respect to trademarks. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. 5353 (Flake)/ S. 2787 (Craig). H.R. Both the House and Senate versions of the bill include a provision (Section 950 in the House version and Section 846 in the Senate version) that prohibits funds from being used to implement tightened restrictions on financing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba that were issued in February 2005. H.R. S. 1604 (Craig). H.R. 109-102 ( H.R. H.R. U.S. Fugitives
S. 600 (Lugar)/ H.R. H.R. H.R. Diplomatic Personnel in Cuba
H.Con.Res. CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation , by [author name scrubbed]. | Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba under Fidel Castro has consisted largely of isolating the communist nation through comprehensive economic sanctions, which have been significantly tightened by the Bush Administration. Another component of U.S. policy has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including private humanitarian donations and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. While there appears to be broad agreement on the overall objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba—to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island—there are several schools of thought on how to achieve that objective: some advocate maximum pressure on Cuba until reforms are enacted; others argue for lifting some U.S. sanctions judged to be hurting the Cuban people; and still others call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations. Fidel Castro's announcement in late July 2006 that he was temporarily ceding political power to his brother Raúl in order to recover from surgery has prompted some Members to call for re-examination of U.S. policy.
In the 109th Congress, legislative initiatives included the approval of five human rights resolutions: H.Con.Res. 81, H.Res. 193, H.Res. 388, S.Res. 140, and S.Res. 469. P.L. 109-102 funded Cuba democracy projects in FY2006. Action on several FY2007 appropriations measures were not completed, so action will need to be completed in 2007: House-passed H.R. 5522 would have funded FY2007 democracy projects, and House and Senate versions of the bill had contrasting provisions on anti-drug cooperation; House-passed H.R. 5576 would have prohibited funds from being used to implement tightened restrictions on financing for agricultural exports to Cuba; the Senate version of H.R. 5384 would have liberalized travel related to the sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba; and H.R. 5522 and H.R. 5672 would have funded Cuba broadcasting.
Other legislative initiatives not acted upon would have eased U.S. sanctions in various ways: suspension of sanctions after Hurricane Dennis (H.Con.Res. 206); overall sanctions (H.R. 208 and H.R. 579); overall travel (S. 894 and H.R. 1814); family visits (H.R. 2617); educational travel (H.R. 3064); cash in advance for U.S. agricultural sales (H.R. 1339 and S. 634); and facilitation of agricultural sales (H.R. 719 and S. 328). Other measures had provisions on Cuba's trademark registrations (H.R. 719, S. 328, H.R. 3372, S. 1604, H.R. 1689 and S. 69); Cuba broadcasting (S. 600, H.R. 2601); U.S. fugitives in Cuba (H.R. 2601, H.R. 332); sanctions related to Cuba's offshore oil development (H.R. 5292, S. 2682, S. 2795); participation in Cuba's offshore oil development (H.R. 5353, S. 2787); support for U.S. diplomats in Cuba (H.Con.Res. 428); repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act (H.R. 5670); assistance to facilitate a peaceful transition in Cuba (S. 3769); and authorization of $5 million for scholarship and exchange programs (House-passed H.R. 2601).
For additional information, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba's Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches; CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances; CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List; and CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation. |
crs_R44911 | crs_R44911_0 | Introduction and the Role of Energy Efficiency
The Energy Savings and Industrial Competitiveness Act, S. 385 / H.R. The bill addresses energy-efficiency policies for buildings, industry, and federal agencies, among other provisions. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the building and industrial sectors collectively consume 72% of all U.S. primary energy. Challenges to energy efficiency include market forces that do not incentivize investment in energy efficiency, a lack of information or awareness of energy saving opportunities and investment returns, and policy approaches that reward selling energy and discourage investment in energy efficiency. It also identifies differences that may be of interest to policymakers between S. 385 / H.R. The first version of the bill, introduced as S. 1000 in the 112 th Congress, was reported by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources but received no further action. Title III focuses on federal agencies and energy efficiency. On June 28, 2017, Senators Murkowski and Cantwell (chair and ranking member, respectively, of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee) introduced S. 1460 , the Energy and Natural Resources Act of 2017. 1443 —The Energy Savings and Industrial Competitiveness Act—was introduced on March 9, 2017, and referred to the following committees: House Energy and Commerce; House Budget; House Financial Services; House Science, Space, and Technology; House Transportation and Infrastructure; and House Oversight and Government Reform. On May 4, 2017, H.R. Potential Costs and Benefits
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated costs for S. 385 . According to CBO, S. 385 would increase direct spending by $17 million for 2017-2027 and cost $198 million over five years to implement, assuming that appropriations would be consistent with the authorizing legislation. ACEEE's analysis determined that the bill and selected amendments would create jobs, save consumers money, reduce energy use, and avoid greenhouse gas emissions. ACEEE found that the majority of potential energy savings in the bill could be realized through implementation of building energy codes. 1443 . 1443 has provisions addressing these issues, it is yet unknown if the provisions will draw support for the legislation. Supporters of H.R. Title I of the bill addresses energy efficiency, and many of the sections within Title I align with the contents of S. 385 / H.R. It contains several differences that may be of interest to Congress. Many of the differences between S. 385 / H.R. 1443 . 1443 :
A requirement for DOE to establish stretch codes and advanced standards, which refer to building energy codes or standards that are adopted by state, tribal, or local governments that exceed the expected energy-efficiency performance of a building energy code target ahead of schedule by three to six years; Studies on code procedures that consider the lifetime of energy-efficiency measures in trade-offs and performance calculations; S. 1460 instead would call for studies on code procedures that adopt energy-efficiency measures that are "technologically feasible and economically justified"; Energy-efficient targets that are "technologically feasible and life-cycle cost effective"; S. 1460 instead would direct DOE to establish targets that are "technologically feasible and economically justified"; and A paragraph that calls for economic considerations for achieving proposed building energy-efficiency targets that would include potential costs and savings for consumers and building owners and include a return on investment analysis. | Energy efficiency—providing the same or an improved level of service with less energy—has been of interest to some Members of Congress. Proponents of increased energy efficiency see an untapped "resource" that can mitigate the demand for additional energy supplies. Perceived benefits of energy efficiency include lowered energy bills, reduced demand for energy, improved energy security and independence, and reduced air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Challenges to energy efficiency include market barriers that do not incentivize builders or developers to invest in energy efficiency, customers' lack of information or awareness of energy saving opportunities and investment returns, and policy barriers that focus on energy supply rather than investment in energy efficiency.
S. 385—the Energy Savings and Industrial Competitiveness Act—and its House companion bill, H.R. 1443, address energy efficiency in buildings, industry, and federal agencies, and various regulatory measures. Energy savings through increased efficiency can be significant. Estimates by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Academies of achievable energy savings using available cost-effective technologies are about 20% for the buildings sector and range from 14% to 22% for the industrial sector. Combined, these sectors consume 72% of all U.S. primary energy. Further savings can be realized through efforts to improve energy efficiency across the federal government, which is the single largest energy consumer in the United States.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that S. 385 would increase direct federal spending by $17 million between 2017 and 2027. Enacting the bill would not affect revenues. CBO estimated that implementing the legislation would cost the government $198 million over the next five years, assuming appropriations actions that fulfill all provisions of the legislation.
Supporters of S. 385/H.R. 1443 state that the bills can improve competitiveness, save consumers money, and increase energy security while reducing air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Provisions identified as potentially controversial include directing DOE to establish aggregate energy saving targets for commercial and residential buildings, determining cost-effectiveness of conservation measures over the lifetime of the building, and removing the requirement to eliminate fossil fuel use by federal buildings.
S. 385 was reported without amendment by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (SENR) on May 10, 2017. H.R. 1443 was referred in the House on March 9, 2017, to the following committees: Energy and Commerce; Budget; Financial Services; Science, Space, and Technology; Transportation and Infrastructure; and Oversight and Government Reform.
On June 28, 2017, S. 1460, the Energy and Natural Resources Act of 2017, was introduced. Title I of the bill addresses energy efficiency and includes many provisions related to S. 385/H.R. 1443. A comparison of the provisions identified several differences between S. 1460 and S. 385/H.R. 1443 that may be of interest to Congress. |
crs_RS22432 | crs_RS22432_0 | State prisoners were once required to exhaust the opportunities for state remedial action before federal habeas relief could be granted. The period is tolled during the pendency of state collateral review. In order the meet this "actually innocent" standard, the prisoner must show that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict him." New Rules and Retroactivity
Under Teague v. Lane a new rule cannot be sought through federal habeas and a new rule may only be applied retroactively for the benefit of habeas petitioners when (1) the new interpretation places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe or places a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe, or (2) the new interpretation significantly improves the pre-existing fact finding procedures which implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial and without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. When a state opts in, federal habeas review of a claim filed by a state death row inmate is limited to issues raised and decided on the merits in state court unless the state unlawfully prevented the claim from being raised in state court, or the claim is based on a newly recognized, retroactively applicable constitutional interpretation or on newly unearthed, previously undiscoverable evidence. In cases where the federal habeas application has been filed by a prisoner under sentence of death under the federal law or the laws of a state which has opted in, the government has a right, enforceable through mandamus, to a determination by the district court within 450 days of the filing of an application and by the federal court of appeals within 120 days of the filing of the parties' final briefs. The Supreme Court has yet to address the question of whether the Teague rule, which requires that a new constitutional interpretation be claimed on direct appeal rather in habeas, applies to section 2255. Review remained possible under the original writ of habeas corpus. The Military Commissions Act stripped federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over the Guantanamo detainees. They argued that the legislation violated the Suspension Clause, which declares that "[t]he privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." The Court found the Detainee Treatment Act procedures wanting when assessed against the standards of an adequate substitute for normal habeas procedures. | Federal habeas corpus is a procedure under which a federal court may review the legality of an individual's incarceration. It is most often the stage of the criminal appellate process that follows direct appeal and any available state collateral review. The law in the area is an intricate weave of statute and case law.
Current federal law operates under the premise that with rare exceptions prisoners challenging the legality of the procedures by which they were tried or sentenced get "one bite of the apple." Relief for state prisoners is only available if the state courts have ignored or rejected their valid claims, and there are strict time limits within which they may petition the federal courts for relief. Moreover, a prisoner relying upon a novel interpretation of law must succeed on direct appeal; federal habeas review may not be used to establish or claim the benefits of a "new rule." Expedited federal habeas procedures are available in the case of state death row inmates if the state has provided an approved level of appointed counsel. The Supreme Court has yet to hold that a state death row inmate who asserts he is "actually innocent" may be granted habeas relief in the absence of an otherwise constitutionally defective conviction. The Court has made it clear in the case of the Guantanamo detainees that the privilege of the writ may not be legislatively extinguished unless there is an adequate substitute, Boumediene v. Bush.
This is an abridged version of CRS Report RL33391, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Brief Legal Overview, by [author name scrubbed], without the footnotes or appendixes, and without most of the quotation marks and citations to authority found in the original. |
crs_R41505 | crs_R41505_0 | Stationary sources—a term that includes electric power plants, petroleum refineries, manufacturing facilities, and other non-mobile sources of air pollution—have not yet been subject to any GHG emission standards issued by EPA; but because of the Clean Air Act's wording, such stationary sources will become subject to permit requirements for their GHG emissions beginning on January 2, 2011. Among the sources likely to be affected by implementation of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permit requirements are new and modified electric generating units of all kinds, but particularly those fired by coal. These sources emit substantially more than EPA's threshold of 100,000 metric tons of CO 2 annually: for example, a 500 megawatt (MW) coal-fired baseload power plant would emit on the order of 3 million metric tons of CO 2 annually. The coal mining industry and coal-fired electric utilities face at least half a dozen major regulatory actions over the next few years; industry supporters view these rules collectively as a significant threat to the future of coal. Viewed in this context, the PSD permit requirement is one more nail in what increasingly appears to them as coal's future coffin. Best Available Control Technology
What is PSD-BACT? EPA's GHG Guidance
On November 10, 2010, the EPA released its package of guidance and technical information to assist local and state permitting authorities in implementing PSD and Title V permitting for greenhouse gas emissions. EPA retains the basic five-step process it has recommended to state and local authorities for 20 years. The primary foci of the EPA guidance package are on state discretion in determining BACT and on energy efficiency as the most likely result of a GHG BACT analysis. These foci are evident through EPA's guidance for each of the five steps. For those looking for bright lines and specific recommendations with respect to GHG BACT technologies, particularly with respect to coal-fired facilities, the released package does not provide them. Indeed, EPA's supplemental "Questions and Answers" release on the guidance seems to stress that it did not draw such conclusions. For example:
Do these tools identify BACT for specific types of industrial facilities? No. Does this guidance say that fuel switching (coal to natural gas) should be selected as BACT for a power plant? No. Does this guidance say that carbon capture and storage (CCS) should be selected as BACT? No. Likewise, the guidance provides no cost thresholds for permitting authorities to consider in determining the economic impacts of alternatives or propose a new approach to selecting BACT for GHG emissions. Instead, the guidance focuses on the discretionary authority that states have in determining BACT; discretion that ensures that BACT will continue to be determined on a case-by-case basis, with states differing in some cases in what they consider appropriate control measures and what constitutes BACT. Whether industry will find such discretion provides sufficient regulatory certainty for it to invest billions in new plant remains to be seen. In short, the EPA GHG guidance is a simple expansion of the five-step BACT process that has been used for two decades to include greenhouse gases. Whether that is an adequate response will be determined by applicants, state authorities, and future EPA regulatory actions under related parts of the act, such as Section 111 (NSPS), to which BACT is linked. | Stationary sources—a term that includes power plants, petroleum refineries, manufacturing facilities, and other non-mobile sources of air pollution—are not yet subject to any greenhouse gas (GHG) emission standards issued by the EPA; but because of the Clean Air Act's wording, such stationary sources will become subject to permit requirements for their GHG emissions beginning on January 2, 2011. Affected units will be subject to the permitting requirements of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V provisions. For PSD, this will include state determinations of what constitutes Best Available Control Technology (BACT) that affected facilities will be required to install. On November 10, 2010, EPA released guidance and technical information to assist state authorities in issuing permits and determining BACT.
Among the sources likely to be affected by implementation of the PSD permit requirements are new and modified electric generating units of all kinds, but particularly those fired by coal. These sources emit substantially more than EPA's threshold of 100,000 metric tons of CO2 annually: for example, a 500 megawatt (MW) coal-fired baseload power plant would emit on the order of three million metric tons of CO2 annually. The coal mining industry and coal-fired electric utilities face at least half a dozen major regulatory actions over the next few years; industry supporters view these rules collectively as a significant threat to the future of coal. Viewed in this context, the permit requirement is one more nail in what increasingly appears to them as coal's future coffin.
In its new guidance, EPA retains the basic five-step process for determining BACT that it has recommended to state authorities for 20 years. The primary foci of the EPA guidance package are on state discretion in determining BACT and on energy efficiency as the most likely result of a GHG BACT analysis. These foci are evident through EPA's guidance for each of the five steps.
For those looking for bright lines and specific recommendations with respect to GHG BACT technologies, particularly with respect to coal-fired facilities, the released package does not provide them. Indeed, EPA's supplemental "Questions and Answers" release on the guidance seems to stress that it did not draw such conclusions. For example:
Do these tools identify BACT for specific types of industrial facilities? No. Does this guidance say that fuel switching (coal to natural gas) should be selected as BACT for a power plant? No. Does this guidance say that carbon capture and storage (CCS) should be selected as BACT? No.
Likewise, the guidance provides no cost thresholds for permitting authorities to consider in determining the economic impacts of alternatives nor proposes a new approach to selecting BACT for GHG emissions. Instead, the guidance focuses on the discretionary authority that states have in determining BACT—discretion that ensures that BACT will continue to be determined on a case-by-case basis with states differing in what they consider appropriate control measures and what constitutes BACT. Whether industry will find such discretion provides sufficient regulatory certainty to invest billions in new plants remains to be seen.
In short, the EPA GHG guidance is a simple expansion of the five-step BACT process that has been used for two decades to include greenhouse gases. Whether that is an adequate response will be determined by applicants, state authorities, and future EPA regulatory actions under related parts of the act, such as Section 111 (NSPS), to which BACT is linked. |
crs_RL32115 | crs_RL32115_0 | This report emphasizes the role of missiles in SouthAsian security because of their potential use as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. 1172, which condemned the two countries' nuclear testsof May 1998. In 2003, and forperhaps the first period in history, the United States simultaneously enjoys positive relations withboth countries. The key issues for Congress addressed here are whether missile proliferation in South Asia enhances or detracts from regional stability and the role of U.S. policy in promoting such stability,as well as in tension reduction and nonproliferation. Levels of U.S. foreign assistance to India andPakistan, the establishment of aid restrictions, the transfer of conventional weapons platforms(possibly including missile defense systems), the setting of export control parameters andnonproliferation goals, and the maintenance of policy and intelligence oversight of U.S. relationswith India and Pakistan all have a vital congressional facet. Regional Conflict and the U.S. Role
Understanding present-day missile proliferation in South Asia and relevant U.S. policy optionsis aided by a review of the historical setting. (12)
A persistent and oftentimes perplexing aspect of U.S. engagement in the region has been the difficulty of maintaining a more-or-less balanced approach toward two antagonistic countries whilesimultaneously promoting perceived U.S. interests in South Asia. Bilateral Security Dynamics
Debate Over a Regional Nuclear Weapons and Missile Race
Central to an analysis of the meaning of missile proliferation in South Asia are two key questions: First, is a strategic arms race between India and Pakistan underway? Both countries also continue development of long-range nuclear-capable ballisticmissiles, and plan to field cruise missiles with a land-attackcapability. Both India and Pakistan have claimed to be seeking only the nuclear weapons needed for minimum credible deterrence (MCD). (46)
While not a weapon or delivery system, India's satellites contribute to its strategic capabilities. Command and Control. The Pakistani Approach to Missile Defense
With the waiver of the Pressler Amendment because of Pakistan's support for the United States in its war on terrorism, the Indian press has reported that Pakistan has initiated negotiations with theUnited States to purchase a ballistic missile defense system. Key Issues and Options for Congress
Nonproliferation
MTCR-Related Issues. Of critical concern to both Congress and the Administration is a suspected Pakistan-North Korean proliferationrelationship. After September 2001, these concerns became acute. The overt nuclearpostures of India and Pakistan, and U.S.-led antiterrorism efforts centered on Southwest Asia havemade the region's security dynamics a matter of great concern for the United States, wheregovernment officials acknowledge that a stable and thriving South Asia would advance U.S.interests. Foreign Involvement in Pakistan's Missile Program. | This report analyzes the policy implications of missile proliferation in South Asia, providing information on India's and Pakistan's missile programs and their role in regional security. Thereport also provides background on the India-Pakistan conflict and the U.S. role, and reviews theregion's strategic security dynamics. The report concludes with a review of key issues and optionsfor U.S. policy.
The United States has long been concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in South Asia. This concern became acute after May 1998, when both India andPakistan tested nuclear explosive devices. Since that time, both countries have continued testingnuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and both have established command and control authorities tooversee their nuclear arsenals. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since 1947 and havesignificant unsettled territorial disputes. Although the status of weaponization is unclear, aslow-speed arms race appears to be underway on the Asian Subcontinent, and the proliferation ofmissile capabilities in South Asia has been identified as a potentially major threat to regional stabilityand to key U.S. foreign policy goals.
A persistent aspect of U.S. engagement in the region has been the difficulty of maintaining a balanced approach toward two antagonistic countries while simultaneously promoting perceived U.S.interests. During the 1990s, U.S. security policy toward South Asia focused on preventing weaponsproliferation, but the Bush Administration shifted to a more "pragmatic" approach emphasizing"restraint" in this area. For perhaps the first period in history the United States currently enjoyssimultaneously positive relations with both countries.
While relationships between the United States, India, and Pakistan have taken on a positive hue, potential for regional instability persists. The strategic capabilities of India and Pakistan couldprovide a ready catalyst for transforming disputes or terrorist incidents into potentially cataclysmicconfrontations. Both countries also are pursuing the development or acquisition of missile defensesystems. It is unknown at this early stage if missile defenses will offer a degree of stability to theregion or if they will create an imbalance, thus prompting the other country to build more missilesto compensate for the disparity.
Key issues for Congress addressed in this report are the extent to which missile proliferation in South Asia enhances or upsets regional stability and the role of U.S. policy in promoting suchstability, as well as in tension reduction and nonproliferation. Levels of U.S. foreign assistance toIndia and Pakistan, the establishment of aid restrictions, the transfer of conventional weaponsplatforms (possibly including missile defense systems), the setting of export control parameters andnonproliferation goals, and the maintenance of policy and intelligence oversight of U.S. relationswith India and Pakistan constitute additional issues of concern to Congress. This report will beupdated as warranted by events. |
crs_R40831 | crs_R40831_0 | Introduction
Health care reform is at the top of the domestic policy agenda for the 111 th Congress, driven by concerns about the growing ranks of the uninsured and the unsustainable growth in spending on health care and health insurance. Improving access to care and controlling rising costs will require changes to both the financing and delivery of health care. Experts point to a growing body of evidence of the health care system's failure to consistently provide high-quality care to all Americans. The first is to improve patient safety by eliminating medical errors and other adverse events. The second challenge is to eradicate disparities in care. The final challenge is to eliminate unnecessary and ineffective care that compromises quality, drives up costs, and neglects the needs of patients. Health Care Delivery Reform
While primarily focused on health care financing issues, the health reform debate has embraced a number of proposals to address these challenges and improve the delivery of health care services. They include initiatives to encourage individuals to adopt healthier lifestyles, and to change the way that physicians and other providers treat and manage disease. Delivery reform proposals focus on (1) expanding the primary care workforce, (2) encouraging the use of clinical preventive services, and (3) strengthening the role of chronic care management. Drivers of Reform
Health care delivery reform cannot happen unless mechanisms are in place to drive change in the systems of care. Key drivers include performance measurement and the public dissemination of performance information, comparative effectiveness research, adoption of health information technology, and, perhaps most importantly, alignment of payment incentives with high-quality care. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
Congress took one step toward reforming the health care delivery system when it enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ) in February 2009. It also established an interagency advisory panel to help coordinate and support the research. In addition, ARRA incorporated the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, which is intended to promote the widespread adoption of health information technology (HIT) for the electronic sharing of clinical data among hospitals, physicians, and other health care stakeholders. Overview of Report
On September 17, 2009, Senator Harkin introduced a comprehensive health care reform bill entitled the Affordable Health Choices Act ( S. 1679 ). Title II includes provisions related to improving health care quality and service delivery, including strengthening quality measurement. Title III promotes preventive services. Title IV includes provisions to increase the primary care and public health workforce. Title V includes a series of provisions intended to prevent health care fraud and abuse. This report summarizes the workforce, quality, prevention, and other provisions in Titles I, II, III, IV, and VI of the Senate HELP bill, as amended and adopted by the HELP Committee. This report will be updated to reflect future legislative actions. A companion report, CRS Report R40745, Public Health, Workforce, Quality, and Other Provisions in H.R. 3200 , summarizes comparable provisions in the House health reform legislation, American's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009 ( H.R. 3200 ). This legislation was jointly developed by the House Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, and Education and Labor, which share jurisdiction over the federal health statutes. | Health care reform is at the top of the domestic policy agenda for the 111th Congress, driven by concerns about the growing ranks of the uninsured and the unsustainable growth in spending on health care and health insurance. But efforts to improve access to care and control rising health care costs also will require changes to the health care delivery system. Experts point to a growing body of evidence of the health care system's failure to consistently provide high-quality care to all Americans. Major challenges to the delivery of high-quality care include improving patient safety by eliminating medical errors, eradicating disparities in care, reducing the burden of chronic disease, and eliminating unnecessary and ineffective care that compromises quality, drives up costs, and neglects the needs of patients.
The health reform debate has embraced a number of proposals to address these challenges and improve the delivery of health care services. They include initiatives to encourage individuals to adopt healthier lifestyles, and to change the way that physicians and other providers treat and manage disease. Delivery reform proposals focus on expanding the primary care workforce, encouraging the use of clinical preventive services, and strengthening the role of chronic care management. However, health care delivery reform cannot happen unless mechanisms are in place to drive change in the systems of care. Key drivers include performance measurement and the public dissemination of performance information, comparative effectiveness research, adoption of health information technology, and, most importantly, the alignment of payment incentives with high-quality care.
Congress took an important first step toward reforming the health care delivery system when it enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) in February 2009. ARRA included $1.1 billion for comparative effectiveness research and established an interagency advisory panel to help coordinate and support the research. It also incorporated the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, which is intended to promote the widespread adoption of health information technology (HIT) for the electronic sharing of clinical data among hospitals, physicians, and other health care stakeholders.
Both the House and the Senate are now considering health reform legislation. America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009 (H.R. 3200), introduced in the House and approved by the Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, and Education and Labor, includes numerous provisions intended to increase the primary care and public health workforce, promote preventive services, and strengthen quality measurement, among other things. In the Senate, the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee has approved the Affordable Health Choices Act (S. 1679), which addresses health care delivery reform issues such as expanding private health insurance coverage, improving health care quality and strengthening quality measurement, encouraging preventive services, expanding the health care workforce, preventing health care fraud and abuse, and improving access to medical therapies. This report summarizes the workforce, quality, prevention, and other selected provisions in S. 1679, as amended and adopted by the Senate HELP Committee. It will be updated to reflect future legislative actions. A companion product, CRS Report R40745, Public Health, Workforce, Quality, and Other Provisions in H.R. 3200, summarizes comparable provisions in the House health reform legislation, American's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009 (H.R. 3200). |
crs_RL30613 | crs_RL30613_0 | First, on March 26, 2010, a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan , sank in waters disputed by the two Koreas. Nearly 50 South Korean sailors died in the incident. A multinational investigation team led by South Korea determined that the ship was sunk by a North Korean submarine. In the spring and early summer of 2010, the State Department appeared to deem these reports insufficient to place North Korea back on the terrorism list. Possible Implications of Re-Listing North Korea
The Bush Administration's removal of North Korea from the terrorism list in 2008 does not appear to have provided Pyongyang with direct, tangible benefits. Thus, the major impact of a decision to re-list North Korea would likely be symbolic. The 2008 Removal of North Korea from the Terrorism List
On October 11, 2008, the Bush Administration formally removed North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea is to allow a process of disablement of its plutonium nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. North Korea's second obligation is to provide the United States and other members of the six party talks on North Korea's nuclear program with a "complete and correct" declaration of nuclear programs. The removal of North Korea from the terrorism list, however, did not result in an early conclusion of the February 2007 six party nuclear agreement, contrary to the expectations of the Bush Administration. The North Korean government and the Bush Administration soon conflicted over the content of the October 2008 agreement on verification, particularly over whether it allowed inspectors to take samples of nuclear materials from the Yongbyon installations. The non-North Korea five parties to the talks (the United States, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia) also had not completed the delivery of 1 million tons of heavy oil that they had promised in the February 2007 agreement. Background
U.S.-North Korean Negotiations
Three Diplomatic Stages over the Terrorism List
The issue of North Korea's inclusion on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism has been in U.S.-North Korean diplomacy since 2000, but three stages are of particular importance: the first in 2000 in Clinton Administration-North Korean negotiations; the second during the 2003-2004 Six Party negotiations over the North Korean nuclear issue; and the third in the diplomacy around the Six Party nuclear agreement of February 2007. Referencing the U.S. commitments in the February 2007 nuclear agreement to begin the process of removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and the Trading with the Enemy Act, the statement read that "the United States will fulfill its commitments to the DPRK in parallel with the DPRK's actions based on consensus reached at the meetings on the working group on normalization of DPRK-U.S. The second type of reports, coming from several diverse sources, asserts that North Korea has provided arms and possibly training to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and that it maintains an intimate relationship with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Three vessels were intercepted, which contained North Korean weapons that Western intelligence and Israeli intelligence officials and non-government experts believe were bound for Hezbollah and Hamas, terrorist groups on the official U.S. list of international terrorist organizations. Moreover, the reported arms supply link between North Korea and the Tamil Tigers appears to be one of long duration. North Korea first tested the missile in 1993. The North Korea Sanctions and Diplomatic Nonrecognition Act of 2010. Condemns and demands an apology from North Korea for the sinking of the Cheonan. | Whether North Korea should be included on the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting countries has been a major issue in U.S.-North Korean diplomacy since 2000, particularly in connection with negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program. North Korea demanded that the Clinton and Bush Administrations remove it from the terrorism support list. On October 11, 2008, the Bush Administration removed North Korea from the terrorism list.
This move was one of the measures the Bush Administration took to implement a nuclear agreement that it negotiated with North Korea in September 2007 and finalized details of in April 2008. The agreement was reached under the format of the six party talks, which involve the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. The President also announced that he was immediately lifting sanctions on North Korea under the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act. North Korea's obligations under this nuclear agreement were to allow the disabling of its plutonium facility at Yongbyon and present to the United States and other government in the six party talks a declaration of its nuclear programs. North Korea submitted its declaration in June 2008.
The removal of North Korea from the terrorism list, however, did not result in an early conclusion of the February 2007 six party nuclear agreement. The North Korean government and the Bush Administration disagreed over the content of an October 2008 agreement on verification, particularly over whether it allowed inspectors to take samples of nuclear materials from the Yongbyon installations. The other parties to the talks also had not completed the delivery of 1 million tons of heavy oil that they had promised in the February 2007 agreement. Against this backdrop, along with an apparent stroke suffered by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, the six party process broke down.
In the months after the breakdown of the talks, North Korea took a series of actions that have led to calls for its reinstatement on the terrorism list. In April 2009, North Korea launched devices suspected of being long-range missiles. In May 2009, North Korea tested a nuclear device. In March 2010, a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, sank in waters disputed by the two Koreas. Nearly 50 South Korean sailors died in the incident. A multinational investigation team led by South Korea determined that the ship was sunk by a North Korean submarine. In June 2010, the State Department determined that the Cheonan sinking was not an act of terrorism and thus by itself was an insufficient reason for placing North Korea back on the terrorism list.
Meanwhile, reports in 2009 and 2010 from French, Japanese, South Korean, and Israeli sources described North Korean programs to provide arms and training to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, two groups on the U.S. list of international terrorist organizations. Large quantities of North Korean arms bound for Iran, intercepted in 2009, contained weapons that Iran supplies heavily to Hezbollah and Hamas. Moreover, a large body of reports describe a long-standing, collaborative relationship between North Korea and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
This report describes the rationales for including North Korea on the terrorism list from 1987-2008, for North Korea's delisting in 2008, and the debate in 2010 over whether to re-list North Korea. The major impact of a decision to return North Korea to the list would likely be symbolic, because removing North Korea from the list does not appear to have provided Pyongyang with direct, tangible benefits. |
crs_RL33691 | crs_RL33691_0 | Introduction
The animal sector of agriculture has undergone major changes in the last several decades, a fact that has drawn the attention of policymakers and the public. In particular, organizational changes within the industry to enhance economic efficiency have resulted in larger confined production facilities that often are geographically concentrated. Increased facility size and regional concentration of livestock and poultry operations have, in turn, given rise to concerns over the management of animal wastes from these facilities and potential impacts on environmental quality, public health and welfare. Federal environmental law does not regulate all agricultural activities. Still, certain large animal feeding operations (AFOs) where animals are kept and raised in confinement are subject to environmental regulation. Some livestock operations also may be subject to requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, the Superfund law) and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). The issue of applicability of these laws to livestock and poultry operations—especially CERCLA and EPCRA—has been controversial and has drawn congressional attention. 2997 and S. 1729 ). §§11001-11050) have reporting requirements that are triggered when specified quantities of certain substances are released to the environment. In addition to reporting requirements, CERCLA includes provisions authorizing federal cleanup of releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants that may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare (§104), and imposing strict liability for cleanup and damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources resulting from releases of hazardous substances (§107). The citizen suit provisions have been used to sue poultry producers and swine operations for violations of the laws. In two cases, environmental advocates claimed that AFO operators had failed to report ammonia emissions, putting them in violation of CERCLA and EPCRA. In both cases, federal courts supported broad interpretation of key terms defining applicability of the laws' reporting requirements to livestock operations. The ruling was not appealed. EPA was not a party in either of these lawsuits. Three other cases in federal courts, while they did not include reporting violations, also have drawn attention, in part because they raised the question of whether animal wastes that contain phosphorus are hazardous substances that can create cleanup and natural resource injury liability under CERCLA. The exemption would apply to releases to the air from manure, digestive emissions, and urea, including animal waste mixed with bedding, compost, and other specified materials. The court approved the government's request in October 2010. Congressional Interest
The court cases testing the applicability of CERCLA and EPCRA to poultry and livestock operations led to congressional interest in these issues. Also in November 2005, legislation was introduced in the 109 th Congress to amend CERCLA to clarify that manure is not a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant under that act and that CERCLA's notification requirements would not apply to releases of manure ( H.R. Enacting an exemption would severely hamper the ability of government to appropriately respond to releases of hazardous substances and pollution caused by an animal agriculture operation, they argued. | The animal sector of agriculture has undergone major changes in the last several decades: organizational changes within the industry to enhance economic efficiency have resulted in larger confined production facilities that often are geographically concentrated. These changes, in turn, have given rise to concerns over the management of animal wastes and potential impacts on environmental quality.
Federal environmental law does not regulate all agricultural activities, but certain large animal feeding operations (AFOs) where animals are housed and raised in confinement are subject to regulation. The issue of applicability of these laws to livestock and poultry operations—especially the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, the Superfund law) and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)—has been controversial and has drawn congressional attention.
Both CERCLA and EPCRA have reporting requirements that are triggered when specified quantities of certain substances are released to the environment. In addition, CERCLA authorizes federal cleanup of releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants and imposes strict liability for cleanup and injuries to natural resources from releases of hazardous substances.
CERCLA and EPCRA include citizen suit provisions that have been used to sue poultry producers and swine operations for violations of those laws. In two cases, environmental advocates claimed that AFO operators had failed to report ammonia emissions, in violation of CERCLA and EPCRA. In both cases, federal courts supported broad interpretation of key terms defining applicability of the laws' reporting requirements. Three other cases not dealing with reporting violations also have attracted attention, in part because of questions of whether animal wastes contain hazardous substances that can create cleanup and natural resource damage liability under CERCLA.
In 2008, EPA issued a rule to exempt animal waste emissions to the air from most CERCLA and EPCRA reporting requirements. Legal challenges to the rule followed. In 2010, a federal court approved the government's request to voluntarily remand the rule to EPA for reconsideration and possible modification, but the agency has not yet proposed a new or revised rule or taken other action following the remand. Litigation challenging the exemption rule was restarted in 2015.
The lawsuits testing the applicability of CERCLA and EPCRA to poultry and livestock operations and potential changes by EPA to the 2008 exemption rule have led to congressional interest in these issues. In the 112th Congress, legislation was introduced that would amend CERCLA to clarify that manure is not a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant under that act and that the notification requirements of both laws would not apply to releases of manure (H.R. 2997 and S. 1729). Proponents argued that Congress did not intend that either of these laws apply to agriculture and that enforcement and regulatory mechanisms under other laws are adequate to address environmental releases from animal agriculture. Opponents respond that enacting an exemption would severely hamper the ability of government and citizens to know about and respond to releases of hazardous substances caused by an animal agriculture operation. Similar legislation has not been introduced subsequently. |
crs_R44083 | crs_R44083_0 | Introduction
The Constitution divides the responsibility for populating the top positions in the federal government between the President and the Senate. The appointments clause (Article II, Section 2) empowers the President to nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint the principal officers of the United States, as well as some subordinate officers. The report begins by explaining the three distinct stages that comprise the advice and consent process, which is the means through which most of these positions are filled. Finally, it discusses certain types of statutory provisions that Congress has applied selectively to specific advice and consent positions in the executive branch: qualifications for officeholders, fixed terms of office, limitations on presidential removal, appointment and removal of chairs, and holdover provisions. Selection, Clearance, and Nomination
In the first stage, the White House selects and clears a prospective appointee before sending the formal nomination to the Senate. Much of the Senate confirmation process occurs at the committee level. Once the appointee is given the commission and sworn in, he or she has full authority to carry out the responsibilities of the office. Other Temporary Appointments
As just discussed, the Constitution authorizes the President to fill vacant PAS positions on a temporary basis through recess appointments. Under the Vacancies Act, when an executive agency position requiring confirmation becomes vacant, it may be filled temporarily in one of three ways:
1. the first assistant to such a position may automatically assume the functions and duties of the office; 2. the President may direct an officer in any agency who is occupying a position requiring Senate confirmation to perform those tasks; or 3. the President may select any officer or employee of the subject agency who is occupying a position for which the rate of pay is equal to or greater than the minimum rate of pay at the GS-15 level and who has been with the agency for at least 90 of the preceding 365 days. Although these types of provisions may be found in the establishing statutes for a variety of positions, they are particularly common for members of regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions. In some cases, these types of provisions have influenced the dynamics of the Senate confirmation process discussed above. They also may be factored into the selection and vetting process in the Administration. Holdover Provisions
Some statutes that establish fixed terms for particular positions also permit an incumbent to remain in office past the end of her or his term without additional appointment or confirmation. In some cases, such a "holdover" provision allows an official to continue serving until he or she is replaced. | The Constitution divides the responsibility for populating the top positions in the executive branch of the federal government between the President and the Senate. Article II, Section 2 empowers the President to nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint the principal officers of the United States, as well as some subordinate officers.
These positions are generally filled through the advice and consent process, which can be divided into three stages:
First, the White House selects and clears a prospective appointee before sending a formal nomination to the Senate. Second, the Senate determines whether to confirm a nomination. For most nominations, much of this process occurs at the committee level. Third, the confirmed nominee is given a commission and sworn into office, after which he or she has full authority to carry out the duties of the office.
The President may also be able to fill vacancies in advice and consent positions in the executive branch temporarily through other means. If circumstances permit and conditions are met, the President could choose to give a recess appointment to an individual. Such an appointment would last until the end of the next session of the Senate. Alternatively, in some cases, the President may be able to designate an official to serve in a vacant position on a temporary basis under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act or under statutory authority specific to the position.
Congress has selectively included certain types of statutory provisions when establishing specific executive branch positions. These provisions include those that require appointees to have specified qualifications, that set fixed terms of office, that limit the circumstances under which the President can remove an officeholder, that specify how the chair of a collegial board or commission will be selected and may be removed, and that allow an incumbent to remain in office past the end of a term until a successor is appointed (hold over). Although these types of provisions may be found in the establishing statutes for a variety of positions, they are particularly common for members of regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions. In some cases, these types of provisions have influenced the dynamics of the Senate confirmation process. They also may be factored into the selection and vetting process in the Administration. |
crs_RL32114 | crs_RL32114_0 | Officials in government and industry now say that cybercrime and cyberattack services available for hire from criminal organizations are a growing threat to national security as well as to the U.S. economy. Some experts argue that the government of Estonia may have already experienced this type of cyberattack directed against their systems and websites in April, 2007. This report explores the possible connections between cybercriminals and terrorist groups that want to damage the U.S. economy or national security interests. The report also examines the effects of a coordinated cyberattack against the U.S. critical infrastructure, including use of cybercrime tools that could possibly take advantage of openly-publicized cyber vulnerabilities. However, in the near future, security experts believe that attackers may use new botnet architectures that are more sophisticated, and more difficult to detect and trace. Eventually, NATO and the United States sent computer security experts to Estonia to help recover from the attacks, and to analyze the methods used and attempt to determine the source of the attacks. Cybercriminals have made alliances with drug traffickers in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and elsewhere where illegal drug funds or other profitable activities such as credit card theft, are used to support terrorist groups. While describing possible offensive tactics for military cyber operations, DOD officials reportedly stated that the U.S. could confuse enemies by using cyberattack to open floodgates, control traffic lights, or scramble the banking systems in other countries. Why Cyberattacks Are Successful
Networked computers with exposed vulnerabilities may be disrupted or taken over by a hacker, or by automated malicious code. Issues for Congress
Policy issues for cybercrime and cyberterrorism include a need for the following:
increase awareness about changing threats due to the growing technical skills of extremists and terrorist groups; develop more accurate methods for measuring the effects of cybercrime; help to determine appropriate responses by DOD to a cyberattack; examine the incentives for achieving the goals of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace; search for ways to improve the security of commercial software products; explore ways to increase security education and awareness for businesses and home PC users; and find ways for private industry and government to coordinate to protect against cyberattack. Could terrorist groups find it advantageous to hire a cybercrime botnet tailored to attack specific targets, possibly including the civilian critical infrastructure of Western nations? | Cybercrime is becoming more organized and established as a transnational business. High technology online skills are now available for rent to a variety of customers, possibly including nation states, or individuals and groups that could secretly represent terrorist groups. The increased use of automated attack tools by cybercriminals has overwhelmed some current methodologies used for tracking Internet cyberattacks, and vulnerabilities of the U.S. critical infrastructure, which are acknowledged openly in publications, could possibly attract cyberattacks to extort money, or damage the U.S. economy to affect national security.
In April and May 2007, NATO and the United States sent computer security experts to Estonia to help that nation recover from cyberattacks directed against government computer systems, and to analyze the methods used and determine the source of the attacks. (See Larry Greenemeier, "Estonian Attacks Raise Concern Over Cyber 'Nuclear Winter,'" Information Week, May 24, 2007, at http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=199701774.) Some security experts suspect that political protestors may have rented the services of cybercriminals, possibly a large network of infected PCs, called a "botnet," to help disrupt the computer systems of the Estonian government. DOD officials have also indicated that similar cyberattacks from individuals and countries targeting economic, political, and military organizations may increase in the future. (See Jeanne Meserve, "Official: International Hackers Going After U.S. Networks," CNN.com, October 19, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/10/19/cyber.threats/index.html. and Sebastian Sprenger, "Maj. Gen. Lord Is a Groundbreaker," Federal Computer Week, October 15, 2007, vol. 21, no. 34, p. 44.)
Cybercriminals have reportedly made alliances with drug traffickers in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and elsewhere where profitable illegal activities are used to support terrorist groups. In addition, designs for cybercrime botnets are becoming more sophisticated, and future botnet architectures may be more resistant to computer security countermeasures. (See Tom Espiner, "Security Expert: Storm Botnet 'Services' Could Be Sold," CnetNews.com, October 16, 2007, http://www.news.com/Security-expert-Storm-botnet-services-could-be-sold/2100-7349_3-6213781.html.)
This report discusses options now open to nation states, extremists, or terrorist groups for obtaining malicious technical services from cybercriminals to meet political or military objectives, and describes the possible effects of a coordinated cyberattack against the U.S. critical infrastructure. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41731 | crs_R41731_0 | Whereas most U.S. security efforts in Central America since the 1990s have focused on preventing illicit narcotics from reaching the United States, CARSI is designed to address a broader array of security concerns. Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated nearly $1.2 billion for the seven nations of Central America through the Mérida Initiative and CARSI. Underlying Societal Conditions
The social fabric in many Central American countries has been tattered by persistent poverty, inequality, and unemployment, with few opportunities available for growing youth populations. With limited opportunities at home, many Central Americans have emigrated abroad. Structural Weaknesses in Governance
In recent years, much has been written about the governance problems that have made many Central American countries susceptible to the influence of drug traffickers and other criminal elements and unable to guarantee citizen security. This is partially a result of several countries' failures to fully implement post-conflict institutional reforms in the 1990s. Criminal groups' efforts to influence public officials and elections, particularly at the local level, have also contributed to corruption. In 2015, Guatemala's Attorney General, with support from the U.N. Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), uncovered massive corruption in the customs and social security systems. Recognizing the challenging nature of institutional reform, some governments have sought outside assistance. It is also critical, they argue, for intervention efforts to focus on strengthening families of at-risk youth. In October 2007, the Bush Administration requested funding for a security assistance package designed to support Mexico and the countries of Central America in their fight against organized crime, to improve communication among the various law enforcement agencies, and to support the institutional reforms necessary to ensure the long-term enforcement of the rule of law and protection of civil and human rights. As currently formulated, CARSI provides the seven nations of the isthmus with equipment, training, and technical assistance to support immediate law enforcement operations. It is also designed to strengthen the long-term capacities of Central American governments to address security challenges and the underlying conditions that contribute to them. The Obama Administration requested $286.5 million for CARSI in FY2016 as part of a broader $1 billion request to implement a new "U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America." Although the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( H.R. 2029 ) would not fully fund the Administration's request for Central America, it would provide $750 million for the region, including $348.5 million for CARSI (see Table 3 ). The bill would also place a number of conditions on the assistance, requiring the State Department to withhold 75% of the funds for the central governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras until the Secretary of State certifies that those governments are taking effective steps to improve border security, combat corruption, increase revenues, and address human rights concerns, among other actions. Programs80
Through CARSI, the United States funds a variety of activities designed to support U.S. and Central American security objectives. As previously noted, the U.S. government has set forth five broad goals for CARSI: (1) create safe streets for the citizens of the region; (2) disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband to, within, and among the nations of Central America; (3) support the development of strong, capable, and accountable Central American governments; (4) establish effective state presence, services, and security in communities at risk; and (5) foster enhanced levels of coordination and cooperation among the nations of the region, other international partners, and donors to combat regional security threats. Many argue that while deportations in the 1990s appear to have contributed to the spread of gang violence in Central America, recent deportations have had a minimal effect on security conditions in the region. Outlook
The seven nations of Central America face significant security challenges. Well-financed and heavily armed criminal threats, fragile political and judicial systems, and persistent social hardships such as poverty and unemployment contribute to widespread insecurity. From FY2008 to FY2015, Congress appropriated nearly $1.2 billion under what is now known as the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) to support security efforts in the region. Absent such efforts, conditions are likely to remain poor in several Central American countries, contributing to periodic instability that—as demonstrated by the increasing number of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees from the region arriving at the U.S. border—is likely to affect the United States. | Central America faces significant security challenges. Criminal threats, fragile political and judicial systems, and social hardships such as poverty and unemployment contribute to widespread insecurity in the region. Consequently, improving security conditions in these countries is a difficult, multifaceted endeavor. Since U.S. drug demand contributes to regional security challenges and the consequences of citizen insecurity in Central America are potentially far-reaching—as demonstrated by the increasing number of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees arriving at the U.S. border—the United States is collaborating with countries in the region to implement and refine security efforts.
Criminal Threats
Well-financed drug trafficking organizations, gangs, smugglers, and other criminal groups are threating citizen security and the rule of law in Central America. The isthmus has become a major transshipment point for illicit drugs as counternarcotics efforts in Colombia and Mexico have disrupted other trafficking routes to the United States. At the same time, clashes between street gangs have paralyzed cities and intensified violence. Several Central American countries now have homicide rates that are among the highest in the world. The resulting desperation has created opportunities for smugglers and traffickers to prey on Central Americans attempting to travel, or to send their children, to the United States.
Social and Political Factors
Throughout Central America, underlying social conditions and structural weaknesses in governance inhibit efforts to improve security. Persistent poverty, inequality, and unemployment leave large portions of the population susceptible to crime. Given the limited opportunities other than emigration available to the expanding youth populations in Central America, young people are particularly vulnerable. The failure to fully implement post-conflict institutional reforms that were initiated in several countries in the 1990s has left police, prisons, and judicial systems weak and susceptible to corruption. Recent scandals that have led to the resignations of the president of Guatemala and senior officials in Honduras demonstrate the extent to which criminality has infiltrated state institutions.
Central American Security Policies
Central American governments have attempted to improve security conditions in a variety of ways. The Honduran government has taken a hardline approach to crime, deploying military forces to carry out policing functions. The Salvadoran government is pursuing similar policies after the truce it brokered between criminal gangs broke down. The Guatemalan government has also embraced a larger role for the military in public security while simultaneously working with the U.N.-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) to strengthen its investigative and prosecutorial capacities and root out corruption. Other Central American governments have emphasized modern policing strategies and prevention activities, such as programs that focus on strengthening families of at-risk youth. Recognizing the transnational nature of the threats they face, Central American governments have also sought to improve regional security cooperation.
U.S. Assistance
Since FY2008, the U.S. government has supported security efforts in Central America through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). The initiative provides the seven nations of the isthmus with equipment, training, and technical assistance to support immediate law enforcement operations. CARSI is also designed to strengthen the long-term capacities of Central American governments to address security challenges and the underlying social and political factors that contribute to them. Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated nearly $1.2 billion for Central America through CARSI. As of the end of FY2015, $457 million of the funds allocated to CARSI had been expended.
The Obama Administration requested $286.5 million for CARSI in FY2016 as part of a broader $1 billion request to support a new "U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America." Although the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2029) would not fully fund the Administration's request for Central America, it would provide $750 million for the region, including $348.5 million for CARSI. The bill would also place a number of conditions on the assistance, requiring governments in the region to take steps to improve border security, combat corruption, increase revenues, and address human rights concerns, among other actions. |
crs_R40601 | crs_R40601_0 | Introduction
As the 80 million baby boomers approach retirement, many are concerned they will not have sufficient savings to sustain their standard of living throughout retirement. Few, however, have focused on another risk to their retirement security—the potential cost of financing often expensive long-term care services. The cost of long-term services and supports (LTSS) for the majority of older Americans may far exceed their financial resources in the future. Private long-term care insurance (LTCI) is available to provide some financial protection for persons against the risk of the potentially high cost of LTSS. To date, however, only about 1 in 10 individuals aged 55 and older own a LTCI policy. This report discusses
the role of LTCI in financing LTSS and current trends in the LTCI industry; factors affecting the demand for LTCI, including cost and complexity of the product and adequacy of consumer protections; and legislative options available to improve affordability, strengthen consumer protections, and expand consumer education. In 2010, about 16% of LTSS spending was paid out-of-pocket. Long-Term Care Insurance Industry Trends
The private LTCI market has undergone significant changes in the past three decades. The employer-sponsored market has grown as a share of total LTCI sales and the overall market has become more concentrated in terms of the number of companies selling the product. Further, a number of newer product lines have been introduced that combine LTCI with other retirement and life-insurance products. There are currently between 7 million to 9 million Americans with an active LTCI policy (often called "in-force"). Over the past decade, the number of companies selling LTCI has declined significantly. Since 2010, a number of well-known companies have exited the LTCI market. In addition, increased concerns have arisen about the adequacy of consumer protections for LTCI as a result of inconsistencies in LTCI laws and regulations across the states. More recently, adverse publicity about potential problems with premium stability, claims denials by LTCI companies, and heightened concerns about the future solvency of LTCI companies in the current economic environment have further dampened demand. Cost and Complexity of Long-Term Care Insurance
The cost of LTCI has been cited as a major deterrent to purchasing the product. Many of the laws and regulations that have been established by federal and state governments attempt to address these issues. Legislative proposals intended to increase the demand for private LTCI policies, and overall participation rates, may include proposals to
increase tax incentives to lower the after-tax cost of policies, improve consumer protections and increase consumer confidence in the product, and expand consumer education. | As the 80 million baby boomers approach retirement, many are concerned they will not have sufficient savings to sustain their standard of living in retirement. Few, however, may be focused on another risk to their retirement security—the potential cost of financing often expensive long-term care services and supports (LTSS). LTSS include help with either functional or cognitive impairment and generally include assistance with activities such as bathing, eating, and dressing. For the majority of older Americans, the cost of obtaining paid help for these services may far exceed their financial resources in the future.
Private long-term care insurance (LTCI) is available to provide some financial protection for persons against the risk of the potentially high cost of LTSS. In 2010, about 6% of LTSS spending was paid by LTCI. This low rate of financing reflects relatively low demand for LTCI over the past few decades. Moreover, most policy owners have not yet reached the age where they may need services.
In 2010, between 7 million to 9 million Americans owned a private LTCI policy, with about 11% of the population aged 55 and older covered by a policy. A number of factors have adversely affected the demand for LTCI. The cost and complexity of LTCI policies have been cited as major deterrents to purchasing LTCI. In addition, increased concerns have arisen about the adequacy of consumer protections for LTCI as a result of inconsistencies in LTCI laws and regulations across the states. More recently, adverse publicity about premium increases and heightened concerns about the future solvency of LTCI insurers in the current economic environment have further dampened demand, prompting state regulators to re-evaluate current regulations and laws governing LTCI.
The private LTCI market has undergone significant changes in the past three decades. The employer-sponsored market has grown as a share of total LTCI sales and the overall market has become more concentrated in terms of the number of companies selling the product. A number of newer product lines have been introduced that combine LTCI with other products, such as retirement annuities and life-insurance products.
To address these issues, the 113th Congress may consider a number of legislative options to increase participation in the voluntary LTCI market. These may include proposals to
increase tax incentives to lower the after-tax cost of policies, improve consumer protections to boost consumer confidence in the product, and expand consumer education.
This report discusses the role of LTCI in financing LTSS and current trends in the LTCI industry; factors affecting the demand for LTCI, including cost and complexity of the product and adequacy of consumer protections; and legislative options available to address these issues. |
crs_R45221 | crs_R45221_0 | U.S. capital markets are considered the deepest and most liquid in the world. To address some of the trends mentioned above, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act; P.L. 112-106 ; see text box below), which established a number of new options for expanding capital access especially for smaller companies. In response, the 115 th Congress has considered many proposals to boost capital markets, including S. 488, a capital formation package that consists of 32 titles that have mostly already passed the House with bipartisan support as standalone bills. Originally a relatively narrow bill, S. 488 was passed by the Senate before being amended significantly and passed by the House. The package has been referred to as JOBS Act 3.0, taking into account the initial JOBS Act in 2012 and the financial services provisions signed into law as part of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (P.L. 114-94; parts of which are referred to as JOBS Act 2.0). Raising Capital Through Securities Offerings
As the principal regulator of U.S. capital markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that offers and sales of securities—whether debt or equity—either be registered with the SEC or be undertaken with an exemption from registration. Registered offerings, often called public offerings , are available to all types of investors and are not limited in the amount of funds that can be raised or resold. By contrast, securities offerings that are exempt from SEC registration are referred to as private offerings , private placements , or unregistered offerings . Compliance Costs. Regulation A facilitates capital access for small to medium-sized companies. This is designed to help investors make informed investment decisions. Capital Formation and Investor Protection
The policy debate surrounding efforts to promote capital access illustrates the perceived tradeoffs between investor protection and capital formation, two of the SEC's statutory mandates. Expanding capital access promotes capital formation and arguably "democratizes" capital markets by allowing for greater access to investment opportunities for more investors. Investor protection is considered to be important for healthy and efficient capital markets because some research suggests that investors would be more willing to provide capital, and even at a lower cost, if they have faith in the integrity and transparency of the underlying markets. At the same time, the reduced disclosure may expose retail investors of limited financial means to additional risks if they are not aware of key risk factors prior to making investment decisions (see " Investor Access to Private Offerings " for a discussion of "accredited investors"). The public and private offering dichotomy started to blur following the JOBS Act, offering a more scaled regulatory approach. Reflecting the same consideration for companies of different sizes and needs, the 115 th Congress is considering a number of legislative proposals to further expand this scaled approach, building on existing JOBS Act measures. 111-203 ), among others. The following sections analyze several of these proposals. Expansion of "IPO On-Ramp"—Emerging Growth Company Status
As noted previously, to address the decline in the number of IPOs over the last two decades and to reduce barriers preventing smaller companies from accessing public offerings, the bipartisan JOBS Act of 2012 created a scaled-down alternative to standard IPOs for smaller companies that meet the criteria to be deemed emerging growth company (EGC) issuers. Disclosure Requirements
SEC registration and disclosure are at the core of securities regulation. Different levels of filings and disclosures are required for both public and private offerings. Disclosure Costs and Readability
Public offerings generally face more rigorous and costly disclosure requirements relative to private offerings. Current Congressional and SEC Actions
Several current legislative proposals and agency actions would ease disclosures. However, concerns persist that smaller companies face difficulties accessing capital. One approach to expanding capital access for private offerings is to expand investor availability. By allowing more companies to use Regulation A+, it would enhance capital formation. | U.S. capital markets are the largest and considered to be the most efficient in the world. Companies rely heavily on capital access to fund growth and create jobs. As the principal regulator of U.S. capital markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that offers and sales of securities either be registered with the SEC or be undertaken with an exemption from registration. Registered securities offerings, often called public offerings, are available to all types of investors and have more rigorous disclosure requirements. By contrast, securities offerings that are exempt from SEC registration are referred to as private offerings and are mainly available to more sophisticated investors.
Some policymakers have concluded that changes in market trends require updated regulations governing capital access. Specifically, the number of publicly listed U.S. companies has declined by half over the last two decades, and small- to medium-sized companies are said to have more difficulty accessing capital relative to larger companies. Additionally, new capital access tools not previously part of the SEC regulatory regime, such as crowdfunding and initial coin offerings, have emerged. These new tools are especially helpful for small businesses and startups.
The bipartisan Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act; P.L. 112-106) scaled regulation for smaller companies and reduced regulations in general for certain types of capital formation. It established a number of new options to expand capital access through both public and private offerings, including a new provision for crowdfunding. Parts of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (JOBS Act 2.0; P.L. 114-94) provided additional relief. Following the JOBS Act, the public and private offering dichotomy has started to blur, and securities regulation has become increasingly tailored to suit companies of different sizes and with different needs.
However, concerns over capital formation have persisted, given that the number of IPOs remained at far below long-term average levels post-JOBS Act and smaller businesses continue to face capital access pressure. To address these concerns, Congress has considered numerous legislative proposals to further expand the scaled approach, with some proposals building on existing JOBS Act provisions. The most notable of these proposals is S. 488, a capital formation package referred to as JOBS Act 3.0. Originally a relatively narrow bill, S. 488 was passed by the Senate and then was amended significantly and passed by the House in a 406-4 vote on July 17, 2018. The package includes 32 titles, many of which have previously passed the House with bipartisan support as standalone bills.
The policy debate surrounding capital formation proposals often focuses on expanding capital access and protecting investors, two of the SEC's core missions. Expanding capital access promotes capital formation and allows for greater access of investment opportunities for more investors. Investor protection is considered to be important for healthy and efficient capital markets because many investors would be more willing to provide capital, and even at a lower cost, if they could expect enforceable contracts for their investments through a transparent process. At times, expanding capital access can come at the expense of investor protection. For example, proposals that reduce the registration and disclosures that a company must make can decrease the company's compliance costs and increase the speed and efficiency of capital formation. But the reduced disclosures may expose a company's investors to additional risks if they are not receiving information that is important to making informed investment decisions.
This report analyzes legislative proposals that would generally affect the terms and amounts of capital provided to companies by investors. It analyzes a number of current legislative proposals and agency actions to expand both public and private securities offerings through amendments to program design, investor access, and disclosure requirements, among other provisions. |
crs_R42820 | crs_R42820_0 | Introduction
Gambling, once widely outlawed, is now a heavily regulated, taxed activity that is legal in some form in all states except Hawaii and Utah. While state governments have the main responsibility for overseeing gambling, Congress historically has played a significant role in shaping the industry. The Evolution of Remote Gambling
Like so many other industries, the gambling industry has been transformed by developments in computing and telecommunications. In 2003, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) warned media outlets that running advertisements for gambling websites could violate the Wire Act. In 2006, partly in response to the recommendations of a congressionally created commission, Congress passed the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA; P.L. 109-347 ). The law bars gambling-related businesses from accepting payment that is outlawed by state or federal statutes. However, UIGEA does not outlaw any specific types of gambling over the Internet, and allows states and tribes to continue or initiate Internet gambling within their borders if they apply certain safeguards. While UIGEA included exceptions for intrastate online betting such as horse racing, "fantasy" sports, and online lotteries, it did not clarify the scope of older laws that DOJ has used to prosecute Internet gambling, such as the Wire Act. A number of states and tribes have taken advantage of the DOJ memo to allow online betting on horse races and Internet lotteries. Georgia and Illinois already sell lottery tickets online, and several others have considered whether to offer online lottery sales, among them New Jersey and Florida. Interest groups and gaming companies are at odds over remote gambling. These interests formed the Coalition for Consumer and Online Protection in 2014. Aligned against them are others, including most prominently the Coalition to Stop Internet Gambling. Opponents of legislation to expand remote gaming cite the potential for an increase in problem gambling if the ease of online gambling encourages even more people to gamble. That legislation would have imposed a license fee for online gambling operations equal to 2% of all funds deposited by customers into special accounts that could be used for online wagering, and it would have given states and tribes the option of accepting from licensees, on a monthly basis, an online gambling fee "equal to 6 percent of all deposited funds deposited by customers residing in each State or area subject to the jurisdiction of an Indian tribal government." The draft called for the establishment of a new regulatory body, the Office of Online Poker Oversight in the Department of Commerce. In the 113 th Congress, the Restoration of America's Wire Act ( S. 2159 and H.R. 4301 ), introduced by Senator Lindsey Graham and a companion bill by Representative Jason Chaffetz, would amend the Wire Act to prohibit all forms of Internet gambling in the United States, including in the three states where online gambling has already been licensed and regulated. 2282 ), which would create an Office of Internet Gambling Oversight (OIGO) in the Department of the Treasury to oversee state and tribal agencies that license and regulate online gambling operators. States began to legalize bingo games in the 1930s, and Nevada legalized casino gambling in 1931. | Gambling, once widely outlawed, is now a regulated, taxed activity that is legal in some form—bingo, card games, slot machines, state-run lotteries, casinos, and even online—in all but two states. Like so many other industries, the gambling industry is being transformed by technology that has begun to shift patronage from casinos, bingo halls, or stores selling lottery tickets to desktop computers and tablets connected to the Internet and to mobile devices that may communicate by telephone or direct satellite links. This report discusses remote gambling and the likely implications for the broader gambling industry.
State governments have the main responsibility for overseeing gambling, but Congress historically has played a key role in shaping the industry. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA; P.L. 109-347) of 2006 prevents payments to illegal gambling-related businesses, but does not outlaw all forms of remote gambling. It allows states and Indian tribes to offer remote gambling within their territory if certain conditions are met. A majority of states allow Internet betting on horse racing, and a few now permit Internet lottery ticket games. A number of Indian tribes and gaming companies have created entities to develop remote gambling, and seem likely to expand them rapidly if the legal issues are clarified.
Another major development was the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) clarification of the scope of long-standing laws it has used to prosecute Internet gambling, including the 1961 Wire Act. In December 2011, a DOJ interpretation of the Wire Act authorized states to allow online gambling, except for sports betting. Since then, Delaware, New Jersey, and Nevada have implemented online gambling programs within their borders. Several more states are considering whether to legalize online gambling, and some have laws that expressly prohibit online gaming.
Several of the larger casino operators favor expanded remote gambling. Proponents have formed the Coalition for Consumer and Online Protection, which asserts the need for comprehensive national regulation and points to anticipated federal revenue from taxes and registration fees generated by authorized remote gambling sites. In the 113th Congress, bills have been introduced that would allow and tax remote gaming nationwide, and create a new federal department to oversee online gambling, with proposals for either an Office of Internet Poker Oversight in the Department of Commerce or an Office of Internet Gambling Oversight in the Department of the Treasury. An opposing group that also includes prominent casino owners, the Coalition to Stop Internet Gambling, supports the Restoration of America's Wire Act (S. 2159 and H.R. 4301), which would expressly prohibit all online gambling in the United States. Opponents are concerned that a national online gaming market could draw customers away from traditional casino operations, and that remote gambling could result in increased fraud and money laundering. Congress also faces consideration of the balance of federal and state regulation and the possible social costs of expanded gaming, including problem gambling. |
crs_R41682 | crs_R41682_0 | President William J. Clinton signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but stated that he would not transmit it to the Senate requesting its advice and consent due to a number of U.S. concerns, primarily the potential for the ICC to assert jurisdiction over U.S. officials and members of the U.S. Armed Forces, even if the United States was not a Party to the Rome Statute. On August 2, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002 (ASPA). In November 2009, the United States for the first time attended a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) of the International Criminal Court as an observer. At the November ASP meeting, Ambassador Rapp stated that the United States would also participate in the ICC Review Conference scheduled to take place in 2010. The Review Conference would also consider a proposal to remove Article 124 from the Statute, which allowed a new State Party to exempt itself from ICC jurisdiction for the first seven years after becoming party to the Statute. These so-called "stocktaking" exercises included sessions on
the obligations of States Parties to cooperate with the ICC and each other to effect international criminal justice; the efforts to improve States Parties' national judicial systems' respective capacity to prosecute individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide under the principle of "complementarity"; the effect of the Rome Statute system on victims of and communities affected by crimes under the ICC's jurisdiction; and the relationship between engaging in peace processes and pursuing international criminal justice. As will be explained in this section, these new provisions address the major concerns about state consent to aggression jurisdiction and Security Council authority over the ICC's exercise of such jurisdiction, and also contain provisions for delayed activation of aggression jurisdiction. Reaction to Aggression Jurisdiction Provisions as Adopted
U.S. officials who participated at the Review Conference have expressed general satisfaction with the aggression jurisdiction provisions adopted by the States Parties. In the Review Conference agenda, the ASP included a proposal to delete Article 124 entirely. Stocktaking of International Criminal Justice
During the Review Conference, the States Parties and other stakeholders convened a number of panel and roundtable discussions to take stock of the state of international criminal justice as undertaken by the ICC, and to discuss and determine strategies concerning the effects of the ICC's work and State Party involvement in that work. The U.S. delegation participated fully as an observer in the stocktaking exercise. ICC officials have stressed the importance of U.S. cooperation with the Court, especially with regard to providing resources necessary to locate, arrest, and transport accused individuals for ICC prosecution. The provisions defining the Court's jurisdiction over the crime seem to exclude U.S. officials and members of the U.S. Armed Forces from prosecution for the crime of aggression, and U.S. delegation efforts to clarify the definition of aggression under the Rome Statute make it likely that only the most serious cases of aggressive military action might be subject to prosecution. U.S. officials at the Review Conference made pledges of in-kind support to the ICC regarding the Court's current cases and the ICC prosecutor's current investigations. Congress may also ask for an explanation of Administration policy and ICC cooperation as it relates to the intended restrictions on the U.S.-ICC relationship in ASPA; the possibility of the United States becoming party to the Rome Statute in the wake of the adoption of the crime of aggression and the restrictions on intrastate use of certain asphyxiating gases and special ammunition; and the implications for U.S. interests, especially the security of members of the U.S. Armed Forces, of the adoption of provisions to activate the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Reporting on U.S. support for the ICC could shed light on whether U.S.-ICC cooperation activities fall within existing legislative authorities and restrictions, especially those in ASPA; and developments in the practices, procedure, and precedents of the ICC, as well as the statements of the ICC Prosecutor and other ICC officials, in relation to preparing for prosecuting the crime of aggression, as well as any ICC investigations into the actions of U.S. officials or officials of U.S. allies. Because official U.S. policy toward the Court has shifted to one of engagement and support, Congress might provide direction to U.S. officials concerning the U.S.-ICC relationship going forward through new legislation, including provisions specifically dealing with the Review Conference's adoption of the crime of aggression and other changes to the Rome Statute. | ICC Review Conference and U.S. Engagement
The International Criminal Court (ICC, or Court) was established in 2002 as the first permanent court to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide (together, "ICC crimes"). Pursuant to a provision in the Statute of the International Criminal Court ("Rome Statute" or "Statute"), the States Parties to the Rome Statute agreed to review the Court's activities seven years after its establishment. In compliance with this provision, the States Parties convened a Review Conference in Kampala, Uganda, May 31–June 11, 2010.
After declining to officially participate in the activities of the ICC or in the sessions of the Rome Statute's Assembly of States Parties (ASP) since the Court was established in 2002, the United States shifted its stance and began attending ASP meetings as an observer in November 2009, signaling a new policy of engagement with the ICC. At the Review Conference, the United States participated fully as an observer.
Issues Considered at the 2010 ICC Review Conference
Proposals in the Review Conference's agenda had broad possible ramifications for U.S. interests, and provided an opportunity for the United States to assess its policy toward the Court. Review Conference participants considered adding the crime of aggression to the ICC's jurisdiction, which would allow prosecution of state officials for using armed force against another state. The United States opposed this proposal for a number of reasons, including the possibility that U.S. officials might be prosecuted for their decisions. These concerns parallel the U.S. concerns over the possible prosecution of U.S. officials and servicemembers for the other ICC crimes. The question of ICC aggression jurisdiction was the most contentious for the Review Conference. States Parties argued over two central issues for activation of ICC aggression jurisdiction:
whether both aggressor and victim state consent would be necessary to grant ICC jurisdiction over an instance of alleged criminal aggression; and the extent to which the U.N. Security Council should control the Court's exercise of aggression jurisdiction.
The States Parties adopted new jurisdiction provisions after several compromises, including delayed implementation and restricted application of the Court's aggression jurisdiction, and allowing states to opt out of ICC aggression jurisdiction.
The Review Conference agenda also included a number of discussions assessing the effect of the ICC on international criminal justice, especially with regard to crime victims and affected communities, and States Parties' cooperation with the ICC. During the Conference, the U.S. delegation demonstrated its new policy of engagement, pledging in-kind support for existing ICC cases and investigations, and for the development of States Parties' judicial-system capacity to prosecute ICC crimes. U.S. officials have since expressed support for the ICC, stating that it is now the global focal point for international criminal justice.
Possible Congressional Actions Concerning the New U.S.-ICC Policy
U.S. officials have asserted that this new policy of engagement with the ICC complies with U.S. law concerning the U.S.-ICC relationship, including the American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002 (ASPA), which was broadly intended to limit U.S. cooperation with and prohibit U.S. funding for the Court. In light of existing law and new ICC engagement, Congress may opt to take certain actions, including
conducting hearings to better inform Members of Congress about the possibility of the United States becoming party to the Rome Statute in the wake of the changes to the Statute made at Kampala; the implications for U.S. interests, especially U.S.-servicemember security, of the adoption of ICC aggression jurisdiction; the new U.S.-ICC relationship; and executive branch compliance with the ASPA and other legislation; adding executive-branch reporting requirements on U.S. cooperation with the ICC and its basis in U.S. law, as well as developments in ICC practice related to changes in the Rome Statute adopted by the Review Conference; and amending existing legislation to direct the U.S.-ICC relationship, including dealing with ICC aggression jurisdiction and other changes to the Rome Statute. |
crs_RL34143 | crs_RL34143_0 | Introduction
In response to concerns raised by the Director of National Intelligence, Admiral Mike McConnell, that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq ., required modernization to meet the current intelligence needs of the nation, a number of bills were introduced in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Intense legislative activity with respect to proposed amendments to FISA in both bodies resulted in the enactment of the Protect America Act of 2007, P.L. 110-55 on August 5, 2007. The measure was introduced as S. 1927 by Senator McConnell, for himself and Senator Bond, on August 1, 2007. The bill was considered in the Senate on August 3, in conjunction with S. 2011 , entitled The Protect America Act of 2007, introduced by Senator Levin, for himself and Senator Rockefeller. 5104 , a 15-day extension to the sunset for the Protect America Act, to allow further time to consider, pass, and go to conference on proposed legislation to amend FISA, while ensuring that the intelligence community would have the authority it needed in the intervening period. The President signed the measure into law on January 31, 2008, as P.L. Bills have been introduced in the Senate to extend the sunset from 180 to 210 days ( S. 2541 , S. 2556 , and S. 2615 ), or to extend it to July 1, 2009 ( S. 2557 ). This report discusses the provisions of P.L. 110-55 , states:
Nothing in the definition of electronic surveillance under section 101(f) shall be construed to encompass surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States. Under these criteria, the Attorney General and the DNI must certify that:
(1) there are reasonable procedures in place for determining that the acquisition of foreign intelligence information under this section concerns persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, and such procedures will be subject to review of the Court pursuant to section 105C of this Act;
(2) the acquisition does not constitute electronic surveillance;
(3) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign intelligence information from or with the assistance of a communications service provider, custodian, or other person (including any officer, employee, agent, or other specified person of such service provider, custodian, or other person) who has access to communications, either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store such communications;
(4) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information; and
(5) the minimization procedures to be used with respect to such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 101(h). P.L. The government or any recipient of the directive may seek review of the decision of the Court of Review by petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. Any order issued by the FISC under subsection 105C(c) may be appealed by the government to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. If treated instead as acquisitions under new section 105B of FISA, then the FISC would seem to be limited to reviewing, under a clearly erroneous standard, the general procedures under which the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Attorney General would make determinations that acquisitions did not constitute electronic surveillance; and judges of the FISC petition review pool would have jurisdiction to consider petitions challenging the legality of directives to persons to furnish aid to the government to accomplish those acquisitions. 110-55 . 110-55 . On January 29, 2008, both the House and the Senate passed H.R. It was signed into law on January 31, 2008, as P.L. 110-182 . On February 13, 2008, the House rejected H.R. 5349 , which would have extended the sunset provision for an additional 21 days. | On August 5, 2007, P.L. 110-55, the Protect America Act of 2007, was signed into law by President Bush, after having been passed by the Senate on August 3 and the House of Representatives on August 4. The measure, introduced by Senator McConnell as S. 1927 on August 1, makes a number of additions and modifications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq., and adds additional reporting requirements. As originally passed, the law was to sunset in 180 days, on February 1, 2008. On January 29, 2008, both the House and the Senate passed H.R. 5104, a 15-day extension to the sunset for the Protect America Act, to allow further time to consider, pass, and go to conference on proposed legislation to amend FISA, while ensuring that the intelligence community would have the authority it needed in the intervening period. Signed into law on January 31, it became P.L. 110-182. On February 13, 2008, the House rejected H.R. 5349, which would have extended the sunset provision an additional 21 days. Bills have been introduced in the Senate to extend the sunset from 180 to 210 days (S. 2541, S. 2556, and S. 2615) or to extend it to July 1, 2009 (S. 2557).
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 was enacted in response both to the Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee) revelations with regard to past abuses of electronic surveillance for national security purposes and to the somewhat uncertain state of the law on the subject. In creating a statutory framework for the use of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information, the Congress sought to strike a balance between national security interests and civil liberties. Critical to an understanding of the FISA structure are its definitions of terms such as "electronic surveillance" and "foreign intelligence information." P.L. 110-55 limits the construction of the term "electronic surveillance" so that it does not cover surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. It also creates a mechanism for acquisition, without a court order under a certification by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Attorney General, of foreign intelligence information concerning a person reasonably believed to be outside the United States. The Protect America Act provides for review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) of the procedures by which the DNI and the Attorney General determine that such acquisitions do not constitute electronic surveillance. In addition, P.L. 110-55 authorizes the Attorney General and the DNI to direct a person with access to the communications involved to furnish aid to the government to facilitate such acquisitions, and provides a means by which the legality of such a directive may be reviewed by the FISC petition review pool. A decision by a judge of the FISC petition review pool may be appealed to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, and review by the U.S. Supreme Court may be sought by petition for writ of certiorari. This report describes the provisions of P.L. 110-55, discusses its possible impact on and parallels to existing law, summarizes the legislative activity with respect to S. 1927, H.R. 3356, and S. 2011, and touches on recent legislative developments. It will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL33192 | crs_RL33192_0 | The agreement is set to expire on December 30, 2015, and a new agreement was submitted for congressional review on April 21, 2015. The required congressional review period ended on July 31, 2015, and the agreement may enter into force. Such agreements are subject to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended (AEA, P.L. and commonly are called "123 agreements." They are a prerequisite for any significant nuclear cooperation with another country, such as exports of nuclear power plants and components and the transfer of nuclear material. The first such agreement with the PRC was concluded in the mid-1980s. President Clinton, on January 12, 1998, signed certifications (as required by P.L. Clinton also issued a certification and waived a sanction imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown (as required by P.L. Renewal of U.S.-China Agreement
The Obama Administration has submitted the new U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress for the required review period. It does allow for the enrichment up to a level less than 20% U-235 and reprocessing of U.S.-obligated material at safeguarded or safeguards-eligible sites. China is currently developing a "large passive plant," as envisioned by the Westinghouse agreement. Since the original nuclear cooperation agreement was concluded, China has joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and made nuclear security improvements to its civilian sector. However, Chinese entities have continued to engage in proliferation. 99-183 on China's nuclear nonproliferation policy and practices) would be the centerpiece of a summit in 1997 advanced the agreement's implementation. Congressional review ended on March 18, 1998, allowing the agreement to be implemented. Almost 13 years passed between the time that President Reagan submitted the agreement to Congress in July 1985 and its implementation in March 1998 under the Clinton Administration. 99-183 , the Joint Resolution Relating to the Approval and Implementation of the Proposed Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States and the People's Republic of China (December 16, 1985), which required a presidential certification and a report followed by a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress before the agreement could be implemented. After the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown, Congress enacted sanctions in P.L. 101-246 , the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (February 16, 1990), suspending nuclear cooperation with China and requiring an additional presidential certification on the PRC's nuclear nonproliferation assurances. Issues During 1985 Congressional Review
The agreement's submission began the periods of congressional review: 30 days of continuous session under Section 123(b) to be followed by 60 days of continuous session under Section 123(d) of the Atomic Energy Act (P.L. However, President Reagan did not issue the certification. 101-246 (waiver authority), President Clinton reported that it was in the "national interest" to terminate the suspension of nuclear cooperation:
"it is in the U.S. national interest to consolidate and build on the progress China has made in the nonproliferation area, and the implementation of the Agreement for Cooperation between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy will establish a promising framework for doing so"; "it is also in the U.S. national interest to build stronger, mutually advantageous bilateral relations with China based on respect for international norms"; "the United States also has an economic national interest ... 99-183 ; Rationale for Report Required by P.L. | Negotiated by the Reagan Administration nearly 30 years ago, the current U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is set to expire on December 30, 2015. President Obama submitted a new 30-year U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement for congressional review on April 21, 2015. Among other provisions, the agreement would allow for uranium enrichment up to a level less than 20% U-235 and Chinese reprocessing of U.S.-obligated material at safeguarded facilities. The required congressional review period ended on July 31.
Such agreements are often called "123 agreements" because they are required by Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (P.L. 95-242). They are a prerequisite for any significant nuclear cooperation with another country, such as exports of nuclear power plants and components and the transfer of nuclear material. Since the original agreement was concluded before China was a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), some changes to the text were required. The recently submitted renewal agreement complies with the relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and therefore was subject to a review period totaling 90 days of continuous session. If no resolution of disapproval is passed into law before that deadline, then the agreement may enter into force. No resolution of disapproval was passed.
Almost 13 years passed between the time President Reagan submitted the current 123 agreement to Congress in July 1985 and its implementation in March 1998 under President Clinton. While Congress did not reject the agreement outright, it passed a Joint Resolution, P.L. 99-183, which required that certain nonproliferation-related certifications be made by the President before the agreement could be implemented. P.L. 99-183 required a presidential certification and a report followed by a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress. After the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown, Congress enacted sanctions in P.L. 101-246, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, suspending nuclear cooperation with China and requiring an additional presidential certification on the PRC's nuclear nonproliferation assurances.
Ahead of a summit with the PRC, President Clinton, on January 12, 1998, signed certifications (as required by P.L. 99-183) on China's nuclear nonproliferation policy and practices. Clinton also issued a certification and waived a sanction imposed under P.L. 101-246. Congressional review ended on March 18, 1998, allowing the agreement to be implemented.
U.S. nuclear commerce with China has expanded in the past decade. On February 28, 2005, Westinghouse submitted an initial bid to sell four nuclear power reactors to China, as supported by the Bush Administration. In Beijing in December 2006, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding that granted the deal to Westinghouse. The first four Westinghouse reactors under the deal are now being constructed, with six more planned and as many as 30 more proposed.
At the same time, some Members of Congress continue to question whether China is fulfilling its nonproliferation commitments, particularly regarding transfers to North Korea by Chinese entities. Proliferation sanctions on Chinese companies and individuals remain in place, and the United States cooperates with China in improving export control and detection systems. In addition, China continues to develop its own nuclear arsenal.
Along with the text of the agreement, the President submitted a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement that evaluates these issues. As Congress reviewed the terms of this agreement, it also examined the PRC's record on nuclear proliferation. A key issue for the U.S. nuclear industry is its continued participation in the construction of new Chinese nuclear power plants. |
crs_R42783 | crs_R42783_0 | The program was first authorized in the Food Security Act of 1985 (1985 farm bill, P.L. While a number of natural resource improvements are attributed to the program, the program contains a number of controversial elements as well, including the economic and environmental effect of permitted activities, such as haying and grazing on CRP acres and the reduction of enrolled acres due to high crop prices and farm bill reauthorization. Program and funding authority for CRP was reauthorized and extended through FY2018 by the Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014 farm bill, P.L. How CRP Works
The program is administered by the Farm Service Agency (FSA) at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), with technical support from the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) and other USDA agencies. There are two main types of enrollment into CRP: general sign-up and continuous sign-up. A general sign-up is not scheduled for FY2014. Continuous sign-up includes a number of initiatives that target acres with specific resource concerns or support additional conservation practices. Land
For land to be eligible for CRP, USDA may consider the following land types for enrollment:
highly erodible cropland that (1) if untreated could substantially reduce the land's future agricultural production capability or (2) cannot be farmed in accordance with a conservation plan; and has a cropping history or was considered to be planted for four of the six years preceding February 7, 2014 (except for land previously enrolled in CRP); marginal pasture land devoted to appropriate vegetation for water quality purposes; grasslands that (1) contain forbs or shrubland on which grazing is the predominant use; (2) are located in an area historically dominated by grasslands; and (3) could provide habitat for ecologically significant animal and plant populations if restored or retained in its current condition. Current Issues
Farm Bill Reauthorization
The 2014 farm bill reauthorized CRP and reduced the enrollment cap from 32 million acres to 24 million acres by FY2018. A number of programmatic changes centered around permitted activities. Emergency harvesting, grazing, and other use of forage are permitted, in some cases, without a reduction in rental rate, as well as livestock grazing for a beginning farmer or rancher. Other approved activities, such as annual or routine grazing, may continue to require a reduction in rental rate (discussed further in the " Harvesting and Grazing " section below). The Grassland Reserve Program (GRP) was repealed in the 2014 farm bill. Grassland contracts, similar to what was repealed under GRP, are now eligible under CRP. The 2014 farm bill also allows CRP participants the opportunity to terminate their contract early if the land has been enrolled longer than five years and it does not contain environmentally sensitive practices. 113-79) . Increases in Enrollment
Despite the potential limiting factors affecting CRP enrollment, the number of acres enrolled under continuous sign-ups, including for the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP, see Appendix A ), has increased. As of July 2014, almost 5.8 million acres (23%) were enrolled through continuous sign-up, an increase of 2.2 million acres since 2007. The additional financial incentive under continuous sign-up could offset the potential gap between CRP rental payments and local rental rates to enroll more environmentally sensitive acres. Environmental Benefits
The greatest concern over a reduced level of CRP acres is a reduced level of environmental benefits. Projects are designed to address specific environmental objectives through targeted CRP enrollments. | The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) provides payments to agricultural producers to take highly erodible and environmentally sensitive land out of production and install resource conserving practices for 10 or more years. CRP was first authorized in the Food Security Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-198, 1985 farm bill) and is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Farm Service Agency (FSA) with technical support from other USDA agencies. Participants offer land for enrollment through two types of sign-up: general and continuous. General sign-ups are competitive and only open during select times. Continuous sign-ups are not competitive, always open for enrollment, and offer additional financial incentives to those who qualify. Continuous sign-ups are targeted to specific environmental and resource concerns and operate through a number of initiatives. The largest and most well-known is the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP), which partners with states to address agricultural-related environmental concerns in specific geographic regions. While the majority of current acres enrolled were under general sign-ups (19.7 million acres), an increasing number are enrolled under continuous sign-ups (5.8 million acres).
The Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014 farm bill, P.L. 113-79) reauthorized CRP and reduced the enrollment cap from 32 million acres to 24 million acres by FY2018. The 2014 farm bill made several changes centered on permitted activities. Emergency harvesting, grazing, and other use of forage are permitted, in some cases, without a reduction in rental rate, as well as livestock grazing for a beginning farmer or rancher. Other approved activities, such as annual or routine grazing, may continue to require a reduction in rental rate. The Grassland Reserve Program (GRP) was repealed in the 2014 farm bill. Grassland contracts, similar to what was repealed under GRP, are now eligible under CRP. The 2014 farm bill also allows CRP participants the opportunity to terminate their contract early if the land has been enrolled longer than five years and it does not contain environmentally sensitive practices.
A number of factors have impacted CRP enrollment recently, mainly high commodity crop prices. These strong prices have encouraged farmers to put CRP acres, even marginal acres, back into production. This pressure could potentially reduce the number of CRP acres offered for reenrollment once they have expired or cause existing current CRP participants to seek an early release from their CRP contract. Some participants also have cited a potentially low CRP rental rate compared to the market rental rate as a reason for decreased enrollment interest. Despite these factors, enrollment has increased under continuous sign-ups and demand for the program, in general, still exceeds the current enrollment level.
CRP has contributed to a number of environmental benefits including reduced soil erosion, improved water quality through wetlands and field buffers, reduced fertilizer use, and increased wildlife habitat. The recent expiration of a number of acres from the program, and a reduced reenrollment, has some concerned that a number of the environmental benefits gained under CRP could be lost or reduced if land is returned to production. |
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