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crs_R41552 | crs_R41552_0 | Development of Relations Between the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament
In light of both the possible benefits of and challenges to greater U.S.-EU cooperation on a wide array of common political and economic issues, some Members of Congress and their counterparts in the European Parliament (EP) have long expressed interest in strengthening institutional ties and exploring greater cooperation in areas of mutual interest. Formal institutional cooperation was established in 1999 and currently exists through the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD). Four such milestones in the evolving relationship include the creation of the Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN) in 1992; the launch of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) in 1995; the establishment of the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) in 2007; and the opening of the European Parliament's Liaison Office (EPLO) in 2010. In announcing the TLD, the two delegations stated that it would "constitute the formal response of the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress to the commitment in the New Transatlantic Agenda to enhance parliamentary ties between the European Union and the United States." relations." The EPLO reports to the EP's Secretary-General. The Lisbon Treaty—the EU's latest effort at institutional reform—significantly increased the relative power of the Parliament within the EU. Analysts observe that the EP has not been shy about exerting its new powers, and in some cases, with implications for U.S. interests. Ambassador to the EU William Kennard asserted that there was an "urgent need to intensify and deepen" the U.S. relationship with the EP, and in particular, that between Congress and the EP. Many of this view recommend that the U.S. Congress and the EP should make a more concerted effort to share legislative information with each other in some policy areas. The potential Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership could be a good test of whether such a relationship between Congress and the Parliament can work. As more Members of Congress and Parliament as well as more outside observers begin to advocate for closer cooperation between Congress and Parliament, especially now that the United States and the EU have begun to discuss a potential transatlantic economic and trade agreement that both legislative bodies would be involved in, several ideas have been put forward to help strengthen the overall effectiveness of the Congress-Parliament partnership. While the European Parliament has been far out in front of Congress in the pursuit of a stronger relationship, as noted earlier, the U.S. Congress as a whole, while supporting dialogue, has not seemed to embrace the need for significantly closer ties. As a result, Evans suggested that Congress and the Parliament consider ways to improve direct committee-to-committee contact on specific issues and for the TLD to develop mechanisms whereby it could tap the expertise of the committees and their staffs when necessary for the TLD meetings or for the TLD response to the TEC. As noted previously, an EP delegation composed mostly of MEPs from the International Trade Committee, traveled to Washington in April 2013 and met with the House Ways and Means Committee to discuss the possible TTIP. Advocates of establishing a Congressional Commission on the EU argue that it would likely focus greater attention on the Congress-EP relationship and the U.S.-EU partnership more broadly, although some point out that it is unclear how a Commission could be any more effective than the Europe Subcommittees, the EU Caucus, or the TLD in raising awareness of the EU. Given the EP's growing power and influence within the EU as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, some U.S. officials and Members of Congress continue to assert that it may be in U.S. interests for Congress to develop closer ties with the Parliament. | The United States and the European Union (EU) share an extensive, dynamic, and mutually beneficial political and economic partnership. A growing element of that relationship is the role that the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament (EP)—a key EU institution—have begun to play, including in areas ranging from foreign and economic policy to regulatory reform. Proponents of establishing closer relations between the U.S. Congress and the EP point to the Parliament's growing influence as a result of the EU's 2009 Lisbon Treaty which increased the relative power of the EP within the EU, and in some cases, with significant implications for U.S. interests. Consequently, some officials and experts on both sides of the Atlantic have asked whether it would be beneficial for Congress and the EP to strengthen institutional ties further and to explore the possibility of coordinating efforts to develop more complementary approaches to policies in areas of mutual interest.
The Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD), the formal exchange between Congress (actually the House of Representatives) and the European Parliament, was launched in 1999, but semi-annual meetings between Congress and the EP date back to 1972. The TLD's visibility, although still relatively low, increased following the 2007 decision to name it as an advisor to the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), which seeks to "advance the work of reducing or eliminating non-tariff barriers to transatlantic commerce and trade."
In response to the TLD's new TEC-related responsibilities, some Members of Congress suggested that there was a need for more contact between and cooperation with the EP, and raised questions with respect to how this might best be accomplished. For those Members and outside advocates of closer relations, questions surfaced about whether the TLD itself was organized in a way that would facilitate such relations, how the standing committees in both institutions might interact, and the role, if any, of the U.S. Senate. Since 2007, regular contacts between Congress and the Parliament, including at the committee level, have fluctuated in frequency. However, many observers note that the EP has been far out in front of Congress in pursuit of a stronger relationship mostly through the many EP delegations traveling to Washington to meet their counterparts. In 2010, a key event in the evolution of Congress-Parliament relations took place when the Parliament opened a liaison office (EPLO) in Washington. The EPLO was charged with keeping the EP better informed of legislative activity in Congress and vice-versa.
With the emergence of several key issues such as the Eurozone crisis, Iran's nuclear progress, the civil war in Syria, and the potential for a new, comprehensive U.S.-EU trade and investment agreement (known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TTIP), there may be some movement within Congress to increase contacts with the European Parliament. However, some point out that with the exception of a few Members with previous experience in the TLD, Congress as a whole is still seen at best as ambivalent to such efforts and has not demonstrated as much enthusiasm as the EP about forging closer relations.
This report provides background on the Congress–EP relationship and the role of the TLD. It also explores potential future options that could be considered during the 113th Congress should an effort to strengthen ties between the two bodies gain more momentum. For additional information, see CRS Report RS21998, The European Parliament, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31841 | crs_RL31841_0 | Farm groups and agribusinesses are well aware that many world factors influence U.S. agricultural exports. In some cases, other countries are using tradenegotiations and, sometimes, dispute settlement procedures in the WTO, to enhance their access tothe U.S. market for agricultural products, or to reduce competition in third-country markets fromsubsidized U.S. production. It is within this context of competing U.S. agricultural interests and other countries' concerns, that agricultural trade issues are likely to be taken up in legislation, congressional-executive branchconsultations on trade negotiations, or in oversight hearings during the 108th Congress. The Free Trade Area of the Americas ( FTAA) isintended to go beyond NAFTA to encompass all trade and services among all of the region'scountries (except Cuba), and eventually supersede both NAFTA and regional trading agreements,including the free trade agreement the United States has just negotiated with Chile and the FTAbeing negotiated with Central America. Agricultural Negotiations in the World Trade Organization. Proponents maintain that the expected benefits to U.S.farmers, ranchers, and consumers will outweigh implementation and compliance costs. Debate continues,though, among policymakers on the scope of restrictions that should apply to agricultural sales toCuba. Bilateral Trade Disputes. USDA currently forecasts FY2003 export value at $57 billion. U.S. agricultural export and food aid programs, domestic farm policiesthat affect output and price, and trade agreements with others also influence the level of U.S.agricultural exports. Though a large share of agricultural imports-about 80% on average of total agriculturalimports-compete against U.S. products, they also generate economic activity in the U.S. economy. Chile views improved market access for its agricultural products to the large and growing U.S. market as important to its economic growth, because agricultural exports ($1.2 billion in 2002)represent about one-third of Chile's total exports to the United States. Singapore . The new regulations are expected to be in place by mid-2003. A number ofU.S. China and U.S. Agriculture (12)
Issue
There is mounting concern from U.S. producer groups, Administration officials, and other trading partners that China has been slow to implement, only partially implemented, orin some instances has failed to comply with agricultural trade commitments made underrecent international trade agreements. Tariffs. Biotechnology Regulations. 107-171 ) soon will require many food stores to provide country-of-origin labeling (COOL) on fresh fruits,vegetables, red meats, seafood, and peanuts. For More Information
WTO. Meat and poultry products are among the fastest growing components of U.S. agricultural exports. Under provisions established by the Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L.107-210 ), Congress and the Administration will be consulting on these negotiations and theirimplications for legislatively authorized programs. | Agricultural exports contribute to the prosperity of the U.S. agricultural economy. Their value is projected at $57 billion for FY2003, and they are expected to grow over the long term. Theseexports are the equivalent of about a quarter of the gross income of U.S. farmers and generate bothfarm and nonfarm employment. U.S. agricultural imports, expected to reach $43 billion in FY2003,are fostered by low average U.S. tariffs, the relative strength of the U.S. dollar, and consumer tastesand preferences for high value food products, the largest component of imports. A large share ofagricultural imports compete against U.S. products, but they also generate economic activity in theU.S. economy.
Although many world economic and other factors influence exports, many farm groups believe that U.S. agriculture's future prosperity also depends on such U.S. trade policies as 1) negotiatingimproved market access for U.S. products bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally; 2) assuringmarket access and consumer acceptance at home and abroad for products of agriculturalbiotechnology; 3) assuring that China adheres to its World Trade Organization (WTO) agriculturalmarket access commitments; and 4) resolving contentious commodity trade disputes. Some farmgroups, mainly producers of import-sensitive commodities, question opening U.S. markets to foreigncompetition. Agricultural trade issues that are being or could be considered during the 108th Congressinclude:
Free trade agreements (FTAs) with Chile and Singapore, which Congress will take up accordingto expedited or fast track procedures in the Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-210 ). The 2002 Trade Actalso requires congressional-executive branch consultation on trade negotiations, which currentlyinclude negotiation of FTAs with 12 other countries or regional groups, negotiations with 34western hemisphere countries for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and multilateraltrade negotiations in the WTO.
Biotechnology regulations in other countries, especially in the EU, which will affect U.S. commodity exports.
China's implementation of its WTO market opening commitments for agriculture , which has been slow and uncertain, and has failed to meet expectations of U.S. agricultural exporters.
Country-of-origin labeling for meats, fresh produce, seafood and peanuts, established by the 2002farm bill, but whose implementation has raised questions about benefits versus compliance costs.
Other trade issues of interest to the 108th Congress include commodity trade disputes overcotton, wheat, meat and poultry, and sweeteners; the scope of restrictions that should apply to agricultural sales to Cuba ; and funding for U.S. agricultural export and food aidprograms.
This report will be updated. |
crs_R44082 | crs_R44082_0 | The federal government is responsible for responding to wildfires that begin on federal lands. The Department of the Interior (DOI) manages the wildfire response for more than 400 million acres of national parks, wildlife refuges and preserves, Indian reservations, and other public lands. The federal government—primarily through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—may provide disaster relief to state and local governments. In general, when the balance of the DRF becomes low, Congress provides additional funding through both annual and supplemental appropriations to replenish the account. Wildfire Management Appropriations
As stated earlier, funding for federal wildfire management is provided to both FS and DOI. Each agency has two accounts for wildfire: a Wildland Fire Management (WFM) account and a Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement Act (FLAME) account. From FY1994 to FY2000, annual appropriations averaged $1.6 billion; since FY2001, annual appropriations have averaged $3.7 billion. Suppression Appropriations
Suppression appropriations are used to fund the control of wildland fires that originate on federal land, as well as wildland fires that originate on nonfederal lands and are under fire protection agreements. Within the overall appropriations for wildfire, suppression operations are appropriated through two accounts for both FS and DOI: the suppression activity within the respective WFM accounts, and the respective FLAME reserve accounts. If these suppression resources are exhausted during any given fiscal year, FS and DOI are authorized to transfer funds from their other accounts to pay for suppression activities. Thus, for any given year, appropriations to FS or DOI for suppression activities may be a combination of three sources: the WFM suppression account, the FLAME account, and supplemental appropriations (see Table 2 ); the agencies also have access to additional funds through the transfer authority. The funds may be provided in an emergency appropriations bill (such as P.L. Suppression costs are difficult to predict and can fluctuate widely. The agencies have borrowed funds from other accounts in 6 of those 10 years, and Congress has also appropriated supplemental suppression appropriations in 5 of those years (and in FY2016 to repay funds borrowed in FY2015). A significant portion of that increase is related to rising suppression costs, even during years of relatively mild wildfire activity. In FY2016, in addition to providing $700 million in supplemental appropriations to FS to repay funds borrowed in FY2015, Congress also appropriated significantly more to each agency's WFM suppression and FLAME accounts. Congress may consider whether or how to address the rising costs of wildfire management and suppression operations. Budgetary Constraints
Discretionary spending—including wildfire appropriations—currently is subject to certain procedural and budgetary controls. In the past, Congress has effectively waived some of these controls for certain wildfire spending, but it has not done so in more recent years. This has prompted some to explore ways to effectively provide certain wildfire spending outside of these constraints. Enacted discretionary spending may not exceed these limits. Emergency spending usually has been provided to supplement disaster-designated spending, as well as spending that is subject to the discretionary spending limits, in response to events that have already occurred, including wildfires. These proposals may be of interest to the 115 th Congress. 167 , and S. 508 —effectively would have allowed some funds provided for wildfire suppression activities that meet certain criteria to not be subject to the limits on discretionary spending. Under these proposals, varying levels of wildfire funding would not have needed to compete with other programs and activities that were subject to the limits. 2647 would have broadened the purposes for major disasters under the Stafford Act to include "wildfires on federal lands" (§901), and it would have created a related budgetary mechanism that potentially could have been used to fund the response to each wildfire on federal land that had been declared to be a major disaster (§902). | Congress has directed that the federal government is responsible for managing wildfires that begin on federal lands, such as national forests or national parks. The states are responsible for managing wildfires that originate on all other lands. Although a greater number of wildfires occur annually on nonfederal lands, wildfires on federal lands tend to be much larger, particularly in the western United States. The federal government's wildfire management responsibilities—fulfilled primarily by the Forest Service (FS) and the Department of the Interior (DOI)—include prevention, detection, response, and recovery. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) also may provide disaster relief for certain nonfederal wildfires.
Congress provides appropriations for wildfire management to both FS and DOI. Within these appropriations, suppression operations are largely funded through two accounts for each agency: Wildland Fire Management (WFM) accounts and Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement Act (FLAME) reserve accounts. If the suppression funding in both of these accounts is exhausted during any given fiscal year, FS and DOI are authorized to transfer funds from their other accounts to pay for suppression activities. Congress also may provide additional funds for suppression activities through emergency or supplemental appropriations. Thus, for any given year, total suppression appropriations to FS or DOI may be a combination of several sources: the WFM account, the FLAME account, additional funding as needed through transfers, and/or supplemental appropriations.
Overall appropriations to FS and DOI for wildland fire management have quadrupled since the 1990s, going from $1.2 billion in FY1994 to $4.9 billion in FY2016 in constant dollars. A significant portion of that increase is related to rising suppression costs, even during years of relatively mild wildfire activity, although the costs vary annually and are difficult to predict in advance. Since FY2001, FS and DOI have required more suppression funds than have been appropriated to them in all but three years. This discrepancy often leads the agencies to transfer funds from other accounts, prompting concerns that increasing suppression spending may be detrimental to other agency programs. In response, Congress has enacted supplemental appropriations to repay the transferred funds or to replenish the agency's wildfire accounts 12 times, including $700 million provided as emergency spending in FY2016 to repay suppression costs from FY2015. Furthermore, wildfire spending—like all discretionary spending—is currently subject to procedural and budgetary controls. In the past, Congress has effectively waived some of these controls for certain wildfire spending, but it has not done so in more recent years. This situation has prompted some to explore providing wildfire spending outside of those constraints.
The 115th Congress may consider legislation to address these issues. The 114th Congress considered—but did not enact—several wildfire spending bills that may be of interest. All of these bills, directly or indirectly, would have allowed for some wildfire suppression funds—subject to certain criteria—to be provided outside the statutory limits on discretionary spending, either through the annual appropriations process or through supplemental appropriations. Under those proposals, varying levels of wildfire funding would not have needed to compete with other programs and activities that are subject to the statutory limits. However, the amounts that could have been provided for wildfire suppression operations under these proposals—both within and outside of the spending limits—would have been subject to future appropriations decisions by Congress. These proposals also could have affected certain funding mechanisms that have been used to provide additional spending for major disaster recovery (e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes). |
crs_R40199 | crs_R40199_0 | Overview
In January 2009, the United States escalated a long-running dispute with the European Union (EU) over its refusal to accept imports of U.S. poultry treated with certain pathogen reduction treatments (PRTs). PRTs are antimicrobial rinses that have been approved for use by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) in poultry production to reduce the amount of microbes on meat. Meat and poultry products processed with PRTs are judged safe by the United States and also by European food safety authorities. Nevertheless, the EU prohibits the use of PRTs and the importation of poultry treated with these substances. This dispute dates to 1997, when the EU first banned the use of PRTs on poultry, effectively shutting out virtually all imports from the United States since then. EU interests believe that stronger sanitary practices during production and processing are more appropriate for pathogen control than what they view as U.S. overreliance on PRTs. The United States has requested World Trade Organization (WTO) consultations with the EU on the matter, a prerequisite first step toward the establishment of a formal WTO dispute settlement panel. Although the WTO case has not moved forward, the U.S. poultry industry and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) continue to actively pursue the case. The United States is the second largest exporter of poultry meat (broiler and turkey) in the world, trailing only Brazil. According to USDA, virtually no U.S. poultry meat is being purchased for consumption in the EU. Some estimate that the combined effects of the ban and the growth of the EU market may have led to $200 million to $300 million in lost U.S. sales annually. These included chlorine dioxide, acidified sodium chlorate, trisodium phosphate, and peroxyacids. USTR and the U.S. poultry industry remain actively engaged in this case. To date, the U.S. and EU have not been able to reach agreement on a number of issues related to veterinary equivalency, and the EU continues to maintain measures that prohibit the use of any substance other than water to remove contamination from animal products unless the substance has been approved by the European Commission, which has rejected USDA's applications to the EU's health agencies requesting approval to use certain poultry treatments. The U.S. is seeking approval of four PRTs: peroxyacetic acid, chlorine dioxide, acidified sodium chlorite, and trisodium. This issue also continues to be raised in trade negotiations between the United States and EU to establish a free trade area as part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). The U.S. poultry industry has indicated that it is unlikely to support a T-TIP agreement that does not provide for better access to the EU of U.S poultry products. | In January 2009, the United States escalated a long-running dispute with the European Union (EU) over its refusal to accept imports of U.S. poultry treated with certain pathogen reduction treatments (PRTs) by requesting World Trade Organization (WTO) consultations with the EU on the matter, a prerequisite first step toward the establishment of a formal WTO dispute settlement panel. This dispute dates back to 1997, when the EU first banned the use of PRTs on poultry, effectively shutting out virtually all imports from the United States since then. This WTO case has not moved forward.
PRTs are antimicrobial rinses—including chlorine dioxide, acidified sodium chlorite, trisodium phosphate, and peroxyacids, among others—that have been approved by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for use in poultry processing to reduce the amount of microbes on meat. Meat and poultry products processed with PRTs are judged safe by the United States and also by European food safety authorities. Nevertheless, the EU prohibits the use of PRTs and the importation of poultry treated with these substances. The EU generally opposes such chemical interventions and believes that stronger sanitary practices during production and processing are more appropriate for pathogen control than what it views as U.S. overreliance on PRTs.
As PRTs are widely used in U.S. poultry processing, the EU's ban on their use effectively prohibits U.S. poultry meat from entering EU countries. Although the United States is the second largest global exporter of poultry (broiler and turkey) meat, virtually no U.S. poultry meat is being purchased for consumption in the EU, according to USDA. As the EU is a major importer of poultry products, some estimate that the combined effects of the ban and the growth of the EU market may have led to $200 million to $300 million in lost U.S. sales annually.
To date, the United States and EU have not been able to reach agreement on a number of issues related to veterinary equivalency, and the EU continues to maintain measures that prohibit the use of any substance other than water to remove contamination from animal products unless the substance has been approved by the European Commission, which has rejected USDA's applications to the EU's health agencies requesting approval to use certain poultry treatments. The United States is seeking approval of four PRTs: peroxyacetic acid, chlorine dioxide, acidified sodium chlorite, and trisodium.
The U.S. poultry industry and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) remain actively engaged in this case. This issue also continues to be raised in ongoing trade negotiations between the United States and EU to establish a free trade area as part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). The U.S. poultry industry has indicated that it is unlikely to support a T-TIP agreement that does not provide for better access to the EU of U.S. poultry products. |
crs_RL31579 | crs_RL31579_0 | The term "services" refers to a broad and widening range of economic activities such as accounting and legal services, banking, transportation, tourism, and telecommunications. Services are a significant sector of the U.S. economy, accounting for almost 70% of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) and for over 80% of U.S. civilian employment. Services are becoming an important element of U.S. foreign trade and of global trade in general, although their intangibility and other characteristics along with other barriers have limited foreign trade in services. The increasing importance of services in U.S. and global trade has placed them on the U.S. agenda for bilateral and regional trade agreements, and services trade occupies a prominent place on the agenda of the United States and the other 152 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the Doha Development Agenda round of multilateral negotiations. This report will be updated as events warrant. The Role of Services in U.S. The number and variety of negotiations planned or already underway suggests that Congress will have a number of trade agreements to consider and that services will be an important part of the deliberations. An overview of barriers, of the disputes in services trade and of the rapidly changing characteristics of the services sector, all suggest that the negotiations and the agreements they produce will become increasingly complex. The United States presses its trading partners to liberalize their services sector as much as possible, because U.S. services providers are very competitive in world markets. However, to accomplish its objectives, the United States is pressed by its partners to make concessions that adversely affect "import-sensitive" industries in the United States. U.S. negotiators and, ultimately, Congress will have to judge whether the agreements strike an appropriate balance for U.S. interests. | The term "services" refers to a broad and widening range of economic activities such as accounting and legal services, banking, transportation, tourism, and telecommunications. Services are a significant sector of the U.S. economy, accounting for almost 70% of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) and for over 80% of U.S. civilian employment.
Services have become an important element of U.S. foreign trade, consistently generating surpluses. The European Union is by far the most important U.S. trade partner in services, accounting for more than 50% of U.S. trade in services.
The increasing importance of services in domestic and global trade have placed them on the U.S. agenda for bilateral and regional trade agreements, and services trade occupies a prominent place on the agenda of the United States and the other 152 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the Doha Development Agenda round of multilateral negotiations. Furthermore, disputes related to trade in services have arisen increasingly between the United States and the European Union, Japan, Canada, and other major trading partners.
Congress will have a number of trade agreements to consider, and services will be an important part of the deliberations. An overview of barriers, of the disputes in services trade and of the rapidly changing characteristics of the services sector, suggest that the negotiations and the agreements they produce will become increasingly complex.
The United States presses its trading partners to liberalize their services sector as much as possible, because U.S. services providers are very competitive in world markets. However, to accomplish its objectives, the United States is pressed by its partners to make concessions that might adversely affect "import-sensitive" industries in the United States. U.S. negotiators and, ultimately, Congress will have to judge whether the agreements strike an appropriate balance for U.S. interests. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42687 | crs_R42687_0 | Introduction
As the Internet has become a significant venue for facilitating commercial transactions, it may be more common in this day and age for a consumer to first turn to the Internet to purchase goods rather than to go to a store. Accordingly, questions and concerns have arisen regarding the extent to which federal law regulates the sale of such goods. A review of applicable federal laws, discussed below, establishes that Internet-based firearm sales are not imbued with a special character by virtue of their medium of transfer, and are in fact subject to the same degree of regulation as any other type of firearm transaction. 6241 ), that would more strictly regulate the online sale of ammunition. When the GCA was originally enacted in 1968, the sale and transfer of ammunition were regulated in nearly the same manner as firearms. In response to this, Senator Frank Lautenberg and Representative Carolyn McCarthy introduced S. 3458 and H.R. | As the Internet has become a significant venue for facilitating commercial transactions, concerns have arisen regarding the use of this medium to transfer firearms. This report discusses the sale of firearms and ammunition over the Internet, with a focus on the extent to which federal law regulates such activity. A review of the relevant factors indicates Internet-based firearm transactions are subject to the same regulatory scheme governing traditional firearm transactions. Over the years, this has raised concern about the possibility of increased violation of federal firearm laws, as well as challenges that law enforcement may face when attempting to investigate violations of these laws. A review of the relevant factors also indicates that the sale and transfer of ammunition are not as strictly regulated as firearms, and that these changes came into effect in 1986. Lastly, this report highlights recent legislative proposals, S. 3458 and H.R. 6241, companion measures introduced by Senator Frank Lautenberg and Representative Carolyn McCarthy in the 112th Congress that would affect online ammunition transactions. |
crs_RL33305 | crs_RL33305_0 | Amendments to the Windfall Profit Tax
The WPT was amended many times after it was enacted in 1980. 3). 3 on April 27. (7)
Structure of the Tax
Despite its name, the crude oil windfall profit tax was not a tax on profits. Cumulative net revenues, which totaled about $43 billion between 1980 and 1987, fell farshort of the $227.3 billion target. Finally, while the tax was called a "profit" tax, it was not really a profit tax but rather aspecial type of excise tax -- a selective excise tax on oil producers. Table 3 also shows that, for the same period, actual gross revenues were about $80 billion,significantly short of projections -- 80% less than the projected amount of $393 billion -- but stilla sizeable sum. The result was two forcesacting to reduce the tax base -- the so-called "windfall profit." Column (3) shows estimated foregone payments ofincome taxes -- reduced income tax collections -- due to the deductibility of the WPT against theincome tax liability as a cost of production. The remaining revenue losses were due to receipts from federalinterests (column [2]). less import dependent. And further, while a WPT made the U.S. more dependent on importedoil, decontrol and a WPT made the U.S. less dependent than controls without WPT. The magnitude by which the WPTreduced domestic oil supplies and increased imports depends on two variables: (1) the magnitudeof the decline in the supply price of domestic crude oil (the amount of the WPT), which determinesthe after-tax price received by oil producers; and (2) the price elasticity of the supply curve, whichdetermines the reduction in oil production in response to the lower price (net of the WPT) receivedby oil producers. Over the entire 1980-1986 period, it is estimated that, depending on the assumed supply curveprice elasticity, the WPT reduced domestic oil production from between 320 million barrels (1.2%of domestic production) and 1,268 million barrels (4.8% of domestic production). The effect ofreducing domestic oil production was to increase the level of imported oil. industry." It was a compliance burden to the oil-producingindustry and an administrative burden for the Internal Revenue Service even though,after FY1986, the tax generated little or no tax revenues. Finally, the domestic U.S. oil industry was experiencing difficult economicconditions due to the collapse of oil prices in 1986. (51) Between1982 and 1988, this industry lost about one-third of its jobs. Also, thetax would be imposed on the windfall profit from and natural gas (and productsthereof). Thus, even without a windfall profit tax governmenttax revenues would increase commensurate with any oil industry windfall. Economic Implications. Alternative Policy Options
If, instead, an excise tax were to be imposed broadly on both imported as wellas domestically produced oil (as proposed in the early 1980s by the ReaganAdministration) much greater price effects would be expected -- the price of crudeoil in the United States would tend to be much higher than under the WPT ondomestic oil alone. Inthis case, the tax would both increase the marginal costs of oil imports (an upwardshift in the oil import supply schedule) and cause a slight movement along theschedule due to increased demand for oil imports, and thus have a bigger price effect. (60)
From an economic perspective, the only tax that would be relatively neutralin the short run -- that would have no (or few) price effects and other economiceffects -- would be a pure corporate profits tax, since this tax does not affectmarginal production costs, and cannot be shifted in the short run. Thus, to the extentthat a surtax on the corporate income of crude oil producers on their upstreamoperations could approximate such a tax, this would not raise crude oil prices andwould not increase petroleum imports in the short run . Technical Appendix
The algebraic formula for the WPT liability is as follows:
T t = Ï [P t m - P t b (1+ Ï t-2 )](1- s ) (1- c )
where
T t = the WPT in $/barrel, in time t (e.g., in the 1st quarter of any year),
Ï = the WPT tax rate in percent (see Table 2 in the text),
P t m = the market (removal) price of domestic crude oil at the wellhead at time t,
P t b = the base price corresponding to the type of oil produced, as specified by law (see Table 2 )
Ï = rate of inflation, as measured by the GNP deflator, so that Ï t-2 is the GNP deflatorlagged two quarters, (61)
s = the rate of State severance tax, if any
c = the rate of federal corporate income tax | In April 1980, the federal government enacted the crude oil windfall profit tax on the U.S.oil industry. The main purpose of the tax was to recoup for the federal government much of therevenue that would have otherwise gone to the oil industry as a result of the decontrol of oil prices. Supporters of the tax viewed this revenue as an unearned and unanticipated windfall caused by highoil prices, which were determined by the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)cartel.
Despite its name, the windfall profit tax (WPT) was actually an excise tax, not a profits tax,imposed on the difference between the market price of oil and an adjusted base price. While mostdomestically produced oil was subject to the tax (about 2/3 in 1985), the remaining 1/3 that wastax-exempt was significant (1.3 billion barrels in 1985, or 360,000 barrels per day). The $80 billionin gross revenues generated by the WPT between 1980 and 1988 was significantly less than the $393billion projected. Due to the deductibility of the WPT against the income tax, cumulative net WPTrevenues were about $38 billion, significantly less than the $175 billion projected. This reportpresents estimates of the amount of foregone oil production from 1980-1986 due to the WPT underthree alternative supply price responses, reflecting three different assumptions about the priceelasticity of the domestic oil supply function, a critical factor (statistic) in estimating lost oil outputand increased import dependence. From 1980 to 1988, the WPT may have reduced domestic oilproduction anywhere from 1.2% to 8.0% (320 to 1,269 million barrels). Dependence on importedoil grew from between 3% and 13%. The tax was repealed in 1988 because (1) it was anadministrative burden to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), (2) it was a compliance burden to theoil industry, (3) due to low oil prices, the tax was generating little or no revenues in 1987 and 1988,and (4) it made the United States more dependent on foreign oil. The depressed state of the U.S. oilindustry after 1986 also contributed to the repeal decision.
Reinstating the windfall profit tax would reduce recent oil industry windfalls due to highcrude and petroleum prices but could have several adverse economic effects. If imposed as an excisetax, the WPT would increase marginal production costs and be expected to reduce domestic oilproduction and increase the level of oil imports, which today is at nearly 60% of demand. Crudeprices would not tend to increase. Some have proposed an excise tax on both domestically producedand imported oil as a way of mitigating the negative effects on petroleum import dependence. Sucha broad-based WPT would tend to reduce import dependence, but it would lead to higher crude oilprices and likely to oil industry profits, potentially undermining its original goals. Because the purecorporate profits tax is relatively neutral in the short run -- few, if any, price and output effects occurbecause marginal production costs are unchanged in the short run -- a possible option would be acorporate income surtax on the upstream operations of crude oil producers. Such a tax that wouldrecoup any recent windfalls with less adverse economic effects; imports would not increase becausedomestic production would remain unchanged. In the long run, such a tax is a tax on capital; itreduces the rate of return, thus reducing the supply of capital to the oil industry. |
crs_R43383 | crs_R43383_0 | Background
In July, 2007 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced that Sochi, Russia had been selected as the host city for the XXII Olympic Winter Games. The Games, which will be held February 7-23, 2014, are the first to be hosted by Russia as a successor state to the former Soviet Union. It is expected that approximately 2,900 athletes from some 88 countries will participate in 15 Olympic Games disciplines at two main locations: a coastal cluster along the Black Sea and a mountain cluster in the Krasnaya Polyana mountains. Recent Terrorist Incidents Related to the Games
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the formation of Russia, ethnic conflict has been most intensive in the North Caucasus area, the site of the Sochi Olympics. President Putin reported in early September 2013 that Russia had agreements with the United States and several European countries on cooperation on Olympic security. Human Rights Issues
Since the 2007 selection of Sochi as the site of Olympic Games, many observers have raised concerns about the protection of human rights of athletes and visitors to the Games, the residents of Sochi and its environs, workers involved in the construction process, and other groups. Athletes and Visitors and About Bilateral Security Cooperation
In a White House statement after the Volgograd bombings, the Obama administration stated that "the U.S. government has offered our full support to the Russian government in security preparations for the Sochi Olympic Games, and we would welcome the opportunity for closer cooperation for the safety of the athletes, spectators, and other participants." On January 24, a senior administration official stressed that "the full resources of the U.S. Government are aligned in support of our athletes, our delegation, and Americans attending the Olympics" and that while "we have seen an uptick in security threats," they are "not unusual for a major international event like this." Administration officials have argued that U.S.-Russia security cooperation is adequate for safely holding the Games, but have added that conditions are being monitored and U.S. athletes and the public will be notified if they change. Some U.S. athletes, visitors, and others have expressed concerns about the "uptick" in terrorism reports. If a terrorist incident occurs that endangers U.S. athletes or visitors, some observers have raised questions about whether the quality of liaison between U.S. and Russian officials is sufficient to ensure the evacuation of U.S. citizens. Members of Congress have also expressed concerns about these issues. Concerns About Human Rights
In late July 2013, a State Department spokesperson called on Russia to protect the human rights of U.S. citizens attending or participating in the Olympic Games, "including LGBT persons, and of course, for anyone attending or participating in the Olympics. We are calling on Russia to uphold its international commitments regarding freedom of assembly and association and freedom of expression." The State Department's January 2014 travel alert reflects human rights concerns when it advises U.S. visitors that they should have "no expectation of privacy," and that all means of communication should be "assumed to be monitored." The alert cautions that the law applies to both Russian citizens and foreigners, whom may be fined, jailed, and/or deported. Some critics of U.S. policy toward Russia—while supportive of the Obama Administration's decision not to send top-level delegations to Sochi—have called for the Administration to make civil and human rights more central in bilateral relations. Most observers argue that notable human rights violations against U.S. citizens attending the Games could further exacerbate tensions in U.S.-Russia relations. Members of Congress have expressed concerns about Russia's anti-LGBT legislation. Among other provisions, the resolution calls on calls on the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to strongly oppose Russia's discriminatory law and to insist, as a condition of holding the Olympic Games in Sochi, that the Russian government provide unconditional assurance that no person at the games will be harassed, fined, detained, or otherwise have their human rights, including their right to free expression, violated due to their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of support for LGBT human rights. | The President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced on July 4, 2007, that Sochi, Russia, had been selected as the host city for the Olympic Winter Games and Paralympics. The Olympic Games, which will be held February 7-23, 2014, are the first to be hosted by Russia as a successor state to the former Soviet Union. Reportedly, some 230 U.S. athletes out of approximately 2,900 from some 88 countries, and about 10,000 U.S. visitors, are expected in Sochi. Olympic events will take place at two main locations: a coastal cluster along the Black Sea and a mountain cluster in the Krasnaya Polyana mountains.
Since the 2007 selection of Sochi as the site of Olympic Games, many observers, including some in Congress, have raised concerns about security and human rights conditions in Sochi and elsewhere in Russia. Sochi is in Russia's North Caucasus area, which has experienced ongoing terrorist incidents, including several bombings in recent weeks. Through hearings, legislation, oversight, and other action, some Members of Congress have expressed concerns over Russia's hosting of the Sochi Olympic Games and Paralympics, particularly the risks that terrorism and human rights violations might pose to U.S. athletes and visitors. Other broader congressional concerns have included whether the United States should participate in the Games in the face of increasing tensions in U.S.-Russia relations and the Russian government's growing restrictions on the civil and human rights of its citizens. Some Members of Congress have called for boycotting the Games. Others have cautioned that U.S. citizens should carefully weigh the security risks of attending, and have urged greater U.S.-Russia counter-terrorism cooperation to ameliorate threats to the Games. In the period during and after the Games, Congress may continue to exercise oversight and otherwise raise concerns about the safety and human rights treatment of U.S. athletes and visitors and the impact of the Games and other developments in Russia on the future of U.S.-Russia relations.
On January 24, 2014, a senior Administration official stressed that the full resources of the U.S. government were being readied to support U.S. athletes, the official delegations, and other citizens attending the Games. Administration officials have argued that U.S.-Russia security cooperation is adequate for safely holding the Games, but have added that conditions are being monitored and U.S. athletes and the public will be notified if they change. They also have stated that there are contingencies for emergencies, including the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens if necessary. Some observers have raised concerns about whether security is adequate and have criticized Russia for not cooperating more with the United States on safeguarding the Games.
One non-sport-related factor that has added an additional dimension to the Olympics beyond security has been the issue of human rights. In 2013 the Russian legislature, at the urging of President Putin, adopted a series of anti-LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) laws. In reaction, in late July 2013, the State Department called on Russia to protect freedom of assembly and association and freedom of expression of U.S. citizens attending or participating in the Olympic Games, including LGBT persons and others traveling to Sochi. In late December 2013, the Obama Administration announced that the U.S. delegates to the Games would not include top-level officials, but would include several LGBT sports figures. The State Department's January 2014 travel alert reflects human rights concerns when it advises U.S. visitors that they should have "no expectation of privacy," and that all means of communication should be assumed to be monitored. The travel alert also cautions that the anti-LGBT propaganda law applies to foreigners, who may be fined, jailed, and/or deported. |
crs_R44559 | crs_R44559_0 | There is no precedent for a country withdrawing from the EU so a high degree of uncertainty exists about how the separation might work. The vote does not force the UK out of the EU immediately. What Could Brexit Mean for the United States and the U.S.-UK Relationship? With the UK commonly regarded as the strongest U.S. partner in Europe and a partner that usually shares U.S. views, U.S. officials have conveyed concerns that a UK break from the EU would reduce U.S. influence in Europe, weaken the EU's position on free trade (because the UK generally acted as a leading voice for economic liberalism in EU debates about trade and the single market), and make the EU a less reliable partner on security and defense issues (because British participation is widely regarded as essential for efforts to develop more robust EU foreign and defense policies). NATO remains the preeminent transatlantic security institution, and the UK will remain a leading member of NATO. In particular, financial markets reacted negatively to the referendum on the UK exit from the EU. The British pound depreciated to its lowest level in more than 30 years; while the dollar, the yen, and other major currencies appreciated sharply, as indicated in Figure 2 . The BOE argued that a vote to leave the EU could
materially alter the outlook for output and inflation, and therefore the appropriate setting of monetary policy; cause households to defer consumption and firms to delay investment, lowering labor demand and causing unemployment to rise; increase the risks for the global economy due to spillover effects through financial market and confidence channels; lower supply growth, reflecting slower capital accumulation and the need to reallocate resources; depreciate the international exchange rate of the British pound, perhaps sharply; and lead to a materially lower path for growth and a notably higher path for inflation through the combination of influences on demand, supply and the exchange rate. These scenarios suggest that Brexit could affect UK GDP in the range of -1.3% and -5.5% per year in the short run (2020) and between -1.2% and -7.5% per year over the long run (2030). Loss of income per UK household is estimated at between -£600 (about $900) and -£5,200 (about $7,500) per year. A study by the London School of Economics (LSE) and the Center for Economic Performance (CEP), which considered the fewest number of factors in their analysis, had the lowest negative assessment in the short run, ranging from -1.3% per year to -2.6% per year, and one of the most negative estimates of the impact of Brexit on the UK economy over the long run, -6.3% to -8.5%. Central banks have been muted in their response to Brexit. Brexit also raises issues about the status of ongoing EU trade negotiations, including current U.S.-EU negotiations to conclude a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) free trade agreement (FTA). An appreciation in the value of safe-haven currencies, especially the dollar, can affect a broad range of economic activities. Some analysts expect the uncertainties created by Brexit to have a negative impact on global markets beyond the immediate turmoil. A protracted political leadership struggle could add to uncertainties over the UK's ability to take the necessary economic and financial measures to restore stability. The simultaneous depreciation of the pound and appreciation of the dollar could add to economic pressures on both developed and emerging market economies. In addition, capital flight from emerging economies to safe-haven assets could further add to the economic challenges facing developed and emerging economies and potentially add negatively to global growth prospects. The Brexit vote also confronts Congress with questions about the future of U.S.-EU and U.S.-UK trade relations, including prospects for the potential T-TIP agreement and any other trade agreements the United States may pursue with the UK going forward. | This report provides an analysis of the possible economic implications for the United States and the global economy of an exit from the European Union (EU) by the United Kingdom (UK), commonly referred to as Brexit. It offers background information on possible implications of the vote to leave the EU, an overview of U.S.-UK trade and investment relations, and various estimates of Brexit's financial implications for the U.S. and global economies. For Members of Congress, economic fallout from Brexit could increase the risks of a slower rate of economic growth and potentially complicate economic policymaking. Brexit also could have implications for congressional oversight of U.S. trade policy, including ongoing U.S.-EU negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) free trade agreement (FTA). Since the Brexit vote, resolutions have been introduced in the House and Senate supporting the negotiation of a U.S.-UK FTA. (See S. 3123 (Lee), S.Res. 520 (Rubio), H.Res. 817 (Dent), and concurrent resolutions H.Con.Res. 146 (Brady) and S.Con.Res. 47 (Hatch).)
Factors that could shape the possible impact of a UK exit from the EU include the following.
There is no precedent for a country withdrawing from the EU, so there is a high degree of uncertainty about how a separation might work. The vote does not force the UK out of the EU immediately. Negotiating the UK's withdrawal and future relationship with the EU could take years to complete. NATO remains the preeminent transatlantic security institution, and the UK will remain a leading member of NATO, but Brexit may affect Euro-Atlantic cooperation and unity on a range of security issues. Various studies project that Brexit would lower UK GDP between -1.3% and -5.5% per year in the short run (2020) and between -1.2% and -7.5% per year over the long run (2030). Estimates of the yearly income loss per UK household are at between -£600 (about $900) and -£5,200 (about $7,500). Immediately following the Brexit vote, global financial markets reacted sharply: the pound depreciated by more than 10% at one point, reaching its lowest level in more than 30 years; the dollar appreciated against major currencies; and the yen and Swiss franc appreciated. Other currencies were mixed as some emerging market currencies depreciated; most major stock indexes and government bond yields were lower. Global financial markets recovered substantially by the end of June, although the pound and stocks of British firms remained lower.
According to some analysts, uncertainties created by Brexit may have a long-term negative impact on global markets, given the tepid pace of the current global economic recovery. A protracted political leadership struggle in the UK also could add to uncertainties over the UK's ability to implement the economic measures that may be necessary to restore stability. To date, various central banks have taken steps to calm financial markets. The depreciation in the pound and simultaneous appreciation in the value of the dollar and other currencies considered to be safe havens could add to the challenges facing some central banks in formulating monetary policy over the near term. Capital flight from emerging economies to safe-haven assets could further add to the economic challenges facing developed and emerging economies and potentially harm global growth prospects. |
crs_R40740 | crs_R40740_0 | Global Health Assistance
U.S. funding for global health activities has grown significantly over the past decade. Much of the growth in U.S. global health spending has been motivated by infectious disease outbreaks, including human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), H5N1 avian influenza (avian flu), extremely drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB), and the 2009 influenza pandemic. Congress also provides funds to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for global health activities. In addition to funds Congress provides directly to U.S. agencies and departments for global health efforts, U.S. agencies and departments also use portions of their budgets for global health programs. For example, CDC regularly allots a part of its tuberculosis budget for international interventions, though Congress does not specify that the funds should be used for those purposes. USAID Global Health Programs
Through Foreign Operations Appropriations, Congress specifies support for five key USAID global health programs:
child survival and maternal health , aimed at, among other things, reducing morbidity and mortality from key diseases such as polio, measles, and diarrhea, providing vaccines and immunizations, supporting safe delivery, and addressing malnutrition; vulnerable children , aimed at providing services to vulnerable children and orphans, particularly those affected by blindness and war (support for children made vulnerable by HIV/AIDS is provided through HIV/AIDS funds); HIV/AIDS , aimed at preventing and treating HIV/AIDS, particularly among vulnerable populations such as women, girls, and orphans, through voluntary counseling and testing, awareness campaigns, and antiretroviral medicines; other infectious diseases , aimed at addressing a number of diseases and resultant outbreaks, such as those related to pandemic and avian influenza, malaria, tuberculosis (TB), and neglected diseases; and family planning and reproductive health , aimed at increasing access to related services, such as reproductive health education to improve awareness about birth spacing, contraception, and sexually transmitted diseases. Although Congress does not appropriate funds to CDC specifically for global tuberculosis and pandemic influenza preparedness and response efforts, CDC allots a portion of its overall TB and pandemic preparedness funds for international assistance. In addition, through the FY2001 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. In FY2008, Congress created a new account that combined appropriations for USAID global health activities funded through the CSH account with appropriations to OGAC for the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative and a U.S. contribution to the Global Fund. From FY2006 through FY2009, Congress provided more than $1.5 million for U.S. malaria programs. The Act made more than $8 billion available for global health programs, including about $5.4 billion for HIV/AIDS programs managed by OGAC, including a $750 million contribution to the Global Fund; an additional $300 million for a contribution to the Global Fund through NIH; some $2.4 billion for USAID; an estimated $328 million for CDC; and $10 million for HIV/AIDS programs conducted by DOD. The President requested that Congress approve his FY2010 budget request of $8.6 billion for the recently established Global Health and Child Survival Account. On May 5, 2009, President Obama announced his new Global Health Initiative (GHI), a six-year, $63 billion from FY2009 to FY2014 to better coordinate the U.S. government's approach to global health programs. The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 ( P.L. Another popular reform proposal would create a cabinet-level international development agency with authority over all global health and development programs. U.S. Department of State
At the U.S. Department of State, a number of activities may be related to global health and are conducted by the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (F Bureau); the Offices of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC or S/GAC) and Global Women's Issues (S/GWI), which report directly to the Secretary of State; and five bureaus or offices within the purview of the Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs (G). | U.S. funding for global health activities has grown significantly over the past decade, from $1.8 billion in FY2001 to $8.5 billion in FY2010. During this time period, Congress has significantly increased funding for responses against infectious disease outbreaks, including the 2009 influenza pandemic (H1N1), H5N1 avian influenza (avian flu), human immunodeficiency/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), tuberculosis (TB), and malaria. U.S. agencies and departments also supplement funds that Congress appropriates for these purposes with funds from their discretionary budgets.
Through FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations (P.L. 111-32), Congress appropriated $100 million to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for an additional contribution to the Multilateral Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and $50 million for international pandemic preparedness and response efforts. The Act also provided $200 million for domestic and global pandemic preparedness response programs conducted by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), though it did not specify how the funds should be apportioned.
President Barack Obama sent Congress a FY2010 budget request of $9.1 billion for global health initiatives. Of those funds, he proposed that $7.6 billion be funded through the Global Health and Child Survival Account (GHCS), which is funded through Foreign Operations Appropriations and supports USAID global health programs, global HIV/AIDS programs managed by the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) at the Department of State and a U.S. contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund). The President asked that Congress support his new Global Health Initiative that would provide $63 billion over six years "to shape a new, comprehensive global health strategy" that would focus on "broader global health challenges, including child and maternal health, family planning, and neglected tropical diseases, with cost effective intervention." He also requested $1.5 billion in emergency funds to support U.S. domestic and international responses to the 2009 influenza pandemic and more than $319 million for CDC global health programs. Through the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), Congress provided more than $8 billion for global health activities.
Foreign assistance reform, including global health aid, has emerged as a key issue in the 111th Congress. This report discusses some of the policy questions Congress may face as it considers proposals to improve U.S. global health aid, including defining U.S. global health aid, identifying the scope of U.S. global health spending, determining oversight and leadership roles, and coordinating global health and development programs. |
crs_R41753 | crs_R41753_0 | Latest Legislative Developments
Comprehensive refugee reform legislation, the Refugee Protection Act of 2011 ( S. 1202 / H.R. 2185 ), would make significant revisions to asylum policy. Foreign nationals seeking asylum must demonstrate a well-founded fear that if returned home, they will be persecuted based upon one of five characteristics: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Foreign nationals arriving or present in the United States may apply for asylum with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) after arrival into the country, or they may seek asylum before a Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) immigration judge during removal proceedings. The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA, P.L. The regulations also state that an asylum seeker "does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the applicant could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant's country.... "
In evaluating whether the asylum seeker has sustained the burden of proving that he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution, the regulations state that the asylum officer or immigration judge shall not require the alien to provide evidence that there is a reasonable possibility he or she would be individually singled out for persecution if
(A) The applicant establishes that there is a pattern or practice in his or her country of nationality or, if stateless, in his or her country of last habitual residence, of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; and
(B) The applicant establishes his or her own inclusion in, and identification with, such group of persons such that his or her fear of persecution upon return is reasonable. As Figure 2 depicts, the number of asylum cases approved more than doubled from 13,532 in FY1996 to 31,202 in FY2002, and then fell to the lowest point over the 14-year period—9,614—in FY2009. Since that time, defensive asylum claims have dropped by 53%, to 39,279 in FY2009. The number of asylum cases that EOIR judges have approved, however, has risen by 99% over this 14-year period. Top 10 Source Countries in FY2009
Asylum seekers from the PRC dominated both the affirmative and defensive asylum caseloads in FY2009, as Figure 5 shows. The five were Haiti, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Colombia. Ethiopia was the only African nation that was a top 10 source country for asylum seekers in FY2009. This section of the report focuses on six major source countries: the PRC, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Haiti, and Mexico. Regardless of the overall decrease in asylum cases since the enactment of IIRIRA in 1996, this data analysis suggests that conditions in the major source countries—whether economic, environmental, political, religious or social—were likely the driving force behind asylum seekers. Analysis of Approvals by Country
Given the sheer number of asylum seekers from the PRC in FY2009, it is not particularly surprising that the PRC led in the number of asylum cases approved by USCIS and EOIR in FY2009 ( Figure 13 ). Refugee Roulette
The example of asylum seekers from the PRC offers striking differences in the percentage of cases approved across regions and jurisdictions, despite national data trends that appeared consistent. A study of 290 asylum officers who decided at least 100 affirmative cases from the PRC from FY1999 through FY2005 found that the approval rate of PRC claimants spanned from zero to over 90% during this period. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) analyzed the disparity in asylum decisions as well and found that "significant variation existed." GAO performed multivariate statistical analyses on asylum cases from 19 immigration courts that handled almost 90% of the cases from October 1994 through April 2007. Some cite the seemingly inexplicable disparities in asylum approvals rates and urge broad-based administrative reforms. Others argue that given the religious, ethnic, and political violence in various countries around the world, it has become more difficult to differentiate the persecuted from the persecutors . Some express concern that U.S. sympathies for the asylum seekers caught up in the current political uprisings in the Middle East, northern Africa, and South Asia could inadvertently facilitate the entry of terrorists. Others maintain that current law does not offer adequate protections for people fleeing human rights violations or gender-based abuses that occur around the world. Some assert that asylum has become an alternative pathway for immigration rather than humanitarian protection provided in extraordinary cases. At the crux of the issue is the extent to which an asylum policy forged during the Cold War is adapting to the competing priorities and turbulence of the 21 st century. | Foreign nationals seeking asylum must demonstrate a well-founded fear that if returned home, they will be persecuted based upon one of five characteristics: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Foreign nationals arriving or present in the United States may apply for asylum affirmatively with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the Department of Homeland Security after arrival into the country, or they may seek asylum defensively before a Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) immigration judge during removal proceedings.
Asylum claims ebbed and flowed in the 1980s and peaked in FY1996. Since FY997, affirmative asylum cases decreased by 79% and defensive asylum claims dropped by 53% by FY2009. Asylum seekers from the People's Republic of China (PRC) dominated both the affirmative and defensive asylum caseload in FY2009. Five of the top 10 source countries of asylum seekers were Western Hemisphere nations in FY2009: Haiti, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Colombia. Ethiopia was the only African nation that was a top source country for asylum seekers in FY2009. Despite the general decrease in asylum cases since the enactment of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA ) in 1996, data analysis of six selected countries (the PRC, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Haiti, and Mexico) suggests that conditions in the source countries are likely the driving force behind asylum seekers.
Roughly 30% of all asylum cases that worked through USCIS and EOIR in recent years have been approved. Affirmative asylum cases approved by USCIS more than doubled from 13,532 in FY1996 to 31,202 in FY2002, and then fell to the lowest point over the 14-year period—9,614—in FY2009. The number of defensive asylum cases that EOIR judges have approved has risen by 99% from FY1996 through FY2009. The PRC led in the number of asylum cases approved by USCIS and EOIR over the decade of FY2000-FY2009.
Despite national data trends that appeared to be consistent, approval rates for asylum seekers differ strikingly across regions and jurisdictions. For example, a study of 290 asylum officers who decided at least 100 cases from the PRC from FY1999 through FY2005 found that the approval rate of PRC claimants spanned from zero to over 90% during this period. In a separate study, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) analyzed asylum decisions from 19 immigration courts that handled almost 90% of the cases from October 1994 through April 2007 and found that "significant variation existed."
At the crux of the issue is the extent to which an asylum policy forged during the Cold War is adapting to the competing priorities and turbulence of the 21st century. Some assert that asylum has become an alternative pathway for immigration rather than humanitarian protection. Others argue that—given the religious, ethnic, and political violence in various countries around the world—it has become more difficult to differentiate the persecuted from the persecutors. Some express concern that U.S. sympathies for the asylum seekers caught up in the democratic political uprisings in the Middle East, northern Africa, and south Asia could inadvertently facilitate the entry of terrorists. Others maintain that current law does not offer adequate protections for people fleeing human rights violations or gender-based abuses that occur around the world. Some cite the disparities in asylum approvals rates and urge broad-based administrative reforms. The Refugee Protection Act of 2011 (S. 1202/H.R. 2185) would make significant revisions to asylum policy. |
crs_RL31767 | crs_RL31767_0 | Aboutone in three children below the age of 15 is economically active in the region. (17)
Child Labor in the Shadows
Children working in export industries (such as textiles, clothing, carpets and footwear) have been featured on news stories causing international uproar. However, the ILO has found that child workers in export industries are relatively few compared to those employed inactivities geared to domestic consumption. HIV/AIDS has already increased the number of child orphans. Efforts to Eliminate International Child Labor
There are a number of other international organizations and international non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) that address child labor, but this report focuses on the international effortsof the International Labor Organization. However, the ILO monitors and reports on international child labor practices. Congressional Action
Congressional support for the abolition of child labor, particularly the worst forms of child labor,is very strong. Congress has acted to fund programs to combat child labor, expand the United States'role in the global fight against child labor, and include clauses that require action on eliminatingchild labor in trade agreements. (68)
Issues and Questions for Congress
Although Congress has consistently supported American efforts to eliminate child laborworld-wide, proponents of these efforts say that a number of issues continue to complicate theseinitiatives, including: ineffective enforcement mechanisms, sparse monitoring systems, and insufficient funding for programs that alleviate poverty, decrease incidences of HIV/AIDS, andincrease access to relevant education. (72) This issue has spurred debates on a numberof issues, including whether the United States should continue to use international trade forums tocontribute to the abolition of international child labor. Appendix
Definitions of Child Labor
The ILO divides child labor into three categories:
labor performed by a child who is under the minimum age ;
children engaged in hazardous work ; and
children in the unconditional worst forms of child labor
Labor that is performed by a child under the minimum age is unacceptable because this work is likely to impede on a child's education and full development (74) , and thus the ILO considers it to bethe first form of child labor to be immediately abolished. An estimated 171 million children between ages 5 and 17were estimated to work in hazardous conditions in 2000. | International child labor has become an increasingly important issue in discussions concerninginternational trade, human rights and foreign aid. While a number of international, national and localinitiatives seek to abolish the practice, there continues to be a debate on what constitutes child labor. Some consider any work undertaken by children to be child labor, while others may use the term torefer to work under abusive conditions. The International Labor Organization (ILO) defines childlabor as a form of work that is inherently hazardous, employs children below the internationallyrecognized minimum age, or is exploitative. Child labor is used in this report as defined by the ILO. According to the ILO about 246 million children were engaged in child labor in 2000. Some 186million child laborers were below the age of 15, and approximately 110 million were below the ageof 12.
While awareness of the issue has increased, the ability to address the complex problem has been complicated by a number of related issues including, rising poverty, surging HIV/AIDS infectionrates, and a lack of relevant education. News stories have featured children working in exportindustries (such as textiles, clothing, carpets and footwear) and caused international uproar. Whilethe news stories have contributed to a heightened awareness about the problem of international childlabor, the ILO has found that child workers in export industries are relatively few compared to thoseemployed in activities geared to domestic consumption.
Congressional support for the abolition of international child labor, particularly the worst formsof child labor, is very strong. Congress has funded programs to combat international child labor,initiated bills that expand the United States' role in the global fight against child labor, and includedclauses that require action on eliminating child labor in international trade agreements. AlthoughCongress has consistently boosted American efforts to eliminate child labor world-wide, there area number of issues that continue to impede these efforts, including: ineffective enforcementmechanisms; sparse monitoring systems; and insufficient funding for programs that alleviatepoverty, decrease incidences of HIV/AIDS, and increase access to relevant education. This reportwill discuss the ILO definition of child labor, outline the scope of the problem, explain thedifficulties in eliminating it, describe U.S. and international efforts to counter exploitative childlabor, and present some issues Congress may consider. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44927 | crs_R44927_0 | Introduction
This report describes and analyzes annual appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2018. 115-141 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018—Division F of which is the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act 2018. The explanatory statement also includes data on FY2018 supplemental appropriations for DHS enacted prior to March 22, 2018. The Trump Administration requested $44.00 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2018, as part of an overall budget that the Office of Management and Budget estimated to be $70.69 billion (including fees, trust funds, and other funding that is not annually appropriated or does not score against discretionary budget limits). The request amounted to a $1.59 billion (3.8%) increase from the $42.41 billion in annual and supplemental appropriations enacted for FY2017 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. The Trump Administration also requested discretionary funding for DHS components that does not count against discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) and is not reflected in the above totals. The Administration requested an additional $6.79 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the BCA, and in the budget request for the Department of Defense, a transfer of $162 million in Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terror designated funding (OCO). House Action
On July 21, 2017, the House Committee on Appropriations reported out H.R. 3355 , the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018, accompanied by H.Rept. 115-239 . Committee-reported H.R. 3355 included $44.33 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2018. This was $327 million (0.7%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $1.92 billion (4.5%) above the enacted level for FY2017. The House committee-reported bill also included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding. In a departure from the FY2017 appropriations process, the House Appropriations Committee chose to provide the Coast Guard OCO funding as a transfer as requested by the Administration, through H.R. 3219 , the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2018, rather than through the DHS appropriations bill. As it passed the House, the bill included $45.2 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, and $6.8 billion in disaster relief designated appropriations. Senate Action
The Senate Appropriations Committee released a draft bill and explanatory statement on November 21, 2017. 115-72, Division A)
On October 4, 2017, the Trump Administration requested an additional $12.7 billion for the DRF, and $16 billion in debt cancellation for the National Flood Insurance Fund (NFIF). The amendment included the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018, as Division F, which would provide $47.7 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS, as well as $7.4 billion designated as disaster relief and $163 million designated as being for overseas contingency operations. The House agreed to the amendment by a vote of 256-167, sending the amended bill back to the Senate. On March 23, the Senate passed the amended bill by a vote of 65-32, and it was presented to the President and signed into law as P.L. 115-141 later that same day. | This report provides an overview and analysis of FY2018 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The primary focus of this report is on congressional direction and funding provided to DHS through the appropriations process. It includes an Appendix with definitions of key budget terms used throughout the suite of Congressional Research Service reports on homeland security appropriations. It also directs the reader to other reports providing context for specific component appropriations.
As part of an overall budget that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimated to be $70.69 billion (including fees, trust funds, and other funding that is not annually appropriated or does not score against discretionary budget limits set by the Budget Control Act (BCA; P.L. 112-25)), the Trump Administration requested $44.00 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2018. The request amounted to a $1.59 billion (3.8%) increase from the $42.41 billion in annual and supplemental appropriations enacted for FY2017 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31, Division F).
The Administration also requested discretionary funding for DHS components that does not count against discretionary spending limits and is not reflected in the above totals. The Administration requested an additional $6.79 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the BCA, and in the budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD), a transfer of $162 million in Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terror designated funding (OCO).
On July 21, 2017, the House Committee on Appropriations reported out H.R. 3355, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018, accompanied by H.Rept. 115-239. Committee-reported H.R. 3355 included $44.33 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2018. This was $327 million (0.7%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $1.92 billion (4.5%) above the enacted level for FY2017. The House committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding—and the House Appropriations Committee chose to provide the Coast Guard OCO funding as a transfer as requested, through H.R. 3219, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2018.
The Senate Appropriations Committee released a draft bill and explanatory statement on November 21, 2017. No further action was taken on the annual appropriations legislation for DHS as a stand-alone bill.
Prior to the resolution of FY2018 annual appropriations the Trump Administration requested two tranches of supplemental appropriations in response to a series of natural disasters in 2017. Congress provided $59.3 billion to DHS, including $42.2 billion for the Disaster Relief Fund and $16.0 billion in debt cancellation for the National Flood Insurance Program.
On March 22, 2018, the House voted on a consolidated appropriations bill, which included the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018, as Division F, providing $47.7 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS, as well as $7.4 billion designated as disaster relief and $163 million designated as being for overseas contingency operations. The House passed the bill by a vote of 256-167. The next day, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 65-32, and it was presented to the President and signed into law as P.L. 115-141 that same day.
This report will be updated in the event of further FY2018 supplemental appropriations action. |
crs_R44317 | crs_R44317_0 | T his report provides a list of expiring health insurance provisions. Specifically, it lists Medicare, Medicaid, State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and private health insurance programs and activities under Chapter 7 of the United States Code (U.S.C. )—Social Security—and Chapter 157 of the U.S.C.—Quality, Affordable Health Care for All Americans, as created by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended)—where available, that are scheduled to expire between the date of this report and after the end of the 114 th Congress, second session (i.e., after December 31, 2016). Health insurance-related programs and activities under Social Security include Title XI of the Social Security Act (SSA; P.L. 74-271), General Provisions, Peer Review, and Administrative Simplification; SSA Title XVIII, Medicare; SSA Title XIX, Medicaid; and SSA Title XXI, CHIP. This report includes only those expiring provisions for which congressional action would be needed to extend the application of a provision once the deadline is reached. The report defines what constitutes an expiring provision, clarifies which issues do not meet the definition of an expiring provision, and summarizes the legislative history of each program and activity that is scheduled to expire between the date of this report and immediately after the end of the 114 th Congress. It also includes future deadlines, when applicable, for those programs and policies. Appendix A provides a list of Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and private health insurance provisions that have expired during the 114 th Congress, first session (i.e., after December 31, 2014, and before the date of this report) with legislative histories for each. Although the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has attempted to be comprehensive, it cannot guarantee that every relevant provision is included in this report. | This report provides a list of expiring health insurance provisions. Specifically, it lists Medicare, Medicaid, State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and private health insurance programs and activities under Chapter 7 of the United States Code (U.S.C.)—Social Security—and Chapter 157 of the U.S.C.—Quality, Affordable Health Care for All Americans, as created by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended)—that are scheduled to expire between the date of this report and after the end of the 114th Congress (i.e., December 31, 2016). Health insurance-related programs and activities under Social Security include Title XI of the Social Security Act (SSA; P.L. 74-271), General Provisions, Peer Review, and Administrative Simplification; SSA Title XVIII, Medicare; SSA Title XIX, Medicaid; and SSA Title XXI, CHIP.
This report includes only those expiring provisions for which congressional action would be needed to extend the application of a provision once the deadline is reached. Additionally, this report provides a list of Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and private health insurance provisions that have expired during the 114th Congress. Although the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has attempted to be comprehensive, it cannot guarantee that every relevant provision is included here.
The report defines what constitutes an expiring provision, clarifies which issues do not meet the definition of an expiring provision, and lists the legislative history of each relevant program and policy that already has expired in the 114th Congress or is scheduled to expire between the date of this report and the end of the 114th Congress (i.e., after December 31, 2016). It also includes future deadlines, when applicable, for those programs and policies. |
crs_R44890 | crs_R44890_0 | 1625 ; P.L. 115-141 , signed March 23, 2018), which provided FY2018 funding through September 30, 2018. Division K of the act―State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS)―provided a total of $54.18 billion, including Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds and rescissions. This represented a decrease of 6.1% from the FY2017 actual funding level. Of the total, $16.22 billion (excluding rescissions) was for the Department of State, international broadcasting, and related agencies, 10.7% below FY2017 levels, and $37.99 billion (excluding rescissions) was enacted for foreign operations, 4% below the FY2017 funding level. The SFOPS total requested for FY2018 (including Overseas Contingency Operations funds, otherwise known as OCO) was $40.25 billion, 30% below the enacted FY2017 SFOPS funding level of $57.53 billion. For Foreign Operations, the FY2018 request was $27.05 billion, 31% below the FY2017 enacted level of $39.44 billion. The SFOPS FY2018 request sought a total of $12.0 billion in OCO funds for FY2018, representing a 42% reduction compared with the FY2017 enacted OCO level. The Administration's broader FY2018 request to fund the government as a whole would have breached defense discretionary spending caps but not the caps for nondefense (that includes SFOPS) required by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25 ). Congressional Action
On September 7 and 8, 2017, the Senate and House respectively passed the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018, and Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2017 ( H.R. 601 ; P.L. 115-56 ). As signed by the President on September 8, 2017, the act provided continuous government funding (continuing resolution, or CR) at the FY2017 level, reduced by 0.6791%, through December 8, 2017. On September 7, 2017, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its State, Foreign Operations, 2018 bill ( S. 1780 ), with a total of $51.35 billion in discretionary and mandatory funding for FY2018 ($6.2 billion more than the FY2018 request), including $20.79 billion for OCO (the same as FY2017 enacted). As compared with the request and the House bill, the Senate bill included 42% more OCO funds. The Senate SFOPS total funding level was $11.1 billion (22%) more than the Administration request and $3.8 billion (7%) more than the House bill. On July 24, 2017, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. While the bill would have provided $7.3 billion more than the President's request, it represented a $10 billion (17%) decline compared with FY2017 total enacted. Compared with the Senate bill, the House funding levels would have been $3.8 billion (7%) less. On September 14, 2017, the House approved a consolidated appropriations bill for FY2018, H.R. 3354 , which incorporated the text of H.R. On February 9, 2018, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA, H.R. 1892 ; P.L. 115-123 ), which continued government funding through March 23, 2018; raised both defense and nondefense discretionary spending limits for FY2018 and FY2019; and extended direct spending reductions through FY2027. The act eased the FY2018 budget process and prevented a breach of the BCA spending limits by raising the overall revised discretionary spending limits from $1.069 trillion for FY2017 to $1.208 trillion for FY2018. It raised the defense cap by $80 billion to $629 billion and the nondefense cap (including SFOPS) by $63 billion to $579 billion for FY2018. On March 23, 2018, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( H.R. FY2018 Budget Request for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS)
The Trump Administration's FY2018 budget request reflected a departure from past Administration budget proposals for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS). About 27% of the State Department and Related Agency funding would have been designated for OCO. 3362 . They included consolidating some bilateral foreign assistance programs, eliminating some programs/entities, and zeroing out funding for the P.L. Other . 480. International Affairs Budget
The International Affairs budget, or Function 150, includes funding that is not in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriation: foreign food aid programs (P.L. | Nearly six months after the start of FY2018, the 115th Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 1625; P.L. 115-141, signed March 23, 2018), which provided FY2018 funding for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS). Division K of the act―State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS)― provided a total of $54.18 billion, including Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds and rescissions. This represented a decrease of 6.1% from the FY2017 actual funding level. Of the total, $16.22 billion (not including rescissions) was for the Department of State, international broadcasting, and related agencies, a reduction of 10.7% as compared with FY2017 levels, and $37.99 billion (not including rescissions) was enacted for foreign operations, 4% below the FY2017 funding level.
President Donald J. Trump submitted his FY2018 budget request to Congress on May 23, 2017. The request sought $40.25 billion (-30% compared with FY2017 enacted) for SFOPS, including Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds. Of this total, $13.20 billion (-27% compared with FY2017 enacted) would have been for Department of State Operations and related programs. For Foreign Operations, the FY2018 request included $27.05 billion (-31% compared with FY2017 enacted). The total OCO funds in the request amounted to $12.02 billion (-42% below FY2017 enacted, including the FY2017 supplemental; excluding the supplemental, it would have been -21%). The OCO designation has the important feature of not counting against the discretionary spending limits imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25).
Prominent issues in the SFOPS request included, among others, reductions in annual appropriations for diplomatic security, contributions to international organizations and international peacekeeping, and educational and cultural exchange programs; a proposal to consolidate several bilateral foreign aid programs into one new account called the Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF); proposed elimination of some foreign operations entities, such as the Trade and Development Agency and the Inter-American Foundation; and a 44% reduction in humanitarian assistance, including a zeroing out of the P.L. 480 (Food for Peace) foreign food aid program.
On July 24, 2017, the House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 3362, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018. The bill would have provided $47.5 billion in discretionary and mandatory funding for FY2018, including $12.02 billion for OCO (the same as requested). The text of H.R. 3362 was later incorporated into a consolidated spending bill, H.R. 3354, which passed the House on September 14, 2017. The total House funding level reflected a $7.3 billion (+18%) increase over the Administration request.
On September 7, 2017, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 1780 with a total of $51.35 billion in discretionary and mandatory funding for FY2018, including $20.79 billion (the same as the FY2017 enacted level) for OCO. This bill would have provided 42% more OCO funds than either the request or the House bill. The Senate SFOPS total funding level was $11.1 billion (22%) more than the Administration request and $3.8 billion (7%) more than the House bill.
On September 7 and 8, 2017, the Senate and House respectively passed the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018, and Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2017 (H.R. 601; P.L. 115-56). As signed by the President on September 8, 2017, the act provided government funding (a continuing resolution, or CR) at the FY2017 rate, reduced by 0.6791%, through December 8, 2017. Subsequent CRs amended that date first to December 22, 2017, then to January 19, 2018, and then February 8, 2018.
On February 9, 2018, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA, H.R. 1892; P.L. 115-123), which continued government funding through March 23, 2018; raised discretionary spending limits for FY2018 and FY2019; and extended direct spending reductions through FY2027. The act eased the FY2018 budget process and prevented a breach of the BCA spending limits by raising the overall revised discretionary spending limit from $1.069 trillion for FY2017 to $1.208 trillion for FY2018. It raised the defense cap by $80 billion to $629 billion and the nondefense cap (including SFOPS) by $63 billion to $579 billion for FY2018. (For more detail on defense FY2018 budget issues, see CRS Report R44866, FY2018 Defense Budget Request: The Basics.)
This is the final update of this report. |
crs_R44632 | crs_R44632_0 | Introduction
Although the extent of future sea-level rise remains uncertain, sea-level rise generally is anticipated to have a range of economic, social, and environmental effects on U.S. coasts. From 1901 to 2010, global sea levels rose an estimated 187 millimeters (mm; 7.4 inches), averaging a 1.7 mm rise annually; estimates are that from 1992 to 2010, the rate increased to 3.2 mm annually. Policy Considerations and Questions .") Sea-Level Rise Issues for Federal Policymakers
In 2010, roughly 100 million people lived in U.S. coastal shoreline counties (exclusive of the Great Lakes) and 2.9 million people resided in coastal shoreline counties of the U.S. territories. Higher sea levels increase permanent or temporary coastal land inundation, change shoreline dynamics and coastal erosion, and increase saltwater intrusion and hydrodynamic changes to coastal freshwater aquifers. If sea-level rise contributes to flooding and associated damages, the federal government can become involved through disaster assistance and the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) for homeowners and businesses. Relative Sea Level
Relative sea level (RSL) refers to the elevation of sea level relative to the land surface from which it is measured. The drivers for rising GSL since 1900 are predominantly thermal expansion of the oceans due to warming ocean water and melting glaciers and ice sheets ( Table 2 ). The oceans have warmed due to a combination of natural variability and the influence of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on atmospheric temperatures. Similarly, glaciers and polar ice sheets have melted since 1900 due to a combination of natural variability and GHG-induced climate change and deposition of pollutants. These regional or local factors can be natural, such as the land rebounding upward after continental ice sheets melted at the end of the last ice age, or they can be due to human activities, such as groundwater pumping, oil and gas extraction, sediment compaction, land management practices, or other factors. In its assessment of future GSL rise, the U.S. National Climate Assessment expressed very high confidence that GSL will rise at least 0.2 meters but no more than 2.0 meters by 2100 (i.e., at least 8 inches to as much as 6.6 feet). Coasts
After a brief introduction to the effects of sea-level rise on U.S. coasts, Part II of the report is divided into the following three sections:
effects on shorelines and ecosystems, which discusses how coastal processes and topography influence how U.S. shorelines and ecosystems may change with sea-level rise; effects on development and society, which describes U.S. coastal development and its coastal storm and nuisance flooding risks; and actions addressing the impacts of sea-level rise, which describes the activities of various federal agencies, existing federal coastal management statutes, and the role of public and private actions. A public policy challenge related to sea-level rise is the intergenerational transfer of risk. Current government programs, policies, and funding would continue. Policies could promote actions that reduce the consequences of the effects of sea-level rise. For all of the policy options, there are the underlying questions of the policies' costs and benefits and of who will bear the costs of not pursuing or pursuing the policies. Considerations for Congress related to the causes of sea-level rise include the following:
How well understood is the current and projected rate of sea-level rise? How may factors that affect sea level change in the future? A challenge for federal lawmakers and other policymakers is how to deal with the tension between federal efforts to manage national and federal government risks (e.g., federal disaster costs, coastal ecosystem shifts) related to sea-level rise and the local, state, and private roles in shaping coastal development and ecosystem health. Among the policy questions associated with sea-level rise facing federal policymakers are the following:
In the U.S. federalist system of shared responsibilities, who is responsible for the costs associated with adjusting to sea-level rise? Are local, regional, and state land-use and development decisions and building requirements contributing to or eroding resilience to sea-level rise and coastal hazards, and what are the implications for the federal role in addressing sea-level rise? Some stakeholders are concerned that insufficient attention is paid to the risk posed by sea-level rise, as well as to the existing risk associated with coastal hazards. Other stakeholders are concerned that overestimating the risk of sea-level rise could result in overinvesting and overdesigning protections and mitigations to sea-level rise. | Policymakers are interested in sea-level rise because of the risk to coastal populations and infrastructure and the consequences for coastal species and ecosystems. From 1901 to 2010, global sea levels rose an estimated 187 millimeters (mm; 7.4 inches), averaging a 1.7 mm (0.07 inch) rise annually. Estimates are that the annual rate rose to 3.2 mm (0.13 inches) from 1992 to 2010. Although the extent of future sea-level rise remains uncertain, sea-level rise is anticipated to have a range of effects on U.S. coasts. It is anticipated to contribute to flood and erosion hazards, permanent or temporary land inundation, saltwater intrusion into coastal freshwaters, and changes in coastal terrestrial and estuarine ecosystems.
Some states, such as Florida and Louisiana, and U.S. territories have a considerable share of their assets, people, economies, and water supplies vulnerable to sea-level rise. In 2010, roughly 100 million people lived in U.S. coastal shoreline counties. Increased flood risk associated with sea-level rise may increase demand for federal disaster assistance and challenge the National Flood Insurance Program. Federal programs support local and state infrastructure investments that may be damaged or impaired, such as roads, bridges, and municipal water facilities. Sea-level rise also is anticipated to affect numerous federal facilities.
Global and Relative Sea Levels. Sea levels are expressed in terms of global sea levels, which is the average value of sea surface heights around the globe, and relative sea levels, which is the sea level relative to the land surface. Since 1900, expanding oceans due to warming ocean water and melting glaciers and ice sheets have been the main drivers of global sea-level rise. Oceans have warmed due to a combination of natural variability and the influence of greenhouse gas emissions on atmospheric temperatures. Similarly, glaciers and ice sheets since 1900 have been melting due to both natural variability and greenhouse gas emissions. In 2012, the U.S. National Climate Assessment expressed very high confidence in global sea levels rising at least 0.2 meters (8 inches) but no more than 2.0 meters (6.6 feet) by 2100.
There are regional and local variations in the rate of sea-level rise. Regional or local factors can be natural, such as the land rebounding upward after continental ice sheets melted at the end of the last ice age, or they may be due to human activities, such as groundwater pumping, oil and gas extraction, sediment compaction, and land management practices, among others. With few exceptions, sea levels are rising relative to the coastlines of the contiguous United States, as well as parts of the Alaskan and Hawaiian coastlines.
Policy Considerations. Policy choices related to sea-level rise have the potential to shape the future development and resiliency of U.S. coasts. Policy options include a continuation of current government programs and policies, actions that address the forces contributing to sea-level rise globally or locally, and actions that reduce the vulnerability to and consequences of sea-level rise on U.S. coasts. For all the policy options, there are underlying questions of costs and benefits and who bears the costs of pursuing or not pursuing the policies. A challenge for federal lawmakers is how to deal with the tension between federal efforts to manage national and federal government risks (e.g., federal disaster costs, coastal ecosystem shifts) related to sea-level rise and the local and state roles in shaping coastal development and ecosystem health. Related policy questions include the following: To what extent do federal programs, regulations, and funding influence how coasts develop and redevelop? Who is responsible for the costs associated with adjusting to sea-level rise? Who will bear the risks associated with vulnerable coastal development and infrastructure? Some stakeholders are concerned that governments at all levels are paying insufficient attention to the risks posed by sea-level rise; others are concerned that overestimating the risk of sea-level rise could result in foregoing current uses of coastal areas and promoting overinvestment and overdesign of sea-level rise mitigation and adaptation.
CRS In Focus IF10468, Sea-Level Rise and U.S. Coasts, also provides a brief overview of sea-level rise science and policy options. |
crs_RL34207 | crs_RL34207_0 | Since the federal crop insurance program is permanently authorized, it does not require periodic reauthorization in an omnibus farm bill. Although the scope of the program has widened significantly over the past 25 years, the anticipated goal of crop insurance replacing disaster payments has not been achieved. See the Appendix , below, for a comparison of the crop insurance and disaster assistance provisions in the enacted 2008 farm bill, with the House- and Senate-passed versions of the farm bill and previous law. Reducing Crop Insurance Program Costs
Because of the rising cost of the crop insurance program, many policymakers viewed the program as a potential target for spending reductions, whereby savings could be used to fund new initiatives in various other titles of the farm bill. Consequently, Title XII of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-246 , the 2008 farm bill) contains several revisions to the crop insurance program, most of which are designed to reduce program costs. For all crop insurance provisions in Title XII, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates net budget outlay savings of $3.9 billion over 5 years (FY2008-FY2012), or $5.6 billion over 10 years (FY2008-FY2017), relative to the March 2007 baseline which was the official budget scoring benchmark for the bill. Timing of Crop Insurance Payments
Approximately $2.8 billion of this estimated five-year savings is attributable to changes in the timing of premium receipts from farmers, and payments to the participating insurance companies. None of these revisions would directly affect the final monetary amounts for participating farmers or insurers, but would still be scored as savings within the five-year horizon of the bill. The 2008 farm bill (Sec. Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
For many years, policymakers have been concerned about waste, fraud, and abuse within the federal crop insurance program. 12021) authorizes up to $4 million annually for data mining activities beginning in FY2009, and authorizes $15 million annually for four years (FY2009-FY2013) to upgrade USDA's computer technology for crop insurance. Supplemental Crop Revenue Assistance Program (SURE)
The SURE program is designed to compensate eligible producers for a portion of crop losses that are not eligible for an indemnity payment under the crop insurance program (i.e., the portion of losses that is part of the deductible on the policy.) To be eligible for a payment, a producer must be either in or contiguous to a county that has been declared a disaster area by either the President or the Secretary of Agriculture. The statute made an exception for the 2008 crop year by allowing producers who did not purchase crop insurance or NAP coverage in advance to be eligible for the program, as long as they pay the equivalent administrative fee for coverage within 90 days of enactment. Other Authorized Disaster Programs
In addition to the supplemental crop revenue assistance payment program described above, the 2008 farm bill also authorizes and funds four smaller disaster programs: (1) Livestock Indemnity Payments, which compensate ranchers at a rate of 75% of market value for livestock mortality caused by a disaster; (2) Livestock Forage Disaster Program, to assist ranchers who graze livestock on drought-affected pastureland or grazing land; (3) Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honey Bees and Farm Raised Fish, which will provide up to $50 million to compensate these producers for disaster losses not covered under other disaster programs; and (4) Tree Assistance Program, for orchardists and nursery growers who can receive a payment to cover 70% of the cost of replanting trees or nursery stock following a disaster (up to $100,000 per year per producer). | The federal government has relied primarily on two policy tools in recent years to help mitigate the financial losses experienced by crop farmers as a result of natural disasters—a federal crop insurance program and congressionally mandated ad-hoc crop disaster payments. Congress has made several modifications to the crop insurance program since the 1980s, in an effort to forestall the demand for supplemental disaster payments. Although the scope of the crop insurance program has widened significantly over the past 25 years, the anticipated goal of crop insurance replacing disaster payments has not been achieved.
The federal crop insurance program is permanently authorized and hence does not require periodic reauthorization; however, some modifications were made to it in the context of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246, the 2008 farm bill). Some policymakers viewed the projected baseline outlays for the crop insurance program as a potential target for program cost reductions, and proposed using these savings to fund new initiatives in various other titles of the farm bill. Consequently, many of the new crop insurance provisions are cost-saving measures. According to Congressional Budget Office estimates, the crop insurance provisions (Title XII) in the 2008 farm bill will reduce program baseline outlays by $3.9 billion over the five-year period of the bill (FY2008-FY2012). Much of the savings ($2.8 billion) is achieved through a change in the timing of crop insurance payments and receipts that will not directly affect the final monetary amounts for participating farmers or insurance companies. The rest of the savings is generated through increased fees paid by farmers for catastrophic coverage and a reduction in reimbursements to the participating insurance companies for their operating expenses, among many other provisions. To address concerns about program waste, fraud, and abuse, the farm bill also authorizes up to $4 million annually for data mining activities beginning in FY2009.
Separately, Title XV of the 2008 farm bill authorizes a new trust fund with projected costs of $3.8 billion for providing agricultural disaster assistance available on an ongoing basis over the next four years through five new programs. The largest program is a supplemental revenue assistance payment program for crop producers that is designed to compensate eligible producers for a portion of crop losses that are not eligible for an indemnity payment under the crop insurance program. To be eligible for a payment, a producer must be either in or contiguous to a county that has been declared a disaster area by either the President or the Secretary of Agriculture. An eligible producer also is required to have purchased crop insurance in advance of a disaster. However, the statute makes an exception for the 2008 crop year by allowing uninsured producers to be eligible, as long as they pay the equivalent administrative fee for coverage within 90 days of enactment.
For a description of all crop insurance provisions in the enacted 2008 farm bill, and a comparison of the provisions with the House- and Senate-passed versions of the bill and previous law, see the Appendix at the end of this report. |
crs_RL31883 | crs_RL31883_0 | Though representing separate organizations, the two CI offices share resources, funds, andpersonnel for some programs. (11)
As part of the restructuring, Congress proposed creating dual CI offices in DOE and NNSA.Within DOE, the already-existing Office of Counterintelligence (OCI) was codified and maderesponsible for developing CI policy for both DOE and NNSA; but, was only authorized to implement that policy at non-NNSA facilities. The NNSAAdministrator would report to the Energy Secretary. Supporters argue that a separate, dedicated CI office within NNSA is necessary ifcounterintelligence is to receive the focus it warrants. Second, is the current partially bifurcated CI managementstructure within DOE and NNSA the most effective approach to CI management? (20) The PFIAB, in 1999 recommended the establishment of a semi-autonomous agency within DOE, with its own coherentCI structure. (25)
Former DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham, after completing his own review of the bifurcatedCI structure, concluded in 2003 that the structure was "not optimal"and proposed to Congress thatthe Department's two CI programs be consolidated under DOE's control, and that the combinedoffice report directly to the Energy Secretary. (29) If Congress, however,ultimately decides to modify the structure, a number of organizational approaches have beenproposed. Alternative One: Maintain the Status Quo
DOE's Office of Counterintelligence would continue to be responsible for developing CIpolicy across DOE (including the NNSA) but implementing that policy only at non-NNSA facilities. (NNSA/ODNCI) would continue to implement CI policy at NNSA facilities. Proponents suggest that this approach would establish clearer lines of authority for CI within DOEand NNSA, which would improve communication and coordination. Opponents counter that suchan arrangement would produce chaos at the field level and could lead to future problems ofredundancy, coordination, communications, and relations with law enforcement. Opponents counter that this approach would leave in place two CI offices, one withpolicymaking responsibilities and one with operational responsibilities, thereby contributing tocontinuing confusion as to roles and mission. Alternative Four: Consolidate All CI Within DOE
The final approach consolidates the two CI programs, either under the control of the EnergySecretary, or under the control of the NNSA administrator. Proponents of DOE consolidation assertthat the importance of CI argues for a consolidated effort controlled by the Energy Secretary. (33)
Opponents counter that consolidating CI under DOE control would be inconsistent withCongress' intent to maximize NNSA autonomy in all areas, and particularly with regard to CI,because of DOE's perceived deeply rooted anti-security culture. | Troubled by reported lapses in security and counterintelligence (CI) at the Department ofEnergy (DOE), the Congress in 1999 established a semi-autonomous agency -- the National NuclearSecurity Administration (NNSA) -- to oversee DOE's national security-related programs ( P.L.106-65 ). Within NNSA, Congress created the Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence to implement CI policy at NNSA facilities. DOE retained a separate Office of Counterintelligence,which develops CI policy for DOE and NNSA, but, implements it only at non-NNSA facilities. Though representing separate organizations, the two CI offices share resources and personnel forsome programs. Although DOE has taken steps to strengthen CI practices, some observers havequestioned whether the Department's bifurcated CI structure is the most effective in counteringcontinuing efforts by foreign intelligence services, friendly and hostile, to target DOE and NNSAfacilities.
Several organizational approaches have been discussed, including the following.
One approach is to maintain the status quo. Proponents suggest that the current structureis necessary if CI is to receive the attention it warrants. Opponents counter that dual offices lead toinefficiencies that could undermine CI effectiveness.
Under a second approach, DOE and NNSA CI programs could be completely separated. Proponents suggest that this approach would establish clearer lines of authority. Opponents counterthat this arrangement would produce chaos at the field level and lead to coordination andcommunication problems.
A third approach would be to give NNSA authority to implement all CI programming, whilepreserving for DOE all CI policymaking responsibility. Proponents suggest that doing so wouldresult in integrated and coordinated CI operational activity. Opponents counter that this approachstill would leave in place two separate CI offices and lead to continuing confusion over roles andmission.
Finally, Congress could consolidate the two CI programs, either under the direct control ofthe Energy Secretary, or under the supervision of the NNSA administrator. Proponents of DOEcontrol assert that the importance of CI argues for a consolidated office that answers directly to theDOE Secretary. Opponents contend consolidation within DOE would contravene Congress's intentto maximize NNSA autonomy in all areas, including CI, because of DOE's perceived deeply rootedanti-security culture. They recommend that all CI programs be consolidated, but under the NNSAAdministrator rather than the Energy Secretary.
Former DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham proposed consolidating the two CI programs intoa single office reporting directly to the Energy Secretary. Congress, however, continues to supportthe bifurcated program. Energy Secretary Samuel W. Bodman is reviewing various legislativeproposals, including one that would consolidate the two CI programs under DOE control. Thisreport will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R45136 | crs_R45136_0 | Introduction
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P.L. 115-123 ), which was enacted on February 9, 2018, addresses a number of issues that were before Congress. Specifically, appropriations for most federal agencies and programs were set to expire on February 8, 2018, and BBA 2018 extends continuing appropriations for these agencies and programs through March 23, 2018. In addition, BBA 2018 includes FY2018 supplemental appropriations, an increase to the debt limit, increases to the statutory spending limits for FY2018 and FY2019, tax provisions, and numerous provisions extending or making changes to mandatory spending programs, among other topics. Division E of BBA 2018 is titled the Advancing Chronic Care, Extenders, and Social Services (ACCESS) Act, which includes provisions affecting the following programs: Medicare; Medicaid; the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP); public health programs; the Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting (MIECHV) program; foster care and child welfare; social impact partnerships; child support enforcement; and prison data reporting. This report provides information about the provisions from Division E of BBA 2018 related to CHIP, certain public health programs, the MIECHV program, and the Medicaid program. These other CHIP-related provisions include the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, the qualifying states option, the Express Lane Eligibility option, the maintenance of effort (MOE) for children, the Pediatric Quality Measures Program, and the outreach and enrollment program. BBA 2018 further extends CHIP funding and these other CHIP-related provisions through FY2027. Public Health3
BBA 2018 extends funding for a number of public health programs funded through mandatory appropriations. Among the programs that receive additional funding through BBA 2018 for FY2018 and FY2019 are two Special Diabetes Programs, the Health Professions Opportunity Grant Program, and the National Health Service Corps. BBA 2018 also extends or increases FY2018 and FY2019 mandatory funding for—and makes programmatic changes to—the Family-to-Family Health Information Program, an abstinence education program now known as the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program; the Personal Responsibility Education Program (which relates to teen pregnancy prevention); the health center program; and the teaching health center graduate medical education program. In addition to the funding extensions included in the BBA 2018, the law reduces the amounts appropriated to the Public Health and Prevention Fund as a funding offset. BBA 2018 extends mandatory funding of $400 million for the program for each of FY2017 through FY2022. Under the BBA 2018, jurisdictions may use some MIECHV funding for a pay-for-outcomes initiative. Medicaid6
BBA 2018 includes some Medicaid provisions as offsets. These Medicaid offsets are (1) modifying the reductions to Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) allotments; (2) making various changes to the third-party liability (TPL) rules; (3) requiring states to consider "qualified lottery winnings" and/or "qualified lump sum income" when determining Medicaid eligibility for certain individuals; (4) changing the rebate obligation with respect to line-extension drugs; and (5) rescinding funds from the Medicaid Improvement Fund. Abbreviated Summary of Provisions
Table 1 provides a high-level summary of the provisions under Division E of BBA 2018 for CHIP, public health, the MIECHV program, and Medicaid. | The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P.L. 115-123), which was enacted on February 9, 2018, addresses a number of issues that were before Congress. For example, appropriations for most federal agencies and programs were to expire on February 8, 2018, and BBA 2018 extends continuing appropriations for these agencies and programs through March 23, 2018. In addition, BBA 2018 includes FY2018 supplemental appropriations, an increase to the debt limit, increases to the statutory spending limits for FY2018 and FY2019, tax provisions, and numerous provisions extending or making changes to mandatory spending programs, among other topics.
Division E of BBA 2018 is titled the Advancing Chronic Care, Extenders, and Social Services (ACCESS) Act, which includes provisions affecting the following programs:
Medicare; Medicaid; the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP); public health programs; the Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting (MIECHV) program; foster care and child welfare; social impact partnerships; child support enforcement; and prison data reporting.
This report provides information about the provisions from Division E of BBA 2018 related to CHIP, certain public health programs, the MIECHV program, and the Medicaid program.
BBA 2018 extends CHIP funding and other CHIP-related provisions (i.e., the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, the qualifying states option, the Express Lane Eligibility option, the maintenance of effort [MOE] for children, the Pediatric Quality Measures Program, and the outreach and enrollment program) for FY2024 through FY2027.
BBA 2018 extends funding for a number of public health programs that were funded through direct appropriations. Among the programs that receive additional funding through BBA 2018 for FY2018 and FY2019 are two Special Diabetes Programs, funding for the Health Professions Opportunity Grant Program, and the National Health Service Corps. BBA 2018 also extends funding, and in some cases increased funding, with programmatic changes for the Family-to-Family Health Information Program, an abstinence education program now known as the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program; the Personal Responsibility Education Program (which relates to teen pregnancy prevention); the health center program; and the teaching health center graduate medical education program. In addition, the law reduces the amounts appropriated to the Public Health and Prevention Fund as a funding offset.
BBA 2018 also extends funding of $400 million annually for the MIECHV program from FY2017 through FY2022. It requires states and other jurisdictions to continue to track and report on performance outcomes. It also allows jurisdictions to use some MIECHV funding for a pay-for-outcomes initiative, among other changes.
BBA 2018 includes some Medicaid provisions as offsets. These Medicaid offsets are related to (1) Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) allotments; (2) the third-party liability (TPL) rules; (3) consideration of "qualified lottery winnings" and/or "qualified lump sum income" when determining Medicaid eligibility; (4) the rebate obligation with respect to line-extension drugs; and (5) the Medicaid Improvement Fund.
This report provides a table with abbreviated summaries for the provisions in Division E of BBA 2018 related to CHIP, certain public health programs, the MIECHV program, and the Medicaid program. The table is followed by detailed summaries for each of these provisions, including background information and descriptions of the BBA 2018 provision. |
crs_R42329 | crs_R42329_0 | U nder the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, the President and the Senate share the power to fill high-level politically appointed positions in the federal government. The Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution also empowers the President unilaterally to make a temporary appointment to such a position if it is vacant and the Senate is in recess. Such an appointment, termed a recess appointment , expires at the end of the following session of the Senate. President Barack Obama made 32 recess appointments. President Obama made four recess appointments during a three-day recess between pro forma sessions of the Senate on January 3 and January 6, 2012, a period that was generally considered too short to permit recess appointments. The recess during which the President made the appointments was part of a period of Senate absence that would otherwise have constituted an intrasession adjournment of 10 days or longer. In an opinion regarding the lawfulness of these appointments, the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice argued that "the President may determine that pro forma sessions at which no business is to be conducted do not interrupt a Senate recess for the purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause." The U.S. Supreme Court later concluded otherwise in a case regarding three of the four appointments. These three recess appointments were found by the Court to be constitutionally invalid. This report identifies recess appointments made by President Obama. The report discusses these recess appointments in the context of recess appointment authorities and practices generally, and it provides related statistics. Additional information concerning recess appointments by President George W. Bush, general recess appointment practices, and legal issues pertaining to judicial recess appointments in particular may be found in other CRS reports. Characteristics of Recess Appointments by President Obama
Full-Time and Part-Time Positions
All of the 32 recess appointments made by President Obama were to full-time positions. During his presidency, President William J. Clinton made 139 recess appointments, 95 to full-time positions and 44 to part-time positions. President George W. Bush made 171 recess appointments, 99 to full-time positions and 72 to part-time positions. In 20 of the 32 instances in which a related nomination was submitted, the Senate subsequently confirmed the nominee to the position to which he or she had been recess appointed. With regard to the 12 remaining individuals, the nominations of 9 were subsequently withdrawn by the President, and the nominations of the 3 remaining individuals were returned to the President, under Senate rules. The table provides, for each appointment, the name of the appointee, the position to which he or she was appointed, and the date on which the appointment was announced. Entries in bold are recess appointments that were made during a recess within a session of Congress ( intrasession recess appointments). All other entries are recess appointments that were made during a recess between Congresses or between sessions of Congress ( intersession recess appointments). During periods of extended absence, the Senate used pro forma sessions to avoid recesses of more than three days. As noted above, in a June 26, 2014, opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this question, concluding that, for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, "the Senate is in session when it says it is, provided that, under its own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate business." | Under the Constitution, the President and the Senate share the power to make appointments to high-level politically appointed positions in the federal government. The Constitution also empowers the President unilaterally to make a temporary appointment to such a position if it is vacant and the Senate is in recess. Such an appointment, termed a recess appointment, expires at the end of the following session of the Senate. This report identifies recess appointments by President Barack Obama. The report discusses these appointments in the context of recess appointment authorities and practices generally, and it provides related statistics. Congressional actions to prevent recess appointments are also discussed.
President Obama made 32 recess appointments, all to full-time positions. During his presidency, President William J. Clinton made 139 recess appointments, 95 to full-time positions and 44 to part-time positions. President George W. Bush made 171 recess appointments, 99 to full-time positions and 72 to part-time positions.
Six of President Obama's recess appointments were made during recesses between Congresses or between sessions of Congress (intersession recess appointments). The remaining 26 were made during recesses within sessions of Congress (intrasession recess appointments).
In each of the 32 instances in which President Obama made a recess appointment, the individual also was nominated to the position to which he or she was appointed. In all of these cases, a related nomination to the position preceded the recess appointment. In 20 of the 32 cases, the Senate later confirmed the nominee to the position to which he or she had been recess appointed. The nominations of the 12 remaining recess appointees were either returned to, or withdrawn by, the President.
Beginning in the 110th Congress, the Senate periodically used pro forma sessions to prevent the occurrence of a recess of more than three days. There appears to have been an expectation that this scheduling would block the President from making recess appointments, based on an argument that an absence of the Senate of three days or less would not constitute a "recess" long enough to permit the use of this authority.
In January 2012, President Obama made four recess appointments during a three-day recess between pro forma sessions of the Senate on January 3 and January 6, 2012, a period that was generally considered too short to permit recess appointments. The recess during which the President made the appointments was part of a period of Senate absence that, absent the pro forma sessions, would have constituted an intrasession adjournment of 10 days or longer.
In an opinion regarding the lawfulness of these appointments, the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice argued that "the President may determine that pro forma sessions at which no business is to be conducted do not interrupt a Senate recess for the purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause." The U.S. Supreme Court later concluded otherwise in a case regarding three of the four appointments. It held that, for purposes of the Clause, "the Senate is in session when it says it is, provided that, under its own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate business." The three recess appointments at issue were found to be constitutionally invalid.
Additional information on recess appointments may be found in other CRS reports: CRS Report RS21308, Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33310, Recess Appointments Made by President George W. Bush, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33935 | crs_RL33935_0 | It found that CEO pay in the United States to be about 1.3 times that of CEOs in the UK and argued that a significant portion of the greater U.S. CEO pay could be attributed to the higher proportion of equity-based pay, such as stock options, in the United States, and the higher risk premiums associated with such pay. The Economics of Executive Pay
High and rising executive pay could be a cause for policy concern on efficiency grounds or on equity grounds. Current pay levels would be economically inefficient if they resulted from a market failure that prevented pay levels from reflecting an equilibrium between supply and demand in the labor market for executives. Some economists argue that the trend in executive pay is not just an equity issue, it is the result of market imperfections that allow executives to manipulate the market outcome. It could also be that the increase in pay is driven by a relative increase in the demand for executives. But does the board really represent the shareholders' interests? Since executives at competing firms are also overpaid, the firm's performance would not fall behind its competitors. Board "Capture"
The neo-classical model assumes that executive pay is determined through "arm's length contracting": in negotiating the executive's pay, the board of directors (typically through its compensation committee) is charged with driving the best bargain it can obtain on behalf of shareholders. "Golden parachutes," generous severance or retirement packages (details of which do not have to be disclosed beforehand), "golden hellos" (additional incentives to join a company), life insurance, deferred compensation, personal loans (before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act), bonuses that are not linked to company performance, and company-provided perks in the form of vehicles, aircraft, and club memberships are all examples of stealth compensation. From a neo-classical perspective, it is difficult to understand why stock options are awarded rather than stock—when the options are too far "underwater" (the stock price is below the option's strike price), there is no incentive effect, and when it is close to the strike price, executives may be extremely risk averse for fear that the option will fall below the strike price. In the context of this report, this shift to so-called "performance-based" pay turns out to be important because it was the source of most of the rise in executive pay in the 1990s and 2000s. BF identify several common characteristics of stock options that seem inconsistent with the pay for performance mantra. Stock options are almost always designed to reward absolute performance rather than relative performance. Yet boards have become more independent and active in recent years. From an economic perspective, the starting point for determining whether pay is excessive is likely to be whether or not pay exceeds marginal product. They fall under three broad categories: improving the transparency of executive pay, strengthening board independence to reduce the potential for board capture, and strengthening shareholder control over the board and management. Factors that may have played a larger role in the growth of stock options include the bull market of the 1990s, not having to treat stock options as a corporate expense, and pressure on firms to provide executive pay that better aligned their interests with those of shareholders. A Cap on the Deductibility of Executive Pay When It Exceeds a Certain Ratio of Non-Managerial Pay
Some critics of executive pay have advocated changing Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code to prohibit businesses from taking tax deductions for compensation provided to executives when the ratio of executive pay to that of its employees exceeds a certain level. In July 2007, the SEC proposed two quite divergent policy proposals. The managerial power critique has fueled growing interest in giving shareholders a non-binding vote on individual executive pay packages. 1257 ), which was approved by the House on April 19, 2007, and Obama's companion and identically named bill ( S. 1181 ). | In the past ten years, the pay of chief executive officers (CEOs) has more than doubled, and the ratio of median CEO to worker pay has risen to 179 to 1. High and rising executive pay could be an issue of public concern on two different grounds. First, it is contributing to widening income inequality that may be of concern from an equity perspective. Second, it could be the result of economically inefficient labor markets. It is difficult to determine whether executive pay is excessive across the board since executives' marginal product cannot be directly observed. An upward trend in pay over time is not sufficient proof that the market is not efficient since factors determining supply and demand, such as the skills required of the position, can change over time. To show that pay is excessive from an economic perspective, one must first demonstrate that there is a market failure that is preventing the market from functioning efficiently. The market failure could originate in the division in large modern firms between management and ownership, which is typically dispersed among millions of shareholders. Shareholders' interests are represented by a board of directors. Critics of executive pay have argued that boards have all too often been "captured" by the executive and are no longer negotiating pay packages that are in the shareholders' best interests. They point to a number of common practices that they call "stealth compensation" which are inconsistent with arm's length contracting. These include "golden parachutes," generous severance packages, company-provided perks, and bonuses that are unrelated to firm performance.
Stock options have been the fastest growing portion of executive pay since the 1990s, and critics believe this pattern can also be explained through the prism of stealth compensation. Rewarding executives with employee stock options was often justified in terms of the "pay for performance" mantra, but options are usually designed to reward absolute, not relative, performance. This means that in the bull market of the 1990s, when virtually all stock prices were rising, a company could fall behind its competitors and its executives could still receive handsome options payouts. Indeed, a sizeable portion of the increase in executive pay in the 1990s was likely due to options that turned out to be much more valuable than expected because of the unprecedented price increases of the bull market.
Many of the recent corporate scandals appear consistent with stealth compensation as well. Stock options backdating, earnings manipulation, and accounting fraud might have been motivated by attempts to covertly increase executive pay. If short-term fluctuations in the stock price are not good proxies of firm performance, then tying compensation to the stock price can create incentives for executives to engage in activities that are detrimental to shareholders. Policy proposals mostly focus on improving transparency, increasing board independence, and strengthening shareholder control rather than attempting to curb pay directly. S. 1181 (Obama) and H.R. 1257 (Frank), which the House approved on April 19, 2007, would give shareholders a non-binding vote on executive pay. Another proposal would modify the limit on deductibility of executive pay from corporate taxation. More broadly, income inequality could be reduced by increasing the progressivity of the tax system. For current developments and legislation, see CRS Report RS22604, Excessive CEO Pay: Background and Policy Approaches. |
crs_RL33017 | crs_RL33017_0 | In the resulting redistribution of subcommittee responsibilities, the Subcommittees on Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development (VA-HUD) and Military Construction were eliminated and some of their responsibilities were assigned to a new Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs under the chairmanship of Representative James T. Walsh. The reconstituted subcommittee continued under the chairmanship of Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson and was renamed the Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans Affairs. Title I: Department of Defense
Military Construction
Army Modularity
All of the military operating forces are undergoing significant structural reorganization as part of the Department of Defense transformation effort. 109-105 ) that the Army's change in organization is intertwined with two other initiatives, Military Base Realignment and Closure, and the redeployment of 60,000 - 70,000 troops from overseas garrisons to posts in the United States and its territories over the next decade. 2559 , P.L. The Commission was also enjoined to "submit to the President and Congress a report which shall contain a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of the Commission, together with its recommendations for such legislation and administrative actions as it considers appropriate ... [and] the report shall also include a proposal by the Commission for an overseas basing strategy for the Department of Defense in order to meet the current and future mission of the Department." We have concluded that we are doing too much too fast and a reordering of the steps is necessary. Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom
The Fiscal Year 2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation request included $1.0 billion to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq through military construction in these and surrounding countries. While the total number of veterans is declining, the number receiving benefits is increasing. In addition to the increased number of beneficiaries, much of the projected increases in recent years result from cost-of-living adjustments for compensation benefits and from liberalizations to the Montgomery GI Bill, the primary education program. 109-188 ) provided $1.5 billion in supplemental appropriations for veterans medical services for FY2005, with carryover authority for FY2006 as well. This action was taken by Congress in response to the FY2005 budget shortfall of more than $1 billion announced by the Administration. 109-105 ), making appropriations for Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies for FY2006 (MIL-CON appropriations bill). Selected Websites
House Committee on Appropriations http://appropriations.house.gov/
Senate Committee on Appropriations http://appropriations.senate.gov/
House Committee on Armed Services http://www.house.gov/hasc/
Senate Committee on Armed Services http://armed-services.senate.gov/
House Committee on Veterans Affairs http://veterans.house.gov/
Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs http://veterans.senate.gov/
Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (Overseas Basing Commission) http://www.obc.gov/
CRS Appropriations Products Guide http://www.crs.gov/products/appropriations/apppage.shtml
CRS Multimedia Library http://www.crs.gov/products/multimedia/multimedialibrary.shtml
Congressional Budget Office http://www.cbo.gov/
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC Commission) http://www.brac.gov
Government Accountability Office http://www.gao.gov/ | The structure of the Committees on Appropriations underwent significant change with the beginning of the 109th Congress. As a result, jurisdictions over the appropriations covered in this report, including military construction, military housing allowances, military installation maintenance and operation, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and other veteran-related agencies, rest in the House Committee on Appropriations with the new Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs. In the Senate Committee on Appropriations, jurisdiction for military construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and other veteran-related agencies lies with the Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, while military housing allowances and military installation maintenance and operation are the responsibility of the Subcommittee on Defense. Authorization jurisdictions lie with the two Committees on the Armed Services and Committees on Veterans Affairs.
Key issues in congressional action to date include:
Military Construction: The changing structure of the Army, the redeployment of troops from overseas garrisons to domestic bases, and the current BRAC round have drawn committee attention during the appropriation process. The report of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (the Overseas Basing Commission), created by Congress, concluded that the Department of Defense (DOD) plan for withdrawing forces from long-standing garrisons in Europe and Asia is moving too fast and that DOD has not engaged in substantive consultation with other agencies whose operations would be affected by the changes. The funding of the construction of military infrastructure in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq), whether continuing through emergency supplemental appropriations or transitioning to the normal annual appropriation cycle, has also been discussed in hearings. Veteran Benefits: Entitlement spending is rising as the number of beneficiaries is increasing, education benefits are being augmented, and annual cost of living adjustments are being granted. Benefits such as disability compensation, pensions, and education are mandatory payments and constitute more than half ($36.6 billion) of the VA appropriation of approximately $70 billion. Veteran Medical Care: The Administration has again requested legislative changes to increase certain co-payments and other cost-sharing fees for veterans in lower priority categories. After VA announced a shortfall of more than $1 billion from its FY2005 enacted appropriations for veterans health programs, $1.5 billion in supplemental appropriations was added by P.L. 109-54. |
crs_R44930 | crs_R44930_0 | Of the 33 temporary tax provisions that expired at the end of 2016, 13 were business-related tax provisions. All 13 business tax provisions that expired at the end of 2016 have been included in recent tax extenders legislation, although one was extended through 2021, leaving 12 that expired at the end of 2017. Most recently, Congress extended expiring tax provisions in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA18; P.L. 115-123 ). This law retroactively extended temporary tax provisions that had expired at the end of 2016 through 2017. This report briefly summarizes and discusses the economic impact of the 12 business-related tax provisions that expired at the end of 2017. Under the special expensing rules for film, television, and live theatrical productions, taxpayers may elect to deduct immediately up to $15 million of production costs ($20 million for productions produced in certain low-income and distressed communities) in the tax year incurred. The cost recovery period for racehorses is seven years, although racehorses that begin training after age two have a three-year recovery period. Accelerated Depreciation for Business Property on an Indian Reservation7
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ( P.L. Extending the provision might encourage additional investment on Indian Reservations. The election to expense advanced mine safety equipment, along with the mine rescue team training credit (discussed below), were enacted following the high-profile mining accident at Sago Mine. For more analysis of EZs, see CRS Report R41639, Empowerment Zones, Enterprise Communities, and Renewal Communities: Comparative Overview and Analysis , by [author name scrubbed]. Other Business Provisions
Credit for Certain Expenditures for Maintaining Railroad Tracks30
Qualified railroad track maintenance expenditures paid or incurred in a taxable year by eligible taxpayers qualify for a 50% business tax credit. Deduction Allowable with Respect to Income Attributable to Domestic Production Activities in Puerto Rico32
The Section 199 domestic production activities deduction reduces tax rates on certain types of economic activity, primarily domestic manufacturing activities. For general information on the Section 199 deduction, see CRS Report R41988, The Section 199 Production Activities Deduction: Background and Analysis , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS In Focus IF10688, Key Issues in Tax Reform: The Section 199 Deduction , by [author name scrubbed]. The 2017 tax legislation ( P.L. | Twelve temporary business tax provisions expired at the end of 2017. All of these provisions had expired at the end of 2016 but were retroactively extended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA; P.L. 115-123) and made available for the 2017 tax year, although one provision was extended through 2021.
This report briefly summarizes and discusses the economic impact of selected business-related tax provisions that expired at the end of 2017, including the following.
Special business investment (cost recovery) provisions:
Special Expensing Rules for Certain Film, Television, and Live Theatrical Productions Seven-Year Recovery Period for Motorsports Entertainment Complexes Three-Year Depreciation for Race Horses Two Years or Younger Accelerated Depreciation for Business Property on an Indian Reservation Election to Expense Advanced Mine Safety Equipment
Economic development provisions:
Empowerment Zone Tax Incentives American Samoa Economic Development Credit
Other business-related provisions:
Credit for Certain Expenditures for Maintaining Railroad Tracks Deduction Allowable with Respect to Income Attributable to Domestic Production Activities in Puerto Rico Indian Employment Tax Credit Mine Rescue Team Training Credit Special Rate for Qualified Timber Gains
This report does not include provisions that in the past have been classified as individual or energy-related. See CRS Report R44925, Recently Expired Individual Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R44990, Energy Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders"), by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. For a general overview of tax provisions that expired in 2016, see CRS Report R44677, Tax Provisions that Expired in 2016 ("Tax Extenders"), by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RS22814 | crs_RS22814_0 | It takes an average of 15 years from the moment a manufacturer first approaches the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with an idea for a new drug to its final approval for marketing. For drugs and biologics that address unmet needs or serious diseases or conditions, FDA regularly uses three formal mechanisms to expedite the development and review process: Fast Track product development, Priority Review, and Accelerated Approval. Accelerated Approval involves different concerns than do the other programs designed to speed the normal process for important new products, and therefore this paper will not discuss it further. FDA's Web pages on the use of its Fast Track and Priority Review programs provide the review times for successful applications. If an application is assigned to one year in the Fast Track column and to another in the All Priority column, for example, relying on the annual median approval times could distort the comparisons. The other categories, however, overlap. For seven of the nine years, median Fast Track times were shorter than Priority Reviews, suggesting that Fast Track may have reduced time-to-market beyond the shortening of review time afforded by Priority Review. | By statutory requirements and by regulation, guidance, and practice, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) works with several overlapping yet distinct programs to get to market quickly new drug and biological products that address unmet needs. FDA most frequently uses three mechanisms for that purpose: Accelerated Approval, Fast Track, and Priority Review. The first two affect the development process before a sponsor submits a marketing application. Accelerated Approval allows surrogate endpoints in trials to demonstrate effectiveness and is relevant in fewer situations than the others. The Fast Track program encourages a sponsor to consult with FDA while developing a product. Unlike the others, Priority Review involves no discussions of study design or procedure; it relates only to an application's place in the review queue. Analysis of total approval time for approved applications under the Fast Track and Priority Review programs shows that for seven of the past nine years, Fast Track products have shorter median approval times than do all those applications assigned to Priority Review. |
crs_RL34347 | crs_RL34347_0 | Background and Context
Since 1973, 84 Members of Congress—69 Representatives and 15 Senators—have died in office. When a sitting Member dies, the House and Senate carry out a number of actions based on chamber rules, statutes, and long-standing practices. Some congressional practices related to the death of a sitting Member predate the national legislature established by the Constitution. Evidence from the Senate Journal , House precedents, and other historical documents shows that some long-standing observances, such as adjourning briefly as a mark of respect to the deceased, appointing Member delegations to attend funerals of deceased colleagues, or paying the costs of a funeral from public funds, may be employed. In addition to some evolutionary changes in institutional patterns, it appears that contemporary congressional response is affected by a number of external factors including the following:
circumstances of the Member's death; preferences of the deceased Member, or the Member's family, regarding funeral services; whether Congress is in session when the Member dies; pending congressional business at the time of the Member's death; and events external to Congress. Consequently, it appears that congressional response to the death of a sitting Member could be characterized as a set of actions that are determined in detail at or around the time of the death, in response to an array of factors. Generally, these actions fall into five categories:
Floor Announcement or Acknowledgment; Resolution of Condolence; Funeral; Deceased Member's Office, Staff, and Survivor Benefits; and Publication of Memorials. Since 1953, Congress has typically adopted a concurrent resolution authorizing the use of the Capitol Rotunda for services or for the remains of a government official or prominent citizen to lie in the Capitol. | Since 1973, 84 Members of Congress—69 Representatives and 15 Senators—have died in office. When a sitting Member dies, the House and Senate carry out a number of actions based on chamber rules, statutes, and long-standing practices. Some observances, such as adjourning briefly as a mark of respect to the deceased, appointing Member delegations to attend funerals of deceased colleagues, or paying the costs of a funeral from public funds, were initially observed in the earliest Congresses, or predate the national legislature established under the Constitution. It appears that contemporary congressional response to the death of a sitting Member is affected by a number of external factors including the following: circumstances of the Member's death, preferences of the deceased Member or the Member's family regarding funeral services, whether Congress is in session when the Member dies, pending congressional business at the time of the Member's death, and events external to Congress at the time.
Congressional response to the death of a sitting Member could be characterized as a broad set of actions that are determined in detail at or around the time of the death, in response to a wide array of factors. Broadly, these actions fall into five categories, including announcement or acknowledgment on the House or Senate floor; consideration of resolutions of condolence; a funeral or other rites; issues related to the deceased Member's office, staff, and survivor benefits; and publication of memorials.
This report, which will be updated as events warrant, is one of several CRS products focusing on various aspects of the operations and administration of Congress and the legislative branch. Others include CRS Report RL30064, Congressional Salaries and Allowances, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R42072, Legislative Branch Agency Appointments: History, Processes, and Recent Proposals, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34619, Use of the Capitol Rotunda, Capitol Grounds, and Emancipation Hall: Concurrent Resolutions, 101st to 112th Congress, by Matthew Eric Glassman and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R42365, Representatives and Senators: Trends in Member Characteristics Since 1945, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R45105 | crs_R45105_0 | Introduction
In September 2017, Hurricanes Irma and Maria, both Category 5 storms, caused catastrophic damage to the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI). On September 6, the eye of Hurricane Irma passed over portions of the USVI—including St. Thomas and St. John—with maximum winds of 185 miles per hour (mph). On September 20, the eye of Hurricane Maria swept near St. Croix with maximum winds of 175 mph. The USVI government estimates that uninsured damage from the hurricanes will exceed $7.5 billion. According to the Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority (VIWAPA), the public water and power utility on the USVI, the Estate Richmond (St. Croix) and Krum Bay (St. Thomas) power plants fared "relatively well during the passage of Hurricane Maria" and provided uninterrupted electrical service to hospitals. However, according to the USVI recovery funding requests, the government estimates that 80-90% of the power transmission and distribution systems across the USVI were damaged. Before the 2017 hurricane season, VIWAPA was already challenged with fiscal problems and aging infrastructure. Although the USVI has never defaulted on its obligations, it shares similar fiscal challenges as other islands in the Caribbean. These include high debt levels, pension obligations, decreasing tax bases, and outdated infrastructures. Policymakers are currently considering possible options for rebuilding the electricity grid on the islands, given the financial debt before the damage from the storms. Should Congress consider funding for electric power restoration, management of the electric power system by VIWAPA or alternatives to VIWAPA may be considered. Congress may consider whether investment incentives to form public-private partnerships could provide alternatives for modernizing the USVI's grid. Congress may also consider the role of comprehensive energy planning and whether the efforts to restore electric power in USVI will need to progress beyond simple restoration of electricity, and require new investment and oversight by the federal government. Like many remote island communities, the USVI is dependent on fuel oil for the generation of electricity. VIWAPA has actively sought to improve energy efficiency and diversify its energy resources in an effort to reduce fossil fuel-based energy use by 60% by 2025. Collaboration with DOE and Western Area Power Administration
On September 13, FEMA authorized the U.S. Department of Energy's Western Area Power Administration (DOE-WAPA) to assist with emergency power restoration efforts on the USVI. On November 30, 2017, the final crew members from DOE-WAPA had completed their electric power system restoration activities and left the USVI. Within that total, the request for the energy sector is $850 million. These goals include reducing operating costs of both electricity and water systems and decreasing dependence on fossil fuels. Maximize development of solar and wind resources. Grid Hardening and Improving Resiliency
Electric power systems exposed to the elements in the USVI were severely damaged by the 2017 hurricanes. | In September 2017, Hurricanes Irma and Maria, both Category 5 storms, caused catastrophic damage to the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI), which include the main islands of Saint Croix, Saint John, and Saint Thomas among other smaller islands and cays. Hurricane Irma hit the USVI on September 6, with the eye passing over St. Thomas and St. John. Fourteen days later, on September 20, the eye of Hurricane Maria swept near St. Croix with maximum winds of 175 mph. The USVI government estimates that total uninsured damage from the hurricanes will exceed $7.5 billion. Although the electric power plants fared "relatively well" according to the local public water and power utility (the Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority [VIWAPA]), 80-90% of the power transmission and distribution systems across the USVI were damaged. In November 2017, the government of the USVI estimated that $850 million in hurricane recovery funding is needed to help "rebuild a more resilient electrical system."
Before the 2017 hurricane season, VIWAPA was already challenged with fiscal problems and aging infrastructure. Although the USVI has never defaulted on its obligations, its fiscal problems include high debt levels, pension obligations, decreasing tax bases, and outdated infrastructures.
Like many remote island communities, the USVI is dependent on fuel oil for the generation of electricity. Until 2014, VIWAPA was 100% dependent on fuel oil. In 2010, the USVI established a goal to reduce fossil fuel-based energy use by 60% by 2025. As a result, VIWAPA has actively sought to improve energy efficiency and diversify its energy resources, particularly through the use of propane, solar, and wind power.
Initial disaster recovery efforts focused on restoring power. On September 13, 2017, the Federal Emergency Management Agency authorized the U.S. Department of Energy's Western Area Power Administration (DOE-WAPA) to assist with emergency power restoration efforts on the USVI. DOE-WAPA completed their electric power system restoration activities and left the USVI by November 29.
Hurricanes and extreme weather will continue to threaten the Caribbean, which may prompt Congress to consider infrastructure hardening and improvements to make the systems more resilient. Building a modernized, flexible electric grid, capable of incorporating more renewable sources of electricity, underpinned by more efficient fossil fuel power plants and energy storage, may help the USVI accomplish these goals.
Policymakers are currently considering possible policy options for rebuilding the electricity grid with greater resiliency. This report explores several alternative electric power system structures for meeting the electricity services and needs of the USVI. The cost of rebuilding and modernizing the entire USVI electric grid likely far exceeds the fiscal capacity of the territory in the current budget environment. Incorporating resiliency could also be expensive. Congress may consider the role of comprehensive energy planning and whether the efforts to restore electric power in the USVI should include support for a resilient and modernized electric power system. Additional support for a modernized electrical grid may require new investment by the federal government, investment incentives to form public-private partnerships, or debt adjustments, among other strategies. |
crs_RL34123 | crs_RL34123_0 | In addition to hands-on assistance, caregivers may arrange, supervise, or pay for formal care to be provided to the care recipient, either as temporary relief from the caregiver's responsibilities (i.e., respite care) or on a more permanent basis. Background
Family caregivers fulfill the majority of the need for long-term care by older persons with chronic disabilities in the United States. Demographic trends such as increases in life expectancy, as well as advances in medical care, have enabled persons with disabilities to live longer. The aging of the baby-boom generation is also likely to increase demand for family caregiving to the older population. As demand for caregiving to older persons with disabilities is likely to increase, other demographic trends, such as smaller family sizes and increased divorce rates, may limit the number of available caregivers to older individuals, as well as the capacity for caregivers to provide needed care. Family caregivers are diverse in terms of gender, age, relationship to the care recipient, and life circumstances. Recognizing family caregivers as an important part of the nation's long-term care delivery system, the federal government has established programs and initiatives that provide direct support to caregivers. Direct supports such as respite care, education and training, tax relief, and cash assistance are targeted at caregivers to reduce stress and financial hardship, and to improve caregiving skills, among other things. Other federal programs and initiatives provide home and community-based long-term care services and supports to the care recipient. These programs can indirectly benefit caregivers in relieving caregiver burden by either supplementing the informal care being provided or substituting some informal care with paid support. However, these federal provisions (discussed in the next section) are not widely used for the purpose of caring for an older frail family member. The Effects of Family Caregiving
The Physical, Emotional, and Financial Effects of Caregiving
While many family members find caregiving a rewarding and satisfying activity, caregivers may also face increased physical strain, emotional stress, and financial hardship as a result of caregiving responsibilities. Other federal programs and initiatives provide home and community-based long-term care services and supports to the care recipient. This section briefly describes three sets of policies that would expand or enhance the federal government's role in providing direct assistance to family caregivers to older adults. These policy issues, which have either received recent congressional attention or otherwise been the subject of discussion among federal policy makers and other interested stakeholders, are organized into the following topics: enhancing and expanding caregiver services and supports, assisting employed caregivers through flexible workplace accommodations and income security, and providing caregivers with opportunities for additional tax credits. | Family caregiving to older individuals in need of long-term care encompasses a wide range of activities, services, and supports. Caregiving can include assistance with personal care needs, such as bathing, dressing, and eating, as well as other activities necessary for independent living, such as shopping, medication management, and meal preparation. In addition, family caregivers may arrange, supervise, or pay for formal or paid care to be provided to the care recipient.
Family caregivers fulfill the majority of the need for long-term care by older persons with chronic disabilities in the United States. As a result of increases in life expectancy, as well as the aging of the baby-boom generation, demand for family caregiving to the older population is likely to increase. However, demographic trends such as reduced fertility, increased divorce rates, and greater labor force participation among women may limit the number of available caregivers to older individuals, as well as the capacity for caregivers to provide needed care.
Although many family caregivers find caregiving for an older family member a rewarding experience, other life circumstances, in addition to caregiving, may increase caregiver stress. For example, family members may not live in close proximity to the care recipient, they may face the competing demands of child care and elder care, and they may have to manage work with caregiving responsibilities. As a result, family caregiving can lead to emotional and physical strain and financial hardship. These effects are more likely to be felt among those caring for persons with high levels of disability or cognitive impairment. Caregiver stress has been linked to nursing home admission for the care recipient, thus interventions that can reduce stress may also reduce nursing home placement.
Recognizing family caregivers as an important part of the nation's long-term care delivery system, the federal government has established programs and initiatives that provide direct supports to caregivers, such as respite care, education and training, tax relief, and cash assistance. These benefits are targeted at family caregivers to reduce stress and financial hardship, and to improve caregiving skills, among other things. Other federal programs and initiatives provide home and community-based long-term care services and supports to the care recipient. These programs can indirectly benefit caregivers in relieving caregiver burden by either supplementing the informal care they are providing or substituting with paid support.
Three sets of policies that would provide direct assistance to family caregivers to older adults are briefly discussed in the last section of this report. These policy issues, which have been the subject of discussion among federal policymakers and other interested stakeholders, include the following: caregiver services and supports, flexible workplace accommodations and income security, and additional tax credits. |
crs_R41756 | crs_R41756_0 | Statutory Protections
A patchwork of federal and state laws exists to protect the privacy of certain personal information. There is no comprehensive federal privacy statute that protects personal information held by both the public sector and the private sector. This report does not address state privacy laws. The private sector's collection and disclosure of personal information has been addressed by Congress on a sector-by-sector basis. Federal laws and regulations extend protection to consumer credit reports, electronic communications, federal agency records, education records, bank records, cable subscriber information, video rental records, motor vehicle records, health information, telecommunications subscriber information, children's online information, and customer financial information. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform
In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to strike a balance between the fundamental privacy rights of citizens and the legitimate needs of law enforcement with respect to data shared or stored in various types of electronic and telecommunications services. | There is no comprehensive federal privacy statute that protects personal information. Instead, a patchwork of federal laws and regulations govern the collection and disclosure of personal information and has been addressed by Congress on a sector-by-sector basis. Federal laws and regulations extend protection to consumer credit reports, electronic communications, federal agency records, education records, bank records, cable subscriber information, video rental records, motor vehicle records, health information, telecommunications subscriber information, children's online information, and customer financial information. Some contend that this patchwork of laws and regulations is insufficient to meet the demands of today's technology. Congress, the Obama Administration, businesses, public interest groups, and citizens are all involved in the discussion of privacy solutions. This report examines some of those efforts with respect to the protection of personal information. This report provides a brief overview of selected recent developments in the area of federal privacy law. This report does not cover workplace privacy laws or state privacy laws.
For information on access to electronic communications, see CRS Report R41733, Privacy: An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33983 | crs_RL33983_0 | Background
Daniel Ortega was a leader of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) when it overthrew the corrupt and repressive Somoza family dictatorship in 1979. When the pro-Soviet Sandinistas gained control of the government and pursued increasingly radical social policies, including redistribution of land and wealth, the United States backed opposition "contras" who launched an eight-year war (1982-1990) against the government. As part of the Central American Peace Plan, Ortega's Sandinista government agreed to internationally monitored democratic elections in February 1990, which he lost and peacefully ceded to Violeta Chamorro. Since 1990 Nicaragua has developed democratic institutions and a framework for economic development. Nonetheless, significant challenges remain: Nicaragua is still very poor, the second poorest nation in the western hemisphere. Its institutions are weak and often corrupt. Recent Political Developments
2006 Elections3
Three elements were key to Ortega's victory: a change in Nicaraguan electoral law, an effective political machine, and a divided opposition. Ortega won only 37.9% of the vote, but was able to avoid a run-off vote because he was 9.6% ahead of the next closest candidate, Eduardo Montealegre of the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN). Montealegre, who gained 28.3% of the vote, is a Harvard-educated banker and former finance minister. He was regarded by many as the U.S.-favored candidate. Montealegre's second place position garnered him a seat in the legislature. The PLC then came in third place with 26.2% for candidate José Rizo, an ally of Alemán and critic of President Bolaños. Critics accused both U.S. officials and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez of trying to influence the election's outcome. Conversations between Ortega and U.S. officials, including President Bush, indicate both sides are seeking a cooperative relationship. Nonetheless, since taking office, Ortega has continued to vacillate between populist, anti-U.S. rhetoric, and pragmatic reassurances that his second administration will respect private property and pursue free-trade policies. Issues in U.S.-Nicaraguan Relations
Level and Focus of U.S. Assistance
Some Members of Congress have criticized the Administration's reduced levels of some funding to Latin America, including to Nicaragua. The Administration notes, however, that it has supported forgiveness of Nicaraguan debts, and is providing significant amounts of aid through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) (see " Development and Poverty Reduction ," below). President Ortega has said he will honor the CAFTA-DR agreement. Property Claims
Resolution of property claims by U.S. citizens has been a contentious area in U.S.-Nicaraguan relations for decades, since the Sandinista regime expropriated property in the 1980s. Congress has also expressed concern over improving civilian control over defense policy. | Sandinista leader and former President Daniel Ortega was inaugurated to a five-year term as President on January 10, 2007. Three elements were key to Ortega's victory in the November 2006 presidential election: a change in Nicaraguan electoral law, an effective political machine, and a divided opposition. Ortega won only 37.9% of the vote, but was able to avoid a run-off vote because he was ahead of the next closest candidate, Eduardo Montealegre of the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN), by more than the 5% required by law. Montealegre, who gained 28.3% of the vote, was regarded by many as the U.S.-favored candidate. His second place position garnered him a seat in the legislature. The Liberal Constitutional party (PLC) then came in third place with 26.2% for candidate José Rizo, an ally of the corrupt former President, Arnoldo Alemán. Critics accused both U.S. officials and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez of trying to influence the election's outcome.
Ortega was a leader of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) when it overthrew the Somoza family dictatorship in 1979. When the pro-Soviet Sandinistas gained control of the government the United States backed opposition "contras" who launched an eight-year war (1982-1990) against the government. Ortega's government agreed to democratic elections in February 1990, which he lost. Since 1990 Nicaragua has developed democratic institutions and a framework for economic development. Nonetheless, significant challenges remain: Nicaragua is still very poor, the second poorest nation in the western hemisphere. Its institutions are weak and widely viewed as corrupt.
In his first three months in office, Ortega has continued to vacillate between anti-U.S. rhetoric and pragmatic reassurances that his second administration will respect private property and pursue free-trade policies, as he did during his campaign. Ortega and U.S. officials have indicated that both sides are seeking a cooperative relationship, however.
There is debate among some Members and the Administration over what the appropriate level and focus of U.S. aid to Nicaragua should be. The Administration says its top priority in Nicaragua is consolidating democratic processes, including reforming the judicial system, implementing good governance, and combating corruption. Another issue is promoting development and poverty reduction; the Millennium Challenge Account compact between the two countries focuses on reducing rural poverty through road-building, increased wages, and strengthening property rights. Supporting the U.S.-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) is the dominant trade issue; President Ortega has said he will honor the agreement. Resolution of property claims by U.S. citizens and immigration are contentious areas in U.S.-Nicaraguan relations. Other issues in U.S.-Nicaraguan relations include improving respect for human rights, improving civilian control over defense policy, the state of Nicaraguan missiles, and increasing Nicaragua's capacity to combat transnational crimes such as narcotics trafficking. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43296 | crs_R43296_0 | Congress adjourned, however, without enacting any of them. 1695 (Representative Scott (VA)) and S. 619 (Senator Paul) would have permitted federal courts to impose a sentence below an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum when necessary to avoid violating the requirements of Section 3553(a). S. 1410 (Senator Durbin)/ H.R. 3382 (Representative Labrador) would have reduced those mandatory minimum sentences by half. H.R. Unlike the Durbin bill ( S. 1410 ), the Waters proposal ( H.R. Safety Valve
The so-called safety valve provision of 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) allows a court to sentence qualified defendants below the statutory mandatory minimum in controlled substance trafficking and possession cases. Finally, the defendant must have a virtually spotless criminal record, that is, not more than 1 criminal history point. S. 1410 (Judiciary), as voted out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, would have expanded safety valve eligibility from defendants with no more than 1 criminal history point to those with no more than 2 points, if they avoided certain disqualifications. 2372 (Representative Scott (VA)) would have eliminated the sentencing distinction between powder and crack cocaine by eliminating the cocaine base specific references. Three proposals would have addressed the Fair Sentencing Act's retroactive application. One, H.R. It would also have allowed a court to reduce, consistent with the act, a previously imposed sentence for crack cocaine possession or trafficking. The others, S. 1410 (Judiciary) and S. 1410 (Senator Durbin)/ H.R. 3382 (Representative Labrador), would also have permitted a court to reduce such sentences, but would have limited the authority to instances in which the defendant had not been previously granted or denied a similar reduction. The mandatory minimums, imposed in addition to the sentence imposed for the underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking, vary, depending upon the circumstances:
imprisonment for not less than five years, unless one of higher mandatory minimums below applies; imprisonment for not less than seven years, if a firearm is brandished; imprisonment for not less than 10 years, if a firearm is discharged; imprisonment for not less than 10 years, if a firearm is a short-barreled rifle or shotgun or is a semi-automatic weapon; imprisonment for not less than 15 years, if the offense involves the armor piercing ammunition; imprisonment for not less than 25 years, if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of Section 924(c); imprisonment for not less than 30 years, if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer; and imprisonment for life, if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of Section 924(c) and if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer. Some of the proposals in the 113 th Congress would have enlarged the coverage of 924(c); others would have curtailed it. H.R. 2405 (Representative Scott (VA)) would have stripped Section 924(c) of its mandatory minimum penalties. H.R. 722 (Representative King (NY)) would have added two years to each of these base mandatory minimums of Section 924(c)(1)(A), if the firearm were stolen or had had its serial number defaced. H.R. 404 (Representative Schiff) would have established a two-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for violation of either false statement proscription if the offense involved two or more firearms and an intent to subsequently transfer them to an ineligible person. 117 (Representative Holt) would have required the Attorney General to establish a system of handgun registration and licensing. Elsewhere, possession without a federal license or of an unregistered handgun would have been punishable by imprisonment for not less than 15 years. Sex Offenses and Domestic Violence
S. 1410 (Judiciary) would have added new mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for various federal sex offenses and for interstate domestic violence. H.R. 1468 (Representative Blackburn) would have created a separate crime for anyone who, during and in relation to a violation of Section 1030 substantially impaired or attempted to impair the operation of a critical infrastructure computer system or an associated critical infrastructure. H.R. 457 (Representative Issa) would have established mandatory minimum penalties for each of these reentry offenses. 1577 (Representative Poe) and S. 698 (Senator Cornyn) would have expanded the class of protected public servants; increased the penalties associated with homicides committed against them; established mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for killing or assaulting them; and created a new flight-to-avoid-prosecution offense for fugitives accused of such crimes, punishable by a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. H.R. H.R. | Defendants convicted of violating certain federal criminal laws face the prospect of mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment. Bills offered during the 113th Congress would have supplemented, enhanced, or eliminated some of these. The most all-encompassing, H.R. 1695 (Representative Scott (VA)) and S. 619 (Senator Paul) would have permitted federal courts to impose a sentence below an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum when necessary to avoid violating certain statutory directives.
Federal drug statutes feature a series of mandatory minimums. S. 1410 (Senator Durbin)/H.R. 3382 (Representative Labrador) and S. 1410 (Judiciary), as voted by the Judiciary Committee, would have reduced several of the most severe of these. H.R. 3088 (Representative Waters) would have eliminated virtually all of them. The Durbin bill would also have enlarged the safety valve exception. The safety valve provision allows a federal court to sentence qualified defendants below the statutory mandatory minimum in drug cases, if the defendant has a virtually spotless criminal record, that is, has not more than one criminal history point. S. 1410 would have expanded safety valve eligibility to defendants with a slightly more extensive criminal record. Elsewhere, H.R. 2372 (Representative Scott (VA)) would have dropped the sentencing distinction between powder and crack cocaine by striking the cocaine base specific references. Two proposals would have addressed the Fair Sentencing Act's retroactive application. One, H.R. 2369 (Representative Scott (VA)) would have permitted a court to reduce, consistent with the act, a previously imposed sentence for crack cocaine possession or trafficking. The second, S. 1410 (Senator Durbin), would also have permitted a court to reduce such sentences, but would have limited the authority to instances in which the defendant had not been previously granted or denied a similar reduction.
The firearms bills were mixed. H.R. 2405 (Representative Scott (VA)) would have stripped the mandatory minimums from Section 924(c) that outlaws possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or serious drug offense. On the other hand, H.R. 722 (Representative King (NY)) would have added two years to each of Section 924(c)'s mandatory minimums, if the firearm were stolen or had had its serial number defaced. H.R. 404 (Representative Schiff) would have established a two-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for violation of either of the two firearm acquisition false statement (straw purchaser) proscriptions, if the offense involved two or more firearms and an intent to subsequently transfer them to an ineligible person. H.R. 117 (Representative Holt) would have required the Attorney General to establish a system of handgun registration and licensing. Possession without a federal license or of an unregistered handgun would have been punishable by imprisonment for not less than 15 years.
Several proposals would have added or enhanced the mandatory minimums associated with individual offenses. For instance, S. 1410 (Judiciary) would have set new mandatory minimums for various weapons and sex offenses. H.R. 1468 (Representative Blackburn) would have created a separate crime for anyone who, during and in relation to a computer fraud or abuse violation, substantially impaired or attempted to impair the operation of a critical infrastructure computer system or an associated critical infrastructure. H.R. 457 (Representative Issa) would have established mandatory minimum penalties for an alien previously removed from the U.S. for his criminal activities. H.R. 1577 (Representative Poe) and S. 698 (Senator Cornyn) would have expanded the class of protected public servants; increased the penalties associated with homicides committed against them; established mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for killing or assaulting them; and created a new flight-to-avoid-prosecution offense for fugitives accused of such crimes, punishable by a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. The 113th Congress adjourned without enacting any of the proposals relating to mandatory minimum sentencing. |
crs_R40238 | crs_R40238_0 | Once a location for a presidential library has been determined, and the facility is deeded or otherwise placed into the custody of the United States, the former President's records are to be deposited there. The provisions of the PRA have remained relatively unchanged since the law's 1978 enactment, except for several technical amendments. The increasing volume of records created by incumbent Presidents may prompt further concerns about incumbent Presidents' abilities to appropriately collect and retain records. Congress has the authority to revise or enhance recordkeeping requirements for incumbent Presidents, including requiring more systematic methods for collecting and maintaining email or Internet records. 113-187 also prevents the President and his immediate staff from use of a "non-official electronic messaging account" to create federal records, unless that record is forwarded to an "official" email address within five days. The Presidential Records Act
As noted above, the Presidential Records Act (PRA) was enacted in 1978, and the statute, as amended, instructs the collection and retention of—as well as codifies public access to—presidential records. Pursuant to the PRA, presidential records are collected and maintained by the incumbent President until he leaves office. Presidential Interpretations of the PRA
Successive presidential Administrations have interpreted the PRA's meaning differently. Executive Order 13489
During his first full day in office, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13489, which explicitly revoked E.O. 13233. Under E.O. According to the executive order, the incumbent President could have instructed the Archivist whether to release the records of a former President, and the Archivist is to "abide by" the President's determination—unless directed otherwise by a court order. E.O. The law, among other things, amended the PRA to explicitly provide a 60-day presidential record review period to the incumbent or applicable former President any time the Archivist intended to release previously unreleased presidential records. In many cases, only the .gov email addresses of the President and his immediate staff are equipped with automated email archiving technologies. Maintaining Electronic Records
Capturing Records Across Multiple Platforms
Although the PRA was written prior to the use of electronic platforms to create records, the law appears to require collection and maintenance of—and accessibility to—the records of former Presidents, which today are largely created electronically. According to NARA, the ERA is currently used to preserve the electronic records from the George W. Bush Administration, including the electronic records of former Vice President Dick Cheney, and it is used by archivists to review these records to make them available to the public. The Growth of Presidential Records
Pursuant to the PRA, presidential records are provided to NARA at the end of each presidential administration. Appendix A describes legislative proposals to amend the PRA that were introduced in recent Congresses. It is not clear, however, that existing technologies are capturing all Presidential records in every medium of creation. Additionally, it is unclear whether the records captured and retained will be accessible to the public in perpetuity. In the report to accompany H.R. 44 U.S.C. | Presidential documents are historical resources that capture each incumbent's conduct in presidential office. Pursuant to the Presidential Records Act ((PRA) 44 U.S.C. §§2201-2207), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) collects most records of Presidents and Vice Presidents at the end of each Administration. They are then disclosed to the public—unless the Archivist of the United States, the incumbent President, or the appropriate former President requests the records be kept private.
The PRA is the primary law governing the collection and preservation of, and access to, records of a former President. Although the PRA has remained relatively unchanged since enactment in 1978, successive presidential Administrations have interpreted its meaning differently. Additionally, it is unclear whether the PRA accounts for presidential recordkeeping issues associated with increasing and heavy use of new and potentially ephemeral technologies—like email, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube—by the President and his immediate staff.
Presidential records are captured and maintained by the incumbent President and provided to NARA upon departure from office. The records are then placed in the appropriate presidential repository—usually a presidential library created by a private foundation, which is subsequently deeded or otherwise provided to the federal government. According to data from NARA, the volume of records created by Presidents has been growing exponentially, and the platforms used to create records are also expanding.
On his first full day in office, President Barack H. Obama issued an executive order that grants the incumbent President and relevant former Presidents 30 days to review records prior to their release to the public. E.O. 13489 changed the presidential record preservation policies promulgated by the George W. Bush Administration through E.O. 13233.
During the 113th Congress (2013-2014), a law was enacted to require a 60-day period of review for the incumbent or applicable former President to determine whether to protest the release of particular presidential records. The law appears to supersede E.O. 13489. The law also prevents the President and his immediate staff from using a "non-official electronic messaging account" to create federal records, unless that record was forwarded to an "official" email address.
Congress has the authority to revise or enhance recordkeeping requirements for the incumbent President, including requiring a more systematic method of collecting and maintaining email or Internet records. Congress might also act to examine whether the incumbent President is appropriately capturing all records in every available medium and whether NARA can appropriately retain these records and make them available to researchers and the general public in perpetuity.
This report examines the newly amended provisions of the PRA, reviews the two most recent presidential interpretations of the PRA, and analyzes potential legislative amendments and oversight considerations. The report also explores the complexities of capturing all presidential records in a digital environment, providing potential policy options for Congress. The appendixes provide a review of proposed amendments to the PRA that were introduced, but not enacted, during recent Congresses as well as background on vice presidential records. |
crs_RL33045 | crs_RL33045_0 | Introduction
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA, 19 U.S.C. 1675c), (1) commonly known as the "ByrdAmendment," requires that duties collected due to antidumping or countervailing duty orders mustbe distributed to petitioners and interested parties in the investigations that resulted in the impositionof the orders. Eight countries successfully challenged the CDSOA in a World Trade Organization (WTO)dispute settlement proceeding, and in August 2004 a WTO arbitrator determined the level of"suspension of concessions" (retaliation) that the co-complainants may claim until the United Statescomplies with the WTO ruling. In late November 2004, the European Union, Japan, Korea, India,Brazil, Mexico, Canada, and Chile received formal authorization to retaliate. Mostrecently, repeal of the CDSOA was included in S. 1932 , the Deficit Reduction Act of2005, which was passed by the Senate on November 3, 2005, and by the House on November 18. There have been three other efforts to repeal the CDSOA in the 109th Congress. Inmid-September 2005, two amendments offered by Senator Grassley to H.R. 1680 ) and removed a negotiationrequirement in the Senate-reported bill aimed at preserving the statute ( S.Amdt. In Congress, the controversy over the Byrd Amendment is one component of a larger debateover the future direction of U.S. trade policy. (16)
Analysis of Prior CDSOA Distributions
Pursuant to the act, CBP collected and distributed about $231 million in FY2001, $330million in FY2002, $190 million in FY2003 (an additional $50 million in FY2003 funds was heldin reserve pending resolution of a legal challenge), and $284 million in FY2004. a. (45)
Request to Suspend Concessions. In addition, Mexico began imposing $20.9 million in retaliatory tariffs effective August 18,2005, placing a tariff of 30% on certain prepared milk products, 20% on wine, and 9% on chewinggum. (60)
The CDSOA and the U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Dispute
For Canada, the CDSOA is also tied to the longstanding U.S.-Canadian dispute over tradein softwood lumber, which itself has resulted in WTO and NAFTA complaints by Canadachallenging U.S. agency actions. (80)
Congressional support for the CDSOA is not unanimous, however. S.Amdt. 1681 would have struck the CDSOA negotiation requirement in Senate-reported H.R. Despite a motion to instructSenate conferees to insist that CDSOA repeal not be included in the S. 1932 conferencereport, (89) House andSenate conferees agreed to include a CDSOA provision that would repeal the measure as of the dateof enactment of S. 1932, but would allow the disbursement of duties on all subjectmerchandise entering the United States before October 1, 2007. The House took final action approving the legislation on February 1, 2006, with a vote of216-214. AD or CVD petitions. | The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA), commonly known as the "ByrdAmendment," is a U.S. law providing for the distribution of import duties collected as a result ofantidumping (AD) or countervailing duty (CVD) orders to petitioners and other interested partiesin the investigations that resulted in the orders. CDSOA disbursements amounted to $231 millionin FY2001, $330 million in FY2002, $190 million in FY2003 (with an additional $50 million heldin reserve pending the outcome of a legal challenge), and $284 million in FY2004. The CDSOA wassuccessfully challenged in a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute proceeding brought by 11WTO Members including Canada, the European Union, and Japan. In late 2004, eight of thecomplaining parties were authorized to "suspend concessions" (retaliate) until the United Statescomplies, most readily by repealing the law. Canada and the European Union began retaliating onMay 2, 2005, by placing a 15% additional import duty on selected U.S. exports. Mexico imposedhigher tariffs on U.S. milk products, wine, and chewing gum as of August 18, and Japan placed anadditional tariff of 15% on 15 steel and industrial products as of September 1. Canada is particularlyconcerned that more than $4 billion in AD and CV duty deposits on softwood lumber may eventuallybe available for distribution to U.S. lumber producers under the CDSOA.
Despite strong congressional support for the CDSOA in both chambers, a provision seekingto repeal the measure (while allowing distributions under the Act to continue on all subjectmerchandise entering the United States through October 1, 2007) was included the conference reportaccompanying S. 1932 , the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. The legislation has passedboth Houses, with final House action having taken place on February 1, 2006.
Another bill seeking to repeal the statute H.R. 1121 (Ramstad), was suggestedfor possible inclusion in House miscellaneous duty suspension legislation. In addition, two proposalsrelated to the CDSOA were offered by Senator Grassley as amendments to Commerce and JusticeDepartment appropriations legislation. S.Amdt. 1680 would have limitedimplementation of the CDSOA, while S.Amdt 1681 would have struck a provision inthe Senate-reported bill requiring WTO negotiations aimed at preserving the CDSOA. Theseamendments were not considered on the floor.
Controversy over the CDSOA is part of a larger ongoing debate in Congress, and in thecountry as a whole, on the future direction of U.S. trade policy. As a result, trade remedy issues areexpected to receive continued attention in second session of the 109th Congress. This report willbe updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43434 | crs_R43434_0 | The purpose of this report is to assist congressional staff in identifying and accessing key resources used during such research. This report does not define or describe the purpose of the various information resources and documents; that information can be found in companion CRS Report RL33895, Researching Current Federal Legislation and Regulations: A Guide to Resources for Congressional Staff . This report is not a comprehensive catalog of resources for conducting policy and legislative research; instead, it provides a selection of widely used electronic resources. Executive Branch Documents and Information
Table 3 serves as a reference guide for locating executive branch documents and information using freely available resources. | This report is intended to serve as a finding aid for congressional documents, executive branch documents and information, news articles, policy analysis, contacts, and training, for use in policy and legislative research. It does not define or describe the purpose of various government documents; that information can be found in companion CRS Report RL33895, Researching Current Federal Legislation and Regulations: A Guide to Resources for Congressional Staff. This report is not intended to be a definitive list of all resources, but rather a guide to pertinent subscriptions available in the House and Senate in addition to select resources freely available to the public. This report is intended for use by congressional staff and will be updated as needed. |
crs_RS22768 | crs_RS22768_0 | The Secretary made eight trips to the region during the year, initially to work with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmud Abbas on developing a "political horizon" that would lead to a resumption of the long-stalled Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, issued by the international Quartet (the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia) on April 30, 2003. Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD. They agree to engage in continuous negotiations in an effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008. Negotiations will be bilateral. The parties further commit to continue implementing the Road Map until they reach a peace treaty. | At the end of November 2007, the Bush Administration convened an international conference in Annapolis, MD to officially revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmud Abbas reached a "Joint Understanding," in which they agreed to launch continuous bilateral negotiations in an effort to conclude a peace treaty by the end of 2008 and to simultaneously implement the moribund 2003 Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Both leaders are operating under significant domestic political constraints and they continue to disagree on many issues. Thus, their negotiations will be challenging. This report will not be updated. For background and future developments, see CRS Report RL33530, Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41810 | crs_R41810_0 | However, since 2008, the insourcing initiatives of recent Congresses and the Obama Administration have generated particular controversy. First, the 110 th Congress required that DOD guidelines and procedures also give consideration to using government employees to perform new functions, as well as those that had been contracted out. These and subsequent insourcing initiatives generated several lawsuits, discussed in more detail below, alleging that DOD failed to comply with its own policies and procedures when determining to insource specific functions. However, various provisions of federal law could constrain whether and how agencies may proceed with insourcing in particular circumstances, as well as limit the activities that former contractor employees may perform after being hired by the federal government. These provisions include (1) the Administrative Procedure Act, which could potentially preclude agencies from implementing insourcing determinations that were not made in accordance with any applicable statutes, regulations, or guidelines; (2) contract law, under which agencies could be found to have constructively terminated for convenience, or even breached, certain requirements contracts by augmenting their in-house capacity to perform services provided for in the contract; (3) civil service law, which would generally limit "direct hires" of contractor employees; and (4) ethics law, which could limit the involvement of former contractor employees who are hired by the government in certain agency actions. Administrative Procedure Act and Insourcing Guidelines
Assuming that the decision to insource particular functions is not "committed to agency discretion by law," as the government has recently asserted, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) could potentially constrain such decisions by allowing challenges to agency actions that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." Majority View That the Court of Federal Claims Has Exclusive Jurisdiction
Most federal appellate and district courts that have considered the question have found that contractors' challenges to insourcing determinations fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims because at least some contractors are interested parties, and insourcing determinations are made in connection with proposed procurements. Prudential Standing
While the Court of Federal Claims has consistently found that it has jurisdiction over challenges to insourcing determinations, judges on the court have reached differing conclusions as to whether contractors who meet the statutory standing requirements (i.e., are "interested parties") must also meet prudential standing requirements and, if so, whether they are within the zone of interests protected by various statutes pertaining to insourcing. Expired Contracts and Mootness
Later decisions of the Court of Federal Claims have raised related questions about whether vendors whose contracts have expired have standing to challenge insourcing determinations, or whether such challenges are moot. The court disagreed. To date, the only court to address the issue has apparently assumed, without deciding, that DOD's guidance on "Estimating and Comparing the Full Costs of Civilian and Military Manpower and Contract Support," among other things, was legally binding. The 112 th Congress enacted legislation that calls for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to establish "procedures and methodologies" for use by agencies in deciding whether to insource functions performed by small businesses, including procedures for (1) identifying which contracts are considered for conversion; (2) determining whether particular functions are inherently governmental or critical functions; and (3) comparing the costs of performance by contractor personnel with the costs of performance by government personnel. However, questions about prudential standing could potentially remain, notwithstanding the enactment of this legislation, because prudential standing is a "judicially self-imposed limit[] on the exercise of federal jurisdiction." | Recent Congresses and the Obama Administration have taken numerous actions to promote "insourcing," or the use of government personnel to perform functions that contractors have performed on behalf of federal agencies. Among other things, the 109th through the 111th Congresses enacted statutes requiring the development of policies and guidelines to ensure that agencies "consider" using government employees to perform functions previously performed by contractors, as well as any new functions. The Obama Administration has similarly promoted insourcing, with officials calling for consideration of insourcing in various workforce management initiatives.
Certain insourcing initiatives of the Department of Defense (DOD), in particular, prompted legal challenges alleging that DOD failed to comply with applicable guidelines when insourcing specific functions. The only court to reach the issue assumed, without deciding, that certain guidelines were legally binding. However, other courts have not addressed this issue because of questions about jurisdiction and standing. The parties initially conceded that such suits were cognizable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which permits challenges to agency actions that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law," although the government has recently asserted that insourcing determinations are committed to agency discretion by law and, thus, not reviewable by the courts.
At first, there was some uncertainty as to whether the U.S. Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over such suits under the Administrative Disputes Resolution Act of 1996, or whether the federal district courts had jurisdiction under the APA. However, most courts to address the issue have found that the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to insourcing determinations because such determinations are made in connection with "proposed procurements" and at least some contractors are "interested parties." Later, questions arose about whether contractors who meet the statutory standing requirements (i.e., are "interested parties") must also meet prudential standing requirements. These judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of jurisdiction ensure that plaintiffs are within the "zone of interests" to be protected by the statutes they seek to enforce. Initially, judges on the Court of Federal Claims reached differing conclusions as to whether prudential standing requirements applied, although later decisions may suggest that any prudential standing requirements that apply could potentially be easily met. Most recently, the court has had to determine whether vendors whose contracts have expired have standing to challenge insourcing determinations, or whether such challenges are moot.
Other provisions of law could also potentially constrain whether and how agencies may proceed with insourcing in specific circumstances, or limit the activities that former contractor employees may perform after being hired by the federal government. These include (1) contract law, under which agencies could be found to have constructively terminated certain requirements contracts by augmenting their in-house capacity to perform services provided for in the contract; (2) civil service law, which would generally limit "direct hires" of contractor employees; and (3) ethics law, which could limit the involvement of former contractor employees in certain agency actions.
Members of the 112th Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 112-239) that calls for the Office of Management and Budget to establish "procedures and methodologies" for use by agencies in deciding whether to insource functions performed by small businesses, including procedures for identifying which contracts are considered for conversion and for comparing the costs of performance by contractor personnel with the costs of performance by government personnel. |
crs_R44333 | crs_R44333_0 | Introduction
Public and private health care spending is growing due to increased enrollment in health insurance, demographic changes of an aging society, and the expansion of government programs, among other reasons. While much attention is being paid to the budgetary cost of outlays from the largest federally funded health programs (Medicare and Medicaid), the implicit subsidies in the Internal Revenue Code for the provision of private and publicly provided health care are sometimes overlooked in public debates. These subsidies come in the form of tax expenditures , or provisions that confer preferential tax status to certain forms of income, and result in revenue foregone. This report analyzes these tax expenditures together at the budget function level, rather than focusing on the size of any single provision. For more information on individual tax expenditures, see CRS Committee Print CP10001, Tax Expenditures: Compendium of Background Material on Individual Provisions — A Committee Print Prepared for the Senate Committee on the Budget , by [author name scrubbed] et al. For broader analysis of tax expenditures and comparisons of different categories of tax expenditures, by budget function, see CRS Report R44012, Tax Expenditures: Overview and Analysis , by [author name scrubbed]. The largest tax expenditure in Table 1 is the tax exclusion for employer-sponsored insurance (ESI). From FY2015 to FY2019, JCT estimates that the annual tax expenditure amount for the ESI tax exclusion will increase from $145.5 billion to $169.4 billion. The second largest health tax expenditure value is for subsidies for insurance purchased in the exchanges (the advance premium tax credits, or APTCs, not the cost-sharing subsidies). From FY2015 to FY2019, JCT estimates that the annual tax expenditure amount for APTCs will increase from $29.6 billion to $84.8 billion. The Value of Health-Related Tax Expenditures Over Time
As shown in Figure 1 , after adjusting for inflation, health-related tax expenditures have increased in value over time (as represented, in 2014 constant dollars, by the dotted line in Figure 1 ). From FY1974 to FY2014, the annual tax expenditure value for health-related provisions has increased by 11.5% (nominal dollars) and 7.5% (real dollars), on average. In current, or nominal, dollars, the annual value of health tax expenditures are estimated to increase from $210.4 billion in FY2015 to $296.2 billion in FY2019. Before FY2015, JCT identified Medicare-related tax expenditures as the value of benefits in excess of insurance payments, not the total value of Medicare benefits received. Health-Related Tax Expenditures Relative to Total Revenue
Health-related tax expenditures have also increased from a value relative to 1.9% of total revenue collected in FY1974 to 8.4% in FY2014, as shown in Figure 2 . In other words, the value of health-related tax expenditures has generally increased at a rate greater than the growth of total revenue collections. Comparing Health-Related Tax Expenditures to Health Outlays
Figure 3 displays discretionary and mandatory outlays, as organized under OMB's health budget function, and health-related tax expenditures as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) from FY1974 to FY2014. As shown in Figure 3 , the values of health-related tax expenditures historically exceeded health discretionary outlays, but were still much less than health mandatory outlays (which primarily consist of funding for Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children's Health Insurance Program). | Public and private health care spending is growing due to increased enrollment in health insurance, demographic changes of an aging society, and the expansion of government programs, among other reasons. While much attention is being paid to the budgetary cost of outlays from the largest federally funded health programs (Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children's Health Insurance Program), the implicit subsidies in the Internal Revenue Code for the provision of private- and publicly-provided health insurance are sometimes less prominent in public debates. These subsidies are tax expenditures, or provisions that confer preferential tax status to certain forms of income, and result in revenue foregone.
This report primarily analyzes health-related tax expenditures, or tax expenditures associated with health and Medicare. As of FY2015, JCT identified 14 health tax expenditures. From FY1974 to FY2014, JCT had been identifying three Medicare-related tax expenditures based on the tax-excluded value of benefits in excess of insurance payments (not the total value of benefits).
The single largest tax expenditure is the tax exclusion for employer-sponsored insurance and health coverage (ESI). From FY2015 to FY2019, JCT estimates that the annual tax expenditure amount for the ESI tax exclusion will increase from $145.5 billion to $169.4 billion. The second largest health tax expenditure is for subsidies for insurance purchased in the exchanges (i.e., the advance premium tax credits, or APTCs). From FY2015 to FY2019, JCT estimates that the annual tax expenditure amount for APTCs will increase from $29.6 billion to $84.8 billion.
Congressional interest in health-related tax expenditures could be related to the value of health-related tax expenditures over time, their value relative to total revenue collected, and how they compare to the value of discretionary and mandatory outlays for health.
Health-related tax expenditures have increased in value over time, after adjusting for inflation in constant 2014 dollars. From FY1974 to FY2014, real health-related tax expenditures have increased, on average, at an annual rate of 7.5%. Looking forward, the nominal value of health tax expenditures is estimated to increase from $210.4 billion in FY2015 to $296.2 billion in FY2019.
Health-related tax expenditures have also increased in value relative to total revenue collected, from 1.9% in FY1974 to 8.4% in FY2014. In other words, health-related tax expenditures have generally increased at a rate greater than the growth of total revenue collections.
Over this FY1974 to FY2014 period, the value of health-related tax expenditures as a percent of GDP exceeded health discretionary outlays, but were still much less than health mandatory outlays according to analyses of Office and Management and Budget (OMB) data on health and Medicare spending.
This report analyzes these provisions at the level of a budget function, rather than focusing any single provision. For more information on individual health tax expenditures, see CRS Committee Print CP10001, Tax Expenditures: Compendium of Background Material on Individual Provisions—A Committee Print Prepared for the Senate Committee on the Budget, by [author name scrubbed] et al. For broader analysis of tax expenditures and comparisons of different categories of tax expenditures, by budget function, see CRS Report R44012, Tax Expenditures: Overview and Analysis, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34072 | crs_RL34072_0 | Seasonal Fluctuations . Over the course of several years, the economy routinely experiences a predictable pattern of boom (expansion), followed by bust (recession), followed by recovery that begins the pattern anew. While the government cannot prevent cyclical fluctuations, it can attempt to soften the booms and busts of the business cycle through monetary and fiscal policy. Structural Growth . In the long run, economic progress is not driven by random, seasonal, or cyclical fluctuations. Microeconomic policy changes can foster faster growth in labor, capital, and productivity at the margin. The Business Cycle
In the long run, economic growth is determined solely by the growth rate of productivity and capital and labor inputs that determine the overall production of goods and services—what is sometimes referred to as the "supply side" of the economy. In this scenario, faster economic growth can become "too much of a good thing" because it is unsustainable. Wages can temporarily rise faster than productivity, but the result would be rising inflation. As seen in Figure 2 , this view is not very accurate—consumption is actually one of the most stable components of spending. Long-term growth is often neglected by comparison, yet sustained, permanent, widespread increases in living standards depend on long-term growth, not the business cycle. In a recession, boosting short-term growth is mainly a question of finding ways to stimulate overall spending so that the economy operates at its productive capacity. Most economists believe that the information technology (IT) revolution has been responsible for the productivity growth rebound. Policy Implications
Policymakers' influence over economic activity is limited. Fiscal policy refers to changes in the budget deficit. Monetary policy refers to changes in short-term interest rates by the Federal Reserve. If recessions are usually caused by declines in aggregate spending, and the government can alter aggregate spending through changes in monetary and fiscal policy, then why is it that the government cannot use policy to prevent recessions from occurring in the first place? As discussed in the introduction, the rate of economic growth changes because of both changes in the business cycle and random fluctuations. Policies to Promote Long-Term Growth
As stated above, increases to the economy's productive capacity (or "supply side") are the key to long-term, sustained improvements in living standards. Other policy areas where good policy can foster higher long-term growth include education, taxation, competition, basic research, openness to trade, and infrastructure. The importance of the falling saving rate to long-term growth can be seen in recent capital investment levels, which have been below the historical average in this decade. | Economic growth can be caused by random fluctuations, seasonal fluctuations, changes in the business cycle, and long-term structural causes. Policy can influence the latter two.
Business cycles refer to the regular cyclical pattern of economic boom (expansions) and bust (recessions). Recessions are characterized by falling output and employment; at the opposite end of the spectrum is an "overheating" economy, characterized by unsustainably rapid economic growth and rising inflation. Capital investment spending is the most cyclical component of economic output, whereas consumption is one of the least cyclical. Government can temper booms and busts through the use of monetary and fiscal policy. Monetary policy refers to changes in overnight interest rates by the Federal Reserve. When the Fed wishes to stimulate economic activity, it reduces interest rates; to curb economic activity, it raises rates. Fiscal policy refers to changes in the federal budget deficit. An increasing deficit stimulates economic activity, whereas a decreasing deficit curbs it. By their nature, policy changes to influence the business cycle affect the economy only temporarily because booms and busts are transient. In recent decades, expansions have become longer and recessions shallower, perhaps because of improved stabilization policy, or perhaps because of good luck.
Long-term growth receives less attention from policymakers than cyclical growth. Yet in a broader view of history, long-term growth is the more important of the two because it is the key to raising living standards. Long-term growth is caused by increases in labor, capital, and productivity. Policy changes in the areas of education, taxation, competition, basic research, and infrastructure can influence the economy's long-term growth rate, but only at the margins. Long-term growth has altered very little over most of U.S. history despite a broad array of policy changes. That fact is less surprising when one considers that the main contributor to long-term growth is technological progress, over which the government has little direct influence. In recent years, long-term growth has accelerated modestly because of higher productivity growth, driven mainly by what is popularly referred to as the "information technology (IT) revolution." Although the government had little direct influence over the IT revolution, it provided an environment in which those technological changes were allowed to thrive, which likely explains why many other economies did not experience a similar productivity acceleration.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL32165 | crs_RL32165_0 | The Chinese government modified its currency policy on July 21, 2005. It announced that the yuan's exchange rate would become "adjustable, based on market supply and demand with reference to exchange rate movements of currencies in a basket," (it was later announced that the composition of the basket includes the dollar, the yen, the euro, and a few other currencies), and that the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar against the yuan would be immediately adjusted from 8.28 to 8.11, an appreciation of about 2.1%. Since July 2005, China has allowed the yuan to appreciate steadily, but slowly. The overall value of the dollar has fallen significantly, to the point where some economists and policymakers fear that a further fall could be destabilizing to the U.S. economy. Concerns Over China's Currency Policy and Recent Action
Many U.S. policymakers, business people, and labor representatives have charged that China's currency is significantly undervalued vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar by as much as 40%, making Chinese exports to the United States cheaper, and U.S. exports to China more expensive, than they would be if exchange rates were determined by market forces. They further argue that the undervalued currency has contributed to the burgeoning U.S. trade deficit with China, which has risen from $30 billion in 1994 to $256 billion in 2007, and has hurt U.S. production and employment in several U.S. manufacturing sectors (such as textiles and apparel and furniture) that are forced to compete domestically and internationally against "artificially" low-cost goods from China. Furthermore, many analysts contend that China's currency policy induces other East Asian countries to intervene in currency markets in order to keep their currencies weak against the dollar to remain competitive with Chinese goods. Trends and Factors in the U.S.-China Trade Deficit
Critics of China's currency peg often point to the large and growing U.S.-China trade imbalance as proof that the yuan is significantly undervalued and constitutes an attempt to gain an unfair competitive advantage over the United States in trade. These factors have led many analysts to conclude that much of the increase in U.S. imports (and hence, the rising U.S. trade deficit with China) is a result of China becoming a production platform for many foreign companies (who are the largest beneficiaries from this arrangement), rather than unfair Chinese trade policies. Economic Consequences of China's Currency Policy
If the yuan is undervalued against the dollar, as many critics charge, then there are benefits and costs of this policy for the economies of both China and the United States. Rather, it leads to a compositional shift in U.S. production, away from U.S. exporters and import-competing firms toward the firms that benefit from the lower interest rates caused by Chinese capital inflows. The U.S.-China Trade Deficit in the Context of the Overall U.S. Trade Deficit
While China is a large trading partner, it accounted for only about 17% of U.S. imports in 2007 and 29.0% of the sum of the bilateral trade deficits (or 32% of the total U.S. trade deficit, including countries where the United States has a trade surplus). This would reduce spending on interest-sensitive purchases, such as capital investment, housing (residential investment), and consumer durables. If the yuan were to appreciate, there is considerable debate over the net effects this policy would have on the U.S. economy since it may benefit some U.S. economic sectors and harm other sectors, as well as consumers. The extensive involvement of foreign multilateral corporations in China's manufactured exports further complicates the issue of who really benefits from China's trade, as well as the implications of a rising U.S. trade deficit with China (since a large share of U.S. imports are coming from foreign firms, including U.S. firms, that have shifted production from one country to China). | The continued rise in China's trade surplus with the United States and the world, and complaints from U.S. manufacturing firms and workers over the competitive challenges posed by Chinese imports have led several Members to call for a more aggressive U.S. stance against certain Chinese trade policies they deem to be unfair. Among these is the value of the China's currency (the renminbi or yuan) relative to the dollar. From 1994 to July 2005, China pegged its currency to the U.S. dollar. On July 21, 2005, China announced it would let its currency immediately appreciate by 2.1% and link its currency to a basket of currencies (rather than just to the dollar). Although the yuan has appreciated 16% since 2005, many Members complain that China continues to "manipulate" its currency in order to gain an unfair trade advantage, resulting in U.S. job loss. Numerous bills have been introduced to induce China to adopt a more flexible currency policy.
If the yuan is undervalued against the dollar (as many analysts believe), there are likely to be both benefits and costs to the U.S. economy. It would mean that imported Chinese goods are cheaper than they would be if the yuan were market determined. This lowers prices for U.S. consumers and dampens inflationary pressures. It also lowers prices for U.S. firms that use imported inputs (such as parts) in their production, making such firms more competitive. When the U.S. runs a trade deficit with the Chinese, this requires a capital inflow from China to the United States, such as Chinese purchases of U.S. Treasury securities. This, in turn, lowers U.S. interest rates and increases U.S. investment spending. On the negative side, lower priced goods from China may hurt U.S. industries that compete with those products, reducing their production and employment. In addition, an undervalued yuan makes U.S. exports to China more expensive, thus reducing the level of U.S. exports to China and job opportunities for U.S. workers in those sectors. However, in the long run, trade can affect only the composition of employment, not its overall level. Thus, inducing China to appreciate its currency would likely benefit some U.S. economic sectors, but would harm others. U.S. data indicate that in 2008, imports from China have slowed significantly and that import prices have risen sharply. Some economists are now concerned that the overall fall in the dollar, which a stronger yuan would exacerbate, could become economically destabilizing.
Critics of China's currency policy contend that the large and growing U.S. trade deficit with China ($256 billion in 2007) is evidence that the yuan is undervalued and harmful to the U.S. economy. However, the relationship is more complex. First, an increasing level of Chinese exports are from foreign-invested companies in China. Second, the deficit masks the fact that China has become one of the fastest growing (and is now the third largest) market for U.S. exports. Finally, the trade deficit with China accounted for 29% of the sum of total U.S. bilateral trade deficits in 2007, indicating that the overall U.S. trade deficit is not caused by the exchange rate policy of one country, but rather the shortfall between U.S. saving and investment. That being said, there are a number of reasons why a more flexible currency policy could benefit both countries. For a brief summary of this report, see CRS Report RS21625, China's Currency: A Summary of the Economic Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44650 | crs_R44650_0 | O n December 15, 2016, USDA published in the Federal Register a final rule, "Enhancing Retailer Standards in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)." This final rule followed USDA-FNS's proposed rule earlier in the year:
On February 17, 2016, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) published the proposed rule. SNAP, the largest of USDA's domestic food assistance programs, provides benefits to eligible participants; these benefits are redeemable for SNAP-eligible foods at SNAP-authorized retailers. SNAP-authorized retailers are stores and other food sellers that are allowed to accept SNAP benefits. The final rule implements provisions of the Agriculture Act of 2014 ("2014 farm bill," P.L. 113-79 ) that made changes to inventory requirements for SNAP-authorized retailers and also addressed other USDA-FNS policy objectives. The proposed rule had been controversial, particularly the provisions not explicitly required by the farm bill. Driving the debate over these changes has been the potential impact on smaller retailers. In FY2015, approximately 82% of benefits were redeemed in supermarkets and superstores. As the proposed rule would have, the final rule made changes to 7 C.F.R. Part 271 and Part 278 in five areas of retailer authorization policy: (1) sales of hot, prepared foods; (2) definition of staple foods; (3) inventory and depth of stock; (4) access-related exceptions to the rules; and (5) disclosures of retailer information. 115-31 , enacted May 5, 2017), which directed USDA to change substantially its implementation of the final rule, particularly variety and breadth of stock requirements. For the most current information on the implementation of retailer standards, see USDA-FNS's website, "Enhancing Retailer Standards in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)," https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/enhancing-retailer-standards-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap . As published, the effective date for the final rule was January 17, 2017, but most aspects of the rule were to take effect in subsequent months. Since enactment of P.L. This is maintained and expanded in the final rule. The final rule included increased flexibility to help stock the required number of varieties. | The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the largest of the U.S Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) domestic food assistance programs, provides benefits to eligible participants; these benefits are redeemable for SNAP-eligible foods at SNAP-authorized retailers. SNAP-authorized retailers are stores and other food sellers that are allowed to accept SNAP benefits. In FY2015, the vast majority of benefits were redeemed at "super stores" and supermarkets.
On December 15, 2016, USDA's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) published in the Federal Register a final rule, "Enhancing Retailer Standards in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)." The final rule implements provisions of the Agriculture Act of 2014 ("2014 farm bill," P.L. 113-79) that increase inventory requirements for SNAP-authorized retailers. In addition, the rule addresses other USDA-FNS policy objectives. Like the proposed rule, the final rule makes changes to 7 C.F.R. Part 271 and Part 278 in five areas of retailer authorization policy: (1) sales of hot, prepared foods; (2) definition of staple foods; (3) inventory and depth of stock; (4) access-related exceptions to the rules; and (5) disclosures of retailer information. The effective date for the final rule is January 17, 2017, but most aspects of the rule take effect on subsequent dates.
The final rule responds to many of the comments and concerns raised about the proposed rule. The proposed rule had been controversial, particularly due to the provisions not explicitly required by the farm bill and due to the potential impact of changed inventory requirements on smaller retailers.
This report focuses on the final rule as published December 15, 2016. However, a number of the changes in the rule will not go into effect due to provisions in the FY2017 appropriations law (P.L. 115-31, enacted May 5, 2017), which directed USDA to change substantially its implementation of the final rule, particularly retailer inventory requirements.
This report currently reflects USDA-FNS plans to implement the final rule as of August 4, 2017. However, the report may not reflect policy developments that have occurred since then. For the most current information on the implementation of retailer standards, see USDA-FNS's website, "Enhancing Retailer Standards in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)," https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/enhancing-retailer-standards-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap. |
crs_RL34010 | crs_RL34010_0 | Yet certain aspects of both programs potentially are ambiguous or fall into "gray" zones concerning their compliance with WTO rules. This report is not a legal opinion, but describes both the CSP and CRP programs, the WTO Annex II (so-called Green Box) provisions that govern compliance, and the potential issues involved in evaluating the compliance status of the two programs. Conservation Security Program (CSP) Payments
The Conservation Security Program, authorized in the 2002 farm bill ( P.L. 107-171 ), is a voluntary program that provides financial and technical assistance to promote conservation and improvement of natural resources on tribal and private working lands within selected watersheds. In FY2006, USDA spent $259 million supporting 19,375 new and existing CSP contracts (4,400 new CSP contracts were added in FY2006) covering 15.8 million acres (an average outlay of about $16.40 per acre). Most CSP spending is for cost-share payments. If, however, CSP payments are made in the form of bonus or incentive payments that exceed the costs incurred or income forgone of implementing a particular conservation activity, then the "Green Box" compliance status of such payments could be called into question. Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) Land Use Issues
The Conservation Reserve Program, enacted in 1985, provides payments to farmers to take highly erodible or environmentally sensitive cropland out of production for ten years or more to conserve soil and water resources. It is the federal government's largest private land retirement program. In FY2006, CRP outlays totaled $1.8 billion and covered almost 37 million enrolled acres (this amounts to about $48.65 per acre on somewhat less than 10% of the nation's cropland). USDA has notified the WTO of CRP outlays for the years 1996 through 2001 as Green Box-compliant under paragraph 10 of Annex II, which refers to long-term resource retirement programs. Inclusion of CRP payments under paragraph 10 hinges on payments being used to retire land from marketable agricultural production for at least three years. Use of the land for agricultural production would potentially disqualify the land from Green Box eligibility for that particular year; and potentially for all years of a CRP contract if the productive activity is engaged in more frequently than once every four years. Section 2101 of the 2002 farm bill appears to have formalized the use of CRP land for harvesting hay and grazing during periods of drought and to offer a further possible exemption for harvesting of biomass or installation of wind turbines on CRP land by stating that a CRP participant shall agree to:
" (7) " not conduct any harvesting or grazing, nor otherwise make commercial use of the forage on land that is subject to the contract... except that the Secretary (of Agriculture) may permit, consistent with the conservation of soil, water quality, and wildlife habitat—
(A) managed harvesting and grazing (including harvesting of biomass), except that in permitting managed harvesting and grazing, the Secretary—
" (i) shall, in coordination with the State technical committee—
" (I) develop appropriate vegetation management requirements; and
" (II) identify periods during which harvesting and grazing under this paragraph may be conducted;
" (ii) may permit harvesting and grazing or other commercial use of the forage on the land that is subject to the contract in response to a drought or other emergency; and
" (iii) shall, in the case of routine managed harvesting or grazing or harvesting or grazing conducted in response to a drought or other emergency, reduce the rental payment otherwise payable under the contract by an amount commensurate with the economic value of the activity;
" (B) the installation of wind turbines, except that in permitting the installation of wind turbines, the Secretary shall determine the number and location of wind turbines that may be installed, taking into account—
" (i) the location, size, and other physical characteristics of the land;
" (ii) the extent to which the land contains wildlife and wildlife habitat; and
" (iii) the purposes of the conservation reserve program under this subchapter; ...
WTO rules (paragraph 10, Annex II, AA) allow for no exception to the eligibility requirement that the land be removed from marketable agricultural production. A potential alternative classification for use of CRP land for an agricultural production activity (e.g., harvesting hay, grazing, or biomass production) would be to reclassify the program activity from a long-term retirement program to an environmental program, where payments would be subject to the criteria of AA, Annex II, paragraph 12 as discussed under the CSP program. | Under the auspices of the Uruguay Round's Agreement on Agriculture (AA), members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreed to limit and reduce their most distortive domestic support subsidies. Several types of domestic subsidies were identified as causing minimal distortion to agricultural production and trade, as identified in Annex II (the so-called Green Box) of the AA, and were provided exemption from WTO disciplines. Potential "Green Box" policies include outlays for conservation activities such as the Conservation Security Program and long-term land retirement programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program. Yet, certain aspects of both programs potentially are ambiguous or fall into "gray" zones concerning their compliance with WTO rules. This report is not a legal opinion, but describes both the CSP and CRP programs, the WTO Annex II provisions that govern compliance, and the potential issues involved in evaluating the compliance status of the two programs.
The Conservation Security Program (CSP) makes payments to participating landowners who advance conservation and improvement of natural resources on tribal and private working lands. Payments are determined by the level (or tier) of participation, conservation activities completed, and acres enrolled. In FY2006, USDA spent $259 million supporting 19,375 CSP contracts covering 15.8 million acres. Federal outlays for CSP activities have yet to be notified to the WTO; however, it is likely that CSP payments will be notified as Green Box-compliant environmental program payments under paragraph 12 of Annex II. Inclusion under paragraph 12 hinges on the payments being limited to the cost of expenses incurred or income forgone in implementing conservation practices. CSP cost-share payments fit this requirement. However, other CSP payments either made in excess of costs incurred or income forgone, or made in the nature of bonus or incentive payments to induce participation, are more difficult to classify.
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) compensates producers for removing environmentally sensitive, privately owned land from production for 10 years or more to conserve soil and water resources. The CRP is the federal government's largest conservation and private land retirement program. In FY2006, CRP outlays totaled $1.8 billion and covered almost 37 million enrolled acres. CRP payments for the period 1996 through 2001 have been notified to the WTO as Green Box-compliant long-term resource retirement payments under paragraph 10 of Annex II. Inclusion under paragraph 10 hinges on the payments being used to retire land from marketable agricultural production for at least three years. Use of CRP land for agricultural production (e.g., cutting hay, grazing, or biomass production) potentially could disqualify the land from Green Box eligibility for that particular year; and potentially for all years of a long-term retirement contract if the productive activity is engaged in more frequently than once every four years. A potential alternative would be to reclassify the productive use of CRP land as a type of environmental program where payments would be subject to the criteria discussed under the CSP program. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33165 | crs_RL33165_0 | Introduction
The electric utility industry is a major source of air pollution, particularly sulfur dioxide(SO 2 ), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and mercury (Hg), as well as suspected greenhouse gases, particularlycarbon dioxide (CO 2 ). On October 27, 2005, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) releaseda long-awaited analysis comparing the costs and benefits of alternative approaches to controlling thispollution. Called multi-pollutant proposals, the alternative schemes focus on using market-orientedmechanisms to achieve health and environmental goals in simpler, more cost-effective ways. EPA'snew analysis compares four versions of the Administration-based "Clear Skies" proposal to billsintroduced by Senator Jeffords ( S. 150 ) and Senator Carper ( S. 843 of the108th Congress), which would impose more stringent requirements. Options Examined in EPA's Analysis
The cost-benefit analysis released by EPA, October 27, (6) examined sixoptions: four of the six were variants of the Administration's Clear Skies bill or itsregulatory counterparts (7) ; the other two options were Senator Carper's CleanAir Planning Act ( S. 843 in the 108th Congress, but as of the date of theanalysis, not yet introduced in the 109th) and Senator Jeffords' Clean Power Act( S. 150 ). (8)
Discussion and CRS Reanalysis
Choice of Baseline Assumptions
EPA's Multi-Pollutant Regulatory Analysis assumes as a baseline that in theabsence of new legislation, EPA and the states will take no additional action tocontrol SO 2 , NOx, Hg, or CO 2 emissions beyond those rules, regulations, oragreements finalized by mid-2004. This baseline is put forth despite three rulesrecently finalized by EPA that directly bear on SO 2 , NOx, and Hg. (10) Instead,EPA included the three regulations as a "sixth proposal" for controlling thesepollutants -- a curious designation for finalized rules. This report uses EPA's Demand Response Scenario as the benchmarkanalysis. Asindicated by Tables 2 and 3 , Senator Jeffords' bill would have the greatest benefits. In 2010, its benefits would be $83 billion annually, $32 billion more than those of theCarper bill, and about 14 times the benefits of Clear Skies. Compared with theassumptions of the EPA Base Case, the effect of higher growth and natural gas costsin the context of zero demand response is most pronounced in the case of S.150 and puts even more pressure on EPA's assumption of zero demandprice elasticity, particularly for 2020. (18)
Table 5. Those analyses used cost and cost-effectivenessdata collected in 2003. Benefits Estimates
EPA's analysis and CRS's reanalysis of the data show benefits substantiallyoutweighing costs for both S. 150 and S. 843 . The omission of environmental benefits has its greatesteffect on S. 150 and S. 843 which have more aggressiveSO 2 , NOx, and Hg control schemes. Finally, the analysis did not attempt to estimate the possible benefits ofcontrolling CO 2 emissions. Still, the absence of such a factor in the analysis may be a significantomission, which understates the potential benefits of the Jeffords and Carper bills. The EPA analysis does not reflect current data on costs of Hgcontrols. | The electric utility industry is a major source of air pollution, particularly sulfur dioxide(SO 2 ), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and mercury (Hg), as well as suspected greenhouse gases, particularlycarbon dioxide (CO 2 ). On October 27, 2005, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) releaseda long-awaited analysis comparing the costs and benefits of alternative approaches to controlling thispollution. The alternative schemes focus on using market-oriented mechanisms directed at multiplepollutants to achieve health and environmental goals. The new analysis compares four versions ofthe Administration-based "Clear Skies" proposal to bills introduced by Senator Jeffords( S. 150 ) and Senator Carper ( S. 843 of the 108th Congress), which wouldimpose more stringent requirements.
This report, which will not be updated, examines EPA's analysis and adjusts some of itsassumptions to reflect current regulations. The most important adjustment is the choice of baseline. The agency's analysis assumes as a baseline that, in the absence of new federal legislation, EPA andthe states will take no additional action to control SO 2 , NOx, Hg, or CO 2 emissions beyond thoseactions finalized by mid-2004. This baseline is put forth despite three rules recently promulgated byEPA that limit SO 2 , NOx, and Hg emissions on a timeframe similar to that proposed by the ClearSkies legislation.
CRS reexamines EPA's data, producing cost and benefit estimates for each bill incrementalto the costs and benefits of current law and promulgated regulations. The reanalysis finds that ClearSkies would have negligible incremental costs and added benefits of $6 billion in 2010 and $3 billionin 2020. For the same years, S. 843 would have annual net benefits 8 and 5 times asgreat as Clear Skies at annual costs of $4.2 billion and $3 billion, and S. 150 wouldhave annual net benefits 10 and 16 times those of Clear Skies at annual costs of $23.6 billion and$18.1 billion.
EPA conducted limited sensitivity analyses to examine the effect on cost of selectcombinations of assumptions, including (1) the responsiveness of electricity demand to changes inprice; (2) the availability of skilled labor to install control equipment; and (3) the growth ofelectricity demand and natural gas prices. However, some potentially useful combinations ofassumptions were not examined. For example, if EPA had combined a relaxed skilled laborconstraint with some responsiveness of electricity demand to changes in price, the cost of S. 150 and S. 843 would be substantially reduced. CRS also concludedthat the Hg control costs used in the analysis may be substantially overstated because of datedassumptions.
Numerous benefits were not estimated by EPA, partly because of methodologicaldifficulties. Benefits not estimated include the environmental (as opposed to health) benefits ofcontrolling the pollutants; the health effects of mercury control; and any benefits from controllingCO 2 emissions. Thus, even though benefits exceeded costs for each of the options in both EPA's andour analysis, one should perhaps view the benefit estimates as a floor rather than a best estimate,particularly for S. 150 and S. 843 , which include significant Hg and CO 2 reductions. |
crs_R43534 | crs_R43534_0 | Among other things, FISA established the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which reviews government applications to conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Members of Congress have introduced various proposals that would amend FISA or amend the practices and procedures of the FISC. This report focuses on the proposals that would alter the process for selecting judges to serve on the FISA courts. Overview of FISA Courts and Selection of FISA Judges
Article III of the U.S. Constitution vests the "judicial power" of the United States in the Supreme Court and any inferior courts established by Congress. FISA also established the FISA Court of Review, which has jurisdiction to review the denial of any application by the FISC. FISA authorizes the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court to "designate" the federal judges to serve on the FISC and FISA Court of Review. With these criticisms in mind, several bills have been introduced in the 113 th Congress to alter the process for selecting FISA judges. This report first briefly reviews the constitutional method for appointing Article III judges. It then surveys the process of "designation," an alternative method used by Congress that allows current federal judges to serve temporarily on another federal court without undergoing a separate constitutional appointment. Lastly, the report explores how a reviewing court might assess the constitutionality of some of these proposals that shift designation authority away from the Chief Justice alone and vest it in other officials within the judicial, executive, and legislative branches. The first set of judges to this court was appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and subsequent judges were "designated" by the Chief Justice from among the judges of the circuit courts. The FISA Judge Selection Reform Act ( S. 1460 ), for example, would maintain designation authority within the judicial branch, but it would disperse the selection process for the FISC between the 13 chief judges of the circuit courts and the Chief Justice. Other proposals would shift authority to designate FISA court judges to the President. For example, the Presidential Appointment of FISA Court Judges Act ( H.R. The FISA Court Accountability Act ( H.R. | In the past year, the decisions and functions of the courts established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) have received much public attention. FISA established two courts—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and the FISA Court of Review—which have jurisdiction to review government applications to conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Various proposals have been introduced in Congress to amend the law that authorizes such surveillance and to change the internal practices and procedures of the courts. This report focuses on those proposals that would amend the process for selecting the judges who serve on the FISC and FISA Court of Review.
Under the existing framework, the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court "designates" existing federal judges to serve on the FISA courts. While critics have argued that the current process is partisan and lacks political accountability, transparency, and oversight, the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, acting on behalf of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, has expressed concern regarding proposals that would change the existing framework. Proposals that would alter the process for selecting FISA judges include S. 1460, the FISA Judge Selection Reform Act, which would effectively shift authority to the chief judges of the circuit courts; H.R. 2761, the Presidential Appointment of FISA Court Judges Act, which would authorize the President to choose FISA judges with the advice and consent of the Senate; and H.R. 2586, the FISA Court Accountability Act, which would permit Members of Congress to select FISA judges.
To understand the potential legal issues implicated by these proposals, this report first briefly reviews the constitutional method for appointing federal judges. The report also surveys the process of "designation," an alternative method used by Congress that allows current federal judges to serve temporarily on another federal court without undergoing a separate constitutional appointment. Lastly, the report explores how a reviewing court might evaluate the constitutionality of these proposals that would shift the authority to select FISA judges away from the Chief Justice alone, and vest it in other officials within the judicial, executive, and legislative branches. |
crs_R44839 | crs_R44839_0 | 5983 ) was sponsored by Representative Jeb Hensarling, chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services. 10 , FCA) on April 26, 2017. It passed the House on June 8, 2017. The FCA is a wide-ranging proposal with 12 titles that would alter many parts of the financial regulatory system. Many of the provisions can be categorized as providing regulatory relief to financial firms, investors, or borrowers. Many parts of the FCA would repeal or amend provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), a broad package of regulatory reform legislation passed following the 2007-2009 financial crisis that initiated the largest change to the financial regulatory system since at least 1999 (see Appendix A ). This report highlights major policy proposals in the version of the bill as passed in the 115 th Congress, but it is not a comprehensive summary of the bill. The FCA would provide regulatory relief to two broad categories—banks and securities markets' participants. Many would modify or repeal rules stemming from the Dodd-Frank Act, whereas others target long-standing regulatory practices. Provision in the FCA
Under the FCA, a banking organization could choose to be subject to a higher, 10% leverage ratio, and in exchange would be exempt from risk-weighted capital ratios; liquidity requirements; stress-test requirements; certain merger, acquisition, and consolidation restrictions; limitations on dividends; and other regulations. A bank would have the option to follow current regulatory requirements or this new regulatory approach. For example, banks opting in to the new leverage ratio approach would be exempt from the Dodd-Frank Act's enhanced prudential regulations for banks with $50 billion or more in assets and other regulations based on financial stability considerations (discussed in " Regulating Systemically Important Financial Institutions and Limiting Their Size "). Designation process. If the latter, then SIFI regulation is unlikely to contain systemic risk. Thus, congressional control over an agency's funding reduces its independence from (and increases its accountability to) Congress. Some also cite funding that is outside the traditional appropriations process as a contributing factor to the CFPB's independence. Similar to the CFPB, the CLEA would be headed by a single director, but unlike the CFPB director, who can only be removed by the President for cause, the CLEA director would be removable at-will by the President. The provision would also require the Fed to calculate a traditional Taylor Rule (called the "Reference Policy Rule" in the bill) and compare it to the Directive Policy rule. further restrict the Fed's emergency lending powers. The APA contains rulemaking requirements and procedures for agency adjudications, and it provides for judicial review of rulemaking and agency actions. H.R. De novo review would require courts to independently interpret a covered agency's statutory authority, rather than deferring to that agency's reasonable interpretation of the law. Policy Issues190
The way in which federal financial regulators exercise their enforcement powers requires a balance between protecting consumers and investors from unlawful conduct, on the one hand, and ensuring that law-abiding financial institutions are not pushed out of certain markets and the costs of their products and services for consumers and investors are not unduly increased, on the other. For example, the FCA would increase the maximum civil penalties that could be assessed for violations of various laws, including Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 951(b) of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989. Provisions of the Financial CHOICE Act Included in FY2018 Appropriations Bills
Selected provisions of the Financial CHOICE Act were included in the FY2018 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act (H.R. 3354 as passed by the House on September 14, 2017. First, H.R. Second, H.R. | The Financial CHOICE Act (FCA; H.R. 10) was introduced on April 26, 2017, by Representative Jeb Hensarling, chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services. It passed the House on June 8, 2017. Selected provisions of H.R. 10 were then added to the appropriations bill passed by the House (H.R. 3354).
H.R. 10, as passed, is a wide-ranging proposal with 12 titles that would alter many parts of the financial regulatory system. Much of the FCA is in response to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203), a broad package of regulatory reform following the financial crisis that initiated the largest change to the financial regulatory system since at least 1999. Many of the provisions of the FCA would modify or repeal provisions from the Dodd-Frank Act, although others would address long-standing or more recent issues.
This report highlights major proposals included in the FCA but is not a comprehensive summary. In general, the bill proposes changes that can be divided into two categories: (1) changes to financial policies and regulations and (2) changes to the regulatory structure and rulemaking process.
Major policy-related changes proposed by the FCA include the following:
Leverage Ratio—allowing a banking organization to choose to be subject to a higher, 10% leverage ratio in exchange for being exempt from risk-weighted capital ratios, liquidity requirements, enhanced prudential regulation (if the bank has more than $50 billion in assets), and other regulations. Regulatory Relief—providing regulatory relief throughout the financial system to banks, consumers, and capital market participants, including by repealing the Volcker Rule, fiduciary rule, and risk retention requirements for nonmortgage asset-backed securities. Some provisions are targeted at small financial institutions or issuers, whereas others provisions are applied across the board. Too Big To Fail—repealing the designation of systemically important nonbank financial institutions, repealing or restricting authority to provide emergency assistance to financial markets, and replacing an option for winding down systemic institutions with a new chapter in the Bankruptcy Code that is tailored to financial firms.
Structural and procedural changes that affect the balance between regulator independence from and accountability to Congress and the judiciary include the following:
Funding—subjecting regulators that currently set their own budgets to the traditional congressional appropriations process. Rulemaking—requiring regulators to perform more detailed cost-benefit analysis when issuing new rules and to use cost-benefit analysis to review existing rules, as well as requiring congressional approval for a major rule to come into effect. Judicial Review—requiring courts to apply a heightened judicial review standard for agency actions taken by financial regulators rather than applying varying levels of deference to the agencies' interpretations of the law. Enforcement—increasing the maximum civil penalties that could be assessed for violations of certain banking and securities laws and restraining certain agency enforcement powers. CFPB—replacing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau with the Consumer Law Enforcement Agency and modifying its powers, leadership, mandate, and funding. The new agency would not have the CFPB's examination or supervisory powers, but would have similar enforcement powers. Its director would be removable at-will by the President. Federal Reserve—requiring a GAO audit of the Fed, restricting emergency lending, and requiring the Fed to compare its monetary policy decisions to a mathematical rule. |
crs_R40193 | crs_R40193_0 | (See " Political Prisoners " below.) In September 2010, the Cuban government announced a significant series of reforms designed to reduce the public sector and increase private enterprise. Looking Ahead
Since Fidel stepped down from power in 2006, Cuba's political succession from Fidel to Raúl Castro has been characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. Human Rights Watch issued a report in November 2009 criticizing Cuba's human rights record under the government of Raúl Castro. The group conducts peaceful protests calling for the unconditional release of political prisoners. In light of Fidel Castro's departure as head of government, many observers have called for a re-examination of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Bush Administration Policy
The Bush Administration essentially continued the two-track U.S. policy of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions while supporting the Cuban people through a variety of measures. In March 2009, Congress took some action ahead of the Administration to change U.S. policy toward Cuba when it approved the FY2009 omnibus appropriations measure ( P.L. (Also see " December 2009 Detainment of American Subcontractor " below.) 111-8 ) that ease sanctions on travel to Cuba. Several other legislative initiatives were introduced in the 111 th Congress that would have eased Cuba travel restrictions: H.R. 874 (Delahunt)/ S. 428 (Dorgan) and H.R. 1530 (Rangel), and H.R. 332 (Lee) would have eased restrictions on educational travel; S. 774 (Dorgan), H.R. 132 (Tiahrt) would have called for the fulfillment of certain democratic conditions before the United States increases trade and tourism to Cuba. (For additional information, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances .) In December 2009, Congress took action in the FY2010 omnibus appropriations measure ( P.L. The 111 th Congress did not complete action on FY2011 Financial Services and General Government appropriations legislation, but instead approved a series of short-term continuing resolutions ( P.L. 111-242 , as amended), the last of which provided funding for federal agencies through March 4, 2011 under conditions provided in enacted FY2010 appropriations measures. This included continuation of the "payment of cash in advance" provision. Similar but not identical bills H.R. 1103 (Wexler) and S. 1234 (Lieberman) would have amended Section 211 with a narrow fix to bring it into compliance with the WTO ruling, while several measures, H.R. 2272 (Rush), and S. 1089 would have repealed Section 211 altogether. For additional information, see CRS Report R41522, Cuba's Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations . FY2010. As set forth in the conference report, the BBG strategic plan is required to include (1) an analysis of the current situation in Cuba and an allocation of resources consistent with the relative priority of broadcasting to Cuba as determined by the annual Language Service Review and other factors, including input form the Secretary of State on the relative U.S. interest of broadcasting to Cuba; (2) the estimated audience sizes in Cuba for Radio and TV Martí and the sources and relative reliability of the data on which such estimates are based; (3) the annual operating cost (and total cost over the life of the contract) of any and all types of TV transmission and the effectiveness of each in increasing such audience size; (4) the principal obstacles to increasing such audience size; (5) an analysis of other options for disseminating news and information to Cuba, including DVDs, the Internet, and cell phones and other handheld electronic devices and a report on the cost effectiveness of each; and (6) an analysis of the program efficiencies and effectiveness that can be achieved through shared resources and cost saving opportunities in radio and television production between Radio and TV Martí and the Voice of America. Legislative Initiatives in the 111th Congress
Approved Measures
P.L. 111-117 ( H.R. H.Con.Res. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. 4645 (Peterson)/ S. 3112 (Klobuchar). S. 1517 (Murkowski). S. 1808 (Feingold). 5136 (Skelton), did not include a similar provision. H.R. The bill would lift all restrictions on travel to Cuba; define the term "payment of cash in advance" for U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) as the payment by the purchaser prior to the transfer of title, and release of control, of such commodity or product to the purchaser; and authorize direct transfers between Cuban and U.S. financial institutions executed in payment for a product authorized for sale under TSRA. On March 18, 2010, the Senate approved S.Con.Res. (See " Trademark Sanction .") On May 14, 2009, the Senate approved S.Res. 111-8 ), which has three provisions intended to ease U.S. sanctions on Cuba for family travel (Section 621 of Division D), travel related to the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical exports (Section 620 of Division D), and payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba (Section 622 of Division D). | Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country's political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. The government of Raúl Castro implemented limited economic policy changes in 2008 and 2009, and in September 2010 began a significant series of reforms to reduce the public sector and increase private enterprise. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system, although it has reduced the number of political prisoners significantly.
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions. A second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including U.S.-sponsored broadcasting and support for human rights activists. In light of Fidel Castro's departure as head of government, many observers called for a re-examination of U.S. policy. The Obama Administration lifted restrictions on family travel and remittances and restarted talks with the Cuban government. It criticized Cuba's repression of dissidents, but also welcomed the release of political prisoners. The Administration also repeatedly called for the release of a U.S. government subcontractor imprisoned since December 2009.
The 111th Congress approved three provisions in the FY2009 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8) in March 2009 that eased sanctions on family travel, travel for the marketing of agricultural and medical goods, and payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports. In December 2009, Congress included a provision in the FY2010 omnibus appropriations legislation (P.L. 111-117) that eased payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba during FY2010 by defining the term "payment of cash in advance" more broadly. While Congress did not complete action on any of the FY2011 appropriations measures, it did approve a series of short-term continuing resolutions (P.L. 111-242, as amended), the last of which (P.L. 111-322) provided funding for federal agencies through March 4, 2011 under conditions provided in enacted FY2010 appropriations measures. This extended the "payment of cash in advance provision" and also continued Cuba broadcasting and democracy funding. In other legislative action, in May 2009, the Senate approved S.Res. 149, related to freedom of the press, and in March 2010 it approved S.Con.Res. 54, recognizing the death of a Cuban hunger striker.
Numerous other initiatives were introduced, but not considered. Several of these would have eased Cuba sanctions: H.R. 188, H.R. 1530, and H.R. 2272 (overall sanctions); H.R. 874/S. 428 and H.R. 1528 (travel); H.R. 332 (educational travel); H.R. 1531/S. 1089 and H.R. 4645/S. 3112 (agricultural exports and travel); H.R. 1737 (agricultural exports); and S. 774, H.R. 1918, and S. 1517 (hydrocarbon resources). H.R. 1103/S. 1234 would have modified a trademark sanction, while several bills cited above would have repealed the sanction. S. 1808 would have eliminated Radio and TV Martí. Measures that would have increased sanctions were: H.R. 2005 (related to fugitives), H.R. 2687 (Organization of American States participation), and H.R. 5620 (Cuba's oil development). H.Con.Res. 132 would have called for the fulfillment of certain democratic conditions before the United States increased trade and tourism to Cuba.
This report reflects legislative developments through the 111th Congress and will not be updated. Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, and CRS Report R41522, Cuba's Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations. |
crs_RL33951 | crs_RL33951_0 | For over 40 years, the United States has relied on unilateral trade preferences as an integral part of its foreign economic policy. Trade preferences give market access to selected developing country goods, duty free or at tariffs below normal (NTR) rates, without requiring reciprocal trade concessions. The Caribbean Basin (see Figure 1 ) has benefitted from multiple preferential trade arrangements, the best known being those linked to the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) implemented on January 1, 1984, and revised periodically by Congress. The GSP permits developed countries to grant unilateral tariff preferences for selected imports from developing countries to promote export-led growth. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) of 1983
The impetus to create a Caribbean trade preference program arose from concern over the region's economic collapse and political radicalization that materialized in the early 1980s. A number of special provisions also applied. Nonetheless, on May 18, 2000, following congressional passage, the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA— P.L. 110 - 246 ), and again through September 30, 2020, in the Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-171 ). Unlike the CBTPA, of which Haiti is a beneficiary country, and the CAFTA-DR, which does not include Haiti, the HOPE Act permits duty-free treatment for apparel imports in limited quantities assembled or knit-to-shape in Haiti with inputs from third-party countries, or those outside the region that are not a party to either a preferential trade arrangement or free trade agreement with the United States. U.S. tariff preferences offered to the Caribbean countries often
replaced tariff with nontariff barriers, usually quantitative restrictions, as is the case for some goods entering under the CBERA, CBTPA, and HOPE Act; have complicated rules of origin that are costly, cumbersome to implement, and frequently inhibit use of preferences; require use of relatively higher-cost U.S. inputs, offsetting the cost competitiveness benefit of the tariff concessions; induce trade growth explicitly through trade diversion (Caribbean apparel instead of Asian or Central American) and potentially in industries where there is no inherent comparative advantage; can bias a country's investment pattern toward particular industries, limiting incentives to diversify their economies, and also prolonging other market-based adjustments; can induce recipients to limit export promotion and increase barriers to entry in industries facing CBI quantitative restrictions, and; can act as a disincentive to support multilateral trade negotiations, given they can erode regional preference margins. U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Relations: Policy Options
For over 40 years, the United States has provided some type of trade preference program to the countries of the Caribbean Basin. Reform Trade Preference Programs
A second option is to consider redefining the unilateral preference programs in a way that might provide more benefit to the CARICOM countries. Still, there appears to be interest in exploring the revision of preference programs to include services exports. Outlook
A number of issues and circumstances have converged that point up challenges for U.S. trade policy in the Caribbean region. Further, these programs are little used by the smaller beneficiary countries, which also have expressed a reluctance to move toward an FTA with the United States without some guarantee of a "development component" to the agreement, despite the promise of permanent market access and increased investment that an FTA holds out. The Caribbean countries, although having restructured their trade relationships with Europe, appear content to take a cautious and leisurely path toward any new trade arrangement with the United States. In fact, broader integration may be difficult to achieve and still meet the needs of very small developing countries. Their economies are highly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of global economic trends and weather patterns, and may require new and creative solutions to make the adjustment to full reciprocal free trade. U.S. trade policy toward the region has also had a historical focus on development and regional security issues in addition to trade liberalization, suggesting that trade liberalization likely will not be the only factor to determine policy. In the context of deciding whether to continue with trade preferences in similar or altered form, or opt for an FTA, agreement has yet to materialize. | For over 40 years, the United States has relied on unilateral trade preferences to promote export-led development in poor countries. Congressionally authorized trade preferences give market access to selected developing country goods, duty free or at tariffs below normal rates, without requiring reciprocal trade concessions, although their extension is conditioned on extensive eligibility criteria and the use of U.S. inputs in many cases. The Caribbean Basin has benefitted from multiple preferential trade arrangements, the first being the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), passed by Congress in the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983. Other programs include the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) of 2000, which provides tariff preferences for imports of apparel products, and the Haiti HOPE Act of 2006 (amended in 2008 and 2010), which gives even more generous preferences to imports of Haitian apparel.
Since the preferences have been implemented, U.S.-Caribbean trade has grown, but evaluations of the early programs suggest that their effects were not as robust as originally hoped. Benefits tended to be concentrated in a few countries and products, limiting export promotion and deterring product diversification. Over time, benefits have been "eroded" by multilateral trade liberalization and other regional U.S. preference programs. Bilateral free trade agreements, particularly the CAFTA-DR, have actually replaced unilateral preferences with permanent, more attractive tariff reductions and trade rules for former CBI countries such as the Dominican Republic and Central American countries. As the main exporters of apparel in the Caribbean Basin, they were among the primary beneficiaries of the Caribbean trade preference programs.
In recent years, Congress had leaned toward short-term extensions of the Caribbean and other preference programs. A number of members seek a comprehensive review of these programs with an eye on harmonizing and revamping their various provisions. Congressional concern over eligibility criteria, simplifying rules of origin, targeting the least developed countries, and standardizing benefits are among a number of broad issues being debated as part of the preference reform agenda. In addition, there are a number of issues and circumstances converging that may suggest the need for reorienting U.S. trade policy in the Caribbean region.
The most effective trade preferences appear to be the apparel provisions provided under the CBTPA and the HOPE Act, as amended. Both were extended through September 30, 2020, in the Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-171). These provisions, however, are not well suited to the services- and energy-based economies of the smaller Eastern Caribbean countries. Also, there is a reluctance by these countries to make the transition to an FTA without some guarantee of a "development component" to the agreement. These concerns persist, despite the promise of permanent market access and increased investment that an FTA holds out. The Caribbean countries appear content to take a cautious path toward any new trade arrangement with the United States.
Achieving broader regional integration may be difficult to reconcile with the needs of very small developing countries, which are highly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of global economic trends and may require new and creative solutions, particularly if U.S. policy is still driven by the historical focus on development and regional security issues in addition to trade liberalization. In the context of continuing with trade preferences in similar or altered form, or opting for an FTA, the solution is not immediately obvious. |
crs_R41590 | crs_R41590_0 | Background: Recent Federal Support
For at least a decade, policymakers have been discussing the potential to shift freight from roads to rivers and coastal waterways as a means of mitigating highway congestion. While U.S. waterways carry substantial amounts of bulk commodities, such as grain, coal, and fuel oil, they are seldom used to transport containerized cargo between points within the lower 48 states. Trucks, which carry most domestic container shipments, and railroads, which carry a large proportion of containers imported or exported by sea, offer much faster transit. Yet, at a time when many highways and rail lines are congested, a parallel river or coastal waterway may be little used. With passage of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ( P.L. 1760), Congress pushed for greater use of marine transportation by requiring the Department of Transportation's (DOT's) Maritime Administration (MARAD) to identify waterways that could potentially serve as "short sea" shipping routes. Subsequently, in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 ( P.L. Can Marine Highways Deliver Tangible Benefits? A prevailing perception is that the slow speed of barges and the additional cargo transfer costs at ports deter use of marine highways. However, there are also highly specific conditions under which barges might be an attractive option for container shippers. Truck ferries demonstrate that marine highways can be successful. However, the geography of the contiguous United States presents few opportunities for cross-waterway ferries. Three barge operators compete for this cargo and in combination provide frequent service. In addition, a significant portion of domestic truck freight is carried in truck trailers rather than in containers that can be detached from their chassis. These factors severely limit the potential universe of truck traffic that marine highways could divert from the highways. Reducing cargo handling costs at ports is key to marine highway development. As the above analysis suggests, marine highways may be commercially viable in certain circumstances. In many instances, however, they have succeeded in capturing only a negligible share of container shipments along a given route. There are questions, therefore, whether marine highways will divert enough trucks to provide public benefits commensurate with their costs. Most of the marine highway services that have received federal grants are carrying, or seem likely to carry, no more than a few thousand containers annually. The Harbor Maintenance Tax
Another means of promoting short-sea shipping would be to repeal the existing harbor maintenance tax as it pertains to containerized domestic shipments, although the tax remains largely unenforced with respect to domestic shippers. Since the construction cost of U.S.-flag deepwater cargo ships is generally believed to be three or four times that of ships in the world market, the Jones Act may be a significant barrier to domestic shipping in oceangoing vessels. | Policymakers have been discussing the potential for shifting some freight traffic from roads to river and coastal waterways as a means of mitigating highway congestion. While waterways carry substantial amounts of bulk commodities (e.g., grain and coal), seldom are they used to transport containerized cargo (typically finished goods and manufactured parts) between points within the contiguous United States. Trucks, which carry most of this cargo, and railroads, which carry some of it in combination with trucks, offer much faster transit. Yet, at a time when many urban highways are congested, a parallel river or coastal waterway may be little used.
With passage of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84), Congress moved this idea forward by requiring the Department of Transportation (DOT) to identify waterways that could potentially serve as "marine highways" and providing grant funding for their development. DOT has selected several marine highways for grant funding totaling about $80 million. To be eligible, a marine highway must be an alternative to a congested highway or railroad and be financially viable in a reasonable time frame.
The prevailing perception is that coastal and river navigation is too slow to attract shippers that utilize trucks and that the additional cargo handling costs at ports negate any potential savings from using waterborne transport. While there are other significant obstacles as well, under highly specific circumstances, marine highways might attract truck freight. Freight corridors characterized by an imbalance in the directional flow of container equipment; shippers with low value, heavy cargoes, and waterside production facilities; and connections with coastal hub ports over medium distances may be suitable for container-on-barge (COB) or coastal shipping services. It also appears that marine highways are more suitable to international rather than domestic shippers because the former have lower service expectations.
A review of the successes and failures of the few marine highway services currently operating in the contiguous United States, as well as those that have failed in the past, indicates that the potential market is limited. In many instances, marine highways have succeeded in capturing only a negligible share of container shipments along a given route. One can question, therefore, whether marine highways will divert enough trucks to provide public benefits commensurate with their costs. Congress may also consider repealing a port use charge, the harbor maintenance tax, for containerized domestic shipments as a means of spurring marine highway development. Repealing the tax raises equity issues because waterway users already benefit from reduced federal user charges compared to trucks, and their other competitor, the railroads, are largely self-financed. The Jones Act is arguably another potential statutory hindrance to marine highway development, particularly coastal highways. This act requires that all domestic shipping be carried in U.S. built ships. Critics claim the act raises the cost of domestic shipping to such a degree that it cannot compete with truck and rail. |
crs_RL32005 | crs_RL32005_0 | Changes to Medicare's Fee for Service Program
The legislation contains extensive changes to Medicare's FFS program, including paymentincreases and, in certain instances, decreases; development of competitive acquisition programs;implementation or refinement of other prospective payment systems (notably, the development ofan end-stage renal disease (ESRD) basic payment system); expansion of covered preventive benefits;establishment of demonstration programs; and required studies. CBO estimates that these provisions will increase direct Medicare spending by $1.7 billion over the10-year period. Generally, Medicare payments to hospitals will increase under the conference report. The impact of the legislation on Medicare's spending for physician spending is difficult to determine. The follow provisions affecting other providers and practitioners are included in the legislation:
Ambulatory Surgical Centers. Durable Medical Equipment (DME). Home Health. Selected Fee-for Service Demonstration Projects. The legislation establishes numerous demonstration projects for the Medicare program. Chronic Care Improvement under Fee-For-Service. The legislation requires the Secretary to establish and implement chronic care improvementprograms under fee-for-service Medicare to improve clinical quality and beneficiary satisfaction andachieve spending targets specified by the Secretary for Medicare for beneficiaries with certainchronic health conditions. CBO has estimated that thisdemonstration will increase direct Medicare spending by $500 million over the 10-year period. The Secretary is required to conduct a 2-year demonstrationwhere payment is made for certain drugs and biologicals that are currently provided as "incident to"a physician's services under Part B. Expansion of Covered Benefits. CBO estimates that this provision will increase directMedicare spending by $1.7 billion over the 10-year period. Beneficiary Payments
The bill contains two provisions which change the beneficiary premiums and deductibles. Income-Relating the Part B Premium. CBO estimates the Medicaid and other provisions included in the bill to increase direct spending by $5.7 billion between FY2004 and FY2013. This report contains a detailed side-by-side comparison of the relevant provisions of the legislation, S. 1 , as passed the Senate, and H.R. 1 , as passed the House. Beneficiary Issues: Cost-Sharing Amounts and Provision of Information
Other Health-Related Studies, Commissions or Committees
Medicaid and State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) Provisions
Cost Containment and Miscellaneous Financial Provisions | On November 22, the House of Representatives voted 220 to 215 to approve the conference report on H.R. 1 , the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Actof 2003. The Senate, on November 24, voted 54 to 44 to approve the conference report. Earlier, theconferees of the Medicare prescription drug and modernization legislation announced an agreementon November 16 and the legislative text was released November 20. The legislative language canbe downloaded from the House Committee on Ways and Means website at: http://waysandmeans.house.gov . The bill was signed into law by the President on December 8,2003.
As well as establishing a prescription drug benefit for Medicare beneficiaries, the legislation contains provisions that involving significant payment increases, payment reductions, an expansionof covered benefits, new demonstration projects and new beneficiary cost-sharing provisions for thetraditional Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) program. The bill includes a measure that would requirecongressional consideration of legislation if general revenue funding for the entire Medicare programexceeds 45%. Provisions affecting the State Childrens' Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) andMedicaid programs are included in the legislation as well.
Earlier this year, under Congress' FY2004 budget resolution, $400 billion was reserved for Medicare modernization, creation of a prescription drug benefit, and, in the Senate, to promotegeographic equity payment. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that thelegislation for H.R. 1 would increase direct (or mandatory) spending by $394.3 billionfrom FY2004 through FY2013. Prescription drug spending is estimated at $409.8 billion over the10-year period and Medicare Advantage spending at $14.2 billion. Overall, the fee-for-serviceprovisions which change traditional Medicare are estimated to save $21.5 billion over the 10-yearperiod and adjusting the Part B premium to beneficiaries' income is estimated to save $13.3 billionover the period. Some fee-for-service provisions will increase spending over this 10-year periodincluding the provisions affecting hospitals and physician. Other fee-for-service provisions areprojected to save money over the period including those affecting durable medical equipment,clinical laboratories and home health agencies. The CBO estimate is available on the CBO websiteat ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/48xx/doc4808/11-20-MedicareLetter.pdf . |
crs_R42559 | crs_R42559_0 | Political Background
Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic; Haiti occupies the western third of the island. Since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has struggled to overcome its centuries-long legacy of authoritarianism, extreme poverty, and underdevelopment. While significant progress has been made in improving governance, democratic institutions remain weak. Poverty remains massive and deep, and economic disparity is wide. Thousands of Haitians took to the streets over the next couple of years to protest the failure to hold elections and to call for Martelly's resignation. The terms for another third of the Senate as well as the entire 99-seat Chamber of Deputies expired on January 12; the legislature was immediately dissolved, and President Martelly began ruling by decree. As of June 30, 2015, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) had decreased its military troops from 5,021 to 2,338, leaving peacekeeping troops in only 4 of Haiti's 10 departments (slightly below the mandated level of 2,370). First-round legislative elections . Runoff presidential and local elections delayed . Just one week before they were to be held, the government postponed the runoff presidential elections scheduled for December 27. The CEP says it will set a date after it receives the commission's recommendations. The Haitian National Police had primary responsibility for election security. More recently, popular protests have called for MINUSTAH's removal because of allegations of its role in introducing cholera to the country, and sexual abuse by some of its forces. As part of its work, the mission has also conducted campaigns to combat gangs and drug trafficking with the Haitian police. MINUSTAH and the U.N. have been widely criticized for not responding strongly enough to an outbreak of cholera in October 2010, the first such outbreak in at least a century in Haiti. Plagued by chronic political instability and frequent natural disasters, Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. After the earthquake, the Haitian government established a framework for reconstruction in the 10-year recovery plan, Action Plan for the Reconstruction and National Development of Haiti , with four areas of concentration:
Territorial building , including creating centers of economic growth to support settlement of displaced populations around the country and to make Port-au-Prince less congested, developing infrastructure to promote growth, and managing land tenure; Economic rebuilding , including modernizing the agricultural sector for both export and food security, promoting manufacturing and tourism, and providing access to electricity; Social rebuilding , prioritizing building education and health systems; and Institutional rebuilding , focusing on making government institutions operational again and able to manage reconstruction, and strengthening governmental authority while also decentralizing basic services, and creating a social safety net for the poorest population. Relations with Donors
Since Haiti's developmental needs and priorities are many, and deeply intertwined, the Haitian government and the international donor community are implementing an assistance strategy that attempts to address these many needs simultaneously. U.S. Policy Objectives and Assistance
Obama Administration officials have said that Haiti is a key foreign policy priority and the Administration's top priority in the Latin America and Caribbean region in terms of bilateral foreign assistance. Other concerns for U.S. policy regarding Haiti include the cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and human trafficking; addressing Haitian migration; and alleviating poverty. The United States and other members of the international community continue to support efforts to hold free and fair elections in Haiti in the belief that in the long run they will contribute to improved governance and, eventually, improved services to Haitian citizens and greater stability, which will allow for increased development. The Dominican Republic ended its "immigrant regularization" process on June 17, 2015, raising concerns that it may deport tens of thousands of people to Haiti. Most of those, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), are Dominican-born people of Haitian descent. Legislation in the 114th Congress
P.L. 113-76 / H.R. P.L. 113-162 / H.R. P.L. 113-235 / H.R. 52 . 1295 . 1891 . H.Res. 25 . S. 503 . S. 1009 . S. 1267 . | Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic. Since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has struggled to overcome its centuries-long legacy of authoritarianism, extreme poverty, and underdevelopment. Economic and social stability improved considerably, and many analysts believed Haiti was turning a corner toward sustainable development when it was set back by a massive earthquake in January 2010 that devastated much of the capital of Port-au-Prince. Although it is recovering, poverty remains massive and deep, and economic disparity is wide: Haiti remains the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.
Throughout President Michel Martelly's five-year term, Haiti has found itself in a prolonged political crisis due to the government's failure to hold a series of elections that were long overdue. The government failed to hold elections by the end of 2012, leaving the Senate without one-third of its members. Thousands of Haitians took to the streets to protest the lack of elections. When the terms for another third of the Senate as well as the entire 99-seat Chamber of Deputies expired on January 12, the legislature was immediately dissolved, and Martelly began ruling by decree. A new Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) organized legislative elections in August, which were marred by violence, and runoff legislative, presidential, and local elections in October 2015. Some presidential candidates have led protests alleging fraud but have failed to file legal complaints. Runoff presidential elections scheduled for December 27 have been postponed while an independent commission makes recommendations. No new date has been set.
Haiti is a key foreign assistance priority for the Obama Administration in Latin American and the Caribbean. Haiti's developmental needs and priorities are many. The Haitian government and the international donor community are implementing a 10-year recovery plan focusing on territorial, economic, social, and institutional rebuilding. An outbreak of cholera in late 2010 has swept across most of the country and further complicated assistance efforts. Progress has been made in developing democratic institutions, although, as evident in the current crisis, they remain weak.
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been in Haiti to help restore order since 2004. The mission has helped facilitate elections, combated gangs and drug trafficking with the Haitian National Police, and responded to natural disasters. MINUSTAH has been criticized because of sexual abuse by some of its forces and scientific findings that its troops apparently introduced cholera to the country. The U.N. says it will not compensate cholera victims, citing diplomatic immunity. As of June 30, 2015, MINUSTAH had decreased its military troops from 5,021 to 2,338, leaving peacekeeping troops in only 4 of Haiti's 10 departments. The Haitian National Police had primary responsibility for election security.
The Dominican Republic ended its "immigrant regularization" process in June 2015. Since then tens of thousands of Dominican-born people of Haitian descent have relocated to Haiti, some out of fear of or intimidation by Dominican communities or authorities, increasing bilateral tensions.
The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti are to strengthen fragile democratic processes, continue to improve security, and promote economic development. Other concerns include the cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and human trafficking; and alleviating poverty. Congress shares these concerns. The immediate priorities are that free and fair elections be held as quickly as possible and a new administration takes office, with hopes that that will reduce political tensions and instability.
Current legislation related to Haiti includes P.L. 114-113, P.L. 113-76, P.L. 113-162, P.L. 113-235, H.R. 52, H.R. 1295, H.R. 1891, H.Res. 25, S. 503, S. 1009, and S. 1267. |
crs_98-206 | crs_98-206_0 | 105-825 ) was submitted on H.R. 4328 , theOmnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY1999. The conference report and the bill passed the House onOctober 20 and the Senate on October 21, and was signed as P.L. Introduction
The annual Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations bill includes fundingfor agencies and programs in five separate federal departments, as well as numeroussmaller agencies and diverse programs. Status of Department of the Interior and Related AgenciesAppropriations, FY1999
On February 2, 1998, the President submitted his FY1999 budget to Congress. The FY1999 request for Interior and Related Agencies totals $14.26 billion comparedto the $13.79 billion enacted by Congress for FY1998 ( P.L. 105-83 ), an increase of$470 million. The actual increase for Title I and Title II agencies in the FY1999request is $1.17 billion, offset by a nonrecurring appropriation of $699 million forpriority land acquisitions and exchanges in Title V of the FY1998 Interior andRelated Agencies Appropriations Act. However, the Emergency Supplemental ( P.L.105-174 ) increased the FY1998 enacted level to a total of $14.1 billion. On June 25, 1998 the House and Senate Appropriations Committees met to mark up their respective versions of the FY1999 Interior Appropriations bill. On July 23, 1998, the House passed H.R. 4193 , the FY1999 Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations bill by a vote of 245-181 and increasedfunding by $60 million to $13.49 billion. The House-passed bill is $800 millionbelow the President's request and $700 million below the FY1998 enacted level. 4193 , the Housevoted 253-173 to restore $98 million for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA)following a point of order which had deleted $98 million since NEA had no programauthorization. It should be noted that the House and Senate totals reflect scorekeeping adjustments (see Table 3 ). In the absence of these scorekeeping adjustments, theSenate bill ( S. 2237 ) is $168 million more than the House bill( H.R. Changes from the House bill are included in parenthesis:$1.2 billion for the Bureau of Land Management (+ $20 million), $797.3 million forthe Fish and Wildlife Service (+ $52.5 million), $1.66 billion for the National ParkService (+ $55.5 million), $1.71 billion for the Bureau of Indian Affairs (- $11.5million), $2.62 billion for the Forest Service (+ $99.7 million), $1.25 billion for theDepartment of Energy (+ $18.4 million), and $2.25 billion for the Indian HealthService (+ $94 million). On September 8, 1998, the Senate began debating S. 2237 , but suspended action after September 17 in favor of other legislative business. On October 19, following a series of temporary continuing resolutions, a conference report ( H.Rept. The total included for the Department of the Interior and Related Agencieswas $14.1 billion, matching FY1998 (including emergency supplementalappropriations) and higher than passed the House or reported to the Senate. 105-277 by the President on October 21. The House approved the Administration request. | The Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations bill includes funding for agencies and programs in five separate federal departments as well as numerous smaller agencies and diverseprograms.
On February 2, 1998, the President submitted his FY1999 budget to Congress. The request for Interior and Related Agencies totals $14.26 billion compared to the $13.79 billion enacted forFY1998 ( P.L. 105-83 ), an increase of $470 million. The actual increase for Title I and Title IIagencies in the FY1999 request is $1.17 billion, offset by a nonrecurring appropriation of $699million for priority land acquisitions and exchanges in Title V of the FY1998 Interior AppropriationsAct. However, the Emergency Supplemental ( P.L. 105-174 ) increased the FY1998 enacted level toa total of $14.1 billion.
On June 25, 1998, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported versions of the FY1999 Interior Appropriations bill. On July 23, the House passed H.R. 4193 by a voteof 245-181, and increased funding by $60 million to $13.49 billion. The House-passed bill is $800million below the President's request and $700 million below FY1998. During the debate on H.R. 4193 , the House voted 253-173 to restore $98 million for the National Endowmentfor the Arts (NEA) following a point of order deleting the funds since NEA had no programauthorization.
The House and Senate totals reflect scorekeeping adjustments (see Table 3 ). Before these adjustments, the Senate bill ( S. 2237 ) is $168 million more than the House bill. Changes from the House bill include: $1.2 billion for the Bureau of Land Management (+ $20million), $797.3 million for the Fish and Wildlife Service (+ $52.5 million), $1.66 billion for theNational Park Service (+ $55.5 million), $1.71 billion for the Bureau of Indian Affairs (- $11.5million), $2.62 billion for the Forest Service (+ $99.7 million), $1.25 billion for the Department ofEnergy (+ $18.4 million), and $2.25 billion for the Indian Health Service (- $94 million).
On September 8, the Senate began debate on S. 2237 . On September 17, further action on the bill was suspended in favor of other legislative business. The Office of Managementand Budget, in a Statement of Administration Policy, suggested the President might veto the bill inits then-current form.
On October 19, following a series of temporary continuing resolutions, a conference report ( H.Rept. 105-825 ) was submitted on H.R. 4328 , the Omnibus Consolidated andEmergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY1999. The total for Interior and Related Agencieswas $14.1 billion, matching FY1998 (including the Emergency Supplemental) and higher thanpassed the House or reported to the Senate. The conference report and the bill passed the House onOctober 20 and the Senate on October 21, and was signed as P.L. 105-277 by the President onOctober 21.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: ENR = Environment and Natural Resources; EPW = Education and PublicWelfare; GOV = Government; STM = Science, Technology, and Medicine. |
crs_R44436 | crs_R44436_0 | The NLD won control over both chambers of Burma's Union Parliament and thereby the ability to select the President and form an NLD-led government. However, Burma's 2008 constitution grants the Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, 25% of the seats in each chamber of the Union Parliament, nearly complete autonomy from civilian control, the ability to appoint key ministers, and the power to block amendments to the constitution. For Congress and the Obama Administration, the election results and the length of the transition period (nearly five months) raise a number of questions regarding U.S. policy toward Burma, including:
To what extent does the election and formation of an NLD-led government constitute the partial fulfilment of U.S. policy as stated in Section 3 of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act ( P.L. Under what conditions and when should the Obama Administration and/or Congress consider relaxing or revoking remaining restrictions on relations with Burma? Should the Obama Administration or Congress undertake any new programs or activities in Burma, and if so, at what stage in the transition process? The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ) contains specific language pertaining to Burma, continuing or adding restrictions on U.S. relations with the country, while requiring new forms of bilateral engagement (see text box below). When the UEC announced the official results on November 20, 2015, it confirmed that Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) had won a landslide victory, winning nearly 80% of the elected seats in the People's Assembly, more than 80% of the elected seats in the National Assembly, and more than 75% of the elected seats in the state and regional parliaments (see Appendix ). For 95 of the constitution's more than 450 sections, the proposed constitutional amendments will also have to be approved by a majority of all eligible voters. The President-Elect, Htin Kyaw, is to take office on March 30, 2016; he will also appoint new Ministers and a new Union Election Commission, subject to the approval of the Union Parliament. Forming a New Government
Most of the legal framework for the transition to a new government is outlined in the 2008 constitution. Htin Kyaw reportedly will be sworn into office on March 30, 2016. Among the most prominent will be finding a path to end the nation's decades-long, low-grade civil war. Article 20 grants the Tatmadaw "the right to independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed services," and designates the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services as the "Supreme Commander" of all armed forces. A number of factors are likely to influence what changes, if any, the Obama Administration and/or Congress may make in current U.S. policy toward Burma. These include:
Whether legislation the outgoing Union Parliament enacted is consistent with U.S. policy objectives, and whether such legislation helps or hinders the ability of the NLD-led government to implement political and economic reforms; Whether executive actions outgoing President Thein Sein may undertake before he leaves office bolster the authority of the NLD-led government or of the Burmese military; What the relationship between Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma's new President, Htin Kyaw, will be; How the Burmese military conducts itself during the transition period and after the NLD-led government takes power, including what military actions it may take against ethnic militias, as well as its position with respect to Burma's peace process; How Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD-led government pursue the peace process, and whether their approach obtains the cooperation of all the ethnic organizations with militias, other political parties, civil society, and the Burmese military; What actions the NLD-led government takes to address Burma's ethnic and religious tensions, and in particular, the treatment of the Rohingya in Rakhine State; and What economic reforms the NLD-led government identifies as its priorities, and the role it would like to see the United States and other donor nations play in the economic reform process. | The landslide victory of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) in Burma's November 2015 parliamentary elections may prove to be a major step in the nation's potential transition to a more democratic government. Having won nearly 80% of the contested seats in the election, the NLD has a majority in both chambers of the Union Parliament, which gave it the ability to select the President-elect, as well as control of most of the nation's Regional and State Parliaments.
Burma's 2008 constitution, however, grants the Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, widespread powers in the governance of the nation, and nearly complete autonomy from civilian control. One quarter of the seats in each chamber of the Union Parliament are reserved for military officers appointed by the Tatmadaw's Commander-in-Chief, giving them the ability to block any constitutional amendments. Military officers constitute a majority of the National Defence and Security Council, an 11-member body with some oversight authority over the President. The constitution also grants the Tatmadaw "the right to independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed services," and designates the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services as "the 'Supreme Commander' of all armed forces," which could have serious implications for efforts to end the nation's six-decade-long, low-grade civil war.
For Congress and the Obama Administration, the election results and a transition period that will last several months raise a number of questions for U.S. policy toward Burma. To what extent does the election and formation of an NLD-led government constitute the partial achievement of the U.S. goal to see a civilian democratically elected government in Burma? Under what conditions and when should the Obama Administration and/or Congress consider relaxing or revoking existing restrictions on relations with Burma? Should the Obama Administration or Congress undertake any new programs or activities in Burma, and if so, at what stage in the transition process? Congress gave one indication of its answers to these questions in December 2015 when it passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), which continued some restrictions on U.S. relations with Burma, while requiring new forms of engagement.
A new NLD-led government may not be fully in place before summer 2016. The new Union Parliament took office in early February, and on March 15 selected Htin Kyaw as the nation's next President. The President-elect is to be sworn into office on March 30, 2016, and will have to appoint new Ministers for his government, as well as Chief Ministers for the nation's 14 Regions and States.
The NLD government will face great expectations from the Burmese people to address the country's more serious problems. These include a six-decade-long, low-grade civil war; serious ethnic and religious tensions (especially in Rakhine State); poor conditions for hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons; and an inefficient and distorted economy. The new government faces the issue of cooperation with the Tatmadaw to address some of these problems; it is unclear if the Burmese military will be willing to cooperate.
What measures the Obama Administration or Congress choose to take, if any, to alter current U.S. policy toward Burma will likely depend on several factors. The first factor is how the transition process proceeds and what the new NLD-led government looks like in terms of parliamentary and ministerial leadership. Another factor is timing; a clearer picture of Burma's political situation is likely to emerge just as the United States enters into the height of its election season. |
crs_RL34206 | crs_RL34206_0 | Introduction
The block grant of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is best known as a funding source for cash welfare for low-income families with children. However, the block grant also funds a wide range of benefits and services for economically disadvantaged families. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. A decision on whether and how to extend TANF supplemental grants, which go to 17 states in the South and West on the basis of low historic levels of welfare funding and high population growth, beyond September 30, 2008, is the only "must-do" task related to TANF in the 110 th Congress. As shown, the cash welfare caseload plummeted from nearly 5 million to 1.9 million families over this period. The ratio of the average monthly number of children in families receiving cash welfare to the total number of children in poverty declined from about six out of ten in 1995 to less than three out of ten in 2006. Figure 1 shows the uses of TANF and MOE funds in FY2006. It shows that the categories typically associated with a traditional cash welfare program—cash benefits, administrative costs, and work activities—accounted for only a little more than half of total TANF funds. 109-171 ) ended more than four years of congressional debate on "reauthorizing" the TANF block grant. Extension of Funding
The DRA extended most TANF funding through FY2010. Federal law lists 12 categories of activities that count toward the participation standards, but regulations promulgated during the Clinton Administration from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) explicitly allowed states to define the specific activities counted in these categories. Unless Congress acts to extend supplemental grants, the FY2009 TANF grant awards, beginning October 1, 2008, would be reduced for the 17 states that receive supplemental grants. The DRA extended supplemental grants at $319 million per year until the end of FY2008. A one-year extension of supplemental grants through FY2009 is included in H.R. 6331 , a Medicare bill. Potential Legislative Issues for the 110th Congress Related to Families Receiving Welfare
Though "welfare" now accounts for only a little more than half of all TANF and MOE funding, most issues the 110 th Congress might consider, other than financing issues, relate to families receiving welfare. Meeting TANF Work Participation Standards
The change in the caseload reduction credit—beginning in FY2007, providing credit only for caseload reduction from FY2005—means that many states had to either quickly raise participation in activities or reduce their caseloads to meet TANF's work participation standards. What Activities Count Toward the Participation Standards? For adults, education and training other than vocational educational training counts only in conjunction with other activities more closely related to work. However, in its final regulations published on February 5, 2008, HHS reversed this policy, allowing states to count all college as vocational educational training. Under HHS regulations, participation in a GED program, adult basic education, and English as a Second Language (ESL) activities are counted in two ways. That is, they could transfer these families from the TANF cash aid caseload to the foster care caseload. A 2006 GAO report found that "reporting and oversight mechanisms have not kept pace with the evolving role in TANF budgets, leaving information gaps at the national level related to the numbers served and how states use funds to meet welfare reform goals...."
Second, on the basis of what is known, a great deal of TANF's "nonwelfare" spending goes to two other federal-state program areas: child care and child welfare. Reporting on "Nonwelfare" Benefits and Services
TANF's detailed reporting requirements focus on families receiving cash welfare. Legislation affecting child welfare funding would also have an impact on TANF. | Enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171) ended more than four years of congressional debate on "reauthorizing" the block grant of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The DRA extended funding for most TANF grants through FY2010, except TANF supplemental grants that expire at the end of this year (FY2008). Supplemental grants go to 17 states that have high population growth or low historic funding in TANF's predecessor programs per poor person. H.R. 6331, a Medicare bill enacted over President Bush's veto on July 15, 2008, extends supplemental grants for one year, through FY2009.
TANF is best known as the funding source for welfare benefits for low-income families with children. In 2006, 1.9 million families per month received TANF cash welfare, down from the historical high of five million families receiving cash welfare in the mid-1990s. In 2006, less than three in ten poor children were in families that received TANF cash welfare. However, TANF funds a wide range of "nonwelfare" benefits and services for needy families with children. In FY2006, spending on activities related to traditional cash welfare accounted for a little more than half of total TANF funding, while other "nonwelfare" activities accounted for the remainder.
Though cash welfare is a shrinking part of what TANF funds, many of the issues Congress might consider in the 110th Congress (beside supplemental grants) focus on families receiving cash welfare, particularly the work participation standards that apply to these families. The DRA made changes that require states to either increase participation among families receiving cash welfare in work or job preparation activities or reduce their welfare caseloads to meet these numerical performance standards. The DRA also required the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to issue rules regulations defining what specific activities count toward the participation standards. HHS final regulations, published on February 5, 2008, allow states to count participation in a four-year college degree program toward the participation standards and provide for limited counting of rehabilitative activities. However, the regulations also limit counting activities such as adult basic education (ABE), pursuing a General Educational Development (GED) credential, and English as a Second Language courses, generally requiring them to be counted only in conjunction with activities more closely related to work.
In terms of "nonwelfare" spending from TANF, Congress might consider proposals left over from TANF reauthorization proposals, but not included in DRA, to loosen some rules for nonwelfare spending. Congress might also consider improving the information available on how TANF funds are used for "nonwelfare" benefits and services, since relatively little is known about this half of TANF funding. Additionally, legislation that affects foster care, child welfare services for abused and neglected children, and child care funding would have an effect on TANF, since large amounts of TANF "nonwelfare" dollars are used to supplement dedicated federal and state funding for these programs. This report will be updated as legislative events warrant. |
crs_R45282 | crs_R45282_0 | T he Pesticide Registration Improvement Extension Act of 2012 (PRIA 3), which amended certain provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), reauthorized the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to collect and use two types of fees to enhance and accelerate the agency's pesticide registration program and related activities. PRIA 3 authorized the collection of maintenance fees until the end of FY2017. Pesticide Maintenance Fees
In accordance with the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, the authority to collect pesticide maintenance fees expires on September 30, 2018. Pesticide Registration Service Fees
In accordance with the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, EPA's authority to collect registration service fees begins to phase out starting at the end of FY2018. If the authority to collect registration service fees is not extended or reauthorized, pursuant to PRIA 3, the amount of registration service fees that EPA may collect would be reduced by 70% for FY2019 and, at the end of FY2019, the authority to collect registration service fees would expire. From FY2004 through FY2018, collected maintenance fees ranged from $21.4 million to $28.7 million per fiscal year. In the same time period, collected registration service fees ranged from $10.6 million to $18.6 million per fiscal year. Collected maintenance and registration service fees each year are estimated to provide one-fourth of the total appropriation for EPA's pesticide program activities. H.R. 1029 and Senate Amendment
On March 20, 2017, the House passed the Pesticide Registration Enhancement Act of 2017 ( H.R. 1029 , renamed the Pesticide Registration Improvement Extension Act of 2018. Both versions of H.R. 1029 would
reauthorize the collection of maintenance fees and registration service fees through FY2023 and FY2025, respectively; increase the cap on annual maintenance fees per registrant by 12% and the aggregate for all maintenance fees from $27.8 million per fiscal year to an average amount of $31.0 million per fiscal year; direct EPA annually to set aside not more than $500,000 in the Reregistration and Expedited Processing Fund for expedited rulemaking and guidance development related to evaluating the efficacy of pesticides in controlling certain invertebrate pests; direct EPA annually to set aside not more than $500,000 in the Reregistration and Expedited Processing Fund for enhancing the good laboratory practices standards compliance monitoring program; revise registration service fee amounts for different actions the applicant may request the agency to conduct; add more actions in which registration service fees may be assessed; and revise certain time frames in which EPA is required to complete review of a requested action. The Senate amendment to H.R. 1029 would require EPA to carry out and not revise two final rules before October 1, 2021, with one exception. EPA promulgated both rules during the previous administration. The other rule revised standards for certified pesticide applicators ("Pesticides; Certification of Pesticide Applicators"), amending elements of the existing standard with the stated intent of protecting applicators, the public, and the environment from risks associated with the use of restricted use pesticides. Additionally, the Senate amendment to H.R. 1029 would direct the U.S. Government Accountability Office to publish a report by October 1, 2021, on the use of designated representatives. The report must examine the effect of designated representatives on the availability of pesticide application and hazard information and worker health and safety. H.R. 2
Section 9119 of H.R. 2 , the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018, as passed by the House on June 21, 2018, would enact House-passed H.R. The Senate amendment to H.R. 2 , the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, passed by the Senate on June 28, 2018, does not include a similar provision. On July 18, 2018, the House requested a conference with the Senate to resolve differences between the House and Senate versions of H.R. | Division G of Title II of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) extended U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authority to collect fees from the pesticide industry for the maintenance and evaluation of pesticide registrations under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA; 7 U.S.C. 136 et seq.) until the end of FY2018. Two types of industry-paid fees supplement annual appropriations from the General Fund to support EPA's pesticide regulatory program.
Without the extension, the authority to collect maintenance fees would have expired at the end of FY2017 under the Pesticide Registration Improvement Extension Act of 2012 (PRIA 3; P.L. 112-177). Maintenance fees are paid by pesticide registrants to retain existing pesticide registrations, which govern the terms and conditions for lawful pesticide distribution and use.
Additionally, without the extension, PRIA 3 would have gradually phased out the authority to collect registration service fees by the end of FY2019. Registration service fees are paid by applicants who seek EPA review of applications associated with pesticide registrations (e.g., new registrations, amendments to existing registrations).
If these fee authorities are not reauthorized or extended after FY2018, pursuant to PRIA 3, the authority to collect maintenance fees would expire and the authority to collect registration service fees would be phased out by the end of FY2019.
Since FY2004, total maintenance fees collected by EPA have ranged from $21.4 million to $28.7 million per fiscal year and total registration service fees have ranged from $10.6 million to $18.6 million per fiscal year. Maintenance and registration service fees collected each fiscal year have provided approximately one-fourth of the total appropriation for EPA's pesticide program activities.
In the 115th Congress, the House-passed H.R. 1029, the Pesticide Registration Enhancement Act of 2017, and the Senate amendment to H.R. 1029, the Pesticide Registration Improvement Extension Act of 2018, would reauthorize the collection of maintenance fees until the end of FY2023 and registration service fees until the end of FY2025. The amount that EPA may collect in registration service fees would be reduced by 40% for FY2024 and 70% for FY2025 in a phase out.
Both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 1029 would increase the cap on annual maintenance fees per registrant by 12% and the aggregate for all maintenance fees from $27.8 million per fiscal year to an average amount of $31.0 million per fiscal year.
Both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 1029 would revise registration service fee amounts for different actions the applicant may request the agency to conduct and certain time frames in which EPA is required to complete review of a requested action.
The Senate amendment to H.R. 1029 would require EPA to implement without revision two final rules promulgated during the previous administration before October 1, 2021. The two EPA rules address standards for the protection of agricultural workers from pesticide exposures and the certification of applicators that use restricted use pesticides. The Senate amendment to H.R. 1029 would also direct the U.S. Government Accountability Office to publish a report on the use of designated representatives and their effect on the availability of pesticide application and hazard information.
On June 21, 2018, the House passed H.R. 2, the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018, which includes a provision that would enact House-passed H.R. 1029. The Senate amendment to H.R. 2, the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, does not include a similar provision. On July 18, 2018, the House requested a conference with the Senate to resolve differences between the House and Senate versions of H.R. 2. |
crs_R41537 | crs_R41537_0 | Introduction
This report describes and analyzes how U.S. policy towards the multilateral development banks (MDBs) is made and implemented by the executive branch and Congress. Both share the responsibility for U.S. participation in the MDBs, but each branch has primary control over different parts of the decision-making process. On behalf of the President, the Secretary of the Treasury is responsible for negotiating with other countries about MDB policies and prospective funding agreements and for managing the day-to-day conduct of U.S. participation in the banks. Congress, for its part, has the ultimate authority over the level of U.S. financial commitments to the multilateral agencies, the general framework for U.S. policy, and the criteria that govern U.S. participation in these institutions. Since 1999, Congress has required that Treasury, as Chairman of the NAC, annually report to Congress on several topics related to U.S. participation in the international financial institutions, including an assessment of the effectiveness of the major policies and operations of the international financial institutions; the major issues affecting U.S. participation; and progress made and steps taken to achieve U.S. policy goals (including major policy goals embodied in current law). I can only be overruled by the President himself." USAID's impact on U.S. policy is limited, however, and NGOs generally address their concerns directly to the Treasury Department and the MDBs. Other U.S. agencies also play a role in the policy process regarding the MDBs. Congress and the MDBs
Congress has authority to set the terms for U.S. participation at the MDBs—including how U.S. executive directors shall vote on specific types of loans—and to determine whether the United States will participate in and contribute money towards new MDB funding plans and whether it will support amendments to the MDBs' Articles of Agreement or other basic changes in their organization. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC) and House Committee on Financial Services (HFSC) have jurisdiction over MDB authorizing legislation. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees deal with MDB issues primarily through their respective Subcommittees on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. Hearings
The authorization and appropriations committees generally hold hearings on the Administration's funding requests for the MDBs. The information provided by these reports helps Congress exercise oversight over U.S. policy and the MDB program. Through reporting requirements, Congress required the Administration to make information about MDB operations and policies available to the public and to pay attention to particular congressional concerns. | This report analyzes how the United States makes policy towards the multilateral development banks (MDBs) and identifies ways by which Congress can shape U.S. policy and influence the activities of the banks themselves.
The executive branch and Congress share responsibility for U.S. policy towards the MDBs and each has primary control over a different part of the policy process. The Administration is responsible for negotiating with other countries and for managing day-to-day U.S. participation in the MDBs. Congress has ultimate authority over the level of U.S. financial commitments and the criteria that govern U.S. participation in these institutions. Congress has authorized the President to direct U.S. participation in the MDBs, and the President has delegated that authority to the Secretary of the Treasury. Other agencies also have reasons for being concerned about U.S. policy and the MDBs. The Administration created a new process, starting in 2009, to help coordinate interagency views on MDB issues.
Authorizing legislation is managed by the House Financial Services Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs handle the appropriations. Since 1981, MDB legislation has become law through the regular legislative process only once. Usually it is enacted as a rider to other legislation.
Congress exercises its influence over MDB policy through its control over authorizations and appropriations and through oversight. The authorizing committees have included in MDB authorizing legislation many directives which affect the goal and direction of U.S. policy. Congress has also used its control over the funding process—its "power of the purse"—to set priorities and encourage the Administration and MDBs to consider changes in their policies or procedures. Congress has used hearings and required reports to get information about U.S. policy and the MDBs onto the public record and to draw the Treasury Department's attention to issues of pressing concern. Since the Administration knows it must come to Congress for future authorizations and MDB funding, the views expressed by Congress through hearings have often had an impact on the focus and direction of U.S. policy regarding particular concerns.
For more information the MDBs, see CRS Report R41170, Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and CRS Report RS20792, Multilateral Development Banks: U.S. Contributions FY2000-FY2015, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43119 | crs_R43119_0 | Although not discussed in this report, the use of chemical weapons in Syria on August 21, 2013, triggered an intense debate over possible U.S. military intervention. This debate created temporary momentum focused on the dire humanitarian situation within Syrian where humanitarian organizations remain severely constrained by the conflict, fighting, and restrictions imposed by the Syrian government. The United States remains the largest humanitarian donor. U.S. humanitarian policy is guided by concerns about access and protection within Syria; the large refugee flows out of the country that strain the resources of neighboring countries (and could negatively impact the overall stability of the region); and an already escalating and protracted humanitarian emergency. These issues are addressed in other CRS reports. As the international community deliberates over what action it can or should take on the crisis, a massive humanitarian operation continues in parts of Syria and in neighboring countries. The "Geneva II" talks in Switzerland, which include some members of the Syrian opposition, representatives of the Syrian government, and other government leaders, were launched on January 22, 2014. The first round came to an end on January 31. Many experts and observers hoped that a lasting agreement would have been reached on "humanitarian pauses" to allow access and relief to thousands of civilians blockaded in towns and cities in Syria. A second round of the Geneva II talks took place in Switzerland between February 10-15, but ended with little progress in efforts to end the civil war. The parties reportedly agreed to an agenda for a third round of talks. After nearly two years, and amid continued lack of progress on a peaceful resolution to the conflict, on May 13, 2014, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced that he "regretfully accepted" the resignation of Lakhdar Brahimi, the Joint United Nations-League of Arab States Special Representative on the crisis. He left his post effective May 31. Further recognizing the need for increased humanitarian access, on February 22, 2014, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2139 (2014), which demanded that "all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access for U.N. humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners, including across conflict lines and across borders." While humanitarian needs are immense and continue to escalate, access and security in Syria present huge challenges in the humanitarian response, particularly for NGOs. Reportedly, Palestinian refugees in Syria are disproportionally and increasingly vulnerable. As of mid-June 2014, an estimated 2.8 million Syrians have been forced to flee the violence and conflict with 97% seeking refuge in countries in the immediate surrounding region, primarily Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, and in other parts of North Africa. The United States and the international community have recognized the contribution of those countries hosting refugees and supported their efforts, while encouraging them to keep their borders open to those fleeing conflict in Syria. U.S. humanitarian priorities in Syria include
providing as much humanitarian assistance as possible through partners and multilateral mechanisms; supporting protection activities for vulnerable populations; helping to develop a strong multilateral response to support countries hosting refugees; encouraging donor pledges and contributions; and building capacity within Syria and among its neighbors for immediate assistance and contingency planning for what has become a protracted crisis. The breadth and scale of the crisis inside Syria, with 9.3 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, requires using multiple resources and aid delivery options. U.S. Funding and Allocation
Beginning in FY2012, through June 4, 2014, the United States has allocated more than $2 billion for humanitarian activities both inside Syria and in neighboring countries. The U.S. contribution has been allocated in response to U.N. humanitarian appeals, as well as supporting other projects using existing funding from global humanitarian accounts and some reprogrammed funding. The Administration's FY2015 budget request seeks $1.1 billion in humanitarian assistance for Syria and the region. International Response Framework
International humanitarian agencies, including NGOs, and governments continue to work in Syria and in countries in the region to provide and coordinate assistance to the civilian populations. A key challenge facing international organizations and NGOs operating in Syria is access, which remains severely constrained by violence and insecurity and conflict, restrictions imposed by the Syrian government on the operations of humanitarian organizations, and obstruction by all sides to the conflict. The plan addresses the needs of Syrians affected by conflict inside Syria. Willingness and cooperation of neighboring countries . So far, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey have received the vast majority of refugees from Syria. Ongoing capacity by the international community to keep pace with humanitarian developments . Burdensharing . Selected Humanitarian Projects Funded by All Donors in Syria and the Region
Appendix C. Selected Humanitarian Partners Serving the Syria Arab Republic Civil Unrest, CY2014
Appendix D. U.S. and International Humanitarian Country Donors to the Syria Crisis, CY2012-2014
Appendix E. 2013 Pledges Not Converted to Commitments or Contributions as of June 18, 2014
Appendix F. Sources for Further Information
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
Syria country page: http://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria
No Lost Generation: http://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria/children
U.S. Department of State
Syria country page: http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/sy/
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM): http://www.state.gov/j/prm/
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
The World Factbook on Syria: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html
United Nations —Selected Sources
UN News Center: http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=146&Body=Syria&Body1=
United Nations Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php
Relief Web link: http://reliefweb.int/country/syr | The ongoing conflict in Syria has created one of the most pressing humanitarian crises in the world. More than three years later, as of mid-June 2014, an estimated 9.3 million people inside Syria, nearly half the population, have been affected by the conflict, with nearly 6.5 million displaced. In addition, 2.8 million Syrians are displaced as refugees, with 97% fleeing to countries in the immediate surrounding region, including Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and other parts of North Africa. The situation is fluid and continues to worsen, while humanitarian needs are immense and increase daily.
While internationally supervised disarmament of chemical weapons in Syria is proceeding, albeit with some difficulty, U.S. and international diplomatic efforts to negotiate a political end to the fighting in Syria opened on January 22, 2014, in Montreux, Switzerland. The "Geneva II" talks included some members of the Syrian opposition, representatives of the Syrian government, and other government leaders. The first round of talks came to an end on January 31 and resumed February 10-15, but ended with little progress in efforts to end the civil war. The parties reportedly agreed to an agenda for a third round of talks. Many experts and observers hoped that a lasting agreement would have been reached on "humanitarian pauses" to allow access and relief to thousands of civilians blockaded in towns and cities in Syria. On February 22, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2139 (2014) to increase humanitarian access and aid delivery in Syria. On May 13, 2014, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced that Lakhdar Brahimi, the Joint United Nations-League of Arab States Special Representative on the crisis, would resign his post, which became effective on May 31.
U.S. Assistance and Priorities
The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance and is part of the massive, international humanitarian operation in parts of Syria and in neighboring countries. Beginning in FY2012, through June 4, 2014, the United States has allocated more than $2 billion to meet humanitarian needs using existing funding from global humanitarian accounts and some reprogrammed funding. U.S. humanitarian policy is guided by concerns about humanitarian access and protection within Syria; the large refugee flows out of the country that strain the resources of neighboring countries (and could negatively impact the overall stability of the region); and a protracted and escalating humanitarian emergency. The Administration's FY2015 budget request seeks $1.1 billion in humanitarian assistance for Syria and the region.
International Response
The international humanitarian response is massive and complex and struggles to keep pace with urgent developments that have escalated well beyond anticipated needs and continue to do so. Access within Syria is severely constrained by violence and restrictions imposed by the Syrian government on the operations of humanitarian organizations. In mid-December 2013, the United Nations launched two appeals—taken together its largest appeal in history—requesting $6.5 billion in contributions to meet the ongoing humanitarian needs in Syria and the region.
Ongoing Humanitarian Challenges of the Syria Crisis and U.S. Policy
As U.S. policy makers and the international community deliberate over what, if any, actions they can or should take on the Syria crisis, possible humanitarian policy issues for Congress include
the immediate need for access within Syria by humanitarian organizations, which has been severely constrained by violence and restrictions imposed by the Syrian government; examining U.S. assistance and priorities in an ongoing humanitarian response; balancing the Syria response with domestic priorities and other humanitarian concerns worldwide; ensuring the ongoing willingness and cooperation of Syria's neighbors, which are receiving the vast majority of refugees from Syria, to keep borders open and to host refugees fleeing Syria; finding ways to alleviate the strain on civilians and those responding to the crisis as the situation worsens and becomes more protracted, including the support of initiatives, such as emergency development assistance, for communities within neighboring countries that are hosting refugees; and encouraging the participation of other countries to provide support through humanitarian admission, resettlement, facilitated visa procedures, and protection for those seeking asylum.
The United States has a critical voice regarding humanitarian access in Syria, the pace of humanitarian developments and contingency planning, support to neighboring countries that are hosting refugees, and burdensharing among donors.
This report examines the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria and the U.S. and international response and will be updated as events warrant. For background and information on Syria, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, by [author name scrubbed] (coordinator), [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R43201, Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress, coordinated by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. See also CRS Report R42848, Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. This report does not address the humanitarian situation in Iraq as a result of the recent wave of violence that began on June 10, 2014. For more information, see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL30588 | crs_RL30588_0 | However, the Administration was unable to moderate the Taliban's policies, and the United States withheld recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government. Additional covert options were reportedly also under consideration. A deadline that the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) set in January 2016 for new parliamentary elections—October 15, 2016—was not met. One of the institutional human rights developments since the fall of the Taliban has been the establishment of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), an oversight body on human rights practices, but its members are appointed by the government and some believe it is not independent. About 4,388 women serve in the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), making up around 1.4% of the force, though the Afghan government has set a goal to increase the number of women in the ANDSF to 10%. The insurgent challenge to stability in Afghanistan has been sustained by a number of factors, including (1) the small numbers of security forces in many rural areas; (2) logistical and other shortfalls on the part of the ANDSF; (3) safe haven enjoyed by militants in Pakistan; (4) a backlash against civilian casualties caused by military operations; and (5) unrealized public expectations of economic performance and the effectiveness and integrity of Afghan governance. U.S. rules of engagement allow for operations against Al Qaeda, the Islamic State (as of January 2016), and associated groups by affiliation, and against the Taliban and other insurgent groups if they pose an imminent threat to U.S. forces or the ANDSF and the Afghan government (since June 2016). In a disputed selection process, he was succeeded by Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, who in turn was killed by a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle strike on May 21, 2016. To address Afghan concerns that the deadline signaled decreasing U.S. involvement, a November 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon decided on a gradual transition to Afghan leadership that would be completed by the end of 2014. Asserting that a full U.S. military departure from Afghanistan would continue to focus the Afghans on improving their skills, the President announced in May 2014
The U.S. military contingent in Afghanistan would be 9,800 in 2015, deployed in various parts of Afghanistan, consisting mostly of trainers in the "Resolute Support Mission" (RSM). About 2,000 of the U.S. force would be Special Operations Forces, of which half would conduct counterterrorism missions. And, the killing of Taliban leader Mullah Mansour by a U.S. strike in May 2016 demonstrates Taliban vulnerabilities to U.S. intelligence and combat capabilities, although it has not to date had a measurable effect on Taliban effectiveness. A U.S. commitment to request economic aid for Afghanistan for the duration of the agreement (2014-2024). Since 2002, over $3 billion in assistance to the ANDSF has come from these sources. Since FY2010, the United States has obligated over $3.2 billion for the AAF, including nearly $1 billion for equipment and aircraft. The government reportedly hopes that the political settlement with HIG signed in September 2016 (more below) will prompt the Taliban to agree to a political settlement. There have been no recent indications that the Taliban leadership is contemplating new talks with the Afghan government. The group is not designated as a "Foreign Terrorist Organization" (FTO). The program depended on donations: Britain, Japan, and several other countries, including the United States, have donated about $200 million, of which the U.S. contribution has been about half the total (CERP funds). The Trump Administration has specifically linked U.S. policy in Afghanistan to broader regional dynamics, particularly as they relate to South Asia, and in particular signaled that the Administration plans to assertively pressure Pakistan to deny safe haven to Afghan militants. Afghanistan has sought to increase its integration with neighboring states through participation in other international fora, including
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which Afghanistan joined in November 2005; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a security coordination body that includes Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, to which Afghanistan was granted full observer status in June 2012; the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA), which was launched in 2005, last met in November 2016 in Istanbul, and is to be hosted by Turkmenistan in Ashkabad in 2017; a "Regional Working Group" initiative, co-chaired by Turkey and UNAMA, which organized the November 2011 Istanbul meeting mentioned above; a "Kabul Silk Road" initiative, led by UNAMA, to promote regional cooperation on Afghanistan; and the still-expanding 50-nation "International Contact Group," through which U.S. officials have sought to enlist regional and greater international support for Afghanistan. Iran helped broker Afghanistan's first post-Taliban government, in cooperation with the United States, at the December 2001 "Bonn Conference." From 2002 to 2014, China provided about $255 million in economic aid to Afghanistan. The cited figures do not include costs for U.S. combat operations. The FY2017 Consolidated Appropriation ( P.L. 111-73 ) did not authorize ROZs. | The United States, partner countries, and the Afghan government are attempting to reverse recent gains made by the resilient Taliban-led insurgency since the December 2014 transition to a smaller international mission consisting primarily of training and advising the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The Afghan government has come under increasing domestic criticism not only for failing to prevent insurgent gains but also for its internal divisions that have spurred the establishment of new political opposition coalitions. In September 2014, the United States brokered a compromise to address a dispute over the 2014 presidential election, but a September 2016 deadline was not met for enacting election reforms and deciding whether to elevate the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) position to a prime ministership. The Afghan government has made some measurable progress in reducing corruption and implementing its budgetary and other commitments. It has adopted measures that would enable it to proceed with new parliamentary elections, but no election date has been set.
The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in 2011, is reportedly about 15,000, of which most are assigned to the NATO-led "Resolute Support Mission" (RSM) that trains, assists, and advises the ANDSF. About 2,000 of the U.S. contingent are involved in combat against Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, including the Afghanistan branch of the Islamic State organization (ISIL-Khorasan), under "Operation Freedom's Sentinel" (OFS). In August 2017, after several months of deliberation, President Trump announced a new strategy that includes several thousand additional U.S. forces to help Afghan forces break a "stalemate" in combat against insurgent groups, as well as expanded authorities to strike Taliban targets. The strategy also appears to signal a U.S. intent to more assertively pressure Pakistan to deny safe haven to Afghan militants.
U.S. officials assert that insurgents control or contest about 40% of Afghan territory, but still are not positioned to overturn the government. In May 2016, the vulnerabilities of the Taliban were exposed when the United States tracked and killed with an unmanned aerial vehicle strike the head of the Taliban, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. However, the successor Taliban leadership has continued to produce battlefield gains and rejects new settlement talks with the government. One small insurgent group reached a settlement with the government in late September 2016, but the agreement has not, to date, broadened to other groups. Afghanistan's minorities and women's groups assert concerns that a settlement with the Taliban might erode post-2001 human rights gains. U.S. forces have helped Afghan units kill several successive leaders of the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan, but without defeating the group outright.
A component of U.S. policy to help establish a self-sustaining Afghanistan is to encourage economic development and integration into regional trading patterns. However, Afghanistan will remain dependent on foreign aid for many years. Through the end of FY2016, the United States provided about $111 billion to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about 60% has been to equip and train the ANDSF. These figures do not include funds for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. The FY2017 appropriation for the ANDSF is $4.2 billion; allocations to Afghanistan from economic assistance account appropriations have not yet been finalized. For FY2018, the Trump Administration has requested $4.9 billion for the ANDSF, as well as funding for a number of other priorities, including $650 million in economic support. |
crs_R44873 | crs_R44873_0 | Introduction
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) is the primary source of federal aid to elementary and secondary education. Title I-A is the largest program in the ESEA, funded at $15.5 billion for FY2017. The program is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. The U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The ESEA was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. This report provides FY2017 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. Under Title I-A, funds are allocated to LEAs via state educational agencies (SEAs) using the four Title I-A formulas. Overall, California received the largest total Title I-A grant amount ($1.8 billion) and, as a result, the largest percentage share (12.00%) of Title I-A grants. Vermont received the smallest total Title I-A grant amount ($35.3 million) and, as a result, the smallest percentage share (0.23%) of Title I-A grants. | The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95), is the primary source of federal aid to K-12 education. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. Title I-A was funded at $15.5 billion for FY2017.
Under current law, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The four Title I-A formulas have somewhat distinct allocation patterns, providing varying shares of allocated funds to different types of states. Thus, for some states, certain formulas are more favorable than others.
This report provides FY2017 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. Overall, California received the largest FY2017 Title I-A grant amount ($1.8 billion, or 12.00% of total Title I-A grants). Vermont received the smallest FY2017 Title I-A grant amount ($35.3 million, or 0.23% of total Title I-A grants). |
crs_RS21702 | crs_RS21702_0 | RS21702 -- Sexual Harassment, Constructive Discharge, and Employers' Affirmative Defenses: The U.S. SupremeCourt Decision in Pennsylvania State Police v.Suders
Updated June 18, 2004
Legal Background - Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment by Supervisors
Originally, courts drew a distinction for purposes of employer liability between so-called " quid pro quo " and "hostile environment" claims of sexual harassment. She claimed that she was forced to resign her job in August 1998, becauseof a sexually hostile work environment created by three male supervisors, and harassment due to her age andpolitical affiliation. The Supreme Court Ruling
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Suders applied the framework of the Court's 1998 rulings to stake out a middle ground between the conflicting approaches to constructive discharge takenby the courts of appeals. While rejecting the availability of the affirmative defense in any constructive discharge case, the appeals courtsuggested that the existence of an effective anti-harassment policy may nonetheless be relevant to the thresholdquestion of whether the harassment was intolerable and the employee'sdecision to quit a reasonable one. Moreover, even where there has been a tangible employment action,coupled with a constructive discharge or resignation, the employermay have defenses available. Under the decision, if there is any realdispute about whether the employee suffered a tangible employment action, the employer may not rely on theaffirmative defense to obtain summary judgment. | On June 14, 2004 the Supreme Court resolved a conflict among the federal circuitsconcerning the defenses, if any, that may be available toan employer against an employee's claim that she was forced to resign because of "intolerable" sexual harassmentat the hands of a supervisor. An employer may generally assert anaffirmative defense to supervisory harassment under the Court's 1998 rulings in Farager v. City of BocaRaton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth. The defense is not available,however, if the harassment includes a "tangible employment action," such as discharge or demotion. InPennsylvania State Police v. Suders, the plaintiff claimed the tangible adverseaction was supervisory harassment so severe that it drove the employee to quit, a constructive discharge in effect. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, with only JusticeThomas dissenting, accepted the theory of a constructive discharge as a tangible employment action, but it also setconditions under which the employer could assert an affirmativedefense and avoid strict liability. The issue is of key importance for determining the scope of employers' vicariousliability in "supervisory" sexual harassment cases alleging a hostilework environment. |
crs_RL34032 | crs_RL34032_0 | 93-198 , 87 Stat. City leaders have consistently expressed concern that Congress has repeatedly delayed passage of the appropriations act for the District (in which Congress approves the city's budgets) well beyond the start of its fiscal year. The city's elected leaders contend that delay in Congress's approval of its budget hinders their ability to manage the District's financial affairs and negatively impacts the delivery of public services. 733 , 110 th Congress, introduced on January 20, 2007, by Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, is the latest in a series of bills dating back to 1981 that would provide budget autonomy for the District of Columbia. When the District of Columbia Government Reorganization and Self-Government Improvement Act (Home Rule Act, P.L. 774) was enacted in 1973, granting the city limited self-governing authority, it retained congressional authority to review and approve the District's annual budget as part of the congressional appropriations process. The Home Rule Act includes several prescriptive provisions governing budget submission, financial management, and borrowing authority. 733 would allow the District to forego congressional review and approval of its operating and capital budgets financed with local revenues. The bill would also remove several budget submission and financial management reporting requirements and restrictions on the city's borrowing authority. Proponents of increased budget autonomy can point to the Bush Administration's budget for FY2004, which included a statement in support of budget autonomy for the District of Columbia, and the fact that the District has produced 10 consecutive balanced budgets (six of them without the supervision of the Financial Control Board). Specifically, the bill would strike provisions that:
limit the city's ability to increase spending based on an increase in revenues after Congress has approved a fiscal year appropriation; require the mayor to submit a complete financial report to the council by February 1 of each year; require the city to maintain an emergency reserve fund equal to 2% of operating expenditures as identified in the Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) submitted by the CFO and dictate the uses of such fund; and require the city to maintain a contingency reserve fund of not less than 4% of operating expenditures as identified in the CAFR submitted by the CFO and dictate the use of such fund; establish the position of the District of Columbia Auditor; require the mayor annually to develop and submit to the House and Senate oversight and appropriations committees, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a performance accountability plan for all departments, agencies, and programs of the government of the District of Columbia for the next fiscal year; require the mayor to develop and submit to the House and Senate oversight and appropriations committees, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a performance accountability report for all departments, agencies, and programs of the government of the District of Columbia for the previous fiscal year; require the CFO to develop and submit to the House and Senate oversight and appropriations committees, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), not later than March 1 of each year, a five-year financial plan for the government of the District of Columbia that contains a description of the steps the government will take to eliminate any differences between expenditures from, and revenues attributable to, each fund of the District of Columbia during the five years beginning after the submission of the plan. Summary
District of Columbia Budget Autonomy Act of 2007, H.R. The budget autonomy bill, H.R. | The District of Columbia Budget Autonomy Act of 2007, H.R. 733, 110th Congress, introduced on January 20, 2007, by Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, is the latest in a series of legislative proposals dating back to 1981 and the 97th Congress that have sought to provide budget autonomy for the District of Columbia. When Congress passed the District of Columbia Government Reorganization and Self-Government Improvement Act (the Home Rule Act, P.L. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774), in 1973, granting the city limited home rule authority, it included provisions retaining its constitutional authority to exercise exclusive legislative control over the District's affairs, including the budget process. The Home Rule Act requires congressional approval of the District's annual budget as part of the congressional appropriations process, and includes prescriptive provisions governing budget submission, financial management, and borrowing authority.
H.R. 733 would allow the District to forego congressional review and approval of that portion of its operating and capital budgets financed with local revenues. The bill would also lift several budget content and financial management reporting requirements and restrictions on the city's borrowing authority. City leaders have consistently contended that Congress has repeatedly delayed passage of the appropriations act for the District (in which Congress approves the city's budgets) well beyond the October 1 start of its fiscal year. The city's elected leaders contend that the delay in Congress's approval of the city's budget hinders their ability to manage the District's financial affairs and negatively affects the delivery of public services. Proponents of increased budget autonomy can point to the Bush Administration's budget for FY2004, which included a statement in support of budget autonomy for the District of Columbia, and the fact that the District has produced 10 consecutive balanced budgets, six of them without the supervision of the Financial Control Board.
An argument against granting the city budget autonomy is that it could be viewed as an abdication of Congress's constitutional responsibility to exercise legislative control over and oversight of the Nation's capital, "the seat of the Government." Such a lack of oversight of the city's financial affairs could result in the city slipping back into a fiscal crisis of the magnitude that led Congress to create the Financial Control Board in 1995. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL34004 | crs_RL34004_0 | 110-161 ) was signed into law by the President on December 26, 2007. The DHS Appropriations Act of 2008 was included as Division E of P.L. The Act provides $38.7 billion in net budget authority for FY2008. 2638
On July 26, 2007, the Senate passed H.R. 2638 would have provided a total of $40.6 billion in net budget authority (including $3 billion in emergency appropriations) for DHS for FY2008. Not including the emergency funding, the Senate-passed version of H.R. 2638 contains a total of $37.6 billion in net budget authority for DHS for FY2008. Not including supplemental appropriations, the House-passed H.R. The Administration's request includes gross appropriations of $42.8 billion, and a net appropriation of $35.5 billion in budget authority for FY2008, of which $34.3 billion is discretionary budget authority, and $1.2 billion is mandatory budget authority. The U.S. 2638 included $37.4 billion for DHS for FY2008; Senate-passed H.R. Title II: Security Enforcement and Investigations
Title II contains the appropriations for the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the US Coast Guard, and the US Secret Service. 110-161 provides $9,423 million in net budget authority for CBP for FY2008. P.L. H.R. H.R. 2638 provided a total of $8,352 million in net budget authority for the Coast Guard, which is $102 million less than the President requested. 2638
The Senate provided $8,559 million for the Coast Guard which is $102 million more than the President requested. 2638
For FY2008, the House proposed an appropriation of $1,396 million for the protection and criminal investigation missions of the Secret Service. 2638
For FY2008, the Senate proposed an appropriation of $1,396 million for the protection and criminal investigation missions of the Secret Service. 110-161 appropriated $6,807 million for FEMA. On June 14, 2007, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2008 appropriations bill for the Department of Homeland Security. This included a funding increase of $17 million, in addition to $100 million for the following transfers:
$5 million from the former Preparedness Directorate, for the Office of the Chief Medical Officer; $82 million from the S&T Directorate, for BioWatch Operations and the Biological Warning and Incident Characterization (BWIC) programs; $3 million from the S&T Directorate, for the Rapidly Deployable Chemical Defense System (RDCDS); $1 million from the S&T Directorate for personnel support for BioWatch, BWIC, and RDCDS; $8 million from the former Preparedness Directorate for NBIS; and $1 million from the former Preparedness Directorate for personnel support for NBIS. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). President's FY2008 Request
The Administration requested a total of $562 million for DNDO for FY2008. 110-161 )
This Appendix describes the distribution of $3,000 million ($3.0 billion) in emergency funds for border security throughout the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. The funds are distributed as follows: $1,531 million ($1.5 billion) for CBP; $527 million for ICE; $166 million for the U.S. Coast Guard; $275 million for USVISIT; $110 million for S&L programs; $80 million for USCIS; and $21 million for FLETC. CBP FY2008 Emergency Border Security Appropriations
The $1,531 million ($1.5 billion) in FY2008 emergency funding for CBP is disbursed as follows, by account and amount:
Salaries and Expenses: $323 million $40 million for the Model Ports of Entry program and includes funding to hire at least 200 additional CBP officers at the 20 U.S. international airports with the highest number of foreign visitors arriving annually; $45 million for terrorist prevention system enhancements for passenger screening—to develop system infrastructure needed to support a real-time capability to process advanced passenger information for passengers intending to fly to the U.S.; $36 million to implement the electronic travel authorization program for visa waiver countries; $150 million for the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI); $25 million for a ground transportation vehicle contract (Border Patrol); $13 million for Border Patrol vehicles; $14 million for Air and Marine Personnel Compensation and Benefits for 82 positions to support the establishment of 11 new marine enforcement units. Of this amount, $4 million was for the DHS OIG and $4,606 million was for FEMA disaster relief. | This report describes the FY2008 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Administration requested a net appropriation of $35.5 billion in net budget authority for FY2008. The requested net appropriation for major components of the department included the following: $8,783 million for Customs and Border Protection (CBP); $4,168 million for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); $3,608 million for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA); $8,457 million for the U.S. Coast Guard; $1,399 million for the Secret Service; $1,047 for the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPP); $5,042 million for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); $30 million for US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); $799 million for the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T); and $562 million for the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO).
The House passed H.R. 2638 on June 15, 2007. H.R. 2638 included $37.4 billion in net budget authority for DHS for FY2008. H.R. 2638 contained the following in net budget authority for major components of DHS: $8,923 million for CBP; $4,192 million for ICE; $3,842 million for the TSA; $8,352 million for the U.S. Coast Guard; $1,396 million for the Secret Service; $1,035 million for the NPP; $7,239 million for FEMA; $30 million for USCIS; $777 million for S&T; and $556 million for the DNDO.
On July 26, 2007, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 2638. The Senate bill included $40.6 billion in net budget authority, including $3 billion in emergency funding; not including the emergency funding, Senate-passed H.R. 2638 included $37.6 billion in net budget authority for DHS for FY2008. The bill contained the following amounts of net budget authority for major components of DHS: $8,841 million for CBP; $4,433 million for ICE; $3,685 million for the TSA; $8,559 million for the U.S. Coast Guard; $1,396 million for the Secret Service; $914 million for the NPP; $7,019 million for FEMA; $50 million (plus and additional $60 million in emergency funding) for USCIS; $838 million for the S&T; and $550 million for the DNDO. Senate-passed H.R. 2638 also included a $3,000 million emergency supplemental appropriation for border-security purposes.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-161) was signed into law by the President on December 26, 2007. The DHS Appropriations Act of 2008 was included as Division E of P.L. 110-161. The Act provides $38.7 billion in net budget authority for FY2008. P.L. 110-161 contains the following amounts of net budget authority for major components of DHS: $9,423 million for CBP; $4,734 million for ICE; $4,021 million for the TSA; $8,521 million for the U.S. Coast Guard; $1,386 million for the Secret Service; $1,177 million for the NPP; $6,807 million for FEMA; $81 million for USCIS; $830 million for the S&T; and $485 million for the DNDO.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33009 | crs_RL33009_0 | The Constitution provides two methods by which the President may make appointments. First, the Appointments Clause establishes that the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for and which shall be established by law. It has generally been opined that the Recess Appointments Clause was designed to enable the President to ensure the operation of the government during periods when the Senate was not in session and therefore unable to perform its advice and consent function. Though used to foster administrative continuity, Presidents also have exercised their recess appointment power for political purposes throughout the history of the republic, giving rise to significant political and legal controversy. However, with evolving legislative responses meant to curb the President's use of his recess appointment power, the Supreme Court had occasion to address the scope of this Clause and the meaning of these phrases for the first time. In 2014, the Court in Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. Scope of the Recess Appointments Clause
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate , by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session (emphasis added). II, §2, cl. Supreme Court Interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause
In NLRB v. Noel Canning , the Supreme Court ruled that the three recess appointments to the NLRB were constitutionally invalid because the Senate was in an intra-session recess of only three days, a time period it considered too short to trigger the President's recess appointment power. Because the NLRB recess appointments are invalid under the minority's interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause alone, Justice Scalia did not examine the significance of pro forma sessions. While 31 U.S.C. The concerns raised in Staebler , which questioned the constitutionality of the restrictions with regard to recess appointments, coupled with the broad interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause in Noel Canning , could be seen as arguably giving rise to an expansive interpretation of the President's recess appointment power. Authority and Tenure of Recess Appointees
As a fundamental matter, a recess appointee possesses the same legal authority as a confirmed appointee. These conclusions relied on the Supreme Court's 1824 decision in United States v. Kirkpatrick , where the Court held that a new appointment made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, once accepted by the individual "was a virtual superseding and surrender of the former commission," which was a recess appointment made pursuant to the statute at issue (as opposed to the President's constitutional recess appointment power). | The U.S. Constitution explicitly provides the President with two methods of appointing officers of the United States. First, the Appointments Clause provides the President with the authority to make appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate. Specifically, Article II, Section 2, clause 2 states that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law." Second, the Recess Appointments Clause authorizes the President to make temporary appointments unilaterally during periods when the Senate is not in session. Article II, Section 2, clause 3 provides: "The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session."
While the Recess Appointments Clause enables the continuity of government operations, Presidents, on occasion, have exercised authority under the Clause for political purposes, appointing officials who might otherwise have difficulty securing Senate confirmation. This constitutional provision is not without its ambiguities, and the President's use of his recess appointment power in light of these ambiguities has given rise to significant political and legal controversy since the beginning of the republic. President's Obama's three recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on January 4, 2012, once again raised questions regarding the scope of the Recess Appointments Clause as well as the significance of the Senate's pro forma sessions in relation to the President's ability to exercise his recess appointment authority. The constitutionality of these recess appointments was challenged, and for the first time, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the Recess Appointments Clause and how it should be interpreted.
This report provides an overview of the Recess Appointments Clause, by first exploring its historical application and legal interpretation by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It then reviews the Supreme Court's decision in Nat'l Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning in which all nine Justices affirmed the constitutional invalidity of these recess appointments. The Justices, however, were divided with respect to the proper interpretation of the Clause and the basis upon which the NLRB recess appointments would be ruled invalid. Also examined in this report is congressional legislation designed to prevent the President's overuse or misuse of the Clause, as well as the authority and tenure of recess appointees. |
crs_RL34414 | crs_RL34414_0 | Introduction
Since enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, the Immigration and Nationality Act has contained a designation for a group of children termed as "unaccompanied refugee minors" (URMs): refugee children in the United States under the age of 18, without a parent or close relative willing or able to care for them. The State Department identifies refugee children overseas who are eligible for resettlement in the United States but who do not have a parent or guardian. Consequently, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) is tasked with caring for these children until they are either reunited with their families or reach the age of 18. Once in ORR's custody, a URM will be placed in the agency's URM program, wherein ORR works with state and local service providers, as well as volunteer agencies, to provide the URM with foster placement, services, and any needed care. Since 1980, approximately 12,000 URMs have been handled by ORR. The divide over URM policy in the United States generally falls between two groups: advocates of increased URM inflows and supporters of current levels. Groups that support greater URM inflows note the rising levels of refugees worldwide, along with media accounts of numerous URMs in regions such as Darfur. Proponents of refugee inflows under the current URM policy point out that the United States already has one of the highest refugee admission levels of any advanced industrialized country. The central policy question for Congress in the URM debate revolves around the number of URMs being identified abroad and brought to the United States. This report will be updated as developments warrant. Presented below are several figures and tables depicting the URM population from FY1999 through FY2005, with FY2005 being the most recent fiscal year of data made available to CRS. During this time period, there were a cumulative total of 782 new URMs admitted to the United States. With an annual average of approximately 112 children, the annual rate has fluctuated between a low of 35 children in FY1999 to a high of 212 in FY2001. As a means of placing URMs, ORR and its partnering state and volunteer services have a number of options at their disposal. Group homes, residential treatment facilities, and homes of relatives are less common options for URM placement. The country sources for URMs from FY1999 to FY2005, which are listed in Table 2 , mostly fell geographically within one of three regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East (with a few notable exceptions such as Vietnam and Russia). In the Senate, Senator Diane Feinstein sponsored the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2007 ( S. 844 ). | Since enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, the Immigration and Nationality Act has contained a designation for a group of children defined as "unaccompanied refugee minors" (URMs): refugee children in the United States under the age of 18, without a parent or close relative who is willing or able to care for them. The State Department identifies refugee children overseas who are eligible for resettlement in the United States but who do not have a parent or guardian. Once these URMs are admitted to the United States, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS's) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) is tasked with caring for them until they are either reunited with their families or reach the age of 18. Since 1980, approximately 12,000 URMs have been handled by ORR.
Once in ORR's custody, a URM will be placed in the agency's URM program, wherein ORR works with state and local service providers, as well as volunteer agencies, to provide URMs with foster placement, services, and any needed care. As a means of placing URMs, both ORR and the state and volunteer services they work with have a number of options at their disposal, including foster homes, group homes, independent living, semi-independent living, placement with a relative, and residential treatment facilities.
The divide over URM policy in the United States generally falls between two groups: advocates of increased URM inflows and supporters of current levels. Groups that support greater URM inflows note the rising levels of refugees worldwide, along with media accounts of numerous URMs in regions such as Darfur. Proponents of refugee inflow levels under the current URM policy contend that present levels suffice. The central policy question for Congress in the URM debate revolves around the number of URMs being identified abroad and brought to the United States.
From FY1999 through FY2005 (the most recent year of data available to CRS), there were a cumulative total of 782 new URMs admitted to the United States. With an annual average of approximately 112 children, the annual rate has fluctuated between a low of 35 children in FY1999 to a high of 212 in FY2001. In FY2005, ORR received 108 URMs, of which 71 were male and 37 were female. The source countries for URMs fall mostly within one of three geographic regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East.
Some legislation that was introduced in previous terms of Congress that would address several of the issues and charges that advocates have raised regarding unaccompanied refugee children are likely to be reintroduced in the 111th Congress. Most visible among these previous efforts was the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2007 (S. 844), which was sponsored by Senator Diane Feinstein. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL33142 | crs_RL33142_0 | Overview
Libya's political transition has been disrupted by armed non-state groups and threatened by the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. After an armed uprising ended the 40-plus-year rule of Muammar al Qadhafi in late 2011, interim authorities proved unable to form a stable government, address pressing security issues, reshape the country's public finances, or reconcile. Qadhafi left state institutions weak and deprived Libyans of experience in self-government, compounding stabilization challenges. At present, armed militia groups and locally organized political leaders remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. An atmosphere of persistent lawlessness has enabled militias, criminals, and Islamist terrorist groups to operate with impunity. Insecurity became prevalent in Libya following the 2011 conflict and deepened in 2014, driven by overlapping ideological, personal, financial, and transnational rivalries. Elections for legislative bodies and a constitutional drafting assembly held in 2012 and 2014 were administered transparently, but were marred by declining rates of participation, threats to candidates and voters, and zero-sum political competition. Issues of dispute have included governance, military command, national finances, and control of oil infrastructure. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has emphasized the importance of a political solution for stability, and in March 2018, told Congress that, in light of prevailing turmoil, "the risk of a full-scale civil war remains real." In December 2015, some Libyan leaders endorsed the U.N.-brokered political agreement to create a Government of National Accord (GNA) to oversee the completion of the transition. GNA Prime Minister-designate Fayez al Sarraj and members of a GNA Presidency Council have attempted to implement the agreement and have competed for influence with political figures and armed forces based in eastern Libya, including leaders of the House of Representatives elected in 2014 and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar's "Libyan National Army" (LNA) movement. U.S. officials and other international actors have worked since 2014 to convince Libyan factions and their various external supporters that inclusive, representative government and negotiation are preferable to competing attempts to achieve dominance through force of arms. The U.N. Security Council has authorized financial and travel sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for threatening "the peace, stability or security of Libya," obstructing or undermining "the successful completion of its political transition," or supporting others who do so. A U.N. arms embargo is in place, and U.S. executive orders provide for sanctions against those undermining the transition. Past mediation efforts struggled to gain traction and outsiders have at times pursued their own agendas through ties with Libyan factions. Such competition by proxy raises the stakes of Libya's internal rivalries and complicates negotiations. U.S. diplomats engage with Libyans and monitor U.S. programs in Libya via the Libya External Office (LEO) at the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia. Periodic U.S. strikes target IS members and other terrorists. U.S. officials judge that the threats posed by IS members and Al Qaeda have been degraded, but note that these groups remain dangerous and could resurge if political and security conditions deteriorate. Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for limited U.S. transition support and security assistance programs for Libya since 2011 and is considering the Trump Administration's request for additional assistance funds for FY2019. As noted above, the State Department suspended operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in July 2014. Since 2017, the Trump Administration has imposed conditional restrictions on the entry of Libyan nationals to the United States, with some exceptions. Possible questions before the United States may include
whether and when to return U.S. personnel to Libya on a permanent basis; what types and extent of assistance, if any, to provide for stabilization and transition support purposes; how to ensure that U.S. aid recipients and security partners have not been and are not now involved in gross violations of human rights; whether or how to use existing sanctions provisions or other coercive measures against parties seen as obstructing progress under the U.N.-sponsored Action Plan; whether or how to continue to intervene militarily against terrorist groups; whether or how to respond to the actions of other third parties, including Russia; whether or how to leverage or amend U.N. arms embargo provisions to allow for security assistance to parties in Libya; what degree of support, if any, to provide to emergent national security forces (particularly in the absence of an agreed political framework); and whether or how to respond in the event of any military clashes between rival Libyan factions that involve groups that have received U.S. assistance. | Libya's political transition has been disrupted by armed non-state groups and threatened by the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. After an armed uprising ended the 40-plus-year rule of Muammar al Qadhafi in 2011, interim authorities proved unable to form a stable government, address pressing security issues, reshape the country's public finances, or create a viable framework for post-conflict justice and reconciliation. Qadhafi left state institutions weak and deprived Libyans of experience in self-government, compounding stabilization challenges.
Elections for legislative bodies and a constitutional drafting assembly held in 2012 and 2014 were administered transparently, but were marred by declining rates of participation, threats to candidates and voters, and zero-sum political competition. Insecurity became prevalent in Libya following the 2011 conflict and deepened in 2014, driven by overlapping ideological, personal, financial, and transnational rivalries. Issues of dispute have included governance, military command, national finances, and control of oil infrastructure. At present, armed militia groups and locally organized political leaders remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. An atmosphere of persistent lawlessness has enabled militias, criminals, and Islamist terrorist groups to operate with impunity, further endangering civilians' rights and safety. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) emphasizes the importance of a political solution for stability, and in March 2018, told Congress that, in light of prevailing turmoil, "the risk of a full-scale civil war remains real."
U.S. officials and other international actors have worked since 2014 to convince Libyan factions and their various external supporters that inclusive, representative government and negotiation are preferable to competing attempts to achieve dominance through force of arms. The U.N. Security Council has authorized financial and travel sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for threatening "the peace, stability or security of Libya," obstructing or undermining "the successful completion of its political transition," or supporting others who do so. A U.N. arms embargo is in place, and U.S. executive orders provide for sanctions on figures that undermine the transition.
In December 2015, some Libyan leaders endorsed a U.N.-brokered political agreement to create a Government of National Accord (GNA) to oversee the completion of the transition. GNA Prime Minister-designate Fayez al Sarraj and members of a GNA Presidency Council have attempted to implement the agreement and have competed for influence with political figures and armed forces based in eastern Libya, including Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar's "Libyan National Army" (LNA) movement. A U.N.-sponsored Action Plan launched in 2017 seeks to complete Libya's transition during the coming year, and Libyans and outsiders are debating terms for its implementation. Previous mediation efforts struggled to gain traction, and outsiders have at times pursued their own agendas through ties with Libyan factions. Such competition by proxy raises the stakes of Libya's internal rivalries and complicates negotiations.
The State Department suspended operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in July 2014. U.S. diplomats engage with Libyans and monitor U.S. programs in Libya via the Libya External Office (LEO) at the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia. Periodic U.S. military strikes target IS members and other terrorists. U.S. officials judge that the threats posed by IS members and Al Qaeda have been degraded, but note that these groups remain dangerous and could resurge if conditions deteriorate.
Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for limited U.S. transition support and security assistance programs for Libya since 2011 and is reviewing the Trump Administration's FY2019 requests for assistance funds. In 2017, the Administration imposed conditional restrictions on the entry of Libyan nationals to the United States, with some exceptions. Political consensus among Libyans remains elusive, and security conditions may create lasting challenges for the return to Libya of U.S. diplomats and the full development of bilateral relations. |
crs_R44654 | crs_R44654_0 | This is far slower than many high-speed rail services in other countries. This changed with passage of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA, Division B of P.L. 110-432 ) in the fall of 2008. Congress approved the passenger rail program in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ), which appropriated $8 billion for grants to states to develop high-speed and intercity passenger rail services. This priority was reflected in the FY2010 Department of Transportation Appropriations Act (Division A, Title I, P.L. 111-117 ), in which Congress appropriated $2.5 billion for high-speed and intercity passenger rail grants to states. Since that time, Congress has not appropriated further amounts for the HSIPR program, although the Administration has repeatedly requested billions of dollars in additional funding for intercity passenger rail development. Although high-speed rail grabbed the headlines, Congress directed that the ARRA funding was also to be used for other intercity passenger rail service and for grants to relieve congestion on the railroad network. In its program guidance FRA combined the grant programs authorized in PRIIA, the funding in ARRA, and the FY2009 DOT appropriations act to produce four categories ("tracks") of grants:
Track 1—Projects: for small-scale construction that could be completed within two years; Track 2—Programs: for a set of interrelated projects that improve all or a portion of a corridor; Track 3—Planning: to support work needed to advance a project to the point of applying for funding under Tracks 1 or 2 to create a pipeline of future construction projects; and Track 4—FY2009 Appropriations Projects: an alternative to Track 1, using the FY2009 funding (which required a 50% match, while the ARRA funding did not require a match). Status of Major HSIPR Grants
Congress provided that the $8 billion appropriated for high-speed and intercity passenger rail development in ARRA, which made up the majority of the HSIPR grant funding, had to be expended by the end of FY2017. California High-Speed Rail Project
The California High-Speed Rail Authority proposes to build a 520-mile dedicated rail line between San Francisco and Los Angeles that will allow trains to reach speeds up to 220 mph. Passenger service is provided by Amtrak's Wolverine route. Several of the components have been completed, including improvements to existing stations. The largest and most complex of the HSIPR projects, the California High-Speed Rail Corridor, illustrates the challenges involved. The project has been in development for many years. The impact on the HSIPR program of the change from the 111 th Congress to the 112 th Congress was dramatic: After having been appropriated $10.6 billion over a span of 10 months, the program received no further funding over the next six years, as well as having $400 million of the funding already appropriated to it rescinded. Supporters of passenger rail service have long called for a dedicated funding source for rail projects, and the Obama Administration has echoed such calls. High-speed rail lines are considerably more expensive. This poses both a financial and political challenge to a federal program that would support development of high-speed rail: not only must significant amounts of funding be provided over a long period of time, but there must also be a willingness for large portions of that funding to be granted to a small number of projects in relatively few states. Others have objected to funding intercity passenger rail in general, contending that it is economically inefficient, requires larger per-passenger subsidies than other modes of travel, is not suited to the economic geography of the United States, and may be superseded by future technologies. | Since 1964, when Japan opened the first rail line allowing trains to travel safely at speeds greater than 150 miles per hour, several European and Asian countries have built high-speed rail lines. There have been frequent calls for the United States to develop similar high-speed rail services, but none have been built. The financial challenge of building high-speed rail lines, which requires many billions of dollars to be spent over a lengthy period before service opens and revenues begin to be collected, makes government financial support unavoidable. Governments in other countries have provided such support, but over many years efforts to get federal support for the construction of high-speed rail lines have, with the partial exception of Amtrak's Northeast Corridor, been unsuccessful. In fact, Congress provided little funding even for expansion of non-high-speed passenger rail service. Opponents of increased funding for intercity passenger rail have contended that it was economically inefficient compared to other modes of travel.
For a brief period in 2008-2009, it appeared that the situation had changed. The 110th Congress authorized several programs to make grants to states for intercity passenger rail development in the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (Division B of P.L. 110-432). The following year, in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) and the FY2010 Department of Transportation Appropriations Act (Division A, Title I, P.L. 111-117), the 111th Congress appropriated $10.6 billion to develop both high-speed and conventional intercity passenger rail services. The Federal Railroad Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation used this money to award 158 grants under the new High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail (HSIPR) Grant Program. Some 80% of the funding went to a relatively small number of large-scale projects. These included multi-billion-dollar grants to California and Florida for high-speed rail lines; Florida subsequently turned down its grant.
This dramatic change in policy ended just as suddenly, as the 112th Congress rescinded $400 million of the $10.6 billion previously appropriated and rejected the Administration's requests for additional funding. Succeeding Congresses have also not responded to requests for HSIPR funding. In addition, several states declined significant grants for improvements to their intercity passenger rail lines. That funding was reallocated to other states. All but two of the HSIPR projects are expected to be complete by 2017, but the most ambitious and expensive, the California High-Speed Rail project, will not enter service for many years.
Congress's creation, then abandonment, of the HSIPR program illustrates the challenges of funding major construction projects that take years to complete without a stable source of financing. At the beginning, the federal and state governments lacked the expertise and program framework to implement the program. Now that the expertise and program framework have been developed, they are at risk of disappearing due to the lack of continued funding. Also, such funding spurts make long-term project planning and implementation very difficult.
A challenge facing the future of the HSIPR program is the large amount of funding required for high-speed rail development, combined with the lack of a dedicated funding source and the funding shortages facing other federal transportation programs even with their dedicated funding sources. Another challenge is contending with arguments against intercity passenger rail. Critics assert that it requires larger per-passenger subsidies than other travel modes, that it is not well-suited to the economic geography of the United States, and that near-term technologies may provide better alternatives. |
crs_R43566 | crs_R43566_0 | Introduction
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies extensively on contractors to equip and support the U.S. military in peacetime and during military operations. Prior Efforts to Improve Acquisitions
Congress and the executive branch have long been frustrated with waste, mismanagement, and fraud in defense acquisitions and have spent significant resources seeking to reform and improve the process. Efforts to address wasteful spending, cost overruns, schedule slips, and performance shortfalls have continued unabated, with more than 150 major studies on acquisition reform since the end of World War II. Every Administration and virtually every Secretary of Defense has embarked on an acquisition reform effort. Major changes include
creating the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to develop uniform acquisition regulations across DOD and the federal government; establishing Defense Acquisition University to train and improve the performance of the acquisition workforce; instituting a streamlined management chain (Program Manager, Program Executive Office, Service Acquisition Executive, Under Secretary of Defense) to foster accountability and authority; implementing a milestone decision process to improve oversight; requiring independent cost estimates to improve budget forecasting; establishing a joint requirements board to improve requirements development and eliminate duplicative programs; moving away from the use of customized military standards and specifications to increased use of commercial technologies; and using multi-year procurements (with congressional approval) to lower costs. More recently, Congress has embarked on select acquisition reform efforts through legislation that some (but not all) analysts believe have contributed to improving defense acquisitions, including the Weapon Systems Reform Act of 2009 and efforts to improve operational contract support . However, a number of analysts believe that the act is already having a positive effect. Now May Be a Good Time for Acquisition Reform
Historically, eras of budgetary restraint have been associated with the pursuit and implementation of acquisition reform. Against the current backdrop of the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 ) and declines in defense spending, many analysts argue that the stage is set for a renewed effort to embark on a significant effort to improve defense acquisitions. In sum, the unique combination of constrained budgets, a changing strategic and industrial landscape, recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the increased availability of data have led many analysts and officials to conclude that this may be a unique opportunity to embark on another effort to improve defense acquisitions. Recent DOD Efforts to Improve Acquisitions
In recent years, DOD has taken a number of steps to improve the process by which it buys goods and services. There has been a significant focus on using data to drive decisions. Issues for Congress
What DOD can do on its own to improve acquisitions can only go so far—for more extensive reforms, DOD needs help from Congress. Such efforts as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, establishment of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, creation of Defense Acquisition University, and streamlined acquisition rules and regulations were all the result of congressional action. Improving the Workforce
Despite the hundreds of recommendations to improve defense acquisitions, most reports seeking to address the fundamental weaknesses of the system arrive at the same conclusion: the key to good acquisitions is having a good workforce and giving them the resources, incentives, and authority to do their job. A number of analysts have argued that the successive waves of acquisition reform have generally yielded limited results, due in large part to poor workforce management. Factors contributing to the increased complexity of the acquisition system include past reform efforts, increased complexity of technology and weapon systems, and inclusion of public policy goals into the acquisition process. | The Department of Defense (DOD) relies extensively on contractors to equip and support the U.S. military in peacetime and during military operations, obligating more than $300 billion on contracts in FY2013.
Congress and the executive branch have long been frustrated with waste, mismanagement, and fraud in defense acquisitions and have spent significant resources attempting to reform and improve the process. These frustrations have led to numerous efforts to improve defense acquisitions. Since the end of World War II, every Administration and virtually every Secretary of Defense has embarked on an acquisition reform effort. Yet despite these efforts, cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls in acquisition programs persist.
A number of analysts have argued that the successive waves of acquisition reform have yielded only limited results due in large part to poor workforce management. Most reports have concluded that the key to good acquisitions is having a sufficiently sized and talented acquisition workforce and giving them the resources, incentives, and authority to do their job. Yet most of the reform efforts of the past decades have not sought to fundamentally and systematically address these workforce-related issues.
Significant changes to the national security and industrial landscape in recent years, including consolidation of the defense industrial base and the increasing complexity of weapon systems, have led many analysts to call for a renewed effort to improve the acquisition process.
Historically, eras of budgetary restraint have been associated with the pursuit and implementation of acquisition reform. Against the current backdrop of the Budget Control Act of 2011 and declines in defense spending, the stage may be set for a renewed effort to significantly improve defense acquisitions. Other factors contributing to a sense among analysts that the time may be ripe for reform include recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and the increasing availability of data to drive decisions.
In recent years, DOD has taken a number of steps to improve the process by which it buys goods and services, including
rewriting the regulatory structure that governs defense acquisitions; launching the Better Buying Power and Better Buying Power II initiatives aimed at improving the productivity of the acquisition system and the industrial base; improving the use of data to support decision making; and establishing a team to develop a legislative proposal aimed at simplifying the laws and regulations governing defense acquisitions.
Many analysts believe that what DOD can do on its own to improve acquisitions can only go so far—that significant, effective, and lasting acquisition reform will occur only with the active participation of Congress. Congress has been critical to advancing acquisition reform; such efforts as establishing the Federal Acquisition Regulation, creating Defense Acquisition University, streamlining acquisition regulations, and enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Act were the result of congressional action.
Oversight issues for Congress include the extent to which the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-23) and the various DOD initiatives are having a positive effect on acquisitions, whether current reform efforts are sufficient to address concerns related to the acquisition workforce, and what additional steps, if any, Congress can take to further the effort to improve defense acquisitions. |
crs_R41844 | crs_R41844_0 | It originated as a revolving fund supported by the proceeds of the sale of land and water in the western United States. Over time it, has been amended to receive proceeds from a number of disparate sources, including power generation and mineral leasing. Barring major changes by Congress in the form of increased appropriations from the fund or a redirection of its receipts, the fund's balance is expected to continue to increase. The Reclamation Fund was established as a special fund within the U.S. Treasury and was designated to receive receipts from the sale of federal land in the western United States. … shall be, and the same are hereby, reserved set aside, and appropriated as a special fund in the Treasury to be known as the "reclamation fund, " to be used in the examination and survey for and the construction and maintenance of irrigation works for the storage, diversion, and development of waters for the reclamation of arid and semiarid lands in the said States and Territories, and for the payment of all other expenditures provided for in this Act. The Reclamation Fund was not adequate to fund many of Reclamation's large investments in water infrastructure. By the end of the 1930s, most major Reclamation projects under construction were financed by the General Fund of the Treasury. Congress made the fund subject to annual appropriations in 1914, and directed additional receipts toward the Reclamation Fund over time, including those from revenues associated water and power uses and from sales, leases, and rentals of federal lands and resources (e.g., oil, gas, and minerals) in the 17 western states. The amendment provided that revenues associated with irrigation projects' power features be deposited into the Reclamation Fund. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the fund's balance began to increase significantly as revenues from power sales and natural resource royalties significantly exceeded appropriations from the fund. 111-5 ) appropriated funding for Reclamation from the Reclamation Fund. As of the end of FY2012, the fund had a balance in excess of $10.8 billion. Some, including water users and others benefitting from Reclamation projects, note that the Reclamation Fund was intended to benefit water resource projects in western states, and spending its balance on the fund's intended purposes is a logical use of the fund. In Title X of the Omnibus Lands Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-11 ), Congress redirected a portion of Reclamation Fund receipts for Indian water rights settlement projects. The bill established a separate fund (known as the Reclamation Water Settlements Fund) in the Treasury and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to transfer into the new fund up to $120 million annually between FY2020 and FY2034 that would otherwise go to the Reclamation Fund. More recently, a bill in the Senate in the 113 th Congress, the Authorized Rural Water Projects Completion Act ( S. 715 ), proposes to establish a new fund for rural water projects (similar to the Water Settlements Fund referenced above) that would receive, without further appropriation, approximately $80 million per year in funding that would otherwise revert to the Reclamation Fund. | The Reclamation Fund was established in 1902 to fund the development of irrigation projects on arid and semiarid lands of the 17 western states. It originated as a revolving fund for construction projects and was supported by the proceeds of the sale of land and water in the western United States. Over time, it was amended to receive proceeds from a number of other sources. It is currently derived from repayments and revenues associated with federal water resources development as well as the sales, rentals, and leases (including natural resource leasing) of federal land in the western United States. Portions of the fund's balance are appropriated annually by Congress for multiple purposes, including some of the operational expenditures of the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the Power Marketing Administrations. Through FY2012, collections deposited into the Reclamation Fund totaled more than $40 billion, while total appropriations from the fund totaled more than $30 billion.
The Reclamation Fund did not finance all Reclamation investments in the western United States. As a result of limited funding availability, a number of large dams and other Reclamation investments were financed by the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury. Notwithstanding advances to the Reclamation Fund by Congress in 1910 and 1931, deposits into and appropriations out of the fund have been roughly equal over time. From the 1940s until the 1990s, the fund maintained a small, relatively stable balance. Beginning in the mid-1990s, balances in the fund began to increase significantly as receipts from mineral leasing and power sales increased, while appropriations from the fund largely remained static. At the end of FY2012, the fund had a balance of more than $10.8 billion, and it is expected to continue to grow.
Receipts deposited into the Reclamation Fund are made available to Reclamation by Congress through annual discretionary appropriations bills, which are subject to congressional budgetary allocations. Some have proposed that Congress appropriate some portion of the surplus balance in the Reclamation Fund to reclamation activities in western states, including new water storage projects or the rehabilitation of existing projects. These interests argue that the Reclamation Fund was set up to benefit western states and should now be used to increase investments in these areas.
As the balance of the Reclamation Fund continues to increase, Congress may reevaluate the Reclamation Fund's status, including its financing of new or ongoing activities. The Omnibus Lands Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-11) included provisions that will transfer $120 million per year from the fund from FY2020 through FY2034, without further appropriation, to a separate fund that provides for Indian Water Settlement construction projects. In the 113th Congress, a bill before the Senate (S. 715) proposes to redirect funding that would otherwise go to the Reclamation Fund for the construction of rural water projects. Major changes to the Reclamation Fund may have scoring implications in the annual budget and under congressional pay-as-you-go rules. |
crs_R42379 | crs_R42379_0 | On January 4, 2011, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) became law. The acronym "GPRA" in the act's short title refers to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA 1993), a law that GPRAMA substantially modified. When GPRA 1993 was enacted, it was regarded as a watershed for the federal government. For the first time, Congress established requirements in statute for most agencies to set goals, measure performance, and report the information to Congress for potential use. After a four-year phase-in period for GPRA 1993 and 13 years of the law's full implementation, GPRAMA makes substantial changes. Among other things, GPRAMA
continues the three agency-level products from GPRA 1993, but with changes; establishes new products and processes that focus on goal-setting and performance measurement in policy areas that cut across agencies; brings attention to using goals and measures during policy implementation; increases reporting on the Internet; and requires individuals to be responsible for some goals and management tasks. In making these changes, GPRAMA aligns the timing of many products to coincide with presidential terms and budget proposals. The law also includes more central roles for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an entity that often seeks to advance the President's policy preferences. GPRAMA also contains more specific requirements for consultations with Congress. By design, many of GPRAMA's products are required to be submitted to Congress for scrutiny and potential use. The law also provides opportunities for Congress and non-federal stakeholders to influence how agencies and OMB set goals and assess performance. This report provides an overview of GPRAMA's products and processes. In addition, the report highlights potential issues for Congress. Each bullet also includes questions that might be considered. GPRAMA requires agencies and OMB to consult with Congress regarding Agency Strategic Plans, federal government priority goals, and agency submissions of plans and reports to Congress. Agency and OMB representations about performance. What are the policy implications of available evidence and analyses? Oversight, transparency, and public participation. Crosscutting policy areas. Are agencies and OMB adequately complying with the act? Are agencies and OMB using the act in way that promotes improvement and learning in addition to accountability? | On January 4, 2011, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) became law. The acronym "GPRA" in the act's short title refers to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA 1993), a law that GPRAMA substantially modified. When GPRA 1993 was enacted, it was regarded as a watershed for the federal government. For the first time, Congress established statutory requirements for most agencies to set goals, measure performance, and submit related plans and reports (hereafter, "products") to Congress for its potential use.
After a four-year phase-in period for GPRA 1993 and 13 years of the law's full implementation, GPRAMA makes substantial changes. Among other things, GPRAMA
continues three agency-level products from GPRA 1993, but with changes; establishes new products and processes that focus on goal-setting and performance measurement in policy areas that cut across agencies; brings attention to using goals and measures during policy implementation; increases reporting on the Internet; and requires individuals to be responsible for some goals and management tasks.
In making these changes, GPRAMA aligns the timing of many products to coincide with presidential terms and budget proposals. The law also includes more central roles for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an entity that often seeks to advance the President's policy preferences. GPRAMA also contains more specific requirements for consultations with Congress.
By design, many of GPRAMA's products are required to be submitted to Congress for scrutiny and potential use. The law also provides opportunities for Congress and non-federal stakeholders to influence how agencies and OMB set goals and assess performance. This report provides an overview of GPRAMA's products and processes. In addition, the report highlights potential issues for Congress. Related questions that Congress might consider include the following:
Are agencies' and OMB's consultations with Congress working well? Are agencies and OMB defining goals and assessing performance in ways that reflect underlying statutes and congressional intent? Are the representations that agencies and OMB make about government performance perceived by Congress, federal personnel, and the public as credible and useful? What are the implications of evidence that is presented? Are agencies and OMB implementing GPRAMA with desired levels of transparency and public participation? Are agencies, OMB, and Congress focusing effectively on crosscutting policy areas to better coordinate efforts and reduce any unnecessary duplication? Are agencies and OMB implementing GPRAMA in a responsive, effective manner? Is GPRAMA working well? If not, what might be done?
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_98-810 | crs_98-810_0 | Background
Most civilian federal employees who were hired before 1984 are covered by the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). Under CSRS, employees do not pay Social Security taxes or earn Social Security benefits. Federal employees first hired in 1984 or later are covered by the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS). 66-215) to provide pension benefits for civilian federal employees. Under the CSRS offset plan, 6.2 percentage points of the employee's payroll contribution and an equal share of the employer contribution are diverted from CSRS to the Social Security trust fund. Retirement Age and Years of Service
Under CSRS, a worker with at least 30 years of service can retire at the age of 55; a worker with at least 20 years of service can retire at the age of 60; and a worker with 5 or more years of service can retire at the age of 62. The FERS minimum retirement age (MRA) for an employee with 30 or more years of service was 55 for workers born before 1948. The MRA for employees born between 1953 and 1964 is 56. It will increase to 57 for those born in 1970 or later. The Thrift Savings Plan
The TSP is a defined contribution (DC) retirement plan similar to the 401(k) plans provided by many private-sector employers. In 2015, federal employees can contribute up to $18,000 to the TSP. Employees aged 50 and older can contribute an additional $6,000. In addition, employees enrolled in FERS can receive employer matching contributions equal to 4% of pay, according to the schedule shown in Table 2 . Federal workers covered by CSRS also may contribute to the TSP, but they receive no matching contributions from their employing agencies. Employer and Employee Contributions to CSRS and FERS
Both CSRS and FERS require participants to contribute toward the cost of their future pensions through a payroll tax. Under CSRS, employees contribute 7.0% of base pay to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF). Under FERS, employees first hired before 2013 contribute 0.8% of pay to the CSRDF and they also pay Social Security taxes (6.2% on salary up to the maximum taxable wage base of $118,500 in 2015). Members of Congress contribute 8.0% of salary to the CSRDF if covered by CSRS; 1.3% of salary to the CSRDF if under FERS and first covered prior to 2013; 3.1% of salary to the CSRDF if under FERS and first covered in 2013; or 4.4% of salary to the CSRDF if under FERS and first covered after 2013. The federal government's share of the estimated normal cost of CSRS is 22.3% of payroll. Effective beginning FY2015, OPM has estimated the normal cost of the FERS basic annuity to be 14.0% of payroll for employees first hired before 2013 and 14.2% of payroll for employees first hired in 2013 or later. The federal government has three other mandatory costs for employees enrolled in FERS: (1) Social Security, (2) the 1% agency automatic contribution to the TSP, and (3) agency matching contributions to the TSP. All agencies must contribute an amount equal to 1% of employee pay to the TSP. The normal cost of FERS to the federal government is therefore is at least 20.4% (13.2 + 6.2 + 1 = 20.4) of pay for employees first hired before 2013 and 18.3% (11.1 + 6.2 + 1 = 18.3) for employees hired in 2013 or later. At the same time, the civil service trust fund had an unfunded actuarial liability of $785.0 billion, with $751.4 billion in unfunded liability attributable to CSRS and $33.6 billion in unfunded liability attributable to FERS. Although the CSRDF has an unfunded liability, it is not in danger of becoming insolvent. | Most civilian federal employees who were hired before 1984 are covered by the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). Federal employees hired in 1984 or later are covered by the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS). Both CSRS and FERS require participants to contribute toward the cost of their pensions through a payroll tax. Employees who are covered by CSRS contribute 7.0% of pay to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF). They do not pay Social Security taxes or earn Social Security benefits. Employees enrolled in FERS and first hired
before 2013 contribute 0.8% of their pay to the CSRDF, in 2013 contribute 3.1% of pay to the CSRDF, and after 2013 contribute 4.4% of pay to the CSRDF.
All FERS employees contribute 6.2% of wages up to the Social Security taxable wage base ($118,500 in 2015) to the Social Security trust fund.
The minimum retirement age (MRA) under CSRS is 55 for workers who have at least 30 years of service. The FERS MRA is 55 for employees born before 1948. The MRA for employees born between 1953 and 1964 is 56, increasing to the age of 57 for those born in 1970 or later. Both FERS and CSRS allow retirement with an unreduced pension at the age of 60 for employees with 20 or more years of service and at the age of 62 for employees with at least 5 years of service.
The Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) is a retirement savings plan similar to the 401(k) plans provided by many employers in the private sector. In 2015, employees covered under either CSRS or FERS can contribute up to $18,000 to the TSP. Employees aged 50 and older can contribute an additional $6,000 to the TSP. Employees under FERS receive employer matching contributions of up to 5% of pay from their federal employing agency. Federal workers covered by CSRS also can contribute to the TSP, but they receive no matching contributions from their employing agencies.
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) estimates the cost of CSRS to be an amount equal to 29.3% of employee pay. Of this amount, the federal government pays 22.3% and employees pay 7.0%. Effective for FY2015, OPM estimates the cost of the FERS basic annuity at an amount equal to 14.0% of pay for employees first hired before 2013 and 14.2% for employees first hired in 2013 or later. Of this amount, for FERS employees first hired
before 2013, the federal government contributes 13.2% and employees pay the other 0.8%, in 2013 or later, the federal government contributes 11.1% and employees pay the remaining 3.1%, and after 2013 pay 4.4% (with the additional sums above the cost of FERS going to pay down the CSRS unfunded liability).
Employers pay three other costs for employees under FERS: (1) both the employer and employee pay Social Security taxes equal to 6.2% of pay up to the maximum taxable amount; (2) agencies automatically contribute an amount equal to 1% of employee pay to the TSP; and (3) agencies make matching contributions to the TSP equal to up to 4% of pay.
At the end of FY2014, the CSRDF had an unfunded liability of $785.0 billion, consisting of a $751.4 billion deficit for CSRS and a $33.6 billion deficit for FERS. Although the civil service trust fund has an unfunded liability, it is not in danger of becoming insolvent. OPM projects that the balance of the CSRDF will continue to grow through at least 2080, at which point it will hold assets equal to more than 5.3 times total payroll and about 20 times total annual benefit payments.
This report provides an overview of current benefits and financing under CSRS and FERS. For summary information on recent reform proposals related to CSRS and FERS, see CRS Report IF10243, Civilian Federal Retirement: Current Law, Recent Changes, and Reform Proposals, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44223 | crs_R44223_0 | For several years, EPA has been working with states and cities to develop and implement new approaches that will achieve water quality goals cost-effectively and in a manner that "addresses the most pressing public health and environmental protection issues first." The first two sections of this report examine two recent initiatives by EPA: (1) an integrated planning policy and (2) a framework policy for assessing a community's financial capability to meet objectives and requirements of CWA. For some time, municipalities have pressed EPA for greater flexibility to meet the financial and compliance challenges that they face for wastewater, stormwater, and other CWA infrastructure improvements. It allows communities to prioritize water management goals—such as water conservation or lower wastewater treatment costs—so that limited public dollars can be invested in ways that each city finds most valuable. A major point of contention between EPA and local government stakeholders has been the agency's reliance on administrative orders or judicially approved consent decrees to codify pollution reduction plans, including plans approved under the integrated planning policy, rather than through modification of CWA permits. Mayors, represented by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, have stated that they would prefer that EPA authorize compliance flexibility through permits, rather than subjecting cities and towns to legally binding consent decrees with penalties and fines for noncompliance. EPA typically uses a consent decree after periods of permit noncompliance. The agency takes the position that both enforcement and permits are necessary, depending on individual circumstances. Utilities and municipalities have welcomed the opportunity for flexibility under the integrated planning policy. But nearly five years after the framework policy was announced, one concern is that, so far, integrated plans have been incorporated only into new or amended consent decrees, not in CWA permits. Determining Community Affordability
A long-standing concern for local governments is EPA's process for evaluating how much communities can afford for CWA-mandated and other water infrastructure improvements. Affordability considerations can influence schedules established by EPA and states for communities to meet CWA requirements. The document identifies additional information that may help some communities provide a more complete picture of their financial capability than under the 1997 guidance alone. Congressional Interest
EPA's integrated planning process and community affordability are issues of interest to legislators, because they relate to policymakers' overall concern with funding needs for water infrastructure projects and the federal role in assisting communities. In recent years, Members have offered bills that would address these issues in different ways. Some bills sought to codify EPA's integrated planning approach—as written in the 2012 framework—into the CWA. Other proposals would go beyond codifying the integrated planning approach by including other provisions that alter the CWA's existing framework to varying degrees. In general, some environmental groups have opposed such changes proposed in bills from prior Congresses. Conclusion
Local government stakeholders generally support EPA's efforts to encourage ways for communities to prioritize their investments in CWA infrastructure and to consider a wide range of factors that affect affordability of such investments. As described in this report, cities and states have some continuing concerns with aspects of both the integrated planning policy and the financial capability assessment framework. | For several years, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been working with states and cities to develop and implement new approaches that will achieve water quality goals cost-effectively and in a manner that "addresses the most pressing public health and environmental protection issues first." Two recent EPA initiatives are an integrated planning policy and a framework policy for assessing a community's financial capability to meet objectives and requirements of the Clean Water Act (CWA).
Pressed by municipalities about the financial challenges that they face in addressing needs for wastewater and stormwater control projects, in 2012 EPA issued an integrated permitting and planning policy. The intention of the policy is to provide communities with flexibility to prioritize and sequence needed water infrastructure investments so that limited public dollars can be invested in ways that each municipality finds most valuable.
Water utilities and municipalities have welcomed the opportunity for flexibility under the integrated planning policy. But they have sought clarification of a number of issues, including EPA and state roles in developing integrated plans. A major point of contention between EPA and local government stakeholders has been the agency's reliance on administrative orders or judicially approved consent decrees to codify integrated pollution reduction plans, rather than through modification of CWA permits. City and town officials say that they would prefer that EPA allow compliance flexibility through permits, rather than subjecting cities and towns to legally binding consent decrees with penalties and fines for noncompliance. The agency takes the position that both enforcement and permits are necessary, depending on individual circumstances. EPA typically uses a consent decree after periods of permit noncompliance.
While integrated planning may be helpful in identifying communities' relative priorities, a long-standing concern for local governments is EPA's process for evaluating how much communities can afford for CWA-mandated and other water infrastructure improvements. EPA has worked with communities to refine how the agency determines when a project is affordable for individual communities, because affordability considerations can influence schedules established for a community to meet CWA requirements. In 2014, EPA released a Financial Capability Assessment Framework that identifies a range of information related to a community's financial strength that may help provide a complete picture of cities' financial capabilities in relation to water infrastructure investments.
State and local governments generally support EPA's efforts to encourage ways for communities to prioritize their CWA infrastructure investments and to consider a wide range of factors that affect affordability. Nevertheless, cities and states have continuing concerns with aspects of both policies. For example, some criticize EPA for relying in part on Median Household Income (MHI) as a measure of community affordability. Further, cities are critical that integrated plans that have been approved so far have been incorporated only into new or amended consent decrees, not CWA permits.
EPA's integrated planning process and water infrastructure affordability are issues of interest to legislators. In recent years, Members have offered bills that would address these issues in different ways. Some bills have sought to codify EPA's integrated planning approach—as written in the 2012 framework—into the CWA. Other proposals would go beyond codifying the integrated planning approach by including other provisions that alter the CWA's existing framework to varying degrees (e.g., H.R. 465 in the 115th Congress). In general, some environmental groups have opposed such changes proposed in bills from prior Congresses, but municipalities have generally supported the additional flexibility. |
crs_R43030 | crs_R43030_0 | Under the Appointments Clause, the President is empowered to nominate and appoint principal officers of the United States, but only with the advice and consent of the Senate. In addition to this general appointment authority, the Recess Appointments Clause permits the President to make temporary appointments, without Senate approval, during periods in which the Senate is not in session. The unique facts underlying President Obama's recess appointments of Richard Cordray as Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and Terrence F. Flynn, Sharon Block, and Richard F. Griffin Jr. as Members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB, or Board) have brought the inherent tensions of the appointments process into stark focus. The President's recess appointments were challenged through various lawsuits filed by parties affected by actions taken by either the CFPB or the NLRB. On January 25, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) became the first court to evaluate the merits of these challenges. In a case entitled Noel Canning v. N ational L abor R elations B oard , the circuit court issued a broad decision invalidating the appointment of all three NLRB Board Members. The court concluded that under the Recess Appointments Clause, the President may make recess appointments only during a formal intersession recess (a recess between the end of one session of Congress and the start of another), and only to fill those vacancies that arose during the intersession recess in which the appointment was made. This report begins with a general legal overview of the Recess Appointments Clause and a discussion of applicable case law that existed prior to the D.C. The report then analyzes the Noel Canning opinion and evaluates the impact the case could have on the roles of the President and Congress in the appointments context. A companion report, CRS Report R43032, Practical Implications of Noel Canning on the NLRB and CFPB , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], provides a detailed discussion of the impact the Noel Canning decision may have on the functioning of the NLRB and the CFPB. Noel Canning challenged the NLRB's decision in the D.C. The D.C. Circuit's actual order in Noel Canning directly implicates only one specific action, against one specific party, within one specific circuit, the court's interpretation of the President's recess appointment authority could have a substantial impact on the future division of power between the President and Congress in the filling of vacancies. If affirmed by the Supreme Court, the likely effect of the reasoning adopted in Noel Canning would be a shift toward increased Senate control over the appointment of government officials and a decrease in the frequency of presidential recess appointments. | Under the Appointments Clause, the President is empowered to nominate and appoint principal officers of the United States, but only with the advice and consent of the Senate. In addition to this general appointment authority, the Recess Appointments Clause permits the President to make temporary appointments, without Senate approval, during periods in which the Senate is not in session. On January 4, 2012, while the Senate was holding periodic "pro forma" sessions, President Obama invoked his recess appointment power and unilaterally appointed Richard Cordray as Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and Terrence F. Flynn, Sharon Block, and Richard F. Griffin Jr. as Members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
The President's recess appointments were ultimately challenged by parties affected by actions taken by the appointed officials, and on January 25, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) became the first court to evaluate the merits of the President's appointments. In a broad decision entitled Noel Canning v. National Labor Relations Board, the court invalidated the appointment of all three NLRB Board Members. In reaching its decision, the D.C. Circuit concluded that under the Recess Appointments Clause, the President may only make recess appointments during a formal intersession recess (a recess between the end of one session of Congress and the start of another), and only to fill those vacancies that arose during the intersession recess in which the appointment was made.
Although the D.C. Circuit's actual order in Noel Canning directly applies only to the NLRB's authority to undertake the single action at issue in the case, the court's interpretation of the President's recess appointment authority could have a substantial impact on the future division of power between the President and Congress in the filling of vacancies. If affirmed by the Supreme Court, the likely effect of the reasoning adopted in Noel Canning would be a shift toward increased Senate control over the appointment of government officials and a decrease in the frequency of presidential recess appointments.
This report begins with a general legal overview of the Recess Appointments Clause and a discussion of applicable case law that existed prior to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Noel Canning. The report then analyzes the Noel Canning opinion and evaluates the impact the case could have on the roles of the President and Congress in the appointments context. A companion report, CRS Report R43032, Practical Implications of Noel Canning on the NLRB and CFPB, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], provides a detailed discussion of the impact the Noel Canning decision may have on the functioning of the NLRB and the CFPB. |
crs_RL32013 | crs_RL32013_0 | Over the years, the blue-slippolicy has been modified to prevent a single Senator from having such absolute power over the fateof home-state judicial nominees. Out of such considerations grew thecustom of senatorial courtesy. In the case of U.S. district court nominations, (9) once a nomination is referred to the Judiciary Committee, thecounsel for the committee will send a blue slip (so called because of its color) to each Senator of thenominee's home state, regardless of party affiliation. (26) The policy was that if aSenator either returned a negative blue slip or failed to return one at all, the committee would stopall action on a nominee. (38)
Therefore, under Chairman Thurmond's blue-slip policy, a home-state Senator could stop allcommittee action on a judicial nominee by returning a negative blue slip; however, the committeewould not stop action on a nominee if the home-state Senator failed to return it. (43) Although tradition dictatedthat negative blue slips from both home-state Senators would prevent committee action, ChairmanThurmond decided to move forward. Bush in 1989, Chairman Biden sent a letter to the President stating the committee's blue-slippolicy:
The return of a negative blue slip will be a significantfactor to be weighed by the committee in its evaluation of a judicial nominee, but it will not precludeconsideration of that nominee unless the Administration has not consulted with both home stateSenators prior to submitting the nomination to the Senate. (49) In that letter, he laid out five circumstances that would promptthe Judiciary Committee to delay or hold up a nomination:
(1) failure to give serious consideration to individualsproposed by home state Senators as possible nominees;
(2) failure to identify to home state Senators and theJudiciary Committee an individual the President is considering nominating with enough time toallow the Senator to provide meaningful feedback before any formal clearance (i.e., by the ABA orFBI) on the prospective nominee is initiated;
(3) after having identified the name of an individual thePresident is considering nominating, failure to (a) seek a home state Senator's feedback, includingany objections the Senator may have to the prospective nominee, at least two weeks before anyformal clearances are initiated, and (b) give that feedback seriousconsideration;
(4) failure to notify a home state Senator, and theJudiciary Committee, that formal clearance on a prospective nominee is being initiated despite theSenator's objections; and
(5) failure to notify home state Senators, and theJudiciary Committee, before a nomination is actually made, that the President will nominate anindividual. (68)
(69)
June 6, 2001, to the End of the 107th Congress
On June 6, 2001, Senator Leahy took over as Judiciary chairman. (81) Thus, the blue-slip policy in the 108th Congress is that only oneof the home-state Senators must return a positive blue slip before the Judiciary Committee will moveforward with a nomination -- provided that the Administration engages in pre-nominationconsultation with both home-state Senators. Circuit or District Court nominee. The following are some of the more important dates of note for blue slips:
1917 -- first appearance of a blue slip
1917 -- first appearance of a negative blue slip
1922 -- time limit placed on the return of blue slips
1956 -- first formal change in blue-slip policy since itscreation
1979 -- second alteration in blue-slip policy
1989 -- first public statement of the blue-slip policy
1998 -- time limit removed on the return of blue slips
2001 -- first time blue slips made public
When Does a Blue Slip Postpone a Nomination Indefinitely? This report will be updated to reflect policy changes relating to blue slips. | The blue-slip process had its genesis in the Senate tradition of senatorial courtesy. Under thisinformal custom, the Senate would refuse to confirm a nomination unless the nominee had beenapproved by the home-state Senators of the President's party. The Senate Committee on theJudiciary created the blue slip (so called because of its color) out of this practice in the early 1900s. Initially, the blue slip permitted Senators, regardless of party affiliation, to voice their opinion on aPresident's nomination to a district court in their state or to a circuit court judgeship traditionallyappointed from their home state. Over the years, the blue slip has evolved into a tool used bySenators to delay, and often times prevent, the confirmation of nominees they find objectionable. The following six periods highlight the major changes that various chairmen of the JudiciaryCommittee undertook in their blue-slip policy:
From 1917 through 1955: The blue-slip policy allowed home-state Senatorsto state their objections but committee action to move forward on a nomination. If a Senatorobjected to his/her home-state nominee, the committee would report the nominee adversely to theSenate, where the contesting Senator would have the option of stating his/her objections to thenominee before the Senate would vote on confirmation.
From 1956 through 1978: A single home-state Senator could stop allcommittee action on a judicial nominee by either returning a negative blue slip or failing to returna blue slip to the committee.
From 1979 to mid-1989: A home-state Senator's failure to return a blue slipwould not necessarily prevent committee action on a nominee.
From mid-1989 through June 5, 2001: In a public letter (1989) on thecommittee's blue-slip policy, the chairman wrote that one negative blue slip would be "a significantfactor to be weighed" but would "not preclude consideration" of a nominee "unless theAdministration has not consulted with both home state Senators." The committee would take noaction, regardless of presidential consultation, if both home-state Senators returned negative blueslips.
From June 6, 2001, to 2003: The chairman's blue-slip policy allowedmovement on a judicial nominee only if both home-state Senators returned positive blue slips to thecommittee. If one home-state Senator returned a negative blue slip, no further action would be takenon the nominee.
2003: A return of a negative blue slip by one or both home-state Senators doesnot prevent the committee from moving forward with the nomination -- provided that theAdministration has engaged in pre-nomination consultation with both of the home-stateSenators.
The blue-slip process has been the subject of growing scholarly and legal debate; a selectedlist of reading material is included at the end of this report.
This report will be updated to reflect future blue-slip policy developments. |
crs_R42734 | crs_R42734_0 | The current policies base families' eligibility for assistance on their incomes and their contributions toward their rent on a share of their adjusted incomes. While the current, rather complicated system is designed to ensure that the most accurate estimate of family income is calculated and that families' financial circumstances are fully captured, it can also lead to confusion among recipients as well as difficulties for local program administrators. This report provides answers to some of the most common questions about the income and rent policies in federal rental assistance programs, including questions about where these policies came from and how they compare to other federal assistance programs that serve the same or similar purposes or populations. It is intended to help answer commonly asked questions, as well as provide information to policymakers seeking to understand and evaluate proposed changes to the current system. This report discusses the five main Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs that subsidize rents for low-income families. Together, these programs serve more than 4 million families and make up well over three-quarters of HUD's budget. These rental assistance programs are
Public Housing —housing developments owned and operated by local Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) for which the federal government provides capital and operating assistance; Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers (HCVs) —rent subsidies that tenants can use to subsidize their rents in the private market housing of their choice; Section 8 project-based rental assistance —subsidies provided directly to private owners of multifamily housing to subsidize the rents of specific units; Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly —multifamily housing developments owned by private nonprofit organizations for which the federal government provides capital grants and project-based rental assistance; and Section 811 Supportive Housing for Persons with Disabilities —similar to Section 202, but serves persons with disabilities. And non-HUD programs, such as the Department of Agriculture Rural Housing Service rental assistance programs and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, also have different policies for eligibility and assistance. It is important to note that even though a family may be eligible for assistance, they are not guaranteed to receive it. Housing assistance programs are not entitlements, thus, due to funding limitations, they serve only roughly one in four eligible households. Families wishing to receive assistance are generally placed on waiting lists. What Counts as Income?29
In general, the statute and regulations governing HUD rental-assistance programs define income by what is excluded , rather than by what is included; most common sources of income from all family members count in determining a family's eligibility for HUD-assisted housing, unless they are otherwise excluded by statute or regulation. What Is the Origin of the Income-Based Rent Setting Standard? HUD operates additional housing programs, and the Departments of Agriculture and the Treasury also administer housing programs targeted to low-income families. These other housing programs serve similar populations as the five HUD rental assistance programs, and while there may be some differences in eligibility and benefit structures, they also use many of the same income and rent standards as the five HUD programs. This is important to note because if changes were to be made to the income and rent policies governing HUD's rental assistance programs, those changes may also affect other programs. This section of the report provides brief comparisons of HUD's five main rental assistance programs to other federal housing programs as well as other federal benefits programs that serve low-income populations. These programs are the Homeless Assistance Grants, the Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA) program, and the HOME Investment Partnerships program. The regulations governing income and adjusted income for the five HUD rental assistance programs and discussed in this report apply. How Do These Income and Rent Policies Compare to Non-HUD Housing Assistance Programs? USDA uses the same basic standards as HUD for determining family income, adjusted income, and rent. The LIHTC program uses the HUD definition of income. Families are eligible for SNAP benefits if they meet income eligibility standards based on federal poverty guidelines that generally apply to the entire country, rather than the local area median income limits used in the HUD rental assistance programs. | The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) administers five main rental assistance programs that subsidize rents for low-income families: the Public Housing program, the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program, the Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance program, the Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly program, and the Section 811 Supportive Housing for Persons with Disabilities program. Together, these programs serve more than 4 million families and make up well over three-quarters of HUD's budget. All five programs provide rental assistance in the form of below-market rent available to low-income individuals and families. While the programs vary in some important ways—how assistance is provided, who administers the assistance, whether the assistance is restricted to certain populations—they use many of the same or similar standards when establishing tenants' income eligibility and their minimum contributions toward rent.
Families are generally eligible for HUD assistance if their incomes are below certain income standards set by HUD. Unlike the poverty measurement used by some other federal benefits programs that target low-income populations, income eligibility for HUD-assisted housing varies by locality and is tied to local area median income. Income, for the purposes of eligibility, is defined as income from all sources earned by all members of the family, with some exclusions (e.g., income earned by minors). Although a family may be eligible for assistance, they are not guaranteed to receive it. Housing assistance programs are not entitlements, thus, due to funding limitations they serve only roughly one in four eligible households. Families wishing to receive assistance are generally placed on waiting lists.
Once a family is determined eligible for HUD assistance and is selected to receive assistance, the rent they pay is generally based on 30% of their adjusted income. Those adjustments include deductions for elderly and disabled families, certain medical costs, and certain child care costs. Families' incomes, adjusted incomes, and contributions toward rent are typically recertified annually.
The laws governing both income eligibility and tenant rents were standardized in the early 1980s, although the origins of the current policies date back earlier and are derived from experiences with the public housing program, which was the first federal rental assistance program.
The income and rent policies in the five primary HUD rental assistance programs are also used to some extent by other HUD programs such as the homeless assistance programs and the HOME Investment Partnerships program. Looking at non-HUD housing programs, the Department of Agriculture's rural rental assistance program largely uses HUD's income and rent policies, and the Department of Treasury's Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program uses some HUD standards, but not all of them. Comparing HUD's primary rental assistance programs to other federal assistance programs that serve similar populations, HUD's programs differ in important ways; most notably, other assistance programs devolve more decisionmaking about income determination and eligibility to state administrators, whereas the HUD policies are largely set by federal statute and regulation.
While the income and rent policies that govern HUD's five main rental assistance programs are designed to accurately calculate and capture family incomes and financial circumstances, they can also lead to confusion among recipients as well as difficulties for local program administrators. In response to the rather complicated rules, stakeholders and some policymakers have called for changes to the current system; in fact, several laws were enacted in the 114th Congress to streamline income and rent calculations and those policy changes are in various stages of implementation.
This report provides answers to some of the most common questions about the income and rent policies in federal rental assistance programs, including questions about where these policies came from and how they compare to other federal assistance programs that serve the same or similar purposes or populations. It is intended to help answer commonly asked questions, as well as provide information to policymakers seeking to understand and evaluate proposed changes to the current system. |
crs_RS22663 | crs_RS22663_0 | Overview
U.S. foreign assistance efforts in the People's Republic of China (PRC) primarily aim to promote human rights and democratic norms; strengthen the rule of law; counter global public health threats and the spread of pandemic diseases; and improve livelihoods, promote sustainable development and environmental conservation, and preserve traditional culture in Tibetan areas. Congressionally mandated foreign assistance programs constitute an important component of U.S. human rights policy toward China, along with the U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue, public diplomacy efforts, reporting on human rights conditions in the PRC, and multilateral diplomacy at the United Nations and elsewhere. Between 2001 and 2015, the United States government allocated over $417 million for the Department of State's foreign operations or aid programs in China, of which $342 million was devoted to democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and related activities; Tibetan communities; and the environment. The direct recipients of State Department and USAID grants have been predominantly U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and universities. Chinese NGOs, universities, and some government entities have participated in or indirectly benefited from U.S. programs or collaborated with U.S. foreign aid grantees. Some analysts fear that growing PRC restrictions on civil society could adversely affect U.S. assistance programs. In FY2011, foreign operations appropriations for programs in China began to decline after peaking in FY2010. Congress eliminated funding for several law programs run jointly through U.S. and PRC universities, as well as a number of collaborative environmental programs. Comparisons with Other Foreign Aid Providers
According to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), multilateral and bilateral official development assistance (ODA) from all donors to China has fallen since the mid-2000s. OECD data include not only State Department and USAID funding, but also international programs carried out by other U.S. agencies. Policy Debates
As with many other efforts to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in China, some observers maintain that U.S. assistance has not led to meaningful changes. Other experts assert that U.S.-funded programs in the PRC have helped to strengthen protections of some rights, promote good governance practices, build foundations for the rule of law and civil society, and temper the effects of periodic political crackdowns. Some proponents of U.S. programs in China responded that U.S. assistance does not provide support to the PRC government, U.S. programs benefit U.S. interests, and they operate in areas where the PRC government has lacked sufficient capacity or commitment. Some Members also opposed U.S. environmental programs in China, asserting that it is not the responsibility of the United States to help alleviate China's environmental problems. They asserted that USAID's environmental activities in China have helped to mitigate this impact. U.S. Assistance to China: History
Congress has played a direct role in determining the Administration's foreign assistance policies for China. In 2000, the act granting permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) treatment to China ( P.L. 106-286 ) authorized programs to promote the rule of law and civil society in the PRC. The United States government began implementing HIV/AIDS programs in the PRC in 2007. Between 2008 and 2012, Congress appropriated approximately $95 million for State Department and USAID global Internet freedom efforts. | This report examines U.S. foreign assistance activities in the People's Republic of China (PRC), undertaken by the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The report also discusses related foreign operations appropriations, policy history, and legislative background. International programs supported by U.S. departments and agencies other than the Department of State and USAID, as well as Department of State public diplomacy programs, are not covered in this report.
U.S. foreign assistance efforts in the PRC aim to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; support sustainable livelihoods, cultural preservation, and environmental protection in Tibetan areas; and further U.S. interests through programs that address environmental pollution and pandemic diseases in China. The U.S. Congress has played a leading role in determining program priorities and funding levels for these objectives. These programs constitute an important component of U.S. human rights policy toward China. Although the United States is not the largest bilateral aid donor to China, it is the largest provider of government and civil society programming, according to data compiled by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
In 2000, the act granting permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) treatment to China (P.L. 106-286) authorized programs to promote democracy in the PRC. Between 2001 and 2015, the United States government allocated over $417 million for Department of State and USAID foreign assistance efforts in the PRC, including Peace Corps programs. Of this total, $342 million was devoted to democracy, human rights, and related activities; Tibetan communities; and the environment. The direct recipients of State Department and USAID grants have been predominantly U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and universities. Chinese NGOs, universities, and some government entities have participated in or indirectly benefited from U.S. programs, or have collaborated with U.S. foreign aid grantees.
Appropriations for Department of State and USAID programs in China reached a peak in FY2010, totaling $46.9 million. Funding decreased by nearly 40% between 2010 and 2012 and has since remained at lower levels. Reduced appropriations have resulted in the discontinuation of a number of rule of law and environmental programs.
Some policymakers argue that the United States government should not fund foreign assistance programs in the PRC because Beijing has significant financial resources and can manage China's own development needs. Other critics say that U.S. democracy, human rights, rule of law, environmental, and related programs have had little effect in China. Some observers fear that growing PRC restrictions on civil society could further undermine U.S. aid efforts. Some experts counter that U.S. programs in China aim to promote U.S. interests in areas where the PRC government has lacked the expertise or will to make greater progress. They argue that U.S. assistance activities in China have helped to develop protections of some rights, build foundations for the rule of law and civil society, and bolster reform-minded officials in the PRC government. Some proponents suggest that U.S. programs have nurtured relationships among governmental and nongovernmental actors and educational institutions in the United States and the PRC, which have helped to develop common understandings about human rights, the rule of law, and related principles and norms. Other programs are said to have reduced environmental and health threats coming from China. |
crs_R44390 | crs_R44390_0 | S ales of locally produced foods comprise a small but growing part of U.S. agricultural sales. Estimates vary, but they indicate that local food sales total between $4 billion and $12 billion annually. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates that local food sales totaled $6.1 billion in 2012, reflecting sales from nearly 164,000 farmers selling locally marketed foods. This represents 8% of U.S. farms and an estimated 1.5% of the value of total U.S. agricultural production. Most (85%) of all local food farms are smaller in size, with gross annual revenues under $75,000. Local and regional food systems generally refer to agricultural production and marketing that occurs within a certain geographic proximity (between farmer and consumer) or that involves certain social or supply chain characteristics in producing food (such as small family farms, urban gardens, or farms using sustainable agriculture practices). Some perceive locally sourced foods as fresher and higher in quality compared to some other readily available foods and also believe that purchasing local foods helps support local farm economies and/or farmers that use certain production practices that are perceived to be more environmentally sustainable. However, no such standards or practices are required under federal programs that support local foods. Many of the federal programs that support local foods generally define "local" based on the geographic distance between food production and/or sales based on the number of miles the food may be transported and require that food be sold within the state where it is produced to be considered local. A wide range of farm businesses may be considered to be engaged in local foods. These include direct-to-consumer marketing, farmers' markets, farm-to-school programs, community-supported agriculture, community gardens, school gardens, food hubs and market aggregators, kitchen incubators, and mobile slaughter units. Other types of operations include on-farm sales/stores, Internet marketing, food cooperatives and buying clubs, pick-your-own or "U-Pick" operations, roadside farm stands, urban farms (and rooftop farms and gardens), community kitchens, small-scale food processing and decentralized root cellars, and some agritourism or other types of on-farm recreational activities. Other programs were authorized in 2010 as part of the most recent child nutrition reauthorization (Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, P.L. Despite the growing popularity of the local foods market, there is no established definition of what constitutes a "local food." The 2008 farm bill (as noted above) defined the term "locally or regionally produced agricultural food product," as it pertains to eligibility under a USDA loan program, to mean "any agricultural food product that is raised, produced, and distributed in ... the locality or region in which the final product is marketed, so that the total distance that the product is transported is less than 400 miles from the origin of the product "; or "any agricultural food product that is raised, produced, and distributed in ... the State in which the product is produced ." Federal Programs and Initiatives
Many existing federal programs benefiting U.S. agricultural producers may provide support and assistance for local food systems. With few exceptions, these programs are not limited or targeted to local or regional food systems, but are generally available to provide support to all U.S. farms and ranchers. In addition, the Obama Administration has implemented departmental initiatives intended to support local food systems, such as the "Know Your Farmer, Know Your Food" Initiative, among other activities. Funding for local and regional foods has increased in recent years. In general, these initiatives are intended to eliminate organizational barriers among existing USDA programs and promote enhanced collaboration among staff, leveraging existing USDA activities and programs. Congressional Actions
Authorizations for many of the highlighted programs supporting local and regional food systems are contained within periodic farm bills or within child nutrition programs. The Agricultural Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-79 ) is the most recent omnibus farm bill, which was enacted in February 2014. 110-246 ). Congress periodically reviews and reauthorizes expiring authorities under these laws. 111-296 ). | Sales of locally produced foods comprise a small but growing part of U.S. agricultural sales. Estimates vary but indicate that local food sales total between $4 billion and $12 billion annually. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates that local food sales totaled $6.1 billion in 2012, reflecting sales from nearly 164,000 farmers selling locally marketed foods. This represents 8% of U.S. farms and an estimated 1.5% of the value of total U.S. agricultural production. Most (85%) of all local-food farms are smaller in size, with gross revenues under $75,000.
A wide range of farm businesses may be considered to be engaged in local foods. These include direct-to-consumer marketing, farmers' markets, farm-to-school programs, community-supported agriculture, community gardens, school gardens, food hubs and market aggregators, kitchen incubators, and mobile slaughter units. Other types of operations include on-farm sales/stores, Internet marketing, food cooperatives and buying clubs, pick-your-own or "U-Pick" operations, roadside farm stands, community kitchens, small-scale food processing and decentralized root cellars, and some agritourism or other types of on-farm recreational activities.
There is no established definition of what constitutes a "local food." Local and regional food systems generally refer to agricultural production and marketing that occurs within a certain geographic proximity (between farmer and consumer) or that involves certain social or supply chain characteristics in producing food (such as small family farms, urban gardens, or farms using sustainable agriculture practices). Some perceive locally sourced foods as fresher and higher in quality compared to some other readily available foods and also believe that purchasing local foods helps support local farm economies and/or farmers that use certain production practices that are perceived to be more environmentally sustainable. However, no such standards or practices are required under federal programs that support local foods. Many federal programs that support local foods generally define "local" based on the geographic distance between food production and/or sales such that "the total distance that the product is transported is less than 400 miles from the origin of the product"; or "any agricultural food product that is raised, produced, and distributed in ... the State in which the product is produced" (P.L. 110-246, §6015).
Authorization for many of the federal programs that support local food farms is contained within periodic farm bills or within the most recent reauthorization of the child nutrition programs. The 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79) is the most recent omnibus farm bill. Other programs and program funding were authorized in the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-296), which includes programs that sometimes promote local food systems. Congress periodically reviews and reauthorizes expiring authorities under these laws. Many existing federal programs benefiting U.S. agricultural producers may also provide support and assistance for local food systems. With few exceptions, these programs are not limited or targeted to local or regional food systems but are generally available to provide support to all U.S. farmers and ranchers. These include farm support and grant programs administered by USDA, among other federal agencies. In addition, USDA has implemented departmental initiatives intended to support local food systems, such as the "Know Your Farmer, Know Your Food" Initiative, among other activities. These initiatives are not stand-alone programs but are intended to eliminate organizational barriers between existing USDA programs and promote enhanced collaboration among staff, leveraging existing federal activities and programs.
In recent years funding to support local food systems has increased. For 2015, USDA awarded nearly $40 million in grants to support local food systems across several programs. In addition, nearly $50 million in loans is available exclusively to support local and regional food enterprises. Other USDA programs often also support local food systems; however, the share of total spending attributable to local foods is not known. |
crs_R45123 | crs_R45123_0 | T axes on firearms and ammunition are collected through different methods and used for different purposes, depending on the nature of the firearm. In general, taxes on the manufacture of firearms (including pistols and revolvers as well as rifles and other long guns) and ammunition are collected as excise taxes based on the manufacturer's or importer's sales price. §§669-669k), these revenues are allocated to the Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration Fund, also known as the Wildlife Restoration Trust Fund, and used for wildlife restoration and for hunter safety and education purposes. Taxes also are collected for the making and transfer of certain types of firearms and equipment (such as machine guns, short-barreled firearms, and silencers) regulated under the National Firearms Act (NFA; 26 U.S.C. §§5801 et seq.). These taxes originally were set at a level intended to slow the transfer of these weapons, but the tax has not been raised since the NFA was enacted in 1934. In addition, special occupation taxes are collected from federally licensed gun dealers who manufacture, import, or sell NFA firearms. NFA-generated tax receipts are deposited into the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury. In addition, it provides information on a variety of legislative proposals that have been advanced in the current and recent Congresses and that could affect the taxes on the manufacture and transfer of firearms and ammunitions and the use of tax revenues. The Excise Taxes on Firearms, Ammunition, and Archery Equipment
The P-R Act directed the proceeds of an existing federal excise tax on firearms and ammunition, under the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. The tax is set at 10% of the manufacturer's price for pistols and revolvers and 11% of the manufacturer's price for other firearms, shells, and cartridges. The tax is currently administered by the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) in the Department of the Treasury (Treasury). The Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Trust Fund: Apportionment and Use
The revenues from P-R taxes go into a special account called the Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration Fund, also known as the Wildlife Restoration Trust Fund. The fund is administered by the U.S. Half of the excise tax on pistols, revolvers, bows, and arrows, but not other firearms, is allocated to states for hunter education and safety programs (known as the Basic Hunter Education or 4(c) program). The federal cost share for wildlife restoration activities is capped at 75%. All ATF-collected taxes and fees are deposited into the General Fund of the Treasury. These tax receipts totaled $68.6 million in FY2016. The first set of proposals, several of which are known as the Hearing Protection Act (HPA), would modify the NFA by shifting silencers out of NFA coverage and make them subject to the excise taxes that go to the Wildlife Restoration Trust Fund. Each of these bills would amend 16 U.S.C. In addition to amending funding parameters related to target ranges, these bills all state the sense of Congress that the U.S. Forest Service (in the Department of Agriculture) and the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (in the Department of the Interior) should cooperate with state and local authorities to carry out waste-removal activities at public target ranges on federal lands. Proposals to Increase Taxes
Other proposals in recent Congresses would increase taxes on firearms. | Federal taxes on firearms and ammunition are collected through different methods and used for different purposes, depending on the nature of the firearms. Some tax receipts are used for wildlife restoration and for hunter education and safety, for example, whereas others are deposited into the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury. The assessment of these taxes and the uses of generated revenues are routinely of interest to many in Congress.
In general, taxes on the manufacture of firearms (including pistols and revolvers as well as rifles and other long guns) and ammunition are collected as excise taxes based on the manufacturer's or importer's sales price, under the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §4181). These taxes are imposed on the manufacturer's sales price at a rate of 10% on pistols and revolvers and 11% on ammunition and other firearms. (Pistols and revolvers, ammunition, and other firearms each account for about a third of these tax revenues.) The tax, which raised $761.6 million in FY2017, is administered by the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) in the Department of the Treasury.
These revenues are allocated to the Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration Fund, also known as the Wildlife Restoration Trust Fund, and used for wildlife restoration and for hunter safety and education purposes. Established by the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act of 1937 (16 U.S.C. §§669-669k, commonly known as the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act), the Wildlife Restoration Trust Fund is administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior. It also receives revenues from taxes on bows and arrows (26 U.S.C. §4161(b)). Amounts in the fund are allocated to states and selected territories based on formulas, with the largest share for wildlife restoration, apportioned one-half according to the size of the area and one-half according to the area's share of the overall number of hunting licenses (with a floor and ceiling on these allocations). The federal cost share for most activities receiving support from the fund is capped at 75%.
Taxes also are collected for the making and transfer of certain types of firearms and equipment (such as machine guns, short-barreled firearms, and silencers) regulated under the National Firearms Act (NFA; 26 U.S.C. §§5801 et seq.). These taxes originally were set at a level intended to slow the transfer of these weapons, although the tax has not been raised since the NFA was enacted in 1934. In addition, special occupational taxes are collected from federally licensed gun dealers who manufacture, import, or sell NFA firearms. NFA-generated tax receipts are deposited into the General Fund of the Treasury. These tax receipts totaled $68.6 million in FY2016.
A variety of proposals have been advanced in recent Congresses that could affect the taxes on firearms and the uses of resulting revenues. In the 115th Congress, some legislative proposals, several of which are known as the Hearing Protection Act, would remove firearm silencers from regulation and taxation under the NFA; firearm silencers would be taxed along with pistols and revolvers at 10%, with revenues deposited into the Wildlife Restoration Trust Fund primarily in support of public target ranges. Other proposals would allow funds to be used to promote hunting and recreational shooting or for Mexican gray wolf management. Still other proposals would increase taxes on guns or ammunition, with proceeds used for gun-violence concerns (e.g., compensation to teachers who are victims of a school shooting, hiring law enforcement personnel, and neighborhood safety). |
crs_R41533 | crs_R41533_0 | Federal policies aiming to improve the effectiveness of schools have historically focused largely on inputs, such as supporting teacher professional development, class-size reduction, and compensatory programs or services for disadvantaged students. Over the last two decades, however, interest in developing federal policies that focus on student outcomes has increased. Most recently, the enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110 ), which amended and reauthorized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), marked a dramatic expansion of the federal government's role in supporting standards-based instruction and test-based accountability, thereby increasing the federal government's involvement in decisions that directly affect teaching and learning. This measure of effectiveness was based on whether schools and LEAs were making "adequate yearly progress" (AYP) toward meeting the content and performance standards. These include issues pertaining to the comparability of data across states and the development of state accountability systems of varying degrees of rigor, the one-size-fits all set of consequences applied to schools that fail to make AYP, the narrowing of the focus of instruction at the school level, and the evaluation of teachers. Because states are using different standards and assessments, it is difficult to determine where students are in terms of skills and knowledge and to gauge the net effect of the NCLB. A related issue is whether states have implemented challenging accountability systems. Absolute Versus Differentiated Consequences
Under the NCLB, LEAs and states simply do or do not meet AYP standards. There is generally no distinction between those that fail to meet only one or two required performance or participation thresholds to a marginal degree versus those that fail to meet numerous thresholds to a substantial extent. Although schools and LEAs are held accountable for the achievement of students in various student groups, they are not held accountable for students at all levels of achievement. Because the goal of the current system is for 100% of students to become proficient by school year 2013-2014, schools and teachers may target instructional time and resources toward students who are nearing proficiency rather than distributing resources equally across students at all achievement levels. Because assessments are aligned with state content standards, there may be a risk that "teaching to the standards" becomes "teaching to the test." The practice of "teaching to the test"—whether intentional or unintentional—may narrow the curriculum in several ways. Thus, in enacting the NCLB, Congress amended the ESEA to establish a requirement that all teachers be highly qualified . In that time, the requirement has come to be seen by many as a minimum standard for entry into the profession (rather than a goal to which teachers might aspire) and a growing body of research has revealed its underlying emphasis on teachers' credentials to be weakly correlated with student achievement. | Federal policies aiming to improve the effectiveness of schools have historically focused largely on inputs, such as supporting teacher professional development, class-size reduction, and compensatory programs or services for disadvantaged students. Over the last two decades, however, interest in developing federal policies that focus on student outcomes has increased. Most recently, the enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110), which amended and reauthorized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), marked a dramatic expansion of the federal government's role in supporting standards-based instruction and test-based accountability, thereby increasing the federal government's involvement in decisions that directly affect teaching and learning.
As states and local educational agencies (LEAs) have implemented the federal accountability requirements, numerous issues have arisen that may be addressed during ESEA reauthorization. Among these issues are those pertaining to the comparability of data across states and the development of state accountability systems of varying degrees of rigor, the one-size-fits-all set of consequences applied to schools that fail to make adequate yearly progress (AYP), the narrowing of the focus of instruction at the school level, and the evaluation of teachers.
Commonality versus flexibility: States have had the flexibility to select their own content and performance standards, as well as the assessments aligned with these standards. This has resulted in a different accountability system in each state, making it difficult to sum up where students are in terms of skills and knowledge and to gauge the net effect of the NCLB. Absolute versus differentiated consequences: Schools simply do or do not meet AYP standards, and there is generally no distinction between those that fail to meet only one or two required performance or participation thresholds to a marginal degree versus those that fail to meet numerous thresholds to a substantial extent. Incentives to focus on proficiency: Schools and LEAs are held accountable for the achievement of all student subgroups. They are not, however, held accountable for students at all levels of achievement. Because the goal of the current system is for 100% of students to become "proficient" by school year 2013-2014, schools and teachers may target instructional time and resources towards students who are nearing proficiency rather than distributing resources equally across students at all achievement levels. Assessment and the narrowing of the curricular focus: Because assessments are aligned with state content standards, there may be a risk that "teaching to the standards" becomes "teaching to the test." The practice of "teaching to the test"—whether intentional or unintentional—may narrow the curriculum. Teacher evaluation and accountability: The NCLB added a requirement that all teachers be highly qualified. Over time, however, the requirement has come to be seen by many as a minimum standard for entry into the profession and a growing body of research has revealed its underlying emphasis on teachers' credentials to be weakly correlated with student achievement. As such, the Administration has moved toward measuring teacher effectiveness based on student achievement, and promoted a focus on output-based accountability for teachers. |
crs_R42602 | crs_R42602_0 | Current and Proposed Corps Firearms Policy
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers manages numerous water resource projects, such as dams and locks, across the United States. The regulation applies at Corps projects regardless of their location in states allowing open or concealed carry of loaded firearms. Roughly half of Corps fee-owned lands are open for hunting, and there are a small number of authorized shooting ranges. Section 327.13 prohibits private (i.e., non-law enforcement) individuals from possessing loaded firearms, ammunition, loaded projectile firing devices, bows and arrows, crossbows, or other weapons at Corps-administered water resource projects, unless they are being used
for hunting (with devices unloaded when being transported to hunting sites), at authorized shooting ranges, or with written permission of the Corps District Commander. Corps regulations allow loaded firearms only for hunting purposes in areas open to hunting or at designated shooting areas. The regulations for hunting at Corps projects are set out in Title 36, Section 327.8, of the Code of Federal Regulations , which states that "hunting is permitted except in areas and during periods where prohibited by the District Commander" and "all applicable Federal, State and local laws regulating these activities apply on project lands and waters, and shall be regulated by authorized enforcement officials as prescribed in 327.26." Of its 8.8 million acres of Corps fee-owned land, roughly half is open to hunting. That is, roughly 4.4 million acres of Corps land is closed to hunting but open to the public; on this land, Corps regulations restrict loaded firearms but allow unloaded firearms. 2046 , the Recreational Lands Self-Defense Act, H.R. 3590 , Sportsmen's Heritage and Recreational Enhancement Act of 2013, and Section 103 of S. 1335 , the Sportsmen's Act) would have banned the Secretary of the Army from promulgating or enforcing regulations that prohibit individuals from possessing firearms (including assembled or functional firearms) at Corps projects. However, individuals still would have been prohibited from possessing a firearm at a "federal facility" as identified under Title 18, Section 930, of the United States Code and in project areas restricted to the public pursuant to Title 16, Section 460d, of the United States Code . 111-24 made it legal for individuals to possess firearms at National Park Service (NPS) and National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS) units. They also saw the proposed legislation as providing for consistent treatment of open and concealed firearms possession within a state, providing for recreational shooting and self-defense, and protecting the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment of the Constitution. Other stakeholders raised concerns that the proposed legislation ignored implementation challenges at Corps projects that are not generally faced at NPS and NWRS units (e.g., presence of critical facilities, limited law enforcement authority) and that enactment could have produced unintended public safety and infrastructure security issues. Existing Corps regulations (36 C.F.R. In contrast, Congress has limited enforcement by Corps rangers to issuing citations for violations of regulations. That is, no armed federal law enforcement authorities responsible for maintaining public safety and security would have been at Corps projects, a continuation of the status quo. The 113 th Congress considered legislation that would have eliminated the Secretary of the Army's ability to enforce or promulgate regulations restricting the possession of loaded firearms in areas of its projects that are open to the public, as long as an individual is lawfully permitted to possess a firearm and such possession is in compliance with state law. Possession of firearms, however, would have remained prohibited at a "federal facility" consistent with Title 18, Section 930, of the United States Code . For the roughly 4.4 million acres that are open to hunting or designated as shooting ranges, the proposed legislation, if enacted, apparently would have essentially lifted the restriction that possession of a loaded firearms be limited for use in hunting or for shooting at designated shooting ranges. That is, under the proposed legislation, consistent with state law and firearms restrictions in Title 18, Section 930, of the United States Code , loaded firearms would have been allowed at all Corps project areas open to the public. | As part of its civil works mission, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers manages water resource projects. Areas behind and below Corps dams and around Corps locks, levees, and waterways are popular recreation sites, attracting 370 million visits annually. Corps projects are some of the most densely used federal recreation sites. Title 36, Section 327, of the Code of Federal Regulations sets out the regulations for public use of Corps projects. Section 327.13 generally prohibits possession of loaded firearms by private (i.e., non-law enforcement) individuals at Corps-administered projects unless the firearms are being used for hunting at designated areas (with devices required to be unloaded while transported to and from the hunting areas) or for shooting at authorized shooting ranges. The regulation applies at projects regardless of their location in states allowing open or concealed carry of loaded firearms.
Corps lands with public access are open for hunting unless designated as closed for hunting (36 C.F.R. §327.8). Roughly half (4.4 million acres) of Corps fee-owned land is closed to hunting but open to the public; on these lands, Corps regulations allow unloaded firearms and prohibit loaded firearms. The other half of Corps fee-owned land is open to hunting or shooting in designated shooting areas; Corps regulations allow loaded firearms for hunting in areas open to hunting or shooting in designated shooting areas.
Legislation proposed in the 113th Congress (e.g., H.R. 2046, the Recreational Lands Self-Defense Act; Section 103 of S. 1335, the Sportsmen's Act) would have banned the Secretary of the Army from promulgating or enforcing regulations that prohibit individuals from possessing firearms, including assembled or functional firearms, at Corps projects. The proposed language would have required firearms possession to comply with state law. Supporters saw the proposed legislation as addressing a patchwork of regulations restricting firearms on federal lands, providing consistency for open and concealed firearms possession within a state, and facilitating recreational shooting and self-defense. They argued that enactment would result in Corps policies consistent with legislation that made it legal for individuals to possess firearms at National Park Service (NPS) and National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS) units of the Department of the Interior (DOI). Other stakeholders were concerned that the proposed legislation could have produced unintended safety and security issues. No armed federal law enforcement officers are commissioned for public safety and security purposes at Corps projects. Corps rangers issue citations for regulatory violations and are not allowed to carry firearms. Most law enforcement at Corps projects is provided by local and state personnel.
The issue for the 113th Congress was not only whether to alter the Corps firearms regulations but also how to maintain public safety and infrastructure security at Corps projects. The proposed language would have eliminated the Secretary of the Army's ability to enforce or promulgate regulations on firearms restrictions in areas of Corps projects that are open to the public if possession were in compliance with state law. However, individuals still would have had to comply with Title 18, Section 930, of the United States Code, which restricts possession of firearms at a "federal facility," and the agency still would have been able to restrict public access to project areas under its authority in Title 16, Section 460d, of the United States Code. Therefore, which Corps facilities qualify as a "federal facility" under Title 18, Section 930, of the United States Code becomes a topic of interest. Under the proposed legislation, consistent with state law and firearms restrictions in Title 18, Section 930, of the United States Code, loaded firearms would have been allowed at all Corps project areas open to the public. |
crs_RL34384 | crs_RL34384_0 | In 2007, GAO reported that, although funding overall for enforcement activities had increased somewhat, it generally had not kept pace with the increasing number of mandates and regulations, or with inflation. Some additional areas of continued interest include
whether there is a need for increased compliance monitoring and reporting by regulated entities; impacts of environmental enforcement and associated penalties/fines on federal facilities' budgets (most notably the Department of Defense, or DOD, and Department of Energy, or DOE); how best to measure the success and effectiveness of enforcement (e.g., using indicators such as quantified health and environmental benefits versus the number of actions or dollar value of penalties); whether penalties are strong enough to serve as a deterrent and maintain a level economic playing field, or too harsh and thus causing undue economic hardship; how to balance punishment and deterrence through litigation with compliance assistance, incentive approaches, self-auditing or correction, and voluntary compliance; the effect of pollutant trading programs on enforcement; and the level of funding required to effectively achieve desired benefits of enforcement. These issues result from disparate values and perspectives among stakeholders, but also from the factors that are the focus of this report: the statutory framework, those who work within this framework, and the tools and approaches that have been adopted for achieving compliance with pollution control laws. The discussion in this report focuses on these federal environmental laws for which the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the primary federal implementing agency. EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA) at headquarters and in the 10 EPA regional offices sets the general framework for federal enforcement activities in coordination with the agency's program offices, states and tribes, and other federal agencies, particularly DOJ. The following discussion provides an overview of the regulated community, and highlights the role and activities of the key regulated entities in the enforcement of the primary pollution control statutes. EPA reported that the combined $1.15 billion in civil penalties (administrative and judicial) assessed in FY2013 was an all-time high, due to a record settlement of $1.0 billion reached with the Transocean defendants to resolve alleged violations associated with the Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Civil Administrative Actions
As noted earlier, a majority of environmental pollution control violations are addressed and resolved administratively by states and EPA without involving a judicial process. EPA imposed penalties in 1,440 final administrative penalty orders during FY2013, representing a total value of $48.0 million. Civil Judicial Enforcement
After civil administrative enforcement actions, civil judicial cases constitute the next-largest category of environmental enforcement. Criminal Judicial Enforcement
States and EPA may initiate criminal enforcement actions against individuals or entities for negligent or knowing violations of federal pollution control law. Within DOJ, the U.S. Attorneys Offices and ENRD's Environmental Crimes Section (ECS) prosecute criminal cases and work closely with EPA's OCEFT investigators. Monetary penalties may be included. Nearly $1.4 billion of $1.5 billion in criminal fines and restitution assessed, and the majority of the $3.0 billion in court-ordered projects for FY2013, were attributed to the Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico FY2013 criminal case, according to EPA's FY2013 annual results report. Funding for Enforcement/Compliance Activities
The adequacy of resources needed by EPA, DOJ, and the states to effectively enforce the major federal environmental pollution control laws is often highlighted during congressional debate of fiscal year appropriations. The President's FY2015 budget request included $583.0 million for EPA's enforcement program activities, compared to $560.9 million enacted for FY2014, $553.1 million enacted (post-sequestration) for FY2013, and $583.4 million enacted for FY2012. On September 19, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015 ( P.L. 113-164 , H.J.Res. Section 101 of the act continues appropriations for federal departments and agencies generally at FY2014 enacted levels minus a 0.0554% rescission. The continuing resolution (CR) is authorized until December 11, 2014, or until the enactment of FY2015 appropriations. Funding for EPA under the CR is subject to the authority and conditions provided in the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2014 (Division G, P.L. 113-76 ). | As a result of enforcement actions and settlements for noncompliance with federal pollution control requirements, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reported that, during FY2013, regulated entities committed to invest an estimated $7.0 billion for judicially mandated actions and equipment to control pollution (injunctive relief), and $22.0 million for implementing mutually agreed-upon (supplemental) environmentally beneficial projects. EPA estimated that these compliance/enforcement efforts achieved commitments to reduce or eliminate 1.3 billion pounds of pollutants in the environment, primarily from air and water, and to treat, minimize, or properly dispose of 148 million pounds of hazardous waste. Noncompliance with federal pollution control laws remains a continuing concern. The overall effectiveness of the enforcement organizational framework, the balance between state autonomy and federal oversight, and the adequacy of funding are long-standing congressional concerns.
This report provides an overview of the statutory framework, key players, infrastructure, resources, tools, and operations associated with enforcement and compliance of the major pollution control laws and regulations administered by EPA. It also outlines the roles of federal (including regional offices) and state regulators, as well as the regulated community. Understanding the many facets of how all federal pollution control laws are enforced, and the responsible parties involved, can be challenging. Enforcement of the considerable body of these laws involves a complex framework and organizational setting.
The array of enforcement/compliance tools employed to achieve and maintain compliance includes monitoring, investigation, administrative and judicial (civil and criminal) actions and penalties, and compliance assistance and incentive approaches. Most compliance violations are resolved administratively by the states and EPA. EPA concluded 1,440 final administrative penalty orders in FY2013. Civil judicial actions, which may be filed by states or EPA, are the next most frequent enforcement action. EPA may refer civil cases to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), referring 138 civil cases in FY2013. The U.S. Attorney General's Office and DOJ's Environmental Crimes Section, or the state attorneys general, in coordination with EPA criminal investigators and general counsel, may prosecute criminal violations against individuals or entities who knowingly disregard environmental laws or are criminally negligent. EPA reported the assessment of nearly $1.15 billion in civil penalties (administrative and judicial) and $4.5 billion in combined criminal fines, restitution, and court-ordered environmental projects during FY2013. Of the FY2013 totals, $1.0 billion in civil penalties and $4.0 billion in criminal fines, restitution, and court-ordered projects were associated with the Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico judicial and criminal cases.
Federal appropriations for environmental enforcement and compliance activities have remained relatively constant in recent fiscal years. Some contend that overall funding for enforcement activities has not kept pace with inflation or with the increasingly complex federal pollution control requirements. Congress appropriated $560.9 million for enforcement activities for FY2014, a 1.4% increase above the $553.1 million enacted for FY2013 (post-sequestration), but roughly 3.8% less than the $583.4 million enacted for FY2012. The President's FY2015 budget request included $583.0 million for EPA enforcement activities. On September 19, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015 (P.L. 113-164). The act provides FY2015 appropriations to federal agencies (including EPA) for continuing projects and activities generally at the rate and under the authority and conditions provided in the applicable conditions of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), less a 0.0554% rescission, until December 11, 2014, or until enactment of regular appropriations legislation. |
crs_RL30727 | crs_RL30727_0 | Background
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
The ability to gather accurate and timely information on enemy forces is an essential enabler of modern military operations. (1) The growing use ofprecision guided munitions (PGMs) which can destroyspecific targets without extensive collateral damage depends upon the availability of preciseinformation. There is a consensus among defense policy makers that no single platform or technology can satisfy DOD's need for information at all times in all scenarios. Thus, airborne platforms will likelycontinue to satisfy a great deal of DOD's ISR requirements over the next several decades. Both Congress and DOD face important decisions regarding current and future U.S. ISR capabilities. An overarching question is: Over the next 20 to 30 years, what mix of existing andplanned manned and unmanned ISR aircraft most effectively satisfies DOD's requirement for timelyand accurate information on enemy forces? Presently, the U-2 Dragon Lady forms thebackbone of this fleet. Should U-2s or other manned aircraft be maintained in the Air Force inventory even as Global Hawks become operational? RQ-4A Global Hawk
The RQ-4A Global Hawk is a high altitude, long endurance, long range un-piloted aerial vehicle designed to perform many of the same functions as the U-2. It flew a second and third time in May 1998. These UAVs would carry the EO/IR/SAR sensor payload, and are described by the AirForce as a complement to the U-2. The platforms are of similar physicaldimension. The Global Hawk has superior range and endurance to the U-2. The U-2 enjoys an advantage in payload over the Global Hawk of more than two-to one. While planning for deployment of new ISR airbornecapabilities into the theaters, the Department of Defense has taken money from existing, supposedlycomplementary, platforms to pay for future capabilities. If so, at what cost? Plans forthe early retirement of the U-2 force will undoubtedly be viewed with care and there will be interestin the progress of Global Hawk acquisition and its integration into the operating forces. | The ability to gather accurate and timely information on enemy forces is an essential enabler of modern military operations. The growing use of precision guided munitions (PGMs) which candestroy specific targets without extensive collateral damage depends upon the availability of preciseinformation. No single platform or technology can satisfy the needs of the Department of Defense(DOD) for information at all times in all scenarios. However, airborne platforms will likely continueto satisfy a large portion of DOD's ISR requirements over the next several decades.
Among airborne ISR platforms, the U-2 Dragon Lady and the RQ-4A Global Hawk are especially valuable. The U-2 stands out for its proven track record of providing vital near-real-timeintelligence to military theater commanders in the 1991 war with Iraq (Operation Desert Storm), the1999 conflict in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force), and other conflict areas.
Global Hawk, a soon to be fielded unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), has been considered a complement to, and potentially a replacement for the U-2. While the un-proven Global Hawkappears to offer some advantages over the U-2 -- such as greater range and endurance, and notexposing a pilot to danger -- as currently designed it does not currently match the U-2's intelligencegathering capabilities. The Air Force is seeking to upgrade these designs so the second generationof Global Hawks would be more similar to U-2s in capability.
Both Congress and DOD face important decisions regarding current and future mix of U.S. airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. An overarching line of inquiryis: Over the next 20 to 30 years, what mix of existing and planned manned and unmanned ISRaircraft can most effectively satisfy DOD's requirement for timely and accurate information onenemy forces?
An important immediate issue to be resolved is how to best introduce Global Hawk platforms into the U.S. ISR inventory and at what pace, relative to planned or unplanned U-2 attrition. Keyconcerns are whether manned aircraft can be completely replaced by UAVs, the time that it will taketo integrate the Global Hawks into the operating force structure, and the availability of adequatefunds to support the acquisition of Global Hawks without compromising vital operationalcapabilities for an extended period. |
crs_R41384 | crs_R41384_0 | In the wake of the recent financial crisis, many commentators have called for systemic risk or "macroprudential" regulation to help avoid future crises. 4173 ), which was signed into law on July 21, 2010, as P.L. 111-203 . Finally, it discusses parts of the Dodd-Frank Act involving the Fed and systemic risk, including the creation of a Financial Stability Oversight Council; regulation of systemically significant firms; resolution authority; modifications to the Fed's emergency lending authority and new disclosure requirements; the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; the regulation of payment, clearing, and settlement systems and activities; and limits on proprietary trading. What is Systemic Risk? Conversely, it has been argued that those systemic risk episodes could not have been prevented precisely because they were systemic risk episodes—by their nature, the problems that arose were unlikely to be foreseen or neutralized. This scenario is referred to as a run. An argument for reducing the number of regulators is that firms can "forum shop" in the current system, choosing the regulator whom they believe will be most sympathetic or have the lightest touch. At the time of the crisis, the Fed could have used its existing regulatory powers over bank holding companies and certain consumer financial products to limit the likelihood of a systemic risk episode, and it could have used its existing lender-of last-resort powers to ameliorate the fallout following a systemic risk episode. This emergency authority was used extensively during the recent crisis to provide assistance to non-bank parts of the financial system. Although regulators may have used their powers to attempt to prevent systemic risk before and during the crisis, it may be the case that they did not have all the legal authority needed to respond to the types of systemic issues that emerged. Too Big to Fail or Systemically Important Firms
The Fed had primary regulatory responsibility for bank holding companies and financial holding companies. Because the Fed could already regulate banks for safety and soundness, it already had authority to take the too big to fail problem into account when setting regulation for these types of holding companies. The Fed used its emergency lending authority (Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act), which is broad enough to allow it to lend to troubled firms, provided the loan is "secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank." Some economists argue that the crisis has demonstrated that existing requirements were either too low or too pro-cyclical. Other payment, settlement, and clearing systems, as well as activities that did not occur through a clearinghouse, were not directly regulated by the Fed. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ( H.R. Systemic Risk Provisions
New systemic risk responsibilities in the Dodd-Frank Act were mostly divided between the newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Federal Reserve, although resolution authority was largely shared between the Treasury Secretary and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Foreign financial firms operating in the United States could be identified by the Council as systemically significant. If the Board determines, and at least two-thirds of the Council confirms, that a systemically significant firm poses a "grave threat" to financial stability, it may:
(1) limit the ability of the company to merge with, acquire, consolidate with, or otherwise become affiliated with another company;
(2) restrict the ability of the company to offer a financial product or products;
(3) require the company to terminate one or more activities;
(4) impose conditions on the manner in which the company conducts one or more activities; or
(5) if the Board of Governors determines that the actions described in paragraphs (1) through (4) are inadequate to mitigate a threat to the financial stability of the United States in its recommendation, require the company to sell or otherwise transfer assets or off-balance-sheet items to unaffiliated entities. If necessary to pay off such obligations to the Treasury, the FDIC would have the authority to assess claimants of the failed institution that received more through the receivership than they would have received had the failed firm been liquidated in bankruptcy, as well as the power to assess certain large financial institutions (bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies eligible for the special resolution regime that have more than $50 billion in assets and all nonbank financial institutions supervised by the Fed as systemically significant). Such institutions are also barred from owning interests in or sponsoring hedge funds or private equity funds. Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Systems and Activities
In addition to the duties listed above, the Council, by a two-thirds vote including the chairman, is authorized to identify systemically significant systems for payment, clearing, and settlement (PCS) of financial transactions (also called utilities) and (PCS) activities for regulation by the SEC or the CFTC if registered therewith; otherwise, by the Fed. These requirements are phased in, and certain small firms are exempted. The Bureau is established within the Federal Reserve System, but it has some measure of independence from the Fed. The legislation does not authorize the GAO to conduct policy evaluations of the Fed's monetary actions. | The recent financial crisis contained a number of systemic risk episodes, or episodes that caused instability for large parts of the financial system. The lesson some policymakers have taken from this crisis is that a systemic risk or "macroprudential" regulator is needed to prevent similar episodes in the future. But what types of risk would this new regulator be tasked with preventing, and is it the case that those activities are currently unsupervised?
Some of the major financial market phenomena that have been identified as posing systemic risk include liquidity problems; "too big to fail" or "systemically important" firms; the cycle of rising leverage followed by rapid deleverage; weaknesses in payment, settlement, and clearing systems; and asset bubbles. At the time of the crisis, the Federal Reserve (Fed) already regulated bank holding companies and financial holding companies for capital and liquidity requirements, and it could influence their behavior in markets that it did not regulate. In addition, the Fed directly regulated or operated in some payment, settlement, and clearing systems. Many systemically significant firms are already regulated by the Fed because they are bank holding companies, although some may exist in what is referred to as the shadow banking system, which was largely free of federal regulation for safety and soundness. The Fed's monetary policy mandate was broad enough to allow it to prick asset bubbles, although it has not chosen to do so. Neither the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) nor other existing regulators had the authority to address gaps in existing regulation that they believed pose systemic risk.
Opponents of giving regulators new systemic risk responsibilities argue that the crisis did not occur because regulators lacked the necessary authority to prevent it, but because they used their authority poorly and failed to identify systemic risk until it was too late. They fear that greater regulation of financial markets will lead to moral hazard problems that increase systemic risk. The recent crisis has demonstrated that government intervention may become unavoidable, however, even when firms or markets are not explicitly regulated or protected by the government.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173, P.L. 111-203) was signed into law on July 21, 2010. Provisions of this legislation involving the Federal Reserve and systemic risk are discussed in this report. The act creates a Financial Stability Oversight Council (Council) to identify (but not rectify) emerging threats and regulatory gaps. It authorizes the Fed to regulate systemically significant firms identified by the Council for safety and soundness. If the Secretary of the Treasury believes that a failure of a firm would threaten financial stability, the firm can be placed in receivership. It prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading, limits their ability to invest in hedge funds and private equity funds, and authorizes the Fed to regulate those activities at systemically significant firms. It also authorizes the Fed to regulate certain payment, clearing, or settlement systems identified as systemically significant by the Council. To prevent assistance to failing firms, it limits the Fed's authority to lend to non-banks in emergencies and requires more oversight and disclosure of Federal Reserve activities. It imposes minimum capital requirements on a greater array of institutions and calls for capital requirements to be made counter-cyclical. It attempts to move more derivatives into clearinghouses and exchanges.
Although the act could be portrayed as an expansion of the Fed's powers, the legislation also strips the Fed of certain powers, such as consumer financial protection responsibilities, and creates new checks on other powers, such as requirements to obtain approval from the Council or the Treasury Secretary before undertaking certain decisions. |
crs_R44313 | crs_R44313_0 | Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, successive U.S. and Department of Defense leaders concluded that the traditional set of security assistance and security cooperation tools did not meet the needs of the changed strategic landscape. Recent events, particularly the battle between the Afghan government and the Taliban over Konduz, as well as the collapse of U.S.-trained and equipped forces in Iraq and Syria in the face of the Islamic State, have called into question whether these BPC programs can achieve their desired effects. If not, why not? Since the term's introduction in 2006, it has been used to describe DOD programs, a strategic rationale for building the security forces of weak and failing states, and broader DOD cooperative activities with a variety of actors, including the State Department, U.S. state and local governments, security institutions in foreign countries, private companies, and nongovernmental organizations. These goals included victory in war or war termination; managing regional security challenges; indirectly supporting a party to a conflict; conflict mitigation; building institutional and interpersonal linkages; enhancing coalition participation; and alliance building. The overall results are depicted in Figure 1 below:
Figure 1 suggests that in the case studies CRS researched, BPC efforts have been the least effective —relative to the strategic goal the United States sought to achieve—when used as a war exit strategy. BPC efforts have been most effective when used to build interpersonal and institutional linkages with other states and to build alliances. What Is "Building Partner Capacity"? Indeed, as a RAND study noted, BPC is more a "term of art" than a specific program or capability. CRS then selected 20 case studies since World War II, organized by strategic rationale, to determine whether a given BPC effort had its intended strategic effect (an explanation of the methodology can be found in the text box below). In 1984, largely as a result of congressional intervention, the U.S. program to assist anti-communist forces in Afghanistan increased significantly. According to the RAND Corporation, regional centers—which include the APCSS—are a critical tool for the DOD to engage with nations and advance U.S. national objectives by
exposing partner nation leaders to U.S. values and rule-of-law, governance, and policies; shaping partners' strategic thinking; nurturing relationships that facilitate U.S. access to the highest levels of partner nations' governments; building communities of interest among partner nation officials from across regions to encourage regional interaction and problem-solving; providing neutral venues for addressing regional conflicts; and offering one of the few security-related engagement tools for smaller countries that have limited military-to-military engagement with the United States. In the cases explored, the BPC efforts that appeared to be the least effective were those associated with victory in war/war termination or, in other words, those efforts wherein the United States based its exit strategy from a conflict on growing capable, durable local forces. The track record of these efforts is mixed, and has at times led to unintended consequences that create long-term strategic challenges. Are the resources for BPC and related efforts sufficient to accomplish stated objectives? Does BPC produce a meaningful return on investment? Given the paucity of literature on the subject, significantly more work could be done to explore and explain BPC successes and failures. Conclusion
The increasing priority that successive U.S. administrations have placed on Building Partner Capacity programs and activities prompted CRS to try to understand the efficacy of these programs. Accordingly, this study sought to understand what, exactly, constitutes DOD's Building Partner Capacity programs, and whether they proved an effective means toward advancing U.S. strategic objectives. | Since 2001, successive U.S. administrations have increasingly prioritized efforts to build foreign security forces—particularly in weak and failing states—arguing that doing so advances U.S. national security objectives. In turn, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested billions of dollars in "Building Partner Capacity," a term that refers to a broad set of missions, programs, activities, and authorities intended to improve the ability of other nations to achieve those security-oriented goals they share with the United States. As a consequence, these efforts and programs have been a growing focus of Congressional attention. Many partner capacity building programs and activities have their roots in the post-World War II period, if not well before, yet today they are implemented more widely, and often with greater resourcing, than efforts prior to September 11, 2001. Indeed, building partner capacity was a central feature of the 2003-2010 Iraq campaign, and is a core component of the ongoing current campaigns both in Afghanistan to counter Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and in Iraq/Syria to counter the Islamic State.
Recent events, particularly the battle between the Afghan government and the Taliban over Konduz, the inability of DOD-led efforts to produce more than a "handful" of anti-Assad, anti-Islamic State (IS) forces in Syria, and the collapse of U.S.-trained forces in Iraq in the face of the Islamic State, have called into question—including in Congress—whether these BPC programs can ever achieve their desired effects. CRS surveyed the publicly available literature on the subject, and found the debate on the strategic effectiveness of BPC and related programs nascent, at best. While a variety of studies explore programmatic effectiveness, very few explore what the United States sought to achieve when engaging in a BPC effort, and whether or not doing so led to desirable outcomes.
The increasing emphasis that the U.S. government is placing on BPC as a means to achieve strategic goals, combined with the paucity of the literature on this subject, prompted CRS to explore the historical track record of BPC efforts to help determine whether they produced outcomes consistent with U.S. strategic objectives. Twenty case studies since World War II were explored; each was grouped according to one of seven strategic goals that U.S. sought to accomplish. These goals included
victory in war/war termination, managing regional security challenges, indirectly supporting a party to a conflict, conflict mitigation, enhancing coalition participation, building institutional and interpersonal linkages, and alliance building.
Given that U.S. leaders often argue that a BPC effort could help accomplish more than one of the above goals, determining what constitutes the "primary" strategic objective for a given BPC effort required analytic judgment. CRS organized the cases according to public statements at the time, with particular attention paid to how leaders described the purpose of the BPC effort. Effectiveness was judged based on two criteria: whether the strategic goal was achieved, and whether the effort produced unintended consequences that were obviously and meaningfully damaging to U.S. national interests. Within the case studies explored, BPC was least effective as a tool for allowing the United States to extract itself from conflict (victory in war/war termination). However, it was most effective as a tool for building interpersonal and institutional linkages, and for alliance building. |
crs_R43969 | crs_R43969_0 | State Occupational Safety and Health Plans
Under the provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), the federal government, through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), has the primary responsibility for establishing and enforcing workplace safety standards. Figure 1 and Table 1 highlight that 21 states and Puerto Rico currently have state plans that cover private- and public-sector employers and 5 states and the U.S. Virgin Islands have plans that cover only state and local government employers, who are not covered by OSHA. OSHA estimates that 40% of all American workers are covered by a state occupational safety and health plan. The Arizona state plan includes a residential construction fall protection standard that has recently been deemed insufficient by OSHA and may result in OSHA reconsidering its approval of the state plan. Thus, the California state plan exemplifies going beyond the statutory requirement of providing a state plan that is at least as effective as the federal system and implementing standards to address hazards not specifically covered by OSHA. | The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act) authorizes states to establish their own occupational safety and health plans and preempt standards established and enforced by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). OSHA must approve state plans if they are "at least as effective" as OSHA's standards and enforcement. Currently, 21 states and Puerto Rico have state plans that cover all employers and 5 states and the U.S. Virgin Islands have state plans that cover only state and local government employers, who are not covered by the OSH Act. OSHA estimates that 40% of all American workers are covered by state occupational safety and health plans.
California's state plan includes specific standards designed to protect workers against heat illness despite OSHA not having a federal heat illness standard, exemplifying a state plan that goes beyond OSHA's standards. In contrast, legislation enacted in Arizona created a residential construction fall protection standard that OSHA determined is not as effective as the federal standard and that has been formally rejected by OSHA. |
crs_R40986 | crs_R40986_0 | In the 111 th Congress, Members have introduced several proposals to establish a commission that would make potentially far-reaching recommendations on how to address the federal government's long-term fiscal situation. Generally speaking, the measures would include Members of Congress as some or most of a commission's membership, provide for a majority of commission members to be appointed by congressional leaders, have varying degrees of partisan balance in membership, and require supermajority votes of commission members to approve recommendations. Each of the bills also would provide special legislative procedures to encourage expedited consideration of a commission's recommendations. Next, the report discusses legislative precursors that may help inform assessments of the proposals. Analyses of potential issues for Congress follow thereafter, including discussion of some advantages and disadvantages of using a commission, potential implications of expedited legislative procedures, and matters related to the structure of proposed commissions. Finally, Appendix A provides a more detailed side-by-side comparison of provisions of each bill. Appendix B discusses the long-term fiscal situation and three major entitlement programs—Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid—that are widely perceived as important for understanding the federal government's long-term fiscal situation. At the end of the report, a table provides a list of CRS subject matter experts who are available to answer questions related to many aspects of these legislative proposals. This measure, S. 2853 , the Bipartisan Task Force for Responsible Fiscal Action Act of 2009 (BTFRFA Act of 2009), was introduced on December 9, 2009. Brief Summaries of Current Fiscal Commission Proposals
The following section includes brief summaries of the four fiscal commission bills that are the subject of this report. 1557, the Securing America's Future Economy Commission Act
The House version of the SAFE Commission Act, H.R. Like S. 1056 , H.R. Issues related to these topics may inform assessments whether the use of a commission, coupled with expedited consideration of a commissions' proposals, may be appropriate for addressing the federal government's long-term fiscal situation; and, if a commission proposal were considered, how a commission proposal might be structured. | In the 111th Congress, Members have introduced several proposals to establish a commission that would make potentially far-reaching recommendations on how to address the federal government's long-term fiscal situation. Generally speaking, the measures would include Members of Congress as some or most of a commission's membership, provide for a majority of commission members to be appointed by congressional leaders, have varying degrees of partisan balance in membership, and require supermajority votes of commission members to approve recommendations. Each of the bills also would provide special legislative procedures to encourage expedited consideration of a commission's recommendations.
This report provides a comparative analysis of four fiscal commission proposals introduced in the 111th Congress that would address some, or all, aspects of the federal government's long-term fiscal situation. The four proposals are S. 2853 (the "Bipartisan Task Force for Responsible Fiscal Action Act of 2009," sponsored by Senator Kent Conrad ); S. 1056 (the "SAFE Commission Act," sponsored by Senator George Voinovich); H.R. 1557 (the "SAFE Commission Act," sponsored by Representative Jim Cooper); and S. 276 (the "Social Security and Medicare Solvency Commission Act," sponsored by Senator Dianne Feinstein). The report also discusses potential issues for Congress that may inform assessments whether the use of a commission, coupled with expedited consideration of a commission's proposals, may be appropriate for addressing the federal government's long-term fiscal situation; and, if a commission proposal were considered, how a commission proposal might be structured.
The report begins with brief summaries of the proposals. To provide context, the report next discusses legislative precursors to the proposals that are the subject of this report. Thereafter, the report includes analysis of potential issues for Congress, including a discussion of advantages and disadvantages of using a commission, potential implications of expedited legislative procedures, and matters related to the structure of proposed commissions.
Finally, Appendix A provides a more detailed side-by-side comparison of provisions of each bill. Appendix B discusses the long-term fiscal situation of the federal government and three major entitlement programs (Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid). At the end of the report, a table provides a list of CRS subject matter experts who are available to answer questions related to many aspects of these legislative proposals. |
crs_RL34614 | crs_RL34614_0 | Introduction
Nanotechnology—a term encompassing nanoscale science, engineering, and technology—is focused on understanding, controlling, and exploiting the unique properties of matter that can emerge at scales of one to 100 nanometers. A key issue before Congress regarding nanotechnology is how best to protect human health, safety, and the environment as nanoscale materials and products are researched, developed, manufactured, used, and discarded. While the rapidly emerging field of nanotechnology is believed by many to offer significant economic and societal benefits, some research results have raised concerns about the potential environmental, health, and safety (EHS) implications of nanoscale materials. Congressionally-mandated reviews of the NNI by the National Research Council (NRC) and the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) have concluded that additional research is required to make a rigorous risk assessment of nanoscale materials. Nevertheless, most stakeholders agree that these concerns about the potential detrimental effects of nanoscale materials and devices—both real and perceived—must be addressed. Proponents maintain that nanotechnology also offers the potential for significant EHS benefits, including:
reducing energy consumption, pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions; cleaner, more efficient industrial processes; remediating environmental damage; curing, managing, or preventing deadly diseases; and offering new materials that protect against impacts, self-repair to prevent catastrophic failure, or change in ways that protect or aid soldiers on the battlefield. Some critics are concerned, however, that nanoscale particles might unintentionally pass through the blood-brain barrier causing harm to humans and animals. Successfully addressing EHS issues is seen as vital for those potentially exposed to nanoscale materials (e.g., consumers, researchers, manufacturing workers, the general public), businesses, and investors for a variety of reasons:
protecting and improving human health, safety, and the environment; enabling accurate and efficient risk assessments, risk management, and cost-benefit trade-offs; ensuring public confidence in the safety of nanotechnology research, engineering, manufacturing, and use; preventing a problem in one application area of nanotechnology from having negative consequences for the use of nanotechnology in unrelated application areas due to public fears, legislative interventions, or an overly-broad regulatory response; and ensuring that society can enjoy the widespread economic and societal benefits that nanotechnology is believed by many to offer. | Nanotechnology—a term encompassing nanoscale science, engineering, and technology—is focused on understanding, controlling, and exploiting the unique properties of matter that can emerge at scales of one to 100 nanometers. A key issue before Congress regarding nanotechnology is how best to protect human health, safety, and the environment as nanoscale materials and products are researched, developed, manufactured, used, and discarded. While the rapidly emerging field of nanotechnology is believed by many to offer significant economic and societal benefits, some research results have raised concerns about the potential adverse environmental, health, and safety (EHS) implications of nanoscale materials.
Some have described nanotechnology as a two-edged sword. On the one hand, some are concerned that nanoscale particles may enter and accumulate in vital organs, such as the lungs and brains, potentially causing harm or death to humans and animals, and that the diffusion of nanoscale particles in the environment might harm ecosystems. On the other hand, some believe that nanotechnology has the potential to deliver important EHS benefits such as reducing energy consumption, pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions; remediating environmental damage; curing, managing, or preventing diseases; and offering new safety-enhancing materials that are stronger, self-repairing, and able to adapt to provide protection.
Stakeholders generally agree that concerns about potential detrimental effects of nanoscale materials and devices—both real and perceived—must be addressed to protect and improve human health, safety, and the environment; enable accurate and efficient risk assessment, risk management, and cost-benefit trade-offs; foster innovation and public confidence; and ensure that society can enjoy the widespread economic and societal benefits that nanotechnology may offer. Congressionally-mandated reviews of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) by the National Research Council and the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology have concluded that additional research is required to make a rigorous risk assessment of nanoscale materials. |
crs_R43664 | crs_R43664_0 | The surge of Central American children coming to the United States who are not accompanied by a parent or legal guardian and who lack proper immigration documents is raising complex and competing sets of humanitarian concerns and immigration control issues. Adults and families from the same three countries—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—have also been coming in increasing numbers over the same period. Current law requires that unaccompanied alien children are treated differently than unauthorized adults or unauthorized families with children who come to the United States seeking asylum. This report focuses on unaccompanied alien children as asylum seekers. It further builds on a set of CRS reports analyzing the issues surrounding unaccompanied alien children. To receive asylum in the United States , foreign nationals must demonstrate a well-founded fear that if returned home, they will be persecuted based upon one of five characteristics: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Treatment of Unauthorized Adults and Families
Foreign nationals—specifically in this context adults and families with children—apprehended along the border or arriving at a U.S. port of entry who lack proper immigration documents or who engage in fraud or misrepresentation are placed in a procedure known as expedited removal; however, if they express a fear of persecution, they receive a "credible fear" hearing with a USCIS asylum officer and—if found credible—are referred to an EOIR immigration judge for a hearing. Treatment of Unaccompanied Alien Children
The most notable and recent revisions to asylum policy that pertain to unaccompanied children were included in the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2008. Asylum Procedures34
As mentioned above, the TVPRA revised the procedures and policies for those unaccompanied children who file for asylum, most notably by requiring that USCIS asylum officers have "initial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by" an unaccompanied child. Asylum Requests
As Table 1 presents, only a small portion of the unaccompanied children apprehended by CBP have requested asylum with USCIS. While the sheer numbers requesting asylum have increased, they have not increased at as fast a rate as the overall increase in apprehensions of unaccompanied children. Through the third quarter of FY2014, USCIS reports that they have adjudicated 167 cases and granted asylum to 108 unaccompanied alien children. Only two of these approved cases were for unaccompanied children apprehended in FY2014. All of the other approved cases were for unaccompanied children apprehended in prior years. Policy Considerations
As Congress faces the challenges posed by an influx of unaccompanied alien children, whether to revise the law on how unaccompanied children are treated in terms of asylum and expedited removal is a key question. | The sheer number of Central American children coming to the United States who are not accompanied by a parent or legal guardian and who lack proper immigration documents is raising complex and competing sets of humanitarian concerns and immigration control issues. Adults and families from the same three countries—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—have also been coming in increasing numbers over the same period. Current law provides that unaccompanied alien children (also referred to as unaccompanied children) are treated differently than adults or children with their parents who come to the United States without proper immigration documents. This report focuses on how unaccompanied alien children are treated in comparison to unauthorized adults and families with children in the specific contexts of asylum and expedited removal.
Foreign nationals apprehended along the border or arriving at a U.S. port who lack proper immigration documents or who engage in fraud or misrepresentation are placed in expedited removal; however, if they express a fear of persecution, they receive a "credible fear" hearing with a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau (USCIS) asylum officer and—if found credible—are referred to an Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) immigration judge for a hearing. To ultimately receive asylum in the United States, foreign nationals must demonstrate a well-founded fear that if returned home, they will be persecuted based upon one of five characteristics: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2008 revised the procedures and policies for those unaccompanied alien children who file for asylum, most notably requiring that unaccompanied children from contiguous countries (i.e., Canada and Mexico) be screened for possible trafficking risks and asylum claims. Subsequently, the Administration opted to screen all unaccompanied children for possible asylum claims. In addition, the TVPRA gives USCIS asylum officers "initial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by" an unaccompanied alien child.
Only a small portion of the unaccompanied children apprehended by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have requested asylum with USCIS thus far. While the numbers requesting asylum have increased, they have not increased at as fast a rate as the overall increase in apprehensions of unaccompanied children. Through the third quarter of FY2014, USCIS reports that they have adjudicated 167 cases and granted asylum to 108 unaccompanied children. Only two of these approved cases were for unaccompanied children apprehended in FY2014. All of the other approved cases were for unaccompanied children apprehended in prior years.
This report builds on a set of CRS reports on issues surrounding unaccompanied alien children: CRS Report R43599, Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report IN10107, Unaccompanied Alien Children: A Processing Flow Chart, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43628, Unaccompanied Alien Children: Potential Factors Contributing to Recent Immigration, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43623, Unaccompanied Alien Children—Legal Issues: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33740 | crs_RL33740_0 | Introduction
The U.S.-Japan alliance, forged in the U.S. occupation of Japan after its defeat in World War II, provides a platform for U.S. military readiness in Asia. Under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, about 50,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan. The United States has the exclusive use of 85 facilities throughout the archipelago, providing the major U.S. forward logistics base in the Asia-Pacific region; Okinawa hosts 33 of the facilities. A series of provocations by North Korea and increasingly aggressive maritime operations by China since 2010 appeared to have set the relationship back on course. Emboldened by its own economic growth and a perception of U.S. decline, Beijing has asserted itself more forcefully in diplomatic and military arenas, including direct challenges to Japan's territorial rights over a set of islets in the East China Sea. The U.S.-Japan alliance, missing a strategic anchor since the end of the Cold War, may have found a new guiding rationale in shaping the environment for China's rise. A Rejuvenated Alliance Since 2012
Prime Minister Abe's commitment to defense reform has dovetailed effectively with the Obama Administration's drive to upgrade bilateral alliances as party of the "strategic rebalancing" to the Asia-Pacific region. Specifically, Abe has adjusted Japan's interpretation of its constitution to allow for the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, passed a package of security legislation that provides a legal framework for the new interpretation, slightly increased Japan's defense budget, relaxed Japan's restrictions on arms exports, established a National Security Council to facilitate decisionmaking on foreign policy, passed a "State Secrets" bill that allows for more intelligence-sharing with the United States, and committed political capital and resources to advance the U.S.-Japan agreement to relocate a controversial U.S. Marine Corps airbase in Okinawa. Many of these initiatives still face considerable obstacles, but the momentum has created new energy in the alliance. The United States and Japan have been steadily enhancing bilateral cooperation in many aspects of the alliance, such as ballistic missile defense, cybersecurity, and military use of space. As Japan sheds its self-imposed restrictions on the use of military force (in particular the constraints on collective self-defense) and the two countries implement their revised bilateral defense guidelines, the opportunities for the U.S. and Japanese militaries to operate as a combined force will grow. North Korea's belligerent rhetoric and repeated ballistic missile tests have heightened the sense of threat in Japan. The U.S.-Japan alliance has been a vehicle for enhancing security ties with Southeast Asian countries, especially since maritime territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas began to intensify in the late 2000s. Without cooperation among its allies, the United States may find itself less able to respond to North Korean nuclear and missile threats and to influence China's behavior. The United States has pursued new basing arrangements with countries in Southeast Asia that could host rotations of troops or other assets: Singapore, the Philippines, Australia, and Malaysia have, to varying degrees, allowed or indicated a willingness to provide expanded access to the United States, although the vast majority of U.S. military assets in Asia will remain in Japan and South Korea for the foreseeable future. In recent years, Japan has donated dozens of used and new patrol boats to the coast guards in the region. Increased joint training activities and shared use of facilities has improved the interoperability of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan also plays an active role in extended deterrence through its BMD capabilities. Forces Japan
The Japanese government provides nearly $2 billion per year to offset the cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan (see Figure 3 ). About 40% of all facilities used by U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) and half of USFJ military personnel are located in the prefecture, which comprises less than 1% of Japan's total land area. Because of these widespread concerns among Okinawans, the sustainability of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa remains a challenge for the alliance. | The U.S.-Japan alliance has long been an anchor of the U.S. security role in Asia. Forged in the U.S. occupation of Japan after its defeat in World War II, the alliance provides a platform for U.S. military readiness in the Pacific. About 50,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan and have the exclusive use of 85 facilities. In exchange for the use of these bases, the United States guarantees Japan's security. Security challenges in the region, particularly nuclear and missile tests by North Korea and increased Chinese maritime activities, have reinforced U.S.-Japan cooperation in recent years. The vitality of the alliance is particularly salient as the Obama Administration renewed the U.S. focus on the Asia-Pacific region through a strategic "rebalancing." The U.S.-Japan alliance, missing a strategic anchor since the end of the Cold War, may have found a new guiding rationale in shaping the environment for China's rise.
Since the early 2000s, the United States and Japan have taken significant strides in improving the operational capability of the alliance as a combined force, despite constraints. In addition to serving as hub for forward-deployed U.S. forces, Japan fields its own advanced military assets, many of which complement U.S. forces in missions like anti-submarine operations. The joint response to a 2011 tsunami and earthquake in Japan demonstrated the interoperability of the two militaries. Cooperation on ballistic missile defense and new attention to the cyber and space domains has also been strong. Japan's own defense policy has evolved, and major strategic documents reflect a new attention to operational readiness and flexibility.
Steady progress on an initiative to realign U.S. forces based in Japan has been overshadowed by the failure to resolve difficult basing issues on Okinawa, the major U.S. forward logistics base in East Asia. About 40% of all facilities used by U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) and half of USFJ military personnel are located in the prefecture, which comprises less than 1% of Japan's total land area. The sustainability of the U.S. military presence on Okinawa remains a critical challenge for the alliance. The long-delayed plan to relocate Marine Corps Air Station Futenma from a densely populated area of Okinawa encountered further obstacles in the first half of 2016.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is a strong supporter of the alliance and has had notable success on his ambitious agenda to increase the capability and flexibility of Japan's military. Abe's dominance over Japanese politics since his election in late 2012 has created opportunities for more predictable alliance planning. However, constitutional, legal, fiscal, and political barriers prevent a significant expansion of defense cooperation. Many of Abe's initiatives have faced opposition from the public and from political parties. In addition, leaders in China and South Korea distrust Abe because of his past statements on Japanese actions in the World War II era. Suspicion from Beijing and Seoul complicates Japan's efforts to expand its security role.
Japan faces a complex security landscape in the region. North Korea's increased asymmetric capabilities pose a direct threat to Japan. A territorial dispute with China over a set of islets in the East China Sea raises the risk of military escalation, a scenario that could trigger U.S. treaty obligations to defend Japan. Japan has pursued security cooperation with others in the region, including Australia, India, and several Southeast Asian countries. Of concern to the United States is the tense Japan-South Korea relationship, which has prevented effective trilateral coordination. Without cooperation among its allies, the United States may find itself less able to respond to North Korean missile threats and to influence China's behavior.
Both Japan and the United States face significant fiscal challenges. Limited resources could strain alliance capabilities as well as produce more contentious negotiations on cost-sharing. The Japanese government provides nearly $2 billion per year to offset the cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan. |
crs_R43905 | crs_R43905_0 | Agricultural exports are important both to farmers and to the U.S. economy. Challenges China's Policies on Wheat, Rice, and Corn7
In September 2016, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) launched two dispute settlement cases against China at the World Trade Organization (WTO) over Chinese policies that USTR alleges are inconsistent with its WTO obligations and have distorted international trade in wheat, rice, and corn. As such, the importance of improving access to overseas markets is readily apparent and is expected to factor more importantly in the years ahead, because the growth of food demand abroad is expected to far outpace increases in domestic demand. As negotiated, TPP would have materially increased the overseas markets to which U.S. farm and food products would have preferential access. U.S.-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP)16
Agricultural issues have been an active topic of debate in the ongoing trade negotiations between the United States and the European Union (EU) to establish a free trade area as part of T-TIP. Some of the principal objectives of U.S. agricultural interests include expanding market access for U.S. agricultural exports, addressing regulatory concerns regarding certain SPS and related non-tariff trade measures, and addressing concerns about EU products characterized by "geographical indications" (GIs). In 2015, U.S. exports of agricultural products to the EU totaled $12 billion, while EU exports of agricultural products to the United States totaled $20 billion, resulting in a substantial trade deficit of nearly $8 billion for the United States. In addition, in June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted to exit the EU (referred to as "Brexit"), and it remains to be seen what impact this will have on the T-TIP negotiation, since the UK accounts for a sizeable share (about 15%) of U.S. agricultural exports to the EU each year, and the exclusion of the UK from the EU could significantly reduce potential U.S. trade gains under a negotiated agreement. As the United States demonstrated that the outbreak was contained and eliminated, most of these bans were lifted. In September 2016, China's Ministry of Agriculture announced that it would lift the ban on U.S. beef. The suspension agreements limit Mexico's sugar exports to the United States to the residual of U.S. needs for domestic human use in a given marketing year minus U.S. production and imports from TRQ countries. U.S. exports of ultra-filtered milk enter Canada duty-free, and U.S. dairy producers, processors, and exporters view Ontario's Class 6 ingredients pricing initiative—and the prospect for a similar Canada-wide program—as an attempt to displace these U.S. exports with domestically sourced dairy ingredients. The same report observed that U.S. agricultural suppliers view prohibitions on providing credit on food and agricultural product sales and U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba as key obstacles to increasing U.S. farm exports to the island nation. Agricultural Trade ; CRS Report R43658, The U.S. Wine Industry and Selected Trade Issues with the European Union ; and CRS Report R44337, TPP: American Agriculture and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement . Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)71
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) provides duty-free tariff treatment for certain products from designated developing countries. With respect to agricultural interests, the Bali Agreement addressed five issues: (1) export competition — reconfirms a commitment to eliminate all export subsidies as part of the ongoing Doha Round, and asks for greater transparency and restraint in their use prior to their final elimination; (2) tariff rate quota (TRQ) administration — addresses persistently under-filled quotas; (3) temporary peace clause (established through 2017) — provides relief from challenge under the WTO dispute settlement process for a developing country's above-market purchases of commodities for food-security stockholding programs (described in more detail below), while working to find a permanent solution; (4) proposed list of green - box-eligible LDC-focused general services — adds new criteria of particular interest to developing countries to existing exemptions; and (5) cotton — regrets lack of progress in addressing LDC-related cotton issues, reiterates commitment to progress in negotiations on cotton, commits to meet twice yearly to study related issues, and reaffirms the importance of cotton to LDCs. COOL for beef and pork. Status: The inability of the WTO to move forward with the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations suggests that the WTO may not rapidly achieve the global trade goals of its members. | Trade, particularly exports, is critical to the vitality of American agriculture. On average, foreign markets absorb about one-fifth of U.S. agricultural production, thus contributing significantly to the health of the farm economy. The positive economic effects of trade in farm products are felt well beyond the farm gate. Farm product exports make up about 10% of total U.S. exports and contribute positively to the U.S. balance of trade. The economic benefits of agricultural exports also extend across rural communities, while overseas farm sales help to buoy a wide array of industries linked to agriculture, including transportation, processing, and farm input suppliers. Moreover, most of the future growth in food demand is expected to occur in developing countries.
Congress has traditionally displayed a keen interest in agricultural trade issues given their importance to farmers and ranchers and to the overall economy. The plethora of agriculture-related policy questions and trade issues in play as the 115th Congress convenes suggests that trade policy in general, as well as specific farm trade issues, may continue to draw congressional oversight and input. One ongoing concern has centered on the trade-distorting domestic policies abroad, including in China, which ranked as the second largest market for U.S. farm exports in FY2016. In late 2016 the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) launched two trade enforcement actions against China at the World Trade Organization (WTO) over its administration of tariff rate quotas for imports of wheat, rice, and corn and over its domestic support measures for these crops.
On the multilateral front, President Trump has ordered the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) regional free trade agreement (FTA), which the United States and 11 other Pacific-facing nations signed but which Congress has not ratified. As negotiated, TPP would have significantly improved access for U.S. farm exports. USTR continues to negotiate with the European Union (EU) over a regional FTA—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP)—involving a number of thorny agricultural issues that have proved to be impediments to trade, including differences over geographic indications (GI) and discontinuity in regulating the application of biotechnology to agricultural production, as well as access for these products to commercial markets. The United Kingdom vote to exit the EU has added to the already uncertain prospects for T-TIP.
At the global level, further liberalization of agricultural trade is an objective of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO, but those talks have been at an impasse for several years. Of concern to the developing world, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)—which provides duty-free tariff treatment for certain products from developing countries and benefits from $2.6 billion in U.S. agricultural imports in 2015—will expire at the end of 2017 unless Congress extends it.
Beyond trade agreements, numerous other trade issues of importance to U.S. agriculture may be of interest to Congress. For one, suspension agreements that limit Mexico's sugar exports to the United States have come under increasing criticism from U.S. stakeholders and may have implications for the U.S. sugar program. In Cuba, U.S. farm and food interests see potential to meaningfully expand exports, but a prohibition on private U.S. financing is viewed as a major obstacle to this end. U.S. dairy interests object to a Canadian dairy ingredient pricing strategy that it believes is aimed at displacing U.S. ingredient exports. U.S. exports of beef, pork, and chicken continue to face bans and trade restrictions over disease outbreaks that are inconsistent with international trade protocols. Examples include China's ongoing bans on imports of U.S. beef and poultry and restrictions imposed by several foreign markets on U.S. ractopamine-fed pork. As the 115th Congress convenes, the United States has settled two long-running WTO challenges to its policies: one to its cotton program and another to its country-of-origin labeling (COOL) law. |
crs_R40785 | crs_R40785_0 | Introduction
Qui tam is whistleblower concept. Contemporary Federal Qui Tam Statutes
In Stevens , the Supreme Court identified four contemporary federal qui tam statutes: the False Claims Act, the Patent Act, and two Indian protection laws. Additional liability may also flow from any retaliatory action taken against those who seek to stop violations of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3279(a)(1)(A))
Prior to enactment of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (2009 Act), this section was designated 31 U.S.C. If the False Claims Act action succeeds, relators are entitled to a share in the proceeds of up to 30%. In any case, they are also entitled to attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs, but may be denied any award if they participated in the underlying fraud. The courts are divided over the question of whether this extension is available to private parties or only in cases initiated by the government. Indian Protection (25 U.S.C. 201)
All penalties which shall accrue under Title 28 of the Revised Statutes shall be sued for and recovered in an action in the nature of an action of debt, in the name of the United States, before any court having jurisdiction of the same, in any State or Territory in which the defendant shall be arrested or found, the one half to the use of the informer and the other half to the use of the United States, except when the prosecution shall be first instituted on behalf of the United States, in which case the whole shall be to their use. Stat. It says nothing of whether he may do so on behalf of the United States qui tam. The rights available in criminal proceedings exist precisely because the proceedings are criminal. Although Hudson was not a qui tam case, later lower federal court qui tam cases consider it dispositive. This "system of separation of powers and checks and balances . , standing in a case or controversy. Each of the constitutional challenges to the False Claims Act's qui tam provisions faces an apparent hurdle. Take care
Unlike the appointments clause, the take care clause does not vest authority in the President. 3729
(a) Liability for certain acts.–
(1) In general.– Subject to paragraph (2), any person who –
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim;
(C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph (A), (B), (D), (E), (F), or (G);
(D) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government and knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of that money or property;
(E) is authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true;
(F) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge property; or
(G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government,
is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, as adjusted by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note; P.L. (c) Rights of the parties to qui tam actions. (3) Limitation on bringing civil action. | Qui tam enlists the public in the recovery of civil penalties and forfeitures. It rewards with a portion of the recovered proceeds those who sue in the government's name. A creature of antiquity, once common, today qui tam lives on in federal law only in the False Claims Act and in Indian protection laws.
The False Claims Act, expanded by the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, P.L. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009), now proscribes: (1) presenting a false claim; (2) making or using a false record or statement material to a false claim; (3) possessing property or money of the U.S. and delivering less than all of it; (4) delivering a certified receipt with intent to defraud the U.S.; (5) buying public property from a federal officer or employee, who may not lawfully sell it; (6) using a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the U.S., or concealing or improperly avoiding or decreasing an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the U.S.; or (7) conspiring to commit any such offense. Additional liability may also flow from any retaliatory action taken against whistleblowers under the False Claims Act. Offenders may be sued for triple damages, costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees in a civil action brought either by the United States or by a relator (whistleblower or other private party) in the name of the United States.
If the government initiates the suit, others may not join. If the government has not brought suit, a relator may do so, but must give the government notice and afford it 60 days to decide whether to take over the litigation. If the government declines to intervene, a prevailing relator's share of any recovery is capped at 30%; if the government intervenes, the caps are lower and depend upon the circumstances. Relators in patent and Indian protection qui tam cases are entitled to half of the recovery.
Federal qui tam statutes have survived two types of constitutional challenges—those based on defendants' rights in criminal cases and those based on the doctrine of separation of powers. The courts have found the rights required in criminal cases inapplicable, because qui tam actions are civil matters. They have generally rejected standing arguments, because relators stand in the shoes of the United States in whose name qui tam actions are brought. They have rejected appointments clause arguments, because relators hold no appointed office. They have rejected take care clause arguments, because the residue of governmental control over qui tam actions is considered constitutionally sufficient.
This report is available in an abridged version, as CRS Report R40786, Qui Tam: An Abbreviated Look at the False Claims Act and Related Federal Statutes, by [author name scrubbed], stripped of the footnotes, quotations, appendix, and most of the citations found here. |
crs_RS22986 | crs_RS22986_0 | Concerns over the price of oil and supply of petroleum have revived interest in alternative energy supplies, including the development of oil shale to help address energy needs in the United States. The process used to develop oil shale resources requires a plentiful water supply. According to news reports, oil companies currently hold senior water rights in the states where oil shale reserves are located. These senior rights reportedly have not been exercised for decades, allowing junior water rights holders to use the water. Because of the nature of the water rights systems in the relevant states, junior water rights holders might face significant limitations on their future use of water from the Colorado River Basin if the oil companies exercise their rights. This report will provide a brief overview of water rights in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming; changes that may be made to currently held water rights; and the possibility for abandonment of unused water rights. | Concerns over fluctuating oil prices and declining petroleum production worldwide have revived interest in oil shale as a potential resource. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct; P.L. 109-58) identified oil shale as a strategically important domestic resource and directed the Department of the Interior to promote commercial development. Oil shale development would require significant amounts of water, however, and water supply in the Colorado River Basin, where several oil shale reserves are located, is limited. According to news reports, oil companies holding water rights in the region have not exercised those rights in decades, which has allowed other water rights holders to use the water for agricultural and municipal needs. Because of the nature of the water rights systems in the relevant states, these users might face significant limitations in their future use of water from the Colorado River Basin if the oil companies exercise their rights. This report will provide a brief overview of water rights in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming, including changes that may be made to currently held water rights and the possibility for abandonment of unused water rights. |
crs_R44324 | crs_R44324_0 | Introduction
Levels of pay for congressional staff are a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations, guidance in setting pay levels for staff in Member offices, or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems. This report provides pay data for 16 staff position titles that are typically used in Senators' offices. The positions include the following:
Administrative Director Casework Supervisor Caseworker Chief of Staff Communications Director Counsel Executive Assistant Field Representative Legislative Assistant Legislative Correspondent Legislative Director Press Secretary Scheduler "Specials Director," a combined category that includes the job titles Director of Projects, Director of Special Projects, Director of Federal Projects, Director of Grants, Projects Director, or Grants Director Staff Assistant State Director
Senators' staff pay data for FY2001-FY2015 were derived from a random sampling of Senators' offices in which at least one staff member worked in a position in each year. Pay data for staff working in House Member offices are available in CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014 . Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in House and Senate committee offices are available in CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014 , and CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014 , respectively. Table 3 - Table 18 provide tabular pay data for Senators' staff positions. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following:
a line graph showing change in pay, depending on data availability, in nominal (current) and constant 2016 dollars; a comparison at 5-, 10-, and 15-year intervals from FY2015, depending on data availability, of the cumulative percentage change in pay of that position to changes in pay, in constant 2016 dollars, of Members of Congress and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of FY2015 pay, in 2016 dollars, in $10,000 increments. Between FY2011 and FY2015, the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, ranged from a 9.86% increase for press secretaries to a -26.05% decrease for specials directors. This may be compared to changes in the pay of Members of Congress, -5.1%, and General Schedule, DC, -3.19%, over approximately the same period (calendar years 2011-2015). Of the 16 staff positions, 4 saw pay increases while 12 saw declines. | The level of pay for congressional staff is a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in Member offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems.
This report provides pay data for 16 staff position titles that are typically used in Senators' offices. The positions include the following: Administrative Director, Casework Supervisor, Caseworker, Chief of Staff, Communications Director, Counsel, Executive Assistant, Field Representative, Legislative Assistant, Legislative Correspondent, Legislative Director, Press Secretary, Scheduler, "Specials Director" (a combined category that includes the job titles Director of Projects, Director of Special Projects, Director of Federal Projects, Director of Grants, Projects Director, or Grants Director), Staff Assistant, and State Director.
Tables provide tabular pay data for each of the selected staff positions in a Senator's office. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following:
a line graph showing change in pay; a comparison at 5-, 10-, and 15-year intervals from FY2015, depending on data availability, of the cumulative percentage change in pay for that position to changes in pay of Members of Congress and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of FY2015 pay in $10,000 increments.
In the past five years (FY2011 and FY2015), the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, ranged from a 9.86% increase for press secretaries to a -26.05% decrease for specials directors. Eight of the 16 positions experienced increases in pay, while the remaining eight positions saw declines in pay. This may be compared to changes to the pay of Members of Congress, -5.10%, and General Schedule, DC, -3.19%, over approximately the same period (calendar years 2011-2015).
Pay data for staff working in House Member offices are available in CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014. Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in House and Senate committee offices are available in CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014, and CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014, respectively.
Information about the duration of staff employment is available in CRS Report R44683, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in House Committees, 2006-2016, CRS Report R44685, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in Senate Committees, 2006-2016, CRS Report R44682, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2006-2016, and CRS Report R44684, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, 2006-2016. |
crs_R44820 | crs_R44820_0 | Introduction
U.S. insurers and Congress face new policy issues and questions related to the opportunities and risks presented by the growth in the international insurance market and trade in insurance products. While the risks of loss and the regulation may be local, the business of insurance, as with many financial services, has an increasingly substantial international component as companies look to grow and diversify. The postcrisis 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) altered the U.S. insurance regulatory system, particularly as it relates to international issues. Dodd-Frank also created a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO). The FIO is not a federal insurance regulator, but is tasked with representing the United States in international fora and, along with the United States Trade Representative (USTR), can negotiate international covered agreements relating to insurance prudential measures. The new federal involvement in insurance issues, both domestic and international, has created frictions both among the federal entities and between the states and the federal entities, and has been a subject of both congressional hearings and proposed legislation. The statute defines a covered agreement as a type of international insurance or reinsurance agreement for recognition of prudential measures that the FIO and the USTR negotiate on a bilateral or multilateral basis. — Nothing in this section shall —
(1) preempt —
(A) any State insurance measure that governs any insurer's rates, premiums, underwriting, or sales practices;
(B) any State coverage requirements for insurance;
(C) the application of the antitrust laws of any State to the business of insurance; or
(D) any State insurance measure governing the capital or solvency of an insurer, except to the extent that such State insurance measure results in less favorable treatment of a non-United State insurer than a United States insurer;
Further strictures are placed on the determination, including notice to the states involved and to congressional committees; public notice and comment in the Federal Register ; and the specific application of the Administrative Procedure Act, including de novo determination by courts in a judicial review. In addition, it requires the submission of the agreement and a layover period of 90 days, but does not require congressional approval. U.S.-EU Covered Agreement
On September 22, 2017, the United States and European Union signed the first bilateral insurance covered agreement. Due to the planned withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU on March 29, 2019 (so-called "Brexit"), Treasury and USTR negotiated a covered agreement with their UK counterparts. The Administration submitted the final text to Congress on December 11, 2018, starting the 90-day layover period for Congress to review the agreement prior to signature. International Insurance Entities
Outside of international trade negotiations and agreements, two separate but interrelated entities have the most significant impact on international insurance issues in the United States: the Financial Stability Board and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors. U.S. members include all the individual states, the NAIC, the Federal Reserve, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Federal Insurance Office. In the case of insurance, the U.S. representation at the IAIS includes (1) the NAIC, which collectively represents the U.S. state regulators, but has no regulatory authority of its own; (2) the 56 different states and territories, which collectively regulate the entire U.S. insurance market, but individually oversee only individual states and territories; (3) the Federal Reserve, which has holding company oversight only over designated systemically significant insurers and insurers with depository subsidiaries; and (4) the FIO, which has authority to monitor and report but no specific regulatory authority. Legislation in the 115th Congress
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 115-174/S. H.R. H.R. 3762)
H.R. 3861 would amend the Dodd-Frank Act provisions creating the Federal Insurance Office, generally limiting the focus and size of FIO. | The growth of the international insurance market and trade in insurance products and services has created opportunities and new policy issues for U.S. insurers, Congress, and the U.S. financial system. Insurance regulation is centered on the states, with the federal government having a limited role. While the risks of loss and the regulation may be local, the business of insurance, as with many financial services, has an increasingly substantial international component as companies and investors look to grow and diversify.
The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank; P.L. 111-203) enhanced the federal role in insurance markets through several provisions, including the Financial Stability Oversight Council's (FSOC's) ability to designate insurers as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs); Federal Reserve oversight of SIFIs and insurers with depository affiliates; and the creation of a Federal Insurance Office (FIO) inside the Department of the Treasury. Alongside FIO, Dodd-Frank defined a new class of international insurance agreements called covered agreements for recognition of prudential measures which the FIO and the United States Trade Representative (USTR) may negotiate with foreign entities. Although not a regulator, FIO has the authority to monitor the insurance industry and limited power to preempt state laws in conjunction with covered agreements. Dodd-Frank requires congressional consultations and a 90-day layover period for covered agreements, but such agreements do not require congressional approval.
International Insurance Stakeholders and Concerns
The international response to the financial crisis included the creation of a Financial Stability Board (FSB), largely made up of various countries' financial regulators, and increasing the focus of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) on creating regulatory standards, especially relating to insurer capital levels. The Federal Reserve and the FIO have assumed roles in the IAIS, whereas previously the individual states and the U.S. National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) had been the only U.S. members. Any agreements reached under the FSB or IAIS would have no legal impact in the United States until adopted in regulation by federal or state regulators or enacted into federal or state statute. Congress has little direct role in international regulatory cooperation agreements such as those reached at the FSB or IAIS.
The federal involvement in insurance issues has created friction both among the federal entities and between the states and the federal entities, and it has been a subject of congressional hearings and legislation. The first covered agreement, between the United States and the European Union (EU), went into effect on September 22, 2017. The agreement was largely rejected by the states and the NAIC, with the insurance industry split in its support, or lack thereof, for the agreement. Treasury and USTR announced a second covered agreement, with the United Kingdom (UK), on December 11, 2018, which is currently in the layover period before Congress.
Issues for Congress
The 115th Congress enacted legislation addressing international insurance issues in P.L. 115-174, with additional proposals included in H.R. 4573, S. 488, S. 1360, H.R. 3861, and H.R. 3762. Congressional interest in international insurance issues focused on (1) the covered agreement addressing the EU and UK treatment of U.S. insurers and the U.S. state requirements for reinsurance collateral and (2) the potential impact of international organizations and standards on the United States. |
crs_R45124 | crs_R45124_0 | 115-97 . Overview
The child tax credit was initially structured in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ( P.L. 105-34 ) as a $500-per-child nonrefundable credit to provide tax relief to middle- and upper-middle-income families. Since 1997, various laws have modified key parameters of the credit, expanding the availability of the benefit to more low-income families while also increasing the value of the tax credit. The first significant change to the child tax credit occurred with the enactment of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16 ). EGTRRA increased the amount of the credit over time to $1,000 per child and made it partially refundable under the earned income formula. The refundable portion of the credit—the amount that exceeds income tax liability—is often referred to as the additional child tax credit or ACTC. Subsequent legislation enacted in 2003 and 2004 accelerated the implementation of the changes made under EGTRRA. In 2008 and 2009, Congress passed legislation—the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343 ) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 )—that further expanded the availability and amount of the credit to taxpayers whose income was too low to either qualify for the credit or be eligible for the full credit. ARRA lowered the refundability threshold to its current level of $3,000 for 2009 through 2010. The ARRA provisions were subsequently extended several times and made permanent by the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act of 2015 (Division Q of P.L. 114-113 ). At the end of 2017, Congress enacted P.L. 115-97 which, in addition to making numerous changes to the tax code, temporarily changed the child tax credit. Specifically, the law increased the credit for many (though not all) taxpayers by doubling the maximum amount of the credit (and increasing the maximum amount of the ACTC to $1,400), increasing the income at which the credit begins to phase out, and reducing the refundability threshold as illustrated in Table 1 . In addition, this law temporarily modified the identification (ID) number requirement of the credit, requiring taxpayers to provide the Social Security number (SSN) for every child for whom they claimed the credit. Finally, the law created a new temporary "family credit" for non-child credit eligible dependents (children ineligible for the child tax credit or older non-child dependents). Non-child credit eligible dependents excludes otherwise eligible dependents who are not U.S. citizens and are residents of Mexico or Canada. The credit is equal to $500 per non-child credit eligible dependent. The amount is not annually adjusted for inflation. The phaseout parameters of the child credit (e.g., phaseout thresholds of $400,000 married filing jointly, $200,000 other taxpayers, 5% phaseout rate) apply to the family credit. The family credit is not annually adjusted for inflation. All the modifications to the child tax credit and the new family credit are currently scheduled to expire at the end of 2025. | The child tax credit was initially structured in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34) as a $500-per-child nonrefundable credit to provide tax relief to middle- and upper-middle-income families. Since 1997, various laws have modified key parameters of the credit, expanding the availability of the benefit to more low-income families while also increasing the value of the tax credit. The first significant change to the child tax credit occurred with the enactment of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16). EGTRRA increased the amount of the credit over time to $1,000 per child and made it partially refundable under the earned income formula. The refundable portion of the credit—the amount that exceeds income tax liability—is often referred to as the additional child tax credit or ACTC.
Subsequent legislation enacted in 2003 and 2004 accelerated the implementation of the changes made under EGTRRA. In 2008 and 2009, Congress passed legislation—the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5)—that further expanded the availability and amount of the credit to taxpayers whose income was too low to either qualify for the credit or be eligible for the full credit. ARRA lowered the refundability threshold to its current level of $3,000 for 2009 through 2010. The ARRA provisions were subsequently extended several times and made permanent by the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act of 2015 (Division Q of P.L. 114-113).
At the end of 2017, Congress enacted P.L. 115-97 which, in addition to making numerous changes to the tax code, temporarily changed the child tax credit. Specifically, the law increased the credit for many (though not all) taxpayers by doubling the maximum amount of the credit (and increasing the maximum amount of the ACTC to $1,400), increasing the income at which the credit begins to phase out, and reducing the refundability threshold. In addition, this law temporarily modified the identification (ID) number requirement of the credit, requiring taxpayers to provide the Social Security number (SSN) for every child for whom they claimed the credit.
P.L. 115-97 also created a new temporary "family credit" for non-child credit eligible dependents (children ineligible for the child tax credit or older non-child dependents). Non-child credit eligible dependents excludes otherwise eligible dependents who are citizens of Mexico or Canada. The credit is equal to $500 per non-child credit eligible dependent. The amount is not annually adjusted for inflation. The phaseout parameters of the child credit (i.e., phaseout thresholds of $400,000 married filing jointly, $200,000 other taxpayers, 5% phaseout rate) apply to the family credit. The family credit is not annually adjusted for inflation.
All the modifications to the child tax credit and the new family credit are currently scheduled to expire at the end of 2025. |
crs_RL34003 | crs_RL34003_0 | Issues for Congress
On February 6, 2007, President George W. Bush formally announced the creation of a new Unified Combatant Command for the African continent, reflecting Africa's increasing strategic importance to the United States. Previously, U.S. military involvement in Africa was divided among three geographic commands: European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM). The command's area of responsibility (AOR) includes all African countries except Egypt, which remains in the AOR of CENTCOM. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was launched with initial operating capability (IOC) as a sub-unified command under EUCOM on October 1, 2007, and reached full operating capability (FOC) as a stand-alone unified command on October 1, 2008. Although the precise wording of AFRICOM's mission statement has evolved since the command was first announced, DOD officials have broadly suggested that the command's mission is to promote U.S. strategic objectives and protect U.S. interests in the region by working with African partners to strengthen their defense capabilities so that they are better able to contribute to regional stability and security. How are U.S. strategic interests influencing the size and scope of the U.S. military footprint on the continent, and what effect might AFRICOM's creation have on future U.S. military operations in Africa? How has AFRICOM prepared to meet potential contingencies on the continent? This report provides information on AFRICOM's mission, structure, interagency coordination, and its basing and manpower requirements. It also gives a broad overview of U.S. strategic interests in Africa and the role of U.S. military efforts on the continent. AFRICOM's first commander, General Kip Ward, viewed the U.S. military's role in Africa as part of a "three-pronged" U.S. government approach, with DOD, through AFRICOM, taking the lead on security issues, but playing a supporting role to the Department of State, which conducts diplomacy, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which implements development programs. Moving the headquarters to Africa, as initially envisioned by DOD, may not occur for several years, if at all. Officials stress that there are no plans to establish new military bases in Africa. Military construction at Camp Lemonnier is budgeted separately. The establishment of AFRICOM reflects an evolution in policymakers' perceptions of the continent's security challenges and U.S. strategic interests there. Natural resources, particularly energy resources, dominate the products imported from Africa under AGOA. Africa now supplies the United States with roughly the same amount of crude oil as the Middle East. Armed Conflicts
Political conflict and instability in parts of Africa have caused human suffering on a massive scale and have undermined economic, social, and political development. DOD suggests that Africa Command builds on the experiences of the U.S. military's only forward presence in the region, the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa. Training has also been provided by contractors. Several Members of Congress expressed interest in the creation of a combatant command for Africa prior to the Bush Administration decision to establish AFRICOM. As U.S. military activity on the continent has expanded in recent years, some observers have expressed concern with the idea that U.S. military efforts on the continent could overshadow U.S. diplomatic objectives. In March 2011, the United States commenced military operations in Libya under Operation Odyssey Dawn, the U.S. contribution to a multilateral military effort to enforce a no-fly zone and protect civilians in Libya, in support of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973. | In recent years, analysts and U.S. policymakers have noted Africa's growing strategic importance to U.S. interests. Among those interests are the increasing importance of Africa's natural resources, particularly energy resources, and mounting concern over violent extremist activities and other potential threats posed by under-governed spaces, such as maritime piracy and illicit trafficking. In addition, there is ongoing concern for Africa's many humanitarian crises, armed conflicts, and more general challenges, such as the devastating effect of HIV/AIDS. In 2006, Congress authorized a feasibility study on the creation of a new command for Africa to consolidate current operations and activities on the continent under one commander. Congress has closely monitored the command since its establishment.
On February 6, 2007, the Bush Administration announced the creation of a new unified combatant command, U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM, to promote U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters. Prior to AFRICOM's establishment, U.S. military involvement on the continent was divided among three commands: U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). The command's area of responsibility (AOR) includes all African countries except Egypt. AFRICOM was officially launched as a sub-unified command under EUCOM on October 1, 2007, and became a stand-alone command on October 1, 2008.
DOD signaled its intention to locate AFRICOM's headquarters on the continent early in the planning process, but such a move is unlikely to take place for several years, if at all. The command will operate from Stuttgart, Germany, for the foreseeable future. DOD has stressed that there are no plans to have a significant troop presence on the continent. The East African country of Djibouti, home to the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) at Camp Lemonnier, provides the U.S. military's only enduring infrastructure in Africa.
As envisioned by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM aims to promote U.S. strategic objectives and protect U.S. interests in the region by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen their defense capabilities so that they are better able to contribute to regional stability and security. AFRICOM also has a mandate to conduct military operations, if so directed by national command authorities. In March 2011, for example, AFRICOM commenced Operation Odyssey Dawn to protect civilians in Libya as part of multinational military operations authorized by the U.N. Security Council under Resolution 1973.
The 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa and more recent attacks have highlighted the threat of terrorism to U.S. interests on the continent. Political instability and civil wars have created vast under-governed spaces, areas in which some experts allege that terrorist groups may train and operate. The upsurge in piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa has been directly attributed to ongoing instability in Somalia. Instability also heightens human suffering and retards economic development, which may in turn threaten U.S. economic interests. Africa's exports of crude oil to the United States are now roughly equal to those of the Middle East, further emphasizing the continent's strategic importance. This report provides a broad overview of U.S. strategic interests in Africa and the role of U.S. military efforts on the continent as they pertain to the creation of AFRICOM. A discussion of AFRICOM's mission, its coordination with other government agencies, and its basing and manpower requirements is included. |
crs_R40210 | crs_R40210_0 | Introduction
The home mortgage foreclosure rate in the United States began to rise rapidly around the middle of 2006 and remained elevated for several years thereafter. Consequently, an issue before Congress was whether to use federal resources and authority to help prevent some home foreclosures and, if so, how to best accomplish that objective. Additional foreclosure prevention initiatives that were established in 2007 or after but ended prior to the end of 2016 are described in the Appendix . Impacts of Foreclosure
Losing a home to foreclosure can have a number of negative effects on a household. Some homeowners might have difficulty finding a place to live after losing their homes to foreclosure. If foreclosures are concentrated, they can also have negative impacts on communities. Federal Response to Increased Foreclosure Rates
As foreclosure rates began to increase rapidly in the years after 2006, there was broad bipartisan consensus that the rapid rise in foreclosures had negative consequences on households and communities. However, there was less agreement among policymakers about how much the federal government should do to prevent foreclosures. Supporters also suggested that preventing foreclosures could help stabilize the economy as a whole. Despite the concerns surrounding foreclosure prevention programs, and disagreement over the proper role of the government in preserving homeownership, the federal government implemented a variety of temporary initiatives to attempt to address the high rates of residential mortgage foreclosures. Some of these initiatives were enacted by Congress, while others were created administratively by the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations. Several of these initiatives remained active through at least 2016, including the following:
the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), which provided financial incentives to mortgage servicers to modify certain mortgages; the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), which allows certain homeowners with little or no equity in their homes to refinance their mortgages; the Hardest Hit Fund, which provides funding to certain states to use for locally tailored foreclosure prevention programs; the FHA Short Refinance Program, which allowed certain borrowers to refinance their mortgages into new loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) while reducing the principal amount of the loan; and additional funding for housing counseling to assist people in danger of foreclosure. Other borrowers, such as those who were re-employed but at a lower salary, may have been able to qualify for a regular HAMP modification. First, Hope for Homeowners required that any second liens on the property be extinguished. Other challenges are more conceptual, and are related to questions of fairness and precedent. This section describes some of the most prominent considerations that were involved in developing programs to preserve homeownership in the years following the increase in foreclosure rates that began in 2006, as well as how some of these challenges were addressed in the years following the programs' establishment. Possibility of Redefault
A challenge associated with loan modification programs is the possibility that a homeowner who receives a modification will nevertheless default on the loan again in the future. Furthermore, modified mortgages that default again in the future can potentially harm borrowers. | The home mortgage foreclosure rate began to rise rapidly in the United States beginning around the middle of 2006 and remained elevated for several years thereafter. Losing a home to foreclosure can harm households in many ways; for example, those who have been through a foreclosure may have difficulty finding a new place to live or obtaining a loan in the future. Furthermore, concentrated foreclosures can negatively impact nearby home prices, and large numbers of abandoned properties can negatively affect communities. Finally, elevated levels of foreclosures can destabilize housing markets, which can in turn negatively impact the economy as a whole.
In the years that followed the increase in foreclosure rates, there was a broad consensus that there are many negative consequences associated with high numbers of foreclosures. There was less consensus over whether the federal government should have a role in preventing foreclosures and, if so, what that role should be. Nevertheless, in the years after the foreclosure rate began to rise, Congress and both the Bush and Obama Administrations created a variety of temporary initiatives aimed at preventing further increases in foreclosures and helping more families preserve homeownership. These efforts included several initiatives that remained active through 2016 or beyond, including
the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), the Hardest Hit Fund, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) Short Refinance Program, and the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program (NFMCP).
Two other initiatives, Hope for Homeowners and the Emergency Homeowners Loan Program (EHLP), expired at the end of FY2011.
Some of these federal foreclosure prevention initiatives were criticized as being ineffective or less effective than had been hoped. This led some policymakers to suggest that changes should be made to these initiatives to try to make them more effective, while other policymakers argued that some of these initiatives should be eliminated entirely. For example, in the 112th Congress, the House of Representatives passed a series of bills that, if enacted, would have terminated several foreclosure prevention initiatives (including HAMP and the FHA Short Refinance Program) prior to their intended end dates. However, these bills were not considered by the Senate.
While many observers agreed that slowing the pace of foreclosures was an important policy goal, several challenges have complicated such efforts. These challenges have included implementation issues, such as deciding who has the authority to make mortgage modifications, developing the capacity to complete widespread modifications, and assessing the possibility that homeowners with modified loans might default again in the future. Other challenges have been related to the perception of unfairness in providing help to one set of homeowners over others, the possibility of inadvertently providing incentives for borrowers to default, and the possibility of setting an unwanted precedent for future mortgage lending. |
crs_R44707 | crs_R44707_0 | Thus, Congress is constitutionally authorized to raise revenue through taxes, tariffs, duties, and the like, and to regulate international commerce. The Constitution, however, assigns no specific power over international commerce and trade to the President. Thus, because the President does not possess express constitutional authority to modify tariffs, he must find authority for tariff-related action in statute. Delegation of Tariff Powers to the President
Prior to the early 1930s, Congress itself usually set tariff rates for imported products. As the focus of international trade negotiations shifted from the imposition of tariffs to other non-tariff barriers to trade, such as antidumping duties, Congress was less inclined to authorize the President to implement these non-tariff measures by presidential proclamation. Instead, in the Trade Act of 1974, Congress provided for legislative implementation of international trade agreements under an expedited legislative procedure, now known as trade promotion authority, so long as certain criteria were met. Over the past few decades, Congress has continued to enact various provisions governing the negotiation and implementation of trade agreements, including free trade agreements, but has not delegated to the President a general authority to modify tariff rates outside of the confines of particular trade agreements or the trade promotion authority framework. Sample Provisions Delegating Tariff Powers to the President
Congress's delegations of tariff and other international trade-related powers to the President through legislation have been worded in various ways. A non-exhaustive list of sample statutory provisions that delegate some authority to the President to take trade-related action follows. What can be culled from these examples is that most of the provisions require the President to make some threshold finding or determination before he may take some circumscribed trade-related action to counteract his finding. More recent statutes frequently begin with the word "Whenever" to set out this threshold determination before delineating the specific authority given to the President. As the following list illustrates, these delegations of power are usually accompanied by clearly defined conditions and frequently include time restrictions. Tariff Act of 1930 § 338(a) : 23 "The President when he finds that the public interest will be served shall by proclamation specify and declare new or additional duties as hereinafter provided upon articles wholly or in part the growth or product of, or imported in a vessel of, any foreign country whenever he shall find as a fact that such country—(1) Imposes, directly or indirectly, upon the disposition in or transportation in transit through or reexportation from such country of any article wholly or in part the growth or product of the United States any unreasonable charge, exaction, regulation, or limitation which is not equally enforced upon the like articles of every foreign country; or (2) Discriminates in fact against the commerce of the United States...." Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232(b)–( c) : 24 If the Secretary of Commerce "finds that an article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security," then the President is authorized to take "such other actions as the President deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security" (subject to certain procedural requirements). Certain legal issues commonly emerge from such challenges, including whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to review the President's exercise of delegated power, and, if so, which court; whether Congress's delegation of power was constitutional; whether a President's course of action falls within the scope of the specific powers delegated to him by Congress; and whether the action taken by the President bears a reasonable relation to the power delegated. Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, a court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to review a challenge to a presidential proclamation issued pursuant to a congressional delegation of power. The CIT's jurisdictional statute vests that court with jurisdiction over certain challenges to presidential proclamations issued under trade-related powers delegated to the Executive by Congress. The CIT has limited exclusive jurisdiction over specific matters arising under the Tariff Act of 1930, and also possesses "residual jurisdiction" over related trade matters under 28 U.S.C. As is evident from these cases, a delegation by Congress will likely be upheld as constitutional so long as the statute allows the President to act as the "agent" of the legislative department, rather than play a law-making role. In other words, a constitutional delegation of tariff powers is one in which the President is simply asked to carry out the will of Congress as expressed in its statute. Challenges as to Whether the President Acted Within the Scope of the Delegated Power
Once a court has determined it has jurisdiction to review a case and that a delegation of power by Congress was constitutional, the issue of whether the President's action fell within the scope of the power delegated to him might arise. | The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to impose and collect taxes, tariffs, duties, and the like, and to regulate international commerce. While the Constitution gives the President authority to negotiate international agreements, it assigns him no specific power over international commerce and trade. Through legislation, however, Congress may delegate some of its power to the President, such as the power to modify tariffs under certain circumstances. Thus, because the President does not possess express constitutional authority to modify tariffs, he must find authority for tariff-related action in statute.
Prior to the early 1930s, Congress itself usually set tariff rates for imported products. Over time, however, Congress increasingly delegated authority to the President to reduce tariffs, subject to statutorily prescribed time periods, periodic review, and renewal. As the focus of international trade negotiations shifted from the imposition of tariffs to other non-tariff barriers to trade, such as antidumping duties, however, Congress was less inclined to authorize the President to implement such measures by presidential proclamation. Instead, Congress provided for legislative implementation of international trade agreements under an expedited procedure, so long as certain criteria were met. Over the past few decades, Congress has continued to enact various provisions governing the negotiation and implementation of trade agreements, but has not delegated to the President a general authority to modify tariff rates.
Congress's delegations of tariff and other trade-related powers to the President through legislation have been worded in various ways. A non-exhaustive list of sample statutory provisions that delegate some authority to the President to take trade-related action shows that most provisions require that the President make some threshold finding or determination before he may take some circumscribed trade-related action to counteract his finding. More recent statutes frequently begin with the word "Whenever" to set out this threshold determination before delineating the specific authority given to the President. These delegations of power are usually accompanied by clearly defined conditions and frequently include time restrictions.
When the President exercises powers over trade delegated to him by Congress, his actions might be challenged in court. These challenges often involve both procedural matters and substantive issues related to the scope of the President's authority under the Constitution and statute. As a threshold matter, a court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to review a challenge to a trade-related presidential proclamation. The jurisdictional statute of the U.S. Court of International Trade has been construed to vest that court with jurisdiction over challenges to trade-related presidential proclamations because the court has limited exclusive jurisdiction over specific matters arising under the Tariff Act of 1930 and possesses all of the equitable powers of a federal district court. As to the merits of such a challenge, a delegation of power by Congress will likely be upheld as constitutional so long as the statute asks the President to carry out the will of Congress as expressed in its statute, rather than to play a law-making role.
Once a court determines it has jurisdiction to review a case and that a delegation of power by Congress was constitutional, it will likely turn to whether the President acted within the scope of his delegated powers as defined by the words of the statute. While a court will probably not review the reasoning behind a President's determination that executive action is warranted, it will likely examine closely whether the selected means of executing the delegated powers bear a reasonable relationship to that determination. |
crs_R42751 | crs_R42751_0 | Introduction
Several issues related to hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting, on both federal and state lands are addressed in S. 3525 , the Sportsman's Act of 2012. Hunting and conservation have been linked since the advent of federal wildlife legislation, such as the Lacey Act of 1900 (making it a federal crime to ship game killed in violation of one state's laws to another state) or the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (regulating the killing, hunting, buying, or selling of migratory birds). Even so, controversy exists about exactly what hunting, fishing, or shooting sports currently are allowed on federal land and when. Under current law, opening more lands to hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting is to be balanced against good game management, public safety, resource management, and the statutory purposes of the lands. S. 3525 focuses on physical access to federal lands where these activities are already allowed by acquiring lands or rights of way. S. 3525 would also create or expand sport fishing programs, allow specified imports of polar bear trophies, support a program of regional working groups to conserve populations of migratory birds, and amend the duck stamp program (which provides funds for acquisition of waterfowl habitat), among other things. S. 3525 would make funding changes for some of these activities, and reauthorize a number of conservation programs, as well as expand an existing program to control nutria, a marshland pest. S. 3525 is not the only hunting and fishing bill pending before Congress. H.R. 4089 , which passed the House in April 2012, would alter the management practices of federal agencies with the intent of opening more lands to hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting. H.R. It was placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders on September 11, 2012. Because the measure was not referred to a committee, it lacks a committee report. On September 20, 2012, a cloture motion on the motion to proceed to the measure was presented in the Senate. Section 222 would allow the Secretary of the Interior to set a new price of duck stamps at three-year intervals beginning in 2013. | The House and Senate have been considering various approaches to open more federal lands to hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting. S. 3525 addresses some of the same topics as H.R. 4089, which passed the House on April 17, 2012. Both concern hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting, but the bills take different approaches. While H.R. 4089 directs changes to federal land management and land planning, S. 3525 allows existing management to continue, requiring only that land managers assemble priority lists to improve access for those activities.
Several issues related to hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting are addressed in S. 3525. Hunting and conservation have been linked since the advent of federal wildlife legislation, such as the Lacey Act of 1900 (making it a federal crime to ship game killed in violation of one state's laws to another state) or the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (regulating the killing, hunting, buying, or selling of migratory birds). Even so, controversy exists about exactly what hunting, fishing, or shooting sports should be allowed on federal land, and when. A primary issue is whether opening more lands to hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting should be balanced against good game management, public safety, resource management, and the statutory purposes of the lands. S. 3525 focuses on providing additional physical access to federal lands where these activities are already allowed. This would be accomplished through acquisition of lands or rights of way.
S. 3525 would also expand or authorize certain sport fishing programs. In addition, it addresses the concerns of trophy hunters who killed polar bears in the months before the species was proposed for listing under the Endangered Species Act or between the proposal and the actual listing. These hunters have not been allowed to import their trophies; the bill would allow specified imports of these trophies.
It would support a program of regional working groups to conserve populations of migratory birds. It would amend the duck stamp program, to allow the Secretary of the Interior to increase the price of the stamp at specified intervals. Such a change, which would provide additional funding for acquisition of waterfowl habitat, has been advocated among hunters for several years. S. 3525 would make funding changes for some of these activities, and reauthorize a number of conservation programs, as well as expanding an existing program to control nutria, a marshland pest.
S. 3525 was not referred to a committee, and consequently lacks a committee report. It was placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders on September 11, 2012; on September 20, 2012, a cloture motion on the motion to proceed to the measure was presented in the Senate. |
crs_RL32011 | crs_RL32011_0 | The expedited consideration, originally called "fast track" procedure, but recentlyalso named "trade authorities procedures (TAPs)," provides for mandatory consideration of themeasure once introduced, with specific deadlines for each legislative phase; allows no amendments;and requires a final up-or-down vote. Implementing Procedure
The steps in the expedited procedure for the legislative consideration and enactment of animplementing bill, and the implementation of the underlying trade agreement are described belowin their functional time sequence. The agreement can take effect only if it is approved by the enactment of an implementing bill(Section 2105(a)(1)(D), TA02); 19 U.S.C. | Trade agreements on tariff-and-nontariff barriers, including those establishing free-tradeareas, must be approved and implemented by the enactment of implementing bills, for theconsideration of which expedited legislative procedures have been enacted. The procedures, initiallyreferred to as "fast track" and more recently as "trade authorities procedures," provide for mandatoryintroduction and consideration of an implementing bill with deadlines for individual legislativestages, prohibit any amendments, and require an up-or-down vote.
This report presents the individual statutes setting out the authorities and procedures forrelevant legislative action in a functional time-table, together with references to their public-law andU.S. Code alphanumerical designations. |
crs_R45347 | crs_R45347_0 | Collectively, temporary tax provisions that are regularly extended as a group by Congress, rather than being allowed to expire as scheduled, are often referred to as "tax extenders." There are several options for Congress to consider regarding temporary provisions. Provisions that expired at the end of 2017 could be extended. The extension could be retroactive. The extension could be short term, long term, or permanent. Another option would be to allow expired provisions to remain expired. 115-123 ) extended through the end of 2017 nearly all of the provisions that had expired at the end of 2016. This extension was purely retroactive. Since the BBA18 was enacted in February 2018, the extensions were not made available for the tax year in which the legislation was enacted. This report provides a broad overview of "tax extenders." More information on specific tax provisions that expired at the end of 2017 can be found in
CRS Report R44925, Recently Expired Individual Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief , coordinated by Molly F. Sherlock; CRS Report R44930, Business Tax Provisions that Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders") , coordinated by Molly F. Sherlock; and CRS Report R44990, Energy Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders") , by Molly F. Sherlock, Donald J. Marples, and Margot L. Crandall-Hollick. 114-113 ), which made permanent a number of provisions that had been part of previous "tax extender" packages. Congress may also choose to enact temporary provisions for budgetary reasons. Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017
Twenty-eight temporary tax provisions expired at the end of 2017. All three of these provisions have been included in recent "tax extender" packages. Permanently extending the three individual provisions that expired at the end of 2017 would reduce federal revenue by an estimated $31.2 billion between FY2018 and FY2027. 115-97 ). The number of temporary tax provisions that expired at the end of 2017 was further reduced following a longer-term extension of certain energy provisions and changes made in the 2017 tax revision ( P.L. Additionally, the act extended the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund financing rate and modified the tax credit for production from advanced nuclear power facilities. Not all of the provisions extended in BBA18 are likely to be considered for extension beyond 2017. Permanently extending tax provisions that expired at the end of 2017 would reduce federal revenues by an estimated $92.5 billion over the FY2018 to FY2027 budget window (see Table 2 ). Thus, making permanent "tax extenders" would reduce federal revenues by about 0.2%. Recent "Tax Extender" Legislation
As discussed above, "tax extenders" were most recently extended as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA18; P.L. Before BBA18, "tax extenders" were addressed in the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act), enacted as Division Q of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. Other Issues Regarding Temporary Tax Provisions
Tax Provisions Expiring in 2018
Additional tax provisions are scheduled to expire at the end of 2018. First, the increased amount of the excise tax on coal used to finance the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund is set to expire at the end of 2018. A second tax provision scheduled to expire at the end of 2018 allows taxpayers to deduct medical expenses in excess of 7.5% of adjusted gross income (AGI). | Twenty-eight temporary tax provisions expired at the end of 2017. Collectively, temporary tax provisions that are regularly extended as a group by Congress, rather than being allowed to expire as scheduled, are often referred to as "tax extenders."
Temporary tax provisions were most recently extended in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA18; P.L. 115-123). BBA18 extended nearly all of the provisions that had expired at the end of 2016, with most provisions extended through the end of 2017. For most provisions, this extension was purely retroactive. Since the BBA18 was enacted in February 2018, the extensions generally were not made available for the tax year in which the legislation was enacted. The extension of expired provisions enacted in BBA18 was estimated to reduce federal revenue by $15.1 billion between FY2018 and FY2027.
All of the temporary tax provisions that expired at the end of 2017 have been included in previous "tax extender" legislation. There are several options for Congress to consider regarding temporary tax provisions. Provisions that expired at the end of 2017 could be extended. The extension could be retroactive. The extension could be short term, long term, or permanent. Another option would be to allow expired provisions to remain expired.
Making permanent the temporary tax provisions that expired at the end of 2017 would reduce federal revenue by an estimated $92.5 billion between FY2018 and FY2027. This is equal to about 0.2% of current-law projected federal revenue over this period.
The number of "tax extender" provisions has fallen in recent years, as has the cost associated with extending "tax extenders." The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act), enacted as Division Q of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), made permanent a number of provisions that had been long-standing "tax extenders," and extended several other provisions through 2019. The 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97) also made changes that resulted in the elimination of certain "tax extender" provisions.
If Congress chooses to consider extending tax provisions that expired at the end of 2017 late in 2018, the option of extending tax provisions that are scheduled to expire at the end of 2018 might be evaluated simultaneously. Tax provisions scheduled to expire at the end of 2018 are (1) increased excise tax rates on coal used to finance the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund; (2) a reduction in the medical expense deduction threshold from 10% of adjusted gross income (AGI) to 7.5% of AGI; and (3) the $0.09 per barrel excise tax on crude oil used to finance the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.
Certain disaster-related tax provisions were available for 2017 disasters. Extending or expanding these provisions to be available for 2018 disasters is a policy option that could be considered.
This report provides a broad overview of "tax extenders." More information on specific tax provisions that expired at the end of 2017 can be found in
CRS Report R44925, Recently Expired Individual Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief, coordinated by Molly F. Sherlock; CRS Report R44930, Business Tax Provisions that Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders"), coordinated by Molly F. Sherlock; and CRS Report R44990, Energy Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders"), by Molly F. Sherlock, Donald J. Marples, and Margot L. Crandall-Hollick. |
crs_R42705 | crs_R42705_0 | Introduction
This report provides an overview of the current debate over whether a holder of a patent essential to an industry standard, who has promised to license such patented technology on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, may nevertheless obtain an injunction from a federal court or an exclusion order from the International Trade Commission against infringing products that implement the industry standard. Standard-Setting Organizations and FRAND Licensing21
An "industry standard" is a set of technical specifications that provides a common design for a product or process. Standards bodies and their members have increasingly encountered claims that a patent covers an industry standard. Many standards bodies have established disclosure and licensing polices to attempt to preempt the potential conflict between industry standards and patent rights. Although these policies vary, they generally require that members of the standards body (1) disclose patent rights that are pertinent to a proposed standard and (2) license the patented invention that is essential to an adopted standard to others, often on "reasonable and nondiscriminatory" terms, a standard commonly known as "RAND licensing" or "FRAND licensing" (some policies call for fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms). Companies that produce products governed by a standard become "locked in" to the technologies included in the standard. In addition, eBay has impacted the availability of injunctive relief for SEP holders that promised to license on FRAND terms. Few would disagree that the SEP holder should be entitled to monetary damages in a situation where an SEP holder offers a FRAND license to an implementer of a standard, but the implementer (believing that the proposed royalty rates are too excessive) refuses to license the SEP and produces the infringing product anyway. However, in such a situation, is injunctive or exclusionary relief appropriate for the SEP holder against any party that wants to practice the standard but does not agree to the SEP holder's licensing terms? Recent Cases Before the ITC Involving Standard-Essential Patents
Several cases before the ITC involve whether a FRAND-encumbered SEP holder is entitled to exclusionary relief. The FTC submitted a statement to the ITC that sets forth the potential economic and competitive impact of injunctive relief on disputes involving SEPs:
ITC issuance of an exclusion or cease and desist order in matters involving RAND-encumbered SEPs, where infringement is based on implementation of standardized technology, has the potential to cause substantial harm to U.S. competition, consumers, and innovation.... [W]e are concerned that a patentee can make a RAND commitment as part of the standard setting process, and then seek an exclusion order for infringement of the RAND-encumbered SEP as a way of securing royalties that may be inconsistent with that RAND commitment. Furthermore, many consumers, counting on standards to provide the functionality they require, are unwilling to purchase noncompliant products. economy." Removing this patent enforcement option at the ITC may be harmful to the rapidly growing IT and telecommunications industries that often participate in the SSOs. For example, Google may seek an exclusion order issued by the ITC or an injunction order issued by a federal court against a potential licensee who:
1. is outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. district courts; 2. has stated in writing or in sworn testimony that it will not license the FRAND patent on any terms (although the Order provides that a challenge to the validity, value, infringement, or essentiality of the FRAND patent shall not constitute a statement that the potential licensee will not license the patent); 3. refuses to enter a license agreement on terms that have been set in a final ruling of a court or through binding arbitration; or 4. fails to respond within 30 days of receiving a "FRAND Terms Letter" that Google sends to a potential licensee, in which Google requests that Google and the potential licensee agree to license each other's patents that are essential to complying with standards that each uses on terms that are FRAND and comply with each party's FRAND commitments. | An "industry standard" is a set of technical specifications that provides a common design for a product or process. Standardization is crucial to the functioning of the modern innovation-based economy and in particular to the efficient interoperability of technologically complex consumer electronic devices. Standards allow several firms to supply services and products that incorporate the standard, which may help to lower prices and provide greater consumer choices. Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) are voluntary membership organizations in which industry participants collaboratively select particular technical standards to be used by products in that industry. Many SSOs require their members to adhere to licensing policies and bylaws that try to preempt the potential conflict between industry standards and patent rights; such policies generally require that members of the SSO (1) disclose patent rights that are pertinent to a proposed standard and (2) license the patented invention within a standard to others on "fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" terms, a standard commonly known as "FRAND licensing."
In the past several years, there has been considerable debate over whether injunctive relief in a patent infringement lawsuit (or exclusionary relief at the International Trade Commission (ITC)) should be available to companies that own patents that cover a particular industry standard (so-called "standard-essential patent" or SEP), when those companies have previously committed themselves to license their patented technology to anyone (corporate partners or competitors) on FRAND terms. The question particularly impacts the computing and telecommunications industries, as consumer electronic products such as smartphones, GPS devices, tablets, and gaming consoles incorporate a number of industry standards that include patented technology. Many high technology companies have been involved in patent infringement lawsuits and cases before the ITC that concern disputes over SEPs and FRAND licensing. Some of the electronic device manufacturers object to what they believe are unreasonably excessive royalty requests by the SEP holder and thus do not reach an agreement to license the SEP. In such a situation, the SEP holder has sought out a judicial determination of the royalty rate or even an injunction (from federal courts) or exclusion order (from the ITC) against the sale or importation of products made by companies that did not obtain a license.
Some argue that a company that owns an SEP and that has promised to license such patent on FRAND terms essentially waives its right to seek an injunction against another company that implements the standard but fails to reach a license agreement with the SEP holder. They raise concerns about the potential negative effects on competition and U.S. consumers of allowing injunctive or exclusionary relief in cases involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs. They also believe that the threat of an injunction weighs heavily in negotiations over SEP licensing in a way that disproportionately rewards the SEP holder. However, others argue that an SEP holder is entitled to injunctive relief because an SSO's FRAND agreement does not include a promise not to seek an injunction in appropriate circumstances. Yet, they assert that if an SSO required its members to give up their right to exclude others (which is the primary right that a patent confers), participation in the voluntary standard-setting process may diminish. Furthermore, if SEP holders were limited to only damages and not injunctive relief, implementers of the industry standard may forgo negotiating a license before introducing a product and then wait for a federal court to decide on an award of damages for the infringement. |
crs_RS21688 | crs_RS21688_0 | According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), about 1.4% of surveyed children living in the United States between the ages of 1 and 5 years had an unacceptably high level of lead in their blood (i.e., 10 micrograms or more of lead per deciliter [i.e., one-tenth of a liter] of blood) between 1999 and 2004. Elevated blood-lead levels may result in learning disabilities, reduced intellectual ability, or other problems. Poor children are at special risk because elevated blood-lead levels are more prevalent among children from families with lower incomes, and inadequate nutrition can increase lead absorption by the body. The drop in blood-lead levels since 1994 may have resulted, at least in part, from the success of federal, state, and local programs aimed at reducing childhood exposure to sources of lead, including house dust containing lead-based paint (LBP) from deteriorated or abraded surfaces of walls, door jambs, and window sashes. Many buildings constructed prior to 1978, when the lead content of interior paint was restricted to current levels, still contain LBP, although most of the lead is found in the existing 18.4 million homes constructed prior to 1960. Federal Mandates
The Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, as amended (LBPPPA, 42 U.S.C. 4822), is the basis for federal regulation of LBP hazards. It directs HUD to establish procedures to eliminate "as far as practicable" LBP hazards in all public housing and private housing constructed prior to 1978 that receive federal financial assistance. There are no federal mandates related to LBP in privately owned housing unless it receives federal financial assistance in some form. Federal Grants
The Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 (Title X of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992) authorizes federal grants to state and local governments that choose to establish LBP poisoning prevention programs targeted at low-income residents in private housing. | According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), about 1.4% of surveyed children living in the United States between the ages of 1 and 5 years have an unacceptably high level of lead in their blood (i.e., 10 micrograms or more of lead per deciliter of blood), which may result in learning disabilities, reduced intellectual ability, or other problems. Poor children are at special risk because elevated blood-lead levels are more prevalent among children from families with lower incomes, and inadequate nutrition can increase lead absorption by the body. Many sources of lead exposure have been eliminated or reduced, but an important remaining source of lead exposure today is house dust containing lead-based paint (LBP) from deteriorated or abraded surfaces of walls, door jambs, and window sashes, or from home renovations that release LBP. Many buildings constructed prior to 1978, when the lead content of interior paint was restricted to current levels, still contain LBP, but most LBP is found in homes constructed prior to 1960.
The federal Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act (LBPPPA), as amended, directs the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to regulate, and authorizes funding for, the detection and control of LBP hazards in housing that receives federal assistance. There are no federal mandates related to LBP in privately owned housing unless it receives federal financial assistance in some form. However, the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 (Title X of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992; P.L. 102-550) directs the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to require training and certification in LBP safe work practices for contractors engaged in home renovations and repairs of homes constructed prior to 1978. In addition, Title X authorizes federal grants through HUD to state and local governments for LBP hazard reduction in privately owned housing that does not receive federal assistance. Congress annually considers funding for these lead hazard reduction grant programs, all of which target older (pre-1978) housing for low-income residents. |
crs_RL33659 | crs_RL33659_0 | Fencing is erected on the border to impede the illegal entry of unauthorized aliens, while vehicle barriers are designed to impede the entry of vehicles but do not impede the entry of individuals. Using the broad powers granted to the Attorney General (AG) to control and guard the U.S. border, the USBP began erecting a barrier known as the "primary fence" directly on the border in 1990 to deter illegal entries and drug smuggling in its San Diego sector. The San Diego fence formed part of the USBP's "Prevention Through Deterrence" strategy, which called for reducing unauthorized migration by placing agents and resources directly on the border along population centers in order to deter would-be migrants from entering the country. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which, among other things, explicitly gave the Attorney General broad authority to construct barriers along the border and authorized the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to construct a secondary layer of fencing to buttress the completed 14-mile primary fence. Construction of the secondary fence stalled after 9.5 miles had been completed due to environmental concerns raised by the California Coastal Commission (CCC). In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act, which, among other things, authorized the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to waive all legal requirements to expedite the construction of border barriers. 2764 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-161 ), which was enacted into law on December 26, 2007. The Secretary of Homeland Security is now required to construct reinforced fencing along not fewer than 700 miles of the southwest border, in locations where fencing is deemed most practical and effective. In addition to border fencing, the USBP deploys both permanent and temporary vehicle barriers at the border. Temporary vehicle barriers are typically chained together and can be moved to different locations at the USBP's discretion. Permanent vehicle barriers are embedded in the ground and are meant to remain in one location. The Secure Fence Act of 2006 ( P.L. This waiver authority was expanded in the 109 th Congress by the REAL ID Act, which will be discussed in greater detail subsequently, and DHS has exercised this expanded waiver authority in order to continue construction of the San Diego border fence, as well as physical barriers and roads along the southwest border. As Figures 1-4 show, the increased deployment of agents, infrastructure, technology, and other resources within the San Diego sector has resulted in a significant decline in the number of apprehensions made in that sector. On September 14, 2005, DHS announced it is applying its new waiver authority to complete the San Diego fence. Issues For Congress
Congress may consider a number of issues concerning the construction of barriers along the border, including, but not limited to, their effectiveness, overall costs compared with benefits, possible diplomatic ramifications, unintended consequences, and the locations in which they are to be constructed. | Congress has repeatedly shown interest in examining and expanding the barriers being deployed along the U.S. international land border. The United States Border Patrol (USBP) deploys fencing, which aims to impede the illegal entry of individuals, and vehicle barriers, which aim to impede the illegal entry of vehicles (but not individuals) along the border.
The USBP first began erecting physical barriers in 1990 to deter illegal entries and drug smuggling in its San Diego sector. The ensuing 14-mile-long San Diego "primary fence" formed part of the USBP's "Prevention Through Deterrence" strategy, which called for reducing unauthorized migration by placing agents and resources directly on the border along population centers in order to deter would-be migrants from entering the country. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act which, among other things, explicitly gave the Attorney General (now the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security) broad authority to construct barriers along the border and authorized the construction of a secondary layer of fencing to buttress the completed 14-mile primary fence. Construction of the secondary fence stalled due to environmental concerns raised by the California Coastal Commission. In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act that authorized the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to waive all legal requirements in order to expedite the construction of border barriers. DHS has announced it will use this waiver authority to complete the San Diego fence. The Secure Fence Act of 2006 directed DHS to construct 850 miles of additional border fencing. This requirement was subsequently modified by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), which was enacted into law on December 26, 2007. The Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to construct fencing along not fewer than 700 miles of the southwest border.
While the San Diego fence, combined with an increase in agents and other resources in the USBP's San Diego sector, has proven effective in reducing the number of apprehensions made in that sector, there is considerable evidence that the flow of illegal immigration has adapted to this enforcement posture and has shifted to the more remote areas of the Arizona desert. Nationally, the USBP made 1.2 million apprehensions in 1992 and again in 2004, suggesting that the increased enforcement in San Diego sector has had little impact on overall apprehensions. In addition to border fencing, the USBP deploys both permanent and temporary vehicle barriers to the border. Temporary vehicle barriers are typically chained together and can be moved to different locations at the USBP's discretion. Permanent vehicle barriers are embedded in the ground and are meant to remain in one location.
A number of policy issues concerning border barriers generally and fencing specifically may be of interest to Congress, including, but not limited, to their effectiveness, costs versus benefits, location, design, environmental impact, potential diplomatic ramifications, and the costs of acquiring the land needed for construction.
This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
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