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crs_R43013 | crs_R43013_0 | A common concern is the pace at which agencies establish rules and complete adjudications. Commentators and courts have noted that agency delay can impact the effectiveness of a regulatory system. Delays can also negatively affect regulated entities that must wait for final agency action. Substantial case law has emerged on how courts will treat agency delay in a variety of circumstances. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) imposes a general time restraint on administrative agencies—they must act within a "reasonable time." In addition to the general timing requirements imposed by the APA, Congress also has the power to require agencies to act on issues within a specific time frame by establishing a statutory deadline in the agency's enabling statute. When an agency fails to meet a statutory deadline, courts are more willing to compel the agency to take prompt action. Judicial remedies available for delayed agency actions are somewhat limited. Claims for unreasonable delay can be brought under the APA against an agency in court. First, although a court can order an agency to take prompt action on an issue, the Supreme Court has declared that a court cannot dictate what conclusion the agency should reach. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that regulations issued after a deadline has passed still maintain the force of law, despite the tardiness of their promulgation. Sometimes courts merely direct the agency to impose a deadline on itself, which the court will accept unless the agency's proposed deadline is unreasonable. Circuit, in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC (" TRAC "), established guidelines to consider when determining whether an agency delay warrants mandamus compelling the agency to act. The court then enumerated several factors, known as the TRAC factors, to consider when answering this question:
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a "rule of reason;" (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed. Circuit has noted that "[t]here is no per se rule as to how long is too long to wait for agency action," and it can be hard to determine which TRAC factor a court will decide to rely on most heavily. Courts still apply the TRAC factors when determining whether a delay is unreasonable in the rulemaking setting. Again, it can be difficult to predict whether a court will compel an agency to act on a claim for unreasonable delay when there is no statutory deadline. Some lower courts have made a distinction between actions "unlawfully withheld" (actions that are delayed beyond a statutory deadline) and actions "unreasonably delayed" (actions that are only governed by the APA's "reasonable time" provision) and have determined that a missed statutory deadline compels the court to mandate prompt agency action. Although it is commonplace for courts to compel agencies to act if a deadline has been missed, some courts, as illustrated below, may decline to compel an agency to act in such circumstances. In Forrest Guardians v. Babbitt , the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Tenth Circuit) stated that when an agency fails to act by a "statutorily imposed absolute deadline," the action has been "unlawfully withheld" and the court has no choice but to compel the agency to act. Ultimately, however, the determination is made on a fact specific, case-by-case basis. | One common concern about federal agencies is the speed with which they are able to issue and implement regulations. Federal regulatory schemes can be quite complex, and establishing rules and completing adjudications can sometimes require substantial agency resources and significant amounts of time. However, critics point out that sometimes an agency can simply take too long to a complete task. Commentators and courts have noted that such agency delay can impact the effectiveness of a regulatory scheme. It can also impact regulated entities that must wait for final agency action. In some circumstances, a court may have to determine whether an agency has violated the law by unreasonable delay in taking action. Substantial case law has emerged for how courts will treat agency delay in a variety of circumstances.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), agency actions must be completed "within a reasonable time." Courts have jurisdiction under the APA to hear claims brought against an agency for unreasonable delay, and the APA provides that courts shall compel any action unreasonably delayed or unlawfully withheld.
When an agency has delayed, but does not have to act by any statutorily imposed deadline, courts are more deferential to the agency's priorities and are less willing to compel an agency to take action. However, if a delay becomes egregious, courts will compel an agency to take prompt action. Generally, courts follow the TRAC factors, from Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, to determine whether a delay is unreasonable. The court will see if Congress has established any indication for how quickly the agency should proceed; determine whether a danger to human health is implicated by the delay; consider the agency's competing priorities; evaluate the interests prejudiced by the delay; and determine whether the agency has treated the complaining party disparately from others. A court balances these TRAC factors to reach a conclusion on a case-by-case basis. It can be difficult to predict which way a court will decide any particular case. There is no strict rule on how long is too long to wait for an agency action. Therefore, it is important to look at previous cases to see what kinds of delays are determined to be unreasonable.
In addition to the APA's general requirement to act within a reasonable time, Congress may also establish specific deadlines for agency actions by statute. When an agency fails to meet a statutory deadline, courts generally compel the agency to take prompt action. Some courts have determined that a court has no choice but to compel agency action in the face of a missed statutory deadline. For these courts, no balancing is permitted when a deadline has been violated. However, other courts note that a statutory deadline is merely one of the factors to consider when determining whether the delay is unreasonable. For these courts, the TRAC factors are still evaluated to determine whether the court should compel the agency to act after a deadline has been missed.
Judicial remedies for delayed agency actions are somewhat limited. The Supreme Court has ruled that a court is permitted to compel an agency to take action, but cannot determine what conclusion the agency shall ultimately reach on the issue. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has also established that agency rules still maintain the force of law, even when they are promulgated after a statutory deadline. Therefore, a court's only remedy for unreasonable agency delay is essentially to impose a deadline on the agency. |
crs_R45085 | crs_R45085_0 | Introduction
When the President declares a major disaster under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, the disaster declaration designates the types of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assistance to be provided. There are three primary types of assistance: Public Assistance (PA), which addresses repairs to a community and state or tribal government infrastructure; Mitigation Assistance (MA), which provides funding for projects a state or tribe proposes to reduce the threat of future damage; and Individual Assistance (IA), which provides help to individuals and households affected by a major disaster. This report provides information on FEMA's IA programs and the factors FEMA uses to determine if IA should be part of a disaster declaration. Individual Assistance Programs
FEMA considers numerous factors (detailed later in this report) when it recommends IA to the President following a major disaster. The program supports short-term counseling of disaster survivors. FEMA may provide manufactured housing units as a form of temporary housing through its Transitional Sheltering Assistance program. Other Needs Assistance provides financial assistance for other disaster-related expenses and needs. The factors include
concentration of damages —FEMA evaluates the concentrations of damages to individuals, and high concentrations of damages generally indicate a greater need for federal assistance than widespread or scattered damages throughout an area, region, or state; trauma —FEMA considers the degree of trauma to a state and communities, and some of the conditions that might cause such trauma include large numbers of injuries and death, large-scale disruption of normal community functions and services, and emergency needs such as extended or widespread loss of power or water; special populations —FEMA considers whether special populations, such as low-income, the elderly, or the unemployed are affected, and whether they may have a greater need for assistance; voluntary agency assistance —FEMA considers the extent to which voluntary agencies and state or local programs can meet the needs of the disaster victims; insurance —FEMA considers the amount of insurance coverage in the disaster area because, by law, federal disaster assistance cannot duplicate insurance coverage; and average amount of individual assistance by state —FEMA's regulations state that "[t]here is no set threshold for recommending Individual Assistance, but the following averages [see Table 1 ] may prove useful to States and voluntary agencies as they develop plans and programs to meet the needs of disaster victims." FEMA has yet to finalize the proposed rule. | When the President declares a major disaster pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) advises the President about types of federal assistance administered by FEMA available to disaster victims, states, localities, and tribes. The primary types of assistance provided under a major disaster declaration include funding through the Public Assistance program, Mitigation Assistance programs, and the Individual Assistance program.
The Public Assistance program provides federal financial assistance to repair and rebuild damaged facilities and infrastructure. Mitigation Assistance programs provide funding for jurisdictions, states, and tribes to ensure damaged facilities and infrastructure are rebuilt and reinforced to better withstand future disaster damage. Finally, the Individual Assistance program provides funding for basic needs for individuals and households following a disaster.
Eligible activities under the Individual Assistance program include funding for such things as mass care, crisis counseling, and temporary housing. FEMA advises the President on the type of individual assistance to be granted following each disaster, and works with state and local authorities in determining what assistance programs would best suit the needs within the disaster area. FEMA makes this determination based on a list of criteria designed to align federal disaster assistance with unmet needs in disaster-impacted areas.
This report provides a short summary of the types of individual assistance programs administered by FEMA following a disaster. This report also provides a summary of the criteria FEMA uses in determining which individual assistance programs may be made available to impacted areas following a major disaster declaration, and discusses a proposed rule to change these criteria. |
crs_R41318 | crs_R41318_0 | Political and Economic Situation
An English-speaking Caribbean nation with a population of about 2.8 million, Jamaica has had a relatively stable parliamentary political system stemming from its history of British colonial rule, even though extensive political violence often marred national elections in the 1970s and 1980s. Two political parties—the People's National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) have dominated the political system since before the country's 1962 independence. 2010 Coke Extradition and Political Fallout
In late May 2010, Jamaica's stability was challenged after the government of Prime Minister Golding agreed to extradite to the United States an at-large alleged drug kingpin, Christopher "Dudas" Coke, the reputed leader of the Shower Posse. The Jamaican government responded by issuing a state of emergency in portions of the capital and deploying police and soldiers to West Kingston seeking to execute a warrant for Coke, whose armed supporters erected barricades and roadblocks to battle the security forces. In the ensuing violence over the next several days, 76 people were killed, including two policemen and a soldier. Security forces ultimately secured the areas of West Kingston by late May, but human rights organizations called for the government to conduct a thorough investigation regarding the deaths and determine whether the use of force was appropriate. Crime and Violence
High rates of crime and violence have plagued Jamaica for many years. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a high level of politically motivated violence surrounding national elections. In the 1970s, the gangs were largely involved in the trafficking of marijuana, but beginning in the 1980s gangs became involved in cocaine trade and weapons trafficking. Since the 1990s, violent crime in the country has been associated in large part with drug trafficking. About half of the murders in 2009 were reported to be related to intra-gang and internal gang feuds. One of the most difficult challenges for Jamaica's political system is breaking the remaining linkages between the political parties and armed gangs. Police Violence and Extrajudicial Killings. At the same time that Jamaica has experienced high rates of crime and violence, the country's police forces have been criticized for many years for extrajudicial killings and indiscriminate use of force. As noted above, one of the most difficult economic challenges for the Jamaica government has been dealing with a large debt burden (over $10 billion), which has limited the government's ability to respond to the effects of the global economic crisis with counter-cyclical policies. In February 2010, the IMF approved a $1.27 billion stand-by arrangement with Jamaica to help the country cope with the consequences of the global downturn and support the country's economic reforms. U.S. Relations
U.S. relations with Jamaica are close, and are characterized by significant economic and cultural linkages and cooperation on a range of bilateral and transnational issues, including cooperation on anti-drug trafficking efforts. There had been increasing tension in U.S.-Jamaican relations in recent months because of the Golding government's reluctance to extradite Jamaican gang leader Christopher Coke to the United States on drug trafficking charges. But in the aftermath of the Jamaican government's efforts to capture Coke and extradite him to the United States in late June 2010, U.S. officials commended the Golding government for its efforts. Drug Trafficking
Jamaica is the Caribbean's largest producer and exporter of marijuana, and is also a drug transit country for South American cocaine destined for the U.S. and other markets. | The Caribbean island-nation of Jamaica has had a relatively stable parliamentary political system stemming from its history of British colonial rule. Current Prime Minister Bruce Golding of the Jamaica Labour Party was elected in September 2007 when his party defeated the long-ruling People's National Party led by then-Prime Minister Portia Simpson. In late May 2010, however, Jamaica's stability was challenged after Prime Minister Golding agreed to extradite to the United States an at-large alleged drug kingpin and gang leader, Christopher Coke. The Jamaican government deployed police and soldiers seeking to execute a warrant for Coke, but his armed supporters erected barricades and roadblocks to battle the security forces. In the ensuing violence, 76 people were killed, including two policemen and a soldier. Human rights organizations have called on the government to conduct a thorough investigation into the killings, especially since Jamaica's police forces have been criticized for many years for extrajudicial killings and the indiscriminate use of force. Coke was ultimately captured and extradited to New York in late June 2010 to face drug and weapons trafficking charges.
High rates of crime and violence have plagued Jamaica for many years. In the 1970s and 1980s there was a high level of politically motivated violence when political parties became allied with armed gangs to deliver votes at election time. Jamaica's gangs initially were involved in the trafficking of marijuana in the 1970s (Jamaica is the Caribbean's largest producer and exporter of marijuana), but in the mid-1980s became involved in cocaine trafficking, with Jamaica used as a transit country, as well as weapons trafficking. Since the 1990s, much of the violent crime in the country has been associated with this drug trafficking and related intra-gang and internal gang feuds. Jamaica's challenges include bringing down the high levels of gang violence, reforming the police and justice system to prevent extrajudicial killings by police and impunity, and breaking the linkages between the political parties and armed gangs.
Jamaica's services-based economy has averaged only modest growth rates over the past two decades, and has been in recession since 2008 because of the global economic crisis, which hurt the tourism sector and reduced the price and demand for Jamaican bauxite/alumina exports. A difficult economic challenge for the government is dealing with a large external debt burden, which has limited the government's ability to respond to the effects of the global economic crisis. In February 2010, the International Monetary Fund approved a $1.27 billion stand-by arrangement to help the country deal with the consequences of the global economic downturn and support the government's fiscal, debt, and financial sector reforms.
U.S. relations with Jamaica are close, and are characterized by significant economic and cultural linkages and cooperation on a range of bilateral and transnational issues, including cooperation on anti-drug trafficking efforts. Congress has regularly supported a variety of foreign assistance programs for Jamaica, and the country will likely receive funding under the Administration's new Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. There had been increasing tension in U.S.-Jamaican relations in recent months because of the Golding government's reluctance to extradite Christopher Coke to the United States, but in the aftermath of the Jamaican government's extradition, U.S. officials commended the Golding government for its efforts. For additional information, see CRS Report RL33951, U.S. Trade Policy and the Caribbean: From Trade Preferences to Free Trade Agreements, and CRS Report R41215, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs. |
crs_R42427 | crs_R42427_0 | Indeed, over the past decade, many sources have reported a precipitous decline in the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the United States—particularly for small companies. The recent decline in IPOs raises several questions: what has caused such a decline? At the same time, while IPOs appear to have fallen in the United States for a variety of reasons, the amount of private stock offerings has increased during this period. This report analyzes the factors contributing to the decline in IPOs and discusses whether that decline is significant; the differences between an IPO involving the sale of shares to the public versus a private stock offering for sophisticated investors; and the potential economic implications of a rise in private versus public stock offerings. On April 5, 2012, the Jumpstart Our Business Startup Act (JOBS Act; P.L. 112-106 ), which is broadly aimed at boosting capital formation, was enacted. Such "private stock offerings" cannot be sold widely to the public, but only to certain "sophisticated" investors. As such, the SEC has established certain exemptions from the registration and disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws for companies that either seek to raise only a small amount of equity capital (less than $5 million) or to sell shares only to a limited number of sophisticated investors, rather than to the general public. Among other things, the JOBS Act relaxes statutory restrictions on launching IPOs, eases the regulatory and disclosure obligations of firms it identifies as "emerging growth companies," reduces restrictions on promotional communications surrounding private offerings, and establishes a higher shareholder number requirement before a private company becomes subject to public company reporting requirements. A company can opt to be defined as an EGC, and then enjoy certain regulatory exemptions as a result of that status, until the earliest time it meets any one of the following conditions: (1) it reports $1 billion or more in annual gross revenues—an amount that will periodically be indexed for inflation; (2) it becomes a "large accelerated filer," which SEC regulations define, among other factors, as a company with a global market float of $700 million or more; (3) the company reaches the fifth anniversary of its IPO's offering date; or (4) the date on which the company has, within the previous three years, issued more than $1 billion in non-convertible debt. The proposed rule would allow companies to use general solicitation and general advertising to offer securities under Rule 506 of Regulation D of the Securities Act and under Rule 144A of the Securities Act. After a 30-day period of public comment, the SEC will vote on whether to adopt the rule as a final rule. Other studies have found a similar, pronounced drop in IPOs. An apparent decline in the U.S. share of IPOs worldwide leads to several corollary questions: what are the implications, if any, for the U.S. economy, and particularly for job creation? What are the causes of this decline? Implications: Decline in IPOs and the Question of Job Creation
Those proposing to streamline the process of raising equity finance, including some supporters of various capital market bills currently being considered by Congress, argue that improving the ability of companies to do both public and restricted stock offerings will benefit the nation through expanded job creation. What Has Caused the Decline in IPOs? First, there are the direct costs, in terms of fees to underwriters, advisers, lawyers, and accountants. These IPO infrastructure-related impediments include (1) lower trading fees for mainline securities firms that stemmed from the rise of online discount brokerage firms; (2) the SEC's order-handling rules; and (3) the decimalization of traded securities (wherein stocks that were historically incrementally priced in fractions were subsequently priced in cents, thereby reducing broker's bid-ask spreads, and thus brokers' profits from market-making for IPO shares). Although studies show that younger firms (i.e., startups) are particularly important for job creation, most have not addressed the question of whether the form of growth financing for young firms—for example, through acquisition, or through IPOs—is a factor in creating jobs. | Over the past decade, many sources have reported a precipitous decline in the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the United States. These statistics raise several questions: what has caused such a decline? What are the implications for the U.S. economy, and particularly for job creation? At the same time as IPOs appear to have fallen, the amount of private stock offerings has increased, suggesting growth in an alternative source of equity financing.
This report analyzes factors contributing to the decline in IPOs, differences between an IPO involving the sale of shares to the public versus a private stock offering limited to sophisticated investors, and potential economic implications of such a rise in private versus public stock offerings. It also provides analysis of the causes and implications of the stagnation in public IPOs.
The decline is particularly noticeable for IPOs by small companies. Because startups are usually small, and have been widely associated with job creation, there are concerns that whatever is causing such a drop in IPOs is hindering job creation. While research finds support for a link between startups and job creation, there does not appear to be a consensus among academics that the form of financing that a startup uses to grow—that is, through acquisition, through an IPO, or through the issuance of private shares to sophisticated investors—affects job creation. Indeed, while the number of IPOs has dropped, the number of private placements of restricted shares sold only to qualified investors has risen markedly, especially in 2009 and 2010.
Central to the question of how best to stimulate capital formation and IPOs is what has led to the decline in IPOs. Researchers and market participants cite several possible causes. These include regulatory factors, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 (P.L. 107-204); the costs of initial and ongoing disclosure to investors; a relaxation of the mandatory holding period for restricted shares by the SEC, which may have fostered liquidity in the alternative private placement market; and the costs of filing with individual states for certain securities offerings. Other research points to changes in securities market infrastructure as causes of the IPO decline. Such changes include the cost of underwriting IPOs; reduced trading fees for mainline securities firms stemming from the rise of online discount brokerage firms; a change in the SEC's order-handling rules; the decimalization of traded securities, thereby reducing brokers' profits from trading; and a requirement establishing a firewall between underwriting and analyst research, which some say has made it costlier to provide research to support small IPOs.
Enacted on April 5, 2012, in the 112th Congress, the Jumpstart Our Businesses Startup Act (JOBS) Act (P.L. 112-106) is broadly aimed at stimulating capital formation for companies, especially for relatively new and smaller ones. Among other things, the JOBS Act lifts certain impediments to a small company external financing technique known as crowdfunding, establishes a category of firm known as an emerging growth company (EGC), and relaxes various disclosure and accounting requirements for such firms. Criteria for EGC status include having up to $1 billion in annual gross revenue and having less than five years elapse since its initial shares were first sold to the public. In late August 2012, some Members of Congress criticized the SEC's decision to issue a proposed rule, with a 30-day public comment period, rather than a quicker, final interim rule without the comment period. Others supported this approach. The SEC's proposed rule would relax traditional restrictions on the ability of a company to use general advertising to promote securities offering to certain defined-sophisticated investors under Rule 506, and under Rule 144a, which exempt certain securities from SEC registration. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43192 | crs_R43192_0 | Introduction
There has been significant activity in the 113 th Congress concerning legislative proposals to reform the nation's immigration laws. In June, the Senate passed an omnibus immigration bill ( S. 744 ) that addresses a broad array of issues, including immigration enforcement and border security, verification of aliens' employment eligibility, the temporary and permanent admission of foreign nationals into the country, and the creation of mechanisms for some unauthorized aliens to acquire legal status. The House, in contrast, is considering a number of stand-alone bills that would reform specific aspects of immigration law. The House Judiciary Committee has ordered several of these bills to be reported. H.R. 2278 , the Strengthen and Fortify Enforcement Act (SAFE Act), is aimed at increasing immigration control and enforcement, particularly within the interior of the United States. Many of the SAFE Act's provisions appear intended to address and override court decisions that have narrowly construed existing statutory authorities for immigration enforcement. The bill would heighten penalties associated with violations of federal immigration laws; clarify or establish rules intended to facilitate the detention and removal of aliens who lack authorization to remain in the United States, particularly when such aliens have been involved in criminal activity; impose additional requirements concerning security-related background checks and screening of aliens seeking admission, status, or benefits under immigration law; and encourage states and localities to play an increased role in immigration enforcement. During Judiciary Committee hearings, several significant amendments were made to the bill, including provisions which would generally make unlawful presence by an alien a criminal offense, require the establishment of a biometric entry/exit system within two years of the bill's enactment, and generally constrain the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the removal process. While the SAFE Act contains a few provisions which resemble those found in S. 744 , there are notable differences in both the breadth of the bills' enforcement provisions and their approach to the unauthorized alien population. The SAFE Act generally imposes more significant penalties for immigration-related violations and more stringent requirements relating to the detention and removal of aliens than the Senate-passed bill. Perhaps most significantly, the SAFE Act would make an alien's knowing unauthorized presence a criminal offense, whereas the Senate bill would not make unlawful presence a crime. In fact, the Senate bill would establish procedures whereby some of the current unauthorized population could potentially acquire legal status, while neither the SAFE Act nor the other bills ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee, to date, make similar provisions for legalization. Indeed, the SAFE Act's provisions much more closely resemble the last comprehensive immigration enforcement legislation passed by the House, H.R. 4437 , the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, though it differs from the earlier legislation on many specific matters. This report describes and analyzes the SAFE Act, as ordered reported out of the House Judiciary Committee. | Reforming the nation's immigration laws has been the subject of significant legislative activity in the 113th Congress. In June, the Senate passed an omnibus immigration bill (S. 744) that addresses a broad array of issues, including immigration enforcement and border security, verification of aliens' employment eligibility, the temporary and permanent admission of foreign nationals into the country, and the creation of mechanisms for some unauthorized aliens to acquire legal status. The House, in contrast, has focused legislative activity on a number of stand-alone bills that would reform specific aspects of immigration law. The House Judiciary Committee has ordered several of these bills to be reported, including proposals that focus on strengthening immigration control and enforcement.
H.R. 2278, the Strengthen and Fortify Enforcement Act (SAFE Act), is aimed at increasing immigration control and enforcement, particularly within the interior of the United States. Many of the bill's provisions appear intended to address and override court decisions that have narrowly construed existing statutory authorities. The bill would encourage states and localities to play a greater role in immigration enforcement; heighten penalties for violations of federal immigration laws; impose additional requirements concerning background checks and screening of aliens seeking admission, status (including naturalization), or benefits under immigration law; and clarify or establish rules to facilitate the detention and removal of aliens who lack authorization to remain in the United States, particularly when such aliens have been involved in criminal activity. During Judiciary Committee hearings, several significant amendments were made to the bill, including provisions which would generally make unlawful presence by an alien a criminal offense, require the establishment of a biometric entry/exit system within two years of the bill's enactment, and generally constrain the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the removal process. On June 18, 2013, the committee completed its markup of the SAFE Act, and ordered it to be reported, as amended, by a vote of 20-15.
While the SAFE Act contains a few provisions which resemble those found in S. 744, there are notable differences in both the breadth of the bills' enforcement provisions and their approach to the unauthorized alien population. The SAFE Act generally imposes more significant penalties for immigration-related violations and more stringent requirements relating to the detention and removal of aliens than the Senate-passed bill. Perhaps most significantly, the SAFE Act would make an alien's knowing unauthorized presence a criminal offense, whereas the Senate bill would not make unlawful presence a crime. In fact, the Senate bill would establish procedures whereby some of the current unauthorized population could potentially acquire legal status, while neither the SAFE Act nor the other bills ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee, to date, make similar provisions for legalization. The SAFE Act more closely resembles the last comprehensive immigration enforcement legislation passed by the House, H.R. 4437, the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (109th Congress), though it differs from the earlier legislation on many specific matters.
This report discusses the SAFE Act, as reported out of the House Judiciary Committee. For discussion of other immigration reform proposals in the 113th Congress and prior Congresses, see CRS Report CRS Report R43097, Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the 113th Congress: Major Provisions in Senate-Passed S. 744, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R42980, Brief History of Comprehensive Immigration Reform Efforts in the 109th and 110th Congresses to Inform Policy Discussions in the 113th Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34160 | crs_RL34160_0 | Introduction
The U.S. agricultural and food infrastructure is a key component of economic productivity and growth. Scientific and medical understanding of zoonotic diseases in their animal hosts may lead to the discovery and development of new medical countermeasures for the animals themselves, as well as for humans. To safeguard the United States against the impacts of naturally occurring and intentional animal disease outbreaks, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) engages in animal disease research, including research into highly contagious animal pathogens and animal diseases not native to the United States. Such research activities have historically been performed at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located on Plum Island, an island near Long Island, New York. When creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, Congress transferred the operation of the PIADC facility from USDA to DHS, though USDA still maintains an active research program at PIADC. The DHS asserts that PIADC can no longer continue as the primary facility performing this research. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9), issued by President G.W. Bush, tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop "a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories that research and develop diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases." This facility would have high-containment laboratories able to hold the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. The DHS chose Manhattan, Kansas, as the NBAF location. The DHS plans to establish NBAF on the mainland have raised congressional and public concerns regarding its safety and security and policy questions regarding DHS and USDA coordination of research to be conducted at NBAF. The DHS estimates costs for deconstruction, decontamination, remediation, and relocation will total $190 million. Policy Issues
The 110 th Congress passed NBAF-related legislation to allow DHS to perform live foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus research on the mainland and to sell Plum Island. The NBAF would be more than twice as large as PIADC. On June 18, 2008, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (also referred to as the 2008 farm bill) was enacted with a provision (section 7524) that requires the Secretary of Agriculture to issue a permit to DHS for live FMD virus research at one successor facility to PIADC. In contrast, P.L. The proceeds of such a sale
shall be deposited as offsetting collections into the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology "Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations" account and, subject to appropriation, shall be available until expended, for site acquisition, construction, and costs related to the construction of the National Bio and Agro-defense Facility, including the costs associated with the sale, including due diligence requirements, necessary environmental remediation at Plum Island, and reimbursement of expenses incurred by the General Services Administration which shall not exceed 1 percent of the sale price: Provided further, That after the completion of construction and environmental remediation, the unexpended balances of funds appropriated for costs in the preceding proviso shall be available for transfer to the appropriate account for design and construction of a consolidated Department of Homeland Security Headquarters project, excluding daily operations and maintenance costs, notwithstanding section 503 of this Act, and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall be notified 15 days prior to such transfer. | The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States may be susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the economic effects of such an attack, some animal pathogens could cause illness in humans. Diseases that can spread from animals to people are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and effects of a successful terrorist attack.
To safeguard the United States against the introduction of non-native animal disease, Congress has appropriated funds to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Some of this work is performed at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located off the coast of New York. Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 and transferred ownership and operation of PIADC from USDA to DHS. The USDA and DHS cooperate to conduct foreign animal disease research at PIADC, but they have identified PIADC as outdated and too limited to continue as the primary facility for this research.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, issued by President G.W. Bush, tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially meet these obligations, DHS has requested Congress appropriate funds to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house high-biocontainment laboratories able to hold the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. The DHS has selected Manhattan, Kansas, as the NBAF site and plans to open the facility in 2015. The DHS estimates the final, total facility construction cost as $725 million, significantly exceeding earlier projections. Additional expenses, such as equipping the new facility, relocating existing personnel and programs, and preparing the PIADC facility for disposition, are expected to add $190 million.
Research with live foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus is allowed on the U.S. mainland only if explicitly permitted by the USDA Secretary. However, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246) instructs USDA to issue such a permit to DHS for possession of FMD virus at NBAF, subject to select agent rules.
The DHS plans regarding the NBAF raise several policy issues. Concerns about safety and security, previously expressed about PIADC and other laboratories being built to study dangerous pathogens, are also being voiced about NBAF. Coordination between DHS and USDA, as well as prioritization and investment in agricultural biodefense, may be reassessed if more high-containment laboratory space becomes available. |
crs_R44005 | crs_R44005_0 | Introduction
A question of the privileges of the House is a formal declaration by a Member of the House asserting that a situation has arisen that affects "the rights of the House collectively, its safety, dignity, and the integrity of its proceedings." Once a question of the privileges of the House is raised, the Speaker must, at some point, entertain the question and rule on its validity. The Speaker makes a ruling regarding whether a question constitutes a valid question of the privileges of the House with guidance from the House Parliamentarian based on House Rule IX and House precedent. If valid, a question of the privileges of the House will be considered on the House floor. Common Categories of Questions Held to Be Valid
Questions Relating to Organization
Questions may relate to the organization of the House and the rights of Members to their seats or their leadership positions. Questions Relating to Constitutional Prerogatives
Matters related to the House's constitutionally granted powers have been recognized as valid questions of the privileges of the House. Questions Relating to Conduct
Certain questions relating to the conduct of Members, officers, and employees have been held to be valid. Questions Relating to Integrity of Proceedings
Questions of the privileges of the House have included matters related to the integrity of the legislative process, both in committee and on the House floor. The number of valid questions offered each Congress varied significantly, with some Congresses considering as few as two and others considering more than 20. How valid questions were disposed of varied significantly depending on whether the Member offering the question belonged to the majority or the minority party. Of the valid questions offered by the minority party, a large majority (82%) were tabled, meaning that the House chose to dispose of the resolution adversely but without taking a vote on the resolution. The notion of questions of privilege predates Congress. The House, however, demonstrated a historical reluctance to define such a question for over a century until the chamber found it necessary to create a definition as part of a rule that would "prevent the large consumption of time which resulted from Members getting the floor for all kinds of speeches under the pretext of raising a question of the privileges of the House." Despite the creation of the rule, raising a question of the privileges of the House allows any Member to be recognized and to have a resolution read on the floor, even if the question is later ruled not to be valid. There is a contrast between the types of questions raised and the types of questions agreed to. The ratios of the types of questions offered and the types of questions agreed to by the House varied. As displayed in Figure 4 , the greatest number of questions raised related to conduct (39%) and to the House's constitutional prerogatives (23%). Of the resolutions agreed to, however, most (78%) related to the House's constitutional prerogatives, while a relative few (9%) related to conduct. First, recall that the minority party offered a majority (72%) of the total number of valid questions, and the proportion of questions offered by the minority remained consistent during most of the period, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Of the questions offered by majority Members, a majority (69%) were agreed to. | A question of the privileges of the House is a formal declaration by a Member of the House asserting that a situation has arisen affecting "the rights of the House collectively, its safety, dignity and the integrity of its proceedings." Once a question of the privileges of the House is raised, the Speaker must, at some point, entertain the question and rule on its validity. The Speaker makes such a ruling with guidance from the House Parliamentarian based on House rule and precedent. If it is ruled to be valid, a question of the privileges of the House will be considered and possibly voted on by the House.
The notion of questions of privilege predates Congress, but the House demonstrated a reluctance to define such a question for over a century. The chamber eventually found it necessary to create a definition as part of a rule that would prevent Members from consuming floor time under the pretext of raising a question of the privileges of the House. Despite the creation of the rule, however, raising a question of the privileges of the House continues to allow any Member to be recognized and to have a resolution read on the floor, even if the question is later ruled not to be valid.
Questions recognized as valid comprise several categories, such as:
questions related to the organization of the House and the rights of Members to their seats or leadership positions, questions related to the House's constitutional prerogatives, such as their power to originate revenue legislation, questions related to the conduct of Members, officers, and employees of the House, questions related to the integrity of the legislative process, both in committee and on the House floor, and questions related to the comfort, convenience, and safety of Members.
Certain categories of questions have been held not to constitute valid questions of the privileges of the House, such as questions that are tantamount to a change in House rules, questions that seek to alter or prescribe a special rule reported from the House Rules Committee, and questions expressing legislative sentiment.
From the 104th Congress through the 113th Congress, Members offered 140 questions of the privileges of the House, 73% of which were ruled valid. The number of valid questions offered each Congress varied significantly, with some Congresses considering as few as two and others considering more than 20. The minority party offered 72% of the total number of valid questions, and the proportion of questions offered by the minority remained consistent during most of the period.
How valid questions were disposed of during this time period varied significantly depending on whether the Member offering the question belonged to the majority or the minority party. A majority of questions offered by the majority party were agreed to, while a majority of the questions offered by the minority party were tabled, meaning that the House chose to dispose of the resolution adversely but without taking a vote on the resolution.
A contrast exists between the types of questions raised and the types of questions agreed to by the House. The greatest number of valid questions raised related to the conduct of Members, officers, and employees of the House (39%) and to the House's constitutional prerogatives, such as their power to originate revenue legislation (23%). Of the resolutions agreed to, however, most (78%) related to the House's constitutional prerogatives, while a relative few (9%) related to conduct. |
crs_R44961 | crs_R44961_0 | Introduction
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) review of medical products (human drugs and devices) is funded through a combination of annual discretionary appropriations from Congress (budget authority) and user fees collected from industry. The human medical product user fee programs require reauthorization every five years to continue uninterrupted. Prior to the passage of the Food and Drug Administration Reauthorization Act of 2017 (FDARA, P.L. 115-52 ), these programs were set to expire on September 30, 2017. The reauthorization legislation typically includes additional provisions related to FDA, since for many the bill is considered "must-pass" legislation in order for FDA product review activities to continue uninterrupted; as in prior reauthorizations, Congress made this user fee legislation a vehicle for addressing other FDA-related issues. FDARA continues the five-year reauthorization cycle of the human medical product user fee programs, which allows FDA to continue collecting fees and using the revenue to support, among other things, the review of marketing applications for brand-name and generic drugs, biological and biosimilar products, and medical devices. In addition to titles that reauthorize the drug, device, generic drug, and biosimilar biological product user fee programs through FY2022, FDARA includes titles that
modify the drug and device regulatory processes to encourage the development of drugs and devices for pediatric use; amend the law regarding medical device, prescription drug, and generic drug regulation; and make changes in several cross-cutting areas, such as annual reporting on inspection and analysis of use of funds. The passage of the 21 st Century Cures Act ( P.L. 114-255 ) in December 2016 resulted in numerous changes to the FDA approval processes for drugs, devices, and biologics, as well as other reforms to FDA. Therefore, fewer non-user fee provisions were included in FDARA. This report presents an overview of FDARA by title and section, providing a narrative context for each title, as well as a brief description of each section. | Food and Drug Administration (FDA) review of medical products (human drugs and devices) is funded through a combination of annual discretionary appropriations from Congress (budget authority) and user fees collected from industry. The human medical product user fee programs require reauthorization every five years to continue uninterrupted. Prior to the passage of the Food and Drug Administration Reauthorization Act of 2017 (FDARA, P.L. 115-52), these programs were set to expire on September 30, 2017. The reauthorization legislation typically includes additional provisions related to FDA, since for many the bill is considered "must-pass" legislation in order to not interrupt FDA product review activities.
FDARA continues the five-year reauthorization cycle of the human medical product user fee programs; this reauthorization allows FDA to keep collecting user fees and using the revenue to support, among other things, the review of marketing applications for brand-name and generic drugs, biological and biosimilar products, and medical devices. In addition to titles that reauthorize the four user fee programs (drugs, devices, generic drugs, and biosimilars) through FY2022, FDARA includes titles that
modify the drug and device regulatory processes to encourage the development of drugs and devices for pediatric use; amend the law regarding medical device, prescription drug, and generic drug regulation; and make changes in several cross-cutting areas, such as annual reporting on inspection and analysis of use of funds.
The passage of the 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255) in December 2016 made numerous changes to the FDA approval processes for drugs, devices, and biologics, as well as other reforms to FDA; therefore, fewer non-user fee provisions were included in FDARA.
This report presents an overview of FDARA by title and section, providing a narrative context for each title, as well as a brief description of each section. |
crs_R44131 | crs_R44131_0 | Introduction
During its development, the U.S. Navy's Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) aircraft and its predecessors have been proposed to fill a number of roles and operate in a variety of air defense environments. Prepared in response to a specific Congressional request, this report details the history of UCLASS requirements development through the program's evolution to its current stage. | During its development, the U.S. Navy's Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) aircraft and its predecessors have been proposed to fill a number of roles and operate in a variety of air defense environments. Over time, those requirements have evolved to encompass a less demanding set of capabilities than first envisioned. This report details the history of UCLASS requirements development through the program's evolution to its current stage. |
crs_RL31518 | crs_RL31518_0 | In the 108th Congress, S. 129 , the Federal Workforce Flexibility Act of 2003, passed the Senate with an amendment by unanimous consent on April 8, 2004. On June 24,2004, the House committee ordered the bill to be reported to the House of Representatives by voicevote, after agreeing, by voice vote, to an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered byRepresentative Jo Ann Davis. Another bill related to management of the federal workforce was introduced in the House of Representatives on April 3, 2003. 1601 ,the Federal Workforce Flexibility Act of 2003, and it was referred to the House Committee onGovernment Reform. S. 129 , as passed by the Senate and as ordered to be reported to the House, would amend current law provisions on critical pay, civil service retirement system computation forpart-time service, agency training, and annual leave. The bill also would amend current lawprovisions on recruitment and relocation bonuses and retention allowances (which would be renamedbonuses). As ordered to be reported to the House, S. 129 would amend the current 5U.S.C. ��5753 and 5754 language on such bonuses and allowances. As passed by the Senate, itwould add new sections 5754a and 5754b on recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses to Title5 United States Code . ��5754a and 5754b. (16)
S. 129 , as ordered to be reported to the House, would amend current law provisions on pay administration. These amendments were included in S. 129 as introduced, but theywere dropped during Senate committee markup and are not included in the Senate-passed versionof the bill. Provisions that would amend current law on retirement service credit for cadet ormidshipman service and compensatory time off for travel were added to S. 129 duringSenate committee markup and are included in the legislation as passed by the Senate and as orderedto be reported to the House. Added during Senate Committee markup as well were provisions onSenior Executive Service authority for the White House Office of Administration that are in theSenate-passed bill, but are not in the legislation as ordered to be reported to the House (theprovisions were removed from the House version of the bill during the full House committeemarkup). Other provisions that would have amended current law provisions relating to contributionsto the Thrift Savings Plan, annuity commencement dates, and retirement for air traffic controllerswere included in S. 129, as forwarded by the House Civil Service and AgencyOrganization Subcommittee to the House Government Reform Committee, but were removed duringthe full committee markup. (25)
This report discusses each of the provisions in S. 129 , as passed by the Senate and as ordered to be reported to the House. Therefore, if the Senate-passed S. 129 were enacted, agencieswould be able to use the current law provisions on recruitment and relocation bonuses at 5 U.S.C.�5753 and the enhanced authority for recruitment and relocation bonuses proposed at 5 U.S.C.�5754a. S. 129 and H.R. | As in the previous Congress, management of the federal workforce continues to be an issue ofinterest to the Senate and the House of Representatives in the 108th Congress. S. 129 ,the Federal Workforce Flexibility Act of 2003, passed the Senate with an amendment by unanimousconsent on April 8, 2004. In the House, the Subcommittee on Civil Service and AgencyOrganization forwarded S. 129 to the House Committee on Government Reform on May18, 2004, after amending it by voice vote. On June 24, 2004, the House committee ordered the billto be reported to the House of Representatives, after amending it, by voice vote. The bill wasintroduced by Senator George Voinovich on January 9, 2003. A similar bill, H.R. 1601 ,the Federal Workforce Flexibility Act of 2003, was introduced in the House by Representative JoAnn Davis on April 3, 2003.
S. 129 , as passed by the Senate and as ordered to be reported to the House, would amend current law provisions on critical pay, civil service retirement system computation forpart-time service, agency training, and annual leave. The bill also would amend current lawprovisions on recruitment and relocation bonuses and retention allowances (which would be renamedbonuses). As ordered to be reported to the House, S. 129 would amend the current 5U.S.C. ��5753 and 5754 language on such bonuses and allowances. As passed by the Senate, itwould add new sections 5754a and 5754b on recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses to Title5 United States Code . Therefore, if S. 129 as passed by the Senate were enacted, agencieswould be able to use the current law provisions on recruitment and relocation bonuses and retentionallowances at 5 U.S.C. ��5753 and 5754 and the enhanced authority for recruitment, relocation, andretention bonuses proposed at 5 U.S.C. ��5754a and 5754b.
S. 129 , as ordered to be reported to the House, would amend current law provisions on pay administration. These amendments were included in S. 129 as introduced, butthey were dropped during Senate committee markup and are not included in the Senate-passedversion of the bill. Provisions that would amend current law on retirement service credit for cadetor midshipman service and compensatory time off for travel were added to S. 129 duringSenate committee markup and are included in the legislation as passed by the Senate and as orderedto be reported to the House. Added during Senate Committee markup as well were provisions onSenior Executive Service authority for the White House Office of Administration that are in theSenate-passed bill, but are not in the legislation as ordered to be reported to the House. Otherprovisions that would have amended current law provisions relating to contributions to the ThriftSavings Plan, annuity commencement dates, and retirement for air traffic controllers were includedin S. 129 as forwarded by the House Civil Service and Agency Organization Subcommitteeto the House Government Reform Committee, but were removed during the full committee markup.
This report, which will be updated as needed, discusses each of the provisions in S. 129 , as passed by the Senate and as ordered to be reported to the House. |
crs_R44905 | crs_R44905_0 | Each of these proceedings allows the USPTO to revisit—and possibly cancel—a patent the agency had previously allowed. In brief, IPR proceedings allow individuals to petition USPTO to assert that a granted patent is invalid in view of earlier patents or printed publications. Should the USPTO's Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) grant the petition, it will preside over the IPR and ordinarily reach a final determination, which may be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit). The unexpected popularity of IPR proceedings may suggest that Congress met its objectives in providing an expedient and cost-effective means for challenging patents that the USPTO may have issued erroneously. These proceedings potentially harness the technical expertise of the USPTO, improve patent quality, are less costly than litigation, and can confirm the validity of patents that meet the statutory standards. Members of the patent community view IPRs as being "patent owner-unfriendly" and having led to "swift and numerous losses of patent rights." Some believe that IPRs have significantly eroded the confidence of innovative industry in the U.S. patent system. Under the AIA, the petitioner must demonstrate that there is a "reasonable likelihood" that he would prevail with respect to at least one claim in order for the IPR to begin. Both PGRs and IPRs operate under a trial-like procedure before a panel with at least three members. These procedures include the use of witnesses, the opportunity for limited discovery, and an oral hearing prior to a decision on the merits. S. 1390 was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary on June 21, 2017. On the other hand, during patent acquisition, the USPTO accords claim terms their "broadest reasonable interpretation." The Court observed both that the patent proprietor had the opportunity to amend claims during an IPR and that the USPTO had applied this standard for more than a century. In the 115 th Congress, the STRONGER Patents Act of 2017 would require the PTAB, in IPR and PGR proceedings, to use the same claim construction standard as the federal courts—that is to say, a construction in accordance with "the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains." The STRONGER Patents Act would also require that the IPR or PGR petitioner demonstrate unpatentability "by clear and convincing evidence." Yet some stakeholders believe that, in practice, the PTAB rarely allows motions to amend claims. In addition, the petitioner asserted that IPRs violated the Seventh Amendment because juries play no role in these proceedings. §318(a), which provides that the [PTAB] in an inter partes review "shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner," require [the PTAB] to issue a final written decision as to every claim challenged by the petitioner, or does it allow [the PTAB] to issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of only some of the patent claims challenged by the petitioner, as the Federal Circuit held? This possibility, which increases the cost and length of participation, may be exacerbated because current law permits one individual to file multiple IPR petitions against a single patent. Statistics with respect to IPRs also suggest that most patents in these proceedings have been subject to contemporaneous litigation. | The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011 introduced inter partes review proceedings (IPRs) into the patent system. IPRs allow the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to revisit—and possibly cancel—a patent the agency had previously allowed. Under these proceedings, any individual may petition the USPTO to assert that a granted patent is invalid in view of earlier patents or printed publications. A petitioner must demonstrate that there is a "reasonable likelihood" that he would prevail for the IPR to begin. Should the USPTO's Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) grant the petition, it will preside over a trial-like proceeding before a panel with at least three members. These procedures include the use of witnesses, the opportunity for limited discovery, and an oral hearing prior to a decision on the merits. IPRs must ordinarily be completed within one year and may result in patent claims being upheld, invalidated, or confirmed as amended.
IPR proceedings are arguably the most impactful of the numerous reforms made by the AIA. To many, their unexpected popularity suggests that Congress met its objectives in providing an expedient and cost-effective means for challenging patents that the USPTO erroneously issued. These proceedings potentially harness the technical expertise of the USPTO, improve patent quality, are less costly than litigation in the district courts, and can confirm the validity of patents that meet the statutory standards.
Others are critical of these proceedings. Many members of the patent community view IPRs as being biased against patent owners and believe that they have significantly eroded the confidence of innovative industry in the U.S. patent system. They observe that most patents involved in IPRs are also subject to litigation in the federal courts, a development that increases the expense and complexity of patent enforcement. They also believe that the prompt pace of these proceedings, as well as the possibility of multiple IPR petitions being filed against a single patent, may challenge patent owners.
Stakeholders have considered numerous possible reforms to the structure of IPR proceedings. In the 115th Congress, the STRONGER Patents Act of 2017 (S. 1390) would require the PTAB to give claim terms their ordinary meaning, in contrast to the "broadest reasonable interpretation" in keeping with USPTO rules. S. 1390 would also require that patent challengers prove invalidity by "clear and convincing" evidence, in contrast to the "preponderance of the evidence" standard that currently applies. And the bill would limit use of IPR proceedings to individuals and enterprises with a demonstrated adverse relationship to the challenged patent. S. 1390 was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary on June 21, 2017.
Other aspects of IPR law and practice remain topics of debate. Some stakeholders assert that even though the AIA provides patent proprietors with the opportunity to amend their claims during an IPR, the PTAB rarely allows them to do so. Others observe that the PTAB often initiates IPRs on a smaller number of claims than are challenged. They believe that such a "partial initiation" can create confusion about claims that were not considered by the PTAB. Some commentators express concern that the increased number of appeals from the USPTO to the Federal Circuit may be frustrating the congressional goal of providing the court with a well-rounded caseload. Critics of the PTAB also believe that IPRs violate the constitutional separation of powers principle and the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. |
crs_R41950 | crs_R41950_0 | What Is a Post Office? Colloquially, the term "post office" often is employed to refer to any place where stamps are sold and postal services are provided by USPS employees. Herein, the term "USPS retail postal facilities" will encompass all five of the aforementioned postal facilities—post offices, post office branches, post office stations, community post offices, and contract postal units. How Many Post Offices Might the USPS Close? It is unclear how many retail postal facilities the USPS intends to close in the coming years. The agency also has not stated how many post offices it needs to serve the public. (1) In May 2009, the USPS announced it planned to shutter up to 3,105 retail facilities. Nor did the agency state which of the postal facilities on the 2009 and 2011 lists have been shuttered or might be shut down. Federal postal law sets forth the basic rules by which the USPS may proceed to close a post office. What Is the Role of the Postal Regulatory Commission in Post Office Closures? 39 U.S.C. Recent Legislation
113th Congress
At the time of the publication of this report, three bills with post office closure related provisions had been introduced into the 113 th Congress— H.R. 630 , H.R. 1016 , and S. 316 . The legislation would
make the statutory closure rules applicable to all USPS-operated facilities that serve the public directly; require the USPS to notify by mail each customer served by a facility in the event that the USPS should wish to consider closing it; expand the current statutory public comment period from 60 to 90 days; require the USPS to explain publicly its analysis of the estimated effects of a closure; empower the PRC to forbid the closure of a post office after conducting a review by request of an affected member of the public; disallow the USPS to use an expedited emergency closure process in the instance of a lease termination or cancellation; and direct the USPSOIG to report on whether a retail postal facility closure produced the savings the USPS had estimated. 101(b) to increase the USPS's authority to close post offices: "The Postal Service shall provide a maximum degree of effective and regular postal services to rural areas, communities, and small towns where post offices are not self-sustaining"; and "No small post office shall be closed solely for operating at a deficit, it being the specific intent of the Congress that effective postal services be insured to residents of both urban and rural communities. | In 2009 and 2011, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) announced initiatives to close post offices. Approximately 4,380 retail facilities in rural, suburban, and urban areas could have been closed. In May 2012, the agency apparently changed course. The USPS issued a plan to "preserve" rural post offices; rather than closing these facilities, the USPS would reduce their operating hours. The agency did not, however, state whether it would continue to shutter post offices in non-rural areas, nor did it provide an estimate of how many post offices it needs to serve the public. Thus, how many post offices may be closed in the coming years remains unclear. At the end of FY2012, the USPS had 34,784 retail postal facilities—1,281 fewer than it had in FY2008.
At the time of the publication of this report, three bills in the 113th Congress carry provisions that address post offices and the public's access to retail postal services, including H.R. 630, H.R. 1016, and S. 316.
Colloquially, the term "post office" often is employed to refer to any place where stamps are sold and postal services are provided by USPS employees. However, the USPS differentiates among several categories of postal facilities, including post offices, post office branches and stations, community post offices, and contract postal units.
Congress long has permitted the USPS considerable discretion to decide how many post offices to erect and where to place them. Congress also requires the USPS to provide the public with access to retail postal services (e.g., sales of postage, parcel acceptance, etc.).
Both federal law and the USPS's rules prescribe a post office closure process, which takes at least 120 days. The USPS must notify the affected public and hold a 60-day comment period prior to closing a post office. Should the USPS decide to close a post office, the public has 30 days to appeal the decision to the Postal Regulatory Commission. Sixty days after it has made a closure decision, the USPS may shut down a post office.
This report will be updated to reflect significant developments. |
crs_RS21424 | crs_RS21424_0 | In the three decades since its enactment, the Clean Air Act (CAA) has seen many skirmishes over how its text should be interpreted. A current, and major, one involves the extent to which a power plant or factory may alter its facilities or operations without bringing about a "modification" of that emissions source. A "modification" turns an existing emissions source into a "new source," which has to meet more stringent air pollution control requirements in the CAA than does an existing source. Legally speaking, the issue is—What changes to an "existing stationary source" of air pollution are significant enough to be a "modification" so as to trigger the CAA's New Source Performance Standards (NSPSs) and pre-construction "new source review" (NSR)? Our topic in this report, however, is narrower. It is the widely used exemption to what constitutes a modification for "routine maintenance, repair, and replacement" (RMRR) at stationary sources. This report surveys the original statutory, regulatory, and case law landscape on RMRR, then describes more recent regulatory and judicial developments. The PSD and nonattainment-area portions of the act, mandating NSR, are to similar effect. | A major Clean Air Act issue is the extent to which an existing power plant or factory may be altered without effecting a "modification." A "modification" of an existing air pollution source is subject to the act's stringent air pollution control requirements for new sources. The topic of this report is a widely used exemption to "modification" allowing changes that constitute "routine maintenance, repair, and replacement" without triggering such stringent requirements. The report surveys the original legal landscape surrounding this exemption—in the contexts of determining applicability of New Source Performance Standards, and New Source Review in Prevention of Significant Deterioration and nonattainment areas. It then summarizes the many significant developments during the current Bush Administration, both in the Federal Register and in the courts. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R40693 | crs_R40693_0 | 111-117 ) on December 16, 2009. Congressional Action
Conference Report
Congress provided a total of $48.9 billion for State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies for FY2010, $3.3 billion (6%) below the President's request of $52.2 billion. On July 9, the committee approved S. 1434 , the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Agency Appropriations Act, 2010. State-Foreign Operations Overview
The State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill funds most programs and activities within the international affairs budget, also known as Function 150, including foreign economic and military assistance, food assistance, contributions to international organizations and multilateral financial institutions, State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) operations, public diplomacy, and international broadcasting programs. The Obama Administration's first international affairs budget proposal continues to use this framework. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is an aid delivery concept, proposed by President Bush in 2002, authorized by Congress (Title VI, Division D of P.L. Further details of the international affairs account are provided in Appendix E .
Use of Supplemental Funding
Supplemental resources for State and Foreign Operations programs, which in FY2004 exceeded regular State and Foreign Operations funding, became a significant source of funds for U.S. international activities during the Bush Administration, especially for programs related to reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and strategic assistance to the Near East and South Central Asia. The Obama Administration has pledged to discontinue the practice of requesting supplemental appropriations to fund ongoing activities, starting with the FY2010 request, and claims that all anticipated funding for FY2010 has been included in the request. FY2010 Budget Request: State Department and Related Agencies
The Administration's FY2010 budget request for the Department of State, international broadcasting, and related agencies is $17.36 billion, representing a 6% increase over the FY2009 estimate of $16.36 billion, including supplementals and the mandatory Foreign Service Retirement Fund. These have included the withholding of funds related to international family planning policies; issues related to implementation of the Iraq Oil for Food Program, and the findings and recommendations of the Volcker Committee Inquiry into that program; alleged and actual findings of sexual exploitation and abuse by personnel in U.N. peacekeeping operations in the field and other misconduct by U.N. officials at U.N. headquarters in New York and at other U.N. headquarters venues; and efforts to develop, agree to, and bring about meaningful and comprehensive reform of the United Nations organization, in most of its aspects. The annual State-Foreign Operations Appropriations bill funds all U.S. bilateral development assistance programs, with the exception of food assistance appropriated through the Agriculture Appropriations bill (for which $2.42 billion was appropriated in FY2009 and $1.89 billion is requested for FY2010). However, the supplemental bill ( H.R. H.R. Development Assistance , from which additional funding would support the Administration's agricultural development and food security priorities, would increase by 37% over the FY2009 funding level under the Administration request, by 25% under the House-passed bill, and by 28% in the Senate-reported bill. | The annual State, Foreign Operations and Related Agencies appropriations bill is the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. international affairs budget and influences executive branch foreign policy making in general, as these activities have not been considered regularly by Congress through the authorization process since 2003. Funding for Foreign Operations and State Department/Broadcasting programs has been steadily rising since FY2002, after a period of decline in the 1980s and 1990s. Amounts approved for FY2004 in regular and supplemental bills reached an unprecedented level compared with the previous 40 years, largely due to Iraq reconstruction funding. Ongoing assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as large new global health programs, has kept the international affairs budget at historically high levels in recent years. The Obama Administration's FY2010 budget proposal indicated that this trend would continue.
On May 7, 2009, President Obama submitted a budget proposal for FY2010 that requests $53.9 billion for the international affairs budget, a 2% increase over the enacted FY2009 funding level, including supplementals. Within that amount, $52.2 billion is for programs and activities funded through the State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill. The Administration requested significant increases to support additional foreign service officers at USAID and the Department of State, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, food security and agricultural development, counter-terrorism and law enforcement activities, and meeting U.S. commitments to international organizations. Among programs and regions for which the Administration recommended reduced funding, compared with estimated FY2009 levels, are economic assistance to Iraq; aid to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia; international peacekeeping; and foreign military financing. These comparisons, however, are in relation to unusually high FY2009 total funding levels in some accounts, and do not necessarily reflect shifts in policy or priorities.
Key policy issues addressed in the Administration's request include enhancing the capacity of civilian diplomatic and development agencies, promoting U.S. leadership in multilateral development banks, and improving fiscal transparency by funding ongoing programs through the regular appropriations process rather than through supplemental appropriations. The proposal also seeks funding for at least two activities that have been rejected by Congress in the past—multilateral clean investment funds managed by the World Bank and the U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA).
This report analyzes the FY2010 request, recent-year funding trends, and congressional action for FY2010, which includes the July 9 House approval of H.R. 3081, the State-Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for FY2010, July 9 Senate Appropriations Committee passage of its bill (S. 1434), and passage of H.R. 3288, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, signed into law Dec. 16, 2009 (P.L. 111-117). |
crs_R41140 | crs_R41140_0 | Introduction
Many federal health, safety, and environmental regulations are primarily designed to reduce the risk of death, illness, or injury from exposure to a particular hazard (e.g., arsenic in drinking water, rollover car crashes, or terrorist attacks on airplanes). The agencies issuing these regulations often place a monetary value on these expected health benefits by determining the number of "statistical lives" that the rules are expected to save, and then multiplying that number by an estimated "value of a statistical life." The monetization of reductions in the number of expected fatalities, injuries, and illnesses in the rulemaking process is often controversial, and the process by which federal agencies place monetary values on such benefits is not widely understood. This report summarizes current government-wide requirements for benefit-cost analysis and the monetization of health benefits, and describes agency-specific policies in selected health, safety, and environmental agencies. Also, the report provides examples of final rules published by the selected agencies from 2007 through 2009 that monetized expected health benefits, and describes how those values were used in the economic analyses for the rules. Finally, the report offers some concluding observations. OMB Circular A-4
The regulatory analysis requirements in Executive Order 12866 are more fully delineated in OMB Circular A-4, which was issued in September 2003. For example, if 100,000 people are each willing to pay an average of $50 to reduce a 1 in 100,000 risk of dying from exposure to a particular risk, then the "value of a statistical life" (VSL) for the population relative to that risk is $5 million ($50 times 100,000). As a consequence of this flexibility, federal agencies reportedly use somewhat different VSLs. Circular A-4 does not indicate how much larger the VSLY should be for senior citizens, or what constitutes a "senior citizen." Discount Rates
In many instances, the benefits and the costs of a regulation are expected to occur at different times. Circular A-4 states that costs and benefits can be compared to determine net benefits only when they have been discounted to present values, and says that agencies should provide estimates of net benefits in regulatory analyses using both a 3% and a 7% discount rate. The last column of the table shows the monetary value of those percentages using DOT's current $6.0 million VSL. The other agencies said they tend to use VSLs used in DOT, EPA, or other agencies and rules. In other cases, the agencies used VSL estimates in break-even analyses, or to rule out a regulatory option. Nevertheless, there were some differences in how the agencies used VSL information in their economic analyses. For example, OMB Circular A-4 does not require the agencies to use a particular VSL; it simply notes that academic studies have suggested values between $1 million and $10 million. The circular also suggests that agencies "consider" providing estimates of both VSL and VSLY, but does not require that agencies do so. Agencies Used VSLs in Different Ways
The agencies also appeared to vary in how the VSL information was used. VSL and Other Variables Can Affect Regulatory Conclusions
Some of the rules discussed in this report illustrate that the size of the VSL used in the economic analysis and other variables have the potential to affect whether the rule is expected to produce positive net benefits. Variations May Be Due to Transparency Differences
The agencies appeared to vary substantially in the degree to which they used various techniques in the monetization of health benefits. | Federal health, safety, and environmental regulations are often designed to reduce the risk of death, illness, or injury from exposure to a particular hazard (e.g., arsenic in drinking water or rollover car crashes). As part of an economic analysis required by Executive Order 12866, the issuing agencies often place a monetary value on these expected health benefits by determining the number of "statistical lives" that the rules are expected to extend or save, and then multiplying that number by an estimated "value of a statistical life" (VSL). For example, if 100,000 people are each willing to pay an average of $50 to reduce a 1 in 100,000 risk of dying from a particular risk, then the VSL for the population relative to that risk is $5 million ($50 times 100,000).
The monetization of regulatory health benefits is often controversial, and the process by which federal agencies do so is not widely understood. This report summarizes current government-wide requirements for benefit-cost analysis and the monetization of health benefits, and describes agency-specific policies in selected health, safety, and environmental agencies. Also, the report provides examples of final rules published by the selected agencies from 2007 through 2009 that monetized expected health benefits and describes how those values were used in the economic analyses for the rules. Finally, the report offers some concluding observations.
OMB Circular A-4, which was issued in September 2003, delineates what is expected in a good regulatory analysis while giving the agencies substantial flexibility. The circular notes that academic studies have identified VSLs from $1 million to $10 million, but it does not recommend that agencies use a particular VSL. Circular A-4 says that VSLs should not vary by age, but recommends that agencies consider providing estimates in terms of both VSLs and the value of statistical life years (VSLY) extended. The circular says that agencies should use larger VSLYs for senior citizens, but does not specify how much larger or what constitutes a "senior citizen." When the benefits and costs of a rule are expected to occur at different times, the circular says agencies should compare them in "present values" using both a 3% and a 7% discount rate.
Some federal agencies have written policies on the monetization of expected health benefits, and those policies differ in some respects. For example, in 2009, the Department of Transportation's (DOT) VSL was $6.0 million while the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) VSL was nearly $7.9 million. Other agencies tended to use the DOT or EPA VSLs, or used VSLs that they or other agencies have used in previous rules. DOT's policy established the value of injuries prevented as percentages of the VSL, whereas EPA's policy does not recommend particular values for injuries or illnesses.
In more than 20 final rules that were issued between 2007 and 2009, federal agencies used somewhat different VSLs, and used VSL information in different ways. The agencies often compared monetized health benefits with costs to determine whether to regulate, but in some cases the agencies used VSL estimates in "break-even" analyses (showing at what point the value of the health benefits equals the cost), or to rule out a regulatory option. The agencies sometimes used lower and higher VSLs, and sometimes used multiple discount rates, in sensitivity analyses. Some of the rules illustrated that the size of the VSL used can affect whether a rule is expected to produce positive net benefits. Some of the apparent variations in the agencies' economic analyses may be due to differences in the degree to which the agencies disclosed their procedures.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R45088 | crs_R45088_0 | Introduction
The Department of Defense (DOD) created the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in 1958. The report also describes funding trends at DARPA and discusses select issues for possible congressional consideration, including the appropriate level of funding for the agency, technology transfer, and the potential role of DARPA in maintaining the technological superiority of the U.S. military. Since its establishment, DARPA-funded research has made important scientific and technological contributions in computer science, telecommunications, and material sciences, among other areas. Risk-Taking and Tolerance for Failure
DARPA's approach to risk is also unusual and is a well characterized element of the agency's success. Many in Congress viewed this flexibility in hiring as improving DARPA's ability to recruit and retain eminent scientific and technical experts. Nearly all of DARPA's funding falls under the categories of basic research (6.1), applied research (6.2), and advanced technology development (6.3). Funding for the 6.1 to 6.3 program elements is referred to by DOD as the science and technology (S&T) budget. DOD's S&T budget is often singled out by analysts and others for additional scrutiny, as it is viewed as an investment in the foundational knowledge needed to develop future military systems. In FY2017 constant dollars, DARPA funding has decreased by less than 1%, from $3.35 billion in FY1996 to $3.32 billion in FY2019. While fluctuating over time the overall trend line for DARPA funding has remained relatively steady in constant dollars ( Figure 3 ). In FY2019, basic research accounts for 14% of DARPA funding, up from 3% in FY1996. However, the proportion of DARPA funding supporting basic research in FY2019 represents a 10% decline when compared to the proportion of DARPA funding supporting basic research in FY2018. Between FY1996 and FY2019, DARPA's share of DOD RDT&E funding has declined from 6.4% in FY1996 to 3.6% in FY2019 ( Figure 5 ). As shown in Figure 6 , DARPA's share of Defense S&T funding has remained relatively steady at between 22% and 25% from FY2000 to FY2019 and is comparable to the percentage of R&D devoted to disruptive projects at leading innovative companies. For example, Congress and others have expressed concern that the United States is at risk of losing its technological advantage and have called for increased innovation within DOD to address the narrowing of the United States' advantage over its adversaries. DARPA's Role and the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering
Over the last several years, some Members of Congress, think tanks, and others have expressed concern that the U.S. military is losing its technical superiority due, in part, to the proliferation of technologies outside the defense sector and the inability of DOD to effectively incorporate and exploit commercial innovations. Congress may consider conducting oversight on the processes and mechanisms used by DARPA to integrate ethical, legal, and societal considerations into its R&D portfolio. | The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), established in 1958, is an agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) responsible for catalyzing the development of technologies that maintain and advance the capabilities and technical superiority of the U.S. military.
DARPA-funded research has made important science and technology contributions that have led to the development of both military and commercial technologies, such as precision guided missiles, stealth, the internet, and personal electronics. DARPA has a culture of risk-taking and tolerance for failure that has led experts, some Members of Congress, and others to view DARPA as a model for innovation both inside and outside of the federal government.
The "DARPA model" is characterized by a flat organization that empowers its tenure-limited program managers with trust, autonomy, and the ability to take risks on innovative ideas. Congress has aided DARPA's efforts by granting the agency certain flexible acquisition and personnel hiring authorities, which have allowed DARPA to engage with people and entities that may have otherwise been reluctant to interact and do business with DOD.
DARPA funding has remained relatively steady over time. In FY2017 constant dollars, DARPA funding has decreased by less than 1% from $3.35 billion in FY1996 ($2.27 billion in current dollars) to $3.32 billion in FY2019 ($3.4 billion in current dollars). Nearly all of DARPA's funding falls under the categories of basic research, applied research, and advanced technology development. Funding under these categories is referred to by DOD as the science and technology (S&T) budget. DOD's S&T budget is often singled out by analysts and others for additional scrutiny, as it is viewed as an investment in the foundational knowledge needed to develop future military systems. DARPA's share of Defense S&T funding has remained relatively steady at between 22% and 25% from FY2000 to FY2019. In FY2019, basic research accounts for 14% of DARPA funding, up from 3% in FY1996. However, the proportion of DARPA funding supporting basic research in FY2019 represents a 10% decline when compared to the proportion of DARPA funding supporting basic research in FY2018. Between FY1996 and FY2019, DARPA's share of DOD research, development, testing, and evaluation funding has declined from 6.4% in FY1996 to 3.6% in FY2019.
Some Members of Congress, think tanks, and other experts have expressed concern that the U.S. military is losing its technological advantage and have called for increased innovation within DOD to address the perceived decline in U.S. technical dominance. In this context, Congress may consider several related issues, including the appropriate level of funding for DARPA; the effectiveness of the agency in transitioning technologies to the military services and the commercial sector; the role to be played by DARPA in any efforts by the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to increase innovation at DOD; and the mechanism by which DARPA integrates ethical, legal, and social considerations into its research and development projects. |
crs_R42511 | crs_R42511_0 | United States v. Jones presented such a challenge to the Supreme Court. The question posed was whether the installation and month-long monitoring of a GPS device attached to Jones's car constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures." In prior government tracking cases, the Court applied the test from Katz v. United States , which addresses whether the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area to be searched. The trespass theory asks whether there was a physical intrusion onto a constitutionally protected area coupled with an attempt to obtain information. Justice Sotomayor agreed with both the majority and Alito's concurrence, but called for additional protection by questioning the viability of the third-party doctrine, which holds that any information voluntarily given to a third party loses all privacy protections. During this time, the device tracked Jones's movements to and from a known stash house. At trial, the prosecution relied heavily on Jones's movements derived from the GPS to connect him with a larger drug ring. Jones was ultimately convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the GPS data were derived in violation of Jones's reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Because Jones's vehicle is an effect —listed in the text of the Fourth Amendment—the police's physical intrusion by attaching the GPS for tracking purposes constituted a search . The Jones Court had no doubts that the attachment of the GPS device (which required a trespass of Jones's car) would have been a search when the Fourth Amendment was adopted—when Entick was fresh in the framers' minds. This idea that the Fourth Amendment protects both privacy and property independently is infused throughout the majority opinion in Jones . The Court answered no: in addition to the physical intrusion, there must be "an attempt to find something or to obtain information." Will computer data constitute an effect ? If a police officer walks onto one's porch, is that an invasion of his house ? The Implications of Jones and Technology
As more cell phones and cars are outfitted with GPS tracking technologies, police need not physically attach a device to track its movements. Justices Alito, and his four-Justice concurrence, and Sotomayor, concurring separately, provide insight into how a future court may apply the Fourth Amendment to evolving technologies. He concluded that four weeks of tracking was a search. To say that short-term monitoring is permissible, but longer-term monitoring is not, indicates there is something about the aggregation of a person's movements that prompted these Justices to deem it a Fourth Amendment search. Justice Sotomayor's Concurrence: The Broadest Reading of the Fourth Amendment
As far as Fourth Amendment rights are concerned, Justice Sotomayor provided the broadest interpretation in Jones by joining the majority's trespass approach, openly supporting Justice Alito's privacy-based approach, and putting into question the continuing viability of the third-party doctrine—a theory many believe creates the largest gap in privacy protection, especially in the realm of technology. Because the government failed to argue that a warrant was not required or that something less than probable cause would be enough to conduct this surveillance, the Court considered the arguments forfeited. Conclusion
Nine Justices are seemingly in agreement that, based on the facts of Jones , the attachment of a GPS device to the bottom of Jones's car and tracking him for a month-long period was a constitutional search. Senator Leahy has introduced the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011 ( S. 1011 ), which would prohibit the government from accessing or using a device to acquire geolocation information, unless it obtains a warrant based upon probable cause or a court order under Title I or Title IV of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. Similarly, Senator Ron Wyden and Representative Jason Chaffetz have introduced identical legislation, S. 1212 and H.R. | In United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), all nine Supreme Court Justices agreed that Jones was searched when the police attached a Global Positioning System (GPS) device to the undercarriage of his car and tracked his movements for four weeks. The Court, however, splintered on what constituted the search: the attachment of the device or the long-term monitoring. The majority held that the attachment of the GPS device and an attempt to obtain information was the violation; Justice Alito, concurring, argued that the monitoring was a violation of Jones's reasonable expectation of privacy; and Justice Sotomayor, also concurring, agreed with them both, but would provide further Fourth Amendment protections. This report will examine these three decisions in an effort to find their place in the body of existing Fourth Amendment law pertaining to privacy, property, and technology.
In Jones, the police attached a GPS tracking device to the bottom of Jones's car and monitored his movements for 28 days. At trial, the prosecution relied on Jones's movements to a stash house to tie him to a drug conspiracy. Jones was convicted and given a life sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence was unlawfully obtained under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court agreed. The majority, speaking through Justice Scalia, explained that a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, coupled with an attempt to obtain information, can constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Although the Court's landmark decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), supposedly altered the focus of the Fourth Amendment from property to privacy, the majority argued that it left untouched traditional spheres of Fourth Amendment protection—a person and his house, papers, and effects. Because the police had invaded Jones's property—his car, which is an effect—that was all the Court needed to hold that a constitutional search had occurred.
The majority's test, however, provides little guidance in instances where the government need not physically install a device to conduct surveillance, for instance, by using cell phones or preinstalled GPS devices in vehicles. To understand how the Court may rule on these technologies, one must look to the two concurrences, which provide a more global interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Alito, writing for a four-member concurrence, would have applied the Katz privacy formulation, asserting that longer-term monitoring constitutes an invasion of privacy, whereas short-term monitoring does not. He left it to future courts to distinguish between the two. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence appears to provide the most protection, finding that both the trespass approach and the privacy-based approach should be utilized. She also questioned the rule that any information provided to a third party, which occurs in many commercial transactions like banking or computing, should lose all privacy protections.
Although all three opinions concluded that the government's action in Jones was a search, none expressly required that police get a warrant in future GPS tracking cases. (The government forfeited the argument.) Further, there is no clear indication of the level of suspicion—probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or something less—that is required to attach a GPS unit and monitor the target's movements. Additionally, there have been several bills filed in the 112th Congress, including Senator Patrick J. Leahy's Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendment Act of 2011 (S. 1011) and Senator Ron Wyden's and Representative Jason Chaffetz's identical legislation, S. 1212 and H.R. 2168, the Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act (GPS bill), that would require a warrant based upon probable cause to access geolocation information. |
crs_R42349 | crs_R42349_0 | In 2004, Congress passed the Project BioShield Act ( P.L. 108-276 ) to encourage the development of CBRN medical countermeasures. In response to perceived problems with Project BioShield countermeasure procurement, the 109 th Congress created the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) and the position of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) through the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA, P.L. 109-417 ). The 112 th Congress is considering several Project BioShield-related policy questions. One question is whether the Project BioShield acquisition mechanism has sufficiently improved national preparedness relative to its costs to merit extension. If so, congressional policymakers may consider whether changes to the funding levels or how Congress provides Project BioShield funds would improve the program's efficiency or performance. Additionally, congressional policymakers are considering whether the federal government sufficiently plans and coordinates its CBRN countermeasure efforts from basic research to distribution. Finally, Congress is considering whether changes to the emergency use authority will improve preparedness and planning. This report will provide a brief overview of the authorities established by the Project BioShield Act of 2004, discuss the availability of Project BioShield appropriations, identify the medical countermeasures obtained through Project BioShield, review the relationship between Project BioShield and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), review policy issues and options faced by congressional policymakers, and review current Project BioShield-related legislation. Instead, it authorized the appropriation of up to $5.593 billion for procuring countermeasures from FY2004 through FY2013. The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004 ( P.L. The Project BioShield Act specified that the funds in this DHS "Biodefense Countermeasures" account are only for the procurement of CBRN countermeasures using the Project BioShield authorities and may not be used for other purposes, such as countermeasure development grants or program administration. The HHS has used Project BioShield to acquire countermeasures against only a few CBRN threats: anthrax, smallpox, botulinum toxin, and radiological and nuclear threat agents. Policy Issues and Options for Congress
As discussed above, the federal government has successfully used the Project BioShield Act authorities to contribute to national preparedness for a CBRN attack and pandemic influenza. The 112 th Congress is considering whether to reauthorize and modify the Project BioShield acquisition mechanism, whether to change the countermeasure development and acquisition process, and whether to modify the authority to allow the emergency use of unapproved medical countermeasures. Additionally, all of these products expire. 2405 , H.R. Subsequent Congresses have rescinded or transferred more than one-third of the advance appropriation for other purposes. 2356 , H.R. 6672 , and S. 1855 . 2405 and S. 1855 , H.R. | In 2004, Congress passed the Project BioShield Act (P.L. 108-276) to provide the federal government with new authorities related to the development, procurement, and use of medical countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism agents. As the expiration of some of these authorities approaches, Congress is considering whether these authorities have sufficiently contributed to national preparedness to merit extension.
The Project BioShield Act provides three main authorities: (1) guaranteeing a federal market for new CBRN medical countermeasures, (2) permitting emergency use of countermeasures that are either unapproved or have not been approved for the intended emergency use, and (3) relaxing regulatory requirements for some CBRN terrorism-related spending. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has used each of these authorities. The HHS obligated approximately $2.625 billion to guarantee a government market for countermeasures against anthrax, botulism, radiation exposure, and smallpox. The HHS allowed the emergency use of several unapproved products, including during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. The HHS used expedited review authorities to approve contracts and grants related to CBRN countermeasure research and development.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-90) advance-appropriated $5.593 billion to acquire CBRN countermeasures through Project BioShield for FY2004-FY2013. Subsequent Congresses have removed $2.078 billion from this account through rescissions and transfers, more than one-third of the advance appropriation. The transfers from this account supported CBRN medical countermeasure advanced development, pandemic influenza preparedness and response, and basic biomedical research.
Since passing the Project BioShield Act, Congress has considered additional measures to further encourage countermeasure development. The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417) created the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in HHS and modified the Project BioShield procurement process. Among other duties, BARDA oversees all of HHS's Project BioShield procurements.
The 112th Congress is considering several Project BioShield-related policy questions. One question is whether the Project BioShield acquisition mechanism merits extension based on its relative cost and contribution to national preparedness. If so, congressional policymakers may consider whether changes to the funding levels or how Congress provides Project BioShield funds would improve the program's efficiency or performance. Additionally, congressional policymakers are considering whether the federal government sufficiently plans and coordinates its CBRN countermeasure efforts from basic research to distribution. Finally, Congress is considering whether changes to the emergency use authority will improve preparedness and planning.
Four bills in the 112th Congress address some of these Project BioShield-related issues, H.R. 2356, H.R. 2405, H.R. 6672, and S. 1855. |
crs_R41851 | crs_R41851_0 | Congressional Priorities
During the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, successive Congresses have demonstrated strong support for global health programs and have, for the most part, appropriated funds for global health in excess of presidential requests. Although some Members of Congress contend that cuts to these programs could yield important savings, others contend that such reductions would have little impact on the federal deficit but could significantly imperil the lives of vulnerable populations reliant on U.S. assistance. This includes global health programs implemented by USAID and CDC as well as interagency presidential global health initiatives including the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), the Neglected Tropical Disease Program (NTD Program), and the Global Health Initiative. The Global Health Initiative
In May 2009, President Obama announced the Global Health Initiative, a six-year plan projected to cost $63 billion. GHI attempts to provide a comprehensive U.S. global health strategy for existing U.S. global health programs, including many of the programs and initiatives outlined above. FY2012 Funding
On December 23, 2011, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-74 ). FY2013 Budget Request
The President's FY2013 budget request includes $8.5 billion for global health activities under the GHI, including $7.9 billion through the GHP account. Early action and debate within both the House and the Senate on FY2013 appropriations indicate that Congress may not support proposed reductions in funding for many global health programs. Likewise, some advocates argue that given advances in global health research and development, increased funding is critical for scaling up the use of new—and potentially very successful—tools to prevent and treat diseases, including HIV/AIDS and malaria. Finally, some global health experts contend that a decline or leveling off of global health spending could threaten U.S. efforts to develop multi-year agreements with governments that call for recipient countries to increasingly assume responsibility over the programs (see " Enhancing Country Ownership "). Over the last decade, Congress has frequently debated the appropriate balance between bilateral and multilateral assistance. On the other hand, supporters of higher multilateral spending argue U.S. participation in multilateral responses to global health offers distinct advantages, including the ability to
pool and leverage limited resources in the face of global challenges such as global health; capitalize on efficiencies in global health programming; coordinate assistance with a range of donors; and provide aid that better aligns with the priorities of the recipient countries. The compact specifically calls on
international organizations and bilateral donors to use national health plans as the basis for funding and planning health aid, ensure efforts to address particular diseases are funded and implemented as part of a broader effort to improve health systems, and be accountable for health aid by annually evaluating, monitoring, and reporting on results; governments to use national health plans to guide development of health systems, work with all stakeholders (including civil society and international organizations) and ensure that budgets reflect common vision for the health sector, tackle misappropriation of funds, strengthen health and financial management systems, and be accountable to the citizenry and funders through reports on results; and other donors to use their resources to advance coordinated multilateral approaches to strengthening health systems, continue to invest in learning and evaluation mechanisms to identify best practices, and be accountable and hold organizations receiving support accountable for measuring impact and directing funding to proven successes. Along with debating issues related to U.S. global health assistance, Congress may also wish to consider its own role in determining how U.S. global health programs are implemented. | U.S. funding for global health has grown significantly over the last decade, from approximately $1.7 billion in FY2001 to $8.8 billion in FY2012. During the George W. Bush Administration, Congress provided unprecedented increases in global health resources, especially in support of multi-agency initiatives targeting infectious diseases, such as the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI). As support for global health increased, the 110th and 111th Congresses began to emphasize better coordination of all global health programs and efforts to strengthen health systems in recipient countries. In 2009, the Obama Administration announced the Global Health Initiative (GHI), proposed as a six-year, $63 billion effort to integrate existing global health programs and provide a comprehensive U.S. global health strategy.
Funding for FY2012 was signed into law on December 23, 2011 (P.L. 112-74). FY2012 appropriations for global health programs remained similar to FY2011, although these amounts were agreed to after prolonged debate over potential budget reductions. The 112th Congress is currently debating FY2013 funding for global health activities. The Administration's FY2013 budget request includes reduced funding for global health for the first time in over a decade. However, early debate and action on FY2013 appropriations by both the House and Senate suggests that Congress may not support these reductions.
While some policymakers and health experts argue that reductions in global health may be possible due to newly identified efficiencies in programming that could yield important savings, others have raised concerns about the impact of potential cuts on current U.S. global health activities and stated targets. Some groups contend that lower levels of U.S. assistance could
limit U.S. agencies' ability to integrate their activities and implement innovative approaches to global health, as emphasized by GHI; threaten advances in eradicating diseases like polio and guinea worm and reverse progress made in preventing and treating diseases like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria; compel recipient countries to decrease spending on health issues that disproportionately affect the poor, like neglected tropical diseases and limit access to basic health services such as midwifery care, nutritional support, and vaccinations; and weaken U.S. efforts to encourage greater country ownership through multi-year funding plans.
This report provides a broad overview of U.S. global health assistance, including global health programs and global health initiatives, and analyzes some of the policy questions that the 112th Congress may consider as it oversees and debates funding for global health programs. For more detail on specific diseases and global health challenges, see related reports at http://www.crs.gov. |
crs_RL32408 | crs_RL32408_0 | The FCC announced in 2004 that it had agreed upon a rebanding plan to consolidate public safety frequencies and those used by some other operators, such as utilities, in the lower part of the 800 MHz band, while moving some of the 800 MHz channels acquired by Nextel, and some other commercial users, to the higher end of the band. The conversion process was scheduled to be completed by June 26, 2008. Disputes related to cost reimbursement have delayed the transition, however. The FCC has ruled to establish December 9, 2013, as the final date for resolving all cost-sharing obligations. These provisions, negotiated with Nextel, apply to Sprint Nextel effective as of the date of the merger. Move channels designated for interoperability to the lower end of the band, close to the planned public safety band at 700 MHz. Require Nextel to make an "anti-windfall payment" to the Treasury at the conclusion of the relocation process that will equal the difference between the $4.9 billion valuation and the cumulative credits. Costs of Rebanding
The FCC rebanding plan required that Sprint Nextel pledge $2.5 billion in cash and letters of credit to cover relocation costs for public safety. The difference between the values of the spectrum Sprint Nextel is relinquishing and of the new spectrum it is receiving is an increase—a potential windfall—of approximately $2.8 billion. This is the value, before specified relocation costs, that Sprint Nextel might be obligated to pay the U.S. Treasury. If the costs exceed $2.8 billion, the Treasury receives nothing. Because the deadline for the completion of the rebanding has been extended several times, the deadline for the true-up has also been extended. The TA must file regular reports with the FCC with its recommendations as to whether it has sufficient information on the costs of rebanding to calculate the anti-windfall payment—if any—that Sprint Nextel will be obligated to pay, or whether the deadline must be postponed again. Transition Administrator
The Transition Administrator (TA) is an independent organization set up in accordance with FCC rules. Disagreements about the implementation of the plan that the TA cannot resolve on its own or through mediation will in most cases be referred to the FCC. | In mid-2005, wireless communications managers commenced the process of moving selected public safety radio channels to new frequencies. This step was part of a rebanding plan to mitigate persistent problems with interference to public safety radio communications. The majority of documented incidents of interference was attributed to the network built by Nextel Communications, Inc (now Sprint Nextel). As part of an agreement originally made between Nextel and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), some public safety wireless users have moved or will move to new frequencies, with the wireless company paying all or part of the cost. The rebanding agreement was not affected by the merger between Nextel and Sprint Corporation. In return for the expenditures, and reflecting the value of spectrum that Sprint Nextel relinquished as part of the band reconfiguration, the FCC assigned new spectrum licenses to the wireless company. The FCC set the "windfall" value of the new licenses, after allowing for the value of the licenses being relinquished, at $2.8 billion. The costs that Sprint Nextel incurs in the rebanding process are being applied to the $2.8 billion windfall. If the total is less than $2.8 billion, Sprint Nextel will be required to make an "anti-windfall" payment to the U.S. Treasury for the difference. If the costs exceed $2.8 billion, Sprint Nextel is obligated to pay them without any new concessions from the FCC.
The rebanding plan is being implemented by the 800 MHz Transition Administrator (TA), created by the FCC for this purpose. The TA's ongoing responsibilities are to set priorities, establish schedules, and oversee reimbursement to parties for eligible expenses associated with relocation. Disagreements about the implementation of the plan that the TA cannot resolve on its own or through mediation are in most cases referred to the FCC. From the outset, there have been debates about the transition plan, such as maintaining interoperability, scheduling, and reimbursement for costs incurred. As the band reconfiguration proceeds, debates have often become protracted negotiations—and even litigatious disputes—slowing the transition process.
The original plan set a deadline of June 2008 to complete the transition, with the calculation—or true-up—of the anti-windfall payment to occur six months later. The deadline has been extended several times while issues regarding the transition process were resolved. Consequently, the deadline for the true-up has also been extended, most recently until December 9, 2013. |
crs_RL34135 | crs_RL34135_0 | Introduction
In the first session of the 110 th Congress, the House and the Senate passed two markedly different versions of omnibus energy efficiency and renewable energy legislation. The key provisions of the Senate-passed H.R. 6 are appliance efficiency standards, an increase of the renewable fuel standard (RFS) to 36 billion gallons by 2022, and an increase of the combined corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards to 35 miles per gallon (mpg) by 2020. The RPS amendment proposed setting a target of 15% by 2020. The proposed tax package amendment included oil and natural gas revenue offset provisions, as well as incentives for renewable energy and energy efficiency. A second challenge involves additional action that will be required to get a bill to conference committee. Because the House and Senate have passed different measures, constitutionally-required congressional procedures prevent the two bills ( H.R. Other concerns included the proposed repeal of the manufacturing tax deduction for the oil and gas industry, the application of royalty requirements for certain offshore oil and gas leases issued in 1998 and 1999, increased authorization for clean renewable energy bonds, and expansion of the Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirements. Comparing the House and Senate Bills
This report compares the major provisions of the House-passed version of H.R. 3221 were adopted, including one that would establish a renewable energy portfolio standard (RPS). 3221: Summary and Discussion of Oil and Gas Provisions .) Certain energy efficiency measures for walk-in coolers and walk-in freezers would be set by legislation. The standard would start at 2.75% in 2010 and then rise annually until reaching a peak of 15% in 2020. 2776)
Title XI—Production Incentives
This Title would extend the renewable electricity production tax credit (PTC) for four years, expand the PTC to include ocean thermal and hydrokinetic (wave, tide, and current) energy, extend the 30% business energy tax credit for solar and fuel cell equipment for eight years, authorize $2 billion of clean renewable energy bonds, and remove the cap on the tax credit for residential solar and fuel cell equipment. The modified standard would start at 8.5 billion gallons in 2008 and rise to 36 billion gallons in 2022. Subtitle B on Revenue Raising Provisions included several tax modifications that aimed to reduce certain subsidies for oil and natural gas development. | In the first session of the 110th Congress, the House and the Senate passed two markedly different versions of omnibus energy efficiency and renewable energy legislation. This report compares major provisions in House-passed H.R. 3221 and Senate-passed H.R. 6. Key legislative challenges remain. First, there are significant differences between the two bills. Second, because the House and Senate have passed different measures, further action will be required in at least one chamber before a conference committee could be arranged. Third, concerns about certain oil and natural gas provisions, and the lack of measures to support increased oil and gas production, have led the Administration to threaten to veto each bill. Highlights of major provisions include:
Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS). The Senate bill would set a modified standard that starts at 8.5 billion gallons in 2008 and rises to 36 billion gallons by 2022. The House bill has no RFS provision. Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE). The Senate bill would set a target of 35 miles per gallon for the combined fleet of cars and light trucks by model year 2020. The House bill has no CAFE provision. Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard (RPS). The House bill would set a minimum standard that would start at 2.75% in 2010 and rise steadily to a peak of 15% in 2020. The Senate bill has no RPS provision. Offshore Oil and Gas Royalties. The House bill would establish royalties, or alternative payments, for certain federal leases established in 1998 and 1999. The Senate bill has no provision. Repeal of Oil and Gas Tax Incentives. The House bill would obtain tax revenue offsets by reducing subsidies for oil and natural gas production. The Senate bill has no provision. Renewable Energy Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC). The House bill would extend the PTC for four years, and expand it to include some additional resources. The Senate bill has no provision. Other Tax Incentives. The House bill would extend several investment tax credits covering solar energy and energy efficiency in residential and commercial sectors. The Senate bill has no provision. Energy Efficiency Equipment Standards. Key differences involve standards for residential refrigerators, freezers, refrigerator-freezers, metal halide lamps, and commercial walk-in coolers and freezers. Loan Guarantees. The House bill would give new loan authority to a wider variety of projects. The Senate bill would prevent appropriations acts from limiting the use of non-appropriated funds. |
crs_RS21997 | crs_RS21997_0 | To this end, this report focuses on the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack using oil tanker ships. Crude oil from the Middle East went to 30 U.S. ports in 2003. Detecting an Atomic Bomb in a Tanker
Some means of detecting atomic bombs in a tanker would fail, especially for a bomb inside an oil tank. To what extent has the Administration considered this threat in planning for port and maritime security? When will they be in place? Create a Tanker Security Initiative (TSI) analogous to the Container Security Initiative for improving containerized cargo security. Costs could be covered by general revenues. Legislative Activities
On January 24, 2005, S. 12 , Targeting Terrorists More Effectively Act of 2005, was introduced and was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. | While much attention has been focused on threats to maritime security posed by cargo container ships, terrorists could also attempt to use oil tankers to stage an attack. If they were able to place an atomic bomb in a tanker and detonate it in a U.S. port, they would cause massive destruction and might halt crude oil shipments worldwide for some time. Detecting a bomb in a tanker would be difficult. Congress may consider various options to address this threat. S. 12 , Targeting Terrorists More Effectively Act of 2005, included a Tanker Security Initiative (sec. 325). This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL32685 | crs_RL32685_0 | In November 2000, the nation faced the unusual circumstance of not knowing the winner of the election for President for several weeks. The public scrutiny resulting from that experience exposed a wide range of weaknesses with the American system of elections. Many of the weaknesses had been known for years by election administrators, but they had been unsuccessful at drawing sufficient attention to them to effect the needed improvements. 3295 , the Help America Vote Act. 107 - 252 ) was enacted in October. The act created a new federal agency with election administration responsibilities, set requirements for voting and voter-registration systems and certain other aspects of election administration, and provided federal funding; but it did not supplant state and local control over election administration. In addition to funding, issues for the 110 th Congress have included those that arose in the 2006 election, as well as voter-verified paper audit trail requirements for electronic voting machines, photo identification, poll worker training, and prohibiting deceptive practices. Despite considerable effort by Congress to alleviate difficulties for military and overseas voters, there remain a number of hurdles to participation. Congress may consider several options for easing them. Other issues that might be considered in the 110 th or 111 th Congress are associated with voting systems standards, remote voting (absentee, early, and Internet), election personnel, polling places, election security, and the electoral college. Issues
The initial establishment of the EAC was delayed for more than nine months beyond the statutory deadline of February 25, 2003, and funding for the commission for FY2004 was less than one-fifth the authorized level of $10 million. It also had to delay beginning many of the tasks assigned to it by HAVA. Payments to States
HAVA established several grant programs for various purposes. Whether the levels of payments provided to states are sufficient to fund HAVA requirements is uncertain. HAVA 2004 Requirements
One of the innovations in HAVA is the establishment, for the first time, of federal requirements for several aspects of election administration: voting systems, provisional ballots, voter information, voter registration, and identification for certain voters. Most of those requirements went into effect in January 2006. However, a separate controversy has arisen over the reliability and security of DREs, resulting in the adoption of a requirement for paper ballots in many states. | In November 2000, the nation faced the unusual circumstance of not knowing the winner of the election for President for several weeks. The public scrutiny resulting from that experience exposed a wide range of weaknesses with the American system of elections. Many of the weaknesses had been known for years by election administrators, but they had been unsuccessful at drawing sufficient attention to them to effect the needed changes. In October 2002, Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act (HAVA, P.L. 107-252), which addressed many of those weaknesses. It created a new federal agency, the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), with election administration responsibilities. It set requirements for voting and voter-registration systems and certain other aspects of election administration, and it provided federal funding; but it did not supplant state and local control over election administration.
The establishment of the EAC was delayed for several months beyond the statutory deadline, and it was initially funded at a fraction of the authorized level. As a result, many of the tasks assigned to it by HAVA were also delayed, although the agency has since been more successful at fulfilling its statutory tasks. HAVA established several grant and payment programs for various purposes, and Congress has appropriated more than $3 billion altogether for them. It is uncertain if current levels of funding are sufficient to meet HAVA goals and requirements.
One of the innovations in HAVA is the establishment, for the first time, of federal requirements for several aspects of election administration: voting systems, provisional ballots, voter information, voter registration, and identification for certain voters. Those requirements are now in effect. Many states have changed voting systems to meet them. Controversy has arisen over the reliability and security of electronic voting, leading many states to adopt requirements for paper ballots. The provisional ballot requirement was one of four that went into effect in 2004, and it was also somewhat controversial. There is also still some question about implementation of computerized statewide voter-registration lists in some states.
In addition to funding, issues for the 110th Congress include voter-verifiable paper audit trails and possibly photo identification, poll worker training, and prohibiting deceptive practices. Despite considerable effort by Congress to alleviate difficulties for military and overseas voters, there remain a number of hurdles to participation. Congress may consider several options for easing them. Other issues that might be considered are associated with voting systems standards, remote voting (absentee, early, and Internet), election personnel, polling places, election security, and the electoral college. |
crs_RS22538 | crs_RS22538_0 | Unemployment Compensation Program
The cornerstone of income support for unemployed workers is the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program, which may provide income support through UC benefit payments. This also creates a surplus of funds or a "cushion" of available funds for the UC program to draw upon during a recession. Other programs that may provide workers with income support are more specialized. Extended Benefit Program
The Extended Benefit (EB) program, established by P.L. 3304), may extend UC benefits at the state level if certain economic situations within the state exist. This new temporary unemployment insurance program provides up to 13 additional weeks of unemployment benefits to certain workers who have exhausted their rights to regular unemployment compensation (UC) benefits. The EUC08 program is temporary and applies to all states. | A variety of benefits may be available to unemployed workers to provide them with income support during a spell of unemployment. When eligible workers lose their jobs, the Unemployment Compensation (UC) program may provide income support through the payment of UC benefits. Many workers who have exhausted their rights to regular UC benefits may have their unemployment insurance benefits extended for up to 13 additional weeks through the temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program. In addition, the Extended Benefit (EB) program may extend UC benefits at the state level if certain economic situations within the state exist. This report briefly summarizes the UC program, its authorization, appropriations, benefit determination, and funding. For a comprehensive summary of all income support programs available to unemployed workers, consult CRS Report RL33362, Unemployment Insurance: Available Unemployment Benefits and Legislative Activity, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R45142 | crs_R45142_0 | While there is currently no official U.S. government definition of IW, it is typically conceptualized as the use and management of information to pursue a competitive advantage, including offensive and defensive efforts. In this sense, IW is a form of political warfare, where targets include a nation state's government, military, private sector, and general population. Taking place below the level of armed conflict, IW is the range of military and government operations to protect and exploit the information environment. IW is a whole-of-society endeavor, in which civilians may be knowingly or unknowingly functioning as proxies on behalf of a government. Information Operations
Current and past U.S. government definitions have conceptualized information operations as a purely military activity involving a set of tactics or capabilities. Information Warfare-Related Terms
National security strategists may use other terms to describe information warfare. Several other related terms are often used in conjunction with IW as they convey similar concepts. Disinformation : Unlike misinformation, disinformation is intentionally false. Cyberspace operations can be used to achieve strategic information warfare goals; an offensive cyberattack, for example, may be used to create psychological effects in a target population. Although several official documents now refer to "information warfare" in other countries, the United States has no formal government definition of IW. Within the U.S. government, much of the current information warfare doctrine and capability resides with the military, making it the de facto center of gravity. DOD is also relatively well-funded, leading some to posit that the epicenter for IW activities should be the Pentagon. The final report of the Active Measures Working Group in 1992 warned that with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, active measures remained a threat to U.S. interests: "As long as states and groups interested in manipulating world opinion, limiting U.S. government actions, or generating opposition to U.S. policies and interests continue to use these techniques, there will be a need for the United States Information Agency to systematically monitor, analyze, and counter them." Case Studies: IW in Practice
Information warfare is hardly a new endeavor. In the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC, Persian ruler Xerxes used intimidation tactics to break the will of Greek city-states. Alexander the Great used cultural assimilation to subdue dissent and maintain conquered lands. These ancient strategists helped to lay the foundation for information warfare strategy in modern times. Military scholars trace the modern use of information as a tool in guerilla warfare to fifth-century BC Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu's book The Art of War and its emphasis on accurate intelligence for decision superiority over a mightier foe. An "information weapon" is information technology, means, and methods intended for use in information warfare. Other questions Congress may consider include whether the United States has a strategy in place to match the robust IW strategies of its competitors, and whether the U.S. government has institutions, organization, and programs to wage and win an information war or to deter foreign information operations. | Information warfare is hardly a new endeavor. In the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC, Persian ruler Xerxes used intimidation tactics to break the will of Greek city-states. Alexander the Great used cultural assimilation to subdue dissent and maintain conquered lands. Military scholars trace the modern use of information as a tool in guerilla warfare to fifth-century BC Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu's book The Art of War and its emphasis on accurate intelligence for decision superiority over a mightier foe. These ancient strategists helped to lay the foundation for information warfare strategy in modern times.
Taking place below the level of armed conflict, information warfare (IW) is the range of military and government operations to protect and exploit the information environment. Although information is recognized as an element of national power, IW is a relatively poorly understood concept in the United States, with several other terms being used to describe the same or similar sets of activity. IW is a strategy for using information to pursue a competitive advantage, including offensive and defensive efforts. A form of political warfare, IW is a means through which nations achieve strategic objectives and advance foreign policy goals. Defensive efforts include information assurance/information security, while offensive efforts include information operations. Similar terms sometimes used to characterize information warfare include active measures, hybrid warfare, and gray zone warfare.
IW is sometimes referred to as a "disinformation campaign," yet disinformation is only one of the tactics used in information operations (IO). The types of information used in IO include propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation.
As cyberspace presents an easy, cost-effective method to communicate a message to large swaths of populations, much of present day information warfare takes place on the internet, leading some to conflate "cyberwarfare" with information warfare. While IO in the United States tends to be seen as a purely military activity, other countries and terrorist organizations have robust information warfare strategies and use a whole-of-government or whole-of-society approach to information operations.
In terms of U.S. government bureaucracy, there are debates in the United States about where the IW center of gravity should be. During the Cold War, the epicenter in the U.S. government was the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency. Since 9/11, much of the current doctrine and capability resides with the military, leading some to posit that the epicenter should be the Pentagon. But others worry that the military should not be involved in the production of propaganda.
This report offers Congress a conceptual framework for understanding IW as a strategy, discusses past and present IW-related organizations within the U.S. government, and uses several case studies as examples of IW strategy in practice. Countries discussed include Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The Islamic State is also discussed. |
crs_R42101 | crs_R42101_0 | The Context of the Durban Climate Change Negotiations
Delegations from more than 190 countries and regions meet from November 28 to December 9, 2011, in Durban, South Africa, to continue discussions of how to address climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The year 2012 will mark both the 20 th anniversary of the opening for signature of the UNFCCC (in Rio de Janeiro, 1992) and the end of the first "commitment period" (2008-2012) of the UNFCCC's subsidiary Kyoto Protocol. Partly because of this, the United States declined to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and is not a Party to it. For many low-income nations and environmental groups, the key ambitions for the Durban meeting are to find agreement on
1. a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol with stronger GHG reduction commitments from the Annex I Parties; 2. the legal form of any new agreements, including proposals for legally binding commitments to GHG reductions to take effect by 2020; 3. design of the new Green Climate Fund, and materialization of funds during the "fast-start" period of 2010-2012, provisions for the unreferenced period of 2013-2020, and the pledged mobilization of $100 billion annually by 2020; 4. design of the new Technology Mechanism; and 5. evolution of the Adaptation Committee. Canada, Japan, and Russia have said they will not offer further GHG reduction commitments in an instrument that does not engage all major emitters, specifically the United States, China, India and Brazil. The European Union has said it would agree to another commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol but would require a clear "road map" to agreements that would include GHG obligations for all major emitting Parties. Added to the reporting requirements for the wealthiest countries is a new agreement to submit information about provision of finance internationally for mitigation and adaptation. The COP will also need to decide on the role and composition of a new Standing Committee on financial matters, agreed in Cancun, that would assist the COP in coordinating and streamlining the various funds established under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, and in ensuring transparent reporting and verification of financing provided by Parties. The text of the Cancun Agreements states that the monies should come from "a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance." In addition, the United States and some other delegations insist that the middle-income countries, including China and India, should also contribute to the Climate Green Fund. Technology Mechanism
The Cancun Agreements mandated establishment of a Technology Mechanism, including a Technology Executive Committee (TEC) for strategic planning purposes and a Clean Technology Centre for carrying out actions to stimulate technology deployment. Provisions in the draft decision regard the composition of the Committee; its relationship to the Conference of the Parties (COP) and to other institutions (including the Standing Committee on finance and the Green Climate Fund); and the Committee's scope and authority. | Delegations from more than 190 countries and regions meet from November 28 to December 9, 2011, in Durban, South Africa, to continue discussions of how to address climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The year 2012 will mark both the 20th anniversary of the opening for signature of the UNFCCC in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the end of the first "commitment period" (2008-2012) of the UNFCCC's subsidiary Kyoto Protocol.
In 2010, the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC adopted a set of decisions referred to as the "Cancun Agreements." These embody pledges to abate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions made by all major emitting Parties; reporting and review systems to ensure "transparency" of implementation; a new Green Climate Fund and a Technology Mechanism; and restatement of pledges by the wealthiest countries to mobilize financing for adaptation, mitigation, technology, and capacity-building: pledges approaching $30 billion during 2010-2012, and a goal of approaching $100 billion annually by 2020. Parties agreed that funding would come from public and private, bilateral and multilateral, and alternative sources. The most vulnerable developing countries have priority for the 2010-2012 funds.
Parties meeting in Durban, South Africa, will seek agreements that would clarify and carry out the Cancun Agreements. The dialogues particularly regard any second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, establishment of the Green Climate Fund and Technology Mechanism; and guidelines for the reporting and review mechanisms.
This report provides context for the discussions that will ensue in the Durban conference, then outlines the main issues and expectations for decisions by the Parties. Many see agreement on a new commitment period for GHG abatement under the Kyoto Protocol as key to almost all other decisions. Notably, delegations from China, India, and some other middle-income countries say they will not discuss their own possible GHG abatement commitments until the highest-income "Annex I" Parties meet their existing commitments and sign up to further reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, Canada, Japan, and Russia have stated they will not offer GHG reductions except in an agreement that includes legally binding commitments from all major emitters (including China, the United States, and others). The United States, which declined to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, has no quantitative and binding GHG commitments. The absence of commitments from the top three global GHG emitters (China, the United States, and India) is a matter of consternation among many delegations.
In Durban, the Parties may agree on rules to establish the Climate Green Fund, the Standing Committee on Finance, the Adaptation Committee, the Technology Committee, and Clean Technology Centre, and additional decisions to promote mitigation of greenhouse gases and adaptation to impacts of climate change. A proposal exists, but seems unlikely to be adopted, to set a mandate to negotiate by 2015 a new global agreement that would take effect by 2020. |
crs_RS22706 | crs_RS22706_0 | To address issues associated with the management of FPS security guard contracts, Congress enacted P.L. 110 - 356 (the Federal Protective Service Guard Contracting Reform Act of 2008) which requires the DHS Secretary, acting through the Assistant Secretary of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to establish guidelines that prohibit convicted felons—who own contract security guard businesses—from being awarded federal security guard contracts. Department of Homeland Security Intended Changes
In FY2009 the physical security of federal property is being maintained solely by contract security guards. DHS intends for FPS to continue maintaining security policy and standards, conducting building security assessments, and monitoring federal agency compliance with security standards. Additionally, the Administration, in the FY2010 budget request, proposes to transfer FPS from ICE to the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) within DHS. 110 - 329 (the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009) which requires the Office of Management and Budget and DHS to fully fund FPS operations through the collection of security fees paid by federal departments and agencies. Only the Senate-passed version of H.R. | The Federal Protective Service (FPS)—within U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—is responsible for protecting federal government property, personnel, visitors, and customers, including property leased by the General Services Administration (GSA). FPS currently employs over 15,000 contract security guards to protect federal property. DHS continued the use of contract security guards to focus FPS activities on maintaining security policy and standards, conducting building security assessments, and monitoring federal agency compliance with security standards in FY2009. P.L. 110-329 (the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009) included provisions on FPS maintaining a certain number of police officers. The 110th Congress also enacted P.L. 110-356 (the Federal Protective Service Guard Contracting Reform Act of 2008) which addressed the issue of awarding federal contracts to privately owned contract security guard businesses. The 111th Congress has yet to take any legislative action on FPS, however, the Administration's FY2010 budget request proposes to transfer FPS from ICE to the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) within DHS, which the Senate-passed version of H.R. 2892 supports. This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_R45305 | crs_R45305_0 | Farm income and commodity support programs have been a part of U.S. farm legislation since the 1930s. Today, these support programs are authorized as part of omnibus U.S. farm legislation—referred to as the farm bill—which has typically been renewed every five or six years. Each successive farm bill usually involves some modification or replacement of existing farm programs. With respect to disciplines governing domestic agricultural support, two WTO agreements are paramount—the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). As a result, designing farm programs that comply with WTO rules can avoid potential trade disputes. A key question that many policymakers ask of virtually every new farm proposal is how it will affect U.S. commitments under the WTO. The AoA contains detailed rules and procedures to guide countries in determining how to classify its programs in terms of which are most likely to distort production and trade; in calculating their annual cost, measured by the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) index; and in reporting the total cost to the WTO. Blue box programs are described as production-limiting. The most recent U.S. notification to the WTO of domestic support outlays (made on May 1, 2018) is for the 2015 crop year. The SCM details rules for determining when a subsidy is "prohibited" (as in the case of certain export- and import-substitution subsidies) and when it is "actionable" (as in the case of certain domestic support policies that incentivize overproduction and result in significant market distortion—whether as lower market prices or altered trade patterns). Questions for Evaluating WTO Compliance of Domestic Farm Spending
The United States is currently committed, under the AoA, to spend no more than $19.1 billion per year on amber box trade-distorting support. However, four questions might be asked to determine whether a particular farm measure will cause total U.S. domestic support to be above or below the $19.1 billion annual AMS limit. If it is a potentially trade-distorting "amber box" policy , can support still be excluded from the AMS calculation under the so-called 5% de minimis exemption (explained later in more detail) because total support is no more than 5% of either: the value of total annual production if the support is non-product specific, or the value of annual production of a particular commodity if the support is specific to that commodity? If a program is fully compliant with the AoA rules and limits, does its support result in price or trade distortion in international markets that, in turn, cause adverse effects upon another WTO member? If so, then it may be subject to challenge under SCM rules. Question 1: Can This Measure Be Placed in the Green Box? Through 2015, the most recent year for which the United States has made notifications to the WTO, the United States has never exceeded its $19.1 billion amber box spending limit. An additional consideration for WTO compliance—the SCM rules governing adverse market effects resulting from a domestic farm support program—comes into play when a domestic farm policy effect spills over into international markets. This is particularly relevant for the United States because it is a major producer, consumer, exporter, and/or importer of most major agricultural commodities—but especially of temperate field crops (which are the main beneficiaries of U.S. farm program support). If a particular U.S. farm program is deemed to result in market distortion that adversely affects other WTO members—even if it is compliant with all AoA commitments and agreed-upon spending limits—then that program may be subject to challenge under the WTO dispute settlement procedures. | Omnibus U.S. farm legislation—referred to as the farm bill—has typically been renewed every five or six years. Farm income and commodity price support programs have been a part of U.S. farm bills since the 1930s. Each successive farm bill usually involves some modification or replacement of existing farm programs. A key question likely to be asked of every new farm proposal or program is how it will affect U.S. commitments under the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and its Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).
The United States is currently committed, under the AoA, to spend no more than $19.1 billion annually on those domestic farm support programs most likely to distort trade—referred to as amber box programs and measured by the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). The AoA spells out the rules for countries to determine whether their policies—for any given year—are potentially trade distorting and how to calculate the costs.
The most recent U.S. notification to the WTO of domestic support outlays (made on May 1, 2018) is for the 2015 crop year. To date, the United States has never exceeded its $19.1 billion amber box spending limit. However, this has been achieved in some years (1999, 2000, and 2001) through judicious use of the de minimis exclusion described below.
An additional consideration for WTO compliance—the SCM rules governing adverse market effects resulting from a farm program—comes into play when a domestic farm policy effect spills over into international markets. The SCM details rules for determining when a subsidy is "prohibited" (e.g., certain export- and import-substitution subsidies) and when it is "actionable" (e.g., certain domestic support policies that incentivize overproduction and result in significant market distortion—whether as lower market prices or altered trade patterns). Because the United States is a major producer, consumer, exporter, and/or importer of most major agricultural commodities, the SCM is relevant for most major U.S. agricultural products. As a result, if a particular U.S. farm program is deemed to result in market distortion that adversely affects other WTO members—even if it is within agreed-upon AoA spending limits—then that program may be subject to challenge under the WTO dispute settlement procedures.
Designing farm programs that comply with WTO rules can avoid potential trade disputes. Based on AoA and SCM rules, U.S. domestic agricultural support can be evaluated against five specific successive questions to determine how it is classified under the WTO rules, whether total support is within WTO limits, and whether a specific program fully complies with WTO rules:
Can a program's support outlays be excluded from the AMS total by being placed in the green box of minimally distorting programs? Can a program's support outlays be excluded from the AMS total by being placed in the blue box of production-limiting programs? If amber, will support be less than 5% of production value (either product-specific or non-product-specific) thus qualifying for the de minimis exclusion? Does the total, remaining annual AMS exceed the $19.1 billion amber box limit? Even if a program is found to be fully compliant with the AoA rules and limits, does its support result in price or trade distortion in international markets? If so, then it may be subject to challenge under SCM rules. |
crs_R42475 | crs_R42475_0 | Data Breaches
A data breach occurs when there is a loss or theft of, or other unauthorized access to, data containing sensitive personal information that results in the potential compromise of the confidentiality or integrity of data. In response to state security breach notification laws enacted thereafter in numerous jurisdictions, over 2,676 data breaches and computer intrusions have been disclosed by the nation's largest data brokers, businesses, retailers, educational institutions, government and military agencies, healthcare providers, financial institutions, nonprofit organizations, utility companies, and Internet businesses. In February 2005, the data broker ChoicePoint disclosed a security breach, as required by the California Security Breach Act, involving the personal information of 163,000 persons. Identity theft involves the misuse of any individually identifying information to commit a violation of federal or state law. State Security Breach Notification Laws
The imposition of data security and security breach notification obligations on entities that own, possess, or license personal information is a recent phenomenon. The majority of states have enacted laws requiring notice of security breaches of personal data. As of January 2012, 46 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have enacted laws requiring notification of security breaches involving personal information. Security breach notification laws typically include definitions for "personal information" or "personally identifiable information." In information privacy law, there is no uniform definition of "personally identifiable information." Federal regulations were issued to implement information security programs and provide standards for security breach notice to affected persons. Federal departments and agencies are obligated by memorandum to provide breach notification, while the Department of Veterans Affairs is statutorily obligated to do so. Other federal laws and regulations, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), require private sector entities to maintain security safeguards to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of personal information, and require notification of security breaches. Others distinguish between private data held by the government and private data held by others, and advocate a higher duty of care for governments with respect to sensitive personal information in the U.S. public sector and to data breaches. This section describes information security and data breach notification requirements included in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act. Because some of the federal security breach notification bills would also apply to federal agencies, we are including an overview of the Office of Management and Budget's "Breach Notification Policy" for federal agencies. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)
Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) requires financial institutions to provide customers with notice of their privacy policies and requires financial institutions to safeguard the security and confidentiality of customer information, to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such records, and to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records or information which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer. Using its authority under the Safeguards Rule, the commission has brought a number of enforcement actions to address the failure to provide reasonable and appropriate security to protect consumer information. | A data security breach occurs when there is a loss or theft of, or other unauthorized access to, sensitive personally identifiable information that could result in the potential compromise of the confidentiality or integrity of data. Forty-six states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have laws requiring notification of security breaches involving personal information. Federal statutes, regulations, and a memorandum for federal departments and agencies require certain sectors (healthcare, financial, federal public sector, and the Department of Veterans Affairs) to implement information security programs and provide notification of security breaches of personal information. In response to such notification laws, over 2,676 data breaches and computer intrusions involving 535 million records containing sensitive personal information have been disclosed by data brokers, businesses, retailers, educational institutions, government and military agencies, healthcare providers, financial institutions, nonprofit organizations, utility companies, and Internet businesses. As a result, a significantly large number of individuals have received notices that their personally identifiable information has been improperly disclosed.
This report provides an overview of state security breach notification laws applicable to entities that collect, maintain, own, possess, or license personal information. The report describes information security and security breach notification requirements in the Office of Management and Budget's "Breach Notification Policy," the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH), and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).
The Senate Judiciary Committee marked up three data security bills and reported the three bills with substitute amendments. See CRS Report R42474, Selected Federal Data Security Breach Legislation, by [author name scrubbed]. S. 1151 (Leahy), the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2011, would apply to business entities to prevent and mitigate identity theft, ensure privacy, provide notice of security breaches, and enhance criminal penalties. It would provide law enforcement assistance and other protections against security breaches, fraudulent access, and misuse of personally identifiable information. S. 1408 (Feinstein), the Data Breach Notification Act of 2011, would require federal agencies and persons engaged in interstate commerce, in possession of data containing sensitive personally identifiable information, to disclose any breach of such information. S. 1535 (Blumenthal), the Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2011, would protect consumers by mitigating the vulnerability of personally identifiable information to theft through a security breach, provide notice and remedies to consumers, hold companies accountable for preventable breaches, facilitate the sharing of post-breach technical information, and enhance criminal and civil penalties and other protections against the unauthorized collection or use of personally identifiable information. The House Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade marked up H.R. 2577 (Bono Mack), the SAFE Data Act, to protect consumers by requiring reasonable security policies and procedures to protect data containing personal information, and to provide for nationwide notice in the event of a security breach. Several subcommittee Democrats objected to the bill's definition of personal information, arguing that the description is limited and does not adequately protect consumers from identity theft. The House Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade Subcommittee approved H.R. 2577 by voice vote and the measure was referred to the full committee for consideration. H.R. 1707 (Rush) and H.R. 1841 (Stearns) were also introduced to protect consumers by requiring reasonable security policies and procedures to protect computerized data containing personal information and providing for nationwide notice in the event of a breach. Congress may address data security during its consideration of cybersecurity legislation. |
crs_R41016 | crs_R41016_0 | From 2004 to 2010, the priorities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) were governed by the Vision for Space Exploration. The Vision was announced by President Bush in January 2004 and endorsed by Congress in the 2005 and 2008 NASA authorization acts ( P.L. 109-155 and P.L. 110-422 ). It directed NASA to focus its efforts on returning humans to the Moon by 2020 and some day sending them to Mars and "worlds beyond." The resulting efforts are now approaching major milestones, such as the end of the space shuttle program and design review decisions for the new spacecraft intended to replace the shuttle. In May 2009, the Obama Administration announced plans for a high-level independent review of the future of human space flight, chaired by Norman R. Augustine. In February 2010, as part of its FY2011 budget, the Administration proposed major changes to the Vision, including the elimination of a human return to the Moon as NASA's primary goal, the cancellation of NASA's Constellation spacecraft development program, a new effort to encourage the private sector to develop commercial crew launch services, and increased emphasis at NASA on technology development and science. Under the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-242 as amended by P.L. For example, it calls for the development of a new, crew-capable, heavy-lift rocket, and it provides for the development of commercial services to transport NASA crews into low Earth orbit. In the longer term, fiscal constraints may also create barriers, if they result in future appropriations that do not match the growing NASA budgets envisioned by the 2010 authorization act. The content of the science, aeronautics, and education programs is less controversial but still faces questions about scope, balance, and other issues. Human Spaceflight: The Vision for Space Exploration
The Vision for Space Exploration, announced by President Bush in a speech on January 14, 2004, directed NASA to focus its efforts on returning humans to the Moon by 2020 and eventually sending them to Mars and "worlds beyond." Program to Implement the Vision
The program for implementing the Vision, as it stood before passage of the 2010 authorization act, addressed the conclusion of the space shuttle and International Space Station programs as well as the development and implementation of new vehicles for taking humans into Earth orbit and then back to the Moon. In October 2009, the Augustine report stated that executing NASA's plans would require an additional $3 billion per year, even with some schedule delays. Operation of the International Space Station would continue until at least 2020. The next human mission beyond Earth orbit would be to an asteroid and would take place in 2025. Human Spaceflight: The 2010 Authorization Act
In October 2010, Congress passed the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-267 ). Several options are available as alternatives to human space exploration. 111-322 ). Among these, P.L. If so, what destination or destinations should NASA's human exploration program explore? When the space shuttle program ends during 2011, how should the transition of shuttle workforce and facilities be managed? What can be done to ensure that new spacecraft for human exploration, both government-owned and commercial, are developed effectively, despite budget constraints? How should NASA's multiple objectives be prioritized? | The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-267) authorized major changes of direction for NASA. Among these, it called for the development of a new, crew-capable, heavy-lift rocket, and it provided for the development of commercial services to transport NASA crews into low Earth orbit. However, under the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 111-242 as amended by P.L. 111-322), NASA continues to operate under a requirement to proceed with its previous human spaceflight program. Moreover, in a period of fiscal constraint, it is unclear whether future appropriations will match the growing NASA budgets envisioned by the 2010 act. Thus the 112th Congress is likely to continue to closely examine the future of NASA.
Before the 2010 act, NASA's priorities were governed by the Vision for Space Exploration. The Vision was announced by President Bush in January 2004 and endorsed by Congress in the 2005 and 2008 NASA authorization acts (P.L. 109-155 and P.L. 110-422). It directed NASA to focus its efforts on returning humans to the Moon by 2020 and some day sending them to Mars and "worlds beyond." The resulting efforts are approaching major decision points, such as the end of the space shuttle program and key milestones for the Constellation spacecraft development program intended to replace the shuttle. A high-level independent review of the future of human space flight, chaired by Norman R. Augustine, issued its final report in October 2009. It presented several options as alternatives to the Vision and concluded that for human exploration to continue "in any meaningful way," NASA would require an additional $3 billion per year above previous plans.
In February 2010, the Obama Administration proposed cancelling the Constellation program and eliminating the goal of returning humans to the Moon. NASA would instead rely on commercial providers to transport astronauts to Earth orbit, and its ultimate goal beyond Earth orbit would be human exploration of Mars, with missions to other destinations, such as visiting an asteroid in 2025, as intermediate goals. Operation of the International Space Station would be extended to at least 2020, and long-term technology development would receive increased emphasis. The 2010 authorization act incorporated many of these proposals, though it retained elements of Constellation and scaled back the proposed emphasis on commercial providers and technology development.
As the 112th Congress oversees NASA's implementation of the 2010 act and considers how to address the broad space policy challenges that remain, it faces questions about
whether NASA's human exploration program is affordable and sufficiently safe, and if so, what destination or destinations it should explore; how to ensure that new spacecraft for human exploration, both government-owned and commercial, are developed effectively, despite budget constraints; how to manage the transition of workforce and facilities as the space shuttle program comes to an end during 2011; how best to manage and utilize the International Space Station; and how NASA's multiple objectives in human spaceflight, science, aeronautics, and education should be prioritized. |
crs_R43853 | crs_R43853_0 | In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted to the President alone. This report identifies, for the 112 th Congress, all nominations submitted to the Senate for executive-level full-time positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2012 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). Appointments During the 112th Congress. Table 1 summarizes appointment activity, during the 112 th Congress, related to full-time PAS positions in the 15 executive departments. President Barack H. Obama submitted 116 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions to executive departments. Of these 116 nominations, 90 were confirmed; 11 were withdrawn; and 15 were returned to the President under the provisions of Senate rules. This report provides, for each executive department nomination confirmed in the 112 th Congress, the number of days between nomination and confirmation ("days to confirm"). For confirmed nominations, a mean of 151.4 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 131.5. | The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using the authorities granted to the President alone or with the advice and consent of the Senate. There are some 349 full-time leadership positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. This report identifies all nominations submitted to the Senate during the 112th Congress for full-time positions in these 15 executive departments.
Information for each department is presented in tables. The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, and appointment action within each executive department. Additional summary information across all 15 executive departments appears in the Appendix.
During the 112th Congress, the President submitted 116 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in executive departments. Of these 116 nominations, 90 were confirmed, 11 were withdrawn, and 15 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, a mean (average) of 151.4 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 131.5.
Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) http://www.lis.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2012 Plum Book (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL30208 | crs_RL30208_0 | Most Recent Developments
The President signed the Department of Transportation and Related AgenciesAct, 2000 ( P.L. The Act provided $50.2 billion for the Department of Transportation (DOT).However, the FY2000 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 106-113 ), mandatesa government wide rescission equal to 0.38% of discretionary budget authorityprovided (or obligation limits imposed) for all government departments.Approximately $179 million will be cut from the DOT funding levels provided for in P.L. The largest reductions are faced by the Federal HighwayAdministration (-$105.3 million), the Airport Improvement Program (-$54.4 million),the Federal Transit Administration (-$17.6 million), and the Coast Guard (-$1.6million). Even accounting for the rescission, the final funding level represents nearlya 6% increase over the appropriations level of the FY1999 Act. The transportation trust funds include: the highway trust fund, thetransit account of the highway trust fund, the airport and airway trust fund, and theinland waterways' trust fund. In addition, TEA-21 provides a mechanismto adjust these amounts in the highway account, but not the transit account, tocorrespond with increased or decreased receipts in the highway generated revenues(see revenue aligned budget authority - RABA- under key policy issues). 1000 contains provisions that take the aviation trust fund off budget. TheSenate-passed version of H.R. Much of the appropriations process must take place within the framework created by the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), signed intolaw on June 9, 1998 ( P.L. 106-69 ). 106-69 . Thisreduces the FY2000 enacted level down to just under $50 billion. Reductions could only be made from discretionary budget authority and obligation limitations. The enacted legislation ( P.L. for distribution to the states on a formula basis. 2084 differs from the House version in that it narrows the scope of RABAdistribution to certain of the core highway programs instead of allocated programs,thereby excluding a number of smaller previously mentioned programs. Duringconsideration in the Senate, a deadlock occurred over a provision that the would havelimited a state's total transit funding to 12.5% of total formula grant transit funding.The provision was controversial not only because it entailed changing the grantdistribution formula enacted in TEA-21 but also because all of the reductions wouldhave come out of the projected distribution of transit funds to the two states, NewYork and California. This exceeded FY1999 funding by $407 million, an increase of more than 7.6%. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
http://www.faa.gov/
For FY2000, the Administration proposed to fund the entire FAA with a combination of current excise taxes and new user fees, and to establish aPerformance-based Organization (PBO) for air traffic services. 106-69 , the FY2000 DOT appropriations bill, was signed by the President on October 9, 1999; the bill provides a total of $10.081 billion for the FAA. Operations. The Senate version of theFAA reauthorization bill ( H.R. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) and the Federal Budget , by [author name scrubbed]. | On October 9, 1999, the President signed the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Act, 2000 ( P.L. 106-69 ). The Act provided $50.2 billion for the Department ofTransportation (DOT). DOT had requested funding similar to the level enacted in P.L. 106-69 . However, the FY2000 Consolidated appropriations act, P.L. 106-113 , calls for an across-the-boardrescission of 0.38% from each agency's discretionary budget authority and obligation limits. Thiswill result in a reduction of approximately $179 million from the level enacted in P.L. 106-69 . TheFederal Highway Administration (-$105.3 million), the Airport Improvement Program (-$54.4million), the Federal Transit Administration (-$17.6 million), and the Coast Guard (-$1.6 million)together absorb all but about $0.5 million of the DOT reductions. Even with the rescission, theamount provided represents a nearly 6% increase over the FY1999 enacted level.
Reflecting the continuing impact of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), both the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the Federal TransitAdministration (FTA) received increases of 7% above FY1999 enacted levels. The Federal AviationAdministration (FAA) received a more modest increase of just under 3%. The FY2000 Act fundsthe entire FAA budget out of the airport and airway trust fund. Historically, a significant portion ofthe FAA operations budget has been provided from general fund revenues.
Much of the debate over the Department's budget focused on allocating resources raised by user fees and deposited in specific transportation trust funds. A debate arose between those in favorof a unified budget vs. those seeking to protect individual programs either by taking them off budgetor using fiscal boundaries or "firewalls" to ensure a minimum level of financing. This policy ofcreating discretionary spending guarantees originated with the provisions of the TransportationEquity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), legislation that placed "firewalls" around certaincategories of the Federal Highway Administration's programs. The House version of the FederalAviation Administration (FAA) reauthorization bill, H.R. 1000 , proposes also changingthe budgetary treatment of the airport and airway trust fund by taking the fund off budget.
For the highway trust fund, TEA-21 provided for the disposition of actual receipts above those forecast and authorized. The Revenue Aligned Budget Authority (RABA) provisions requireadditional trust fund receipts to be redistributed to individual states based on the formula used toapportion highway dollars. The enacted version of H.R. 2084 narrows the scope ofRABA distribution to certain core highway programs, thereby reducing the allocations to a numberof smaller TEA-21 programs and increasing the funds flowing to the states.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: RSI = Resources, Science, and Industry Division. |
crs_R43027 | crs_R43027_0 | Introduction
Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides Congress with the explicit power to collect taxes. Implicit in that power to collect revenue is also the power to spend that revenue. This clause is known as the Taxing and Spending Clause of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court has found that it grants Congress wide latitude to promote social policy that the federal government supports. One way that Congress may exercise its spending power to encourage the implementation of policies that the federal government supports is through appropriations. One common example of Congress exercising spending power to impose its will is the National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984. That act conditioned the receipt of a percentage of federal highway funding on states agreeing to raise the minimum drinking age to 21. While states were not required by the act to raise the drinking age, they could not receive the funds if they did not, thus creating a powerful incentive for states to adopt Congress's chosen policy on the subject of the legal drinking age. Congress has wide discretion to provide subsidies to activities that it supports without incurring the constitutional obligation to also provide a subsidy to activities that it does not necessarily encourage. However, the power to spend money only on policies that Congress supports is not without limits. Congress may not place what have come to be known as "unconstitutional conditions" on the receipt of federal benefits, even benefits Congress was not required to provide in the first place. Which conditions on the receipt of federal funds are and are not constitutional is a longstanding question with somewhat unclear answers, particularly when it comes to conditions placed upon the speech of the recipients of federal funds. Most recently, the Supreme Court heard a case challenging the constitutionality of a provision of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act). The relevant provision prohibited the government from making funds available to grant recipients that do not have a policy of opposing prostitution. The question facing the Court in this case was whether the Leadership Act's requirement that recipients affirmatively adopt a policy that applied to the entire organization, and not just to the federal funds received, violated the First Amendment. The decision outlines an important limitation on the ability of Congress to place conditions upon the receipt of federal funds. The Supreme Court disagreed. | Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides Congress with the explicit power to collect taxes. Implicit in that power to collect revenue is also the power to spend that revenue. This clause is known as the Taxing and Spending Clause of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court has found that it grants Congress wide latitude to promote social policy that the federal government supports.
One way that Congress may exercise its spending power to encourage the implementation of policies that the federal government supports is through appropriations. One common example of Congress exercising spending power to impose its will is the National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984. That act conditioned the receipt of a percentage of federal highway funding on states agreeing to raise the minimum drinking age to 21. While states were not required by the act to raise the drinking age, they could not receive the funds if they did not.
Congress has wide discretion to provide subsidies to activities that it supports without incurring the constitutional obligation to also provide a subsidy to activities that it does not necessarily encourage. However, the power to spend money only on policies that Congress supports is not without limits. Congress may not place what have come to be known as "unconstitutional conditions" on the receipt of federal funds. Which conditions on the receipt of federal funds are and are not constitutional is a longstanding question with somewhat unclear answers, particularly when it comes to conditions placed upon the speech of the recipients of federal funds. To what extent may the federal government prevent recipients of federal funds from using that money to communicate a message that may not be supported by the federal government? To what extent may the federal government require fund recipients to espouse a particular point of view as a condition upon the receipt of funds? Courts have struggled with these issues time and again.
Most recently, the Supreme Court heard a case challenging the constitutionality of a provision of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act). The relevant provision prohibited the government from making funds available to grant recipients that do not have a policy of opposing prostitution. The question facing the Court in this case was whether the Leadership Act's requirement that recipients affirmatively adopt a policy that applied to the entire organization, and not just to the federal funds received, violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court decided that the requirement is unconstitutional and struck it down in an opinion released on June 20, 2013. The case makes it clear that, while the government has wide latitude to control the message conveyed with federal dollars within a federal program, the First Amendment prohibits the government from controlling speech outside the federal program. |
crs_R40942 | crs_R40942_0 | 111-148 , PPACA) was signed into law on March 23, 2010. On March 30, 2010, PPACA was amended by P.L. 111-152 , the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010. This report summarizes the key provisions in PPACA (hereafter referring to PPACA as amended by P.L. 111-152 ) that affect private health insurance. With respect to the private health insurance market, mostly by full implementation in 2014, PPACA focuses on restructuring the market (particularly the small-group and nongroup markets), setting minimum standards for health coverage, and providing financial assistance to certain individuals and, in some cases, small employers. Overall, the law includes the following provisions:
Beginning in 2014, individuals will be required to maintain health insurance, and certain employers with more than 50 full-time equivalent employees (FTEs) will be required to pay a penalty, with some exceptions. Several market reforms will be made, such as prohibition against lifetime benefit limits and coverage for preexisting health conditions. Exchanges will not be insurers but will provide eligible individuals and small businesses with access to private plans in a comparable way. The exchange will consist of a selection of private plans as well as "multi-state qualified health plans," administered by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). States will be provided the flexibility to establish basic plans for low-income individuals not eligible for Medicaid. Individual and small group coverage will be allowed to be offered through nonprofit, member-run health insurance companies. These reforms include the following, in the order in which they would become effective (see Appendix A for additional details and Appendix B for a chronology of implementation deadlines):
authorizing the Secretary to award grants to states to provide information and assistance to health insurance consumers; establishing a process for the annual review of unreasonable premium increases; providing coverage assistance for those who are uninsured because of a preexisting condition; creating a temporary re-insurance program to support coverage for early retirees; establishing an Internet portal to assist consumers in identifying coverage options; prohibiting lifetime limits and restricted annual limits on essential benefits; prohibiting rescissions of health insurance policies; requiring coverage of preventive services and immunizations; extending dependent coverage up to age 26; prohibiting discrimination based on salary with respect to eligibility for benefits; capping insurance company non-medical, administrative expenditures; ensuring that consumers have access to an effective appeals process; providing coverage for preexisting health conditions for enrollees under age 19; ensuring patient protections regarding the choice of a primary care provider, access to emergency services and obstetrical and gynecological care, and access to medical reimbursement data; requiring the Secretary to develop uniform summary of benefits documents so consumers can make easier comparisons when shopping for health insurance; facilitating administrative simplification to lower health system costs; and tasking the Secretary with developing requirements for quality of care. QHPs will include qualified health plans offered through the CO-OP program (described below; see " Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) "). Individuals will be required to maintain minimum essential coverage for themselves and their dependents. American Health Benefit Exchanges
Exchange Structure
In addition to establishing new federal private health insurance standards, PPACA enables and supports states' creation by 2014 of "American Health Benefit Exchanges," similar in many respects to existing entities like the Massachusetts Connector and eHealthInsurance. Premium Credits and Cost-Sharing Subsidies
Beginning 2014, some individuals will be eligible for premium tax credits toward their required purchase of health insurance, based on income. Cost-sharing subsidies will only be available for silver plans sold through an exchange, including private plans. PPACA does not change noncitizens' eligibility for Medicaid. | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148, PPACA) was signed into law on March 23, 2010. On March 30, 2010, PPACA was amended by P.L. 111-152, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010. This report summarizes the key provisions in PPACA (hereafter referring to PPACA as amended by P.L. 111-152) that affect private health insurance. PPACA imposes new requirements on individuals, employers, and health plans; restructures the private health insurance market; sets minimum standards for health coverage; and provides financial assistance to certain individuals and, in some cases, small employers.
In general, PPACA requires individuals, beginning in 2014, to maintain health insurance, with some exceptions. Individuals will be required to maintain minimum essential coverage, which includes eligible employer coverage, individual coverage, grandfathered plans, and federal programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, among others. Employers are not explicitly required to provide health benefits, although certain employers with more than 50 employees may be required to pay a penalty if either (1) they do not provide insurance, under certain circumstances, or (2) the insurance they provide does not meet specified requirements. Several insurance market reforms will be implemented, including some prior to full implementation in 2014, such as prohibition against lifetime benefit limits and coverage for preexisting health conditions for children.
In addition to establishing new federal private health insurance standards, PPACA will enable and support states' creation by 2014 of "American Health Benefit Exchanges." An exchange cannot be an insurer, but will provide eligible individuals and small businesses with access to insurers' plans in a comparable way. The exchange will consist of a selection of private plans as well as "multi-state qualified health plans," administered by the Office of Personnel Management. Individuals will only be eligible to enroll in an exchange plan if they are not enrolled in Medicare, Medicaid, or acceptable employer coverage as a full-time employee. Based on income, certain individuals may qualify for a tax credit toward their premium costs and a subsidy for their cost-sharing; the credits and subsidies will be available only through an exchange. States will have the flexibility to establish basic health plans for low-income individuals not eligible for Medicaid.
Individual and small group coverage will be allowed to be offered through nonprofit, member-run health insurance companies. Such nonprofit insurers will be eligible for grants and loans distributed through the new Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) program. |
crs_R44095 | crs_R44095_0 | In August 2015, debt service on bonds issued by the Public Finance Corporation, an arm of the Government Development Bank (GDB), was not paid in full. The Puerto Rico Infrastructure Financing Authority (PRIFA) did pay interest in full on certain bonds due on January 1, 2016. The Puerto Rican government's fiscal situation, according to emergency legislation (Act 21 of 2016) enacted on April 6, 2016, "is more dire than at any other point in its history" and "depleted resources and strained liquidity threaten to bind the Commonwealth to a choice between honoring its commitments to bondholders or continuing to provide the residents of Puerto Rico with essential services." On May 1, 2016, Governor García Padilla issued an order to declare a moratorium on certain debt payments by the Government Development Bank (GDB), the government's fiscal agent, which was due to make a debt service payment of $423 million on that date. The Commonwealth government has stated that even after recapturing or "clawing back" revenues from other parts of the public sector that it "will not have sufficient resources to meet the entire debt service obligation on the Commonwealth's general obligations bonds due on July 1, 2016." On June 29, 2015—a day before the end of Puerto Rico's fiscal year 2015—Governor García Padilla stated during a televised address that "the debt is not payable." On the same day, a report by three former International Monetary Fund (IMF) economists was released that described serious problems with Puerto Rico's fiscal situation, budget execution, public administration, and tax structure. The Working Group issued a framework plan on September 9, 2015, that outlined a strategy for putting the island's finances on a stable basis. The GDB and its subsidiaries are the main source of short-term financing for the Puerto Rican government and its public corporations and municipalities. In late March 2016, as noted above, a federal district court judge unveiled a 2015 finding of the Puerto Rico Commissioner of Financial Institutions that the GDB was insolvent in 2015. Fiscal Strategy and Outmigration
The precarious state of Puerto Rico's public finances stems in part from prolonged economic weakness. Economic growth was sluggish even before the 2007-2009 recession, and official forecasts project continued slow growth. Previous economic analyses of Puerto Rico's economy have pointed to low employment and labor participation rates, an economic structure shaped more by tax advantages than comparative advantages, and intensified global competition. To that end, Resident Commissioner Pierluisi introduced H.R. 870 on March 16, 2015. Senator Blumenthal introduced a similar measure ( S. 1774 ) on July 15, 2015. 4290 ) on December 18, 2015, a measure to stay litigation related to the island's public debts, which could provide further time for negotiations between Puerto Rico and its creditors. On March 14, 2016, Senator Menendez introduced two bills ( S. 2675 , S. 2676 ) that would allow adjustments of Puerto Rico's debt. Congressional and Administration Proposals for Fiscal Oversight
In October 2015, the U.S. Department of the Treasury set out a reform framework that included a call for fiscal oversight as well as a broad debt restructuring of Puerto Rico's debts. Representative Sean Duffy introduced H.R. Senator Hatch introduced S. 2381 , the Puerto Rico Assistance Act of 2015, on the same day. The House Natural Resources Committee issued a discussion draft on March 29, 2016, of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act. PROMESA
On April 12, 2016, Representative Duffy introduced the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA; H.R. 4900 ), which would set up an Oversight Board for Puerto Rico and create a process to restructure the island's debts, among other provisions. Representative Duffy introduced H.R. 5278 , a revised version of H.R. 4900 , on May 18, 2016. | The government of Puerto Rico faces severe fiscal challenges. A federal district court judge in late March 2016 held that the island's government was insolvent and unable to pay its obligations on time. Emergency legislation (Act 21 of 2016) enacted on April 6, 2016, stated that the Puerto Rican government's fiscal condition "is more dire than at any other point in its history" and that "depleted resources and strained liquidity threaten to bind the Commonwealth to a choice between honoring its commitments to bondholders or continuing to provide the residents of Puerto Rico with essential services." On April 8, 2016, the Puerto Rican governor invoked emergency authorities to maintain essential public services.
The Puerto Rican government has been facing serious liquidity challenges and has lost normal access to credit markets despite measures taken by the island's government to reduce spending, increase revenues, and restructure its obligations. Much of the island's liquidity challenges stem from substantial debt service costs facing the central government and its public corporations. In August 2015, debt service on Public Finance Corporation bonds was not paid in full. The Puerto Rico Infrastructure Financing Authority (PRIFA) did pay interest in full on certain bonds due on January 1, 2016. On May 1, 2016, Governor Alejandro García Padilla declared a moratorium on certain debt payments by the Government Development Bank (GDB), the government's fiscal agent, due on that date. The Commonwealth government doubts that it can make a larger debt service payment on July 1, 2016. On June 29, 2015, Governor García Padilla stated during a televised address that "the debt is not payable." On the same day, a report commissioned from three former International Monetary Fund economists was released, which described severe short-term funding challenges as well as long-standing issues with key parts of the Puerto Rican economy and public sector. On September 9, 2015, a working group appointed by the governor released a plan that outlined its strategy. Puerto Rico's financing gap over the coming five years, according to the plan, is nearly $28 billion. The plan's proposals, along with hoped-for improvement in economic growth, were said to halve that gap.
The precarious state of Puerto Rico's public finances stems in part from prolonged economic weakness. Economic growth was sluggish even before the 2007-2009 recession, and projections suggest that the economy is contracting. Past analyses noted low employment and labor participation rates, high rates of outmigration leading to a decline in population, an economic structure shaped more by tax advantages than comparative advantages, and intensified global competition, among other factors. Others point to weaknesses in fiscal and operational controls.
In October 2015, the U.S. Department of the Treasury set out a reform framework and called on Congress to pass legislation to aid Puerto Rico. Resident Commissioner Pierluisi introduced H.R. 870 on March 16, 2015; the bill would restore the island's access to chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. Senator Blumenthal introduced a similar measure (S. 1774) on July 15, 2015. On December 9, 2015, Representative Sean Duffy introduced H.R. 4199, a measure to provide fiscal oversight and a debt restructuring process. Senator Hatch introduced a similar measure (S. 2381) on the same day. On December 18, 2015, Representative Pelosi introduced H.R. 4290 and Senator Warren introduced S. 2436, both measures to stay debt-related litigation. On March 14, 2016, Senator Menendez introduced two bills (S. 2675, S. 2676) that would allow adjustments of Puerto Rico's debt. The House Natural Resources Committee issued a discussion draft on March 29, 2016. Representative Duffy introduced the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (H.R. 4900) on April 12, 2016, and a revised version (H.R. 5278) on May 18, 2016, which would set up an Oversight Board for Puerto Rico and create a process to restructure the island's debts, among other provisions. |
crs_R40134 | crs_R40134_0 | Graduated Authorization to Purchase
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to act to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of the United States, and authorizes funds on a graduated scale that the Secretary may use for this purpose. Should the Secretary of the Treasury wish to have in excess of $350 billion outstanding at any one time under the program, the President must submit a written report to Congress detailing the Secretary's plan to exercise this additional authority. The submission of this report triggers a 15-calendar day period during which Congress may enact a joint resolution disapproving the request. In short, the resolution is considered not under the ordinary parliamentary procedures of the House and Senate, which are, by design, slow and uncertain, but on a special parliamentary "fast track." | The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA, Division A of H.R. 1424, P.L. 110-343) empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to act to stabilize the economy. Should the Secretary wish to have more than $350 billion outstanding under the program, the President must submit a written report to Congress detailing the Secretary's request and his plan to implement it. The receipt of this report triggers a 15-day period during which Congress may reject the Secretary's request by enacting a joint resolution of disapproval. This disapproval resolution would be considered in the House and Senate under "fast track" parliamentary procedures which are intended to ensure an opportunity to consider and vote on the measure. This report examines these procedures and explains how they differ from the regular parliamentary mechanisms of the House and Senate. It also estimates certain deadlines under the act based on the recent submission of the President's report. It will be updated as needed. |
crs_R44660 | crs_R44660_0 | Introduction
This report is part of a suite of reports that address appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2017. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the third title of the homeland security appropriations bill—the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Collectively, Congress has labeled these components in recent years as "Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery." The report provides an overview of the Obama Administration's FY2017 request for these components, the appropriations proposed by the appropriations committees in response, and those enacted in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
As noted above, the Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery title (Title III) of the FY2017 DHS appropriations bill is the second largest of the four titles that carry the bulk of the funding in the bill, and includes most of the grant funding provided by DHS. The Obama Administration requested $5.69 billion in FY2017 net discretionary budget authority for NPPD and FEMA (including the effect of transfers), and $6.71 billion in specially designated funding for disaster relief as part of a total budget for these components of $20.00 billion for FY2017. The appropriations request for the two components funded in this title was $718 million (11.2%) less than was provided for FY2016 in net discretionary budget authority. The Senate Appropriations Committee, in S. 3001 , would have provided the components included in this title $6.58 billion in net discretionary budget authority. This would have been $898 million (15.8%) more than requested, and $180 million (2.8%) more than was provided in FY2016. 5634 , would have provided the components included in this title $6.44 billion in net discretionary budget authority. This would have been $753 million (13.2%) more than requested, and $34 million (0.5%) more than was provided in FY2016. On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed into law P.L. A second continuing resolution was signed into law on December 10, 2016 ( P.L. 115-31 ), which includes the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2017 as Division F. For details on these continuing resolutions and their impact on DHS, see CRS Report R44621, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2017 . The committee-reported bills expired January 3, 2017, at the end of the 114 th Congress. On March 16, 2017, the Trump Administration submitted an amendment to the FY2017 budget request, which included a request for $3 billion in additional funding for DHS. 115-31 on May 5, 2017). The act included both annual and supplemental appropriations for DHS as Division F. It provided $41.3 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority in annual appropriations, as well as $6.7 billion in funding for the costs of major disaster under the Stafford Act and $163 million in funding for overseas contingency operations. On September 6, the House passed the relief package requested by the Administration as an amendment to H.R. 115-56 . House Appropriations Committee-reported H.R. 5634 included $4.71 billion in net discretionary budget authority for FEMA. This would have been $585 million (14.2%) more than was requested by the Administration, and $39 million (0.8%) more than was provided in FY2016. On September 6, the House passed the relief package requested by the Administration as an amendment to H.R. The House passed the Senate-amended version of the bill on September 8, 2017, and it became P.L. 115-56 . On September 1, 2017, the Trump Administration requested $7.85 billion in supplemental funding for FY2017, including $7.4 billion for the DRF. | This report is part of a suite of reports that address appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2017. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the third title of the homeland security appropriations bill—the National Protection and Programs Directorate, the Office of Health Affairs, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Collectively, Congress has labeled these components in recent years as "Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery."
The report provides an overview of the Obama Administration's FY2017 request for these components, the appropriations committees' response, the annual DHS appropriations enacted in Division F of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), as well as supplemental appropriations enacted in separate legislation (P.L. 115-56) enacted in September 2017.
Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery is the second largest of the four titles that carry the bulk of the funding in the bill, and includes the bulk of grant funding provided by DHS. The Obama Administration requested $5.69 billion in FY2017 net discretionary budget authority for components included in this title and $6.71 billion in specially designated funding for disaster relief—together representing 26.0% of the Obama Administration's $47.7 billion request for net discretionary budget authority and disaster relief funding for DHS. The appropriations request was $718 million (11.2%) less than was provided for FY2016 in net discretionary budget authority. The largest budget decrease proposed was a $546 million (11.7%) reduction for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, largely driven by reductions in grant programs.
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 3001, which would have provided the components included in this title $6.58 billion in net discretionary budget authority. This would have been $898 million (15.8%) more than requested, and $180 million (2.8%) more than was provided in FY2016. The House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 5634, which would have provided the components included in this title $6.44 billion in net discretionary budget authority—$753 million (13.2%) more than requested, and $34 million (0.5%) more than was provided in FY2016. Both bills also included the requested disaster relief funding.
On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed into law the first of a series of continuing resolutions that funded DHS until its annual appropriations were finalized. The committee-reported bills expired January 3, 2017, at the end of the 114th Congress.
On March 16, 2017, the Trump Administration submitted an amendment to the FY2017 budget request, which included a request for $3 billion in additional funding for DHS. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (signed into law as P.L. 115-31 on May 5, 2017) included both annual and supplemental appropriations for DHS as Division F. The act provided the components included in this title $6.67 billion in net discretionary budget authority and $6.71 billion in disaster relief funding. This was $957 million (16.8%) more than requested by the Obama Administration, and $239 million (4.2%) more than was provided in FY2016.
On September 1, 2017, the Trump Administration requested $7.85 billion in supplemental funding for FY2017, including $7.4 billion for the DRF. On September 6, the House passed the relief package requested by the Administration as an amendment to H.R. 601. On September 7, the Senate passed an amended version as part of a broader relief package. The House passed the Senate-amended version of the bill on September 8, and it was signed into law as P.L. 115-56.
For information on the broader subject of FY2017 funding for DHS, details on the continuing resolutions, links to analytical overviews, and details regarding components in other titles, see CRS Report R44621, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2017. |
crs_R40657 | crs_R40657_0 | Introduction
The location and permitting of facilities used to transmit electricity to residential and commercial customers have been the province of the states (with limited exceptions) for virtually the entire history of the electricity industry. Although this new role has met some resistance from those who oppose expanding federal authority over siting, other policymakers and commentators have advocated an increased federal role in order to encourage development of renewable energy, which is often located in remote areas that are not easily connected with the interstate grid. In 2011, the Ninth Circuit vacated the Department of Energy's congestion study underlying the designation of national interest electric transmission corridors, and as a result, there are presently no such corridors in effect. The increased federal role in transmission siting decisions raises a number of legal and policy issues. This report provides a review of the history of transmission siting; a summary and analysis federal authority to designate transmission corridors and provide backstop siting authority for transmission facilities in those corridors; a discussion of the legal issues associated with this expansion of federal authority and any future expansions of federal transmission siting authority; and a look at recent developments concerning transmission siting on federal lands. Difficulty in constructing new transmission led Congress to include federal transmission siting authority as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct). In 2005, EPAct established for the first time a significant federal role in transmission siting decisions. The permit application must also satisfy the following criteria to be eligible for FERC authorization:
(1) (A) a State in which the transmission facilities are to be constructed or modified does not have authority to: (i) approve the siting of the facilities; or (ii) consider the interstate benefits expected to be achieved by the proposed construction or modification of transmission facilities in the State; (B) the applicant for a permit is a transmitting utility under this Act but does not qualify to apply for a permit or siting approval for the proposed project in a State because the applicant does not serve end-use customers in the State; or (C) a State commission or other entity that has authority to approve the siting of the facilities has—(i) withheld approval for more than 1 year after the filing of an application seeking approval pursuant to applicable law or 1 year after the designation of the relevant national interest electric transmission corridor, whichever is later; or (ii) conditioned its approval in such a manner that the proposed construction or modification will not significantly reduce transmission congestion in interstate commerce or is not economically feasible;
(2) the facilities to be authorized by the permit will be used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce;
(3) the proposed construction or modification is consistent with the public interest;
(4) the proposed construction or modification will significantly reduce transmission congestion in interstate commerce and protects or benefits consumers
(5) the proposed construction or modification is consistent with sound national energy policy and will enhance energy independence; and
(6) the proposed modification will maximize, to the extent reasonable and economical, the transmission capabilities of existing towers or structures. One of the more common criticisms was that the corridors were drawn too broadly, resulting in too significant a role for the federal government in what had been local decisions. However, in recent years there has been a push to expand the federal role in transmission siting. | The location and permitting of electricity transmission lines and facilities have traditionally been the exclusive province of the states, with only limited exceptions. However, the inability to get transmission lines built due to local interests, as well as competition in generation, has resulted in calls for an increased role for the federal government in transmission siting.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct; P.L. 109-58) established a role for the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in transmission siting. The act directed DOE to create "transmission corridors" in locations with adequate transmission capacity. The act also granted FERC secondary authority over transmission siting in the corridors. This new federal role in a decision-making process that had previously been the province of state governments was predictably met with resistance from those seeking to protect local and regional interests. Although the process of creating "transmission corridors" and increasing the federal role in transmission siting has moved forward, the Ninth Circuit recently vacated the congestion study that led to the designation of two such corridors. Nonetheless, there have been calls for further expansion of the federal role in transmission siting by some policymakers and commentators.
This report looks at the history of transmission siting and the reason for an increased federal role in siting decisions, explains the new federal role in transmission siting pursuant to EPAct, and discusses legal issues related to this and any potential future expansions of the federal role. |
crs_R42849 | crs_R42849_0 | Congress has held numerous hearings on Iran, passed various resolutions regarding Iran and approved a range of sanctions against Iran over the past several decades. Iran: A Source of Global Political Concern
Iran is often a topic of discussion and a source of concern for many policymakers and experts in the national and international security community: "much of the debate over U.S. policy toward Iran has centered on the nature of the current regime; some believe that Iran … is a threat to U.S. interests because hardliners in Iran's regime dominate and set a policy direction intended to challenge U.S. influence and allies in the region." Clearly everybody in the Middle East recognizes it. In Iran's case, no major intelligence community has concluded that Iran has made the decision to develop a nuclear weapon. It is important to note that this report does not assess Iran's capabilities in the other two critical areas. At the other end of the spectrum, in 1990 the U.S. IC projection for MRBMs and ICBMs by 2000 did not transpire:
Most missiles likely to be fielded in the Third World over the next 5 years will have ranges of less than 1,000 kilometers, but by the year 2000 at least six countries probably will have missiles with range of up to 3,000 kilometers. Iran also may be satisfied with an ICBM capability of lesser quality and reliability, it is argued. It is quite clear to them" when maneuvers are real and when Iran exercises with live weapons and are not simply exhibitions. Iran's Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
Iran has been acquiring, developing and testing its ballistic missile capabilities for decades. What is striking is the degree to which there is an overwhelming amount of information written about Iran's ballistic missile capabilities, performance parameters, testing results, infrastructure and Iran's cooperation with others compared to the paucity of public detail about how many missiles Iran actually has. Dennis Blair, then Director of National Intelligence, said in his 2010 annual threat assessment report to Congress that
Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East and it continues to expand the scale, reach and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces – many of which are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear payload….Tehran views its conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its strategy to deter – and if necessary retaliate against – forces in the region. Iran's Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Complex
Unclassified government and other open-source materials indicate that Iran has an extensive ballistic missile and space launch complex scattered throughout the country. The Shahab-1 has a range estimated of about 300 km, while the Shahab-2, which carries a lighter conventional warhead, has a range estimated at about 500 km. Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs)
Iran has invested for several decades in an organized and well-planned effort to acquire, develop, test and deploy MRBMs capable of striking targets throughout the Middle East. No official numbers of MRBMs operationally deployed are provided by official U.S. government sources. U.S. and other intelligence reports indicate that Iran apparently has not made the decision to develop a nuclear weapon, but developments such as these cause concern among many decision makers and observers. Whether Iran acquired these missiles or their rocket motors in whole or part, or received other technical assistance regarding these missiles or their component parts is important. Since the late 1990s, the U.S. intelligence community has repeatedly stated, with a number of caveats, that Iran would be able to test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015, which is at least 10,000 km away. Other countries do not necessarily share this assessment and Iran has long denied that it is developing an ICBM capable of reaching the United States. Such a test did not occur in this time frame, but in 2010 the DIA assessed that, by 2015:
with sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could develop and test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States. These assessments drive U.S. military efforts designed to respond to such threats, such as the U.S. BMD program in general and the U.S. missile defense system in Europe specifically, as well as U.S. diplomatic and other efforts such as sanctions to dissuade or slow down Iranian long-range ballistic missile programs. The Russians indicated they believed Iran
was a long way from building intercontinental ballistic missiles that could hit the United States.... Iran lacks appropriate structural materials for long-range systems.... Iran can build prototypes, but in order to be a threat to the U.S. or Russia, Iran needs to produce missiles in mass quantities, and it lacks materials sufficient for the type of mass production needed to be a security threat. Sub-orbital Launches
As part of a nation's space program, it is common to develop, test and launch a number of rockets into space for short durations to measure the effects of space and study its effects on animals in preparation for subsequent manned space flight. Although many of those articles are likely accurate, it is not entirely possible to sort them all out from those accounts that are not entirely accurate. As a result of this decades long effort, Iran is now considered to have become self-sufficient in major parts of its own ballistic missile programs, yet it is still apparently reliant on outside sources for some key missile components, especially for further development of its longer range ballistic missile program. Iran is using these goods and technologies to achieve its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of MRBMs. Although China has export control legislation that approximates MTCR controls, enforcement continues to fall short. Is slowing down Iran's ballistic missile and space launch programs, making them more difficult and expensive, and forcing Iran to find less reliable and capable alternatives an adequate solution for dealing with Iran? This appendix will be updated for future "Great Prophet" exercises. | Iran has long been a source of concern for the United States and other countries because its goals are at odds with core U.S. objectives in the Middle East. Although it is not certain that Iran has made the decision to develop a nuclear weapon, it is taking steps to drastically reduce the time needed to obtain nuclear weapons should a decision be made to do so. It is the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon mated to an effective missile delivery capability that is especially worrisome to most.
Congress has long been interested in these matters. Congress has held numerous hearings on Iran, passed various resolutions regarding Iran and approved a range of sanctions against Iran over the past several decades.
According to the U.S. government, Iran has the largest number of ballistic missiles in the Middle East; it is developing missiles and space launch vehicles for multiple purposes. Iran is pursuing its missile and space programs with development and testing facilities that are scattered throughout the country. Assessing Iran's ballistic missile programs is challenging for many reasons, including the lack of specificity in official public sources, the secretive nature of Iran's regime and the regime's frequent exaggerations of its ballistic missile capabilities, and the overwhelming amount of and often conflicting information found in non-official sources.
The vast majority of Iran's heavy artillery rockets and ballistic missiles are short-range of less than about 500 kilometers. Most of Iran's ballistic missiles in fact are Scud-B and Scud-Cs, with a majority likely being Scud Cs, which are 500 km range capable. Iran views its short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) capability as necessary for battlefield and tactical military purposes. These missiles could not strike U.S. or allied bases in the region unless they were moved far from their operating base and launched from vulnerable positions along Iran's Persian Gulf coastline. This is not likely because of logistical and operational security reasons. Although these SRBMs are not very accurate, they could be fired against economic or civilian targets. Also, any such missile attacks against U.S. bases, while not militarily decisive, could disrupt or complicate (but not halt) base operations.
Iran has grown increasingly self-sufficient in the production of SRBMs, but it still probably relies on others for some key components. Gaining access to these kinds of critical components and materials has grown increasingly difficult for Iran. Stricter international enforcement of export controls and broadening sanctions have reportedly slowed down Iran's efforts and forced Iran to find less reliable alternative sources of rocket and missile technology.
Iran is developing and producing medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) capabilities with ranges estimated up to about 2,000 kilometers (with some non-U.S. government sources citing slightly higher ranges), sufficient to strike targets throughout the Middle East. U.S. intelligence assessments state such missiles are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Although the number of Iran's MRBMs is thought to be relatively small by official U.S. estimates, it is expected to continue to build more capable MRBMs. Iran views these missiles as an important deterrent and retaliatory force against U.S. and other forces in the region in the event of war. Iran has also constructed an underground network of bunkers and underground silo-like missile launch facilities, and is seeking improved air defenses presumably to enhance the survivability of their MRBMs against preemptive attack.
Currently Iran must rely on others for certain key missile components and materials in its MRBM program. Export controls and sanctions have made it increasingly difficult, but certainly not impossible, for Iran to acquire the best of such items. On the other hand, these export control measures and sanctions have forced Iran to try to exploit weaknesses in existing export and nonproliferation regimes, including by trying to find foreign sellers willing to circumvent those laws.
Iran also has a genuine and ambitious space launch program, which seeks to enhance Iran's national pride, and perhaps more importantly, its international reputation as a growing advanced industrial power. Iran also sees itself as a potential leader in the Middle East offering space launch and satellite services. Iran has stated it plans to use future launchers for placing intelligence gathering satellites into orbit, although such a capability is a decade or so in the future. Many believe Iran's space launch program could mask the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) – with ranges in excess of 5,500 km that could threaten targets throughout Europe, and even the United States if Iran achieved an ICBM capability of at least 10,000 km. ICBMs share many similar technologies and processes inherent in a space launch program, but it seems clear that Iran has a dedicated space launch effort and it is not simply a cover for ICBM development. Since 1999, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has assessed that Iran could test an ICBM by 2015 with sufficient foreign assistance, especially from a country such as China or Russia (whose support has reportedly diminished over the past decade). It is increasingly uncertain whether Iran will be able to achieve an ICBM capability by 2015 for several reasons: Iran does not appear to be receiving the degree of foreign support many believe would be necessary, Iran has found it increasingly difficult to acquire certain critical components and materials because of sanctions, and Iran has not demonstrated the kind of flight test program many view as necessary to produce an ICBM.
This report will be updated regularly. |
crs_RL33828 | crs_RL33828_0 | Overview1
Conditions in the Region
The Latin America and Caribbean region has made enormous strides over the past two decades in political development, with all countries but Cuba having regular free and fair elections for head of government. Despite this democratic progress, several nations face considerable challenges, including persistent poverty, violent guerrilla conflicts, autocratic leaders, drug trafficking, and high rates of crime and violence. Despite strong growth economic growth in the region from 2004-2007, the advent of the global financial crisis in 2008 is having a significant negative effect on the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean. U.S. Policy
U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are diverse, and include economic, political and security concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured strong economic linkages between the United States and the region, with the United States being the major trading partner and largest source of foreign investment for most countries in the region. Free trade agreements with Mexico and Canada, Chile, Central America and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR), and most recently with Peru have augmented U.S. economic linkages with the region. The region is also the largest source of migration, both legal and illegal, with geographic proximity and economic conditions in the region being major factors in the migration. Curbing the flow of illicit drugs from Mexico and South America into the United States has been a key component of U.S. relations with Latin America for almost two decades. Latin American nations, largely Venezuela and Mexico, supply the United States with just over one-third of its imported oil, but there have been concerns about the security of the region as an oil supplier because of Mexico's declining oil reserves and periodic threats by Venezuela's President to cut oil exports to the United States. As noted above, Latin America has made enormous strides in terms of political and economic development over the past 25 years, with considerable U.S. support, but such conditions as persistent poverty and the rise of populism in such countries as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador continue to pose challenges for U.S. interests and policy in the region. | Over the past two decades, the Latin America and Caribbean region has made enormous strides in terms of political and economic development, with regular free and fair elections the norm in most countries. Although the region overall experienced an economic setback in 2002-2003, it rebounded from 2004-2007, with strong economic growth. In 2008, however, the advent of the global financial crisis and U.S. economic recession began to be felt in Latin America. Growth began to slow as commodity prices and the demand for exports and services from the region declined. Several nations also continued to face considerable challenges that affect U.S. interests and policy in the region. These include entrenched poverty, guerrilla conflicts, autocratic leaders or the so-called rise of radical populism in several nations, drug trafficking, and high rates of crime and violence.
U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are diverse, and include economic, political and security concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured strong economic linkages between the United States and the region, with the United States being the major trading partner and largest source of foreign investment for most countries in the region. Free trade agreements with Mexico and Canada, Chile, Central America and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR), and most recently with Peru have augmented U.S. economic linkages with the region. The region is also the largest source of migration, both legal and illegal, with geographic proximity and economic conditions in the region being major factors in the migration. Curbing the flow of illicit drugs from Colombia and Mexico into the United States has been a key component of U.S. relations with Latin America for almost two decades. Latin American nations, largely Venezuela and Mexico, supply the United States with just over one-third of its imported oil, but there have been concerns about the security of the region as an oil supplier.
This report provides an overview of U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean and focuses on the role of Congress and congressional concerns during the 110th Congress. It will not be updated. |
crs_R45191 | crs_R45191_0 | Non-Covert Intelligence Activities Notifications
Section 3092 of Title 50, U . S. Code , requires that the congressional intelligence committees be kept "fully and currently informed" of all intelligence activities, other than a covert action, by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the head of any of the component organizations of the intelligence community. Covert Action Notifications
Section 3093 of Title 50, U . S. Code sets out how the congressional intelligence committees are to be informed of covert actions, to include use of cyber capabilities when employed as a covert action. Findings must be made in writing unless immediate United States action is required. Covert Action Gang of Eight Notifications
If the President determines that it is "essential" to limit access to a covert action finding in order to "meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States," he may limit the notification of such a finding to the chairs and ranking minority members of the House and Senate intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate. Insofar as Congress exercises oversight over these activities, DOD's requirements for notifying Congress differ from those of the intelligence community. Moreover, prior notification, which is generally required for covert action and significant anticipated intelligence activities, is not typical of congressional notifications of sensitive DOD activities conducted in support of a larger military operation. Following are notification requirements for sensitive military activities that, from an operational standpoint, could be confused with covert or clandestine activities of the intelligence community. In statute, however, traditional military activities and routine support to these activities are exempt from the congressional notification requirements for covert action. They may be conducted covertly and clandestinely (i.e., the activity as well as U.S. sponsorship are secret). | Covert action and clandestine activities of the intelligence community and activities of the military may appear similar, but they involve different notification requirements and usually are conducted under different authorities of the U. S. Code.
The requirements for notifying Congress of activities of the intelligence community originated from instances in the 1970s when media disclosure of past intelligence abuses underscored reasons for Congress taking a more active role in oversight. Over time, these requirements were written into statute or became custom.
Section 3091 of Title 50, U. S. Code requires the President of the United States to ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are "kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity," significant intelligence failures, illegal intelligence activities, and financial intelligence activities. Intelligence activities also include covert action as outlined under Section 3093(e) of Title 50, U.S. Code.
Section 3092 of Title 50, U. S. Code sets out the congressional notification requirements for non-covert action intelligence activities. Section 3093 of Title 50 sets out the congressional notification requirements for covert actions. Both sections 3092 and 3093 explicitly state such notification is to be provided to the "extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods, or other exceptionally sensitive matters."
The President and intelligence committees are responsible for establishing the procedures for notification, which are generally to be done in writing. Partly in deference to this higher standard, such notifications are sometimes limited to specific subgroups of Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in certain circumstances, as defined by law and custom. |
crs_R41368 | crs_R41368_0 | In August 2018, the Trump Administration levied sanctions against Turkey in connection with the continued detention of Andrew Brunson, an American pastor charged with terrorism. 1 Within the tense bilateral context, Congress has required the Trump Administration—in the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 115-232 )—to report on the status of U.S.-Turkey relations. While Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other Turkish leaders have sharply criticized U.S. policies on many issues, questions in U.S. public debate about Turkey's status as an ally and its relationship with Russia have intensified. Turkey's domestic trajectory and financial distress . Erdogan's consolidation of power has continued. The U.S. sanctions related to Pastor Andrew Brunson's case (see " Sanctions, Pastor Brunson, and Other Criminal Cases " below) and the historic crisis they may augur for U.S.-Turkey relations could be speeding the lira's decline. Under the state of emergency enacted after the failed July 2016 coup attempt, Turkey's government cracked down on Turkey's Kurdish minority. The Turkish government controls or closely oversees religious activities in the country. In the context of concerns about Turkey's strategic orientation (see " Turkey's Strategic Orientation and Foreign Policy "), many Members of Congress are increasingly active in proposing legislation and exercising oversight on U.S.-Turkey matters that include arms sales and strategic cooperation, various criminal cases, and economic sanctions. Calculating the costs and benefits to the United States of a U.S./NATO presence in Turkey, and of potential changes in U.S./NATO posture, revolves to a significant extent around three questions:
To what extent does strengthening Turkey relative to other regional actors serve U.S. interests? As mentioned above, the planned S-400 acquisition could trigger sanctions under existing U.S. law. Parallel with nationwide efforts to imprison and marginalize those with connections to Gulen, Turkish authorities have detained Brunson (see textbox below) and a number of other U.S. citizens (most of them dual U.S.-Turkish citizens), along with Turkish employees of the U.S. government. The report will include
an assessment of the U.S. military and diplomatic presence in Turkey, including military activities conducted from Incirlik air base; an assessment of Turkey's potential S-400 purchase from Russia and the effects it might have on the U.S.-Turkey relationship, including on other U.S. weapon systems and platforms operated with Turkey (aircraft, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles); an assessment of Turkey's participation in the F-35 program, including how changing Turkey's participation could impact the program and what steps might mitigate negative impacts for the United States and other program partners; and an identification of potential alternative air and missile defense systems for Turkey, including military air defense artillery systems from the United States or other NATO member states. Turkey is a cooperative partner in developing the F-35, and as part of its involvement, several Turkish companies are assisting with development and manufacture of various F-35 components. Possible U.S. Opposition to Assistance to Turkey from Selected International Financial Institutions (S. 3248)
In July 2018, six Senators introduced the Turkey International Financial Institutions Act ( S. 3248 ), which would direct "the U.S. executive of the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to oppose future loans, except for humanitarian purposes, to Turkey by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and EBRD until the administration can certify to Congress that Turkey is 'no longer arbitrarily detaining or denying freedom of movement to United States citizens (including dual citizens) or locally employed staff members of the United States mission to Turkey.'" Assessment
Turkey's priorities in Syria appear to have evolved during the course of Syria's civil war. Since the rapprochement, the two countries have cooperated in a number of areas, most notably
the possible S-400 air defense deal (see " Possible S-400 Acquisition from Russia " above); some military and political coordination in northern Syria (see " Syria " above); and energy dealings (see " Energy " above). In connection with bilateral tensions, Israel has raised concerns with U.S. officials over Turkey's acquisition of the F-35 and has contemplated measures to limit Turkish influence over holy sites in Jerusalem. Questions persist about how these ties will develop in response to changes in Turkey. Appendix A. Profiles of Key Figures in Turkey
Appendix B. | Turkey, a NATO ally since 1952, significantly affects a number of key U.S. national security issues in the Middle East and Europe. U.S.-Turkey relations have worsened throughout this decade over several matters, including Syria's civil war, Turkey-Israel tensions, Turkey-Russia cooperation, and various Turkish domestic developments. The United States and NATO have military personnel and key equipment deployed to various sites in Turkey, including at Incirlik air base in the southern part of the country.
Bilateral ties have reached historic lows in the summer of 2018. The major flashpoint has been a Turkish criminal case against American pastor Andrew Brunson. U.S. sanctions on Turkey related to the Brunson case and responses by Turkey and international markets appear to have seriously aggravated an already precipitous drop in the value of Turkey's currency.
Amid this backdrop, Congress has actively engaged on several issues involving Turkey, including the following:
Turkey's possible S-400 air defense system acquisition from Russia. Turkey's efforts to acquire U.S.-origin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft and its companies' role in the international F-35 consortium's supply chain. Complex U.S.-Turkey interactions in Syria involving several state and non-state actors, including Russia and Iran. Over strong Turkish objections, the United States continues to partner with Syrian Kurds linked with Kurdish militants in Turkey, and Turkey's military has occupied large portions of northern Syria to minimize Kurdish control and leverage. Turkey's domestic situation and its effect on bilateral relations. In addition to Pastor Brunson, Turkey has detained a number of other U.S. citizens (most of them dual U.S.-Turkish citizens) and Turkish employees of the U.S. government. Turkish officials and media have connected these cases to the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, and to Fethullah Gulen, the U.S.-based former cleric whom Turkey's government has accused of involvement in the plot.
In the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 115-232) enacted in August 2018, Congress has required a comprehensive report from the Trump Administration on (1) U.S.-Turkey relations, (2) the potential S-400 deal and its implications for U.S./NATO activity in Turkey, (3) possible alternatives to the S-400, and (4) various scenarios for the F-35 program with or without Turkey's participation. Other proposed legislation would condition Turkey's acquisition of the F-35 on a cancellation of the S-400 deal (FY2019 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, S. 3180), place sanctions on Turkish officials for their role in detaining U.S. citizens or employees (also S. 3180), and direct U.S. action at selected international financial institutions to oppose providing assistance to Turkey (Turkey International Financial Institutions Act, S. 3248). The S-400 deal might also trigger sanctions under existing law (CAATSA).
The next steps in the fraught relations between the United States and Turkey will take place in the context of a Turkey in political transition and growing economic turmoil. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has dominated politics in the country since 2002, won reelection to an empowered presidency in June 2018. Given Erdogan's consolidation of power, observers now question how he will govern a polarized electorate and deal with the foreign actors who can affect Turkey's financial solvency, regional security, and political influence. U.S. officials and lawmakers can refer to Turkey's complex history, geography, domestic dynamics, and international relationships in evaluating how to encourage Turkey to align its policies with U.S. interests. |
crs_R40152 | crs_R40152_0 | However, this report focuses singularly on aggregate national net farm income and the status of the farm debt-to-asset ratio as reported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Economic Research Service (ERS). USDA's 2017 Farm Income Forecast
According to ERS, net farm income is forecast at $63.4 billion in 2017, up 3% from last year ( Table 1 ). The forecast rise in 2017 net farm income comes after three consecutive years of decline from 2013's record high of $123.8 billion. The 2017 net farm income forecast is substantially below the 10-year average of $86.4 billion ( Figure 1 ). In inflation-adjusted dollars, the 2017 forecast is the second lowest since 2003 ( Figure 2 ). Net cash income is also projected to be up in 2017 but by a larger share (12.5%), driven largely by sales from previous years' inventory, to $100.4 billion. Since the record highs of 2013, net farm income and net cash income have fallen by 49% and 26%, respectively ( Figure 1 ). The downward trend in farm income since 2013 was primarily a result of the significant decline in most farm commodity prices since the 2013-2014 period. The price outlook for 2017 is mixed. Lower marketing-assistance loan benefits and the end of the cotton ginning cost-share program, which paid $326 million in 2016, more than offset projected higher Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) program payments of $8.4 billion—triggered by lower commodity prices. U.S. farm prices are supported in part by global demand for U.S. agricultural exports ( Figure 18 ), which are expected to rise to $139.8 billion (+8%) in 2017—still well below the record of $152.3 billion set in 2014. As a result, the outlook for these two crops is critical to both farm sector profitability and regional economic activity across large swaths of the United States as well as in international markets. Government Payments
Government payments in 2017 are projected to be down slightly, by 0.2% from 2016, at $13.0 billion. Production expenses will affect crop and livestock farms differently. Agricultural Trade Outlook
U.S. agricultural exports have been a major contributor to farm income, especially since 2005. USDA projects U.S. agricultural exports at $139.8 billion in 2017, up 8% from 2016's total ( Figure 18 ), due largely to an improving economic outlook in several major foreign importing countries. ROW is expected to account for 36% of U.S. agricultural exports in 2017. Farm Asset Values and Debt
The U.S. farm income and asset-value situation and outlook suggest a relatively stable financial position heading into 2017 for the agriculture sector as a whole but with considerable uncertainty regarding the downward outlook for prices and market conditions for the sector and an increasing dependency on international markets to absorb domestic surpluses:
Farm asset values—which reflect farm investors' and lenders' expectations about long-term profitability of farm sector investments—are projected to be up 4% in 2017 to a nominal $3,075 billion ( Table 3 ). On-Farm vs. Off-Farm Income Shares
Average farm household income (sum of on- and off-farm income) is projected at $119,598 in 2017 ( Table 2 ), up 1.4% from $117,918 in 2016 but well below the record of $134,164 in 2014. U.S. Total vs. Farm Household Average Income
Since the late 1990s, farm household incomes have surged ahead of average U.S. household incomes ( Figure 26 and Figure 27 ). In 2015 (the last year for which comparable data were available), the average farm household income of $119,880 was about 51% higher than the average U.S. household income of $79,263 ( Table 2 ). | According to USDA's Economic Research Service (ERS), national net farm income—a key indicator of U.S. farm well-being—is forecast at $63.4 billion in 2017, up 3% from last year. The forecast rise in 2017 net farm income comes after three consecutive years of decline from 2013's record high of $123.8 billion. Net farm income is calculated on an accrual basis. Net cash income (calculated on a cash-flow basis) is also projected to be up in 2017 but by a larger share (12.6%), driven largely by sales from previous years' inventory, to $100.4 billion.
The 2017 net farm income forecast is substantially below the 10-year average of $86.4 billion and would be the second lowest since 2003 in inflation-adjusted dollars. This is primarily the result of the outlook for continued weak prices for corn, soybeans, and cotton. Most crops and livestock product prices remain significantly below the average for the period of 2011-2013, when prices for many major commodities attained record or near-record highs. Net farm income is down 49% since 2013; net cash income is down 26%. Farm-sector production expenses have fallen slightly over that period (-1%) but not nearly as quickly as commodity prices and revenue, thus contributing to lower aggregate income totals.
Partially offsetting the decline in farm revenues is a rise in government payments since 2013 (+18%). In 2017, payments are projected at $13.0 billion, down slightly (-0.2%) from 2016. The Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) revenue support programs for major field crops are expected to trigger payments of $8.4 billion in 2017, up 2.5% from 2016.
U.S. farm income experienced a golden period during 2011 through 2014, due to strong commodity prices and agricultural exports. In 2017 agricultural exports are forecast to be up 8%, at $139.8 billion, due largely to an improving economic outlook in several major foreign importing countries—but still well below 2014's record of $152.3 billion. U.S. agricultural exports are projected to account for 33% of farm sector gross earnings in 2017.
In addition to the outlook for slightly higher net farm income in 2017, farm wealth is also projected to be up 4% from 2016, to $3,075 billion. Farm asset values reflect farm investors' and lenders' expectations about long-term profitability of farm sector investments. The outlook for slightly higher farm income has reversed the decline in farmland values experienced in 2016. Because they comprise such a significant portion of the U.S. farm sector's asset base (81%), change in farmland values is a critical barometer of the farm sector's financial performance.
At the farm household level, average farm household incomes have been well ahead of average U.S. household incomes since the late 1990s. In 2015 (the last year for which comparable data were available), the average farm household income (including off-farm income sources) of $119,880 was about 51% higher than the average U.S. household income of $79,263.
The outlook for a slight rise in net farm income and farm wealth suggests that the farm economy has at least temporarily stabilized but with substantial regional variation. Relatively weak prices for most major program crops signal continued tough times ahead. Heading into 2018, the financial picture for the agricultural sector as a whole remains dependent on continued growth in domestic and foreign demand sources to sustain prices at current modest levels. Improvements in agricultural economic well-being will hinge on crop harvests and prices, as well as both domestic and international macroeconomic factors, including economic growth and consumer demand.
This report is an update of the February 2017 version to take account of USDA's August 30, 2017, farm income update and the August 29, 2017, U.S. agricultural trade outlook update. |
crs_R41310 | crs_R41310_0 | The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA) gives most private sector workers the right to join or form a labor union and to bargain collectively over wages, hours, and working conditions. The act allows workers in the construction industry to enter into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) before a project begins. A project labor agreement (PLA) is a collective bargaining agreement that applies to a specific construction project and lasts only for the duration of the project. In February 2009, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13502, which encourages federal agencies "to consider requiring" the use of PLAs on large-scale construction projects. Regulations implementing the Executive Order (EO) went into effect in May 2010. A PLA generally specifies the wages and fringe benefits to be paid on a project. A PLA may require contractors to hire workers through a union hiring hall. If not, it may require employees to become union members after being hired. PLAs usually include a provision that unions agree not to strike and contractors agree not to lock out workers. The EO defines large-scale projects as those where the total cost to the federal government is $25 million or more. The order states that agencies are not required to use PLAs. A PLA shall
bind all contractors and subcontractors on a construction project to comply with the PLA; allow all contractors and subcontractors to compete for contracts and subcontracts whether or not they are otherwise a party to a collective bargaining agreement; contain guarantees against strikes, lockouts, and similar job disruptions; provide binding procedures for resolving labor disputes that may arise during the term of the PLA; provide other mechanisms for labor and management cooperation on matters of mutual interest and concern, such as productivity, quality of work, safety, and health; and include any additional requirements that an agency deems necessary. Advantages and Disadvantages of PLAs
Proponents of PLAs argue that the agreements have several advantages, including the following:
A PLA provides uniform wages, benefits, overtime pay, hours, working conditions, and work rules for work on major construction projects. A PLA provides contractors with a reliable and uninterrupted supply of workers at predictable costs for wages and benefits. Because labor costs are predictable and because a PLA makes it easier to manage a large project, a PLA helps ensure that a project will be completed on time and on budget. Opponents argue that PLAs have several disadvantages:
PLAs can increase costs. If a PLA requires contractors to hire workers through a union hiring hall, contractors may not be able to use their own workers. If a contractor is able to use his own workers, the workers may have to join a union and pay union dues. If a contractor has to pay into a union pension plan, the employees may not be on the project long enough to vest in the plan. Nonunion contractors may operate more efficient worker training programs. Evidence does not indicate that nonunion construction projects are less safe than union projects. The Economic Effects of PLAs
Opponents and proponents of PLAs disagree on the economic effects of PLAs. In short, much of the research on the effect of PLAs on the costs of construction is inconclusive. In part, it can be difficult to find similar projects where some use a PLA and the others do not. Instead of comparing similar projects, economists use statistical models that attempt to control for differences in the characteristics of construction projects. It can be difficult, however, to control for all the factors that affect the costs of construction. For example, if the Davis-Bacon locally prevailing wage is the local union wage, contractors may pay workers the union wage whether or not the project is covered by a PLA. In addition, statistical models may not take into account the quality of construction, whether projects are finished on time, or the safety records of different projects. Finally, the relationship between PLAs and construction costs may be interdependent. PLAs may affect construction costs, but the size and cost of construction may also affect the use of PLAs. | The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) gives most private sector workers the right to join or form a labor union and to bargain collectively over wages, hours, and working conditions. The act allows workers in the construction industry to enter into a collective bargaining agreement before a project begins. A project labor agreement (PLA) is a collective bargaining agreement that applies to a specific construction project and lasts only for the duration of the project.
In February 2009, President Barack Obama signed an Executive Order (EO) that encourages federal agencies "to consider requiring" the use of PLAs on large-scale construction projects. The EO defines a large-scale project as one where the total cost to the federal government is $25 million or more. The order states that agencies are not required to use PLAs. Regulations implementing the EO went into effect in May 2010.
A PLA generally specifies the wages and fringe benefits to be paid on a project, and it usually includes procedures for resolving labor disputes. PLAs generally include a provision that unions agree not to strike and contractors agree not to lock out workers. A PLA may require contractors to hire workers through a union hiring hall. If not, it may require employees to become union members after being hired. A PLA applies to all contractors and subcontractors on a project.
Opponents and proponents of PLAs disagree on the economic effects of PLAs. Supporters argue that the agreements provide uniform wages, benefits, overtime pay, hours, working conditions, and work rules for work on major construction projects. They maintain that PLAs provide contractors with a reliable and uninterrupted supply of workers at predictable costs for wages and benefits, and they argue that a PLA makes it easier to manage a large project, which ensures that it will be completed on time and on budget. Supporters also say that PLAs help train workers, improve worker safety, and ensure compliance with labor and health and safety laws.
Opponents argue that PLAs have several disadvantages. They argue that PLAs increase construction costs. Nonunion contractors may not bid on projects that are covered by a collective bargaining agreement or, when they bid, they cannot win contracts on the basis of lower costs. If they have to hire workers through a union hiring hall, contractors may not be able to use their own workers. A nonunion contractor's workers may have to join a union and pay union dues. When a contractor has to pay into a union pension plan, employees may not be on the project long enough to vest in the plan. PLA opponents also argue that nonunion contractors can operate more efficient worker training programs and that evidence does not indicate that nonunion construction projects are less safe than union projects. Finally, opponents argue that federal and state agencies enforce labor and workplace health and safety laws.
Much of the research on the effect of PLAs on the costs of construction is inconclusive. In part, it can be difficult to find similar projects where some use a PLA and the others do not. Instead of comparing similar projects, economists often use statistical models that attempt to control for differences in the characteristics of the projects. It can be difficult, however, to control for all the factors that affect the costs of construction. For example, if the Davis-Bacon locally prevailing wage is the local union wage, contractors may pay workers the union wage whether or not the project is covered by a PLA. In addition, statistical models may not take into account the quality of construction, whether projects are finished on time, or the safety records of different projects. Finally, the relationship between PLAs and construction costs may be interdependent. PLAs may affect construction costs, but the size and cost of construction may also affect the use of PLAs. |
crs_R43433 | crs_R43433_0 | As U.S.-Vietnam bilateral economic, military, and diplomatic ties have grown, so has interest in strengthening cooperation in the nuclear energy sphere. Such "123 agreements" are necessary for the export of nuclear reactors and components and can help facilitate the transfer of nuclear energy technology. Congress received the agreement with the required supporting documents on May 8, 2014, for review. The congressional review period for this agreement was completed on September 9, 2014. At least four issues were prominent during the congressional review period: (1) whether the agreement should have included stronger nonproliferation commitments such as a legally binding commitment by Vietnam not to build uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities; (2) the extent to which Vietnam's human rights record should affect the decision to enter into a nuclear energy agreement; (3) the weight that should be given to the growing strategic relationship between the United States and Vietnam; and (4) the extent to which U.S. companies would benefit from an agreement. In March 2010, the United States and Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation in the Civil Nuclear Field that was designed to increase cooperation on nuclear safety and facilitate development of an independent regulatory agency. Ambassador to Vietnam Michael Michalak said he anticipated the 2010 Memorandum would be a "stepping stone" to a bilateral nuclear energy cooperation (Section 123 agreement). Nuclear power is projected to provide 20%-30% of the country's electricity by 2050. Another 4,000 megawatts of planned capacity would bring the country's generating capacity to 14,800 megawatts by 2030. According to the IAEA, Vietnam has no plans for developing a full fuel cycle capability. Regional Energy Dynamics
Vietnam would be the first country in Southeast Asia to operate a nuclear power plant. Vietnam and the Nonproliferation Regime
Obama Administration officials have stated that the prospect of concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States spurred Vietnam to strengthen its nonproliferation policies. Vietnam's Law on Atomic Energy passed in 2008 forbids the development of nuclear weapons and all forms of nuclear proliferation. Vietnam signed the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement in 2007, and it entered into force in 2012. Enrichment and Reprocessing Debate
Enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology can be used both to make fuel for nuclear reactors or material for nuclear weapons. The nuclear cooperation agreement complies with all the terms of the Atomic Energy Act as amended and therefore is a "non-exempt" agreement. This means that it may enter into force after the 90 th day of continuous session (a period of 30 plus 60 days of review) following its submittal to Congress on May 8, 2014, unless a joint resolution disapproving the agreement is enacted by both the House and Senate. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez introduced a resolution that would approve the agreement ( S.J.Res. 36 ) on May 22. This bill was passed by the full Senate on July 31, 2014. Typically, such agreements enter into force after an exchange of diplomatic notes between the two countries. | U.S.-Vietnamese cooperation on nuclear energy and nonproliferation has grown in recent years along with closer bilateral economic, military, and diplomatic ties. In 2010, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding that Obama Administration officials said would be a "stepping stone" to a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. This agreement was signed by the two countries on May 6, 2014, and transmitted to Congress for review on May 8. The required congressional review period for this agreement was completed in early September, and the agreement will enter into force after an exchange of diplomatic notes between the two countries.
Under the agreement, the United States can license the export of nuclear reactor and research information, material, and equipment to Vietnam. The agreement does not allow for the transfer of restricted data or sensitive nuclear technology, and contains required nonproliferation provisions. The nuclear cooperation agreement complies with all the terms of the Atomic Energy Act as amended and therefore is a "non-exempt" agreement. This means that it may enter into force after a review period of 90 days of continuous session after its submittal to Congress (a period of 30 plus 60 days of review) unless Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving agreement, or approving the agreement at an earlier date. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez introduced a resolution that would approve the agreement (S.J.Res. 36) on May 22. This bill was passed by the Senate on July 31, 2014. No equivalent bill was passed by the House.
Vietnam would be the first country in Southeast Asia to operate a nuclear power plant. Vietnam has announced a nuclear energy plan that envisions installing several nuclear plants, capable of producing up to 14,800 megawatts of electric power (MWe), by 2030. Nuclear power is projected to provide 20%-30% of the country's electricity by 2050. Significant work remains, however, to develop Vietnam's nuclear energy infrastructure and regulatory framework. Since Vietnam has other commercial partners in the nuclear energy field, a lack of agreement with the United States would not be likely to have a significant impact on its nuclear energy plans.
Vietnam's Law on Atomic Energy, passed in 2008, forbids the development of nuclear weapons and all forms of nuclear proliferation. In 2007, Vietnam signed the IAEA Additional Protocol, a significant nonproliferation safeguard for nuclear power, which entered into force in September 2012. Vietnamese officials have said they have no interest in developing domestic enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, which can potentially be used to make fissile material for nuclear weapons, but they have not made a binding commitment not to do so. Vietnam is exploring the possibility of eventually mining domestic uranium reserves.
At least four issues were debated during the congressional review period for this agreement: (1) whether the agreement should have included stronger nonproliferation commitments such as a legally binding commitment by Vietnam not to build uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities; (2) the extent to which Vietnam's human rights record should affect the decision to enter into a nuclear energy agreement; (3) the weight that should be given to the growing strategic relationship between the United States and Vietnam; and (4) the extent to which U.S. companies would benefit from an agreement. |
crs_RL34441 | crs_RL34441_0 | This CRS Report analyzes the security implications of Taiwan's presidential election of March 22, 2008, including the implications for U.S. assessments, security interests, and options for policymakers in Congress and the Bush Administration. This analysis draws in part from direct information gained through a visit to Taiwan to observe the election and to discuss views with a number of interlocutors, including those advising or aligned with President Chen Shui-bian and President-elect Ma Ying-jeou. This CRS Report will discuss the results of Taiwan's presidential election and symbolic yet sensitive referendums on U.N. membership, outlook for Taiwan's policies, implications for U.S. security interests in Taiwan, and options for U.S. policymakers presented with a window of opportunity. Voters said they viewed them as cynical political gimmicks, since it is "impossible" for Taiwan to join the U.N. (The PRC's opposition to Taiwan's membership is backed by veto power at the U.N.)
KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou won, as expected, but with a surprising and solid margin of victory (17 percent; 2.2 million votes). Mature Democracy but Declining DPP
The near-term outlook for Taiwan's future is positive for stability and progress in policy-making, including policies on defense that previously faced partisan bickering in Taiwan's polarized political environment. Separate Identity and Military Imbalance
However, in the longer term for Taiwan (for both the DPP and KMT), the question of Taiwan's identity and sovereignty as separate from that of the PRC remains unresolved. The PLA has continued to build up its forces that threaten Taiwan, raising the question of whether the military balance already has shifted to favor the PRC. Nonetheless, aside from those excluded routes, the KMT could choose approaches of accommodating Beijing, challenging Beijing, and seeking a bipartisan consensus on national security. Implications for U.S. Security Interests
The results of March 22 sapped the PRC's alarmist warnings about the election and referendums, although it might still warn about instability until the inauguration on May 20 while Chen Shui-bian is still president. Nevertheless, cross-strait tension is greatly reduced. Chen is effectively weakened and concentrating on the transition. President-elect Ma and KMT interlocutors give pro-U.S. assurances. As president, Ma is expected to be less provocative towards Beijing than Chen. In one view, there is opportunity to turn U.S. attention from managing the cross-strait situation to urgent problems that require the PRC's improved cooperation, such as dealing with nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran, the crisis in Darfur in Sudan, repression in Burma, the crackdown in Tibet, etc. Thus, one significant consideration for U.S. policymakers is whether to take steps to dispel notions of "co-management" (as Administration officials have firmly denied) and to counter any rising expectations from Beijing. Window of Opportunity: Policy Options? Ma Ying-jeou's election presents a window of opportunity in the cross-strait and U.S.-Taiwan relationships. Accept Taiwan's formal letter of request for U.S. consideration of whether to sell new F-16C/D fighters. | This CRS Report analyzes the security implications of Taiwan's presidential election of March 22, 2008. This analysis draws in part from direct information gained through a visit to Taiwan to observe the election and to discuss views with a number of interlocutors, including those advising or aligned with President Chen Shui-bian and President-elect Ma Ying-jeou. This CRS Report will discuss the results of Taiwan's presidential election and symbolic yet sensitive referendums on U.N. membership, outlook for Taiwan's stability and policies, implications for U.S. security interests, and options for U.S. policymakers in a window of opportunity. This report will not be updated.
The United States positioned two aircraft carriers near Taiwan. Thus, there was U.S. relief when the referendums, as targets of the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s condemnation, failed to be valid. Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou won with a surprising and solid margin of victory (17 percent; 2.2 million votes), against Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Frank Hsieh.
The near-term outlook for Taiwan's future is positive for stability and in policy-making on defense. However, in the longer term, the question of Taiwan's identity and sovereignty as separate from the PRC remains unsettled. Moreover, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has continued to build up its forces that threaten Taiwan, raising the issue of whether the military balance already has shifted to favor the PRC.
The results of March 22 sapped the PRC's alarmist warnings about the election and referendums, although it might still warn about instability until the inauguration on May 20 while Chen is still president. Nevertheless, cross-strait tension is greatly reduced. Chen is effectively weakened and concentrating on the transition. Ma is less provocative towards Beijing than Chen. Ma gives pro-U.S. assurances. There is future uncertainty, however, as the KMT could choose to accommodate Beijing, challenge Beijing, or seek a bipartisan consensus on national security.
In one view, there is an opportunity to turn U.S. attention from managing the cross-strait situation to more urgent priorities that require the PRC's improved cooperation, such as dealing with nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran, the crisis in Darfur in Sudan, repression in Burma, the crackdown in Tibet, etc. Alternatively, a window of opportunity is presented for the first time in years to take steps to sustain U.S. interests in security and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Considerations include whether to counter perceptions in Beijing of "co-management" with Washington and rising expectations about U.S. concessions to PRC demands, notions denied by the Administration. An issue for policymakers is what approach to take in a window of opportunity. U.S. policymakers have various options to: continue the existing approach; engage with president-elect Ma (including a possible U.S. visit before his inauguration); strengthen ties for Taiwan's military, political, and economic security (including a possible consideration of its request for F-16C/D fighters); promote a new cross-strait dialogue; and conduct a strategic review of policy toward Taiwan. |
crs_94-166 | crs_94-166_0 | Introduction
Crime is ordinarily proscribed, tried, and punished according to the laws of the place where it occurs. American criminal law applies beyond the geographical confines of the United States, however, under certain limited circumstances. Unfortunately, many of the cases do little more than note that due process restrictions mark the frontier of the authority to enact and enforce American law abroad. The Court in RJR Nabisco , another civil case, however, may have changed that. Neither Congress nor the courts are bound to the dictates of international law when enacting or interpreting statutes with extraterritorial application. Current Extent of American Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction
Federal Law
Express
Congress's declaration that a particular statute is to apply outside of the United States is the most obvious evidence of intent to create extraterritorial jurisdiction. Some enjoy extraterritorial application under any of a number of these and other explicit jurisdictional circumstances. Consequently, investigations within another country of extraterritorial federal crimes without the consent or at least acquiescence of the host country are extremely rare. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Agreements
Congress has endorsed diplomatic efforts to increase multinational cooperative law enforcement activities. Cooperative Efforts
American law enforcement officials have historically used other, often less formal, cooperative methods overseas to investigate and prosecute extraterritorial offenses. For instance, the Foreign Evidence Request Efficiency Act of 2009 authorizes Justice Department attorneys to petition federal judges for any of a series of orders to facilitate investigations in this country by foreign law enforcement authorities. The Supreme Court's United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez decision makes it clear that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search of the property of foreign nationals outside the United States, unless the property owner has some "previous significant voluntary connections with the United States." Whatever the applicable statute of limitations, Section 3292 authorizes the federal courts to suspend it in order to await the arrival of evidence requested of a foreign government:
Upon application of the United States, filed before return of an indictment, indicating that evidence of an offense is in a foreign country, the district court before which a grand jury is impaneled to investigate the offense shall suspend the running of the statute of limitations for the offense if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an official request has been made for such evidence and that it reasonably appears, or reasonably appeared at the time the request was made, that such evidence is, or was, in such foreign country. More recent extradition treaties address other traditional features of the nation's earlier agreements that complicate extradition, most notably the nationality exception, the political offense exception, and the practice of limiting extradition to a list of specifically designated offenses. Congress has enacted both general and specific venue statutes governing extraterritorial offenses. Otherwise, depositions may be ordered only under exceptional circumstances. As general matter, depositions are to be taken in the same manner as depositions in civil cases. § 963 (conspiracy or attempt to violate the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act)
Model Penal Code
§1.03 Territorial Applicability
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, a person may be convicted under the law of this State of an offense committed by his own conduct or the conduct of another for which he is legally accountable if:
(a) either the conduct that is an element of the offense or the result that is such an element occurs within this State; or
(b) conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under the law of this State to constitute an attempt to commit an offense within the State; or
(c) conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under the law of this State to constitute a conspiracy to commit an offense within the state and an overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy occurs within the state; or
(d) conduct occurring within the State establishes complicity in the commission of, or an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit , an offense in another jurisdiction that also is an offense under the law of this State; or
(e) the offense consists of the omission to perform a legal duty imposed by the law of this State with respect to domicile, residence or a relationship to a person, thing or transaction in the State; or
(f) the offense is based on a statute of this State that expressly prohibits conduct outside the State, when the conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this State and the actor knows or should know that his conduct is likely to affect that interest. 1660 (2009)
Zachary D. Clopton, Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Criminal Law After Morrison v. National Australia Bank , 67 NYU Ann. 647 (2008)
[author name scrubbed], Substantive Due Process and U.S. L. Rev. | Criminal law is usually territorial. It is a matter of the law of the place where it occurs. Nevertheless, a number of American criminal laws apply extraterritorially outside of the United States. Application is generally a question of legislative intent, express or implied. There are two exceptions. First, the statute must come within Congress's constitutional authority to enact. Second, neither the statute nor its application may violate due process or any other constitutional prohibition.
Claims of implied extraterritoriality must overcome additional obstacles. Federal laws are presumed to apply only within the United States, unless Congress clearly provides otherwise. Moreover, the courts will also presume that Congress intends its statutes to be applied in a manner that does not offend international law.
Historically, in order to overcome these presumptions, the lower federal courts have read certain vintage Supreme Court cases broadly. The Supreme Court's recent pronouncements in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. and RJR Nabisco v. European Community, however, suggest a far more restrictive view.
Although the crimes over which the United States has extraterritorial jurisdiction may be many, so are the obstacles to their enforcement. For both practical and diplomatic reasons, criminal investigations within another country require the acquiescence, consent, or preferably the assistance, of the authorities of the host country. The United States has mutual legal assistance treaties with several countries designed to formalize such cooperative law enforcement assistance. It has agreements for the same purpose in many other instances. Cooperation, however, may introduce new obstacles. Searches and interrogations carried out jointly with foreign officials, certainly if they involve Americans, must be conducted within the confines of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. And the Sixth Amendment imposes limits upon the use in American criminal trials of depositions taken abroad.
The nation's recently negotiated extradition treaties address some of the features of earlier agreements which complicate extradition for extraterritorial offenses, that is, dual criminality requirements; reluctance to recognize extraterritorial jurisdiction; and exemptions on the basis of nationality or political offenses. To further facilitate the prosecution of federal crimes with extraterritorial application Congress has enacted special venue, statute of limitations, and evidentiary statutes. To further cooperative efforts, it enacted the Foreign Evidence Request Efficiency Act, P.L. 111-79, which authorizes federal courts to issue search warrants, subpoenas, and other orders to facilitate criminal investigations in this country on behalf of foreign law enforcement officials.
This report is available in an abridged version, stripped of its attachments, bibliography, footnotes, and most of its citations to authority, as CRS Report RS22497, Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law: An Abbreviated Sketch, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42703 | crs_R42703_0 | The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or "the Act") recognizes the right of employees to engage in collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing. By "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining," the Act attempts to mitigate and eliminate labor-related obstructions to the free flow of commerce. Although union membership has declined dramatically since the 1950s, congressional interest in the NLRA remains significant. In the 112 th Congress, over 30 bills have been introduced to amend the NLRA. Some of these bills address the timing of union representation elections, while others are concerned with varying aspects of the NLRA, such as the activities of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which implements and administers the Act. Since the NLRA's enactment in 1935, the NLRB and the courts have considered a variety of issues arising under the Act. This report reviews selected decisions of the NLRB and the courts that involve topics that continue to be relevant for employers and unions during the collective bargaining process. Coverage Under the NLRA
The right to engage in collective bargaining under the NLRA does not apply to all individuals employed by an employer. Rather, the right extends only to "employees." An employee's job title does not determine whether an individual is a supervisor for purposes of the NLRA. To determine whether an unfair labor practice has been committed under either subsection, a reviewing court asks the same question: whether the misconduct "reasonably tends" to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under the NLRA. Courts have emphasized that the actual effect of the misconduct is immaterial. Pre-Election Communication with Employees
While section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA does prohibit an employer from interfering with the right of employees to engage in collective bargaining, the NLRB has long maintained that an employer may make antiunion, but noncoercive, speeches to their employees on company time and on company property without allowing a union an equal opportunity to reply. | The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or "the Act") recognizes the right of employees to engage in collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing. By "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining," the Act attempts to mitigate and eliminate labor-related obstructions to the free flow of commerce. Although union membership has declined dramatically since the 1950s, congressional interest in the NLRA remains significant. In the 112th Congress, over 30 bills have been introduced to amend the NLRA. Some of these bills address the timing of union representation elections, while others are concerned with varying aspects of the NLRA, such as the activities of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which implements and administers the Act.
Since the NLRA's enactment in 1935, the NLRB and the courts have considered a variety of issues arising under the Act. This report reviews selected decisions of the NLRB and the courts on three of them. Determining when an employee may be deemed a supervisor for purposes of coverage under the Act is important because the right to engage in collective bargaining is extended only to employees under the NLRA. Employees who are properly classified as supervisors are not afforded collective bargaining rights.
Both employers and unions are prohibited from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them under the Act. In general, to determine whether an unfair labor practice has been committed by either an employer or union, a reviewing court asks whether the misconduct "reasonably tends" to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under the NLRA. Courts have emphasized that the actual effect of the misconduct is immaterial.
Finally, pre-election communication with employees may influence the outcome of a representation election. While the NLRA does prohibit an employer from interfering with an employee's collective bargaining rights, decisions discussed in this report indicate that an employer does not violate the Act in all cases when it denies a union access to its property. |
crs_R41345 | crs_R41345_0 | H.R. The Senate received the bill on July 13, but it had lain dormant on the chamber's Legislative Calendar (General Orders, Calendar No. On September 29, the Senate amended the bill, renamed it as the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, and passed it by Yea-Nay vote (69-30, Record Vote No. 564), making funds available through December 3, 2010. Appropriation
President Barack Obama submitted a detailed appropriations request for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 on February 1, 2010. In it, he requested $18.7 billion in new budget authority for regular military construction and military family housing construction and operation, plus an additional $1.3 billion for construction in support of ongoing military contingency operations overseas, primarily in Afghanistan. 111-226 ), to the Senate on July 19, 2010, where it was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders (Calendar No. 469). Representative Chet Edwards (TX/17), chair of the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies, reported an original measure, H.R. 5822 . The House passed the rule on July 28 and took up the bill, considering a total of 14 amendments. Detailed, appropriations account-level data on the appropriations bills, including enacted amounts for prior years, are displayed in Table 4 (Department of Veterans Affairs), Table 6 (Related Agencies), and Table A -1 (Military Construction and Family Housing) and Table A -2 (Overseas Contingency Operations Military Construction). Title I: Department of Defense
Military Construction
The military construction appropriations account includes a number of appropriations subaccounts:
Military Construction accounts provide funds for new construction, construction improvements, planning and design, and host nation support of active and reserve military forces and DOD agencies. needed to support major NATO commands. The President has requested $2.4 billion as the final implementation installment. Both House and Senate committees have recommended full funding of the President's request. In the end, of the $566.2 million requested by the President for construction on Guam, the House committee recommended appropriating $393.2 million, and the Senate committee recommended $246.0 million. Title II: Department of Veterans Affairs
Agency Overview
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers directly, or in conjunction with other federal agencies, programs that provide benefits and other services to veterans and their spouses, dependents and beneficiaries. The largest dollar increases in funding for the VA between FY2010 and FY2011 in the Administration request, the House Appropriations Committee recommendation ( H.R. 5822 ) and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommendation ( S. 3615 ) are for disability compensation and pension benefits, and readjustment benefits, where the largest component is for education benefits. 5822 , and S. 3615 for FY2011 would provide discretionary funding that is less than mandatory funding. Title III: Related Agencies
American Battle Monuments Commission
The American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) is responsible for the maintenance and construction of U.S. monuments and memorials commemorating the achievements in battle of U.S. armed forces since the nation's entry into World War I; the erection of monuments and markers by U.S. citizens and organizations in foreign countries; and the design, construction, and maintenance of permanent cemeteries and memorials in foreign countries. H.R. The appropriation for the AFRH facilities is from the Armed Forces Retirement Home Trust Fund. CRS Report RS22561, Veterans Affairs: The U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims—Judicial Review of VA Decision Making , by [author name scrubbed]. | The Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies appropriations bill provides funding for the planning, design, construction, alteration, and improvement of facilities used by active and reserve military components worldwide. It capitalizes military family housing and the U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program, and finances the implementation of installation closures and realignments. It underwrites veterans benefit and health care programs administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs, provides for the creation and maintenance of U.S. cemeteries and battlefield monuments within the United States and abroad, and supports the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Armed Forces Retirement Homes, and Arlington National Cemetery. The bill also funds construction supporting military operations overseas (known as Overseas Contingency Operations, or OCO), a function previously carried out through emergency supplemental appropriations, and advance appropriations for veterans medical services.
President Barack Obama submitted his request to Congress for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 appropriations on February 1, 2010. For the appropriations accounts included in this bill, his request totaled $191.7 billion in new budget authority, divided into four major categories: Title I (military construction and family housing) at $18.7 billion; Title II (veterans affairs) at $171.4 billion; Title III (related agencies) at $283.8 million; and Title IV (a new category of funding for construction in support of active military operations overseas) at $1.3 billion. All told, the request comprised $20.0 billion in Department of Defense (DOD), $171.4 billion in veterans affairs, and $283.8 million in other agency funding. Of the total, $76.0 billion (39.6%) would be discretionary appropriations, with the remainder considered mandatory.
Simultaneously, the President requested an emergency supplemental appropriation for FY2010 that contained $521.4 million for Army and Air Force construction in Afghanistan.
The military construction funding amounts requested by the President and recommended by the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations have fallen off as building for the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) round has nearly reached completion. Funding support for military family housing construction has also declined as the military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) continue their efforts to privatize formerly government-owned accommodations.
In the area of non-medical benefits, the largest dollar increases in funding for the VA between FY2010 and FY2011 in the Administration request, the House Appropriations Committee recommendation (H.R. 5822) and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommendation (S. 3615) are for disability compensation and pension benefits, and readjustment benefits, where the largest component is for education benefits.
The appropriations subcommittees in both chambers reported their versions of the bill (S. 3615) on July 14, 2010. The Senate introduced S. 3615 and placed it on the Legislative Calendar (Calendar No. 469) on July 19. The House introduced H.R. 5822 on July 22, took it up on July 28, and passed it with amendments. The Senate received H.R. 5822 on July 29 and placed it on the Legislative Calendar under General Orders (Calendar No. 494). On September 29, the Senate revived H.R. 3081, a bill that had lain dormant since July 13, 2009, amended it to form a Continuing Appropriations Act that expires not later than December 3, 2010, and passed the measure. The House followed suit early on September 30. |
crs_RS22517 | crs_RS22517_0 | Current Status of Turkey's Accession
New Agenda—Relabeled Approach
As 2012 began, Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU had basically reached a political and technical stalemate with little anticipation of any additional chapters of the EU's rules and regulations known as the acquis communautaire being opened in the near term. Movement Toward New Negotiations
In early February 2013, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius announced that the new government in Paris was favorably disposed to resuming the accession talks with Turkey and was prepared to lift its hold on opening at least one new chapter of the acquis —Chapter 22, Regional Policy. Public protests over the future of Gezi park in central Ankara and the government's reaction precipitated a harsh response from Brussels over the use of force and the freedom of assembly and speech. A resolution was adopted on June 13 by the European Parliament expressing its "deep concern at the disproportionate and excessive use of force by the Turkish police." After two weeks of rather nasty verbal sparring, and Ankara's continued crackdown on the protestors, several EU member states, including Germany, threatened to press for the postponement of the upcoming accession talks, again provoking an angry response from Ankara, including comments by Turkey's EU Minister Bağış that some European countries should "get lost" if they decided not to open Chapter 22 or delay the start of the accession negotiations. Since neither side really wanted to end the accession process altogether or to further freeze the relationship despite mutual ill-feelings, the EU, in a face-saving decision for both sides, agreed to officially declare Chapter 22 open but to postpone the resumption of the accession negotiations until October 2013 after the social unrest in Turkey had subsided and after the German national elections had taken place. On November 5, 2013, formal negotiations between the EU and Turkey resumed. On October 19, 2013, the European Commission issued its annual assessment of the progress of the candidate countries, including Turkey. The Commission's report seemed more upbeat than previous versions restating Turkey's importance to the EU and offering a few positive conclusions including references to a new democracy proposal regarding tolerance for the wearing of headscarves, use of the Kurdish language in limited circumstances, and the lowering of the electoral threshold under which political parties could enter parliament, circulating in Ankara. However, the Commission expressed overall disappointment with Turkey's progress on a number of issues including its handling of the Gezi Park protests, freedom of expression and media freedom. The Commission again expressed concern over Turkey's continued refusal to extend diplomatic recognition to EU member Cyprus, and Turkey's position to basically ignore the Cyprus Presidency of the EU Council in the latter half of 2012. With many in Ankara now believing it may no longer be necessary for Turkey to become a member of the EU in order to define Turkey or its place in the international community and with what appears to be a great deal of rhetoric but little real enthusiasm in Europe (except from the EU Commission) for Turkey as a full voting member of the club, observers have begun to question why both the EU and Turkey continue with the accession process at all. Administrations and many in Congress have continued to support EU enlargement, believing that it serves U.S. interests by spreading stability and economic opportunities throughout Europe. This is between the EU and Turkey." Although some Members of Congress continue to support Turkey's EU accession, attitudes toward Turkey have changed somewhat and the vocal enthusiasm for Turkey's EU membership seems to have waned. | October 2013 marked the eighth anniversary of the European Union's decision to launch formal negotiations with Turkey toward full membership in the Union. Throughout all of 2012 and the first half of 2013, little or no progress was made on any open chapters of the EU's rules and regulations known as the acquis communautaire, as formal accession talks between Turkey and the EU seemed to have reached a political and technical stalemate.
In February 2013, France, which has been part of a group in the EU that has expressed doubts about Turkey's EU membership, signaled that it was prepared to support opening at least one new chapter of the acquis (Chapter 22, Regional Policy) as a way to rejuvenate the accession talks. This step was supported by many EU member states, although some retained their doubts. Eventually, agreement was reached to open the first new chapter of the acquis in over three years and to resume the actual negotiations in June.
In early June 2013 public protests in Turkey over the future of a park (Gezi) and the government's tough reaction precipitated a harsh response from Brussels and a resolution from the European Parliament expressing its "deep concern at the disproportionate and excessive use of force by the Turkish police." Turkish officials responded with tough rhetoric toward the EU. After two weeks of rather nasty verbal sparring, and Ankara's continued crackdown on the protestors, several EU member states threatened to press for the postponement of the scheduled accession talks. Since neither side really wanted to end the accession process despite mutual ill-feelings, the EU agreed to open the new chapter but to postpone the resumption of the actual accession negotiations until October 2013 once the protests in Turkey subsided and after the national elections in Germany. The talks officially resumed on November 5, 2013.
In October 2013, the European Commission issued its annual assessment of the progress of the candidate countries, including Turkey. The Commission's report seemed more upbeat than previous versions restating Turkey's importance to the EU and offering a few positive conclusions including references to a new democracy proposal circulating in Ankara. However, the Commission expressed overall disappointment with Turkey's progress on a number of issues including its handling of the Gezi Park protests, freedom of expression and media freedom. The Commission again expressed concern over Turkey's continued refusal to extend diplomatic recognition to EU member Cyprus, and Turkey's position to basically ignore the Cyprus Presidency of the EU Council in the latter half of 2012.
For many Turks, EU membership seems to have lost its appeal with some public opinion polls suggesting only 35% of Turks felt Turkey would join the EU. Turkey's economy continues to thrive and Ankara continues to try to reposition and strengthen itself in its own neighborhood between secular Europe and the Islamist emergence in the Middle East. Many Turks seem to feel "being European" or gaining membership in the Union is no longer needed in order to secure Turkey's status or to have an otherwise normal partnership with Europe. European support for Turkey, never really that strong among the average citizenry, now seems even more ambivalent.
This report provides a brief overview of the EU's accession process and Turkey's path to EU membership. The U.S. Congress has had a long-standing interest in Turkey as a NATO ally and partner in regional foreign policy and energy security issues. Although some Members of Congress have expressed continued support for Turkey's membership in the EU, congressional interest and enthusiasm seems to have diminished recently. |
crs_R43140 | crs_R43140_0 | T he Buy American Act of 1933 is the earliest and arguably the best known of the various statutes regarding federal procurement of domestic products. Essentially, the act attempts to protect domestic businesses and labor by establishing a price preference for domestic end products and construction materials in government acquisitions. The act is of perennial interest to Congress, which has periodically enacted or considered measures to expand the scope of domestic preferences in federal procurements or, more rarely, to narrow it. The act itself has seldom been amended. However, numerous statutory requirements like those of the Buy American Act have been enacted. See generally CRS Report R43354, Domestic Content Restrictions: The Buy American Act and Complementary Provisions of Federal Law , by [author name scrubbed] et al. Specifically, the provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) implementing the Buy American Act require that, when a domestic offer (i.e., an offer of a domestic end product) is not the low offer, the procuring agency must add a certain percentage of the low offer's price (inclusive of duty) to that offer before determining which offer is the lowest priced or "best value" for the government. This percentage typically ranges from 6%, in cases where the lowest domestic offer is from a large business; to 12%, when the lowest domestic offer is from a small business; to 50%, for Department of Defense procurements, although agencies may adopt higher percentages by regulation. If the domestic offer is the lowest, or tied for lowest, after the application of this price preference, the agency must award the contract to the domestic offeror. However, if the foreign offer still has the lowest price, the agency generally awards the contract to the foreign offeror pursuant to provisions of the Buy American Act permitting the purchase of foreign end products (and the use of foreign construction materials) when the costs of domestic ones are "unreasonable." Acquisitions of services are generally not subject to the Buy American Act. Domestic construction material , in turn, includes unmanufactured construction materials mined or produced in the United States, as well as construction material manufactured in the United States, provided that (1) the cost of the components mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50% of the cost of all components, or (2) the construction material is a COTS item. Exceptions to the Buy American Act
The FAR lists five "exceptions" to the Buy American Act, or five circumstances in which an agency may purchase foreign end products or use foreign construction materials without violating the act. These exceptions apply when (1) the procurement of domestic goods or the use of domestic construction materials would be inconsistent with the public interest; (2) domestic end products or construction materials are unavailable; (3) the contracting officer determines that the costs of domestic end products or construction materials would be unreasonable; (4) the agency is procuring information technology that is a commercial item; or (5) the goods are acquired specifically for commissary resale. However, some commentators also view the requirements that purchases be above the micro-purchase threshold, and for use in the United States, as exceptions to the Buy American Act. Unreasonable Cost
The Buy American Act and its implementing regulations also authorize the purchase of foreign end products and construction materials if the cost of domestic end products or construction materials would be "unreasonable." This means that products that are wholly grown, produced, or manufactured in certain foreign jurisdictions, or "substantially transformed" into new and different articles within these jurisdictions, may be treated the same as "domestic" ones in particular procurements. | The Buy American Act of 1933 is the earliest and arguably the best known of various statutes regarding federal procurement of domestic products. Essentially, the act attempts to protect U.S. businesses and labor by restricting the acquisition and use of end products or construction materials that are not "domestic." For purposes of the act, domestic end products and domestic construction materials include (1) unmanufactured end products or construction materials mined or produced in the United States, as well as (2) end products or construction materials manufactured in the United States, provided that (a) the cost of the components mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50% of the cost of all components, or (b) the product is a commercially available off-the-shelf item. End products or construction materials that do not qualify as domestic under these definitions are generally treated as foreign, and offers that supply foreign end products or construction materials are foreign offers, regardless of the offeror's nationality. Purchases of services are generally not subject to the Buy American Act.
As implemented, the Buy American Act limits the purchase of foreign end products and the use of foreign construction materials by establishing price preferences for domestic offers. Specifically, the provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) implementing the Buy American Act provide that, when a domestic offer is not the low offer, the procuring agency must add a certain percentage of the low offer's price to that offer before determining which offer is the lowest priced or "best value" for the government. This percentage generally ranges from 6%, in cases where the lowest domestic offer is from a large business; to 12%, when the lowest domestic offer is from a small business; to 50%, for Department of Defense procurements, although agencies may adopt higher percentages by regulation. If the domestic offer is the lowest, or tied for lowest, after the application of this price preference, the agency must award the contract to the domestic offeror. However, if the foreign offer still has the lowest price, the agency generally awards the contract to the foreign offeror pursuant to provisions of the Buy American Act permitting the purchase of foreign end products when the costs of domestic ones are "unreasonable."
There are also other "exceptions" to the Buy American Act, which permit the purchase of foreign end products and the use of foreign construction material when (1) the expected value of the procurement is below the micro-purchase threshold (generally $3,500); (2) the goods are for use outside the United States; (3) the procurement of domestic goods or the use of domestic construction materials would be inconsistent with the public interest; (4) domestic end products or construction materials are unavailable; (5) the agency is procuring information technology that is a commercial item; or (6) the goods are acquired specifically for commissary resale.
In addition, the Buy American Act is often waived pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act. When this happens, certain products that are wholly grown, produced, or manufactured in foreign jurisdictions, or "substantially transformed" into new and different articles within foreign jurisdictions, are treated the same as "domestic" ones for purposes of the procurement.
The Buy American Act is of perennial interest to Congress, which has periodically enacted or considered measures to expand the scope of domestic preferences in federal procurements or, more rarely, to narrow it. The act itself has seldom been amended. However, numerous statutory requirements like those of the Buy American Act have been enacted. See CRS Report R43354, Domestic Content Restrictions: The Buy American Act and Complementary Provisions of Federal Law, by [author name scrubbed] et al. |
crs_RL34150 | crs_RL34150_0 | Covered entities emit about 45% of the EU's carbon dioxide emissions. A "Phase 1" trading period began January 1, 2005. A second, Phase 2, trading period began January 1, 2008, covering the period of the Kyoto Protocol, with a Phase 3 planned to begin in 2013. Several positives resulted from the Phase 1 experience that assisted the ETS in making the Phase 2 process run smoothly, at least so far. Second, the ETS helped jump-start the project-based mechanisms—Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI)—created under the Kyoto Protocol. However, several issues that arose during the first phase remain contentious as the ETS implements Phase 2, including allocation (including use of auctions and reliance on model projections), shutdown credits and new entrant reserves, and others. In addition, the expansion of the EU and the implementation of the linking directives create new issues to which Phase 2 has had to respond. However, through almost four years of carbon emissions trading the EU has gained valuable experience. This experience, along with the process of developing Phase 3, may provide some insight into current cap-and-trade design issues in the United States. As suggested by the EU-ETS experience, expanding equivalent data requirements to all facilities covered under a cap-and-trade program would be the foundation for developing the allocation systems, reduction targets, and enforcement provisions. Most bills are more comprehensive than the ETS, covering 80% to 100% of the country's greenhouse gas emissions. As noted, the EU's experience with the ETS suggests that adding sectors to an emission trading scheme can be a slow and contentious process. Like the situation in the ETS, most U.S. industry groups either oppose auctions outright or want them to be supplemental to a base free allocation. Given the experience with the ETS where the EC and individual governments have been unwilling or unable to move away from free allocation, the Congress, like the EC, may ultimately be asked to consider specifying any auction requirement if it wishes to incorporate market economics more fully into compliance decisions. Analysis of ETS allowance prices during Phase 1 suggests the most important variables in determining allowance price changes were oil and natural gas price changes. This apparent linkage between allowance price changes and price changes in two commodities markets raises the possibility of market manipulation, particularly with the inclusion of financial instruments such as options and futures contracts. Congress may ultimately be asked to consider whether the Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, or other body should have enhanced regulatory and oversight authority over such instruments. | The European Union's (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is a cornerstone of the EU's efforts to meet its obligation under the Kyoto Protocol. It covers more than 10,000 energy intensive facilities across the 27 EU Member countries; covered entities emit about 45% of the EU's carbon dioxide emissions. A "Phase 1" trading period began January 1, 2005. A second, Phase 2, trading period began in 2008, covering the period of the Kyoto Protocol, with a Phase 3 proposed for 2013.
Several positives resulting from the Phase 1 "learning by doing" exercise assisted the ETS in making the Phase 2 process run more smoothly, including: (1) greatly improving emissions data, (2) encouraging development of the Kyoto Protocol's project-based mechanisms—Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), and (3) influencing corporate behavior to begin pricing in the value of allowances in decision-making, particularly in the electric utility sector.
However, several issues that arose during the first phase were not resolved as the ETS moved into Phase 2, including allocation schemes, shutdown credits and new entrant reserves, and others. In addition, the expansion of the EU and the implementation of the directives linking the ETS to the Kyoto Protocol project-based mechanisms created new issues to which Phase 2 had to respond. A more comprehensive response to these issues is envisioned for Phase 3.
The United States is not a party to Kyoto. However, almost four years of carbon emissions trading has given the EU valuable experience in designing and operating a greenhouse gas trading system. This experience may provide some insight into cap-and-trade design issues currently being debated in the United States.
The U.S. requires only electric utilities to monitor CO2. The EU-ETS experience suggests that expanding similar requirements to all facilities covered under a cap-and-trade scheme would be pivotal for developing allocation systems, reduction targets, and enforcement provisions. In the U.S. debate on comprehensive versus sector-specific reduction programs, the EU-ETS experience suggests that adding sectors to a trading scheme once established may be a slow, contentious process. As with most EU industries, most U.S. industry groups either oppose auctions outright or want them to be supplemental to a base free allocation. The EU-ETS experience suggests Congress may want to consider specifying any auction requirement if it wishes to incorporate market economics more fully into compliance decisions. EU-ETS analysis suggests the most important variables in determining Phase 1 allowance price changes were oil and natural gas price changes; this apparent linkage raises possible market manipulation issues, particularly with the inclusion of financial instruments such as options and futures contracts. Congress may consider whether the government needs enhanced regulatory and oversight authority over such instruments. |
crs_R41660 | crs_R41660_0 | Congress also has enacted targeted adjustment assistance programs to provide training and other assistance to help workers and firms that may be dislocated by greater market opening adjust to new economic opportunities. This report discusses the models used to estimate the employment effects of the agreement and their various assumptions, necessary in order for the model to generate results. Invariably, these assumptions determine to some extent the results that are generated and, therefore, limit their representation of the real world economy. U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC): U.S-Korea Free Trade Agreement Potential Economy-wide and Selected Sectoral Effects The University of Michigan: Economic Effects of a Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement U.S.-Korea Business Council: Failure to Implement the U.S.-Korea Free Tr ade Agreement: The Cost for American Workers and Companies Economic Policy Institute (EPI): Trade Policy and Job Loss: U.S. Trade Deals with Colombia and Korea Will be Costl y
In addition, two other estimates, derived by the USITC and released by the Obama Administration and the Majority Staff of the Senate Finance Committee Trade Subcommittee, are reported. Congress has demonstrated an ongoing interest in concluding trade agreements to eliminate and reduce barriers to U.S. trade in goods, services, and agriculture, and it has assumed a direct role in assessing the impact of trade agreements on the U.S. economy. Estimating Employment Effects of Trade Agreements
Although discussions of trade agreements often focus on potential employment gains or losses, most economists argue that such employment estimates represent a partial accounting of the total economic effects of trade agreements and, therefore, do not perform well as an indicator of the overall impact of the agreement on the economy. However, this lack of precision may be an issue when the models are used to estimate the effects of bilateral trade agreements where the overall amount of trade and, therefore, the impact of the agreement, is expected to be less than that of a comprehensive multilateral agreement. Movements in exchange rates, however, could have an important impact on trade patterns that involve countries that are parties to a bilateral trade agreement. The estimates range from 280,000 jobs gained to a loss of 159,000 jobs if the United States does adopt the agreement. As a result of these actions, some firms expand, while others contract. Throughout this process, however, the total number of jobs in the U.S. economy is not affected, that is, trade agreements do not affect the total number of jobs in a large open economy such as the U.S. economy, but can affect the composition of employment. For the United States, international trade is not the primary force creating employment in the economy. Also, U.S. trade with South Korea is about one-fourth that of U.S. trade with Mexico, and the United States and South Korea do not share a common border as is the case between the United States and Mexico. In addition, the ITA estimates relate to the average number of jobs supported by exports across a broad section of the economy and should not be used in conjunction with trade agreements where the approach should more appropriately focus on estimating the change in the composition of employment that are associated with a change in trade as a result of a trade agreement. As this reports indicates, the most important assumption involved in generating estimates of the impact of the KORUS-FTA on employment appears to be the expected level of labor utilization in the U.S. economy over the ten-year phase-in period expected to be required to fully implement the KORUS-FTA. Such an assumption often is necessary in order to generate results from the economic models. | The Obama Administration finalized negotiations with South Korea in early December 2010 on a bilateral free trade agreement. Congress passed the implementing legislation for the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement on October 21, 2011 (P.L. 112-42). Congress not only plays a direct role in approving legislation that implements the provisions of free trade agreements, but also authorizes and appropriates funding for programs that are meant to provide special assistance to firms and workers that are dislocated as a result of lower barriers to trade. Since the agreement with South Korea covers a wide range of trade and investment issues, it could have substantial economic implications for both the United States and South Korea. South Korea is the seventh-largest trading partner of the United States, and the United States is South Korea's third-largest trading partner.
Similar to other trade agreements, the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) attracted both supporters and detractors, primarily over the impact the agreement could have on employment in the economy. Supporters argued that the agreement could create as many as 280,000 jobs in the economy. Others, however, argued that the agreement could lead to an overall loss of up to 159,000 jobs in various sectors of the economy. Still others contended that the United States could stand to lose exports, employment, and extended economic opportunities if it failed to sign a trade agreement, while the European Union and other nations were lining up to finalize similar agreements with South Korea.
Estimating the economic impact of trade agreements, however, is a daunting task, due to a lack of data and important theoretical and practical matters associated with generating results from economic models. In addition, such estimates provide an incomplete accounting of the total economic effects of trade agreements. This report assesses the results of a number of models used to generate estimates of the effect of the KORUS FTA on employment. These studies were chosen specifically because they estimate (or can be used to estimate) data on employment effects of the trade agreement. All economic models incorporate various assumptions that are necessary in order for the model to generate results. Invariably, these approaches determine, to some extent, the results that are generated and, therefore, limit their representation of the real world economy. Currently, the various models produce widely disparate estimates of the number of jobs affected by the trade agreement, reflecting the various assumptions that are used in the models and differences in the approaches.
From the perspective of a large open economy such as the U.S. economy, international trade is not a major determinate of total employment in the economy, real wages in the economy, or the overall level of production. This is especially true for bilateral trade agreements with individual countries where the impact on the economy as a whole is expected to be small. Nevertheless, some sectors of the economy are likely to be affected more than others. Congress has demonstrated an ongoing interest in assessing the economic impact of trade agreements and, at times, has provided assistance to those workers and firms that are disproportionately affected. |
crs_R42690 | crs_R42690_0 | An "immigration detainer" is a document by which U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) advises other law enforcement agencies of its interest in individual aliens whom these agencies are detaining. The standard detainer form (Form I-247) allows ICE to indicate that it has taken certain actions that could lead to the alien's removal (e.g., determining that there is reason to believe the alien is removable, initiating removal proceedings). The form also allows ICE to request that the other agency take certain actions that could facilitate such removal (e.g., holding the alien temporarily, notifying ICE prior to releasing the alien). ICE and its predecessor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), have used detainers as one means of obtaining custody of aliens for purposes of removal proceedings since at least 1950. However, ICE's implementation of the Secure Communities program in the period between 2008 and 2014 raised numerous questions about detainers. This program relied upon information sharing between various levels and agencies of government to identify potentially removable aliens. Detainers were then issued for some of these aliens. However, with PEP, detainers are to be issued only for aliens who have been convicted of (rather than just arrested for ) certain offenses that are among ICE's priorities for civil immigration enforcement. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) did not expressly address the issuance of detainers prior to 1986. Section 287 generally specifies the powers of immigration officers and employees and, as amended, provides that
[i]n the case of an alien who is arrested by a Federal, State, or local law enforcement official for a violation of any law relating to controlled substances, if the official (or another official)—
(1) has reason to believe that the alien may not have been lawfully admitted to the United States or otherwise is not lawfully present in the United States,
(2) expeditiously informs an appropriate officer or employee of the Service authorized and designated by the Attorney General of the arrest and of the facts concerning the status of the alien, and
(3) requests the Service to determine promptly whether or not to issue a detainer to detain the alien, the officer or employee of the Service shall promptly determine whether or not to issue such a detainer. After the 1986 amendments, the INS amended its regulations to address the issuance of detainers. §242.2) governing detainers for other offenses. Legal Issues
Numerous questions about detainers were raised in the period between March 2008, when the Secure Communities program began, and November 2014, when the Obama Administration announced it is discontinuing the Secure Communities program and replacing it with a new Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). These questions include (1) whether DHS's detainer regulations and practices are beyond its statutory authority; (2) whether states and localities are required to comply with immigration detainers; (3) who has custody of aliens subject to detainers; and (4) whether detainer practices violate aliens' constitutional rights. In particular, certain questions about holds of aliens pursuant to detainers may have been mooted by the Obama Administration's announcement that ICE will generally request such holds only "in special circumstances" when the alien is subject to a final order of removal, or when there is other sufficient probable cause to believe that the alien is removable. The only court to have ruled on this issue to date—the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California—found that DHS's detainer regulations are within DHS's statutory authority in its 2009 decision in Committee for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma . Specifically, in its March 4, 2014, decision in Galarza v. Szalczyk , a majority of the reviewing three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the word "shall" in DHS's detainer regulation prescribes the maximum period of any detention, instead of requiring states and localities to hold aliens for DHS. Courts in numerous jurisdictions have held that the filing of a detainer, in itself, does not result in an alien being in federal custody. In addition, at least some commentators would construe Section 287(d) of the INA to authorize the detention of aliens arrested for controlled substance offenses. As discussed above, some commentators have asserted that the provisions of the INA addressing the issuance of detainers for controlled substance offenses and the regulations implementing them are the sole authority for holds pursuant to detainers. | An "immigration detainer" is a document by which U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) advises other law enforcement agencies of its interest in individual aliens whom these agencies are detaining. ICE and its predecessor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), have used detainers as one means of obtaining custody of aliens for removal proceedings since at least 1950. ICE's implementation of the Secure Communities program in the period between 2008 and 2014 raised numerous questions about detainers. This program relied upon information sharing between various levels and agencies of government to identify potentially removable aliens. Detainers were then issued for some of these aliens. However, the Obama Administration's announcement on November 20, 2014, that it is replacing the Secure Communities program with a new Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) may moot certain questions, since detainers are to be used differently with PEP than with Secure Communities.
Prior to 1986, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) did not explicitly address detainers, and the INS appears to have issued detainers pursuant to its "general authority" to guard U.S. borders and boundaries against the illegal entry of aliens, among other things. However, in 1986, Congress amended the INA to address the issuance of detainers for aliens arrested for controlled substance offenses. After the 1986 amendments, INS promulgated two regulations, one addressing the issuance of detainers for controlled substance offenses and the other addressing detainers for other offenses. These regulations were merged in 1997 and currently address various topics, including who may issue detainers and the temporary detention of aliens by other law enforcement agencies. There is also a standard detainer form (Form I-247) that allows ICE to indicate that it has taken actions that could lead to the alien's removal, and request that another agency take actions that could facilitate such removal (e.g., notify ICE before the alien's release).
Some commentators and advocates for immigrants' rights have asserted that, because the INA addresses only detainers for controlled substance offenses, ICE's detainer regulations and practices are beyond its statutory authority insofar as detainers are used for other offenses. However, a federal district court in California found otherwise in its 2009 decision in Committee for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma.
Some have also suggested that a federal regulation—which provides that law enforcement agencies receiving immigration detainers "shall maintain custody of the alien for a period [generally] not to exceed 48 hours"—means that states and localities are required to hold aliens for ICE. Prior versions of Form I-247 may also have been construed as requiring compliance with detainers. However, in its recent decision in Galarza v. Szalczyk, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected this view. Instead, it adopted the same interpretation of the regulation that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has advanced, construing it as prescribing the maximum period of any detention pursuant to a detainer, rather than mandating detention.
In addition, questions have been raised about who has custody of aliens subject to detainers, and whether the detainer practices of state, local, and/or federal governments impinge upon aliens' constitutional rights. Answers to these questions may depend upon the facts and circumstances of particular cases. For example, courts have found that the filing of a detainer, in itself, does not result in an alien being in federal custody, although aliens could be found to be in federal custody if they are subject to final orders of removal. Similarly, holding an alien pursuant to a detainer when there is not probable cause to believe the alien is removable could be distinguished from holding an alien when there is probable cause, or when the alien is subject to a removal order. |
crs_RL34641 | crs_RL34641_0 | The statute says that the federal agencies "shall" work toward those goals "in consultation with and with the assistance of" the two agencies that supervise the ESA program: the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) of the Department of the Interior, and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) of the Department of Commerce (together: the Services). It has long been within the discretion of the Action Agencies to determine whether a proposed action requires consultation. There was no deadline for the Service to respond to a request for concurrence in the previous regulations. The final version was published December 16, 2008, and took effect January 15, 2009. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. A provision of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-8 ) authorized the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce to "withdraw or reissue" the revised regulations within 60 days of the act "without regard to any provision of statute or regulation." President Obama issued a memorandum on March 3, 2009, directing the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce to consider issuing new regulations to "promote the purposes of the ESA." The memorandum also requested that other federal agencies exercise the discretion allowed under the revised regulations to follow the "prior longstanding consultation and concurrence practices" involving the Services, since nothing in the revised regulations prohibited agencies from carrying out a full consultation. How the Regulations Were Revised
The regulations that were in effect from January 15, 2009, to May 4, 2009, had revised the consultation process by: (1) allowing already prepared documents to be used as a BA; (2) allowing Action Agencies greater discretion to determine whether consultation applies; (3) clarifying certain definitions; and (4) making procedural changes to informal consultations. The Services said that the modifications would "reinforce the Services' current view that there is no requirement to consult on [greenhouse gas] emissions' contribution to global warming and its associated impacts on listed species." Six substantive changes were made to the regulations. The alterations included the following:
changing the definition of biological assessment; changing the definition of cumulative effects; changing the definition of effects of the action; changing when a consultation is needed; changing the procedure for informal consultation; and changing the procedure for formal consultation. The standards for consultation before the revisions turned on questions of jeopardizing the continued existence of a listed species and modifying its critical habitat. Those criteria were:
The action has no effect on a listed species or critical habitat; The effects of an action are manifested in global processes and cannot be reliably predicted or measured at the local scale; The effects of an action are manifested in global processes and would result in only an extremely small, insignificant local impact; The effects of an action are manifested in global processes and pose a remote potential risk of harm to species or habitat; The effects of an action are not capable of being meaningfully identified or detected in a manner that permits evaluation; or The effects of an action are wholly beneficial. If it agrees, the Service is required to concur with the Action Agency's determination of "not likely to adversely affect" in writing. Joint regulations were issued in 2003 to address the effects of increasing levels of wildfires on listed species. | The Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires all federal agencies to consult with either the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service (the Services) to determine whether their actions may jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or destroy or adversely modify designated critical habitat of listed species. In August 2008, FWS and NMFS proposed changes to the regulations that address the consultation process. Final regulations were published December 16, 2008, and took effect on January 15, 2009. On May 4, 2009, those regulations were withdrawn and the regulations that were in effect before the changes were reinstated. FWS and NMFS were authorized by P.L. 111-8, § 429 to make the substitution. This report explains what changes had been made to the consultation regulations and related issues.
The revisions were intended to do three things, according to the Services: clarify when consultation is applicable; clarify certain definitions; and establish time frames for consultation. The Services argued that the new regulations showed the ESA does not require consultation on greenhouse gas emissions' contribution to global warming and its associated impacts on listed species.
The revised regulations gave federal agencies greater discretion to determine when and how their actions may affect listed species. They also addressed issues of causation—when an agency action truly affects the well-being of listed species or critical habitat. The changes modified definitions and altered the process for consultations. The definitions that were modified include cumulative effects, effects of an action, and biological assessment. The changes added criteria for determining when consultations do not apply. The Action Agency continued to determine whether consultation is required. The processes for formal and informal consultations were revised to include a 60-day deadline (which may be increased to 120 days) for the appropriate Service to concur in writing with an Action Agency's finding during informal consultation. If the Service failed to respond in writing, the project could continue without further consultation at the discretion of the Action Agency.
Congress addressed the regulations. A provision in the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8) allowed the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce to withdraw the regulations without any administrative steps, putting the previous regulations back in effect, provided they acted within 60 days. Additionally, President Obama issued a memorandum directing those Secretaries to decide whether to develop new regulations that would "promote the purposes of the ESA." The memorandum also requested all agencies to exercise the discretion allowed under the revised regulations to "follow the prior longstanding consultation and concurrence practices" of the Services. |
crs_R43047 | crs_R43047_0 | Determining how many people have a mental illness can be difficult, and prevalence estimates vary. While numerous surveys include questions related to mental illness, few provide prevalence estimates of diagnosable mental illness , and fewer still provide national prevalence estimates of diagnosable mental illness. This report briefly describes the methodology and selected findings of three large federally funded surveys that provide national prevalence estimates of diagnosable mental illness : the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R), the National Comorbidity Survey Replication Adolescent Supplement (NCS-A), and the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH). On the other hand, the NCS-R and the NCS-A provide prevalence estimates for specific disorders, which the NSDUH does not provide. Between February 2001 and April 2003, NCS-R staff conducted in-person interviews with more than 9,000 adults aged 18 or older, drawing the sample from households in the contiguous United States. Analyses of NCS-R data have yielded different prevalence estimates. One analysis of NCS-R data estimated that 26.2% of adults had a mental illness within a 12-month period (hereinafter called 12-month prevalence). Another analysis of NCS-R data estimated the 12-month prevalence of mental illness to be 32.4% among adults; the difference may be attributable to the use of more recent information about the U.S. population in weighting the NCS-R data. Both of these estimates include substance use disorders as mental illness; an analysis of NCS-R data estimated the 12-month prevalence of mental illness excluding substance use disorders to be 24.8% among adults. The estimated 12-month prevalence of serious mental illness among all adults was 5.8%. Between February 2001 and January 2004, NCS-A staff interviewed more than 10,000 adolescents aged 13 to 17, drawing the sample from both schools and households in the coterminous United States. Using NCS-A data, researchers estimated the 12-month prevalence of mental illness to be 40.3% among adolescents. Some have suggested that the current version of the DSM identifies people who should not be considered mentally ill. The estimated 12-month prevalence of serious mental illness among all adolescents was 8.0%. Although the NSDUH collects information related to mental illness (e.g., symptoms of depression) from adolescents aged 12 to 17, it does not produce prevalence estimates of mental illness for that population. According to the 2016 NSDUH, the estimated 12-month prevalence of mental illness excluding substance use disorders is 18.3% of adults (aged 18 or older). According to the 2016 NSDUH, the estimated 12-month prevalence of serious mental illness excluding substance use disorders is 4.2% among adults (aged 18 or older). For example, given the difference in prevalence estimates between any mental illness and serious mental illness among adolescents, might policymakers choose to focus on a large group of adolescents that includes many whose mental illnesses may be mild and even transient, or might they choose to focus more narrowly on adolescents with serious mental illness? Policymakers may come to different conclusions about the best policy approach depending in part on how they answer such questions. | Determining how many people have a mental illness can be difficult, and prevalence estimates vary. While numerous surveys include questions related to mental illness, few provide prevalence estimates of diagnosable mental illness (e.g., major depressive disorder as opposed to feeling depressed, or generalized anxiety disorder as opposed to feeling anxious), and fewer still provide national prevalence estimates of diagnosable mental illness. This report briefly describes the methodology and results of three large surveys (funded in whole or in part by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) that provide national prevalence estimates of diagnosable mental illness: the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R), the National Comorbidity Survey Replication Adolescent Supplement (NCS-A), and the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH). The NCS-R and the NCS-A have the advantage of identifying specific mental illnesses, but they are more than a decade old. The NSDUH does not identify specific mental illnesses, but it has the advantage of being conducted annually.
Between February 2001 and April 2003, NCS-R staff interviewed more than 9,000 adults aged 18 or older. Analyses of NCS-R data have yielded different prevalence estimates. One analysis of NCS-R data estimated that 26.2% of adults had a mental illness within a 12-month period (hereinafter called 12-month prevalence). Another analysis of NCS-R data estimated the 12-month prevalence of mental illness to be 32.4% among adults. A third analysis of NCS-R data estimated the 12-month prevalence of mental illness excluding substance use disorders to be 24.8% among adults. The 12-month prevalence of serious mental illness was estimated to be 5.8% among adults, based on NCS-R data.
Between February 2001 and January 2004, NCS-A staff interviewed more than 10,000 adolescents aged 13 to 17. Using NCS-A data, researchers estimated the 12-month prevalence of mental illness to be 40.3% among adolescents. Some have suggested that the current approach to diagnosing mental illness identifies people who should not be considered mentally ill. The 12-month prevalence of serious mental illness was estimated to be 8.0% among adolescents, based on NCS-A data.
The NSDUH is an annual survey of approximately 68,000 adults and adolescents aged 12 years or older in the United States. According to the 2016 NSDUH, the estimated 12-month prevalence of mental illness excluding substance use disorders was 18.3% among adults aged 18 or older. The estimated 12-month prevalence of serious mental illness (excluding substance use disorders) was 4.2% among adults. Although the NSDUH collects information related to mental illness (e.g., symptoms of depression) from adolescents aged 12 to 17, it does not produce estimates of mental illness for that population.
The prevalence estimates discussed in this report may raise questions for Congress. Should federal mental health policy focus on adults or adolescents with any mental illness (including some whose mental illnesses may be mild and even transient) or on those with serious mental illness? Should substance use disorders be addressed through the same policies as other mental illnesses? Members of Congress may approach mental health policy differently depending in part on how they answer such questions. |
crs_R40800 | crs_R40800_0 | Introduction
The federal government's role in the mortgage market dates to the Depression, when Fannie Mae (officially the Federal National Mortgage Association) and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA, which is part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD) were created. Many consider its role to be substantial: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac (which Congress created as the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation in 1970), and Ginnie Mae (officially, the Government National Mortgage Association and part of HUD) guarantee virtually all of the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) newly issued. With slightly less than $10 trillion in mortgages outstanding, the residential mortgage market is of central importance both to households and to lenders. As government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have special privileges and obligations, though they are corporate entities with shareholders. Broadly speaking, the GSEs' role is to ensure appropriate availability of mortgages to creditworthy households. By law, the GSEs purchase mortgages from lenders, and either hold the mortgages as investments or pool the mortgages into MBS, which are sold to institutional investors. The GSEs guarantee that investors in these MBS will receive timely payment of principal and interest even if the borrower becomes delinquent. Their congressional charters give them a close relationship to the federal government that is widely (but not universally) viewed as providing an implicit federal guarantee of their bonds and MBS. In September 2008, the GSEs individually agreed with their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), that unexpected mortgage delinquencies and resulting losses jeopardized their solvency. The GSEs agreed to direct government control, known as conservatorship, which is the equivalent of bankruptcy reorganization for financial companies. As part of the agreement to conservatorship, Treasury agreed to provide financial support to keep the GSEs solvent. The agreement has been amended three times. It currently requires Treasury to provide, as needed, up to an additional $125 billion to Fannie Mae and an additional $149 billion to Freddie Mac. At the end of 2012, the Federal Reserve and Treasury held $821 billion of Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's MBS. The 113 th Congress continues deliberation started in earlier Congresses as to how and when to unwind the federal control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and what (if any) is the proper role of the federal government in the nation's mortgage markets. Some proposals called for reducing the government's support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, selling off their assets, and revoking their congressional charters. Other proposals concentrated not so much on unwinding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as on replacing them with new institutions. Arguably, the GSEs have led to many changes in the nation's mortgage markets that have improved efficiency and consumer choice, including
standardizing mortgages, which has contributed to economies of scale and lower interest rates for homeowners; automating and standardizing underwriting, which has reduced the cost of obtaining a home mortgage; making widespread certain features such as assumable mortgages and mortgages without prepayment penalties, both of which facilitate refinancing; tapping new sources of funding including pension funds, trusts, and international investors, which has led to lower mortgage interest rates; eliminating state and local mortgage interest rate differentials, which has lowered mortgage rates in some parts of the nation, but possibly increased them in others; innovating in affordable housing and equal housing opportunity; and creating a liquid secondary mortgage market, which has lowered mortgage interest rates. | The federal government's role in the mortgage market dates to the Depression and is considered by many to be substantial: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae (officially the Government National Mortgage Association, which is part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development) together guarantee virtually all new mortgage-backed securities (MBS). With slightly less than $10 trillion in mortgages outstanding, the residential mortgage market is of central importance both to households and to lenders.
As government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have special privileges and obligations. Their congressional charters give them a close relationship to the federal government that is widely (but not universally) viewed as an implicit federal guarantee of their bonds and MBS. Broadly speaking, their role is to ensure appropriate availability of mortgages to creditworthy households. By law, the GSEs purchase mortgages from lenders, and either hold the mortgages as investments or pool the mortgages into mortgage-backed securities, which are sold to institutional investors. The GSEs guarantee that investors in these MBS will receive timely payment of principal and interest even if the borrower becomes delinquent.
In September 2008, the GSEs individually agreed with their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), that unexpected mortgage delinquencies and resulting losses jeopardized their solvency. The GSEs agreed to direct government control, known as voluntary conservatorship, which is the equivalent of bankruptcy reorganization for a financial company. As part of the agreement to conservatorship, Treasury contracted to provide financial support to keep the GSEs solvent. Pursuant to this agreement, which has been amended three times, the federal government has purchased more than $187 billion in special stock from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In addition, the government holds $821 billion in MBS issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The agreement requires Treasury to provide up to $274 billion of additional funds, if necessary. In return for this support, Treasury receives special stock and other considerations.
The 113th Congress and the Administration are deliberating how and when to unwind the federal control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and what (if any) is the proper role of the federal government in the nation's mortgage markets. Some proposals have called for reducing the government's support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, selling off their assets, and revoking their congressional charters. Other proposals have concentrated not so much on unwinding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as on replacing them with new institutions.
It is not only Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that have raised issues. At the end of FY2012, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which is part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, reported the fund backing its insured mortgages had a negative net worth of -1.44%.
This report examines options concerning the future of the GSEs and the future government role in residential mortgage markets. Other CRS reports address related issues such as conservatorship, the GSEs' financial condition, residential mortgage markets in other nations, and affordable housing.
This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL32790 | crs_RL32790_0 | Introduction
The Bush Administration considers coal a major component of its National Energy Strategy.The Administration anticipates a long-term reliance on coal because of its low-cost abundance.Numerous issues arise when harnessing this cheap, abundant fuel source. This report examines someof the major legislative issues related to coal in the 109th Congress, including coal and energysecurity, clean air and environmental concerns, funding strategies for technology R&D, loanguarantees for coal gasification projects, and the Abandoned Mine Land program. Coal supplies 22% of U.S. energy demand but over 50% of the energy used by the electricpower sector (both utility and non-utility consumers). (3) The increase in demand is largely to be met by new coal-fired ornatural gas-fired power plants. Clear Skies Legislation(7)
By mandating significant reductions in three pollutants emitted by coal-fired electricgenerating units, proposed Clear Skies legislation could have significant impact on coal productionand distribution, if enacted. (9)
Legislative Issues
When Clear Skies was introduced in the 108th Congress, EPA conducted an analysis of itseffects on the coal industry. (10) While the analysis indicated growth in coal production forelectric utility consumption (from 905 million tons in 2000 to 998 million tons in 2020), coalgeneration's share of the 2020 generation mix (11) was projected to decline from 46% to 44%. In March 2005, the Senate Environment and PublicWorks Committee killed S. 131 on a 9-9 vote. President Bush, however, has revived the CCT program under a newbanner -- the Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI) -- focusing on advanced coal combustiontechnology for removal of SOx, NOx, mercury, and fine particulate matter and carbon sequestration. The CCPI is a 10-year, $2 billion government-industry cost sharing program structuredsimilarly to the original CCT program. Outlook
The FY2006 funding request for Fossil Energy R&D is heavily weighted towards clean coaltechnology, potentially at the expense of other fossil technologies -- such as natural gas orpetroleum technology R&D. The House-passed version of the FY2006 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill( H.R. Legislative Issues
Legislation in the 109th Congress for an omnibus energy bill ( H.R. 6 ) wasapproved by the House on April 21, 2005. 6 includes provisions for coal nearlyidentical to the H.R. 6 conference report filed in the 108th Congress. (17) Within the Clean CoalPower Initiative section there would be loan guarantees for specific IGCC projects. Legislative Issues
Authorization for collection of AML fees was scheduled to expire at the end of FY2004 andwas extended nine months to the end of June 2005 by the Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2005( P.L. 108-447 ). Subsequently, H.R. 1268 ( P.L. 109-13 ), a supplemental appropriationsbill for FY2005, extended AML authorization to the end of FY2005. 2721 , was introduced May 26,2005. | Major legislative issues related to coal in the 109th Congress include coal and energy security,clean air and environmental concerns, funding strategies for technology R&D, loan guarantees forcoal gasification projects, and the Abandoned Mine Land (AML) program.
The Administration anticipates a long-term reliance on coal because of its relatively low-costabundance. Coal supplies 22% of U.S. energy demand but over 50% of the energy used by theelectric power sector. The Energy Information Administration forecasts electricity consumption togrow by 1.9% per year through 2025. The increase will largely be met by new coal-fired or naturalgas-fired power plants.
By mandating significant reductions in three pollutants emitted by coal-fired electricgenerating units, proposed Clear Skies legislation ( S. 131 ) could have significantimpact on coal production and distribution, if enacted. When Clear Skies was introduced in the 108thCongress, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted an analysis of its effects on thecoal industry. While the analysis indicated growth in coal production for electric utility production(from 905 million tons in 2000 to 998 million tons in 2020), coal generation's share of the 2020generation mix was projected to decline from 46% to 44%. Clear Skies legislation, however, facesan uncertain future. In March 2005, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee killed S.131 on a 9-9 vote.
In FY2002, President Bush initiated the Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI) focusing onadvanced coal combustion technology for removal of SOx, NOx, mercury, and fine particulatematter and carbon sequestration. The CCPI is a 10-year, $2 billion government-industry cost sharingprogram. The FY2006 funding request for Fossil Energy R&D is heavily weighted towards cleancoal technology, potentially at the expense of other fossil technologies -- such as natural gas orpetroleum technology R&D.
Legislation in the 109th Congress for an omnibus energy bill ( H.R. 6 ) wasapproved by the House on April 21, 2005. H.R. 6 includes provisions for coal nearlyidentical to the H.R. 6 conference report filed in the 108th Congress. Within the CCPIsection there would be loan guarantees for specific integrated gasification combined cycle projects. The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources approved its version of the bill( S. 10 ) on May 26, 2005.
Authorization for collection of AML fees was scheduled to expire at the end of FY2004 andwas extended nine months to the end of June 2005 by the Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2005( P.L. 108-447 ). Subsequently, H.R. 1268 ( P.L. 109-13 ) a supplemental appropriationsbill for FY2005, extended AML authorization to the end of FY2005. In its FY2006 budgetsubmission for the Office of Surface Mining, the Administration once again proposed the changesin the AML program included with the FY2005 budget, this time seeking a $58 million increase inthe appropriation for the fund. This report will be updated. |
crs_R40852 | crs_R40852_0 | Congress enacted the honest services statute, 18 U.S.C. In the private sector, a notable case involves the conviction of Jeffrey Skilling, a former Enron executive. Honest Services Statute
The honest services statute, 18 U.S.C. The following year, in response to the McNally decision, Congress amended the statutory definition of "scheme or artifice to defraud" for purposes of mail and wire fraud to encompass any "scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." They may have influenced the Supreme Court's decision in Weyhrauch , in which the Court granted certiorari to resolve the question "[w]hether, to convict a state official for depriving the public of its right to the defendant's honest services through the disclosure of material information, in violation of the mail-fraud statute ... the government must prove that the defendant violated a disclosure duty imposed by state law." As discussed below, the three most prominent requirements include the "private gain," a "state law violation," and a "foreseeable harm" requirement. Six members of the Court joined in Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion which limited honest services mail and wire fraud to those cases that involve either bribery or kickbacks; the other three members of the Court would have found the honest services definition unconstitutionally vague. Construing the honest-services statute to extend beyond that core meaning ... would encounter a vagueness shoal." Concerned about the "ambiguous" nature of the doctrine and its implications for federal-state relations, the Court in McNally confined the mail and wire fraud statutes to the prosecution of schemes designed to deprive victims of money or other property, not merely honest services. "Congress responded swiftly" with the honest services statute which provides that, "For purposes of th[e] chapter [of the United State Code that prohibits, inter alia , mail fraud, §1341, and wire fraud §1343], the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." This, the Court rejected in light of splits among the pre- McNally lower federal courts and in the interests of lenity (i.e., when a criminal statute admits to two interpretations, the more lenient should prevail). [If Congress were to take up the enterprise of criminalizing undisclosed self-dealing by a public official or private employee, it would have to employ standards of sufficient definiteness and specificity to overcome due process concerns. As for Skilling himself, it was clear to the Court that the conduct with which he was charged and for which he was convicted did not constitute honest services fraud as construed by the Court. United States v. Black
The Court's Skilling construction of the honest services statute doomed the jury instructions in Black's honest services case as well. The Court left for the lower courts the determination of whether the error was harmless or warranted overturning the convictions of the Black defendants and ordering a new trial. Skilling holds that an honest services fraud prosecution must involve bribery or a kickback. | The United States Supreme Court in Skilling v. United States construed the honest services branch of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes to reach no more than cases involving bribery or kickbacks. The mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. Sections 1341 and 1343, impose criminal penalties for the use of mail or interstate wire communications to deprive another of money or property through a "scheme or artifice to defraud." In its 1987 McNally decision, the Court had held that while the fraud statutes reached schemes to deprive another of property rights, they did not cover "the intangible right of the citizenry to good government." Congress responded almost immediately by enacting the "honest services" statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 1346, which declares that the phrase "scheme or artifice to defraud" in the mail and wire statutes also encompasses depriving "another of the intangible right of honest services."
In its 2009 term, the Court was presented with three honest services cases—Skilling, Black, and Weyhrauch. Each offered the Court a slightly different prerequisite for an honest services conviction—for Weyhrauch, a public official, it was an underlying state law violation; for Black, in the private sector, it was foreseeable harm; for Skilling, an Enron executive, it was private gain. The Court instead returned to the pre-McNally case law which it felt Congress intended the honest services statute to revive. In the pre-McNally world, most of the honest services cases, the core cases, involved bribery or kickbacks. This, the Court said, is what Congress meant when it spoke of honest services: the deprivation of honest services, public or private, by bribery or kickbacks.
To construe the statute otherwise, the Court felt, would ground the statute on "a vagueness shoal." In fact, three members of the Court refused to endorse the majority opinion in full because they thought the honest services statute unconstitutionally vague on due process grounds. Should Congress desire a more inclusive definition of honest services fraud, the Court urged that it "employ standards of sufficient definiteness and specificity to overcome due process concerns."
The Court sent each of the three cases back to the lower courts—Black and Skilling, for a determination of whether erroneous jury instructions on honest services fraud had so tainted their convictions as to require a new trial or whether the instructions simply constituted harmless error; Weyhrauch, for the reconsideration in light of the Court's Skilling decision.
Related CRS Reports include CRS Report R41930, Mail and Wire Fraud: A Brief Overview of Federal Criminal Law, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R42016, Prosecution of Public Corruption: An Overview of Amendments Under H.R. 2572 and S. 401, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33508 | crs_RL33508_0 | The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) operates a number of programs that provide both housing and supportive services for elderly households. HUD defines "elderly person" as a household composed of one or more persons in which at least one person is age 62 or older at the time of initial occupancy. The Section 236 and Section 221(d)(3) programs insured loans to private developers during the 1960s and early 1970s so that they could build low-income housing, some of which included buildings dedicated to elderly residents (neither program makes new loans, although some buildings still have active mortgages). In addition to housing, HUD funds four supportive services programs for elderly residents in its subsidized properties. This report provides a summary of the HUD programs that provide multi-family rental housing for low-income elderly households and their related supportive services programs. It also discusses funding and current issues in the area of assisted housing for low-income elderly persons. HUD Housing Programs
The Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly Program
The Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly program is the only HUD program that currently provides housing exclusively for elderly households. Congress has not funded new units of Section 202 housing since FY2011, though funds sufficient to pay rental assistance on existing units continues to be appropriated. Phases of the Section 202 Program
History of the Section 202 Program: 1959 to 1974
When the Section 202 program was established in 1959, its purpose was to provide housing for moderate-income elderly tenants—those with too much income for Public Housing but insufficient income for market-rate housing. Through this model, developers are to fund the capital costs of new housing units with other available funds such as Low Income Housing Tax Credits and the HOME Investment Partnerships program funds. Section 202 would then provide rental assistance for units dedicated to elderly residents. HUD makes available on its website data on the number of PHAs with approved designated housing plans that set aside projects, or portions of projects, for elderly residents or developments for elderly residents and residents with disabilities together. The programs are the Congregate Housing program, the Service Coordinator program, the Resident Opportunity and Self Sufficiency (ROSS) Service Coordinator program, and the Assisted Living Conversion/Service Enriched Housing Program. 106-74 ) created the Assisted Living Conversion Program (ALCP) to allow HUD-subsidized facilities for elderly residents to modify their apartments and common areas to accommodate elderly persons and persons with disabilities who need additional assistance in order to remain in their units. Initiatives and Issues
Supportive Services Demonstration for Elderly Households in HUD-Assisted Multifamily Housing
In the FY2014 appropriations law ( P.L. In its FY2016 congressional budget justifications, HUD had set aside $20 million for this purpose. Nonprofit owners will be able to realize sale proceeds if each of the following requirements are met: (1) the property is sold to another owner that will enter into a use agreement to maintain affordability for at least 20 years beyond the original mortgage maturity date under the same terms as the original mortgage, (2) if there is a Section 8 Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) contract in place, it must be renewed for at least 20 years, (3) rent increases must be implemented in conformance with guidance in the notice, (4) the purchaser must submit a capital needs assessment, and significant repairs must be undertaken after the transaction closes, (5) the purchaser should have a feasible financing plan for the duration of the use agreement or HAP contract (whichever is longer), and (6) the purchaser must be experienced in the operation of affordable rental housing. | The population of persons age 65 and older in the United States is expected to grow both in numbers and as a percentage of the total population over the coming years, through 2030. In 2002, a bipartisan commission created by Congress issued a report, A Quiet Crisis in America, that detailed the need for affordable assisted housing and supportive services for elderly persons and the shortage the country will likely face as the population ages. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) operates a number of programs that provide assisted housing and supportive services for low-income elderly persons (defined by HUD as households where one or more persons are age 62 or older) to ensure that elderly residents in HUD-assisted housing can remain in their apartments as they age. This report describes those programs, along with current developments in the area of housing for elderly households.
HUD operates five programs that designate assisted housing developments for either low-income elderly residents alone, or low-income elderly residents and residents with disabilities. The primary HUD program that provides housing for low-income elderly households is the Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly program. Established in 1959, it is the only HUD program that provides housing exclusively for elderly residents. The Section 221(d)(3) Below Market Interest Rate and Section 236 programs are mortgage subsidy programs that provide housing for all age levels, but have properties specifically dedicated to elderly households. The Public Housing and project-based Section 8 housing programs also have projects dedicated to elderly households.
In addition to providing housing, HUD operates four supportive services programs for elderly persons residing in HUD-assisted properties. The Congregate Housing program, Service Coordinator program, and Resident Opportunity and Self-Sufficiency (ROSS) Service Coordinator program each provide services such as meals and assistance with activities of daily living. The Assisted Living Conversion Program makes grants to HUD-assisted developments so that they can convert units or entire buildings into assisted living facilities or service enriched housing.
Congress has not funded new units of Section 202 housing since FY2011, though funds sufficient to pay rental assistance on existing units continue to be appropriated. In budget requests, the Administration has proposed to change the way in which new units of Section 202 housing are financed. The FY2013 and FY2014 budgets proposed that rental assistance through the Section 202 program be combined with other forms of capital financing (such as Low Income Housing Tax Credits) to fund new units. The Section 811 Supportive Housing for Persons with Disabilities program has already adopted this structure.
In the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76), Congress provided that excess amounts in residual receipts accounts could, upon Section 202 contract termination, be used to fund a housing and services demonstration project to analyze effects on delay or avoidance of nursing home entry. According to congressional budget justifications, HUD set aside $20 million for this purpose and, in January 2016, announced the availability of $15 million to owners of assisted multifamily properties serving elderly residents. |
crs_R44843 | crs_R44843_0 | Introduction
The federal government spends more than $80 billion each year on information technology (IT) investments; in FY2017 that investment is expected to increase to more than $89 billion. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found that, historically, the projects supported by these investments have often incurred "multi-million dollar cost overruns and years-long schedule delays." In addition, they may contribute little to mission-related outcomes and, in some cases, may fail altogether. These undesirable results, according to GAO, "can be traced to a lack of disciplined and effective management and inadequate executive-level oversight." The Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act ( FITARA ) was enacted on December 19, 2014, to address these issues and codify existing initiatives managed by the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO). Oversight of Federal CIO Initiatives
Through hearings and GAO investigations, Congress has been active in monitoring the activities of the Federal CIO and the initiatives carried out by the office. Congress has been especially attentive to the topics of data center use and cloud adoption as they relate to achieving the goals of FITARA. Legislation
Two pairs of companion bills related to FITARA have been signed into law in the 115 th Congress, the Modernizing Government Technology Act of 2017 (MGT Act) ( H.R. 2227 , S. 990 , P.L. 115-91 ) and the FITARA Enhancement Act of 2017 ( H.R. 3243 , S. 1867 , P.L. 115-88 ). FITARA Enhancement Act of 2017
H.R. Hearings
The House has held four hearings related to FITARA:
The Federal Information T echnology Reform Act Scorecard 6 .0 Joint Hearing: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Subcommittees on Information Technology and Government Operations) May 23, 2018 The Federal Information T echnology Reform Act Scorecard 5 .0 Joint Hearing: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Subcommittees on Information Technology and Government Operations) November 14, 2017 The Federal Information T echnology Reform Act Scorecard 4 .0 Joint Hearing: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Subcommittees on Information Technology and Government Operations) June 15, 2017 GAO'S 2017 High-Risk Report: 34 Programs in Peril House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform February 15, 2017
Government Accountability Office Reports and Testimony, 2016-2017
The GAO has conducted numerous investigations into the initiatives being carried out under the auspices of the U.S. CIO. | The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that the federal government budgets more than $80 billion each year on information technology (IT) investments and in FY2017, GAO estimates that this investment will increase to more than $89 billion. Historically, the projects supported by these investments have often incurred "multi-million dollar cost overruns and years-long schedule delays." In addition, GAO has reported that these projects may contribute little to mission-related outcomes and, in some cases, may fail altogether. These undesirable results, according to GAO, "can be traced to a lack of disciplined and effective management and inadequate executive-level oversight."
The Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) was enacted on December 19, 2014, to establish a long-term framework through which federal IT investments could be tracked, assessed, and managed, to significantly reduce wasteful spending and improve project outcomes. These requirements of FITARA are carried out by the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO). The position of the Federal CIO was created by the E-Government Act of 2002 as the "Administrator, Office of Electronic Government."
Congress and GAO have actively monitored the activities of the Federal CIO and the initiatives carried out by the office. Both have been especially attentive to the topics of data center use and cloud deployment as they relate to achieving the goals of FITARA.
Two pairs of companion bills related to FITARA have been signed into law in the 115th Congress, the Modernizing Government Technology Act of 2017 (MGT Act) (H.R. 2227, S. 990, P.L. 115-91) and the FITARA Enhancement Act of 2017 (H.R. 3243, S. 1867, P.L. 115-88). Additionally, the House has held four hearings related to FITARA. |
crs_R45263 | crs_R45263_0 | Background
On September 20, 2017, Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico as a Category 4 storm with sustained wind speeds of over 155 miles per hour. At that time, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the Commonwealth) was already in recovery mode following the glancing blow struck by Hurricane Irma on September 6, 2017, which left 70% of electricity customers without power. Puerto Rico's office of emergency management reported that Hurricane Maria had incapacitated the central el ectric power system, leaving the entire island without power as the island's grid was essentially destroyed. Even before the 2017 hurricane season, Puerto Rico's electric power infrastructure was known to be in poor condition, due largely to underinvestment and the perceived deficient maintenance practices of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA). The primary focus thus far has largely been on restoring electric power in Puerto Rico, while the task of rebuilding the grid in Puerto Rico to modern standards is expected to follow. The new hurricane season in the Atlantic Basin (comprised of the Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico) began June 1, 2018, and will last until November 30. Status of Electric Power Restoration
A large part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) role in Puerto Rico was centered on coordinating the restoration of electric power. For this task, FEMA brought about 900 portable generators (including several generation units providing over 50 Megawatts (MW) of capacity at the partially operating Palo Seco electric power generation station in San Juan), and tasked the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to oversee restoration of the electric transmission system, which was damaged extensively. PREPA itself has largely been focused on the restoration of the electric distribution system, and service connections to its customers. With the end of the grid repair part of USACE's mission assignment on May 18, 2018, almost 99% of PREPA's customers have seen their electric service restored. In Puerto Rico, USACE not only restored emergency power but also led initial grid repair. Modernizing Puerto Rico's Grid
Approximately $2 billion in CDBG funds were made available to "enhance or improve" any electric power systems damaged by Hurricane Maria. To help guide the process of rebuilding Puerto Rico's grid, DOE reports that five national laboratories have collaboratively built a model of Puerto Rico's electricity system to test how to place microgrids, determine where to place power lines underground, and test siting of renewable energy projects where they can be sheltered from damage by extreme weather events. DOE believes its modeling efforts can therefore help guide HUD and FEMA CDBG investments to improve the power grid in Puerto Rico. This would allow potential impacts on other critical infrastructure such as the petroleum, natural gas, and telecommunications sectors to be estimated. Prospective Funding for Electric Power Systems
Section 21101 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ) provided $28 billion in supplemental appropriations to HUD, under the Community Development Fund. Of this amount, up to $2 billion was made available (until expended) for "enhanced or improved electrical power systems." Building Electric System Resilience
With the power restoration effort almost finished, the next focus for authorities will likely be on rebuilding Puerto Rico's electricity transmission and distribution systems, as a modern system built to U.S. industry standards is more likely to survive extreme weather events. Electric System Resilience Must Be Planned
Once the backbone of Puerto Rico's electric system infrastructure is in place, then the major effort of making the system more resilient can follow. Resilience may require additional improvements to the system aimed at better withstanding the effects of extreme weather events. | On September 20, 2017, Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico as a Category 4 storm with sustained wind speeds of over 155 miles per hour. At that time, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was already in recovery mode following the glancing blow struck by Hurricane Irma on September 6, 2017, which left 70% of electricity customers without power. Puerto Rico's office of emergency management reported that Hurricane Maria had incapacitated the central electric power system, leaving the entire island without power as the island's grid was essentially destroyed. Even before the 2017 hurricane season, Puerto Rico's electric power infrastructure was known to be in poor condition, due largely to underinvestment and the perceived poor maintenance practices of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA).
The primary focus of territorial and federal efforts thus far has largely been on restoring electric power in Puerto Rico. The new hurricane season in the Atlantic Basin (comprised of the Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico) began on June 1, 2018, and will last until November 30.
A large part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) role in Puerto Rico was centered on coordinating the restoration of electric power. For this task, FEMA made available about 900 portable generators (including several generation units providing over 50 Megawatts of capacity at the partially operating Palo Seco station in San Juan), and contracted with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to oversee restoration of the electric transmission system, which was damaged extensively. PREPA itself has largely been focused on the restoration of the electric distribution system, and service connections to its customers. In Puerto Rico, USACE is not only restoring emergency power but also leading initial grid repair. With the end of the grid repair part of USACE's mission assignment on May 18, 2018, almost 99% of PREPA's customers have seen their electric service restored.
Section 21101 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123) provided $28 billion in supplemental appropriations to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), under the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) fund. Of this amount, up to $2 billion was made available (until expended) for "enhanced or improved electrical power systems."
Approximately $2 billion in CDBG funds were made available to "enhance or improve" any electric power systems damaged by Hurricane Maria. To help guide the process of rebuilding Puerto Rico's grid, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) reports that five national laboratories have collaboratively built a model of Puerto Rico's electricity system to test how to place microgrids, determine where to place power lines underground, and test siting of renewable energy projects where they can be sheltered from damage by extreme weather events. DOE believes its modeling efforts can therefore help guide HUD and FEMA CDBG investments to improve the power grid in Puerto Rico. DOE says that it plans to complete a "resilient grid model" to prioritize investments for "transmission, distribution, new generation, energy storage, microgrids, and strategic power reserves." This would allow potential impacts on other critical infrastructure such as the petroleum, natural gas, and telecommunications sectors to be estimated.
With the power restoration effort almost finished, the next focus for authorities will likely be on rebuilding Puerto Rico's electricity transmission and distribution systems, as a modern system built to U.S. industry standards is more likely to survive extreme weather events. Once the backbone of the infrastructure is in place, then the major effort of making the electricity system of Puerto Rico more resilient can follow in earnest. Building resilience would likely require improvements that go beyond even modernization and rebuilding. Resilience may require additional improvements to the system aimed at better withstanding the effects of extreme weather events. |
crs_RL33453 | crs_RL33453_0 | Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
By the end of 1991, the United States had recognized the independence of all the former Soviet republics. The United States pursued close ties with Armenia, because of its profession of democratic principles, and concerns by Armenian Americans and others over its fate. U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus states has included promoting the resolution of conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Azerbaijan's breakaway Nagorno Karabakh (NK) region and between Georgia and its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (resolving these latter conflicts became much more difficult following the August 2008 conflict; see " The August 2008 Russia-Georgia Conflict ," below). They urge great caution in adopting policies that will heavily involve the United States in a region beset by ethnic and civil conflicts, and some argue that, since the European Union has recognized the region as part of its "neighborhood," it rightfully should play a major role. Other observers believe that the United States should be more actively engaged in the region. They urge greater U.S. aid and conflict resolution efforts to contain warfare, crime, smuggling, and Islamic extremism and to bolster the independence of the states. While Azerbaijan may have followed such policies, it continued troop support for NATO operations in Afghanistan (see below, " Regional Support for Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan ") and played a significant role as part of the Northern Distribution Network for the transit of U.S. and NATO supplies to and from Afghanistan. Armenia's 46 personnel were pulled out in late 2008. According to some observers, the Charter aimed to reaffirm the United States' high strategic interest in Georgia's fate, to counter perceptions that the United States (and the West) had acquiesced to increased Russian dominance in the South Caucasus. At the same time, most observers advise against extending diplomatic recognition to the breakaway regions without an international consensus. Azerbaijan has been concerned about Russia's ties with Armenia and has eliminated Russia's military presence. Armenia pays a share of gas to Georgia as a transit fee. Separatist NK relies on economic support from Armenia, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Russia. The United States and others in the international community raised concerns when the Russian foreign and defense ministries announced on April 29, 2008, that the number of "peacekeepers" in Abkhazia would be boosted up to the maximum permitted under ceasefire accords. Some members of the security forces continued to commit human rights abuses with impunity. EUCOM continues vigorous engagement across the Caucasus, given the region's strategic importance as a global energy corridor, key node on the NDN, source of national contributions to ISAF, potential for narcotics and illicit weapons trafficking, interest area for both Russia and Iran, and location of frozen conflicts that have potential to flash into wider and more destabilizing wars.... Security cooperation program priorities in the South Caucasus are focused on developing and sustaining relationships that: ensure U.S. access and freedom of action (focused in the near term on NDN areas); counter regional and transnational threats, especially violent extremist organizations, counter-WMD proliferation, and illicit trafficking; solidify defense institutional reforms; and sustain partner capacity to enhance regional security ...
EUCOM initiatives in the region have included the Georgia Deployment Program and the Caspian Regional Maritime Security Cooperation program. Troops from all three regional states have served as peacekeepers in the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). In October 2013, Rasmussen called for Russia to remove fences and other obstacles it was constructing in South Ossetia and to reverse the recognition of the independence of the breakaway regions. U.S. Trade and Investment
Successive U.S. U.S. investment is highest in Azerbaijan's energy sector, but corruption in the three regional states and regional instability have appeared to discourage investors. In August 2007, the U.S. Trade Development Administration granted Azerbaijan $1.7 million to fund feasibility studies on building both oil and gas pipelines across the Caspian Sea to link Central Asia to Azerbaijani pipelines. 113th Congress Legislation
S.Res. Declares U.S. support for Georgia's territorial integrity and concern over the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; encourages enhanced defense cooperation with Georgia; reaffirms support for Georgia's NATO membership aspirations; commends Georgia's ongoing support in Afghanistan; commends Georgia for holding a peaceful and democratic presidential election; and encourages Georgia to protect the rights of the political opposition and to refrain from politically motivated arrests. | The United States recognized the independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia when the former Soviet Union broke up at the end of 1991. The United States has fostered these states' ties with the West in part to end their dependence on Russia for trade, security, and other relations. The United States has pursued close ties with Armenia to encourage its democratization and because of concerns by Armenian Americans and others over its fate. Close ties with Georgia have evolved from U.S. contacts with its pro-Western leadership. Successive Administrations have supported U.S. private investment in Azerbaijan's energy sector as a means of increasing the diversity of world energy suppliers. The United States has been active in diplomatic efforts to resolve regional conflicts in the region. As part of U.S. global counter-terrorism efforts, the U.S. military in 2002 began providing equipment and training for Georgia's military and security forces. Troops from all three regional states have participated in stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The regional states also have granted transit privileges for U.S. military personnel and equipment bound to and from Afghanistan.
Beginning on August 7, 2008, Russia and Georgia warred over Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian troops quickly swept into Georgia, destroyed infrastructure, and tightened their de facto control over the breakaway regions before a ceasefire was concluded on August 15. The conflict has had long-term effects on security dynamics in the region and beyond. Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but the United States and nearly all other nations have refused to follow suit. Russia established military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia—in violation of the ceasefire accords—that buttress its long-time security presence in Armenia. Although there were some concerns that the South Caucasus had become less stable as a source and transit area for oil and gas, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are barging oil across the Caspian Sea for transit westward. Also, the United States and the European Union still support building more east-west pipelines through Turkey to bring Azerbaijani and perhaps other gas to European markets.
Issues of concern in the 113th Congress regarding the South Caucasus may include Armenia's independence and economic development; Azerbaijan's energy development; and Georgia's recovery from Russia's August 2008 military incursion. At the same time, concerns have been raised about the status of human rights and democratization in the countries; the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over the breakaway Nagorno Karabakh region; and ongoing threats posed to Georgia and the international order by Russia's 2008 incursion and its diplomatic recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Congress has continued to oversee the region's role as part of the Northern Distribution Network for the transit of U.S. and NATO military supplies to and from Afghanistan. Georgia's aspirations for NATO membership have received ongoing congressional support. Many Members of Congress have evinced interest in recent political trends in Georgia following the peaceful transfer of party control in the October 2012 legislative election and in the wake of an October 2013 presidential election.
Some Members of Congress and other policy makers believe that the United States should provide greater support for the region's increasing role as an east-west trade and security corridor linking the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, and for Armenia's inclusion in such links. They urge greater U.S. aid and conflict resolution efforts to contain warfare, crime, smuggling, and terrorism, and to bolster the independence of the states. Others urge caution in adopting policies that will increase U.S. involvement in a region beset by ethnic and civil conflicts. |
crs_RL32603 | crs_RL32603_0 | It is said to cost the country in lost time, economic efficiency, trade, and contentment. This report surveys some of the issues to be considered in debating such drastic tax changes, considering not only a broader based income tax but also three basic forms of consumption taxes: the Hall-Rabushka "flat tax," the value-added tax (VAT), and the national retail sales tax. Although many recent proposals are referred to as "flat taxes," most actually go much further than merely adopting a flat-rate tax structure and would change the tax base from income to consumption. The President indicated that fundamental tax reform would be a major priority of his second term, although the shape of that reform is uncertain at this point. His advisory commission has included a modified flat tax (which included a tax on financial income) as one of the recommended options along with an income tax reform. (There are distributional consequences to this feature that will be discussed subsequently). Effects on Saving
Intertemporal models also tend to predict an increase in savings in switching from income to consumption taxes and this effect is often viewed to be a positive result of a consumption tax (separate from the efficiency gains described above). Other sectors that might be adversely affected by broadening the base to more fully reflect income and by removing itemized deductions are the non-profit sector, the state and local sector, the residential real estate industry, and the health care sector. These are sectors that receive special benefits under the income tax. Proposals to shift the tax base from an income base to a consumption base (most proposals), while generally increasing business investment, would differentially affect firms, depending on their growth rate, capital structure, and employee benefit structure. They would also make investment in pensions, insurance policies, owner-occupied housing, and tax-exempt bonds relatively less attractive, and investments in ordinary stocks and bonds more attractive. While all shifts to a consumption tax cause some common transitional disturbances and windfall gains and losses, the most serious problems arise from a shift to a national retail sales tax or to a value added tax. Windfall Losses for Equity Investments Under the Flat Tax
The flat tax also produces some transitional effects on cash flow that can be quite severe for owners of assets because it does not require a price accommodation. Such revisions would be costly to include, and would require much higher tax rates, perhaps for a long period of time. In fact, for many individuals, the current system is a flat tax with a single rate and a large exemption. Administrative costs often arise from taxpayers' attempts to avoid paying taxes, and no tax reform will produce a system in which people do not wish to avoid taxes. How Would the Distribution of the Tax Burden and the Level of Tax Revenues be Affected by a Different Tax System? The required rates in other proposals will depend on the base. Increases in labor supply would increase the tax base. Wealthy individuals would have their tax burdens reduced over their lifetime if they maintain and increase their assets. | The current income tax system is criticized for costly complexity and damage to economic efficiency. Reform suggestions have proliferated, including a national retail sales tax, several versions of a value-added tax (VAT), the much-discussed "Flat Tax" on consumption (the "Hall-Rabushka" tax), the "USA" proposal for a direct consumption tax, and revisions of the income tax. The President has indicated that major tax reform will be a priority item in his second term, and his tax reform commission has included a modified flat tax as one of its options.
Most reform proposals are based on the notion that switching to a consumption tax base or exempting savings from tax would increase the savings rate and improve economic efficiency. Although theoretical inter-temporal models predict that saving and efficiency would increase, evidence from past tax cuts does not bear out this prediction. Any effect on savings would depend crucially on the transition provisions. It is also argued that these taxes could improve the country's trade balance. Trade balances, however, depend on capital flows and would be affected by these tax changes only if they do bring about an increase in the U.S. savings rate. There is no reason to expect trade benefits from any of the tax changes per se.
A broader tax base would have diverse effects on economic sectors. Sectors that might be adversely affected include the non-profit sector (loss of charitable contributions deductions), the state and local sector (loss of state tax deductions, change in their own tax structures), and the health care sector (taxation of fringe benefits). Shifting the tax base from income to consumption, while generally increasing business investment, would differentially affect firms, depending on their growth rate, capital structure, and employee benefit structure. Such a shift would also make investment in pensions, insurance policies, owner-occupied housing, and tax-exempt bonds relatively less attractive.
There are macroeconomic problems with a transition to a consumption tax, and these problems are extremely serious for transiting to a system that collects all revenue from business (VAT or retail sales tax). For these tax shifts, avoiding a serious economic contraction would be quite difficult. The flat tax would not have these problems but it can cause significant windfall losses in asset values.
A flat-rate tax is also intended to simplify the system and reduce compliance and administration costs. Many of the proposals, if kept simple while being enacted, would reduce costs; however, many individual taxpayers are currently under a flat-rate income tax, so their lot would not be much improved. An enacted law, however, might not be as simple as the proposals.
Consumption taxes also change the distribution of tax burdens, especially on generations. The old consume more of their incomes, and their burden would increase; younger people save more, and their burdens would fall. Higher income individuals would see a reduction in taxes. This report does not track current legislation and will not be updated. |
crs_R43845 | crs_R43845_0 | Introduction
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (together, ADA) have often been described as the most sweeping nondiscrimination legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The ADA provides broad nondiscrimination protection in employment, public services, public accommodations and services operated by private entities, transportation, and telecommunications for individuals with disabilities. After the ADA Amendments Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency responsible for enforcing Title I of the ADA, issued regulations that provide the following guidance on interpreting the term substantially limits :
The primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life activity. It does not exempt state and local governments. Definition of the Term Qualified Individual
The ADA prohibits discrimination against "qualified individuals." It defines the term qualified individual to mean "an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." "Reasonable Accommodation"
If a qualified individual with a disability could perform the job he or she is seeking with reasonable accommodation by the employer, the employer may not discriminate against the individual on the basis of disability. This section protects, for example, parents of children with disabilities from discrimination solely because they have children with disabilities. The requirement that a covered entity provide reasonable accommodations for a qualified individual with a disability does not mean that the covered entity must provide whatever accommodation the individual with a disability identifies. The ADA covers drug addicts and alcoholics who are in recovery or in rehabilitation programs and are not using illegal drugs or alcohol—and any individual who is regarded as using illegal drugs and abusing alcohol but is not. Compensatory and Punitive Damages
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded the remedies available in cases involving intentional discrimination, as opposed to cases involving facially neutral employment practices that have a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities. In addition, there is a "good faith" exception to the award of damages for defendants found to have failed to provide reasonable accommodation. | Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (together, ADA) prohibit discrimination in employment against qualified individuals on the basis of disability. The ADA defines the term disability broadly to include individuals with disabilities, individuals with a history of a disability, and individuals regarded as having disabilities whether they have one or not. The ADA protects alcoholics and drug addicts who are in recovery, but does not protect individuals who are actively abusing drugs or alcohol.
The ADA requires "covered entities"—including labor unions, employment contractors, and private companies and state and local governments with 15 or more employees—to provide reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals with disabilities so that they can perform the essential functions of their jobs. Employers need not provide whatever accommodations individuals with disabilities identify. Rather, employers need to negotiate with individuals with disabilities to settle on reasonable accommodations. They do not need to provide accommodations that would impose undue burdens. The ADA limits the types of questions that employers can ask of individuals with disabilities, and governs employers' requirement and use of medical and other tests.
Individuals with disabilities who believe they have been unlawfully discriminated against can bring claims against their employers with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the state counterpart. In addition, the Attorney General may enforce the ADA by bringing lawsuits when there is a pattern or practice of unlawful discrimination. Under the ADA, plaintiffs may seek a variety of remedies including injunctions, damages, and even compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination. |
crs_RL34305 | crs_RL34305_0 | Finally, this report analyzes the issues surrounding what many experts consider to be the single most effective motorcycle safety strategy, the requirement that all motorcyclists wear a helmet that complies with federal safety standards (universal helmet law). Motorcycle Fatalities are an Increasingly Significant Proportion of all Motor Vehicle Fatalities
The number of motorcycle fatalities has more than doubled over the past decade, from 2,176 in 1996 to 4,810 in 2006. Part of this increase can be attributed to a significant growth in the number of motorcyclists. According to the motorcycle industry, annual sales of on-highway motorcycles have tripled in the past decade. But as Table 1 shows, the rate of increase in fatal motorcycle crashes (116%) and rider fatalities (115%) is almost double the rate of increase in the number of motorcycles registered (63%). As a result of both vehicle characteristics and operator characteristics, the rate of motorcycle involvement in fatal crashes, both by the number of registered vehicles and by VMT, is several times that of passenger vehicles (see Table 2 ). As noted above, the number of passenger vehicle traffic deaths has declined over the past decade, while the number of motorcycle deaths has been increasing. In light of this, DOT has declared that motorcycle fatalities are currently the nation's greatest highway traffic safety challenge. NHTSA has detailed information about the characteristics of fatal crashes, but without detailed information on the population of motorcyclists who are exposed to the same risks but do not experience fatal crashes, the significance of the factors observed in fatal crashes cannot be established. Since that time there have been significant changes in the characteristics of the motorcycle rider population, the highway vehicle fleet mix, and the highway environment. Additional Sources of Motorcycle Safety Recommendations
National Agenda for Motorcycle Safety (NAMS)
In 2000, DOT published the National Agenda for Motorcycle Safety (NAMS), a plan for improving motorcycle safety. Selected Options for Improving Motorcycle Safety
There are two main approaches to reducing motorcycle crashes and fatalities: reduce the number of crashes (through rider skills training and reductions in risky behaviors, educating motorists to be aware of motorcyclists, improvements to road design, and improvements to motorcycle stability) and reduce the deadliness of motorcycle crashes (through improvements in rider protective gear, reduction in roadside hazards, and improvements in the crashworthiness of motorcycles). Universal Helmet Law
Head injuries resulting in injury to the brain are the leading cause of death in motorcycle crashes. NHTSA has found that motorcycle helmets are the single motorcycle safety measure whose effectiveness has been specifically proven, and that requiring riders to wear helmets is a relatively low cost measure which can be implemented by a state passing a law requiring all motorcyclists to wear helmets and is relatively easy to enforce. Rates of Motorcycle Helmet Use
The most recent survey of helmet use showed that only 58% of motorcyclists were wearing a DOT-compliant helmet in 2007, up from 51% in 2006 but down from 71% in 2000. Twenty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, have universal helmet laws (see Table 3 ). In 1976, Congress repealed the penalty for failure to have a universal helmet law. In 1995, Congress repealed that provision. Subsequent studies have continued to support these findings. Proponents of universal helmet laws include NHTSA and numerous groups representing the transportation safety, medical, law enforcement, and insurance communities. | The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has declared that motorcycle fatalities represent the nation's greatest highway traffic safety challenge. Over the past decade, the number of passenger vehicle auto deaths has declined slightly, even as more drivers have been driving more vehicles more miles. But the number of motorcycle fatalities has more than doubled over the past decade, to 4,810 in 2006ârepresenting 14% of all passenger vehicle occupant deaths. Annual motorcycle fatalities are now more that double the number of annual deaths from aviation, rail, marine, and pipeline accidents combined. While part of this increase can be attributed to an increase in the number of motorcyclists, the number of fatalities is increasing at a greater rate than the overall increase in ridershipâthe number of fatalities has increased by 116% in the past decade, while the number of registered motorcycles increased by 63%. The increase in fatalities has continued in spite of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)'s publication in 2000 of the National Agenda for Motorcycle Safety, a plan for reducing motorcycle accidents and fatalities. The motorcycle industry expects the growth in motorcycle sales to continue, so the total number of motorcycle fatalities may continue to increase, barring new safety measures.
A clear understanding of the factors involved in motorcycle crashes is needed in order to develop effective safety measures to reduce the rate of motorcycle crashes. NHTSA has detailed information about the characteristics of fatal motorcycle crashes, but not about causes of the crashes. The last major study of the causes of motorcycle crashes in the United States was published in 1981. Since that time, the motorcycle rider population and the characteristics of both the motorcycle and passenger vehicle fleet have changed. Congress has authorized another major study of the causes of motorcycle crashes; the results of this study are expected in 2010. Congress has also authorized a motorcycle safety grant program promoting rider education and training and motorist awareness of motorcyclists, and established a Motorcycle Advisory Commission to advise DOT on infrastructure issues of concern to motorcyclists.
According to NHTSA, the single most effective safety measure to reduce motorcycle fatalities is to wear a helmet that meets DOT standards; such helmets are estimated to reduce fatalities by 37%. Helmets also reduce the severity and cost of injuries received in motorcycle crashes. Twenty states and the District of Columbia currently have universal helmet laws requiring all motorcyclists to wear helmets; most other states only require minors to wear helmets. The National Transportation Safety Board has recommended that all states adopt universal helmet laws. Universal helmet laws have been controversial. Congress has twice adopted and then repealed incentives promoting universal helmet laws, most recently repealing the incentives in 1995. These incentives were effective in getting states to adopt universal helmet laws, and the laws proved effective in promoting helmet use. After each repeal, the number of states with universal helmet laws declined. Surveys indicate that 58% of motorcycle riders wore a helmet in 2007, up from 51% in 2006, but down from 64% in 1996. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R43818 | crs_R43818_0 | In the hands of nonfederal entities, the previously underutilized properties may be used to provide services to the public, such as temporary housing, or contribute to economic development. Postal Service (USPS), which each have independent statutory authority to dispose of their own properties. It concludes with an overview of the environmental and historic preservation requirements that apply to the disposal of properties at all federal agencies. Centralized Disposal Through the General Services Administration5
The Federal Real Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (Property Act) applies to real property held by most federal agencies. The Property Act gives GSA the authority to dispose of real property that federal agencies no longer need, although some agencies have been granted the authority to dispose of some or all of their own property. Public Benefit Conveyance
If no federal agency wants an unneeded property, it is declared "surplus" and made available to state and local governments, and nonprofits. These entities may have surplus property transferred to them for a discount of up to 100% of fair market value, provided they use the property for a public benefit. Negotiated Sale
Surplus property that is not disposed of through the public benefit conveyance process may be sold to state and local governments at fair market value. Both DOD and USPS have independent statutory authority to dispose of unneeded real property, although the scope of that authority differs. While USPS has been given autonomy in disposing of all of its properties, DOD's disposal authorities are more limited and more complicated. Postal Service27
Congress has given USPS independent statutory authority to dispose of its real estate as it deems proper. 2694a, a section that authorizes a Secretary to convey to a State, one of its political subdivisions, or a nonprofit organization any surplus real property under his jurisdiction that is suitable for conservation purposes, has been made available for a public benefit conveyance, and is not subject to a pending request for transfer to another federal agency, after notification of the relevant congressional committees and waiting 21 days; 10 U.S.C. Though created under different laws, each series has become commonly referred to as a Base Realignment and Closure, or BRAC, round. Actions necessary to complete the review process are generally integrated into the broader due diligence process established in federal regulation, during which the landholding agency would be required to assess and determine various details about the property, such as
any past activities or present conditions at the site that could pose a human health or safety hazard—the existence of mold hazards, radon hazards, asbestos-containing materials, or lead-based paint in any building; whether pesticides have been applied in the management of the property; or whether past activities at the site resulted in the release of hazardous substances that must be remediated; the property's location—in a federally designated floodplain, wetland, or coastal zone; or in an area that contains federally threatened or endangered species; and the property's historical significance—a site, buildings or fixtures on the site that are historically, architecturally, or culturally significant. The principal federal statutes that govern the environmental review process, identification and remediation of hazardous substances, and historic preservation are outlined below, followed by a summary of the requirements of each statute. The National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA; 42 U.S.C. The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA; 16 U.S.C. | The federal government holds thousands of properties that agencies no longer need to accomplish their missions. When the government disposes of unneeded properties—through transfer, donation, or sale—it generates savings by eliminating maintenance costs. In addition, when state or local governments, nonprofits, or businesses acquire unneeded federal properties, they may be used to provide services to the public, such as temporary housing, or contribute to economic development.
The General Services Administration (GSA) plays a central role in disposing of unneeded property at most federal agencies. The Federal Real Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (Property Act) gives GSA the authority to dispose of real property at all federal agencies unless they have independent statutory authority to dispose of their own properties themselves. A number of agencies have independent disposal authority—ranging from limited to broad in scope—including two of the largest federal landholders, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and the Department of Defense.
When an agency notifies GSA that it has unneeded real property, GSA first offers to transfer the property to another federal agency, which must pay fair market value for it. If no other agency wishes to acquire the property, GSA may then convey it to a state or local government, or a qualified nonprofit, for up to a 100% discount—provided it is used for an approved public benefit. Should a state or local government or qualified nonprofit wish to acquire the property for a use other than one of the approved public benefits, GSA has the option to sell the property to them at fair market value. Finally, if the property is not sold to a public or nonprofit entity, it is offered for sale to the public.
The disposal of a federal property may be subject to a number of environmental requirements and historic preservation mandates, although which requirements apply depends on a number of site-specific conditions. Three principal federal statutes govern the environmental review process, identification and remediation of hazardous substances, and historic preservation: the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).
Among the agencies with independent statutory disposal authority, USPS has the greatest autonomy. The Postal Service has, in essence, been granted the authority to dispose of its properties as it deems appropriate, without the assistance of GSA. DOD also has independent statutory disposal authority, but of a more limited scope. DOD must use GSA to dispose of all properties that do not otherwise fall under the scope of special, temporary disposal authorities, commonly referred to as Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) legislation. |
crs_RL32273 | crs_RL32273_0 | Overview
On December 17, 2003, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued proposed rules toaddress the effects of interstate transport of air pollutants on non-attainment of the National AmbientAir Quality Standards (NAAQS) for fine particulates (PM 2.5 ) and ozone (specifically, the 8-hourstandard). (1) The proposed Interstate Air Quality (IAQ)rule appeared in the Federal Register January30, 2004. For PM 2.5 , the proposed rule finds that the interstate transport of sulfur dioxide(SO 2 ) andnitrogen oxides (NOx) from 28 states and the District of Columbia contributes significantly todownwind non-attainment; for ozone, the proposed rule finds that interstate transport of NOx from25 states and the District of Columbia contributes significantly to downwind non-attainment of the8-hour standard. With the IAQ rule, EPA proposes a region-wide emissions cap for NOx and SO 2 to be implemented in two phases -- 2010 and 2015. EPA's methodology determines the caps by applying "highly costeffective" pollution controls on electric generating units. From a policy standpoint, EPA has presented the proposed Interstate Air Quality rule and the accompanying proposed Mercury rule as a "suite of integrated airactions" to reduce emissions of three pollutants -- SO 2 , NOx, and Hg. (41) The twoproposed rules are integrated in such a way that the technologies reducing SO 2 andNOx emissions under the Interstate Air Quality rule also reduce enough Hg emissionsto meet the 2010 reduction requirements of the proposed Mercury rule. Thiscombination of requirements and technology allows utilities to meet the requirementsof both rules without installing three different control technologies -- one for eachpollutant. As EPA doesnot provide a cost-benefit analysis of Hg reductions, it is not possible toquantitatively determine whether this decision is economically efficient in terms ofpotential Hg benefits foregone by the lower reduction requirement. However, from the broader perspective of the interaction of the proposed rules with the underlying Clean Air Act, there is a resulting lack of integration. It is likelyto be argued that the proposed rule simply adds another layer on an already multi-layered cake called the Clean AirAct. Adding a regionwide annual cap and tradeprogram on top a regulatory structure whose foundation is health-based nationalstandards that focus on the local concentration of pollutants in the ambient airpresents numerous difficulties. As a result, there are multiple inconsistencies betweenthe proposed rule and other provisions of the Clean Air Act. These conflicts are notsurprising -- there is little EPA can do to resolve them through regulation. If theAdministration's goal is to restructure CAA compliance strategies toward market-oriented cap and trade programswithout creating more layers and conflicts, it ispossible a statutory solution will be necessary. | On December 17, 2003, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a proposed rule to address the effect of interstate transport of air pollutants on non-attainment of the NationalAmbient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for fine particulates (PM 2.5 ) and ozone (specifically, the8-hour standard). The proposed Interstate Air Quality (IAQ) rule appeared in the Federal Register January 30, 2004. For PM 2.5 , the proposed rule finds that the interstate transport of sulfur dioxide(SO 2 ) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) from 28 states and the District of Columbia contributessignificantly to downwind non-attainment; for ozone, the proposed rule finds that interstate transportof NOx from 25 states and D.C. contributes significantly to downwind non-attainment of the 8-hourstandard.
With the IAQ rule, EPA proposes a region-wide emissions cap for NOx and SO 2 to be implemented in two phases -- 2010 and 2015. Based on the methodology employed in the proposedrule, EPA estimates reductions of about 70% from baseline emissions in 2015. EPA's methodologydetermined the caps by applying "highly cost effective" pollution controls on electric generatingunits.
EPA has presented the proposed IAQ rule and the accompanying proposed Mercury (Hg) rule as a "suite of integrated air actions" to reduce emissions of three pollutants -- SO 2 , NOx, and Hg. The two proposed rules are integrated in such a way that the technologies reducing SO 2 and NOxemissions under the IAQ rule also reduce enough Hg emissions to meet the modest 2010 reductionrequirements of the proposed Hg rule. This combination of requirements and technology allowsutilities to meet the requirements of both rules without installing three different control technologies-- one for each pollutant. As EPA does not provide a cost-benefit analysis of Hg reductions, it is notpossible to quantitatively determine whether this decision is economically efficient in terms ofpotential Hg benefits foregone by not imposing a more stringent reduction requirement.
However, from the broader perspective of the interaction of the proposed rules with the underlying Clean Air Act (CAA), there is a resulting lack of integration. It is likely to be argued thatthe proposed rule simply represents another layer on an already multi-layered cake called the CleanAir Act. Adding a regionwide annual cap and trade program onto a regulatory structure whosefoundation is health-based national standards that focus on the local concentration of pollutants inthe ambient air presents numerous difficulties. As a result, there are multiple inconsistencies betweenthe proposed rule and other provisions of the CAA. These conflicts are not surprising -- there islittle EPA can do to resolve them out by regulation. If the Administration's goal is to restructureCAA compliance strategies toward market-oriented cap and trade programs without creating morelayers and conflicts, it is possible a statutory solution will be necessary.
This report will be updated if events warrant. |
crs_R41096 | crs_R41096_0 | The decision invalidated two provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), codified at 2 U.S.C. It struck down the long-standing prohibition on corporations using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures, and Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which amended FECA, prohibiting corporations from using their general treasury funds for "electioneering communications." The Court, however, upheld the disclaimer and disclosure requirements in Sections 201 and 311 of BCRA as applied to a movie regarding a presidential candidate that was produced by Citizens United, a tax-exempt corporation, and the broadcast advertisements it planned to run promoting the movie. For a legal analysis of the Supreme Court's ruling, see CRS Report R41045, The Constitutionality of Regulating Corporate Expenditures: A Brief Analysis of the Supreme Court Ruling in Citizens United v. FEC , by [author name scrubbed]. In addition, corporations and unions were prohibited from using general treasury funds to finance electioneering communications, which FECA defines as any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified federal candidate made within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary. As a result of the Court's ruling, it appears that federal campaign finance law does not restrict corporate or, most likely, labor union use of general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for any communication expressly advocating election or defeat of a candidate. In addition, the law now also permits corporate and union treasury funding of electioneering communications. However, the law prohibiting contributions to candidates, political parties, and political action committees (PACs) from corporate and labor union general treasuries still applies. Legislation and Proposals in Response to Citizens United
In response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens United v. FEC , various proposals have been discussed and legislation has been introduced. This report provides an analysis of the constitutional and legal issues raised by several proposals, organized by regulatory topic: increasing disclaimer requirements, increasing disclosure for tax-exempt organizations, requiring shareholder notification and approval, restricting U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations, restricting political expenditures by government contractors and grantees, taxing corporate independent expenditures, and providing public financing for congressional campaigns. The report also discusses amending the Constitution. For a comprehensive discussion of legislation that has been introduced and an analysis of policy options, see CRS Report R41054, Campaign Finance Policy After Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission: Issues and Options for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. § 441b, finding that they were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The Court determined that these prohibitions constitute a "ban on speech" in violation of the First Amendment. | In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court invalidated two provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), finding that they were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The decision struck down the long-standing prohibition on corporations using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures, and Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), prohibiting corporations from using their general treasury funds for "electioneering communications." BCRA defines "electioneering communication" as any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified federal candidate made within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary. The Court determined that these prohibitions constitute a "ban on speech" in violation of the First Amendment. The Court, however, upheld the disclaimer and disclosure requirements in Sections 201 and 311 of BCRA as applied to a movie regarding a presidential candidate that was produced by Citizens United, a tax-exempt corporation, and the broadcast advertisements it planned to run promoting the movie.
As a result of the Court's ruling, federal campaign finance law no longer restricts corporate or, most likely, labor union use of general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for any communication expressly advocating election or defeat of a candidate. In addition, the law now also permits corporate and union treasury funding of electioneering communications. However, the law prohibiting contributions to candidates, political parties, and political action committees (PACs) from corporate and labor union general treasuries still applies.
In response to the Supreme Court's ruling, various proposals have been discussed and legislation has been introduced in the 111th Congress, including for example H.Con.Res. 13, H.J.Res. 13, H.J.Res. 68, H.J.Res. 74, H.R. 158, H.R. 1095, H.R. 1826, H.R. 2038, H.R. 2056, H.R. 3574, H.R. 3859, H.R. 4431, H.R. 4432, H.R. 4433, H.R. 4434, H.R. 4435, H.R. 4487, H.R. 4510, H.R. 4511, H.R. 4517, H.R. 4522, H.R. 4523, H.R. 4527, H.R. 4537, H.R. 4540, H.R. 4550, H.R. 4583, H.R. 4617, H.R. 4630, H.R. 4644, H.R. 5175, S.J.Res. 28, S. 133, S. 752, S. 2954, S. 2959, S. 3004, and S. 3628. This report provides an analysis of the constitutional and legal issues raised by several proposals, organized by regulatory topic: increasing disclaimer requirements, increasing disclosure for tax-exempt organizations, requiring shareholder notification and approval, restricting U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations, restricting political expenditures by government contractors and grantees, taxing corporate independent expenditures, and providing public financing for congressional campaigns. The report also addresses amending the Constitution.
For a comprehensive discussion of legislation that has been introduced and an analysis of policy options, see CRS Report R41054, Campaign Finance Policy After Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission: Issues and Options for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. For a legal analysis of the Supreme Court's ruling, see CRS Report R41045, The Constitutionality of Regulating Corporate Expenditures: A Brief Analysis of the Supreme Court Ruling in Citizens United v. FEC, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43778 | crs_R43778_0 | Executive Summary
Medicaid is a federal-state entitlement program that pays for health care and related services on behalf of certain low-income individuals. Prescription drugs are an optional Medicaid benefit, but all states cover outpatient drugs. States may create formularies, lists of preferred drugs, but federal rules tend to result in comprehensive coverage, even for beneficiaries enrolled in Medicaid managed care plans. Since 1990, pharmaceutical manufacturers who voluntarily agree to participate in Medicaid are required to rebate a portion of drug payments back to states. States share the rebates they receive from drug manufacturers with the federal government. The drug rebates required under federal law help the state and federal Medicaid program receive manufacturers' lowest or best price . Medicaid Prescription Drug Reimbursement
For the purpose of determining rebates, Medicaid distinguishes between two drug types: (1) single source drugs (generally, those still under patent) and innovator multiple source drugs (drugs originally marketed under a patent or original new drug application but for which there now are generic equivalents); and (2) all other, non-innovator, multiple source drugs. Rebates for the first category of drugs—drugs still under patent or those once covered by patents—have two components: a basic rebate and an additional rebate. Medicaid FFS payments to pharmacies for outpatient prescription drugs have two components: a payment to cover the cost of the pharmacy buying the drug (the ingredient cost) and a payment for the pharmacist's professional services in filling and dispensing the prescription (the dispensing fee). The statutory changes helped to increase overall rebate collections, which had the effect of reducing net drug expenditures. In December 2013, Sovaldi ® a new brand name drug was approved by the Food and Drug Administration for treatment of hepatitis virus C (HVC) infections. Sovaldi was estimated to cost $1,000 per pill and total treatment cost estimates can range from $84,000 to more than $168,000. For Medicaid, states and the federal government will receive rebates for Sovaldi that will help reduce the drug's cost, but until other equivalent drugs are available to increase competition, states may have limited leverage to negotiate additional manufacturer price concessions. Medicaid rebates, while buffering the cost of prescription drugs somewhat, might also contribute to drug manufacturers setting increasingly higher launch prices. The current Medicaid drug pricing and policy infrastructure was designed for FFS, and may not work as well with significant managed care enrollment. Under managed care contracts, states generally delegate some or all of drug utilization review and individual drug claim oversight to plans, including program integrity. When managed care and PBMs are responsible for these activities, states have responsibility for ensuring plans uphold their contract obligations. States' prescription drug monitoring is tailored to FFS drug claims, and it is unclear how much oversight of managed care claims states will be able to provide. If states and the federal government currently procure drugs for Medicaid beneficiaries at some of the lowest prices, will it be possible for managed care plans and PBMs to further reduce costs without imposing barriers to Medicaid beneficiaries in obtain covered drugs? A number of Medicaid drug pricing terms are commonly abbreviated. States, subject to CMS approval, set separate reimbursement amounts for both ingredient costs and dispensing fees. In FY2013, the Medicaid (state and federal) FFS rebates—basic, inflation, and supplemental—were approximately $12.4 billion (see Table 6 ). Managed Care Rebates
Prior to ACA, drug manufacturers were not required to pay rebates on drugs purchased for Medicaid beneficiaries by managed care plans. As shown in Table 5 , Medicaid managed care rebates increased substantially since 2011. By FY2013, net Medicaid FFS outpatient drug expenditures had decreased to about $16.2 billion and accounted for less than 4% of benefit expenditures. The decrease in FFS drug rebates was due to reduced FFS drug expenditures—fewer drugs purchased translates to lower rebate collections. 108-173 ) implemented many prescription drug and other Medicare program changes, but the most far-reaching was the addition of the voluntary outpatient prescription drug benefit for Medicare beneficiaries, Part D. MMA also had an important Medicaid provision that moved outpatient drug coverage for full benefit dual eligibles from Medicaid to Medicare Part D. Although Medicare Part D assumed coverage and payment for dual eligible beneficiaries, MMA contained a maintenance-of-effort provision that required states to continue to pay the majority of dual eligibles' prescription drug costs. | Medicaid is a federal-state entitlement program that pays for health care and related services on behalf of certain low-income individuals. Prescription drugs are an optional Medicaid benefit and all states cover outpatient drugs. States can create formularies, or lists of preferred drugs, but federal rules tend to result in comprehensive coverage, even for beneficiaries enrolled in Medicaid managed care plans. Pharmaceutical manufacturers that voluntarily participate in Medicaid are required to pay rebates to states on covered outpatient drugs, which help Medicaid receive manufacturers' lowest or best price. States then share the rebate they receive from pharmaceutical manufacturers with the federal government.
In determining the amount of rebate, Medicaid law distinguishes between the following two drug types: (1) single source drugs (brand-name drugs) and innovator multiple source drugs (brand-name drugs that now have generic competition); and (2) all other, non-innovator, multiple source (generic) drugs. Rebates for the first category of drugs—drugs still under patent or those once covered by patents—have two components: a basic rebate and an additional rebate. In addition to basic and additional rebates, most states negotiate supplemental rebates with drug manufacturers, by offering to encourage use of a manufacturer's product in exchange for a price concession (rebate).
States, through retail pharmacies, purchase drugs on behalf of Medicaid beneficiaries. Medicaid pharmacy reimbursement has two components: a payment to cover the cost of the pharmacy buying the drug (ingredient cost) and a payment for the pharmacist's services in filling a prescription (dispensing fee). States set reimbursement for both ingredient costs and dispensing fees.
In FY2005, Medicaid fee-for-service (FFS) drug expenditures were approximately $43.1 billion, but by FY2013 had decreased to $19.8 billion. Over the same period, Medicaid FFS drug rebate collections were at about the same level ($12.4 billion), but managed care rebate collections increased substantially to about $4.8 billion in FY2013. The decreases in Medicaid FFS drug expenditures and the increases in rebate collections were mostly offset by at least the following other factors or trends: (1) Beginning January 1, 2006, prescription drug coverage of individuals eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid (dual eligibles) was moved from Medicaid to Medicare Part D, which resulted in substantially reduced Medicaid FFS drug spending. Due to maintenance of effort requirements, state Medicaid programs continue to pay the vast majority of dual eligible drug costs, even though those expenditures are not counted as drug spending. (2) Statutory changes helped to increased rebate collections by extending rebates to Medicaid enrollees covered by managed care plans and increasing the amount of rebates owed by drug companies. (3) The loss of patent protection for a number of commonly prescribed drugs further contributed to decreasing Medicaid drug expenditures. And (4) the rapid shift in enrollment of beneficiaries to managed care plans that cover prescription drugs.
In December 2013, Sovaldi®, a new brand-name drug, was approved by the Food and Drug Administration for treatment of hepatitis virus C (HVC) infections. Sovaldi is estimated to cost $1,000 per pill, and total treatment cost estimates range from $84,000 to more than $168,000. The rebates states and the federal government receive will help reduce Medicaid's Sovaldi expenditures, but until other equivalent drugs are available to increase competition, states may have limited leverage to negotiate additional manufacturer price concessions. Medicaid rebates, however, while buffering the cost of prescription drugs, might also contribute to drug manufacturers setting increasingly higher launch prices.
The current Medicaid drug pricing and policy infrastructure was designed for FFS, and may not work as well with significant managed care enrollment. Under managed care contracts, states generally delegate some or all of drug utilization review and individual drug claim oversight to plans, including program integrity. With managed care and pharmaceutical benefit managers (PBMs) responsible for these activities, states have responsibility for ensuring plans uphold their contract obligations. States' prescription drug monitoring is tailored to FFS drug claims. It is unclear how much oversight of managed care claims states will be able to provide. If states and the federal government currently procure drugs for Medicaid beneficiaries at some of the lowest prices, will it be possible for managed care plans to further reduce costs without imposing barriers to Medicaid beneficiaries in obtaining covered drugs? |
crs_RL32618 | crs_RL32618_0 | Introduction
Medicare has a long-standing history of offering its beneficiaries managed care coveragethrough private plans as an alternative to the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) program, in which apayment is made for each Medicare-covered service provided to a beneficiary. Beginning in the1970s, private health plans were allowed to contract with Medicare on a cost-reimbursement basis. In 1982, Medicare's risk contract program was created, allowing private entities, mostly healthmaintenance organizations (HMOs), to contract with Medicare. Then, in 1997, Congress passed the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA, P.L. 105-33 ),replacing the risk contract program with the Medicare+Choice (M+C) program. (1)
Most recently, Congress made substantial changes to the M+C program with the passage ofthe Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA, P.L.108-173 ). The act creates the Medicare Advantage (MA) program to replace the M+C program and introducesseveral enhancements intended to increase the availability of private plans to Medicare beneficiaries. In addition to the immediate payment increases to plans, beginning in 2006, the MA program willchange the payment structure for local plans and introduce regional plans that operate like PreferredProvider Organizations -- a popular option in the private health insurance market. The MA programprovides financial incentives for plans to participate in this new regional option. Additionally, in2006 beneficiaries will have access to a Medicare Part D prescription drug plan whether they are inFFS Medicare or enrolled in Medicare managed care. (2) Finally, beginning in 2010 a limited number of geographic areaswill be selected to examine enhanced competition among local MA plans and competition betweenthose private plans and FFS Medicare. Beginning in 2006, the MMA changes the payment structure for MA local plans byestablishing benchmarks. Effect of MMA. a. a. a. | Medicare has a long-standing history of offering its beneficiaries managed care coveragethrough private plans as an alternative to the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) program, in which apayment is made for each Medicare-covered service provided to a beneficiary. Beginning in the1970s, private health plans were allowed to contract with Medicare on a cost-reimbursement basis. In 1982, Medicare's risk contract program was created, allowing private entities, mostly healthmaintenance organizations (HMOs), to contract with Medicare. Then, in 1997, Congress passed theBalanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA, P.L. 105-33 ), replacing the risk contract program with theMedicare+Choice (M+C) program. Most recently, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug,Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA, P.L.108-173 ) which included provisions tocreate the Medicare Advantage (MA) program offering a variety of managed care options forMedicare beneficiaries. The MA program replaces the M+C program.
The newly created MA program offers a new payment structure and provides more optionsthan its predecessor, the M+C program. In addition to the immediate payment increases to plans,beginning in 2006, the MA program will change the payment structure and introduce regional plansthat operate like Preferred Provider Organizations -- a popular option in the private health insurancemarket. The MA program provides financial incentives for plans to participate in this new regionaloption. Additionally, in 2006, beneficiaries will have access to a Medicare Part D prescription drugplan whether they are in fee-for-service Medicare or enrolled in Medicare managed care. Finally,beginning in 2010, for a six-year period, a limited number of geographic areas will be selected toexamine enhanced competition among local MA plans and competition between private plans andFFS Medicare.
This report focuses on MA payments. For a discussion on the effect of the MMA onMedicare managed care, see CRS Report RS21761 , Medicare Advantage: What Does It Mean forPrivate Plans Currently Serving Medicare Beneficiaries? This report will be updated as necessaryto reflect significant changes to the program. |
crs_RL34201 | crs_RL34201_0 | Since the law was first enacted, much progress has been made in assuring the quality of public water supplies. EPA has regulated some 91 drinking water contaminants, and more regulations are pending. Despite this progress, drinking water safety concerns and challenges remain. In the 111 th Congress, the House passed H.R. Safe Drinking Water Act Issues
Recent drinking water safety issues have included the gap between infrastructure funding needs and spending; the capacity of public water systems, especially small systems, to comply with a growing set of complex standards; and the contamination of water supplies by unregulated contaminants, such as perchlorate and various pharmaceuticals and personal care products. Issues involving the act's groundwater protection provisions include proposals for large-scale storage of carbon dioxide deep underground to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the increased reliance on hydraulic fracturing to develop domestic oil and natural gas resources, and the potential impacts these activities might have on underground sources of drinking water. Bills were introduced on these issues in the 111 th Congress. Congress last reauthorized appropriations for most SDWA programs in the 1996 amendments, through FY2003. As with other EPA-administered statutes having expired funding authority, Congress has continued to appropriate funds annually for SDWA programs. 111-380 . This legislation revised the act's definition of lead free (Section 1417(d)) to reduce the amount of lead allowed in water pipes, plumbing fittings, and fixtures to 0.25%. 111-5 ) provided $2 billion for drinking water infrastructure projects through the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund program; the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 111-88 ), provided $1.387 billion for the program. In 2007, EPA completed revisions to the Lead and Copper Rule (LCR). H.R. Taking another approach, H.R. Drinking Water Infrastructure Needs and Funding
A persistent SDWA issue concerns the ability of water systems to construct or upgrade infrastructure to comply with drinking water regulations and, more broadly, to ensure the provision of a safe and reliable water supply. In the 1996 amendments, Congress responded to growing complaints about the act's unfunded mandates and authorized a drinking water state revolving loan fund (DWSRF) program to help water systems finance infrastructure projects needed to meet drinking water standards and address the most serious health risks. This would be a new requirement for the states under the DWSRF program, and the provision has been problematic for similar legislation in recent Congresses. 3202 ) was offered to establish a dedicated water infrastructure trust fund. In the face of uncertainty over increased federal assistance for water infrastructure, EPA, states, communities, and utilities have been examining alternative management and financing strategies to address SDWA compliance costs and broader infrastructure maintenance and repair costs. Underground Injection Control Program
Most public water systems rely on groundwater as a source of drinking water, and the 1974 Safe Drinking Water Act authorized EPA to regulate the underground injection of fluids (including solids, liquids, and gases) to protect underground sources of drinking water. In July 2008, EPA proposed regulations to create a nationally consistent framework for managing the underground injection of CO 2 for geologic sequestration purposes, thus taking a step toward providing certainty to industry and the public about requirements that would apply to this activity. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA; P.L. Hydraulic fracturing is a technique that has enabled the production of natural gas and oil from unconventional formations, which represent an increasingly important source of domestically produced hydrocarbons. Companion bills H.R. Senate. Report to accompany S. 1005 . Report No. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. | Much progress has been made in assuring the quality of public water supplies since the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) was first enacted in 1974. Public water systems must meet extensive regulations, and water utility management has become a much more complex and professional endeavor. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has regulated some 91 drinking water contaminants, and more regulations are pending. In 2007, the number of community water systems reporting no violations of drinking water standards was 89.5%. Despite nationwide progress in providing safe drinking water, an array of issues and challenges remain.
Recent issues have involved infrastructure funding needs, regulatory compliance, and concerns caused by detections of unregulated contaminants in drinking water, such as perchlorate, and pharmaceuticals and personal care products (PPCPs). Another issue involves the adequacy of existing regulations (such as the lead rule) and EPA's pace in reviewing and potentially revising older standards (such as the chromium standard).
Congress last reauthorized SDWA in 1996. Although funding authority for most SDWA programs expired in FY2003, Congress continues to appropriate funds annually for these ongoing programs, while EPA, states, and water systems continue efforts to meet current statutory requirements. The 111th Congress made one amendment to SDWA, P.L. 111-380, which reduces the amount of lead allowed in water pipes and plumbing fittings and fixtures.
An overarching SDWA issue concerns the cumulative cost and complexity of drinking water standards and the ability of water systems, especially small systems, to comply with standards. The issue of the affordability of drinking water regulations has merged with the larger debate over what is the appropriate federal role in assisting communities with financing drinking water projects needed for SDWA compliance, and for water infrastructure improvements generally.
Water infrastructure financing legislation has been offered repeatedly in recent Congresses to authorize higher funding levels for the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) program, and/or to provide grants and other compliance assistance to small communities. In the 111th Congress, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) included $2 billion for the DWSRF program, and the EPA appropriations act for FY2011 (P.L. 111-88) included another $1.387 billion. Two bills to revise and reauthorize the DWSRF received action: House-passed H.R. 5320 and Senate-reported S. 1005. Taking an alternative financing approach, H.R. 3202 proposed to create a water infrastructure trust fund supported by fees and taxes.
The SDWA also mandates regulation of underground injection activities to protect drinking water sources. An issue in this area concerns the underground injection of carbon dioxide (CO2) for long-term storage as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) specified that sequestration activities shall be subject to SDWA underground injection control provisions. In 2010, EPA issued a SDWA rule to provide a national permitting framework for managing the underground injection of CO2 for commercial-scale sequestration projects. Another underground injection issue concerns the growing reliance on hydraulic fracturing to produce natural gas and oil from unconventional geologic formations. Two bills (H.R. 2766 and S. 1215, the FRAC Act) were introduced to authorize EPA regulation of this practice under the SDWA underground injection control program; in contrast, H.R. 2300 expressed opposition to federal regulation of gas and oil production wells under SDWA. |
crs_R40243 | crs_R40243_0 | Introduction
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has been insuring lenders against loss on home loans since 1934. From 1934 through the end of FY2007, FHA has insured about 34.6 million home loans at a mortgage volume of about $2 trillion. Until the recent turmoil in the mortgage market, that argument appeared to have some validity. FHA reform, however, proved controversial and these efforts stalled. Several FHA reform proposals were introduced in the 110 th Congress, and provisions from some of the bills were included in H.R. 3221 , the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), which was enacted on July 30, 2008, as P.L. 110-289 . Title I of Division B of HERA is cited as the FHA Modernization Act of 2008. The FHA Modernization Act of 2008 (the Act) contains two subtitles. Subtitle A, the Building American Homeownership Act of 2008, makes several amendments to the FHA program that insures loans on single family homes under Title II of the National Housing Act. Subtitle B, the FHA Manufactured Housing Loan Modernization Act of 2008, makes several amendments to the FHA program that insures loans on manufactured housing loan program under Title I of the National Housing. The remainder of this report discusses these two subtitles. The Act adds the provision that, in any fiscal year, the number of energy efficient mortgages may not exceed 5% of the number of FHA-insured home loans in the previous fiscal year. | The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has been insuring lenders against loss on home loans since 1934, and has insured about 35 million homes at a mortgage volume of about $2 trillion. In past years, FHA was often the innovator in testing new mortgage products, but in recent years the private mortgage market has been offering mortgages that appealed to borrowers who otherwise may have sought FHA-insured home loans. As a result, the FHA share of the mortgage market declined. FHA reform measures were debated in previous sessions of Congress, but FHA reform proved controversial and these efforts stalled. Momentum for FHA reform grew as the downturn in the housing market worsened in 2008. Reform measures were introduced in the 110th Congress and some of the provisions were included in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, P.L. 110-289, enacted July 30, 2008. Title I of Division B of P.L. 110-289 is cited as the FHA Modernization Act of 2008, and it contains two subtitles. Subtitle A, the Building American Homeownership Act of 2008, makes several amendments to the FHA program that insures loans on single family homes under Title II of the National Housing Act. Subtitle B, the FHA Manufactured Housing Loan Modernization Act of 2008, makes several amendments to the FHA program that insures loans on manufactured housing loan program under Title I of the National Housing. This report discusses the provisions of these subtitles. The changes enacted in these subtitles affect the delivery of FHA-insured home loans in communities throughout the United States. This report may be updated as warranted by issues related to implementing the new law. |
crs_R44612 | crs_R44612_0 | Background
The size of the Armed Forces is a topic of perennial congressional interest and debate, as each year Congress sets
minimum and maximum strength levels for the active components (AC); and maximum strength levels for the reserve components (RC). The House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2017 authorized differing levels for active duty personnel in each of the services, but these authorizations diverge most significantly with respect to the Army. This report provides an overview of active duty Army personnel strength changes in recent years, highlights the factors which have contributed to these diverging approaches in the respective NDAAs, and outlines some factors which Congress may consider. For FY2017, the Administration proposed lowering the Army's end strength to 460,000. The Senate version of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act approved Army end strength identical to the Administration request, while the House version approved Army end strength of 480,000. These include the strategic environment, the role of the Army within this environment, how the Army might use additional end strength, the results of a congressionally directed study on the future of the Army, and the constraints of the Budget Control Act of 2011. Roles for the U.S. Army? National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA)
Title XVII of the FY2015 NDAA established an independent commission to study Army strength and force structure and directed it to
... undertake a comprehensive study of the structure of the Army, and policy assumptions related to the size and force mixture of the Army, in order—
(A) to make an assessment of the size and force mixture of the active component of the Army and the reserve components of the Army; and
(B) to make recommendations on the modifications, if any, of the structure of the Army related to current and anticipated mission requirements for the Army at acceptable levels of national risk and in a manner consistent with available resources and anticipated future resources. Key Questions
The Department of Defense plans further reductions in the size of the Army, proposing a FY2018 end strength of 450,000. To reconcile competing interpretations and judgments about the proper size of the Army, Congress may gather additional information from the Army and outside experts. What additional resources are associated with end strength increases? | Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution vests Congress with broad powers over the Armed Forces, including the power "To raise and support Armies" and "To provide and maintain a Navy." As such, the size of the Armed Forces is a topic of perennial congressional interest and debate. Congress annually sets minimum and maximum strength levels for the active components and maximum strength levels for the reserve components.
The House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2017 authorized differing levels for active duty personnel in each of the services, but these authorizations diverge most significantly with respect to the Army. The Senate version of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act approved Army end strength of 460,000 soldiers, while the House version approved an Army end strength of 480,000. The Senate figure represents a decrease of 15,000 soldiers in comparison to the Army's FY2016 end strength of 475,000, while the House figure represents an increase of 5,000.
Congress's decision about the size of the Army for FY2017 will likely hinge on how it reconciles competing interpretations and judgments about key issues, including
the current and emerging strategic environment; the role of the Army in advancing national security interests within that environment; how any additional end strength would be used by the Army; the results of a congressionally directed study on the future of the Army; and the trade-offs associated with various options to fund additional strength in the context of budgetary constraints.
In addition to the decision for FY2017, the debate about the size of the Army may well continue into the next Congress, as the Department of Defense plans further reductions in the size of the Army, proposing FY2018 end strength of 450,000. There will also be a new President in January, and his or her policy priorities may revise the contours of this debate.
This report provides an overview of active duty Army personnel strength changes in recent years, outlines the different end strength authorizations in the House and Senate versions of the FY2017 NDAA, highlights the perspectives which have contributed to these diverging approaches in the respective NDAAs, and outlines some factors which Congress may consider as it determines the appropriate size for the Army. |
crs_RL32842 | crs_RL32842_0 | 308 and S. 32 ) following the January 8, 2011, Tucson, AZ, shooting, in which 6 people were killed and 14 wounded, including Representative Gabrielle Giffords, who was grievously wounded. Similarly, the Aurora, CO, shootings led some Members to call for greater regulation of interstate, Internet-based ammunition transfers ( S. 3458 / H.R. Since March 2011, much of the gun control debate in the 112 th Congress has swirled around allegations that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) mishandled a Phoenix, AZ-based gun trafficking investigation known as "Operation Fast and Furious." The OIG testified to the report's findings that high-ranking, supervisory officials within ATF headquarters and the Phoenix Field Division, as well as the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Arizona and Main Justice (DOJ headquarters), were responsible for misguided strategies and tactics, errors in judgment, and management failures related to Operation Fast and Furious. On June 28, 2012, the House passed a resolution ( H.Res. On April 19, 2012, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported a bill ( S. 2323 ) that would fund ATF for FY2013 at $1.153 billion. On April 17, 2012, the House passed the Sportsmen's Heritage Act of 2012 ( H.R. 4089 ), a bill that would require agencies that manage federal public lands to facilitate access to and use of those lands for the purposes of recreational fishing, hunting, and shooting with certain exceptions set out in statute. On November 16, 2011, the House passed a bill ( H.R. 822 ) that would establish a greater degree of reciprocity between states that issue concealed carry permits for handguns to civilians than currently exists under state law. On October 11, 2011, the House passed a Veterans' Benefits Act ( H.R. This bill includes a provision that would prohibit the Department of Veterans Affairs from determining a beneficiary to be mentally incompetent for the purposes of gun control, unless such a determination were made by a judge, magistrate, or other judicial authority based upon a finding that the beneficiary posed a danger to himself or others. Issues in the 112th Congress
In the wake of the Aurora, CO, theater and Oak Creek, WI, Sikh temple mass-casualty shootings, several Members of Congress called for reconsideration of the 1994-2004 ban on semiautomatic assault weapons and the large capacity ammunition feeding devices. (For a related bill, see also H.R. Armed Forces Members and Privately Held Firearms Off-Base
On May 18, 2012, the House passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 ( H.R. On May 10, 2012, during House consideration of the FY2013 CJS Appropriations bill ( H.R. On June 11, 2012, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform issued a press release announcing that it would meet to consider a staff briefing paper and draft resolution (described above) holding Attorney General Eric Holder in contempt of Congress for his failure to produce subpoenaed documents related to Operation Fast and Furious. Other Salient Gun Control Legislative Issues
Other salient firearms-related issues that continue to receive attention include (1) screening firearms background check applicants against terrorist watch lists; (2) combating gun trafficking and straw purchases; (3) reforming the regulation of federally licensed gun dealers; (4) requiring background checks for private firearms transfers at gun shows; (5) more-strictly regulating certain firearms previously defined in statute as "semiautomatic assault weapons"; and (6) banning or requiring the registration of certain long-range .50 caliber rifles, which are commonly referred to as "sniper" rifles. On August 12, the Senate passed H.R. Similar language was included in the House-passed CJS appropriations bill ( H.R. | Congress has debated the efficacy and constitutionality of federal regulation of firearms and ammunition, with strong advocates arguing for and against greater gun control. During the 112th Congress, several mass-casualty shootings punctuated public discourse on gun control. In a January 8, 2011, Tucson, AZ, shooting, 6 people were killed and 14 wounded, including Representative Gabrielle Giffords, who was grievously wounded. In a July 20, 2012, Aurora, CO, theater shooting, 12 people were killed and 58 wounded. In an August 5, 2012, Milwaukee, WI, Sikh temple shooting, 6 people were killed and three wounded. Several Members of Congress called for reconsideration of an expired ban on high capacity ammunition feeding devices (H.R. 308 and S. 32), strengthening provisions designed to encourage states to make firearms-related disqualifying records more accessible to federal authorities (S. 436/H.R.1781), and tightening regulation of interstate ammunition transfers (S. 3458/H.R. 6241).
As a matter of oversight, the 112th Congress also considered the implications of Operation Fast and Furious and allegations that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) mishandled that Phoenix, AZ-based gun trafficking investigation. On June 28, 2012, the House passed a resolution (H.Res. 711) and cited Attorney General Eric Holder with contempt for his failure to produce additional, subpoenaed documents related to that operation to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. The DOJ Office of the Inspector General issued findings that high-ranking officials within ATF, the Arizona U.S. Attorney's Office, and the DOJ Criminal Division were responsible for misguided strategies and tactics, errors in judgment, and management failures related to this operation.
On May 18, 2012, the House passed the FY2013 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310), which would amend a limitation on the Secretary of Defense's authority to regulate firearms privately held by members of the Armed Forces off-base. On May 10, 2012, the House passed a Commerce-Justice-State appropriations bill (H.R. 5326) that would fund ATF for FY2013, and on April 19, 2012, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported a similar bill (S. 2323). On April 17, 2012, the House passed the Sportsmen's Heritage Act of 2012 (H.R. 4089), a bill that would require agencies that manage federal public lands to facilitate access to and use of those lands for the purposes of recreational fishing, hunting, and shooting. The Senate could consider a related bill (S. 3525). Related language was included in a House-reported Interior Appropriations bill (H.R. 6091). On November 16, 2011, the House passed a bill (H.R. 822) that would establish a greater degree of reciprocity between states that issue concealed carry handgun permits. On October 11, 2011, the House passed a Veterans' Benefits Act (H.R. 2349) that would prohibit the Department of Veterans Affairs from determining a beneficiary to be mentally incompetent for the purposes of gun control, unless such a determination is made by a judicial authority.
This report also includes discussion of other salient and recurring gun control issues that have generated past or current congressional interest. Those issues include (1) screening firearms background check applicants against terrorist watch lists, (2) combating gun trafficking and straw purchases, (3) reforming the regulation of federally licensed gun dealers, (4) requiring background checks for private firearms transfers at gun shows, (5) more-strictly regulating certain firearms previously defined in statute as "semiautomatic assault weapons," and (6) banning or requiring the registration of certain long-range .50 caliber rifles, which are commonly referred to as "sniper" rifles. To set these and other emerging issues in context, this report provides basic firearms-related statistics, an overview of federal firearms law, and a summary of legislative action in the 111th and 112th Congresses. |
crs_RL32866 | crs_RL32866_0 | Since 1992, the United States has provided more than $28 billion in assistance to the 12 states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). It continues to provide nearly $2 billion annually. This report describes the broad framework of U.S. assistance programs and policies in the former Soviet Union and then focuses on the foreign operations FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) account which, encompassing all U.S. objectives in the region, has often been the means by which Congress has expressed its views and sought to influence policy. Three objectives have been most prominent—facilitating the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, promoting the introduction and growth of free market economies, and fostering security by controlling the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and expertise. A fourth objective of U.S. assistance, humanitarian relief, was especially significant at discrete points in the 1990s when several countries experienced critical food shortages. More recently, a fifth objective, very much encompassing the other four, has emerged—supporting the war on terror. Under the control of the State Department's Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, the FSA account has been a special interest of Congress since its creation in 1992. About $11 billion of the $28 billion in total U.S. aid provided between 1992 and 2005 has come from the Foreign Operations-funded FSA account. Legislation
FY2007 Appropriations
FY2007 economic aid funding for the FSU is provided under the terms of a continuing appropriations resolution ( H.R. 109-289 Division B, as amended by H.J.Res. 20 on February 15, 1007) which provides $452 million in the FSA account, $11 million more than the Administration request. Country allocations have not yet been determined. 5631 ( P.L. FY2008 Appropriations
In February 2007, the Administration requested $351.6 million for the FSA account in FY2008, a $100 million, or 22% decrease, from the FY2007 level. With democracy challenged in Russia, and ongoing reform efforts in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as important U.S. interests in Central Asia, some observers have questioned the decline in aid to the region. Cuts in the Russia Program . Under the FY2008 request, FSA assistance would again be cut to $50 million from a level of $80 million in FY2006. The recent rise of democracy in Ukraine and Georgia and its evident decline in Russia have highlighted the role and possible need for U.S. democratization assistance. Conditionality
Aid to the FSU has always come with conditions. The majority of specific restrictions have been aimed at Russia. As a result, in most years as much as 60% of planned U.S. assistance to the federal Russian government has been cut. Currently, the most difficult conditionality issue arises with respect to human rights in Central Asia. | Since 1992, the United States has provided more than $28 billion in assistance to the 12 states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). It continues to provide nearly $2 billion annually. This report describes the broad framework of U.S. assistance programs and policies in the region and then focuses on the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) account under the foreign operations budget which, encompassing all U.S. objectives in the region, has often been the means by which Congress has expressed its views and sought to influence policy.
Three objectives have been most prominent in the U.S. assistance program to the region—facilitating the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, promoting the introduction and growth of free market economies, and fostering security by controlling the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and expertise. More recently, a fourth objective, very much encompassing the other three, has emerged—supporting the war on terror. A fifth objective of U.S. assistance, humanitarian relief, was mostly applied in the early 1990s in response to countries experiencing food shortages.
Under the State Department's Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia and encompassing all U.S. policy objectives, the FSA account has been a special interest of Congress since its creation in 1992. About $11 billion of the $28 billion in total U.S. aid provided between 1992 and 2005 has come from the FSA account. Under the terms of a continuing resolution (H.R. 5631/P.L. 109-289, as amended by H.J.Res. 20 on February 15, 2007) the FSA account receives $452 million in FY2007 appropriations. Country allocations have not yet been determined. The Administration has requested $351.6 million for the FSA account in FY2008, about $100 million less than the previous year.
Perhaps the most notable feature of the FY2008 Administration foreign operations request is the proposed 22% cut in aid. With democracy challenged in Russia and making headway in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as important U.S. interests in Central Asia, cuts might appear to indicate a low U.S. priority for the region.
The recent rise of democracy in Ukraine and Georgia and its evident decline in Russia have highlighted the role and possible need for U.S. democratization assistance. However, absolute levels of democracy aid to Russia in the FSA account have not increased since 1999 when it reached a level of $64 million; it is roughly $43 million in FY2006 and, under the FY2008 request, would fall to about $26 million. Aid to the FSU has always come with conditions. The majority of specific restrictions have been aimed at Russia. As a result, in most years as much as 60% of planned U.S. assistance to the federal Russian government has been withheld. Currently, the most difficult conditionality issue arises with respect to human rights and democracy in Central Asia. This report will be updated as events warrant |
crs_R41886 | crs_R41886_0 | Introduction
Electricity is vital to the commerce and daily functioning of United States. The modernization of the grid to accommodate today's power flows, serve reliability needs, and meet future projected uses is leading to the incorporation of information processing capabilities for power system controls and operations monitoring. The "Smart Grid" is the name given to the evolving electric power network as new information technology systems and capabilities are incorporated. While these new components may add to the ability to control power flows and enhance the efficiency of grid operations, they also potentially increase the susceptibility of the grid to cyber (i.e., computer-related) attack since they are built around microprocessor devices whose basic functions are controlled by software programming and subject to manipulation over a network. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) ( P.L. The potential for a major disruption or widespread damage to the nation's power system from a large scale cyberattack has increased focus on the cybersecurity of the Smart Grid. Federal efforts to enhance the cybersecurity of the electrical grid were reemphasized with the recognition of cybersecurity as a critical issue for electric utilities in developing the Smart Grid. 110-140 ) thus added requirements for "a reliable and secure electricity infrastructure" with regard to Smart Grid development. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or the Commission) received primary responsibility for the reliability of the bulk power system from the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05) ( P.L. FERC subsequently designated the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) as the ERO. Compliance with reliability standards for electric utilities thus changed from a voluntary, peer-driven undertaking to a mandatory function. NERC is also responsible for standards for critical infrastructure protection (CIP) which focus on planning and procedures for the physical security of the grid. Policy Concerns
Self-determination is a key part of the CIP reliability process. Utilities are allowed to self-identify what they see as "critical assets" under NERC regulations. Only "critical cyber-assets" (i.e., as essential to the reliable operation of critical assets) are subject to CIP standards. FERC directed NERC to revise the standards so that some oversight of the identification process for critical cyber-assets was provided, but any revision is again subject to stakeholder approval. While reliability standards are mandatory, the ERO process for developing regulations is somewhat unusual in that the regulations are essentially being established by the entities who are being regulated. This can potentially be an issue when cost of compliance is a concern, and acceptable standards may conceivably result from the option with the lowest costs. But since utility systems are interconnected in many ways, the system with the least protected network potentially provides the weakest point of access. Recovery of costs may present a major challenge especially to distribution utilities and state commissions charged with overseeing utility costs. EISA requires states only to consider recovery of costs related to Smart Grid systems. FERC cannot compel entities involved in distribution to comply with its regulations. However, recoverability from a cyberattack on the scale of something which might take down a significant portion of the grid will likely be very difficult. Maintaining a ready inventory of critical spare parts in close proximity to key installations would likely prove useful to quickening recovery efforts from some types of attack. Although this report has focused on cybersecurity aspects of a smarter electrical grid, technologies being developed for use by the Smart Grid could also be used by natural gas pipeline, water supply, and telecommunications systems. Consideration could be given to applying similar control system device and system safeguards to these other vital utility systems. | Electricity is vital to the commerce and daily functioning of United States. The modernization of the grid to accommodate today's uses is leading to the incorporation of information processing capabilities for power system controls and operations monitoring. The "Smart Grid" is the name given to the evolving electric power network as new information technology systems and capabilities are incorporated. While these new components may add to the ability to control power flows and enhance the efficiency of grid operations, they also potentially increase the susceptibility of the grid to cyber (i.e., computer-related) attack since they are built around microprocessor devices whose basic functions are controlled by software programming. The potential for a major disruption or widespread damage to the nation's power system from a large scale cyberattack has increased focus on the cybersecurity of the Smart Grid.
Federal efforts to enhance the cybersecurity of the electrical grid were emphasized with the recognition of cybersecurity as a critical issue for electric utilities in developing the Smart Grid. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) received primary responsibility for the reliability of the bulk power system from the Energy Policy Act of 2005. FERC subsequently designated the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) as the "Electric Reliability Organization" (ERO) with the responsibility of establishing and enforcing reliability standards. Compliance with reliability standards for electric utilities thus changed from a voluntary, peer-driven undertaking to a mandatory function. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) later added requirements for "a reliable and secure electricity infrastructure" with regard to Smart Grid development. NERC is also responsible for standards for critical infrastructure protection (CIP) which focus on planning and procedures for the physical security of the grid. Self-determination is a key part of the CIP reliability process. Utilities are allowed to self-identify what they see as "critical assets" under NERC regulations. Only "critical cyber assets" (i.e., as essential to the reliable operation of critical assets) are subject to CIP standards. FERC has directed NERC to revise the standards so that some oversight of the identification process for critical cyber assets was provided, but any revision is again subject to stakeholder approval. While reliability standards are mandatory, the ERO process for developing regulations is somewhat unusual in that the regulations are essentially being established by the entities who are being regulated. This may potentially be a conflict of interest, especially when cost of compliance is a concern, and acceptable standards may conceivably result from the option with the lowest costs. Since utility systems are interconnected in many ways, the system with the least protected network potentially provides the weakest point of access.
Cybersecurity threats represent a constantly moving and increasing target for mitigation activities and mitigation efforts could likewise spiral upward in costs. Recovery of costs may present a major challenge especially to distribution utilities and state commissions charged with overseeing utility costs. EISA only requires states to consider recovery of costs related to Smart Grid systems. FERC has jurisdiction over the bulk power grid, and cannot compel entities involved in distribution to comply with its regulations. Recoverability from a cyber attack on the scale of something which could take down a significant portion of the grid will likely be very difficult, but maintaining a ready inventory of critical spare parts in close proximity to key installations could quicken recovery efforts from some types of attack. The electricity grid is connected to (and largely dependent on) the natural gas pipeline, water supply, and telecommunications systems. Technologies being developed for use by the Smart Grid could also be used by these industries. Consideration could be given to applying similar control system device and system safeguards to these other critical utility systems. |
crs_RL33190 | crs_RL33190_0 | Most voting systems used in federal, state, and local elections in the United States rely on computers in some way. The most computerized is the direct recording electronic voting machine, in which votes are recorded directly onto computer memory devices. Questions about the security and reliability of DREs were a relatively minor issue until 2003. Two factors led to a sharp increase in public concerns about them: (1) the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) requires at least one voting machine in each precinct to fully accommodate disabled voters and DREs are the only system that currently meets this requirement; and (2) the security vulnerabilities of DREs were widely publicized as the result of several studies released in 2003. However, others, including many election officials, believe that VVPAT is unnecessary or even counterproductive and that security issues are best addressed through other approaches. The public debate about DREs and VVPAT has led to some confusion about the problems and issues involved, and as a consequence, the options that might resolve them. Two significant problems were reported in 2006. In comparison, many problems have been associated with provisional and absentee ballots. Have DREs been thoroughly studied in the scientific community? Are there any unique security concerns with DREs? Have DRE security flaws compromised any elections? Malfunctions occur, but most problems that have occurred with DREs can be attributed to human mistakes or procedural errors, rather than security issues. Do security flaws in DREs pose the greatest threat to election integrity? While current DREs have unique security flaws, it has not been established that they pose a greater risk to the integrity of elections than other kinds of problems. However, the proportion of voters using DREs could continue to increase as a result of HAVA's accessibility requirements, since DREs are currently the only kind of voting system that is generally agreed to meet those requirements. There are many other potential threats to the integrity of elections. Do problems with DREs result from weaknesses in the technology itself? While it is not clear whether the certification testing of those systems identified any of the problems that were discovered in the studies, the process did not in any case prevent those systems from being certified and deployed with the vulnerabilities present. Unfortunately, none of these methods, including paper, have been sufficiently developed to compare efficacy, practicality, and cost in a meaningful way. Paper ballots used with DREs—usually called a voter-verified paper audit trail, or VVPAT—provide a permanent, independent record of votes that can be verified by the voter before casting the ballot. Some systems using this approach have been developed. However, paper also has several security weaknesses in comparison—for example, it is easy to manipulate by hand without specialized tools; it does not eliminate risk from Trojan horses or other malware if counting is done with the aid of computers; and, unlike electronic records, it cannot take full advantage of the protections afforded through the use of cryptographic techniques, although those techniques are not currently used in public elections in the United States. In particular, the following issues may be worth considering:
Lack of information. There remains considerable uncertainty about the relative security of DREs in comparison to other voting systems; how security measures such as VVPAT may impact other important goals such as accuracy, reliability, usability, and accessibility; and the effectiveness of those security measures. Potential conflicts with HAVA requirements. Voter Confidence. Impacts on Innovation. | Most voting systems used in U.S. elections rely on computers in some way. The most computerized is the direct recording electronic voting machine, or DRE. In this system, votes are recorded directly onto computer memory devices. While DREs have been in use since the early 1990s, questions about their security and reliability were previously a relatively minor issue, even following the November 2000 presidential election and the subsequent congressional deliberations leading to the enactment of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA, P.L. 107-252).
However, at least two factors led to a sharp increase in public concerns about DREs, beginning in 2003. First, the voting accessibility provisions in HAVA promote the use of DREs, which have been the only kind of voting system that can meet the HAVA requirements to permit persons with disabilities, including blindness, to vote privately and independently. Second, potential security vulnerabilities with DREs were publicized as a result of several studies. Several bills were introduced in the 109th Congress that would address these issues in different ways; a number of similar bills have been introduced thus far in the 110th Congress.
In the public debate about DREs, there has been some confusion about what the problems and issues are, arising to a significant degree from the complexity of DREs and of elections in general. This confusion can lead to misperceptions about facts as well as issues and options for resolving them. Several points are worth noting:
DREs do have unique security concerns and have only recently been studied by the scientific community. However, most problems in recent elections were not associated with DREs. Security flaws in them are not known to have compromised any elections, and it is not clear how much of a threat those vulnerabilities pose to election integrity in practice, especially in comparison to other kinds of threats. The different models of DREs in current use vary substantially in design, and problems that one model exhibits may not occur in others. Many of the problems that have occurred are procedural, not weaknesses in the technology itself.
It is not clear whether the unique security problems posed by DREs are best addressed by requiring that they produce paper ballots or by other means. While paper has useful security properties and is well-known, other methods exist that might be superior. Furthermore, paper ballots used with DREs (called voter-verified paper audit trails, or VVPAT) are largely unproven and it is not clear how well they can meet HAVA requirements for accessibility or other goals such as usability.
As the 110th Congress considers proposals relating to DREs, salient issues might include the lack of information about DRE security, especially in relation to other systems and other components of election integrity; potential conflicts with HAVA requirements that might be associated with the proposals; how those proposals might impact voter confidence; and what impacts they might have on future innovation that could greatly improve the transparency and integrity of elections. This report will be updated in response to major developments. |
crs_RL32212 | crs_RL32212_0 | Introduction
Over the past 20 years, a number of commissions and task forces have examined the process by which the President makes appointments to certain positions with the advice and consent of the Senate (PAS positions). Congress might elect to make these agency plans the basis for future decisions concerning the reduction of PAS positions. This report provides background information and analysis of issues concerning possible congressional action to reduce PAS positions. The last third of the report identifies potential congressional approaches to reducing the number of PAS positions, and analyzes the institutional and political considerations associated with each of these options. The Constitutional Framework for the Appointment of Officers of the United States
As part of its system of checks and balances, the Constitution provides a general framework for the appointment of officers of the United States:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. The Senate confirmation process is centered at the committee level. V. Length of the Appointment Process
As discussed in the introduction to this report, some proponents of reducing the number of PAS positions have asserted that, over the last several decades, the appointment process has taken longer, and the number of PAS positions has grown, and that the longer process is due, in part, to the greater number of positions. Assessment of Expected Benefits of a Reduction in the Number of Advice and Consent Positions
Proponents of a reduction in the number of PAS positions have suggested that such a reduction would be expected to "yield a more efficient and more consistent performance of the Senate's confirmation responsibilities" and to reduce the overall the length of the appointment process. If the positions removed from PAS status were among those that involve significant investigations or hearings, their removal might result in shorter appointment times, on average. To a considerable extent, the Constitution gives Congress discretion over the determination of which officers will be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, and which may be appointed by the President alone, the courts, or agency heads. What institutional and political considerations are relevant in the decision making process? It could be argued that the confirmation process, in general, provides the Senate with leverage during negotiations with the President over related and unrelated matters. Option 3: Establish a Military Base Closure-Type Procedure
Congress could establish an expedited, or "fast-track," procedure to facilitate the selection of PAS positions for reduction. Option 6: Distribute PAS Positions in Proportion to Agency Size
Congress also could approach the effort to reduce the number of PAS positions by attempting to distribute PAS positions in relation to the size of each agency. In addition, or instead, Congress might establish appointment notification requirements for newly converted positions. | This report provides background information and analysis of issues concerning possible congressional action to reduce the number of positions to which the President makes appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate (PAS positions). Among other topics, the report discusses the constitutional framework that guides congressional action in this area, identifies potential congressional options, and analyzes associated institutional and political considerations.
The Constitution provides Congress with considerable discretion over which officers of the United States will be in PAS positions, and which may be appointed by the President alone, the courts, or agency heads. At present, more than 2,000 high-level officials across the three branches are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The appointment process includes presidential selection and nomination, Senate consideration, and formal presidential appointment.
In general, the number of PAS positions has grown and the appointment process has gotten longer over the last three decades. It is not clear, however, that the larger number is responsible for the lengthier process. Other factors, such as stricter vetting requirements, also play a role. Proponents of a reduction in the number of PAS positions have suggested that it might lead to an improvement in the efficiency and performance of the Senate confirmation process and to a decrease in the length of the appointment process, but this will probably be the case only if the positions removed from PAS status are those for which appointments consume the most time. Some argue that removing advice and consent requirements from such positions might have undesirable political and institutional consequences for Congress.
A recently enacted provision directs each federal agency head to submit a PAS position reduction plan to the President and Congress. Congress might elect to make these plans the basis for future decisions concerning the reduction of PAS positions. Alternative options for Congress include maintaining the status quo; creating a commission to make recommendations for reductions of PAS positions; establishing a "fast track" procedure for these reductions; reducing the number of positions by category or function; distributing PAS positions in proportion to agency size; and delegating reduction choices to committees of jurisdiction. In lieu of maintaining PAS status for certain positions, Congress might continue to influence the appointment process by legislatively establishing qualifications or notification requirements for appointments to those positions.
Congressional action on PAS positions would involve a number of institutional and political considerations. For example, participation in the appointment process through advice and consent gives Senators influence over the selection of nominees and facilitates obtaining testimony from appointees during oversight hearings. In addition, the confirmation process arguably provides the Senate with leverage during negotiations with the President over unrelated matters. This report will be updated as warranted by events. |
crs_RL33628 | crs_RL33628_0 | Many experts consider TCB to be vital for developing countries to benefit from trade liberalization and to participate actively in the global economy. This report examines key issues in TCB, provides an overview of U.S. and international TCB programs, and explores Congressional involvement in TCB. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has historically provided the bulk of U.S. TCB assistance, but other agencies such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), U.S. Department of Commerce, and U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) also provide such assistance. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) first provided TCB assistance in FY2005, and in FY2006 and FY2007 its TCB funding obligations surpassed those of USAID. Congress has several policy interests in TCB. First, TCB may be included in some potential free trade agreements (FTAs). Finally, TCB is provided to developing countries through their participation in the WTO, and has been a topic of discussion in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) round of negotiations. Despite the GSP and other trade preference programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), most developing countries have not substantially increased their trade globally or with the United States. Therefore, TCB aims to help developing countries cope with this dislocation. From FY1999 to FY2005, USAID funded the majority of TCB assistance. For example, the Department of Labor and the Department of Agriculture both fund their own programs and implement TCB activities funded by other agencies such as USAID and the State Department. USTR exclusively plays a role in coordinating TCB. In FY2007 OPIC implemented $27 million in TCB programs, mainly in the areas of physical infrastructure development and financial sector development. Trade Capacity Building by Non-U.S. Donors
Multilateral Trade Capacity Building
TCB is provided by multilateral development banks such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and through multilateral funds managed by the WTO. Technical assistance is also discussed as part of the WTO negotiations. Legislation on Trade Capacity Building
Congress has passed appropriations legislation providing funds and guidance for trade capacity building. The 110 th Congress directed the administration to use at least $550 million of foreign aid appropriations for TCB in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-161 ). In the 109 th Congress, the House version of the FY2007 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill ( H.R. Legislative Limitations on TCB
In the mid-1980s, Congress passed legislation restricting the use of foreign development assistance programs in response to problems in the U.S. farm economy. In addition to restrictions on agricultural assistance, there are other restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance that affect TCB assistance. Policy Issues
Motivations for Trade Capacity Building
Trade capacity building is generally regarded as an activity taken on by the United States and other donors for altruistic purposes: to help developing countries benefit from trade and achieve poverty reduction. Evaluating the effectiveness of TCB is another challenge. | Trade capacity building (TCB) is a form of development assistance provided by the United States and other donors to help developing countries participate in and benefit from global trade. In addition to helping developing countries negotiate and implement trade agreements, TCB includes development assistance for agricultural development, customs administration, business training, physical infrastructure development, financial sector development, and labor and environmental standards. Some experts believe that TCB is necessary for developing countries to adjust to trade liberalization and achieve trade-led economic growth.
In FY2007, the United States obligated about $1.4 billion in TCB worldwide. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funds and implements the majority of U.S. TCB programs. In FY2005, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) began to fund TCB activities, and in FY2006 and FY2007 it overtook USAID as the agency with the highest TCB obligations. Other agencies also provide TCB, including the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Treasury Department, the Department of Labor, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA). The United States also contributes to multilateral funds for TCB, and it contributes to multilateral development banks such as the World Bank, which also provide TCB programs.
Congress has played a key role in TCB by providing funding through appropriations legislation. In the 109th Congress, the House passed a measure to create a Trade Capacity Enhancement Fund in the 2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (H.R. 5522), but this measure was not included in the Senate bill. The 110th Congress directed the administration to use at least $550 million of foreign aid appropriations for TCB in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-161). TCB may become a key part of the 110th Congress' discussions on potential free trade agreements (FTAs) with developing countries, renewal of trade promotion authority (TPA), and U.S. involvement in the Doha round of WTO negotiations. The 110th Congress may also be interested in using TCB to increase the effectiveness of trade preference programs initiated through legislation such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
In the past, Congress has passed legislation restricting the use of foreign assistance for certain activities promoting trade in developing countries. While TCB generally has trade-promoting motivations, any resulting increased import competition could also raise Congressional concern.
This report describes trade capacity building and discusses the history of TCB in foreign assistance. It also provides an overview of U.S. bilateral TCB assistance, as well as multilateral and bilateral TCB assistance from other donors. There is also a discussion of legislation affecting TCB, including appropriations and legislative restrictions on foreign assistance. Finally, this report highlights some of the policy issues concerning TCB. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41956 | crs_R41956_0 | Introduction
The U.S. livestock and poultry sector is presently confronting near-record-high feed costs. Finally, when profit margins turn unfavorable, producers are more likely to retain fewer breeding animals or to liquidate herds. Near-term liquidation means smaller future herds or flocks and ultimately higher retail prices for beef, pork, poultry meat, eggs, and dairy products. Persistent upward feed price movements could result in substantial and long-lasting consequences for livestock product prices throughout the marketing chain. It also provides background information on the structure of the U.S. feed grain sector in an Appendix . Current and Emerging Issues for Livestock Feedstuffs
High feed costs are being driven by the convergence of both current tight supply prospects and long-run market forces. With respect to current conditions, USDA forecasts that U.S. corn stocks will approach historic low levels relative to demand by the end of summer 2011. In addition, uncertainty about the current crop outlook, due to late planting in the Northern Plains and Eastern Corn Belt and a severe drought that has spread from the Southern Plains into the Southeast, has dried up pasture lands, exposing cattle producers to expensive commercial feed markets. From a longer-term perspective, U.S. feed grain demand has exceeded production in all but one year since 2004. This persistent trend is primarily the result of five factors:
rapid growth of U.S. corn-based ethanol production (whose share of the U.S. corn crop in 2011 is forecast to exceed feed use for the first time), limited supply of available U.S. cropland to expand production, prolonged weakness of the U.S. dollar which has made U.S. agricultural exports very competitive despite high commodity prices, strong income growth in China and other international markets which has increased demand for livestock products and the feed grains and protein meal needed to produce them, and a decline in the responsiveness of feed demand to higher prices—the result of tight stocks, limited cropland, the increased use of corn for ethanol production, and the increasing industrialization of hog and poultry production. These factors are expected to persist for several more years, thus maintaining strong demand for feed grains and strong upward pressure on prices for all commodities that compete for farm land. The result of these convergent forces has been falling grain and oilseed stocks, record or near-record prices for most feedstuffs—grains, oilseeds, hay, and pasture—in 2011, and increasingly volatile feed grain prices due to tight supplies and the declining demand responsiveness. Emerging U.S. For the U.S. livestock and poultry sector—where feed costs account for 50% to 80% of cash operating expenses—this poses significant consequences including declining profit margins, increased financial pressure, and the prospects for substantial near-term liquidation of herds or flocks. These and other issues related to livestock feed availability are likely to be of growing interest to Congress as the House and Senate Agriculture Committees monitor the financial health and well-being of the U.S. livestock and poultry sectors as well as any future ramifications for retail food price inflation. In addition, Congress, along with energy and agricultural market participants, is expected to closely follow any further acceleration of unanticipated side-effects on the U.S. livestock sector from continued corn use for ethanol production. Finally, feed availability and associated market price volatility are likely to play a significant role in the next farm bill debate, as the current omnibus farm bill expires in 2012. | The U.S. livestock and poultry sector is presently confronting near-record high feed costs driven by the convergence of both current tight supply prospects and long-run market forces. The U.S. livestock sector, where feed costs account for 50% to 80% of cash operating expenses, has seen its profit margins steadily squeezed and its share of U.S. agricultural cash receipts decline. Since June 2010 feed cost increases have outpaced livestock price increases, squeezing the profitability of livestock and poultry producers. When profit margins turn unfavorable, producers are more likely to retain fewer breeding animals or to liquidate herds. Near-term liquidation means smaller future herds or flocks and ultimately higher retail prices for beef, pork, poultry meat, eggs, and dairy products. Persistent upward feed price movements could result in substantial and long-lasting consequences for livestock product prices throughout the marketing chain.
USDA forecasts that U.S. corn stocks will approach historic low levels relative to demand by the end of summer 2011. In addition, the current crop outlook remains uncertain due to late planting in the Northern Plains and Eastern Corn Belt and a severe drought that has dried up pasture lands from the Southern Plains into the Southeast, exposing cattle producers to expensive commercial feed markets.
From a longer-term perspective, U.S. feed grain demand has exceeded production in all but one year since 2004. This persistent trend is primarily the result of five factors: rapid growth of U.S. corn-based ethanol production (whose share of the U.S. corn crop in 2011 is forecast to exceed feed use for the first time), limited supply of available U.S. cropland to expand production, prolonged weakness of the U.S. dollar which has made U.S. agricultural exports competitive in foreign markets despite high prices, strong income growth in China and other international markets which has increased demand for livestock products and the feedstuffs (feed grains and protein meals) needed to produce them, and a substantial decline in the price responsiveness of both supply and demand in agricultural commodity markets. The convergence of these factors has resulted in falling grain and oilseed stocks, record or near-record prices for most feedstuffs—grains, oilseeds, hay, and pasture—in 2011, and increasingly volatile commodity prices. These factors are expected to persist for several more years, thus maintaining strong demand for feed grains and strong upward pressure on prices for all commodities that compete for farm land.
Issues surrounding feed use and availability are likely to be of growing interest to Congress as the House and Senate Agriculture Committees monitor the financial health and well-being of the U.S. livestock and poultry sectors, as well as any future ramifications for retail food price inflation. In addition, Congress, along with energy and agricultural market participants, will closely follow any further acceleration of unanticipated side effects on the U.S. livestock sector from continued corn use for ethanol production. Finally, feed availability and associated market price volatility are likely to play a significant role in the next farm bill debate, as the current omnibus farm bill expires in 2012.
Feed market dynamics and what they mean for the U.S. livestock sector depend on many factors. This report provides a review of the current feed market dynamic including the major emerging issues mentioned above and their implications for the U.S. livestock sector and Congress. In addition, background information on the market structure of the U.S. feed grain sector is contained in an appendix. |
crs_R42352 | crs_R42352_0 | These include the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 , hereinafter the BCA), which established a range of budget-controlling mechanisms. Caps were placed on discretionary spending from FY2012 through FY2021. If these caps are exceeded, an automatic cancellation of budget resources—known as sequestration—would take place across most discretionary budget accounts to reduce spending down to the cap. Finally, the report explores a number of other issues pertinent to disaster relief funding in the BCA-regulated environment, including
time frames for congressional action after a large-scale disaster strikes; the implications of the rising number of Stafford Act declarations; funding disaster relief efforts in severe disaster years; offsetting the cost of disaster relief; calculating the allowable adjustment for disaster relief; the degree to which different types of disaster relief are included in the methodology for calculating the 10-year average on disaster relief spending; and the possible implications of excluding Stafford Act assistance for emergencies and fires from the allowable adjustment calculation. The limit established by the BCA on adjustments to the caps for disaster relief is based on the average funding provided for disaster relief over the last ten years, excluding the highest and lowest annual amounts, calculated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). If Congress spends less than that average on disaster relief in a given fiscal year, the caps can be further adjusted upward by the unspent amount in the following year. Funding requested under the disaster relief cap adjustment is for major disasters declared pursuant to the Stafford Act and designated by the Congress as being for disaster relief pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(D) of the BBEDCA, as amended by the BCA. 113-2 , the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (that provided $50.5 billion in supplemental funding for Hurricane Sandy), used the remaining $5.4 billion of the allowable adjustment to provide additional resources for the DRF. The sizeable initial disaster relief expenditures for Hurricane Katrina and the other 2005 storms will begin to lose relevance in calculating the allowable adjustment for disaster assistance for FY2016, and will no longer impact calculations for the allowable adjustment in FY2017. Once FY2005 and FY2006 rotate out, there will be a corresponding drop in the allowable disaster assistance adjustments. Moreover, as the Administration and Congress work to spend under the adjustment, the allowable adjustment could continue to decrease, increasing the likelihood that it would be inadequate to accommodate future catastrophic disaster needs. Renegotiation of the underlying budget control laws, or 4. In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, the Administration submitted a request to Congress for more than $60 billion in relief, well in excess of the available allowable adjustment. Efforts were made to reduce the size of the FY2013 disaster supplemental, as well as to remove emergency funding designations for mitigation programs, to ensure that such funding would count against the BCA's discretionary spending limits. Supporters argued that additional funds could be provided later in the process. Disaster Relief Spending Under the BCA
In the "minibus" legislation, P.L. The structure of the appropriation for the DRF has change d to reflect the availability of resources that do not count against the allocation for annual appropriations, allowing for prefunding of disaster needs. | On August 2, 2011, the President signed into law the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25), which included a number of budget-controlling mechanisms. As part of the legislation, caps were placed on discretionary spending for the next ten years, beginning with FY2012. If these caps are exceeded, the BCA provides for an automatic rescission—known as sequestration—to take place across most discretionary budget accounts to reduce the effective level of spending to the level of the cap. Additionally, special accommodations were made in the BCA to address the unpredictable nature of disaster assistance while attempting to impose discipline on the amount spent by the federal government on disasters. The BCA created an allowable adjustment specifically to cover disaster relief (defined as the costs of major disasters under the Stafford Act), separate from emergency appropriations.
The limit established by the BCA on adjustments to the caps for disaster relief is based on the average funding provided for disaster relief over the previous ten years, excluding the highest and lowest annual amounts, calculated by the Office of Management and Budget. If Congress spends less than that average on disaster relief in a given fiscal year, the caps can be further adjusted upward by the unspent amount in the following year. The existence of this "allowable adjustment" for disaster relief has influenced the way that the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) is structured, allowing a larger overall funding stream to be provided in annual appropriations without it counting against the bill's allocation of discretionary spending.
On October 29, 2013, Hurricane Sandy came ashore, causing loss of life and billions of dollars in damage. The Administration proposed a relief package that exceeded the allowable adjustment for disaster relief under the BCA. The Administration requested, and Congress for the most part agreed, to designate the supplemental funding provided in the wake of Hurricane Sandy as emergency spending outside of the limited disaster relief adjustment made available under the BCA. The history of the legislative response to this disaster demonstrated that while the BCA included an accommodation to provide dedicated additional funding for many disasters, catastrophic events such as Sandy remain a challenge to those developing long-term budgeting strategies.
This challenge could be compounded by the fact that by design, the methodology used by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to calculate the allowable adjustment could not capture the full range of disaster relief spending, and that the structure of the formula for calculating the average provides smaller allowable adjustments in future years. The sizeable initial disaster relief expenditures for Hurricane Katrina and the other 2005 storms will begin to lose relevance in calculating the allowable adjustment for disaster assistance for FY2016, and will no longer impact calculations for the allowable adjustment in FY2017. Once FY2005 and FY2006 rotate out, there will be a corresponding drop in the allowable disaster assistance adjustment.
In the face of these challenges, Congress could choose to continue to use emergency funding to meet unbudgeted disaster relief needs, or change the allowable adjustment mechanism. Congress may also consider changing the formula used for calculating the allowable adjustment. Another potential option would be to take other steps to mitigate the impact of federal disaster relief spending on the budget, including altering the underlying laws, if Congress believes further legislative controls for federal disaster relief expenditures are a priority.
This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RS22709 | crs_RS22709_0 | Restitution for New and Existing Crimes
Restitution legislation in the 110 th Congress fell into three categories. Some proposals created or would have created new federal crimes or amend specific existing federal offenses and in doing so included restitution provisions particular to those offenses. By virtue of Section 206 of the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, P.L. 110 - 403 , 122 Stat. (2008)( S. 3325 ), conviction for any of a number of intellectual property offenses also results in a mandatory restitution order. The Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act, P.L. 110 - 326 , 122 Stat. The bill's sponsor, Senator Feinstein, reintroduced essentially the same proposal as S. 149 in the 110 th Congress, which Representative Shea-Porter introduced in the House as H.R. 4111 . H.R. H.R. It would have adopted some features of existing law and changed others. H.R. Procedural Adjustments (H.R. H.R. 4110)
Like H.R. 4110 had several provisions designed to prevent the dissipation of assets following the issuance of the original restitution order. H.R. 845 and S. 973 / H.R. 845 and S. 973 / H.R. Courts would have been authorized to issue an ex parte protective order upon a probable cause showing that (1) the defendant had been indicted for an offense for which restitution might be ordered, (2) that the offense or offenses had resulted in qualified losses to qualified victims of an approximate amount for which the defendant would be obligated to make restitution if convicted of the offense or offenses charged, (3) that the value of the property to be restrained or the amount of the bond to be posted did not greatly exceed the approximate amount of restitution that might be awarded, and (4) (perhaps) that the property was traceable to the offense charged. 4110 and H.R. 853(e) and proposed Section 3664A. As part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. | Congress enacted two restitution provisions in the 110th Congress, one as part of the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 (Title II of P.L. 110-326)(H.R. 5938), and the other as part of the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-403)(S. 3325). It also devoted considerable time and attention to other restitution proposals that did not see final action before the end of the Congress.
Restitution legislation in the 110th Congress fell into three categories. Some proposals, like the two provisions enacted, create or would have created new federal crimes or amend specific existing federal offenses and in doing so include restitution provisions particular to those offenses, e.g., P.L. 110-326 (intellectual property), P.L. 110-403 (identity theft); H.R. 880, H.R. 1582, H.R. 1692, S. 456, and S. 990 (gang bills); H.R. 6491 (organized retail offenses), H.R. 3148 (Mann Act), H.R. 3990 (sexual military offenses), and H.R. 871 (spousal support offenses). Other proposals would have addressed a particular aspect of the law such as abatement which limits restitution collection after the defendant's death (S. 149 / H.R. 4111). Two bills – H.R. 845, the Criminal Restitution Improvement Act, and S. 973 / H.R. 4110, the Restitution for Victims of Crime Act – sought to make substantial changes in federal restitution law. They anticipated three kinds of adjustments: (1) an expansion of offenses for which restitution may be ordered without recourse to the laws relating to probation and supervised release; (2) an overhaul of the procedures governing the issuance and enforcement of restitution orders to afford prosecutors greater enforcement flexibility without having to seek the approval of the sentencing court; and (3) authority for preindictment and presentencing restraining orders and other protective measures to prevent dissipation of assets by those who may subsequently owe restitution.
This is an abridged version of CRS Report RL34139, Criminal Restitution Proposals in the 110th Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. Related reports include CRS Report RL34138, Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RS22708, Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases: A Sketch, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44542 | crs_R44542_0 | 109-270 ) is the most recent federal law supporting career and technical education (CTE) services offered within the states at the secondary and postsecondary education levels. The stated purpose of Perkins IV is to support the development of career and technical, as well as academic, skills among secondary and postsecondary education students enrolled in CTE programs. Most recently, Perkins IV was funded at $1.1 billion for FY2016. Career and Technical Education under Perkins
For the purposes of Perkins IV, CTE includes organized educational activities that impart technical or occupational skills at the secondary and postsecondary levels and lead to an industry-recognized credential, a certificate, or an associate's degree. History of Federal Involvement in CTE
The federal government has a long history of supporting workforce development, including CTE. Perkins IV
The Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act of 2006 (Perkins IV; P.L. The authorization was extended through FY2013 under the General Education Provisions Act, although the act continues to receive appropriations in FY2016. While maintaining the overall structure of its predecessors, Perkins IV introduced the following major changes:
The act was renamed "career and technical," replacing "vocational and technical," education; separate core indicators of performance for the Basic State Grants (BSG) program were introduced for the secondary and postsecondary levels, requiring grantees to meet at least 90% of their adjusted levels of performance on each core indicator; state improvement plans were required if the 90% target is not met on the BSG adjusted level of performance for at least one core indicator; CTE provisions were explicitly linked with the academic standards required under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as authorized by the No Child Left Behind Act ( P.L. Structure and Purpose of the Act
Perkins IV authorizes funding for five separate programs:
the Basic State Grants program; Tech Prep; National Programs; the Tribally Controlled Postsecondary Career and Technical Institutions (TCPCTI) Program; and Occupational and Employment Information. Each indicator must be disaggregated by special populations and by ESEA Title I subgroups. Other Programs under Title I
National Programs52
Perkins IV authorizes the Secretary to carry out the following national activities:
collect performance information on the state of CTE and on the effectiveness of state and local CTE programs; provide an annual report to Congress on the state of CTE and on state and local performance of Perkins CTE programs; direct the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to collect information on CTE for a nationally representative sample of students as part of its regular assessments; carry out research, development, dissemination, evaluation, and assessment of CTE activities under Perkins IV based on a single plan developed by the Secretary; conduct an "independent evaluation and assessment" of programs under this act and submit a report to Congress summarizing all studies related to the assessment; appoint an independent advisory panel to conduct an analysis of the findings and recommendations resulting from the assessment described above; collect and disseminate information regarding state efforts to meet their performance standards; establish a national center for research on career and technical education; and carry out demonstration CTE programs and disseminate information about best practices for providing CTE programs under this act. States with lower per capita incomes are also targeted by the initial allocation formula. | The Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act of 2006 (Perkins IV; P.L. 109-270) is the main federal law supporting the development of career and technical skills among students in secondary and postsecondary education. Perkins IV aims to improve academic outcomes and preparedness for higher education or the labor market among students enrolled in career and technical education (CTE) programs, previously known as vocational education programs.
The federal government has a long history of supporting programs to develop students' career and technical skills, dating back to the 19th century. Perkins IV, the most recent federal law targeting CTE, was passed in 2006 and authorized through FY2012. The authorization was extended through FY2013 under the General Education Provisions Act, and Perkins IV has continued to receive fairly constant appropriations through FY2016. The total appropriations for Perkins IV in FY2016 were approximately $1.1 billion. This report provides a summary of Perkins IV.
The largest program authorized by Perkins IV is the Basic State Grants program. Key features of this program include the following:
formula grants to the states to develop and improve CTE programs at the secondary and postsecondary levels; a state allocation formula that allocates money based on population and per capita income factors; a distribution of at least 85% of the funds from the states to the local level; state flexibility in deciding the allocation of state funds between secondary and postsecondary local CTE providers; requirements for states to develop and implement programs of study, which are nonduplicative sequences of courses that span the secondary and postsecondary levels and lead to an industry-recognized credential, certificate, or postsecondary degree; core indicators of performance for accountability purposes, with target levels of performance negotiated between each state and the Secretary of Education; disaggregation of performance data by special populations and subgroups defined in Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015; and the requirement for states to prepare and implement program improvement strategies if the target levels on core indicators of performance are not met.
Perkins IV also authorizes additional programs: Tech Prep, National Programs, Tribally Controlled Postsecondary Career and Technical Institutions (TCPCTI), and Occupational Employment Information. Of these, only National Programs and TCPCTI received funding for FY2011-FY2016. |
crs_RL30840 | crs_RL30840_0 | The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. (b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection there with; and
(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith....
(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require. Implicitly criticizing the expansive role of the NSC staff under Kissinger, the Commission recommended that only the President should have line responsibility in the White House; that staff officials should not themselves issue directives to departmental officials; that, in the future, the National Security Adviser have no other official responsibilities; that the Secretary of the Treasury be made a statutory member of the NSC and that the NSC's scope be expanded to include major international economic policy issues; and that senior officials concerned with domestic policy be invited to NSC meetings when issues with domestic implications were discussed. The NSC Principals Committee, was composed of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the DCI, the Chairman of the JCS, the Chief of Staff to the President, and the National Security Adviser, who was the chairman. Hadley made fewer public appearances but emphasized the importance of the NSC staff monitoring the implementation of NSC decisions. In May 2009 the Administration announced the integration or the staffs of the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council into a single National Security Staff (NSS), with the goal of ending "the artificial divide between White House staff who have been dealing with national security and homeland security issues." Overview of Current NSC Functions
Largely because of the major influence in policymaking exerted by Kissinger and Brzezinski, the position of National Security Adviser has emerged as a central one. Most of the NSC staff positions in the George H. W. Bush Administration were filled with government officials. The Senate does not approve the appointment of the National Security Adviser, although it does confirm statutory NSC members. 110 - 140 , §932) Congress added the Secretary of Energy to the NSC. The Role of the National Security Adviser
The NSC was created by statute, and its membership has been designated and can be changed by statute. 2007. Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. Report . "NSC Reform for the Post-Cold War Era," Orbis , Summer 2000. National Security Advisers | The National Security Council (NSC) was established by statute in 1947 to create an inter-departmental body to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. Currently, statutory members of the Council are the President, Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and, since 2007, the Secretary of Energy; but, at the President's request, other senior officials participate in NSC deliberations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intelligence are statutory advisers.
The President clearly holds final decision-making authority in the executive branch. Over the years, however, the NSC staff has emerged as a major factor in the formulation (and at times in the implementation) of national security policy. Similarly, the head of the NSC staff, the National Security Adviser, has played important, and occasionally highly public, roles in policymaking. This report traces the evolution of the NSC from its creation to the present.
The organization and influence of the NSC have varied significantly from one Administration to another, ranging from highly structured and formal systems to loose-knit teams of experts. Although it is universally acknowledged that the NSC staff should be organized to meet the particular goals and work habits of an incumbent President, the history of the NSC provides ample evidence of the advantages and disadvantages of different types of policymaking structures.
Congress enacted the statute creating the NSC and has altered the character of its membership over the years. Congress annually appropriates funds for its activities, but does not, routinely, receive testimony on substantive matters from the National Security Adviser or from NSC staff. Proposals to require Senate confirmation of the Security Adviser have been discussed but not adopted.
The post-Cold War world has posed new challenges to NSC policymaking. Some argue that the NSC should be broadened to reflect an expanding role of economic, environmental, and demographic issues in national security policymaking. The Clinton Administration created a National Economic Council tasked with cooperating closely with the NSC on international economic matters. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the George W. Bush Administration established a Homeland Security Council. The Obama Administration has combined the staffs of the Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council into a single National Security Staff, while retaining the two positions of National Security Adviser and Homeland Security Adviser. Although the latter has direct access to the President, the incumbent is to report organizationally to the National Security Adviser. |
crs_RL34212 | crs_RL34212_0 | M ortgage debt cancellation occurs when lenders engage in loss-mitigation solutions that either (1) restructure the loan and reduce the principal balance or (2) sell the property, either in advance, or as a result of foreclosure proceedings. 110-142 ) signed into law on December 20, 2007, temporarily excluded qualified COD income. Thus, the act allowed taxpayers who did not qualify for the existing exceptions to exclude COD income. The provision was effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010. 110-343 ) extended the exclusion of COD income to debt discharged before January 1, 2013. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-240 ) subsequently extended the exclusion through the end of 2013. Most recently, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. The extension also allowed for debt discharged after 2017 to be excluded from income if the taxpayer had entered into a binding written agreement before January 1, 2018. The rationales for this change are to minimize hardship for households in distress and to ensure that non-tax-related homeowner retention efforts are not thwarted by tax policy. Critics argue that the exclusion could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations. This income is typically referred to as cancellation of debt (COD) income. As a result of the attribute reduction, the taxpayer may be subject to tax on the excluded COD income in years following the year of discharge—in other words, the tax on the COD income is deferred. Legislative Developments
On December 20, 2007, The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P.L. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( P.L. The Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-295 ) extended the exclusion through the end of 2014. The exclusion was extended again through the end of 2016 by Division Q of P.L. 114-113 —the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act (or "PATH" Act). 115-123 ) retroactively extended the exclusion through the end of 2017. If the exclusion on canceled debt income were to expire, improving awareness about the existing exclusions for canceled debt, such as for insolvency or bankruptcy, may be an option to pursue. The first is which tax attributes, if any, should be adjusted to account for excluded canceled mortgage debt income. Basis adjustment results in the taxation of cancelled debt income to the extent that gain from the disposition of the home is taxable; however, the timing of the basis adjustment may result in different tax consequences for taxpayers who lose their home. | A home foreclosure, mortgage default, or mortgage modification can have important tax consequences. As lenders and borrowers work to resolve indebtedness issues, some transactions are resulting in cancellation of debt. Mortgage debt cancellation can occur when lenders restructure loans, reducing principal balances, or sell properties, either in advance, or as a result, of foreclosure proceedings. Historically, if a lender forgives or cancels such debt, tax law has treated it as cancellation of debt (COD) income subject to tax. Exceptions have been available for taxpayers who are insolvent or in bankruptcy, among others—these taxpayers may exclude canceled mortgage debt income under existing law.
The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-142) signed into law on December 20, 2007, temporarily excluded qualified COD income. Thus, the act allowed taxpayers who did not qualify for the existing exceptions to exclude COD income. The provision was effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343) extended the exclusion of COD income to debt discharged before January 1, 2013. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240) subsequently extended the exclusion through the end of 2013. The Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-295) extended the exclusion through the end of 2014. The exclusion was extended again through the end of 2016 by Division Q of P.L. 114-113—the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act (or "PATH" Act). Most recently, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123) retroactively extended the exclusion through the end of 2017. The extension also allowed for debt discharged after 2017 to be excluded from income if the taxpayer had entered into a binding written agreement before January 1, 2018.
A rationale for excluding canceled mortgage debt income has focused on minimizing hardship for households in distress. Policymakers have expressed concern that households experiencing hardship and that are in danger of losing their home, presumably as a result of financial distress, should not incur an additional hardship by being taxed on canceled debt income. Some analysts have also drawn a connection between minimizing hardship for individuals and consumer spending; reductions in consumer spending, if significant, can lead to recession.
As efforts to minimize the rate of foreclosure are being made, lenders are, in some cases, renegotiating loans with borrowers to keep them in the home. For some policymakers, the exclusion of canceled mortgage debt income may be a necessary step to ensure that homeowner retention efforts are not thwarted by tax policy.
Opponents of an exclusion for canceled mortgage debt income might argue that the provision would make debt forgiveness more attractive for homeowners, and could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations.
This report will be updated in the event of significant legislative changes. |
crs_R43867 | crs_R43867_0 | Introduction
Much progress has been made in achieving the ambitious goals that Congress established more than 40 years ago to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters. However, long-standing problems persist, and new problems have emerged. Water quality problems are diverse, ranging from pollution runoff from farms and ranches, city streets, and other diffuse or "nonpoint" sources, to "point" source discharges of metals and organic and inorganic toxic substances from factories and sewage treatment plants. Authorizations of appropriations for some programs provided in P.L. Authorizations for wastewater treatment project funding expired in FY1994. Criticism also has come from developers and property rights groups who contend that federal regulations (particularly the act's wetlands permit program) are a costly intrusion on private land-use decisions. However, there is less agreement about what solutions are needed and whether new legislation is required. Several key water quality issues exist: what additional actions, if any, should be taken to implement existing provisions of the law; whether additional steps are necessary to achieve overall goals of the act that have not yet been attained; how to ensure that progress made to date is not lost through diminished attention to water quality needs; whether existing regulatory authorities should be reduced; and what is the appropriate federal role in guiding and paying for clean water infrastructure and other activities. For some time, efforts to comprehensively amend the act have stalled as interests have debated whether and exactly how to change the law. These factors partly explain why Congress has recently focused legislative attention on narrow bills to extend or modify selected CWA programs, rather than taking up comprehensive proposals. In recent years, congressional attention turned significantly to oversight and legislation focused on criticism of EPA regulatory activities—particularly in the House, which has passed a number of bills to limit EPA's regulatory authority. Two CWA issues that have been the focus of much of legislators' interest in recent Congresses and are likely to be prominent in the 115 th Congress, as well—regulatory protection of wetlands, in relation to the scope of the regulatory jurisdiction of the CWA, and water infrastructure financing—are discussed next. But they acknowledged that it raised questions that required clarification in the final rule. But the uncertainties about federal jurisdiction over wetlands and other waters raised by the rulings remain highly controversial. Environmental advocates argue that legislation is needed to "reaffirm" what Congress intended when the CWA was enacted in 1972 and what EPA and the Corps have subsequently been practicing until the two Supreme Court rulings, in terms of CWA jurisdiction. The act's program of financial aid for municipal wastewater treatment plant construction is a key contributor to that effort. 113-121 ). However, in legislation enacted in December 2016, Congress appropriated $20 million that will allow EPA to begin making loans (see " FY2017 Appropriations "). Some of the provisions in P.L. Other Clean Water Act Issues
A number of other issues affecting efforts to achieve the goals and objectives of the CWA have drawn interest and been the subject of congressional oversight and legislation. Some legislators have been highly critical of recent regulatory initiatives, while others have been more supportive of EPA's implementation efforts. In several cases, policymakers sought to curtail water quality protection initiatives under the CWA following court rulings that expanded the regulatory scope of the law. In the 114 th Congress, scrutiny of EPA initiatives continued to be intense, including those involving water quality. 113-121"). | Much progress has been made in achieving the ambitious goals that Congress established in 1972 in the Clean Water Act (CWA) to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters. However, long-standing problems persist, and new problems have emerged. Water quality problems are diverse, ranging from pollution runoff from farms and ranches, city streets, and other diffuse or "nonpoint" sources, to toxic substances discharged from factories and sewage treatment plants.
There is little agreement among stakeholders about what solutions are needed, whether legislation is required to address the nation's remaining water pollution problems, or whether regulatory authorities should be reduced. For some time, efforts to comprehensively amend the CWA have stalled as interests have debated whether and exactly how to change the law. Congress has instead focused legislative attention on enacting narrow bills to extend or modify selected CWA programs, but not comprehensive proposals.
Programs that regulate activities in wetlands have been of particular interest recently, especially CWA Section 404, which has been criticized by landowners for intruding on private land-use decisions and imposing excessive economic burdens. Environmentalists view this regulatory program as essential for maintaining the health of wetland ecosystems, and they are concerned about court rulings that have narrowed regulatory protection of wetlands. Many stakeholders desire clarification of the act's regulatory jurisdiction, but they differ on what solutions are appropriate. In 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers finalized a rule intended to clarify jurisdictional issues in light of two key Supreme Court rulings, but the rule, which has been stayed by a federal court, remains controversial inside and outside of Congress.
Another prominent water quality issue for some time has concerned financial aid for municipal wastewater treatment projects. House and Senate committees have approved bills to reauthorize CWA assistance on several occasions, but, for various reasons, no legislation other than appropriations was enacted. At issue has been the role of the federal government in assisting states and cities in meeting needs to rebuild, repair, and upgrade wastewater treatment systems, especially in light of capital costs that are projected to be more than $270 billion over the next 20 years. The 113th Congress enacted legislation that created a pilot program to provide federal credit assistance for water infrastructure projects (P.L. 113-121). In December 2016, the program received initial appropriated funds, and EPA expects to begin making loans in 2017. P.L. 113-121 also revised certain of the water infrastructure funding provisions of the CWA.
A number of other water quality issues have been the subject of congressional oversight and legislation for some time, with some legislators highly critical of EPA's recent regulatory initiatives and others more supportive. In several cases, policymakers have sought to curtail water quality protection initiatives under the CWA following court rulings that expanded the regulatory scope of the law. Among the topics of particular interest has been regulation of surface coal mining activities in Appalachia. Congressional interest in this and other topics has been reflected in specific legislative proposals and debate over policy provisions of bills providing appropriations for EPA. Members from both parties have raised questions about the cost-effectiveness of some of EPA's actions and whether the agency has exceeded its authority. In the 114th Congress, scrutiny of EPA initiatives continued to be intense. |
crs_R42882 | crs_R42882_0 | A list of CRS reports covering in detail each of the issues addressed is provided at the end of the report. It may also take up implementing legislation for reciprocal trade agreements including the negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, with the European Union for the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement, and the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). These changes have also raised new trade policy issues, some of which are being discussed in current U.S. free trade agreement negotiations. The Role of Congress in International Trade and Finance5
The U.S. Constitution assigns express authority over foreign trade to Congress. Congress also exercises trade policy authority through its oversight responsibilities and the enactment of laws authorizing trade programs and governing trade policy generally. These include such areas as U.S. trade agreement negotiations; tariffs; nontariff barriers; trade remedies; import and export policies; economic sanctions; and the trade policy functions of the federal government. Congress has an important role in international investment and finance as well. It has authority over bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the level of U.S. financial commitments to the multilateral development banks (MDBs), including the World Bank, and to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They include: renewal of trade promotion authority (TPA); potential trade agreements including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), and also expanded agreements in information technology products and trade facilitation under the WTO; U.S.-China trade relations; international finance issues; review of the U.S. export control regime; reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank; and reauthorization of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and expiring trade preference programs. Among the trade issues for the 113th Congress are U.S. negotiations with the TPP countries—now 12 countries and possibly more—to create a comprehensive and high-standard regional FTA in the Asia-Pacific region. Democratic leaders and the Obama Administration, however, considered TAA renewal essential for passage of three implementing bills for free trade agreements (FTAs) with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. The TAA statute reauthorized the workers, firms, and farmers programs through December 31, 2013, but included provisions that allow TAA programs to continue assisting clients who were certified before December 31, 2013. Congress also could conduct oversight of the treatment of IPR issues in current U.S. trade negotiations. The United States and Europe have the largest bilateral economic relationship in the world, and many Members of Congress have expressed concern about the impacts of the Eurozone crisis on the U.S. economy. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. | The U.S. Constitution grants authority over the regulation of foreign commerce to Congress, which it exercises through oversight of trade policy, including the consideration of legislation to approve trade agreements and authorize trade programs. Policy issues cover such areas as: U.S. trade negotiations; tariff and nontariff barriers; worker dislocation from trade liberalization, trade remedy laws; import and export policies; international investment, economic sanctions; and trade policy functions of the federal government. Congress also has an important role in international finance. It has the authority over U.S. financial commitments to international financial institutions and oversight responsibilities for trade- and finance-related agencies of the U.S. Government.
The 112th Congress approved U.S. bilateral free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea, extended the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs through December 31, 2013, and reauthorized the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) through July 31, 2013. It also authorized permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status for Russia and Moldova, reauthorized the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and approved full U.S. participation in general capital increases for the World Bank and four regional development banks. The 113th Congress may revisit these issues and address new ones. Among the more potentially prominent issues are:
1.Possible renewal of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), allowing the President to enter into reciprocal trade agreements, and providing trade negotiating objectives and expedited legislative procedures to consider trade agreement implementing bills; and the possible related issue of TAA program reauthorization;
2.Negotiations for comprehensive reciprocal trade agreements with major trading partners, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with the United States 12 countries from the Western Hemisphere and Asia, and new negotiations with the European Union for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement;
3.U.S.-China trade relations including investment, intellectual property rights protection, currency reform, and market access liberalization;
4.International finance issues including implications of the ongoing Eurozone debt crisis for the U.S. economy, oversight of international financial institutions, and negotiations to conclude new bilateral investment treaties (BITs);
5.Oversight of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round negotiations, including the completed trade facilitation agreement, and of separate new trade negotiations (e.g. services) that some members of the WTO have undertaken;
6.Review of the President's export control reform initiative and possible renewal of the Export Control Act (EAA), and review of trade sanctions; and
7.Reauthorization of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and expiring trade preference programs (e.g., the GSP and the Andean Trade Preference Act).
A list of CRS reports covering these issues is provided at the end of the report. |
crs_R44105 | crs_R44105_0 | Introduction
On May 26, 2015, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) released a proposed rule (CMS-2390-P) that lays out the agency's plan to update the federal regulations pertaining to Medicaid managed care, under which states contract with private health insurers to provide health care to some enrollees. The proposed rule was posted to the Federal Register on June 1, 2015. The proposed rule would be the first major federal regulation impacting Medicaid managed care since 2002, and it would influence how states structure their managed care programs going forward. Many states rely on managed care organizations (MCOs) to deliver services to individuals newly eligible for Medicaid under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's (ACA's; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) Medicaid expansion. With so many people getting Medicaid services through managed care, CMS is updating the regulations to better align them with today's health care landscape. This report responds to a series of frequently asked questions (FAQs) identified to address some of the major updates included in the proposed rule. The FAQs summarize provisions such as the introduction of a minimum medical loss ratio (MLR), guidance on enrolling the long-term services and supports (LTSS) population in managed care, and network adequacy. This report is not meant to be comprehensive and does not include all of the numerous technical changes CMS outlines in the proposed rule. Instead, this report provides a high-level summary of some of the major provisions in the proposed rule. Beginning in the early 1990s, states began turning more and more to managed care to deliver benefits to enrollees. In FY2011, 49.8% of Medicaid enrollees were enrolled in comprehensive risk-based managed care. Because of the high percentage of Medicaid enrollees receiving benefits through comprehensive risk-based managed care (delivered primarily through managed care organizations [MCOs]), the proposed rule is likely to impact millions of Medicaid enrollees. As of September 2014, 39 states had contracted with MCOs to deliver care to their Medicaid enrollees. The proposed rule would codify that guidance. The ACA established minimum MLRs for the private health insurance market and Medicare Advantage. | On May 26, 2015, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) released a proposed rule (CMS-2390-P) laying out the agency's plan to update the federal regulations pertaining to Medicaid managed care, under which states contract with private health insurers to provide health care to some enrollees. The proposed rule was posted to the Federal Register on June 1, 2015.
The proposed rule would be the first major federal regulation impacting Medicaid managed care since 2002. In the early 1990s, states began turning to managed care to deliver benefits to enrollees. In FY2011, 49.8% of Medicaid enrollees were enrolled in comprehensive risk-based managed care. Many states rely on managed care organizations (MCOs) to deliver services to individuals newly eligible for Medicaid under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's (ACA's; P.L. 111-148, as amended) Medicaid expansion. The proposed rule would influence how states structure their managed care programs going forward. As of September 2014, 39 states had contracted with MCOs to deliver care to their Medicaid enrollees. Because of the high percentage of Medicaid enrollees receiving benefits through managed care, the proposed rule likely would impact millions of Medicaid enrollees. With so many people receiving Medicaid services through managed care, CMS is updating the regulations to better align them with today's health care landscape, including the recent changes to Medicare Advantage and the private health insurance market (including the introduction of health insurance exchanges) as a result of the ACA.
This report responds to a series of frequently asked questions (FAQs) identified to address some of the major updates included in the proposed rule. The FAQs summarize provisions such as the introduction of a minimum medical loss ratio (MLR), guidance on enrolling the long-term services and supports (LTSS) population in managed care, and network adequacy. This report is not meant to be comprehensive and does not include all of the numerous technical changes CMS outlines in the proposed rule. Instead, this report provides a high-level summary of some of the major provisions in the proposed rule.
CMS is taking public comments on the proposed rule through July 27, 2015. Once the comment period closes, CMS will review the comments and make any changes before preparing a final rule. This report may be updated to include additional FAQs or more detailed answers on certain aspects of the proposed rule. |
crs_RL33038 | crs_RL33038_0 | This report analyzes the threat to U.S. security posed by the Al Qaeda organization. Cells and associates have been located in over 70 countries, according to U.S. officials. Although U.S. officials say that the post-September 11 struggle against Al Qaeda uses all aspects of U.S. national power (legal, economic, diplomatic, as well as military), a cornerstone of the post-September 11 U.S. effort has been the military effort in Afghanistan. Many believe that the weakening of central direction renders Al Qaeda less able to conduct catastrophic attacks inside the United States because its diffusion limits its ability to orchestrate complicated, coordinated plots similar to the September 11, 2001 attacks. According to this view, bin Laden and Zawahiri are far less operationally relevant than they were at the time of September 11 and U.S. and allied counter-terrorist efforts might be better spent on countering the ideology that is promoted by Al Qaeda. Emerging Al Qaeda Presence in Africa and Europe
Depending on the outcome of investigations, some of the bombings and attempted bombings of the London transportation system in July 2005 might support the belief in the Administration and among some outside experts that there is a growing Al Qaeda presence in East Africa. A claim of responsibility for the July 7 attacks came from a previously little known group called "The Secret Organization of Al Qaeda in Europe," a name that suggest some linkage to or affinity with Al Qaeda. Conclusion
The assessment of the degree and character of the threat posed by the Al Qaeda organization might suggest strategies for combating it. On the other hand, some who believe that Al Qaeda remains central to the Islamist terrorism threat might tend to recommend policies that focus on finding, combating, and arresting Al Qaeda leaders and operatives that are still at large. Many believe that, no matter the structure and capabilities of Al Qaeda, stabilizing Iraq will likely be crucial to reducing the recruitment of militants willing to conduct acts of terrorism against the United States and its allies. Others believe that the Al Qaeda and global Islamic terrorist threat is difficult to assess, no matter how much intelligence is shared and gathered, and that combating Al Qaeda and its affiliates abroad could have only partial success. | There is no consensus among experts in and outside the U.S. government about the magnitude of the threat to U.S. national interests posed by the Al Qaeda organization. Virtually all experts agree that Al Qaeda and its sympathizers retain the intention to conduct major attacks in the United States, against U.S. interests abroad, and against Western countries.
In assessing capabilities, many believe that the Al Qaeda organization and its leadership are no longer as relevant to assessing the global Islamic terrorist threat as they were on September 11, 2001. Some believe U.S. and allied counter efforts have weakened Al Qaeda's central leadership structure and capabilities to the point where Al Qaeda serves more as inspiration than as an actual terrorism planning and execution hub. According to this view, the threat from Al Qaeda has been replaced by a threat from a number of loosely affiliated cells and groups that subscribe to Al Qaeda's ideology but have little, if any, contact with remaining Al Qaeda leaders. Those who take this view believe that catastrophic attacks similar to those on September 11, 2001 are unlikely because terrorist operations on that scale require a high degree of coordination.
An alternate view is that the remaining Al Qaeda leadership remains in contact with, and possibly even in control of numerous Islamic militant cells and groups that continue to commit acts of terrorism, such as the July 7, 2005 bombings of the London underground transportation system. According to those who subscribe to this view, Al Qaeda as an organization has not been weakened to the degree that some Administration officials assert, and the global effort against Islamic terrorism would benefit significantly from finding and capturing Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden and his top associate, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Subscribers to this view believe that a coordinated attack on the scale of September 11 should not be ruled out because the remaining Al Qaeda structure is sufficiently well-organized to conduct an effort of that magnitude.
This paper will focus on the Al Qaeda organization and its major affiliates, but not the full spectrum of like-minded Islamist cells or groups that might exist. This report will be updated as warranted by developments. See also CRS Report RL32759, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41144 | crs_R41144_0 | This contribution to GHG emissions makes efforts to reduce deforestation significant in international strategies to mitigate climate change. The existing data show little, if any, net deforestation in boreal and temperate forests, and thus the carbon consequences of deforestation in these ecosystems might not be significant. Under pending climate change legislation (e.g., H.R. 2454 , the American Clean Energy Act of 2009, and S. 1733 , the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act), Congress is considering providing resources for developing countries to establish programs and implement projects to reduce deforestation and forest degradation, and creating policy mechanisms to establish standards and markets for international offsets to reduce GHGs. International proposals focus on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) in developing countries. Biomass not removed for products remains on the site and decomposes. There are direct anthropogenic drivers of tropical deforestation, such as clearing for agriculture, as well as underlying causes, such as road construction, market forces, and government policies. Permanent small-scale agriculture is associated with about another third of agriculture-related tropical deforestation. The annual clearing of dense forest is related to the rural population density near the forest, suggesting that proximity of the populations and their access to forests is a major cause of deforestation in the region. This releases the carbon from the vegetation that is cut down. Forest and Deforestation Data Issues
Various sources report data on forest area and deforestation. Forests occur around the globe, at many latitudes. Many are concerned with the possible impacts of losing boreal and temperate forests. In contrast, the loss of tropical rainforests is substantial and ongoing, with significant climate impacts because of the large amount of CO 2 currently stored in vegetation in the tropics—40%-50% of the carbon in all terrestrial vegetation. Measuring forests is complicated. Forests are extensive and often inaccessible. In some places, the drivers are commercial logging, followed by slash-and-burn agriculture that may prevent regrowth of tropical forests. Elsewhere, the major cause of deforestation is large-scale commercial agriculture, especially for cattle ranching, soybeans, and oil palm. Deforestation may also result from weak land tenure and/or weak or corrupt governance to protect the forests. Further, reducing deforestation in the tropics would likely have ancillary benefits, including preserving biodiversity, providing livelihoods for rural poor, and sustaining indigenous communities and their cultures, among other things. Some forestry practices can reduce the impacts of net deforestation, and several market approaches are evolving that could compensate landowners for not deforesting their lands. Some of the challenges for implementing REDD programs include accurately and effectively monitoring REDD activities and projects and improving the capacity of developing countries to implement REDD programs and to ensure compliance. Evidence from past efforts to reduce deforestation as well as from existing data on forests and deforestation suggest this might be a significant challenge. | Efforts to mitigate climate change have focused on reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions into the atmosphere. Some of these efforts center on reducing CO2 emissions from deforestation, since deforestation releases about 17% of all annual anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and is seen as a relatively low-cost target for emissions reduction. Policies aimed at reducing deforestation are central points of a strategy to decrease carbon emissions, reflected in pending legislation in Congress (e.g., H.R. 2454 and S. 1733) as well as in international discussions, such as the December 2009 negotiations in Copenhagen.
Forests exist at many latitudes. Many are concerned about the possible impacts of losing boreal and temperate forests, but existing data show little, if any, net deforestation, and their loss has relatively modest carbon consequences. In contrast, tropical deforestation is substantial and continuing, and releases large amounts of CO2, because of the carbon stored in the vegetation and released when tropical forests are cut down.
There are many causes of tropical deforestation—commercial logging, large-scale agriculture (e.g., cattle ranching, soybean production, oil palm plantations), small-scale permanent or shifting (slash-and-burn) agriculture, fuelwood removal, and more. Often, these causes combine to exacerbate deforestation; for example, commercial logging often includes road construction, which in turn opens the forest for subsistence farmers. At times, tropical deforestation results from weak land tenure and/or weak or corrupt governance to protect the forests.
Congress and international bodies are discussing various policies to reduce carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD). Reducing deforestation in the tropics is likely to have additional benefits as well, such as preserving biological diversity and sustaining livelihoods for the rural poor and for indigenous communities and cultures. Proposals may be adapted to address local and regional causes of deforestation. Various forestry practices can reduce the impacts of deforestation, and several market approaches are evolving to compensate landowners for preserving their forests.
Many challenges remain for implementing REDD programs, particularly internationally, including monitoring REDD projects and improving developing-country capacity to ensure compliance. Existing evidence on forests and deforestation suggest the difficulties might be significant. Measuring forests is complicated, with multiple definitions, inaccessible sites, and expensive, complicated, and imperfect measurement technologies.
This report provides basic information on forests and climate change. The first section discusses the linkages between forests and climate. The next three describe the characteristics of the three major forest biomes, with an overview of deforestation causes and impacts. This is followed by an overview of approaches to reducing deforestation. The final section examines issues related to forest and deforestation data. |
crs_R43141 | crs_R43141_0 | P ortions of all 50 states and the District of Columbia are vulnerable to earthquake hazards, although risks vary greatly across the country and within individual states. Alaska is the most earthquake-prone state, experiencing a magnitude 7 earthquake almost every year and a magnitude 8 earthquake every 13 years, on average, since 1900. However, on November 30, 2018, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck just north of Anchorage, AK, causing extensive damage. Four federal agencies responsible for long-term earthquake risk reduction coordinate their activities under NEHRP
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS); National Science Foundation (NSF); Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). On November 27, 2018, Congress passed the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program Reauthorization Act of 2018, and President Trump signed the bill into law on December 11 as P.L. 115-307 , Congress last made changes to NEHRP under the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program Reauthorization Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-360 ; 42 U.S.C. 7704). 108-360 expired in 2009; however, Congress continued to appropriate funds for NEHRP activities during the intervening nine years until enactment of P.L. A Shift in Program Emphasis to Hazard Reduction
Congress changed NEHRP's original focus on research to predict earthquakes in the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program Reauthorization Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-614 ). Table 1 shows the enacted budgets for NEHRP agencies from FY2005 through FY2018 (and the budget request for FY2019). The new NEHRP reauthorization act authorizes a total of $760.3 million for NEHRP activities summed over the five-year span FY2019-FY2023, approximately $142 million less than total amount authorized by P.L. 115-307)
The 2018 NEHRP reauthorization act largely leaves the current four-agency NEHRP program intact, while providing some new areas of emphasis and specific authorization of appropriations levels for the member agencies. An earthquake early warning system would automatically send an alert to areas in danger of potential shaking after the earthquake is initially triggered. The alert would potentially allow components of the lifeline infrastructure, such as electric utilities, railway systems, and even hospital operating rooms, to cease activities that could be impaired by violent shaking before the first earthquake-triggered surface waves reach them. The review requires discussion of the following elements:
the extent to which the USGS has identified the risks and hazards to the United States posed by earthquakes, including risks and hazards resulting from tsunamis and landslides that are generated by earthquakes; the efforts of FEMA and NIST to improve the resilience of the United States to earthquakes and to identify important gaps in the resilience of the United States to earthquakes; progress made by NIST and the Interagency Coordinating Committee in advancing the plans and goals of NEHRP and how coordination among the NEHRP agencies may be improved; the extent to which the results of research in earthquake risk and hazards reduction supported by NSF during the 40 years of NEHRP have been effectively disseminated to federal, state, local, and private-sector stakeholders; and the extent to which the research done under NEHRP has been applied to both public and private earthquake risk and hazards reduction. That value is about twice the average annual amount authorized for appropriations in P.L. 115-307 ) leaves the program largely intact, while emphasizing activities to promote greater resilience to earthquakes and activities that would enhance the effectiveness of an earthquake early warning system, among other changes. The new act authorizes annual appropriations levels for NEHRP at slightly higher levels than the amount of enacted appropriations for the program in FY2017, but slightly lower than the amount enacted in FY2018. 115-307 also removes statutory language regarding earthquake prediction. Since NEHRP shifted its emphasis toward reducing losses during an earthquake, one persistent question has been how to establish a more precise relationship between NEHRP activities and reduced earthquake risk and actual losses from earthquakes. 115-307 appears to address that question by requiring the Comptroller General of the United States to review the activities of the program and produce a report for Congress that addresses the earthquake risks and hazards in the nation. The review and report are to examine how federal activities are addressing those risks and hazards, including how states, tribes, and local governments are using NEHRP-generated information and implementing measures to reduce their earthquake risk. | Portions of all 50 states and the District of Columbia are vulnerable to earthquake hazards, although risks vary greatly across the country and within individual states. Alaska is the most earthquake-prone state, experiencing a magnitude 7 earthquake almost every year and a magnitude 8 earthquake every 13 years, on average, since 1900. On November 30, 2018, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck north of Anchorage at 8:29 AM local time, causing extensive damage.
Under the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), four federal agencies have responsibility for long-term earthquake risk reduction: the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). These agencies assess U.S. earthquake hazards, deliver notifications of seismic events, develop measures to reduce earthquake hazards, and conduct research to help reduce overall U.S. vulnerability to earthquakes. Congressional oversight of the NEHRP program encompasses how well the four agencies coordinate their activities to address the earthquake hazard. Better coordination was a concern that led to changes to the program in legislation enacted in 2004 (the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program Reauthorization Act of 2004; P.L. 108-360; 42 U.S.C. 7704).
P.L. 108-360 authorized appropriations for NEHRP through FY2009. Although authorization for appropriations expired in 2009, Congress continued to appropriate funds for NEHRP activities during the nine intervening years. In FY2018, Congress appropriated $169.5 million for program activities, $30.6 million more than FY2017 spending of $138.9 million. The budget request for FY2019 would reduce total funding for NEHRP activities, primarily at the USGS and NSF, by $35.1 million and $13.7 million, respectively, compared to their FY2018 enacted amounts.
On November 27, 2018, Congress passed the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program Reauthorization Act of 2018, and President Trump signed the bill into law on December 11 (P.L. 115-307). The new act largely leaves the current four-agency NEHRP program intact, while providing some new areas of emphasis. For example, the act emphasizes activities to promote greater resilience to earthquakes. Resilience would include, for example, designing and building structures that not only protect human lives during an earthquake but also continue to be functional structures after an earthquake. Those structures then could be reoccupied instead of being total losses.
The 2018 NEHRP reauthorization act removes statutory language referring to seeking a capability to predict earthquakes. Earthquake prediction thus far has proven to be virtually impossible, and in its 1990 reauthorization (P.L. 101-614), Congress shifted the NEHRP program emphasis from prediction to hazard reduction. P.L. 115-307 continues that emphasis, along with a new focus on activities that would enhance the effectiveness of an earthquake early warning system, among other changes to the program. An earthquake early warning system would automatically send an alert to areas in danger of potential shaking after the earthquake is initially triggered. The alert would notify electric utilities, railway systems, and even hospital operating rooms to cease activities before the earthquake-triggered shaking begins.
The 2018 NEHRP reauthorization act authorizes appropriations for NEHRP activities from FY2019 to FY2023, for a total amount of about $760 million over the five-year span, or approximately $152 million annually. That annual amount is slightly higher than enacted appropriations for the program in FY2017, but slightly lower than the amount enacted in FY2018.
One persistent question has been how to assess more precisely the relationship between NEHRP activities and reduced earthquake risk and actual losses from earthquakes. P.L. 115-307 appears to address that question by requiring the Comptroller General of the United States to review the program's activities and produce a report for Congress that addresses earthquake risks and hazards. The review and report would look at how states, tribes, and local governments are using NEHRP-generated information and implementing measures to reduce their earthquake risk. |
crs_RL34240 | crs_RL34240_0 | Overview
The year 2007 has seen Pakistan buffeted by numerous and serious political crises culminating in the December 27 assassination of former Prime Minster and leading opposition figure Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan from self-imposed exile in October. Bhutto's killing in an apparent gun and bomb attack (the circumstances remain controversial) has been called a national tragedy for Pakistan and does immense damage to already troubled efforts to democratize the country. The assassination came just 12 days after Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had lifted a 6-week-old emergency order. A Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) was issued by Musharraf (in his role as army chief) on the same day pursuant to the emergency proclamation. Top U.S. officials repeatedly have urged President Musharraf to make more energetic efforts to restore civilian government and rule of law in Islamabad by respecting the independence of the country's judiciary and by holding free and fair parliamentary elections in early 2008. Despite seemingly undemocratic developments in Islamabad, the United States has since 2001 provided billions of dollars in foreign assistance to Pakistan. Several bills condemning the emergency declaration were introduced in Congress ( S.Res. 372 , H.Res. 810 , and H.Res. 823 ), but none has moved out of committee to date. The U.S. government had supported a Musharraf-Bhutto accommodation as being in the best interests of both Pakistan and the United States. Bhutto's catastrophic removal from Pakistan's political equation thus dealt a serious blow to U.S. policies aimed at bringing greater stability to that country. U.S. and other Western officials, including Secretary Rice, urged Musharraf to refrain from any such move. President Musharraf announced his decision to declare a state of emergency in a late-night televised address to the Pakistani people on November 3. Moreover, several thousand opposition figures, human rights activists, and lawyers were rounded up and detained in the days following the emergency proclamation. The Pakistani media were largely unanimous in their criticism of what was widely seen to be a bald-faced attempt by Musharraf to maintain his own power in the face of increasing pressures. In late November, the newly reconstituted Supreme Court struck down challenges to the validity of Musharraf's October 2007 reelection, clearing the way for Musharraf to resign his military commission, which he did on November 28. Musharraf, for his part, called Bhutto "too confrontational" and ruled out further power-sharing negotiations with her. Especially worrisome for skeptics is Musharraf's demolition of the country's judiciary: deposed Chief Justice Chaudhry remains under house arrest, as does many of the approximately 100 high court judges who refused to take a new oath of office under the PCO. There have been numerous reports of government efforts to "pre-rig" the polls. Implications for Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Policy Discussion
The ability of the United States to effectively exert diplomatic pressure on Pakistan is demonstrably low at present. Congress already has placed legal conditions on future U.S. military aid to Pakistan. | The year 2007 has seen Pakistan buffeted by numerous and serious political crises culminating in the December 27 assassination of former Prime Minster and leading opposition figure Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan from self-imposed exile in October. Bhutto's killing in an apparent gun and bomb attack (the circumstances remain controversial) has been called a national tragedy for Pakistan and does immense damage to already troubled efforts to democratize the country. The assassination came just 12 days after Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had lifted a 6-week-old emergency order. On November 3, some eight years after he overthrew the elected government in a bloodless 1999 military coup, Musharraf had suspended the country's constitution and assumed emergency powers in his role as both president and army chief. The move came as security circumstances deteriorated sharply across the country, but was widely viewed as being an effort by Musharraf to maintain his own power. His government placed numerous Supreme Court justices under house arrest, and jailed thousands of opposition figures and lawyers who opposed the abrogation of rule of law. It also cracked down on independent media outlets, many of which temporarily were shut down completely.
President Musharraf sought to justify his "second coup" as being necessary to save Pakistan from Islamist extremism and from a political paralysis he blamed largely on the country's Supreme Court. The United States, which had exerted diplomatic pressure on Musharraf to refrain from imposing a state of emergency, views Pakistan as a vital ally in global and regional counterterrorism efforts, and it has provided considerable foreign assistance to Pakistan since 2001, in part with the goal of facilitating a transition to democracy in Islamabad. Washington and other world capitals pressured Musharraf to return Pakistan to its pre-November 3 political circumstances, relinquish his status as army chief, and hold free and fair elections in January 2008. Musharraf vowed to hold such elections (which, following the Bhutto assassination, were rescheduled for February 18) and he finally resigned his military commission in late November. While thousands of previously detained political activists have been released, most of the approximately 100 high court judges who refused to take a new oath of office remain under house arrest.
In the months preceding the emergency declaration, Bhutto had engaged negotiations toward a power-sharing arrangement with Musharraf. The U.S. government supported such accommodation as being in the best interests of both Pakistan and the United States. Bhutto's catastrophic removal from Pakistan's political equation thus dealt a serious blow to U.S. interests. In light of this and other developments that constitute major setbacks for U.S. policy toward Pakistan, U.S. officials are reevaluating their approach, and many in Congress have called for cutting or halting certain types of U.S. assistance to Pakistan. Several bills condemning the emergency declaration were introduced in Congress (S.Res. 372, H.Res. 810, and H.Res. 823), but none has moved out of committee to date. Division J of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (H.R. 2764) places conditions on a portion of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and includes a call for "implementing democratic reforms" there. See also CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations. This report will be updated. |
crs_R41656 | crs_R41656_0 | Some economists have argued that Congress should strike the goals of maximum employment and moderate long-term interest rates from the current mandate, leaving price stability as the only mandated goal. Often the proposal for a single mandate is paired with a more specific proposal that the Fed should adopt an inflation target. Under an inflation target, monetary policy would aim to achieve a predefined numerical target or range for some measure of inflation (the change in the general price level). The bill would also replace current semi-annual "Humphrey-Hawkins" reporting requirements to Congress, which call for "a discussion of the conduct of monetary policy and economic developments and prospects for the future, taking into account past and prospective developments in employment, unemployment, production, investment, real income, productivity, exchange rates, international trade and payments, and prices," with reporting requirements on "whether the goal of long-term price stability is being met and, if such goal is not being met, an explanation of why the goal is not being met and the steps that the Board and the Federal Open Market Committee will take to ensure that the goal will be met in the future…," as well as a description of the instruments used and strategy employed to achieve price stability, and the effect of monetary policy on the exchange rate value of the dollar. Were a single mandate to be adopted in the United States, it would follow an international trend that has seen many foreign central banks, including those of New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, adopt price stability mandates, inflation targets, or both in recent decades. In January 2012, the Fed voluntarily announced a "longer-run goal for inflation" of 2%, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures. Because it is a part of a strategy for achieving statutory goals, it could be codified through legislation or voluntarily adopted internally by the Fed. Although many proponents of inflation targeting also favor a single mandate, an inflation target could also be adopted without changing the current mandate. Has the Fed Already Adopted An Inflation Target? In this case, inflation was lower than desired. Oversight and accountability would improve under a single mandate, according to proponents, because it would make it easier to evaluate the Fed's performance, particularly if the single mandate included an inflation target. H.R. 1174 / S. 238 requires the Fed to consider asset prices in its inflation target. Nevertheless, as long as the Fed is given discretion to pursue policies that it believes are consistent with price stability, it seems doubtful that a single mandate would have prevented the Fed from pursuing price stability. It is not clear that the short-term cost of creating higher inflation or deflation to return to the planned price level path is worth the benefits. A Point Estimate or a Range? Conclusion
A single mandate or inflation target may constrain the Fed's ability to pursue policies that result in high inflation, but in practice Fed policies over the past two decades have not resulted in high inflation. Since the recent financial crisis, however, the problem has generally been modestly lower-than-desired inflation. An inflation target could potentially have more of an impact on the Fed's discretion, but the extent that its discretion would be constrained would depend on the characteristics of the inflation targeting regime, such as what consequences there would be if the target were missed, and whether the inflation target was selected and designed by the Fed or by Congress. Arguments in favor of an inflation target and single mandate include improved accountability of monetary policymakers and increased transparency of monetary policy to financial markets. Some of the desire for legislative change comes from discontent with the Fed's recent performance. Criticism that the Fed should have done more to prevent the depth and length of the recession implicitly speaks to the "maximum employment" part of the dual mandate, and so it does not follow that a single mandate of price stability would result in more aggressive countercyclical policy. A similar argument applies to criticisms that the Fed's program of quantitative easing is inconsistent with a price stability mandate—the Fed believes that quantitative easing is necessary to maintain price stability (to avoid deflation), and as long as the Fed has discretion to set its policies, a single mandate would not prevent quantitative easing. | The Federal Reserve's (Fed's) current statutory mandate calls for it to "promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates." Some economists have argued that this mandate should be replaced with a single mandate of price stability. Often the proposal for a single mandate is paired with a more specific proposal that the Fed should adopt an inflation target. Under an inflation target, the goal of monetary policy would be to achieve an explicit, numerical target or range for some measure of price inflation. Inflation targets could be required by Congress or voluntarily adopted by the Fed as a way to pursue price stability, or a single mandate could be adopted without an inflation target. Alternatively, an inflation target could be adopted under the current mandate. In January 2012, the Fed voluntarily introduced a "longer-run goal for inflation" of 2%, which some might consider an inflation target.
In the 113th Congress, H.R. 1174/S. 238 and S. 215 would strike the goal of maximum employment from the mandate, leaving a single goal of price stability, and require the Fed to adopt an inflation target. Were a single mandate to be adopted in the United States, it would follow an international trend that has seen many foreign central banks adopt single mandates or inflation targets in recent decades.
Arguments made in favor of a price stability mandate are that it would better ensure that inflation was low and stable; increase the predictability of monetary policy for financial markets; narrow the potential to pursue monetary policies with short-term political benefits but long-term costs; remove statutory goals that the Fed has no control over in the long run; limit policy discretion; and increase transparency, oversight, accountability, and credibility. Defenders of the current mandate argue that the Fed has already delivered low and stable inflation for the past two decades, unemployment is a valid statutory goal since it is influenced by monetary policy in the short run, and discretion is desirable to respond to unforeseen economic shocks. A case could also be made that changing the mandate alone would not significantly alter policymaking, because Fed discretion, transparency, oversight, and credibility are mostly influenced by other factors, such as the Fed's political independence.
Discontent with the Fed's performance in recent years has led to calls for legislative change. It is not clear that a single mandate would have altered its decision making, however. Criticizing the Fed for the depth and length of the recession arguably leads to the prescription that monetary policy should have been more stimulative, which points to greater weight on the employment part of the dual mandate. Whether or not the Fed allowed the housing bubble to inflate, it is not clear that a single mandate would have changed matters because the housing bubble did not result in indisputably higher inflation. Some economists believe that the Fed's recent policy of "quantitative easing" (large-scale asset purchases) will result in high inflation. Inflation has not increased to date, but even if these economists are correct, the Fed has discretion to pursue policies it believes are consistent with its mandate. It has argued that quantitative easing was necessary to maintain price stability by avoiding price deflation, and it could still make this argument under a single mandate. Since the recent financial crisis, the problem has generally been modestly lower-than-desired inflation.
This report discusses a number of implementation issues surrounding an inflation target. These include what rate of inflation to target, what inflation measure to use, whether to set a point target or range, and what penalties to impose if a target is missed. |
crs_R44747 | crs_R44747_0 | Introduction
The United States, Canada, and Mexico in many ways comprise one large, integrated market for energy commodities. Canada, for example, is the single largest foreign supplier of crude oil to the United States, and the United States is Canada's sole crude oil customer. Both Mexico and Canada are major buyers of petroleum products refined in the United States. A growing trade in natural gas produced in the United States is also increasingly important to the energy relationship among the three countries. Trade in the other energy commodities—electricity, natural gas liquids (NGLs), and coal—is comparatively small, but regionally important. Altogether, the value of the energy trade between the United States and its North American neighbors exceeded $140 billion in 2015, with $100 billion in U.S. energy imports and over $40 billion in exports ( Figure 1 ). These energy trade relationships are increasingly complex, however, and have been undergoing fundamental change in recent years, largely due to technological advancements in the petroleum and natural gas sectors creating new competition for energy supplies and new market interconnections. Consequently, while energy policies in one country have inevitably affected the others, their cross-cutting effects in the future are difficult to predict. To date, the judgment of Congress has favored a growing North American energy partnership—but ensuring that this partnership continues to be as mutually beneficial as possible will likely remain a key oversight challenge for the next decades. Congress has been facing important policy questions in the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico energy contexts on several fronts, including the siting of major cross-border pipelines, increasing petroleum supplies from Canadian oil sands, exporting natural gas production from North American shales, and meeting commitments to increase renewable energy supplies and reduce atmospheric emissions of greenhouse gases. Legislative proposals in the 115 th Congress could directly influence these developments. This report provides an overview of the United States' energy trade with Canada and Mexico. Several new pipeline projects within the United States could increase U.S. Appalachian Basin natural gas supplies to markets in Ontario and Quebec, which could further supplant Canadian natural gas in favor of U.S. exports to Canada. U.S. Electric Power Import and Exports
Over the last decade, the United States has experienced a marked trend of growing net electricity imports from both Canada and Mexico, although Canada is, by far, the greater trade partner. U.S. exports to Mexico have been relatively low and flat. | The United States, Canada, and Mexico in many ways comprise one large, integrated market for energy commodities. Canada, for example, is the single largest foreign supplier of crude oil to the United States, and the United States is Canada's sole crude oil customer. Both Mexico and Canada are major buyers of petroleum products refined in the United States. A growing trade in natural gas produced in the United States is also increasingly important to the energy relationship among the three countries. Trade in the other energy commodities—electricity, natural gas liquids, and coal—is comparatively small, but regionally important. Altogether, the value of the energy trade between the United States and its North American neighbors exceeded $140 billion in 2015, with $100 billion in U.S. energy imports and over $40 billion in exports.
The United States' energy trade relationships with Canada and Mexico are increasingly complex. They have been undergoing fundamental change in recent years—largely due to technological advancements in the petroleum and natural gas sectors creating new competition for energy supplies and new market interconnections. Consequently, while energy policies in one country have inevitably affected the others, their cross-cutting effects in the future are difficult to predict. Nonetheless, a review of the recent trade data highlights several key market developments.
U.S. crude oil imports from both Canada and Mexico dominate the energy trade, but they support U.S. supplies of refined products to both those countries—by far the United States' largest energy export commodity to its two neighbors. U.S. development of shale gas resources has been substituting for Canadian natural gas imports and driving a rapid increase in natural gas exports to Mexico, where such supplies are in high demand to fuel that country's growing electric power sector. Canada and, to a lesser extent, Mexico have potential to provide significant future supplies of renewable electricity to U.S. markets, which could help the United States meet environmental policy objectives. The expansion of cross-border energy transportation infrastructure—pipelines for oil and natural gas, and transmission lines for electricity—has been an ongoing enabler of increased energy trade. A number of new projects are currently under construction or proposed to further expand cross-border capacity, but their completion is not assured.
To date, Congress has favored a growing North American energy partnership—but ensuring that this partnership continues to be as mutually beneficial as possible will likely remain a key oversight challenge for the next decades. Congress has been facing important policy questions in the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico energy contexts on several fronts, including the siting of major cross-border pipelines, increasing petroleum supplies from Canadian oil sands, exporting natural gas production from United States' shales, and meeting commitments to increase renewable energy supplies and reduce atmospheric emissions of greenhouse gases. Legislative proposals in the 115th Congress could directly influence these developments. |
crs_R44701 | crs_R44701_0 | The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate. Although financial services are a major focus of the bills, FSGG appropriations bills do not include many financial regulatory agencies, which are instead funded outside of the appropriations process. Administration and Congressional Action
On February 9, 2016, President Obama submitted his FY2017 budget request. The request included a total of approximately $3.19 billion for the independent agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $330 million for the CFTC. On June 15, 2016, the House Committee on Appropriations reported the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2017 ( H.R. 5485 , H.Rept. The bill was amended on the House floor and passed on July 7, 2016. Total FY2017 funding for the FSGG independent agencies in the House-passed bill would have been approximately $1.65 billion, with another $250 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 5054 , H.Rept. 114-531 ). The combined total of approximately $1.9 billion would have been about $1.3 billion below President Obama's FY2017 request for the FSGG independent agencies. On June 16, 2016, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2017 ( S. 3067 , S.Rept. 114-280 ). S. 3067 would have appropriated approximately $2.08 billion for the FSGG independent agencies, about $1.11 billion below President Obama's request. 114-223 . Division C of this act provided for continuing appropriations through December 9, 2016, generally termed a continuing resolution (CR). The CR provides funding for most FSGG agencies at the FY2016 funding rate subject to an across-the-board decrease of 0.496% (pursuant to Section 101(b) of Division C). 114-254 provided funding through April 28, 2017, and a third, P.L. 115-30 , provided funding through May 5, 2017. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 244 on May 3, 2017, followed by Senate passage on May 4 and enactment on May 5. FSGG appropriations, including the CFTC, were provided in Division E. FSGG appropriations for the independent agencies totaled $1.53 billion, approximately $1.66 billion below President Obama's request. 114-624 and H.Rept. Independent Agencies
The FSGG appropriations bill provides funding for more than two dozen independent agencies, performing a wide range of functions. P.L. According to CPSC's budget document, relative to the FY2016-enacted amount, the budget request included a decrease of $1 million for a project to lower the costs of third-party testing related to the certification of children's products under the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA); the request contained increases of $0.5 million to maintain the collection of data on product-related injuries treated in hospital emergency rooms through the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System, $3 million to expand the commission's involvement in the Import Surveillance pilot program, and $3 million to conduct research into the potential harm to people from long-term exposure to nanotechnology in consumer products and crumb rubber, a recycled granular rubber used in playgrounds and artificial turf on athletic fields, among other uses. United States Postal Service100
The U.S. P.L. H.R. 115-31 . | The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bills include funding for more than two dozen independent agencies in addition to the larger entities in the bill (Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President, the District of Columbia, and the judiciary). Among these are
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Election Assistance Commission (EAC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Election Commission (FEC), Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), General Services Administration (GSA), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Selective Service System, Small Business Administration (SBA), and United States Postal Service (USPS).
The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate.
On February 9, 2016, President Obama submitted his FY2017 budget request. The request included a total of approximately $3.19 billion for the independent agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $330 million for the CFTC.
On June 15, 2016, the House Committee on Appropriations reported the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 5485, H.Rept. 114-624). The bill was amended on the House floor and passed on July 7, 2016. Total FY2017 funding for the FSGG independent agencies in the passed bill would have been approximately $1.65 billion, with another $250 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 5054, H.Rept. 114-531). The combined total of approximately $1.9 billion would have been about $1.3 billion below President Obama's FY2017 request.
On June 16, 2016, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2017 (S. 3067, S.Rept. 114-280). S. 3067 would have appropriated approximately $2.08 billion for the FSGG independent agencies, about $1.11 billion below President Obama's request.
No full-year FY2017 FSGG appropriations were enacted prior to the end of FY2016. On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed P.L. 114-223. Division C of this act provided for continuing appropriations through December 9, 2016, generally termed a continuing resolution (CR). The CR provided funding for most FSGG agencies at the FY2016 funding rate subject to an across-the-board decrease of 0.496%. This was followed by a second CR, P.L. 114-254, which provided funding through April 28, 2017, and a third, P.L. 115-30, which provided funding through May 5, 2017.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31/H.R. 244) was enacted on May 5, 2017, following House passage on May 3 and Senate passage on May 4. FSGG appropriations, including the CFTC, were provided in Division E. FY2017 FSGG appropriations for the independent agencies totaled $1.53 billion, approximately $1.66 billion below President Obama's request.
Although financial services are a major focus of the FSGG appropriations bills, these bills do not include funding for many financial regulatory agencies, which are funded outside of the appropriations process. The FSGG bills do, however, often contain additional legislative provisions relating to such agencies. |
crs_R41336 | crs_R41336_0 | Overview of Sanctions
The United States imposes sanctions on Burma by a variety of means, including certain laws and presidential executive orders (E.O.s) specifically targeting Burma, as well as laws that impose sanctions on countries for unacceptable behavior related to functional issues of importance to the U.S. government, such as nuclear proliferation or human trafficking. The Burma-specific laws and E.O.s were issued between 1990 and 2012, often in response to actions on the part of Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), that were considered sufficiently egregious to warrant the imposition of sanctions. The result is a web of overlapping sanctions subject to differing restrictions, waiver provisions, expiration conditions, and reporting requirements. Since Burma's former ruling military junta formally transferred power to a quasi-civilian government in April 2011, Burma's Union Government and Union Parliament have implemented a number of political reforms that the Obama Administration sees as progress towards the fulfillment of U.S. objectives in Burma. Some of the announced steps—in particular, the establishment of a USAID mission in Burma, U.S. support for UNDP projects in Burma, the relaxation of restrictions on nonprofit activities in Burma by private entities, and the facilitation of travel by selected Burmese officials—may require the explicit invoking of presidential authority in existing sanction laws (possibly involving the issuance of a presidential executive order), as well as the delivery to Congress of a presidential determination and certification stipulating that the situation meets the waiver provisions in existing sanction laws. prohibits the issuance of a visa to, freezes the assets of, and bans the provision of financial services to any person who:
has engaged in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Burma; is responsible for or complicit in the commission of human rights abuses in Burma; directly or indirectly imported, exported, reexported, sold, or supplied arms or related materiel from North Korea to Burma; is a senior official of an entity that has engaged in any of the preceding activities; has materially assisted or supported persons engaged in the preceding activities; or is owned or controlled by a person subject to these sanctions. Brief History of U.S. Sanctions on Burma
U.S. sanctions on Burma are the end result of a general, but uneven decline in U.S. relations with Burma and its military, the Tatmadaw, since World War II. For the most part, the decline is due to what the U.S. government sees as a general disregard by the Burmese military for the human rights and civil liberties of the people of Burma. 13047 banning all new investments in Burma. Summary of Burma-Specific Sanctions
The existing U.S. sanctions specifically targeted at Burma can be generally divided into several broad categories. Additional Sanctions Based on Functional Issues56
In addition to the targeted sanctions, Burma is currently subject to certain sanctions specified in U.S. laws based on various functional issues. In many cases, the type of assistance or relations restricted or prohibited by these provisions is also addressed under Burma-specific sanction laws. Additional Sanctions Previously Proposed
Since 1989, some Members of Congress have proposed, and Congress has at times considered, additional sanctions on Burma. Options for Congress
Various recent developments in Burma sparked a general reexamination of U.S. policy towards Burma, and a discussion of whether U.S. sanctions continue to be an effective means of achieving policy goals or effecting change in Burma. After Senior General Than Shwe formally dissolved the SPDC on March 30, 2011, and officially transferred power to the new Union Government, an era of political reforms and improved communications with the United States has ensued. Since taking office, President Thein Sein has issued prisoner amnesties on six occasions, resulting in the release of 28,838 prisoners, including 745 political prisoners. The Union Parliament has enacted laws that allowed the NLD and other opposition parties to participate in parliamentary by-elections in April 2012, and permit the formation of labor unions. In addition, the Union Government has begun ceasefire talks with several of the nation's ethnic-based militias, concluding preliminary agreements in some cases. However, serious human rights violations continue to occur in Burma. | Existing U.S. sanctions on Burma are based on various U.S. laws and presidential executive orders. This report provides a brief history of U.S. policy towards Burma and the development of U.S. sanctions, a topical summary of those sanctions, and an examination of additional sanctions that have been considered, but not enacted, by Congress, or that could be imposed under existing law or executive orders. It also discusses recent easing of some of those sanctions and provisions under which additional sanctions could be waived or removed. The report concludes with a discussion of options for Congress.
The current U.S. sanctions on Burma were enacted, for the most part, due to what the U.S. government saw as a general disregard by Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), for the human rights and civil liberties of the people of Burma. The actions of the new quasi-civilian government in Burma have led the Obama Administration to waive some of the existing sanctions in an effort to promote further reforms and to support perceived pro-reform Burmese government officials. The easing of U.S. sanctions has been generally timed to correspond with a significant political development in Burma-U.S. relations.
Burma-specific sanctions began following the Burmese military's violent suppression of popular protests in 1988, and have continued through several subsequent periods in which Congress perceived major human rights violations in Burma. The result is a web of overlapping sanctions with differing restrictions, waiver provisions, expiration conditions, and reporting requirements.
The United States currently imposes sanctions specifically on Burma via six laws and five presidential documents. These sanctions can be generally divided into several broad categories, such as visa bans, restrictions on financial services, prohibitions of Burmese imported goods, a ban on new investments in Burma, and constraints on U.S. assistance to Burma. Past Congresses have considered a variety of additional, stricter sanctions on Burma.
In addition to the targeted sanctions, Burma is currently subject to certain sanctions specified in U.S. laws based on various functional issues. In many cases, the type of assistance or relations restricted or prohibited by these provisions is also addressed under Burma-specific sanction laws. The functional issues include the use of child soldiers, drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, failure to protect religious freedoms, violations of workers' rights, and threats to world peace and the security of the United States.
On March 30, 2011, SPDC formally dissolved itself and transferred power to the new Union Government, headed by President Thein Sein, ex-general and prime minister for the SPDC. On six separate occasions since his appointment, President Thein Sein has ordered the release of prisoners, including a number of political prisoners. The Union Government has also initiated ceasefire talks with various ethnic-based militias, and altered laws that allowed opposition parties to participate in parliamentary by-elections held on April 1, 2012. However, the continuation of serious human rights abuses has raised questions about the extent to which there has been significant political change in Burma.
The 112th Congress may consider either the imposition of additional sanctions or the removal of some of the existing sanctions, depending on the conduct of Burma's new Union Government and other developments in Burma. This report will be updated as conditions warrant. |
crs_R41430 | crs_R41430_0 | Introduction to U.S. Inland Waterways
Inland waterways are a significant component of the nation's marine transportation system. Costs for maintenance and construction on inland waterways are funded by the Corps (through appropriations) and the commercial user industry (through user fees paid to the federal government). §9506) and the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1986, as amended ( P.L. Together, the acts of 1978 and 1986 established a fuel tax on commercial barges, cost-share requirements for inland waterway projects, and a trust fund to hold these revenues and fund investments in construction. On multiple occasions, the executive branch (through the Clinton Administration in 1996 and the Bush Administration in 2004) proposed to further increase fees on the user industry and require the IWTF to also fund some portion of operations and maintenance expenditures (in addition to the construction and major rehabilitation requirements). Concerns with IWTF Planning and Oversight
In addition to problems with the IWTF financing system, other concerns have been raised in recent years. Inland Waterway Financing Proposals
Concerns related to the solvency of the IWTF and the equity of the financing system for fuel-taxed inland waterways have led to a number of recent proposals, first by the Bush Administration in 2008, then by the Obama Administration in 2009 and 2010. To date, none of these proposals have been enacted. Inland Waterways Users Board Proposal
In 2010, the Inland Waterways Users Board (IWUB) adopted and transmitted to Congress a proposal of its own. Increase Overall Spending on Inland Waterways . Increase User Fees
The most prominent component of the IWUB report is a proposed increase to the inland waterway fuel tax rate (currently $0.20 per gallon) of between $0.06-$0.09 per gallon. Increase the Federal Share of Inland Waterway Costs
The IWUB report also proposes to shift more of the cost for inland waterway projects toward the federal government by increasing the number of investments on inland waterways that are funded solely by the federal government and decreasing the projects that are subject to 50/50 cost-sharing. Changes to inland waterways financing have been enacted in the 113th Congress. Specifically, the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-121 ) made limited changes to inland waterways. It authorized the project delivery recommendations of the IWUB proposal, made the federal government responsible for paying all rehabilitation costs less than $20 million out of the General Revenue fund (previously the General Fund only covered costs less than $8 million), and reduced the cost-sharing requirement for the Olmsted Locks and Dam Project from 50% from the IWTF to 15% from the IWTF (thereby increasing the proportion of project funding from the General Fund, and theoretically freeing up IWTF monies for other projects). It did not alter the inland waterways fuel tax. Most observers agree that the changes enacted in WRRDA will be insufficient to finance all of the needed waterway upgrades in the long-term. Other groups argue against significant new investments for inland waterway projects. The user industry has not indicated whether it would accept increases to the fuel tax without the proposed changes to cost-sharing arrangements. Additionally, the report proposes to make all cost overruns for IWTF construction projects a 100% federal responsibility. As noted above, the Obama Administration's proposals have all recommended alteration of the type and amount of user fees levied but not the overall cost-share between the federal and nonfederal expenditures. These groups, including some of the aforementioned environmental and taxpayer interest groups, have argued that waterway users should not only pay for 50% of construction and major rehabilitation costs, but also pay for some or all operations and maintenance costs, which are currently fully funded by the general treasury revenues. | Inland waterways are a significant part of the nation's transportation system. Because of the national economic benefits of maritime transport, the federal government has invested in navigation infrastructure for two centuries. Commercial barge shippers and other waterway users receive significant support through federal funding for operational costs, capital expenditures, and major rehabilitation on inland waterways. Since the Water Resources Development Act of 1986, expenditures for construction and major rehabilitation projects on inland waterways have been cost-shared on a 50/50 basis between the federal government and commercial users through the Inland Waterways Trust Fund (IWTF). Operations and maintenance costs for inland waterways (which typically exceed construction and major rehabilitation costs) are a 100% federal responsibility.
Future financing for the inland waterway system is uncertain. The IWTF is supported by a $0.20 per gallon tax on commercial barge fuel, but its balance has declined significantly since 2005 due to a combination of increased appropriations, cost overruns, and decreased revenues. Without changes to the current financing system, IWTF spending is likely to be limited.
The Obama Administration recommends replacing the fuel tax with user fees that would increase revenues and potentially allow for more spending on inland waterways projects. Similar to prior administrations, the Obama Administration has regularly submitted proposals to Congress to raise inland waterways user fees. Congress and industry interests have rejected these proposals. In 2010, the Inland Waterways Users Board (IWUB), a federal advisory committee advising the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on inland waterways, endorsed an alternative proposal that is supported by many barge industry interests. The proposal would increase the fuel tax by $0.06-$0.09 per gallon, but would require the federal government to cover all project costs for dams and rehabilitation that are currently shared with the IWTF. To date, no major changes to the inland waterway financing system have been enacted.
The user industry (including the barge industry and agricultural groups) argues that its recommended changes are necessary to shore up the trust fund, improve deteriorating infrastructure, and distribute costs equitably among beneficiaries (e.g., more funding for dams by federal taxpayer beneficiaries). The Obama Administration agrees that infrastructure upgrades are needed, but argues against shifting these costs to the federal government and instead proposes higher user fees. Some taxpayer and environmental groups favor increasing nonfederal costs not just for construction, but also for operation and maintenance expenses that are not cost-shared.
Changes to inland waterways financing have been enacted in the 113th Congress. The Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA, P.L. 113-121), enacted in June 2014, authorized changes to the project delivery process, altered cost-sharing requirements for some rehabilitation projects, and partially exempted from IWTF cost-sharing requirements a project (the Olmsted Locks and Dam) that has required the majority of IWTF appropriations in recent years. It did not alter the fuel tax or IWTF requirements for other projects. Two other bills in the 113th Congress, S. 407 and H.R. 1149, would attempt to address long-term issues with the IWTF by enacting much of the user proposal, including fuel tax increases of $0.09 and $0.06 per gallon, respectively. In considering legislation related to inland waterways, Congress may consider the appropriate cost share between the federal government and users, the appropriate type of user fee to fund the nonfederal share, preferred funding levels, and other related questions. |
crs_R41023 | crs_R41023_0 | Donors pledged over $5 billion for the first 18 months of Haiti's reconstruction. The United States pledged $1.2 billion. The Haitian government presented an action plan for reconstruction and development, and a Post Disaster Needs Assessment that estimated the total value of recovery and reconstruction needs to be $11.5 billion. Extra-constitutional rule will begin after May 10, when most parliamentarians' terms expire; President Préval will probably rule by decree after that. Humanitarian assistance is focused on providing waterproof emergency shelter, improving sanitation and meeting the basic needs of the displaced and other vulnerable Haitians. The relief effort is expected to last for many months. Current Conditions
The largest earthquake ever recorded in Haiti devastated parts of the country, including the capital, on January 12, 2010. The quake, centered about 15 miles southwest of Port-au-Prince, had a magnitude of 7.0. A series of strong aftershocks have followed. Prior to the earthquake, the international community was providing extensive development and humanitarian assistance to Haiti. With that assistance, the Haitian government had made significant progress in recent years in many areas of its development strategy, including security; judicial reform; macroeconomic management; procurement processes and fiscal transparency; increased voter registration; and jobs creation. The destruction of Haiti's nascent infrastructure and other extensive damage caused by January's earthquake will set back Haiti's development significantly. A major global donors' conference was held March 31, 2010, in New York at which 48 countries, multilateral institutions, and a coalition of non-governmental organizations pledged $5.3 billion for the first 18 months of Haiti's reconstruction, part of nearly $10 billion pledged toward long-term reconstruction efforts. Preliminary Numbers at a Glance
It is estimated that 3 million people, approximately one-third of the overall population, have been affected by the earthquake. The government of Haiti is reporting an estimated 230,000 deaths (2% of the population), 300,600 injured and 383 missing. Haitian Government Response
In the immediate wake of the earthquake, President Préval described conditions in his country as "unimaginable," and appealed for international assistance. As those immediate needs are met and the humanitarian relief operation continues, the government is struggling to restore the institutions needed for it to function and to address long-term reconstruction and development planning. The sheer scale of the relief effort in Haiti has brought together tremendous capacity and willingness to help, but an ongoing effort and strategic planning is required at each phase to work out coordination and logistics issues. On January 14, 2010, President Obama announced $100 million in humanitarian assistance (in addition to pre-existing funding appropriated for Haiti) to meet the immediate needs on the ground. As of April 30, 2010, USAID reported that the United States has provided more than $1 billion in humanitarian funding for Haiti as follows:
FY2010 Supplemental Humanitarian Relief Funding for Haiti
The Administration is requesting a total of $1.5 billion in relief and disaster assistance funding for Haiti, which would reimburse U.S. government agencies for services provided and for funds already obligated for ongoing relief activities. Recovery and Reconstruction Funding in the FY2010 Supplemental Request
Within the Haiti supplemental proposal, the request for Recovery and Reconstruction funding is $1.1 billion. This is primarily for new activities, in support of the Haitian government's Action Plan. U.S. programs to be funded through the supplemental request focus on urgent infrastructure repairs, especially in the energy and agricultural sectors; critical health care; governance; and security. Committees in the Senate and House have held hearings on Haiti. Immigration, Adoption85
The devastation caused by the January 12, 2010, earthquake in Haiti led Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano to grant Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Haitians in the United States at the time of the earthquake. On January 13, 2010, DHS had announced that it was temporarily halting the deportation of Haitians. 111-117 . P.L. 111-126 . P.L. P.L. 111-158 . H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. S. 2961 . S. 2978 . S. 2998 . S. 3202 . S. 3275 . S. 3317 . Links for Further Information
U.S. Government Agencies
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
http://www.usaid.gov/helphaiti/
USAID AIDMATRIX: In Kind Donations
http://www.aidmatrixnetwork.org/fema/PublicPortal/ListOfNeeds.aspx?PortalID=133
USAID Humanitarian Assistance to Haiti for the Earthquake and Earthquake Affected Areas Maps
http://www.usaid.gov/helphaiti/documents/02.15.10-USAID-DCHAHaitiEarthquakeMapbook34.pdf
U.S. Department of Defense
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0110_haiti/
Major Military Support for Haiti at a Glance
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0110_haiti/military-support.html
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
http://www.hhs.gov/haiti/
Centers for Disease Control Guidance for Relief Workers and Travelers to Haiti for Earthquake Response
http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/content/news-announcements/relief-workers-haiti.aspx
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
http://www.dhs.gov/journal/theblog/2010/02/guardians-report-in-from-haiti-video.html
U.S. Department of State
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/ci/ha/earthquake/index.htm
U.S. Department of State Embassy, Port-au-Prince
http://haiti.usembassy.gov/
U.S. Geological Survey
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010rja6/
White House: Help for Haiti
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/01/13/help-haiti
Information on the Haitian Earthquake
Haiti Earthquake Damage Map
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullmaps_am.nsf/eca57e2740e7a919412569cf003180fa/0573522688593a18c12576aa00483368/ $FILE/100112_07.45NYT_Haiti_Epicenter.pdf
Haiti Earthquake Intensity Map
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullmaps_am.nsf/luFullMap/A4228B2905DCFFE6C12576AB0028581B/$File/map.pdf?OpenElement
Haiti Earthquake 2010, Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake and Engineering Research (MCEER)
http://mceer.buffalo.edu/research/Reconnaissance/Haiti1-12-10/default.asp
Other Resources
Center for International Disaster Information (CIDI)
http://www.cidi.org/news/haiti-quake.htm
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI)
http://www.eqclearinghouse.org/20100112-haiti/
European Commission for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO)
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/caribbean_pacific/haiti_earthquake_en.htm
InterAction
http://www.interaction.org/crisis-list/earthquake-haiti
Inter American Development Bank
http://www.iadb.org/haiti/index.cfm?lang=en&id=6407
International Monetary Fund
http://www.imf.org/external/country/hti/index.htm
Organization of American States: Pan American Disaster Foundation
http://www.panamericanrelief.org/
Pan American Health Organization
http://new.paho.org/disasters/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1088&Itemid=1
Red Cross Movement
The American Red Cross
http://www.redcross.org
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
http://www.ifrc.org
The Haitian Red Cross
http://www.ifrc.org/address/ht.asp
The International Committee of the Red Cross
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/haiti
Relief Web
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc108?OpenForm&emid=EQ-2010-000009-HTI&rc=2
United Nations
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/haiti_newsline.html
United Nations Habitat(UN-Habitat)
http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=7780&catid=5&typeid=6&subMenuId=0
United Nations News Center
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=91&Body=Haiti&Body1=
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA)
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MUMA-84TW2F-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/
United Nations World Food Program (WFP)
http://www.wfp.org/stories/haiti-wfp-bring-food-devastating-quake
World Bank
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/HAITIEXTN/0,,menuPK:338184~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:338165,00.html | The largest earthquake ever recorded in Haiti devastated parts of the country, including the capital, on January 12, 2010. The quake, centered about 15 miles southwest of Port-au-Prince, had a magnitude of 7.0. A series of strong aftershocks have followed. Experts estimate the earthquake caused $8 to $14 billion in damage. Approximately 3 million people, roughly one-third of the overall population, have been affected by the earthquake with estimates ranging from 1.2 to 2 million people displaced. The government of Haiti is reporting an estimated 230,000 deaths and 300,600 injured. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, President Rene Préval described conditions in his country as "unimaginable," and appealed for international assistance. As the humanitarian relief operation continues, the government is struggling to restore the institutions needed for it to function, ensure political stability, and address long-term reconstruction and development planning. Prior to the earthquake, the international community was providing extensive development and humanitarian assistance to Haiti. With that assistance, the Haitian government had made significant progress in recent years in many areas of its development strategy. The destruction of Haiti's nascent infrastructure and other extensive damage caused by the earthquake will set back Haiti's development significantly. A post-disaster needs assessment estimated the total value of recovery and reconstruction needs to be $11.5 billion. The Haitian government presented an action plan for reconstruction and development at a global donors' conference held on March 31, 2010. Donors pledged over $5 billion for the first 18 months of Haiti's reconstruction. The United States pledged $1.2 billion. Extra-constitutional rule will begin after May 10, when most parliamentarians' terms expire; President Préval will probably rule by decree after that. There is no timetable for new parliamentary elections.
The sheer scale of the relief effort in Haiti has brought together tremendous capacity and willingness to help. As the rainy and hurricane seasons begin, the massive humanitarian relief operation underway in Haiti is focused on providing waterproof emergency shelter, improving sanitation and meeting the basic needs of the displaced and other vulnerable Haitians. The relief effort is expected to last for many months. On January 12, 2010, President Barack Obama assembled heads of U.S. agencies to begin working immediately on a coordinated response to the disaster, with the U.S. Agency for International Development through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance as the lead agency. On January 14, the Administration announced $100 million in humanitarian assistance to Haiti to meet the immediate needs on the ground. As of April 30, 2010, total humanitarian funding provided to Haiti for the earthquake had reached over $1 billion. In the FY2010 supplemental request, the Administration is seeking a total of $2.8 billion for Haiti. Of that, $1.5 billion is for relief and disaster assistance, which would reimburse U.S. government agencies for services provided and for funds already obligated for ongoing relief activities. The request for recovery and reconstruction is $1.1 billion. This is primarily for new activities, focused on urgent infrastructure repairs, especially in the energy and agricultural sectors; critical health care; governance; and security.
The Department of Homeland Security has temporarily halted the deportation of Haitians and granted Temporary Protected Status for 18 months to Haitian nationals in the United States as of January 12, 2010. Congressional concerns include budget priorities and oversight, burden-sharing, immigration, tax incentives for charitable donations, trade preferences for Haiti, and helping constituents with adoptions and other issues. Several congressional committees have held hearings on Haiti. The focus of this report is on the immediate crisis in Haiti as a result of the earthquake, the U.S. and international response to date, and long-term implications of the earthquake. Related legislation includes P.L. 111-117, P.L. 111-126, P.L. 111-158,H.R. 144, H.R. 264, H.R. 417. H.R. 1567, H.R. 3077, H.R. 4206, H.R. 4577, H.R. 4616, H.R. 4952, H.R. 4961, H.R. 5006, H.R. 5160, H.R. 5171, S. 2949, S. 2961, and S. 2978, S. 2998, S. 3202, S. 3275, and S. 3317. |
crs_RL32201 | crs_RL32201_0 | Introduction
Designating funds within appropriations legislation for specified projects or locations has been a way for Congress to provide funding for designated communities to build and upgrade water infrastructure systems. In the past, such legislative action has often been popularly referred to as earmarking. This report discusses appropriations for EPA water infrastructure programs, focusing on congressional special project designations in the account that funds these programs. Because some Members of Congress, interest groups, and Administration officials criticize these types of congressional actions, the practice of congressionally designated special project funds for EPA's water infrastructure and other programs was banned in FY2011, but some policy makers and constituents would like to see it restored. Information on the programmatic history of EPA involvement in assisting wastewater treatment and drinking water projects also is provided in two appendixes. After FY2000, the larger total number of projects resulted in more communities receiving such grants, but at the same time receiving smaller amounts of funds. Of the $67 billion appropriated to EPA for water infrastructure programs since 1989 (both for wastewater, under the Clean Water Act, and drinking water projects, under the Safe Drinking Water Act), $7.4 billion, or 11%, was directed to specified project grants. Policy Implications
Groups representing state water program managers and administrators of infrastructure financing programs have criticized the congressional practice of awarding grants to designated communities. The practice has been criticized because designated projects have received more favorable treatment than other communities' projects: they generally are eligible for 55% federal grants (and are not required to repay 100% of the funded project cost, which they must do in the case of a loan through an SRF), and the practice sidesteps the standard process of states' determining the priority by which projects will receive funding. It also means that the projects have generally not been reviewed by the congressional authorizing committees. Members of Congress may intervene to provide funding for a specific community for a number of reasons. In some cases, the community may have been unsuccessful in getting state approval to fund the project under an SRF loan or other program. For some, especially small and rural communities, the cost of a project financed through a state loan, which the community must repay in full, is deemed unacceptably high, because repaying the loan can result in increased user fees that ratepayers feel are unduly burdensome. Conclusion
Attention is often drawn to the relatively few projects that received large grant awards by Congress, especially over multiple years. Even with the large awards described here for some communities, more than 75% of the projects designated in the EPA appropriations legislation received total awards (either in a single year or over multiple years) of $2 million or less. | Designating funds within appropriations legislation for specified projects or locations has been a way for Congress to help communities meet needs to build and upgrade water infrastructure systems, whose estimated future funding needs exceed $630 billion. Such legislative action has often been popularly referred to as earmarking. This report discusses appropriations for water infrastructure programs of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), focusing on such designations in the account that funds these programs. Information on the programmatic history of EPA involvement in assisting wastewater treatment and drinking water projects is provided in two appendixes.
Congressional appropriators began the practice of supplementing appropriations for the primary Clean Water Act (CWA) and Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) assistance programs with grants for individually designated projects in FY1989. These designated project grants are often referred to as earmarks, or as STAG grants. Since 1989, of the $67 billion appropriated to EPA for water infrastructure assistance, $7.4 billion has gone to designated project grants. Beginning in FY2000, appropriators awarded such grants to a larger total number of projects, resulting in more communities receiving such assistance, but at the same time receiving smaller amounts of funds, on average.
Members of Congress may intervene to provide funding for a specific community for a number of reasons. In some cases the community may have been unsuccessful in getting state approval to fund the project under other programs. Some, especially small and rural communities, seek a grant because the cost of a project financed through a state loan which must be fully repaid is deemed unacceptably high (loans are the primary assistance under the CWA and SDWA). However, this congressional practice has been criticized by state water program managers and administrators of infrastructure financing programs because designated projects are receiving more favorable treatment (55% federal grants, rather than loans) and because the practice sidesteps the standard process of states' determining the priority by which projects will receive funding. Projects so funded through appropriations acts also have generally not been reviewed by congressional authorizing committees.
Attention is often drawn to the relatively few projects that have received large special project grants (more than $100 million), especially over multiple years. The majority of designated projects, however, have received comparatively small amounts. More than 75% of the projects designated in the EPA appropriations legislation received total awards (either in a single year or over multiple years) of $2 million or less. Growing criticism of congressional earmarks resulted in banning the practice since FY2011, but some policy makers and constituents would like to see a return of congressionally designated special project funds for EPA's water infrastructure and other programs. |
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