id
stringlengths 9
18
| pid
stringlengths 11
20
| input
stringlengths 120
17k
| output
stringlengths 127
13.7k
|
|---|---|---|---|
crs_R41706 | crs_R41706_0 | Overview
The 112 th Congress continued to take a strong interest in the health of the U.S. research and development (R&D) enterprise and in providing support for federal R&D activities in the course of the FY2012 appropriations process. As Congress acted to complete the FY2012 appropriations process it faced two overarching issues: the extent to which the federal R&D investment can grow in the context of increased pressure on discretionary spending and how available funding will be prioritized and allocated. President Obama's proposed FY2012 budget, released on February 14, 2011, included $147.911 billion for R&D in FY2012, a 0.5% increase over the actual FY2010 R&D funding level of $147.139 billion. Adjusted for inflation, the President's FY2012 R&D request represented a decrease of 2.2% from the FY2010 level. Moreover, aggregate FY2011 funding for the targeted accounts was approximately $12.280 billion, $1.101 billion less than authorized in the act, setting a pace to double over 16 years from the FY2006 level—more than twice the length of time originally envisioned in the 2007 America COMPETES Act and about a third longer than the doubling period established by the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010. In FY2012 President Obama sought funding for the targeted accounts that would have increased aggregate funding to $13.947 billion, an increase of $1.667 billion (13.6%) above the FY2011 (actual) aggregate funding level of $12.323 billion. 112-55 provided $7.033 billion. 2055 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, which was signed into law ( P.L. 112-74 ) by President Obama on December 23, 2011. 112-74 includes the nine regular appropriations bills that had yet to be enacted: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2012 (as Division A); the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2012 (as Division B); the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2012 (as Division C); the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2012 (as Division D); the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012 (as Division E); the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012 (as Division F); the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2012 (as Division G); the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012 (as Division H); and the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012 (as Division I). Earlier, on November 17, 2011, Congress completed action on the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-55 ), which combined into a single measure three regular appropriations bills: the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Act, as H.R. 2112 , Division B; and Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Act, as H.R. 2112 , Division C. President Obama signed the bill into law two days later. Previously, Congress passed and the President signed two bills, both titled the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, that provided continuing appropriations for all agencies for FY2012. 112-33 extended agency funding through October 4, 2011; P.L. 112-10 . FY2012 President's Budget Request. Other Funding Mechanisms. Among other things, P.L. As initially passed by the Senate, H.R. 2596 , 32.1% below the Administration's budget request, and 9.3% below the FY2011 appropriation. In President Obama's FY2011 budget, the timeframe for doubling slipped to 11 years and his FY2012 budget was intentionally silent on a timeframe for doubling. Prior to enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. The FY2012 request for FHWA R&D funding was $548 million, an increase of $95 million (20.9%) over FY2010. | Federal research and development (R&D) funding for FY2012 is estimated to total $138.869 billion, $3.845 billion (-2.7%) below the FY2011 funding level of $142.714 billion, and $9.042 billion (-6.1%) below the President's request of $147.911 billion. Among the overarching issues that Congress contended with in the FY2012 appropriations process were the extent to which the federal R&D investment could grow in the context of increased pressure on discretionary spending and how available funding would be prioritized and allocated. The appropriations legislation was incorporated into two bills, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-55) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74). P.L. 112-55, included the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Act; the Commerce, Justice, State and Related Agencies Act; and the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Act, and was passed by Congress on November 17, 2011, and signed into law two days later. P.L. 112-74, incorporating the nine remaining appropriations bills, was passed by Congress on December 17, 2011, and signed into law by President Obama on December 23, 2011. Prior to enactment of these bills, government operations into FY2012 were funded through a series of continuing appropriations acts.
President Obama requested $147.911 billion for R&D in FY2012, a $772 million (0.5%) increase from the FY2010 actual R&D funding level of $147.139 billion. At the time the President's FY2012 budget was released, action had not been completed on FY2011 full-year funding so the President's budget compared the FY2012 request to FY2010 appropriations. On April 15, 2011, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10) was signed into law. Division A of the act provided FY2011 appropriations for the Department of Defense; Division B provided full-year continuing funding for FY2011 for all other agencies at their FY2010 levels unless otherwise specified in the act.
President Obama's request sought increases in the R&D budgets of the three agencies targeted for doubling over 7 years by the America COMPETES Act, and over 10 years by the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 and by President Bush under his American Competitiveness Initiative, as measured using FY2006 funding as the baseline. Although President Obama supported a 10-year doubling in his FY2010 budget, his FY2012 budget was intentionally silent on a timeframe. Congress appropriated $12.529 billion in FY2012 for the targeted accounts, an increase of $207 million (1.7%) over FY2011 funding of $12.323 billion, and $1.417 billion (-10.2%) less than the President's request.
For more than a decade, federal R&D has been affected by mechanisms used to continue appropriations in the absence of enactment of regular appropriations acts and to complete the annual appropriations process. Completion of appropriations after the beginning of a fiscal year may cause agencies to delay or cancel some planned R&D and equipment acquisition. |
crs_RL34438 | crs_RL34438_0 | U.S. policymakers have generally addressed VAW as a component of other international development efforts rather than as a stand-alone issue. Congress has authorized and appropriated funds for international programs that address types of VAW, including trafficking in persons and female genital cutting (FGC). Similarly, in the last decade past and current Administrations have supported initiatives to reduce specific types and circumstances of international VAW through programs addressing humanitarian assistance and healthcare. It provides examples of completed and ongoing U.S. government programs that—in whole or in part—work to reduce or eliminate international violence against women. The report also outlines possible policy considerations for the 112 th Congress, including the scope and effectiveness of current U.S. programs, further integrating VAW prevention and treatment into U.S. foreign assistance programs, coordinating among U.S. executive branch agencies and departments, and U.S. funding of international anti-VAW programs. Scope and Context
VAW occurs in all geographic regions, countries, cultures, and economic classes. Many experts view VAW as a symptom of the historically unequal power relationship between men and women, and argue that over time this imbalance has led to pervasive cultural stereotypes and attitudes that perpetuate a cycle of violence. The WHO surveys found that levels of violence tend to vary by country, and that women in developing countries may experience higher rates of violence than those in developed countries. Types of Violence
Violence against women can include both random acts as well as sustained abuse over time, which can be physical, psychological, or sexual in nature (see Table 1 ). Administration Actions
Most U.S. agencies and departments do not track the cost or number of current anti-VAW programs; therefore, it is unclear how much money the U.S. government, or individual agencies, spends annually on anti-VAW programs. Approximately 350 U.S. government programs with VAW components across eight agencies have been identified. Scope, Effectiveness, and Funding of U.S. Programs
Some experts argue that U.S. government programs and initiatives do not sufficiently address international violence against women. Supporters of increased integration maintain that, in addition to receiving attention as a stand-alone global health and human rights issue, VAW should be a component of broader U.S. foreign assistance efforts—including health services, development, human rights, foreign military training and law enforcement training, humanitarian assistance, and legal and political reform. Agencies and Departments
Some have expressed concern that the U.S. government does not adequately coordinate its anti-VAW efforts. For a discussion of U.N. system programs and mechanisms that address VAW, see CRS Report RL34518, United Nations System Efforts to Address Violence Against Women , by [author name scrubbed]. | In recent years, the international community has increasingly recognized international violence against women (VAW) as a significant human rights and global health issue. VAW, which can include both random acts of violence as well as sustained abuse over time, can be physical, psychological, or sexual in nature. Studies have found that VAW occurs in all geographic regions, countries, cultures, and economic classes, with some research showing that women in developing countries experience higher rates of violence than those in developed countries. Many experts view VAW as a symptom of the historically unequal power relationship between men and women, and argue that over time this imbalance has led to pervasive cultural stereotypes and attitudes that perpetuate a cycle of violence.
U.S. policymakers have generally focused on specific types or circumstances of VAW rather than view it as a stand-alone issue. Congress has authorized and appropriated funds for international programs that address VAW, including human trafficking and female genital cutting. In addition, past and current Administrations have supported efforts to reduce international levels of VAW—though many of these activities are implemented as components of broader foreign aid initiatives.
There is no U.S. government-wide coordination of anti-VAW efforts. Most agencies and departments do not track the cost or number of programs with VAW components. Therefore, it is unclear how much money the U.S. government, or individual agencies, spend annually on VAW-related programs. Some experts have suggested that the U.S. government should re-examine, and perhaps enhance, current U.S. anti-VAW activities. They argue that VAW should not only be treated as a stand-alone human rights issue, but also be integrated into U.S. assistance and foreign policy mechanisms. Other observers are concerned with a perceived lack of coordination among U.S. government agencies and departments that address international violence against women.
This report addresses causes, prevalence, and consequences of violence against women. It provides examples of completed and ongoing U.S. activities that address VAW directly or include anti-VAW components, and it outlines possible policy issues for the 112th Congress, including
the scope and effectiveness of U.S. programs in addressing international VAW; further integrating anti-VAW programs into U.S. assistance and foreign policy mechanisms; U.S. funding for anti-VAW activities worldwide, particularly in light of the global financial crisis, economic recession, and subsequent calls to reduce the U.S. budget deficit; and strengthening U.S. government coordination of anti-VAW activities.
Information on United Nations (U.N.) anti-VAW activities that previously appeared in this report is now published in CRS Report RL34518, United Nations System Efforts to Address Violence Against Women, by [author name scrubbed].
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44973 | crs_R44973_0 | Overview
Amtrak—officially, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation—is the nation's primary provider of intercity passenger rail service. Amtrak is structured as a private company, but virtually all its shares are held by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Amtrak was created by Congress in 1970 to preserve a basic level of intercity passenger rail service, while relieving private railroad companies of the obligation to provide money-losing passenger service. Although created as a for-profit corporation, Amtrak has never made a profit; in this it resembles both the passenger rail experience of the private-sector companies that preceded it and of intercity passenger rail operators in many other countries. Most of that track is owned by freight rail companies; Amtrak owns about 625 route miles. Most of its corridor routes are financially supported by states they serve. Congress changed the structure of federal grants to Amtrak in the Passenger Rail Reform and Investment Act of 2015 (Title XI of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act; P.L. Starting in FY2017, the grants are divided between funding for Amtrak's NEC service (which is operationally self-sufficient but has billions of dollars in capital needs) and the rest of Amtrak's network (the National Network, which has modest capital needs but runs an operating deficit of several hundred million dollars). 114-94 ). The stability, or predictability, of Amtrak's federal funding levels is a perennial issue. These two factors have complicated Amtrak's efforts to improve service on the NEC. Operating Efficiency
The number of passengers carried is not the only measure that should be considered when evaluating Amtrak's performance. First and foremost, low on-time performance reduces ridership (and ticket revenue). PRIIA Initiatives to Improve On-Time Performance
In PRIIA §207, Congress directed FRA and Amtrak to develop metrics and standards for measuring the performance and service quality of intercity passenger train operations, including on-time performance and delays incurred by Amtrak trains on the rail lines of each carrier. When on-board labor costs are excluded, Amtrak says, the service covers its costs. Privatization of Intercity Passenger Rail Services
When discussing privatization of intercity passenger rail service, details are important. One obstacle to privatization is that if a state or a private operator other than Amtrak wishes to begin passenger service over freight-owned right-of-way, it would likely have to pay more than Amtrak does to gain access to freight property. Amtrak would be eligible to bid; if a bidder other than Amtrak is selected, the winning bidder would have the same right to operate over the freight railroad's tracks as Amtrak, subject to performance standards set by DOT, and could receive an operating subsidy of not more than 90% of the amount provided for service on that route in the year before the bid to operate the route was received, adjusted for inflation. The project group says it does not expect to request government grants, though it may seek a federal loan. California High-Speed Rail Project
The California High-Speed Rail Authority proposes to build a dedicated rail line between Sacramento and San Diego that will allow trains to reach speeds of up to 220 mph. | Amtrak is the nation's primary provider of intercity passenger rail service. It was created by Congress in 1970 to preserve some level of intercity passenger rail service while enabling private rail companies to exit the money-losing passenger rail business. It is a quasi-governmental entity, a corporation whose stock is almost entirely owned by the federal government. It runs a deficit each year, and relies on congressional appropriations to continue operations. Amtrak was last authorized in the Passenger Rail Reform and Investment Act of 2015 (Title XI of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94). That authorization expires at the end of FY2020. Amtrak's annual appropriations do not rely on separate authorization legislation, but authorization legislation does allow Congress to set multiyear Amtrak funding goals and federal intercity passenger rail policies.
Since Amtrak's inception, Congress has been divided on the question of whether it should even exist. Amtrak is regularly criticized for failing to cover its costs. The need for federal financial support is often cited as evidence that passenger rail service is not financially viable, or that Amtrak should yield to private companies that would find ways to provide rail service profitably. Yet it is not clear that a private company could perform the same range of activities better than Amtrak does. Indeed, Amtrak was created because private-sector railroad companies in the United States lost money for decades operating intercity passenger rail service and wished to be relieved of the obligation to do so.
By some measures, Amtrak is performing as well as or better than it ever has in its 47-year history. For example, it is carrying a near-record number of passengers, and its passenger load factor and its operating ratio are at the upper end of their historic ranges. On the other hand, Amtrak's ridership is barely growing at a time when other transportation modes are seeing ridership increases. Amtrak contends that improvements to its infrastructure in the Northeast Corridor (NEC), between Washington, DC, and Boston, would enable it to offer faster and more reliable service and thus boost ridership. However, such improvements are expected to be extremely costly.
Amtrak's ridership may also be hurt by its relatively low on-time performance, which is especially low on routes which use tracks owned by freight railroads. In 2008, Congress tried to put in place measures that could improve Amtrak's on-time performance on these routes, but that effort has been blocked by the courts.
There are perennial calls to privatize Amtrak, but it could be argued that Amtrak is already privatized to a considerable degree. Efforts to create intercity passenger service independently of Amtrak have had limited success.
Several efforts are under way to build high-speed rail lines independent of Amtrak. These include the state-sponsored California High Speed Rail project and private passenger rail initiatives in Florida, Texas, and Nevada. It is unclear whether any of these initiatives, if completed, will ultimately be operated by or have business relationships with Amtrak. |
crs_R42684 | crs_R42684_0 | The question of whether a political advertisement is issue advocacy (including lobbying) or campaign activity is an important one under the tax laws, particularly for tax-exempt 501(c) organizations. This is because the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) imposes limitations on the ability of 501(c) groups to engage in campaign activity. Some 501(c) groups—primarily 501(c)(3) charitable organizations, including houses of worship, charities, and educational institutions—are prohibited under the IRC from engaging in any campaign intervention. They are, however, allowed to take positions on policy issues and conduct an insubstantial amount of lobbying. Others types of 501(c)s—primarily 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, 501(c)(5) labor unions, and 501(c)(6) trade associations —may engage in campaign intervention. However, because these groups' primary purpose must be their tax-exempt purpose (e.g., promoting social welfare), campaign activity, along with any other non-exempt purpose activity, cannot be their primary activity. Recently, this standard has received significant attention because 501(c) organizations have reportedly spent millions of dollars on campaign activity and allegations have been made that some should have their tax-exempt status revoked. Guidance released by the IRS shows that in any situation that falls short of express advocacy, this issue does not lend itself to bright-line rules. The focus is essentially on whether the activity exhibits a preference for or against a candidate. As a result, the line between issue advocacy and campaign activity can be difficult to discern. The IRS Factors
The IRS has released two revenue rulings that discuss when an issue advocacy communication has crossed the line into campaign activity. Both contain a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered, as well as some examples. According to the IRS, key factors to be examined in determining whether an issue advocacy communication crosses the line into campaign intervention include the following:
whether it identifies a candidate for a given public office by name or other means, such as party affiliation or distinctive features of a candidate's platform or biography; whether it expresses approval or disapproval for any candidate's positions or actions; whether it is delivered close in time to an election; whether it refers to voting or an election; whether the issue it addresses has been raised as one distinguishing the candidates; whether it is part of an ongoing series by the group on the same issue and the series is not timed to an election; and whether its timing and the identification of the candidate are related to a non-electoral event (e.g., a scheduled vote on legislation by an officeholder who is also a candidate). Application of the Factors
The determination of whether an advertisement is actually campaign activity is entirely dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. This requires actually looking at the ad in question. Additionally, it requires being familiar with the organization's other activities—e.g., is the group running a series of ads on the issue, and one just happens to coincide with an election? Illustrating the importance of the overall context in which the ad is run, and not just the text of the ad itself, is the fact that it is not necessary for the ad to expressly mention a candidate by name. The ad ends by urging people to contact the Senator and tell him/her to vote for the bill. One recurring issue is that similar or identical terms in tax and campaign finance law and policy do not always have the same meanings. Thus, it should not be assumed that the characterization or treatment of an activity for campaign finance purposes necessarily results in the same characterization or treatment for tax purposes, and vice versa. | Television and radio airwaves are inundated with political ads right now, and their numbers will only increase as the November 2012 elections get closer. Some ads expressly tell viewers or listeners which candidate to vote for or against. Others take a different approach. These ads typically urge people to contact an elected official, who also happens to be a candidate in the upcoming election, and tell him/her to support an issue or piece of legislation. Sometimes they do not even mention any candidate/officeholder by name, yet some still feel political in nature.
The question of whether an advertisement has crossed the line into campaign activity is an important one under the tax laws, particularly for tax-exempt 501(c) organizations. There are two main reasons. First, 501(c)(3) charitable organizations (including churches and other houses of worship) are prohibited under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) from engaging in campaign activity. They are, however, permitted to take policy positions and engage in an insubstantial amount of lobbying.
Second, other types of 501(c)s—primarily 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, 501(c)(5) labor unions, and 501(c)(6) trade associations—may engage in campaign activity. However, it (along with any other non-exempt purpose activity) cannot be their primary activity. This standard has been the focus of congressional and public scrutiny, as 501(c) groups have reportedly spent millions of dollars on campaign activity in the post-Citizens United era, and allegations have been made that some should have their status revoked for engaging in too much campaign activity. Whether an advertisement is campaign activity is key in this context because a "true" issue ad, as defined for tax purposes, would not be counted as campaign activity when determining whether revocation of 501(c) status is appropriate.
The standard for determining whether something is campaign activity under the IRC is whether it exhibits a preference for or against a candidate. Clearly, ads that tell people who to vote for or against are campaign intervention. However, in situations involving something short of express advocacy, this standard does not lend itself to bright-line rules. Preference can be subtle, and the IRS takes the position that it is not always necessary to expressly mention a candidate by name. As a result, the line between issue advocacy and campaign activity can be difficult to discern.
The IRS has released two rulings that provide a non-exhaustive list of factors the agency considers when determining whether an issue advocacy communication is electioneering. The most important point to keep in mind is that the determination of whether an ad is actually campaign activity is entirely dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. This requires looking at the ad in question, as well as being familiar with some of the organization's other activities (e.g., has the group run a series of similar ads?) and the election (e.g., has the issue been raised to distinguish among the candidates?).
Finally, the term "issue advocacy" is also used when people talk about campaign finance law and policy. The terminology used in tax and campaign finance law and policy do not always match. Thus, it should not be assumed that the characterization or treatment of an activity for campaign finance purposes necessarily results in the same characterization or treatment for tax purposes, and vice versa. |
crs_R40736 | crs_R40736_0 | Presently, two automakers have been formed as a result of bankruptcy and with financial assistance from the federal government: Chrysler Group LLC and General Motors Company. 2743 and S. 1304 , appear intended to renew statutory and contractual obligations that were owed from Old Chrysler and Old GM to their respective dealers before bankruptcy. 2796 , has similar requirements without naming the auto manufacturers to which it applies. This report will address various constitutional concerns raised by these bills. The three areas of concern are (1) whether the bills violate the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (2) whether mandatory assignment of the contractual and statutory obligations associated with the dealer contracts in question to the New GM and the New Chrysler would violate either substantive due process or the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause; and (3) whether such mandatory assignment would make the United States liable for damages under a theory of breach of implied contract. Current Legislative Proposals
The current legislative proposals appear to be Congress's response to the current bankruptcy proceedings involving Old Chrysler and Old GM and their network of former and soon-to-be-former dealers. Factors a court might consider as suggesting that the proposals, if passed, are bankruptcy laws include (1) the termination of the dealers' agreements was done during bankruptcies; (2) the dealers were unsecured creditors in the bankruptcies; (3) the assets were sold to the new entities as part of bankruptcy proceeding; and (4) the New Chrysler and New GM were formed as a result of bankruptcies. It is less clear whether these automakers would be subject to the proposals in H.R. H.R. 2796 and § 744(b) of H.R. If the provisions of these legislative proposals were to apply to Old GM and Old Chrysler, application of these sections could apply to benefit one class of claimants in a specific class of debtors by allowing them to extend their franchise agreements to a new entity that purchased the assets of the debtor. Although it is impossible to say whether a court would find that these bills meet the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause, comparison to Gibbons makes it seem plausible that the bill, if enacted, might face legal challenges in the courts. Turning to substantive due process (and subject to the voluntary-action exclusion at the start of the takings discussion), the picture remains cloudy. Indeed, research fails to reveal any Supreme Court decision in the past half-century finding economic legislation to violate substantive due process. For the foregoing reasons, the possibility cannot be dismissed that the forced contracts (with specified terms and parties) might be judicially determined to offend substantive due process. Breach of Contract62
The facts at issue in the case United States v. Winstar may be somewhat analogous to the application of the instant legislation to the New GM and the New Chrysler. Additionally, it appears that the approval of the sale of assets by the bankruptcy court included both a plan for an infusion of federal money into the New Chrysler and New GM, and an expectation that New Chrysler and New GM would be able to avoid the statutory and contractual obligations of many of the dealership agreements. | Auto dealers, which act as intermediaries between automakers and final consumers, are independent businesses with contracts with the automakers. As General Motors Corporation (Old GM) and Chrysler LLC (Old Chrysler) have moved through bankruptcy restructuring, the presence of these dealer contracts has been an important issue. In order to allow the automakers to downsize and seek a more competitive business model, the bankruptcy courts allowed both Old Chrysler and Old GM to cut their dealership networks. This allowed the new entities that bought the assets of the bankrupt companies, Chrysler Group LLC (New Chrysler) and General Motors Company (New GM), to operate without the contractual and statutory obligations associated with those dealership agreements.
Dealers objected to the cuts, first in the bankruptcy proceedings, and later in the media and to the Congress. Several congressional hearings have been held that addressed the reduction of the automakers' dealership networks. Additionally, several bills have been introduced that appear to be intended to restore the dealership agreements with the automakers in bankruptcy or assign those agreements to the newly created automakers that purchased assets from those automakers that are currently in bankruptcy proceedings.
This report discusses the constitutionality of legislation to require that auto manufacturers receiving federal aid be subject to the contractual and statutory obligations owed to such dealers before bankruptcy. The report will address two forms of these proposals, one that addresses GM and Chrysler dealers specifically (H.R. 2743 and S. 1304), and one that addresses the issue of dealership assignment more generally (H.R. 2796 and H.R. 3170 § 744(b)). The report will address three questions: (1) whether these proposals violate the uniformity requirement of Article I, Section 8, clause 4 of the Constitution (the Bankruptcy Clause); (2) whether mandatory assignment of the dealers' contracts to the New GM and the New Chrysler would violate either substantive due process or the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause; and (3) whether such mandatory assignments could make the United States liable for damages under a theory of breach of implied contract.
The report concludes that, of the proposals at issue, those that arguably are not limited to the GM and Chrysler bankruptcies may be less likely to be found to violate the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. The report also concludes that, while it is difficult to establish the long-term economic impact of these legislative proposals, the application of these bills to the New GM and the New Chrysler are not likely to be found to violate substantive due process, or to constitute a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution if analyzed under current case law. However, these proposals are beyond anything the U.S. Supreme Court has previously addressed in its substantive due process decisions, which makes it impossible to dismiss the possibility that the Court might find that substantive due process was offended by forcing the new automakers to be parties to dealership contracts formed between the dealers and the bankrupt automakers. Additionally, the report concludes that it is not clear to what extent the United States might be liable under a breach of implied contract theory for the application of these bills to those two new corporate entities. |
crs_RL34409 | crs_RL34409_0 | Background
In response to a petition filed by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) concerning numerous websites advertising the sale of personal telephone records, the Federal Communications Commission conducted a rulemaking to determine the extent of the problem and construct regulations in response to consumer concerns. Data brokers claimed to be able to provide this information fairly quickly, in a few hours to a few days. Data brokers are thought to employ three different practices to obtain customer telephone records without the approval of the customer. The first method occurs when an employee of one of the phone companies sells the records to the data broker. The second method occurs through a practice called "pretexting," where a data broker pretends to be the owner of the phone and obtains the records from the telephone company under false pretenses. The third method is employed when a data broker obtains the customer's telephone records by accessing the customer's account on the Internet. Pretext calling for customer telephone records occurs when the data broker or investigator pretends to be the cell phone account holder and persuades phone company employees to release the information. In response to these concerns, Congress, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have acted to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of phone records. For further information, see CRS Report RL34120, Federal Information Security and Data Breach Notification Laws , by [author name scrubbed]. In 2006, Congress enacted the Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act, which makes pretexting for the acquisition of telephone records a federal offense. Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act
Section 3 of the Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act makes it a crime to knowingly and intentionally obtain, or attempt to obtain, "confidential phone records information" of a covered entity (defined as a telecommunications carrier or an IP-enabled voice service provider) by making false statements or representations to an employee of a covered entity, making false or fraudulent statements to a customer of a covered entity, providing a document to a covered entity knowing that the document is false or fraudulent, or accessing customer accounts via the Internet without prior authorization from the customer to whom the information pertains. Federal Trade Commission Act
The FTC may bring a law enforcement action against a pretexter of telephone records for deceptive or unfair practices. Section 222 of the Communication Act of 1934, as amended, establishes a duty of every telecommunications carrier to protect the confidentiality of CPNI. It does not include subscriber list information, such as name, address, and phone number. The CPNI Order and subsequent orders issued by the Commission govern the use and disclosure of customer proprietary network information by telecommunications carriers. The certification must contain a list of customer complaints regarding unauthorized disclosure of CPNI for the previous year. | Telephone records contain a large amount of intimate personal information. Recent years have seen a rise in the use of this information for marketing and even for criminal purposes. The purchase and sale of telephone record information, therefore, became a booming business. Websites and data brokers claiming to be able to obtain the phone records for any phone number within a few days abounded. However, the methods by which these data brokers obtained their information came under intense fire from public interest groups concerned about consumer privacy.
Consumer groups and news outlets reported that telephone records were being obtained fraudulently by data brokers or other individuals without the knowledge or consent of the customers to whom the records related. Data brokers are thought to employ three different practices to obtain customer telephone records without the approval of the customer. The first method occurs when an employee of one of the phone companies sells the records to the data broker. The second method occurs through a practice called "pretexting," where a data broker pretends to be the owner of the phone and obtains the records from the telephone company under false pretenses. The third method is employed when a data broker obtains the customer's telephone records by accessing the customer's account on the Internet.
In response to increased concern over the unauthorized disclosure of private telephone records, Congress and other regulatory agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of this information. Congress enacted the Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006, which makes "pretexting" a federal offense. The Federal Trade Commission has instituted a number of enforcement actions against data brokers. And the FCC recently amended its regulations governing the disclosure of Customer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI) in an attempt to address the concerns raised by Congress, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), and other consumer groups regarding the unauthorized disclosure of such information.
This report discusses recent efforts to protect the privacy of customer telephone records and efforts to prevent the unauthorized use, disclosure, or sale of such records by data brokers. In addition, it provides a brief overview of the confidentiality protections for customer information established by the Communications Act of 1934. It does not discuss the legal framework for the disclosure by telephone companies of phone records to the government. For an overview of laws that address disclosure of telephone records to the government, see CRS Report RL33424, Government Access to Phone Calling Activity and Related Records: Legal Authorities, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. For an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, see CRS Report 98-326, Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] (pdf). This report will be updated when warranted. |
crs_R43462 | crs_R43462_0 | In recent years, U.S. civilian personnel, military personnel, and other parties have sued federal contractors under state tort law, alleging that contractors intentionally or accidentally injured them during the course of performing a federal contract. Contractors have responded to these tort suits by raising the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the political question doctrine, and derivative immunities in seeking to avoid liability. Some have also alleged that the government is obligated to indemnify them for any liability they may incur to third parties. Contractors have argued that the protections of some of the FTCA's exceptions should be extended to them under the doctrine of preemption. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law is "the supreme Law of the Land" and applies instead of, or preempts, state law to the degree that the two are incompatible. It is the tension between this FTCA exception, known as the discretionary function exception, and imposing tort liability on government contractors for harms caused by defects in some government-approved designs that spurred the Supreme Court to create the government contractor defense in its 1988 decision in Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation . After the Boyle decision, lower courts were left to determine whether the Supreme Court's rationale applies only to design defect claims, or whether it also supports immunizing contractors from manufacturing defect claims and claims originating in the performance of service contracts. In response, the defendant contractor argued that the Court should recognize contractor immunity from liability for harms caused by defects in government-selected designs through a judicially created tort immunity based on the FTCA's discretionary exception. Specifically, in determining the scope of preemption, the Court sought to avoid frustration of the discretionary function exception's underlying policy of preventing the government from bearing the costs of liability caused by its discretionary acts, while simultaneously preventing contractors from perversely altering their behavior because of overly broad immunity from tort liability. Some courts have declined to extend the exception to immunize contractors from tort liability. Therefore, Bentzlin could potentially be said to have extended to contractors broad immunity against any tort claims arising out of combatant activities much like the government's own immunity under the combatant activities exception, and some courts have subsequently construed it as doing so. In accordance with Supreme Court precedent, "no justiciable 'controversy' exists when parties seek adjudication of a political question," which is generally a question that courts should refrain from deciding because the Constitution has entrusted its resolution to the legislative or executive branches of government. Though these cases have diverged greatly in their outcomes, it would appear that courts are more likely to find the political question doctrine applicable when (1) the military largely controls the contractor's actions; (2) the plaintiff's claims are not seen as presenting an "ordinary tort suit"; (3) the record before the court is sufficiently developed; (4) the government intervenes on the contractor's behalf; or (5) the applicable state law recognizes the tort doctrine of contributory negligence, whereby plaintiffs may not recover in a negligence claim when their own negligence is a proximate cause of their injuries, and the plaintiff is a government employee. Some lower courts have recognized such derivative immunity, but have required, pursuant to Westfall v. Erwin , that the act giving rise to potential liability be a discretionary function that occurred within the scope of the contractor's employment or duties. Courts in the Fourth Circuit have also held that contractors have derivative absolute immunity against tort liability arising from their participation in official investigations under certain circumstances. Initially, some lower courts held that the Feres doctrine proscribed only suits against the government in which a servicemember caused harm to another servicemember. In the context of tort suits against contractors, when the government has agreed to indemnify a contractor, the government may be obligated to compensate the contractor for certain damages paid to third parties. In such contracts, military departments can include indemnification clauses to protect contractors against losses that arise out of direct contract performance, but only to the extent that they are not compensated by insurance or otherwise. | Contractors have played a considerable role in U.S. military operations over the last decade, and some commentators anticipate they will continue to do so in the future. Due in part to their heavy involvement in military operations, contractors have faced numerous tort suits, or suits seeking remedy for civil wrongs, in recent years. Many of these tort suits have alleged that contractors' negligence, or failure to take due care, in performing contractual obligations has caused harms to third/private parties (as opposed to the contracting agency). Contractors have often responded to such suits by raising the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the political question doctrine, and derivative immunities in seeking to avoid liability. They may also, to the extent permitted by their contract, seek indemnification from the government if found liable.
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that federal law is the "supreme law of the land" and preempts, or applies instead of, inconsistent provisions of state law. The FTCA is a federal law through which the government largely waives its inherent sovereign immunity from tort liability, although it retains sovereign immunity if one of the FTCA's exceptions applies (e.g., against any claim arising in a foreign country). Although the FTCA does not apply directly to federal contractors, they have long argued that the FTCA's exceptions can preempt state tort law claims against them in addition to federal agencies, and the Supreme Court agreed in its 1988 decision in Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation. There, the Court held that failure to find that one such FTCA exception, the discretionary function exception, preempts state law tort claims against contractors in narrowly prescribed circumstances would frustrate the exception's underlying purpose of shielding the government from liability caused by its discretionary decisions. The Court thus fashioned a rule immunizing contractors from tort liability caused by defects in some government-selected designs. Lower courts subsequently grappled with questions regarding the Boyle rule's scope (e.g., does it protect against manufacturing defect claims?), as well as whether the FTCA's combatant activities exception immunity may be extended to contractors under the Boyle Court's rationale. Based largely on the terms and performance of particular contracts, some courts extended the combatant activities exception to contractors, whereas others did not.
Contractors have also asserted that the political question doctrine—which recognizes limitations on justiciability, or the appropriateness of a court hearing a claim—bars particular tort suits against them because determining whether they are liable would require the court to decide questions that the Constitution commits to the legislative or executive branches of government. Though the outcomes in such cases have varied, it would appear that courts may be more likely to find a political question when a case presents certain characteristics.
In addition, contractors have argued for immunities deriving from federal employees' absolute immunity under the Westfall Act, pursuant to which they cannot be liable for any harms that occur within the scope of their employment. Contractors have also argued that the judicially created Feres doctrine, which provides that the government cannot be liable to servicemembers for torts arising in the course of, or incidental to, military service, should apply to them. Some courts have recognized a derivative absolute immunity for contractors, but have held that it applies only to harms caused by contractors' performance of discretionary, rather than ministerial, functions. Courts have generally rejected contractors' derivative Feres immunity arguments.
In some cases, the government may also have agreed to indemnify a contractor, or promised to pay certain liabilities to third parties that the contractor may incur through contract performance. |
crs_RL34646 | crs_RL34646_0 | Overview
Secularism has been one of the "fundamental and unchanging principles" guiding the Turkish Republic since its founding in 1923. It also has been the principle that has led to considerable domestic political tension. Over the years, political parties have emerged that appeared to challenge that principle and to seek to restore the centrality of religion to the state. Each time, the party has eventually been banned from the political stage. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) formed in 2001, has Islamist roots, but claims a conservative democratic place in the political spectrum. The AKP won the 2002national election by a wide margin and the 2007 election by a wider one, but its victories have not ended the secular-religious tensions in the country. The public prosecutor initiated a lawsuit to have the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) banned for being a "focal point of anti-secular activities." Prior to this action and after it, in stages, the authorities arrested prominent secularists/ultranationalists ( ulusalcilar ) on suspicion of plotting and instigating actions to create chaos in the country and provoke the military to overthrow the government. The United States is concerned for stability in Turkey because it is a strategic partner, NATO ally, and candidate for membership in the European Union (EU). The Bush Administration may be concerned about the survival of Turkey's democracy because Turkey is one of the few predominantly Muslim democratic countries in the world and Administration officials refer to it as an inspiration for other Muslims even as they appear to have lessened emphasis on democratization elsewhere. Some analysts concluded that the Court had placed the AKP on probation. The Court has not yet issued the reasoning for its decision, which reportedly is based on the constitution. It may be premature to expect the AKP to undertake an aggressive agenda before renewing its mandate in the March 2009 municipal elections or in early national elections; the next national elections are otherwise scheduled to occur in July 2012. The High Criminal Court has accepted the indictment, and the case will be heard beginning October 20, 2008. Some analysts believe that the AKP is using the Ergenekon prosecutions in its fight for life, seeking to intimidate its opponents. If true, charges that Ergenekon is a product created for revenge and intimidation would undermine AKP's claim to be the standard-bearer of democracy. | Secularism has been one of the "fundamental and unchanging principles" guiding the Turkish Republic since its founding in 1923. It also has been the principle that has produced considerable domestic political tension. Over the years, political parties have emerged that appeared to challenge that principle and to strive to restore religion to a central place in the state. Each time, the party has eventually been banned from the political stage. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), formed in 2001, has Islamist roots and claims to be conservative and democratic. The AKP won the 2002 and 2007 national elections by wide margins, yet its victories have not ended the secular-religious tensions in the country.
The AKP narrowly survived a lawsuit seeking its closure on July 30, 2008, when the Constitutional Court held that the party was a "focal point of anti-secular activities," but opted for a financial penalty instead of a ban. Some analysts contend that the party is on "probation," but it is not yet clear how the court case will affect AKP's conduct. In the near term, it is proposing to pursue additional reforms required to achieve European Union (EU) membership. If AKP renews and strengthens its mandate in the March 2009 municipal elections or in early national elections, it might then opt for a more aggressive agenda.
At the same time, police have unearthed what they claim is a conspiracy, called Ergenekon, of ultranationalists and secularists to create chaos in the country and provoke the military to overthrow the government. Those arrested include two retired four-star generals. The case will be presented in Court beginning in October 2008. Some suggest that the arrests are evidence of Turkey's progress as a democracy because the "deep state" or elite who have manipulated and controlled the political system for 50 years are finally being confronted. Others charge that the AKP is using the affair to intimidate its opponents and that the authorities' handling of those charged fails to meet international standards. The powerful Turkish military has been unusually quiet throughout the closure case and the Ergenekon revelations and appears to be cooperating with the Ergenekon investigation.
The United States is concerned for stability in Turkey because it is a strategic partner and NATO ally. The Bush Administration has closely monitored recent developments in Turkey, which it continues to view as a secular democracy that could serve as an inspiration for other Muslim majority countries. The recent domestic turmoil may either strengthen Turkey's democracy or cast a shadow on it.
This report will be updated if developments warrant. It is a sequel to CRS Report RL34039, Turkey's 2007 Elections: Crisis of Identity and Power, by [author name scrubbed], which may be consulted for background. |
crs_R44250 | crs_R44250_0 | O n November 201, the President signed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, P.L. 114-74 . Title VIII of the act makes several changes to the Social Security system, including provisions that affect the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program. Subtitle A. Ensuring Correct Payments and Reducing Fraud
Section 811. Subtitle B. Promoting Opportunity for Disability Beneficiaries
Section 821. Subtitle C. Protecting Social Security Benefits
Section 831. Reallocation of Payroll Tax Revenue
Section 833 of the act reallocates the share of the Social Security payroll tax designated for the Disability Insurance (DI) trust fund that pays SSDI benefits and administrative costs. Under the current allocation, 10.60% is allocated to the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund and 1.80% to the DI trust fund. The intent of this reallocation is to increase the amount of money in the DI trust fund to delay its exhaustion which is currently predicted to occur in 2016. Subtitle D. Relieving Administrative Burdens and Miscellaneous Provisions
Section 841. | Title VIII of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (H.R. 1314, P.L. 114-74) makes several changes to the Social Security programs. Among these changes is a temporary reallocation of the Social Security payroll taxes so that a larger share is deposited in the Disability Insurance (DI) trust fund to extend the life of this trust fund beyond its current predicted exhaustion in 2016. Under this provision, the allocation of the 12.40% Social Security payroll tax assigned to the DI trust fund increases from 1.80% to 2.37% and the allocation to the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund decreases from 10.60% to 10.03%. These changes last through 2018.
In addition, these provisions extend the Social Security Administration's (SSA) demonstration authority for the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) programs, make changes to data and earnings reporting, and increase penalties for benefit fraud.
Title VIII of the act includes the following subtitles:
Subtitle A. Ensuring Correct Payments and Reducing Fraud Subtitle B. Promoting Opportunity for Disability Beneficiaries Subtitle C. Protecting Social Security Benefits Subtitle D. Relieving Administrative Burdens and Miscellaneous Provisions |
crs_R43827 | crs_R43827_0 | Introduction
During the last few decades, consumers in the United States have shown a significant interest in purchasing consumer products and packaging that appear to be beneficial—or at least not harmful—to the natural environment. In response to consumers' willingness to pay a premium for these products, manufacturers and others have increasingly touted the positive environmental attributes of their products in marketing materials, such as in advertising or on product labels. Federal Regulation of Environmental Marketing Claims: Select Legal Issues for Congress
Some commentators have suggested that certain environmental marketing messages have the potential to deceive consumers, and that the prevalence of such messages in the marketplace may discourage companies from competing to create more environmentally beneficial products. These claims may concern a single environmental attribute or relate to the environmental impacts of a product during all or part of its life cycle, such as the effect on the environment of the product's manufacture, distribution, use, or disposal. The FTC and other federal agencies also enforce federal laws and regulations that address specific types of environmental claims such as "dolphin-safe" or "organic" claims. Finally, in some contexts, the federal government has required manufacturers to disclose certain information about their products in marketing materials, including on labels. Currently, federal regulation of environmental marketing claims consists primarily of the FTC's case-by-case enforcement approach under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. The commission has provided nonbinding guidelines explaining how it might enforce Section 5 in the environmental marketing context. Federal regulation of environmental marketing claims potentially raises legal issues involving the First Amendment, international trade law, and preemption of state law. Legislation that regulates how manufacturers or sellers make certain claims about their products in advertisements or on labels may raise questions about the constitutional limits of regulating commercial speech. Requiring manufacturers to disclose certain information relating to the environmental characteristics of their products in advertisements and on labels may raise questions about the constitutionality of legislation that compels speech. In addition, a law regulating environmental marketing claims that appear on product labels could potentially raise issues concerning the United States' obligations under international trade law. For example, such measures could potentially be subject to the WTO TBT Agreement, which generally requires WTO Members preparing, adopting, and applying a measure to adhere to obligations concerning nondiscrimination; trade-restrictiveness; transparency; and reliance on international standards as a basis for regulation. However, the extent to which the TBT Agreement applies to measures that regulate claims made on labels that address so-called "non-product-related processes and production methods" (e.g., the amount of carbon dioxide emitted during manufacture of a product) is unclear. Another issue is the degree to which federal laws and regulations governing environmental marketing claims should expressly preempt state laws. | During the last few decades, consumers in the United States have shown a significant interest in purchasing consumer products and packaging that appear to be beneficial—or at least not harmful—to the natural environment. In response to consumers' willingness to pay a premium for these products, manufacturers and others have increasingly touted the positive environmental attributes of their products in marketing materials, such as in advertising or on product labels. These environmental marketing claims may concern a single environmental attribute or relate to the environmental impacts of a product during all or part of its life cycle, such as the effect on the environment of the product's manufacture, distribution, use, or disposal.
Some commentators have suggested that certain environmental marketing messages have the potential to deceive consumers, and that the prevalence of such messages in the marketplace may discourage companies from competing to create more environmentally beneficial products. Currently, federal regulation of environmental marketing claims consists primarily of the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC's) case-by-case enforcement approach under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. The commission has issued nonbinding guidelines that explain how it might enforce Section 5 in the environmental marketing context. The FTC and other federal agencies also enforce federal laws and regulations that address specific types of environmental claims such as "dolphin-safe" or "organic" claims. Finally, in some cases, the federal government has required manufacturers to disclose certain information about the environmental attributes of their products. The EnergyGuide labeling program administered by the FTC and Department of Energy (DOE) serves as one example.
Federal regulation of environmental marketing claims raises certain legal issues including questions involving the First Amendment, international trade law, and federal preemption of state law. For example, legislation that regulates how manufacturers or sellers make certain claims about their products in advertisements or on labels may raise questions about the constitutional limits of regulating commercial speech. Requiring manufacturers to disclose certain information relating to the environmental characteristics of their products in advertisements and on labels may raise questions about the constitutionality of legislation that compels speech.
In addition, laws regulating environmental marketing claims that appear on product labels could potentially raise issues concerning the United States' obligations under international trade law. For example, such measures could potentially be subject to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), which generally requires WTO Members preparing, adopting, and applying a measure to adhere to obligations concerning nondiscrimination; trade-restrictiveness; transparency; and reliance on international standards as a basis for regulation. However, the extent to which the TBT Agreement applies to measures that regulate claims made on labels that address so-called "non-product-related processes and production methods" (e.g., the amount of carbon dioxide emitted during manufacture of a product) is unclear.
Another issue that might arise is the degree to which federal laws and regulations governing environmental marketing claims should expressly preempt state laws. |
crs_R40206 | crs_R40206_0 | Overview of TAAF Program
The Trade Act of 2002 established a new Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers program by amending the Trade Act of 1974 ( P.L. As amended by the enacted 2009 economic stimulus package ( P.L. First, a producer group must be certified by USDA as eligible to apply for program benefits (see " Requirements for a Commodity Group to Be Certified "). Second, if the group is certified, individual producers in that group must meet certain requirements to be approved to receive technical assistance and cash payments (see " Individual Producer Eligibility Requirements " and " TAAF Program Benefits "). To certify a commodity group, the Secretary must determine that the increase in imports of the agricultural commodity produced by members of the group "contributed importantly" to at least a 15% decline in the national average price, quantity of production, or value of production or cash receipts of the commodity. To be eligible, an individual producer must show in the application submitted to USDA that (1) the agricultural commodity was produced in the year covered by the group's petition, and in at least one of the three preceding marketing years; (2) the quantity of the commodity produced in that year has decreased compared to the amount produced in a previous year, or the price received for the commodity in that year has decreased compared to the average price received in the preceding three marketing years; and (3) no cash benefits were received under the TAA for Workers and TAA for Firms programs, nor were benefits received based on producing another commodity eligible for TAAF assistance. The reauthorization of TAAF through FY2021 under P.L. 111-5 ) authorized and appropriated $90 million in each of FY2009 and FY2010, and $22.5 million for the first quarter of FY2011 (October to December 2010). Under Section 223 of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2011 ( P.L. 114-27 ) authorized TAAF to be appropriated $90 million each year for FY2015 through FY2021. To date, no new funds have been appropriated. Certifications and Producer Approvals
With the 2009 changes to the TAAF program that eased the criteria for a producer group to be certified and for individual producers to be approved for program assistance, more of the provided funding has been used than in the FY2003-December 2007 period. These included producers of shrimp, catfish, lobsters, asparagus, and wild blueberries ( Table 3 ). USDA subsequently approved about 4,500 producers for training assistance and cash benefits in FY2010. In reviewing how USDA implemented the program, GAO offered three recommendations:
Require spouses of producers (i.e., those who share in the risk of producing an agricultural commodity) who may be eligible to apply for assistance to provide documentation on how they contribute to producing a certified commodity. Take steps to help ensure that any financial assistance payments made to producers are used for intended purposes (e.g., by requiring them to detail in their business plans how they plan to use these funds). Broaden the program's evaluation approach to help ensure that USDA can comprehensively evaluate the impact of the TAAF program on producers' competitiveness. USDA OIG Audit Called for Improved Oversight
In an audit report of TAAF dated October 2013, the USDA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) identified a number of shortcomings in the administration of the TAAF program. Major Trade Agreements Could Bring Adjustments
Following the enactment of P.L. 114-26 —the law that provides the President with Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)—the Obama Administration concluded negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) regional free-trade agreement, which includes the United States and 11 other Pacific-facing nations, but to date the agreement has not been ratified by Congress or by other TPP countries. | The Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers (TAAF) program provides technical assistance and cash benefits to producers of farm commodities and fishermen who experience adverse economic effects from increased imports. Congress first authorized this program in 2002, and made significant changes to it in the 2009 economic stimulus package (P.L. 111-5). The 2009 revisions were aimed at making it easier for farmers and fishermen to qualify for program benefits, and provided over $200 million in funding through December 2010. Subsequently, P.L. 112-40 (enacted in October 2011) authorized $202.5 million through December 2013, but no new program activity has occurred since December 2010 for lack of appropriated funds. In June 2015, Congress passed H.R. 1295, the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, authorizing TAAF through FY2021, and the President signed the bill into law on June 29, 2015, as P.L. 114-27. Any program activity would still be contingent on the appropriation of funds.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is required to follow a two-step process in administering TAAF. First, a group of producers must be certified eligible to apply. Second, a producer in a certified group must meet specified requirements to be approved for benefits.
To be certified, a group must show that imports were a significant cause for at least a 15% decline in one of three factors: the price of the commodity, the quantity of the commodity produced, or the production value of the commodity. Once a producer group is certified, an individual producer within that group must meet three requirements to be approved for program benefits. These include technical assistance with a training component, and financial assistance. A producer must show that (1) the commodity was produced in the current year and also in one of the previous three years; (2) the quantity of the commodity produced decreased compared to that in a previous year, or the price received for the commodity decreased compared to a preceding three-year average price; and (3) no benefits were received under any other trade adjustment assistance program. The training component is intended to help the producer become more competitive in producing the same or another commodity. Financial assistance is to be used to develop and implement a business adjustment plan designed to address the impact of import competition.
From 2009 to 2011, USDA certified 10 of 30 petitions filed by producers of 5 commodity groups—shrimp, catfish, asparagus, lobster, and wild blueberries. USDA approved TAAF benefits for about 4,500 individual producers in FY2010, and for about 5,700 producers in FY2011.
In a 2012 audit of TAAF, the Government Accountability Office recommended that USDA require spouses who apply for assistance to submit documentation on how they contribute to producing a commodity, take steps to ensure that the program's financial assistance component is used for intended purposes, and adopt a longer-term approach to evaluate its effectiveness. A 2013 audit by USDA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) identified several shortcomings in administering the program, including determining eligibility and providing effective oversight.
The 2015 reauthorization of TAAF programs follows directly in the wake of the enactment of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation (P.L. 114-26) that President Obama had requested of Congress to facilitate the conclusion of regional free trade agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 other Pacific-facing nations. Under P.L. 114-27, TAAF is authorized to receive $90 million annually for FY2015 through FY2021, subject to annual appropriations. No new funding has been appropriated since the program's reauthorization. |
crs_R41207 | crs_R41207_0 | Introduction
The unauthorized immigrant (illegal alien) population in the United States is a key and controversial immigration issue. Competing views on how to address this population proved to be a major obstacle to enacting comprehensive immigration reform legislation in past Congresses. It is unknown, at any point in time, how many unauthorized aliens are in the United States; what countries they are from; when they came to the United States; where they are living; and what their demographic, family, and other characteristics are. Demographers develop estimates about unauthorized immigrants using available survey data on the U.S. foreign-born population. These estimates can help inform possible policy options to address the unauthorized alien population. Pew also estimated the 2011 unauthorized resident population at 11.5 million, and using data from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) and other sources, released a preliminary estimate of 11.7 million for the March 2012 unauthorized population. About 61% of all unauthorized aliens living in the United States in January 2012 were in this age group, according to DHS. Current Law
The Immigration and Nationality Act and other federal laws place various restrictions on unauthorized immigrants. Relief for Unauthorized Aliens
At the same time that the INA places restrictions on unauthorized immigrants, it provides limited avenues for certain unauthorized immigrants to obtain LPR status. Policy Options
Over the years, a range of options has been offered for addressing the unauthorized resident population. In most cases, the ultimate goal is to reduce the number of aliens in the United States who lack legal status. They typically have no legal right to live or work in the United States and are subject to removal from the country. One set of options for addressing the unauthorized resident population centers on requiring or encouraging illegal aliens to leave the country. Those who support this approach argue that these individuals are in the United States in violation of the law and that their presence variously threatens social order, national security, and economic prosperity. Removal
One departure strategy is for ICE, the DHS entity responsible for immigration enforcement within the United States, to locate and deport unauthorized aliens from the country. Legal Status for Unauthorized Aliens
One of the basic tenets of the departure approach is that unauthorized aliens in the United States should not be granted benefits. An opposing strategy would grant qualifying unauthorized immigrants various benefits, including an opportunity to obtain legal status. Supporters of this type of approach do not characterize unauthorized aliens in the United States as lawbreakers, but rather as contributors to the economy and society at large. A variety of proposals have been put forth over the years to grant some type of legal status to some portion of the unauthorized population. Some of these options would use existing mechanisms under immigration law to grant legal status, while others would establish new mechanisms. Some would benefit a particular subset of the unauthorized population, while others would make relief available more broadly. | The unauthorized immigrant (illegal alien) population in the United States is a key and controversial immigration issue. Competing views on how to address this population have been, and continue to be, a major obstacle to enacting immigration reform legislation.
It is unknown, at any point in time, how many unauthorized aliens are in the United States; what countries they are from; when they came to the United States; where they are living; and what their demographic, family, and other characteristics are. Demographers develop estimates about unauthorized aliens using available survey data on the U.S. foreign-born population and other methods. These estimates can help inform possible policy options to address the unauthorized alien population. Both the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Pew Research Center estimate that approximately 11.5 million unauthorized aliens were living in the United States in January 2011. DHS further estimates that there were some 11.4 unauthorized residents in January 2012. Pew has released a preliminary estimate of 11.7 million for the March 2012 unauthorized resident population.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and other federal laws place various restrictions on unauthorized aliens. In general, they have no legal right to live or work in the United States and are subject to removal from the country. At the same time, the INA provides limited avenues for certain unauthorized aliens to obtain legal permanent residence.
Over the years, a range of options has been offered for addressing the unauthorized resident population. In most cases, the ultimate goal is to reduce the number of aliens in the United States who lack legal status. One set of options centers on requiring or encouraging unauthorized immigrants to depart the country. Those who support this approach argue that these aliens are in the United States in violation of the law and that their presence variously threatens social order, national security, and economic prosperity. One departure strategy is to locate and deport unauthorized aliens from the United States. Another departure strategy, known as attrition through enforcement, seeks to significantly reduce the size of the unauthorized population by across-the-board enforcement of immigration laws.
One of the basic tenets of the departure approach is that unauthorized immigrants in the United States should not be granted benefits. An opposing strategy would grant qualifying unauthorized residents various benefits, including an opportunity to obtain legal status. Supporters of this type of approach do not characterize unauthorized immigrants in the United States as lawbreakers, but rather as contributors to the economy and society at large. A variety of proposals have been put forth over the years to grant some type of legal status to some portion of the unauthorized population. Some of these options would use existing mechanisms under immigration law to grant legal status. Others would establish new legalization programs. Some would benefit a particular subset of the unauthorized population, such as students or agricultural workers, while others would make relief available more broadly. |
crs_RL34035 | crs_RL34035_0 | Introduction
Members of Congress receive numerous requests from grant seekers, including state and local governments, nonprofit social service and community action organizations, private research groups, small businesses, and individuals, for information and help in obtaining funds for projects. Most federal grant funds goes to state and local governments, which in turn sub-award to local entities such as nonprofit organizations. Offices organized in this way may have a full-time grants specialist or several staff members under the supervision of a grants coordinator working solely in the area of grants and projects. In some offices, all grants requests are handled in the district or state office; in others, they are answered by the Washington, DC, staff; still others divide grants and projects activity between the district or state office and the Washington, DC, office. The congressional office should first determine the priorities of its particular office:
assess the volume of incoming grants requests; determine criteria for how much attention should be given to each grants request, for example, number of people who will be affected, visibility of projects, or political implications; decide the role of the congressional office: information source or active advocacy, or sometimes even earmarking appropriations for a project that mirrors the Member's legislative agenda. Office Grants Manual
An internal grants manual is a valuable tool for grants staff to develop. It can outline office policies and procedures and ensure continuity when staff changes. Congressional grants staff can also serve as liaison between grant seekers and government executive offices, including their own state offices that administer federal grants. Some congressional offices may help grant seekers by forwarding to them descriptions and contact information on federal grants programs for particular projects. The assistance listing descriptions also link to related websites, such as federal department and agency home pages and Office of Management and Budget grants management circulars. Congressional offices can also prepare their own information packets on federal grants programs, which are requested most frequently. CRS Resources
To assist Members in their representational duties, and to help congressional offices respond to grants questions, CRS has developed two Grants web pages:
For congressional staff, the Grants and Federal Assistance web page, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], focuses on key CRS products, available at http://www.crs.gov/resources/GRANTS . CRS automatically updates the web page for Members on the House and Senate servers. Key useful CRS reports (in addition to the current report) to assist staff undertaking grants work include
CRS Report RL34012, Resources for Grantseekers , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL32159, How to Develop and Write a Grant Proposal , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Grants.gov and FedConnect
More than 80% of federal grant funding is allocated to states to administer, or directly to local governments, and funding opportunities may be posted at the state level. CRS reports provide guidance to congressional staff on federal programs and funding, and may be forwarded to constituents in response to grants requests. Grants and Federal Domestic Assistance web page, by [author name scrubbed] http://www.crs.gov/resources/MEMBER-GRANTS-PAGE
Provides Internet links to free key federal and private grants and funding information, including beta.SAM.gov, Grants.gov, and other federal websites; and the Foundation Center, and other private funding resources. | Members of Congress receive frequent requests from grant seekers needing funds for projects in districts and states. The congressional office should first determine its priorities regarding the appropriate assistance to give constituents, from providing information on grants programs to active advocacy of projects. Congressional grants staff can best help grant seekers by first themselves gaining some understanding of the grants process.
Each office handles grants requests in its own way, depending upon the Member's legislative agenda and overall organization and workload. There may be a full-time grants specialist or several staff members under the supervision of a grants coordinator working solely in the area of grants and projects. In some offices, all grants requests are handled in the district or state office; in others, they are answered by the Washington, DC, staff.
To assist grant seekers applying for federal funds, congressional offices can develop working relationships with grants officers in federal and state departments and agencies. Because more than 80% of federal funds go to state and local governments that, in turn, manage federal grants and sub-award to applicants in their state, congressional staff need to identify their own state administering offices.
To educate constituents, a congressional office may provide selected grant seekers information on funding programs or may sometimes sponsor workshops on federal and private assistance. Because most funding resources are on the Internet, Member home pages can also link to grants sources such as Assistance Listings at beta.SAM.gov and Grants.gov so that constituents themselves can search for grants programs and funding opportunities. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) web page, Grants and Federal Domestic Assistance, by [author name scrubbed] (see sample at http://www.crs.gov/resources/MEMBER-GRANTS-PAGE), can be added to a Member's home page upon request and is updated automatically on House and Senate servers. Another CRS web page, Grants and Federal Assistance, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], at http://www.crs.gov/resources/GRANTS, covers key CRS products.
Congressional staff can use CRS reports to learn about grants work and to provide information on government and private funding. In addition to the current report, these include CRS Report RL34012, Resources for Grantseekers, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] ; and CRS Report RL32159, How to Develop and Write a Grant Proposal, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS also offers reports on block grants and the appropriations process; federal assistance for homeland security and terrorism preparedness; and federal programs on specific subjects and for specific groups, such as state and local governments, police and fire departments, libraries and museums, nonprofit organizations, small business, and other topics.
An internal grants manual outlining office policies and procedures, including perhaps templates for letters of support, might be developed to help grants staff. With reductions in federal programs, and with most government grants requiring matching funds, grants staff should also become familiar with other funding, such as private or corporate foundations, as alternatives or supplements to federal grants.
This report will be updated at the beginning of each Congress and as needed. |
crs_RL31720 | crs_RL31720_0 | The previous Congress passed a massive energy bill, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT, P.L. 109-58 ), but subsequent developments worked to keep crude oil and gasoline prices high and interest in legislative solutions active. Successive hurricanes, Katrina and Rita, in late August and late September 2005, brought about the shutdown of more than 5 million barrels per day of refining capacity in Texas and Louisiana and initially shut down the 25% of U.S. crude oil production and 20% of U.S. natural gas production that comes from the Outer Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Mexico. World and domestic demand for oil has remained strong, taking up most of the world's spare production capacity. The phaseout of the gasoline additive methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) and a renewable fuels mandate in EPACT have placed additional pressure on gasoline price and deliverability in the United States. Whenever the United States has experienced a period marked by sharp increases in the price for energy and concern about the adequacy of essential supplies, there is widespread concern that the nation has no energy policy. However, not only does the nation have an energy policy, it has adopted several distinct policy approaches over the years. However, it is apparent from a review of the years since the time of the Arab oil embargo and first oil price shock in 1973 until 2004 that it is more accurate to see this 30-year period as one of general price and supply stability that was periodically broken by short episodes of supply disruption and price volatility. It wasn't so much that energy policy failed to be responsive to earlier crises; rather, during lengthy periods of stability and declining prices for conventional fuels, it proved difficult to sustain certain policy courses that might help shield the nation from future episodes of instability. Traditionally, the energy debate has been the most vigorous over the balance to be struck between increasing supply and encouraging conservation. However, energy policy turns on the additional axis of short- and long-term policies. For example, one of the major issues in energy policy is the price for fuels. Tax policy plays a role in many of these areas. 94-163 ) established new car corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards, beginning with model year 1978. | Energy policy continues to be a major legislative issue, despite passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT, P.L. 109-58). Shortly after EPACT's enactment, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita temporarily shut down production of oil and gas and refining capacity in Texas and Louisiana. World and domestic demand for oil remained strong, and other factors have placed pressure on gasoline prices and deliverability in the United States.
In the face of these developments, and because the prospect that this episode of elevated prices is likely to be a long one, interest in energy policy remains high in the 110th Congress. When the United States experiences a period marked by sharp increases in the price for energy and concern about the adequacy of essential supplies, there is widespread concern that the nation has no energy policy. The nation has, in fact, adopted several distinct policy approaches over the years, and many of the debates have been about determining the appropriate extent of the federal government's role in energy.
There were episodes from 1973-2003 when oil prices spiked, but these were generally for comparatively brief periods; overall, the period was one of general price and supply stability. It isn't so much that energy policy failed to be adequately responsive to past crises; rather, during lengthy periods of stability and declining prices for conventional fuels, it has proven difficult to sustain certain policy courses that might help shield the nation from occasional episodes of instability. Because prices are now expected by some analysts to remain high, the prospect for certain longer-range energy policies may now be more favorable. Traditionally, the energy debate has been most vigorous over the balance to be struck between increasing supply and encouraging conservation. However, when markets are unstable, debate turns on another axis as well, that of short-term versus long-term policies.
Energy policy issues of continuing interest include Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (CAFE) for passenger vehicles; improving U.S. energy infrastructure, including pipelines and refineries; seeking effective means to promote energy conservation using currently available technologies; and developing new technologies and alternative fuels. |
crs_R44946 | crs_R44946_0 | From that point on, the number of these temporary special representatives expanded and contracted, depending on each Administration's governing style and the issues at the time. Congressional Actions
While it is not unusual for Congress to express concern regarding the department's use of these temporary positions in the foreign policy arena, the 115 th Congress is particularly interested because of the Trump Administration's announced goals to reorganize the executive branch, including the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. On July 17, 2017, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing with Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan on the State Department FY2018 Reauthorization and Reorganization Plan. Title III, Section 301, of S. 1631 would require that
the Secretary of State provide a report, not later than 30 days after enactment of the bill, comprising recommendations regarding whether to maintain each existing "Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor" that is not expressly authorized by a provision of law enacted by Congress; no later than 90 days after the issuance of the aforementioned report, the Secretary of State present any "Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor" that the department intends to retain but is not expressly authorized by a provision of law enacted by Congress to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the advice and consent of the Senate; the Secretary can establish or maintain "Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor" positions provided that the appointment is established for a specified term and presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the advice and consent of the Senate within 90 days of the appointment; the Secretary of State may maintain or establish temporary "Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, or Special Advisor" positions for a limited period of no longer than 180 days without the advice and consent of the Senate as long as the Secretary notifies the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at least 15 days prior to the appointment and certifies that the position is not expected to demand the exercise of significant authority pursuant to U.S. law (the Secretary may renew any position established under these authorities provided that the Secretary complies with these notification requirements); beginning not later than 120 days following enactment, no funds may be obligated or expended for any "Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor" positions exercising significant authority pursuant to U.S. law that is not being served by an individual who has been presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for advice and consent of the Senate; in addition, funds may not be obligated or expended for any staff or resources related to such positions until the appointed individual has been presented; beginning not later than 120 days following enactment, no funds may be obligated or expended for temporary positions (those lasting for a duration of no longer than 180 days) or any related staff and resources unless the Secretary of State has complied with the notification process; no "Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor" authorized by a provision of law enacted by Congress shall be appointed absent the advice and consent of the Senate (with the exception of the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues); the congressional authorization for the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma shall be repealed. In September 2017, the Senate Committee on Appropriations passed S. 1780 , the "Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018." The Department of State provided this report to the committees in April 2017. The following tables identify key positions, including
special envoy, representative, coordinator, advisor, ambassador-at-large, and similar positions that the State Department identified in an April 2017 report transmitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; additional positions that CRS identified; descriptions for each position; and the Trump Administration's proposed plan for each position as described in Secretary Tillerson's August 28, 2017, letter. However, the duties of the congressionally authorized coordinator positions are provided in statute. There are numerous arguments for and against the use of special envoys—both in general and with regard to specific policy issues. Which positions are necessary or unnecessary may differ from one Member of Congress to another or from one Administration to another. Congressional Outlook
Congress has addressed issues arising from the use of special appointments by requiring the Department of State to report to Congress on the existing use of these positions, holding hearings, and including language in legislation (currently in the Senate) that would require many appointments to be made with the advice and consent of the Senate. | The 115th Congress has expressed interest in monitoring the use of special envoys, representatives, and coordinator positions by the Department of State, as well as any changes to their status. Special, temporary diplomatic appointments originated during the presidency of George Washington, and the number of special representatives has expanded and contracted since then. Tabulating the precise number of these positions is difficult, however, because some special positions have fallen into disuse over time and were never officially eliminated.
Administration Action on Special Positions
It is not unusual for Congress to express concern or assert legislative prerogatives regarding the department's use of temporary positions in the foreign policy arena. These positions may come under particular scrutiny in the 115th Congress in light of the Trump Administration's ongoing effort to reorganize the executive branch, including the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. On August 28, 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson transmitted a letter detailing the Trump Administration's proposed plans to expand, consolidate, or eliminate several temporary special envoy positions, while keeping others in place without any changes. For those positions that are authorized in statute, congressional action may be required for the Administration to move forward with its proposed changes.
Congressional Action on Special Positions
The 115th Congress has also taken action to address the issue of special envoys. For example, on July 17, 2017, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing with Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan in which the use of such positions was discussed extensively. Later in July, the committee passed an authorization bill (S. 1631) that, if enacted, would include new limitations pertaining to the use of special envoys, such as provisions subjecting the appointment of individuals to such positions to the advice and consent of the Senate. Furthermore, the Senate Committee on Appropriations passed a State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill (S. 1780) that would prohibit the use of funds to downsize, downgrade, consolidate, close, move, or relocate (to another federal agency) select special envoys or their offices. Some Members of Congress perceive congressional input regarding the use of special envoys as both important in its own right and a crucial component of the broader need for Congress to assert its prerogatives as the Trump Administration continues to reorganize the executive branch and the Department of State.
Scope of This Report
This report provides background on the use of special envoys, representatives, and coordinators (primarily within the foreign affairs arena; for the most part, interagency positions are not included). It identifies various temporary positions, their purpose, and existing authorities. The report presents commonly articulated arguments for and against the use of these positions and issues for Congress going forward. The scope of this report is limited to the special envoy and related positions identified by the Department of State in a 2017 report to Congress and additional selected positions identified by CRS. This report may be updated to reflect congressional action. |
crs_RL31073 | crs_RL31073_0 | Introduction
Congress established a statutory formula governing distribution of financial aid for municipal wastewater treatment in the Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1972. Since then, Congress has modified the formula and incorporated other eligibility changes five times, actions which have been controversial on each occasion. Federal funds are provided to states through annual appropriations according to the statutory formula to assist local governments in constructing wastewater treatment projects in compliance with federal standards. That grants program was replaced in the law in 1987 by a new program of federal grants to capitalize state revolving loan funds (SRFs) for similar activities. The most recent formula change, also enacted in 1987, continues to apply to federal capitalization grants for clean water SRFs. The current state-by-state allotment is a complex formulation consisting basically of two elements, state population and "need." The latter refers to states' estimates of capital costs for wastewater projects necessary for compliance with the act. Funding needs surveys have been done since the 1960s and became an element for distributing CWA funds in 1972. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in consultation with states, has prepared 15 clean water needs surveys since then to provide information to policymakers on the nation's total funding needs, as well as needs for certain types of projects. This report describes the formula and eligibility changes adopted by Congress since 1972, revealing the interplay and decisionmaking by Congress on factors to include in the formula. Two types of trends and institutional preferences can be discerned in these actions. First, there are differences over the use of need and population factors in the allocation formula itself. Second, until recently, there have been gradual increases in restrictions on types of wastewater treatment projects eligible for federal assistance. The EPA report, completed in May 2016, concludes that the current allotment formula does not adequately reflect reported water quality needs or current population for the majority of states. Crafting an allotment formula has been one of the most controversial issues debated during reauthorization of the Clean Water Act. The dollars involved are significant, and considerations of "winner" and "loser" states bear heavily on discussions of policy choices reflected in alternative formulations. This is likely to be the case again, when Congress reauthorizes the wastewater infrastructure funding portions of the act. In part because the current allocation formula is now more than 25 years old, the issue of how to allocate state-by-state distribution of federal funds remains an important topic of interest to policymakers and state and local officials. | Congress established a statutory formula governing distribution of financial aid for municipal wastewater treatment in the Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1972. Since then, Congress has modified the formula and incorporated other eligibility changes five times. Federal funds are provided to states through annual appropriations according to the statutory formula to assist local governments in constructing wastewater treatment projects in compliance with federal standards. The most recent formula change, enacted in 1987, continues to apply to distribution of federal grants to capitalize state revolving loan funds (SRFs) for similar activities.
The current state-by-state allotment is a complex formulation consisting basically of two elements, state population and "need." The latter refers to states' estimates of capital costs for wastewater projects necessary for compliance with the act. Surveys of funding needs have been done since the 1960s and became an element of distributing CWA funds in 1972. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in consultation with states has prepared 16 clean water needs surveys since then (the most recent was released in 2016) to provide information to policymakers on the nation's total funding needs, as well as needs for certain types of projects.
This report describes the formula and eligibility changes adopted by Congress since 1972, revealing the interplay and decisionmaking by Congress on factors to include in the formula. Two types of trends and institutional preferences can be discerned in these actions. First, there are differences over the use of "need" and population factors in the allocation formula itself. Over time, the weighting and preference given to certain factors in the allocation formula have become increasingly complex and difficult to discern. Second, until recently, there was a gradual increase in restrictions on types of projects eligible for federal assistance. However, amendments adopted in 2014 expanded eligibilities, adding eligibility for such measures as water conservation, efficiency, or reuse in order to reduce demand for capacity of wastewater treatment facilities.
Crafting an allotment formula has been one of the most controversial issues debated during past reauthorizations of the Clean Water Act. The dollars involved are significant, and considerations of "winner" and "loser" states bear heavily on discussions of policy choices reflected in alternative formulations. This is likely to be the case again, when Congress considers legislation to reauthorize the act. Because the current allocation formula is now more than 25 years old, while needs and population have changed, the issue of how to allocate state-by-state distribution of federal funds remains an important topic. In May 2016, EPA issued a report requested by Congress on the allotment of CWA water infrastructure funding. It concludes that, for the majority of states, the current allotment does not adequately reflect reported water quality needs or the most recent Census data on population. It provides several possible options to update the allotment in the future, but does not recommend or identify a preferred option. |
crs_R43249 | crs_R43249_0 | In response to deteriorating conditions in the ecosystem, the federal governments of the United States and Canada and the state and provincial governments in the Great Lakes basin have implemented several restoration activities. These laws have authorized activities ranging from mitigating the harmful effects of toxic substances on water quality to mitigating damages caused by invasive species. Most laws address specific issues in the Great Lakes; yet few address the entire ecosystem. Over the years, several stakeholders have expressed the need for initiating and implementing a comprehensive approach for restoring the Great Lakes ecosystem. Great Lakes Restoration Initiative
The GLRI was proposed in 2009 by the Obama Administration, and implemented in 2010. The goal of the GLRI is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem by directing activities to address five focus areas:
toxic substances and Areas of Concern; invasive species; nearshore health and nonpoint source pollution; habitat and wildlife protection and restoration; accountability, monitoring, evaluation, communication, and partnerships. The EPA, serving as chair of the Task Force, is the lead federal agency for implementing and administering the GLRI. In appropriations laws from FY2010 to FY2013, the EPA has been given authority to receive and distribute congressionally appropriated funds to several federal agencies, which then undertake restoration activities and projects in the Great Lakes. Restoration activities are being done under existing federal authorities that address restoration in the Great Lakes. There is no single law that specifically authorizes the GLRI as a restoration initiative for the Great Lakes. The Action Plan provides a framework for restoring the Great Lakes ecosystem from 2010 through 2014. For each focus area under the GLRI, the Action Plan provides a problem statement, a set of goals, interim objectives, progress measures, final targets, and principal activities for restoring the ecosystem. Some issues with GLRI that have emerged include clarity about the management structure of GLRI, the potential integration of GLRI with existing federal and state restoration efforts in the Great Lakes, the effectiveness of the Action Plan in laying out a strategy for fully restoring the Great Lakes, the overall direction and duration of restoring the Great Lakes, and the funding needed to implement and complete the GLRI. 2773 would establish a governance and management structure for restoration activities in the Great Lakes, authorize GLRI and appropriations for its implementation, specify the scope and function of GLRI, and authorize the coordinating role of the Great Lakes Interagency Task Force. Questions such as who is in charge, and how are the implementation of restoration activities to be governed, were posed. For example, EPA received funds from FY2010 to FY2013 to implement the GLRI and was given authority to transfer these funds to other federal agencies to conduct GLRI activities. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), water users, and environmental entities. The lack of defining what a restored ecosystem might resemble under the GLRI or how long it might take restore the ecosystem could generate questions related to how much restoring and maintaining the Great Lakes ecosystem could ultimately cost. S. 1232 and H.R. Reporting by GLRI does not project how much longer restoration might take. | The Great Lakes ecosystem is recognized by many as an international natural resource that has been altered by human activities and climate variability. These alterations have led to degraded water quality, diminished habitat, lower native fish and wildlife populations, and an altered ecosystem. In response, the federal governments of the United States and Canada and the state and provincial governments in the Great Lakes basin are implementing several restoration activities. These activities range from mitigating the harmful effects of toxic substances in lake waters to restoring fish habitat.
Most laws and efforts in the past addressed specific issues in the Great Lakes; a few addressed issues at the ecosystem level. This caused the Government Accountability Office and others to express the need for initiating and implementing a comprehensive approach for restoring the Great Lakes ecosystem. In 2010, the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative (GLRI) was proposed and implemented by the Obama Administration. The aim of GLRI is to restore the Great Lakes ecosystem under one initiative. Specifically, the GLRI is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem by directing activities to address five focus areas: (1) toxic substances and Areas of Concern (these are areas in the Great Lakes that are environmentally degraded); (2) invasive species; (3) nearshore health and nonpoint source pollution; (4) habitat and wildlife protection and restoration; and (5) accountability, monitoring, evaluation, communication, and partnerships.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the lead federal agency for implementing and administering GLRI. The EPA has received authority to distribute appropriated funds to several federal agencies, which then undertake restoration activities and projects. The EPA also administers grant programs to fund nonfederal projects and activities related to restoration. An interagency Great Lakes Task Force oversees the implementation of GLRI and created a strategy to guide restoration. The strategy (referred to as the Action Plan) provides a framework for restoring the Great Lakes ecosystem under GLRI from 2010 through 2014. For each focus area under the GLRI, the Action Plan provides a problem statement, a set of goals, interim objectives, progress measures, final targets, and principal activities for restoring the ecosystem. Restoration activities are being done under existing federal authorities. The GLRI has received approximately $1.37 billion in appropriated funds since FY2010.
The scope and scale of this restoration initiative have led some to question its direction and duration. The GLRI does not specify what a restored ecosystem might look like, nor does it estimate how long restoration activities will need to be conducted, and how much restoration might cost. Some other questions surrounding this initiative include how the GLRI is governed and how federal and state restoration efforts are coordinated. Furthermore, GLRI remains an administrative initiative; there is no law that specifically authorizes GLRI, though Congress has appropriated funds to implement the program. Congress might consider these questions in oversight hearings or in legislation during the 113th Congress. Companion bills have been introduced in the 113th Congress to address GLRI. S. 1232 and H.R. 2773 would establish an administrative and management structure for restoration activities in the Great Lakes, authorize GLRI and appropriations for its implementation, specify the scope and function of GLRI, and authorize the coordinating role of the Great Lakes Interagency Task Force. |
crs_R44751 | crs_R44751_0 | TANF replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which was a cash assistance program for needy families with children. A major focus of the debates leading to the 1996 welfare reform law was how to move non-employed single mothers from welfare to work. That goal is enforced by TANF's measure of program performance: the work participation standard. The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant
The statutory purpose of the TANF block grant is to "increase the flexibility of states in operating a program" to achieve four statutory goals, which are to
1. provide assistance to needy families with children so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; 2. end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; 3. prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and 4. encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. Determination of the State Work Participation Rate (WPR)
The TANF WPR is a percentage that divides families receiving assistance who are considered "engaged in work" by the number of families receiving assistance with a work-eligible individual who are not disregarded from the rate. Unsubsidized Employment in Earnings Supplement Programs
Earnings supplement programs are separate from the regular TANF cash assistance program in the state and operate under separate rules. Other programs pay earnings supplements to working parents who had no necessary connection to the TANF cash assistance programs. The official rates used as the main TANF performance measure are computed for each state; the national TANF WPR represents the average for the states, with the average weighted by the size of each state's caseload. As shown in the figure, the national WPR has been below 50% for all years from FY2002 through FY2015. For the period from FY2003 through FY2011, the national WPR hovered around 30%. Through the history of TANF, participation in welfare-to-work activities has been relatively modest among non-employed work-eligible individuals. In FY2015, a monthly average of 143,000 TANF work-eligible individuals were not employed and were participating in activities, less than 1 in 5 non-employed TANF work-eligible individuals. Participation in Welfare-to-Work Activities in FY2015
Figure 6 provides some more detail on participation in welfare-to-work activities in FY2015 among those who were not employed. The record of the past 20 years shows
declining cash assistance caseloads, with particularly large declines in the early years; and an increase in the share of families receiving assistance who have a working member. A third part of that record is modest rates of participation in welfare-to-work activities among those who were not otherwise employed. Credit for Excess State Spending
The excess spending credit was seen as an incentive for states to increase their investment in TANF-related activities. Additionally, there has been no research on the efficacy of earnings supplement programs that provide working families with a relatively small, and sometimes nominal, amount (e.g., $10 a month) to continue aid after recipients reach the end of eligibility for a state's regular assistance program, or provide it for families with no necessary connection to the cash assistance programs. What Activities Should Be Emphasized? Further, even fewer TANF work-eligible individuals were engaged in supported work activities—subsidized jobs, community service, work experience, and on-the-job training—than were engaged in pre-employment activities such as job search or education. The issues raised above do question whether the multiple routes to meeting the work participation standard—including caseload reduction and crediting states for unsubsidized employment—take the focus off of engaging non-employed recipients in welfare-to-work activities. Does TANF's current program structure give states the incentive to engage non-employed recipients in welfare-to-work activities? The TANF Work Participation Standard
The TANF work participation standard serves two purposes: (1) it is a measure of how a state is performing in engaging recipients in work or work activities, and (2) it reinforces the notion that participation in work or work activities in return for receiving welfare assistance is a policy goal of TANF. | The 1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193) created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. TANF's predecessor program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), historically assisted non-working single mothers. The debates leading to the 1996 law focused on how to move those single mothers from welfare to work.
TANF provides states with flexibility in how they design their programs. It has national goals, one of which is ending dependence of needy parents on government benefits by, in part, promoting job preparation and work. To enforce that goal, TANF requires that 50% of each state's TANF families with an adult recipient include a member who is either working or engaged in welfare-to-work activities. There are credits that states may receive that lower the 50% goal for states that have reduced caseloads or spend from their own funds more than the amount required under TANF. Thus, there are four different routes for states to meet the work participation standard: (1) caseload reduction (i.e., reducing the number of families receiving TANF assistance); (2) excess state spending; (3) providing assistance to those already working ("unsubsidized employment"); and (4) engaging otherwise non-employed recipients in welfare-to-work activities, such as job search, education and training, community service, work experience, and subsidized employment.
The main performance measure for TANF is the work participation rate (WPR), which measures the share of families in the caseload with a member who is either working or engaged in welfare-to-work activities. The WPR is compared annually to the state's after-credit numerical goal to determine whether it met the work participation standard. The national average WPR fluctuated around 30% from FY2002 through FY2011. Most states met the work participation standard through a combination of caseload reduction, excess spending credits, and a WPR below 50%. Over that period, about half of the national WPR was comprised of recipients in unsubsidized jobs.
In recent years, the national TANF average WPR has increased; it approached 50% for the first time in FY2015. This increase is due to states using TANF dollars to implement "earnings supplement" programs, separate from the regular TANF cash assistance programs. Earnings supplement programs provide benefits, usually small ones ($10 to $50 per month), to families with working parents who are not in regular state TANF assistance programs. Some earnings supplement programs provide benefits to those who left regular state TANF cash assistance programs; others provide benefits to families without any necessary connection to regular TANF cash assistance. Despite this, families who receive these TANF-funded benefits are counted toward the WPR.
Throughout the history of TANF, participation in welfare-to-work activities has been relatively modest. In FY2015, out of a monthly average of 743,000 non-employed TANF work-eligible individuals, 143,000 (less than 1 in 5) were reported as engaged in welfare-to-work activities.
TANF now has a record of 20 years, highlighted by (1) caseload reduction, with particularly large caseload declines in the early years; (2) an increase in the share of families receiving assistance with a parent who is employed; and (3) modest rates of participation in welfare-to-work activities among those who are not otherwise employed. If policymakers wish to increase engagement of non-employed recipients, a number of questions would be raised—including whether TANF's flexibility with the performance standards structure provides sufficient incentives to increase engagement, or whether other program models, such as a separate program dedicated to work activities for assistance recipients, should be considered. |
crs_R41447 | crs_R41447_0 | Whether it was the manner in which a new constitution was supposedly approved or the provisions of the elections laws, several members of Congress and the Obama Administration have been critical of the process by which Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), plans on conducting the election. The election has opened debates about U.S. policy towards Burma, including questions about whether the largely isolationist policy of the past 20 years, marked by extensive economic sanctions against the regime for its human rights violations, has been effective in encouraging political change and improving the government's treatment of the Burmese people; whether the Obama Administration's decision to engage the Burmese government can be effective; and whether sanctions are sufficiently strict and sufficiently well-enforced to pressure the junta to improve its human rights policies. Background
On November 7, 2010, Burma (also known as Myanmar) will hold its first parliamentary elections in 20 years. On May 27, 1990, Burma held parliamentary elections in which the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won 392 seats out of 485 seats. Following the elections, SLORC arrested and imprisoned many of the opposition leaders, including NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi. There have also been objections to the terms of the Union Election Commission Law and the 17 people subsequently appointed to the commission by the SPDC. The Political Parties and Their Candidates
According to a notification released by the UEC on September 14, 2010, 37 political parties will be allowed to run candidates in the 2010 elections (see Table 1 ). There has also been controversy about some of the USDP candidates. The official campaign period for the November elections began on September 24, 2010, with the first broadcast of a UEC-approved statement by the National Unity Party (NUP). Opposition parties also assert that the UEC has been more lenient and forthcoming with permits for the USDP and other pro-junta political parties. Some of the first voices raised in support of an election boycott were student groups and Buddhist monks. In August 2010, the NLD officially announced that it was boycotting the election. Some election observers report little interest in the election, as many voters presume the USDC and other pro-junta parties will be declared the official winners, either because of a lack of opposition or fraud. By contrast, it would take a near complete sweep of contested seats for the opposition parties to win a majority of the contested seats in the national parliament. In addition, opposition parties do not have a sufficient number of candidates to win a majority of the state or regional parliamentary seats, but could win control in the Arakan (Rakhine), Kachin, Mon, and Shan states. However, the decision not to allow portions of these states to participate in the election, as well as continued reports of intimidation in these regions, may indicate that the SPDC is trying to insure a USDP victory even in ethnic minority regions. Implications for U.S. Policy
The Obama Administration has repeatedly stated that it does not expect Burma's parliamentary elections of November 7, 2010, to be free and fair. According to an anonymous source quoted on August 18, 2010, in the Washington Post , the Obama Administration is considering tightening financial sanctions on Burma, and supports the creation of a U.N. commission of inquiry into crimes against humanity and war crimes in Burma. 110-286 ), the President has the authority to impose financial sanctions on certain Burmese officials, military personnel, or their associates. | Burma is to hold its first parliamentary elections in 20 years on November 7, 2010. The polls raise questions about U.S. policy towards the Burmese regime, coming in the context of two decades of largely isolationist U.S. policy towards Burma. Some argue that these elections, even if far from free and fair, offer a limited opportunity for political change, even if evolutionary. Others believe that the ruling junta's restrictions on electoral activity thus far demonstrate that it has little interest in democracy or in loosening its repressive policies. These considerations weigh deeply in policy debates over sanctions and engagement with the regime—debates in which Congress has had a strong voice over the past two decades.
In 1990, the last time nationwide parliamentary elections were held in Burma, the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by prominent opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, won a stunning and unexpected victory. The junta's subsequent refusal to seat the newly elected parliament and its arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi were widely condemned internationally, and led to the imposition of numerous U.S. and international sanctions against the regime. This time, the circumstances surrounding the elections have been controversial from the start. The Obama Administration has repeatedly stated that it does not foresee the elections being free and fair, and the outcome will not be a genuine reflection of the will of the people of Burma. Some members of Congress have also expressed skepticism that Burma's impending elections will be a true expression of democracy.
Most observers feel that by various means and methods, the ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and the Union Election Commission (UEC) are conspiring to ensure that the pro-junta political parties will win most of the 1,163 seats at stake. Preliminary information on the number of proposed candidates submitted by each of the political parties indicate that it would take a virtual election sweep by their candidates for the opposition parties to win a majority. The opposition parties are particularly weak in many of the state and regional parliamentary elections; an exception is in states where ethnic minorities are a large percentage of the population. Thus, it is more likely that the pro-junta parties will win a majority of the seats on November 7.
The UEC has approved 37 parties to participate in the elections, but on September 14 it announced that several political parties—including Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD—were officially dissolved. The formal campaign period for the parliamentary elections began on September 24, 2010. There have been accusations of irregularities in the campaign process, including decisions by the UEC to reject the broadcasting of some party statements, undue restrictions on campaign rallies, and intimidation of opposition party members. The SPDC has also arrested Buddhist monks and students advocating boycotting the elections.
The Obama Administration reportedly is considering the imposition of additional sanctions on Burma, in part because of the manner in which the SPDC is conducting the election. The Administration is also backing calls for the creation of a U.N. Commission of inquiry into crimes against humanity and war crimes in Burma. Ten other nations have also backed the creation of the U.N. Commission.
Under current federal law, President Obama has the authority to impose certain types of financial sanctions without seeking approval from Congress. However, he must inform Congress if and when he imposes new sanctions. |
crs_RL34630 | crs_RL34630_0 | Federal funds do, however, provide certain financial support to convention committees that choose to accept public money. A variety of policy issues surrounds convention financing. The 2012 Democratic and Republican conventions received a total of approximately $36.5 million from the Presidential Election Campaign Fund (which generally excludes security costs). Although both presidential public funds and security funds support conventions, Congress may reassess them separately. This report will not be updated. Discussion of subsequent developments appears in another CRS product that supersedes this report. For additional detail, see CRS Report R43976, Funding of Presidential Nominating Conventions: An Overview , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Convention Financing: An Overview
Federal Funds
Two sources of federal funds support different aspects of presidential nominating conventions. In 2008, Congress appropriated $100 million for the Democratic and Republican presidential nominating convention security in Denver and Minneapolis-St. Paul, respectively. Recent Federal Convention Funding
As Table 1 shows, the federal government provided a total of approximately $136.5 million—combining PECF grants and security expenditures—to support the 2012 Democratic and Republican conventions. Each convention was allocated approximately $68.2 million. The $100 million Congress appropriated for the FY2012 presidential nominating conventions was, reportedly, primarily to reimburse states and localities for law enforcement costs associated with their participation in securing the convention sites. Some of these additional security costs may have included the USSS protection of the major presidential candidates (whether at the convention or at other campaign locations) and the use of other federal government personnel which assisted in securing the convention sites, such as Federal Protective Service law enforcement officers. 2019 . The Committee on House Administration has reported two other related bills ( H.R. 94 ; H.R. H.R. 94 would eliminate convention financing; H.R. 95 would eliminate the entire public financing program. Other bills that would eliminate convention financing include H.R. 260 , H.R. 1724 , H.R. 2857 , and S. 118 . Another bill, H.R. 270 , would eliminate convention financing but revamp other parts of the presidential public financing program. In the Senate, an amendment (containing text from S. 3257 (Coburn)) to the 2012 Agriculture Reform, Food and Jobs Act, S. 3240 , would have eliminated PECF convention funding. Separately, S. 194 (McConnell) proposed to eliminate the entire public financing program. The House passed (239-160) H.R. That bill's public financing provisions were virtually identical to H.R. 359 . H.R. 3463 also would have eliminated the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), a topic that is unrelated to public financing of presidential campaigns and conventions. 5912 (Cole), would have eliminated only convention financing. Other legislation would have maintained the public financing program for candidates but would alter convention financing. Both would eliminate convention funding. 2992 proposed to eliminate PECF convention funding. 6061 and S. 3681 , although bolstering other elements of the public financing program, also would have eliminated convention funding. None of these measures appeared to affect separate security funding discussed in this report. Additional discussion appears in the " Policy Issues and Options " section of this report. 112-55 ). DOJ's role in providing convention security funding, the mission of the USSS, and the relationship between federal funding and nonfederal costs associated with convention security could be issues that Congress might choose to address prior to the conventions in 2016. Congress has several options for revisiting the federal role in PECF funding, if it chooses to do so. | This report provides overview and analysis of two recurring questions surrounding the federal government's role in financing presidential nominating conventions. First, how much public funding supports presidential nominating conventions? Second, what options exist for changing that amount if Congress chooses to do so? In the 113th Congress, the House passed legislation (H.R. 2019) to eliminate nonsecurity funding. The Committee on House Administration reported two other related bills (H.R. 94; H.R. 95). Other bills that would eliminate convention financing include H.R. 260, H.R. 1724, H.R. 2857, and S. 118. Another bill, H.R. 270, would eliminate convention financing but revamp other parts of the presidential public financing program.
The 112th Congress also considered legislation to end convention funding. In the Senate, an amendment (containing text from S. 3257) to the 2012 Agriculture Reform, Food and Jobs Act, S. 3240, would have eliminated the convention funding portion of the presidential public financing program. Separately, S. 194 proposed to eliminate the entire public financing program. Another Senate bill, S. 3312, would reform the public financing program partially by eliminating convention funding. Two measures that would have eliminated convention funding passed the House (H.R. 359 and H.R. 3463). Both would have eliminated the entire public financing program. H.R. 5912 would have eliminated only convention financing. H.R. 414 would have revamped the public financing system but eliminated convention financing. These measures do not appear to affect separate security funding discussed in this report.
The 112th Congress enacted one law (P.L. 112-55) in FY2012 that affected convention security funding with the appropriation of $100 million for the Democratic and Republican nominating conventions (each was allocated $50 million). This security funding was not provided to party convention committees but to the state and local law enforcement entities assisting in securing the convention sites.
The 2012 Democratic and Republican convention committees each received grants, financed with public funds, of approximately $18.2 million (for a total of approximately $36.5 million, as rounded). A total of approximately $133.6 million in federal funds supported the 2008 Democratic and Republican conventions. Such funding was provided through separate federal programs that support public financing of presidential campaigns and convention security.
Some Members of Congress and others have objected to federal convention funding and have argued that the events should be entirely self-supporting. Others, however, contend that public funding is necessary to avoid real or apparent corruption in this aspect of the presidential nominating process. If Congress decides to revisit convention financing, a variety of policy options discussed in this report might present alternatives to current funding arrangements.
Additional discussion of public financing of presidential campaigns appears in CRS Report RL34534, Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns: Overview and Analysis, by [author name scrubbed] and CRS Report R41604, Proposals to Eliminate Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns, by [author name scrubbed]. For additional information on National Special Security Events, which include presidential nominating conventions, see CRS Report RS22754, National Special Security Events, by [author name scrubbed]. This report will not be updated. Discussion of subsequent developments appears in another CRS product that supersedes this report. For additional detail, see CRS Report R43976, Funding of Presidential Nominating Conventions: An Overview, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40779 | crs_R40779_0 | Introduction
Congress established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) via the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) amendments. The six-member independent regulatory agency is responsible for civil enforcement of the nation's campaign finance law. In practice, the Commission has been divided equally among Democrats and Republicans. Throughout its history, the Commission has been criticized for failing to reach at least a four-vote consensus on some key policy and enforcement issues, resulting in what are commonly termed deadlocked votes. In August 2009, citing deadlocks and other issues, Senators Feingold and McCain introduced legislation ( S. 1648 ) to restructure the agency. Although the topic of deadlocked votes arises frequently, empirical analyses of the phenomenon are rare. Those that exist rely on older data. What is less clear, however, is whether deadlocks are common or whether deadlocks fall along party lines. Both points are commonly cited (although often without quantitative data) in anecdotal accounts. This report addresses those questions by exploring deadlocks in rulemakings, enforcement matters, and AOs during the current Commission's first year in office—from July 2008 through June 2009. Although this report examines deadlocks that can occur during rulemakings, enforcement matters, and AOs, it is not intended to provide an exhaustive account of Commission operations, procedures, or processes. The analysis also provides an overview of the policy or legal issues considered in each of those deadlocks. The data show that although deadlocks occurred throughout the year, they occurred in a minority of the matters the Commission considered. Those issues on which deadlocks occurred, however, featured strong disagreement among Commissioners and reflected apparently unsettled positions on some major policy questions, such as: political committee status, when particular activities triggered filing requirements or other regulation, and questions related to investigations and other enforcement matters. This report discusses substantive deadlocks (or simply deadlocks ). Policy Options
Maintain the Status Quo
As the data show, during the current Commission's first year, substantive deadlocks occurred in about 13% of votes in MURs and less than 6% of all enforcement actions when combining MURs with ADR and AFP cases. In addition, a legislative overhaul of the agency is likely to be controversial. No deadlocks occurred on rulemakings. | In the mid-1970s, Congress designed the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to be a bipartisan independent regulatory agency. The agency's structure is intended to guard against partisan enforcement of campaign finance law. Consequently, the six-member Commission has been evenly divided among Democrats and Republicans. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) also requires that the Commission muster at least four votes to exercise core functions—meaning that no measure can advance without at least some bipartisan support.
Perhaps because of that structure, however, the Commission has been criticized for sometimes failing to achieve consensus on key policy issues, resulting in what are typically termed deadlocked votes, in which matters of law or regulation may be left unresolved. In August 2009, citing deadlocks and other issues, Senators Feingold and McCain introduced legislation (S. 1648) to restructure the agency.
Although the topic of deadlocked votes arises frequently, empirical analyses of the phenomenon are rare. Those that exist focus on older data. Accordingly, this report asks whether deadlocks are as common as popular wisdom suggests and whether deadlocks fall along party lines. Both points are commonly cited (although often without quantitative data) in anecdotal accounts. The report addresses those questions by providing an overview of deadlocks in rulemakings, enforcement matters, and advisory opinions (AOs) during the current Commission's first year in office—from July 2008 through June 2009—when concern over deadlocks has most recently reemerged. Although this report examines deadlocks that can occur during rulemakings, enforcement matters, and AOs, it is not intended to provide an exhaustive account of Commission operations, procedures, or processes.
The data show that deadlocks occurred throughout the current Commission's first year in office, but they affected a minority of the matters considered. Specifically, deadlocks occurred in about 13% of matters under review (MURs) and in about 17% of AOs. No deadlocks occurred on rulemakings. Those issues on which deadlocks occurred, however, featured staunch disagreement among Commissioners and reflected apparently unsettled positions on some major policy questions. In addition, when deadlocks occurred, Commissioners always voted in partisan blocs. Deadlocked votes can be interpreted from various perspectives, which may influence whether Congress decides to maintain the status quo or pursue oversight or legislative action.
This report will be updated periodically to reflect new data or as developments warrant. |
crs_R41286 | crs_R41286_0 | Background
The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with preventing the entry of terrorists, securing the borders, and carrying out immigration enforcement functions. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of DHS, has primary responsibility for securing the borders of the United States, preventing terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States, and enforcing hundreds of U.S. trade and immigration laws. Within CBP, the U.S. Border Patrol's mission is to detect and prevent the illegal entry of aliens across the nearly 7,000 miles of Mexican and Canadian international borders and 2,000 miles of coastal borders surrounding Florida and Puerto Rico. On May 25, 2010, President Obama announced that up to 1,200 National Guard troops would be sent to the southern border to support the Border Patrol. Indeed, direct military involvement in law enforcement activities without proper statutory authorization might run afoul of the Posse Comitatus Act. The PCA also does not apply where Congress has expressly authorized use of the military to execute domestic law. The military indirectly supports border security and immigration control efforts under general legislation that authorizes the Armed Forces to support federal, state, and local LEAs. | The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with preventing the entry of terrorists, securing the borders, and carrying out immigration enforcement functions. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of DHS, has primary responsibility for securing the borders of the United States, preventing terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States, and enforcing hundreds of U.S. trade and immigration laws. Within CBP, the U.S. Border Patrol's mission is to detect and prevent the illegal entry of aliens across the nearly 7,000 miles of Mexican and Canadian international borders and 2,000 miles of coastal borders surrounding Florida and Puerto Rico.
Although the military does not have primary responsibility to secure the borders, the Armed Forces generally provide support to law enforcement and immigration authorities along the southern border. Reported escalations in criminal activity and illegal immigration, however, have prompted some lawmakers to reevaluate the extent and type of military support that occurs in the border region. On May 25, 2010, President Obama announced that up to 1,200 National Guard troops would be sent to the border to support the Border Patrol. Addressing domestic laws and activities with the military, however, might run afoul of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), which prohibits use of the Armed Forces to perform the tasks of civilian law enforcement unless explicitly authorized. There are alternative legal authorities for deploying the National Guard, and the precise scope of permitted activities and funds may vary with the authority exercised. |
crs_RL31823 | crs_RL31823_0 | Introduction
In January 2004, federal white-collar employees received a 1.5% annual pay adjustment anda 0.5% locality-based comparability payment under Executive Order 13322, issued by PresidentGeorge Bush on December 30, 2003. (2) H.R. 2989 , the Departments ofTransportation and Treasury and IndependentAgencies Appropriations Bill, 2004, as passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate in thefirst session of the 108th Congress, provided a 4.1% pay adjustment to federal civilian employees. 2989 was incorporated in H.R.2673. President Bush signed H.R. The President issued Executive Order 13332 on March 3, 2004, to provide theadditional pay adjustment, which was allocated as an average 1.2% annual and 0.9% locality. Federal white-collar employees are to receive an annual pay adjustment and a locality-based comparability payment, effective in January of each year, under Section 529 of P.L. 101-509 , theFederal Employees Pay Comparability Act (FEPCA) of 1990. (4) Although the federal pay adjustmentsare sometimes referred to as cost-of-living adjustments, neither the annual adjustment nor the localitypayment is based on measures of the cost of living. FEPCA has never been implemented asoriginally enacted. The nationwideaverage net pay increase in January 2004, if the ECI and locality-based comparability payments hadbeen granted as specified by FEPCA, would have been 15.15%. The annual pay adjustment is based on the Employment Cost Index (ECI), which measures change in private sector wages and salaries. For the January 2004 localitypayments, a phase-in of NCS survey data was approved. By law, the disparitybetween non-federal and federal salaries is to be reduced to 5%. In order to meet the target for closing the pay gap, the council recommended locality pay raises ranging from 19.45% in the "Rest of the United States" (RUS) pay area to 47.64% in the SanFrancisco pay area. The payment recommended for the Washington, DC, pay area was 28.78%. (25) Because the new locality rate replaces the existing locality rate, the change in locality rates is derivedby comparing 2003 locality payments with those recommended for 2004. This comparison resultedin recommended increases in locality rates from 2003 to 2004 of 11.90% in the RUS pay area to25.23% in the San Francisco pay area, and 17.31% in the Washington, DC, pay area. The cost of the January 2004 locality-based comparability payments would be $8.830 billion if the full amount necessary to reduce the pay disparity of the target gap to 5% were provided inJanuary 2004 as required by FEPCA, according to the Pay Agent. The President issued an alternative plan to change the amount of the annual adjustment and locality-based comparability payments on August 27, 2003. 108-199 on January 23,2004. 108-199 . (77)
The Consolidated Appropriations Act provides an additional 2.1% pay adjustment to federal civilian employees. OPM issuedrevised salary tables for 2004 on its website the next day; these are available on the Internet at http://www.opm.gov . Themethodology has remained a concern because the Bureau of Labor Statistics surveys documentingnon-federal rates of pay were not approved for use in determining the 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003locality payments. In P.L. | Federal white-collar employees are to receive an annual pay adjustment and a locality-based comparability payment, effective in January of each year, under Section 529 of P.L. 101-509 , theFederal Employees Pay Comparability Act (FEPCA) of 1990. In January 2004, they received a 1.5%annual pay adjustment and a 0.5% locality-based comparability payment under Executive Order13322, issued by President George W. Bush on December 30, 2003. P.L. 108-199 , enacted onJanuary 23, 2004, provides a 4.1% pay adjustment for 2004. Under the law, an additional 2.1% payadjustment, allocated as an average 1.2% annual and 0.9% locality, was provided to federal civilianemployees under Executive Order 13332, issued by the President on March 3, 2004. OPM publishedrevised salary tables for 2004 on its website the next day. Although the federal pay adjustments aresometimes referred to as cost-of-living adjustments, neither the annual adjustment nor the localitypayment is based on measures of the cost of living.
The annual pay adjustment is based on the Employment Cost Index (ECI), which measures change in private-sector wages and salaries. The index showed that the annual across-the-boardincrease would be 2.7% in January 2004. The size of the locality payment is determined by thePresident, and is based on a comparison of non-federal and General Schedule (GS) salaries in 32 payareas nationwide. By law, the disparity between non-federal and federal salaries was to be graduallyreduced to 5% over the years 1994 through 2002; FEPCA requires that amounts payable may not beless than the full amount necessary to reduce the pay disparity to 5% in January 2004. The FederalSalary Council and the Pay Agent recommended that the 2004 locality payments range from 19.45%in the "Rest of the United States" (RUS) pay area to 47.64% in the San Francisco pay area. Thepayment recommended for the Washington, DC, pay area was 28.78%. Because the new localityrate replaces the existing locality rate, the change in locality rates is derived by comparing 2003locality payments with those recommended for 2004. This comparison resulted in recommendedincreases in locality rates from 2003 to 2004 of 11.90% in the RUS pay area to 25.23% in the SanFrancisco pay area, and 17.31% in the Washington, DC, pay area. The nationwide average net payincrease, if the ECI and locality-based comparability payments were granted as stipulated in FEPCA,would have been 15.15%. President Bush proposed a 2.0% federal civilian pay adjustment in hisFY2004 budget. On August 27, 2003, he issued an alternative plan to provide the 2.0% adjustmentin January 2004. H.R. 2989 , the Departments of Transportation and Treasury andIndependent Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2004, as passed by the House of Representatives and theSenate, and as incorporated in H.R. 2673 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act forFY2004, provides a 4.1% pay adjustment for federal civilian employees. H.R. 2673 wasenacted as P.L. 108-199 .
FEPCA has never been implemented as originally enacted. Since 1995, locality payments have been much lower than FEPCA requires. Additionally, the Bureau of Labor Statistics surveysdocumenting non-federal rates of pay were not approved for use in determining the 2000, 2001,2002, and 2003 locality payments. A phase-in of BLS survey data was approved for 2004. |
crs_R44246 | crs_R44246_0 | 3713 , occasioned by the manager's amendment adopted before the Senate Judiciary Committee passed S. 2123 , are noted in the prefatory remarks for each chart, and in the remarks relating to the inventory of federal crimes. S. 502 / H.R. H.R. 2944 would expand the safety valve to mandatory minimums associated with the use of firearm during and in furtherance of a drug trafficking cases as well as to drug trafficking mandatory minimums. 3553(a). Fair Sentencing Act
Originally, the Controlled Substances Act made no distinction between powder cocaine and crack cocaine (cocaine base). 2944 would simply make the FSA retroactively applicable. 3713 and H.R. 2944 would create no new mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. | This is a comparison of selected criminal sentencing reform bills as introduced: H.R. 3713, H.R. 2944, S. 502, and H.R. 920; and S. 2123 as passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee with a manager's amendment. It consists of narrative and charts comparing the bills with respect to adjustments in the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions that apply to controlled substance and firearms offenses, the safety valve, and retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA). |
crs_R42987 | crs_R42987_0 | Developments in the 113th Congress
In the 113 th Congress, Members of Congress introduced a wide range of longstanding gun control proposals. Some of these proposals gained renewed energy following the December 2012 Newtown, CT, tragedy, and several other "mass shooting" incidents in that year. Some, but not all, of these provisions were included in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. Those proposals would have (1) required background checks for intrastate firearms transfers between unlicensed persons at gun shows and nearly any other venue, otherwise known as the "universal background checks" proposal; (2) increased penalties for gun trafficking; and (3) reinstated and strengthened an expired federal ban on detachable ammunition magazines of over 10-round capacity and certain "military style" firearms commonly described as "semiautomatic assault weapons," which are designed to accept such magazines. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Action
In alignment with the President's plan, in the Spring 2013, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary approved the following four gun control-related bills:
Stop Illegal Trafficking in Firearms Act of 2013 ( S. 54 ), on March 7, 2013, to establish standalone straw purchasing and gun trafficking prohibitions and increase related penalties; Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013 ( S. 374 ), on March 11, to require background checks for private firearms transfers, and encourage states to provide the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with greater access to records on prohibited persons for background check purposes; and to authorize additional appropriations of $100 million annually (FY2014-FY2018) for funding grants to states to improve access to firearms-related prohibiting records—especially for persons adjudicated "mentally defective" and persons convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence; School Safety Enhancements Act of 2013 ( S. 146 ), on March 11, to authorize annual appropriations of up to $40 million for the next 10 years for the Secure Our Schools grant program under the Department of Justice (DOJ) Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS); and Assault Weapons Ban of 2013 ( S. 150 ), on March 14, to ban permanently the further production or importation of certain semiautomatic firearms, as well as high-capacity magazines. Senate Floor Action
From April 16-18, 2013, the Senate considered the Safe Communities, Safe Schools Act of 2013 ( S. 649 ). As introduced, this bill included the language of S. 54 , S. 374 , and S. 146 , but it did not include S. 150 . In total, the Senate voted on nine amendments that addressed a wide array of gun control issues. By unanimous consent, the Senate agreed that adoption of these amendments would require a 60-vote threshold. All but two of these amendments were defeated. House and Senate Veterans' Committees Action
While the House did not considered any of the wider gun control proposals, such as universal background checks, debated in the Senate, on May 8, 2013, the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs approved a bill, the Veterans 2 nd Amendment Protection Act ( H.R. The House Committee reported this bill ( H.R. Extension of the 1988 Undetectable Firearms Act
The House and Senate passed a 10-year extension of the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 ( H.R. 3626 ). 113-57 ). Hunting, Fishing, Recreational Shooting, and Firearms Carry on "Public Lands"
The gun rights community supported legislation intended to promote hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting on public lands. §4161(a)), respectively. On July 9, 2014, the House Committee on Appropriations approved an FY2015 Interior Appropriations bill ( H.R. 4923 ) that included provisions that were similar, but not identical, to those originally included in H.R. 3590 and S. 2363 . On July 10, 2014, the House Committee approved an FY2015 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill ( H.R. 4923 ) that included a provision that would have prohibited the Army Corps of Engineers from implementing or enforcing regulations to prevent private persons from otherwise legally carrying firearms on Corps-managed property. The House passed H.R. 113-235 ). Both of these amendments would have also addressed veterans' firearms eligibility and mental incompetency, as would have an amendment offered by Senator Burr. 725 ) that would have also amended P.L. 602 )—that included similar provisions. The Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs approved a nearly identical bill on September 4, 2013 ( S. 572 ). §924(a)(1)(A). | The December 2012 Newtown, CT, tragedy, along with other mass shootings in Aurora, CO, and Tucson, AZ, restarted the national gun control debate in the 113th Congress. The Senate considered a range of legislative proposals, including several that President Barack Obama supported as part of his national gun violence reduction plan. The most salient of these proposals would have (1) required background checks for intrastate firearms transfers between unlicensed persons at gun shows and nearly any other venue, otherwise known as the "universal background checks" proposal; (2) increased penalties for gun trafficking; and (3) reinstated and strengthened an expired federal ban on detachable ammunition magazines of over 10-round capacity and certain "military style" firearms commonly described as "semiautomatic assault weapons," which are designed to accept such magazines.
On March 21, 2013, Senator Harry Reid introduced the Safe Communities, Safe Schools Act of 2013 (S. 649). As introduced, this bill included the language of several bills previously reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: (1) the Stop Illegal Trafficking in Firearms Act of 2013 (S. 54), (2) the Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013 (S. 374), and (3) the School Safety Enhancements Act of 2013 (S. 146). However, the Assault Weapons Ban of 2013 (S. 150) was not included in S. 649. From April 17-18, 2013, the Senate considered S. 649 and nine amendments that addressed a wide array of gun control issues, ranging from restricting assault weapons to mandating interstate recognition (reciprocity) of state handgun concealed carry laws. By unanimous consent, the Senate agreed that adoption of these amendments would require a 60-vote threshold. All but two of these amendments were rejected. A final vote was not taken on S. 649.
Although Members of the House of Representatives introduced similar proposals, none were approved by Committee, nor considered on the House floor. On May 8, 2013, however, the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs approved a bill, the Veterans 2nd Amendment Protection Act (H.R. 602), that would have addressed veterans, mental incompetency, and firearms eligibility. This bill would have narrowed the grounds by which beneficiaries of veterans' disability compensation or pensions are determined to be ineligible to receive, possess, ship, or transfer a firearm or ammunition because a fiduciary had been appointed on their behalf. The Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs approved a nearly identical bill (S. 572) on September 4, 2013. In addition, in December 2013, Congress approved a 10-year extension of the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 (H.R. 3626; P.L. 113-57).
The House passed and the Senate considered bills (H.R. 3590 and S. 2363) intended to promote hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting in February and July 2014, respectively. Both bills arguably included several gun control-related provisions. The House Committee on Appropriations approved an FY2015 Interior appropriations measure (H.R. 4923) on July 9, 2014, that included provisions which were similar, but not identical, to those included in H.R. 3590 and S. 2363. The House passed an FY2015 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill (H.R. 4923) on July 10, 2014, that included a provision that would have addressed civilian carry of firearms on public properties managed by the Army Corps of Engineers. In addition, the House amended and passed an FY2015 District of Columbia appropriations bill (H.R. 5016) on July 16, 2014, with a provision that would have prohibited the use of any funding provided under that bill from being used to enforce certain District gun control statutes. Some, but not all, of these provisions were included in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235). This report reflects the final update for the 113th Congress. |
crs_RS21508 | crs_RS21508_0 | Spectrum Management and Auction Proceeds
Current broadcast and wireless communications technology requires the assignment of specific frequencies to prevent interference among transmissions. Spectrum policy that designates auction proceeds for specific uses is a departure from this requirement. This was accomplished with the passage of the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act, Title II of P.L. 108-494 , in 2004. The Communications Act of 1934 was therefore amended to create a Spectrum Relocation Fund within the Treasury to hold auction proceeds as designated. Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund
To facilitate the clearing of spectrum for revenue-generating auctions, the 109 th Congress included measures in a budget reconciliation bill to create a fund to hold the proceeds from Congressionally mandated auctions of licenses in the 700 MHz band. 95 up to $1,500 million on coupons for households toward the purchase of TV set top boxes that can convert digital broadcast signals for display on analog sets; a grant program of up to $1,000 million to improve communications capabilities for public safety agencies; payments of up to $30 million toward the cost of temporary digital transmission equipment for broadcasters serving the Metropolitan New York area; payments of up to $10 million to help low-power television stations purchase equipment that will convert full-power broadcast signals from digital to analog; a program funded up to $65 million to reimburse low-power television stations in rural areas for upgrading equipment from analog to digital technology; up to $106 million to implement a unified national alert system and $50 million for a tsunami warning and coastal vulnerability program; contributions totaling no more than $43.5 million for a national 911 improvement program established by the ENHANCE 911 Act of 2004; and up to $30 million in support of the Essential Air Service Program. Legislation in the 110th Congress
The Public Safety Interoperability Implementation Act ( H.R. 3116 , Representative Stupak) would establish a separate fund within the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund that would be used for public safety communications grants. This separate fund would receive the proceeds remaining from the auction required by the Deficit Reduction Act, after the payments required by the act had been made. The Spectrum Relocation Improvement Act of 2008 ( H.R. | Congress has acted to create two special funds to hold the revenue of certain spectrum auctions for specific purposes. These funds represent a departure from existing practice, which requires that auction proceeds be credited directly to the Treasury as income. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171, Title III) required the auctioning of licenses for spectrum currently used by TV broadcasters for analog transmissions. It established the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund to receive this auction revenue and use some of the proceeds for the transition to digital television, public safety communications, and other programs. The Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act (P.L. 108-494, Title II) established a Spectrum Relocation Fund to hold the proceeds of certain spectrum auctions for the specific purpose of reimbursing federal entities for the costs of moving to new frequency assignments. The spectrum being vacated by federal users has been sold for commercial use. Passage of the Spectrum Enhancement Act set a precedent in national policy for spectrum management by linking spectrum auction proceeds to specific funding programs.
Among bills related to special funds that were introduced during the 110th Congress are: the Spectrum Relocation Improvement Act of 2008 (H.R. 7207, Inslee): the RESPONDER Act of 2008 (S. 3465, Wicker); and The Public Safety Interoperability Implementation Act (H.R. 3116, Stupak). |
crs_R44087 | crs_R44087_0 | T he number of people incarcerated in federal prisons increased dramatically over the past three decades. However, even with the recent decrease in the number of federal prison inmates, the federal prison population is more than seven times larger than it was three decades ago. Concerns about both the economic and social consequences of the country's burgeoning prison population have resulted in a range of organizations including the American Civil Liberties Union, Right on Crime, and the American Conservative Union's Center for Criminal Justice Reform calling for reforms to the nation's criminal justice system. This assessment is used to place inmates in facilities commensurate with their security needs. Under the proposed system, some inmates would be eligible for earned time credits for participating in rehabilitative programs that reduce their risk of recidivism. Such credits would allow inmates to be placed in prerelease custody earlier than under their original sentences. This includes a discussion of the Risk-Needs-Responsivity principles, which have become the dominant paradigm for reducing the likelihood of recidivism among convicted offenders. Assessment instruments typically consist of a series of questions that help guide an interview with an offender in order to collect data on behaviors and attitudes that research indicates are related to the risk of recidivism. Static risk factors do not change over time. Dynamic risk factors, also called "criminogenic needs," change and/or can be addressed through interventions. In general, research indicates that most commonly used risk and needs assessment instruments can, with a moderate level of accuracy, predict who is at risk for recidivism. It also indicates that of the most commonly used risk and needs assessments, no one instrument is superior to any other when it comes to predictive validity. The risk principle states that high-risk offenders need to be placed in programs that provide more intensive treatment and services while low-risk offenders should receive minimal or even no intervention. Needs Principle
The needs principle states that effective treatment should focus on addressing criminogenic needs, that is, dynamic risk factors that are highly correlated with criminal conduct. Responsivity Principle
The responsivity principle states that rehabilitative programming should be delivered in a style and mode that is consistent with the ability and learning style of the offender. Implementing an assessment system and offender programming regime that adheres to the RNR principles in federal prisons is, based on the current research, an evidence-based way to better match inmates with the rehabilitative programming they need, and when combined with earned time credits for some inmates who complete rehabilitative programs and productive activities, it might provide a means for reducing the federal prison population without increasing the risk to public safety. Policymakers might be interested in steps that can be taken to reduce the potential for bias in risk and needs assessment. The recommendations of the Council of State Governments are consistent with requirements in legislation before Congress that would require DOJ to validate the proposed risk and needs assessment instrument on the federal prison population, use the best available research on risk and needs assessment when developing the proposed risk and needs assessment system, make regular adjustments to the system to ensure that it does not result in any unwarranted disparities, train assessors on how to properly use the system, and monitor and assess the use of the system and periodically audit its use in BOP facilities. Should Certain Inmates Be Excluded from Receiving Time Credits? Should Priority Be Given to High-Risk Offenders? Should Risk and Needs Assessment Be Used in Sentencing? Should There Be a Decreased Emphasis on Long Prison Sentences? Legislation before Congress would exempt inmates convicted of certain crimes from being eligible for earned time credits. | The number of people incarcerated in federal prisons increased dramatically over the past three decades. While the number of inmates in the federal prison system has decreased since FY2013, the federal prison population remains substantially larger than it was three decades ago.
Concerns about both the economic and social consequences of the country's reliance on incarceration have led to calls for reforms to the nation's criminal justice system, including improving the federal prison system's ability to rehabilitate incarcerated offenders by better assessing their risk for recidivism and addressing their criminogenic needs. "Criminogenic needs" are factors that contribute to criminal behavior that can be changed and/or addressed through interventions.
There have been legislative proposals to implement a risk and needs assessment system in federal prisons. The system would be used to place inmates in appropriate rehabilitative programs. Under the proposed system some inmates would be eligible for earned time credits for completing rehabilitative programs that reduce their risk of recidivism. Such credits would allow inmates to be placed on prerelease custody earlier. The proposed system would exclude inmates convicted of certain offenses from being eligible for earned time credits.
Risk and needs assessment instruments typically consist of a series of items used to collect data on offender behaviors and attitudes that research indicates are related to the risk of recidivism. Generally, inmates are classified as being at a high, moderate, or low risk of recidivism. Assessment instruments are comprised of static and dynamic risk factors. Static risk factors do not change (e.g., age at first arrest or gender), while dynamic risk factors can either change on their own or be changed through an intervention (e.g., current age, education level, or employment status). In general, research suggests that the most commonly used assessment instruments can, with a moderate level of accuracy, predict who is at risk for violent recidivism. It also suggests that of the most commonly used risk assessments none distinguishes itself from the others when it comes to predictive validity.
The Risk-Needs-Responsivity (RNR) model has become the dominant paradigm in risk and needs assessment. The risk principle states that convicted offenders need to be placed in programs that are commensurate with their risk level; in other words, provide more intensive treatment and services to high-risk offenders while low-risk offenders should receive minimal or even no intervention. The need principle states that effective treatment should also focus on addressing the criminogenic needs that contribute to criminal behavior. The responsivity principle states that rehabilitative programming should be delivered in a style and mode that is consistent with the ability and learning style of the offender.
There are several issues policymakers might contemplate should Congress choose to consider legislation to implement a risk and needs assessment system in federal prisons, including the following:
Is there the potential for bias in the use of risk and needs assessment? Should certain inmates be ineligible for earned time credits? Should prison programming focus on inmates at high risk of recidivism? Should risk assessment be incorporated into sentencing? Should there be a decreased focus on long prison sentences? |
crs_R43395 | crs_R43395_0 | This new law extended the authorization for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) for five years, through September 30, 2017, while requiring significant program reforms affecting flood insurance, flood hazard mapping, and floodplains management. 113-76 ) that President Barack Obama signed into law on January 17, 2014. Flood insurance premium rates were initially set "based on consideration of the risk involved and accepted actuarial principles." The key issues of contention have been
what to do about the nation's increasing exposure to flood risks, the cost and consequences of flooding, premium rate structure changes designed to strengthen the financial solvency of the NFIP, and the affordability of flood insurance coverage in the aftermath of the phase-out of premium subsidies on pre-FIRM properties and policies "grandfathered" into the program. The Biggert-Waters Act
On July 6, 2012, Congress passed and the President signed into law P.L. 112-141 , the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Biggert-Waters Act) that reauthorized the NFIP for five years while requiring significant program changes designed to make the program more financially sustainable and to ensure that flood insurance rates more accurately reflect the real risk of flooding. The key to understanding the underlying affordability issues of contention surrounding the reforms made to the NFIP's premium rate structure is to recognize that, in the context of the phase-out of pre-FIRM premium subsidies and grandfathered policy discounts authorized under Section 100205 and Section 100207 of Biggert-Waters, FEMA now considers the expected flood damage or DELV factor (elevation relative to lowest floor of the house) when setting rates for pre-FIRM subsidized and grandfathered properties. On January 17, 2014, President Barack Obama signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, that prohibits FEMA from implementing Section 100207 (the "grandfather" provision) of the Biggert-Waters Act, codified at Section 1308(h) of the 1968 Act. The Omnibus requires FEMA to cease any current planning and development for Section 100207. However, according to FEMA, because Section 100207 does not relate to changes to flood insurance rates that have already taken place, and the Omnibus does not roll back any rate increases that have already occurred, the effect of Section 572 of the Omnibus is that FEMA would not implement Section 100207 until 12 to 18 months after the start of FY2015. FEMA indicated that the agency will continue to map flood risk as authorized by current law. Section 100236 requires FEMA to conduct a study and issue a report to Congress assessing "methods for establishing an affordability framework for [NFIP], including methods to aid individuals to afford risk-based premiums under [NFIP] through targeted assistance rather than generally subsidized rates, including means-tested vouchers." Responses to Affordability Issues and Concerns
In the aftermath of Biggert-Waters reforms and FEMA's adoption of "elevation rating" of pre-FIRM structures, owners of certain properties that, heretofore, did not have to consider the elevation of the structure in the insurance pricing process, now face relatively large rate increases. Opposition to the Removal of Premium Subsidies
Opponents of eliminating subsidized rates argue that the Biggert-Waters law does not explicitly address affordability concerns of existing policyholders facing mandatory coverage requirements and living in older, riskier homes in high-risk flood zones. Further, supporters of delaying rate increases maintain that, although FEMA does not have data on policyholders' ability to pay, the agency has begun implementing sharply higher flood insurance rates for some policyholders. Supporters of the Removal of Premium Subsidies
Proponents of eliminating subsidized rates, and charging all policyholders full-risk rates, point to the NFIP's burden on taxpayers. Congress, they argue, found that ensuring the long-term financial stability of the NFIP is in the public interest, and the Biggert-Waters law seeks to further this goal by transitioning subsidized rates to actual risk-based rates. From this perspective, the removal of premium subsidies would reduce taxpayer costs associated with a fiscally unsound government insurance program and have the additional benefit of reducing hidden financial incentives that encourage building in flood-prone and environmental sensitive coastal areas. 3370 (Grimm)
H.R. In addition, H.R. S. 1926 (Menendez)
On January 31, 2014, the Senate passed S. 1926 , the Homeowners Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, to delay the increase in rates for six months after the later of the date on which FEMA proposes the draft affordability framework or the date on which FEMA certifies that the agency has implemented a flood mapping approach that employs sound scientific and engineering methodologies to determine varying levels of flood risk in all areas participating in the NFIP. FEMA is prohibited from implementing section 1308(h) of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, pertaining to grandfathered properties. Analysis of Bills
H.R. The potential impact of eliminating the pre-FIRM premium subsidy will likely be greatest in communities with a relatively large number of older, negatively-elevated rates and grandfathered policies with significant flood risk. As with S. 1926 , H.R. | On July 6, 2012, President Barack Obama signed into law the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Division F, Title II, P.L. 112-141; 126 Stat. 918) to reauthorize the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) through September 30, 2017, and make significant program changes designed to make the program more financially stable. To achieve long-term financial sustainability and ensure that flood insurance rates more accurately reflect the actuarial risk of flooding, the new law gradually phases out subsidized premiums and grandfathered policies for approximately 19% (or about 1.1 million policyholders) of the program's total number of policyholders.
Under the Biggert-Waters Act, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) began imposing premium rates based on the property's "elevation rate," which, in turn, is based on the property's lowest floor elevation relative to the Base Flood Elevation (BFE) for existing homes and businesses built prior to the community's initial Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM). Since 1973, these so-called pre-FIRM structures had been shielded from higher premium rates. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-448; 82 Stat. 572) included a provision for subsidizing pre-FIRM structures by charging less than full risk-based premiums for flood insurance because their construction took place before the application of the NFIP construction standards. These structures are also exempt from the NFIP's mitigation requirements unless they become substantially damaged or substantially improved.
Thus, with the elevation of the property now being a factor in the rating process, owners of certain properties—that is, those property owners with federally insured mortgages residing in government-designated, flood-prone areas—now face relatively larger flood insurance premium rate increases. Importantly, this transition toward full-risk premium rates for generally older and more risky properties has occurred before FEMA's completion of a congressionally mandated affordability study
The impact of moving to full-risk premiums by eliminating the pre-FIRM premium subsidies, as required by the Biggert-Waters Act, is being felt in virtually all 21,000 NFIP communities across the nation. The impact of elimination of the subsidies on non-principle residential properties (i.e., second homes), business properties, and new or lapsed policies has been particularly felt in communities with a relatively high proportion of high-risk flood-prone pre-FIRM properties. In addition to its impact on property owners, the elimination of the subsidy affects local community economic development as well as debates concerning how to equitably distribute the burden of recovering from flood events.
Opponents of eliminating subsidized rates argue that the Biggert-Waters Act does not explicitly address the affordability concerns of existing policyholders in high-risk flood zones and FEMA does not have sufficient data on policyholders' ability to pay; however, the agency has begun implementing sharply higher flood insurance rates for some policyholders.
Proponents of eliminating subsidized rates maintain that Congress explicitly found that ensuring the long-term financial stability of the NFIP is in the public interest and the Biggert-Waters law seeks to further this goal by transitioning subsidized rates to actual risk-based rates. Removal of premium subsidies and grandfathered policies would reduce taxpayer costs associated with a fiscally unsound government insurance program while reducing the arguably hidden financial incentives that encourage building in flood-prone and environmental sensitive coastal areas.
The key policy questions facing Congress with respect to the post-reform NFIP issues include
addressing the affordability issue; deciding whether, how, and when to privatize flood risk; exploring options for improving flood risk analysis and maps; and finding innovative new approaches to financing the nation's increasing exposure to hurricane-induced catastrophic floods and coastal hazards.
On January 17, 2014, President Barack Obama signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (Division F, Title V, Section 572 of P.L. 113-76), that prohibits FEMA from implementing Section 100207 (the "grandfather" provision) of the Biggert-Waters Act, codified at Section 1308(h) of the 1968 Act, during FY2014. The Omnibus requires FEMA to cease any current planning and development for Section 100207. However, according to FEMA, because Section 100207 does not relate to changes to flood insurance rates that have already taken place, and the Omnibus does not roll back any rate increases that have already occurred, the effect of Section 572 of the Omnibus is that FEMA would not implement Section 100207 until 12 to 18 months after the start of FY2015. FEMA indicated that the agency will continue to map flood risk as authorized by current law.
On January 31, 2014, the Senate passed S. 1926, the Homeowners Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, to delay the increase in rates for six months after the later of the date on which FEMA proposes the draft affordability framework or the date on which FEMA certifies that the agency has implemented a flood mapping approach that employs sound scientific and engineering methodologies to determine varying levels of flood risk in all areas participating in the NFIP. The report to Congress would assess "methods for establishing an affordability framework for [NFIP], including methods to aid individuals to afford risk-based premiums under [NFIP] through targeted assistance rather than generally subsidized rates, including means-tested vouchers."
Several other bills—H.Amdt. 121 (Cassidy) of H.R. 2217 (Carter), H.R. 2199 (Richmond), H.R. 3370 (Grimm), H.R. 3511 (Capuano), and S. 996 (Landrieu) have been introduced to delay implementation of the rate structure reform provisions of the new law and provide additional funding for the completion of the affordability study. |
crs_RL31139 | crs_RL31139_0 | Accordingly, from 1963 until 1977, travel to Cuba was effectively banned under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) issued by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to implement the embargo. Among the significant travel-related measures, the Administration authorized travel by general license for all 12 categories of travel to Cuba set forth in the CACR; permitted authorized travelers to use U.S. credit and debit cards; eliminated traveler per diem limits; authorized general license travel for professional media or artistic productions as part of the travel category for those involved in the export, import, or transmission of information or informational materials; and authorized people-to-people educational travel for individuals. With regard to remittances, the Administration initially increased the dollar limits for so-called nonfamily or donative remittances and the amount of remittances that authorized travelers could carry to Cuba. The most significant regulatory changes, issued in November 2017, included the elimination of individual people-to-people travel and restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel. Easing of Restrictions in 2015 and 2016
Just after the adjournment of the 113 th Congress in December 2014, President Obama announced a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba, moving away from a sanctions-based policy toward one of engagement and a normalization of relations. Changes to the Travel Restrictions. Trump Administration Policy
As noted above, the Trump Administration unveiled Cuba policy changes in June 2017 partially rolling back the Obama Administration's engagement with Cuba. The changes included new restrictions on travel and remittances. In November 2017, the Treasury Department's OFAC issued amendments to the CACR, and the State Department took complementary action by issuing a list of almost 180 restricted entities associated with the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel with which financial transactions that would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba are prohibited. To the extent not authorized above, U.S. academic institutions and their faculty, staff, and students are authorized to engage in transactions directly incident to the following activities, provided these authorizations take place under the auspices of an organization that is subject to U.S. jurisdiction and that all such travelers be accompanied by an employee, paid consultant, or other representative of the sponsoring organization: (1) participation in a structured educational program in Cuba as part of a course offered for credit by a U.S. graduate or undergraduate degree-granting academic institution that is sponsoring the program; (2) noncommercial academic research in Cuba specifically related to Cuba and for the purpose of obtaining an undergraduate or graduate degree; (3) participation in a formal course of study at a Cuban academic institution that will be accepted for credit toward the student's graduate or undergraduate degree; (4) teaching at a Cuban academic institution related to an academic program at the Cuban institution, provided the individual is regularly employed by a U.S. or other non-Cuban academic institution; (5) sponsorship of a Cuban scholar to teach or engage in other scholarly activity at the sponsoring U.S. academic institution; (6) educational exchanges sponsored by Cuban or U.S. secondary schools involving student participation in a formal course of study or in a structured educational program offered by a secondary school or other academic institution and led by a teacher or other secondary school official; (7) sponsorship or cosponsorship of noncommercial academic seminars, conferences, symposia, and workshops related to Cuba or global issues involving Cuba and attendance at such events by faculty, staff, and students of a participating U.S. academic institution; (8) establishment of academic exchanges and joint noncommercial academic research projects with universities or academic institutions in Cuba; (9) provision of standardized testing services to Cuban nationals; (10) provision of internet-based courses, provided that the course content is at the undergraduate level or below; (11) the organization of, and preparation for, activities described above, by an employee, paid consultant, agent, or other representative of the U.S. sponsoring organization; and (12) the facilitation by a U.S. organization, or by a staff member of that organization, of licensed educational activities in Cuba on behalf of U.S. academic institutions or secondary schools with certain provisions for the U.S. organization (31 C.F.R. People-to-People Travel. In 2009, the President lifted all restrictions on family remittances. Remittances to Religious Organizations. Legislative Initiatives in the 115th Congress
In the 115 th Congress, six bills have been introduced that would lift restrictions on travel to Cuba. 572 (Serrano), the Promoting American Agricultural and Medical Exports to Cuba Act of 2017, would ease certain restrictions on agricultural and medical exports to Cuba and would lift restrictions on travel and prohibit restrictions on travel if such travel would be lawful in the United States. 2966 (Rush), the United States-Cuba Normalization Act of 2017, and S. 1699 (Wyden), the United States-Cuba Trade Act of 2017, would lift the embargo on Cuba by removing provisions of law restricting trade and other financial transactions with Cuba, including restrictions on travel, and would prohibit restrictions on travel if such travel would be lawful in the United States. (Both H.R. 2966 and S. 1699 also would prohibit restrictions on U.S. remittances to Cuba.) The 115 th Congress also took legislative action related to concerns about Cuba's airport security. In early October 2018, Congress completed action on the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, signed into law October 6, 2018, as P.L. 115-254 ( H.R. 302 ), which includes a provision in Section 1957 requiring the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to provide Congress a briefing on certain aspects of security measures at airports in Cuba that have air service to the United States. (The language of the provision is similar, although not identical, to a provision in H.R. 3328 [Katko], the Cuban Airport Security Act of 2017, approved by the House in October 2017.) For more comprehensive information on legislative initiatives on Cuba in the 115 th Congress, see CRS Report R44822, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress . Appendix A. The new regulations also further restricted sending cash remittances to Cuba. 201 5 —As part of President Obama's new policy approach toward Cuba, OFAC amended the embargo regulations, effective January 16, 2015, that significantly eased restrictions on travel and also eased restrictions on remittances. Effective October 17, 2016, OFAC amended the CACR to remove the value limit for Cuban products, including alcohol and tobacco, that U.S. travelers may bring back to the United States from Cuba or from third countries as accompanied baggage for personal use. Appendix B. 214 (Serrano), H.R. Three bills would have lifted the overall embargo, including restrictions on travel and remittances: H.R. Three bills would have focused solely on prohibiting restrictions on travel to Cuba: H.R. 664 (Sanford), and S. 299 (Flake). | Restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba have constituted a key and often contentious component in U.S. efforts to isolate Cuba's communist government since the early 1960s. Such restrictions are part of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), the overall embargo regulations administered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Various Administrations have eased and tightened the restrictions over the years as U.S. policy toward Cuba has changed.
The Obama Administration lifted all restrictions on family travel and remittances in 2009. In 2011, the Administration eased restrictions on other types of travel, including travel related to religious, educational, and people-to-people exchanges, and allowed any U.S. person to send remittances to individuals in Cuba. As part of President Obama's major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba in December 2014, which moved the U.S. approach away from a sanctions-based policy toward one of engagement, the Administration took actions that considerably eased restrictions on nonfamily travel and remittances. In 2015 and 2016, OFAC amended the embargo regulations five times to implement the new policy. It initially authorized travel by general license for all 12 categories of travel set forth in the CACR; eliminated traveler per diem limits; increased the amount of nonfamily remittances; and permitted other types of remittances. OFAC subsequently removed dollar limits for donative remittances to Cuban nationals; authorized people-to-people educational travel for individuals; and removed value limits for the importation of Cuban products, including alcohol and tobacco products, by U.S. travelers as accompanied baggage for personal use.
In June 2017, the Trump Administration announced a partial rollback of U.S. engagement toward Cuba that included the elimination of individual people-to-people travel and restrictions on financial transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel. To implement the policy changes, OFAC amended the embargo regulations in November 2017, and the State Department took complementary action by issuing a list of restricted entities, including more than 80 hotels.
Legislative Initiatives
In the 115th Congress, six bills have been introduced that would lift all restrictions on travel to Cuba. H.R. 351 (Sanford) and S. 1287 (Flake) would focus solely on prohibiting restrictions on travel to Cuba. H.R. 572 (Serrano) would ease certain restrictions on agricultural and medical exports to Cuba and also would lift restrictions on travel to Cuba. H.R. 574 (Serrano), H.R. 2966 (Rush), and S. 1699 (Wyden) would lift the embargo on Cuba by removing provisions of law restricting trade and other financial transactions with Cuba, including restrictions on travel; both H.R. 2966 and S. 1699 also would prohibit restrictions on remittances.
The 115th Congress also took legislative action in October 2018 related to concerns about Cuba's airport security. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, P.L. 115-254, signed into law October 6, 2018, includes a provision requiring the Transportation Security Administration to brief Congress on certain aspects of security measures at Cuban airports that have air service to the United States and to take action to more reliably track air charter operations between the United States and Cuba. Some of the language in the provision is similar, although not identical, to a provision in H.R. 3328 (Katko), the Cuban Airport Security Act of 2017, approved by the House in October 2017; an identical bill, S. 2023 (Rubio), was introduced in the Senate in October 2017.
This report examines developments in U.S. policy restricting travel and remittances to Cuba, current permissible travel and remittances, enforcement of the travel restrictions, and debate on lifting the travel restrictions. Appendix A provides a chronology of major actions taken on travel restrictions from 1962 through 2018. Appendix B provides a history of legislative action related to the restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba from 1999 through 2016.
For further information on Cuba from CRS, see CRS Report R44822, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress and CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview. |
crs_RS21554 | crs_RS21554_0 | Free Trade Agreements: WTO Obligations
MFN Exception
As parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, World Trade Organization (WTO) Members must grant immediate and unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to the products of other Members with respect to customs duties and import charges, internal taxes and regulations, and other trade-related matters. Free trade agreements (FTAs) are inconsistent with this obligation because of the favorable treatment granted by FTA parties to each other's goods. FTAs, however, have generally been viewed as vehicles of trade liberalization; therefore, the GATT contains an exception for such agreements. Further improvement in this area is also a part of the negotiating mandate for the WTO Doha Round. On December 14, 2006, the WTO General Council established a new transparency mechanism for FTAs which, among other things, provides for early notification of FTA negotiations. Safeguards provisions are also included in recently signed FTAs with Colombia, Panama and the Republic of Korea, all of which are awaiting approval by Congress. The United States has also entered into FTAs with Oman, Peru, Colombia, Panama and South Korea. While implementing legislation for the FTAs with Oman and Peru has been enacted into public law, neither FTA has yet entered into force. Implementing legislation for the FTA with Colombia was introduced April 8, 2008 ( H.R. 5724 ; S. 2830 ), but expedited legislative procedures that would have applied to the bill were suspended by the House on April 10, 2008 ( H.Res. 1092 ). The Administration has also begun negotiating FTAs with Thailand, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). | World Trade Organization (WTO) members must grant immediate and unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to the products of other members with respect to tariffs and other trade matters. Free trade agreements (FTAs) are facially inconsistent with this obligation because they grant countries who are party to the agreement more favorable trade benefits than those extended to other trading partners. Due to the prevailing view that such arrangements are trade-enhancing, Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) contains a specific exception for FTAs. The growing number of regional trade agreements, however, has made it difficult for the WTO to efficiently monitor the consistency of FTAs with the provided exemption. Negotiations on rules for regional trade agreements are part of the WTO Doha Round; separately, the WTO General Council in December 2006 established a new transparency mechanism for FTAs which provides for early notification by WTO Members of FTA negotiations. The United States is presently a party to nine bilateral or regional trade agreements. While Congress has approved FTAs with Oman and Peru FTAs, these have not yet entered into force. In addition, the Administration has entered into FTAs with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea FTAs, all of which are pending approval by Congress. Implementing legislation for the FTA with Colombia was introduced April 8, 2008 (H.R. 5724, S. 2830), but expedited legislative procedures that would have applied to the House bill were suspended by the House on April 10, 2008 (H.Res. 1092). The Administration has also been involved in FTA negotiations with several other countries, including Thailand, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and the South African Customs Union. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL34592 | crs_RL34592_0 | 110-275 , the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act (MIPPA) became law on July 15, 2008, after Congress overrode a Presidential veto on H.R. 6331 . The bill was originally passed by the House on June 24, 2008, under suspension of the rules by a vote of 355 to 59. On July 9, 2008, the Senate passed the bill without amendment by unanimous consent after approval was given for cloture by a vote of 69-30. The bill was cleared for the White House. On July 15, 2008 President Bush vetoed the bill. On the same day, the House voted 383-41 to override the veto and the Senate later voted 70-26 to override the veto. MIPPA is designed to avert a statutory Medicare reduction in payments for physicians and make other changes. MIPPA freezes physician fees at the June 2008 level until January 2009. In January 2009, fees will increase by 1.1%. In 2010, the statutory reduction will again apply, resulting in a 21% reduction in Medicare physician payment levels, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). CBO estimates that the physician payments provision cost $9.4 billion (over the 2008-2010 period). Other provisions in the Act will offset these and other costs, so that in total, the provisions in MIPPA will reduce deficits (or increase surpluses) by an estimated $0.1 billion over the 2008-2013 period and by less than an estimated $50 million over the 2008-2018 period. The main source for these offsets comes from reductions in spending for (1) the Medicare Advantage program, and (2) the physician assistance and quality initiative (PAQI) fund. The Act also makes further changes to Medicare, Medicaid, and other programs under the Social Security Act. This report provides a description of each of the provisions of MIPPA. P.L. | P.L. 110-275, the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act (MIPPA), is designed to avert a statutory Medicare reduction in payments for physicians and make other changes. MIPPA freezes physician fees at the June 2008 level until January 2009. In January 2009, fees will increase by 1.1%. In 2010, the statutory reduction will again apply, resulting in a 21% reduction in Medicare physician fees, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). CBO estimates that the physician payments provision costs $9.4 billion (over the 2008-2010 period). Other provisions in the Act will offset these and other costs, so that in total, the provisions in MIPPA will reduce deficits (or increase surpluses) by an estimated $0.1 billion over the 2008-2013 period and by less than an estimated $50 million over the 2008-2018 period. The main source for these offsets comes from reductions in spending for (1) the Medicare Advantage program and (2) the physician assistance and quality initiative (PAQI) fund. The Act also makes further changes to Medicare, Medicaid, and other programs under the Social Security Act. This report provides a description of the provisions of MIPPA.
MIPPA became law on July 15, 2008, after Congress overrode a presidential veto on H.R. 6331. The bill was originally passed by the House on June 24, 2008, under suspension of the rules by a vote of 355 to 59. On July 9, 2008, the Senate passed the bill without amendment by unanimous consent and the bill was cleared for the White House. On July 15, 2008, President Bush vetoed the bill. On the same day, the House voted 383-41 to override the veto, and the Senate later voted 70-26 to override the veto. |
crs_R44759 | crs_R44759_0 | Lebanese leaders agreed to an informal National Pact, in which each of the country's officially recognized religious groups were to be represented in government in direct relation to their share of the population, based on the 1932 census. Christian dominance in Lebanon was challenged by a number of events, including the influx of (primarily Sunni Muslim) Palestinian refugees as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the mobilization of Lebanon's Shia Muslim community in the south—which had been politically and economically marginalized. The civil war drew in a number of external actors, including Syria, Israel, Iran, and the United States. War in Syria . Issues for Congress
U.S. policy in Lebanon has sought to limit threats posed by Hezbollah both domestically and to Israel, bolster Lebanon's ability to protect its borders, and build state capacity to deal with the refugee influx. Iranian influence in Lebanon via its ties to Hezbollah, the potential for renewed armed conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, and Lebanon's internal political dynamics complicate the provision of U.S. assistance. At the same time, he represents a Christian community which views Hezbollah's interference in Syria as endangering Lebanese stability. 2017 Border Operations
In an effort to counter the infiltration of militants from Syria, both the LAF and Hezbollah have deployed forces at various points along Lebanon's eastern border. In May 2000, Israel withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon, but Hezbollah has used the remaining Israeli presence in the Sheb'a Farms (see below) and other disputed areas in the Lebanon-Syria-Israel triborder region to justify its ongoing conflict with Israel—and its continued existence as an armed militia alongside the Lebanese Armed Forces. Hezbollah has at times served as a destabilizing political force, despite its willingness to engage in electoral politics. By 2014, Lebanon had the highest per capita refugee population in the world, with refugees equaling one-quarter of the resident population. Thus, while roughly 1 million Syrian refugees were registered with UNHCR in late 2016, officials estimate that the actual refugee presence is closer to 1.2 million to 1.5 million (Lebanon's prewar population was about 4.3 million). In addition, there are 450,000 Palestinian refugees registered with the U.N. The Lebanese government has been unwilling to take steps that it sees as enabling Syrians to become a permanent refugee population akin to the Palestinians—whose militarization in the 1970s was one of the drivers of Lebanon's 15-year civil war. Legal Status . The war in neighboring Syria has significantly affected Lebanon's traditional growth sectors—tourism, real estate, and construction. U.S. Policy
The United States has sought to bolster forces that could serve as a counterweight to Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon through a variety of military and economic assistance programs. Hezbollah's participation in the Syria conflict on behalf of the Asad government is presumed to have strengthened the group's military capabilities and has increased concern among some in Congress over the continuation of U.S. assistance to the LAF. Military Aid
The United States has provided more than $1.7 billion to LAF since 2006. U.S. Recent Legislation
Annual appropriations bills have established conditions for ESF and security assistance for Lebanon. The Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015 (HIFPA) requires, inter alia, that the President, subject to a waiver authority, prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that knowingly
facilitates a transaction or transactions for Hezbollah; facilitates a significant transaction or transactions of a person on specified lists of specially designated nationals and blocked persons, property, and property interests for acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or being owned or controlled by, Hezbollah; engages in money laundering to carry out such an activity; or facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services to carry out such an activity. Meanwhile, tensions between Israel and Iran in neighboring Syria continue to escalate, risking spillover into Lebanon. | Since having its boundaries drawn by France after the First World War, Lebanon has struggled to define its national identity. Its population included Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shia Muslim communities of roughly comparable size, and with competing visions for the country. Seeking to avoid sectarian conflict, Lebanese leaders created a confessional system that allocated power among the country's religious sects according to their percentage of the population. The system continues to be based on Lebanon's last official census, which was conducted in 1932.
As Lebanon's demographics have shifted over the years, Muslim communities have pushed for the political status quo, favoring Maronite Christians, to be revisited, while the latter have worked to maintain their privileges. This tension has at times manifested itself in violence, such as during the country's 15-year civil war, but also in political disputes such as disagreements over revisions to Lebanon's electoral law. To date, domestic political conflicts continue to be shaped in part by the influence of external actors, including Syria and Iran.
The United States has sought to bolster forces that could serve as a counterweight to Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon, providing more than $1.7 billion in military assistance to Lebanon with the aim of creating a national force strong enough to counter nonstate actors and secure the country's borders. Hezbollah's armed militia is sometimes described as more effective than the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and has also undertaken operations along the border to counter the infiltration of armed groups from the war in neighboring Syria. U.S. policy in Lebanon has been undermined by Iran and Syria, both of which exercise significant influence in the country, including through support for Hezbollah. The question of how best to marginalize Hezbollah and other anti-U.S. Lebanese actors without provoking civil conflict among Lebanese sectarian political forces has remained a key challenge for U.S. policymakers.
U.S. assistance to Lebanon also has addressed the large-scale refugee crisis driven by the ongoing war in neighboring Syria. There are over 1 million Syrian refugees registered with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, in addition to a significant existing community of Palestinian refugees. This has given Lebanon (a country of roughly 4.3 million citizens in 2010) the highest per capita refugee population in the world. Lebanon's infrastructure has been unable to absorb the refugee population, which some government officials describe as a threat to the country's security. Since 2015, the government has taken steps to close the border to those fleeing Syria, and has implemented measures that have made it more difficult for existing refugees to remain in Lebanon legally.
At the same time, Hezbollah has played an active role in the ongoing fighting in Syria. The experience gained by Hezbollah in the Syria conflict has raised questions about how the eventual return of these fighters to Lebanon could impact the country's domestic stability or affect the prospects for renewed conflict with Israel.
This report provides an overview of Lebanon and current issues of U.S. interest. It provides background information, analyzes recent developments and key policy debates, and tracks legislation, U.S. assistance, and recent congressional action. |
crs_R42052 | crs_R42052_0 | Introduction
The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is an agency in the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) that serves as the executive branch's principal advisory office on domestic and international telecommunications and information technology policies. As required by the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. Its role in federal spectrum management includes acting as a facilitator and mediator in negotiations among the various federal agencies regarding usage, priority access, causes of interference, and other radio spectrum questions. The Institute for Telecommunication Sciences (ITS), which is the research and engineering laboratory of NTIA. 112-96 ). The act has also given the NTIA responsibilities to create and support FirstNet in planning, building, and managing a new, nationwide, broadband network for public safety communications. | The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an agency of the Department of Commerce, is the executive branch's principal advisory office on domestic and international telecommunications and information policies. Its mandate is to provide greater access for all Americans to telecommunications services, support U.S. attempts to open foreign markets, advise on international telecommunications negotiations, and fund research for new technologies and their applications. NTIA also manages the distribution of funds for several key grant programs. Its role in federal spectrum management includes acting as a facilitator and mediator in negotiations among the various federal agencies regarding usage, priority access, causes of interference, and other radio spectrum questions.
The 112th Congress, with the passage of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96), in February 2012, has given the NTIA new responsibilities in spectrum management and the support of public safety initiatives. |
crs_R40544 | crs_R40544_0 | Overview of Disposal and Use Issues
Coal fired power plants account for almost 45% of electric power generated in the United States. Coal combustion waste is managed in two ways: It may be disposed of in landfills or surface impoundment ponds, or in mines as minefill, or it may be used in some capacity (commonly referred to as "beneficial use")—for example, as a component in concrete, cement, or gypsum wallboard, or as structural or embankment fill. On December 22, 2008, national attention was turned to potential risks associated with CCW management when a breach in an impoundment pond at the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA's) Kingston, TN, plant released 1.1 billion gallons of coal fly ash slurry. According to TVA, the estimated cleanup cost will likely reach $1.2 billion. Some plants have been in operation for decades (the site of the Kingston release has accumulated ash sludge since 1954), resulting in the disposal of millions of tons of CCW at individual plants across the United States. The waste likely contains certain hazardous constituents that EPA has determined pose a risk to human health and the environment. Those constituents include heavy metals such as arsenic, beryllium, boron, cadmium, chromium, lead, and mercury, and certain toxic organic materials such as dioxins and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) compounds. Instead, it is regulated in accordance with requirements established by the states. In 1999, EPA determined that national regulations regarding CCW disposal were needed, in part due to inconsistencies in state requirements. EPA stated that regulations would be proposed for public comment by the end of 2009. Since EPA's statement, industry and environmental groups, state government representatives, and some Members of Congress have expressed concerns regarding how the waste will ultimately be regulated. On December 17, 2009, EPA issued a statement that its pending decision on regulating CCW would be delayed for a "short period due to the complexity of the analysis the agency is currently finishing." Surface or Groundwater Contamination
Although the possibility exists that hazardous constituents in CCW could become airborne, the primary concern regarding the management of the waste usually relates to the potential for hazardous constituents to leach into surface or groundwater, and hence contaminate drinking water, surface water, or biota. The presence of hazardous constituents in the waste does not, by itself, mean that they will contaminate the surrounding air, ground, groundwater, or surface water. The 2006 NRC report stated that there are many complex physical and biogeochemical factors that influence the degree to which heavy metals can essentially dissolve and migrate offsite. Those factors include:
T he volume and degree to which water is able to flow through the waste . EPA has also conducted studies into the beneficial use of CCW. In addition, both EPA and the Department of the Interior's Office of Surface Mining (OSM) have conducted various activities related to mine placement of CCW. On March 9, 2009, EPA announced that it was moving forward on developing regulations to address the management of CCW. In 2008, 136 million tons of CCW were generated. However, it is unknown how accurate that estimate is. As with the disposal of CCW in landfills and surface impoundments, there are no explicit federal requirements specific to the use of CCW as part of the mine reclamation process. According to EPA, unencapsulated uses of CCW require proper hydrogeologic evaluation to ensure adequate groundwater protection. | In 2008, coal-fired power plants accounted for almost half of the United States' electric power, resulting in as much as 136 millions tons of coal combustion waste (CCW). On December 22, 2008, national attention was turned to issues regarding the waste when a breach in an impoundment pond at the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA's) Kingston, TN, plant released 1.1 billion gallons of coal ash slurry. The estimated cleanup cost will likely reach $1.2 billion.
The characteristics of CCW vary, but it generally contains a range of heavy metals such as arsenic, beryllium, chromium, lead, and mercury. While the incident at Kingston drew national attention to the potential for a sudden catastrophic release of waste, the primary concern regarding the management of CCW usually relates to the potential for hazardous constituents to leach into surface or groundwater, and hence contaminate drinking water, surface water, or living organisms. The presence of hazardous constituents in the waste does not, by itself, mean that they will contaminate the surrounding air, ground, groundwater, or surface water. There are many complex physical and biogeochemical factors that influence the degree to which heavy metals can dissolve and migrate offsite—such as the mass of toxins in the waste and the degree to which water is able to flow through it. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has determined that arsenic and lead and other carcinogens have leached into groundwater and exceeded safe limits when CCW is disposed of in unlined disposal units.
In addition to discussions regarding the potential harm to human health and the environment, the Kingston release brought attention to the fact that the management of CCW is essentially exempt from federal regulation. Instead, it is regulated in accordance with requirements established by individual states. State requirements generally apply to two broad categories of actions—the disposal of CCW (in landfills, surface impoundment, or mines) and its beneficial use (e.g., as a component in concrete, cement, or gypsum wallboard, or as structural or embankment fill).
In May 2000, partly as a result of inconsistencies in state requirements, EPA determined that national regulations regarding CCW disposal were needed. To date, regulations have not been proposed. However, on March 9, 2009, EPA stated that regulations to address CCW disposal in landfills and surface impoundments would be proposed by the end of 2009. Also, in March 2007, an advance notice of proposed rulemaking regarding the disposal of CCW in mines was released by the Department of the Interior's Office of Surface Mining (OSM). Draft rules have not yet been proposed. With regard to potential uses of CCW, EPA has stated that there have been few studies that would definitively prove that certain uses of CCW are safe, but that its use should include certain precautions to ensure adequate groundwater protection. It is unknown whether regulations regarding beneficial uses of CCW will be included in the upcoming rulemaking.
Some Members of Congress and other stakeholders have expressed concern regarding how CCW will ultimately be regulated. Among other issues, there is concern that the upcoming regulations will be either too far-reaching, and hence costly, or not far-reaching enough—meaning that they will not establish consistent, enforceable, minimal federal requirements applicable to CCW disposal units. On December 17, 2009, EPA issued a statement that its pending decision on regulating CCW would be delayed for a "short period due to the complexity of the analysis the agency is currently finishing." |
crs_RS22731 | crs_RS22731_0 | Introduction
The Chief Administrative Officer of the House of Representatives (CAO) is an elected officer of the House. Initially created in the 104 th Congress (1995-1996) to replace the appointed Director of Non-Legislative and Financial Services, the CAO oversees human resources, financial services, technology infrastructure, procurement, facilities management, and other support functions for the House of Representatives. CAO office divisions are organized along operational and mission lines that include the immediate office of the CAO, operations, and customer solutions. Immediate Office
The immediate office includes the office of the chief administrative officer and his support staff. | The Chief Administrative Officer of the House of Representatives (CAO) is an elected officer of the House, chosen at the beginning of each Congress. The office of the CAO consists of three divisions: the immediate office of the CAO, operations, and customer solutions. Together, these divisions oversee human resources, financial services, technology infrastructure, procurement, facilities management, and other House support functions. An office initially created at the beginning the 104th Congress (1995-1996), the CAO assumed the duties previously performed by the Director of Non-Legislative and Financial Services, and manages the operations of other House administrative offices and support services. |
crs_R42585 | crs_R42585_0 | One of the world's poorest nations, Timor-Leste (also known as East Timor) continues to face many challenges in consolidating its democracy and developing its economy, though it has made considerable strides in building stability and democratic institutions. The current U.N. mission, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), has been present since a breakdown in civil order in 2006. Timor-Leste emerged in 2002 as an independent state after a long history of Portuguese colonialism and, more recently, Indonesian rule. Independence followed a U.N.-organized 1999 referendum in which the people of Timor-Leste overwhelmingly voted for independence, after which Indonesian-backed pro-integrationist militias rampaged, killing an estimated 1,300 civilians and destroying much of Timor-Leste's infrastructure. Under several different mandates, the United Nations has provided a range of assistance, such as peacekeeping, supporting capacity building efforts to strengthen the security and justice sectors, and ensuring the provision of humanitarian and reconstruction aid. The current situation in Timor-Leste is relatively calm compared with past periods of political strife and insurrection. The main threat to Timor-Leste is not external, but rather internal strife resulting from weak state institutions, rivalries among elites and between security forces, and large-scale youth unemployment. The reintroduction of peacekeeping troops and the UNMIT mission in 2006, the flow of revenue from hydrocarbon resources in the Timor Sea, and improved political stability are helping Timor-Leste move towards more effective democratic government. Congressional concerns have focused on internal security and the role of the United Nations, human rights and the development of democratic institutions and the nation's parliament. Recent Developments
2012 Elections
Timor-Leste held two-stage Presidential elections in March and April, 2012, and will hold nationwide Parliamentary polls on July 7. The U.N. described the presidential polls as "clean and orderly." Taur Matan Rauk
President Taur Matan Rauk is a former Army chief. Timor-Leste formally became independent on May 20, 2002. The United States representative pointed to several key priorities, while commending efforts made towards achieving them, including:
the transfer of primary policing responsibilities from UNMIT to the PNTL and the importance of Timor-Leste maintaining stability in the election period and further developing national security institutions; the continued preparations of the Government of Timor-Leste for the upcoming elections and ongoing efforts of the United Nations and other international partners in supporting that process; the development of competent and strong rule of law and governance institutions; the ongoing collaborative effort between UNMIT and the Government of Timor-Leste in developing a transition plan for UNMIT's withdrawal; and the future engagement of the United Nations and the Security Council in Timor-Leste after UNMIT's expected withdrawal, which needs to include the Government of Timor-Leste and the international community. Under a previous agreement, decisions on how to exploit Timor Sea energy resources were to be made on a commercial basis. | The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste gained independence on May 20, 2002, after a long history of Portuguese colonialism and, more recently, Indonesian rule. The young nation, with a population of 1.1 million, has been aided by the United Nations under several different mandates under which the U.N. has provided peacekeeping, humanitarian, reconstruction and capacity building assistance to establish a functioning government. The current United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) is slated to withdraw from the nation at the end of 2012.
The independence of Timor-Leste (also known as East Timor) followed a U.N.-organized 1999 referendum in which the East Timorese overwhelmingly voted for independence. In response, Indonesian-backed pro-integrationist militias went on a rampage, killing an estimated 1,300 people and destroying much of Timor-Leste's infrastructure. For several years thereafter, the international community's main concern focused on possible tensions in East Timor's relations with Indonesia. Since 2006 the main threat to East Timor has been internal strife resulting from weak state institutions, rivalries among elites and security forces, deep-set poverty, unemployment, east-west tensions within the country, and population displacement.
The situation in Timor-Leste in 2012 is relatively calm compared with recent periods of political strife and insurrection. The country held Presidential elections in March and April, which led to the election of Tuar Matan Rauk, a former army chief. The U.N. described the polls as "peaceful, smooth and orderly." Parliamentary polls are due on July 7. Stability has been aided by the 2006 reintroduction of peacekeeping troops and a United Nations mission, the flow of revenue from hydrocarbon resources in the Timor Sea, and improved political stability. East Timor has significant energy resources beneath the Timor Sea.
That said, Timor-Leste faces many serious challenges as it seeks to establish and deepen a stable democracy and develop its economy. Many institutions in the young nation remain weak, and tensions remain between the young country's political elites and among security forces. Timor-Leste remains one of Asia's poorest nations, ranking 147th out of 187 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index. Generating economic opportunity and employment are among the government's greatest challenges.
Congressional concerns have focused on security and the role of the United Nations, human rights, East Timor's boundary disputes with Australia and Indonesia, and the strengthening of the nation's political system and functioning of its parliament. Key challenges for Timor-Leste include creating enough political stability to focus on building state capacity and infrastructure, providing employment, and preventing the oil-and-gas revenue stream from being squandered by corruption or poor investment decisions. |
crs_RS21255 | crs_RS21255_0 | Nowadays, however, the Senate normally cedes to the majority leader the prerogative of calling up measures, either by motion or by unanimous consent. Items of executive business, which include nominations and treaties, are also brought to the floor by unanimous consent or a motion to proceed to consider, but this report does not address motions to proceed to executive business, and the figures in Table 1 exclude them. Table 1 includes both debatable and non-debatable motions to proceed. Sometimes more than one motion to proceed was offered on a single measure. Frequency of Motions to Proceed
As Table 1 shows, from the 96 th through the 113 th Congress (1979-2014), a total of 628 motions to proceed to consider measures were offered, 86% of them by the majority leader personally and 96% of them either by the majority leader or under his direction. Five Congresses exceeded this average, including three of the four most recent ones. If, as suggested in the next section, the Senate has lately started to display less deference to the majority leader in offering motions to proceed, then it is possible that the majority leader has resorted more frequently to offering these motions as a means of precluding others from offering their own motions to proceed to other measures. This report provides no overall data on how the Senate disposes of motions to proceed. Few such motions, however, are defeated outright, because a motion to proceed that was unlikely to command majority support usually would not be offered in the first place. Instead, most motions to proceed that are not adopted simply do not reach a final vote. The final two were ruled out of order. Thirteen of these 28 motions were offered under the general rules of the Senate, under which they were debatable; the remaining 15 addressed matters that, under Senate practice, are considered privileged, meaning that motions to proceed to their consideration are not debatable. The 18 motions offered during the last 3 Congresses include 14 of the 20 motions that were offered by the minority leader, to whom (at least in principle) the prerogative of making motions to proceed may be accorded. These 18 motions also encompass 12 of the 16 motions that the Senate has considered under unanimous consent agreements, which implicitly indicates at least some degree of acquiescence by, or prearrangement with, the majority leadership. The recent increase in motions to proceed not offered by direction of the majority leader is partially accounted for by the rising number of motions to proceed that were non-debatable under expedited procedure statutes; 12 of the 18 such motions in the 111 th through 113 th Congresses fell into this group, compared with 2 of the 10 such motions in the earlier Congresses examined. The 18 motions of this kind in the 3 recent Congresses include all 15 of those that the Senate defeated outright. Subsequently, the Senate rejected the second cloture motion on the conference report and the cloture motion on the motion to proceed to consider it. No further action occurred in relation to the measure. This disapproval resolution was subject to expedited procedures established in the Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014 ( P.L. | In recent practice, the Senate generally cedes to its majority leader the prerogative of calling up items of business for floor consideration. Most measures are brought to the floor by unanimous consent, but when this consent cannot be obtained, a motion to proceed to consider can be used to accomplish the same purpose. Sometimes a Senator other than the majority leader offers this motion, but usually this occurs in coordination with the majority leader.
This report examines motions to proceed to consider items of legislative business ("measures"); it does not cover nominations or treaties ("executive business"). Motions to proceed to legislative business are normally debatable unless the underlying measure is "privileged," which includes conference reports and measures subject to statutory expedited procedures. The data in this report do not distinguish between debatable and non-debatable motions to proceed. In some cases, as well, more than one motion to proceed was offered on the same measure; the report considers each motion as a separate unit for purposes of analysis.
Of 628 motions to proceed to consider measures in the Senate from 1979 through 2014, all but 28 were offered either by the majority leader or apparently at his direction. In the four most recent Congresses (2007-2014), the number of motions to proceed offered per Congress has been significantly greater than before. Reasons for this increase may relate to changes in (1) the use of daily adjournments rather than recesses, (2) the way cloture is used in relation to these motions, or (3) the degree of deference paid to the majority leader in the exercise of his scheduling function.
The report presents no overall data on the disposition of motions to proceed, but few are defeated outright, because those unlikely to command majority support are seldom offered, and those that are not adopted usually reach no final vote (for example, because they are withdrawn). Of the 28 motions clearly not offered by direction of the majority leader, by contrast, the Senate adopted 2, defeated 15, and laid 5 on the table. Four were abandoned after the Senate rejected cloture and two were ruled out of order.
Of these 28 motions, 15 were non-debatable because they addressed privileged matters (14 of them subject to expedited procedures under budgetary statutes or for congressional disapproval of executive actions). Of the 28 motions, 18 occurred in the 3 most recent Congresses (2009-2014), including 12 of the 14 that were non-debatable under expedited procedure statutes. These 18 motions also include 14 of the 20 offered by the minority leader, all 15 of those that the Senate defeated outright, and 12 of the 16 that the Senate considered under unanimous consent agreements.
The report concludes by describing the essential procedural features of the proceedings on each of these 28 motions. It will be updated to reflect action in later Congresses. |
crs_R44989 | crs_R44989_0 | T he State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) is a federal-state program that provides health coverage to certain uninsured, low-income children and pregnant women in families that have annual income above Medicaid eligibility levels. CHIP is jointly financed by the federal government and the states and is administered by the states. FY2017 was the last year federal CHIP funding was appropriated in statute, and FY2018 began on October 1, 2017, without CHIP funding being extended. As a result, states do not currently have full-year FY2018 CHIP allotments, and states are funding their CHIP programs with unspent federal CHIP funds from prior years. On October 4, 2017, both the Senate Finance Committee and the House Energy and Commerce Committee had markups on different bills that would extend CHIP federal funding through FY2022, among other things. The Senate Finance Committee reported the Keeping Kids' Insurance Dependable and Secure Act of 2017 (KIDS Act, S. 1827 ), which would extend federal CHIP funding through FY2022 and extend the increased enhanced federal medical assistance percentage (E-FMAP) rates for one year (i.e., through FY2020) but with an 11.5 percentage point increase instead of a 23 percentage point increase under current law. The bill also includes extensions of other CHIP provisions (e.g., the Express Lane eligibility option and the maintenance of effort [MOE] for children in families with incomes below 300% of the federal poverty level [FPL]) and other programs and demonstrations (e.g., the Child Obesity Demonstration Project and the Pediatric Quality Measures Program). 115-97 , enacted on December 22, 2017. The House Energy and Commerce Committee reported the Helping Ensure Access for Little Ones, Toddlers, and Hopeful Youth by Keeping Insurance Delivery Stable Act of 2017 (HEALTHY KIDS Act, H.R. 3921 ), which includes almost identical language to the KIDS Act that would extend CHIP federal funding through FY2022 and extend the increased E-FMAP for one year at 11.5 percentage points. The HEALTHY KIDS Act also includes almost identical language that would extend the same CHIP provisions and other programs and demonstrations as the KIDS Act. The HEALTHY KIDS Act also includes some provisions that are not in the KIDS Act, such as adding a new CHIP state option for qualified CHIP look-alike plans; modifying the Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) allotment reductions; and providing additional Medicaid funding to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The HEALTHY KIDS Act includes the following provisions as offsets: modifications to Medicaid third party liability, treatment of lottery winnings for Medicaid eligibility, and Medicare Part B and D premium subsidies for higher-income individuals. On October 30, 2017, the House Rules Committee posted an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the Community Health And Medical Professionals Improve Our Nation Act of 2017 (CHAMPION Act, H.R. 601 ), meaning that it is intended to be considered by the House as an amendment to H.R. 3922 and the language of the CHAMPION Act would be stricken and the text of the amendment in the nature of the substitute would be inserted in its place. This amendment in the nature of a substitute is entitled the Continuing Community Health And Medical Professional Programs to Improve Our Nation, Increase National Gains, and Help Ensure Access for Little Ones, Toddlers, and Hopeful Youth by Keeping Insurance Delivery Stable Act of 2017 (CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act), and it includes revised language for the CHAMPION Act (which would extend funding for community health centers and other programs, among other things) under Division A and revised language for the HEALTHY KIDS Act under Division B. The House passed the CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act on November 3, 2017, by a vote of 242 to 174. This report contains a table that provides an overview of the provisions in the KIDS Act and Division B of the CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act as baselined against current law. Funding was not appropriated for FY2015. | The State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) is a means-tested program that provides health coverage to targeted low-income children and pregnant women in families that have annual income above Medicaid eligibility levels but have no health insurance. CHIP is jointly financed by the federal government and the states, and the states are responsible for administering CHIP.
In statute, FY2017 was the last year a federal CHIP appropriation was provided. Federal CHIP funding was not extended before the beginning of FY2018. As a result, states do not currently have full-year FY2018 CHIP allotments and states are funding their CHIP programs with unspent federal CHIP funds from prior years. The continuing resolutions enacted on December 8, 2017, and December 22, 2017, both include provisions that provide short-term funding for CHIP. The continuing resolution enacted on December 8, 2017, includes a special rule for redistribution funds, and the continuing resolution enacted on December 22, 2017, includes short-term appropriations and an extension of the special rule for redistribution funds. This short-term funding is not sufficient to fund CHIP through the end of FY2018.There are a couple of bills that would extend federal funding for CHIP for five years. On October 4, 2017, both the Senate Finance Committee and the House Energy and Commerce Committee had markups on different bills that would extend CHIP federal funding through FY2022, among other provisions.
The Senate Finance Committee reported the Keeping Kids' Insurance Dependable and Secure Act of 2017 (KIDS Act, S. 1827), which would extend federal CHIP funding through FY2022 and extend the increased enhanced federal medical assistance percentage (E-FMAP) rates for one year (i.e., through FY2020) but with an 11.5 percentage point increase instead of the 23 percentage point increase under current law. The bill also includes extensions of other CHIP provisions (e.g., the Express Lane eligibility option and the maintenance of effort for children with incomes below 300% of the federal poverty level) and other programs and demonstrations (e.g., the Child Obesity Demonstration Project and the Pediatric Quality Measures Program).
The House Energy and Commerce Committee reported the Helping Ensure Access for Little Ones, Toddlers, and Hopeful Youth by Keeping Insurance Delivery Stable Act of 2017 (HEALTHY KIDS Act, H.R. 3921, H.Rept. 115-358), which includes almost identical language to the KIDS Act that would extend CHIP federal funding through FY2022 and extend the increased E-FMAP for one year at 11.5 percentage points. The HEALTHY KIDS Act also includes almost identical language that would extend the same CHIP provisions and other programs and demonstrations as the KIDS Act. The HEALTHY KIDS Act also includes some provisions that are not in the KIDS Act, such as adding a new CHIP state option for qualified CHIP look-alike plans, modifying the Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) allotment reductions, and providing additional Medicaid funding to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The HEALTHY KIDS Act includes the following provisions as offsets: modifications to Medicaid third party liability, treatment of lottery winnings for Medicaid eligibility, and Medicare Part B and D premium subsidies for higher-income individuals.
On October 30, 2017, the House Rules Committee posted an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the Community Health And Medical Professionals Improve Our Nation Act of 2017 (CHAMPION Act, H.R. 3922), meaning that it is intended to be considered by the House as an amendment to H.R. 3922 and the language of the CHAMPION Act would be stricken and the text of the amendment in the nature of the substitute would be inserted in its place. This amendment in the nature of a substitute is entitled the Continuing Community Health And Medical Professional Programs to Improve Our Nation, Increase National Gains, and Help Ensure Access for Little Ones, Toddlers, and Hopeful Youth by Keeping Insurance Delivery Stable Act of 2017 (CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act), and it includes revised language for the CHAMPION Act (which would extend funding for community health centers and other programs among other things) under Division A and revised language for the HEALTHY KIDS Act under Division B. The House passed the CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act on November 3, 2017, by a vote of 242 to 174.
This report compares and summarizes the provisions in the KIDS Act and in Division B of the CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act. |
crs_RL33211 | crs_RL33211_0 | Introduction: The Issue Before Congress
The issue before Congress is whether to continue the federal prosecution of medical marijuana patients and their providers, in accordance with marijuana's status as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act, or whether to relax federal marijuana prohibition enough to permit the medicinal use of botanical cannabis products when recommended by a physician, especially in those states that have created medical marijuana programs under state law. 2835 ), which would allow the medical use of marijuana in states that permit its use with a doctor's recommendation, was introduced on June 11, 2009, by Representative Barney Frank. The second bill, the Truth in Trials Act ( H.R. 3939 ), introduced by Representative Sam Farr on October 27, 2009, would make it possible for medical marijuana users and providers who are being tried in federal court to reveal to juries that their marijuana activity was medically related and legal under state law. The CSA is not preempted by state medical marijuana laws, under the federal system of government, nor are state medical marijuana laws preempted by the CSA. 5842 , the Medical Marijuana Patient Protection Act, to provide for the medical use of marijuana in accordance with the laws of the various states. The bill would move marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II of the CSA and exempt from federal prosecution authorized patients and medical marijuana providers who are acting in accordance with state laws. For the first time since District of Columbia residents approved a medical marijuana ballot initiative in 1998, a rider blocking implementation of the initiative was not attached to the D.C. appropriations act for FY2010 ( H.R. 111-117 ), clearing the way for the creation of a medical marijuana program for seriously ill patients in the nation's capital. The Obama Administration and Medical Marijuana
During the presidential campaign, candidate Barack Obama stated several times his position that moving against medical marijuana dispensaries that were operating in compliance with state laws would not be a priority of his administration. States Allowing Use of Medical Marijuana70
Fourteen states, covering about 27% of the U.S. population, have enacted laws to allow the use of cannabis for medical purposes. The therapeutic value of smoked marijuana is supported by existing research and experience. Furthermore, marijuana does not have to be smoked to be used as medicine. It is certainly true that the medical cannabis movement is an offshoot of the marijuana legalization movement. Both sides in the medical marijuana debate claim adherence to this principle. And medical marijuana advocates plead with the federal government to permit scientific research on medical marijuana to proceed. | The issue before Congress is whether to continue the federal prosecution of medical marijuana patients and their providers, in accordance with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), or whether to relax federal marijuana prohibition enough to permit the medicinal use of botanical cannabis products when recommended by a physician, especially where permitted under state law.
Fourteen states, mostly in the West, have enacted laws allowing the use of marijuana for medical purposes, and many thousands of patients are seeking relief from a variety of serious illnesses by smoking marijuana or using other herbal cannabis preparations.
Two bills relating to the therapeutic use of cannabis have been introduced in the 111th Congress. The Medical Marijuana Patient Protection Act (H.R. 2835), which would allow the medical use of marijuana in states that permit its use with a doctor's recommendation, was introduced on June 11, 2009, by Representative Barney Frank. The bill would move marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II of the CSA and exempt from federal prosecution authorized patients and medical marijuana providers who are acting in accordance with state laws. Also, the Truth in Trials Act (H.R. 3939), a bill that would make it possible for defendants in federal court to reveal to juries that their marijuana activity was medically related and legal under state law, was introduced on October 27, 2009, by Representative Sam Farr.
For the first time since District of Columbia residents approved a medical marijuana ballot initiative in 1998, a rider blocking implementation of the initiative was not attached to the D.C. appropriations act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-117), clearing the way for the creation of a medical marijuana program for seriously ill patients in the nation's capital.
The Obama Administration Department of Justice, in October 2009, announced an end to federal raids by the Drug Enforcement Administration of medical marijuana dispensaries that are operating in "clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws." This move fulfills a pledge to end such raids that was made by candidate Obama during the presidential campaign.
Claims and counterclaims about medical marijuana—much debated by journalists and academics, policymakers at all levels of government, and interested citizens—include the following: Marijuana is harmful and has no medical value; marijuana effectively treats the symptoms of certain diseases; smoking is an improper route of drug administration; marijuana should be rescheduled to permit medical use; state medical marijuana laws send the wrong message and lead to increased illicit drug use; the medical marijuana movement undermines the war on drugs; patients should not be arrested for using medical marijuana; the federal government should allow the states to experiment and should not interfere with state medical marijuana programs; medical marijuana laws harm the federal drug approval process; the medical cannabis movement is a cynical ploy to legalize marijuana and other drugs. With strong opinions being expressed on all sides of this complex issue, the debate over medical marijuana does not appear to be approaching resolution.
This report will be updated as legislative activity and other developments occur. |
crs_RS22846 | crs_RS22846_0 | Generally, proposals would codify the definition of "economic substance" rather than codifying the doctrine. This codification has been proposed in several bills during the 110 th Congress. This penalty would be 30% of the understatement in tax that resulted from disallowance of the transaction. The bill would add language to also prohibit deduction of interest on underpayments due to a transaction that lacked economic substance. However, since it is left to the courts to determine whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant, taxpayers are placed in a situation in which they may need professional guidance as to whether the doctrine is applicable, but cannot rely on that guidance to avoid a substantial penalty if a court determines that the doctrine applies and the transaction lacked economic substance. There is also some question about both the cost saving and revenue raising prospects for the proposal. | The economic substance doctrine was judicially developed. A number of bills introduced in the 110 th Congress would codify the definition of "economic substance," provide a strict liability penalty for underpayments resulting from disallowed transactions that lack economic substance, and prohibit deduction of interest on those underpayments. The proposals would not codify the doctrine, itself, nor provide standards for a court's determination that the doctrine was relevant to a particular case. Codification has been dubbed a "revenue raiser," though there is disagreement as to both the amount that would be raised and the way in which codification would increase revenue. |
crs_98-808 | crs_98-808_0 | It is a federal crime to make a material false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency or department. Finally, conspiracy to commit any these underlying crimes is also a separate federal crime. This is an overview of federal law relating to the principal false statement and to the three primary perjury statutes. Within the judicial branch, it applies to all but presentations to the court by parties or their attorneys in judicial proceedings. In outline form, Section 1001(a) states:
I. One proscribes false statements in matters of legislative branch administration and reaches false statements made in financial disclosure statements. § 1621(2))
Congress added Section 1621(2) to the general perjury statute in 1976 in order to dispense with the necessity of an oath for various certifications and declarations. Perjury in a Judicial Context (18 U.S.C. § 371)
Section 371 outlaws conspiring to commit another federal offense, including making a false statement in violation of Section 1001, perjury under Sections 1621 and 1623, and subornation of perjury under Section 1622. Conspiracy under Section 371 is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years. § 3C1.1)
Perjury, subornation of perjury, and false statements are each punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years. When the defendant is convicted of a crime other than perjury or false statements, however, perjury or false statements during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the defendant for the underlying offense will often be treated as the basis for enhancing his sentence by operation of the obstruction of justice guideline of the U.S. The examples in the section's commentary cover conduct:
(B) committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury, including during the course of a civil proceeding if such perjury pertains to conduct that forms the basis of the offense of conviction;
(F) providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate;
(G) providing a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense;
(H) providing materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for the court; [and]
(I) other conduct prohibited by obstruction of justice provisions under Title 18, United States Code ( e.g. | Federal courts, Congress, and federal agencies rely upon truthful information in order to make informed decisions. Federal law therefore proscribes providing the federal courts, Congress, or federal agencies with false information. The prohibition takes four forms: false statements; perjury in judicial proceedings; perjury in other contexts; and subornation of perjury.
Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the general false statement statute, outlaws material false statements in matters within the jurisdiction of a federal agency or department. It reaches false statements in federal court and grand jury sessions as well as congressional hearings and administrative matters but not the statements of advocates or parties in court proceedings. Under Section 1001, a statement is a crime if it is false, regardless of whether it is made under oath.
In contrast, an oath is the hallmark of the three perjury statutes in Title 18. The oldest, Section 1621, condemns presenting material false statements under oath in federal official proceedings. Section 1623 of the same title prohibits presenting material false statements under oath in federal court proceedings, although it lacks some of Section 1621's traditional procedural features, such as a two-witness requirement. Subornation of perjury, barred in Section 1622, consists of inducing another to commit perjury. All four sections carry a penalty of imprisonment for not more than five years, although Section 1001 is punishable by imprisonment for not more than eight years when the offense involves terrorism or one of the various federal sex offenses. The same five-year maximum penalty attends the separate crime of conspiracy to commit any of the four substantive offenses.
A defendant's false statements in the course of a federal criminal investigation or prosecution may also result in an enhanced sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for the offense that was the subject of the investigation or prosecution.
This report is available in abbreviated form—without footnotes, quotations, or citations—as CRS Report 98-807, False Statements and Perjury: A Sketch of Federal Criminal Law. |
crs_RL34156 | crs_RL34156_0 | Introduction
In MedImmune v. Genentech , the U.S. Supreme Court held that, at least in instances where the licensor-patentee has implicitly or explicitly threatened to sue for patent infringement if the licensee did not pay the demanded royalties, a patent licensee need not terminate or breach its license agreement before it may bring suit to obtain a declaratory judgment that the underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Judgment Act
Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to actual, ongoing cases and controversies. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) had attempted to articulate such a test. The district court explained that it was obliged to dismiss the case due to the controlling precedent of the Federal Circuit's Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc. decision in 2004, which had held that "a patent licensee in good standing cannot establish an Article III case or controversy with regard to validity, enforceability, or scope of the patent because the license agreement 'obliterates any reasonable apprehension' that the licensee will be sued for infringement." § 2201(a), require a patent licensee to refuse to pay royalties and commit material breach of the license agreement before suing to declare the patent invalid, unenforceable or not infringed? MedImmune's payment of royalties under such "coercive" circumstances does not eliminate jurisdiction of a court to entertain a declaratory judgment action, Justice Scalia stated. Justice Scalia cautioned that the Supreme Court's decision in this case is limited to the procedural issue of whether federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over these types of declaratory judgment actions brought by nonrepudiating licensees; the Court declined, however, to express an opinion on the merits of the arguments made by the licensor-patentee for denying declaratory relief to the licensee. | According to earlier precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a suit filed by a patent licensee in good standing, seeking to declare the underlying patent invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed, is non-justiciable under the Declaratory Judgment Act because there is no actual controversy between the licensee and licensor. The Federal Circuit had asserted that a license agreement eliminates any "reasonable apprehension" that the nonrepudiating licensee will be sued for infringement and thus federal courts must dismiss such declaratory judgment actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
In MedImmune v. Genentech (549 U.S. __, No. 05-608, decided January 9, 2007), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the jurisdictional rule adopted by the Federal Circuit, holding to the contrary that a patent licensee need not materially breach its license agreement (for example, by ceasing royalty payments to the patent holder) before it may bring suit to obtain a judgment that the underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed, in situations where the licensor-patentee has implicitly or explicitly threatened to sue for patent infringement if the licensee did not pay the demanded royalties. Payment of royalties under such "coercive" circumstances does not eliminate the jurisdiction of the federal courts to entertain declaratory judgment actions from patent licensees in good standing, the Court explained. Notably, this decision is limited to the procedural issue of whether federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over these types of claims; the Supreme Court declined to express an opinion on the merits of the arguments made by the licensor-patentee in the case for denying declaratory relief to the licensee.
This report provides a summary and analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion in MedImmune and discusses its potential ramifications on patent law. |
crs_RL34716 | crs_RL34716_0 | No rights or privileges are forfeited under the Constitution, statutory law, or the Rules of the Senate merely upon an indictment for an offense. Internal party rules in the Senate may be relevant, however, and the Senate Republican Conference Rules, for example, have required an indicted chairman or ranking Member of a Senate committee, or a member of the Senate party leadership, to temporarily step aside from his or her leadership or chairmanship position, although the Member's service in Congress would otherwise continue. It should be noted that Members of Congress do not automatically forfeit their offices even upon conviction of a crime that constitutes a felony. There is no express constitutional disability or "disqualification" from Congress for the conviction of a crime, other than under the Fourteenth Amendment for certain treasonous conduct after having taken an oath of office. Under party rules, however, Members may lose their chairmanships of committees or ranking Member status upon conviction of a felony, and this has been expressly provided under the Senate Republican Conference Rules. Conviction of certain crimes may subject Senators to internal legislative disciplinary proceedings, including resolutions of censure, as well as expulsion from the Senate upon approval of two-thirds of the Members. An attempt to mandatorily suspend an indicted or convicted Member from voting or participating in congressional proceedings raises several issues. Although the Supreme Court has not needed to address the subject of recall of Members of Congress directly, other Supreme Court decisions, as well as other judicial and administrative rulings, decisions, and opinions, indicate that (1) the right to remove a Member of Congress before the expiration of his or her constitutionally established term of office resides exclusively in each house of Congress as established in the expulsion clause of the United States Constitution and (2) the length and number of the terms of office for federal officials, established and agreed upon by the states in the Constitution creating that federal government, may not be unilaterally changed by an individual state, such as through the enactment of a recall provision or other provision limiting, changing, or cutting short the term of a United States Senator or Representative. Salary
No law or Rule exists providing that a Member of the Senate who is indicted for or convicted of a crime must forfeit his or her congressional salary. The states may not, therefore, by statute or otherwise, bar from the ballot a candidate for federal office because such person is indicted or has been convicted of a felony. However, the federal pensions of Members of Congress will be affected in two general instances: upon the conviction of a crime concerning any of the national security offenses listed in the so-called "Hiss Act," and upon the conviction of any one of several felony offenses relating to public corruption, abuse of one's official position in the Congress, fraud, or campaign finance laws if the elements of the offense relate to the official duties of the Member. | There are no federal statutes or Rules of the Senate that directly affect the status of a Senator who has been indicted for a crime that constitutes a felony. No rights or privileges are forfeited under the Constitution, statutory law, nor the Rules of the Senate upon an indictment. Under the Rules of the Senate, therefore, an indicted Senator may continue to participate in congressional proceedings and considerations. Under the United States Constitution, a person under indictment is not disqualified from being a Member of or a candidate for reelection to Congress. Internal party rules in the Senate may, however, provide for certain steps to be taken by an indicted Senator. For example, the Senate Republican Conference Rules require an indicted chairman or ranking Member of a Senate committee, or a member of the party leadership, to temporarily step aside from his or her leadership or chairmanship position.
Members of Congress do not automatically forfeit their offices upon conviction of a crime that constitutes a felony. No express constitutional disability or "disqualification" from Congress exists for the conviction of a crime, other than under the Fourteenth Amendment for certain treasonous conduct by someone who has taken an oath of office to support the Constitution. Unlike Members of the House, Senators are not instructed by internal Senate Rules to refrain from voting in committee or on the Senate floor once they have been convicted of a crime which carries a particular punishment. Internal party rules in the Senate may affect a Senator's position in committees. Under the Senate Republican Conference Rules, for example, Senators lose their chairmanships of committees or ranking Member status upon conviction of a felony.
Conviction of certain crimes may subject—and has subjected in the past—Senators to internal legislative disciplinary proceedings, including resolutions of censure, as well as an expulsion from the Senate upon approval of two-thirds of the Members. Conviction of certain crimes relating to national security offenses would result in the Member's forfeiture of his or her entire federal pension annuity under the provisions of the so-called "Hiss Act" and, under more recent provisions of law, conviction of a number of crimes by Members relating to public corruption, fraud, or campaign finance law will result in the loss of the Member's entire "creditable service" as a Member for purposes of calculating his or her federal retirement annuities if the conduct underlying the conviction related to one's official duties.
This report has been updated from an earlier version, and will be updated in the future as changes to law, congressional rules, or judicial and administrative decisions may warrant. |
crs_R44265 | crs_R44265_0 | Introduction
On October 23, 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released the final version of its regulations to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from existing power plants (also referred to as electric generating units or EGUs). Since carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from fossil fuel combustion is the primary source of GHG emissions, and fossil fuels are used for the majority of electric power generation, reducing CO 2 emissions from power plants plays a key role in the Administration's climate change policy. The combined state targets are expected to result in reducing CO 2 emissions from power generation in the United States approximately 32% by 2030 as compared to 2005 levels. EPA is also giving each state a specific CO 2 emissions rate based on these national performance rates and the state's existing power generation portfolio. A state must implement an EPA-approved plan to ensure that power plants individually, in aggregate, or in combination with other measures undertaken by the state, achieve the equivalent of the interim CO 2 emissions performance rates (over the "glide path" period of 2022 to 2029), and the final CO 2 performance rates, rate-based goals or mass-based goals by 2030. Building Block 1 : Improving the heat rate at affected coal-fired steam EGUs. Building Block 2 : Substituting increased generation from lower-emitting existing natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) units for reduced generation from higher-emitting (primarily coal-fired) affected steam generating units. Building Block 3 : Substituting increased generation from new zero-emitting renewable energy generating capacity for reduced generation from affected fossil fuel-fired generating units. Increased dependence on renewable generation will likely require new transmission lines, and many of today's transmission projects awaiting regulatory approvals are intended to serve renewable electricity projects. It can take anywhere from 3 to 10 years to get the federal, state, and local permits in place to build a major electric transmission line. If additional transmission capacity is required, planning would likely need to begin soon to get new lines in place for when they would be needed in the early 2020s. The agency has modelled potential implications of the CPP in its Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule. State decisions on the design and availability of DSEE programs will be crucial to attaining the levels of subscribership necessary to achieve the cost reductions projected in EPA's RIA analysis. For some states, attaining the levels of cost-effective DSEE projects needed to reduce CPP compliance costs may be a challenge. For the top tier of states engaged in DSEE, the challenge may be where to look for the next increment of cost-effective projects. Given the CPP's focus on the three legs of the BSER (representing potential actions by EGUs inside the fence line), the EPA's inclusion of demand-side energy efficiency (representing actions outside the fence line) in the RIA does not clarify the costs of the BSER. However, the actual overall costs of CPP compliance will not begin to be known until after state compliance plans are filed and implemented. Concluding Comments
EPA declares in the CPP that states and affected EGUs can use whatever methods they choose to meet the applicable CO 2 emissions or emission rate reductions in the timeframes proposed. In so doing, EPA creates a plan that, according to EPA, allows most states and affected EGUs to be able to comply within the timeframe allowed. Going forward, EPA CO 2 regulations may provide a basis for the evolution of the U.S. electric power sector. In its final rule, EPA has largely calculated the CPP compliance obligations based on increasing renewable generation as the technology of choice for new power generation, emphasizing less fossil-fueled generation (including generation fueled by natural gas). | On October 23, 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released the final version of regulations to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from existing power plants (also referred to as electric generating units or EGUs by EPA). Since carbon dioxide (CO2) from fossil fuel combustion is the largest source of U.S. GHG emissions, and fossil fuels are used for the majority of electric power generation, reducing CO2 emissions from power plants plays a key role in the Administration's climate change policy. Under the provisions of the Clean Power Plan (CPP), states must prepare plans that reduce either total CO2 emissions or emission rates at affected EGUs. When implemented, EPA projects the state plans will reduce CO2 emissions from U.S. power generation approximately 32% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels.
EPA prepared state-specific CO2 emissions rates based on newly established national performance standards and the state's existing power generation portfolio. A state must implement an EPA-approved plan to ensure that power plants individually, in aggregate, or in combination with other measures undertaken by the state, achieve the equivalent of the interim CO2 emissions performance rates (over the "glide path" period of 2022 to 2029), and the final CO2 performance rates, rate-based goals, or mass-based goals by 2030.
EPA based the national performance standards in the CPP on the best system of emissions reduction (BSER). In the final rule, BSER includes three ("inside the fence line") Building Blocks (BBs): BB 1 involves improving the heat rate (i.e., efficiency) of coal-fired steam EGUs. BB 2 substitutes generation from (lower-emitting) existing natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) units for generation from (higher-emitting) steam generating units. BB 3 has generation from new (zero-emitting) renewable energy generating capacity replacing generation from fossil fuel-fired generating units.
EPA has modeled potential implications of the CPP in its Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), and emphasizes demand-side energy efficiency (DSEE) as a potential low-cost option. While DSEE is not a part of the BSER (and is an "outside the fence" activity), EPA's RIA assumes DSEE can lower electricity demand and reduce electric system costs, thereby offsetting estimated electricity price increases. As a result, EPA projects lower average electricity bills nationally by 2030. EPA's RIA also estimates reduced electricity demand will lower natural gas consumption, even as more NGCC capacity may be called upon to back up increased intermittent and variable renewable electric generation. Increased dependence on renewable generation may require new transmission lines. Many of today's transmission projects awaiting regulatory approvals are intended to serve renewable electricity projects. It can take from 3 to 10 years to get the federal, state, and local permits to build a major electric transmission line; planning may need to begin now so that new lines will be in place for when they may be needed in the early 2020s. State decisions on the design and availability of DSEE programs may be crucial to attaining the levels of subscribership necessary to achieve the demand reductions projected in the RIA. For some states, attaining the levels of cost-effective DSEE projects needed to reduce CPP compliance costs may be a challenge, while for the top tier of states currently engaged in DSEE, the challenge may be identifying the next increment of cost-effective projects.
Going forward, EPA's GHG regulations may provide a basis for the evolution of the U.S. electric power sector. EPA has based the CPP on increasing renewables as the technology of choice for new power generation. EPA declares in the CPP that states and affected EGUs can essentially use whatever methods they choose to meet CO2 emissions and emission-rate reductions in timeframes proposed, and in so doing, creates a plan it believes most states and affected EGUs may be able to comply with in the timeframe allowed. The overall costs of CPP compliance will not begin to be known until after state compliance plans are filed and implemented. |
crs_RS21768 | crs_RS21768_0 | Broadcast television is free to consumers,who receive the signals via over-the-air (rooftop or "rabbit ear") antennas. The 1999 Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act (SHVIA) (2) extended andexpandedupon provisions of the 1988 Satellite Home Viewer Act (SHVA), as amended in 1994. Key Provisions of the 2004 Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act (SHVERA)
On November 20, 2004, Congress passed the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act (SHVERA), also known as the William J. 4818 , P.L. 108-447 ). H.R. SBCA and the Digital Transition Coalition (DTC) want "digital white areas" to be defined, similar tothe existing analog white areas, where satellite companies would beallowed to provide distant digital network signals to subscribers unable to receive local network digital signalsterrestrially. The details are explained in CRS Report RS21990(pdf) . Nonetheless, SHVERArequires satellite companies to offer all local channels on a single dish within 18 months of the law's enactment(except that digital TV service signals and non-digital TV service signalsmay be on separate dishes). | In November 2004, Congress passed the Satellite Home Viewer Extension andReauthorization Act (SHVERA) as part of the FY2005Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447). SHVERA extends and expands upon provisionsin the 1999 Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act(SHVIA) that regulate the satellite television (TV) industry. Among the more controversial provisions wereextension of a copyright law provision that allows TV companies to provide"distant network signals" to subscribers who cannot receive broadcast network television signals via over-the-airtelevision antennas, the creation of analogous "digital white areas" asthe TV industry transitions to digital signals, and whether to require satellite companies to offer all local networkTV stations on a single dish. CRS Report RS21990(pdf) explainsSHVERA's digital white area provisions in more detail. This is the final edition of this report. |
crs_RL31191 | crs_RL31191_0 | Appendix A
Military Order of November 13, 2001. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism
By the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of theUnited States by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including theAuthorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution (Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. Findings. (a) International terrorists, including members of al Qaida, have carried out attacks on United Statesdiplomatic and military personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens and property within theUnited States on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the UnitedStates Armed Forces. (e) To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective conduct of military operationsand prevention of terrorist attacks, it is necessary for individuals subject to this order pursuant tosection 2 hereof to be detained, and, when tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of war and otherapplicable laws by military tribunals. GEORGE W. BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 13, 2001. DENYING CERTAIN ENEMIES ACCESS TO THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
WHEREAS the safety of the United States demands that all enemies who have entered uponthe territory of the United States as part of an invasion or predatory incursion, or who haveentered in order to commit sabotage, espionage or other hostile or warlike acts, should bepromptly tried in accordance with the law of war;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States ofAmerica and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, by virtue of theauthority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, do herebyproclaim that all persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with theUnited States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such nation, and whoduring time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States or any territory or possessionthereof, through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting orpreparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war,shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals; and that suchpersons shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding directly orindirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on their behalf, in the courts of theUnited States, or of its states, territories, and possessions, except under such regulations as theAttorney General, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may from time to time prescribe. Military Order of January 11, 1945. 1509), it is ordered as follows:
1. | On November 13, 2001, President Bush signed a Military Order pertaining to the detention,treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens as part of the war against terrorism. The order makesclear that the President views the crisis that began on the morning of September 11 as an attack "ona scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the United States ArmedForces." The order finds that the effective conduct of military operations and prevention of militaryattacks make it necessary to detain certain non-citizens and if necessary, to try them "for violationsof the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals."
The unprecedented nature of the September attacks and the magnitude of damage and lossof life they caused have led a number of officials and commentators to assert that the acts are not justcriminal acts, they are "acts of war." The President's Military Order makes it apparent that he plansto treat the attacks as acts of war rather than criminal acts. The distinction may have more thanrhetorical significance. Treating the attacks as violations of the international law of war could allowthe United States to prosecute those responsible as war criminals, trying them by special militarycommission rather than in federal court.
The purpose of this report is to identify some of the legal and practical implications oftreating the terrorist acts as war crimes and of applying the law of war rather than criminal statutesto prosecute the alleged perpetrators. The report will first present an outline of the sources andprinciples of the law of war, including a discussion of whether and how it might apply to the currentterrorist crisis. A brief explanation of the background issues and arguments surrounding the use ofmilitary commissions will follow. The report will then explore the legal bases and implications ofapplying the law of war under United States law, summarize precedent for its application by militarycommissions, and provide an analysis of the President's Military Order of November 13, 2001. Finally, the report discusses considerations for establishing rules of procedure and evidence thatcomport with international standards. |
crs_RS21880 | crs_RS21880_0 | With the population and size of the wildland-urban interface (WUI) expanding, more money is being spent on fire management in these locales. Federal funding for fire protection has increased over the past decade, and administration and congressional leaders have urged additional wildfire protection. The U.S. Forest Service (USFS) in the Department of Agriculture, along with the Department of the Interior (DOI), are responsible for protecting the majority of federal lands from wildfire, including any federal areas that comprise a WUI. Wildfire funding accounts for approximately 56% of the USFS budget and roughly 8% of the DOI budget in 2014. Furthermore, approximately 10% of all land within the lower 48 states is classified as WUI, with a significant concentration along the East Coast, although western states have the highest proportions of their homes in the WUI. Fire control focuses on removing one of those elements. A surface fire burns the needles or leaves, grass, and other small biomass within a foot or so of the ground and quickly moves on. A crown fire burns biomass at all levels, from the surface through the tops of the trees. In many temperate ecosystems, wildfires (including crown fires) are natural events, and the ecosystems are adapted to recover from the fire. Congress decides what programs to authorize and fund to protect the WUI from wildfires. To date, Congress has mostly addressed wildfire prevention and suppression by increasing funding. Given the current economic climate, better national data could provide insight as to whether or not other options to address wildfire management (e.g., a reduction in funding or a do-nothing approach) should receive more careful consideration. Programs could be expanded to educate homeowners, state and local governments, and the insurance industry about the ways to protect homes through actions, planning, and zoning and building regulations. Congress could also consider expanding protection for defensible space beyond the home ignition zone to a community protection zone. Funding for fuel reduction in the WUI could also be expanded. Additional funding through the states for fuel reduction on private lands in the WUI is a possibility that Congress could contemplate. Finally, Congress could consider compensation for landowners that suffer resource losses from wildfires. | Congressional interest in funding to protect against wildfire threats has focused on communities in and near forests, an area known as the wildland-urban interface (WUI). The WUI is expanding in size and population, leading to increased concern for life and property that could potentially be damaged by wildfires. Approximately 10% of all land in the lower 48 states is classified as WUI. A significant concentration lies along the East Coast, although western states have the highest proportions of homes in the WUI.
Federal funding for wildfire protection has increased over the last decade. The U.S. Forest Service (USFS) and the Department of the Interior (DOI) receive the bulk of funding to prevent and suppress wildfires. In 2014, approximately 56% of the USFS budget (discretionary funding) was allocated for wildfire management. A portion of this funding is spent on WUI efforts.
Wildfire, whether in a WUI community or not, occurs primarily as a surface fire or a crown fire. A surface fire burns the needles or leaves, grass, and other small biomass within a foot or so of the ground and quickly moves on. A crown fire burns biomass at all levels, from the surface through the tops of the trees.
Wildfire suppression involves removing one of the three elements that cause fire—fuel, heat, or oxygen. A variety of WUI wildfire control efforts may be used for structures, including building structures to meet protective standards. Some standards vary by state, and many are voluntary, such as removing burnable materials in proximity of a structure (i.e., defensible space). Control efforts for protecting wildlands include fuel reduction, or allowing the fire to burn if the ecosystem is able to adapt to and recover from periodic burning.
Programs and other options exist to address wildfires in the WUI. However, these programs could be refined to better address the current situation, and new initiatives and funding could be applied towards WUI issues not yet addressed. For example, programs could be expanded to educate homeowners, state and local governments, and the insurance industry about the ways to protect homes through actions, planning, and zoning and building regulations. Congress could consider expanding protection for defensible space beyond the home ignition zone to a community protection zone. Congress could also consider appropriating additional funds through the states for fuel reduction on private lands in the WUI where the treatments would be effective. Additionally, Congress could consider expanded compensation for landowners who suffer resource losses from wildfires. |
crs_RL31406 | crs_RL31406_0 | Most Recent Developments
On August 13, President Bush announced that he would not utilize $5.1 billion of contingentemergency spending Congress had provided as part of a $28.9 billion FY2002 SupplementalAppropriation ( P.L. The funding designated as contingent emergency spending was either not requested by the President or reflected higher levels for certain programs than in the Administration's request. 107-206 , the President had 30 days after enactment (September 1) to decidewhether to designate all or none of the $5.1 billion as emergency funding. Funds that willnot be used include about $500 million for DOD funding, $275 million for veterans' medical care,and about $700 million for foreign assistance including $250 million in aid for Israel and thePalestinians, and $200 million in HIV/AIDS funding. White House officials said, however, that theAdministration would seek about $1 billion of the $5.1 billion as an amended FY2003 appropriationrequest, including funds for Israel, the Palestinians, international HIV/AIDS, and theTransportation Security Agency. 4775 as passed by the House and Senate, H.Rept.107-480 , S.Rept. b Includes Administration request of $1.3 billion for Pell grants in its February 2002 budgetsubmission. b Excludes mandatory $1.1 billion in funding for additional disability payments for veteransthat theAdministration requested on May 21 and the Senate, and the conference included in its bill.Includes non-emergency spending offset by rescissions and offsets and spending that does notrelate to combating terrorism (see other). 107-593 . Although there was broad support for defense requests, particularly now, last year Congresssignificantly adjusted both the total amount as well as the types of spending requested by theAdministration in the first supplemental's defense request. (16)
On July 18, the House and Senate reached agreement on a spending compromise of $28.9 billion that was developed by House appropriators. The Senate passed the bill the following day and thePresident signed the bill on August 2 ( P.L. 107-206 ). Generally splitting the difference between the two houses, the conference version of the bill includes thefollowing spending levels:
$14.5 billion for the Department of Defense ($500 million above the request);
$6.7 billion for homeland security ($1 billion to $2 billion above the request)with
$3.85 billion for the Transportation Security Administration ($550 millionbelow the request);
$201 million for first responders;
$175 million for grants to fire departments;
$100 million for emergency FEMA grants;
$175 million for the FBI. about $24 billion where Congress adopts the same emergency designation as in the President's request;
about $5.1 billion that Congress designates as "contingent emergency" spending where the President has the choice of designating all or none of that funding as anemergency. On May 22, 23, and 24, the House debated H.R. And both houses added funds for assistance to Israel. 107-38 enacted last year and the new supplemental. In FY2003, DOD is requesting an additional $20.1 billionto continue the "global war on terrorism." (87)
Combining the request for $5.5 billion for aid to New York in the FY2002 emergency supplemental with $5 billion in business tax credits for Lower Manhattan passed by the House inearly March, and funding already provided in the ETR, the Administration contends that New YorkCity would receive a total of $21.5 billion. House Action on the Administration's New York City Request. | On March 21, 2002, President Bush requested $27.1 billion in emergency supplemental funding to continue the war on terrorism and provide additional assistance for New York City and aviationsecurity as well as other homeland security needs. With the $1.3 billion FY2002 supplementalrequest for Pell grants in the President's February budget, the Administration's request was $28.4billion.
Although there was broad congressional support for the new supplemental, Congress debated the total spending level, the amount for homeland security, and inclusion of budget ceilings forFY2003, as well as other issues from the time that the bill was submitted in the spring to its finalpassage in late July.
Resolving differences between the two houses and between Congress and the Administration proved to be difficult. The initial draft conference version developed by the appropriators wasrejected by the White House. A compromise package designed by Senate appropriators was thenrejected by the House. House appropriators then put together a final $28.9 billion spending packagethat was acceptable to both houses and the Administration.
That package, the conference version of H.R. 4775 ( H.Rept. 107-593 ), passed the House by 397 to 32 on July 23, and the Senate by 92 to 7 on July 24, 2002. The President signed the bill on August2, 2002 ( P.L. 107-206 ). As cleared by both houses, the bill includes $14.5 billion for DOD, $6.7billion for homeland security, $5.5 billion for assistance to New York, $2.1 billion for foreignassistance and embassy security, $1 billion for Pell grants, and $400 million for electionadministration reform.
As enacted, P.L. 107-206 includes $25 billion in emergency spending and $5.1 billion in contingent emergency spending. The President had thirty days after enactment (September 1) todecide whether to submit a budget amendment to Congress that designates either all or none of that$5.1 billion of contingent spending as emergency funding. The $5.1 billion portion includes about$1 billion in additional DOD funding, $275 million for veterans' medical care, $250 million in aidto Israel and the Palestinians, $200 million in HIV/AIDS funding, and $450 million for electionreform. The funding designated as contingent emergency spending was either not requested by thePresident or reflects higher levels than included in the Administration's request.
On August 13, the President announced that he would not utilize the $5.1 billion contingent emergency spending. White House officials said, however, that the Administration would seek about$1 billion of that amount as an amended FY2003 appropriation request, including funds for Israel,the Palestinians, international HIV/AIDS, and the Transportation Security Agency. Based on thisaction, the total funding dedicated to combating terrorism since September 11 is $63.9 billion,including $40 billion that was appropriated immediately after the terrorist attacks and $24 billion inthe FY2002 supplemental. |
crs_RS22782 | crs_RS22782_0 | Background
The Railroad Retirement Act authorizes retirement, survivor, and disability benefits for railroad workers and their families. The Railroad Retirement Board (RRB), an independent federal agency, administers these benefits. The Tier I railroad retirement benefit that is equivalent to Social Security benefits is mainly finance by Tier I payroll taxes (typically the same rate as the 12.4% Social Security payroll tax) and Social Security's financial interchange transfers. Tier II benefits, Tier I benefits in excess of Social Security benefits, and supplemental annuities are mainly financed by Tier II payroll taxes (currently 13.1% on employers and 4.9% on employees) and transfers from the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (NRRIT; hereinafter, the Trust). History of the Trust
Beginning in 2002, Tier II tax revenues in excess of obligatory benefits and associated administrative costs have been transferred from the Railroad Retirement Accounts to the Trust, which is invested in private stocks, bonds, and other investments. Prior to the Railroad Retirement and Survivors' Improvement Act of 2001 (RRSIA; P.L. 107-90 ), surplus railroad retirement assets could be invested only in U.S. government securities—just as the Social Security trust funds must be invested. The RRSIA established the Trust to manage and invest assets in the Railroad Retirement Account in much the same way that the assets of private-sector retirement plans are invested. Since February 2002 when railroad retirement funds were first invested through the Trust, a total of $21.3 billion has been transferred to the Trust from the RRB, and $21.1 billion in earnings have been transferred from the Trust to the RRB to pay railroad benefits and administrative expenses. At the end of FY2017, the market value of the Trust's managed assets was $26.5 billion. Structure of the Trust
Independence
Congress structured the Trust to be independent and free of political interference. As such, the Trust is a tax-exempt entity independent of the RRB and is not part of the federal government. Investing railroad retirement funds in private markets was expected to yield higher average annual returns than investing solely in government securities. The ABR is the ratio of the combined fair market value of Railroad Retirement Account and Trust assets as of the close of the fiscal year to the total RRB benefits and administrative expenses paid from the Railroad Retirement Account and the Trust in that fiscal year. Investment Guidelines
The Trust's assets are invested in a diversified portfolio, both to minimize investment risk and avoid disproportionate influence over a particular industry or firm. Oversight
The Trust is an independent nongovernmental entity, and it is not subject to the same oversight as federal agencies. The RRSIA outlines specific reporting requirements, including an annual management report to Congress. From FY2003 to FY2017, the Trust's annual rates of return, net of fees, have averaged 8.3%. Administrative Expenses
The Trust's administrative expenses steadily increased through FY2011 as its investment portfolio diversified. | The Railroad Retirement Board (RRB), an independent federal agency, administers retirement, survivor, disability, unemployment, and sickness insurance for railroad workers and their families. Railroad retirement payroll taxes include two tiers—Tier I and Tier II taxes. The Tier I tax finances the Tier I railroad retirement benefit that is equivalent to Social Security benefits and the Tier II tax finances the Tier II benefit, Tier I benefits in excess of Social Security benefits, and supplemental annuities.
Since 2002, Tier II tax revenues in excess of obligatory RRB benefits and associated administrative costs have been invested in private stocks, bonds, and other investments. Prior to the Railroad Retirement and Survivors' Improvement Act of 2001 (RRSIA; P.L. 107-90), surplus railroad retirement assets could only be invested in U.S. government securities—just as the Social Security trust funds must be invested. The RRSIA established the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (NRRIT; hereinafter, the Trust) to manage and invest part of the RRB's assets in much the same way that the assets of private-sector and most state and local government pension plans are invested. The remainder of RRB's assets continues to be invested solely in U.S. government securities.
Congress structured the Trust in an effort to ensure investment independence and limit political interference. It also aimed to increase railroad retirement system funding, add enhanced benefits, potentially reduce taxes, and protect system financing in case of market downturns. The Trust's assets are invested in a diversified portfolio, both to minimize investment risk and avoid disproportionate influence over an industry or firm. The Trust is a tax-exempt entity independent of the federal government, and it is not subject to the same oversight as federal agencies. However, the RRSIA requires an annual management report to Congress.
From its inception in February 2002 to September 30, 2017, $21.3 billion has been transferred to the Trust from the RRB and $21.1 billion has been transferred from the Trust to pay railroad retirement benefits. At the end of FY2017, the net asset value of the Trust was $26.5 billion.
The Trust's investments have generally followed the markets' recent performance. From FY2003 to FY2017, the Trust's annual returns averaged 8.3%, slightly higher than expectations of the bill's drafters, who assumed nominal annual returns of 8.0%. As the Trust's investment portfolio diversified over time, its administrative expenses steadily increased, to 36 basis points in FY2011, but fell to 31 basis points in FY2017, and remain low when compared with other mutual funds.
The combined fair market value of Tier II taxes and Trust assets is designed to maintain four to six years' worth of RRB benefits and administrative expenses. To maintain this balance, the Railroad Retirement Tier II tax rates automatically adjust as needed. This tax adjustment does not require congressional action. The Railroad Retirement Tier II tax rates increased in 2013 and most recently in 2015. |
crs_R43237 | crs_R43237_0 | Introduction
Minority-serving institutions (MSIs) are institutions of higher education that serve high concentrations of minority students who, historically, have been underrepresented in higher education. Generally, many such institutions have faced challenges in obtaining access to financial support, thus affecting their ability to enhance their academic offerings and institutional capabilities and ultimately serve their students. Federal higher education policy recognizes th e importance of such institutions in improving access for and increasing completion of underrepresented minorities and targets financial resources to them. Funding for MSIs is channeled through numerous federal agencies, and several of these funding sources are available to MSIs through grant programs authorized under the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA; P.L. 89-329). Over the years, HEA support of MSI programs has expanded to include a wider variety of underrepresented groups, and in FY2016, MSI programs under the HEA were appropriated approximately $817 million, which helped fund more than 929 grants. For purposes of this report, MSIs include, but are not limited to, American Indian Tribally Controlled Colleges and Universities (TCCUs); Alaska Native and Native Hawaiian-serving institutions (ANNHs); predominantly Black institutions (PBIs); Native American-serving, nontribal institutions (NASNTIs); Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander-serving institutions (ANNAPISIs), historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs), and Hispanic-serving institutions (HSIs). The HEOA also authorized additional annual mandatory appropriations for Masters Degree Programs at HBCUs and PBIs and the Promoting Postbaccalaureate Opportunities for Hispanic American programs for each of fiscal years FY2009 through FY2014, programs that typically receive discretionary appropriations. Institutions that receive a Strengthening AANAPISI grant under Title III-A in a fiscal year are prohibited from receiving funds under other Title III-A programs, Title III-B (Strengthening HBCU and HBGI programs), or Title V (HSI program and Promoting Postbaccalaureate Opportunities for Hispanic Americans (PPOHA)) in the same fiscal year; however, in general, they may receive a grant under any of the Title III-F programs in the same fiscal year. Section 323, the Strengthening HBCUs program, authorizes the Secretary to award formula-based grants to eligible HBCUs for activities to strengthen academic, administrative, and fiscal capabilities; these grants are typically available through discretionary appropriations. Finally, the Historically Black College and University Capital Financing (HBCU Cap Fin) program assists HBCUs in obtaining low-cost capital financing for campus maintenance and construction projects. Typically, the Strengthening HBCUs program is funded through discretionary appropriations under Title III-B. Additional mandatory appropriations are provided through FY2019 in Title III-F. Finally, any amount appropriated over $62.9 million is made available to any of the eligible institutions, schools, or programs pursuant to a formula to be developed by ED that uses the following elements:
the ability of an institution, school, or program to match federal funds with nonfederal funds; the number of students enrolled in the program for which funding is being received; the average cost of education per student for all full-time graduate and professional students enrolled in the eligible professional or graduate school; the number of students in the previous year who received their first professional or doctoral degree from the programs for which funding was received in the previous year; and the contribution, on a percentage basis, of the programs for which the institution is eligible to receive funds to the total number of African Americans receiving graduate or professional degrees in the professions or disciplines related to the programs for the previous year. Since FY2010, the Title III-A Strengthening PBI program grants have been funded through annual discretionary appropriations under Title III-A. Additional mandatory appropriations are provided annually through FY2019 under Title III-F. Authorization for mandatory appropriations, and mandatory appropriations, were provided for the program under Title VIII for FY2009-FY2014. Title III-F contains the HSI Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics and Articulation Program (HSI STEM), which assists in increasing the number of Hispanic and low-income students attaining degrees in STEM fields and in the development of transfer and articulation agreements between two-year and four-year institutions in STEM fields. The HSI program is funded through annual discretionary appropriations. This is a competitive grant program funded with annual mandatory appropriations through FY2019. Two such programs are the Endowment Challenge Grant and the Minority Science and Engineering Improvement Program. This program has not been funded since FY1995. To counter this, MSEIP was established to provide grant-based assistance to predominantly minority institutions to effect long-term improvements in science and engineering education. MSEIP funding is provided through annual discretionary appropriations. | Minority-serving institutions (MSIs) are institutions of higher education that serve high concentrations of minority students who, historically, have been underrepresented in higher education. Many MSIs have faced challenges in securing adequate financial support, thus affecting their ability to develop and enhance their academic offerings and ultimately serve their students. Federal higher education policy recognizes the importance of such institutions and targets financial resources to them. Funding for MSIs is channeled through numerous federal agencies, and several of these funding sources are available to MSIs through grant programs authorized under the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA; P.L. 89-329). Over the years, HEA programs that support MSIs have expanded and now include programs for institutions serving a wide variety of student populations. In FY2016, MSI programs under the HEA were appropriated approximately $817 million, which helped fund more than 929 grants to institutions.
Currently, the HEA authorizes several programs that benefit MSIs:
Title III-A authorizes the Strengthening Institutions Program, which provides grants to institutions with financial limitations and a high percentage of needy students. Title III-A also authorizes separate similar programs for American Indian tribally controlled colleges and universities; Alaska Native and Native Hawaiian-serving institutions; predominantly Black institutions (PBIs); Native American-serving, nontribal institutions; and Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander-serving institutions. Grants awarded under these programs assist eligible institutions in strengthening their academic, administrative, and fiscal capabilities. These programs are typically funded through annual discretionary appropriations, but additional annual mandatory appropriations are provided through FY2019 under Title III-F. Title III-B authorizes the Strengthening Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) program and the Historically Black Graduate Institutions program, both of which award grants to eligible institutions to assist them in strengthening their academic, administrative, and fiscal capabilities. These programs are typically funded through annual discretionary appropriations; however, additional annual mandatory appropriations are provided for HBCUs through FY2019. Title III-C authorizes the Endowment Challenge Grant program, which has not been funded since FY1995. Title III-D authorizes the HBCU Capital Financing Program, which assists HBCUs in obtaining low-cost capital financing for campus maintenance and construction projects and is generally funded through annual discretionary appropriations. Title III-E authorizes the Minority Science and Engineering Improvement Program, which provides grants to MSIs and other entities to effect long-term improvements in science and engineering education and is funded through annual discretionary appropriations. Title III-F provides additional annual mandatory appropriations through FY2019 for many of the Title III-A and Title III-B MSI programs. It also provides mandatory appropriations through FY2019 for the Hispanic-serving institutions (HSIs) Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Articulation Program, which provides grants to HSIs to increase the number of Hispanic students in STEM fields and to develop model transfer and articulation agreements. Title V authorizes the HSI program and the Promoting Postbaccalaureate Opportunities for Hispanic Americans (PPOHA), both of which award grants to eligible institutions to assist them in strengthening their academic, administrative, and fiscal capabilities. Typically, both programs are funded through annual discretionary appropriations, but additional annual mandatory appropriations were provided for the PPOHA program from FY2009 through FY2014. Title VII-A-4 authorizes Masters Degree Programs at HBCUs and PBIs, which provide grants to select HBCUs and PBIs to improve graduate educational opportunities. Typically, both programs are funded through annual discretionary appropriations, but additional annual mandatory appropriations were provided for both programs from FY2009 through FY2014. |
crs_RL34537 | crs_RL34537_0 | Overview of Pre-Disaster Mitigation
Program Purposes
The purpose of the original pre-disaster hazard mitigation pilot program, known as Project Impact, as well as the successor Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program, has been to implement hazard reduction measures prior to a disaster event. Following four years of funding through appropriations statutes, Congress authorized the program from 2000 to 2003 in the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA2K) which placed the PDM program in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act as Section 203. The changes in the funding levels represented differing approaches not only to PDM but to the mitigation concept as a whole. This formula, in effect, made PDM both a competitive and a formula-driven program. 111-351 . Congress funded the program at the $90 million level. The explanations offered for this reversal in policy included the existing balance of funds in the program but also that the PDM program duplicated other mitigation programs such as the HMGP program and the FMA program. These issues include the pace at which grant awards are made, the best methods for funding awards, the priority uses for PDM funds, the amount of resources devoted to the program, the length of authorization for the program, and, most importantly, the direction of pre-disaster mitigation and where it may be best realized given recent Presidential action. The FEMA Administrator may make grant awards at his discretion pursuant to Section 203 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5133) with funds otherwise designated as congressionally directed spending and appropriated in any fiscal year under FEMA National Pre-disaster Mitigation Fund", if either: (a) the intended applicant for such earmarked funding informs FEMA in writing that no application will be submitted to use the funding; or (b) no application for such earmarked funding is submitted to FEMA within two years of the date of the respective appropriation for such funds; Provided, that amounts appropriated under "National Pre-disaster Mitigation Fund" in any fiscal year shall be available for necessary and reasonable costs to administer and to close out Pre-disaster Mitigation grants. In addition to authorizing PDM, DMA2K also required local mitigation plans as a condition of eligibility for FEMA hazard mitigation grants. These grants have had a nationwide impact in communities' readiness to implement mitigation strategies at the local level. P.L. H.R. If the initial questions concerning the efficacy of the program are resolved, Congress might authorize the PDM program, like the rest of the Stafford Act, without a sunset date. Methods of Awarding PDM Funds
When the pilot program, Project Impact, was initiated in 1997 an emphasis was placed on the communities' disaster history, the involvement of community-based organizations in mitigation work, the participation of the local business community and the commitment of the state and local governments. While that budget suggested a new approach to the distribution of funds, the reauthorization legislation, P.L. Perhaps the recent unveiling of a new "Disaster Resilience Competition" provides some hint at the future direction of pre-disaster mitigation or mitigation overall. The competitive program, announced by the President in June of 2014, has $1 billion in funding; the last $1 billion of the initial $16 billion provided to HUD's CDBG program in the Hurricane Sandy supplemental. The Committee notes that this program is one of several mitigation programs run by FEMA, including the Repetitive Flood Claims grant program, the Flood Mitigation Assistance program, the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, and the Severe Repetitive Loss grant program. An additional argument can be made that eventual savings from mitigation activities would accrue to not only the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) but also the private insurance industry as losses are reduced. As previously noted, legislation has been introduced to reauthorize PDM. To either further the confusion or bring some clarity to the argument, the President's most recent budget (FY2015) contained an Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative. This was within the same budget that recommended zeroing out the PDM program. Those positions, along with the issues discussed in this report, are some of the broader considerations the Congress may choose to take up regarding federal mitigation policy in the future and the PDM program's role in that policy. | Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM), as federal law and a program activity, began in 1997. Congress established a pilot program, within the Appropriations Act, which FEMA named Project Impact, to test the concept of investing prior to disasters to reduce the vulnerability of communities to future disasters. Several years later, P.L. 106-390, the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, authorized the PDM program in law as Section 203 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. However, unlike the rest of the Stafford Act which has a freestanding authorization, the PDM program had a sunset provision and has required reauthorization in the ensuing years.
For most of its history, the PDM program had grown in appropriated resources as well as the scope of participation nationwide. But that growth ceased in 2011 when funding was cut in half. The Administration has recommended no PDM funding for the past three budgets (including FY2015). However, Congress has chosen to maintain funding, albeit at a reduced amount. For FY2014 the appropriated level was $25 million. All of this has contributed uncertainty to the program at all levels and to the concept of disaster mitigation outside of Presidential declarations or the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).
An interesting interregnum in the PDM program's history is its involvement in the debate over congressionally directed funding. Many projects, and a large portion of the program's funding, were earmarked for several years. These actions created questions of eligibility for some projects named but also meant that the lower level of remaining funds in the program could not justify the regimen of a competitive grant process.
The FY2015 budget has offered a mixed message for pre-disaster mitigation efforts. Despite again zeroing out the PDM budget, the Administration also has sought to establish the "Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative" (OGSI) and pledged that $400 million derived from the OGSI would be placed in the PDM account for a renewed, competitive grant program.
The PDM program's authorization (P.L. 111-351) expired at the end of FY2013. Legislation has been introduced, H.R. 3282, to reauthorize the program through 2018.
In addition to the waning of funding and congressional retractions of earmarks, the current Administration has consistently suggested elimination of the program. Taken together these actions leave the program with a clouded future that may be confusing to current recipients as well as discouraging to potential applicants.
In its rationale for eliminating PDM funding the Administration has pointed to remaining mitigation programs such as the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (Section 404 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act) and the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program within the NFIP. While both of those are mitigation programs, the former is only available after major disaster declarations and the latter can only be used to address flood hazards on NFIP insured structures.
In considering the PDM program's future, the recent decision by the Administration to place a new Disaster Resilience Competition Grant within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) further complicates the program's future. The new program was arguably placed at HUD since the funds are coming from the last $1 billion in the Hurricane Sandy Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) appropriation. But given FEMA's previous role in establishing mitigation plans at the state and local level, as well as its other mitigation programs, placing a new competitive program tied to climate change at a different department may cause some to question FEMA's role in future mitigation efforts.
Combined, the actions noted at HUD and the new OGSI initiative, may hold out the promise of the highest funding levels in the history of pre-disaster mitigation. In light of these initiatives, Congress may wish to examine where the program's future course lies.
This report will be updated as warranted by events. |
crs_R42489 | crs_R42489_0 | For discretionary DOD budget authority, the request includes a total of $613.9 billion, of which $525.4 billion is for "base" defense budget costs that cover day-to-day operations other than war costs, and $88.5 billion is for "Overseas Contingency Operations" (OCO), which include military operations abroad—largely, now, in Afghanistan. The downward trend is due, in part, to the drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Compared with the amounts appropriated for DOD in FY2012, the FY2013 budget request is highlighted by a drop of 23% in funding for war costs—a change reflecting the planned reduction in deployments to Afghanistan by the end of FY2012 ( Table 1 ). The proposed FY2013 DOD reduction also reflects the broad-gauged effort to reduce federal budget deficits that was embodied in the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, enacted on August 2, 2011 ( P.L. The base budget request, which is $5.2 billion lower than the corresponding enacted FY2012 appropriation, would mark the first decrease in Pentagon spending (excluding war costs) since 1998. The FY2013 base budget request also is $45.3 billion lower than the amount the Administration had projected a year earlier it would request for the FY2013 base budget, reflecting mandatory caps on discretionary spending in FY2013 that were established by the BCA (see Figure 1 ). The latter amount is particularly significant because it is subject to limits on discretionary spending established by the BCA, if automatic cuts in spending are implemented beginning in January 2013 ( Table 2 ). In addition to the $900 billion worth of deficit savings resulting from BCA's spending caps for FY2012 and 2013, the act also requires additional deficit reduction measures totaling at least $1.2 trillion through 2021 (resulting in a total spending reduction through FY2021 of $2.1 trillion). Unless Congress and the President either repeal BCA or enact legislation that would reduce deficits over that period by at least an additional $1.2 trillion, the BCA will trigger automatic reductions that would cut the Administration's current DOD base budget plan by whatever amount is needed to cover the defense share of the shortfall between whatever cuts Congress does agree to and the required total reduction of $2.1 trillion (i.e., the $900 billion reduction resulting from the FY2012 and 2013 spending caps plus an additional $1.2 trillion as a result of legislation yet to be enacted). A Smaller but Ready Force
The Administration's plan would reduce the size of the active-duty force—slated to be 1.42 million at the end of FY2012—by 21,600 personnel in FY2013 and by a total of 102,400 by the end of FY2017. (see Table 5 )
'Pivot' Toward the Pacific
The new strategic guidance calls for DOD to put a higher priority on deploying U.S. forces in the Pacific and around Asia while scaling back deployments in Europe. Longer-Term Budget Issues
Longer-term budget issues may be the focus of greater attention in Congress than the FY2013 DOD request itself, with debate being driven by efforts to reduce federal budget deficits. Matters of debate—much of which is already underway—include
$487 billion of cuts in projected defense spending over the 10 years from FY2012-FY2021 that the Administration has proposed, including a cut of $45 billion in FY2013; a potential sequester of defense funds in FY2013 followed by reduced defense spending caps in FY2014-21 required by the BCA either to enforce the additional $1.2 trillion of savings over the 9 years from FY2013-FY2021 (unless cuts totaling that amount are agreed on), or to make up the shortfall between whatever amount of savings Congress can agree on and the required $1.2 trillion total; the possibility of setting limits on funding for overseas operations, first, as a way of avoiding the erosion of deficit savings required by the BCA and, second, as a source of deficit savings to be claimed as part of a deficit agreement; and, cuts to the end-strength of the Army and Marine Corps as well as other changes in defense strategy that the Administration has articulated as a means of adjusting to proposed budget cuts. A View from DOD
For their part, senior defense officials have warned that a sequestration of funds large enough to achieve the entire $1.2 trillion reduction, implemented through an across-the-board percentage cut on all parts of the DOD budget, would have effects on critical defense capabilities ranging from disruptive, to destructive, to devastating. | This report analyzes President Obama's FY2013 defense budget request and the long-term deficit reduction issues relevant to congressional discussion of that request. Congressional action on the FY2013 defense budget will be analyzed in a separate report.
The FY2013 Department of Defense (DOD) budget request includes a total of $613.9 billion in discretionary budget authority: $525.4 billion for the so-called "base budget" (excluding operations in Afghanistan and Iraq), and $88.5 billion for war costs or "Overseas Contingency Operations" (OCO). Overall, that request is $31.8 billion less than was appropriated for DOD in FY2012, with most of the reduction accounted for by the continuing drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan (see Table 1 and "Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)").
Apart from declining war costs, the base budget request is $5.2 billion below the corresponding FY2012 appropriation, and it would mark the first decrease in Pentagon spending (excluding war costs) since FY1998. Moreover, the request is $45.3 billion lower than the amount the Administration had projected a year earlier that it would request for the FY2013 base budget (see Figure 1). That reduction reflects caps on discretionary spending that were established by the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, enacted in August 2011. All told, funding caps established by the BCA are intended to reduce projected federal spending by more than $900 billion over the 10 years from FY2012-FY2021.
The FY2013 DOD base budget request incorporates some policy initiatives intended, at least in part, to anticipate future budgets which will be lower (because of deficit reduction efforts) than DOD had planned. The proposed departures from previous plans are congruent with a new strategic concept, unveiled in January 2012, which the Administration says is intended to reflect both lower budgets and a global security environment that is different from the past decade's focus on Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, the FY2013 budget includes
the first increment of a three-year plan to reduce the size of the active-duty Army and Marine Corps by 102,400 troops—a 7.2% reduction (see Table 4); the Administration bases these reductions on the premise that new, large-scale, long-term ground force deployments, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, are unlikely (see "A Smaller but Ready Force"); savings of $9.6 billion as a result of so-called "efficiency" initiatives (see "Reductions in Overhead and Support Costs"); several actions intended to increase the focus of DOD operations on the Pacific region (see "'Pivot' Toward the Pacific"); and several initiatives intended to slow the growth of military compensation and health care (see "Personnel Costs").
Other long-term issues also may be matters of discussion in Congress. A key issue is whether additional cuts in defense spending, beyond those required by the initial limits on discretionary spending in the BCA, should be considered as a part of further deficit reduction measures. In addition to the $900 billion worth of deficit savings resulting from the BCA's spending caps, the act also requires additional deficit reduction measures totaling at least $1.2 trillion through 2021, (resulting in a total spending reduction through FY2012 of $2.1 trillion). Unless Congress either revises the BCA or agrees to an additional $1.2 trillion worth of reductions by January 2013, the BCA mandates automatic cuts in spending, equally divided between defense and nondefense expenditures (see "Longer-Term Budget Issues").
In FY2013, the automatic cuts may be imposed through a process of sequestration in which an across-the-board percentage cut is imposed on each program in the budget, either (1) to yield the required $1.2 trillion worth of additional cuts or (2) to make up the difference between whatever lesser reduction Congress agrees to and the $1.2 trillion target. Senior DOD leaders have warned that sequestration would have a devastating impact on defense capabilities, and some members of Congress have argued for legislation that would exempt DOD from a sequester. President Obama has said he would veto any legislation that exempted defense, however. While few deny that sequestration would be disruptive, the prospect of automatic cuts in spending is seen by most as a vital incentive for Congress to reach a balanced deficit reduction agreement. |
crs_R41484 | crs_R41484_0 | Additionally, this report examines several issues for the 112 th Congress, which is likely to remain concerned with all aspects of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, including authorizing and appropriating ROL-related programs and assistance, as well as oversight on policy implementation and effectiveness. By all accounts, the challenges in Afghanistan confronting ROL development and justice sector reform remain substantial. Interagency Planning and Implementation Team
Also newly established is the ROL Interagency Planning and Implementation Team (IPIT). These factors are a challenge not only among and between U.S. government entities, but also among the other international donors involved in ROL assistance in Afghanistan. Changes to the current coordination mechanisms in place or the relative participation of various U.S. agencies involved in ROL efforts may occur under the new CDROLLE and CJIATF-435, as both entities evolve. Most recently, the U.S. military has established a ROL field force (ROLFF), whose mission is to support jointly implemented civilian and military ROL projects in the field, including in otherwise non-permissive areas of Afghanistan. Major programs include the primary projects implemented by the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, as well as USAID. Major Justice Sector Programs
The four major U.S. funded programs are the Judicial Sector Support Program (JSSP), the Corrections System Support Program (CSSP), the ROL Stabilization (RLS) Program, and the Senior Federal Prosecutors Program. The Defense Department is also increasingly supporting the training and mentoring of Afghan corrections and other aspects of the Afghan justice sector through Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 (CJIATF-435) and ongoing efforts to transition detention operations in Afghanistan to the Afghan government. Supporters of such a policy approach have emphasized the importance of anti-corruption efforts in an overall counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan, focused on improving Afghan perceptions of the Afghan government's legitimacy and transparency. Additional reported concerns included the following:
The lack of both a formally approved ROL strategy and an anti-corruption strategy for Afghanistan limits the U.S. Embassy in Kabul from setting ROL and anti-corruption priorities and timelines, as well as identifying the appropriate number of personnel and needed skill sets, according to the State Department's OIG and SIGAR. U.S. Support to the Informal Justice Sector
Observers have described current U.S. efforts to support Afghan ROL development, including increased emphasis on the informal justice sector and other civilian and military efforts to improve access to justice at the provincial and district level, to be in many ways unique and untested, due the sheer scale of the programs involved, the low level of existing justice sector capacity, gaps in U.S. government understanding of existing dispute resolution mechanisms throughout the country, the absence of security in many parts of Afghanistan, and the existence of entrenched corruption at all levels of the Afghan bureaucracy. Proponents of the current U.S. approach to ROL institutions in Afghanistan would argue that it is informed by prior challenges and policy criticism and reflects a strategic evolution in the level of U.S. commitment, resources, and policy approach to ROL-related efforts in Afghanistan. Observers continue to debate, however, whether or to what extent these shifts in the level of U.S. commitment and resources for ROL efforts in Afghanistan will help the U.S. government reach its ultimate goal of developing a stable, capable, and legitimate Afghan government. | Developing effective Afghan justice sector institutions is considered by many observers to be essential in winning the support of the Afghan population, improving the Afghan government's credibility and legitimacy, and reducing support for insurgent factions. Such sentiments are reinforced in the face of growing awareness of the pervasiveness of Afghan corruption. To this end, establishing the rule of law (ROL) in Afghanistan has become a priority in U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and an issue of interest to Congress. Numerous U.S. programs to promote ROL are in various stages of implementation and receive ongoing funding and oversight from Congress. Major programs include the following:
State Department's Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) and Corrections System Support Program (CSSP); U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID's) formal and informal ROL stabilization programs (RLS); Justice Department's (DOJ's) Senior Federal Prosecutors Program, which, with State Department funds, provides legal mentoring and training; and Defense Department's (DOD's) operational support through Combined Joint Task Force 101 (CJTF-101), as well as through Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 (CJIATF-435).
It is difficult to identify all the programs, activities, and actors involved in ROL in Afghanistan, in part because of the continued evolution of U.S. strategy and interagency coordination for supporting the Afghan justice sector. Among the most recent shifts in strategy, U.S. efforts are increasingly resourced by a surge in civilian personnel at the provincial and district levels. To align with counterinsurgency (COIN) objectives, the U.S. government is emphasizing not only ministerial-level institution-building, but also projects to improve local-level access to justice, including projects to support informal dispute resolution mechanisms. Policy coordination among U.S. civilian and military entities involved in ROL efforts in Afghanistan also continues to change—including, most recently, the establishment of an Ambassador-led Coordinating Director for Rule of Law and Law Enforcement (CDROLLE) directorate at the U.S. Embassy, a General-led Rule of Law Field Force (ROLFF) under the CJIATF-435, as well as an Interagency Planning and Implementation Team (IPIT) to coordinate all civilian and military ROL activities in Afghanistan. Future shifts in policy approaches may also occur as policymakers seek to address growing concerns regarding Afghan corruption.
Observers debate whether or to what extent the increased U.S. commitment to and resources for ROL efforts in Afghanistan will help the U.S. government reach its ultimate goal of developing a stable, capable, and legitimate Afghan government. Many would argue that the challenges in Afghanistan to ROL development and justice sector reform remain substantial and many factors undermine prospects for success. Chief among these are ongoing allegations of severe corruption at all levels of the Afghan government, lack of overall security and stability, limited Afghan government capacity, the existence of competing justice mechanisms, and the persistence of traditional attitudes that perpetuate the perception that well-connected Afghans can avoid facing prosecution and conviction. These debates will likely continue in the 112th Congress, as Members remain concerned with all aspects of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, including authorizing and appropriating ROL-related programs and assistance, as well as conducting oversight on policy implementation and effectiveness. |
crs_R44812 | crs_R44812_0 | These countries are struggling with widespread insecurity, fragile political and judicial systems, and high levels of poverty and unemployment. The Obama Administration determined that it was "in the national security interests of the United States" to work with Central American governments to improve security, strengthen governance, and promote economic prosperity in the region. Congress has appropriated an estimated $2.1 billion in aid for the region since FY2016 but has required the Northern Triangle governments to address a series of concerns prior to receiving U.S. support. Although the updated strategy maintains the objectives that were adopted during the Obama Administration, the Trump Administration's policy toward Central America places more emphasis on preventing illegal immigration, combating transnational crime, and generating export and investment opportunities for U.S. businesses. assistance to Central America. The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America is intended to take a broader, more comprehensive approach than previous U.S. initiatives in the region. Whereas other U.S. efforts over the past 20 years generally emphasized a single objective, such as economic growth or crime reduction, the current strategy is based on the premise that prosperity, security, and governance are "mutually reinforcing and of equal importance." Congressional Funding
Congress has appropriated an estimated $2.1 billion for efforts under the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. This figure includes $754 million in FY2016, nearly $700 million in FY2017, and an estimated $627 million in FY2018 (see Table 5 and the Appendix ). Congress has placed strict conditions on aid to those three countries, however, requiring the Northern Triangle governments to address a range of concerns to receive assistance (see " Conditions on Assistance ," below). Due to those legislative requirements, delays in the budget process, and congressional holds, assistance has been slow to arrive in the region. 115-245 and P.L. The act also stipulated that another 50% of the "assistance for the central governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras" could not be obligated until the Secretary of State certified the each government was
working cooperatively with an autonomous, publicly accountable entity to provide oversight of the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle in Central America; combating corruption, including investigating and prosecuting current and former government officials credibly alleged to be corrupt; implementing reforms, policies, and programs to improve transparency and strengthen public institutions, including increasing the capacity and independence of the judiciary and the Office of the Attorney General; implementing a policy to ensure that local communities, civil society organizations (including indigenous and other marginalized groups), and local governments are consulted in the design, and participate in the implementation and evaluation of, activities of the [Alliance for Prosperity] that affect such communities, organizations, and governments; countering the activities of criminal gangs, drug traffickers, and organized crime; investigating and prosecuting in the civilian justice system government personnel, including military and police personnel, who are credibly alleged to have violated human rights, and ensuring that such personnel are cooperating in such cases; cooperating with commissions against corruption and impunity and with regional human rights entities; supporting programs to reduce poverty, expand education and vocational training for at-risk youth, create jobs, and promote equitable economic growth, particularly in areas contributing to large numbers of migrants; implementing a plan that includes goals, benchmarks, and timelines to create a professional, accountable civilian police force and end the role of the military in internal policing, and make such plan available to the Department of State; protecting the right of political opposition parties, journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders, and other civil society activists to operate without interference; increasing government revenues, including by implementing tax reforms and strengthening customs agencies; and resolving commercial disputes, including the confiscation of real property, between United States entities and such government. Policy Issues for Congress
Congress may examine a number of policy issues as it deliberates on potential changes to the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America and future appropriations for the initiative. These issues include the funding levels and strategy necessary to meet U.S. objectives in the region, the extent to which Central American governments are demonstrating the political will to undertake domestic reforms, the utility of the conditions placed on assistance to Central America, and the potential implications of changes to U.S. immigration, trade, and drug control policies for U.S. objectives in the region. Strategy and Funding Levels
U.S. policymakers have begun to reassess the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. The Trump Administration also has sought to reduce funding for U.S. foreign aid programs in Central America and shift the balance of the remaining assistance toward security efforts. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. | Central America has received renewed attention from U.S. policymakers over the past few years as the region has become a major transit corridor for illicit drugs and has surpassed Mexico as the largest source of irregular migration to the United States. These narcotics and migrant flows are the latest symptoms of deep-rooted challenges in several countries in the region, including widespread insecurity, fragile political and judicial systems, and high levels of poverty and unemployment. The U.S. government and partners in the region have begun to implement new initiatives intended to address those challenges, but living conditions in Central America have yet to improve significantly.
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America
The Obama Administration determined it was in the national security interests of the United States to work with Central American governments to address their challenges. With congressional support, it launched a new U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America and significantly increased aid to the region. The strategy takes a broader, more comprehensive approach than previous U.S. initiatives in Central America and is based on the premise that efforts to promote prosperity, improve security, and strengthen governance are mutually reinforcing and of equal importance. The strategy focuses primarily on the "Northern Triangle" countries of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras), which face the greatest challenges and are carrying out complementary efforts under their Alliance for Prosperity initiative. It also provides an overarching framework for U.S. engagement with the other countries in the region: Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama.
The Trump Administration has maintained the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America but has adjusted the initiative to place more emphasis on preventing illegal immigration, combating transnational crime, and generating export and investment opportunities for U.S. businesses. The Administration also has sought to scale back U.S. assistance to Central America, but Congress has rejected the majority of the proposed reductions.
Funding and Conditions
Congress has appropriated nearly $2.1 billion for the Central America strategy since FY2016. This figure includes $754 million appropriated in FY2016, $700 million appropriated in FY2017, and an estimated $627 million appropriated in FY2018 (through P.L. 114-113, P.L. 115-31, and P.L. 115-141, respectively). Congress has placed strict conditions on the aid, requiring the Northern Triangle governments to address a range of concerns, including border security, corruption, and human rights, to receive assistance. As a result of those legislative requirements, delays in the budget process, and congressional holds, aid has been slow to arrive in the region.
Future Appropriations and Other Policy Issues
The first session of the 116th Congress will determine the amount of assistance to be appropriated for the Central America strategy for the remainder of FY2019 and consider the Trump Administration's forthcoming foreign aid budget request for FY2020. As Congress deliberates on the future of the Central America strategy, it may examine a number of policy issues. These issues include the funding levels and strategy necessary to meet U.S. objectives; the extent to which Central American governments are demonstrating the political will to undertake domestic reforms; the utility of the conditions placed on assistance to Central America; and the potential implications of changes to U.S. immigration, trade, and drug control policies for U.S. objectives in the region. |
crs_R44952 | crs_R44952_0 | Introduction
Chemicals and the facilities that manufacture, store, distribute, and use them are essential to the U.S. economy. However, incidents occasioned by natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes, floods), unintentional events (e.g., fire, accidents), or security threats (e.g., terrorism) show that the handling and storage of chemicals are not without risk. Federal agencies implement a number of programs to help prevent chemical facility accidents, reduce risks of terrorist attacks on chemical facilities, protect chemical facility workers, collect and share relevant information with the public and decisionmakers, and prepare communities and local, tribal, and state first-responders to respond to potential large-scale accidents. This report reviews the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) authorities regarding risk management, emergency planning, and release notification, among others, at chemical facilities. In doing so, it describes the statutory authorities—and makes note of some of the more prominent, subsequent regulations—as provided by the following:
facility risk management planning requirements under Section 112(r)(7) of the Clean Air Act (CAA); emergency planning notification requirements under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA); emergency release notification requirements under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA); duties of the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, known as the Chemical Safety Board (CSB), under Section 112(r)(6) of the CAA; and toxic release inventory reporting requirements under EPCRA. This information is intended to assist state and local officials in developing their own emergency response plans in the event of an incident at a facility. CERCLA requires a facility to report certain releases to the National Response Center to inform decisions about federal involvement in responding to the incident to coordinate with state and local officials. Section 107 of CERCLA also establishes liability for response costs and natural resource damages. The principal mission of the CSB is to
investigate (or cause to be investigated), determine and report to the public in writing the facts, conditions, and circumstances and the cause or probable cause of any accidental release resulting in a fatality, serious injury or substantial property damages. Toxic Release Inventory Reporting Requirements
In addition to emergency planning and release notification requirements, Section 313 of EPCRA authorized EPA to establish and maintain a Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) of facilities that manufacture, import, process, or use certain types of toxic chemicals. | Chemicals and the facilities that manufacture, store, distribute, and use them are essential to the U.S. economy. However, incidents occasioned by natural disasters, unintentional events, or security threats show that the handling and storage of chemicals are not without risk. Federal agencies implement a number of programs to help prevent chemical facility accidents, reduce risks of terrorist attacks on chemical facilities, protect chemical facility workers, collect and share relevant information with the public and decisionmakers, and prepare communities and local, tribal, and state first-responders to respond to potential large-scale accidents.
This report reviews the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) authorities regarding risk management, emergency planning, and release notification, among others, at chemical facilities. In doing so, it describes the statutory authorities—and makes note of some of the more prominent, subsequent regulations—as provided by the following:
Facility risk management planning requirements under Section 112(r)(7) of the Clean Air Act (CAA). EPA's Risk Management Program (RMP) is aimed at reducing chemical risk at the local level. EPA regulations require owners and operators of a facility that manufactures, uses, stores, or otherwise handles certain listed flammable and toxic substances to develop a risk management program that includes hazard assessment (including an evaluation of worst-case and alternative accidental release scenarios), prevention mechanisms, and emergency response measures. Emergency planning notification requirements under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA). The requirements are designed to promote emergency planning and preparedness at the state, local, and tribal levels. EPCRA helps ensure local communities and first responders have needed information on potential chemical hazards within their communities in order to develop community emergency response plans. Emergency release notification requirements under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). CERCLA obligates a facility to report certain releases of hazardous substances to the National Response Center to inform decisions about federal involvement in responding to the incident to coordinate with state and local officials. The requirements also establish liability for response costs and natural resource damages. Duties of the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, known as the Chemical Safety Board (CSB), under Section 112(r)(6) of the CAA. The purpose of the CSB is to investigate accidents to determine the conditions and circumstances that led up to the event and to identify the cause or causes so that similar events might be prevented. Toxic release inventory reporting requirements. EPCRA authorizes EPA to establish and maintain a Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) of facilities that manufacture, import, process, or use certain types of toxic chemicals by providing public disclosure of the locations of such facilities. |
crs_R45028 | crs_R45028_0 | Introduction
The President is responsible for appointing individuals to positions throughout the federal government. In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted by law to the President alone. Other appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate via the nomination and confirmation of appointees. This report identifies, for the 114 th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions requiring Senate confirmation in 40 organizations in the executive branch (27 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President [EOP], and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions, which are covered in other Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports. Information for this report was compiled using the Legislative Information System (LIS) Senate nominations database at http://www.lis.gov/nomis , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2016 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). Appointments During the 114th Congress
During the 114 th Congress, President Barack Obama submitted 43 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these nominations, 22 were confirmed, 16 were returned to the President, and 5 were withdrawn. For agency nominations confirmed in the 114 th Congress, a mean of 174.1 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 152.0. | The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using the authorities granted by law to the President alone or with the advice and consent of the Senate. This report identifies all nominations during the 114th Congress that were submitted to the Senate for full-time positions in 40 organizations in the executive branch (27 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President [EOP], and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions, which are covered in other Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports.
Information for each agency is presented in tables. The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, and appointment action within each agency. Additional summary information across all agencies covered in the report appears in an appendix.
During the 114th Congress, the President submitted 43 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these 43 nominations, 22 were confirmed, 5 were withdrawn, and 16 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, a mean (average) of 174.1 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 152.0.
Information for this report was compiled using the Legislative Information System (LIS) Senate nominations database at http://www.lis.gov/nomis, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2016 Plum Book (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL32952 | crs_RL32952_0 | 3010) Enacted
On December 30, 2005, following a series of three continuing resolutions, H.R. Prior to a 1% rescission for most discretionary activities, the act provides $143.0 billion in discretionary appropriations; the comparable FY2005 amount was $143.5 billion. President's Budget Submitted
On February 7, 2005, the President submitted the FY2006 budget to Congress; the request was for $141.7 billion in discretionary funds for L-HHS-ED programs. This bill provides discretionary funds for three federal departments and 14 related agencies including the Social Security Administration (SSA). For the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the FY2006 request proposed increases of $304 million for Community Health Centers, $145 million for the National Institutes of Health (NIH), $512 million for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Program Management, and $171 million for the Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund (PHSSEF). Overall, the House bill would have provided $11.7 billion in discretionary funds for DOL; $11.6 billion was requested; and $12.1 billion was provided for FY2005. 3010 , the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, was signed into law on December 30, 2005, as P.L. 109 - 149 . For HHS, funding was increased by $155 million for Community Health Centers, $252 million for NIH, and $506 million for CMS Program Management. First-year funding of $500 million was provided for Bioterrorism Hospital Grants and $1.6 billion for CDC Terrorism Preparedness and Response (TPAR). Funding was decreased by $153 million for Health Professions other than nursing, $219 million for CDC activities other than TPAR, and $2.3 billion for PHSSEF. Funding was eliminated for Health Care-Related Facilities and Activities, which received $483 million in FY2005. Funding was decreased by $780 million for ESEA programs in aggregate, $197 million for Comprehensive School Reform, $221 million for Educational Technology State Grants, $254 million for FIE, and $140 million for FIPSE. The Pell Grants accumulated shortfall, estimated at $4.3 billion, was paid off. For the related agencies, SSI discretionary activities received $254 million less than in FY2005, and SSA Administrative Expenses received $723 million more than the FY2005 amount. For FY2006, the President requested $18.8 billion in advance appropriations for L-HHS-ED, but P.L. The FY2006 conference agreement, as enacted, provided $63.4 billion in discretionary funding prior to the 1% cut required by P.L. 108 - 447 ( H.Rept. Department of Education
FY2005 discretionary appropriations for the Department of Education (ED) were $56.6 billion. No funds were requested; $225 million was provided in FY2005. Related Agencies
FY2005 discretionary appropriations for L-HHS-ED related agencies were $11.1 billion. 109-77 (H.J.Res. 109-148 (H.R. The supplemental L-HHS-ED emergency funds were allocated as follows:
DOL, Training and Employment Services, national emergency grants, $125 million; HHS, Social Services Block Grant, social and health care services and facilities, $550 million; HHS, Children and Family Services, Head Start, services for displaced children, $90 million; ED, Elementary and Secondary, assistance to restart school operations and reimburse states, $750 million; ED, Homeless Education, assistance for displaced children and youth, $5 million; ED, Elementary and Secondary, grants for temporary emergency impact aid for displaced students, $645 million; ED, Higher Education, grants for college students and institutions for "unanticipated expenses," $200 million; HHS, Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund, influenza preparedness and response, $3.1 billion, including $350 million for upgrading state and local capacity and $50 million for laboratory capacity and research at the CDC; DOL and HHS, expenses related to 9/11 terrorist attacks, $50 million for New York State Uninsured Employers Fund and $75 million for the CDC (§5011, P.L. | This report tracks FY2006 appropriations for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED). This legislation provides discretionary funds for three major federal departments and 14 related agencies. The report, which will be updated, summarizes L-HHS-ED discretionary funding issues but not authorization or entitlement issues.
On February 7, 2005, the President submitted the FY2006 budget request to Congress, including $141.7 billion in discretionary L-HHS-ED funds; the comparable FY2005 appropriation was $143.5 billion, enacted primarily through P.L. 108-447. Congress reached agreement on H.R. 3010 (H.Rept. 109-337), providing $143.0 billion of discretionary L-HHS-ED funds, prior to a 1% rescission required by P.L. 109-148. H.R. 3010 was signed into law on December 30, 2005, as P.L. 109-149. A series of three continuing resolutions, beginning with P.L. 109-77 (H.J.Res. 68), provided temporary FY2006 funding from October 1 through December 30, 2005.
Department of Labor (DOL). DOL discretionary appropriations were $12.1 billion in FY2005; $11.6 billion was provided for FY2006. FY2006 funding for Workforce Investment Act (WIA) programs was decreased by $225 million.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS discretionary appropriations were $63.8 billion in FY2005; $63.4 billion was provided for FY2006. Funding was increased by $155 million for Community Health Centers, $252 million for the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and $506 million for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Program Management. Initial funding of $500 million was provided for Bioterrorism Hospital Grants and $1.6 billion for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Terrorism Preparedness and Response (TPAR). Funding was decreased by $153 million for Health Professions other than nursing, $219 million for CDC activities other than TPAR, and $2.3 billion for the Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund. Funding was eliminated for Health Care-Related Facilities and Activities, which received $483 million in FY2005.
Department of Education (ED). ED discretionary appropriations were $56.6 billion in FY2005; $56.5 billion was provided for FY2006. Funding was increased by $812 million for Pell Grants. Funding was decreased by $780 million for Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) programs in aggregate, $197 million for Comprehensive School Reform, $221 million for Educational Technology State Grants, and $254 million for the Fund for the Improvement of Education (FIE). The estimated $4.3 billion Pell Grant shortfall was paid off.
Related Agencies. Discretionary appropriations for related agencies were $11.1 billion in FY2005; $11.5 billion was provided for FY2006. For the related agencies, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) discretionary activities received $254 million less than in FY2005, and Social Security Administration (SSA) Administrative Expenses received $723 million more. |
crs_RS21542 | crs_RS21542_0 | Eight federal agencies currently operate a total of 36 FFRDCs. According to the National Science Foundation, once theagency implements the OFPP guidelines, the new FFRDC should have the following characteristics: (1) its primaryactivities shouldinclude: basic research, applied research, development, or management of research and development; (2) it is aseparate operationalunit within the parent organization or is organized as a separately incorporated organization; (3) it performs actualR&D or R&Dmanagement either upon direct request of the federal government or under a broad charter from the federalgovernment, but in eithercase under direct monitoring by the federal government; (4) it receives its major financial support (70% or more)from the federalgovernment, usually from one agency; (5) it has, or is expected to have, a long-term relationship with its sponsoringagency (usually 5years, with a review of the center's progress conducted by the sponsoring agency during the third year of theagreement); (6) most orall of its facilities are owned by, or are funded under contract with, the federal government, (7) it has an averageannual budget(operating and capital equipment) of at least $500,000; and (8) when renewing the sole-source contract, thesponsoring agency isrequired to determine if it still needs to sponsor an FFRDC or if the work could be done in a federal facility, orthrough a traditionalprivate sector contract. (6)
DHS FFRDCs
Within Title III, Science and Technology in Support of Homeland Security, of the Homeland Security Act ( P.L.107-296 ) there are twoprovisions that call for the establishment of FFRDCs. Oncethese requirementshave been met, the DHS can develop a request for proposals to establish one or more FFRDCs. More recently, congressional concerns have focused on the continuingneed for FFRDCs,diversification into areas beyond the Centers' original mission, and each sponsoring agency's oversight of itsFFRDC's activities. With the end of the Cold War and declining DOD R&D budgets, observers in the private and public sectors are concerned thatFFRDCs might have diversified into areas beyond their originally defined missions. | Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) were first establishedduring World War II to provide specific defense research and development (R&D) capabilities that were notreadily available withinthe federal government or the private sector. The federal government currently operates 36 FFRDCs. Title III of theDepartmentHomeland Security (DHS) Act (P.L.107-296) calls for the creation of one or more FFRDCs , including a HomelandSecurity Institute.On September 10th, the DHS released a "Sources Sought" notice requesting that contractors indicate their interestin competing tooperate an FFRDC for DHS. Those responding must include a 400 words, or less, qualification statement by October30. DHS plansto release a formal request for proposal, for the FFRDC, before the end of this year. In the past several years, somecongressional andnon-congressional critics have questioned the use of FFRDCs, including the continuing need for such Centers, diversification intoareas beyond the Centers' original missions, and oversight of each FFRDC's activities by its sponsoring agency. Thisreport will beupdated to reflect most recent events. |
crs_R43169 | crs_R43169_0 | To implement the act, EPA was directed to issue effluent limitation guidelines and standards, or technology-based regulations, for industrial dischargers. Steam Electric Power Industry ELG
EPA initially promulgated effluent limitation guidelines for the steam electric industry in 1974 and issued revised standards in 1982. Broadly speaking, two factors have altered existing wastestreams or created new wastestreams at many power plants since promulgation of the 1982 power plant ELG. The first is the development of new technologies for generating electric power, such as coal gasification. The second, a result of federal and state requirements, is the widespread implementation of air pollution controls to reduce emissions of hazardous air pollutants and acid gases (e.g., flue gas desulfurization [FGD], selective catalytic reduction [SCR], and flue gas mercury controls [FGMC]). Consequently, each year the pollutant discharges from this industry are increasing in volume, with additional chemical constituents. While scrubbers dramatically reduce emissions of harmful pollutants into the air, some create a significant liquid waste stream (especially wet scrubbers). EPA believes that many current CWA permits for power plants do not fully address potential water quality impacts of these discharges through appropriate pollutant limits and monitoring and reporting requirements. Coal- and petroleum-coke fired plants comprise 44% of the 1,080 plants subject to the ELG. A 2014 rule under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) on managing coal combustion residuals (CCR) also relates to the CWA ELG rule, because both statutes address coal combustion waste such as coal ash that is generated by electric utilities and independent power producers and is released to the environment. The scope of the CWA ELG and RCRA rule differ. While both address disposal of CCR in surface impoundments at power plants, only the RCRA rule regulates disposal of CCRs in landfills. In the final CCR rule, EPA extended by one year, compared to the proposed rule, that rule's deadline for owners or operators of covered facilities to prepare a closure plan. This would give owners or operators 24 months after publication of the CCR rule, or slightly more than 6 months after the effective date of the revised ELG, to understand the requirements of both regulations and to make the appropriate business decisions and prepare closure and post-closure plans. Costs and Benefits of the ELG
Compliance Costs
EPA estimates that the final rule will result in annualized pre-tax compliance costs for industry of $496.2 million and after-tax costs of $339.6 million. EPA projects that 88% of the plants subject to the rule will incur zero compliance costs, because they already have implemented processes or technologies that are the basis for the rule. EPA projects that the final rule will have small effects on the electricity market in 2030, both nationally and regionally, despite the higher compliance costs. It should be noted that the CWA does not require that the benefits of regulation exceed or even equal the costs. Many in industry are concerned that the CWA rule imposes new requirements and compliance timelines at the same time that power plants are implementing other costly and burdensome EPA rules. One issue concerns impacts of the rule on small entities, including small businesses and small governmental jurisdictions. Environmental advocates view the ELG differently from industry and reportedly are generally satisfied with the final rule, but expressed concerns that parts of the rule were not stringent enough. Conclusion
As noted in the introduction to this report, EPA rules affecting steam electric power plants have been scrutinized and challenged based on their stringency, feasibility, and projected compliance costs. Congressional interest has been evident in legislation that has been introduced to alter the direction and substance of some of EPA's regulatory actions and initiatives. To this point, discussion of the power plant ELG has centered on the administrative proceedings at EPA and has not drawn significant attention of lawmakers. Amounts released to surface waters from impoundment overflow or discharge totaled 157 billion gallons in 2009. Thus, these systems are relatively new to the steam electric industry. | To implement the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues effluent limitation guidelines (ELG), or technology-based standards, for categories of industrial dischargers. These standards are implemented through permits issued by states or EPA to individual facilities. In November 2015, EPA promulgated revised effluent limitations for the steam electric power industry to replace rules that were issued in 1982. The new rule was effective on January 4, 2016.
Two factors have altered existing wastestreams or created new wastestreams from many power plants since promulgation of the 1982 ELG. These factors are the development of new technologies for generating electric power, such as coal gasification, and, as a result of federal and state requirements, the widespread implementation of air pollution controls to reduce emissions of hazardous air pollutants and acid gases, such as flue gas desulfurization (scrubber) systems. While scrubbers dramatically reduce emissions of harmful pollutants into the air, some create a significant liquid waste stream. As a result, pollutant discharges from this industry to surface waters have increased in volume, with additional chemical constituents, and EPA believes that many current CWA permits for power plants do not fully address potential water quality impacts of these discharges.
Based on studies of the industry and to settle litigation brought by environmental advocates, EPA proposed a rule in April 2013 to revise the steam electric ELG and issued a final rule in November 2015. A total of 1,080 steam electric plants that burn fossil fuels and whose primary purpose is generating electricity are subject to the ELG. Only a subset of these plants is likely to incur compliance costs as a result of the 2015 rule—only 133—because a large portion of the industry has already implemented processes or technologies that are required by the rule. All of the plants that are expected to incur compliance costs are coal- or petroleum coke-fired. EPA estimates that the annualized compliance costs for the rule are $496 million pre-tax and $340 million after-tax, costs that the agency believes are economically achievable and would have minimal effects on the electricity market, both nationally and regionally. The rule also would reduce pollutant discharges by 385 million pounds annually and reduce water use by 57 billion gallons per year. Estimated costs of the rule exceed estimates of monetized benefits; however, the CWA does not require that the benefits of regulation exceed or even equal the costs.
An EPA rule under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) on managing coal combustion residuals (CCR) also relates to the CWA ELG rule, because both statutes address coal ash that is generated by power plants and released to the environment. The scope of the CWA and RCRA rules differ. While both address disposal of CCR in surface impoundments at power plants, only the RCRA rule regulates disposal of CCRs in landfills. To coordinate the two rules, in the final CCR rule, EPA extended by one year that rule's deadline for owners or operators of covered facilities to prepare a closure plan. This would give owners or operators 24 months after publication of the CCR rule, or slightly more than 6 months after the effective date of the revised ELG, to understand the requirements of both regulations and to make the appropriate business decisions and prepare closure and post-closure plans.
Many in industry are concerned that the 2015 rule will impose new requirements and compliance timelines at the same time that power plants are implementing other EPA rules. One issue concerns impacts of the proposal on small entities, including small businesses and small governmental jurisdictions. Environmental advocates view the ELG differently from industry and reportedly are generally satisfied with the final rule, but many do have concerns with issues such as compliance deadlines in the rule. Both industry groups and environmental groups have challenged the rule in federal court.
EPA rules affecting steam electric power plants have been scrutinized and criticized based on their stringency, feasibility, and projected compliance costs. Congressional interest has been evident in legislation to alter the direction and substance of some of EPA's regulatory actions and initiatives. To this point, discussion of the power plant ELG has centered on the administrative proceedings at EPA and has not drawn specific attention of lawmakers. |
crs_R44761 | crs_R44761_0 | Introduction
Renewed attention to the role of Congress in the termination of treaties and other international agreements has arisen in response to President Donald J. Trump's actions related to certain high-profile international commitments. This report examines the legal framework for withdrawal from international agreements, and it focuses specifically on two pacts that may be of interest to the 115 th Congress: the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) related to Iran's nuclear program. Although the Constitution sets forth a definite procedure whereby the President has the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, it is silent as to how treaties may be terminated. Moreover, not all pacts between the United States and foreign nations take the form of Senate-approved, ratified treaties. The President commonly enters into binding executive agreements, which do not receive the Senate's advice and consent, and "political commitments," which are not legally binding, but may carry significant political weight . Consequently, the legal regime governing withdrawal under domestic law may differ in meaningful ways from the procedure for withdrawal under international law. And the domestic withdrawal process may be further complicated if Congress has enacted legislation implementing an international pact into the domestic law of the United States. Under the domestic law of the United States, a treaty is an agreement between the United States and another state that does not enter into force until it receives the advice and consent of a two-thirds majority of the Senate and is subsequently ratified by the President. Withdrawal from Treaties Under Domestic Law
Unlike the process of terminating executive agreements, which has not generated extensive opposition from Congress, the constitutional requirements for the termination of Senate-approved, ratified treaties have been the subject of occasional debate between the legislative and executive branches. . . has involved mutual action by the executive and legislative branches." Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
On June 1, 2017, President Trump announced that he intends to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement—a multilateral, international agreement intended to reduce the effects of climate change by maintaining global temperatures "well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels[.]" Article 28 of the Paris Agreement provides that any party that withdraws from the UNFCCC shall be considered also to have withdrawn from the Paris Agreement. The Trump Administration, however, has not announced that it intends to take action with respect to the UNFCCC. Therefore, at present, the United States remains a party to the subsidiary Paris Agreement until Article 28's withdrawal procedure is complete—albeit one that has announced its intention to withdraw once it is eligible to do so. As discussed in more detail below, the President's certification decisions did not automatically terminate the United States' participation in the JCPOA or re-impose lifted sanctions, even though the President stated that he may take these actions in the future and may have domestic legal authority to do so unilaterally. To the extent the JCPOA is correctly understood as a nonbinding political commitment, international law would not prohibit President Trump from withdrawing from the plan of action and reinstating certain sanctions that had been previously imposed under U.S. law, but there may be political consequences for this course of action. As a matter of international law, by contrast, termination of the JCPOA or re-imposition of sanctions (either by Congress or the President alone) could implicate the question of whether Resolution 2231 converted the JCPOA's nonbinding political commitments into obligations that are binding under the U.N. Charter. | The legal procedure through which the United States withdraws from treaties and other international agreements has been the subject of long-standing debate between the legislative and executive branches. Recently, questions concerning the role of Congress in the withdrawal process have arisen in response to President Donald J. Trump's actions related to certain high-profile international commitments. This report outlines the legal framework for withdrawal from international agreements under domestic and international law, and it applies that framework to two pacts that may be of significance to the 115th Congress: the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) related to Iran's nuclear program.
Although the Constitution sets forth a definite procedure whereby the Executive has the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, it is silent as to how treaties may be terminated. Moreover, not all agreements between the United States and foreign nations take the form of Senate-approved, ratified treaties. The President also enters into executive agreements, which do not receive the Senate's advice and consent, and "political commitments" that are not binding under domestic or international law. The legal procedure for withdrawal often depends on the type of agreement at issue, and the process may be further complicated when Congress has enacted legislation to give the international agreement domestic legal effect.
On June 1, 2017, President Trump announced that he intends to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement—a multilateral, international agreement intended to reduce the effects of climate change. Historical practice suggests that, because the Obama Administration considered the Paris Agreement to be an executive agreement that did not require the Senate's advice and consent, the President potentially may claim authority to withdraw without seeking approval from the legislative branch. By its terms, however, the Paris Agreement does not allow parties to complete the withdrawal process until November 2020, and Trump Administration officials have stated that the Administration intends to follow the multiyear withdrawal procedure. Consequently, absent additional action by the Trump Administration, the United States will remain a party to the Paris Agreement until November 2020, albeit one that has announced its intent to withdraw once it is eligible to do so.
The Trump Administration has not withdrawn the United States from the JCPOA, but the President has stated he intends do so unless the plan of action is renegotiated. When the Obama Administration concluded the JCPOA, it treated the plan of action as a non-binding political commitment. To the extent this understanding is correct, President Trump's ability to withdraw from the JCPOA would not be restricted by international or domestic law. However, some observers have suggested that U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 subsequently converted at least some provisions in the JCPOA into obligations that are binding under international law. As a result, withdrawal from the JCPOA could implicate a complex debate over the plan of action's status in international law.
As a matter of domestic law, the President and Congress have authority to reassert sanctions lifted pursuant to U.S. pledges made in the JCPOA if they deem the reinstitution of such sanctions to be appropriate, even if such action resulted in a violation of international law. Several possible domestic legal avenues exist to re-impose sanctions, some of which would involve joint action by the President and the legislative branch, and others that would involve decisions made by the President alone. |
crs_R40592 | crs_R40592_0 | The agency responsible for administering Medicare is the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Recovery Audit Contractors (RACs) in Medicare
In the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA, P.L. The legislation also granted CMS the authority to reimburse RACs using contingency fees. A contingency fee is a negotiated payment, typically a percentage, of every overpayment recovered. CMS conducted the demonstration in five states (California, Florida, Massachusetts, New York, and South Carolina) between March 2005 and March 2008. Over the course of three years, the RACs returned $693.6 million in overpayments to the Medicare Trust Funds and corrected a total of $1 billion in improper payments (overpayments and underpayments) at a cost of only 20 cents for every dollar collected, a return of 5 to 1. Prior to the conclusion of the demonstration, Congress passed the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (TRHCA, P.L. 109-432 ), which made RACs permanent and mandated their expansion nationwide by January 1, 2010. The legislation was passed in December 2006; one month after a preliminary status report on the demonstration was released. Beginning in March 2009, the four RACs began reviewing claims for select states in approximately one-fourth of the country. Although this was not a requirement for the RACs during the demonstration program, it has been mandated for the permanent program. Medicare's other administrative contractors will still be allowed to look-back four years. Concerns Related to the RAC Program
Payment
The RAC legislation provided CMS with the authority to pay RACs differently than it pays other administrative contractors. They receive no additional funding as part of the contract. Opponents of the program charge that paying contractors on a contingent basis creates an incentive for RACs to aggressively audit and deny claims. Provider groups such as the American Hospital Association (AHA) and the American Medical Association (AMA) have requested that CMS remove the contingency fee payment structure and compensate RACs as they do other Medicare contractors—by paying them a fixed annual amount for a defined scope of work. CMS subsequently changed this in the permanent program. Trust Fund Recoveries
Throughout the three-year demonstration, RACs returned $693.6 million to the Medicare Trust Funds and corrected more than $1.03 billion in improper payments. Historically, CMS has relied on its claims administration contractors to reduce improper payments in the Medicare program. | Recovery Audit Contractors, or RACs, are private organizations that contract with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to identify and collect improper payments made in Medicare's fee-for-service (FFS) program. CMS projects improper FFS payments to amount to approximately $10.4 billion or 3.6% of all paid Medicare claims in 2008. Congress originally required the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to conduct a three-year demonstration program using RACs in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA, P.L. 108-173). In December 2006, Congress passed the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (TRHCA, P.L. 109-432), which made the program permanent and mandated the expansion of RACs nationwide by 2010. CMS began the national rollout of the permanent program in 19 states in March 2009.
CMS initiated the RAC demonstration in March 2005 in three states—California, Florida, and New York. After a preliminary status report revealed that the three participating RACs had returned $54.1 million to the Medicare Trust Funds during its first year of operation, CMS expanded the demonstration to two additional states—Massachusetts and South Carolina. The agency concluded the pilot in March 2008. According to the final evaluation of the demonstration, the RACs returned $693.6 million in overpayments to the Medicare Trust Funds over the course of three years.
Throughout the demonstration, CMS continuously highlighted the success of the RAC initiative in protecting the fiscal integrity of Medicare. However, the demonstration and subsequent permanent program have raised concerns among policymakers and industry groups because Medicare pays RACs differently than it pays other administrative contractors. Historically, Medicare's administrative contractors have been paid a fixed annual budget for a defined scope of work. In contrast, Congress mandated that CMS pay RACs using contingency fees. A contingency fee is a negotiated payment, typically a percentage, for every overpayment recovered. Under a contingency fee payment system, contractors receive no additional administrative funding. This type of compensation has been criticized for incentivizing RACs to aggressively audit and deny provider claims.
This report provides an overview of the RAC program along with a brief history of improper payments in Medicare. A description of the medical review processes used by RACs and how it compares with other Medicare administrative contractors is also presented. The report concludes with a discussion of current issues. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R44457 | crs_R44457_0 | Subsequently, President George W. Bush acknowledged that, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, he had authorized the National Security Agency to conduct a Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) to "intercept int ernational communications into and out of the United States" by "persons linked to al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations" based upon his asserted "constitutional authority to conduct warrantless wartime electronic surveillance of the enemy." After the TSP activities were concluded in 2007, Congress enacted the Protect America Act (PAA, P.L. 110-55 ), which established a mechanism for the acquisition, via a joint certification by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Attorney General (AG), but without an individualized court order, of foreign intelligence information concerning a person reasonably believed to be outside the United States. This temporary authority ultimately expired after approximately six months, on February 16, 2008. Several months later, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008, which created separate procedures for targeting non-U.S. persons and U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States under a new Title VII of FISA. Title VII of FISA was reauthorized in late 2012; this authority now sunsets on December 31, 2017. Significant details about the use and implementation of the Section 702 of Title VII, which provides procedures for targeting non-U.S. persons, became known to the public following reports in the media beginning in summer 2013. According to a partially declassified 2011 opinion from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), the National Security Agency (NSA) collected 250 million Internet communications per year under Section 702. Of these communications, 91% were acquired "directly from Internet Service Providers," using a mechanism referred to as "PRISM collection." The other 9% were acquired through what NSA calls "upstream collection," meaning acquisition while Internet traffic is in transit from one unspecified location to another. Specifically, an acquisition
may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States; may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States; may not intentionally target a U.S. person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States; may not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States; and must be conducted in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. As amended by the USA FREEDOM Act, surveillance of a non-U.S. person may continue for 72 hours after the target is reasonably believed to be within the United States, if a lapse in surveillance of the target poses a threat of death or serious bodily harm. A traditional FISA order for electronic surveillance must be obtained to continue surveillance after that period. | After the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush authorized the National Security Agency to conduct a Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) to "intercept international communications into and out of the United States" by "persons linked to al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations." After the TSP activities were concluded in 2007, Congress enacted the Protect America Act (PAA, P.L. 110-55 ), which established a mechanism for the acquisition, via a joint certification by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Attorney General (AG), but without an individualized court order, of foreign intelligence information concerning a person reasonably believed to be outside the United States. This temporary authority ultimately expired after approximately six months, on February 16, 2008. Several months later, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-261 ), which created separate procedures for targeting non-U.S. persons and U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States under a new Title VII of FISA. Title VII of FISA was reauthorized in late 2012 ( P.L. 112-238 ); this authority now sunsets on December 31, 2017.
Significant details about the use and implementation of Section 702 of Title VII, which provides procedures for targeting non-U.S. persons who are abroad, became known to the public following reports in the media beginning in summer 2013. According to a partially declassified 2011 opinion from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), the National Security Agency (NSA) collected 250 million Internet communications per year under Section 702. Of these communications, 91% were acquired "directly from Internet Service Providers," using a mechanism referred to as "PRISM collection." The other 9% were acquired through what NSA calls "upstream collection," meaning acquisition while Internet traffic is in transit from one unspecified location to another.
In 2015, Congress enacted the USA FREEDOM Act ( P.L. 114-23 ) to reauthorize and amend various portions of FISA. While most of the amendments dealt with portions of FISA that were unrelated to Section 702, the act did include authority to continue surveillance of a non-U.S. person for 72 hours after the target is reasonably believed to be within the United States, but only if a lapse in surveillance of the target would pose a threat of death or serious bodily harm. A traditional FISA order for electronic surveillance must be obtained to continue surveillance after that period. |
crs_R42452 | crs_R42452_0 | Since 1908, the Forest Service (USFS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture has paid 25% of its gross receipts from timber sales and most other revenue-generating activities to the states for use on roads and schools in the counties where the national forests are located. Similarly, since 1937, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the U.S. Department of the Interior has paid 50% of its gross receipts to the counties containing the "O&C lands" (described below). Congress has enacted temporary programs to sustain the payments at higher levels; the most recent such program, the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 (SRS), expired following payments made for FY2011. Title I of H.R. The House Committee on Natural Resources ordered the bill reported on February 16, 2012. Payments for Counties
In 1908, Congress added a provision to the Agriculture Appropriations Act directing the USFS to give 25% of its gross receipts to the states for use on roads and schools in the counties where the national forest lands are located. 4019 is called the County, Schools, and Revenue Trust for Federal Forest Land. Section 105(e) would direct that the provisions of this section, for implementing trust projects, are "deemed to be compliance with the requirements of" the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (RPA), the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA), the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA). The environmental review also would include the public comments and objections and any response, as well as modifications needed "to ensure the annual revenue requirement is met." Finally, the environmental report would not be subject to judicial review. Distribution of Amounts from Trust Projects
This section would allocate receipts from trust projects:
65% would be deposited in the trust; and 35% would be "deposited in the general fund of the Treasury for use ... in such amounts as may be provided in advance in appropriation Acts, for the Forest Service." 4019 raises many possible issues for Congress. Thus, the trust payments would apparently be in addition to the USFS 25% and O&C 50% payments. The bill would establish a responsibility to produce income, but is unclear on the responsibilities of the agency and the means citizens might have to protect the assets—the federal lands and resources. Annual Revenue Requirements
H.R. Other possible questions include what would be included in "gross receipts"; what receipts would be available to make the specified payments; what additional receipts would be needed to make the specified payments; and where those receipts might come from. Only receipts from trust projects would be deposited in the trust, and trust projects could only occur in counties that did not opt out of the trust payment program. However, all trust project receipts would be deposited in the trust, and the allocation to counties in the trust payment program would not be based on where those receipts were generated. 4019 has been on increased timber sales to provide the additional revenues for the trust. The allocation among states—by historic payments or SRS formula—would make a substantial difference in state payments. Six implementation provisions could raise more complicated issues and warrant some additional discussion: the provision on state education funding; inclusion of the O&C lands; implementation in parts of national forests; directions on timber sale practices and procedures; the need for regulations for implementation; and impacts on USFS staffing and funding. Thus, the bill includes the O&C lands in its definition of federal land, but other provisions of the bill seem not to apply to the O&C lands and it is not clear whether the counties with O&C lands would be eligible for trust payments. | Since 1908, the Forest Service (USFS) in the Department of Agriculture has paid 25% of its receipts to the states for use on roads and schools in the counties where the national forests are located. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior has paid 50% of its receipts to the Oregon counties where the revested (returned to federal ownership) Oregon and California Railroad (O&C) grant lands are located. Payments under these programs dropped substantially in the 1990s, largely because of declining timber sales. In the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-393; SRS), Congress created an optional alternative payment system for these lands, but the law expired at the end of FY2011.
The 112th Congress has considered options for addressing the lower payments from federal lands due to lower timber sales. One bill, H.R. 4019 (Title I, the County, Schools, and Revenue Trust for Federal Forest Land), would establish a new payment program; the House Committee on Natural Resources has ordered the bill reported. The bill would establish the trust with receipts from certain projects, and give the USFS the "fiduciary responsibility" to undertake projects to achieve annual revenue requirements in counties that do not opt out of the trust program. The bill would direct the USFS to calculate the revenue requirements and, to implement trust projects, establish procedures for public involvement, environmental reporting, and judicial review. The bill also would direct the allocation and use of the trust payments, and provide appropriations for the payments until trust projects generated receipts for the trust payments.
H.R. 4019 raises several issues for Congress. One is that, although the trust program has been described as a replacement for the SRS, the payments would apparently be in addition to the USFS 25% and O&C 50% payments that had been replaced by the SRS. Also, the fiduciary responsibility for trust payments makes the counties the primary beneficiary of federal land management and could restrict the ability of individuals to challenge decisions that they feel could degrade the federal lands and resources. The annual revenue requirement—60% of average 1980-1999 gross receipts—raises several questions: what would be included in "gross receipts"; what receipts could be deposited in the trust (e.g., whether deposits to other accounts could instead be deposited in the trust); how much additional revenue would be needed; and where those revenues could come from (e.g., how much additional timber might need to be cut, how many jobs might be created, where the timber could be cut, and what other options might be feasible, such as permits for currently free uses). Public involvement would be limited to written comments and objections to proposed and final trust decisions, filed before the required environmental report is prepared. The environmental report would not need to be made available, and could not be challenged in court or administratively. Trust project decisions would be presumed to be in accordance with several laws, such as the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the National Forest Management Act. The 65% of trust project receipts that would be paid to the states would be a significant increase over the 25% USFS payments and the 50% O&C payments. The bill is unclear on the allocation among states; it could be based on historic receipts or on SRS payments, with substantially different results. There could also be numerous implementation issues, such as treatment of state education funding, inclusion of the O&C lands, forests with some counties opting out of the trust payments, existing federal timber sale requirements, the possible need for implementing regulations, and possible additional staffing and funding requirements. |
crs_R42490 | crs_R42490_0 | On January 4, 2011, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) became law. The acronym "GPRA" in the act's short title refers to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA 1993), a law that GPRAMA substantially modified. Some of GPRAMA's provisions require agencies to produce plans and reports for a variety of audiences that focus on goal-setting and performance measurement. Other provisions, by contrast, establish an annual process to reexamine the usefulness of certain reporting requirements. Specifically, Section 11 of GPRAMA enacts into law a multi-step process in which the President and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) may propose to Congress that certain plans and reports be eliminated or consolidated. The GPRAMA process covers the plans and reports that executive branch agencies produce "for Congress" in response to statutory requirements or as directed in non-statutory congressional reports. As a consequence of this scope, the GPRAMA process covers some, but not all, reporting requirements. Notably, as a step in this process, GPRAMA requires an agency to consult with congressional committees to determine whether products are considered to be useful or could be eliminated or consolidated. This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report provides an overview of GPRAMA's processes that relate to the reexamination of agency reporting requirements. The report also will be updated to track some aspects of GPRAMA's implementation. Because GPRAMA's provisions are not the first to focus on agency reporting requirements, the report also contrasts GPRAMA's provisions with related authorities and selected efforts from the past. The report concludes by highlighting potential issues for Congress. To provide some context, the report begins by discussing potential categories, advantages, and disadvantages of reporting requirements. Advantages and Disadvantages
Views about the advantages and disadvantages of reporting requirements may be in the eye of the beholder. When Congress establishes a reporting requirement, Congress may intend to make information available to primary audiences in addition to itself. For example, Congress may intend to
enhance capacity within an agency; promote interagency collaboration and information sharing; provide information or studies that may be valuable to non-federal stakeholders or the broader public; establish broader transparency and accountability; influence the course of policy discussion; alert agencies to the existence of a problem and influence them to act; facilitate the work of congressional support agencies; or enhance congressional oversight by allowing the public to more easily identify any issues of concern, which, in turn, members of the public may bring to Congress's closer attention. Potential Issues When Considering Specific Proposals
Looking ahead to annual implementation of GPRAMA's provisions, the President and OMB may propose the consolidation, modification, or elimination of specific reporting requirements. Members and committees of Congress may consider a specific proposal from several perspectives. Context. Consultations. Usefulness. What are the workload, costs, and side effects that correspond to a reporting requirement? Potential Issues When Considering Changes to GPRAMA's Process
Congress also may evaluate how well the GPRAMA process is working. If Congress perceives a problem or the potential for improvement, Congress may consider amending the law to change aspects of how the process operates. A number of topics might be examined. Coverage. Consultations. GPRAMA does not address how agencies, OMB, and the President are to analyze reporting requirements or justify proposals to Congress. | On January 4, 2011, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) became law. The acronym "GPRA" in the act's short title refers to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA 1993), a law that GPRAMA substantially modified. Some of GPRAMA's provisions require agencies to produce plans and reports for a variety of audiences that focus on goal-setting and performance measurement. Other provisions, by contrast, establish an annual process to reexamine the usefulness of certain reporting requirements.
Specifically, Section 11 of GPRAMA enacts into law a multi-step process in which the President and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) may propose to Congress that certain plans and reports be eliminated or consolidated. The GPRAMA process covers the plans and reports that executive branch agencies produce "for Congress" in response to statutory requirements or as directed in non-statutory congressional reports. As a consequence of this scope, the GPRAMA process covers some, but not all, reporting requirements. For example, reports from the President are not covered, because the President is not an "agency" under the act. Notably, as a step in this process, GPRAMA requires an agency to consult with congressional committees to determine whether products are considered to be useful or could be eliminated or consolidated.
This Congressional Research Service report provides an overview of GPRAMA's processes that relate to the reexamination of agency reporting requirements. To provide context, the report begins by discussing potential categories, advantages, and disadvantages of reporting requirements. Notably, views about the advantages and disadvantages of reporting requirements may be in the eye of the beholder. Congress also may intend to make information available to primary audiences in addition to itself, such as key non-federal stakeholders and the broader public. Because GPRAMA's provisions are not the first to focus on agency reporting requirements, the report contrasts GPRAMA's provisions with related authorities and selected efforts from the past.
The report concludes by highlighting potential issues for Congress in two categories. First, looking ahead to continued implementation of GPRAMA's provisions, the President and OMB may propose that specific reporting requirements be consolidated, modified, or eliminated. Members and committees of Congress may consider a specific proposal from several perspectives, including the sufficiency of consultations with agencies about reporting requirements, the broader policy and political context of a proposed change to a reporting requirement, a reporting requirement's usefulness to Congress and other primary audiences, and a reporting requirement's costs and side effects.
Second, Congress may evaluate how well the GPRAMA process is working. If Congress perceives a problem or the potential for improvement, Congress may consider amending the law to change aspects of how the process operates. A number of topics might be examined, including the coverage of GPRAMA's statutory process (and what the law does not cover), how consultations are required to take place, and how proposals to modify or eliminate reporting requirements are to be justified with analysis.
This report will be updated to track any statutory changes to GPRAMA's process and some aspects of the law's implementation. |
crs_RL34140 | crs_RL34140_0 | Introduction
The Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) was the subject of a controversy that called attention to several issues, including the policy and process governing the conduct of OMB Circular A-76 competitions, the state of the military health care system, and a planned Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) action. A series of articles that first appeared in the Washington Post chronicled the dilapidated conditions and substandard outpatient treatment given to some returning veterans. Some media reports had suggested that one of the factors that may have caused or contributed to the substandard conditions, existing at some of the facilities at Walter Reed, was the push to privatize base support services. This report will examine the issues surrounding the WRAMC public-private competition conducted under OMB Circular A-76 and discuss some options that Congress may want to consider in its oversight role. 4986 , the proposed FY2008 NDAA, would impact the conduct of future competitions. The OMB Circular A-76, first issued in 1966, defines federal policy for determining whether recurring commercial activities should be performed by the private sector or federal employees. 5658 , the House-passed version of the FY2009 National Defense Authorization bill, has a provision (Section 2721) that would halt the closure of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center and discontinue the construction at the National Naval Medical Center and Fort Belvoir, VA of replacement facilities (beyond the construction necessary to complete the foundations of the replacement facilities) until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense committees that each of the conditions imposed has been satisfied, and a period of seven days has expired following the date on which the certification is received by the committees. Another provision in the bill (Section 325) would temporarily suspend the conduct of future DOD public-private competitions (regarding the conversion of functions performed by DOD civilians to performance by contractors) from the date of the enactment of the bill until September 30, 2011. P.L. 110-181 , the FY2008 NDAA ( H.R. The bill contains several provisions that affect the conduct of future public-private competitions as described here. Others have questioned whether the desire to reach the Bush Administration's competitive sourcing goals overrode other considerations. The United States entered combat operations in Iraq in 2003. Possibly due to the Walter Reed controversy, the Army has announced its plan to cancel all future outsourcing contracts at military medical facilities for 2007 and 2008. Is A-76 inherently flawed, or is the Walter Reed situation an anomaly? While it may be unfair to generalize about all A-76 studies based on Walter Reed, it appears that the Walter Reed competition was poorly executed. Certain conclusions may be drawn from this competition. Some have suggested that the Army's constrained resources was the reason why repairs were not made to the reportedly substandard facilities at WRAMC. Congress may want to receive a quarterly update on the status of DOD competitions, to include the following information:
the number of older competitions under review, and whether these competitions have been granted waivers; the status of new standard multi-function A-76 studies, including how many competitions are in excess of the 12-months limitation, and how many have been granted waivers; the number of competitions that are in excess of 18 months, with or without waivers; the number of competitions in excess of 30-months, with or without waivers; and the demographics of the affected government employees in A-76 competitions, and whether any particular group of employees are adversely impacted by the A-76 policy, competition process or the final outcome. A-76:
The Office of Management and Budget A-76 circular provides for public/private competition for tasks that are not considered inherently governmental. | This report examines the issues surrounding the Walter Reed public-private competition conducted under Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 and its potential impact on future Department of Defense (DOD) competitions. Circular A-76 is a policy and a process first initiated in 1966 that was designed to determine whether federal employees or private sector contractors are best to perform activities deemed commercial. A series of articles that first appeared in the Washington Post chronicled the dilapidated conditions and the substandard medical treatment afforded to returning veterans. Media reports surrounding the competition have suggested that one possible contributing factor to the Walter Reed controversy was the decision to privatize base support services.
What caused the problems at Walter Reed? To what extent were the problems related to the A-76 competition? Did it go badly because A-76 is an inherently flawed policy, or was it a convergence of events? Should Congress draw any conclusions from the outcome of the Walter Reed competition for future competitions on military medical facilities? While it may be hard to draw conclusions of cause and effect, there may be lessons learned applicable to future competitions.
Some have suggested that constrained Army resources, due to a convergence of events, may have caused and/or contributed to the problems in the competition and led to the attrition of skilled base support services staff. Other factors that may have affected the process were the entry of the United States into combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, a 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendation for the consolidation of Army and Navy military medical services into a single tertiary hospital at the campus of the Bethesda Naval Hospital (effectively closing the Walter Reed campus), a surge in the number of outpatient medical care visits for veterans returning from the war, and the Army's push to achieve the Bush Administration's competitive sourcing goals.
P.L. 110-181, the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), includes several provisions that affect A-76 competitions. H.R. 5658, the House-passed version of the FY2009 NDAA, contains several new provisions which could impact the conduct of future competitions, including Section 321, which would limit the conduct of A-76 competitions to 540 days (about 18 months); Section 322, which would require the analysis and development of a single government-wide definition for the term "inherently governmental function;" and Section 325, which would temporarily suspend DOD A-76 competitions and prevent the conversion of civilian functions to performance by contractors.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL32769 | crs_RL32769_0 | Introduction
Department of Defense (DOD) benefits for survivors of deceased members of the armed forces vary significantly in purpose and structure. Benefits such as the death gratuity provide immediate cash payments to assist these survivors in meeting their financial needs during the period immediately following a member's death. Similarly, the Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance (SGLI) provides the life insurance policy value in a lump sum payment following the servicemembers' death. Other benefits such as the Veterans Affairs Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) and the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP), are designed to provide long-term monthly income. Survivors may also receive death benefits from Social Security. In response, on February 1, 2005, DOD presented proposed changes to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Defense officials also requested that these benefits be made retroactive to October 2001 for relatives of U.S. troops killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The President proposed these same increases as part of his FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations request. The Death Benefits Enhancements increased the Death Gratuity to $100,000 and the SGLI to $400,000 for those who die from wounds, injuries or illness that are combat or combat-training related. Public Law 109-163, January 6, 2006, made these changes permanent for nearly all active duty deaths, retroactive to October 7, 2001. 109-80 (September 30, 2005) and P.L. Listed below is a description of the various death benefits from the Department of Defense, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and Social Security available to certain survivors of members of the Armed Forces who die on active duty. The designated survivor of virtually all deceased DOD military personnel receives this gratuity immediately. 109-13 regarding SGLI and in its place makes permanent (effective September 1, 2005) the increase in this benefit from $250,000 to $400,000. In addition, P.L. Survivors' and Dependents' Educational Assistance Program (DEA)45
Purpose: "...providing opportunities for education to children whose education would otherwise be impeded or interrupted by reason of the disability or death of a parent from a disease or injury incurred or aggravated in the Armed Forces...the educational program extended to the surviving spouses of veterans who died of service-connected disabilities and to spouses of veterans with a service-connected total disability permanent in nature is for the purpose of assisting them in preparing to support themselves and their families at a standard of living level which the veteran, but for the veteran's death or service disability, could have expected to provide for the veteran's family." Finally, P.L. P.L. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Summary on Military and Civilian Death Benefits
In July 2004, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report comparing death benefits of military and civilian government employees. | Department of Defense (DOD) benefits for survivors of deceased members of the armed forces vary significantly in purpose and structure. Benefits such as the death gratuity provide immediate cash payments to assist these survivors in meeting their financial needs during the period immediately following a member's death. Similarly, the Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance (SGLI) provides the life insurance policy value in a lump sum payment following the servicemember's death. Other benefits such as the Veterans Affairs Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) and the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP), are designed to provide long-term monthly income. Additional death benefits provided by the DOD for survivors and dependents include housing assistance, health care, commissary and exchange benefits, educational assistance, and burial, funeral, and related benefits. Survivors may also receive death benefits from Social Security.
In response to P.L. 108-375, February 1, 2005, DOD presented proposed survivor benefit changes during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. DOD recommended an increase in the death gratuity benefit from its current amount of $12,420 to $100,000, limited to servicemembers killed in an area or operation designated by the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the DOD also recommended an increase in Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance (SGLI) coverage from $250,000 to $400,000, with the premiums for the additional $150,000 coverage paid for by the government for servicemembers serving in areas or operations designated by the Secretary of Defense. Military personnel not serving in such designated areas could receive the additional coverage, but at their own expense through higher monthly premiums. As proposed by DOD, both of these measures would be made retroactive to October 7, 2001, when U.S. military operations began in Afghanistan. The President proposed these same increases as part of his FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations request. The Death Benefits Enhancements (P.L. 109-13) increased the Death Gratuity to $100,000 and the SGLI to $400,000 for those who die from wounds, injuries or illness that are combat or combat-training related. P.L. 109-80 and P.L. 109-163 made these benefits permanent for nearly all active duty deaths.
This report describes the various death benefits from the Department of Defense, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and Social Security available to certain survivors of members of the Armed Forces who die on active duty. (This report does not consider benefits available to civilian employees of the Department of Defense.) Benefits are listed, along with their purpose, how they are calculated, and where appropriate, recent changes. Finally, two hypothetical examples for determining a level of death benefits and a Government Accountability Office (GAO) summary comparing military and other death related benefits are presented in the Appendices. The report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43599 | crs_R43599_0 | Background
After several years of increases, the number of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) apprehended at the Southwest border by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) peaked at 68,541 in FY2014. Unaccompanied alien children are defined in statute as children who: lack lawful immigration status in the United States; are under the age of 18; and are without a parent or legal guardian in the United States or without a parent or legal guardian in the United States who is available to provide care and physical custody. Less frequently, they are apprehended in the interior of the country and determined to be juveniles and unaccompanied. In FY2015, apprehensions numbered 39,970, a 42% drop from FY2014 apprehensions. At the close of FY2016 they stood at 59,692, roughly 20,000 more than in FY2015, and 9,000 less than the peak of FY2014. During the first two months of FY2017 (October and November, 2016), USBP apprehended 14,128 unaccompanied alien children. As a basis for comparison, apprehensions in the first two months of FY2015 and FY2016 numbered 5,143 and 10,588, respectively
Nationals of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico account for the majority of unaccompanied alien children apprehended at the Mexico-U.S. border ( Figure 1 ). In FY2009, Mexican UAC accounted for 82% of 19,668 UAC apprehensions, while the other three Central American countries accounted for 17%. By September 30, 2014, those proportions had almost reversed, with Mexican UAC comprising 23% of the 68,541 UAC apprehensions and UAC from the three Central American countries comprising 75%. Current Policy
Two laws and a settlement most directly affect U.S. policy for the treatment and administrative processing of UAC: the Flores Settlement Agreement of 1997; the Homeland Security Act of 2002; and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008. 107-296 ) divided responsibilities for the processing and treatment of UAC between the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS's) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). 110-457 ). DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) physically transports UAC from CBP to ORR custody. The Border Patrol apprehends the majority of UAC at or near the border. In addition, ICE represents the government in removal procedures before EOIR. The Administration developed a working group to coordinate the efforts of the various agencies involved in responding to the issue, temporarily opened additional shelters and holding facilities to accommodate the large number of UAC apprehended at the border, initiated programs to address root causes of child migration in Central America, and requested funding from Congress to deal with the crisis. On July 8, 2014, the Administration requested a $3.7 billion supplemental appropriation, almost all of which was directly related to addressing the UAC surge, including $433 million for CBP, $1.1 billion for ICE, $1.8 billion for HHS, $64 million for the Department of Justice (DOJ), and $300 million for the Department of State (DOS). In addition, P.L. In March 2015, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 114-4 ) provided $3.4 billion to ICE for detection, enforcement, and removal operations, including $23.7 million for the transport of unaccompanied children for CBP. In its FY2016 budget, the Obama Administration requested contingency funding as well as base funding for several agencies in the event of another surge of unaccompanied children. Congress, in turn, has passed two continuing resolutions (CRs) to fund ORR for FY2017. However, this CR also contains a special provision authorizing HHS to transfer additional funds into the Refugee and Entrant Assistance account to support the UAC program under certain circumstances. Specifically, the CR authorizes HHS to transfer $300 million to fund ORR programs dedicated to unaccompanied children as of February 1, 2017. After March 1, 2017, if the UAC caseload for FY2017 exceeds by 40% or more the UAC caseload for the comparable period in FY2016, the CR would appropriate an additional $200 million in new funding. Going Forward
In response to the UAC surge in the spring and summer of 2014, the Administration announced initiatives to unify efforts among federal agencies with UAC responsibilities and to address the situation with programs geared toward unaccompanied children from several Central American countries. Additionally, Congress increased funding for the HHS program responsible for the care of unaccompanied children, and permitted the Secretary of DHS to transfer funds from within a specific CBP and ICE account for the care and transportation of unaccompanied children, among other actions taken. Since FY2014, the Administration has continued to request additional funding for programs geared toward unaccompanied children, and Congress has appropriated for some but not all such requests. | In FY2014, the number of unaccompanied alien children (UAC, unaccompanied children) that were apprehended at the Southwest border while attempting to enter the United States without authorization reached a peak, straining the system put in place over the past decade to handle such cases. Prior to FY2014, UAC apprehensions were steadily increasing. For example, in FY2011, the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) apprehended 16,067 unaccompanied children at the Southwest border, whereas in FY2014 more than 68,500 unaccompanied children were apprehended. In FY2015, UAC apprehensions declined 42% to 39,970. At the close of FY2016 they increased to 59,692, roughly 20,000 more than in FY2015, and 9,000 less than the peak of FY2014. During the first two months of FY2017 (October and November, 2016), USBP apprehended 14,128 unaccompanied children. Apprehensions in the first two months of FY2015 and FY2016 were 5,143 and 10,588, respectively.
UAC are defined in statute as children who lack lawful immigration status in the United States, who are under the age of 18, and who either are without a parent or legal guardian in the United States or without a parent or legal guardian in the United States who is available to provide care and physical custody. Two statutes and a legal settlement directly affect U.S. policy for the treatment and administrative processing of UAC: the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-457); the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296); and the Flores Settlement Agreement of 1997.
Agencies in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) share responsibility for the processing, treatment, and placement of UAC. DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) apprehends and detains unaccompanied children arrested at the border. DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) handles custody transfer and repatriation responsibilities, apprehends UAC in the interior of the country, and represents the government in removal proceedings. HHS's Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) coordinates and implements the care and placement of unaccompanied children in appropriate custody.
Foreign nationals from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico accounted for almost all UAC cases in recent years, especially in FY2014. In FY2009, Mexico accounted for 82% of the 19,688 UAC apprehensions at the Southwest border, while the other three Central American countries accounted for 17%. In FY2014, the proportions had almost reversed, with Mexican nationals comprising 23% of UAC apprehensions and the three Central American countries comprising 77%. In FY2016, Mexican nationals made up 20% of all UAC apprehensions.
To address the crisis at its peak in 2014, the Obama Administration developed a working group to coordinate the efforts of federal agencies involved. It also opened additional shelters and holding facilities to accommodate the large number of UAC apprehended at the border. In June 2014, the Administration announced plans to provide funding to the affected Central American countries for a variety of programs and security-related initiatives to mitigate the flow of unaccompanied migrant children. In July 2014, the Administration requested, and Congress debated but did not approve, $3.7 billion in FY2014 supplemental appropriations to address the crisis.
For FY2015, Congress appropriated nearly $1.6 billion for the Refugee and Entrant Assistance Programs in ORR, most of which was directed toward the UAC program (P.L. 113-235). For DHS agencies, Congress appropriated $3.4 billion for detection, enforcement, and removal operations, including for the transport of unaccompanied children for CBP. The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, FY2015 (P.L. 114-4) also allowed the Secretary of Homeland Security to reprogram funds within CBP and ICE and transfer such funds into the two agencies' "Salaries and Expenses" accounts for the care and transportation of unaccompanied children. The act also allowed for several DHS grants awarded to states along the Southwest border to be used by recipients for costs or reimbursement of costs related to providing humanitarian relief to unaccompanied children. Congress continued to provide base funding at comparable levels for FY2016, but did not appropriate funds for contingency funding that was requested by the Administration to address potential surges in UAC flows.
Congress has passed two continuing resolutions to fund ORR for FY2017 (P.L. 114-223 and P.L. 114-254), both of which maintain funding at levels and conditions comparable to FY2016. For both resolutions, Congress has granted HHS the authority to transfer funds from other HHS budget accounts to address higher than anticipated caseloads. The second CR also contains a special "anomaly" provision authorizing HHS to transfer $300 million to fund ORR programs dedicated to unaccompanied children as of February 1, 2017. After March 1, 2017, if the UAC caseload for FY2017 exceeds by 40% the UAC caseload for the comparable FY2016 period, the CR will appropriate an additional $200 million in new funding. |
crs_R43575 | crs_R43575_0 | Introduction
Since FY2008, federal highway user taxes and fees have been inadequate to fund the surface transportation program authorized by Congress. Although the 2015 surface transportation act addressed the revenue shortfall through FY2020 by authorizing the use of general funds for transportation purposes, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that after FY2020 the gap between dedicated surface transportation revenues and spending will average $20 billion annually. The search for revenue to fill this gap may revive congressional interest in tolling as a means of financing transportation projects without federal expenditures. Although states are free to impose tolls on roads, bridges, and tunnels that have been built and maintained without federal assistance, federal law limits the imposition of tolls on existing federal-aid highways, especially on the Interstate Highways. 102-240 ) opened non-Interstate federal-aid highways to tolling, but allowed existing roads or bridges to be tolled only after being reconstructed. The Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. Financial Realities of Toll Roads
Whether it is built or operated by a government agency or by private investors, a toll road must have sufficient traffic willing to pay a high enough toll to cover construction, maintenance, and toll collection costs if it is to be financially successful. In rural areas, highways often do not have enough traffic to cover the cost of building toll-collection infrastructure and collecting tolls. Other public toll facilities, however, have struggled. Collecting federal motor fuels taxes is estimated to cost about 1% of the amount collected. In principle, the cost of operating an electronic tolling system should be much lower than the cost of manual collection, due to obvious personnel savings. There are three possible means of increasing revenue from tolling:
Increase the extent of toll roads. Trucking interests frequently raise opposition to rate changes that increase truck tolls relative to automobile tolls. Additionally, large increases can encourage motorists to use competing non-tolled routes. These factors suggest that imposing tolls on individual transportation facilities is likely to be of only limited use in helping states overcome reductions in federal grants should Congress deal with the shortfall in motor fuels tax revenue by reducing the size of the federal surface transportation program. Increased Use of Tolling to Encourage Innovative Finance
The revenue stream provided by tolling can be used to support highway projects that rely on debt finance and private equity investment, both of which have long histories in toll road construction. This paradigm would have the advantage of assuring that all states would begin imposing tolls at roughly the same time, and federal leadership would likely not allow the outbreak of "toll wars" among the states, whereby states attempt to impose toll rates in a way that shifts the burden of the toll to their neighbors or interstate travelers generally. More widespread use of tolls is likely to raise significant questions about equity. Some existing facilities offer preferential toll rates to residents of particular jurisdictions; if that practice were to become widespread, it could burden interstate travel and commerce. States may be tempted to collect tolls at state borders rather than at internal locations where more residents would be affected, effectively taxing interstate travel at higher rates than in-state travel and in some cases putting out-of-state companies at a competitive disadvantage against local companies. Proposals for a major expansion of tolling of federal-aid highways are likely to lead to discussion of a federal role in rate-setting. Deeper federal involvement might include a federal framework of regulatory standards or a more precise definition of the requirement in current law that tolls be "just and reasonable," along with provision for the enforcement of that requirement. | Toll roads have a long history in the United States going back to the early days of the republic. During the 18th century, most were local roads or bridges that could not be built or improved with local appropriations alone. During the tolling boom of the late 1940s and early 1950s, the prospect of toll revenues allowed states to build thousands of miles of limited-access highways much sooner than would have been the case with traditional funding. The imposition of tolls on existing federal-aid highways is restricted under federal law, and while new toll facilities have opened in several states, some of those projects have struggled financially.
The failure of federal highway user taxes and fees to provide sufficient revenues to fund the surface transportation program authorized by Congress beginning in FY2008 renewed interest in expanded toll financing. The recently passed five-year surface transportation act, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), made few changes in tolling policy. Nonetheless, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that annual highway revenues, mostly from motor fuels taxes, will fall an average of $20 billion short of the amount needed to sustain the current federal surface transportation program between FY2021 and FY2025. This impending shortfall could again revive congressional interest in tolling.
Congress could achieve an expansion of tolling in several ways. At one extreme, it could simply encourage tolling pilot projects on federal-aid highways, of which relatively few have been implemented to date. At the other extreme, Congress might authorize states to toll federal-aid highways as they see fit, or even require that Interstate Highway segments be converted to toll roads as they undergo reconstruction in the future, eventually turning all Interstates into toll roads.
Whatever policies Congress adopts, tolls are likely to play only a limited role in funding surface transportation projects. The costs of toll collection on many existing toll roads exceed 10% of revenues even if all tolls are collected electronically, not including the cost of toll collection infrastructure. This compares unfavorably to the cost of collecting the existing federal motor fuels taxes, estimated to be about 1% of revenues. Many roads may not have sufficient traffic willing to pay a high enough toll to cover construction, maintenance, and toll collection costs. The availability of competing non-tolled routes may allow motorists to evade tolls. In addition, political concerns often limit the ability of operators to raise toll rates.
Beyond a requirement that bridge tolls "shall be just and reasonable" and a provision limiting tolls on over-the-road buses, current federal law provides no role for the federal government in regulating toll rates or practices. A number of states offer preferential tolls for in-state residents or residents of particular localities. Some states have attempted to collect tolls at borders rather than at internal locations where more residents would be affected, and in a number of places trucking interests have complained that truck tolls are excessive compared to auto tolls. More widespread use of tolls is likely to raise questions about the extent to which tolling should be subject to federal oversight. |
crs_R41173 | crs_R41173_0 | Recent Developments
Several actions occurred throughout the past year related to foreign aid reform, including:
On December 15, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton released the Obama Administration's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), outlining the direction for foreign aid reform and elevating as well as integrating diplomacy and development to be more effective and more on par with defense as foreign policy tools. Historical Perspective
For years, many foreign aid experts have expressed concern about ongoing inefficiencies associated with the overall organization, effectiveness, and management of U.S. foreign aid. Specific problems most commonly cited include the lack of a national foreign assistance strategy; failure to elevate the importance and funding of foreign aid to be on par with diplomacy and defense as a foreign policy tool; lack of coordination among the large number of Cabinet-level departments and agencies involved in foreign aid, as well as fragmented foreign aid funding; a need to better leverage U.S. multilateral aid to influence country or program directions; and a lack of visibility at the Cabinet level for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—the primary administrator of aid programs. Another criticism is a perceived lack of progress in some countries that have been aid recipients for decades. And a growing concern, especially on the part of the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community, is the increasing involvement of the Department of Defense (DOD) in disbursing foreign aid, rising from 29% in 2001 to 60% in 2007 (including aid to Iraq and Afghanistan). The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. Several actions occurred in 2009 and 2010, including introduction of legislation to reform certain aspects of foreign aid, a State Department announcement of a quadrennial review, and a Presidential Study Directive (PSD) on U.S. Its mission statement said, "In the coming years, the principal aims of the Department of State and USAID are clear. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has stated in the past that DOD personnel do not have expertise or the mission for delivering aid. During the 111 th Congress, Chairman Berman stated on the House Foreign Affairs Committee website that foreign aid reform was a priority; Senator Kerry (chair) and Senator Lugar (ranking member) of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in a dear colleague letter, said: "In order for foreign aid to play its critical role, we must ensure that it is both effective and efficient." Legislators in 2009 and 2010 held differing views on what was needed to adequately reform U.S. foreign aid, but many generally agreed that reform was needed. Released on June 29, 2010, was a discussion draft, "Global Partnerships Act of 2010," that provided the preamble and Title I of a foreign aid reform bill. Legislation involving foreign aid reform provisions before the 111 th Congress included the following:
On June 10, 2009, the House passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 ( H.R. H.R. 2139 , Initiating Foreign Assistance Reform Act of 2009 , introduced by Representatives Berman and Kirk on April 28, 2009 and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, would have: required the President to develop and implement, on an interagency basis, a "National Strategy for Global Development;" developed a monitoring and evaluation system; and established a foreign assistance evaluation advisory council. 2387 , Strategy and Effectiveness of Foreign Policy and Assistance Act of 2009, introduced by Representative Ros-Lehtinen and others on May 13, 2009, and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, stated the sense of Congress that (1) the Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator should make funding decisions on the basis of a long-term strategy that addresses national security, diplomatic and foreign assistance objectives, and the needs of the United States; and (2) foreign affairs agencies' budget requests should be more effectively integrated with national security objectives, program evaluation, and management. | Several development proponents, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and policymakers have pressed Congress to reform U.S. foreign aid capabilities to better address 21st century development needs and national security challenges. Over the past 50 years, the legislative foundation for U.S. foreign aid has evolved largely by amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), the primary statutory basis for U.S. foreign aid programs, and enacting separate freestanding laws to reflect specific U.S. foreign policy interests. Many describe U.S. aid programs as fragmented, cumbersome, and not finely tuned to address overseas needs or U.S. national security interests. Lack of a comprehensive congressional reauthorization of foreign aid for half of those 50 years compounds the perceived weakness of U.S. aid programs and statutes.
The structure of U.S. foreign aid entities, as well as implementation and follow-up monitoring of the effectiveness of aid programs, have come under increasing scrutiny in recent years. Criticisms include a lack of focus and coherence overall; too many agencies involved in delivering aid with inadequate coordination or leadership; lack of flexibility, responsiveness, and transparency of aid programs; and a perceived lack of progress in some countries that have been aid recipients for decades. Over the last decade a number of observers have expressed a growing concern about the increasing involvement of the Department of Defense in foreign aid activities. At issue, too, has been whether the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or the Department of State should be designated as the lead agency in delivering, monitoring, and assessing aid, and what the relationship between the two should be.
The Obama Administration, led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, and USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah, announced action to seek solutions to the problems associated with foreign aid and begin the process of reform. Secretary Clinton announced in July 2009 that the Department of State would conduct a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) to address issues involving State Department and USAID capabilities and resources to meet 21st century demands. In September 2010, the President signed a Presidential Study Directive (PSD) on U.S. Global Development Policy to address overarching government department and agency issues regarding foreign aid activities and coordination. Secretary Clinton presented the QDDR report in December 2010.
Foreign aid reform was a key area of focus throughout the 111th Congress, although no comprehensive reform legislation was enacted. Representative Berman, then-chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) in the 111th Congress, stated on the committee website in 2009 and 2010 how foreign assistance reform was a top priority. In 2009, he introduced H.R. 2139, Initiating Foreign Assistance Reform Act of 2009. Between July 2009 and May 2010, Chairman Berman released several discussion papers on foreign aid reform, as well as a discussion draft of the first 55 pages of possible foreign aid reform legislation.
In the Senate, Senator Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), Senator Lugar, ranking minority member, and others introduced a reform bill, S. 1524, the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act of 2009. The Senate did not consider H.R. 2410, the House-passed Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2010 and 2011 requiring a national strategy for development and a quadrennial review of diplomacy and development.
Foreign aid reform may continue to be a concern in the 112th Congress. This report addresses aid reform through early 2011 and will not be updated. |
crs_R40806 | crs_R40806_0 | Introduction
A variety of interrelated statutes and agency regulations govern leasing and permitting for energy exploration and production on federal lands. Oil, natural gas, and coal exploration and production on federal lands are generally governed by the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 (MLA) as amended. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), an agency that is part of the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), administers the MLA. Generally, the lessee is authorized to explore for and ultimately produce oil, natural gas, or coal on federal lands in exchange for lease payments and royalties paid to the U.S. government on the production. The first half of this report details the legal framework for this leasing process. Federal Lands Subject to Coal, Oil, Natural Gas Leasing
The MLA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to lease virtually all onshore lands owned by the United States that contain fossil fuel deposits, with the federal government retaining title to the lands. Areas within the National Wilderness Preservation System also cannot be leased, but valid property rights that were already in existence by 1984 are preserved. "Multiple use" principles require
management of the public lands and their various resource values so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the American people; making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these resources or related services over areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing needs and conditions; the use of some land for less than all of the resources; a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses that takes into account the long-term needs of future generations for renewable and non-renewable resources. Renewable Energy Projects on Federal Lands
Background
In recent years, concern over the impact of emissions from fossil fuel-fired power plants has resulted in increased interest in renewable energy sources. The governing law for steam leasing is the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970. The laws and regulations governing geothermal steam leasing and administration are similar to the principles and processes for oil and natural gas leasing on federal lands described in detail earlier in this report. BLM will accept the highest bid from a qualified bidder. Lessees are required to make annual rental payments to BLM. Authorizations for Wind and Solar Energy Projects
While oil, gas, and geothermal projects are permitted by BLM under leasing processes, those interested in producing wind or solar energy on federal lands do not seek leases. Instead, they seek more limited authorizations for development of their energy projects pursuant to Title V of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). BLM retains the right to
1. access the lands covered by the right-of-way, including any facilities constructed on the right-of-way; 2. require common use of the land (including subsurface and air space) and to authorize others to use the right-of-way for compatible uses; 3. retain ownership of the resources of the land; 4. determine whether or not the grant is renewable; and 5. change the terms and conditions of the right-of-way as a result of changes in legislation or regulation or as otherwise necessary to protect public health or safety or the environment. | Recent concerns over energy supply and pricing have led some to look increasingly to federal lands as a potential energy source. This report explains the legal framework for energy leasing and permitting for onshore lands subject to the control of the federal government.
The report first reviews the laws and regulations affecting leasing of federal lands for exploration and production of oil, natural gas, and coal, as well as the permits that lessees must obtain in order to explore for and produce these resources. This leasing process has evolved over the last century under the framework established by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (MLA). Oil, natural gas, and coal leasing and production on federal land pursuant to this act are currently overseen by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), an agency within the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI). Federal lands identified in the area's Resource Management Plan (RMP) as amenable to oil, coal, or natural gas exploration and production may be leased by BLM, so long as such activities in that area are not prohibited by statute or regulation. Such lands are usually leased to the highest bidder as determined by competitive auction. Leaseholders are generally required to pay both rental fees and royalties (a percentage of the value of produced oil, natural gas, or coal) to the U.S. government.
The report also addresses existing laws and regulations that govern the use of federal lands for renewable energy projects, including geothermal, wind, and solar energy. BLM oversees permitting for these projects. Geothermal projects are leased in accordance with the requirements of the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970. That act functions similarly to the MLA; lands that are amenable to geothermal projects are leased to the highest qualified bidder. In contrast, wind and solar projects on federal lands are not authorized by leases, but rather by obtaining a right-of-way from BLM. These rights-of-way are issued pursuant to the requirements of Title V of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), and holders of these rights-of-way must make monthly rental payments to the U.S. government.
This framework provides BLM and the federal government with flexibility to use federal lands to help satisfy the nation's energy needs, while generating revenue for the federal government and protecting environmentally sensitive areas. |
crs_R44511 | crs_R44511_0 | In order to take advantage of these price disparities, at least six bills have been introduced in the 114 th Congress that would allow individuals to import lower-cost prescription drugs from foreign jurisdictions. The bills differ on the jurisdictions from which imports are permissible. Some bills restrict the sources of prescription drugs to Canadian pharmacies; some to a set of specifically named jurisdictions; while others potentially apply to any foreign country. None of these bills have been enacted. None of the bills introduced in the 114 th Congress address the intellectual property implications of this so-called "parallel importation" or "re-importation." Many prescription drugs are subject to patent rights in the United States. As a result, even if a foreign drug is judged safe and effective for domestic use, brand-name firms may nonetheless be able to block the unauthorized importation of prescription drugs through use of their patent rights. In this context, the term "parallel imports" refers to patented products that are legitimately distributed abroad, and then sold to consumers in the United States without the permission of the authorized U.S. dealer. Although these "grey market goods" are authentic products that were sold under the authorization of the brand-name drug company, they entered the U.S. market outside the usual distribution channels for that drug. As a result, brand-name drug companies may potentially block imports of patented medications into the United States even if the imported good is the patent owner's own product, legitimately sold to a customer in a foreign jurisdiction. Related Issues
In addition to the issue of patent infringement, the parallel importation of patented pharmaceuticals potentially raises other issues. In some circumstances, however, the patent owner may attempt to restrict a customer's use of a good. Article 17:9, paragraph 4 of the United States–Australia FTA has a similar effect, stipulating:
Each Party shall provide that the exclusive right of the patent owner to prevent importation of a patented product, or a product that results from a patented process, without the consent of the patent owner shall not be limited by the sale or distribution of that product outside its territory, at least where the patentee has placed restrictions on importation by contract or other means. If the possibility of an infringement action against unauthorized importers of patented pharmaceuticals is deemed sound, then no action need be taken. Alternatively, Congress could confirm the Federal Circuit's decision in Lexmark v. Impression Products , which rejects the doctrine of international exhaustion and confines the patent exhaustion principle to sales that occurred within the United States. Another statutory mechanism for promoting the importation of patented drugs is to immunize specific individuals from infringement liability. | Prescription drugs often cost far more in the United States than in other countries. Some consumers have attempted to import medications from abroad in order to realize cost savings. The practice of importing prescription drugs outside the distribution channels established by the brand-name drug company is commonly termed "parallel importation" or "re-importation." Parallel imports are authentic products that are legitimately distributed abroad and then sold to consumers in the United States, without the permission of the authorized U.S. dealer.
Numerous bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress that would ease the ability of individuals to import lower-cost prescription drugs from foreign jurisdictions. None of these bills have been enacted. Each bill would allow individuals to import drugs from foreign jurisdictions, although the bills differ on the jurisdictions from which imports are permissible. Some bills are restricted to Canada; some to a set of specifically named jurisdictions; while others potentially apply to any foreign country.
None of these bills address intellectual property issues that may arise through parallel importation. However, many prescription drugs are subject to patent rights in the United States. In its 2016 decision in Lexmark International v. Impression Products, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit confirmed that the owner of a U.S. patent may prevent imports of patented goods, even in circumstances where the patent holder itself sold those goods outside the United States. The Lexmark opinion squarely declined to extend the "exhaustion" doctrine—under which patent rights in a product are spent upon the patent owner's first sale of the patented product—to sales that occurred in foreign countries. The court's ruling will in some cases allow brand-name pharmaceutical firms to block the unauthorized parallel importation of prescription drugs through use of their patent rights.
In addition to any patent rights they possess, brand-name drug companies may place label licenses on their medications. A label license may be drafted in order to restrict use of a drug to the jurisdiction in which it was sold. As a result, in addition to a charge of patent infringement, an unauthorized parallel importer may potentially face liability for breach of contract.
Introduction of an "international exhaustion" rule restricted to pharmaceuticals does not appear to be restricted by the provisions of the so-called TRIPS Agreement, which is the component of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements concerning intellectual property. Another possible legislative response is the immunization of specific individuals, such as pharmacies or importers, from patent infringement liability. Alternatively, no legislative action need be taken if the current possibility of an infringement action against unauthorized importers of patented pharmaceuticals is deemed satisfactory. |
crs_R41082 | crs_R41082_0 | Background
Four species of nonindigenous Asian carp are expanding their range in U.S. waterways, resulting in a variety of concerns and problems. Three species—bighead, silver, and black carp—are of particular note, based on the perceived degree of environmental concern. Current controversy relates to what measures might be necessary and sufficient to prevent movement of Asian carp from the Mississippi River drainage into the Great Lakes through the Chicago Area Waterway System. Congressional interest in the 115 th Congress has focused on a draft feasibility study including proposed actions at the Brandon Road Lock and Dam to avoid the possibility of carp becoming established in the Great Lakes, as well as other actions to stem the further spread of Asian carp upstream in the Mississippi River Basin. According to the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Asian carp pose a significant threat to fisheries of the Great Lakes. Asian carp populations could expand rapidly and change the composition of Great Lakes ecosystems. Resident Great Lakes fish species could be harmed, because Asian carp are likely to compete with them for food and modify their habitat. It has been widely reported that Great Lakes fisheries generate U.S. economic activity of approximately $7 billion annually. Although Asian carp introduction is likely to harm many Great Lakes fisheries, potential changes to ecosystems and the associated economy are not well understood. The Chicago Area Waterway System (CAWS)
The Chicago Area Waterway System (CAWS) is a segment of the Illinois Waterway in northeastern Illinois and northwestern Indiana. It is the only navigable link between two of the largest freshwater drainage basins in the world, the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River. In recent years, the locks of the CAWS have become a focal point for those debating how to prevent invasive species (and specifically, Asian carp) encroachment between the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River. Federal Response to Asian Carp
Congress has directed the Corps and other agencies to undertake specific actions to block the upstream passage of Asian carp in the CAWS. That authorization directed the Corps to expedite completion of the GLMRIS study. The Corps released its GLMRIS study on January 6, 2013. The cost for the options analyzed ranges from no cost to more than $18 billion for complete lakefront hydrologic separation. After receiving pressure from Congress, the Trump Administration released a draft plan for the BRLD in August 2017. The study is a follow-up to the broader GLMRIS, which surveyed potential options to separate the Great Lakes and Mississippi River drainage basins so as to prevent encroachment of Asian carp and other invasive species. The study selected the technology alternative, including both complex noise and an electric barrier, as the tentatively selected plan, which involves using nonstructural control, complex noise, water jets, an engineered channel, an electric barrier, and other measures to prevent Asian carp from traveling further upstream. These measures would cost over $275 million and could be complete by 2025 at the earliest. Michigan also requested that the Court order Illinois, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago to prevent the spread of Asian carp into the lake by closing shipping locks and taking other necessary measures to prevent the carp from entering Lake Michigan. The states sought an order compelling the Corps and MWRD to abate the public nuisance created by the migration of Asian carp into the Great Lakes, to minimize the risk of migration from the CAWS to Lake Michigan, and to implement permanent measures to separate Illinois waters from Lake Michigan. Legislation
Bills introduced in the 115 th Congress, H.R. 2983 and S. 1398 , would have required the Corps to release a draft version of the GLMRIS Brandon Road Study, which was subsequently released in August 2017. | Four species of nonindigenous Asian carp are expanding their range in U.S. waterways, resulting in a variety of concerns and problems. Three species—bighead, silver, and black carp—are of particular note, based on the perceived degree of environmental concern. Current controversy relates to what measures might be necessary and sufficient to prevent movement of Asian carp from the Mississippi River drainage into the Great Lakes through the Chicago Area Waterway System. Recent federal response and coordination measures direct actions to avoid the possibility of carp becoming established in the Great Lakes. These include ongoing studies of efforts to separate the two drainage basins.
According to the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Asian carp pose a significant threat to commercial and recreational fisheries of the Great Lakes. Asian carp populations could expand rapidly and change the composition of Great Lakes ecosystems. Native species could be harmed because Asian carp are likely to compete with them for food and modify their habitat. It has been widely reported that Great Lakes fisheries generate economic activity of approximately $7 billion annually. Although Asian carp introduction is likely to modify Great Lakes ecosystems and cause harm to fisheries, studies forecasting the extent of potential harm are not available. Therefore, it is not possible to provide estimates of potential changes in the regional economy or economic value (social welfare) by lake, species, or fishery.
The locks and waterways of the Chicago Area Waterway System (CAWS) have been a focal point for those debating how to prevent Asian carp encroachment on the Great Lakes. The CAWS is the only navigable link between the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River, and many note the potential of these waterways to facilitate invasive species transfers from one basin to the other. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) constructed and is operating electrical barriers to prevent fish passage through these waterways. In light of indications that Asian carp may be present near the Great Lakes, beginning in FY2010 the Obama Administration increased federal funding to prevent fish encroachment and related damage. Part of this funding was spent by the Corps to explore options that would achieve "hydrologic separation" of the Great Lakes and Mississippi River drainage basins. In January 2014, the Corps released a study (known as the "GLMRIS" study) which outlined a number of potential options ranging from no action to more than $18 billion for complete hydrologic separation and related mitigation. After pressure from Congress, the Corps in August 2017 released a draft of the Brandon Road Lock and Dam study (i.e., a follow-up study to GLMRIS focusing on a specific project) and recommended a tentatively selected plan. The selected alternative involves nonstructural control, complex noise, an electric barrier, and other measures, which would cost over $275 million and take four years to complete.
Since December 2010, Michigan and other Great Lakes states have filed a number of requests for court-ordered measures to stop the migration of invasive Asian carp toward Lake Michigan from the Mississippi River basin via the CAWS. The U.S. Supreme Court denied several motions for injunctions to force Illinois, the Corps, and the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago to take necessary measures to prevent the carp from entering Lake Michigan. Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin sought a separate order in federal district court seeking similar relief, which was also denied.
Bills introduced in the 115th Congress, H.R. 2983 and S. 1398, would have required the Corps to release a draft version of the GLMRIS Brandon Road Study (which was subsequently released in August 2017). With the release of the study, some in Congress may wish to authorize its draft contents, or direct other actions by the Corps and other agencies to stem the further spread of Asian carp. |
crs_R42724 | crs_R42724_0 | The TRIO programs are the primary federal programs providing support services to disadvantaged students to promote achievement in postsecondary education. The Higher Education Amendments of 1968 (P.L. 90-575) consolidated a "trio" of programs under one overall program. Collectively, the TRIO programs are designed to identify qualified individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds, prepare them for a program of postsecondary education, provide support services for postsecondary students, motivate and prepare students for doctoral programs, and train individuals serving or preparing for service in the TRIO programs. There are six main TRIO programs (in descending order of funding levels):
TRIO Upward Bound (UB) Program, TRIO Student Support Services (SSS) Program, TRIO Talent Search (TS) Program, TRIO Educational Opportunity Centers (EOC) Program, Ronald E. McNair Postbaccalaureate Achievement (McNair) Program, and TRIO Staff Development (Training) Program. This report serves as an introduction to the TRIO programs. Pipeline of TRIO Programs
The federal TRIO programs provide support services and some financial assistance primarily to low-income, first-generation college students to help them succeed academically and encourage them to advance through much of the educational pipeline. In addition, all participants must be in need of academic support to pursue education beyond secondary school successfully. Outcome Criteria
All UB projects must annually report the extent to which they meet or exceed the goals approved in their application for the following outcome criteria:
the number of participants served; participant school performance, as measured by the percentage of participants with a specified cumulative grade point average (inapplicable to VUB grantees); participant academic performance, as measured by the percentage of participants scoring at or above the proficient level on state standardized tests in reading/language arts and math, or, in the case of VUB, receiving a better score on a standardized test after completing the program; secondary school retention and graduation of participants, as measured by the percentage of participants reenrolling at the next grade level or graduating with a regular high school diploma or, in the case of VUB, program retention or completion; completion of a rigorous secondary school curriculum (see box below), as measured by the percentage of current and prior participants expected to graduate who actually graduate with a regular high school diploma and complete a rigorous secondary school curriculum (inapplicable to VUB grantees); postsecondary enrollment of participants, as measured by the percentage of current and prior participants expected to graduate or, in the case of VUB, who have completed the VUB program and enrolled in an IHE within a specified timeframe; and completion of a postsecondary degree, as measured by the percentage of prior participants enrolled in an IHE within a specified timeframe who graduate with a degree within a specified period or, in the case of VUB, completion of postsecondary education. Major HEOA Amendments to Common TRIO Provisions
Several statutory provisions common to most of the TRIO programs were amended or added by the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA; P.L. 110-315 ) of 2008. Prior Experience Points
The TRIO programs have always been designed to reward successful grantees with new grants. TRIO Training
TRIO Training uses a different process for PE points, and it was not amended by the HEOA. During the FY2012 Regular UB competition, the Secretary reserved almost $9 million (3.5%) of the over $260 million allocation for the second review. Applicants that propose serving a different population from the prior grant do not receive PE points for the application serving a new population. | The TRIO programs are the primary federal programs providing support services to disadvantaged students to promote achievement in postsecondary education. The Higher Education Amendments of 1968 (P.L. 90-575) consolidated a "trio" of programs under one overall program. This report provides a description of the TRIO programs, authorized in Title IV-A-2-1 of the HEA.
In FY2017, the TRIO programs were funded at $950 million, and they served more than 800,000 secondary, postsecondary, and adult students. The TRIO programs have been designed to encourage and prepare qualified individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds for success throughout the educational pipeline from secondary school to undergraduate and graduate education. While the TRIO programs primarily serve low-income, first-generation college students, they also serve students with disabilities, veterans, homeless youth, foster youth, and individuals underrepresented in graduate education. The TRIO programs are also designed to award prior grantees that implement successful projects and propose high-quality projects with subsequent grants before awarding applicants without prior TRIO experience.
There are now six TRIO programs, each serving a different demographic. The TRIO Upward Bound (UB) Program serves secondary school students, providing relatively intensive preparation services and encouragement to help students pursue education beyond secondary school. The TRIO Talent Search (TS) Program provides less intensive services than UB in support of the completion of high school and enrollment in postsecondary education, and it encourages primarily students and out-of-school youth. The TRIO Educational Opportunity Centers (EOC) Program primarily serves adults. The TRIO Student Support Services (SSS) Program aims to motivate undergraduate students to complete their undergraduate education. The Ronald E. McNair Postbaccalaureate Achievement (McNair) Program prepares undergraduate students for graduate school. Finally, the TRIO Staff Development (Training) Program trains TRIO project staff to be more effective.
Several key TRIO program provisions were amended by the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA; P.L. 110-315) in 2008. Two key HEOA amendments address issues pertaining to the application review process: scoring and second reviews (appeals). The first amendment defined outcome criteria that require the Secretary and each grantee to agree upon objectives/targets for the criteria. The extent to which grantees meet or exceed these objectives determines the number of prior experience (PE) points the grantee may earn as part of its application in the next grant competition. Earning more PE points increases the likelihood of funding. The second amendment established an application review process by which those unsuccessful applicants that can identify a specific technical, administrative, or scoring error may have their applications reviewed a second time (appealed). The FY2012 TRIO UB competition was the first to use the revised application review process. |
crs_R43255 | crs_R43255_0 | They have done so primarily by holding hearings and introducing legislation addressing the interrelated topics of quality of mental health care, access to mental health care, and the cost of mental health care. The quality of mental health care, for example, is influenced by the skills of the people providing the care. Access to mental health care depends on the number of appropriately skilled providers available to provide care, among other things. Thus, an understanding of the mental health workforce may be helpful in crafting legislation and conducting oversight for overall mental health care policy. It is important to note that, while the federal government has an interest in the mental health workforce, and federal initiatives may affect the training of mental health care providers, for instance, most of the regulation of the mental health workforce occurs at the state level. It then describes three dimensions of the mental health workforce that may influence quality of care, access to care, and costs of care: (1) licensure requirements and scope of practice for each provider type in the mental health workforce, (2) estimated numbers of each provider type in the mental health workforce, and (3) average annual wages for each provider type in the mental health workforce. Mental Health Workforce Definition: No Consensus
No consensus exists on which provider types make up the mental health workforce. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA)—the public health agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that leads efforts to improve the nation's mental health—has defined the mental health workforce to include psychiatry, clinical psychology, clinical social work, advanced practice psychiatric nursing, marriage and family therapy, substance abuse counseling, and counseling. Notably, this definition is limited to highly trained mental health professionals. Mental Health Workforce Overview
In conceptualizing and outlining the mental health workforce, this report relies on the HRSA definition of mental health providers, including clinical social workers, clinical psychologists, marriage and family therapists, psychiatrists, and advanced practice psychiatric nurses. Although the licensure requirements vary widely across provider types, the scopes of practice converge into provider types that generally can prescribe medication (psychiatrists and advanced practice psychiatric nurses) and provider types that generally cannot prescribe medication (clinical psychologists, clinical social workers, and marriage and family therapists). All provider types in this report can provide psychosocial interventions (e.g., talk therapy). Administration and interpretation of psychological tests is generally the province of clinical psychologists. Mental Health Workforce Annual Wages
Just as access to mental health care providers depends partly on the size of the mental health workforce, the cost of mental health care depends partly on the wages paid to mental health providers. Psychiatrists are the relative highest earners, followed by advanced practice psychiatric nurses and clinical psychologists. Marriage and family therapists generally earn more than clinical social workers. An understanding of typical licensure requirements and scopes of practice may help policymakers determine how to direct federal policy initiatives focused on enhancing the quality of mental health care such as those related to training mental health providers. Policymakers may also wish to consider the relative wages of different provider types, particularly when addressing domains within which the federal government employs mental health providers. As such, the cost of employing different provider types—as well as their scopes of practice—may be a consideration in determining staffing priorities. | Congress has held hearings and some Members have introduced legislation addressing the interrelated topics of the quality of mental health care, access to mental health care, and the cost of mental health care. The mental health workforce is a key component of each of these topics. The quality of mental health care depends partially on the skills of the people providing the care. Access to mental health care relies on, among other things, the number of appropriately skilled providers available to provide care. The cost of mental health care depends in part on the wages of the people providing care. Thus an understanding of the mental health workforce may be helpful in crafting policy and conducting oversight. This report aims to provide such an understanding as a foundation for further discussion of mental health policy.
No consensus exists on which provider types make up the mental health workforce. This report focuses on the five provider types identified by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) as mental health providers: clinical social workers, clinical psychologists, marriage and family therapists, psychiatrists, and advanced practice psychiatric nurses. The HRSA definition of the mental health workforce is limited to highly trained (e.g., graduate degree) professionals; however, this workforce may be defined more broadly elsewhere. For example, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) definition of the mental health workforce includes mental health counselors and paraprofessionals (e.g., case managers).
An understanding of typical licensure requirements and scopes of practice may help policymakers determine how to focus policy initiatives aimed at increasing the quality of the mental health workforce. Most of the regulation of the mental health workforce occurs at the state level because states are responsible for licensing providers and defining their scope of practice. Although state licensure requirements vary widely across provider types, the scopes of practice converge into provider types that generally can prescribe medication (psychiatrists and advanced practice psychiatric nurses) and provider types that generally cannot prescribe medication (clinical psychologists, clinical social workers, and marriage and family therapists). The mental health provider types can all provide psychosocial interventions (e.g., talk therapy). Administration and interpretation of psychological tests is generally the province of clinical psychologists.
Access to mental health care depends in part on the number of mental health providers overall and the number of specific types of providers. Clinical social workers are generally the most plentiful mental health provider type, followed by clinical psychologists, who substantially outnumber marriage and family therapists. While less abundant than the three aforementioned provider types, psychiatrists outnumber advanced practice psychiatric nurses. Policymakers may influence the size of the mental health workforce through a number of health workforce training programs.
Policymakers may assess the relative wages of different provider types, particularly when addressing policy areas where the federal government employs mental health providers or pays for their services through government programs such as Medicare. Psychiatrists are typically the highest earners, followed by advanced practice psychiatric nurses and clinical psychologists. Marriage and family therapists earn more than clinical social workers. The relative costs of employing different provider types may be a consideration for federal agencies that employ mental health providers. |
crs_R43147 | crs_R43147_0 | This report presents an analysis of the discretionary appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for fiscal year 2014 (FY2014). Most Recent Developments
April 10, 2013—President's FY2014 Budget Request Submitted
For FY2014, the Administration requested $39.028 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS, as part of an overall budget request of $60.0 billion (including fees, trust funds, and other funding that is not appropriated or does not score against the overall discretionary spending caps budget allocation for the bill). More than 31,000 DHS employees were furloughed, and tens of thousands of others who were excepted from furlough and whose salaries were paid through annual appropriations worked without pay. October 17, 2013—P.L. 113-76, Short-Term Continuing Resolution
On January 14, 2014, the House passed by voice vote H.J.Res. January 17, 2014 – President Signs the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act
On January 17, 2014, the President signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, which included annual appropriations legislation covering the entire discretionary budget for FY2014. 113-76 is the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2014, which includes $39,270 million in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS. The act also included an additional $5.6 billion requested by the Administration for FEMA in disaster relief funding as defined by the Budget Control Act, and an additional $227 million for the Coast Guard to pay the costs of overseas contingency operations. However, due to the impact of sequestration on budget authority available to the federal government under P.L. Appropriations measures for DHS have generally been organized into five titles:
Title I contains appropriations for the Office of Secretary and Executive Management (OSEM), the Office of the Under Secretary for Management (USM), the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, the Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO), Analysis and Operations (A&O), and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG); and Title II contains appropriations for Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Coast Guard (USCG), and the Secret Service; Title III contains appropriations for the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), Office of Health Affairs (OHA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); Title IV contains appropriations for U.S. Under the terms of P.L. 113-76 , DHS received $46.0 billion in discretionary appropriations. 2217 , as well as the explanatory statement accompanying Division F of P.L. The Senate-reported version of H.R. 2217 would have provided $5,054 million in net budget authority for FY2014, an increase of $58 million (1.1%) over the Administration's request. This funding comes not only from FEMA, but also from accounts across the federal government. 2217
The Senate-reported bill would have provided $1.218 billion for S&T. 2217
The House bill would have provided the requested amount for DNDO. | This report analyzes the FY2014 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Administration requested $39.0 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2014, as part of an overall budget of $60.0 billion (including fees, trust funds, and other funding that is not appropriated or does not score against the budget caps).
Net requested appropriations for major agencies within DHS were as follows:
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), $10,833 million; Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), $4,997 million; Transportation Security Administration (TSA), $4,857 million; Coast Guard, $8,051 million; Secret Service, $1,546 million; National Protection and Programs Directorate, $1,267 million; Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), $3,984 million; and Science and Technology, $1,527 million.
The Administration also requested an additional $5.6 billion for FEMA in disaster relief funding as defined by the Budget Control Act.
H.R. 2217, the House-passed DHS appropriations bill, would have provided $39.0 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority. The Senate-reported version of the same bill would have provided $39.1 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority. Both bills also would have provided the $5.6 billion in disaster relief requested by the Administration.
Congress did not enact annual FY2014 appropriations legislation prior to the beginning of the new fiscal year. From October 1, 2013, through October 16, 2013, the federal government (including DHS) operated under an emergency shutdown furlough due to the expiration of annual appropriations for FY2014. More than 31,000 DHS employees were furloughed. Tens of thousands of others who were excepted from furlough, and those whose salaries were paid through annual appropriations, worked without pay until the lapse was resolved by passage of a short-term continuing resolution. From October 17, 2013, to January 17, 2014, the federal government operated under the terms of two consecutive continuing resolutions: P.L. 113-46, which lasted until its successor was enacted on January 15, 2014; and P.L. 113-73, which lasted until the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), was enacted on January 17, 2014. The Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2014, was included as Division F, and provided $39.3 billion in net discretionary budget authority, as well as the requested disaster relief funding.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33362 | crs_RL33362_0 | Introduction
The federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program provides income support to eligible workers through the payment of UC benefits during a spell of unemployment. UC benefits are available for a maximum duration of up to 26 weeks in most states. Unemployment benefits may be extended for up to 13 or 20 weeks by the Extended Benefit (EB) program under certain state economic conditions. For information on the temporary, now-expired Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program, which provided additional unemployment benefits depending on state economic conditions during the period of July 2008 to December 2013, see CRS Report R42444, Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08): Status of Benefits Prior to Expiration . Certain groups of workers who lose their jobs because of international competition may qualify for income support through Trade Adjustment Act (TAA) programs. Unemployed workers may be eligible to receive Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) benefits if they are not eligible for regular UC and if their unemployment may be directly attributed to a declared major disaster. Former civilian federal employees may be eligible for unemployment benefits through the Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) program. Former U.S. military servicemembers may be eligible for unemployment benefits through the unemployment compensation for ex-servicemembers (UCX) program. The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 ( P.L. 102-164 ) provides that ex-servicemembers be treated the same as other unemployed workers with respect to benefit levels, the waiting period for benefits, and benefit duration. This report describes two kinds of unemployment benefits in detail: regular UC and EB. These include the broad categories of workers that must be covered by the program, the method for triggering the EB program, the floor on the highest state unemployment tax rate to be imposed on employers (5.4%), and how the states will repay UTF loans. The UC program generally does not provide UC benefits to the self-employed, those who are unable to work, or those who do not have a recent earnings history. This may result in a lag of up to five months between the end of the base period and the date a worker becomes unemployed. These taxes are deposited in the appropriate accounts within the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF). Extended Benefit Program
The EB program was established by the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 (EUCA), P.L. EUCA may extend receipt of unemployment benefits (Extended Benefits) at the state level if certain economic situations exist within the state. | Certain benefits may be available to unemployed workers to provide them with income support during a spell of unemployment. The cornerstone of this income support is the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program, which may provide income support through the payment of UC benefits for up to a maximum of 26 weeks in most states. Other programs that may provide workers with income support are more specialized. They may target special groups of workers, be automatically triggered by certain economic conditions, be temporarily created by Congress with a set expiration date, or target typically ineligible workers through a disaster declaration.
UC benefits may be extended at the state level by the permanent Extended Benefit (EB) program if high unemployment exists within the state. Once regular unemployment benefits are exhausted, the EB program may provide up to an additional 13 or 20 weeks of benefits, depending on worker eligibility, state law, and economic conditions in the state. The EB program is funded 50% by the federal government and 50% by the states.
A temporary, now-expired unemployment insurance program, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program, began in July 2008 and ended in December 2013. For details on EUC08, see CRS Report R42444, Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08): Status of Benefits Prior to Expiration.
Former civilian federal employees may be eligible for unemployment benefits through the Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) program. Former U.S. military servicemembers may be eligible for unemployment benefits through the unemployment compensation for ex-servicemembers (UCX) program. The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-164) provides that ex-servicemembers be treated the same as other unemployed workers with respect to benefit levels, the waiting period for benefits, and benefit duration. (See CRS Report RS22440, Unemployment Compensation (Insurance) and Military Service.)
If an unemployed worker is not eligible to receive UC benefits and the worker's unemployment may be directly attributed to a declared major disaster, that worker may be eligible to receive Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) benefits under the Stafford Act. The federal disaster declaration will include information on whether DUA benefits are available. For information on Disaster Unemployment Assistance, see CRS Report RS22022, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA).
Certain groups of workers who lose their jobs because of international competition may qualify for additional or supplemental support through Trade Adjustment Act (TAA) programs or (for certain workers aged 50 or older) through Reemployment Trade Adjustment Assistance (RTAA). This report does not describe the TAA or RTAA programs. (See CRS Report R44153, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers and the TAA Reauthorization Act of 2015 for information on these programs.)
Within the unemployment insurance system, there are also two programs that provide alternative benefits in lieu of benefits through the UC program: the Short-Time Compensation (STC) or "work sharing" program and the Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) program. For details on STC, see CRS Report R40689, Compensated Work Sharing Arrangements (Short-Time Compensation) as an Alternative to Layoffs. For details on SEA, see CRS Report R41253, The Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) Program.
For a shorter description of UC, see CRS In Focus IF10336, The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation. |
crs_R43561 | crs_R43561_0 | Introduction
The degree to which foreign nationals (noncitizens/aliens) should be accorded access to certain benefits as a result of their presence in the United States, as well as the responsibilities of such persons given their legal status (e.g., immigrants, nonimmigrants, unauthorized aliens), often figures into policy discussions in Congress. These issues become particularly salient when Congress considers legislation to establish new immigration statuses or to create or modify benefit and entitlement programs. The 111 th Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( P.L. 111-148 ), which has been amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-152 ) and several other bills. (ACA refers to P.L. 111-148 as amended by P.L. 111-152 and the other legislation.) The ACA created new responsibilities (e.g., the requirement that most people in the United States obtain health insurance) and new benefits (e.g., tax credits to help certain people purchase health insurance), and it addressed the eligibility and responsibility of foreign nationals for these provisions. One issue that has arisen during debates to amend provisions in the ACA and during discussions of immigration reform is the eligibility of foreign nationals for some of the ACA's key provisions. This report then analyzes the eligibility of foreign nationals for key provisions in the ACA that have restrictions based on immigration status: the requirement to maintain health insurance, the ability to purchase insurance through an exchange, and eligibility for the premium tax credit and cost-sharing subsidies. Treatment of Noncitizens Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
The following section discusses alien eligibility for the following provisions under the ACA: the health insurance mandate, the exchanges (the Marketplace), and premium tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies. The term "lawfully present" in the INA is only defined in regards to noncitizen eligibility for Social Security. (The exchanges are also called health insurance marketplaces.) The law allows all lawfully present noncitizens to purchase insurance through an exchange, but specifies that a person is only considered lawfully present if the person is, and is reasonably expected to be for the entire period of enrollment, a U.S. citizen or national or an alien who is lawfully present in the United States. Although the shortest period of enrollment has been established by regulation as 12 months, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has indicated that an exchange will determine an individual's eligibility for the period of time for which the individual's lawful presence has been verified. Aliens who are not lawfully present are barred from obtaining insurance through an exchange. In order to claim the credit or subsidy, an individual's household income generally must be at least 100% but no more than 400% of the applicable federal poverty level (FPL). This is because the credit and subsidy are only available for months during which a person purchases health insurance through the exchanges and aliens who are not lawfully present are prohibited from buying insurance through an exchange. Under the ACA, lawfully present noncitizens (including some LPRs within five years of entry) who are ineligible for Medicaid due to their alien status are eligible to participate in an exchange and receive premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies. Verification of Alien Status Under the ACA
To enforce the alien eligibility requirements under the act, Section 1411 of the ACA requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish a program to determine whether an individual who is to be covered through an exchange plan or who is claiming a premium tax credit or reduced cost-sharing is a citizen or national of the United States or an alien lawfully present in the United States. | The degree to which foreign nationals (noncitizens/aliens) should be accorded access to certain benefits as a result of their presence in the United States, as well as the responsibilities of such persons given their legal status (e.g., immigrants, nonimmigrants, unauthorized aliens), often figures into policy discussions in Congress. These issues become particularly salient when Congress considers legislation to establish new immigration statuses or to create or modify benefit or entitlement programs.
The 111th Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148), which has been amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152) and several other bills. (ACA refers to P.L. 111-148 as amended by P.L. 111-152 and the other legislation.) The ACA created new responsibilities (e.g., the requirement that most people in the United States obtain health insurance) and new benefits (e.g., tax credits to help certain people purchase health insurance), and it addressed the eligibility and responsibility of foreign nationals for these provisions. One issue that has arisen during some debates to amend provisions in the ACA and during discussions of immigration reform is the eligibility of foreign nationals for some of the ACA's key provisions.
At the center of noncitizen eligibility for provisions under the ACA is the term "lawfully present." Aliens who are "lawfully present in the United States" are generally subject to the health insurance mandate and are eligible, if otherwise qualified, to participate in the exchanges (the health insurance marketplace) and for the premium tax credit and cost-sharing subsidies available to certain individuals who purchase insurance through an exchange. For purposes of the ACA, "lawfully present" has been defined in regulation and includes lawful permanent residents (LPRs), asylees, refugees, foreign nationals admitted under any nonimmigrant visa who are in status, and certain other classifications under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
To purchase insurance through an exchange, a noncitizen must be expected to be lawfully present for the entire period of coverage. Although the minimum period of coverage was established by regulation as 12 months, the exchanges will decide on an enrollment period based on the length of time the alien is authorized to be in the country. The ACA bars foreign nationals who are not lawfully present from purchasing insurance through a health insurance exchange.
In addition, certain individuals who purchase insurance through an exchange may be eligible for the premium tax credit and cost-sharing subsidies to help defray the cost of the insurance. To be eligible, an applicant must meet income requirements based on family size and the federal poverty level, and must also file a tax return in order to claim the credit. Noncitizens who are not lawfully present are ineligible for the premium credit and cost-sharing subsidies because they are barred from purchasing insurance through an exchange.
To enforce the noncitizen eligibility requirements under the ACA, the act required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a program to determine whether an individual who is to be covered in the individual market by a qualified health plan offered through an exchange or who is claiming a premium tax credit or cost-sharing subsidy is a citizen or national of the United States or an alien lawfully present in the United States. This system first checks the Social Security Administration (SSA) records. If SSA can confirm that the person is a citizen, then the check stops at that point. If the person is a "noncitizen" in SSA records, the system checks against Department of Homeland Security (DHS) records to confirm lawful presence. The Departments of Health and Human Services and Homeland Security have stated that no information collected as part of enrollment in an exchange plan will be used for any civil immigration enforcement actions. |
crs_RL34188 | crs_RL34188_0 | Introduction
The franking privilege, which allows Members of Congress to send official mail via the U.S. Although the cost of official congressional mail has fluctuated widely, franking reform efforts have produced over an 85% reduction in even-numbered-year costs and over a 90% reduction in odd-numbered-year costs in the past 30 years, from a high of $113.4 million and $89.5 million in FY1988 and FY1989 to $16.9 million and $8.3 million in FY2014 and FY2015. House official mail costs ($6.8 million) were 82% of the total, whereas Senate official mail costs ($1.5 million) were 18% of the total. House official mail costs ($15.1 million) were 89% of the total, whereas Senate official mail costs ($1.8 million) were 11% of the total. During FY2011, total expenditures on official mail were $12.8 million. Election Year vs. Non-election Year
The higher official mail costs in FY2014, FY2012, FY2010, FY2008, and FY2006 compared with FY2015, FY2013, FY2011, FY2009, and FY2007 continue a historical pattern of Congress spending more on official mail costs during election years. Figure 1 demonstrates that the higher mail costs in FY2006, FY2008, FY2010, FY2012, and FY2014 result from two separate events: a general increase in monthly mail costs prior to the pre-election prohibited period, and a significant spike in costs during December of 2005, December of 2007, December of 2009, December 2011, December of 2013, and December 2015, perhaps reflecting the traditional end-of-session newsletters many Members mail to constituents. Both of these increases are largely due to increased mailings by the House during those periods. Although mail costs do rise in the months prior to the pre-election prohibited period, Figure 1 shows that the structure of the fiscal calendar is also important in creating large disparities between election year and non-election year mail costs. Thus comparisons of fiscal year official mail costs tend to overstate the effect of pre-election increases in mail costs, because they also capture the effect of the December spike in mail costs. Even-numbered-year franking expenditures have been reduced by over 85% from $113.4 million in FY1988 to $16.9 million in FY2014. Odd-numbered-year franking expenditures have been reduced by over 90% from $89.5 million in FY1989 to $8.3 million in FY2015. | The congressional franking privilege allows Members of Congress to send official mail via the U.S. Postal Service at government expense. This report provides information and analysis on the costs of franked mail in the House of Representatives and Senate.
In FY2015, total expenditures on official mail were $8.3 million. House official mail costs ($6.8 million) were 82% of the total, whereas Senate official mail costs ($1.5 million) were 18% of the total. In FY2014, total expenditures on official mail were $16.9 million. House official mail costs ($15.1 million) were 89% of the total, whereas Senate official mail costs ($1.8 million) were 11% of the total.
These expenditures continue an historical pattern of Congress spending less on official mail costs during non-election years than during election years (Figure 3). However, analysis of monthly data on official mail costs indicates that, due to the structure of the fiscal year calendar, comparisons of election year and non-election year mailing data tend to overstate the effect of pre-election increases in mail costs, because they also capture the effect of a large spike in mail costs from December of the previous calendar year.
The analysis demonstrates that between FY2000 and FY2015, higher official mail costs in even-numbered fiscal years occurred for two reasons: a general increase in monthly mail costs prior to the pre-election prohibited period, and a significant spike in costs during December of odd-numbered calendar years. Both increases were largely the result of an increase in the number of House Members sending mass mailings during those months.
Reform efforts during the past 30 years have reduced overall franking expenditures in both election and non-election years. Even-numbered-year franking expenditures have been reduced by over 85% from $113.4 million in FY1988 to $16.9 million in FY2014, while odd-numbered-year franking expenditures have been reduced by over 90% from $89.5 million in FY1989 to $8.3 million in FY2015. House mail costs have decreased from a high of $77.9 million in FY1988 to $6.8 million in FY2015. The Senate has dramatically reduced its costs, from $43.6 million in FY1984 to $1.5 million in FY2015.
This report will be updated annually. |
crs_RL31762 | crs_RL31762_0 | 5005 , the Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296 . The "Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002," ("CIIA"), to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 131 et seq., is found in Subtitle B of Title II of the Homeland Security Act (sections 211 - 215). CIIA establishes several limitations on the disclosure of critical infrastructure information voluntarily submitted to DHS. ), see CRS Report RL30153, Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation , by [author name scrubbed]. | The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 ("CIIA"), to be codified at 6 U.S.C. §§131 - 134, was passed on November 25, 2002 as subtitle B of Title II of the Homeland Security Act ( P.L. 107-296 , 116 Stat. 2135, sections 211 - 215), and regulates the use and disclosure of information submitted to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) about vulnerabilities and threats to critical infrastructure. This report examines the CIIA. For further information, see CRS Report RL30153, Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation , by [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RS22499 | crs_RS22499_0 | The national Census Bureau data show that the aggregate amount of child support received in 2013 was $22.5 billion, and that 13.4 million parents had custody of children under the age of 21 while the other parent lived elsewhere. In 2013, almost 83% of custodial parents were mothers. Of all custodial parents, 48% were white (non-Hispanic), 25% were black, 23% were Hispanic, 16% were married, 33% were divorced, 38% were never married, 13% did not have a high school diploma, almost 20% had at least a bachelor's degree, 50% worked full-time year-round, 29% had family income below poverty, and nearly 43% received some type of public assistance (i.e., Medicaid, food stamps, public housing or rent subsidy, TANF, or general assistance). In 2013, only 2.6 million (19%) of the 13.4 million custodial parents eligible for child support actually received the full amount of child support that was owed to them. In 2013, 68% of the $32.9 billion in aggregate child support due was actually paid. In 2013, the average yearly child support payment received by custodial parents with payments was $5,333; $5,181 for mothers and $6,526 for fathers. These full or partial payments represented (on average) 14% of the custodial parent's yearly income, 16% of the custodial mothers' total yearly income, and 9% of the custodial fathers'. | The national Census Bureau data show that in 2013, 13.4 million parents had custody of children under the age of 21 while the other parent lived elsewhere, and the aggregate amount of child support received was $22.5 billion. In 2013, almost 83% of custodial parents were mothers. Of all custodial parents, 48% were white (non-Hispanic), 25% were black, 23% were Hispanic, 16% were married, 33% were divorced, 38% were never married, 13% did not have a high school diploma, almost 20% had at least a bachelor's degree, 50% worked full-time year-round, 29% had family income below poverty, and nearly 43% received some type of public assistance. In 2013, 2.6 million (40%) of the 6.5 million custodial parents with child support orders actually received the full amount of child support that was owed to them. The average yearly child support payment received by custodial parents with payments was $5,181 for mothers and $6,526 for fathers. These full or partial payments represented about 16% of the custodial mothers' total yearly income and 9% of the custodial fathers' yearly income. Compared to 1993 Census data, less child support was received by custodial parents in 2013 ($24.8 billion in 1993 versus $22.5 billion in 2013; in 2013 dollars). However, a higher percentage of those owed child support actually received all that they were due (36.9% in 1993 versus 45.6% in 2013). |
crs_R43019 | crs_R43019_0 | 104-199 , the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Numerous legal challenges have been made to these laws, including petitions of certiorari that have been granted by the United States Supreme Court in two cases. Legislative History of DOMA
H.R. The legislation passed the Senate on September 10, 1996. It was signed by the President on September 21, 1996, and designated P.L. September 10, 1996) (Defense of Marriage Act). 3396 (July 12, 1996). On November 4, 2008, California citizens passed Proposition 8, which added new Section 7.5 to Article I of the California Constitution, and reads "Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California." CRS Legal, Policy, and Research Experts | On September 10, 1996, the Senate passed H.R. 3396, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which had been cleared on July 12 by the House. On September 21, 1996, President Clinton signed DOMA and it became P.L. 104-199.
On November 4, 2008, California citizens passed Proposition 8, which added new Section 7.5 to Article I of the California Constitution that reads "Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California."
Petitions of certiorari have been granted by the United States Supreme Court in two cases resulting from these events.
This report contains resources for retrieving legislative and background information for the Defense of Marriage Act, as well as the Proposition 8 ballot initiative in California. It also contains selected legal materials relevant to the cases. In addition, it includes information on CRS products and experts to assist in understanding the related legislative, legal, and policy issues. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL33431 | crs_RL33431_0 | The program is administered by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), which is part of the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Justice Programs (OJP). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) aids BJA in administering the program. SCAAP is designed to reimburse states and localities for correctional officers' salary costs incurred for incarcerating "undocumented criminal aliens." Any state or locality that incurred costs for incarcerating "undocumented criminal aliens" is eligible to apply for SCAAP funding. Recent Legislation
In 2005, SCAAP was reauthorized through FY2011, and a provision was added that required SCAAP reimbursement funds be used for correctional purposes only. Legislation had been introduced in previous Congresses that would have modified the program to include covering costs for indigent defense, translators, criminal aliens charged with two misdemeanors or a felony, and limited reimbursement to border states and states with large numbers of unauthorized aliens. In the 111 th Congress, legislation has been introduced to reauthorize the program until FY2014 ( H.R. The Administration's FY2010 budget request did not include funding for SCAAP; however, funding for the program was included in the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2010 ( H.R. 2847 ). H.R. 2847 as passed by the House on June 18, 2009, would appropriate $300 million for SCAAP, and the Senate reported version would appropriate $228 million for the program. | The State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) is a formula grant program that provides financial assistance to states and localities for correctional officer salary costs incurred for incarcerating "undocumented criminal aliens." Currently, SCAAP funds do not cover all of the costs for incarcerating immigrants or foreign nationals. The program is administered by the Office of Justice Programs' Bureau of Justice Assistance, located in the U.S. Department of Justice, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Between FY1995 and FY2009, a total of more than $5 billion has been distributed to states in SCAAP funding.
Recent changes to SCAAP include reauthorization through FY2011 and the requirement that SCAAP reimbursements be used for correctional purposes only. Legislation introduced in the 111th Congress includes provisions that would extend the program through FY2014 and authorize appropriations at $1 billion annually for FY2011-FY2014 (H.R. 2282); and would change SCAAP eligibility guidelines to reimburse states not only for criminal aliens convicted of two misdemeanors or a felony, but also for those charged with these crimes as well (S. 168). Funding for the program has also been included in the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2010 (H.R. 2847). H.R. 2847 as passed by the House on June 18, 2009, would appropriate $300 million for SCAAP, and the Senate reported version would appropriate $228 million for the program.
This report will be updated as warranted by legislative, funding, or policy developments. |
crs_RS22705 | crs_RS22705_0 | The Federal Reserve (Fed) is mandated to keep inflation low and stable, and alters interest rates in order to do so. In recent years, the Fed has focused attention on the core rate of inflation, a measure of inflation that excludes food and energy prices, in explanations of its policy decisions. When core inflation approached 3% in 2006, Chairman Bernanke said that it had "reached a level that, if sustained, would be at or above the upper end of the range that many economists, including myself, would consider consistent with price stability...." This report defines core inflation, reviews recent trends, and analyzes the advantages and drawbacks of using core inflation. When food and energy prices are omitted from the CPI, the remaining basket is commonly referred to as the core CPI . When Should Core Inflation Be Used? Headline inflation often does not have good predictive power over short-time periods because food and energy prices are so volatile. Policymakers are concerned with future inflation because of lags between a change in policy and its effect on the economy. Relying on core inflation for policymaking has its drawbacks, however. This scenario occurred in the 1970s where rising energy prices resulted in a rise in total inflation. In scenarios like this one, a focus on core inflation could forestall a needed policy change until it is too late. In fact, that study found food prices to be a better predictor of future inflation than any other measure, including core inflation. | Inflation measures the rate of change in all prices. Maintaining low and stable inflation is one of the primary goals of macroeconomic policy. But how should inflation be measured? Policymakers, particularly at the Federal Reserve, often refer to core inflation in their policy decisions. Core inflation is commonly defined as a measure of inflation that omits changes in food and energy prices. Some policymakers prefer to use core inflation to predict future overall inflation because food and energy price volatility makes it difficult to discern trends from the overall inflation rate. A drawback of an over-reliance on core inflation, however, is that an extended period of rapidly rising food or energy prices could cause all other prices to accelerate. A focus on core may cause policymakers to fail to react to such a rise in inflation until it is too late. This scenario may have occurred recently. Many economists are concerned that rapid increases in food and energy prices are now pushing overall inflation to uncomfortably high levels. Furthermore, several studies have failed to find core inflation to be a good forecaster of future inflation, casting doubt on the very rationale for relying on it. |
crs_R43690 | crs_R43690_0 | Both loan guarantees and tax incentives have been available to the private sector for clean coal activities following enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58 ). At issue for Congress is the extent to which the private sector has used these financial tools—and whether they are the right tools—to develop the technology needed for reducing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions from fossil fuel power plants while continuing to use available domestic coal reserves for electricity generation. Coal represents a major energy resource for the United States. Coal-fired power plants provided approximately 37% of U.S. generated electricity (about 1.5 billion megawatt-hours) in 2012, while consuming over 800 million tons of coal. Power plants that use coal are also a major source of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. The use of coal for electricity generation complicates policy efforts to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Mitigating CO 2 emissions has become the primary focus of U.S. Department of Energy efforts within the clean coal research and development program (now Coal R&D) within its Office of Fossil Energy. 16511-16514) authorized the Secretary of Energy to make loan guarantees for projects that (1) avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases; and (2) employ new or significantly improved technologies as compared to commercial technologies in service in the United States at the time. Projects Awarded Loan Guarantees
No loan guarantees have been issued to clean coal projects since enactment of EPACT05. Tax Incentives
Clean coal investment tax credits were first authorized in EPACT05. Additional tax incentives for clean coal were provided in P.L. 110-343 , the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). Investment Tax Credits
EPACT05 codified two new sections in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). IRC Section 48A provides tax credits for investment in qualifying advanced coal projects. The second clean coal investment tax credit established under EPACT05, IRC Section 48B, provides tax credits for investment in qualifying gasification projects. Under Section 45Q, taxpayers may claim a $20 per metric ton credit ($21.51 in 2014, adjusted for inflation) for qualifying domestic carbon dioxide that is captured and sequestered. Loan Guarantees
A question for Congress to consider is why no loan guarantees have been issued for clean coal projects, despite several authorizations of appropriations and two solicitations. Yet, only two Section 1703 projects, both nuclear power-related, have received or are on the path to obtaining loan guarantees since enactment of EPACT05 nearly 10 years ago. Tax Incentives
When it comes to tax incentives for clean coal and carbon capture and sequestration, there are several options for Congress to consider. One option is to maintain the status quo, which would essentially allow existing tax incentives to phase out. A second option is for Congress to authorize additional funding for investment tax credits under Sections 48A and 48B. | Coal represents a major energy resource for the United States. Coal-fired power plants provided approximately 37% of U.S. generated electricity (about 1.5 billion megawatt-hours) in 2012, while consuming over 800 million tons of coal. Power plants that use coal are also a major source of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States, contributing approximately 28% of total U.S. CO2 emissions in 2012.
As part of federal efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, loan guarantees and tax incentives have been made available to support private sector investment in "clean coal." Both loan guarantees and tax incentives were included in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58). Mitigating CO2 emissions has also become the primary focus of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) efforts within the clean coal research and development program (now Coal R&D) within its Office of Fossil Energy. At issue for Congress is the extent to which the private sector has used the financial incentive tools available, and whether they are the right tools for promoting the development of technology to reduce CO2 emissions from fossil fuel power plants.
No loan guarantees have been issued to clean coal projects since enactment of Section 1703 of EPACT05. This legislation authorized the Secretary of Energy to make loan guarantees for projects that (1) avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases; and (2) employ new or significantly improved technologies as compared to commercial technologies in service in the United States at the time. Only two projects, both nuclear power-related, have obtained or are on track to obtain loan guarantees under Section 1703. A question for Congress to consider is why no loan guarantees have been issued for clean coal projects under Section 1703, despite several authorizations of appropriations and two solicitations for proposals since enactment of EPACT05.
Tax incentives for clean coal were first authorized in EPACT05. EPACT05 codified two new sections in the Internal Revenue Code: Section 48A was added to provide tax credits for qualifying advanced coal projects; and Section 48B provides tax credits to qualifying gasification projects. Additional tax incentives for clean coal were included in P.L. 110-343, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). EESA provided additional funding for clean coal investment tax credits. EESA also included the Section 45Q CO2 sequestration credit, under which taxpayers may claim up to a $20 per metric ton credit for qualifying domestic CO2 that is captured and sequestered.
Regarding tax incentives, Congress might consider several options: (1) maintain the status quo, which would allow existing tax incentives to phase out; (2) authorize additional funding for existing tax incentives; or (3) redesign tax incentives for clean coal or carbon capture and sequestration related technologies. Several projects that were previously allocated tax credits have been cancelled. A question for Congress is whether there is demand for tax benefits in their current form. Further, are tax incentives an effective tool for encouraging investment in clean coal technologies? |
crs_R45298 | crs_R45298_0 | Introduction
Disaster-damaged roads and public transportation systems are eligible for federal assistance under two U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) programs, the Emergency Relief (ER) Program administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the Public Transportation ER Program administered by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). This report begins by discussing FHWA assistance for the repair and reconstruction of highways and bridges damaged by disasters (such as the 2017 Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria) or catastrophic failures (such as the collapse of the Skagit River Bridge in Washington State in 2013). This includes information on the use of ER funds on disaster-damaged federally owned public-use roadways, such as National Park Service roads and U.S. Forest Service roads, under an affiliated program, the Emergency Relief for Federally Owned Roads Program. FHWA's Emergency Relief (ER) Program
For over 80 years, federal aid has been available for the emergency repair and restoration of disaster-damaged roads. The decision to seek financial assistance under the program is made by state departments of transportation, not by the federal government. Tribal, state, and other government entities that have the authority to repair or reconstruct eligible facilities must apply through a federal land management agency. ER Funding
The ER program has a permanent annual authorization of $100 million in contract authority to be derived from the HTF. Because the costs of road repair and reconstruction following disasters typically exceed the $100 million annual authorization, the FAST Act authorizes the appropriation of additional funds on a "such sums as may be necessary" basis, generally accomplished in either annual or emergency supplemental appropriations legislation. These funds are available until expended. The intent of ER assistance is to restore highway facilities to conditions comparable to those before the disaster, not to increase capacity or fix non-disaster-related deficiencies. Emergency Repairs
State and local transportation agencies can begin emergency repairs during or immediately following a disaster to meet the program goals to "restore essential traffic, to minimize the extent of damage, or to protect the remaining facilities." To be eligible for a 100% federal share, emergency repair work must be completed within 180 days of the disaster, although FHWA may extend this time period if there is a delay in access to the damaged areas, for example due to flooding. Debris removal is generally the responsibility of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Permanent Repairs
Permanent repairs go beyond the restoration of essential traffic and are intended to restore damaged bridges and roads to conditions and capabilities comparable to those before the event. ER Funding Distribution and Management
Because the program is funded primarily through supplemental appropriations the amounts available for distribution can vary greatly from year to year. There are two processes used to apply for ER funds following a disaster: quick release and the standard method. Allocations to repair damage from the 2017 hurricanes appear in Table 1 . FTA's program provides federal funding on a reimbursement basis to states, territories, local government authorities, Indian tribes, and public transportation agencies for damage to public transportation facilities or operations as a result of a natural disaster or other emergency and to protect assets from future damage. The Public Transportation ER program provides federal support for both capital and operating expenses. Funding and Federal Share
Unlike the FHWA's ER program, FTA's ER program does not have a permanent annual authorization. All funds are authorized on a "such sums as necessary" basis and require an appropriation from the Treasury's general fund. Since its enactment in 2012, there have been two appropriations to the Public Transportation ER program. Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria
Congress appropriated $330 million for FTA's Public Transportation ER Program in response to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria on February 9, 2018. Program Issues
Because the Public Transportation ER program does not have a permanent annual authorization, FTA cannot provide funding immediately after a disaster or emergency. Transit agencies, therefore, typically rely on FEMA for funding their immediate needs. GAO has observed that FTA's ER program has fewer limits and more flexibility than the emergency relief programs administered by FEMA and, to some extent, FHWA. | The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) provides federal assistance for disaster-damaged roads and public transportation systems through two programs: the Emergency Relief Program (ER) administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program administered by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). These programs are funded mainly by appropriations that have varied considerably from year to year. Over time the amounts are substantial. Since 2012, the Highway ER Program has received $5.4 billion; FTA's ER program has received $10.7 billion, all but $330 million of which was in response to Hurricane Sandy.
Roads and bridges that are federal-aid highways or are public-use roads on federal lands are eligible for assistance under FHWA's ER Program. Following natural disasters (such as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017, which damaged highways in Florida, Texas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands), or catastrophic failures (such as the 2013 collapse of the Skagit River Bridge in Washington State), ER funds are made available for both emergency repairs and restoration of eligible facilities to conditions comparable to those before the disaster.
Although emergency relief for highways is a federal program, the decision to seek ER funding is made by a state government or by a federal land management agency. Local governments are not eligible to apply. The program is funded by a permanent annual authorization of $100 million from the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) along with general fund appropriations provided by Congress on a "such sums as necessary" basis. Appropriated ER funds have averaged roughly $730 million annually since FY2009. FHWA pays 100% of the cost of emergency repairs done to minimize the extent of damage, to protect remaining facilities, and to restore essential traffic during or immediately after a disaster. Emergency repairs must be completed within 180 days of the disaster event. Permanent repairs go beyond the restoration of essential traffic and are intended to restore damaged bridges and roads to conditions and capabilities comparable to those before the event. The federal share for permanent repairs is generally 80% for non-Interstate roads and 90% for Interstate Highways.
All ER funding is distributed through state departments of transportation or federal land management agencies such as the National Park Service. Certain "quick release" funds are allocated to help with initial emergency repair costs and may be released prior to completion of detailed damage inspections and cost estimates. Other allocations to the states follow a more deliberate process of completing detailed damage reports, developing cost estimates, and processing competitive bids.
Unlike the long-standing ER program in highways, the Public Transportation ER Program dates to 2012. The Public Transportation ER program provides federal funding on a reimbursement basis to public transportation agencies, states, and other government authorities for damage to public transportation facilities or operations as a result of a natural disaster or other emergency and to protect assets from future damage. The Public Transportation ER program provides federal support for both capital and operating expenses. Unlike the FHWA's ER program, FTA's ER program does not have a permanent annual authorization. All funds are authorized on a "such sums as necessary" basis and are available only pursuant to an appropriation from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. In the absence of an appropriation, transit agencies must rely on funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Since its creation in 2012, there have been two appropriations to the Public Transportation ER program. More than $10 billion was appropriated in 2013 to respond to Hurricane Sandy and $330 million was appropriated in 2018 to respond to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.
Two recurring issues drawing congressional attention are funding levels and funding of activities that go beyond restoring transportation facilities to predisaster conditions, such as making damaged highways more resilient to natural disasters. FTA's ER program has fewer limits and more flexibility than the emergency relief programs administered by FEMA and FHWA; thus it too faces questions about expenditures that go beyond repairing damage from a disaster. The lack of a permanent annual authorization for FTA means FTA cannot provide funding immediately after a disaster or emergency, and transit agencies must rely on FEMA for a quick response. |
crs_R43998 | crs_R43998_0 | The sugar program provides a price guarantee to the processors of sugarcane and sugar beets, and by extension, to the producers of both crops. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is directed to administer the program at no budgetary cost to the federal government by limiting the amount of sugar supplied for food use in the U.S. market. To achieve both objectives, USDA uses four tools to keep domestic market prices above guaranteed levels. Measures one through three below were reauthorized through crop year 2018 without change by the 2014 farm bill ( P.L. 113-79 ). The four are:
1. price support loans at specified levels—the basis for the price guarantee; 2. marketing allotments to limit the amount of sugar that each processor can sell; 3. a sugar-to-ethanol (feedstock flexibility) backstop—available if marketing allotments and import quotas fail to prevent a price-depressing surplus of sugar from developing (i.e., fail to keep market prices above guaranteed levels); 4. import quotas to control the amount of sugar entering the U.S. market. In addition to the foregoing policy tools, two agreements signed by the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) in late 2014—one with the government of Mexico and another with Mexican sugar producers and exporters—impose annual limits on Mexican sugar exports to the United States and establish minimum prices for imported Mexican sugar. Price Support Loans
Nonrecourse loans taken out by a processor of a sugar crop, not producers themselves, provide a source of short-term, low-cost financing until a raw cane sugar mill or beet sugar refiner sells sugar. The "nonrecourse" feature means that processors—to meet their loan repayment obligation—can exercise the legal right to forfeit sugar offered as collateral to USDA to secure the loan, if the market price is below the effective support level when the loan comes due. Marketing Allotments
Sugar marketing allotments limit the amount of domestically produced sugar that processors can sell each year. In a 2008 farm bill provision that was retained in the 2014 farm bill, USDA is required each year to set the overall allotment quantity (OAQ) at not less than 85% of estimated U.S. human consumption of sugar for food. The OAQ is intended to ensure that permitted sales of domestic sugar, when added to imports under U.S. trade commitments, do not depress market prices below loan forfeiture levels for refined beet sugar and raw cane sugar. Import Quotas
The United States imports sugar in order to meet total food demand. The amount of foreign sugar supplied to the U.S. market reflects U.S. commitments made under various trade agreements. At the same time, a 2008 farm bill provision—one retained in the 2014 farm bill—directs USDA to manage overall U.S. sugar supply, including imports, so that market prices do not fall below effective support levels. The most significant import limit is the World Trade Organization (WTO) quota commitment, which requires the United States to allow not less than 1.256 million tons, raw value, of sugar (almost all raw cane) to enter the domestic market from 40 countries (equivalent to 1.139 million metric tons, raw value [MTRV]). The United States also grants much smaller import quotas to the six countries covered by the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), and to Colombia, Panama, and Peru under separate free trade agreements (FTAs). A major change with substantial repercussions for the U.S. sugar program in late 2014 concerned the treatment of imported sugar from Mexico. Following these determinations, the ITC reaffirmed its earlier finding that the U.S. sugar industry was injured as a result of these practices. | The U.S. sugar program provides a price support guarantee to producers of sugar beets and sugarcane and to the processors of both crops. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), as program administrator, is directed to administer the program at no budgetary cost to the federal government by limiting the amount of sugar supplied for food use in the U.S. market. To achieve both objectives, USDA uses four tools—as reauthorized without change by the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) and found in chapter 17 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United States—to keep domestic market prices above guaranteed levels. These are:
price support loans at specified levels—the basis for the price guarantee; marketing allotments to limit the amount of sugar that each processor can sell; import quotas to control the amount of sugar entering the U.S. market; a sugar-to-ethanol backstop—available if marketing allotments and import quotas are insufficient to prevent a sugar surplus from developing, which in turn could result in market prices falling below guaranteed levels.
To supplement these policy tools in supporting sugar prices above government loan levels, while avoiding costly loan forfeitures, important administrative changes were adopted in late 2014. These included imposing limits on U.S. imports of Mexican sugar and establishing minimum prices for Mexican sugar imports, actions that fundamentally recast the terms of bilateral trade in sugar. A U.S. sugar refiner is pursuing a legal challenge to the U.S. government's finding that these changes have eliminated the harm to the U.S. sugar industry, so although this new regime is in effect, a measure of uncertainty about its future remains.
Under the U.S. sugar program, nonrecourse loans that may be taken out by sugar processors, not producers themselves, provide a source of short-term, low-cost financing until a raw cane sugar mill or beet sugar refiner sells sugar. The "nonrecourse" feature of these loans means that processors—to meet their repayment obligation—can exercise the legal right to forfeit sugar offered as collateral to USDA to secure the loan, if the market price is below the effective support level when the loan comes due.
Sugar marketing allotments limit the amount of domestically produced sugar that processors can sell each year. In a 2008 farm bill provision, retained by the 2014 farm bill, USDA each year must set the overall allotment quantity (OAQ) at not less than 85% of estimated U.S. human consumption of sugar. The OAQ is intended to ensure that permitted sales of domestic sugar, when added to imports under U.S. trade commitments, do not depress market prices below loan forfeiture levels for refined beet sugar and raw cane sugar.
The United States imports sugar in order to meet total food demand. The amount of foreign sugar supplied to the U.S. market reflects U.S. commitments made under various trade agreements. The most significant import obligation is the World Trade Organization (WTO) quota commitment, which requires the United States to allow not less than 1.256 million tons of sugar (almost all raw cane) to enter the domestic market from 40 countries. The United States also grants much smaller import quotas to nine countries covered by four free trade agreements. At the same time, a 2008 farm bill provision, also retained in the 2014 farm bill, directs USDA to manage overall U.S. sugar supply, including imports, so that market prices do not fall below effective support levels.
If market prices fall below levels guaranteed by the sugar program, USDA must administer a sugar-for-ethanol program in which it buys domestically produced sugar from the market and sells it to ethanol producers as feedstock for fuel ethanol. A source of controversy over the sugar program is the balance it strikes between the interests of the sugar industry and sugar users. |
crs_R42657 | crs_R42657_0 | The President's Budget Request
On February 13, 2012, the Obama Administration released its detailed budget request for FY2013. The Administration's proposed budget included $677.8 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia, which was $12.2 million more than the District's FY2012 appropriation of $665.6 million. Approximately 78% ($526.7 million) of the President's proposed budget request for the District would have been targeted to the courts and criminal justice system. This represented 14% of the Administration's federal payment budget request for the District of Columbia. On May 15, 2012, the council approved an FY2013 budget that included $11.4 billion in operating funds and $1.1 billion in capital outlays. The mayor signed the measure (A19-0381) on June 15, 2012. Included in the act was a provision that would have granted the District some level of budget autonomy in the expenditure of local funds if Congress failed to pass and the President failed sign a District of Columbia appropriations act before the beginning of the 2013 fiscal year. Senate Bill, S. 3301
On June 14, 2012, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 3301, its version of the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act for FY2013, with an accompanying report (S. Rept. 112-177). As reported, the bill recommended $676.2 million in special federal payments to the District. This was $10.6 million more than appropriated for FY2012, and $1.6 million more than requested by the Administration. The bill also included changes in three provisions that city officials had sought to eliminate or modify. The bill would have
lifted the prohibition on the use of District funds to provide abortion services, but would have continued the prohibition against the use of federal funds; prohibited the use of federal funds to regulate and decriminalize the medical use of marijuana; and maintained the prohibition on the use of federal funds to support a needle exchange program. 6020
On June 26, 2012, a House Appropriations Committee approved the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 2013, H.R. 6020 , with an accompanying report ( H. Rept. 112-550 ). The bill included $673.7 million in special federal payments to the District. This was $12.2 million more than appropriated for FY2012, $4.1 million less than requested by the Obama Administration and $2.5 million less than recommended by the Senate bill. 6020, as reported by the House Appropriations Committee on June 26, 2012, included $673.7 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia. Unable to reach agreement on appropriation measures, including the FSGG, before the beginning of FY2013, the 112 th Congress passed H.J. Res.117 extending funding at an annualized rate of 0.6% above the FY2012 funding levels through March 27, 2013. The act, which was signed into law as P.L. 112-175 by the President on September 28, 2012, (1) allowed the District to spend its local funds as outlined in the District of Columbia Budget Request Act of 2012 and (2) appropriated $9.8 million for expenses associated with the Presidential Inauguration. On March 26, 2013, the President signed into law P.L.113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, which superseded P.L. 113-6 funded special federal payments to the District at the FY2012 funding levels, except for emergency planning and security, which was funded at $24.7 million. Both the House and Senate bills (H.R. The Obama Administration's FY2013 budget request included a provision that would have prohibited the use of federal funds for abortion services except in cases of rape, incest, or when the mother's life would be endangered if the pregnancy were carried to term, but did not include language that would have restricted the use of District funds for abortion services. P.L. | On February 13, 2012, the Obama Administration released its detailed budget request for FY2013. The Administration's proposed budget included $677.8 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia, which was $12.2 million more than the District's FY2012 appropriation of $665.6 million in special federal payments. Approximately 78% ($526.7 million) of the President's proposed budget request for the District would have been targeted to the courts and criminal justice system. The President's budget request also included $95.6 million in support of education initiatives. This represented 14% of the Administration's federal payment budget request for the District of Columbia.
On May 15, 2012, the District of Columbia Council approved a FY2013 budget that included $11.4 billion in operating funds and $1.1 billion in capital outlays. The mayor signed the measure (A19-0381) on June 15, 2012. Included in the act was a provision that would have granted the District some level of budget autonomy in the expenditure of local funds, if Congress failed to pass and the President failed to sign a District of Columbia appropriations act before the beginning of the 2013 fiscal year on October 1, 2012.
On June 14, 2012, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 3301, its version of the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act for FY2013 (FSGG), with an accompanying report (S.Rept. 112-177). As reported, the bill recommended $676.2 million in special federal payments to the District. This was $10.6 million more than appropriated for FY2012, and $1.6 million less than requested by the Administration. On June 26, 2012, a House Appropriations Committee approved its version of the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 2013, H.R. 6020, with an accompanying report (H.Rept. 112-550). The bill included $673.7 million in special federal payments to the District. This was $8.1 million more than appropriated for FY2012, $4.1 million less than requested by the Administration and $2.5 million less than recommended by the Senate bill.
The Senate bill, S. 3301, included changes in two provisions that city officials had sought to eliminate or modify. The bill would have lifted the prohibition on the use of District funds to provide abortion services, but would have continued the prohibition against the use of federal funds. The House bill would have restricted the use of District and federal funds for abortion services to instances involving rape, incest, or a health threat to the life of the pregnant woman. Both the House and Senate bills would have continued to prohibit the use of federal funds to regulate and decriminalize the medical use of marijuana and would have provided funding for a school voucher program, which was not funded in FY2012. The private school voucher program was opposed by some city leaders, but supported by others. The Administration did not include funding for school vouchers in its budget submission to Congress.
Unable to reach agreement on appropriation measures, including the FSGG, before the beginning of FY2013, the 112th Congress passed H.J.Res. 117 extending funding at an annualized rate of 0.6% above the FY2012 funding levels through March 27, 2013. The act, which was signed into law as P.L. 112-175 by the President on September 28, 2012, (1) allowed the District to spend its local funds as outlined in the District of Columbia Budget Request Act of 2012 and (2) appropriated $9.8 million for expenses associated with the Presidential Inauguration. On March 26, 2013, the President signed into law P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, which superseded P.L. 112-175. P.L. 113-6 funded special federal payments to the District at the FY2012 funding levels, except for emergency planning and security, which was funded at $24.7 million. The act also continued the prohibition on the use of federal funds for abortion services and needle exchange programs. |
crs_RL34604 | crs_RL34604_0 | Despite occasional close elections, this system has selected the candidate with the most popular votes in 47 of the past 51 elections since the 12 th Amendment was ratified in 1804. These controversial elections occurred because the system requires a majority of electoral, not popular, votes to win the presidency, and this feature, which is original to U.S. Constitution, has been the object of persistent criticism and numerous reform plans. Some would require simply that the candidates winning the most popular votes be elected. Direct Popular Election: Pro and Con
Pro
Proponents of direct popular election cite a number of factors in support of their proposal. 36 in the House of Representatives, and S.J.Res. 4
This measure, the Every Vote Counts Amendment, was introduced by Representative Gene Green of Texas on January 4, 2007. Section 3 set a plurality, rather than a majority requirement for election. Section 2 of H.J.Res. More problematic, however, was the fact that while it established a majority requirement, H.J.Res. 39
This measure was introduced by Senator Bill Nelson of Florida on June 6, 2008. Section 1 of this proposed amendment to the Constitution sought to establish direct election of the President and Vice President. Next, the states and DC provide for popular election of presidential electors. Specifically, the U.S. Constitution (in Article II, Section 1, clause 2) provides that, "Each state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.... " Since the early years of government under the Constitution, the state legislatures have generally exercised this grant of power by authorizing the voters to choose electors, and they have usually specified the winner-take-all or general ticket system as the means by which the voters' decision is used to allocate electors and electoral votes. This proposal, which became the National Popular Vote plan, relies on the Constitution's broad grant of power to each state to "appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct [emphasis added], a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.... "
The Plan
Specifically, the plan calls for an agreement or compact in which the legislatures in each of the participating states would agree to appoint electors (and hence, electoral votes) pledged to the candidates who won the nationwide popular vote . States That Have Approved NPV
By the end of 2008, the compact had been introduced in 45 states, of which four, possessing a total of 50 electoral votes, had adopted it. It would guarantee at least a plurality President and Vice President, thus eliminating any possibility of Presidents who won fewer votes than their opponent, one of the most widely criticized aspects of the electoral college system. First, the volume of proposed amendments that would reform the electoral college, as opposed to those that would eliminate the electoral college and substitute direct popular election, has declined almost to zero. Prospects for a Constitutional Amendment
Some observers assumed that action of the electoral college in 2000, in which George W. Bush was elected with a small majority of electoral votes, but fewer popular votes than Al Gore, Jr., would lead to serious consideration of constitutional amendment proposals that would have reformed or eliminated the electoral college. For further information on this proposal, please consult CRS Report RL32611, The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Presidential Elections , by [author name scrubbed]. | American voters elect the President and Vice President indirectly, through presidential electors. Established by Article II, Section 1, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, this electoral college system has evolved continuously since the first presidential elections. Despite a number of close contests, the electoral college system has selected the candidate with the most popular votes in 47 of 51 presidential elections since the current voting system was established by the 12th Amendment in 1804. In three cases, however, candidates were elected who won fewer popular votes than their opponents, and in a fourth, four candidates split the popular and electoral vote, leading to selection of the President by the House of Representatives. These controversial elections occur because the system requires a majority of electoral, not popular, votes to win the presidency. This feature, which is original to the U.S. Constitution, has been the object of persistent criticism and numerous reform plans. In the contemporary context, proposed constitutional amendments generally fall into two basic categories: those that would eliminate the electoral college and substitute direct popular election of the President and Vice President, and those that would retain the existing system in some form, while correcting its perceived defects.
Reform or abolition of the electoral college as an institution would require a constitutional amendment, so these proposals take the form of House or Senate joint resolutions. Three relevant amendments were introduced in the 110th Congress. H.J.Res. 36, (Representative Jesse Jackson, Jr.) sought to provide for direct popular election, requiring a majority of votes for election. H.J.Res. 4, the Every Vote Counts Amendment, (Representative Gene Green et al.) also sought to establish direct popular election, but with a popular vote plurality, rather than a majority, for election. It would proposed additional powers to regulate presidential elections for the states and the federal government. The third, S.J.Res. 39 (Senator Bill Nelson of Florida), proposed establishment of direct popular election, as well as authorizing congressional, and thus federal, authority over certain aspects of election administration.
Supporters of direct election advanced another option in 2006, the National Popular Vote (NPV) plan. This would bypass the electoral college system through a multi-state compact enacted by the states. Relying on the states' constitutional authority to appoint electors, NPV would commit participating states to choose electors committed to the candidates who received the most popular votes nationwide, notwithstanding results within the state. NPV would become effective when adopted by states that together possess a majority of electoral votes (270). At the present time, four states with a combined total of 50 electoral votes (Hawaii, 4; Illinois, 21; Maryland, 10; and New Jersey, 15) have approved the compact.
For additional information on contemporary operation of the system, please consult CRS Report RL32611, The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Presidential Elections, by [author name scrubbed]. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RS22968 | crs_RS22968_0 | Background
The Randolph-Sheppard Act, originally signed into law by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936, requires that blind individuals receive priority for the operation of vending facilities on federal property. The Randolph-Sheppard Act and Military Troop Dining Facilities
Application of the Act to Military Troop Dining Facilities
Two major circuit court cases have dealt with the issue of whether the term "cafeteria" in the Randolph-Sheppard Act applies to military troop dining facilities. Both the Fourth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit concluded that military troop dining facilities are "cafeterias" under the Randolph-Sheppard Act. NISH v. Cohen
In NISH v. Cohen , the court held that the Randolph-Sheppard Act applied to military troop dining facilities at Fort Lee in Virginia. Legislation in the 110th Congress
The Javits-Wagner-O'Day and Randolph-Sheppard Modernization Act of 2008 was introduced by Senator Enzi on June 11, 2008. This legislation would, among other things, address several issues raised by the judicial decisions previously discussed. | The Randolph-Sheppard Act requires that blind individuals receive priority for the operation of vending facilities on federal property. "Vending facilities" include automatic vending machines, cafeterias, and snack bars. This report will discuss several significant court decisions and recent legislation related to the Randolph-Sheppard Act. Two federal court of appeals decisions, NISH v. Cohen and NISH v. Rumsfeld, held that military troop dining facilities are "cafeterias" under the Randolph-Sheppard Act and that the act controlled over the Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act, which provides employment opportunities for the severely disabled. Other cases have analyzed the scope of the Randolph-Sheppard Act's application to military troop dining facilities. S. 3112, which was introduced on June 11, 2008, would amend the Javits-Wagner-O'Day and Randolph-Sheppard Acts and address several issues raised by these judicial decisions. |
crs_R41898 | crs_R41898_0 | Over the same period, employment in the U.S. manufacturing sector has increased slightly. A sharp increase in the bilateral U.S. trade deficit with China following that country's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 contributed importantly to manufacturing job loss in the first half of the last decade, but changes in the bilateral balance in goods trade since 2006 are not associated with changes in employment of factory workers in the United States. Transportation equipment, fabricated metal products, food manufacturing, and plastics and rubber manufacturing have added workers since the end of the last recession in 2009, and account for larger shares of manufacturing employment. In 2000, 53% of all workers in manufacturing had no education beyond high school. Including employer-provided benefits, the Commerce Department reported, manufacturing workers earned 17% more per hour than workers in other industries. Moreover, average wages for production and nonsupervisory workers in manufacturing have declined over time, compared to those in other industries, with the exceptions of retailing and transportation (see Figure 6 ). One criticism of this analysis is that the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) considers a smaller proportion of employees to be production and nonsupervisory workers in manufacturing than in other sectors of the economy, so that comparing the wages of this subset of workers may lead to misleading conclusions about relative pay in manufacturing. While manufacturing employers, on average, still spend more on benefits than private-sector employers in general, the differential has diminished in recent years, according to BLS data (see Table 2 ). Although workers in some manufacturing industries earn relatively high wages, the assertion that the manufacturing sector as a whole provides better wages and benefits than the rest of the economy is increasingly difficult to defend. Factoryless Goods Production/Contract Manufacturing
Factoryless goods producers are firms that design products to be manufactured and own the finished goods but do not engage directly in physical transformation. Many of the tasks performed by the employees of the purchaser firms may be identical to those performed by employees of manufacturing establishments in management, professional, sales, office, and transportation occupations. Most contract manufacturing services are provided by establishments in the manufacturing sector, either in the United States or abroad. Nor is it known how many of those workers were captured as manufacturing-sector workers in government data. Similarly, while plant closings are frequently in the headlines, closings are responsible for less than 12% of the manufacturing jobs lost over the past decade. Only a small share of the jobs that are created in the manufacturing sector comes from new establishments, largely because factories typically expand slowly in their early years. Increases in manufacturing employment are unlikely to result in significant employment opportunities for workers who have not continued their educations beyond high school, as the sorts of tasks performed by manufacturing workers increasingly require higher levels of education and training. Policies that promote construction of new facilities for manufacturing may be less effective ways of preserving or creating jobs than policies aimed at existing facilities, as new establishments appear to be relatively limited drivers of employment in manufacturing. It is important to note that increased manufacturing activity may lead to job creation in economic sectors other than manufacturing. | The health of the U.S. manufacturing sector is of ongoing interest to Congress. Numerous bills aimed at promoting manufacturing are introduced in each Congress, often with the stated goal of creating jobs. Implicit in many of these bills is the assumption that the manufacturing sector is uniquely able to provide well-paid employment for workers who have not pursued education beyond high school.
Lines between manufacturing and other economic sectors are increasingly blurred. Many workers in fields such as industrial design and information technology perform work closely related to manufacturing, but are usually counted as employees in other sectors unless their workplace is within a manufacturing facility. Temporary workers in factories typically are employed by third parties and not treated as manufacturing workers in government data. Further, technology, apparel, and footwear firms that design and market manufactured goods but contract out production to separately owned factories are not considered to be manufacturers, even though many of their activities may be identical to those performed within manufacturing firms. These definitional issues have made it more challenging to assess the state of the manufacturing sector.
This report addresses the outlook for employment in the manufacturing sector. Its main conclusions are the following:
U.S. manufacturing output has risen approximately 22% since the most recent low point in 2009, but almost all of that expansion occurred prior to the end of 2014. Increased manufacturing activity has resulted in modest growth of employment in the manufacturing sector, a trend that seems likely to persist even if manufacturing output continues to expand. Wages for production and nonsupervisory workers in manufacturing, on average, have declined relative to wages of similar workers in other industries. Although workers in some manufacturing industries earn relatively high wages, the assertion that manufacturing as a whole provides better jobs than the rest of the economy is increasingly difficult to support. Manufacturers spend more per work-hour for worker benefits than private employers in other industries, but the difference has diminished in recent years. A declining proportion of manufacturing workers is involved in physical production processes, while larger shares perform managerial and professional tasks. Many routine manufacturing tasks are now performed by contract workers, whose wages are lower than those of manufacturing firms' employees in similar occupations. These changes are reflected in increasing skill requirements at manufacturing firms and diminished opportunities for workers without education beyond high school. The average number of new manufacturing establishments opened each year since the end of the last recession remains much lower than in the period between 1977 and 2009. Unlike in the service sector, few jobs in manufacturing are provided by new establishments. Conversely, plant closings are responsible for only a small share of jobs lost. Change in manufacturing employment overwhelmingly occurs through hiring or job reductions at existing facilities. |
crs_RL33460 | crs_RL33460_0 | The collapse of the Yanukovych government did not sit well in Moscow. U.S. Seen initially as a political move (Lutsenko was not an attorney or from the legal world) to consolidate Poroshenko's influence and to satisfy critics, including in the United States, observers, despite some internal problems including a dispute between staff members from the prosecutor-general's office and members of the new Anti-Corruption Bureau, continue to express optimism that Lutsenko appears committed to move forward on needed reforms and prosecutions of corrupt officials of both the former and current governments. Energy has long been an important factor in Ukraine's relations with Russia and a key to the success of Ukraine's economic reforms. Annexation has not been all positive for Crimea. Demonstrators seized government buildings. Several prisoner exchanges have taken place between Kyiv and the separatists. This approach, in the eyes of some, reinforces resentment of the West and suspicions of Europe's commitment to its own principles of rule of law and raises the question of whether Europe's real priority is lasting peace and political reform or simply implementation of the Minsk agreement. In response to the crisis in Ukraine, in March 2014, the European Commission unveiled an initial support package of €11 billion (about $15.5 billion) focusing on the comprehensive reform process initiated by the new government in Ukraine. Pointing to the difficulty in the EU's ratification of the AA with Kyiv and the delays associated with implementation of the visa liberalization agreement, some in Ukraine are beginning to conclude that key EU member states are dragging their feet and have failed to honor their promises to Ukraine. The United States has also placed additional restrictions on defense-related exports to Russia. Nevertheless, some business sectors in Europe that were geared toward the Russian market as well as the agriculture sectors have continued to complain. According to USAID, since the crisis began in late 2013, the U.S. government has committed more than $1.3 billion in foreign assistance to Ukraine to advance reforms, strengthen democratic institutions and civil society, stimulate economic growth, and help Ukraine more safely monitor and secure its borders and preserve its territorial integrity. This amount includes some $135 million in humanitarian assistance provided through the U.N., and three $1 billion loan guarantees. In April 2014, President Obama signed into law H.R. Several other pieces of legislation were adopted by the House and Senate over the period of the crisis, including urging NATO allies and European Union member states to immediately suspend military cooperation with Russia; to adopt visa, financial, trade, and other sanctions on senior Russian and Ukrainian officials and oligarchs complicit in Russia's intervention and interference in Ukraine; requiring the U.S. government to assist Ukraine to recover assets stolen by the previous regime through corruption; to provide accurate information to eastern Ukraine, Crimea, and Moldova in order to counteract inflammatory Russian propaganda; authorizing increased military and economic assistance for Ukraine; and authorizing support for Russian civil society and democracy organizations. In the 2015 Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress supported an enhanced security assistance package for Ukraine, and expanded that initiative in the 2016 NDAA. On September 21, 2016, the U.S. House adopted the STAND for Ukraine Act ( H.R. 5094 , Engel). The legislation addresses the ongoing crisis in Ukraine by clarifying the position of the United States on Russia's illegal occupation of Crimea, tightening sanctions on Russia, and addressing new options to provide support for Ukraine. In the waning hours of the 114 th Congress, a Senate version of the act was introduced by Senator Menendez of New Jersey. Prime Minister Groysman, who came into office with little public confidence in his willingness to seriously tackle the root causes of much of the country's corruption, has since shown a relatively strong commitment to enact reforms and has appeared to be less intimidated than feared by those who oppose those reforms. The facts on the ground in the Donbas have also created an internal challenge to the government in that the stalemate in the Donbas continues to fuel the growing gap between those individuals, particularly inside Ukraine, who do not want to implement parts of the Minsk-2 agreement—particularly by amending the Ukrainian constitution—or to accommodate the separatists at all until the separatists fulfill their responsibilities to Minsk-2 and those, under pressure from the outside, who want to keep the process moving forward as long as the other side appears willing to do so. At the same time, although a period of political stability and progress in the economic and reform efforts of the Groysman government would be good for Kyiv and the West, despite the continued conflict in the east, such progress could also cause problems for Kyiv. U.S. Sanctions
After an initial round of sanctions imposed on Russia for its annexation of Crimea and military activity in eastern Ukraine, the United States and the EU continued to add additional travel freezes, visa restrictions, and economic sanctions on Russia for its failure to cease its support for the pro-separatists' actions in the Donbas regions of eastern Ukraine. | November 2016 marked the third anniversary of the popular uprising that erupted in Kyiv's Maidan Square in late 2013 over the government's decision to reject closer relations with the European Union (EU). February 2017 will mark the third anniversary of the collapse of the Kremlin-favored government of Viktor Yanukovych. The regime's demise was brought about by bitter protests and by civil society's reaction to a brutal government response to the Maidan protestors. In the aftermath of the turmoil of the Maidan and the collapse of the government, Ukraine saw the emergence of a pro-Western government promising reform and generally anxious to lessen Moscow's influence, as well as an energized civil society committed to pressing for the implementation of serious reform measures and determined to draw closer to the EU and the United States.
The current government of President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman, appears, to many, to be moving slowly and cautiously in a positive direction, implementing much-needed government reform, addressing endemic corruption, and achieving economic progress. For some, the government has already achieved what they believe has been the most substantial reform wave seen in Ukraine in the last 25 years.
Under Groysman, the adoption of a public asset and income declaration law required of all government officials has been hailed as a significant anticorruption achievement. Significant reforms also have taken place in the federal prosecutor's office, energy and banking sectors, and health care system. Economic progress has begun to increase slowly as the government has reduced its budget and accounts deficits. Exports have begun to increase. Shortcomings in the rule of law that have plagued the country are also reportedly being overcome. The judicial system, however, remains a problem, and attempts to promote privatization have not been successful.
At the same time, the government's cautious approach has failed to impress some sectors of a frustrated public that continues to pressure the government for more progress. The influence of a small group of old-time oligarchs and politicians, who initially refused to relinquish power or support reform, remains a distraction, and the opposition continues to criticize the government. And although the international community appears to be more encouraged by government action, many concede more work needs to be done.
Ukraine's problems have not been solely political and economic. Russia responded to the change of government in Kyiv by seizing Ukraine's Crimea region and annexing it March 2014. In April 2014, armed pro-Russian separatists supported by Moscow seized parts of the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. A 12-point agreement to end the conflict, known as Minsk-2, was reached by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany and took effect in February 2015. Since then, however, the separatists and their patrons in the Kremlin have shown little interest in fulfilling their responsibilities to implement Minsk-2, whereas Europe and the United States have continued to press Kyiv to move forward with implementing the agreement.
The United States and the EU strongly condemned Russia's incursions into Ukraine and have imposed sanctions on Russian individuals and key Russian economic and business sectors. The United States has committed close to $1.5 billion in foreign assistance to Ukraine to advance reforms and strengthen democratic institutions, including some $135 million in humanitarian assistance provided through the United Nations and $3 billion in loan guarantees.
The U.S. Congress has been a strong advocate for assisting Ukraine. In 2014, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act (H.R. 5859) was adopted, which, among other provisions, authorized increased military and economic assistance for Ukraine. In the Fiscal Year 2017 Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress supported an expansion and enhancement of security assistance for Ukraine that was initiated by the U.S. government in 2015. In September 2016, the House adopted the STAND for Ukraine Act (H.R. 5094, Engel), which, among other provisions, clarified the position of the United States on Russia's illegal occupation of Crimea. A Senate version of the legislation was introduced in the waning days of the 114th Congress, but the legislation was not enacted.
Nevertheless, some observers believe there is a growing Ukraine fatigue in Europe and a euro-skepticism taking hold in Ukraine, fueled by those who oppose the government and its reform effort and by those who have become disenchanted by Europe's lack of actions to support the pro-Europe movement in Ukraine. Concerns about the new U.S. Administration's commitment to Ukraine also are raising the level of anxiety among many in Kyiv.
This report provides an overview of the situation in Ukraine. |
crs_R43564 | crs_R43564_0 | Historically, Medicaid eligibility has generally been limited to certain low-income children, pregnant women, parents of dependent children, the elderly, and individuals with disabilities; however, starting January 1, 2014, states have the option to extend Medicaid coverage to most non-elderly, nonpregnant adults with income up to 133% of the federal poverty (FPL). This expansion of Medicaid eligibility is one of a number of changes the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. The ACA Medicaid expansion (as initially enacted) established 133% of FPL as the new mandatory minimum Medicaid income eligibility level for most non-elderly, nonpregnant adults. The Supreme Court decision in National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius made the ACA Medicaid expansion optional rather than mandatory. The federal government funds a vast majority of the cost for the ACA Medicaid expansion. On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court issued its decision in NFIB , and the Supreme Court held that the ACA Medicaid expansion violated the Constitution. If a state accepts the ACA Medicaid expansion funds, it must abide by the new expansion coverage rules. For instance, MAGI counting rules are used for determining eligibility for the ACA Medicaid expansion population, and individuals covered under the ACA Medicaid expansion are required to receive alternative benefit plan (ABP) coverage. Financing
The ACA provides different federal Medicaid matching rates for the individuals that will gain Medicaid coverage through the ACA Medicaid expansion. The federal government's share of most Medicaid expenditures is determined according to the FMAP rate, but exceptions to the regular FMAP rate have been made for certain states, situations, populations, providers, and services. The ACA adds a few FMAP exceptions for the ACA Medicaid expansion: the "newly eligible" FMAP rate, the "expansion state" FMAP rate, and the additional FMAP increase for certain expansion states. Additional FMAP Increase for Certain "Expansion States"
During 2014 and 2015, an FMAP rate increase of 2.2 percentage points is available for "expansion states" that (1) the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) determines will not receive any FMAP rate increase for "newly eligible" individuals and (2) have not been approved to use Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) funds to pay for the cost of health coverage under a waiver in effect as of July 2009. State Decisions
On January 1, 2014, when the ACA Medicaid expansion went into effect, 24 states and the District of Columbia included the expansion as part of their Medicaid programs. Michigan implemented the expansion on April 1, 2014, and New Hampshire implemented the expansion on July 1, 2014. Alternative Models
Most states implementing the ACA Medicaid expansion will do so through an expansion of their current Medicaid program. However, some states are implementing the expansion through alternative models, such as premium assistance through the "private option" and health savings accounts. States Not Implementing the Expansion
State decisions not to implement the ACA Medicaid expansion could have implications for low-income individuals, large employers with low wage workers, and hospitals. However, most uninsured individuals with incomes under 100% of FPL living in states that decide not to implement the ACA Medicaid expansion will likely remain uninsured, because these individuals are not eligible for premium tax credits or the cost-sharing subsidies to purchase health insurance through the exchanges. Large Employers with Low-Wage Workers
Large employers with low-wage workers in states that do not implement the ACA Medicaid expansion might have greater exposure to employer penalties included in the ACA when the penalty goes into effect in 2015. | Historically, Medicaid eligibility has generally been limited to certain low-income children, pregnant women, parents of dependent children, the elderly, and individuals with disabilities; however, as of January 1, 2014, states have the option to extend Medicaid coverage to most non-elderly, low-income individuals.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 as amended) established 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL) (effectively 138% of FPL with an income disregard of 5% of FPL) as the new mandatory minimum Medicaid income eligibility level for most non-elderly individuals. On June 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, finding that the enforcement mechanism for the ACA Medicaid expansion violated the Constitution, which effectively made the ACA Medicaid expansion optional for states.
If a state accepts the ACA Medicaid expansion funds, it must abide by the expansion coverage rules. For instance, modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) counting rules are used for determining eligibility for the ACA Medicaid expansion population, and individuals covered under the ACA Medicaid expansion are required to receive alternative benefit plan (ABP) coverage.
The ACA provides different federal Medicaid matching rates for the individuals who receive Medicaid coverage through the ACA Medicaid expansion. The federal government's share of most Medicaid expenditures is determined according to the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) rate, but exceptions to the regular FMAP rate have been made for certain states, situations, populations, providers, and services. The ACA adds a few FMAP exceptions for the ACA Medicaid expansion: the "newly eligible" FMAP rate, the "expansion state" FMAP rate, and the additional FMAP increase for certain expansion states. Due to these ACA FMAP rates, the federal government pays for a vast majority of the cost of the ACA Medicaid expansion.
On January 1, 2014, when the ACA Medicaid expansion went into effect, 24 states and the District of Columbia had included the ACA Medicaid expansion as part of their Medicaid programs. Michigan and New Hampshire implemented the expansion on April 1, 2014, and July 1, 2014 (respectively). Pennsylvania recently received approval to implement the ACA Medicaid expansion beginning on January 1, 2015.
Most states implementing the ACA Medicaid expansion will do so through an expansion of their current Medicaid program. However, some states are implementing the expansion through an alternative method, such as the "private option" (i.e., premium assistance to purchase health insurance through the health insurance exchanges under the ACA) and health savings accounts.
State decisions not to implement the ACA Medicaid expansion could have implications for low-income individuals, large employers with low-wage workers, and hospitals. For example, most uninsured individuals with incomes under 100% of FPL will likely remain uninsured, and large employers with low-wage workers might have greater exposure to employer penalties included in the ACA. Also, Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) allotments will be reduced by the same across the nation whether or not states implement the expansion. |
crs_R41469 | crs_R41469_0 | The Davis-Bacon Act (DBA) requires employers to pay workers on federal construction projects at least locally prevailing wages and fringe benefits. These wages and benefits, which are determined by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), are the minimum hourly wages and benefits that employers must pay workers. In order to hire and retain workers, employers may pay more than locally prevailing wages or benefits. Supporters of the Davis-Bacon Act maintain that it creates stability in local construction and labor markets and ensures that projects are built by the most skilled and experienced workers. Critics of the act argue that it impedes competition, raises construction costs, and imposes additional administrative requirements on projects that receive financial assistance from the federal government. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly called the Clean Water Act (CWA), authorizes appropriations to states to operate state revolving loan funds (SRFs) that finance the construction of wastewater treatment plants. The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) similarly authorizes appropriations for SRFs to finance the construction of public drinking water systems. The SDWA has a Davis-Bacon provision, but the provision predates the state revolving loan program. The CWA states that Davis-Bacon prevailing wages will apply to projects "constructed in whole or in part before fiscal year 1995." Authorization for appropriations expired at the end of FY1994 for the CWA and the end of FY2003 for the SDWA. Nevertheless, Congress has continued to appropriate funds for the SRFs under both statutes. After the authorization of appropriations for the SRFs under the CWA expired at the end of FY1994, Davis-Bacon coverage was the subject of considerable debate. An issue for Congress is whether to apply Davis-Bacon prevailing wages to projects financed by the state revolving loan programs under the CWA or SDWA. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) provided FY2009 supplemental appropriations to both revolving loan programs, and required Davis-Bacon prevailing wages on projects funded in whole or in part by the act. As interpreted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), regular appropriations for the EPA for FY2010 required Davis-Bacon prevailing wages on any project funded with FY2010 appropriations or any agreement signed in FY2010, even if the funds were appropriated in a prior year. EPA appropriations for FY2012 requires Davis-Bacon prevailing wages for projects funded under both revolving loan programs for FY2012 and future fiscal years. In 1995, EPA issued a memorandum in which it said that projects that began construction after the end of FY1994 did not have to comply with the requirements of Section 602(b)(6). The Building and Construction Trades Department (BCTD) of the AFL-CIO disagreed with EPA's interpretation of the law. The BCTD argued that Davis-Bacon coverage applied to projects funded by the SRFs as long as Congress continued to appropriate funds for the program. In June 2000, EPA and the BCTD proposed a settlement agreement that would require states to ensure that prevailing wages were paid for work performed on projects funded through the SRF program "for as long as grants are awarded to the states." The agreement was to take effect in July 2001. It does not appear that the settlement agreement was ever implemented. Appropriations Acts for the CWA and SDWA State Revolving Loan Funds (SRFs)
Appropriations acts for EPA for FY2010 and FY2012 included provisions that applied Davis-Bacon prevailing wages to projects financed by the state revolving loan programs under both the CWA and SDWA. | The Davis-Bacon Act requires employers to pay workers on federal construction projects at least locally prevailing wages and fringe benefits. These wages and benefits are the minimum hourly wages and benefits that employers must pay workers. In order to hire and retain workers, employers may pay more than locally prevailing wages or benefits. Supporters of the Davis-Bacon Act maintain that it creates stability in local construction and labor markets and ensures that projects are built by the most skilled and experienced workers. Critics of the act argue that it impedes competition, raises construction costs, and imposes additional administrative requirements on contractors.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly called the Clean Water Act (CWA), authorizes appropriations to states to operate state revolving loan funds (SRFs) that finance the construction of wastewater treatment plants. The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) authorizes appropriations for SRFs to finance the construction of public drinking water systems. An issue for Congress is whether to apply Davis-Bacon prevailing wages to projects financed by the state revolving loan programs under the CWA and SDWA.
The SDWA has a Davis-Bacon provision, but the provision predates, and does not apply to, the state revolving loan program. The CWA states that Davis-Bacon prevailing wages apply to projects that are "constructed in whole or in part before fiscal year 1995" with funds from the revolving loan program. Authorization for appropriations expired at the end of FY1994 for the CWA and the end of FY2003 for the SDWA. Nevertheless, Congress has continued to appropriate funds for the SRFs under both statutes.
After the authorization of appropriations for the SRFs under the CWA expired at the end of FY1994, Davis-Bacon coverage was the subject of considerable debate. In 1995, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a memorandum stating that projects that began construction after the end of FY1994 did not have to comply with the Davis-Bacon requirements. However, the Building and Construction Trades Department (BCTD) of the AFL-CIO disagreed with EPA's interpretation of the law. The BCTD argued that Davis-Bacon coverage applied to projects funded by the SRFs as long as Congress continued to appropriate funds for the program. In June 2000, EPA and the BCTD proposed a settlement agreement that would require states to ensure that prevailing wages are paid for work performed on projects funded through the SRF program "for as long as grants are awarded to the states." The agreement was to take effect in July 2001. Later, the implementation date was moved to September 2001, and then to October 2001. It does not appear that the settlement agreement was ever implemented.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) provided FY2009 supplemental appropriations funds to the CWA and SDWA SRFs, and required Davis-Bacon prevailing wages on projects funded in whole or in part by the act. Regular appropriations for EPA for FY2010 and FY2012 included provisions that applied Davis-Bacon prevailing wages to projects financed by the state revolving loan programs under both the CWA and SDWA. As interpreted by the EPA, regular appropriations for the EPA for FY2010 required Davis-Bacon prevailing wages on any project funded with FY2010 appropriations or any agreement executed in FY2010, even if the funds were appropriated in a prior year. Appropriations for FY2012 required Davis-Bacon prevailing wages for projects funded under both revolving loan programs for FY2012 and future fiscal years. |
crs_R41973 | crs_R41973_0 | A variety of factors contribute to the changes, their weights differing depending on the time periods and geographic locations under examination. In public media, the controversy over causes may appear much greater than the broad scientific agreement that exists: the scientific evidence best supports rising atmospheric concentrations of "greenhouse gases" (GHG) (particularly carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides) and other air pollutants as having contributed to the majority of global average temperature increase since the late 1970s. The rise of GHG concentrations is due to emissions from human-related activities. Other air pollution, irrigation, the built environment, and depletion of ozone in the stratosphere may be more important for changing temperature and/or precipitation patterns in some locations over the past 30 years but have small overall effect on global average temperature. Regardless of causes, climate changes have potentially large economic and ecological consequences, both positive and negative, which depend on the rapidity, size, and predictability of change. Some of the impacts of past change are evident in shifting agricultural productivity, forest insect infestations and fires, shifts in water supply, record-breaking summer high temperatures, and coastal erosion and inundation. People and natural systems respond to climate changes regardless of whether the government responds. Over time, the consequences of climate change for the United States and the globe will be influenced by choices made or left to others by the U.S. Congress. Congress has engaged, over the past three decades, in authorizing and funding federal programs to improve understanding of climate changes (past and predicted) and their implications. Conceptual Policy Approaches
Neither domestically nor internationally have policy-makers converged on a common approach to setting goals or managing climate change-related risks. For policy-makers who may wish to consider addressing climate change, this section articulates four competing strategies for setting climate change policies: (1) research and wait-and-see, (2) science-based goal setting, (3) economics-based policies, and (4) incrementalism or adaptive management. A variety of generic policy tools may be in use already or be potentially available to address climate change concerns. The order of the following policy tools is not intended to represent any order of priority:
regulatory, including market-based, tools to reduce GHGs; distribution of potential revenues from GHG programs; non-regulatory tools that help markets work more efficiently; tools to stimulate technological change; options to ease the economic transition to a lower GHG economy; instruments to encourage international actions; and tools to stimulate adaptation to climate change. | Congress has, over the past three decades, authorized and funded federal programs to improve understanding of climate changes and their implications. Climate changes have potentially large economic and ecological consequences, both positive and negative, which depend on the rapidity, size, and predictability of change. Some of the impacts of past change are evident in shifting agricultural productivity, forest insect infestations and fires, shifts in water supply, record-breaking summer high temperatures, and coastal erosion and inundation.
People and natural systems respond to climate changes regardless of whether the government responds. Over time, the consequences of climate change for the United States and the globe will be influenced by choices made or left to others by the U.S. Congress.
Different factors contribute to climate change, their contributions depending on the time periods and geographic locations under examination. Current scientific evidence best supports rising atmospheric concentrations of "greenhouse gases" (GHG) (particularly carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides) and other air pollutants as having driven the majority of global average temperature increase since the late 1970s. The increase in concentrations is due almost entirely to GHG emissions from human activities. Hence, the policy debate has focused on whether and how to abate GHG emissions from human-related activities. Locally, human-related air pollution, irrigation, the built environment, land use change, and depletion of ozone in the stratosphere may be more important but have small overall effect on global average temperature.
Policy proposals take different approaches to setting goals or managing climate change-related risks. This report describes four strategies for setting climate change policies: (1) research and wait-and-see, (2) science-based goal setting, (3) economics-based policies, and (4) incrementalism or adaptive management. Each may take into account the concerns, values, and skepticisms of some constituencies, but each also has limitations. It is unclear whether any single conceptual approach could cover all elements of the policy debate, though hybrid approaches may help to build political consensus over whether and how much policy intervention is appropriate.
If climate change merits federal action, a variety of generic policy tools may be available (some in use already) to achieve policy goals:
regulatory, including market-based, tools to reduce GHGs; distribution of potential revenues from GHG programs; non-regulatory tools that help markets work more efficiently; tools to stimulate technological change; options to ease the economic transition to a lower GHG economy; instruments to encourage international actions; and tools to stimulate adaptation to climate change.
Analysts have elucidated the potential usefulness and limitations of each option. Many experts have concluded that, to achieve a given policy goal, strategies using complementary policy tools can increase cost-effectiveness, alleviate burdens on particular constituencies, and address additional concerns of policy-makers. This report seeks to support Congress as it debates and modifies the mix of federal programs that may influence the climate or adaptation to its changes. |
crs_RL33844 | crs_RL33844_0 | Introduction
With the current economic downturn, Members of the 111 th Congress are likely to be faced with many policy options aimed at economic improvement. Foreign investors are often viewed as providing employment opportunities for U.S. citizens rather than displacing native workers. Yet, extending foreign investor visas provides several potential risks as well, such as visa abuses and security concerns. The central policy question surrounding foreign investors—and particularly legal permanent resident (LPR) investors—is whether the benefits reaped from allocating visas to foreign investors outweigh the costs of denying visas to other employment-based groups. Falling under the employment-based class of immigrant visas, the immigrant investor visa is the fifth preference category in this visa class. 111-83 , §548), extends the authorization of the Regional Center Pilot Program through September 30, 2012. Following the 2003 legislation, USCIS decided to develop a new unit to govern matters concerning LPR investor visas and investments. Since FY2004, an additional 1,901 immigrant investor visas have been issued. Nonimmigrant Investor Visas
When coming to the United States as a temporary investor, there are two classes of nonimmigrant visas which a foreign national can use to enter: the E-1 for treaty traders and the E-2 for treaty investors. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) offers statistics on the admissions of nonimmigrants and their destination state. Table 3 indicates the destination states of nonimmigrant treaty trader and investor visa admissions into the United States for FY2008. According to published accounts, the Canadian investor visa was developed initially to attract investors from the British colony of Hong Kong. Both countries have shown an upward trend in immigrant investor visas since 2003. The investor visas offered by the United States operate on the principal that FDI into the United States should spur economic growth in the United States. According to the classical theory, if these investments are properly targeted towards the U.S. labor force's skill sets, it should reduce the migration pressures on U.S. workers. What is less clear from the empirical research is the degree to which potential migration provides any additional incentive for investment activity in the United States. For permanent migrants, however, the prospects for professional and social mobility are the main motivating factors. Administrative Efforts
In recent years, significant efforts have been made by administrative agencies to both promote investment by foreigners in the United States economy, and to close perceived loopholes for visa exploitation. A number of current investment projects are using LPR investor financing because it is less costly for the domestic investors. Current Legislation and Potential Issuesfor Congress
In the 111 th Congress, authorizing language in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. Philadelphia is one of the Regional Centers that has been most successful in attracting foreign investors through the EB-5 visa. | With the current economic downturn, Members of the 111th Congress are likely to be faced with many policy options aimed at economic improvement, including the possible consideration of amending visa categories for foreign investors. Foreign investors are often viewed as providing employment opportunities for U.S. citizens rather than displacing native workers. Yet, extending foreign investor visas provides several potential risks as well, such as visa abuses and security concerns. Thus, a potential policy question for Congress—and particularly legal permanent resident (LPR) investors—is whether the benefits reaped from allocating visas to foreign investors outweigh the costs of denying visas to other employment-based groups.
There are currently two categories of nonimmigrant investor visas and one category of immigrant investor visa for legal permanent residents (LPR). The visa categories used for nonimmigrant investors are: E-1 for treaty traders; and the E-2 for treaty investors. The visa category used for immigrant investors is the fifth preference employment-based (EB-5) visa category. According to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) statistics, there were 230,647 nonimmigrant treaty trader and investor visa arrivals in the United States in FY2008. For the same time frame, DHS reported the granting of 1,360 investor visas.
When viewed from a comparative perspective, the investor visas of the United States are most closely mirrored by those of Canada. The LPR investor visa draws especially strong parallels to the Canadian immigrant investor visa, since the latter served as the model for the former. Comparing the admissions data between these two countries, however, reveals that the Canadian investor provision attracts many times the number of investors of its United States counterpart. Yet, both countries showed an upward trend in immigrant investor visas in the last two years.
The investor visas offered by the United States operate on the principle that foreign direct investment into the United States should spur economic growth in the United States. According to the classical theory, if these investments are properly targeted towards the U.S. labor force's skill sets, it should reduce the international migration pressures on U.S. workers. To attract foreign investors, research indicates that temporary migrants are motivated most significantly by employment and wage prospects, while permanent migrants are motivated by professional and social mobility. Theoretically, however, it is unclear to what extent potential migration provides additional incentive for investment activity. Investors from developed countries may sometimes lack incentive to settle in the United States since they can achieve foreign direct investment (FDI) and similar standards of living from their home country. Yet, in cases where foreign investors have been attracted, the economic benefits have been positive and significant.
Immigrant investors have been subject to notable administrative efforts in the past couple of years. In 2005, DHS developed the Investor and Regional Center Unit (IRCU) to govern matters concerning LPR investor visas and investments to better adjudicate petitions and coordinate investments. In the 111th Congress, authorizing language in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-83, §548), extends the authorization of the Regional Center Pilot Program through September 30, 2012. |
crs_RL34372 | crs_RL34372_0 | Introduction
In response to the downturn in the U.S. mortgage market, the Bush Administration helped broker an alliance of mortgage lenders, servicers, counselors, and investors, called the HOPE NOW Alliance, whose stated goals are to "maximize outreach efforts to homeowners in distress to help them stay in their homes" and to "create a unified, coordinated plan to reach and help as many homeowners as possible." One aspect of the alliance is the Statement of Principles, Recommendations and Guidelines for a Streamlined Foreclosure and Loss Avoidance Framework for Securitized Subprime Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loans (the Framework or the ASF Plan). The Framework was proposed by the American Securitization Forum (ASF), a professional forum for many organizations that participate in the securitization market and a member of the HOPE NOW Alliance. Borrowers who meet all of the requirements of Segment 2 qualify for "fast track" loan modification, which may include an interest rate freeze at the rate prior to reset that, in most cases, lasts for five years. Because broad swath modification is a deviation from the norm, servicers willing to perform loan workouts in accordance with the Framework's guidelines could worry that they would expose themselves to tax, accounting, and contract liability from secondary market investors and federal regulators of tax-exempt trusts. This potential liability could deter servicers from engaging in loss mitigation, including making use of those measures outlined in the ASF Plan. The IRS then issued a separate revenue procedure (Rev. Proc 2008-28) to clarify more general tax issues relating to modification of securitized mortgage loans. The IRS identified conditions under which it would not challenge the tax status of the trusts that hold securitized loans, or assert that anticipatory loan modifications create a tax liability on prohibited transactions. Proc 2008-28 are (1) the mortgage is for a single-family (one- to four-unit) dwelling; (2) the dwelling is owner-occupied; (3) overdue mortgages make up less than 10% of the trust's assets at start-up; (4) there is reasonable belief that the original loan will result in foreclosure; (5) the loan modification is less favorable to the holder of the loan than the original loan; and (6) there is reasonable belief that the loan modification reduces the risk of foreclosure. The data show that loan modifications and formal repayment plans have been increasing steadily in each successive quarter since the issuance of the Framework. However, it is difficult to identify how many of these measures were made pursuant to the ASF Plan and how many were performed through alternative channels. | In response to the downturn in the U.S. mortgage market, the Bush Administration helped broker an alliance of mortgage lenders, servicers, counselors, and investors called the HOPE NOW Alliance, whose stated goals are to "maximize outreach efforts to homeowners in distress to help them stay in their homes" and to "create a unified, coordinated plan to reach and help as many homeowners as possible." One aspect of the alliance is the Statement of Principles, Recommendations and Guidelines for a Streamlined Foreclosure and Loss Avoidance Framework for Securitized Subprime Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loans (the Framework or ASF Plan), as proposed by the American Securitization Forum (ASF).
Pursuant to the Framework, borrowers who meet certain requirements qualify for "fast track" loan modification, which may include an interest rate freeze at the rate prior to reset that, in most cases, lasts for five years. Because this type of modification is a deviation from the norm, servicers willing to perform loan workouts in accordance with the Framework's guidelines could worry that they would open themselves up to tax, accounting, and contract liability from secondary market investors and federal regulators of tax-exempt trusts. This potential liability could deter servicers from engaging in loss mitigation, even those measures outlined in the Framework.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a revenue procedure (Rev. Proc 2008-28) on May 16, 2008, to clarify certain tax issues relating to modification of securitized mortgage loans. The IRS said that it would not challenge the tax status of the trusts that hold securitized loans, nor would the IRS assert that anticipatory loan modifications create a tax liability on prohibited transactions, if: (1) the mortgage is for a single-family (one- to four-unit) dwelling; (2) the dwelling is owner-occupied; (3) overdue mortgages make up less than 10% of the trust's assets at start-up; (4) there is reasonable belief that the original loan will result in foreclosure; (5) the loan modification is less favorable to the holder of the loan than the original loan; and (6) there is reasonable belief that the loan modification reduces the risk of foreclosure.
The data show that loan modifications and formal repayment plans have been increasing steadily in each successive quarter since the issuance of the Framework. However, it is difficult to identify which of these modifications were made pursuant to the ASF Plan and which occurred through alternative channels. The Framework only applies to certain mortgages that are current, which makes it distinct from Project Lifeline, a plan announced on February 12, 2008, for mortgages that are in serious default.
On June 17, 2008, the HOPE NOW servicers announced common measures to expedite resolution of short sales and second mortgages, which can require third-party approval. |
crs_R41843 | crs_R41843_0 | Their interest has been sparked by the debate over the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), which would lower or eliminate U.S. tariffs and non-tariff barriers on most imports from South Korea. Some, particularly the agreement's opponents, argue that the agreement could lead to increased U.S. imports of goods or components made in North Korea. Those concerned that the KORUS FTA would change this situation focus considerable attention on the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), a seven-year-old industrial park located in North Korea just across the demilitarized zone, where more than 100 South Korean manufacturers employ over 45,000 North Korean workers at relatively low wages. Critics argue that South Korean firms could obtain low-cost Kaesong-made goods or components, incorporate the latter into finished products such as electronics or automobiles, and then reship the final goods to the United States with "Made in [South] Korea" labels. The first section of this report examines existing U.S. rules and practices governing imports from North Korea. The third section addresses the issue of how, if at all, the KORUS FTA would affect potential U.S. imports of North Korean content, including whether the agreement could result in legal action against the U.S. government if it kept out imports of North Korean content. In 1999, President Clinton significantly loosened restrictions on U.S. exports to and imports from North Korea except those involving national security concerns. Admissibility: Department of Treasury Approval Required
Importing Directly from North Korea
One may not import directly from North Korea without approval from OFAC; this applies to all imports from North Korea. Over the course of the 2000s, North Korea's significant export markets shrunk to two countries, South Korea and China, which in 2010 appear to have accounted for over three-quarters of North Korea's export shipments. By the end of February 2011, almost all of North Korea's exports to South Korea were attributable to activities in the KIC. By the end of the decade, more than half of North Korea's imports and most of its foreign assistance came from China. North Korean exports to China rose nearly fivefold from 2001 to 2009, and in 2010, North Korea's $1.2 billion in commercial shipments to China accounted for over 40% of its total annual exports. Recently, North Korea has increased its exports of primary products (such as fish, shellfish and agro-forest products) and mineral products (such as base metallic minerals). The KORUS FTA in the future could allow products made in the Kaesong Industrial Complex to be covered by the agreement, thereby conferring preferential treatment to these products. The KORUS FTA might constrain the U.S. government's ability to impose restrictions on imports from North Korea. In March 2011, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) issued a statement that "Congress would need to pass, and the President would need to sign, a law to extend any KORUS tariff benefits to products made in Kaesong or any OPZ." Thus, in the event that the United States were to prohibit the importation of a good from North Korea, the KORUS FTA would not preclude the United States from prohibiting the importation of that North Korean good from the territory of South Korea as well. Rules of Origin (ROO)42
A number of U.S. critics of the KORUS FTA have argued that under the agreement's rules of origin (ROO), South Korean manufacturers will be able to incorporate North Korean components into their exports to the United States. Since goods from the KIC must also pass through South Korean customs, to the extent that the KORUS FTA (1) further assists in the establishment of rules-based trade between the United States and South Korea, (2) continues to deepen the U.S.-South Korea economic relationship, and (3) continues to provide grounds and methods for customs cooperation and ongoing dialogue between officials of the two countries, one could argue that the proposed FTA may serve to further limit the entrance into the United States of North Korean-manufactured inputs. Conclusion
The KORUS FTA appears likely to have only a minimal impact on whether U.S. sanctions on North Korean imports are put to the test. The KORUS FTA's preferential terms would not apply to finished goods made in the KIC, and the provisions for bringing the KIC into the agreement include multiple opportunities for the United States, including Congress, to block such a move by a future South Korean government. The agreement also contains provisions that aim to help preserve the United States' ability to maintain its restrictions on imports of North Korean goods and components. As long as U.S. sanctions on North Korean imports remain in place and are adequately enforced, the KORUS FTA's rules of origin—which are used to determine the country of origin of imported products—would apply only in cases where an importer has received a license from OFAC to bring in a South Korean good that contains North Korean components. Thus, the issue of how best to handle imports from North Korea appears to center on customs controls, cooperation, and enforcement. There is no means to determine with one hundred percent certainty that there are no goods or components originating in North Korea entering U.S. commerce without proper authorization. | In early 2011, many Members of Congress focused their attention on U.S. rules and practices governing the importation of products and components from North Korea. Their interest was stimulated by debate over the proposed South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) and the question of whether the agreement could lead to increased imports from North Korea. Some observers, particularly many opposed to the agreement, have argued that the KORUS FTA could increase imports from North Korea if South Korean firms re-export items made in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), a seven-year-old industrial park located in North Korea, where more than 100 South Korean manufacturers employ over 45,000 North Korean workers. Two concerns expressed by critics are (1) that South Korean firms could obtain low-cost KIC-made goods or components, incorporate them into finished products and then reship the goods to the United States with "Made in [South] Korea" labels so that they would receive preferential treatment under the KORUS FTA; and (2) that such exports would benefit the North Korean government.
At present, North Korea's relative economic isolation and an array of U.S. restrictions have resulted in less than $350,000 in U.S. cumulative imports from North Korea since 2000. Thus, the issue of U.S. imports from North Korea is essentially about what might happen in the future.
This report examines the issue of U.S. imports from North Korea in three parts:
U.S. rules and practices governing imports from North Korea. The United States does not maintain a comprehensive embargo against North Korea. However, imports from North Korea require approval from the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). This restriction includes finished goods originating in North Korea as well as goods that contain North Korea-made components. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), of the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for reviewing an importer's OFAC license as the goods enter the United States. North Korea's exports to South Korea (via the KIC) and China, its dominant export markets. In 2010, over three-quarters of North Korea's export shipments went to China and South Korea. Most of North Korea's $1.2 billion in exports to China in 2010 were mineral resources or primary products (such as fish, shellfish, and agro-forest products). An increasing proportion of North Korea's exports to South Korea have become attributable to activities in the KIC, where factories manufactured more than $320 million in goods in 2010, a 25% increase over 2009. The present South Korean government has halted plans for a major expansion of the complex. If a future South Korean government resumes these plans, or if China and North Korea significantly boost bilateral economic integration, more North Korean goods and components could enter global supply chains and test U.S. restrictions against North Korean imports. The KORUS FTA's potential effect on U.S. imports of North Korean content. The KORUS FTA appears likely to have only a minimal impact on whether U.S. sanctions on North Korean imports are put to the test. At present, the agreement would not give preferential treatment to finished products made in the KIC. The agreement would establish a binational committee to discuss whether zones such as the KIC should be given preferential treatment in the future. The committee would operate by consensus, and Congress would need to pass a law to extend any KORUS FTA tariff benefits to products made in the KIC. Moreover, the KORUS FTA contains provisions that make it highly unlikely the agreement would constrain the United States' ability to maintain its restrictions on North Korean products. Many critics of the KORUS FTA argue that the agreement's rules of origin would make it possible for South Korean exports with North Korean components to receive preferential treatment. However, the KORUS FTA's rules of origin do not appear to limit the United States' ability to enforce its restrictions on imported products that contain North Korean inputs.
The issue of how best to handle imports from North Korea appears to center on customs controls, cooperation, and enforcement. The complex nature of many types of goods, such as automobiles and electronics, poses a particular challenge for Customs and Border Protection officials to determine the origin of these products. There is no means to determine with one hundred percent certainty that there are no goods or components originating in North Korea entering U.S. commerce without proper authorization. This will be true regardless of whether the KORUS FTA is in effect. Thus, perhaps the most important factor that will determine whether U.S. restrictions on North Korean imports are tested appears to be the degree to which North Korean goods enter global supply chains. |
crs_R44763 | crs_R44763_0 | Overview
Mandatory spending is composed of budget outlays controlled by laws other than appropriation acts, including federal spending on entitlement programs. Entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare make up the bulk of mandatory spending. Mandatory spending also finances income support programs such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI), unemployment insurance, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and the earned income and child tax credits. Trends that have influenced mandatory spending over time, such as the growth of health care costs in excess of general inflation and the retirement and aging of the Baby Boom generation, present policy makers with choices whether to increase federal revenues, change the structure of mandatory programs, reduce spending on other programs, or some combination of those strategies. Mandatory Spending and Net Interest Account for Two-Thirds of Outlays
In FY2016, mandatory spending—totaling an estimated 13% of gross domestic product (GDP)—exceeded discretionary spending's 6.5% share of GDP. Together, total federal spending represented an estimated 21% of GDP. Social Security, Medicare, and the federal share of Medicaid alone composed about half of all federal spending. Mandatory spending, when combined with net interest's share of spending (6.5% in FY2016), accounts for over two-thirds of federal outlays in FY2016, and that proportion is expected to grow over time. In 1962, before the creation of Medicare and Medicaid, mandatory spending was less than 30% of all federal spending. At that time, Social Security accounted for about 13% of total federal spending or about half of all mandatory spending. Discretionary spending was defined as budgetary resources provided in and controlled by appropriations acts. Net interest payments, the final category of federal spending, are automatically authorized and are the government's interest payments on debt held by the public offset by interest income that the government receives. Such entitlement spending is referred to as appropriated entitlements. Medicaid is a joint federal-state program. At that time, Social Security accounted for about 13% of total federal spending or about half of all mandatory spending. Mandatory Spending Prospects
Projections for the Next Decade
Over the next decade, mandatory spending is projected to continue rising, reaching 15% of GDP in FY2026, while discretionary spending is projected to fall to 5.3% of GDP in that year, its lowest level in modern times. Much of the projected increase in mandatory spending stems from rising per capita health care costs and the demographic effects of an aging population. Baby Boomers will continue to retire over the coming decade, and the proportion of retirees over age 85—whose health care needs are typically greater than younger retirees—has been rising steadily, thus increasing the expected flow of federal benefits. While the growth of health care costs per beneficiary has moderated in the past decade, concerns remain that health care cost growth could again accelerate. Some health economists note that health care prices are higher in the United States than in other advanced economies. According to CBO's extended baseline projections, Social Security outlays would account for 6.3% of GDP in FY2046, while Medicare would account for another 5.7%. Demographic Shifts and Social Cohesion
Future changes in demographics and in the social structure of the U.S. population could affect support for funding of social insurance and other mandatory spending programs. | Federal spending is divided into three broad categories: discretionary spending, mandatory spending, and net interest. Mandatory spending is composed of budget outlays controlled by laws other than appropriation acts, including federal spending on entitlement programs. Entitlement programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid make up the bulk of mandatory spending. Other mandatory spending funds various income support programs, including Supplemental Security Income (SSI), unemployment insurance, and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), as well as federal employee and military retirement and some veterans' benefits. In contrast to mandatory spending, discretionary spending is provided and controlled through appropriations acts. Net interest spending is the government's interest payments on debt held by the public, offset by interest income that the government receives.
In FY2016, mandatory spending accounted for an estimated 63% of total federal spending and over 13% of gross domestic product (GDP). Social Security alone accounted for about 24% of federal spending. Medicare and the federal share of Medicaid together accounted for an estimated 27% of federal spending. Therefore, spending on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid now make up about half of total federal spending. In previous decades, mandatory spending accounted for a smaller share of federal outlays. In 1962, before the creation of Medicare and Medicaid, mandatory spending was less than 30% of all federal spending. At that time, Social Security accounted for about 13% of total federal spending or about half of all mandatory spending.
Mandatory spending is projected to continue rising over the next decades. Over the next decade, mandatory spending is projected to reach 15% of GDP in FY2026, while discretionary spending is projected to fall to 5% of GDP, its lowest level ever. Much of the projected increase in mandatory spending stems from the demographic effects of an aging population and rising health care costs. Baby Boomers will continue to retire over the coming decade, and the proportion of retirees over age 85 has been rising steadily, thus increasing the expected flow of federal benefits. While health care costs per beneficiary have increased in recent years more slowly than previously expected, concerns remain that health care cost growth could again accelerate.
Other countries with advanced economies also face challenges related to rising costs of social insurance programs, although per capita health care costs are generally lower in those countries than in the United States. Some of those countries have more extensive social safety nets. Some in the United States have called for expanding certain social insurance benefits, or for programs that would do more to address challenges faced by non-elderly families, such as expanded options for repayment of student loans or support for child care.
Over the long term, projections suggest that if current policies remain unchanged, the United States could face major fiscal imbalances. According to CBO's extended baseline projections, Social Security would grow from 4.9% of GDP in FY2016 to 5.9% of GDP by FY2026 and 6.4% by FY2036. Federal mandatory spending on health care is projected to expand from about 5.5% of GDP in FY2016 to 6.5% in FY2026 and to 7.9% by FY2036. The share of mandatory spending in total federal spending is also projected to rise.
Because costs of mandatory programs account for nearly two-thirds of total federal outlays, some budget experts contend that putting federal finances on a sustainable path would require significant reductions in federal spending, including cuts in entitlement spending. Other budget and social policy experts contend that curtailing entitlement program eligibility or benefits would compromise the goals of improving the economic security of the elderly and the poor, as well as mitigating the financial consequences of adverse events such as unemployment or disability. |
crs_R40850 | crs_R40850_0 | Introduction
Electronic waste (e-waste) is a term that is used loosely to refer to obsolete, broken, or irreparable electronic devices like televisions, computer central processing units (CPUs), computer monitors (flat screen and cathode ray tubes), laptops, printers, scanners, and associated wiring. To date, 23 states and New York City have enacted some form of e-waste management law. New state requirements, mixed with increased consumer awareness regarding potential problems with landfilling e-waste, have led to an increase in recycling. With that increase have come new questions about e-waste EOL management. Instead of questions only about the potential impacts associated with e-waste disposal , questions have arisen regarding the potential danger associated with e-waste recycling . Accurate data regarding how much is generated, how it is managed, and where it is processed (either domestically or abroad) are largely unavailable. What is known is that e-waste recycling may involve costly, complex processes and that there is an insufficient, though growing, national recycling infrastructure to enable the United States to fully manage its own e-waste. It also is known that markets for e-waste (either for reuse or recycling for scrap) are largely overseas. As a result, the majority of e-waste collected for recycling appears to be exported for processing. Concerns regarding the potential impact of exporting e-waste for processing in developing countries have led to increased scrutiny from members of the public and environmental organizations, as well as some Members of Congress. Particularly, it discusses documented impacts to human health and the environment that have been tied to unsafe recycling practices in developing countries. With increased exports have come increased media attention on the improper handling of e-waste in those areas and its resulting impacts. It is difficult to document all e-waste recycling hubs, but popular destinations for e-waste exported from the United States (and other developed countries) are waste processing operations in Guiyu in the Shantou region of China, Delhi and Bangalore in India, and the Agbogbloshie site near Accra, Ghana. For example, a June 2009 study found that the primary hazardous recycling operations in Guiyu involve
metal recovery that involves open burning of wires to obtain steel and copper, cathode ray tube (CRT) cracking to obtain copper-laden yokes, desoldering and burning of circuit boards to remove solder and chips, and acid stripping chips for gold; plastic recycling through chipping and melting; and dumping of materials that cannot be further processed (such as leaded CRT glass and burned circuit boards) and residues from recycling operations (such as ashes from open burn operations, spent acid baths, and sludges). Concerns About Domestic E-Waste Disposal
To understand why e-waste is exported, it is helpful to understand why landfill disposal has become a concern to certain stakeholders in the United States. While an individual electronic device may not have dangerously high levels of a given toxic material, the cumulative impact of large volumes of e-waste being disposed of in a municipal solid waste landfill has become troubling to many state waste management agencies. Also, as with e-waste disposal, there are few federal environmental regulatory requirements applicable to recycling operations themselves (including the export of e-waste for recycling or reuse). Further, most consumer electronics manufacturers (who provide the market for materials recovered from recycled electronics) have manufacturing operations overseas. | Electronic waste (e-waste) is a term that is used loosely to refer to obsolete, broken, or irreparable electronic devices like televisions, computer central processing units (CPUs), computer monitors (flat screen and cathode ray tubes), laptops, printers, scanners, and associated wiring. E-waste has become a concern in the United States due to the high volumes in which it is generated, the hazardous constituents it often contains (such as lead, mercury, and chromium), and the lack of regulations applicable to its disposal or recycling.
Under most circumstances, e-waste can legally be disposed of in a municipal solid waste landfill or recycled with few environmental regulatory requirements. Concerns about e-waste landfill disposal have led federal and state environmental agencies to encourage recycling. To date, 23 states have enacted some form of mandatory e-waste recycling program. These state requirements, mixed with increased consumer awareness regarding potential problems with landfilling e-waste, have led to an increase in recycling. With that increase have come new questions about e-waste management. Instead of questions only about the potential impacts associated with e-waste disposal, questions have arisen regarding the potential danger associated with e-waste recycling—particularly when recycling involves the export of e-waste to developing countries where there are few requirements to protect workers or the environment.
Answering questions about both e-waste disposal and recycling involves a host of challenges. For example, little information is available to allow a complete assessment of how e-waste is ultimately managed. General estimates have been made about the management of cathode ray tubes (CRTs, the only devices where disposal is federally regulated), but little reliable information is available regarding other categories of e-waste. For example, accurate data regarding how much is generated, how it is managed (through disposal or recycling), and where it is processed (domestically or abroad) are largely unknown. Further, little information is available regarding the total amount of functioning electronics exported to developing countries for legitimate reuse.
What is known is that e-waste recycling involves complex processes and it is more costly to recycle e-waste in the United States. It also is known that most consumer electronics manufacturers (who provide the market for material recovery from recycled electronics) have moved overseas. As a result, the majority of e-waste collected for recycling (either for reuse or recycling) appears to be exported for processing.
Although there may be limited data regarding how e-waste is managed, the consequences of export to developing countries that manage it improperly are becoming increasingly evident. In particular, various reports and studies (by the mainstream media, environmental organizations, and university researchers) have found primitive waste management practices in India and various countries in Africa and Asia. Operations in Guiyu in the Shantou region of China have gained particular attention. Observed recycling operations involve burning the plastic coverings of materials to extract metals for scrap, openly burning circuit boards to remove solder or soaking them in acid baths to strip them for gold or other metals. Acid baths are then dumped into surface water. Among other impacts to those areas have been elevated blood lead levels in children and soil and water contaminated with heavy metals.
The impacts associated with e-waste exports have led to concerns from environmental organizations, members of the public, and some Members of Congress. |
crs_R44734 | crs_R44734_0 | T he House of Representatives has several different parliamentary procedures through which it can bring legislation to the chamber floor. Which will be used in a given situation depends on many factors, including the type of measure being considered, its cost, the amount of political or policy controversy surrounding it, and the degree to which Members want to debate it and propose amendments. According to the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress (LIS), in the 114 th Congress (2015-2016), 1,200 pieces of legislation received House floor action. This report provides a statistical snapshot of the forms, origins, and party sponsorship of these measures and of the parliamentary procedures used to bring them to the chamber floor during their initial consideration. Of these, 907 (76%) were bills or joint resolutions, and 293 (24%) were simple or concurrent resolutions. Origin of Measures
Of the 1,200 measures receiving initial House floor action in the 114 th Congress, 1,068 originated in the House, and 132 originated in the Senate. The ratio of majority to minority party sponsorship of measures receiving initial House floor action in the 114 th Congress varied widely based on the parliamentary procedure used to call up the legislation on the House floor. As noted in Table 2 , 69% of the measures considered under the Suspension of the Rules procedure were sponsored by Republicans, 31% by Democrats, and none by political independents. The ratio of party sponsorship on measures initially brought to the floor under the terms of a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House was far wider. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are counted, 78% of bills and joint resolutions receiving floor action in the 114 th Congress came up by Suspension of the Rules. Eighty-nine percent of measures brought up by Suspension of the Rules originated in the House. Procedural resolutions reported by the House Committee on Rules affecting the "rules, joint rules, and the order of business of the House" are themselves privileged for consideration under clause 5 of House Rule XIII. In the 114 th Congress, 172 measures, or 14% of all legislation receiving House floor action, were initially brought before the chamber under the terms of a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and agreed to by the House. As noted above, all but one measure—a Senate bill—brought before the House using this parliamentary mechanism were sponsored by majority party Members. Unanimous Consent
In current practice, legislation is sometimes brought before the House of Representatives for consideration by the unanimous consent of its Members. | The House of Representatives has several different parliamentary procedures through which it can bring legislation to the chamber floor. Which of these will be used in a given situation depends on many factors, including the type of measure being considered, its cost, the amount of political or policy controversy surrounding it, and the degree to which Members want to debate it and propose amendments. This report provides a snapshot of the forms and origins of measures that, according to the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress, received action on the House floor in the 114th Congress (2015-2016) and the parliamentary procedures used to bring them up for initial House consideration.
In the 114th Congress, 1,200 pieces of legislation received floor action in the House of Representatives. Of these, 907 (76%) were bills or joint resolutions, and 293 (24%) were simple or concurrent resolutions. Of these 1,200 measures, 1,068 originated in the House, and 132 originated in the Senate.
During the same period, 62% of all measures receiving initial House floor action came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure, 16% came to the floor as business "privileged" under House rules and precedents, 14% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House, and 7% came up by the unanimous consent of Members. One measure was processed under the procedures associated with clause 2 of Rule XV, the House Discharge Rule.
When only lawmaking forms of legislation (bills and joint resolutions) are counted, 78% of measures receiving initial House floor action in the 114th Congresses came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure, 18% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House, and 5% came up by unanimous consent. No lawmaking forms of legislation received House floor action via the Discharge Rule or by virtue of being "privileged" under House rules.
The party sponsorship of legislation receiving initial floor action in the 114th Congress varied based on the procedure used to raise the legislation on the chamber floor. Sixty-nine percent of the measures considered under the Suspension of the Rules procedure were sponsored by majority party Members. All but one of the 172 measures brought before the House under the terms of a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House were sponsored by majority party Members. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.