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crs_RL31446 | crs_RL31446_0 | In its effort to develop such statements ofgenerality this report will study the work and results of a number of commissions and other similarbodies that have had executive organization and reorganization as part of their mandate. Forpurposes of this report, these reorganization exercises are referred to collectively as "landmarkcommissions." Context for discussion of landmark commissions in the 20th century is provided by a reviewand analysis of six crucial periods in the evolution of the organization of the executive branch ofgovernment:
the Founders and the political theory that informed their organizationaldecisions in 1789;
the interplay of the President and Congress in executive organizationalmanagement during the 19th century;
the Progressive Movement of the 20th century's first decades and its continuinglegacy;
the rise and decline of "orthodoxy" in organizational management of theexecutive branch;
the interregnum period (1972-1992) with its doctrinal heterodoxy;and
the emergence of a New Public Management paradigm and itscritics. The selected landmark commissions of the recently completed century, beginning with theKeep Commission in 1905, are described and analyzed in chronological order. Promoters of NPM ("entrepreneurs") rely on literature, propositions, and practices thatstrive for convergence of the governmental and private sectors. Constitutionalists view the government and private sectors as distinct in character, with thedistinctions founded in law. Keep Commission (1905-1909)
Context. He believed that the true purpose of reorganization wasimproved management.... (265)
National Performance Review (1993-1997) National Partnership for Reinventing Government (1997-2000)(266)
Context. Has the day of the landmark commission passed? The result isincreasing disaggregation in the organization and management of the executive branch. Several generalizations may be useful in concluding this review and analysis of landmarkcommissions and their utility for the future. | This report studies the work and results of a number of 20th century commissions and other similarbodies that have had executive organization and reorganization as central to their mandate. Forpurposes of this report, these reorganization exercises are referred to as "landmark commissions."
Context for discussion of landmark commissions is provided by a review and analysis of sixcrucial historical periods, such as the Progressive Era, in the evolution of the executive branch. Theselected landmark commissions, beginning with the Keep Commission in 1905 and concluding withthe National Performance Review (1993-2000) are described and analyzed in chronological order.
Each commission and its work is founded on philosophical principles of management, someof which are made explicit while others have to be interpreted from texts and actions. The prevailingconsensus on organizational management principles changed considerably during the course of the20th century and these changing principles and assumptions are analyzed.
Highlighted is the current debate over which set of principles should form the basis for futureorganizational design and management in the executive branch. The debate, in its essence, isbetween those believing that the governmental and private sectors are distinctive in theircharacteristics, based on legal theory, and ought to kept separate ("constitutionalists"), and those whobelieve that the governmental and private sectors are essentially alike and ought to be organized andmanaged according to generic principles with an economic foundation ("entrepreneurs").
The report concludes with a discussion of the future, if any, for the landmark commissionapproach to organizational management in the executive branch. |
crs_R40586 | crs_R40586_0 | Overview
A series of elections in Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq may be critical in determining the future direction and success of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. In 2009, as the Obama Administration and Members of the 111 th Congress face the challenges of withdrawing from Iraq, stabilizing Afghanistan, and containing Iran's regional ambitions, election outcomes and new governments could lead to changing regional dynamics that may complicate or advance U.S. interests. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the election process is seen as at least as important as the outcomes. Implications for U.S. Policy
Current U.S. policy in Lebanon focuses on strengthening democratic institutions in an independent Lebanon, and on promoting the control of the government, police, and military over the entire territory of the state. Most analysts agree that a March 8 victory would be a setback for U.S. policy in the Middle East and for Arab states which have worked to counter the influence and reach of Iran and Syria in the region. Implications for U.S. Policy
The Obama Administration is officially neutral in the contest. | The strategic influence of Iran in the Middle East, the stability of Iraq, and the ongoing war in Afghanistan are at the forefront of U.S. policy and Congressional interest in the region. The Obama Administration and many Members of the 111th Congress are making decisions about the U.S. approach to the Middle East at a time when the consequences of recent decisions and events may constrain U.S. options. In 2009, key elections in Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq could reshape regional dynamics and either complicate or advance U.S. policy goals in the Middle East.
This report provides an overview of the election contests in Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq, including possible outcomes and implications for U.S. policy. It will be updated periodically to reflect major developments. For more information, see CRS Report R40054, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44257 | crs_R44257_0 | Introduction
On October 6, 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered a judgment that invalidated the Safe Harbor Agreement between the United States and the 28-member European Union (EU). U.S. and EU officials claim that Privacy Shield will contain significantly stronger privacy protections and oversight mechanisms, multiple redress possibilities, and new safeguards related to U.S. government access to personal data. Many U.S. officials and business leaders hope that the recently concluded (but not yet finalized) U.S.-EU Data Privacy and Protection Agreement (DPPA)—an "umbrella" accord aimed at better protecting personal information exchanged in a law enforcement context—and the newly enacted U.S. Judicial Redress Act ( H.R. 1428 / S. 1600 , P.L. 114-126 )—which extends the core of the judicial redress provisions in the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 to EU citizens—could help ameliorate European concerns about U.S. data protection standards and bolster confidence in the newly proposed Privacy Shield Agreement. Data Privacy and Protection in the EU and the United States
Both the United States and EU assert that they are committed to upholding individual privacy rights and ensuring the protection of personal data, including electronic data. Nevertheless, data privacy and data protection issues have long been sticking points in U.S.-EU economic and security relations, in large part due to fundamental differences between the United States and EU in their approaches to data protection and data privacy laws. The U.S. As noted by U.S. They worried that these differences in approach could negatively affect many businesses and industries on both sides of the Atlantic, and potentially impact the U.S.-EU trade and investment relationship. Security. Access . Some 4,500 companies were on the Safe Harbor list. Notably, this included U.S. financial firms and telecommunications carriers. The New EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Agreement
U.S.-EU discussions on revising and updating the Safe Harbor Agreement began in late 2013 in response to growing European concerns about the NSA surveillance programs and subsequent allegations of other U.S. intelligence collection operations in Europe. The European Commission agreed, however, that there were a number of weaknesses in the Safe Harbor scheme. On February 2, 2016, two days after the January 31 deadline established by the Article 29 Working Group, U.S. and EU officials announced their agreement, "in principle," on a replacement to Safe Harbor—the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, which if approved by the European Commission, would allow companies to continue to transfer EU citizen's personal data to the United States while complying with the requirements outlined by the CJEU when it declared Safe Harbor invalid in October 2015. On February 29, 2016, U.S. and EU officials released the full text of the agreement and supporting documentation. Many U.S. officials and industry leaders hope that recent Congressional efforts to provide a limited right of judicial redress to EU citizens—undertaken initially to help conclude a separate U.S.-EU umbrella accord for law enforcement, known as the Data Privacy and Protection Agreement (DPPA) —could help ease at least some European concerns about U.S. data protection standards and the new Privacy Shield agreement as well. Many U.S. officials and industry leaders view the Judicial Redress Act as a concrete indication of the U.S. commitment to addressing EU data protection concerns and hope that it will help boost confidence in U.S. data protection standards and the new Privacy Shield accord. As noted above, Safe Harbor was one of several mechanisms used as a legal basis for U.S.-EU data transfers. Issues for Congress
The CJEU's invalidation of Safe Harbor and the newly proposed EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Agreement raise issues for Members of Congress. U.S. Acceptability of Alternative Data Transfer Arrangements . Some analysts contend that the sweeping nature of the CJEU's decision could have implications for other U.S.-EU data-sharing arrangements, especially in the law enforcement field. | Both the United States and the European Union (EU) maintain that they are committed to upholding individual privacy rights and ensuring the protection of personal data. Nevertheless, data privacy and protection issues have long been sticking points in U.S.-EU economic and security relations, in part because of differences in U.S. and EU data privacy approaches and legal regimes. In the late 1990s, the United States and the EU negotiated the Safe Harbor Agreement of 2000 to allow U.S. companies and organizations to meet EU data protection requirements and permit the legal transfer of personal data between EU member countries and the United States.
The unauthorized disclosures in June 2013 of U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance programs and subsequent allegations of other U.S. intelligence activities in Europe renewed and exacerbated European concerns about U.S. data privacy and protection standards. The alleged involvement of some U.S. Internet and telecommunications companies in the NSA programs also elevated European worries about how U.S. technology firms use personal data and the extent of U.S. government access to such data. As a result, a number of U.S.-EU data-sharing accords in both the commercial and law enforcement sectors have come under intense scrutiny in Europe.
In October 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, which is also known as the European Court of Justice, or ECJ) invalidated the Safe Harbor Agreement. The CJEU essentially found that Safe Harbor failed to meet EU data protection standards, in large part because of the U.S. surveillance programs. Given that some 4,500 U.S. companies were using Safe Harbor to legitimize transatlantic data transfers, U.S. officials and business leaders were deeply dismayed by the CJEU's ruling. Companies that had been using Safe Harbor as the legal basis for U.S.-EU data transfers were required to immediately implement alternative measures. Experts claimed that the CJEU decision created legal uncertainty for many U.S. companies and feared that it could negatively impact U.S.-EU trade and investment ties.
On February 2, 2016, U.S. and EU officials announced an agreement, "in principle," on a revised Safe Harbor accord, to be known as Privacy Shield; the full text of the agreement was released on February 29, 2016. U.S. and EU officials assert that the new accord will address the CJEU's concerns. In particular, they stress that it contains significantly stronger privacy protections as well as safeguards related to U.S. government access to personal data.
Some analysts question, however, whether Privacy Shield will sufficiently address the broader issues about the U.S. data protection framework raised by the CJEU decision, and thus be able to withstand future legal challenges. Many U.S. policymakers and trade groups hope that the recently concluded U.S.-EU "umbrella" Data Privacy and Protection Agreement (DPPA)—which seeks to better protect personal information exchanged in a law enforcement context—and the newly enacted U.S. Judicial Redress Act (H.R. 1428 / S. 1600, P.L. 114-126)—which extends the core of the judicial redress provisions in the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 to EU citizens—could help ease at least some concerns about U.S. data protection standards and boost confidence in Privacy Shield.
This report provides background on U.S. and EU data protection policies and the Safe Harbor Agreement, discusses the CJEU ruling, and reviews the key elements of the newly-proposed Privacy Shield. It also explores various issues for Congress, including implications for U.S. firms of Safe Harbor's invalidation and the role of the Judicial Redress Act in helping to ameliorate U.S.-EU tensions on data privacy and protection issues. |
crs_RL32905 | crs_RL32905_0 | 109-148 ), which included a one percent across-the-board rescission of non-emergency federal discretionary funding for FY2006. This bill also provided supplemental funding to several federal agencies to respond to the consequences of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, including $2.8 billion for the Department of Transportation, $11.9 billion for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, $38 million for the General Services Administration, and $18 million for the Judiciary. 109-115 ). The bill was passed by Congress on November 18. The bill provided $137.6 billion in net budgetary resources, less than either the House or Senate versions, but $4.1 billion (3.0%) more than the FY2005 enacted level and $7.3 billion (5.6%) more than the Administration requested. The Senate bill includes provisions that would restrict outsourcing of federal work and ease restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba. This was $1.6 billion (1%) below the FY2005 enacted level of $127.7 billion (after a 0.83% rescission). The House-passed version of H.R. 3058 , the FY2006 Departments of Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, The Judiciary, District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations bill, provided $140.0 billion, $6.5 billion (5%) over comparable FY2005 enacted levels and $9.7 billion (7%) over the Administration's request. The Senate-passed version of H.R. Conferees did not include provisions passed by both chambers easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba, which had elicited veto threats from the Administration. Conferees added language prohibiting the use of funds in this bill for projects using eminent domain to acquire land for projects that primarily benefit private entities. New Appropriations Subcommittee Structure
In early 2005, the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations reorganized their subcommittee structures. As a result, the area of coverage of the House and Senate subcommittees with jurisdiction over this appropriations bill are almost, but not quite, identical; the major difference being that in the Senate the appropriations for the District of Columbia originate in a separate bill. The Administration's proposal received bipartisan criticism in both the House and the Senate. The House supported the Committee's recommendations. 3058 passed Congress on November 18, 2005, and was signed into law on November 30, 2005 ( P.L. 3058 did not include funding for the program. The conference version of H.R. The FY2006 Defense appropriations bill ( P.L. Title V: Executive Office of the President and Funds Appropriated to the President
Executive Office of the President Budget and Key Policy Issues
All but three offices in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) are funded in the same appropriations act entitled the Departments of Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies. | At the beginning of the 109th Congress, both the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations reorganized their subcommittee structure, affecting the coverage of the FY2006 appropriations bills. As a result, the appropriations subcommittees that previously oversaw the Departments of Transportation and the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President, and Independent Agencies now also oversee the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, and (in the case of the House, but not the Senate) the District of Columbia.
The Bush Administration requested $126.1 billion for these agencies for FY2006, a slight decrease from the comparable figure of $127.7 billion for FY2005 (after a 0.83% across-the-board rescission that was included in the FY2005 Omnibus Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-447).
The House-passed version of H.R. 3058, the FY2006 Departments of Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, The Judiciary, District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies appropriations bill, provided $140.0 billion for FY2006, $6.5 billion (5%) over comparable FY2005 enacted levels and $9.7 billion (7%) over the Administration's request. The House did not support most of the Administration's requested changes, while providing significant increases for aviation, highway and transit programs, Amtrak, rental subsidies for the poor, and housing for Native Americans.
The Senate-passed version of H.R. 3058 provided $142.0 billion. The Senate Committee also did not support most of the Administration's requested changes, while also providing significant increases for several programs. The bill included provisions that would restrict outsourcing of federal work and ease restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.
The conference version of H.R. 3058 was passed by Congress on November 18, 2005; the President signed the bill into law on November 30, 2005 (P.L. 109-115). The bill provided $137.6 billion in net budgetary resources, less than either the House or Senate versions, but $4.1 billion (3%) more than the FY2005 enacted level and $7.3 billion (6%) more than the Administration requested. Conferees did not include provisions passed by both chambers easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba. Conferees added language prohibiting the use of funds in this bill for projects using eminent domain to acquire land for private development. In a subsequent bill, Congress enacted a one percent across-the-board rescission of non-emergency FY2006 discretionary funding, and provided almost $15 billion in supplemental funding to the Departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, and the General Services Administration to respond to the consequences of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33490 | crs_RL33490_0 | Status of Vietnam PNTR Legislation
On December 8, 2006, the House passed legislation (212-184) to grant Vietnam permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status as part of a more comprehensive trade bill ( H.R. Pursuant to H.Res. 1100 , the bill was then coupled with a tax-extension bill ( H.R. 6111 ) and sent to the Senate. The Senate passed the combined bills (79-9) on December 8. 109-432 ) and, per the law, proclaimed PNTR for Vietnam on December 29, 2006. Congress' Role
The U.S. Congress has had no direct role in Vietnam's accession to the WTO. The agreement itself does not establish any new obligations on the part of the United States, only on the part of Vietnam. However, Vietnam's accession to the WTO will require the United States and Vietnam to adhere to WTO rules in their bilateral trade relations, including not imposing unilateral measures, such as quotas on textile imports, that have not been sanctioned by the WTO. As has been the case with U.S. trade relations with most of the other communist and former communist states, U.S. trade relations with Vietnam had been governed by Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, which includes the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment (section 402). Title IV prohibits the President from granting those countries most-favored-nation (MFN), called normal trade relations (NTR) in U.S. law, unless the country has met certain conditions. However, the WTO requires its members to extend unconditional MFN (permanent NTR (PNTR)) in order to receive the benefits of WTO membership in their bilateral trade relations. During the congressional debate on PNTR Members raised issues regarding the conditions for Vietnam's entry into the WTO and other issues pertaining to the U.S.-Vietnam economic relationship; in particular, the impact of increased imports from Vietnam on the U.S. textile and apparel industry. It affords Vietnam the protection of the multilateral system of rules in its trade relations with other WTO members, including the United States. PNTR from the United States provides more predictability to Vietnam's growing trade relations with the United States and sheds a legacy of the cold war. For the United States, PNTR is another in a series of steps the United States has taken in trade and foreign policy to normalize relations with Vietnam and place distance between current relations and the Vietnam War. Vietnam's accession to the WTO could help the United States manage its trading relationship with Vietnam in that Vietnam would be obligated to WTO rules thus providing some discipline in the relationship. On December 20, 2006, President Bush signed the bill into law ( P.L. | On December 8, 2006, the House passed legislation (212-184) to grant Vietnam permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status as part of a more comprehensive trade bill (H.R. 6406). Pursuant to H.Res. 1100, the bill was then coupled with a tax-extension bill (H.R. 6111) and sent to the Senate. The Senate passed the combined bills on December 8 (79-9). On December 20, 2006, President Bush signed the bill into law (P.L. 109-432) and, per the law, proclaimed PNTR for Vietnam on December 29, 2006.
Congress considered PNTR in the context of Vietnam's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which Vietnam joined in January 2007. Although Congress had no direct role in Vietnam's accession to the WTO, congressional approval was necessary for the President to extend PNTR to Vietnam. The WTO requires its members to extend unconditional most-favored-nation status (MFN), called PNTR in the United States, in order to receive the full benefits of WTO membership in their bilateral trade relations. Until PNTR was granted, the United States had extended conditional NTR treatment to Vietnam under Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, which includes the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment (section 402). Title IV prohibits the President from granting certain countries permanent NTR unless the country has met certain conditions.
Vietnam's entry into the WTO does not establish any new obligations on the part of the United States, only on the part of Vietnam. However, Vietnam's WTO accession requires the United States and Vietnam to adhere to WTO rules in their bilateral trade relations, including not imposing unilateral measures, such as quotas on textile imports, that have not been sanctioned by the WTO. Accession to the WTO affords Vietnam the protection of the multilateral system of rules in its trade relations with other WTO members, including the United States. It could help the United States in that Vietnam would be obligated to apply WTO rules in its trade. PNTR status from the United States provides Vietnam more predictability its growing trade relations with the United States and sheds a legacy of the cold war. For the United States, PNTR is another in a series of steps the United States has taken in trade and foreign policy to normalize relations with Vietnam and place distance between current relations and the Vietnam War.
During the congressional debate on PNTR, Members raised issues regarding the conditions for Vietnam's entry into the WTO, other issues pertaining to the U.S.-Vietnam economic relationship, and other aspects of the overall U.S.-Vietnam relationship. |
crs_RL33245 | crs_RL33245_0 | Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Officials
A provision in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 provides for an annual salary adjustment for leaders and Members of the Senate and House of Representatives, the Vice President, individuals in positions on the Executive Schedule (EX), and federal justices and judges. The adjustment is based on the percentage change in the wages and salaries (not seasonally adjusted) for the private industry workers element of the Employment Cost Index (ECI), minus 0.5% (December indicator). While this provision of the Ethics Reform Act sets the rate of the judicial pay adjustment, a 1981 law provides that any salary increase for justices and judges must be "specifically authorized by Act of Congress hereafter enacted." The legislative, executive, and judicial officials are all hereafter referred to as federal officials in this report. Federal officials did not receive a pay adjustment ( P.L. Federal officials did not receive a pay adjustment ( P.L. 111-165 denied the Members a pay adjustment in 2011. The Vice President, federal officials paid on the EX schedule, and justices and judges also did not receive a pay adjustment in January 2011 because GS base pay was not adjusted (Title I, Section 1(a)(2) of P.L. 2012
Projected adjustment would have been 1.3%. This adjustment would have been limited to 1.1%, the January 2012 base pay adjustment required under the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 for federal civilian white-collar employees paid under the GS. GS base pay is frozen through December 31, 2012, so Members of Congress, the Vice President, federal officials paid on the EX schedule, and justices and judges will not receive a pay adjustment in January 2012 (Title I, Section 1(a)(2) of P.L. 111-322 , December 22, 2010). Senior Executive Service and Certain Senior-Level Positions
Maximum basic pay rates for members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and certain senior-level positions are tied to the Executive Schedule. SL and ST employees no longer receive locality pay. EX pay rates provide limitations on GS pay. | Leaders and Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Vice President, individuals in positions on the Executive Schedule (EX), and federal justices and judges—all hereafter referred to as federal officials—are to receive an annual pay adjustment under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, P.L. 101-194 (103 Stat. 1716, at 1769, 5 U.S.C. §5318 note). The percentage change in the wages and salaries for the private industry workers element of the Employment Cost Index (ECI), minus 0.5% (December indicator), provides the basis for the pay adjustment. In January 2011, the Vice President and federal officials paid on the EX schedule did not receive a salary increase. Members of Congress also did not receive a pay adjustment in January 2011; P.L. 111-165, enacted on May 14, 2010, denied the adjustment. Federal justices and judges, likewise, did not receive a January 2011 pay adjustment. Section 140 of P.L. 97-92, enacted on December 15, 1981, provides that any salary increase for justices and judges must be specifically authorized by Congress, and this authorization was not provided for 2011.
The pay adjustment for federal officials required under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 would have been 1.3% in January 2012. This adjustment would have been limited to 1.1%, the January 2012 base pay adjustment required under the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 for federal civilian white-collar employees paid under the GS. Under Title I, Section 1(a)(2) of P.L. 111-322, enacted on December 22, 2010, GS base pay is frozen through December 31, 2012, so Members of Congress, the Vice President, federal officials paid on the EX schedule, and justices and judges will not receive a pay adjustment in January 2012.
EX pay rates provide limitations on maximum basic pay rates for members of the Senior Executive Service (SES), employees in senior-level (SL) and scientific and professional (ST) positions, and on basic pay, basic pay and locality pay combined, and total compensation for employees in General Schedule positions.
This report will be updated as events dictate. |
crs_R41046 | crs_R41046_0 | This report concentrates on multifamily and commercial mortgages. It examines policy concerns over the future of multifamily finance and commercial and multifamily mortgage losses in the aftermath of the December 2007-June 2009 recession. Current Concerns and Legislation
As financial markets continue to recover from the December 2007-June 2009 recession, congressional interest has turned from concerns about the impact of losses in multifamily and commercial mortgages on financial stability to reforming the single-family and multifamily mortgage markets. One key issue under debate is the question of what the federal government's role should be in residential mortgage markets, including multifamily housing. Bills in both the House and Senate would wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two congressionally chartered government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), which were created to support the market for single-family and multifamily mortgages. By law, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are limited to purchasing existing single-family and multifamily mortgages that others have originated. In the House, H.R. 2767 , the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners (PATH) Act of 2013, proposes to wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac over a period of years. The bill makes no mention of the GSEs' multifamily lending. In the Senate, S. 1217 , the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2013 (Corker-Warner), proposes to wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and to replace the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) with a new entity to be called the Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation (FMIC). These MBS would have an explicit full-faith-and-credit federal government guarantee, and the FMIC would regulate aspects of the mortgage market related to these MBS. The risk to the government from all mortgages has decreased as the economy has recovered. The government has provided explicit full faith and credit guarantees to the FDIC, FHA, and others. The federal government has implicitly backed Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's guarantees to purchasers of MBS. Treasury has invested more than $187 billion in the two GSEs to keep them solvent. The largest holder of commercial mortgages and multifamily mortgages, providing 54.7% of commercial mortgages and 30.0% of multifamily mortgages, is U.S.-chartered depositories, which experienced severe financial distress during the recession. | As the recovery from the recession of December 2007-June 2009 continues, congressional interest in multifamily and commercial mortgages has shifted from worries about the immediate impact of foreclosures to consideration of the future of mortgage finance. During the recession, losses on mortgages raised concerns about the risk to tax payers through Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance, which is backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government. Significant parts of these losses occurred due to commercial loans at smaller insured depositories. The federal government has invested more than $187 billion in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which guarantee single-family and multifamily mortgages. Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not have explicit full faith and credit backing from the federal government, they do have a legal agreement that would provide additional government funds, if needed.
Congressional interest in mortgage reform, including multifamily mortgages, is reflected in several bills that have been introduced. In the House, only H.R. 2767, the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 2013 (PATH Act), has been ordered to be reported by the Financial Services Committee. In the Senate, hearings have been held on S. 1217, commonly referred to as the Corker-Warner bill. Both would wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which have been key sources of multifamily finance. (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are prohibited by their congressional charters from activities not directly related to single-family and multifamily mortgages and have not been involved in commercial lending.) The PATH Act makes no mention of multifamily housing finance. Corker-Warner would create a new entity, the Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation (FMIC), which would take over Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's role in multifamily finance.
The PATH Act would greatly reduce the government's role in the mortgage system whereas the Corker-Warner bill would reshape the government's role.
This report is an overview of multifamily and commercial mortgage issues that may be of interest to Congress. It compares multifamily and commercial mortgages to the more familiar single-family mortgages. For an analysis of legislation, see CRS Report R43219, Selected Legislative Proposals to Reform the Housing Finance System, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL30387 | crs_RL30387_0 | Introduction
Federal employees participate in one of two retirement systems. The Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) was established in 1920 and covers only employees hired before 1984. Participants in the CSRS do not pay Social Security payroll taxes and they do not earn Social Security benefits. For a worker retiring after 30 years of federal service, a CSRS annuity will be equal to 56.25% of the average of his or her highest three consecutive years of basic pay. Because the Social Security trust funds needed additional cash contributions to remain solvent, the Social Security Amendments of 1983 ( P.L. 98-21 ) required federal employees hired after 1983 to participate in Social Security. To coordinate federal pension benefits with Social Security, Congress directed the development of a new retirement system for federal employees hired after 1983. The result was the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) Act of 1986 ( P.L. 99-335 ). Calculating the FERS Basic Retirement Annuity
The FERS basic retirement annuity is a defined benefit (DB) pension. The amount of the pension benefit is determined by multiplying three factors—the employee's number of years of service, the annual benefit accrual rate, and the salary base—as is shown in the following formula:
Pension A mount = Years of Service × Accrual Rate × S alary Base
Salary Base
In both CSRS and FERS, the salary base is the average of the employee's three highest consecutive years of basic pay, sometimes called "high-three pay." Under FERS, retirement benefits accrue at the rate of 1.0% per year. The FERS supplement is paid until the age of 62 to workers who retire at the minimum retirement age (currently 56) or older with at least 30 years of service, or at the age of 60 with at least 20 years of service. The Thrift Savings Plan
The Thrift Savings Plan is a defined contribution (DC) retirement plan similar to the 401(k) plans provided by many employers in the private sector. In 2015, employees can contribute up to $18,000 to the TSP. Employees aged 50 and older can contribute an additional $6,000. In addition, contributions of up to 5% of pay made by employees under FERS are matched by the federal government according to the schedule shown in Table 2 . Federal workers covered by CSRS also may contribute to the TSP, but they receive no matching contributions from their employing agencies. Assuming a rate of return on investment of 8.0%, employees who contribute 10% of pay over a 30-year career can replace 47.0% of their final pay from the TSP. Additional Income Replacement from Social Security and the FERS Annuity
The TSP was designed to supplement retirement income from the FERS annuity as well as Social Security. For a federal employee who begins his or her career in 2015 and retires at the age of 62 after 30 years of service, the FERS basic annuity will provide first-year retirement income equal to 31.7% of the worker's final annual salary. The percentage of earnings replaced by Social Security is greater for low-wage workers than for high-wage workers. 111-31 :
provides for newly hired federal employees to be enrolled automatically in the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) at a default contribution rate of 3% of pay; requires the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board to establish within the TSP a qualified Roth contribution program that provides for after-tax contributions and tax-free distributions; gives the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board authority to allow TSP participants to invest in mutual funds in addition to the five investment funds now included in the TSP; requires the Thrift Board to submit to Congress an annual report that includes demographic information about TSP participants and fund managers; requires participants to sign an acknowledgement of risk if they invest contributions in any investment option other than government securities; grants the executive director of the TSP authority to issue subpoenas under certain circumstances; allows funds held in an individual's TSP account to be subject to court orders with respect to payment of restitution to victims of certain crimes; requires the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress the estimated cost of an agency match on contributions to the TSP by members of the uniformed services; and allows the surviving spouse of a deceased TSP participant to maintain the decedent's account with the TSP. | Federal employees participate in one of two retirement systems. The Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) was established in 1920 and covers only employees hired before 1984. Participants in the CSRS do not pay Social Security payroll taxes and they do not earn Social Security benefits. For a worker retiring after 30 years of federal service, a CSRS annuity will be equal to 56.25% of the average of his or her highest three consecutive years of basic pay.
The Social Security Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21) required federal employees hired after 1983 to participate in Social Security. Because the CSRS was not designed to coordinate with Social Security, Congress directed the development of a new retirement plan for federal workers hired after 1983. The result was the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-335). The FERS has three elements: (1) Social Security, (2) the FERS basic retirement annuity and FERS supplement, and (3) the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP).
The amount of the FERS basic retirement annuity is determined by three factors: (1) the salary base, (2) the accrual rate, and (3) years of service. The salary base is the average of the worker's highest three consecutive years of pay. Under FERS, the benefit accrual rate is 1.0% per year of service, or 1.1% for workers retiring at the age of 62 or later with 20 or more years of service. A worker with 30 years of service retiring at the age of 62 will receive a FERS pension equal to 33% of the average of his or her highest three consecutive years of pay, or about 32% of final annual salary.
The TSP is a defined contribution retirement plan similar to the 401(k) plans provided by many employers in the private sector. The income that a retired worker receives from the TSP will depend on the balance in his or her account. In 2015, employees covered by FERS or CSRS can contribute up to $18,000 to the TSP. Employees aged 50 or older can contribute an additional $6,000. Contributions of up to 5% of pay made by workers under FERS are matched by the federal government. Workers covered by CSRS can contribute to the TSP, but they receive no matching contributions.
The TSP is a key element of the FERS, especially for workers at the upper ranges of the federal pay scale. The Social Security benefit formula is designed to replace a greater share of income for low-wage workers than for high-wage workers. The FERS basic annuity will replace about 32% of final salary for an employee retiring at the age of 62 with 30 years of service. Higher-wage federal workers need to contribute a greater percentage of pay to the TSP to reach the same level of income replacement as lower-paid workers can achieve from just the FERS retirement annuity and Social Security. At an annual rate of return of 6.0%, income from the TSP can replace about 33% of final pay for a federal employee who contributes 10% of pay over 30 years. |
crs_R42150 | crs_R42150_0 | Introduction
Although "too big to fail" (TBTF) has been a perennial policy issue, it was highlighted by the near-collapse of several large financial firms in 2008. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (government-sponsored enterprises) entered government conservatorship and were kept solvent with government funds. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) arranged for Wachovia (a commercial bank) and Washington Mutual (a thrift) to be acquired by other banks without government financial assistance. Systemic risk mitigation, including eliminating the TBTF problem, was a major goal of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter, the Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. Different parts of this legislation jointly address the "too big to fail" problem through requirements for enhanced regulation for safety and soundness for "systemically important" (also called "systemically significant") financial institutions (SIFIs), limits on size and the types of activities a firm can engage in (including proprietary trading and hedge fund sponsorship), and the creation of a new receivership regime for resolving failing non-banks that pose systemic risk. In addition, Basel III, an international agreement, placed heightened requirements on the largest banks. Title IV of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act ( P.L. By international standards, U.S. banks are not that large, however. Moral hazard refers to the theory that if TBTF firms expect that failure will be prevented, they have an incentive to take greater risks than they otherwise would because they are shielded from at least some negative consequences of those risks. Creditors, account holders, and counterparties have generally been shielded from any losses. Do TBTF Firms Enjoy a Funding Advantage or Implicit Subsidy? Policy options for TBTF can be categorized as preventive (how to prevent TBTF firms from either emerging or posing systemic risk) or reactive (how to contain the fallout when a TBTF firm experiences a crisis). A comprehensive policy is likely to incorporate more than one approach because different approaches are aimed at different parts of the problem. These authorities were also used to create broadly based emergency programs. 115-174 , allows the Federal Reserve to prevent mergers and acquisitions, restrict the products a firm is allowed to offer, terminate activities, and sell assets if the Federal Reserve and at least two-thirds of FSOC believe that a firm that has more than $250 billion in assets poses a "grave threat to the financial stability of the United States." Prudential regulation, such as capital requirements, could be set to hold TBTF firms to higher standards than other financial firms, whether or not those firms are already subject to prudential regulation. FSOC has designated three insurers (AIG, Metlife, and Prudential Financial) and one other firm (GE Capital) as systemically important, and therefore subject to heightened prudential regulation, but only Prudential Financial's designation remains in place. As a result, FSOC rescinded GE Capital's designation on June 28, 2016. 115-174 raised the $50 billion threshold to $250 billion in assets, but granted the Fed discretion to apply individual enhanced prudential provisions to individual BHCs with assets between $100 billion and $250 billion if it would promote financial stability or the institution's safety and soundness. To date, this has happened once. The Dodd-Frank Act addresses this issue by designating financial market utilities for enhanced prudential regulation and emergency access to Fed lending, but critics argue that designation causes moral hazard by creating expectations that they will be rescued. Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act created the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), a resolution regime for any financial firm whose failure would have "serious adverse effects on financial stability." Policy before the financial crisis could be characterized as an implicit market discipline approach with ambiguity about which firms policymakers considered to be TBTF and how the imminent failure of a systemically important firm might be addressed. Examples of Dodd-Frank Act provisions intended to reduce contagion effects include a special resolution regime for failing systemically important firms (OLA) and placing limits on counterparty exposure to large firms. Some policy approaches are complementary—others could undermine each other. Some take the fact that many of the largest financial firms have become larger since the crisis (at least in dollar terms) as a sign that the TBTF problem has not been solved. 115-174
Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act imposed a number of enhanced prudential regulatory requirements on bank holding companies and foreign banks operating in the United States with over $50 billion in assets, and non-banks designated as systemically important financial institutions (described in the section above entitled " Regulating TBTF "). | Although "too big to fail" (TBTF) has been a long-standing policy issue, it was highlighted by the financial crisis, when the government intervened to prevent the near-collapse of several large financial firms in 2008. Financial firms are said to be TBTF when policymakers judge that their failure would cause unacceptable disruptions to the overall financial system. They can be TBTF because of their size or interconnectedness. In addition to fairness issues, economic theory suggests that expectations that a firm will not be allowed to fail create moral hazard—if the creditors and counterparties of a TBTF firm believe that the government will protect them from losses, they have less incentive to monitor the firm's riskiness because they are shielded from the negative consequences of those risks. If so, TBTF firms could have a funding advantage compared with other banks, which some call an implicit subsidy.
There are a number of policy approaches—some complementary, some conflicting—to coping with the TBTF problem, including providing government assistance to prevent TBTF firms from failing or systemic risk from spreading; enforcing "market discipline" to ensure that investors, creditors, and counterparties curb excessive risk-taking at TBTF firms; enhancing regulation to hold TBTF firms to stricter prudential standards than other financial firms; curbing firms' size and scope, by preventing mergers or compelling firms to divest assets, for example; minimizing spillover effects by limiting counterparty exposure; and instituting a special resolution regime for failing systemically important firms. A comprehensive policy is likely to incorporate more than one approach, as some approaches are aimed at preventing failures and some at containing fallout when a failure occurs.
Parts of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) address each of these policy approaches. For example, it created an enhanced prudential regulatory regime administered by the Federal Reserve for non-bank financial firms designated as "systemically important" (SIFIs) by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and banks with more than $50 billion in assets. The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 115-174) raised this threshold to $250 billion in assets, but gave the Federal Reserve discretion to apply individual provisions as needed to banks between $100 billion and $250 billion in assets. Thirteen U.S. bank holding companies and a larger number of foreign banks have more than $250 billion in assets, and FSOC designated three insurers (AIG, MetLife, and Prudential Financial) and GE Capital as systemically important. MetLife's designation was subsequently rescinded by a court decision, and AIG's and GE Capital's designations were rescinded by FSOC. A handful of the largest banks face additional capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements stemming from Basel III, an international agreement. The Dodd-Frank Act also allowed FSOC to designate payment, clearing, and settlement systems as systemically important "financial market utilities" (FMUs) that are subject to enhanced prudential regulation.
The Dodd-Frank Act also created the "orderly liquidation authority" (OLA), a special resolution regime administered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to take into receivership failing firms that pose a threat to financial stability. This regime has not been used to date, and has some similarities to how the FDIC resolves failing banks. Statutory authority used to prevent financial firms from failing during the crisis has either expired or been narrowed by the Dodd-Frank Act.
The fact that most large firms have grown in dollar terms since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act has led some critics to question whether the TBTF problem has been solved and propose more far-reaching solutions, such as repealing parts of the Dodd-Frank Act, breaking up the largest banks, or restoring Glass-Steagall. Others argue that systemic risk regulation should focus on risky financial activities, regardless of firm size. (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain in government conservatorship and have not been addressed by legislation to date.) |
crs_R42841 | crs_R42841_0 | Introduction
Under its civil works program, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) plans, builds, operates, and maintains a wide range of water resource facilities. Of this total, Congress provided $31.4 billion from 2005 to 2016, which was significant relative to the agency's regular (i.e., nonsupplemental) annual discretionary appropriations over that period (approximately $63.8 billion for FY2005 through FY2016). If supplemental bills provide funds to the Corps, they most frequently fund two accounts: Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies (FCCE; i.e., flood fighting, repairs to damaged nonfederal flood-control projects) and Operations and Maintenance (O&M; i.e., repairs to existing Corps projects). In some instances, principally since 2005, Congress also has provided supplemental funding for other Corps accounts, such as the Mississippi River and Tributaries (MR&T) account and the Construction account. Of the supplemental funds that Congress provided to the Corps for Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, 31% and 66%, respectively, were for construction activities. In the wake of major flooding and other natural disasters, Congress often considers whether to provide supplemental appropriations to the Corps and other agencies. Proponents of providing supplemental funding for the Corps argue that these investments are significant for recovery efforts and improve flood resilience of the affected areas. Other stakeholders would prefer more attention and funding that supports other programs and measures to reduce the nation's flood risks. 4667 —Further Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements, 2017 (as passed by the House). It also discusses common issues that policymakers consider in deliberating on these supplemental appropriations bills. H.R. Like most supplemental appropriation bills with direct appropriations for the Corps, the bill would fund the agency's emergency response activities and repair of damage to flood-control works and other Corps civil works projects (e.g., navigation); these response and repair activities would be funded as follows: $537 million for natural disasters through the FCCE account, $608 million for natural disaster-related repairs through the O&M account, $370 million for natural disasters through the MR&T account, and $55 million for natural disaster-related repairs to Corps construction projects through the Construction account. H.R. For comparison, Congress directed 31% and 65% of the Corps supplemental funding for Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy to Corps construction of flood-risk reduction projects. 4667 would provide the Secretary of the Army authority to use funds from the bill to initiate construction on projects that have completed the agency's multistep project development process without obtaining project-specific congressional construction authorization, subject to approval by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Over the decade from FY2008 to FY2017, discretionary appropriations for Corps flood-related construction activities averaged $907 million annually; total funding for the decade was $9.1 billion. For supplemental appropriations related to Hurricane Sandy, cost-sharing requirements were waived for ongoing construction projects but not for new construction. H.R. Concluding Remarks
The 115 th Congress is considering possible responses to various natural disasters in 2017. In recent years through supplemental appropriations, Congress not only has funded the emergency response and repair activities of the Corps but also has provided the Corps with funding to study and construct projects that reduce flood risks in areas recently affected by some hurricanes and floods. H.R. 4667 proposes $12.09 billion for the agency's activities associated with response, repair, and recovery from natural disasters including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria; of the $12.09 billion total, $10.425 billion would be for new construction of Corps flood-risk reduction projects in areas affected by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. These include the role of Congress in the authorization of construction of Corps projects that receive supplemental funds, whether to maintain requirements for nonfederal cost sharing, and what requirements to include regarding reporting to Congress and public transparency associated with supplemental funds. Supplemental Corps funding debates also raise broader questions for policymakers, such as the effectiveness and efficiency of processes such as those for postdisaster supplemental appropriations and Corps annual budget development, especially in regard to identifying and supporting priority investments in reducing the nation's flood risk. | Congress directs the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to plan and build water resource facilities through the agency's civil works program. The Corps also has a prominent role in responding to natural disasters, especially floods, in U.S. states and territories. In recent years through supplemental appropriations, Congress also has funded the agency to study and construct projects that reduce flood risks in areas recently affected by some hurricanes and floods. The 115th Congress is considering possible responses to various natural disasters in 2017. H.R. 4667—Further Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements, 2017 (as passed by the House)—proposes $12.09 billion for the agency's activities associated with response, repair, and recovery from natural disasters including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.
Policy Considerations. A common issue for Congress after a flood-related disaster is whether to provide supplemental funds directly to the Corps and, if so, how much and for which Corps activities. During its deliberations on recent supplemental appropriations bills, Congress also has considered whether to maintain requirements for nonfederal cost sharing, what requirements to include regarding reporting to Congress and public transparency associated with supplemental funds, and what type of flood damage-reduction efforts to support (e.g., repair of existing infrastructure, construction of new infrastructure). Supplemental Corps funding debates also may raise broader questions for policymakers. These include, for example, the effectiveness and efficiency of processes such as those for postdisaster supplemental appropriations and Corps annual budget development, especially in regard to identifying and supporting priority investments in reducing the nation's flood risk. Supporters of supplemental appropriations for the construction of Corps flood-risk reduction projects in natural disaster-affected areas view these projects as part of the broader recovery effort and as means to improve flood resilience of the affected areas. Other stakeholders would prefer more attention and funding that supports other programs and measures to reduce the nation's flood risks.
Supplemental Funds. From 2005 to 2016, Congress appropriated $31.4 billion in supplemental funding to the Corps; these funds amounted to almost half of the agency's annual discretionary appropriations over that same period. Of the $31.4 billion, $27.2 billion (87%) was for responding to flooding and other natural disasters. The majority of this funding related to Hurricane Katrina and other 2005 storms (approximately $16 billion) and to Hurricane Sandy in 2012 ($5.3 billion).
Supplemental bills most frequently fund two Corps accounts: Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies (FCCE; i.e., flood fighting, repairs to damaged nonfederal flood-control projects) and Operations and Maintenance (O&M; i.e., repairs to existing Corps projects). In some instances, principally since 2005, Congress also has provided supplemental funding for other Corps accounts, such as the Construction account. Of the supplemental funds that Congress provided to the Corps for Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, 31% and 66%, respectively, were for construction activities. Of the $12.1 billion that H.R. 4667 would provide, $10.48 billion would be for activities in the agency's Construction account—$55 million for repairs to Corps construction projects damaged by natural disasters, and $10.425 billion for expedited construction of flood control and storm damage reduction projects in areas affected by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. That is, 86% of the funding for the Corps in H.R. 4667 would be for construction. For comparison, that amount would exceed the agency's $9.1 billion total discretionary spending appropriations for flood-related construction for the decade FY2008 to FY2017.
Conditions Applicable to Supplemental Funds. In supplemental appropriations bills, Congress has at times maintained, and at other times waived, local cost-sharing requirements for Corps flood-risk reduction construction projects. The standard nonfederal cost shares range from 35% to 50%, depending on the activity. H.R. 4667 would waive the nonfederal cost share for studies and ongoing construction funded through the bill. The bill also would provide the Secretary of the Army with the authority to use funds from the bill, subject to approval by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, to initiate construction on projects that have completed the agency's multistep project development process without project-specific congressional construction authorization. |
crs_RL34621 | crs_RL34621_0 | Much of the focus of debate on developing carbon capture technology has been on research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) needs. However, for technology to be fully commercialized, it must meet a market demand—a demand created either through a price mechanism or a regulatory requirement. As suggested by the previous discussion, any carbon capture technology for coal-fired power plants will increase the cost of electricity generation from affected plants with no increase in efficiency. Indeed, regulated industries may find their regulators reluctant to accept the risks and cost of installing technology that is not required by legislation. Carbon Capture and Sequestration in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)
Funding for carbon capture and sequestration technology has increased substantially as a result of enactment of ARRA ( P.L. Despite the lack of regulatory incentives or price signals, DOE has invested millions of dollars since 1997 into capture technology R&D, and the question remains whether it has been too much, too little, or about the right amount. In addition to appropriating funds each year for the DOE program, Congress signaled its support for RD&D investment for CCS through provisions for tax credits available for carbon capture technology projects and through loan guarantees. Congress also authorized a significant expansion of CCS spending at DOE in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. Other legislation introduced in the 110 th Congress invoked the symbolism of the Apollo program of the 1960s to frame proposals for large-scale energy policy initiatives that include developing CCS technology. As mentioned above, commercialization of technology and integration of technology into the private market were not goals of either the Manhattan project or Apollo program. Implications for Climate Change Legislation
Any comprehensive approach to reducing greenhouse gases substantially must address the world's dependency on coal for one-quarter of its energy demand, including almost half of its electricity demand. To maintain coal as a key component in the world's energy mix in a carbon-constrained future would require developing a technology to capture and store its CO 2 emissions. This situation suggests to some that any greenhouse gas reduction program be delayed until such carbon capture technology has been demonstrated. However, technological innovation and the demands of a carbon control regime are interlinked; therefore, a technology policy is no substitute for environmental policy and must be developed in concert with it. Finally, it should be noted that the status quo for coal with respect to climate change legislation isn't necessarily the same as "business as usual." The financial markets and regulatory authorities appear to be hedging their bets on the outcomes of any federal legislation with respect to greenhouse gas reductions, and are becoming increasingly unwilling to accept the risk of a coal-fired power plant with or without carbon capture capacity. [ emphasis in original ]
As noted earlier, lack of a regulatory scheme (or carbon price) presents numerous risks to any research and development effort designed to develop carbon capture technology. Ultimately, it also presents a risk to the future of coal. | Any comprehensive approach to substantially reduce greenhouse gases must address the world's dependency on coal for one-quarter of its energy demand, including almost half of its electricity demand. To maintain coal in the world's energy mix in a carbon-constrained future would require development of a technology to capture and store its carbon dioxide emissions. This situation suggests to some that any greenhouse gas reduction program be delayed until such carbon capture technology has been demonstrated. However, technological innovation and the demands of a carbon control regime are interlinked; a technology policy is no substitute for environmental policy and should be developed in concert with it.
Much of the debate about developing and commercializing carbon capture technology has focused on the role of research, development, and deployment (technology-push mechanisms). However, for technology to be fully commercialized, it must also meet a market demand—a demand created either through a price mechanism or a regulatory requirement (demand-pull mechanisms). Any conceivable carbon capture technology for coal-fired power plants will increase the cost of electricity generation from affected plants because of efficiency losses. Therefore, few companies are likely to install such technology until they are required to, either by regulation or by a carbon price. Regulated industries may find their regulators reluctant to accept the risks and cost of installing technology that is not required.
The Department of Energy (DOE) has invested millions of dollars since 1997 in carbon capture technology research and development (R&D), and the question remains whether it has been too much, too little, or about the right amount. In addition to appropriating funds each year for the DOE program, Congress supported R&D investment through provisions for loan guarantees and tax credits. Congress also authorized a significant expansion of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) spending at DOE in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. Funding for carbon capture technology has increased substantially as a result of enactment of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
Legislation introduced in the 111th and 110th Congresses invokes the symbolism of the Manhattan project of the 1940s and the Apollo program of the 1960s to frame proposals for large-scale energy policy initiatives that include developing CCS technology. However, commercialization of technology and integration of technology into the private market were not goals of either the Manhattan project or Apollo program.
Finally, it should be noted that the status quo for coal with respect to climate change legislation isn't necessarily the same as "business as usual." The financial markets and regulatory authorities appear to be hedging their bets on the outcomes of any federal legislation with respect to greenhouse gas reductions, and becoming increasingly unwilling to accept the risk of a coal-fired power plant with or without carbon capture capacity. The lack of a regulatory scheme presents numerous risks to any research and development effort designed to develop carbon capture technology. Ultimately, it also presents a risk to the future of coal. |
crs_RL32984 | crs_RL32984_0 | The new chapter of thislong running discussion is primarily the result of events that have occurred since the Fall of 2004.First, Delta Airlines decided in October 2004 to pull most of its service out of Dallas- Ft. WorthInternational Airport (DFW). Next, DFW asked Southwest Airlines to consider operating longdistance flights out of DFW. Southwest rejected the DFW offer and instead announced in November2004 that it intended to seek legislative relief from the Wright/Shelby Amendments. Thisannouncement ended what was regarded as a long standing truce on this issue between Southwestand DFW. Since November, DFW, joined by other parties such as American Airlines (American),have lobbied extensively in favor of retaining the existing Wright/Shelby restrictions on airlineoperations at Love Field. Southwest, and others, have, at the same time, presented their ownarguments as to why these restrictions should be removed. This section of the report will discuss the major claims and counterclaims made by each sidein this discussion. Airline Competition in the Dallas-Ft. Worth Market
As can be seen from the above, most of the airline traffic in the regional market is controlledby a small number of air carriers. Over time, Southwest has faced very limited competition at Love Field. At the moment, no legacy airline is knownto be contemplating the creation of a new hub. It is, asdiscussed earlier, a principal argument made by the airport for retention of the restrictions. Notably, the Mayor of Dallas nowseems to be seeking an as of yet undefined compromise on the issue. Prospects for Congressional Action
In the 108th Congress, several members of the Tennessee congressional delegation introducedlegislation that would have allowed direct air service between Love Field and airports in Tennessee( H.R. Comparablelegislation has now been introduced in the 109th Congress ( H.R. Legislation that would repeal the Wright/Shelby Amendments has been introduced in the109th Congress ( H.R. In its November 2005 announcement, Southwest contended that H.R. Byextension, such a move could also diminish the economic vibrancy of the airport and the region(Love Field, in this view, is not seen as a regional asset, but rather as a Dallas City asset). The DFW arguments are primarily couched in the politics, legalities, and history of theregional compact that created the airport that are discussed more fully earlier in this report. Therationales for retaining the Amendments are primarily of local interest and origin, e.g. protectinginvestments and markets at DFW. The rationale for removing Wright/Shelby restrictions, therefore, is the rationale for deregulation inthe first place: the unrestricted flow of air commerce. A question for policymakers, then, is shouldthe exceptions to deregulation that are the Wright/Shelby Amendments be retained in the context ofthe existing national aviation system or should local concerns be the primary determinant as to thedesirability of repeal and/or modification? | The history of the Wright Amendment dates back to the 1960s when the now defunct CivilAeronautics Board (CAB) proposed the creation of a single regional airport in the Dallas-Fort Worth(DFW) area. To construct the new airport, the two cities entered into an agreement that required thephasing out of separate existing airports in Dallas and Ft. Worth and transferring air service to thenew DFW Airport, which opened in 1974. During this time, Southwest Airlines began operating outof Dallas's Love Field as a purely intrastate air carrier. As such, Southwest was not subject to CABregulation. Congress's subsequent passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, resulted inSouthwest being allowed to operate interstate flights from Love Field, and prompted concerns frommany local officials about DFW's financial stability.
The Wright Amendment represents a compromise that was designed to protect the interestsof both DFW Airport and Southwest Airlines. The Wright Amendment contains a generalprohibition on interstate commercial aviation to or from Love Field subject to exceptions thatpermits Southwest's continued operations in a regional four state market. In addition, the ShelbyAmendment, enacted in 1997, further expands the scope of the regional market to three additionalstates, but nevertheless retains the basic compromise and structure of the original WrightAmendment. The language of the Wright Amendment has been the focus of several administrativeinterpretations by the Department of Transportation, as well as litigation at both at the state andfederal level. Each court decision to date has affirmed the DOT's interpretation of the WrightAmendment.
The newest iteration of this long running issue is primarily the result of events that haveoccurred since the Fall of 2004. First, Delta Airlines decided in October 2004 to pull most of itsservice out of Dallas Ft. Worth International Airport (DFW). Next, DFW asked Southwest Airlinesto consider operating long distance flights out of DFW. Southwest rejected the DFW offer andinstead announced in November 2004 that it intended to seek legislative relief from theWright/Shelby Amendments. This announcement ended what was regarded as a long standing truceon this issue. In the period since November, DFW, joined by other parties such as AmericanAirlines, have lobbied in favor of retaining the existing Wright/Shelby restrictions on airlineoperations at Love Field. Southwest, and others, have, at the same time, presented their ownarguments as to why these restrictions should be removed.
The DFW arguments are primarily couched in the politics, legalities, and history of theregional compact that created the airport. The rationales for retaining the Amendments are primarilyof local interest and origin, e.g. protecting investments and markets at DFW. The rationale forremoving the restrictions is the rationale for deregulation in the first place, the unrestricted flow ofair commerce. A question for policymakers then is should the exceptions to deregulation that are theWright/Shelby Amendments be retained in the context of the existing national aviation system?Legislation affecting the Wright/Shelby restrictions has been introduced in the 109th Congress; H.R. 2932 , H.R. 2646 , H.R. 3058 , H.R. 3383 , S. 1424 , and S. 1425 . This report will be updated as warranted by events. |
crs_RL31310 | crs_RL31310_0 | Most Recent Developments
The President submitted his fiscal year 2003 budget request to Congress on February 4, 2002.The House Subcommittee on Military Construction forwarded its markup to the full AppropriationsCommittee on June 12, which completed its mark on June 24. The bill ( H.R. TheSenate substituted the text of S. 2709 and passed the amended H.R. (4)
The military construction appropriations bill is one of several annual pieces of legislation that provide funding for national defense. The appropriations committees established military construction subcommittees andcreated a separate military construction bill. Several special accounts are included within the military construction appropriation. (21)
The President requested $545.1 million in BRAC funding for FY2003, which the House passed. It will be updated as the appropriation process moves forward. 5011 , H.Rept 107-533 ) was introduced on June 25, and the RulesCommittee introduced a rule ( H.Res. The bill was received in the Senate on June 28.The House rejected theSenate amendment on September 10, 2002, and appointed conferees. Committee markup on its version of the bill wascompleted on June 27, 2002. Its companion authorization bill, H.R. In the Appendix , Tables 10 and 11 list the line items that wereadjusted during the legislative process, indicating the amount of new budget authorityrequested by the President, appropriated in the House, the Senate, and the finalconference versions of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, and authorizedby the National Defense Authorization Act. 1. 2. Increases in budget authority are evident in the construction and renovation of military family housing both within the United States and at overseas installations,offset somewhat by a reduction in the unspecified location accounts devoted tomaintenance, management, provision of utilities, etc. This increase may be considered to constitute the substantive additionalfunds devoted to maintaining existing property. The Administration defense budget request for operations andmaintenance (considered part of the defense appropriation, not the militaryconstruction appropriation) contained a single new entry for $20.1 billion entitled theDefense Emergency Response Fund (DERF). Making appropriations for military construction, family housing, and base realignment and closure for the Departmentof Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2003, and for other purposes.The House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Constructionheld a series of hearings between February 6 and April 17, 2002. 486).On July 17, the Senate substituted the language of S. 2709 for that of H.R. The Houseaccepted the conference report ( H.Rept. The President signed the bill on October 23 as P.L.107-249 . 5011 by substituting the language of S. 2709 on July 18, 2002, and passed the amended H.R. The bill was reported on May 3, 2002 ( H.Rept. 379). The Senate disagreed byUnanimous Consent to the House amendment on July 26 and appointed conferees.The conferees began meeting on September 5, 2002. Conferees reported the authorization bill to the Houseon November 12 ( H.Rept. ThePresident enacted the bill as P.L. S. 2514 (Levin). * Includes DERF requests of $594 million (House) and $717 million (Request andSenate), does not include additional appropriations included in H.J.Res 2 of the 108th Congress. CRS Report RL31305 . Authorization and Appropriations for FY2003: Defense , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Selected World Wide Web Sites
Legislative Branch Sites
House Committee on Appropriations http://www.house.gov/appropriations/
Senate Committee on Appropriations http://www.senate.gov/~appropriations/
CRS Appropriations Products Guide http://www.crs.gov/products/appropriations/apppage.shtml
Congressional Budget Office http://www.cbo.gov/
General Accounting Office http://www.gao.gov/
U.S. Department of Defense Sites
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), FY2003 Budget Materials http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/fy2003budget/
U.S. Department of Defense, Installations Home Page http://www.acq.osd.mil/installation/
White House Sites
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Budget Materials http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
Office of Management & Budget http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
Appendix
These tables include only those projects and other line items that were eitherrequested by the President or appropriated or authorized by Congress. 107-731 , H.Rept.107-772 . | The military construction (MilCon) appropriations bill provides funding for (1) military construction projects in the United States and overseas; (2) military family housing operations andconstruction; (3) U.S. contributions to the NATO Security Investment Program; and (4) the bulk ofbase realignment and closure (BRAC)costs.
On February 4, 2002, the Administration submitted a $379 billion FY2003 defense budget request. Of this, $9.0 billion was designated for accounts falling within the jurisdiction of theAppropriations Committees' subcommittees on military construction. This request wasapproximately $1.7 billion less than that appropriated for FY2002. The decrease resulted from a$2.1 billion reduction in domestic military construction that was offset somewhat by increases forfamily housing and for building at military installations overseas. The Department of Defense statedthat some projects were withheld anticipating the FY2005 base realignments and closures (BRAC)round. To offset the decrease, DOD increased its request to maintain and rehabilitate existing defenseproperty (funded from other appropriations) by approximately $677 million above the amountenacted in FY2002. $4.2 billion of this year's request is devoted to military construction projects.According to the President's current national defense budget estimate, requests for these sameaccounts are expected to rise to $12.7 billion by FY2007. Amendments to the FY2003 militaryconstruction appropriation are included in H.J.Res. 2 of the 108th Congress.
In a separate action for the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF), the Administration requested an additional $594 million (subsequently raised to $717 million) in military constructionbudget authority. This report contains information on how this has been apportioned between theservices. For the current status of DERF legislation, see CRS Report RL31305 , Authorization andAppropriations for FY2003: Defense , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
Authorization of military construction is included within the defense authorization bill. The House passed its version of the bill ( H.R. 4546 ) on May 10. The Senate Armed ServicesCommittee marked its authorization bill ( S. 2514 ) and reported it on May 15. TheSenate substituted the text of S. 2514 for that of H.R. 4546 , passed theamended bill, and appointed conferees on June 27, 2002. The House further amended the bill andappointed conferees on July 26. Conferees began meeting on September 5, 2002, reporting the billon November 12 ( H.Rept. 107-772 ). The President enacted the bill as P.L. 107-314 on December2.
Military construction appropriations markup by the House Appropriations Committee occurred on June 24. The bill ( H.R. 5011 ) was introduced on June 25 and passed on June 26. TheSenate Appropriations Committee marked its version of the bill ( S. 2709 ) on June 27. On July 17, the Senate substituted the language of S. 2709 for that of H.R. 5011 , passed the amended bill on July 18, and appointed conferees. The House rejected the Senateamendment on September 10. The House and Senate adopted the conference report ( H.Rept.107-731 ) on October 10 and 11, respectively, and the bill was enacted by the President on October23 as P.L. 107-249 . This report will be updated as necessary.
Key Policy Staff
* FDT = Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service. |
crs_RL31097 | crs_RL31097_0 | In response to the devastation from Hurricane Katrina, the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA, P.L. That legislation included a temporary expansion of the tax deduction for charitable contributions of food inventory. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-280 ) extended the temporary expansion through January 1, 2008. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( H.R. 1424 ; P.L. 110-343 ), which was signed into law on Friday, October 3, 2008, retroactively extends the temporary expansion of eligible donors through December 31, 2009. In the 110 th Congress, the Good Samaritan Hunger Relief Tax Incentive Extension Act of 2007 ( S. 689 ) proposes to permanently extend and expand the charitable deduction for contributions of food inventory. H.R. 3976 proposes making the provision permanent. H.R. 6049 , the Renewable Energy and Job Creation Act of 2008, which were passed by the House, both include a provision to retroactively extend the temporary expansion of eligible donors through December 31, 2008, as do H.R. Proposals to retroactively extend the temporary expansion of eligible donors through December 31, 2009, have been made in S. 2886 , the Alternative Minimum Tax and Extenders Tax Relief Act of 2008; S. 3098 , also titled the Alternative Minimum Tax and Extenders Tax Relief Act of 2008; and S. 3322 and its companion H.R. H.R. Additionally, S. 1132 proposes to qualify Indian tribes as eligible recipients of tax deductible contributions of food inventory. S. 2420 , the Federal Food Donation Act of 2008, which became law in June 2008 ( P.L. 110-247 ), revised the Federal Acquisition Regulation to require certain contracts to private entities to include a clause that encourages the donation of food. This provision is temporarily available to S corporations , partnerships, and sole proprietorships. Summary of Restrictions
In summary, current law provides that the charitable deduction for contributions of inventory and other property is as follows:
The gift must be made to a U.S. charitable organization; There is a 10% limitation on the total amount a corporation can deduct as charitable contributions; Contributions made in excess of this limitation may be carried forward for the next five years; Special rules are available for gifts made by C corporations of tangible personal property (inventory) when donated to qualified charitable organizations for the care of the ill, the needy, or infants. 109-73 ). The 1976 Act provided that such gifts by corporations were to be based on the taxpayer's basis in the property and one-half of the unrealized appreciation as long as the deduction did not exceed twice the property's basis. An article which appeared in Worth magazine provided information on the 50 companies that gave the most in 1999. All of the food companies showed substantial in-kind giving while 15 of the remaining 45 companies showed no in-kind giving at all. Those companies are pharmaceutical/health care or computer/information technology firms. In all cases, whether corporate or individual, the value of the enhanced deduction is dependent on the applicable tax rate. | Tax law provides an enhanced deduction for certain charitable contributions of food inventory. The value of the existing deduction is the corporation's basis in the donated product plus one half of the amount of appreciation, as long as that amount is less than twice the basis in the product. This deduction has generally been limited to contributions made by a certain type of corporation, C corporations.
The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA, P.L. 109-73) temporarily extended the enhanced deduction to include contributions made by other types of businesses, sole proprietors, partnerships, and S corporations in particular. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-280) further extended the temporary expansion of qualified donors through January 1, 2008. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (H.R. 1424; P.L. 110-343), which was signed into law on Friday, October 3, 2008, retroactively extends the temporary expansion of eligible donors through December 31, 2009.
Other legislation in the 110th Congress has also proposed changes to the deduction. S. 689 proposes to permanently extend and expand the charitable deduction for contributions of food inventory, while H.R. 3976 proposes making the provision permanent. H.R. 3996 and H.R. 6049, both passed by the House, include provisions to retroactively extend the temporary expansion of eligible donors through December 31, 2008, as do H.R. 3970, S. 3335, and S. 3125. S. 2886, S. 3098, and S. 3322 and its companion H.R. 6587 H.R. 3628 proposes extension through 2011.
Additionally, S. 1132 proposes to qualify Indian tribes as eligible recipients of tax deductible contributions of food inventory. S. 2420, the Federal Food Donation Act of 2008, which became law in June 2008 (P.L. 110-247), revised the Federal Acquisition Regulation to require certain contracts to private entities to include a clause that encourages the donation of food.
A review of charitable giving by the 50 companies that were the largest corporate donors revealed that five food concerns in that group showed substantial in-kind giving in 1999. Other companies in the pharmaceutical/health care or computer/information technology industries also made substantial in-kind gifts. These firms, like food companies, are provided an enhanced deduction for in-kind gifts. It appears that in the case of large firms, the enhanced deduction has stimulated contributions.
Although the temporary expansion of the enhanced deduction may have the effect of reducing equity differences between C corporations and other business concerns, it may not entirely eliminate them. If the intent is to resolve the equity issues, transforming the deduction to a credit might be more effective. Unlike deductions, whose value is based on the tax rate of the taxpayer, tax credits provide dollar-for-dollar value and do not fluctuate with the taxpayer's marginal tax bracket.
This report will be updated to reflect major legislative developments. |
crs_R41206 | crs_R41206_0 | This report provides an overview of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) budget and operations. Legislative Developments
On April 14, 2011, Congress passed the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 ( H.R. Hence, ATF's FY2011 appropriation is $1.113 billion. Besides ATF's multiple rifle sales reporting proposal, another emerging issue related to the ATF budget and operations includes the agency's conduct of a Phoenix, AZ-based investigation known as "Operation Fast and Furious." ATF Mission
Located in DOJ, the ATF is the lead federal law enforcement agency charged with administering and enforcing federal laws related to the manufacture, importation, and distribution of firearms and explosives. As part of the Homeland Security Act, Congress transferred ATF's enforcement and regulatory functions for firearms and explosives to DOJ from the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), adding "explosives" to ATF's title. ATF is also responsible for investigating arson cases with a federal nexus, as well as criminal violations of federal laws governing the manufacture, importation, and distribution of alcohol and tobacco. ATF Appropriations
In the 10-year period from FY2001 through FY2010, Congress increased direct appropriations for the ATF by 50.2%, from $771.0 million to $1.158 billion. Most of this funding has been dedicated to ATF efforts to reduce firearms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. Previously, Congress provided annual appropriations authorizations, for FY2006 through FY2009, in the Department of Justice Authorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-162 ) (see Appendix ). In the 111 th Congress, no action was taken on bills to reauthorize or increase ATF appropriations. The FY2011 budget request included $1.163 billion for ATF. As Table 1 shows, the FY2010 appropriation of $1.121 billion included $1.115 billion for salaries and expenses and $6 million for construction. The Administration, however, requested no funding for ATF construction for FY2011. This amount included
$35.2 million in base adjustments (less certain offsets and other reductions) and 46 FTE positions; $11.8 million and 37 FTE positions for Project Gunrunner; and and $1.2 million and 3 FTE positions for Emergency Support Function #13. On July 22, 2010, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its FY2011 CJS appropriations bill ( S. 3636 ; S.Rept. In the absence of an enacted FY2011 CJS appropriations bill, the 112 th Congress passed a series of CRs, which the President signed into law ( P.L. These CRs temporarily funded most federal agencies, including ATF, at their FY2010 enacted level of funding. Under this act, for FY2011 Congress has funded the ATF salaries and expenses account at slightly below its FY2010 enacted level of funding (reduced by two-tenths of a percent). Also, to ramp up Project Gunrunner, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. The ATF FY2011 budget request included $1.163 billion, including $11.8 million to annualize the 37 positions (21 SAs) previously funded under the ARRA ( P.L. As described above, Congress provided ATF with $37.5 million in supplemental appropriations for FY2010 ( P.L. 111-230 ) for Project Gunrunner, as requested by the Administration. This bill would have authorized a total of $73.5 million to be appropriated over three years, for FY2008 through FY2010, to increase the number of ATF positions dedicated to Project Gunrunner ($45 million) and assign ATF agents to Mexico ($28.5 million). | The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is the lead federal law enforcement agency charged with administering and enforcing federal laws related to the manufacture, importation, and distribution of firearms and explosives. Congress transferred ATF's enforcement and regulatory functions for firearms and explosives from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Justice (DOJ) as part of the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296). ATF is also responsible for investigating arson cases with a federal nexus, as well as criminal violations of federal laws governing the manufacture, importation, and distribution of alcohol and tobacco. Congress authorized appropriations for ATF in the Department of Justice Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-162) for FY2006 through FY2009; however, the 111th Congress did not consider legislation to reauthorize annual appropriations for DOJ or ATF.
From FY2001 through FY2010, Congress increased direct appropriations for the ATF from $771.0 million to $1.158 billion. The FY2010 appropriation amount includes $37.5 million in supplemental appropriations for Project Gunrunner (P.L. 111-230). With this supplemental, Congress has provided ATF with $86.5 million in budget increases over three fiscal years, FY2008 through FY2010, to combat gun trafficking. Most of this funding has been allocated to Project Gunrunner, an ATF initiative to reduce gun trafficking across the Southwest border, or other projects to assist the government of Mexico.
For FY2011, the Administration requested $1.163 billion for ATF, an increase of 3.8% over the agency's initial FY2010 appropriation ($1.121 billion), which included $1.115 billion for salaries and expenses and $6 million for construction. For Project Gunrunner, the request included $11.8 million to annualize 37 positions that were previously funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5). It also included $1.2 million to enable ATF to coordinate state and local law enforcement efforts in the event of a national emergency and, thus, fulfill the Attorney General's Emergency Support Function (ESF) #13 obligations under the National Response Framework (NRF). The FY2011 request assumed $35.2 million and 46 FTE positions in base adjustments, less offsets and other reductions. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported a bill (S. 3636) that would have matched the FY2011 request, but no further action was taken on that bill. In the absence of an enacted FY2011 CJS appropriations bill, Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions (CRs) that temporarily funded ATF at its FY2010 enacted level.
On April 14, 2011, Congress passed the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (H.R. 1473; P.L. 112-10) and funded ATF for the rest of FY2011 at its FY2010 enacted level, reduced by two-tenths of a percent. Hence, ATF's FY2011 appropriation is $1.113 billion. Other emerging issues related to the ATF budget and operations include a proposal to require multiple rifle sales reports from Southwest border state gun dealers and the agency's conduct of a Phoenix, AZ-based investigation known as "Operation Fast and Furious." This report complements CRS Report RL34514, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF): Budget and Operations for FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010. For the FY2011 budget cycle, this report will be updated as needed. For coverage of ATF's FY2012 budget request, see CRS Report RL32842, Gun Control Legislation. |
crs_RS21332 | crs_RS21332_0 | RS21332 -- The African Union
Updated April 30, 2003
Origins
The African Union (AU) has its roots in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Economic Community (AEC)Treaty of 1991. This factor, along with increasing calls for a basic restructuring of the purposes, priorities, and organizationof the OAU,ultimately led to its replacement by the AU. H.Res. 155 , introduced by Representative Meeks on March 2003, urges that the United States commend the AU'screation and support its diverse economic and political goals. (4)
Mandated that, as provided by the AU Constitutive Act, OAU assets, liabilities, and agreements withotherparties would devolve to the AU. In July 2002 in Durban, South Africa, the final meetings of the OAU were held. Structure and Functioning of the African Union
Organization. President ThaboMbeki was namedas the first chairperson of the AU during its inaugural year, and the first AU summit was held in Durban, SouthAfrica. | In July 2002, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963 during thedecolonization era, was superseded by the African Union (AU). An AU Interim Commission, created to transfer theinstitutional andreal assets and liabilities of the OAU to the AU, and establish the AU's organizational structure, is the focal pointof AU activitiesduring its inaugural year. The AU's policy agenda overlaps substantially with that of the OAU, but more stronglyemphasizes a needfor greater economic growth and for governance reforms. The AU is likely to confront many of the same policy andfiscal challengesfaced by the OAU (see CRS Report RS20945(pdf), The Organization of African Unity). H.Res. 155,introduced in March2003, urges U.S. support of the AU and its diverse economic and political goals. This report will be updated asevents warrant. |
crs_R42462 | crs_R42462_0 | This report examines how varied, and evolving, homeland security definitions and strategic missions may affect the prioritization of national homeland security policy and how it may affect the funding of homeland security. To address this issue, this report first discusses and analyzes examples of strategic documents, their differing homeland security definitions, and their varying homeland security missions. There are also strategic documents that provide specific guidance to DHS entities and include the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review , the Bottom-Up Review , and the 2012 Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan . Prior to issuance of these documents, national and DHS homeland security strategic documents included the 2002 and 2007 National Strategies for Homeland Security and the 2008 Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan . Definitions and Missions as Part of Strategy Development
Definitions and missions are part of strategy development. Policymakers develop strategy by identifying national interests, prioritizing missions to achieve those national interests, and arraying instruments of national power to achieve national interests. Developing strategy, however, may be complicated if the key concept of homeland security is not succinctly defined, and strategic missions are not aligned and synchronized among different strategic documents and federal entities. It was the 9/11 terrorist attacks that initiated the debate and development of a broader homeland security strategy. The debate over and development of homeland security definitions persist as the federal government continues to issue and implement homeland security strategy. In 2008, DHS issued Strategic Plan— One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland . 2010–Present Document Evolution
The White House and DHS are the principle source of homeland security strategies. The primary national homeland security strategic document developed by the White House is the 2010 National Security Strategy , which unlike the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security addresses all-hazards and is not primarily terrorism focused. Since the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review missions are differing and varied, and because the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review does not specifically identify a strategic process to achieve the missions, one may assume that this document is solely operational guidance. Further congressional criticism includes an observation on the absence of a single DHS strategy. DHS is aligning its definition and missions in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review , the Bottom-Up Review , and the 2012 Strategic Plan ; however, DHS does not prioritize the missions. | Ten years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government does not have a single definition for "homeland security." Currently, different strategic documents and mission statements offer varying missions that are derived from different homeland security definitions. Historically, the strategic documents framing national homeland security policy have included national strategies produced by the White House and documents developed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Prior to the 2010 National Security Strategy, the 2002 and 2007 National Strategies for Homeland Security were the guiding documents produced by the White House. In 2011, the White House issued the National Strategy for Counterterrorism.
In conjunction with these White House strategies, DHS has developed a series of evolving strategic documents that are based on the two national homeland security strategies and include the 2008 Strategic Plan—One Team, One Mission, Securing the Homeland; the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and Bottom-Up Review; and the 2012 Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan. The 2012 DHS strategic plan is the latest evolution in DHS's process of defining its mission, goals, and responsibilities. This plan, however, only addresses the department's homeland security purview and is not a document that addresses homeland security missions and responsibilities that are shared across the federal government. Currently, the Department of Homeland Security is developing the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which is due late 2013 or early 2014.
Varied homeland security definitions and missions may impede the development of a coherent national homeland security strategy, and may hamper the effectiveness of congressional oversight. Definitions and missions are part of strategy development. Policymakers develop strategy by identifying national interests, prioritizing goals to achieve those national interests, and arraying instruments of national power to achieve the national interests. Developing an effective homeland security strategy, however, may be complicated if the key concept of homeland security is not defined and its missions are not aligned and synchronized among different federal entities with homeland security responsibilities.
This report discusses the evolution of national and DHS-specific homeland security strategic documents and their homeland security definitions and missions, and analyzes the policy question of how varied homeland security definitions and missions may affect the development of national homeland security strategy. This report, however, does not examine DHS implementation of strategy. |
crs_RL33683 | crs_RL33683_0 | Introduction
In Paul v. Virginia (75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868)), the Supreme Court ruled that "[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of [interstate] commerce." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass ' n. (322 U.S. 533 (1944)) held that the federal antitrust laws were applicable to an insurance association's interstate activities in restraint of trade. Although the 1944 Court did not specifically overrule its prior determination, the case was viewed as a reversal of 75 years of precedent and practice, and created significant apprehension about the continued viability of state insurance regulation and taxation of insurance premiums. Congress' response was the 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act. In addition to preserving the states' ability to tax insurance premiums, McCarran-Ferguson prohibits application of the federal antitrust laws and similar provisions in the Federal Trade Commission Act, as well as most other federal statutes, to the "business of insurance" to the extent that such business is regulated by State law —except that the antitrust laws are applicable if it is determined that an insurance practice amounts to a boycott. "
About 25 years after National Securities limited the term "business of insurance" to activities involving only insurance companies' relationships with their policyholders, the Court extended that ruling. Some Past Legislation Concerning McCarran-Ferguson
110th Congress
At least two, bipartisan bills to "end the insurance industry's exemption from the requirements of [the antitrust] laws," by amending the McCarran-Ferguson Act were introduced in the 110 th Congress. The identical bills— S. 618 (Leahy, with the co-sponsorship of Senators Specter, Lott, Reid, and Landrieu) and H.R. Both however, would have specified that the Federal Trade Commission Act, "as it relates to areas other than unfair methods of competition" would continue to be applicable to the "business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law." It would have amended McCarran-Ferguson to clarify that the antitrust laws would be generally applicable, except with respect to the smallest entities in the insurance industry, to such activities as price fixing ( e.g ., currently permissible joint rate setting), geographic market allocation, "tying the purchase of insurance to the sale or purchase or another type of insurance," or monopolization of "any part of the business of insurance." § 1012(b)) to clarify that the federal antitrust laws would be applicable to the business of insurance "except to the extent [that] the conduct of a person engaged in the business of insurance is undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated policy of a State [and] that is actively supervised by that State; ..." Those words appeared to represent tacit acknowledgment that (1) the original purpose of McCarran-Ferguson was to assure the ability of the states to regulate the business of insurance; and (2) the existence of the state action doctrine in antitrust law. The State Action Doctrine and its Relevance to McCarran Immunity
The state action doctrine, first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown , has come to stand for the proposition that federalism dictates that the antitrust laws are not applicable to the states. | In Paul v. Virginia (75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868)), the Supreme Court ruled that "[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of [interstate] commerce." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n. (322 U.S. 533 (1944)) held that the federal antitrust laws were applicable to an insurance association's interstate activities in restraint of trade. Although the 1944 Court did not specifically overrule its prior determination, the case was viewed as a reversal of 75 years of precedent and practice, and created significant apprehension about the continued viability of state insurance regulation and taxation of insurance premiums. Congress' response was the 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act. It prohibits application of the federal antitrust laws and similar provisions in the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, as well as most other federal statutes, to the "business of insurance" to the extent that such business is regulated by State law—except that the antitrust laws are applicable if it is determined that an insurance practice amounts to a boycott. Early McCarran-Ferguson decisions mostly favored insurance companies. After 1969, however, the exemption for the "business of insurance" was generally limited to activities surrounding insurance companies' relationships with their policyholders. In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that McCarran case law prohibiting the indirect application of federal antitrust (or other) laws to the "business of insurance" would no longer control with respect to those areas over which Congress has unquestionable legislative authority (e.g., ERISA, civil rights, securities), notwithstanding insurance-company involvement. The issue of amending McCarran Ferguson so as to further limit the scope of the exemption for the "business of insurance" continued to receive attention in the 110th Congress, with the introduction of at least two bipartisan measures. S. 618 would not only have eliminated the antitrust exemption provided by McCarran-Ferguson, it would also have restored the FTC's authority to investigate the insurance industry. An identical bill, H.R. 1081, was introduced in the House. Both bills would have retained the exemption for the applicability of the FTC Act, "as it relates to areas other than unfair competition." It is not known at this time whether the issue will be revisited in the 111th Congress.
Even in the event the McCarran exemption were to be severely limited or totally eliminated, however, the state-action doctrine in antitrust law has the potential to mitigate the consequences of either. State action stands for the proposition that the federal antitrust laws do not apply to the states, nor to private individuals acting either under state order or authorization. To the extent that state regulation of insurance embodies "clearly articulated" state policy, and regulators "actively supervise" the activities of insurance companies, the industry's antitrust exemption could actually be broadened to include actions not clearly "the business of insurance." (Those phrases have been firmly embedded in the state-action-doctrine jurisprudence in the antitrust law for more than 25 years.) This report will be updated as needed. See, also, CRS Report RL31982, Insurance Regulation: History, Background, and Recent Congressional Oversight, CRS Report RL32789, Insurance Regulation: Issues, Background, and Current Legislation, CRS Report RL33439, Insurance Regulation in the United States and Abroad, CRS Report RL33892, Post-Katrina Insurance Issues Surrounding Water Damage Exclusions in Homeowners' Insurance Policies, and CRS Report RS22506, Surplus Lines Insurance: Background and Current Legislation for information on other issues affecting or concerning insurance regulation, including a discussion of issues surrounding the option of federal chartering and regulation of insurance companies, which would generally make the federal antitrust laws applicable to those entities opting for federal regulation. |
crs_RS20946 | crs_RS20946_0 | Part C, Medicare Advantage (MA), provides private plan options, such as managed care, for beneficiaries who are enrolled in both Part A and Part B. Part D provides optional outpatient prescription drug coverage. The Medicare program has two separate trust funds—the Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund and the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) Trust Fund. The Part A program, which is financed mainly through payroll taxes levied on current workers, is accounted for through the HI Trust Fund. The Part B and Part D programs, which are funded primarily through general revenue and beneficiary premiums, are accounted for through the SMI Trust Fund. Both funds are maintained by the Department of the Treasury and overseen by the Medicare Board of Trustees, which reports annually to Congress concerning the funds' financial status. From its inception, the HI Trust Fund has faced a projected shortfall and eventual insolvency. Additional income to the HI Trust Fund consists of premiums paid by voluntary enrollees who are not entitled to premium-free Medicare Part A through their (or their spouse's) work in covered employment, a portion of the federal income taxes paid on Social Security benefits, and interest on federal securities held by the HI Trust Fund. The HI Trust Fund is a financial account in the U.S. Treasury into which all income to the Part A portion of the Medicare program is credited and from which all benefits and associated administrative costs of the Part A program are paid. The insolvency date has been postponed a number of times since the beginning of Medicare through various methods. Current Insolvency Projections
In their 2018 report, the Medicare trustees projected a worsened short-term outlook for the HI Trust Fund and therefore moved the insolvency date three years earlier than their 2017 estimate, to 2026 (from 2029 in the 2017 report). | Medicare is the nation's health insurance program for persons aged 65 and older and certain disabled persons. Medicare consists of four distinct parts: Part A (Hospital Insurance, or HI); Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance, or SMI); Part C (Medicare Advantage, or MA); and Part D (the outpatient prescription drug benefit).
The Part A program is financed primarily through payroll taxes levied on current workers and their employers; these taxes are credited to the HI Trust Fund. The Part B program is financed through a combination of monthly premiums paid by current enrollees and general revenues. Income from these sources is credited to the SMI Trust Fund. As an alternative, beneficiaries can choose to receive all their Medicare services through private health plans under the MA program; payment is made on beneficiaries' behalf in appropriate parts from the HI and SMI Trust Funds. The Part D drug benefit is funded through a separate account in the SMI Trust Fund and is financed through general revenues, state contributions, and beneficiary premiums. The HI and SMI Trust Funds are overseen by the Medicare Board of Trustees, which makes an annual report to Congress concerning the financial status of the funds.
From its inception, the HI Trust Fund has faced a projected shortfall. The insolvency date has been postponed a number of times, primarily due to legislative changes that have had the effect of restraining growth in program spending. The 2018 Medicare Trustees Report projects that, under intermediate assumptions, the HI Trust Fund will become insolvent in 2026, three years earlier than estimated in the prior year's report. |
crs_R40585 | crs_R40585_0 | Introduction
This report was originally published in May 2009, and the majority of the text reflects the authors' analysis of EPA's potential regulation of stationary sources under the Clean Air Act at that time. An "endangerment finding,," which is a prerequisite for the motor vehicle and other greenhouse gas standards, was finalized December 7, 2009. The agency has stated in several venues that promulgation of motor vehicle GHG standards would make GHGs "subject to regulation" for the purposes of triggering permitting requirements for new and modified stationary sources under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration requirements of Section 165 of the Clean Air Act, and also for the purposes of the operating permit requirements of Title V. And it has p r oposed a Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule to limit the applicability of the PSD and Title V permitting requirements to sources that emit more than 25,000 tons per year of carbon dioxide equivalents. New legislation to address greenhouse gases is a leading priority of the President and many members of Congress, but the ability to limit these emissions already exists under various Clean Air Act (CAA) authorities that Congress has enacted, a point underlined by the Supreme Court in an April 2007 decision (discussed below). Indeed, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has already begun the process that could lead to greenhouse gas regulations for new mobile sources in response to court decisions. The legal drivers are beyond the scope of this report, which is focused on the policy options and control alternatives available to EPA as it uses existing authorities to regulate greenhouse gases from stationary sources. Section 202 gives the EPA Administrator broad authority to set "standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles" if in her judgment they contribute to air pollution which "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." If it makes this finding of endangerment, the Act requires the agency to establish standards for emissions of the pollutants. Publication of the proposal in the Federal Register on April 24 began a 60-day public comment period. The endangerment finding was finalized December 7, 2009. It should be noted that amidst this legal activity and EPA's commitment to move forward with an endangerment finding, EPA Administrator Jackson and others in the Administration have made clear that their preference would be for Congress to address the climate issue through new legislation. Global emissions are increasing. Section 111 provides authority for EPA to impose performance standards on stationary sources—directly in the case of new (or modified) sources, and through the states in the case of existing sources (Section 111(d)). Controlling GHG through Section 111
Section 111 appears to provide a strong basis for EPA to establish a traditional regulatory approach to controlling greenhouse gas emissions from large stationary sources. Focused on existing sources, EPA used Sec. Rather, as stated in a September 30, 2009 proposal, "Although several possible triggering events may be considered ..., the latest of these events would be the one that applies under EPA's current interpretation: a nationwide rule controlling or limiting GHG emissions." Title V and the Size Threshold
In the ANPR, EPA discussed the possibility that an endangerment finding and subsequent regulation of GHGs as air pollutants under any section of the Act could trigger Title V permit requirements, and that all facilities that have the potential to emit a GHG pollutant in amounts of 100 tons per year or more would be required to obtain permits. General Permits
Perhaps the most straightforward method of reducing administrative burden is for EPA to adopt a general permit scheme for PSD-NSR and Title V. For categories with numerous similar sources of emissions, the Clean Air Act provides in Section 504(d) that the permitting authority—be it EPA or a delegated state agency—may issue a "general permit" covering all sources in the category. There are also disadvantages to using existing Clean Air Act provisions to address climate change. | Although new legislation to address greenhouse gases is a leading priority of the President and many members of Congress, the ability to limit these emissions already exists under Clean Air Act authorities that Congress has enacted – a point underlined by the Supreme Court in an April 2007 decision, Massachusetts v. EPA. In response to the Supreme Court decision, EPA has begun the process of using this existing authority, issuing an "endangerment finding" for greenhouse gases (GHGs) December 7, 2009, and proposing GHG regulations for new motor vehicles in the September 28, 2009 Federal Register.
On September 30, 2009, the agency took another step toward Clean Air Act regulation of GHGs, proposing what it calls the Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule. The rule would define when Clean Air Act permits would be required for GHG emissions from stationary sources. The proposed threshold (annual emissions of 25,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalents) would limit which facilities would be required to obtain permits; for the next six years, the nation's largest GHG emitters, including power plants, refineries, cement production facilities and about two dozen other categories of sources, would be the only sources required to obtain permits. Smaller businesses and almost all farms would be shielded from permitting requirements during this period. By tailoring the permit requirement to the largest sources, EPA says it would focus on about 13,000 facilities accounting for nearly 70% of stationary source GHG emissions.
Like the proposed standards for motor vehicles, the Tailoring Rule is part of a two-track approach to controlling emissions of GHGs. On one track, Congress and the Administration are pursuing new legal authority (for cap-and-trade, carbon tax, or other mechanisms) to limit emissions. At the same time, on a parallel track, the Administration, through EPA, has begun to exercise the Clean Air Act's existing authority to regulate GHGs. Despite EPA's commitment to move forward on this second track, EPA Administrator Jackson and others in the Administration have made clear their preference that Congress address the climate issue through new legislation.
The first step in using the Clean Air Act's existing authority is for the EPA Administrator to find that GHG emissions are air pollutants that endanger public health or welfare. The Administrator proposed this endangerment finding in the April 24, 2009 Federal Register and finalized it December 7. With the finding finalized, the agency can (indeed, must) proceed to set GHG emission standards for new motor vehicles, as it proposed to do, September 28.
Motor vehicle GHG standards will lead EPA and state permitting authorities to require permits for stationary sources: language in the Act triggers permitting under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program and Title V of the Act whenever a pollutant is "subject to regulation" under any of the Act's authorities. It is this trigger that the Tailoring Rule addresses.
This report reviews the various options that EPA could exercise to control GHG emissions from stationary sources under the Act. The PSD and Title V permitting requirements that are automatically triggered may be the most immediate point of interest, but an endangerment finding for GHGs would present the agency with other options, as well. Five of these options are discussed in this report. Among these, particular attention should be paid to Section 111 of the Act, which provides authority to set New Source Performance Standards and, under Section 111(d), requires the states to control emissions from existing sources of the same pollutants. As EPA moves forward, Section 111 appears to be the most likely authority it will use to establish emission standards for stationary sources. |
crs_R40460 | crs_R40460_0 | Introduction
On August 8, 2005, President Bush signed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005; P.L. 109-58 ). The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA; P.L. 110-140 ), signed by President Bush on December 19, 2007, significantly expanded the RFS to include diesel fuel, requiring the use of 9.0 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 2008, increasing to 36 billion gallons in 2022. EISA also requires an increasing amount of the mandate be met with "advanced biofuels"—biofuels produced from feedstocks other than corn starch and with 50% lower lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions than petroleum fuels. Within the advanced biofuel mandate, there are specific carve-outs for cellulosic biofuels and biomass-based diesel substitutes (e.g., biodiesel). Under EPAct 2005, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released a final rulemaking for 2007 and beyond. Because of the changes in the RFS from P.L. To classify biofuels under the RFS, EPA must calculate the lifecycle emissions of each fuel relative to gasoline or diesel fuel. Debate is ongoing on how each factor in the biofuels lifecycle should be addressed, and the issues surrounding direct and indirect land use are particularly controversial. However, EPA's proposed methodology was criticized by many stakeholders. In response to comments by peer reviewers and the public, EPA modified its methodology to reflect some of those criticisms. In the final rule, all assessed biofuels met the threshold requirements for their category. Further, EISA does not specify the methodology for EPA to make its determinations on lifecycle emissions. EPA's methodology in the final rule is described in a subsequent section of this report. Land Use Change Estimations for the Lifecycle Emissions Analysis
On May 26, 2009, EPA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to issue new RFS regulations. The NPRM included suggested methodology for a lifecycle analysis of significant greenhouse gas emissions—both direct and indirect—from the production of renewable fuels. The following paragraphs summarize the major points of the methodology put forth by EPA in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to account for land use change in the LCA, as well as key changes between the NPRM and the final rule issued on February 3, 2010. California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS)
On January 12, 2009, the state of California finalized regulations for a state low carbon fuel standard (LCFS). The LCFS requires increasing reductions in the average lifecycle emissions of most transportation fuels. Oversight
Definitions for various biofuels under the RFS could directly affect the supply of eligible fuels in the program. The specifics of any new legislation on fuel carbon emissions would determine how that legislation interacts with the RFS requirements. | The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA; P.L. 110-140) significantly expanded the renewable fuel standard (RFS) established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005; P.L. 109-58). The RFS requires the use of 9.0 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 2008, increasing to 36 billion gallons in 2022. Further, EISA requires an increasing amount of the mandate be met with "advanced biofuels"—biofuels produced from feedstocks other than corn starch and with 50% lower lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions than petroleum fuels. Within the advanced biofuel mandate, there are specific carve-outs for cellulosic biofuels and biomass-based diesel substitutes (e.g., biodiesel).
To classify biofuels under the RFS, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must calculate the lifecycle emissions of each fuel relative to gasoline or diesel fuel. Lifecycle emissions include emissions from all stages of fuel production and use ("well-to-wheels"), as well as both direct and indirect changes in land use from farming crops to produce biofuels. Debate is ongoing on how each factor in the biofuels lifecycle should be addressed, and the issues surrounding direct and indirect land use are particularly controversial. How EPA resolves those issues will affect the role each fuel plays in the RFS.
EPA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on May 26, 2009, for the RFS with suggested methodology for the lifecycle emissions analysis. EPA issued a final rule on February 3, 2010. The final rule includes EPA's methodology for determining lifecycle emissions, as well as the agency's estimates for the emissions from various fuels. In its proposed rule, EPA found that many fuel pathways did not meet the threshold requirements in EISA. However, its methodology was criticized by biofuels supporters. In the final rule, EPA modified its methodology to reflect some of those comments. However, some biofuels opponents counter that the final rules went too far in the opposite direction. In most cases, estimated emissions decreased (i.e., emissions reductions increased), leading to more favorable treatment of biofuels in the final rule.
Because of the ongoing debate on the lifecycle emissions from biofuels, including finalized regulations by the state of California for a state low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) in January 2009, there is growing congressional interest in the topic. Congressional action could take the form of oversight of EPA's rulemaking process, or could result in legislation to amend the EISA RFS provisions. Further, related legislative and regulatory efforts on climate change policy and/or a low-carbon fuel standard would likely lead to interactions between those policies and the lifecycle determinations under the RFS. |
crs_R44870 | crs_R44870_0 | Therefore, international financial assistance has been a principal method for governments to support actions on global environmental problems in lower-income countries. Framework Convention on Climate Change
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992) was the first international treaty to acknowledge and address human-driven climate change. The United States ratified the treaty in 1992 (U.S. Treaty Number: 102-38). Among the obligations outlined in Article 4, higher-income Parties (i.e., those listed in Annex II of the Convention, which were members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1992) committed themselves to seek to provide unspecified amounts of "new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obligations" under the Convention. Over the past several decades, the United States has delivered financial and technical assistance for climate change activities in the developing world through a variety of bilateral and multilateral programs. U.S.-sponsored bilateral assistance has come through programs at the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Department of State, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, among others. U.S.-sponsored multilateral assistance has come through contributions by the U.S. Departments of State and the Treasury to environmental funds at various international financial institutions and organizations such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the U.N. Development Program, the U.N. The Paris Agreement
In 2015, the COP to the UNFCCC in Paris, France, adopted the Paris Agreement (PA). The PA builds upon the Convention and—for the first time—brings all nations into a common framework to undertake efforts to combat climate change, adapt to its effects, and support developing countries in their efforts. Article 9 of the PA reiterates the obligation in the Convention for developed country Parties, including the United States, to seek to mobilize financial support to assist developing country Parties with climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts (Article 9.1). On June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump announced his intention to withdraw from the PA. The Trump Administration's FY2018 budget request, released on May 23, 2017, proposes to "eliminate U.S. funding for the Green Climate Fund (GCF) in FY2018, in alignment with President Trump's promise to cease payments to the United Nations' climate change programs." Other multilateral aid . Under the Obama Administration, the U.S. government provided about $1 billion annually for climate finance in the developing world. These funds accounted for approximately 3% of the U.S. foreign operations budget. Reductions in international financial assistance could help sustain markets for these products, including U.S. exports. International leadership. | The United States and other industrialized countries have committed to providing financial assistance for global environmental initiatives, including climate change, through a variety of multilateral agreements. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992, U.S. Treaty Number: 102-38) was the first international treaty to acknowledge and address human-driven climate change. Among other obligations, the Convention commits higher-income parties (i.e., those listed in Annex II of the convention, which were members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1992) to seek to mobilize financial assistance to help lower-income countries meet certain obligations common to all parties. International financial assistance may take many forms, from fiscal transfers to market transactions. It may include grants, loans, loan guarantees, export credits, insurance products, and private sector investment. It may be structured as official bilateral development assistance or as contributions to multilateral development banks and other international financial institutions.
Over the past several decades, the United States has delivered financial and technical assistance for climate change activities in the developing world through a variety of bilateral and multilateral programs. U.S.-sponsored bilateral assistance has come through programs at the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Department of State, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, among others. U.S.-sponsored multilateral assistance has come through contributions by the U.S. Departments of State and the Treasury to environmental funds at various international financial institutions and organizations such as the Global Environment Facility and the Green Climate Fund, among others. Under the Barack Obama Administration, the U.S. government provided about $1 billion annually for climate finance in the developing world. These funds accounted for approximately 3% of the U.S. foreign operations budget and 0.1% of all discretionary spending.
In 2015, Parties to the UNFCCC in Paris, France, adopted the Paris Agreement (PA). The PA builds upon the Convention and—for the first time—brings all nations into a common framework to undertake efforts to combat climate change, adapt to its effects, and support developing countries in their efforts. The PA also reiterates the obligation in the Convention for developed country Parties, including the United States, to seek to mobilize financial support to assist developing country Parties with climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts.
On June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump announced his intention to withdraw from the PA. Further, the Administration's FY2018 budget request, released on May 23, 2017, proposes to "eliminate U.S. funding for the Green Climate Fund (GCF) in FY2018, in alignment with the President's promise to cease payments to the United Nations' climate change programs." These actions may have several implications for the United States. Withdrawal may aid the domestic budget process and may assist certain U.S. industries in the global marketplace, specifically GHG-intensive fuels and technologies. However, withdrawal may also restrict the global marketplace for U.S. exporters of low-emission technologies and may impede U.S. efforts in natural disaster preparedness, national security, and international leadership. |
crs_R45044 | crs_R45044_0 | FMMO Authority
FMMOs are permanently authorized and are therefore not subject to periodic reauthorization. 750) to the 1933 act expanded and made explicit the authority of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to establish minimum prices for milk. The most recent major national revision to FMMOs occurred as part of the 1996 farm bill—the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR Act; P.L. The law mandated that USDA reduce the number of milk marketing orders from 31 to no fewer than 10 and no more than 14 by April 4, 1999. USDA published a proposed rule on January 30, 1998, to solicit public comment on proposals for consolidation of the order system, including changes to classified pricing; replacement of the benchmark Basic Formula Price; and changes in order provisions, terminology, and classification of milk by end use. Individual FMMOs are established and amended through a formal public hearing process that allows interested parties to present evidence regarding marketing and economic conditions in support of, or in opposition to, instituting or amending an order. Objectives of FMMOs
According to testimony USDA provided to the House Committee on Agriculture in 1979, the objectives of FMMOs are as follows:
to promote orderly marketing conditions in fluid milk markets, to improve the income situation of dairy farmers, to supervise the terms of trade in milk markets in such a manner as to achieve more equality of bargaining between producers and milk processors, and to assure consumers of adequate supplies of good quality milk at reasonable prices. Handlers and Usage
FMMOs regulate milk processors, known as handlers. 2. Regulatory Scope
Milk handlers (excluding cooperatives) are required to pay no less than the minimum prices established by USDA using the classified pricing system (see " Current Dairy Pricing ") for Grade A milk purchased from milk producers within the FMMO. Handlers report receipts and end use of milk and maintain adequate records for the USDA market administrator to audit and verify the accuracy of the reported uses (see " USDA Administration "). Current Dairy Pricing
Milk marketing orders require FMMO-regulated milk handlers to pay milk producers minimum prices for Grade A fluid milk. Class II : milk used for soft products such as cottage cheese, yogurt, cream, and ice cream; 3. Each FMMO pooled its milk receipts and end-use data for August to compute the uniform price, the minimum price that each handler must pay milk producers. Milk Pooling
The second key feature of milk pricing in the FMMOs is the "pooling" of milk. Milk handlers are obligated to report milk receipts and milk end use by class to the FMMO market administrator. Handlers pay milk producers and dairy cooperatives at least a uniform price based on a weighted average of the class prices. In addition, Congress can address issues related to the FMMO system through legislation. Current FMMO Issues
Some dairy stakeholders have raised concern about how AMS prices milk under federal orders and about the ability of fluid milk processors to manage risk. Some analysts believe that FMMO advanced Class I pricing and the Class I formula of the "higher of" the Class III or Class IV skim milk pricing factors compromise the ability of processors to manage price risk in fluid milk (see " Class I and Class II "). In the 1996 farm bill, Congress authorized a California FMMO if state producers petitioned and approved such an order. According to the Organic Trade Association (OTA), most organic milk is purchased on long-term forward contracts, and about 65% of organic milk is processed into Class I products. However, conventional milk cannot be sold as organic milk, and OTA argues that the FMMO system disfavors organic milk handlers and producers. | Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs) are geographically defined fluid-milk demand areas. Under FMMO law and regulations, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) establishes a minimum milk price, and those who buy milk from producers, known as handlers, are required to pay milk producers no less than this established price. Handlers are responsible for reporting milk receipts by end use to FMMO milk market administrators and maintain adequate records so that administrators may audit and verify the accuracy of the reported uses.
The two main features of the FMMO system are classified pricing and pooling of milk. The FMMO system recognizes four different classes of milk: Class I (fluid use), Class II (soft products such as ice cream), Class III (cheese), and Class IV (butter and milk powder). Milk handlers report all milk receipts by end use, and the FMMO values this "pool" of milk receipts through fixed minimum-price formulas to compute the four class prices. Milk handlers pay milk producers at least the weighted-average price of all class uses—known as a "uniform" price or "blend" price.
The main objectives of FMMOs are to (1) promote orderly marketing conditions in fluid milk markets, (2) improve the income situation of dairy farmers, (3) supervise the terms of trade in milk markets in such a manner as to achieve more equality of bargaining between milk producers and milk processors, and (4) assure consumers of adequate supplies of good quality milk at reasonable prices.
FMMOs are permanently authorized in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended, and not subject to reauthorization. FMMOs are established and amended through a formal public-hearing process that allows interested parties to present evidence regarding marketing and economic conditions in support of, or in opposition to, instituting or amending an order. Most FMMO changes are made administratively by USDA through the rulemaking process, which must then be approved by farmers in a referendum. Legislation can also address issues related to the FMMO system.
The most recent major national revision to FMMOs occurred as part of the 1996 farm bill (P.L. 104-127). It reduced the number of orders from 31 to 11 (now 10 since 2004) and made changes to classified pricing, order provisions, terminology, and classification of milk by end use. The 1996 farm bill provisions went into effect on January 1, 2000. FMMOs continue to operate under those reforms, although there have been some changes in the operations of orders brought about through FMMO hearings and rulemaking since then.
Several dairy issues have attracted stakeholder attention. Milk industry stakeholders have proposed two changes to how milk is priced. Milk handlers may forward contract milk purchases used to manufacture dairy products. Milk processors, who would like to use forward contracts as a risk management tool, have asked Congress to expand forward contracting rules to fluid milk. Also, both milk processors and producers have proposed that USDA change the method used to calculate the Class I milk price. Some stakeholders believe that altering the Class I milk formula could improve their ability to manage price risk.
In addition to these pricing issues, California milk producers petitioned USDA to establish a California federal order, which would bring an additional 20% of national milk production under federal regulations. Lastly, the Organic Trade Association (OTA) petitioned USDA to alter FMMO pricing requirements for organic milk handlers. Organic milk handlers are required to pool organic milk under FMMO regulations, but OTA argues that classified pricing and pooling disfavor organic handlers. |
crs_R44942 | crs_R44942_0 | Overview of the Issue
In October 2017 and more explicitly in January 2018, the President linked continued U.S. participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to congressional and allied action to address the deficiencies in the JCPOA that the President identified. On May 8, he announced that the United States would cease implementing the JCPOA, using the mechanism of reimposing suspended U.S. sanctions to implement the U.S. pullout. This report bases its analysis primarily on the text of key documents involved in the issue—the JCPOA itself; U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 of July 20, 2015, which endorsed the JCPOA; and the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17 , of May 22, 2015). As President Trump noted in his October 2017 and January 2018 statements, he has the authority to cease U.S. implementation of the accord. The President's May 8, 2018, announcement that the United States would no longer implement the JCPOA indicated that he would exercise all these options to reimpose all U.S. sanctions that were revoked or suspended to implement the JCPOA. President Trump's May 8 announcement was widely foreshadowed. They refuse, and that's fine. European Reaction and Plans
The leaders of France, Germany, and Britain (the three European countries that negotiated the JCPOA alongside the United States)— as well as the EU collectively — issued a joint statement expressing "regret" over the decision. As the May 12 deadline to again waive key sanctions laws loomed, France's President Emmanuel Macron and Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel each met with President Trump in Washington, DC, during the week of April 23, expressing support for working with the United States on additions to the JCPOA, or other U.S.-European joint action, that would address the expiration of nuclear restrictions, Iran's regional activities, and Iran's ballistic missile programs. We made a—we had movement, a ton of good progress, which will not be wasted, but we didn't get there....
Iranian Reaction and Plans
Iran's President Hassan Rouhani reacted to the May 8 announcement immediately, stating that Iran would work with the remaining parties to the accord to keep it intact. He indicated that Iran would continue to implement its commitments as long as Iran derives the economic benefits of the agreement, an implicit threat that Iran might leave the accord if reimposed U.S. sanctions damage its economy significantly. Iranian officials have consistently insisted that they would not renegotiate the JCPOA under any circumstances. Senator Corker indicated in a press interview on April 29, 2018, that Congress might act to address President Trump's concerns about the JCPOA if European leaders support joint action on the JCPOA even if doing so might appear to contradict the provisions of the JCPOA. The four points are that (1) Iran is verifiably and fully implementing the JCPOA; (2) Iran has not committed an uncured material breach; (3) Iran has not taken any action that could advance a nuclear weapons program; and (4) continued suspension of sanctions (including issuance of waivers of applicable sanctions laws) is (a) appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program and (b) vital to the national security interests of the United States. In his October 13, 2017, speech on Iran, President Trump announced that he was withholding INARA compliance certification on the grounds that he cannot certify that continued sanctions relief is "appropriate and proportionate" to the measures taken by Iran to terminate its illicit nuclear program. President Trump also asserted that Iran has not complied with the "spirit" of the agreement and has violated some JCPOA nuclear-related provisions. As discussed in the text box below, the refusal to certify Iranian compliance gave Congress the option to act under expedited procedures to reimpose sanctions on Iran. The sanctions, to go fully back into effect by no later than November 6, 2018 (180 days from May 8), are analyzed in significant detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions , by [author name scrubbed]. There is potential for Iran to react to the U.S. pullout from the JCPOA in ways unrelated to the agreement. | On May 8, 2018, President Donald Trump announced that his Administration would cease implementing U.S. commitments under the 2015 multilateral Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and reimpose all U.S. sanctions that were in place prior to the JCPOA. His announcement made reference to his previous statements on the issue, including an October 13, 2017, announcement of U.S. strategy on Iran and a January 12, 2018, statement pledging to leave the agreement unless Congress and U.S. allies acted to address the full range of U.S. concerns on Iran. In his May 8 and earlier statements, President Trump asserted that the agreement does not address the full range of potential threats posed by Iran, or permanently ensure that Iran cannot develop a nuclear weapon. President Trump also again asserted that the JCPOA provided Iran with additional financial resources with which to pursue its ballistic missile program and support its regional "malign activities." In his May 8 statement, President Trump indicated that reimposed U.S. sanctions would succeed in pressuring Iran to renegotiate the JCPOA to accommodate Administration demands.
President Trump's May 8 statement also implied that, based on an early May presentation by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Iran has not abandoned an intent to ultimately develop a nuclear weapon. International nuclear inspectors, as well as senior U.S. officials, have consistently indicated in their reports that Iran is complying with the provisions of the JCPOA. The President foreshadowed his May 8 announcement with his October 2017 and January and April 2018 refusal to certify to Congress, under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17), that continued U.S. sanctions relief to Iran under the JCPOA is "appropriate and proportionate" to the measures taken by Iran to terminate its illicit nuclear program. The withholding of that certification did not automatically reimpose any U.S. sanctions on Iran, but gave Congress the opportunity to use expedited procedures to do so. Congress did not act to reimpose the sanctions.
The other powers that negotiated the accord with Iran—Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany—have consistently asserted that the JCPOA is succeeding in its core objectives and that its implementation should not be jeopardized. Several European countries have sought to address President Trump's demands in negotiations with U.S. officials. In late April 2018 visits to Washington, DC, the President of France and the Chancellor of Germany told President Trump they want to work with the United States to formulate joint action that would address his concerns, but they urged that he keep the United States in the accord as a foundation on which to build additional restrictions on Iran. The leaders of Britain, France, and Germany, as well as the European Union, expressed "regret" about the U.S. decision and pledged to work with Iran to continue implementing the JCPOA. Iran's President Hassan Rouhani immediately reacted to the May 8 U.S. decision by pledging to continue implementing the accord, provided Iran continues to receive the economic benefits of the agreement.
This report analyzes the U.S. pullout from the JCPOA and its potential implications. For details on the JCPOA's provisions and related sanctions issues, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42396 | crs_R42396_0 | The Simpson-Bowles (SB) deficit reduction plan proposes complete elimination of the tax preference. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) "Revenue Options" report proposes changing the tax exclusion for investors to a direct tax subsidy to issuers . Issuers, such as governments and certain private entities, benefit from lower cost of borrowing and relatively high-income investors benefit from the resulting tax-free income. In particular, the top 10% of all earners realize more than 77% of the total reported tax-exempt interest income. Overview and Background
The impact of changes to the tax treatment of the interest on state and local government debt can be assessed from three perspectives to analyze: the size of the tax expenditure, the distribution of the tax-exempt interest income, and the value of the tax-exemption to issuers. The array of marginal tax rates in the first column of Table 3 are a mix of current law rates and rates as proposed in the President's FY2013 budget. Thus, under the SB plan, interest payments from new bonds issued by state and local governments would be treated like all other income. This option is estimated to increase revenues $142.7 billion over the 2012 to 2021 budget window. Conclusion
Under current law, there is a significant transfer of federal tax revenue to tax-exempt bond issuers and investors. The proposals do differ in the relative impact on investors and issuers. The FY2013 budget proposal to cap the benefit to the 28% tax bracket would be felt relatively equally between issuers and investors and would not address the inefficiency of using tax-exempt bonds to encourage investment in public capital. The SB tax reform plan would eliminate the tax preference thereby eliminating the economic inefficiency generated by the current tax preference, but would also eliminate the relative benefit of tax-exempt bonds for both issuers and investors. The CBO proposal also eliminates the tax preference for investors, but would preserve the issuer preference albeit at a lower level. The economic inefficiency arising from the current tax preference would also be eliminated by the CBO proposal. The CBO proposal can be modified to yield a roughly equivalent subsidy to the current tax-exempt bond preference for issuers. | Under current law, interest income from bonds issued by state and local governments is exempt from federal income taxes. In addition, interest on bonds issued by certain nonprofit entities and authorities is also exempt from federal income taxes. Together, these tax preferences are estimated to generate a federal revenue loss of $309.9 billion over the 2012 to 2016 budget window. Along with this direct "cost," economic theory holds that tax-exempt bonds distort investment decisions (leading to over-investment in this sector). As with many other tax preferences, the income exclusion is being examined as part of fundamental tax reform.
Generally, the tax preference directly benefits two groups: issuers and investors. Issuers, principally state and local governments (but also certain nonprofits and qualified private entities) benefit from a current lower cost of borrowing. Investors, particularly those in the top tax brackets, benefit from mostly tax-free income. In particular, the top 10% of all earners realize more than 77% of the total reported tax-exempt interest income.
This report first explains the tax preference and the distribution of the receipt of tax-exempt interest. An analysis of the impact of several different proposals then follows. Included in this analysis are proposals to (1) cap the benefit at a specific income tax rate (as offered in the FY2013 budget), (2) eliminate the tax preference and lower overall rates (as proposed in the Simpson-Bowles (SB) deficit reduction plan), and (3) change the current tax exclusion for investors to a tax credit (or subsidy) for issuers (as proposed in the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Revenue Options report). The proposals differ in the relative impact on investors and issuers.
The proposal in the President's FY2013 budget would be felt relatively equally by issuers and investors and would not address the economic inefficiency of using tax-exempt bonds to encourage investment in public capital. The SB tax reform plan would eliminate the tax preference thereby eliminating the economic inefficiency generated by the current tax preference, but would also eliminate the relative benefit of tax-exempt bonds for both issuers and investors. The CBO proposal also eliminates the tax preference for investors, but would preserve the issuer preference albeit at a lower level. The economic inefficiency arising from the current tax preference would also be eliminated by the CBO proposal. The CBO proposal can be modified to yield a roughly equivalent subsidy to the current tax-exempt bond preference for issuers.
This report will be updated as significant new proposals or legislative events warrant. |
crs_R43892 | crs_R43892_0 | The removal and return of aliens to their country of nationality have become important policy issues for Congress, and tend to be key issues in debates about immigration reform. In 2012, there were an estimated 11.4 million resident unauthorized aliens in the United States; estimates of other removable aliens, such as lawful permanent residents (LPRs) who commit crimes, are elusive. More than 600,000 foreign nationals were repatriated from the United States in FY2013—including about 440,000 formal removals. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides broad authority to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to remove certain aliens from the United States, including unauthorized aliens and lawfully present foreign nationals who commit certain crimes. It also describes several streamlined forms of removal, and two alternative forms of removal (often referred to as returns) that exempt aliens from certain penalties associated with formal removal: voluntary departure and withdrawal of petition for admission. The INA describes procedures for making and reviewing such a determination, and specifies conditions under which some of these provisions may be waived. DHS officials may exercise certain forms of discretion in pursuing removal orders, and certain removable aliens may be eligible for permanent or temporary relief from removal. Nonetheless, some grounds for removal (e.g., criminal grounds, terrorist grounds) render aliens ineligible for most forms of relief and may make the alien eligible for a streamlined removal process (see " Streamlined Removal Processes "). Following an order of removal, an alien is inadmissible to the United States for a minimum of five years after the date of the removal, and therefore is generally ineligible during the period of inadmissibility to return to the United States in the absence of an applicable exception. The period of inadmissibility is determined by the reason for the removal and the type of removal process used. For example, an alien who is ordered removed based on removal proceedings initiated upon the alien's arrival is inadmissible for five years, while an alien ordered removed after being apprehended within the United States is inadmissible for 10 years. The length of inadmissibility increases to 20 years in the case of an alien's second or subsequent removal order, and is indefinite in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Removal Processes
Absent additional factors, unlawful presence in the United States is a civil violation, not a criminal offense, and removal and its associated administrative processes are civil proceedings. Thus, aliens in removal proceedings generally have no right to appointed counsel (though they may be represented by counsel at their own expense). In addition, Congress may pass legislation that imposes immigration consequences retroactively. Standard Removal Process (INA §240)
The standard removal process is a civil administrative proceeding in which an EOIR immigration judge determines whether an alien is removable. Immigration judges may grant certain forms of relief (see " Relief from Removal ") during the removal proceeding, and their removal decisions are subject to certain forms of review. The number of removals declined between FY2013 and FY2014. In addition, funding for immigration enforcement increased during this period. The highest number of removals occurred in FY2013 (438,421). There were 21,717 foreign nationals who requested asylum before an immigration judge during removal proceedings in FY2013. The Attorney General may also cancel the removal of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable and adjust the alien's status to LPR if the alien
has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of 10 years prior to the date of application for relief; has been a person of good moral character; has not been convicted of a criminal offense that would make the alien inadmissible or deportable, or convicted of an offense related to document fraud or falsely claiming citizenship; and establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child who is a U.S. citizen or LPR (i.e., the hardship cannot be to the alien). | The ability to remove foreign nationals (aliens) who violate U.S. immigration law is central to the immigration enforcement system. Some lawful migrants violate the terms of their admittance, and some aliens enter the United States illegally, despite U.S. immigration laws and enforcement. In 2012, there were an estimated 11.4 million resident unauthorized aliens; estimates of other removable aliens, such as lawful permanent residents who commit crimes, are elusive. With total repatriations of over 600,000 people in FY2013—including about 440,000 formal removals—the removal and return of such aliens have become important policy issues for Congress, and key issues in recent debates about immigration reform.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides broad authority to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to remove certain foreign nationals from the United States, including unauthorized aliens (i.e., foreign nationals who enter without inspection, aliens who enter with fraudulent documents, and aliens who enter legally but overstay the terms of their temporary visas) and lawfully present foreign nationals who commit certain acts that make them removable. Any foreign national found to be inadmissible or deportable under the grounds specified in the INA may be ordered removed. The INA describes procedures for making and reviewing such a determination, and specifies conditions under which certain grounds of removal may be waived. DHS officials may exercise certain forms of discretion in pursuing removal orders, and certain removable aliens may be eligible for permanent or temporary relief from removal. Certain grounds for removal (e.g., criminal grounds, terrorist grounds) render foreign nationals ineligible for most forms of relief and may make them eligible for more streamlined (expedited) removal processes.
The "standard" removal process is a civil judicial proceeding in which an immigration judge from DOJ's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) determines whether an alien is removable. Immigration judges may grant certain forms of relief during the removal process (e.g., asylum, cancellation of removal), and the judge's removal decisions are subject to administrative and judicial review. The INA also describes different types of streamlined removal procedures, which generally include more-limited opportunities for relief and grounds for review. In addition, two alternative forms of removal exempt aliens from certain penalties associated with formal removal: voluntary departure (return) and withdrawal of petition for admission. These are often called "returns."
Following an order of removal, an alien is inadmissible for a minimum of five years after the date of the removal, and therefore is generally ineligible to return to the United States during this time period. The period of inadmissibility is determined by the reason for and type of removal. For example, a foreign national ordered removed based on removal proceedings initiated upon the foreign national's arrival is inadmissible for five years, while a foreign national ordered removed after being apprehended within the United States is inadmissible for 10 years. The length of inadmissibility increases to 20 years for an alien's second or subsequent removal order, and is indefinite for a foreign national convicted of an aggravated felony.
Absent additional factors, unlawful presence in the United States is a civil violation, not a criminal offense, and removal and its associated administrative processes are civil proceedings. As such, aliens in removal proceedings generally have no right to counsel (though they may be represented by counsel at their own expense). In addition, because removal is not considered punishment by the courts, Congress may impose immigration consequences retroactively.
There were a record number of removals between FY2009 and FY2013, including 438,421 removals in FY2013. Approximately 71% of the foreign nationals removed were from Mexico. However, during the same time period the number of returns (most of which occur at the Southwest border) decreased to a low of 178,371 in FY2013—the fewest returns since 1968. |
crs_R43604 | crs_R43604_0 | High voltage (HV) transformer units make up less than 3% of transformers in U.S. power substations, but they carry 60% or more of the nation's electricity. Because they serve as vital transmission network nodes and carry bulk volumes of electricity, HV transformers are critical elements of the nation's electric power grid. For reasons discussed below, however, HV transformers are considered by many experts to be the most vulnerable to intentional damage from malicious acts. Congressional Interest
Congress has long been concerned about grid security in general, but recent security exercises, together with a 2013 physical attack on transformers in Metcalf, CA, have focused congressional interest on the physical security of HV transformers, among other specific aspects of the grid. They have also prompted new grid security initiatives by utilities and federal regulators. Legislative proposals including the Enhanced Grid Security Act of 2015 ( S. 1241 ), the Critical Electric Infrastructure Protection Act ( H.R. 2271 ), the Terrorism Prevention and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015 ( H.R. 85 ), a House bill to establish a strategic transformer reserve program ( H.R. 2244 ), and the Grid Modernization Act of 2015 ( S. 1243 ) would expand these activities by strengthening federal efforts to prevent or recover from a physical attack on the U.S. grid. Sector Initiatives for HV Transformer Security
Over the last decade or so the electric utility industry and government agencies have engaged in a number of initiatives to secure HV transformers from physical attack and to improve recovery in the event of a successful attack. These initiatives include coordination and information sharing, spare equipment programs, security standards, grid security exercises, and other measures discussed below. NERC Physical Security Regulations
On March 7, 2014, FERC ordered NERC to submit to the commission within 90 days proposed reliability standards requiring certain transmission owners "to take steps or demonstrate that they have taken steps to address physical security risks and vulnerabilities related to the reliable operation" of the power grid. On November 20, 2014, FERC approved the proposed standard, with minor changes, as NERC's new Physical Security Reliability Standard (CIP-014-1). Development, documentation, and implementation of physical security plans to protect critical facilities; and
R6. As the standards discussed in the previous section suggest, there has been some level of physical security investment and an increasing refinement of grid security practices across the electric power sector for at least the last 15 years. As the electric power industry and federal agencies continue their efforts to improve the physical security of critical HV transformer substations, Congress may consider several key issues as part of its oversight of the sector. There is widespread agreement among government, utilities, and manufacturers that HV transformers in the United States are vulnerable to terrorist attack, and that such an attack potentially could have catastrophic consequences. But the most serious, multi-transformer attacks could require acquiring operational information and a certain level of sophistication on the part of potential attackers. Consequently, despite the technical arguments, without more specific information about potential targets and attacker capabilities, the true vulnerability of the grid to a multi-HV transformer attack remains an open question. As Congress continues its examination of physical security policy, maintaining an integrated perspective on prevention, recovery, and resilience may help to promote an effective balance among industry investment, regulatory requirements, and federal oversight. | The U.S. electric power grid consists of over 200,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines and hundreds of large transformer substations. High voltage (HV) transformer units make up less than 3% of U.S. transformers, but they carry 60%-70% of the nation's electricity. Because they serve as vital nodes, HV transformers are critical to the nation's electric grid. HV transformers are also the most vulnerable to damage from malicious acts.
For more than 10 years, the electric utility industry and government agencies have engaged in activities to secure HV transformers from physical attack and to improve recovery in the event of a successful attack. These activities include coordination and information sharing, spare equipment programs, security standards, security exercises, and other measures. There has been some level of physical security investment and an increasing refinement of voluntary security practices across the electric power sector for at least the last 15 years. However, recent grid security exercises, together with a 2013 physical attack on transformers in Metcalf, CA, have changed the way grid security is viewed and have focused congressional interest on the physical security of HV transformers. They have also prompted new grid security efforts by utilities and regulators.
On November 20, 2014, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved a new mandatory Physical Security Reliability Standard (CIP-014-1) proposed by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). The new standards require certain transmission owners "to address physical security risks and vulnerabilities related to the reliable operation" of the power grid by performing risk assessments to identify their critical facilities, evaluate potential threats and vulnerabilities, and implement security plans to protect against attacks. Legislative proposals would expand federal efforts to prevent or recover from a physical attack on the U.S. grid. These include the Enhanced Grid Security Act of 2015 (S. 1241), the Critical Electric Infrastructure Protection Act (H.R. 2271), the Terrorism Prevention and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015 (H.R. 85), a House bill to establish a strategic transformer reserve program (H.R. 2244), and the Grid Modernization Act of 2015 (S. 1243).
There is widespread agreement among government agencies, utilities, and manufacturers that HV transformers in the United States are vulnerable to terrorist attack, and that such an attack potentially could have catastrophic consequences. But the most serious, multi-transformer attacks could require acquiring operational information and a certain level of sophistication on the part of potential attackers. Consequently, despite the technical arguments, without more specific information about potential targets and attacker capabilities, the actual risk of a multi-HV transformer attack remains an open question. As the electric power industry and federal agencies continue their efforts to improve the physical security of critical HV transformer substations, Congress may consider several issues as part of its oversight of the sector: identifying critical transformers, confidentiality of critical transformer information, adequacy of HV transformer protection, quality of federal threat information, recovery from HV transformer attacks, and the overall resiliency of the grid. Maintaining an integrated perspective on prevention, recovery, and resilience may help to promote an effective balance among industry investment, regulatory requirements, and federal oversight. |
crs_RL32774 | crs_RL32774_0 | Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative
Plan Colombia was developed by former President Pastrana (1998-2002) as a six-year planto end the country's 40-year old armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economicand social development. (1)
The Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) is the primary U.S. program that supports PlanColombia, as well as assistance to other nations in the Andean region. In addition to ACI funding,Colombia also benefits from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, and the Departmentof Defense's central counternarcotics account. ACI funding for Plan Colombia from FY2000 through FY2005 totalsapproximately $2.8 billion. When FMF and DOD assistance is included, the total level of U.S.support to Colombia is $4.5 billion. Because Plan Colombia is a six-year plan that expired at the end of 2005, Congress has beenand will likely continue assessing its progress in light of the Administration request to continue ACIfunding, the latter having no statutory end-date. The House bill, as well as some individual Members of Congress, expressed the opinion thatthe ratio between alternative development and interdiction should be more balanced. Objectives
The objectives of Colombia and the United States for Plan Colombia differ in some aspects,although there is a significant overlap of goals. The primary U.S. objective is to prevent the flowof illegal drugs into the United States, as well as to help Colombia promote peace and economicdevelopment because it contributes to regional security in the Andes. (2) The primary objectives ofColombia are to promote peace and economic development, and increase security. (3)
The objectives of each country have evolved over time. U.S. policy has also evolved from a strictly counternarcotics focus to support for Colombia'sfight against IAGs. Assessment of Key Objectives and Issues
Drug Flows to the United States
After many years of stable prices, purity, and availability of cocaine and heroin in the UnitedStates, prices for both drugs have increased in 2005, whereas purity and availability have decreased. Despite some expectations that U.S. support forPlan Colombia would end, or begin to decrease in FY2006, U.S. and Colombian officials haveargued that significant progress has been made, but that more needs to be done. There has been measurable progress in Colombia's internal security, as measured bydecreases in violence, and in the eradication of drug crops. Military operations againstillegally armed groups have intensified, but the main leftist guerrilla group has neither been defeated,nor brought closer to wanting to enter peace negotiations. | Plan Colombia was developed by former President Pastrana (1998-2002) as a six-year planto end Colombia's long armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economic and socialdevelopment. The Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) is the primary U.S. program that supportsPlan Colombia. In addition, Colombia receives assistance from the Foreign Military Financing(FMF) program and the Department of Defense's central counternarcotics account. ACI funding forPlan Colombia from FY2000 through FY2005 totals approximately $2.8 billion. When FMF andDOD assistance is included, the total level of U.S. support to Colombia is $4.5 billion. Congressapproved the Administration's request to continue support for Plan Colombia beyond FY2005, butit also expressed the need for an evaluation of progress and a plan for future years.
The objectives of Colombia and the United States differ in some aspects, although there isa significant overlap of goals. The primary U.S. objective is to prevent the flow of illegal drugs intothe United States, as well as to help Colombia promote peace and economic development becauseit contributes to regional security in the Andes. The primary objectives of Colombia are to promotepeace and economic development, increase security, and end drug trafficking. Both U.S. andColombian objectives have also evolved over time from a strict counternarcotics focus to encompasscounterterrorism activities.
Because Plan Colombia is a six-year plan that expired at the end of 2005, Congress has beenand will likely continue assessing its progress in light of the Administration's request to continuefunding the ACI account, the latter having no statutory end-date. Congress has expressed theexpectation that funding would begin to decrease in FY2006. Some Members have also expressedthe opinion that the ratio between interdiction and alternative development should become morebalanced, and that the U.S. role should diminish as Colombia develops more operational capabilities.
Measurable progress in Colombia's internal security has been made, as indicated by decreasesin violence and the eradication of drug crops. After many years of stable prices, purity, andavailability of cocaine and heroin in the United States, prices for both drugs have increased, whereaspurity and availability have decreased. Military operations against illegally armed groups haveintensified, but the main leftist guerrilla group seems no closer to agreeing to a cease-fire. Thedemobilization of rightist paramilitary fighters is proceeding, but its is doing so amid controversywith regard to its implementation.
For more information on Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, see CRS Report RL32250 , Colombia: Issues for Congress ; CRS Report RL32337 Andean Counterdrug Initiative(ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2005 Assistance ; and CRS Report RL33163 , Drug CropEradication and Alternative Development in the Andes , all by [author name scrubbed]. This report will beupdated as new data become available. |
crs_RL32051 | crs_RL32051_0 | Among other efforts, the U.S. government and private firms are seeking high technology solutions to detect and prevent such attacks, as well as to respond to any future attacks that do occur. On the other hand, some commentators have expressed concern that the existence of intellectual property rights may impede homeland security needs. Nonetheless, this scenario remains a possibility for other technologies that bear upon homeland security. Perhaps not fully appreciated during the Cipro incident was the fact that existing laws provide mechanisms for addressing potential conflicts between intellectual property rights and homeland security needs. Patent rights may also facilitate technology transfer. Government Use of Privately Owned Intellectual Property
Episodes such as the Cipro incident have raised the possibility that intellectual property rights may clash with homeland security needs. Another is that the federal government purchase any applicable patents from their owners. This authority is ordinarily termed "eminent domain." This government right is not unlimited, however. As a result, the U.S. government effectively enjoys the ability to declare a "compulsory license" that allows it to use a patented invention without obtaining the permission of the patentee. Under § 1498(a), all patent suits against the U.S. government are litigated in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. In such cases the private contractor may not be enjoined from infringing the patent while performing a government contract. Other Compulsory Licenses
As noted previously, 28 U.S.C. The bill provided in part:
In determining the reasonableness of remuneration for use of a patent, the Secretary of Health and Human Services may consider—
(1) evidence of the risks and costs associated with the invention claimed in the patent and the commercial development of products that use the invention;
(2) evidence of the efficacy and innovative nature and importance to the public health of the invention or products using that invention;
(3) the degree to which the invention benefitted from publicly funded research;
(4) the need for adequate incentives for the creation and commercialization of new inventions;
(5) the interests of the public as patients and payers for health care services;
(6) the public health benefits of expanded access to the invention;
(7) the benefits of making the invention available to working families and retired persons;
(8) the need to correct anti-competitive practices; and
(9) other public interest considerations. The TRIPS Agreement addresses a number of intellectual property laws, including patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets. The TRIPS Agreement places some limits upon the ability of WTO member states to award compulsory licenses for the use of a private person's patented invention. Other Issues at the Interface Between Intellectual Property and Homeland Security
Alongside the various laws pertaining to U.S. government use of subject matter protected by an intellectual property right, other legislation relates to the issues at the intersection of homeland security and intellectual property. Government Purchase of Intellectual Property
In addition to invoking a compulsory license of a proprietary right, another government option is to seek a voluntary license, or simply purchase outright, an intellectual property right that pertains to homeland security. Recognizing this potential, Congress enacted the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 in order to control the disclosure of certain inventions based upon concerns of national security. | The U.S. government and private firms alike seek high technology solutions to detect and prevent future terrorist attacks, as well as to respond to any future attacks that do occur. Some concerns exist, however, that patents, trade secrets or other intellectual rights may impede the prompt, widespread and cost-effective distribution of innovations that promote homeland security. In 2001, these concerns arose with respect to pharmaceutical CIPRO, an antibiotic that treats inhalation anthrax. Some commentators called for the U.S. government to "override" a privately owned patent in order to distribute CIPRO to persons who were potential anthrax victims. Although the patent holder ultimately chose to increase production of CIPRO and lower costs, this scenario remains a possibility for other technologies that bear upon homeland security.
Perhaps not fully appreciated during the CIPRO incident was the fact that existing laws provide mechanisms for addressing potential conflicts between intellectual property rights and homeland security needs. The principal statute concerning U.S. government use of intellectual property is 28 U.S.C. § 1498. This statute allows the federal government to exercise eminent domain authority against private intellectual property rights. As a result, the federal government may use patented inventions without the prior consent of the patent owner, subject to an obligation to compensate the rights holder on a monetary basis. The federal government may not be enjoined from infringement of an intellectual property right. Intellectual property owners may enforce this government compensation obligation by bringing suit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
A number of more specialized statutes, such as the Atomic Energy Act, also allow federal government officials to declare a compulsory license with respect to a particular patent. Reportedly these provisions have been used infrequently. Legislative initiatives have proposed that U.S. law provide for other kinds of compulsory licenses, including a compulsory license that the government could invoke during a public health emergency. Existing legislation and proposed reforms should be evaluated in view of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. This "TRIPS Agreement" places some limits on the ability of WTO member states to award compulsory licenses for the use of a private person's patented invention.
If an invention was developed using federal government funding, the government may possess certain rights in that invention even though the government contractor obtained a patent. Many entities of the federal government enjoy the statutory authority to purchase a patent or other intellectual property right.
Several other statutes and legislative proposals also concern issues at the intersection of homeland security and intellectual property. The Invention Secrecy Act controls the disclosure of inventions that raise national security concerns. Legislative proposals would also call for patent term extensions to award technological progress in anti-terrorism technologies. |
crs_R42557 | crs_R42557_0 | Overview
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations bill includes funding for all components and functions of the Department of Homeland Security. Table 1 includes a summary of funding included in the FY2012 regular DHS appropriations bill, the Administration's FY2013 appropriations request, the House-passed and Senate-reported versions of the FY2013 appropriations bill broken down by title, and the final DHS appropriations legislation included in Division D of P.L. 113-6 , prior to the impact of sequestration. The "joint committee" sequestration process for FY2013 required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to implement across-the-board spending cuts at the account and program level to achieve equal budget reductions from both defense and nondefense funding at a percentage to be determined after enactment, under terms specified in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA), as amended by the BCA. However, the Office of Management and Budget is the final arbiter of whether those spending limits have been exceeded. Since these cuts were intended to reduce the amount of discretionary budget authority in the bill, funding that is not included in that total—specifically funding for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terror and funding designated as being for disaster relief under the Budget Control Act—are not subject to the across-the-board cuts. The left column shows discretionary budget authority as scored against the bill's budget allocation, while the right column shows that plus resources available under adjustments to the allocation allowed under the Budget Control Act ( P.L. 112-25 ). The enacted graphic also includes funding provided through P.L. 113-2 , the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013. FY2013 Appropriations by Title
Title I: Departmental Management and Operations
Title I of the DHS appropriations bill provides funding for the department's management activities, Analysis and Operations (A&O) account, and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Title II: Security, Enforcement and Investigations
Title II of the DHS appropriations bill, which includes over three-quarters of the budget authority provided in the legislation, contains the appropriations for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS). Title III: Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
Title III of the DHS appropriations bill contains the appropriations for the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Senate-reported bill would have provided $5,971 million, 1% above the request and 5.1% above FY2012. 112-77 ). Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the Science and Technology directorate (S&T), and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. | The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations bill includes funding for all components and functions of DHS, including Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); the Transportation Security Administration (TSA); Coast Guard (USCG); Secret Service (USSS); the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), which includes Infrastructure Protection and Information Security (IPIS) and the Federal Protective Service (FPS); the Office of Health Affairs (OHA); the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); the Science and Technology directorate (S&T); the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO); departmental management, Analysis and Operations (A&O), and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).
For FY2013, the Administration requested $39.510 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS, as part of an overall budget of $59.501 billion (including fees, trust funds, and other funding that is not appropriated or does not score against the budget caps). H.R. 5855, the House-passed DHS appropriations bill in the 112th Congress, would have provided $39.114 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, while S. 3126, its Senate-reported counterpart in the 112th Congress, would have provided $39.514 billion.
Congress did not enact final FY2013 appropriations legislation prior to the end of FY2012. From October 1, 2012, through March 26, 2013, the federal government (including DHS) operated under the terms of P.L. 112-175, a part-year continuing resolution. While operating under this resolution, two major events impacted the DHS budget. First, Hurricane Sandy struck the east coast of the United States, which started a legislative process that resulted in enactment of legislation that provided $50.7 billion in disaster relief and emergency appropriations, including $12.072 billion for DHS, and $9.7 billion in additional borrowing authority for the National Flood Insurance Program. Weeks later, On March 1, 2013, an across-the-board reduction in budget authority, or sequestration, was ordered as required under the terms of the Budget Control Act (P.L. 112-25). The Office of Management and Budget's sequestration report indicated that DHS would lose $3.191 billion as a result of sequestration.
On March 26, 2013, the President signed into law P.L. 113-6, the FY2013 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act. Division D of that act is the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2013, which includes $39.646 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS. Two across-the-board cuts unrelated to the March 1 sequestration that were included in the final legislation to ensure the bill complies with discretionary budget caps reduced this by $54 million to $39.592 billion.
The above enacted funding levels for FY2013 are subject to sequestration cuts. As the federal government was operating under a continuing resolution at the time sequestration was ordered, the final budget impact cannot be authoritatively stated until the Office of Management and Budget provides further information.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL34091 | crs_RL34091_0 | Introduction
The U.S. economy is becoming increasingly open to the world economy. In the process, today's global economy, or what many call globalization, is having a growing impact on the economic futures of American companies, workers, and families. Competition from economic integration is seen as making the U.S. economy more efficient and more productive. Increased economic openness and interdependence may also engender opposition as some groups benefit more than others from globalization, leading some to question whether the global economy is structured to help the few or the many. While the U.S. economy as a whole benefits, some workers, firms, and communities are made worse off. To bolster public support for an open world economy, conventional wisdom suggests that the legitimate concerns of those who are adversely affected by the contemporary economic environment need to be addressed. To what extent adversely affected workers should be helped to adjust to the changes associated with globalization and how, however, is a matter of considerable congressional and public debate. The current wave of globalization, which may be unprecedented in terms of its scale and pace, is supported by three broad trends. The first is technology, which has sharply reduced the cost of communication and transportation that previously divided markets. The second is a dramatic increase in the world supply of labor engaged in international trade. The third is government policies which have reduced barriers to trade and investment. A growing body of research examines whether these trends are combining to create new vulnerabilities for workers. The information technology revolution also facilitates international trade in a wider range of services, from call center operations to sophisticated financial, legal, medical, and engineering services. Not only does this integration increase fears of job loss among workers in rich countries, but it leads to concerns that employers will have to lower their wages and benefits in order to compete. For most Americans, this translated into absolute increases in living standards as measured by gains in real consumption and real disposable incomes. However, these positive developments coincided with changing employment patterns caused by increased foreign competition, a declining wage share of national income, and rising earnings inequality. Whether these trends may be contributing to declining public support for U.S. engagement with the world economy and for additional trade agreements remains to be seen. The trend of rising income inequality is not unique to the United States. A variety of explanations—trade with developing countries, increases in foreign investment flows, an increase in low-skilled immigration, trade and financial liberalization, skill-based technological change, and changes in regulations and institutions—have been put forth to explain these income trends where the relative returns to skilled labor and capital are increasing while the relative returns to unskilled labor are decreasing. Policy Approaches
The relationship between globalization and worker insecurity is complicated and uncertain. As a result, a number of different approaches might be required if ones goal is to maximize American economic well being with the derivative need to bolster public support for globalization and an open global economy. Approaches involving adjustment assistance, education, taxes, and trade are most commonly put forth in this context. A key question may be the extent to which any of these approaches can be designed and implemented in a way that would reduce worker insecurity without undermining the benefits of globalization. In the view of many economists, policies that inhibit the dynamism and flexibility of labor and capital markets or raise barriers to international trade and investment would not be helpful because technology and trade are critical sources of overall economic growth and increases in the U.S. standard of living. | Today's global economy, or what many call globalization, has a growing impact on the economic futures of American companies, workers, and families. Increasing integration with the world economy makes the U.S. and other economies more productive. For most Americans, this has translated into absolute increases in living standards and real disposable incomes. However, while the U.S. economy as a whole benefits from globalization, it is not always a win-win situation for all Americans. Rising trade with low-wage developing countries not only increases concerns of job loss, but it also leads U.S. workers to fear that employers will lower their wages and benefits in order to compete. Globalization facilitated by the information technology revolution expands international trade in a wider range of services, but also subjects an increasing number of U.S. white collar jobs to outsourcing and international competition. Also, globalization may benefit some groups more than others, leading some to wonder whether the global economy is structured to help the few or the many.
The current wave of globalization is supported by three broad trends. The first is technology, which has sharply reduced the cost of communication and transportation that previously divided markets. The second is a dramatic increase in the world supply of labor engaged in international trade. The third is government policies that have reduced barriers to trade and investment. Whether these trends are creating new vulnerabilities for workers is the subject of increasing research and debate.
Some of the vulnerabilities for workers are underlined by changing employment patterns caused by increased foreign competition, weak wage growth, and rising income inequality. These trends, in turn, have become a source of economic insecurity for many Americans and may be weakening public support for U.S. engagement with the world economy.
To bolster public support for an open world economy, the conventional wisdom is that the legitimate concerns of those who are losing in the contemporary economic environment need to be addressed. To what extent the losers should be compensated and how is a matter of considerable congressional and public debate. Because the relationship between globalization and worker insecurity is complicated and uncertain, a number of different approaches may be considered if the goal is to bolster public support for U.S. trade policies, globalization, and an open world economy. Policies involving adjustment assistance, education, tax, and trade are most commonly proposed.
There appears to be a range of views on the merits of each of these policy approaches and the extent to which they can be designed and implemented in a way that would reduce worker insecurity without undermining the benefits of globalization. In the view of many economists, policies that inhibit the dynamism of labor and capital markets or erect barriers to international trade and investment would not be helpful because technology and trade are critical sources of overall economic growth and increase U.S. living standards. At the same time, identifying the most effective policy approach is made difficult by the variety of factors – trade with developing countries, increases in foreign investment flows, trade and financial liberalization, immigration, and skill-based technological change – that may be generating job and income trends that are increasing worker insecurity. |
crs_R43569 | crs_R43569_0 | FY2015 Chronology
December 16, 2014. The President signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( H.R. 83 / P.L. On November 5 and 10, 2014, the Administration submitted amendments to its FY2015 budget request to address the Ebola crisis and the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS), respectively. The Administration requested an additional $2.89 billion in emergency funding through international affairs accounts for activities related to Ebola, including a $792 million contingency fund. An additional $520 million was requested for the international affairs OCO budget to support efforts to defeat IS and address humanitarian needs related to IS attacks. The House and Senate were unable to pass regular appropriations bills before the end of the fiscal year and, therefore, passed H.J.Res. 124 , Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015, on September 17 and 18, respectively. The President signed the CR into law ( P.L. 113-164 ) on September 19, 2014. The CR funded government agencies and programs at an across-the-board reduction of .0554% below the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. 113-76 ), funding rate through December 11, 2014. OCO funds were not subject to the reduction. The CR included some anomalies, with one for foreign affairs: Section 145 provided the Department of State with the ability to exceed the rate for operations that would otherwise apply to funds in a number of accounts—International Broadcasting Operations, Economic Support Fund (ESF), Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF)—to sustain assistance for Ukraine and other independent states in that region. Two additional CRs— P.L. 113-202 and H.J.Res. 131 —kept the government funded until the full-year appropriations bill was signed into law. On June 27, the Administration amended its OCO request, asking for an additional $1.35 billion in State-Foreign Operations OCO funds (out of a total $65.8 billion OCO request, mostly for Department of Defense programs) for peacekeeping and counterterrorism activities. On June 19, 2014, the Senate Appropriations Committee introduced and passed S. 2499 , an SFOPS appropriation for FY2015 that totaled $47.18 billion. 5013 , on June 27, which recommended total funding of $48.45 billion. The Obama Administration submitted its original FY2015 budget request, including for International Affairs (function 150), to Congress on March 4, 2014. Of the total FY2015 foreign a ffairs request, $17.09 billion wa s for State Department Operations and related agencies, a 7.8% increase from the FY2014 funding estimate of $15.86 billion. For Foreign Op erations, the Administration requested $32.99 billion, a 2.2% decrease from the FY2014 estimate of $33.72 billion. The FY2015 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Appropriations Request
The amended FY2015 foreign affairs request (about 1% of the total FY2015 budget request) would have increased overall SFOPS funding by 8.8% from the FY2014 funding estimate. The amended Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) portion of the FY2015 request was 14.6%, compared to 13.3% in FY2014, and 5% of the amended request was designated as emergency Ebola funding. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
For the FY2015 foreign affairs budget, the Administration requested $7.785 billion (as amended) for OCO—more than double the $3.8 billion requested in FY2014, and 19% more than Congress appropriated for that year (after rescissions). The House committee bill, H.R. The final FY2015 appropriation included $9.26 billion for OCO, more than either House or Senate proposals, largely because of additional OCO funding to counter the Islamic State (IS). Since FY2012, the Administration's foreign affairs budget has distinguished between what it has interchangeably called "enduring", "base," or "ongoing" funding, and funding to support "overseas contingency operations" (OCO), described in budget documents as "extraordinary, but temporary, costs of the Department of State and USAID in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan." The Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative
The Obama Administration added to its FY2015 budget a new government-wide proposal referred to as the Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative. Proposed funding for the initiative covered the following:
$350 million to the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), above the requested $1 billion, to develop overseas economic environments and help U.S. businesses be more competitive; $300 million within the Global Health Programs (GHP) account to encourage more funding from other donors to the Global Fund for fighting AIDS, TB, and Malaria; funds for Maternal and Child Health activities within GHP to provide extra momentum toward ending preventable maternal and child deaths; $80 million in multilateral aid for the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program; $29.9 million for the Board for International Broadcasting's satellite transmission program, estimated to provide a 31% cost savings; an unspecified amount of funding within the Development Assistance (DA) account to support bilateral and multilateral food security in the Feed the Future Initiative; and support within DA for USAID's Global Development Lab to encourage science, technology, innovation, and partnerships that would promote development. The FY2015-enacted level shows a slight decrease in enduring funds and the peak funding level for OCO/emergency funds, including funds to address IS and the Ebola crisis. State Operations and Related Agencies
The Administration's FY2015 request, as amended, sought to increase funding for the State Department and Related Accounts category by 8.3% over FY2014 estimated levels, to $17.18 billion. In addition, the Administration's FY2015 request, as amended, included a $428 million Peacekeeping Response Mechanism (PKRM), a new proposal intended to support urgent peacekeeping needs, including $278 million for a recently authorized U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic. (Both bills were reported before the Administration revised its Foreign Operations OCO request upward to $5.47 billion). 113-235 , included $7.49 billion in foreign operations funds designated as OCO, a 46% increase over FY2014 and higher than the Administration's request and both the House and Senate bills. However, with the growing humanitarian needs created by the Ebola epidemic in Africa and the deteriorating environment in Iraq and Syria, the Administration requested an additional $1.49 billion in IDA funds in November 2014. The FY2014 appropriation did not adopt these reforms, but new authorizing legislation in the 2014 Farm Bill (Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. Africa Initiatives. The Senate committee report recommended $1 billion for this purpose. Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI) . Appendix A. State-Foreign Operations Appropriations, by Account
Appendix B. | On December 16, 2014, Congress presented the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R. 83), to the President, who signed it into law (P.L. 113-235) that same day. In Division J of that act, Congress appropriated $51.98 billion for the Department of State and Foreign Operations, including $9.26 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) and $2.53 billion to address the Ebola crisis.
The annual State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill (also referred to here as "foreign affairs appropriations" or "foreign affairs funding") is the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. international affairs budget and influences executive branch foreign policymaking. (Foreign relations authorization and foreign assistance authorization legislation, required by law prior to State Department and foreign aid expenditures, are also available to Congress to influence foreign policy, but Congress has not passed either since FY2003 and FY1985, respectively. Instead, Congress has waived the requirement within the appropriations laws.)
On March 4, 2014, the Obama Administration submitted to Congress its budget request for FY2015. The original request for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs totaled $48.62 billion, including $5.91 billion for OCO funding. The Administration amended this request on June 27, 2014 by increasing OCO funds and updating export assistance estimates, thus raising the overall total to $50.08 billion. The Administration further amended the request in November 2014 for emergency funding to address the Ebola crisis in Africa and for civilian activities to counter the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS). The amended FY2015 request totaled $53.50 billion, 8.8% more than the FY2014-enacted level.
Of the total FY2015 request, as amended, 14.6% was designated as OCO (compared to 13.3% in FY2014) and 5.4% was designated as emergency funding (compared to no emergency funding in FY2014). $17.18 billion was for State Department Operations and related agencies, an 8.3% increase from the FY2014 funding estimate of $15.86 billion. For Foreign Operations, the Administration requested $36.32 billion, a 7.7% increase from the FY2014 estimate of $33.72 billion.
Key aspects of the Administration request that interested some Members of the 113th Congress included
$4.59 billion requested for enduring diplomatic security funding to continue implementing post-Benghazi Accountability Review Board recommendations in FY2015, 4.7% more than estimated for these same accounts in FY2014; a twice-amended OCO request for funding to the frontline states of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; including an additional $278 million for estimated costs of a U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic within the new Peacekeeping Response Mechanism (PKRM); an additional $75 million within Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for security reform in Europe; $1 billion to enhance counterterrorism and crisis response activities within a Counterterrorism Partnership Fund; and $520 million to assist Syrian opposition groups and address humanitarian needs related to IS attacks in Iraq and Syria. $2.896 billion for humanitarian and health care activities related to the Ebola virus outbreak, including a $792 million contingency fund to increase flexibility in addressing future Ebola-related needs. support for the Administration's ongoing development initiatives: Global Health, Global Climate Change, and Feed the Future, as well as $114.3 million for new Africa initiatives; and an additional request for a new government-wide Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative that would provide more than $760 million to foreign affairs programs, beyond the regular budget request.
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported FY2015 SFOPs bills out of committee on June 27 and June 9, respectively. The House committee bill (H.R. 5013) recommended $48.45 billion in total, including $5.19 billion designated as OCO. The Senate committee bill (S. 2499) recommended a funding total of $47.18 billion, with $8.63 billion designated as OCO. Both bills were reported before the Administration amended the OCO request, twice, and requested emergency funds to address the Ebola outbreak. Final funding levels are compared to FY2014 funding estimates and the FY2015 request (as amended, when noted) throughout this report and in Appendix A and Appendix B.
Since the House and Senate were unable to pass regular appropriations bills before the end of the fiscal year, they passed H.J.Res. 124, Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015 (CR), on September 17 and 18, 2014, respectively. The President signed the CR into law (P.L. 113-164) on September 19, 2014. The CR funded government agencies and programs at an across-the-board reduction of .0554% below the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), funding rate through December 11, 2014. OCO funds were not subject to the reduction. The CR included some anomalies, including one for foreign affairs that provided the Department of State with the ability to exceed the rate for operations applied to funds in a number of accounts in order to sustain assistance for Ukraine and other independent states in that region for programs, such as international broadcasting, economic, and security assistance.
Two additional CRs—P.L. 113-202 and H.J.Res. 131—were passed to keep the government funded until passage of the full-year appropriations bill could occur.
Total funding for the State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs over the past 10 years has ranged from a low of $35.85 billion (including supplemental appropriations) in FY2006 to a high of $53.00 billion in FY2012 (including war-related Overseas Contingency Operations, OCO, appropriations). With the exception of FY2015, it has declined each year since FY2012, attributable, perhaps, to passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25). Appendix A (State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs) and Appendix B (function 150) tables provide side-by-side account-level funding data for FY2014 estimated funding, the amended FY2015 request, and FY2015-enacted levels. |
crs_RL34284 | crs_RL34284_0 | Aviation congestion and delay is an issue of long standing. Statistically, there was a significant increase in congestion and delay throughout the national aviation system in 2007. The situation has been especially noticeable at certain key airports, namely the New York region in general and John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in particular. The Department of Transportation (DOT) and its operating agency, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), have promised to take actions aimed at reducing congestion and delay both in the short and long terms. In the short term, DOT is proposing to address the JFK situation through administrative and economic measures that would likely restrict or otherwise provide for the allocation of flights into the airport during specific periods of time. In addition to the proposals likely to be made by DOT, there are other potential near-term fixes that can be considered to add system-wide capacity to the aviation system. These include, but are not limited to: airspace redesign, use of military airspace, and airspace flow control. Over the longer term the FAA is primarily relying on modernization of the air traffic control system through the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS or NextGen) and the creation of new airport infrastructure to provide major reductions in aviation congestion and delay. Congress has taken a particular interest in this issue as these growing concerns over airline service have paralleled ongoing legislative action to reauthorize the activities of the FAA and the revenue mechanisms for funding the operations of the national airspace system. The Bush Administration, and especially Secretary of Transportation Peters, favor market mechanisms for infrastructure development and maintenance in all transportation modes. It was, therefore, not a surprise that the Administration made a review of congestion pricing part of its proposal for FAA reauthorization in early 2007, H.R. The FAA proposal seeks to establish a pilot program to evaluate market-based mechanisms to relieve congestion at up to 16 airports (including LGA, which was the subject of a separate provision). The FAA proposal was not adopted in either the House ( H.R. 2881 ) or Senate ( S. 1300 ) reauthorization bills still under consideration at the end of 2007. 1356 / S. 1076 ). Neither the FAA nor the DOT have, to date, attempted to develop and impose a congestion pricing scheme on the local authorities. In the event that FAA should decide to make such an attempt, it appears that there are several legal issues that may arise. | Aviation congestion and delay is an issue of long standing. Statistically, there was a significant increase in congestion and delay throughout the national aviation system in 2007. The situation has been especially noticeable at certain key airports, namely the New York region in general and John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in particular. The Department of Transportation (DOT) and its operating agency, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), have promised to take actions aimed at reducing congestion and delay both in the short and long terms. In the short term, DOT is proposing to address the JFK situation through administrative and economic measures that would likely restrict or otherwise provide for the allocation of flights into the airport during specific periods of time.
In addition to the proposals likely to be made by DOT, there are other potential near-term fixes that can be considered to add system-wide capacity to the aviation system. These include, but are not limited to: airspace redesign, use of military airspace, and airspace flow control. Over the longer term the FAA is primarily relying on modernization of the air traffic control system through the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS or NextGen) and the creation of new airport infrastructure to provide major reductions in aviation congestion and delay, although a recent FAA capacity needs study has concluded that these enhancements are needed immediately, especially in the New York region.
Congress has taken an interest in this issue as growing concerns over airline service have paralleled ongoing legislative action to reauthorize the activities of the FAA and the revenue mechanisms for funding the operations of the national airspace system. The Bush Administration, and especially Secretary of Transportation Peters, favor examining market mechanisms as a means to pay for infrastructure operations, maintenance, and development in all transportation modes. When the Administration submitted its proposals for FAA reauthorization in early 2007 (H.R. 1356/S. 1076), it included a pilot program to evaluate market-based mechanisms to relieve congestion at up to 16 airports. The FAA proposal was not adopted in either the House (H.R. 2881) or Senate (S. 1300) reauthorization bills still under consideration at the end of 2007, but the House bill contains provisions intended to help the FAA deal with congestion problems at specific airports.
Regulation of the national air transportation system is legally the domain of the federal government. The operation and ownership of airports, however, is provided primarily by regional, state and local entities. Neither the FAA nor the DOT have, to date, attempted to develop and impose a congestion pricing scheme on the local authorities. In the event that FAA should decide to make such an attempt, it appears that there are several legal issues that may arise. This report will be updated as warranted by DOT and congressional actions. |
crs_R44365 | crs_R44365_0 | These Members have raised questions about the size and composition of the gig workforce, the proper classification of gig workers (i.e., as employees or independent contractors), the potential for gig work to create work opportunities for unemployed or underemployed workers, and implications of gig work for worker protections and access to traditional employment-based benefits. An Overview of the Gig Economy
The gig economy is the collection of markets that match providers to consumers on a gig (or job) basis in support of on-demand commerce. In the basic model, gig workers enter into formal agreements with on-demand companies to provide services to the company's clients. Prospective clients request services through an Internet-based technological platform or smartphone application that allows them to search for providers or to specify jobs. Providers (i.e., gig workers) engaged by the on-demand company provide the requested services and are compensated for the jobs. With some exceptions, on-demand companies view providers as independent contractors—not employees—using their platforms to obtain referrals and transact with clients. This designation is frequently made explicit in the formal agreement that establishes the terms of the provider-company relationship. In some ways, then, the gig economy can be viewed as an expansion of traditional freelance work (i.e., self-employed workers who generate income through a series of jobs and projects). However, gig jobs may differ from traditional freelance jobs in a few ways. Because gig workers do not need to invest in establishing a company and marketing to a consumer base, operating costs may be lower and allow workers' participation to be more transitory in the gig market (i.e., they have greater flexibility around the number of hours worked and scheduling). On-demand companies collect commissions from providers for jobs solicited through the company platform. Some on-demand companies discourage or bar providers from accepting work outside the platform from clients who use the company's platform. This is a potentially important difference between gig work and traditional freelance work, because it curtails the provider's ability to build a client base or operate outside the platform. Measuring and characterizing the gig economy workforce are challenging tasks for several reasons. Bureau of Labor Statistics Data: Contingent Workers, Alternative Employment Arrangements, and Self-Employment
Existing large-scale labor force survey data on nontraditional work arrangements and self-employment may provide some insights, but are imperfect proxy measures of contemporary gig economy participants. Other Data Sources: Company Data and Small-Scale Surveys
A small but growing literature examines data collected from individual companies operating in the gig economy or pockets of gig economy workers. However, with few exceptions, they do not profile the gig economy as a whole; instead, they can be viewed as snapshots of certain groups of gig workers. Whether a worker in the gig economy may be considered an employee rather than an independent contractor is significant for purposes of various federal labor and employment laws. In general, employees enjoy the protections and benefits provided by such laws, whereas independent contractors are not covered. Two laws, in particular, have drawn recent attention. Voluntary Employer-Provided Benefits
Beyond federally mandated labor standards, certain other benefits often associated with traditional employment relationships may not be available in the same form to workers in the gig economy. New mechanisms, such as portable benefits or risk-pooling, may serve to provide benefits to workers in the on-demand or gig economy. | The gig economy is the collection of markets that match providers to consumers on a gig (or job) basis in support of on-demand commerce. In the basic model, gig workers enter into formal agreements with on-demand companies (e.g., Uber, TaskRabbit) to provide services to the company's clients. Prospective clients request services through an Internet-based technological platform or smartphone application that allows them to search for providers or to specify jobs. Providers (i.e., gig workers) engaged by the on-demand company provide the requested service and are compensated for the jobs.
Recent trends in on-demand commerce suggest that gig workers may represent a growing segment of the U.S. labor market. In response, some Members of Congress have raised questions, for example, about the size of the gig workforce, how workers are using gig work, and the implications of the gig economy for labor standards and livelihoods more generally.
With some exceptions, on-demand companies view providers as independent contractors (i.e., not employees) using the companies' platforms to obtain referrals and transact with clients. This designation is frequently made explicit in the formal agreement that establishes the terms of the provider-company relationship. In some ways, the gig economy can be viewed as an expansion of traditional freelance work (i.e., self-employed workers who generate income through a series of jobs and projects).
However, gig jobs may differ from traditional freelance jobs in a few ways. For example, coordination of jobs through an on-demand company reduces entry and operating costs for providers and allows workers' participation to be more transitory in gig markets (i.e., they have greater flexibility around work hours). The terms placed around providers' use of some tech platforms may further set gig work apart. For example, some on-demand companies discourage providers from accepting work outside the platform from certain clients. This is a potentially important difference between gig work and traditional freelance work because it may limit the provider's ability to build a client base and operate outside the platform.
Characterizing the gig economy workforce (i.e., those providing services brokered through tech-based platforms) is challenging along several fronts. To date, no large-scale official data have been collected, and there remains considerable uncertainty about how to best measure this segment of the labor force. Existing large-scale labor force survey data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the U.S. Census Bureau may provide some insights, but are imperfect proxy measures of contemporary gig economy participants. A small literature examines data collected by individual companies operating in the gig economy or from pockets of gig-economy workers. As such, these analyses can be viewed as snapshots of certain gig workers, but they are not necessarily representative of the full market.
The apparent availability of gig jobs and the flexibility they seem to provide workers are frequently touted features of the gig economy. However, to the extent that gig-economy workers are viewed as independent contractors, gig jobs differ from traditional employment in notable ways. First, whether a worker in the gig economy may be considered an employee rather than an independent contractor is significant for purposes of various federal labor and employment laws. In general, employees enjoy the protections and benefits provided by such laws, whereas independent contractors are not covered. Two laws, in particular, the Fair Labor Standards Act and the National Labor Relations Act, have drawn recent attention.
In addition, certain other benefits (e.g., paid sick leave, health insurance, retirement benefits) that are often associated with traditional employment relationships may not be available in the same form to workers in the gig economy. Should Congress choose to consider ways of increasing access to such benefits for nontraditional employees, new mechanisms, such as portable benefits or risk-pooling, could serve to provide benefits to workers in the gig economy. |
crs_R43966 | crs_R43966_0 | Introduction and Overview
The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). President Obama's FY2016 budget request, released February 2, 2015, would have provided $36.04 billion for agencies in the Energy and Water Development bill—3.6% above the $34.78 billion appropriated for FY2015. The House approved its version of the FY2016 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill ( H.R. 2028 , H.Rept. 114-91 ) May 1, 2015, by a vote of 244-177. Total funding in the bill, including rescissions, was $35.4 billion, 1.8% below the Administration's request. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of H.R. 2028 ( S.Rept. 114-54 ) on May 21, 2015. Congress enacted an omnibus funding measure for the entire federal government on December 18, 2015, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. The omnibus measure provided a total of $37.3 billion for energy and water programs for FY2016, an increase of 7.3% over FY2015. For FY2015, appropriations for Energy and Water Development programs were included in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( H.R. 83 ). For details, see CRS Report CRS Report R43567, Energy and Water Development: FY2015 Appropriations , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. Waters of the United States
The Corps requested but did not receive a $5 million increase for Clean Water Act (CWA) rulemaking activities, including developing a final rule to define "waters of the United States (WOTUS)" jointly with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). H.R. Energy Efficiency in Manufacturing and Vehicles
DOE's energy efficient manufacturing research funding would have more than doubled under the Administration request, with most of the increase going to the establishment of two new Clean Energy Manufacturing Institutes as part of the National Network for Manufacturing Innovation. Research on energy efficient vehicles would have risen 59% under the FY2016 budget request. But the House, as it has in the past, rejected funding for the Administration's nuclear waste management program and provided $175 million to continue the Yucca Mountain licensing process. International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), under construction in France, continues to draw congressional concerns about management, schedule, and cost. The Senate committee proposed eliminating ITER funding. DOE efforts to resume operations at WIPP have continued in FY2016. 114-113 . DOE also proposed for FY2016 to transfer counterterrorism and counterproliferation programs from the Weapons Activities appropriations account to Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. | The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) civil works projects, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), and the Department of Energy (DOE), as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill's total funding.
President Obama's FY2016 budget request was released February 2, 2015. Including adjustments, the request for Energy and Water Development agencies totaled $36.04 billion, compared with a total of $34.78 billion appropriated for FY2015, an increase of 3.6%. The House approved its version of the FY2016 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill on May 1, 2015 (H.R. 2028, H.Rept. 114-91), and the Senate Appropriations Committee followed on May 21, 2015 (H.R. 2028, S.Rept. 114-54); both bills provided total budget authority of about $35.4 billion.
After lengthy negotiations, Congress enacted an omnibus funding measure on December 18, 2015, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2029, P.L. 114-113). The omnibus measure provided a total of $37.3 billion for energy and water programs for FY2016, an increase of 7.3% over FY2015.
Major Energy and Water Development funding highlights for FY2016 included
Waters of the United States. Language to block a controversial rulemaking to define "waters of the United States" was considered but not adopted; Energy Efficiency in Manufacturing and Vehicles. DOE's energy efficient manufacturing research would have more than doubled and research on energy efficient vehicles would have risen 59% under the FY2016 budget request, but smaller increases were approved; Nuclear Waste Management. The House approved $175 million for the statutorily authorized candidate disposal site at Yucca Mountain, NV, while the Senate Appropriations Committee would have authorized and funded an interim storage pilot facility, but none of those provisions were adopted; ITER Fusion Reactor. Cost, schedule, and management concerns were raised about the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER); Nuclear Weapons Activities. Congress approved the Administration's requested 10.7% increase for weapons activities and a proposal to combine and transfer two counterterrorism programs within DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration; Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Recovery. Efforts to resume operations at the WIPP defense transuranic waste repository in New Mexico are to continue in FY2016 with decreased total funding; and Surplus Plutonium Disposition. Level funding was approved, as requested, for a multibillion-dollar plant to convert surplus nuclear weapons plutonium into civilian nuclear reactor fuel.
For FY2015, appropriations for Energy and Water Development programs were included in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R. 83, Division D). For details, see CRS Report R43567, Energy and Water Development: FY2015 Appropriations, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34329 | crs_RL34329_0 | Introduction
In the last 30 years, the United States has devoted resources and committed billions of dollars toward restoring large ecosystems such as the Chesapeake Bay, the Great Lakes, the Florida Everglades, and the San Francisco Bay and Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers Delta (California Bay-Delta). Congress is generally responsible for authorizing federal agency involvement in restoration efforts and establishing guidelines for managing and implementing ecosystem restoration projects. Congress is also interested in the progress of ecosystem restoration initiatives because many restoration activities and projects are funded by federal appropriations. A crosscut budget can be developed and organized in several ways. Potential Elements of a Crosscut Budget
Purposes, Stakeholders, and Audiences
At its most basic level, a crosscut budget is often used to present budget information from two or more agencies whose activities are targeted at a common policy goal or, alternatively, related policy goals. This can assist in making data from multiple agencies more understandable (e.g., putting levels of effort into perspective, showing how different efforts relate to each other) and might be used as a tool for congressional oversight committees, participating agencies, and stakeholders implementing an ecosystem restoration program or initiative. A crosscut budget may be used to track program accomplishments, measure progress toward achieving program goals, or compare activities conducted by various agencies aimed at the same goal. When designing a crosscut budget, questions to consider include:
How closely related to the overall program goal must an activity be to be included in the crosscut budget? (See " Tracking Progress ," below.) Stages of Funding
Funding may be tracked in terms of appropriations, obligations, and outlays. Therefore, the time frame for submitting the crosscut budget may affect the accuracy or currency of the data. Examples of Crosscut Budgets for Ecosystem Restoration
The Everglades and CALFED ecosystem restoration initiatives submit crosscut budgets annually. Funding Categories
Defining what programs should be included in an assessment of restoration activities and their funding has been controversial for several restoration initiatives. Before determining what activities to include in a crosscut budget, some restoration initiatives have defined the geographical area of the ecosystem and determined what activities constitute ecosystem restoration. However, if crosscuts become too unwieldy and large, or are not designed to address the needs of specific audiences and stakeholders, some believe that they will not communicate information in an effective and timely manner and will result in a wasted investment of resources. | In the last 30 years, the United States has devoted enormous effort and committed billions of dollars toward restoring large ecosystems such as the Chesapeake Bay and the Great Lakes. These ecosystem restoration initiatives generally address multiple objectives that go beyond restoring the ecosystem, such as water conveyance and levee stability. Consequently, these initiatives involve many stakeholders conducting and implementing a variety of restoration activities and other projects. Coordinating and overseeing the implementation and funding of such projects and activities can be challenging, and sometimes controversial. To address the complexity of organizing, managing, and implementing ecosystem restoration initiatives, some agencies involved in restoration initiatives have implemented crosscut budgets.
At its most basic level, a crosscut budget is often used to present budget information from two or more agencies whose activities are targeted at a common policy goal or related policy goals. Crosscut budgets can assist in making data from multiple agencies more understandable, and could be used to inform congressional oversight committees, participating agencies, and stakeholders implementing an ecosystem initiative. A crosscut budget may also be used to track program accomplishments, measure progress towards achieving program goals, or compare activities conducted by various agencies aimed at the same goal.
When designing a crosscut budget, there are several potential elements that can be considered, including the scope of the crosscut, or which types of programs and activities should be included in the crosscut; levels of aggregation within the crosscut; stages of funding tracked by the crosscut (e.g., appropriations or outlays); time frame covered; timing of submission and updates; assigning responsibility for gathering the data for the crosscut; and tracking progress of restoration activities and projects.
The variability in the design and implementation of crosscut budgets for ecosystem restoration initiatives generates several design questions. For example, some believe that funding amounts should be portrayed in relation to progress toward achieving restoration goals. Other issues include determining what programs to include or exclude in a crosscut budget, assigning accountability, and coordinating projects in an ecosystem restoration initiative.
Crosscut budgets can help address coordination and organizational issues in restoration initiatives. Some contend that expanding their breadth to track progress or evaluate success in restoration initiatives may make them more effective. Others, however, suggest that if crosscuts become too unwieldy and complex, or are not designed to address the needs of specific audiences and stakeholders, they may not communicate information in an effective and timely manner. |
crs_R43265 | crs_R43265_0 | 105-220 ) is the primary federal program that supports workforce development. The authorizations for appropriations for most programs under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 ( P.L. 105-220 ) expired at the end of FY2003. Since that time, WIA programs have been funded through the annual appropriations process. The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) held a markup of S. 1356 on July 31, 2013, and ordered the bill reported by a vote of 18 to 3. WIA established the One-Stop delivery system as a way to co-locate and coordinate the activities of multiple employment programs for adults, youth, and various targeted subpopulations. The delivery of these services occurs primarily through more than 3,000 career centers nationwide. Major Provisions of Title IV of WIA and Title V of S. 1356 . S. 1356 would maintain the existing One-Stop delivery system as the delivery mechanism for employment and training services but would change the governing structure, performance accountability, and some programs. To address coordination and alignment, S. 1356 would
add the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program as a required One-Stop partner (optional partner under current WIA); add requirements for Workforce Development Boards (WDBs, renamed from current Workforce Investment Boards) to coordinate, align programs, and reduce duplicative services; require a Unified State Plan (USP) for core programs—state formula grants, adult education, the Employment Service, and Vocational Rehabilitation; allow a Combined State Plan (CSP) that would include core programs and at least one other One-Stop partner program; expand demonstration and evaluation activities to emphasize collaborative partnerships across institutions and strategies to improve outcomes for individuals with barriers to employment; and establish and authorize appropriations for Workforce Innovation and Replication Grants (WIRG) and Youth Innovation and Replication Grants (YIRG); the WIRG program would provide competitive grants to states and localities to develop and implement innovative strategies to align programs and create coordination in workforce strategies and the YIRG program would provide competitive grants to states and localities to develop and implement strategies and programs (e.g., career pathways) to improve education and employment outcomes for youth. Note on Terminology
This section discusses Title V of the Workforce Investment Act of 2013. | The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA; P.L. 105-220) is the primary federal program that supports workforce development activities, including job search assistance, career development, and job training. WIA established the One-Stop delivery system as a way to co-locate and coordinate the activities of multiple employment programs for adults, youth, and various targeted subpopulations. The delivery of these services occurs primarily through more than 3,000 One-Stop career centers nationwide.
WIA includes four main titles that cover employment and training services, adult education and literacy services, the employment service, and vocational rehabilitation services for individuals with disabilities. The authorizations for appropriations for most programs under WIA expired at the end of FY2003. Since that time, WIA programs have been funded through the annual appropriations process.
The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) held a markup of S. 1356 (the Workforce Investment Act of 2013) on July 31, 2013, and ordered the bill reported by a vote of 18 to 3. S. 1356 would reauthorize WIA through 2018.
S. 1356 would maintain the One-Stop delivery system established by WIA but would make changes to the programs, services, and governing structure of WIA, through changes to Workforce Investment Boards (WIBs), state plan requirements, national programs, and alignment and coordination provisions across all titles. Some of the major changes include the adoption of primary indicators of performance across all WIA titles, the requirement of a Unified State Plan that includes all core programs, the authorization of innovation and replication grants, greater emphasis on economic and employment outcomes for adult education programs, and expanded services for youth and students with disabilities.
This report provides a comparison of major themes in current WIA and in S. 1356. |
crs_RS22665 | crs_RS22665_0 | I n 2007, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Massachusetts v. EPA , its first pronouncement on climate change and still one of the most important environmental law decisions in the past decade. By a vote of 5-4, the Court held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2003 had improperly denied a petition asking the agency to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act (CAA). Contrary to EPA's position, the Court said that the CAA definition of "air pollutant" was unambiguously broad enough to include GHGs. Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower court decision upholding the petition denial. This report confines itself to the Massachusetts v. EPA litigation and leaves to other CRS reports the numerous EPA actions taken as a result of the Supreme Court decision. On the merits, it found that the CAA gives EPA authority to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles, and does not give EPA discretion to inject policy considerations into its decision whether to so regulate. As to the issue of EPA's discretion, the Court concluded that the phrase "in [the Administrator's] judgment" in CAA Section 202 should be read narrowly. Since the Supreme Court Decision
The Court's decision left EPA with three options for responding to the petition: (1) find that new motor vehicle GHG emissions may "endanger public health or welfare," the prerequisite to limiting them under Section 202, then issue emission standards; (2) find that they do not satisfy that prerequisite, or (3) decide that climate change science is so uncertain as to preclude making either finding (1) or (2). Given the state of climate change science by 2007, it was widely believed at the time that option (1) was the only legally defensible one for EPA. This is the option that EPA took. Under other sections of the CAA, EPA has regulated GHG emissions from various stationary sources. Its holding that the CAA authorizes EPA to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles is the governing law, barring Supreme Court reversal or congressional amendment. Standing
So far, the finding of standing in Massachusetts generally has not proved helpful to non-state plaintiffs seeking to establish standing in other climate change litigation. Displacement of Federal Common Law
The holding of Massachusetts was used by a 2011 Supreme Court decision to bar federal common law claims (such as nuisance) against entities on the basis of their contribution to climate change. Regulation of GHG Emissions Under CAA Section 111
The Massachusetts ruling upholding CAA coverage of Section 202 GHG emissions contributed to a 2010 litigation settlement that committed EPA to establishing new source performance standards (NSPSs) for GHG emissions from new fossil fuel fired power plants, and emission guidelines for existing fossil fuel fired power plants, under CAA Section 111. | In 2007, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, its first pronouncement on climate change and a singularly important environmental law decision. This report reviews that decision, but leaves coverage of the many EPA actions based on the decision to other CRS reports.
Massachusetts v. EPA was a case brought to challenge EPA's denial of a petition asking the agency to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act (CAA). By a vote of 5-4, the Court held first that Massachusetts had standing to sue, an issue that took up most of the majority opinion. On the merits, the Court found that the CAA definition of "air pollutant" was unambiguously broad enough to include GHGs. That being so, the Court held, CAA Section 202 authorizes EPA to regulate emissions from new motor vehicles on the basis of their possible climate change impacts. Finally, the Court determined that the phrase "in [the Administrator's] judgment" in Section 202 did not authorize EPA to inject policy considerations into its decision whether to so regulate. For these reasons, the Court reversed the lower court decision upholding the petition denial.
The Court's decision left EPA with three options for responding to the petition: (1) find that new motor vehicle GHG emissions may "endanger public health or welfare," the prerequisite to limiting them under Section 202, then issue emission standards; (2) find that they do not satisfy that prerequisite, or (3) decide that climate change science is so uncertain as to preclude making either finding (1) or (2). Given the state of climate change science by 2007, it was widely believed at the time that option (1) was the only legally defensible one for EPA. This is the option that EPA took, starting with an "endangerment finding" issued in 2009.
Since 2007, the finding of standing in Massachusetts generally has not proved helpful to non-state plaintiffs in climate change litigation, leaving intact this considerable threshold hurdle for climate change plaintiffs. In addition, the Massachusetts holding was used, in part, by a 2011 Supreme Court decision to bar federal common law claims against entities based on their contribution to climate change. On the other hand, Massachusetts has been applied by EPA to support regulations not only of motor vehicles but also of stationary sources of GHG emissions. In particular, Massachusetts helped bring about a 2010 litigation settlement that committed EPA to restricting GHG emissions from certain stationary sources of emissions under Section 111 of the CAA. EPA issued two rules based in part on this settlement: New Source Performance Standards (NSPSs) for GHG emissions from new, modified, or reconstructed fossil fuel fired power plants, and emission guidelines (known as the "Clean Power Plan") for GHG emissions from existing fossil fuel fired power plants. Both rules are being challenged in litigation, and the Clean Power Plan was stayed by the Supreme Court in February 2016, as discussed in other CRS reports.
The Massachusetts decision remains judicially unquestioned. Its holding that the CAA authorizes EPA to regulate GHG emissions remains the governing law, barring Supreme Court reversal or congressional amendment of the CAA. |
crs_R42881 | crs_R42881_0 | Introduction
Since 2001, hundreds of thousands of elementary, secondary, and postsecondary education students have been adversely affected by natural disasters, such as hurricanes and floods, and by national emergencies, such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The majority of federal assistance for disaster management is made available from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), as authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act: P.L. 93-288 ). The public assistance available under the Stafford Act largely provides funds for disaster relief activities such as debris removal, emergency protective measures, and the repair, replacement, or restoration of public facilities damaged during the disaster. On several occasions, Congress has also enacted legislation to create temporary targeted assistance programs to support Department of Education (ED) administered programs at the elementary, secondary, and postsecondary education levels. As of the date of this report, legislation has been enacted in response to the 2017 hurricanes to provide the Secretary of Education (the Secretary) with waiver authority for certain statutory provisions not otherwise authorized, which relates to the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA; P.L. 89-329) Title IV campus-based student aid programs, and to permanently make private schools eligible for funding under the Project School Emergency Response to Violence Program (Project SERV), as authorized under the ESEA. 115-123 ) was enacted. This report reflects the most recently available information on laws and guidance related to education-related disaster response and flexibilities. It will be updated should new or additional statutes be enacted or guidance be issued. The majority of these funds are provided under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Improvement Act (Perkins). This section of the report provides an overview of existing general statutory and regulatory authorities for elementary and secondary education that enable the Secretary of Education (the Secretary) to waive or modify various education requirements. Under Section 8401, the Secretary has broad authority to issue waivers of a number of statutory or regulatory requirements of the ESEA for a state education agency (SEA); local education agency, through an SEA; an Indian tribe; or a school, through an LEA that receives funds under an ESEA program and requests a waiver. The Secretary is prohibited from waiving any statutory or regulatory requirement related to the following requirements:
allocation or distribution of funds to states or LEAs (or other grant recipients); maintenance of effort (MOE) requirements for LEAs or SEAs to maintain their level of spending for specified educational services; comparability of services; the use of federal aid only to supplement, and not supplant, state and local funds for specified purposes; equitable participation of private school students and teachers; parental participation and involvement; applicable civil rights requirements; the requirement for a charter school under the Public Charter Schools program (Title IV-C); prohibitions against consideration of ESEA funds in state aid to LEAs; prohibitions against use of funds for religious worship or instruction; certain prohibitions against use of funds for sex education; and certain ESEA Title I-A school selection requirements. 111-5 ), waivers have also been granted in response to natural disasters. Other ESEA Flexibilities
There are several additional provisions included in the ESEA that may be helpful in providing assistance in response to a disaster, including flexibility related to MOE requirements, charter schools, and funding flexibility. The Secretary may waive these sanctions due to "exceptional or uncontrollable circumstances, such as a natural disaster." In addition, the Secretary has some flexibility with respect to the MOE provision in Perkins. The Secretary may waive up to 5% of the MOE requirement for states for one year due to exceptional or uncontrollable circumstances. As it relates to elementary and secondary education, the act includes FY2018 supplemental appropriations for disaster relief for "covered disasters or emergencies" (i.e., Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, or California wildfires in 2017 for which a major disaster or emergency has been declared under Sections 401 or 501 of the Robert T. Stafford Disasters Relief and Emergency Assistance Act). The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers entitlement programs providing vocational and educational assistance. For example, additional funds were appropriated to IHEs to support recovery efforts and to provide grants to students. As it relates to postsecondary education, the act makes several modifications to the Federal Work Study (FWS) and Federal Supplemental Educational and Opportunity Grant (FSEOG) programs:
With respect to funds made available for award years 2016-2017 and 2017-2018, the act requires the Secretary to waive nonfederal share requirements of FWS and FSEOG programs for IHEs located in affected areas and authorizes the Secretary to waive such requirements for IHEs not located in an affected area that have enrolled or accepted for enrollment any affected students, after considering such IHE's student population and existing resources. The Further Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act, 2018
Also in the 115 th Congress, in response to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria and wildfire incidents in California in 2017, the Further Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act, 2018 (Division B, Subdivision 1 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, P.L. Two such programs are state grants authorized under the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA), which support education for adults at the secondary level and below, as well as English language training; and Vocational Rehabilitation State Grants authorized under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which support the provision of vocational rehabilitation (VR) services to individuals with disabilities. AEFLA does not grant ED the authority to waive states' nonfederal match. | The 21st century has seen the operation of elementary, secondary, and postsecondary educational institutions and the education of the students they enroll disrupted by natural disasters, such as hurricanes and floods, and by national emergencies, such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This report is intended to inform Congress of existing statutory and regulatory provisions that may aid in responding to future disasters and national emergencies that may affect the provision of or access to education and highlight the actions of previous Congresses to provide additional recovery assistance. This report reflects the most recently available guidance, as of the date of publication, related to education-related disaster response and flexibilities. It will be updated should new or additional statutes be enacted or guidance be issued.
The majority of federal aid for disaster management is made available from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act; P.L. 93-288). Under the Stafford Act, public school districts, charter schools, private nonprofit educational institutions, public institutions of higher education (IHEs), and federally recognized Indian tribal governments are eligible to receive assistance for activities such as debris removal, infrastructure and equipment repair and replacement, hazard mitigation, and temporary facilities.
In addition to the assistance available through the Stafford Act, assistance is available through numerous provisions in education laws. At the elementary and secondary level, there are several existing provisions that may be helpful in providing assistance in response to a disaster. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) grants the Secretary of Education (the Secretary) authority to issue waivers of any statutory or regulatory requirement of the ESEA for a state educational agency (SEA), local educational agency (LEA), Indian tribe, or school that receives funds under an ESEA program and requests a waiver. In response to past disasters, waivers have been granted to address funding flexibility issues and accountability requirements. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) grants the Secretary authority to waive state maintenance of effort (MOE) requirements and requirements to supplement, not supplant, federal funds under certain circumstances. The Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act grants the Secretary authority to waive certain accountability metrics and provides some flexibility with regard to MOE requirements. The Secretary is not, however, able to waive all statutory and regulatory requirements with respect to the acts. Under the ESEA, for example, the Secretary may not waive civil rights requirements or prohibitions against the use of funds for religious worship or instruction. Under IDEA, for example, the Secretary may not grant waivers from the right to a free appropriate public education.
At the postsecondary level, various provisions exist to ensure continuity of operations and continuity of federal funding following a disaster. Under the Higher Education Act (HEA), the Secretary of Education has authority to waive several of the requirements for aid recipients, IHEs, and financial institutions when a disaster has been declared. In particular, waivers have been provided from various requirements related to the disbursement, repayment, and administration of federal student aid. Under Title 38 of the U.S. Code, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) may extend payment of veterans educational assistance benefits to cover periods when enrollment is interrupted.
In addition, various provisions exist to provide flexibilities in other Department of Education-administered programs. The Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA) and accompanying regulations grant the Secretary the authority to waive state MOE and reporting requirements for AEFLA state grants due to uncontrollable circumstances such as natural disasters. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, and accompanying regulations grant the Secretary the authority to waive state MOE and reporting requirements for state vocational rehabilitation grants due to uncontrollable circumstances, such as natural disasters.
In response to the multiple hurricanes and tropical storms in 2017, Congress enacted the Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria Education Relief Act of 2017, P.L. 115-64, which amended the ESEA to make private schools eligible for funds under the Project School Emergency Response to Violence Program, which provides funds to help schools recover from violent or traumatic events in which the learning environment has been disrupted. The act also provided short-term authority for the Secretary to waive or modify statutory or regulatory requirements to ensure funds were targeted to affected populations and institutions at the elementary, secondary, and postsecondary levels. On February 9, 2018, the Further Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act, 2018 (Division B, Subdivision 1 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, P.L. 115-123) was enacted. It includes FY2018 supplemental appropriations for disaster relief for, among other things, education-related programs and activities for "covered disasters or emergencies," which include the aforementioned hurricanes and tropical storms and also the California wildfires of 2017. |
crs_RL32929 | crs_RL32929_0 | Background
Most Recent Developments
For FY2010, the Administration proposed to terminate the RRW program and requested no funds for it. The House and Senate Armed Services Committee versions of the FY2010 defense authorization bill each had a provision that would strike Section 4204a of the Atomic Energy Act, which directed the Department of Energy to establish the RRW program. Neither committee recommended providing RRW funds. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees recommended providing no RRW funds for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Reflecting NNSA's concern, Congress first funded the RRW program in the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. CRS Report RL33748, Nuclear Warheads: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program and the Life Extension Program , by Jonathan Medalia, details 20 such goals. In contrast, NEP components cannot be subjected to nuclear tests because the United States has observed a moratorium on nuclear testing since 1992. In this way, it is hoped, components will be close to the originals so that they can be qualified for use in warheads. They believe that LEP can continue to maintain warheads. They note that Congress rejected funds for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, which many Members perceived as being a new nuclear weapon, and that the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. Others hold that neither RRW nor LEP provides confidence in the stockpile. The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 1815 , the committee required the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to carry out the RRW program, and spelled out its objectives for RRW:
(b) Objectives- The objectives of the Reliable Replacement Warhead program shall be—
(1) to increase the reliability, safety, and security of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile;
(2) to further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of nuclear testing;
(3) to remain consistent with basic design parameters by using, to the extent practicable, components that are well understood or are certifiable without the need to resume underground nuclear testing;
(4) to ensure that the United States develops a nuclear weapons infrastructure that can respond to unforeseen problems, to include the ability to produce replacement warheads that are safer to manufacture, more cost-effective to produce, and less costly to maintain than existing warheads;
(5) to achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile based on increased reliability of the reliable replacement warheads;
(6) to use the design, certification, and production expertise resident in the nuclear complex to develop reliable replacement components to fulfill current mission requirements of the existing stockpile; and
(7) to serve as a complement to, and potentially a more cost-effective and reliable long-term replacement for, the current Stockpile Life Extension Programs. DOE's FY2007 operating plan includes $35.8 million for RRW. In addition, the Navy requests $30.0 million for FY2008, and estimates a request of $50.0 million for FY2009, for RRW. A reduction in NNSA's RRW funds, from $88.8 million requested to $68.8 million (pp. This facility would make pits. The House Appropriations Committee marked up the bill on June 6. The House Appropriations Committee reported the defense appropriations bill ( H.R. 110-434 ), which included $15.0 million for the Navy for RRW. P.L. 110-161 eliminated NNSA RRW funds. Congressional Action on the FY2009 RRW Request
For FY2009, DOE requests $10.0 million and projects a request the same sum for each year FY2010-FY2013. In its markup of the FY2009 defense authorization bill, reported in a press release of May 1, 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee recommended retaining NNSA's request for RRW but eliminating the Navy's request. 5658 . The resulting bill had no RRW funds for the Navy or NNSA. The committee eliminated the $10.0 million NNSA request for RRW. H.R. 110-329 through March 11, 2009. The Administration requested $23.3 million in RRW funds for the Navy in the Department of Defense appropriations bill. That bill eliminated Navy RRW funds. No amendments on RRW were offered to either bill. It contained no funds for RRW. It contained no funds for RRW. Webb, Greg, "Leading U.S. | Most current U.S. nuclear warheads were built in the 1970s and 1980s and are being retained longer than was planned. Yet they deteriorate and must be maintained. To correct problems, a Life Extension Program (LEP), part of a larger Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), replaces components. Modifying some components would require a nuclear test, but the United States has observed a test moratorium since 1992. Congress and the Administration prefer to avoid a return to testing, so LEP rebuilds these components as closely as possible to original specifications. With this approach, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy have certified stockpile safety and reliability for the past 12 years without nuclear testing.
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Department of Energy (DOE) component that operates the U.S. nuclear weapons program, would develop the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). For FY2005, Congress provided an unrequested $9.0 million to start RRW. The FY2006 RRW appropriation was $24.8 million, and the FY2007 operating plan had $35.8 million. For FY2008, the request was $88.8 million for NNSA and $30.0 million for the Navy; Congress appropriated no RRW funds for NNSA and $15 million for the Navy. For FY2009, DOE requested $10.0 million for RRW. The Navy requested $23.3 million for RRW but said it prepared its request before Congress eliminated NNSA RRW funds and that the Navy funds would not be used for RRW. The House Armed Services Committee, in its report H.R. 5658, the FY2009 defense authorization bill, recommended eliminating Navy and NNSA RRW funds while adding funds for the Navy and NNSA for related purposes. The House defeated an amendment to add $10.0 million in NNSA RRW funds to H.R. 5658. The Senate Armed Services Committee recommended retaining NNSA's request for RRW but eliminating the Navy's request. The FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 110-417, contained no RRW funds for the Navy or NNSA. Both appropriations committees recommended eliminating NNSA RRW funds for FY2009. Neither P.L. 110-329, Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, nor the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-32, contained NNSA RRW funds. Neither appropriations committee marked up the Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations bill, but P.L. 110-329, Division C, the DOD appropriations bill, contained no Navy RRW funds. For FY2010, the Administration canceled the RRW program and requested no RRW funds. No bills contained RRW funds, but a provision in the House and Senate defense authorization bills would strike Section 4204a of the Atomic Energy Act directing DOE to establish the RRW program.
NNSA argues it will become harder to certify current warheads with LEP because small changes may undermine confidence in warheads, perhaps leading to nuclear testing, whereas new-design replacement warheads created by the RRW program will be easier to certify without testing. Critics believe LEP and SSP can maintain the stockpile indefinitely. They worry that untested RRWs may make testing more likely and question cost savings, given high investment cost. They note that there are no military requirements for new weapons. Others feel that neither LEP nor RRW can provide high confidence over the long term, and would resume testing. Another point of view is that either LEP or RRW will work without nuclear testing.
This report provides background and tracks legislation. It will be updated to reflect final FY2010 congressional action on RRW. See also CRS Report RL33748, Nuclear Warheads: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program and the Life Extension Program, by Jonathan Medalia, which compares these two programs in detail. |
crs_RS21364 | crs_RS21364_0 | Introduction
Supervised release is the successor to parole in the federal criminal justice system. In its place, Congress instituted a system of supervised release, which applies to all federal crimes committed after November 1, 1987. Sentencing courts determine the terms and conditions of supervised release at the same time that they determine other components of a defendant's sentence, and "[t]he duration, as well as the conditions of supervised release are components of a sentence." Conditions
Conditions for supervised release are determined during a federal defendant's initial sentencing, based on the nature of the offense, the defendant's particular history, and other factors. It also authorizes a court, in the case of an offender required to register as a sex offender, to condition supervised release upon the offender's submission to warrantless, suspicionless searches by his probation officer, or with reasonable suspicion warrantless searches by any law enforcement officer. Finally, it allows a court to impose any other appropriate condition as long as the condition is reasonably related to one of several sentencing goals and as long as it involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to accommodate those goals. Courts regularly impose the Sentencing Guidelines' standard conditions as a matter of practice. For example, the Sentencing Guidelines recommend that a court ban possession of weapons during supervised release, if the defendant used a weapon in the commission of the crime at issue or had a record including prior felony convictions. Factors to which the condition must be "reasonably related" include (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the defendant's history and character; (2) deterrence of crime; (3) protection of the public; and (4) the defendant's rehabilitation. In addition to earlier termination of a defendant's term of supervised release, a court may modify supervised release conditions at any time, may revoke a defendant's term of supervised release, require him to return to prison for an addition term of imprisonment, and impose an additional term of supervised release to be served thereafter. Constitutional Considerations
The Constitution limits the range of permissible conditions. In fact, cases that have First Amendment implications are often resolved on those statutory grounds. | Supervised release replaces parole for federal crimes committed after November 1, 1987. Like parole, supervised release is a term of restricted freedom following an offender's release from prison. The nature of supervision and the conditions imposed during supervised release are also similar to those that applied in the old system of parole. However, whereas parole functions in lieu of a remaining prison term, supervised release begins only after an offender has completed his full prison sentence.
A sentencing court determines the duration and conditions for an offender's supervised release term at the time of initial sentencing. As a general rule, federal law limits the maximum duration to five years, although it permits, and in some cases mandates, longer durations for relatively serious drug, sex, and terrorism-related offenses. A sentencing court retains jurisdiction to modify the terms of an offender's supervised release and to revoke the term and return an offender to prison for violation of the conditions.
Several conditions are standard features of supervised release. Some conditions, such as a ban on the commission of further crimes, are mandatory. Other conditions, such as an obligation to report to a probation officer, have become standard by practice and by the operation of the federal Sentencing Guidelines, which courts must consider along with other statutorily designated considerations.
Together with these regularly imposed conditions, the Sentencing Guidelines recommend additional conditions appropriate for specific circumstances. Courts also have the discretion to impose "any other" conditions, as long as they involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary and "reasonably relate" to at least one of the following: the nature of the offense; the defendant's crime-related history; deterrence of crime; protection of the public; or the defendant's rehabilitation.
The conditions of supervised release have been a source of constitutional challenges. Yet a constitutionally suspect condition is also likely to run afoul of statutory demands. In which case, the courts often resolve the issue on statutory grounds.
This report is an abridged version of a longer report, CRS Report RL31653, Supervised Release: A Brief Sketch of Federal Law, without footnotes or citations to authority found in the longer report. |
crs_R44316 | crs_R44316_0 | To date, federal legislative proposals to address current drought conditions have focused on managing federal water projects, supporting new or expanded drought-related projects and programs (including those at the state and local levels), and mitigating the effects of drought and water management on agricultural production, municipal and industrial water supplies, recreational resources, and the environment. These bills include S. 176 , S. 1837 , S. 1894 , H.R. 2898 , H.R. 2983 , and H.R. 3045 , among others. On July 17, 2015, H.R. 2898 , the Western Water and American Food Security Act, passed the House. It includes analysis of provisions specific to California, such as the management of threatened and endangered fish populations in relation to pumping operations of the CVP and SWP, as well as provisions that are broader in scope and might have nationwide implications (e.g., water resources financing, permitting issues, project repayment policies, and support for new water storage and water reuse/recycling). More information about drought in California and in general is provided in the following CRS reports:
CRS Report R40979, California Drought: Hydrological and Regulatory Water Supply Issues , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43407, Drought in the United States: Causes and Current Understanding , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS In Focus IF10196, Drought Policy, Response, and Preparedness , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], Drought Policy, Response, and Preparedness , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]
Overview of the Bills
Of the bills in the 114 th Congress considered to date, H.R. 2898 and S. 1894 , the California Emergency Drought Relief Act of 2015, have received the most congressional and public attention. These bills were the focus of a Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee hearing on October 8, 2015. Both bills focus on water projects and management during drought, and do not attempt to address the broad suite of drought impacts and policies (e.g., effects on wildfire and agricultural assistance programs). 2898 and S. 1894 have generated both support and opposition from stakeholders and have raised several questions about their implementation, if passed. Some controversy is rooted in how the bills address implementation of the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. Supporters of H.R. 2898 contend that such changes would improve the flexibility and responsiveness of the management and operations of the CVP and SWP and could potentially make available additional water to users facing curtailed allocations. The bills contain several similar provisions such as addressing nonnative species, expediting environmental reviews, and increasing science and data collection on listed species, among others. 2898 and S. 1894 have raised a number of questions among interested stakeholders. For example, if water pumped from the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers' Delta (Delta) is directed to be increased beyond the status quo, where will that increased water come from and what effect might it have on other water users, various species, or in-Delta water quality? 2898 and S. 1894 , Managing Salmon Under H.R. 2898 and S. 1894 include provisions that would address water conveyance and flows in relation to fish populations listed under the ESA. 2898 , including the bill's sponsors, state that the incidental take calculation proposed in the legislation would be based on the most up-to-date science and would allow managers to maximize water supplies without harming species. Operational Flexibility During Drought
Both H.R. The directive to maximize water flows, used in both bills, also might raise the question of how agencies would provide the "maximum quantity of water supplies possible" to CVP and other contractors and, relatedly, how they would make such a determination consistent with laws and regulations. Although H.R. However, the new authorities in both bills differ in some ways. in a manner that would not impede project activities, including environmental reviews and construction. S. 1894
Unlike H.R. However, H.R. 2898
H.R. S. 1894
S. 1894 includes multiple provisions associated with expanding federal support for alternative water supplies, efficiency, and conservation. Other issues for Congress may involve the type of projects and financing supported. For example, the bills would authorize the approval of projects and activities that aim to maximize water supplies while remaining consistent with existing laws and regulations. A broad policy question is whether the issue that Congress is addressing is the current Western drought, drought in arid regions, drought in any part of the United States, or gaps in water supply and demand. | Several western states are experiencing extreme or exceptional drought conditions. The persistence and intensity of the drought, which began in 2011 in some areas, has received considerable attention from Congress. To date, federal legislative proposals have focused primarily on the management of federal water projects, support for drought-related programs, and needs of fish and wildlife for water. A broad policy question is how Congress might address western drought, drought in any part of the United States, and gaps in water supply and demand.
Several bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress that would address issues associated with drought. They include S. 176, S. 1837, S. 1894, H.R. 2898, H.R. 2983, and H.R. 3045, among others. Of the bills considered to date, H.R. 2898, the Western Water and American Food Security Act, and S. 1894, the California Emergency Drought Relief Act of 2015, have received the most congressional and public attention. On July 17, 2015, H.R. 2898 passed the House, and on October 8, 2015, both H.R. 2898 and S. 1894 were the focus of a Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee hearing. There are reports that a draft bill addressing differences between H.R. 2898 and S. 1894 is being negotiated; however no new bills have been introduced.
Although H.R. 2898 and S. 1894 address some common issue areas and include some similar provisions, the bills' approaches often differ in important ways. Both bills focus on water projects and management during drought, and do not attempt to address the broad suite of drought impacts and policies (e.g., effects on wildfire and agricultural assistance programs).
To date, the focus on both bills has centered primarily on provisions related to the management and operations of the federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP) in California; however, S. 1894 would authorize several programs and activities that would aim to benefit water users and increase water supplies, including water recycling and desalination. H.R. 2898's supporters contend that the bill would, among other things, improve the flexibility and responsiveness of CVP and SWP operations during the current drought in California and beyond. Supporters also contend that activities authorized under H.R. 2898 could increase water supplies to users facing curtailed allocations and improve the science and data collection activities for identifying the effects of operations on listed species. Broadly speaking, supporters of both H.R. 2898 and S. 1894 contend that the legislation would allow for maximum available water supplies in a manner that is consistent with existing laws and regulations; however, S. 1894 would provide fewer directives for project operations. Others believe the bills could harm listed species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205).
H.R. 2898 and S. 1894 have generated both support and opposition from stakeholders and have raised questions about their potential implementation. The bills also raise a number of questions for Congress to consider when addressing drought, including how to reconcile environmental protections with demand for more water and increased pumping from the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers Delta to support CVP and SWP water contractors. Related questions include whether the Administration is already maximizing water supplies at federally operated water projects and whether water project management and operations pursuant to the ESA and other laws should be adjusted to better account for water resources challenges. The bills also raise other issues, including what principles and approaches should guide federal involvement in water resources management and how much (if any) support the federal government should provide for drought preparedness and relief efforts. Related topics may include the preferred mix of federal and state leadership in addressing drought; the proper balance of federal investment in surface water storage and in new "alternative" water supplies (e.g., water recycling and reuse, desalination); and the geographic scope of drought-related assistance, authorities, and programs. |
crs_R42433 | crs_R42433_0 | The program is administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)—specifically by its Bureau of Primary Care—within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The federal health center program is authorized in Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) and supports four types of health centers: (1) community health centers; (2) health centers for the homeless; (3) health centers for residents of public housing; and (4) migrant health centers. Regardless of type, health centers are required, by statute, to provide health care to all individuals regardless of their ability to pay and are required to be located in geographic areas that have few health care providers. These requirements make health centers part of the health safety net—providers that serve the uninsured, the underserved, or those enrolled in Medicaid. Data compiled by HRSA demonstrate that health centers serve the intended safety net population as the majority of patients are uninsured or enrolled in Medicaid. This report provides an overview of the federal health center program including its statutory authority, program requirements, and appropriation levels. The report then describes health centers in general, where they are located, their patient population, and some outcomes associated with health center use. It also describes the federal programs available to assist health center operations including the federally qualified health center (FQHC) designation for Medicare and Medicaid payments. The report concludes with a brief discussion of issues for Congress such as the potential effects of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) on health centers (both the program and individual health centers), the health center workforce, and financial considerations for health centers in the context of changing federal and state budgets. Finally, the report has two appendices that describe (1) FQHC payments for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries served at health centers; and (2) programs that are similar to health centers but not authorized in Section 330 of the PHSA. The federal health center program awards grants to support outpatient primary care facilities that provide care to primarily low income individuals. This section of the report describes the statutory authority for the federal health center program (also called the health center program), program requirements, types of grants awarded in support of the health center program, the health center program's appropriation, and other funding/revenue that health centers receive. The health center program's appropriation has increased over the past decade, resulting in the establishment of more centers and the ability to serve more patients. ACA, which permanently authorized the health center program, appropriated a total of $1.5 billion for health center construction and repair, and created the Community Health Center Fund (CHCF), which included a total of $9.5 billion for health center operations to be appropriated in FY2011 through FY2015. Researchers have found that access to health centers can improve health outcomes and reduce costs for the populations and areas they serve. Some research has suggested that health centers may reduce health disparities because they provide care to a population that might otherwise have difficultly accessing health care. The FQHC designation was created to ensure that Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements cover the costs of providing services so that Section 330 grant funds are not used to subsidize these costs. | The federal health center program is authorized in Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §§201 et. seq.) and administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) within the Department of Health and Human Services. It awards grants to support outpatient primary care facilities that provide care to primarily low-income individuals or individuals located in areas with few health care providers. Federal health centers are required to provide health care to all individuals regardless of their ability to pay and are required to be located in geographic areas with few health care providers. These requirements make health centers part of the health safety net—providers that serve the uninsured, the underserved, or those enrolled in Medicaid. Data compiled by HRSA demonstrate that health centers serve the intended safety net population, as the majority of patients are uninsured or enrolled in Medicaid. Some research also suggests that health centers are a cost-effective way of meeting this population's health needs because researchers have found that patients seen at health centers have lower health care costs than those served in other settings. In general, research has found that health centers, among other outcomes, improve health, reduce costs, and provide access to health care for populations that may otherwise not obtain health care.
Section 330 grants—funded by the health center program's appropriation—are only one funding source for federal health centers. They are estimated to only cover one-fifth of an individual health center's operating costs; however, individual health centers are eligible for grants or payments from a number of federal programs to supplement their facilities' budgets. These federal programs provide (1) incentives to recruit and retain providers; (2) access to the federally qualified health center (FQHC) designation that entitles facilities to higher reimbursement rates from Medicare and Medicaid; (3) access to additional funding through federal programs that target populations generally served by health centers; and (4) in-kind support such as access to discounted or free drug discounts or medical malpractice insurance.
Appropriations for the health center program have increased over the past decade, resulting in more centers and more patients served. The program expansion occurred partially through the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-148, ACA), which created the Community Health Center Fund (CHCF) that included a total of $9.5 billion for health center operations to be appropriated in FY2011 through FY2015. Despite recent program increases, it is not clear that the program's budget will continue to increase. In recent years, funds from the CHCF were used to augment discretionary appropriation reductions to the health center program and have made up nearly half of the health center's appropriation. As the CHCF ends in FY2015, continued program funding may be of congressional concern.
This report provides an overview of the federal health center program including its statutory authority, program requirements, and appropriation levels. The report then describes health centers in general, where they are located, their patient population, and some outcomes associated with health center use. It also describes some federal programs available to assist health center operations including the FQHC designation for Medicare and Medicaid payments. The report concludes with a brief discussion of issues for Congress such as the potential effect of the ACA on health centers, the health center workforce, and financial considerations for health centers in the context of changing federal and state budgets. Finally, the report has two appendixes that describe (1) FQHC payments for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries served at health centers; and (2) programs that are similar to health centers but not authorized in Section 330 of the PHSA. |
crs_RL32421 | crs_RL32421_0 | This technology has the potential to play a significant role in increasing the competitive landscape of the electric utility and telecommunications industry, as well as making broadband available to more Americans than ever before. BPL, however, like any technology, has its advantages and disadvantages. For example, BPL, in general, is less expensive to deploy than the cable and telephone companies' broadband offerings because it does not require upgrades to the actual electric grid and is not limited by certain technical constraints of its competitors. However, critics of BPL have expressed concern that it will interfere with licensed radio spectrum such as amateur radio, government, and emergency response frequencies. Federal Communications Commission Activity
The FCC has been investigating BPL since 2003 and adopted rules regulating BPL systems in October 2004; it is also addressing BPL-related issues in its CALEA and IP-Enabled Services Proceedings. The FCC adopted its Report and Order (R&O or "Order") in this proceeding in October 2004. On August 3, 2006, the FCC adopted a Memorandum Opinion and Order (MO&O) in this matter. On October 10, 2006, the ARRL notified the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that it would appeal certain aspects of both the FCC's October 2004 R&O and August 2006 MO&O. National Telecommunications and Information Administration Activity
In April 2004, the NTIA released Phase 1 of a study on the potential for BPL to interfere with radio frequencies used by Government users for homeland security, defense, and emergency response. Such underestimation increases the risk of interference. Congressional Action: 110th Congress
In January 2007, Representative Mike Ross introduced H.R. 462 , the Emergency Amateur Radio Interference Protection Act. Upon completion, the FCC would be required to submit the study report to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. This bill was referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. No further action has been taken. In June 2007, Senator Mark Pryor introduced S. 1629 , which contains the same study requirements as H.R. 462 . That bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. On August 4, 2007, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3221 , the New Direction for Energy Independence, National Security, and Consumer Protection Act. If signed into law, Section 9113(a)(8) would require an assessment by a newly established Grid Modernization Commission to determine, biannually, the progress being made toward modernizing the electric system, including an "assessment of ancillary benefits to other economic sectors or activities beyond the electricity sector, such as potential broadband service over power lines." | Congress has expressed significant interest in increasing the availability of broadband services throughout the nation. Broadband over powerlines (BPL) has the potential to play a significant role in increasing the competitive landscape of the communications industry as well as extend the reach of broadband to a greater number of Americans. BPL, like any technology, has its advantages and disadvantages. Proponents state that BPL is less expensive to deploy than the cable and telephone companies' broadband offerings; it does not require upgrades to the actual electric grid; and, it is not limited by some technical constraints of its competitors. However, critics are concerned that BPL interferes with licensed radio frequencies used for amateur radio, government, and emergency response.
In October 2004 and October 2006, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted a Report and Order (R&O) (FCC 04-245) and a Memorandum Opinion and Order (MO&O) (FCC 06-113) on BPL issues. In May 2007, the American Radio Relay League (ARRL) petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit to review the FCC's October 2004 R&O and 2006 MO&O. In its brief, the ARRL contends, among other things, that the FCC's actions in adopting rules to govern unlicensed BPL systems fundamentally alter the longstanding rights of radio spectrum licensees, including amateur radio operators. In April 2008, the court remanded the rules to the Commission.
In January 2007, Representative Mike Ross introduced H.R. 462, the Emergency Amateur Radio Interference Protection Act, which would require the FCC to conduct a study on the "interference caused by broadband Internet transmission over powerlines." The bill was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet on February 2, 2007; no further action has been taken. In June 2007, Senator Mark Pryor introduced S. 1629, which contains the same study requirements as H.R. 462. That bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
In August 2007, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3221, the New Direction for Energy Independence, National Security, and Consumer Protection Act. If signed into law, Section 9113(a)(8) would require an assessment by a newly established Grid Modernization Commission to determine, biannually, the progress being made toward modernizing the electric system, including an "assessment of ancillary benefits to other economic sectors or activities beyond the electricity sector, such as potential broadband service over power lines."
In October 2007, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) published its Phase II BPL Study Report. The NTIA concluded that the FCC's BPL rules, measurement guidelines, and special protection provisions will limit the interference risks for federal radiocommunication systems. |
crs_R43782 | crs_R43782_0 | T he scope of the executive's discretion in implementing federal immigration law is a topic of perennial interest to Members and committees of Congress. Most recently, questions have been raised as to whether particular actions announced by the Obama Administration in November 2014 are within the executive's authority. However, similar questions were raised in the past about other executive actions including, but not limited to (1) suspending enforcement of certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in areas affected by natural disasters; (2) granting deferred enforced departure, extended voluntary departure, or other relief from removal to certain aliens who entered or remained in the United States in violation of the INA; and (3) "paroling," or permitting the entry of, certain aliens into the United States who were not admissible under current law. Express Delegations of Discretionary Authority
In several instances, the INA expressly grants immigration officials some degree of discretion over aliens' eligibility for particular immigration benefits or relief, including adjustment to legal immigration status or authorization to work in the United States. Aliens granted parole may also, under current regulations, be granted work authorization. (See "Discretion in Interpreting and Applying Statutes.") Discretion in Enforcement
The executive is generally recognized as possessing some degree of independent authority in assessing when, against whom, how, and even whether to prosecute apparent violations of federal law; an authority generally referred to as "prosecutorial discretion" or "enforcement discretion." Determining Whether to Issue an NTA
One example of the executive's prosecutorial or enforcement discretion as to immigration involves determinations as to whether to issue Notices to Appear (NTAs) or other charging documents initiating proceedings against individual aliens who are believed to be removable. Discretion in Interpreting and Applying Statutes
Another type of discretion that the executive branch may exercise as to immigration law involves the interpretation and application of statutes. Whether particular actions are within the executive's existing authority depends upon whether these actions can be seen to fall within one (or more) of the three broad types of discretion that the executive is generally seen to have as to immigration. Each of these three types of authority is subject to certain constraints. For example, exercises of statutory authority must be consistent with the terms of the delegation (although the executive branch could have some discretion in interpreting the statute). Similarly, the executive's exercise of prosecutorial or enforcement discretion could be limited by specific statutory mandates that the executive take particular actions (e.g., detaining certain aliens pending removal proceedings). The express adoption of a policy that constitutes an abdication of a statutory duty could also be found to be impermissible, although it might be difficult for a court to assess whether an alleged failure to enforce the law constitutes an "abdication." Likewise, agencies' interpretations and applications of statutes must conform to the "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." | The scope of the executive's discretion in implementing federal immigration law is a topic of perennial interest to Members and committees of Congress. Most recently, questions have been raised as to whether particular actions announced by the Obama Administration in November 2014 are within the executive's authority. See generally CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1442, The Obama Administration's November 20, 2014, Actions as to Immigration: Pending Legal Challenges One Year Later, by [author name scrubbed]. However, similar questions were raised in the past about other executive actions including, but not limited to (1) suspending enforcement of certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in areas affected by natural disasters; (2) granting deferred enforced departure, extended voluntary departure, or other relief from removal to certain aliens who entered or remained in the United States in violation of the INA; and (3) "paroling," or permitting the entry of, certain aliens into the United States who were not admissible under current law.
Whether particular executive actions are permissible generally depends upon whether they can be seen as falling within one (or more) of the three broad types of authority that the executive can be seen to have as to immigration. These include the following:
Express delegations of discretionary authority by statute. In some cases, the INA explicitly authorizes the executive to provide certain relief or benefits to foreign nationals (e.g., temporary protected status or work authorization). In other cases, the INA expressly permits immigration authorities to waive the application of requirements which would render an alien ineligible for particular immigration benefits. The INA also grants the executive broad authority to "parole" aliens into the United States. Discretion deriving from the executive's independent constitutional authority. The executive is generally recognized as possessing some degree of independent authority in assessing whether to prosecute apparent violations of federal law. Courts have recognized certain actions as within the prosecutorial or enforcement discretion of immigration authorities. These include deciding whether to issue a Notice to Appear beginning removal proceedings; deciding whether to detain aliens who are not subject to "mandatory detention" pending removal; and granting deferred action (at least in individual cases). Discretion in interpreting and applying immigration law. The Supreme Court has found that some deference may be owed to agency regulations (or adjudications) which implement or apply statutes that are "silent or ambiguous" as to specific issues. The executive branch may also be afforded deference in less formal interpretations of statutes and in interpreting its own regulations.
All of these forms of discretion are subject to certain constraints. For example, exercises of statutory authority must be consistent with the terms of the delegation (although the executive branch could have some discretion in interpreting the statute). Similarly, the executive's exercise of prosecutorial or enforcement discretion could be limited by specific statutory mandates that the executive take particular actions (e.g., detaining certain aliens pending removal proceedings). The express adoption of a policy that constitutes an "abdication" of a statutory duty could also be found to be impermissible, although it might be difficult for a court to assess whether an alleged failure to enforce the law represents an abdication. Likewise, agencies' interpretations and applications of statutes must conform to the "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." |
crs_R41075 | crs_R41075_0 | This violence has generated concern among U.S. policy makers that the violence in Mexico might spill over into the United States. U.S. federal officials have denied that the increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has resulted in a spillover into the United States, but they acknowledge that the prospect is a serious concern. The Southwest Border Region and the Illicit Drug Trade Between the United States and Mexico
The nature of the conflict between the DTOs in Mexico has manifested itself, in part, as a struggle for control of the smuggling routes into the United States. The most recent threat assessment indicates that the Mexican DTOs pose the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States. Supply of Illegal Drugs from Mexico
Mexican DTOs are the major suppliers and key producers of most illegal drugs smuggled into the United States across the SWB. Relationship Between Illicit Drug Markets and Violence
In an illegal marketplace, where prices and profits are elevated due to the risks of operating outside the law, violence or the threat of violence becomes the primary means for settling disputes and maintaining a semblance of order—however chaotic that "order" might appear to the outside observer. When assessing the potential implications of increased violence in Mexico as a result of the increasing tensions between the DTOs located in Mexico, one of the central concerns for U.S. policy makers is the potential for what has recently been termed "spillover" violence—an increase in drug trafficking-related violence in United States. Currently, there is no comprehensive, publicly available data that can definitively answer the question of whether there has been a significant spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into the United States. Although anecdotal reports have been mixed, U.S. government officials maintain that there has not yet been a significant spillover. Of note, however, the UCR data does not allow analysts to determine what proportion of the violent crime rate is related to drug trafficking or, even more specifically, what proportion of drug trafficking-related violent crimes can be attributed to spillover violence. While the interagency community has defined spillover violence as violence targeted primarily at civilians and government entities—excluding trafficker-on trafficker-violence—other experts and scholars have recognized trafficker-on-trafficker violence as central to spillover. When defining and analyzing changes in drug trafficking-related violence within the United States to determine whether there has been (or may be in the future) any spillover violence, critical elements include who may be implicated in the violence (both perpetrators and victims), what type of violence may arise, when violence may appear, and where violence may occur (both along the Southwest border and in the nation's interior). CRS analyzed violent crime data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) Uniform Crime Report program in order to examine data that could provide insight into whether there has been a significant spillover in drug trafficking-related violence from Mexico into the United States. In conclusion, however, because the trends in the overall violent crime rate may not be indicative of trends in drug trafficking-related violent crimes, CRS is unable to develop fact-based conclusions about trends in drug trafficking-related violence spilling over from Mexico into the United States. | There has been an elevated level of drug trafficking-related violence within and between the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. This violence has generated concern among U.S. policy makers that the violence in Mexico might spill over into the United States. U.S. federal officials have denied that the increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has resulted in a spillover into the United States, but they acknowledge that the prospect is a serious concern.
The most recent threat assessment indicates that the Mexican drug trafficking organizations pose the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States, and this threat is driven partly by U.S. demand for drugs. Mexican drug trafficking organizations are the major suppliers and key producers of most illegal drugs smuggled into the United States across the Southwest border (SWB). The nature of the conflict between the Mexican drug trafficking organizations in Mexico has manifested itself, in part, as a struggle for control of these smuggling routes into the United States. Further, in an illegal marketplace—such as that of illicit drugs—where prices and profits are elevated due to the risks of operating outside the law, violence or the threat of violence becomes the primary means for settling disputes.
When assessing the potential implications of the increased violence in Mexico, one of the central concerns for Congress is the potential for what has been termed "spillover" violence—an increase in drug trafficking-related violence in United States. While the interagency community has defined spillover violence as violence targeted primarily at civilians and government entities—excluding trafficker-on-trafficker violence—other experts and scholars have recognized trafficker-on-trafficker violence as central to spillover. When defining and analyzing changes in drug trafficking-related violence within the United States to determine whether there has been (or may be in the future) any spillover violence, critical elements include who may be implicated in the violence (both perpetrators and victims), what type of violence may arise, when violence may appear, and where violence may occur (both along the SWB and in the nation's interior).
Currently, no comprehensive, publicly available data exist that can definitively answer the question of whether there has been a significant spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into the United States. Although anecdotal reports have been mixed, U.S. government officials maintain that there has not yet been a significant spillover. In an examination of data that could provide insight into whether there has been a significant spillover in drug trafficking-related violence from Mexico into the United States, CRS analyzed violent crime data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Report program. The data, however, do not allow analysts to determine what proportion of the violent crime rate is related to drug trafficking or, even more specifically, what proportion of drug trafficking-related violent crimes can be attributed to spillover violence. In conclusion, because the trends in the overall violent crime rate may not be indicative of trends in drug trafficking-related violent crimes, CRS is unable to develop fact-based conclusions about trends in drug trafficking-related violence spilling over from Mexico into the United States. |
crs_RL32158 | crs_RL32158_0 | CWC Ratification and Implementation
Ratifying Legislation (S.Res.75, 105th Congress)
The United States signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in the last days of the first Bush Administration (1/13/93), and the Convention was submitted to the Senate for its advice and consentin the midst of the 103rd Congress (11/23/93). Prohibits transfer of inspection samples collected in the United States tolaboratories outside the United States. Implementing Legislation (P.L. 105-277 ; 22 USC 75)
The implementing legislation sets criminal and civil penalties for the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use of chemical weapons. It also establishes: 1) procedures for seizure, forfeiture, and destruction ofcontraband chemical weapons; 2) statutory authority for record-keeping and reporting requirementsrelevant to the CWC; 3) various restrictions on certain chemicals, depending on their likelihood ofbeing used to produce chemical weapons; and 4) a protective regime for confidential businessinformation gathered from private corporations. It also provides detailed procedures to be used foron-site inspections by the OPCW, including limitations on access and search warrant procedures,should they be required. Sections 237 -- grants the President the right to deny a request forinspection if it "may cause a threat to U.S. national security interests." Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention
More than 100 years of international efforts to ban chemical weapons culminated January 13,1993, in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC bans the development,production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons (CW) by its states parties. The Convention provides the mostextensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to notonly governmental but also civilian facilities. The Convention also requires export controls andreporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors. Administratively, the Convention established the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), located in The Hague, Netherlands, to oversee the Convention's implementation. Both the United states and Russia haveapplied for and been granted extensions. These chemical Schedules are to be updated as needed by the OPCW TechnicalSecretariat. Universality
How many nations are willing to ratify the CWC and, more importantly, which nations are not? Chemical Weapons Stockpiles and Facilities Destruction
The CWC mandates the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities within 10 years of the Convention's coming into force (i.e. Even with foreign assistance, Russia will not be able to meet CWC destruction deadlines. | More than 100 years of international efforts to ban chemical weapons culminated January 13, 1993, in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Convention entered intoforce April 29, 1997. One hundred fifty-three of the 178 signatories have ratified the Convention. On April 24, 1997, the Senate passed the CWC resolution of ratification ( S.Res. 75 ,105th Congress) by a vote of 74-26. President Clinton signed the resolution and the United Statesbecame the 75th nation to ratify the CWC Convention, and Congress retains a continuing oversightrole in its implementation.
The CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons by members signatories. It also requires the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles andproduction facilities. Neither the United States nor Russia will be able to meet the original CWC'sdeadlines for destruction of their CW stockpiles, and have been granted extensions to at least 2012. The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms controltreaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The Conventionalso requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfareagents and their precursors. The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention's implementation.
Chemical Weapons Convention implementing legislation ( P.L. 105-277 ) provides the statutory authority for domestic compliance with the Convention's provisions. It sets criminal and civilpenalties for the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use ofchemical weapons. It also establishes: 1) procedures for seizure, forfeiture, and destruction ofcontraband chemical weapons; 2) statutory authority for record-keeping and reporting requirementsrelevant to the CWC; 3) various restrictions on certain chemicals, depending on their likelihood ofbeing used to produce chemical weapons; and 4) a protective regime for confidential businessinformation gathered from private corporations. The legislation also provides detailed proceduresto be used for on-site inspections by the OPCW, including limitations on access and search warrantprocedures, should they be required.
CWC advocates continue to express concerns over so-called "treaty-breaking "sections of the implementing legislation, and lobby for their amendment. Of particular concern are provisions thatallow the President to block challenge inspections, and that prohibit the OPCW inspectors fromsending chemical samples outside the United States for analysis. These provisions are intended toprotect U.S. national security interests and proprietary commercial information. CWC supporters,however, believe that blocking a challenge inspection violates a basic premise of the convention, andthat forcing inspectors' analysis to be conducted within the United States undermines confidence inthe verification regime. These provisions may also provide an excuse for other nations to adoptsimilar positions. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43497 | crs_R43497_0 | The agency reports that in 2013 on-road vehicles accounted for about 34% of carbon monoxide emissions in the United States, 38% of nitrogen oxides, 12% of volatile organic compounds, and 3% of particulate matter. The standards significantly targeted emissions of NMOG and NO x to help control the formation of ground-level ozone pollution. The Tier 2 standards also required at least an 80% reduction in PM emissions and a less stringent reduction in CO emissions. GHG emissions from new vehicles will decline by about 50% as a result of the standards. The memorandum directed EPA to "review for adequacy the current non-greenhouse gas emissions regulations for new motor vehicles, new motor vehicle engines, and motor vehicle fuels, including tailpipe emissions standards for nitrogen oxides and air toxics, and sulfur standards for gasoline," and to promulgate regulations as required. The final rule is effective on June 27, 2014. The evaporative emissions program represents about a 50% reduction from current standards and applies to all light-duty and on-road gasoline-powered heavy-duty vehicles. EPA is also extending the regulatory useful life period during which the standards apply from 120,000 miles to 150,000 miles. Fuel Standards
As with Tier 2, the Tier 3 standards treat vehicles and fuels as a system to reduce both vehicle emissions and fuel pollutants. Under the Tier 3 fuel program, gasoline is required to contain no more than 10 parts per million (ppm) sulfur on an annual average basis beginning January 1, 2017, down from 30 ppm under the Tier 2 program (similar reductions have already been phased in for highway diesel fuels beginning in 2006). Benefits of the Rule
EPA anticipates that the implementation of the Tier 3 vehicle and fuel standards will reduce emissions of NO x , VOC, PM 2.5 , and air toxics. Auto manufacturers have been generally supportive of the standards, which they view as allowing the adoption of new technology necessary to meet the separate GHG standards already promulgated, and which would harmonize the U.S. fuel requirements with those of foreign fuels. The Tier 3 gasoline sulfur standards are similar to levels already achieved in Europe, Japan, and South Korea, as well as those proposed in China and some other countries. EPA estimates that these costs differ across years and range from $46 to $65 for cars, $73 to $88 for trucks, and $33 to $75 for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles covered by the rule. More controversial has been the potential impact on the cost of gasoline. In letters to the President before the standards' proposal, several Senators of both parties asked that the Administration delay the EPA rulemaking over concerns that the new fuel standards would raise the price of gasoline; similar concerns have been expressed in the wake of the final rule. The American Petroleum Institute contends that the tighter sulfur controls would impose almost $10 billion in refinery capital expenditures, create an annual compliance cost of $2.4 billion, increase gasoline manufacturing costs from 6 to 9 cents per gallon, and increase refinery GHG emissions by 1%. EPA has asserted that the rule as proposed would add less than a penny to the price of a gallon of gasoline (0.65 cents according to the final rule's Regulatory Impact Analysis). In sum, EPA estimates the annual compliance cost of the overall program in 2030 would be approximately $1.5 billion ($760 million for the vehicle program and $700 million for the fuel program), and the 2030 benefits would be between $6.7 billion and $19 billion, or 4.5 to 13 times greater than the costs of the program. To address industry concerns, the final rule would allow a three-year delay in compliance for small refiners. It also includes averaging, banking, and trading programs that would give the refining industry flexibility in meeting the standards. | On March 3, 2014, the Environmental Protection Agency finalized new ("Tier 3") emission standards for light duty (and some larger) motor vehicles. Light duty vehicles include cars, SUVs, vans, and most pickup trucks. Phase-in of the standards will begin with Model Year 2017. By the time Tier 3 is fully implemented in Model Year 2025, the standards for light duty vehicles will require reductions of about 80% in tailpipe emissions of non-methane organic gases and nitrogen oxides (both of which contribute to the formation of ground-level ozone) and of about 70% in tailpipe emissions of particulates. Ozone and particulates are the most widespread air pollutants in the United States. Both contribute to respiratory illness and premature mortality. EPA estimates that implementation of the standards will reduce premature mortality by 770 to 2,000 persons annually, as well as providing reductions in hospital admissions, lost work days, school absences, and restricted activity days for persons with respiratory illness. Assigning monetary values to these benefits, EPA estimates the annual benefits at between $6.7 billion and $19 billion in 2030.
Like the current "Tier 2" standards, which were promulgated in 2000 and phased in between Model Years 2004 and 2009, the Tier 3 standards treat vehicles and fuels as a system: reductions in vehicle emissions are easier to achieve if the fuel used contains less sulfur. The Tier 3 standards will require that gasoline contain no more than 10 parts per million (ppm) sulfur on an annual average basis beginning January 1, 2017, down from 30 ppm under the Tier 2 program. The fuel standards will match limits already attained in California and in much of the world, including the European Union, Japan, and Korea, and proposed for adoption in China. Further, the rule extends the required useful life of emission control equipment from 120,000 miles to 150,000 miles, and sets standards for heavier duty gasoline-powered vehicles. The standards will also require about a 50% reduction in evaporative emissions (some of which also contribute to ozone formation and/or cause health problems directly).
EPA estimates the cost of the rules at $1.1 billion annually in 2017 to $1.5 billion annually in 2030. The agency estimates that the rule will add $33 to $88 to the cost of a new vehicle, and less than one cent to the price of a gallon of gasoline. The effect on gasoline prices has been the most controversial issue: the American Petroleum Institute contends that the tighter sulfur controls will impose almost $10 billion in refinery capital expenditures and increase gasoline manufacturing costs by 6 to 9 cents per gallon. But, in addition to EPA, at least two studies by third-party consultants conclude that the costs will be far less than API's estimate. To address refining industry concerns, the final rule will allow a three-year delay in compliance for small refiners. It also includes averaging, banking, and trading programs that will give the refining industry some flexibility in meeting the standards.
The auto industry is generally supportive of the rule—five auto companies, five trade groups, and the United Auto Workers union have issued statements of support, and a GM executive joined the EPA Administrator as she announced the standards. The standards facilitate the adoption of new technologies necessary to meet greenhouse gas standards already promulgated by EPA. In addition, California and 12 other states have already adopted tailpipe standards similar to Tier 3. Proponents contend that the harmonization of national standards eliminates the threat of a patchwork of state requirements and decreases compliance costs by preserving a unified national market. Many in Congress have expressed concern about the potential impacts of the rule. As a result, Congress can be expected to continue oversight as the rule is implemented. |
crs_RS20762 | crs_RS20762_0 | Banning Exit Polling Within a Prescribed Distance from the Polls
The purpose of legislation banning exit polling within a prescribed distance from the polls would be to make exit polling more difficult. Banning Media Access to Ballot Counts
If Congress could not ban media projections outright, could it prohibit government officials from releasing ballot counts to the media? Could Congress, that is,deny media access to ballot counts, either when the polls have not closed in the jurisdiction whose votes are beingcounted, or when the polls have not closedacross the nation? | Media projections may be based both on exit polls and on information acquired as toactual ballot counts. The FirstAmendment would generally preclude Congress from prohibiting the media from interviewing voters after they exitthe polls. It apparently would also precludeCongress from prohibiting the media from reporting the results of those polls. Congress, could, however, ban votersolicitation within a certain distance from apolling place, and might be able to include exit polling within such a ban. It also might be able to deny media accessto ballot counts, either when the polls havenot closed in the jurisdiction whose votes are being counted, or when the polls have not closed across the nation. |
crs_R42721 | crs_R42721_0 | However, in recent years, as oil prices have spiked to historic levels, and concerns over greenhouse gas emissions and climate change have grown, there has been a resurgence in interest in the fuel economy and emissions of motor vehicles in the United States. Proponents of higher vehicle fuel efficiency standards argue that they create incentives for the development of new technologies that will help reduce dependence on imported oil and better enable the United States to use scarce resources and limit greenhouse gas emissions—technologies that would not be developed in the absence of that "technology push." Critics argue that efficiency standards distort the market for new vehicles, compromising consumer choice, and that other policy mechanisms (e.g., higher fuel taxes) would be more effective at reducing petroleum consumption and emissions. Fuel consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from motor vehicles are closely linked. For these reasons, the Obama Administration has issued joint rules on vehicle fuel economy and GHG emissions for model year (MY) 2012-2016 passenger cars and light trucks, MY2014-MY2018 medium- and heavy-duty trucks, and MY2017-MY2025 passenger cars and light trucks. Passenger Vehicle Standards for MY2017-MY2025
On August 28, 2012, the Obama Administration issued final rules to tighten passenger vehicle fuel economy and greenhouse gas (GHG) standards for MY2017-2025. In a similar process to the landmark agreement that led to new fuel economy and greenhouse gas standards for MY2012-MY2016, the Administration has secured commitment letters from the state of California and from 13 automakers. Many stakeholders were concerned about a potential "patchwork" of different federal and state standards if EPA, NHTSA, and California were to establish different standards at the intersection of fuel economy and GHG emissions. Two key parts of the agreement are that California will treat any vehicle meeting the new federal GHG standards as meeting California standards, and that the automakers agree to not challenge the new standards in court. The Administration expects that consumers' fuel savings from the new standards will more than offset the additional cost of the new technology for these vehicles, which could be thousands of dollars per vehicle. EPA and NHTSA expect that the new standards will save roughly 4 billion barrels of oil and 2 billion metric tons of greenhouse gases over the life of the vehicles covered under the new standards. Critics have challenged the Administration's assumptions, countering that the costs will be higher and could lead to a drop in new vehicle sales. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA) requires NHTSA to set Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for passenger cars and light trucks. The oft-cited "standard" of 54.5 mpg in MY2025 for the rule is a proxy for the actual GHG standard of 163 grams per mile (g/mi) of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) equivalent. As the vast majority of vehicle GHG emissions come from fuel combustion, the primary means for achieving the standards will be through fuel economy increases. | In recent years, as oil and gasoline prices have risen and concerns over greenhouse gas emissions and climate change have grown, there has been a resurgence of interest in the fuel economy and emissions of motor vehicles in the United States. Federal fuel economy and greenhouse gas standards have become a focal point for addressing these concerns. The debate over rising fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas standards for passenger vehicles and heavy trucks has been controversial. Proponents of higher fuel economy argue that new standards will create incentives for the development of new technologies that will help reduce oil consumption and limit greenhouse gas emissions. Critics argue that these standards will impose regulatory costs which will distort the market for new vehicles, and that other policy mechanisms would be more effective at reducing petroleum consumption and emissions (e.g., higher fuel taxes).
On August 28, 2012, the Obama Administration issued new passenger vehicle fuel economy and greenhouse gas standards for vehicle model years (MY) 2017-2025. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) expect that combined new passenger car and light truck Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards will rise to as much as 41.0 miles per gallon (mpg) in MY2021 and 49.7 mpg in MY2025, up from 34.1 mpg in MY2016. To the extent possible, new CAFE standards will be integrated with federal and state greenhouse gas (GHG) standards for automobiles, because fuel economy improvements are a key strategy for reducing vehicle emissions. If all of the GHG reductions were made through fuel economy improvements, the equivalent miles-per-gallon requirement would be 54.5 mpg in MY2025. However, other strategies will also be used (for example, improved vehicle air conditioners) to reduce GHG emissions to the actual GHG standard of 163 grams of carbon dioxide per mile.
The Administration expects that consumers' fuel savings from the new standards will more than offset the additional cost of the new technology for these vehicles, which could be thousands of dollars per vehicle. EPA and NHTSA expect that the new standards will save roughly 4 billion barrels of oil and 2 billion metric tons of greenhouse gases over the life of the vehicles covered under the proposal. Critics dispute some of the Administration's assumptions. They counter that the costs will be higher and could lead to a drop in new vehicle sales, as the higher vehicle costs may put new car financing out of reach for many consumers.
In a similar process to an earlier Obama Administration agreement that led to new fuel economy and greenhouse gas standards for MY2012-MY2016, the Administration has secured commitment letters from the state of California and from 13 automakers to support the MY2017-2025 rulemaking as well. There has been concern about a potential "patchwork" of different federal and state standards if EPA, NHTSA, and California were to establish different standards on fuel economy and GHG emissions. Two key parts of the agreement are that California will treat any vehicle meeting the new federal GHG standards as meeting California standards, and that the automakers agree to not challenge the new standards in court.
In August 2011, the Administration also tightened fuel economy and GHG emissions standards for MY2014-MY2018 medium- and heavy-duty trucks. |
crs_RS21017 | crs_RS21017_0 | (5)
As enacted, the National Emergencies Act consisted of five titles. (9)
Responding to Terrorist Attacks
Prior to the September 14, 2001, national emergency declaration of President George W. Bush in response to terrorist attacks in NewYork City and Washington, D.C., President William Clinton had declared a January 1995 national emergencyrelative to prohibitingtransactions with terrorists who threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process. On December 17, 2003, President Bush, pursuant to his national emergency declaration of September 14, 2001, issued E.O. (19)
Further actions by the President pursuant to his September 14 and 23, 2001, national emergency declarations, and the issuance ofadditional such declarations concerning terrorism, will be chronicled in this report as they occur. | As part of his response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World TradeCenter and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush formally declared national emergencies on September 14 and23 pursuant to theNational Emergencies Act. The President's actions follow a long-standing tradition of alerting the nation to a crisisthreatening publicorder and constitutional government. Currently, such declarations also allow the President to make use of activatedauthority on aselective basis, as appropriate for responding to an emergency. Updated as events recommend, this report chroniclesthe actions takenby President Bush pursuant to his national emergency declarations, as well the issuance of additional suchdeclarations concerningterrorism. |
crs_R44950 | crs_R44950_0 | Introduction
The United States deployed nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula between 1958 and 1991. The United States removed these weapons as a part of a broader change in the U.S. nuclear force posture at the end of the Cold War, but it remains committed to defending South Korea under the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty and to employing nuclear weapons, if necessary, in that defense. Recent advances in North Korea's nuclear and missile programs have led to discussions, both within South Korea and, reportedly, between the U.S. and South Korean officials, about the possible redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. Options for Redeployment of U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Because the United States retired all warheads for land-based nonstrategic nuclear weapons under the 1991 presidential initiative, the only warheads remaining in the U.S. stockpile that could be deployed on the Korean Peninsula are B61 bombs, which can currently be delivered by B-2 bombers and F-15 or F-16 fighters. To redeploy B61 bombs to South Korea, the United States would have to recreate the infrastructure needed to house the bombs. It would also require resources and training time to certify that the personnel at the bases were capable of maintaining the weapons and operating the aircraft for the nuclear mission. Some who support the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons argue that their presence on the peninsula would be a visible, high-profile form of reassurance. They argue that, while off-shore weapons could conduct the necessary attacks if a conflict occurred, the act of returning weapons to the peninsula would send a powerful deterrent message to the North and demonstrate a strong commitment to the South. Some also argue that weapons located on the peninsula could serve as a "bargaining chip" in negotiations to freeze or eliminate North Korea's nuclear program, and that their presence would allow for a more rapid nuclear response to a North Korean attack. Some note that nuclear weapons deployed on the peninsula could undermine deterrence and would present a tempting target for North Korea, possibly inviting an early attack if North Korea believed it needed to destroy the weapons before a conflict escalated to nuclear use. Finally, some assess that the cost of installing the necessary storage, security, and safety infrastructure could drain funding from other military priorities and time needed to train and certify the crews could undermine readiness for other military missions. If the United States believed it needed the capability to deliver nuclear weapons to North Korea in a shorter amount of time than allowed by the current force posture, it could pursue sea-based options that would not impose many of the costs or risks associated with the deployment of nuclear weapons on the peninsula. Position of the Current South Korean Government on U.S. Redeployment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons to South Korea
Although President Moon has advocated for more muscular defense options, including reversing his decision to delay the deployment of a U.S. missile defense battery and requesting that the United States allow South Korea to develop more missile capabilities, his administration has indicated that it continues to support the denuclearization of the peninsula and that it is not currently reviewing its policy on the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons. The Liberty Korea Party, the main opposition party, has formally called for the move. For those who maintain hope that North Korea could take steps toward denuclearization, including individuals in the current Moon administration, reintroducing nuclear weapons into South Korea could make it much more difficult to pressure the North to take these steps. China could also respond by increasing its own nuclear weapons arsenal. Japan
For Japan, reaction could be mixed as well. Nevertheless, any adjustment of the U.S. military posture on the peninsula, including a redeployment of nuclear weapons to the peninsula, could create additional security concerns for Tokyo if it sees the moves as bolstering South Korea's military capabilities. | Recent advances in North Korea's nuclear and missile programs have led to discussions, both within South Korea and, reportedly, between the United States and South Korean officials, about the possible redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. The United States deployed nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula between 1958 and 1991. Although it removed the weapons as a part of a post-Cold War change in its nuclear posture, the United States remains committed to defending South Korea under the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty and to employing nuclear weapons, if necessary, in that defense.
The only warheads remaining in the U.S. stockpile that could be deployed on the Korean Peninsula are B61 bombs. Before redeploying these to South Korea, where they would remain under U.S. control, the United States would have to recreate the infrastructure needed to house the bombs and would also have to train and certify the personnel responsible for maintaining the weapons and operating the aircraft for the nuclear mission.
Some who support the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons argue that their presence on the peninsula would send a powerful deterrent message to the North and demonstrate a strong commitment to the South. Their presence would allow for a more rapid nuclear response to a North Korean attack. Some also argue that weapons could serve as a "bargaining chip" with North Korea and that their presence would allow for a more rapid nuclear response to a North Korean attack. Those who oppose the redeployment argue the weapons would present a tempting target for North Korea and might prompt an attack early in a crisis. They also argue that nuclear weapons based in the United States are sufficient for deterrence, and that the costs of installing the necessary facilities on the peninsula could detract from conventional military capabilities. Finally, some assess that the cost of installing the necessary storage, security, and safety infrastructure could drain funding from other military priorities and time needed to train and certify the crews could undermine readiness for other military missions. Some analysts also assert that, if the United States believed it needed the capability to deliver nuclear weapons to North Korea in a shorter amount of time than allowed by the current force posture, it could pursue sea-based options that would not impose many of the costs or risks associated with the deployment of nuclear weapons on the peninsula.
South Korea's President Moon Jae-in has advocated for more muscular defense options, but does not support the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. The Liberty Korea Party, the main opposition party, has formally called for the move. While some in South Korea believe nuclear weapons are necessary to deter the North, others, including those who maintain hope that North Korea will eliminate its program, argue that their redeployment could make it that much more difficult to pressure the North to take these steps. Further, if North Korea saw the deployment as provocative, it could further undermine stability and increase the risk of conflict on the peninsula.
China would also likely view the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons as provocative; it has objected to U.S. military deployments in the past. Some analysts believe that China might respond by putting more pressure on North Korea to slow its programs, while others believe that China might increase its support for North Korea in the face of a new threat and, possibly, expand its own nuclear arsenal. Japan's reaction could also be mixed. Japan shares U.S. and South Korean concerns about the threat from North Korea, but given its historical aversion to nuclear weapons, Japan could oppose the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons near its territory. In addition, any adjustment of the U.S. military posture on the peninsula could create additional security concerns for Tokyo. |
crs_R43450 | crs_R43450_0 | Technical barriers to trade (TBTs) cover both food and non-food traded products. TBT measures address technical characteristics of products, such as process and product standards, technical regulations, product environmental regulations, and voluntary procedures relating to health, sanitary, and animal welfare, but also inspection procedures, product specifications, and approval and marketing of biotechnology. Overall, SPS/TBT measures comprise a group of widely divergent standards and standards-based measures that countries use to regulate markets, protect their consumers, and preserve natural resources, but that can also be used to discriminate against imports in favor of domestic products. Specific examples in agriculture include meat and poultry processing standards to reduce pathogens, residue limits for pesticides in foods, fumigation requirements for grains and wood packaging materials to kill pests, labeling and marketing standards, food safety protocols, and regulation of agricultural biotechnology. Foreign countries also have objected to various U.S. trade measures. These agreements establish rules regarding the use of certain human, animal, and plant health protection measures, as well as the technical requirements, standards and procedures intended to ensure such protections are met, for a range of traded goods. WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures
The SPS Agreement addresses the rights and obligations of WTO member nations regarding health protection measures related to humans, animals, and plants. Accordingly, the SPS Agreement reaffirms that no WTO member country should be:
prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, subject to the requirement that these measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade... to improve the human health, animal health and phytosanitary situation in all Members... and noting that sanitary and phytosanitary measures are often applied on the basis of bilateral agreements or protocols. Key principles and provisions of the TBT Agreement are described in Appendix C .
U.S. Free Trade Agreements
Bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) between the United States and other countries also address SPS and TBT matters. Ongoing FTA Negotiations
In an effort to resolve perceived obstacles in trade regarding SPS and TBT matters, many in U.S. agriculture and the food industry are supporting efforts by U.S. negotiators to build on and "go beyond" the rules, rights, and obligations in the WTO SPS Agreement and TBT Agreement, as well as beyond commitments in existing U.S. FTAs. These efforts are referred to as "WTO-Plus" rules, or alternatively, as "SPS-Plus" and "TBT-Plus" rules. The U.S. meat and poultry industry initially proposed efforts to adopt tougher WTO rules for animal health regulations as part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. These concepts were later reinforced by recommendations from U.S. and EU trade officials involved in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. As part of the Administration's formal notification to Congress in March 2013 launching the U.S.-EU trade talks, USTR stated that among its specific objectives in negotiating the TTIP is "to eliminate or reduce non-tariff barriers that decrease market opportunities for U.S. exports, provide a competitive advantage to products of the EU, or otherwise distort trade," such as SPS measures "that are not based on science" as well as "unjustified" TBT measures and "other 'behind-the-border' barriers, including restrictive administration of tariff-rate quotas and permit and licensing barriers, that impose unnecessary costs and limit competitive opportunities for U.S. These include concerns regarding the EU's ban on U.S. meats treated with growth-promoting hormones, the EU's restrictions on chemical treatments ("pathogen reduction treatments" or "PRTs") on U.S. poultry, and the EU's moratorium on approvals of biotechnology products. Other types of trade concerns with other countries have not risen to the level of a formal WTO dispute. The potential of SPS/TBT measures to become non-tariff barriers to trade has increased as monetary tariffs on traded goods have been reduced under multilateral trade agreements and various free trade agreements. Government." is an example of a TBT-related law. Some lawmakers also have expressed concern that as additional FTAs further lower agricultural tariffs, countries may turn more and more to SPS and TBT measures to protect their farmers from import competition. | Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are the laws, rules, standards, and procedures that governments employ to protect humans, animals, and plants from diseases, pests, toxins, and other contaminants. Examples include meat and poultry processing standards to reduce pathogens, residue limits for pesticides in foods, and regulation of agricultural biotechnology. Technical barriers to trade (TBT) cover technical regulations, product standards, environmental regulations, and voluntary procedures relating to human health and animal welfare. Examples include trademarks and patents, labeling and packaging requirements, certification and inspection procedures, product specifications, and marketing of biotechnology. SPS and TBT measures both comprise a group of widely divergent standards and standards-based measures that countries use to regulate markets, protect their consumers, and preserve natural resources.
According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), SPS and TBT measures have become more prominent concerns for agricultural exporters and policy makers, as tariff-related barriers to trade have been reduced by various multilateral, regional, and bilateral negotiations and trade agreements. The concerns include whether SPS and TBT measures might be used to unfairly discriminate against imported products or create unnecessary obstacles to trade in agricultural, food, and other traded goods. Notable U.S. trade disputes involving SPS and TBT measures have included a European Union (EU) ban on U.S. meats treated with growth-promoting hormones and also certain pathogen reduction treatments, and an EU moratorium on approvals of biotechnology products, among other types of trade concerns with other countries. Foreign countries have also objected to various U.S. trade measures.
Multilateral trade rules allow governments to adopt measures to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, provided such measures do not discriminate or use them as disguised protectionism. This principle was clarified in the mid-1990s by WTO members' approval of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement"). The SPS Agreement sets out the basic rules for ensuring that each country's food safety and animal and plant health laws and regulations are transparent, scientifically defensible, and fair. Similarly, in the late 1970s, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement") addressed the use of technical requirements and voluntary standards for a range of traded goods.
In addition, the United States has entered into, or is currently negotiating, numerous regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) that contain SPS and TBT language. In an effort to resolve perceived intractable trade problems regarding SPS and TBT matters, many in U.S. agriculture and the food industry are supporting efforts to build on and go beyond rules, rights, and obligations in the SPS Agreement and TBT Agreement, as well as beyond commitments in existing U.S. FTAs. The U.S. meat and poultry industry initially proposed efforts to adopt tougher WTO rules for animal health regulations as part of the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. These concepts were later reinforced by recommendations from U.S. and EU trade officials involved in the ongoing Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. These efforts are referred to as WTO-Plus rules, SPS-Plus, and TBT-Plus rules.
In Congress, which must approve legislation if a trade agreement is to be implemented, many Members are interested in how a trade agreement might address SPS and TBT matters. Many remain concerned that countries are turning to non-tariff measures, such as SPS and TBT measures, to protect their farmers from import competition. U.S. rights and obligations regarding SPS and TBT measures are also relevant to regulations affecting imported food. |
crs_RL30484 | crs_RL30484_0 | However, for a number of reasons, including the energy density of petroleum fuels, the internal combustion engine has been the power source of choice for automobiles and most other vehicles. However, with the oil shocks of the past few decades, as well as an increasing awareness of the emissions of air pollutants and greenhouse gases from cars and trucks, interest in the use of electrical power train systems has grown. PNGV focused on near-term goals and the development of hybrid electric vehicles, while FreedomCAR, which replaced PNGV in 2002, focuses on long-term research on fuel cells and hydrogen fuel. Japanese manufacturers were the first to introduce high-efficiency gasoline-electric hybrid vehicles in the U.S. market. Four advanced propulsion technologies of key interest are electric vehicles, hybrid vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and fuel cell vehicles. However, as with pure electric vehicles, maintenance of the electric components in hybrid vehicles generally must happen at licensed dealers, who will have more access to the technology. Many of these demonstrations are in conjunction with the California Fuel Cell Partnership, a consortium of auto manufacturers, fuel providers, fuel cell developers, and state and federal agencies. Further research and development would be necessary to achieve these benefits. In January 2002, the Bush Administration announced the FreedomCAR program, which focuses federal vehicle research on fuel cell vehicles. To complement this program, in January 2003, the Administration announced the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative, which focuses research on hydrogen fuel and infrastructure, as well as research on fuel cells for other applications (e.g., backup power). Component Technologies
Another way to improve the fuel economy and emissions characteristics of vehicles is to use advanced components that reduce friction, decrease vehicle weight, or improve system efficiency. This technology is already available on consumer EVs and HEVs. The three key issues for the marketability of advanced technology vehicles are cost, infrastructure, and performance. Therefore, research and development has been a key issue in the discussion of these vehicles, as have efforts to make the vehicles more affordable and the infrastructure more accessible. | Research and development of cleaner and more efficient vehicle technologies has been ongoing for the past few decades. Much of this research started in response to the oil shocks of the 1970s, which triggered concerns about rising fuel costs and growing dependence on imported fuel. The urgency of those concerns was lost as fuel prices declined in the 1980s and 1990s. At the same time, however, rising concerns about vehicle contributions to air pollution and global climate change added a new dimension to the issue. Recently, instability in world oil prices and political concerns have reawakened the energy dependence concerns of the 1970s. Meanwhile, research on new technologies continues, with a particular focus on commercialization. Despite widespread agreement in principle on the benefits of decreased dependence on petroleum and the internal combustion engine, the practical challenges posed by a transition to advanced vehicle technologies are formidable. Nonetheless, significant research and development progress has been made since the 1970s.
These new technologies have sparked more interest as some major auto manufacturers have introduced high-efficiency production vehicles to the American market, and others have plans to introduce similar vehicles in the future. Furthermore, interest has grown recently as a result of higher petroleum prices, and the announcement of new emission regulations for passenger vehicles.
In January 2002, the Bush Administration announced the FreedomCAR initiative, which focuses federal research on fuel cell vehicles. In conjunction with FreedomCAR, in January 2003, President Bush announced the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative, which focuses federal research on hydrogen fuel and fuel cells for stationary applications. The goal of these initiatives is to improve the competitiveness of hydrogen fuel cell vehicle technologies. However, fuel cell vehicles share many components with hybrid and pure electric vehicles. Thus, this research will likely promote advanced vehicle technologies in general.
This report discusses four major vehicle technologies—electric vehicles, hybrid electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and fuel cell vehicles—as well as advanced component technologies. Each technology is discussed in terms of cost, fueling and maintenance infrastructure, and performance. |
crs_R40725 | crs_R40725_0 | These challenges have reached the Supreme Court, where oral arguments in the cases took place during the last week of March, 2012. This report first analyzes the authority of Congress to enact the minimum coverage provision contained in ACA and discusses whether there must be exceptions to a requirement to purchase health insurance based on First Amendment freedom of religion. It finally examines some of the legal challenges to this federal requirement as well as other questions (relating to the Anti-Injunction Act and severability) that the Supreme Court is considering in conjunction with the minimum coverage provision. For a discussion of the constitutional challenge to ACA's expansion of the Medicaid program, see CRS Report R42367, Federalism Challenge to Medicaid Expansion Under the Affordable Care Act: Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services , by [author name scrubbed]. Constitutional Authority to Require an Individual to Have Health Insurance
While there is no specific enumerated constitutional power to regulate health care or establish a minimum coverage provision, one can look to Congress's other broad enumerated powers which have been used to justify health care regulation in the past. In the instant case, Congress's taxing power or its power to regulate interstate commerce may be pertinent. If so, the provision might be upheld as constitutional so long as it was found to comply with the constitutional restrictions imposed on direct and indirect taxes discussed below. As the tax is imposed conditionally and may be avoided by compliance with regulations set out in the statute, some might argue that it may also be accurately described as a penalty and, therefore, the taxing power alone might not provide Congress the constitutional authority to impose the requirement. Under the first factor of the test, it must be determined whether requiring individuals to purchase health insurance is commercial or economic in nature. On the other hand, it is argued that the minimum coverage provision goes beyond the bounds of the Commerce Clause, as regulation of the health insurance industry or the health care system could be considered economic activity, but regulating a choice to purchase health insurance is not. Plaintiffs' success in challenging the minimum coverage provision has been mixed. Certain individuals, the National Federation of Independent Business, and several other states later joined this lawsuit, and there are currently 26 state plaintiffs. Virginia also alleged that Congress did not have the authority to enact the minimum coverage provision under, among other things, its power to regulate interstate commerce and its taxing power. Aside from evaluating the constitutional issues surrounding the requirement to have health insurance, the Court agreed to separately examine whether the Court is barred from evaluating the individual mandate at this time because of the Anti-Injunction Act, which prohibits lawsuits seeking to restrain the assessment or collection of a tax. The Court also agreed to review the question of whether the individual mandate may be severed from the rest of ACA, assuming the individual mandate is found to be unconstitutional. It is not clear whether the Court might regard these findings as an indicator that Congress regarded the individual mandate as an indispensable part of ACA, as the petitioners argue; as an expression of Congress's view that the individual mandate is inseparable from the guaranteed issue and community rating provisions, as the Administration claims; or conversely, unrelated to the severability question, as a demonstration of Congress's view that the individual mandate plays an essential role in a broader regulatory scheme for purposes of the Commerce Clause, as the amicus contends. | As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), P.L. 111-148, as amended, Congress enacted a "minimum coverage provision," which compels certain individuals to have a minimum level of health insurance (i.e., an "individual mandate"). Individuals who fail to do so may be subject to a monetary penalty, administered through the tax code. Congress has never compelled individuals to buy health insurance, and there has been significant controversy and debate over whether the requirement is within the scope of Congress's legislative powers.
Shortly after ACA was enacted, several lawsuits were filed that challenge the individual mandate on constitutional grounds. While some of these cases have been dismissed for procedural reasons, others have moved forward. These challenges have now reached the Supreme Court. During the last week of March, the Court heard arguments in HHS v. Florida, a case in which attorneys general and governors in 26 states as well as others brought an action against the Administration, seeking to invalidate the individual mandate and other provisions of ACA. Besides evaluating the constitutionality of the individual mandate, the Court is examining the question of whether the Anti-Injunction Act currently prevents the Court from ruling on the merits of the case. It also is considering the extent to which the minimum coverage provision can be severed from the remainder of ACA, if it is found to be unconstitutional. Finally, the Court is analyzing ACA's expansion of the Medicaid program and whether it unconstitutionally "coerces" states into compliance with federal requirements. This last issue will be addressed in CRS Report R42367, Federalism Challenge to Medicaid Expansion Under the Affordable Care Act: Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, by [author name scrubbed].
While there is no specific enumerated constitutional power to regulate health care or establish a minimum coverage provision, Congress's taxing power or its power to regulate interstate commerce may be pertinent. With regard to the taxing power, the requirement to purchase health insurance might be construed as a tax and upheld so long as it was found to comply with the constitutional restrictions imposed on direct and indirect taxes. On the other hand, opponents of the minimum coverage provision may argue that since it is imposed conditionally and may be avoided by compliance with regulations set out in the statute, that the requirement may be more accurately described as a penalty. If so, the taxing power alone might not provide Congress the constitutional authority to support this provision.
In evaluating the minimum coverage provision under the Commerce Clause, one of several issues that may be examined is whether the individual mandate is a regulation of economic activity. Some argue that the requirement to purchase health insurance is economic in nature because it regulates how an individual participates in the health care market, through insurance or otherwise. Conversely, others argue that forcing individuals to participate in commerce in order to regulate them goes beyond the bounds of the clause.
This report analyzes certain constitutional issues raised by requiring individuals to purchase health insurance under Congress's authority under its taxing power or its power to regulate interstate commerce. It also addresses whether the exceptions to the minimum coverage provision to purchase health insurance satisfy First Amendment freedom of religion protections. Finally, this report discusses some of the more publicized legal challenges to ACA, as well additional issues that are currently before the Court. |
crs_RL32140 | crs_RL32140_0 | This reportdiscusses the history of the federal railroad rights of way grants, the various forms such grants havetaken, and the provisions Congress has enacted to govern disposition of railroad rights of way. Thisreport will be updated as circumstances warrant. At times, railroads also acquired some rights through the exercise of state power of eminentdomain and through the exercise of federal power of eminent domain. In the latter instance, therailroad obviously could hold full title to the right of way lands and the federal government none. This report does not address privately-owned railroad rights of way but discusses railroadrights of way granted by the federal government, either as part of a land grant or under the 1875 rightof way statute. (11) However, the "rail banking" provisions of the Rails to Trails Act(discussed below) have again resulted in a focus on the exact nature of the right of way interest andthe authority of Congress over rail corridors. In 1875, Congress approved the general railroad right of way grant (GRRWA) using the samelanguage as in some of the land-grant rights of way grants: "The right of way through the publiclands of the United States is hereby granted to any railroad company ...." (17) The Supreme Court heldin Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States that this language clearly granted only a surfaceeasement rather than the strip of land right of way. (28)
Despite the limitations on the alienability of federal rights of way, the railroads still purportedto convey, and adjacent landowners continued to encroach upon, rights of way and claim rightsthereto. Congressional Disposition of Underlying Federal Interests
Congress legislated specially to provide for the final disposition of particular rights of wayno longer being used for railroad purposes, and in 1922 also enacted a general statute. Theprovisions state:
Whenever public lands of the United States have beenor may be granted to any railroad company for use as a right of way for its railroad or as sites forrailroad structures of any kind, and use and occupancy of said lands for such purposes has ceasedor shall hereafter cease, whether by forfeiture or by abandonment by said railroad company declaredor decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction or by Act of Congress, then and thereupon all right,title, interest, and estate of the United States in said lands shall, except such part thereof as may beembraced in a public highway legally established within one year after the date of said decree orforfeiture or abandonment[,] be transferred to and vested in any person, firm, or corporation, assigns,or successors in title and interest to whom or to which title of the United States may have been ormay be granted, conveying or purporting to convey the whole of the legal subdivision or subdivisionstraversed or occupied by such railroad or railroad structures of any kind as aforesaid, except landswithin a municipality the title to which, upon forfeiture or abandonment, as herein provided, shallvest in such municipality, and this by virtue of the patent thereto and without the necessity of anyother or further conveyance or assurance of any kind or nature whatsoever: Provided , That thissection shall not affect conveyances made by any railroad company of portions of its right of wayif such conveyance be among those which have been or may after March 8, 1922, and before suchforfeiture or abandonment be validated and confirmed by any Act of Congress; nor shall this sectionaffect any public highway on said right of way on March 8, 1922: Provided further , That the transferof such lands shall be subject to and contain reservations in favor of the United States of all oil, gas,and other minerals in the land so transferred and conveyed, with the right to prospect for, mine andremove same. The importance of this question has beenhighlighted by recent cases involving the Rails to Trails litigation. The Preseault cases involved private fee-title landowners whose predecessorshad sold an easement for railroad purposes to a railroad. This case again did not take into account the years ofenactments by Congress premised upon some retained interest or authority over the rights of way,nor the language of § 913 that on its face makes a disposition different from that which wouldpertain if the right of way were an easement at common law. Although Congress has on many occasions addressed the disposition ofrailroad rights of way, controversies may be expected to continue to arise because of issues as to thenature and scope of Congress' authority over the rights of way; the nature and scope of the interestof the railroad, the validity of attempts by the railroad to convey all or part of that interest,ambiguities associated with dating abandonment, disputes between adjacent landowners overperceived entitlements to lands within a right of way, and assertions that compensation is owed. | During the drive to settle the western portion of the United States, Congress sought toencourage the expansion of railroads, at first through generous grants of rights of way and lands tothe great transcontinental railroads between 1862 and 1871, and later through the enactment of ageneral right of way statute. The 1875 General Railroad Right of Way Act permitted railroads toobtain a 200-foot federal right of way by running tracks across public lands. Some railroads alsoobtained rights of way by private purchase or through the exercise of state or federal powers ofeminent domain. Therefore, not all railroad rights of way are on federal lands, and the propertyinterest of a railroad in a right of way may vary. The courts have characterized the interest held bya railroad pursuant to a federally granted right of way variously: as a "limited fee" in the case of aland grant right of way, or as an easement in the case of a right of way under the 1875 Act.
As railroads closed rail lines, questions arose as to the disposition of the lands within theformer rights of way. Many individual instances were resolved in separate legislation. In 1922,Congress enacted a general law to provide that federal railroad rights of way on federal lands becomethe property of the adjacent landowner or municipality through which the right of way passed. Thislaw is unclear in several respects -- for example, as to what procedures are sufficient to constitutean abandonment of a right of way, and on what authority Congress could provide for theestablishment of highways within the right of way after abandonment of the rail line. In 1988, inwhat is popularly known as the Rails to Trails Act, Congress opted to bank rail corridors, keepingthem available for possible future use as railroads and making them available for interim use asrecreational trails.
Some cases have held that Rails to Trails results in takings of private property whennon-federal easements were involved. In the context of federal rights of way, recent cases have heldthat the federal government did not retain any interest in federal railroad rights of way when theunderlying lands were conveyed into private ownership, and therefore if an abandoned rail corridoris held for interim trail use, compensation is owed the adjacent landowners. However, Congress haslegislated numerous times over the years regarding federal railroad rights of way, as though Congressbelieved it had continuing authority over their ultimate disposition. Issues may continue to arisesurrounding the disposition of federal railroad rights of way, possibly involving, for example, theauthority of Congress over the rights of way, the nature of the interest held by the railroad, thevalidity of attempts by the railroad to convey all or part of that interest, and disputes betweenadjacent landowners over perceived entitlements to lands within a particular right of way.
This report discusses the history of federal railroad rights of way and some of the casesaddressing them. It will be updated from time to time as circumstances warrant. |
crs_RL31543 | crs_RL31543_0 | Introduction
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have made a strategic decision to reorient Russiannational security policy from a posture of antagonism, if not hostility, toward the United States andits allies, to a policy of more cooperation with the United States and the West. Among the more notable results of this shift in Russian national security policy were: Russia's political and military cooperation with the U.S. campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,including U.S. military deployments in former Soviet states in Central Asia; Moscow's decision toclose its electronic intelligence base in Cuba; and the softening (nearly to the point of abandonmentin some cases) of Russia's previously tough positions on NATO enlargement, the ABM Treaty,missile defense, and strategic nuclear force reductions. Primakov viewed China, India, and Iran askey partners and sought support among other states that opposed U.S. policy and/or resented U.S.power. Putin responded publicly with praise for the new and untested U.S. President. The new dominant issue would be cooperation against international terrorism. Reasons for the New Policy
If Putin really has fundamentally reoriented Russian policy toward cooperation and integration with the West, one may well ask why. As the shift in Russian national security policy became evident in 2001, some in the United States saw it as a short-term tactical response to the September 11 attacks and their aftermath. Those who see the new Russian policy as a strategic decision argue that the numerous changes of position that Putin has made on major issues in relations with the United States are cumulativelyso substantial that they seem too high a price to pay in exchange for some short-term tacticalobjective(s). The change in Russia's strategic relationship with China may also fall into this category. (48)
After September 11, the Bush Administration substantially reduced, although it did not entirely stop, its criticism of Russian human rights abuses in Chechnya. (50)
The Bush Administration has been more forthcoming in addressing what Putin says is his top priority, Russian economic interests. Both countriesexcoriate Al Qaeda and like-minded radical Islamic movements. That leaves missile defense as the principal item remaining from the old strategic arms controlagenda. (81) He alsopledged cooperation with Russia's energy transportation infrastructure. Political support for this idea, however, mightbe adversely affected by Russia's reported plan to build more nuclear reactors in Iran. Beijing and Moscow continue toproclaim good will and harmonious relations between them. Some supporters of U.S. policy toward Russia contend that Putin's repeated concessions to U.S. positions and acceptance of faits accomplis , acknowledging U.S. force majeure , confirmthecorrectness of that policy - that there was, and is, no need to make undue concessions to Moscow,because Russia has no choice but to go along with the United States, due to Russia's weaknessvis-a-vis the United States and because of Russia's objective need to join the western world, on theWest's terms. Others reply that to the extent that there is a danger of Putin's pro-western policies being reversed, it will hinge not on whether the United States and the West reward Russia, but on whetherPutin's domestic economic policies succeed. After all, these observers contend, Putin's fundamentalrationale is that Russia must integrate with the West in order to reconstruct its economy and achievea decent living standard for its people. | Russian President Putin appears to have made a strategic decision to shift Russian policy toward cooperation with the United States and the West. This is a major departure from the policy that Putininherited from his predecessors, which saw Russia as the leader of a coalition aimed at opposing U.S."global domination."
Putin seized upon the events of September 11 to promote his new policy by: cooperating with the United States against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan; softening Russianopposition to NATO enlargement, including admission of former Soviet republics, and establishinga new cooperative relationship with NATO; acquiescing in U.S. decisions regarding withdrawal fromthe ABM Treaty, strategic nuclear force reductions, and missile defense; and closing Russia's largemilitary intelligence base in Cuba.
The principal reason given by Putin for the new policy is that Russia must integrate with the West in order to reconstruct its own economy and achieve a decent living standard for its people. Putin also acknowledges Russia's weakness and inability to act globally in opposition to the UnitedStates. He may also have rejected as unwise, the previous policy of de facto alliance with Chinaagainst the United States, instead seeing China as a possible long-term threat to Russia. Putin's new policy does not seem to enjoy strong support among Russian political elites, the military and foreignpolicy establishment, and the general public. Putin's overall political power and prestige, however,may be sufficient to sustain the policy.
The Bush Administration responded positively to the new Russian policy after September 11. The Administration, however, did not make many concessions on key issues related to arms control,missile defense, and NATO. It has been more forthcoming on some economic issues.
The implications of Russia's pro-western policy are overwhelmingly positive for the United States in the war on terrorism and in relations with Russia and China. Russia's strategic choice ofintegration with the West reduces the danger seen by some of Russo-Chinese cooperation againstthe United States. By depriving China of its erstwhile Russian partner, it may encourage China toseek improved relations with the United States - or risk geostrategic isolation.
Some sore points remain between Washington and Moscow in which Congress takes a strong interest, such as Russia's continued and possibly expanded plans to construct nuclear reactors in Iran,its support of Iraq, and its heavy-handed policy in Chechnya. There is also friction on some tradeissues.
Critics of Bush Administration policy argue that it has not been sufficiently responsive to Putin and risks losing the new cooperativeness. Others reply that Russia has no choice but to continue itspro-western course, in view of Russia's weakness and its self-interest in integrating with the West. In this view, the endurance of Russia's pro-western policy ultimately may depend on Putin's successin reviving the economy and improving Russians' well-being. |
crs_R42547 | crs_R42547_0 | Background
Twenty-first century criminals increasingly rely on the Internet and advanced technologies to further their criminal operations. For instance, criminals can easily leverage the Internet to carry out traditional crimes such as distributing illicit drugs and sex trafficking. In addition, they exploit the digital world to facilitate crimes that are often technology driven, including identity theft, payment card fraud, and intellectual property theft. In addition to the economic impact, cybercrimes can have public health and national security consequences, among others. For over three decades, Congress has been concerned about cybercrime and its related threats. Today, these concerns often arise among a larger discussion surrounding the federal government's role in ensuring cyber security. Irrespective of the definition, conceptualizing cybercrime involves a number of key elements and questions, including where do the criminal acts exist in the real and digital worlds (and what technologies are involved), why are malicious activities initiated, and who is involved in carrying out the malicious acts? Technology: Cyber vs. Real World Crime
Perhaps one way of viewing cybercrimes is that they are digital versions of traditional offenses. It appears that many cybercrimes could be considered traditional, or real world, crimes if not for the incorporated element of virtual or cyberspace. In some instances, it may seem that law enforcement struggles to keep up with developments in the virtual world, which transform routine activities once driven by paper records in the real world. As a result, criminals are often prosecuted using laws intended to combat crimes in the real world. Cyber criminals can exhibit a wide range of self interests, deriving profit, notoriety, and/or gratification from activities such as hacking, cyber stalking, and online child pornography. Without knowing the criminal intent or motivation, however, some activities of cyber criminals and other malicious actors may appear on the surface to be similar, causing confusion as to whether a particular action should be categorized as cyber crime or not. Blurring Lines Between Cybercrime and Related Threats
When referring to cybercrime incidents, terms such as cyber attack and cyber war are often loosely applied, and they may obscure the motives of the actors involved. Criminal attribution is a key delineating factor between cybercrime and other cyber threats. When investigating a given threat, law enforcement is challenged with tracing the action to its source and determining whether the actor is a criminal or whether the actor may be a terrorist or state actor posing a potentially greater national security threat. As such, some refer to Anonymous as a group of online activists, others see the collective as a group of criminal actors, and still others have likened it to online insurgents. Government Definitions and Agency Focus
The U.S. government does not appear to have an official definition of cybercrime that distinguishes it from crimes committed in what many consider the real world. Similarly, there is not a definition of cybercrime that distinguishes it from other forms of cyber threats, and the term is often used interchangeably with other Internet or technology-based malicious acts such as cyber warfare, cyber attack, and cyber terrorism. Federal law enforcement agencies often define cybercrime based on their jurisdiction and the crimes they are charged with investigating. And, just as there is no overarching definition for cybercrime, there is no single agency that has been designated as the lead investigative agency for combating "cybercrime." Some may question whether it is necessary to have a clear definition of what constitutes cybercrime and what delineates it from other real world and cyber threats. On one hand, if the purpose of defining cybercrime is for investigating and prosecuting any of the various crimes under the broader cybercrime umbrella, it may be less critical to create a definition of the umbrella term and more imperative to clearly define which specific activities constitute crimes—regardless of whether they are considered real world crimes or cybercrimes. On the other hand, a distinction between cybercrime and other malicious activities may be beneficial for creating specific policies on combating the ever-expanding range of cyber threats. If government agencies and private sector businesses design strategies and missions around combating "cybercrime," it may be useful to communicate a clear definition of cybercrime to those individuals who may be involved in carrying out the strategies. Strategies and Cybercrime
The United States does not have a national strategy exclusively focused on combating cybercrime. Rather, there are other, broader strategies that have cybercrime components. Policy makers may question whether there should be a distinct strategy for combating cybercrime or whether efforts to control these crimes are best addressed through more wide-ranging strategies, such as those targeting cybersecurity or transnational organized crime. Congress may also question whether these broader strategies provide specific cybercrime-related objectives and clear means to achieve these goals. However, comprehensive data on cybercrime incidents and their impact are not available, and without exact numbers on the current scope and prevalence of cybercrime, it is difficult to evaluate the magnitude of the threats posed by cyber criminals. There are a number of issues that have prevented the accurate measurement and tracking of cybercrime. Firstly, the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes cybercrime presents a barrier to tracking comprehensive cybercrime data. Moving Forward
Policy makers may debate whether to direct an evaluation of the threats posed by cybercriminals. Appendix. | Twenty-first century criminals increasingly rely on the Internet and advanced technologies to further their criminal operations. These criminals can easily leverage the Internet to carry out traditional crimes such as distributing illicit drugs and sex trafficking. In addition, they exploit the digital world to facilitate crimes that are often technology driven, including identity theft, payment card fraud, and intellectual property theft. Cybercrimes have economic, public health, and national security implications, among others. For over three decades, Congress has been concerned about cybercrime and its related threats. Today, these concerns often arise among a larger discussion surrounding the federal government's role in ensuring U.S. cyber security.
Conceptualizing cybercrime involves a number of key elements and questions that include where do the criminal acts exist in the real and digital worlds (and what technologies are involved in carrying out the crimes), why are malicious activities initiated, and who is involved in carrying out the malicious acts?
One way of viewing cybercrimes is that they may be digital versions of traditional, real world offenses. They could be considered traditional, or "real world," crimes if not for the incorporated element of virtual or cyberspace. In some instances, however, it may seem that law enforcement struggles to keep up with developments in the virtual world, which transform routine activities once driven by paper records in the real world. As a result, criminals are often prosecuted using laws intended to combat crimes in the real world. The distinction between cybercrime and other malicious acts in the virtual realm is the actor's motivation. Cyber criminals can exhibit a wide range of self interests, deriving profit, notoriety, and/or gratification from activities such as hacking, cyber stalking, and online child pornography. Without knowing the criminal intent or motivation, however, some activities of cyber criminals and other malicious actors may appear on the surface to be similar, causing confusion as to whether a particular action should be categorized as cybercrime or not. When referring to cybercrime incidents, terms such as cyber attack, cyber espionage, and cyber war are often loosely applied, and they may obscure the motives of the actors involved. Criminal attribution is a key delineating factor between cybercrime and other cyber threats. When investigating a given threat, law enforcement is challenged with tracing the action to its source and determining whether the actor is a criminal or whether the actor may be a terrorist or state actor posing a potentially greater national security threat. This is highlighted by examining the online collective known as Anonymous. Some refer to Anonymous as a group of online activists, others see the collective as a group of criminal actors, and still others have likened it to online insurgents.
The U.S. government does not appear to have an official definition of cybercrime that distinguishes it from crimes committed in what is considered the real world. Similarly, there is not a definition of cybercrime that distinguishes it from other forms of cyber threats, and the term is often used interchangeably with other Internet- or technology-linked malicious acts. Federal law enforcement agencies often define cybercrime based on their jurisdiction and the crimes they are charged with investigating. And, just as there is no overarching definition for cybercrime, there is no single agency that has been designated as the lead investigative agency for combating cybercrime.
Congress may question whether it is necessary to have a clear definition of what constitutes cybercrime and what delineates it from other real world and cyber threats. On one hand, if the purpose of defining cybercrime is for investigating and prosecuting any of the various crimes under the broader cybercrime umbrella, it may be less critical to create a definition of the umbrella term and more imperative to clearly define which specific activities constitute crimes—regardless of whether they are considered real world crimes or cybercrimes. On the other hand, a distinction between cybercrime and other malicious activities may be beneficial for creating specific policies on combating the ever-expanding range of cyber threats. If government agencies and private sector businesses design strategies and missions around combating cybercrime, it may be useful to communicate a clear definition of cybercrime to those individuals who may be involved in carrying out the strategies.
The United States does not have a national strategy exclusively focused on combating cybercrime. Rather, there are other, broader strategies that have cybercrime components (a selection of which are presented in the Appendix). Policy makers may question whether there should be a distinct strategy for combating cybercrime or whether efforts to control these crimes are best addressed through more wide-ranging strategies such as those targeting cyber security or transnational organized crime. Congress may also question whether these broader strategies provide specific cybercrime-related objectives and clear means to achieve these goals.
Comprehensive data on cybercrime incidents and their impact are not available, and without exact numbers on the current scope and prevalence of cybercrime, it is difficult to evaluate the magnitude of the threats posed by cyber criminals. There are a number of issues that have prevented the accurate measurement and tracking of cybercrime. For one, the lack of a clear sense of what constitutes cybercrime presents a barrier to tracking inclusive cybercrime data. Additionally, much of the available data on cybercrime are self-reported, and individuals or organizations may not realize a cybercrime has taken place or may elect—for a host of reasons—not to report it. Policy makers may debate whether to direct a thorough evaluation of the threats posed by cyber criminals. |
crs_R43380 | crs_R43380_0 | The coastal environment has been altered over time due to changes in hydrology, loss of barrier islands and coastal wetland habitat, issues associated with low water quality, human development, and natural processes, among other things. Major restoration projects led by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have been implemented. Significant state and local efforts to restore the Gulf Coast have also been undertaken, in some cases in consultation with the federal government. For example, in 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused widespread damage to wetland and coastal areas along the Gulf, and altered the plans for restoring some parts of the coast. In 2010, a manmade disaster, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, resulted in an unprecedented discharge of oil in U.S. waters and oiling of over 1,100 miles of U.S. shoreline. As an identified responsible party, the oil and gas company BP is liable for response (i.e., cleanup) costs, as well as specified economic and natural resource damages related to the spill. 112-141 , also known as the RESTORE Act); other CWA civil and criminal penalties, including funding for projects to be selected by the nonprofit National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF) under court settlements; and funding to compensate for spill impacts through the Natural Resources Damage Assessment (NRDA) process, a component of oil spill liability pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act. Introduction to Congressional Role
Congress has varying degrees of oversight and control over the dissemination of funding to restore the Gulf Coast. Restoration of the Gulf Coast is complicated from a congressional perspective because multiple restoration processes are interrelated, but largely occur outside of the traditional appropriations process (including funds being used by nonfederal sources). It includes an overview of previous, ongoing restoration work in the Gulf Coast region and a more detailed discussion of the implementation of the RESTORE Act and other Deepwater Horizon -related processes. Background on the Gulf Coast Ecosystem
The Gulf Coast region is home to more than 22 million people and 15,000 species over five southern states: Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. Overall, the Gulf Coast environment includes multiple interconnected ecosystems spanning 600,000 square miles of shoreline of the Gulf of Mexico. Prespill Federal Restoration Activities in the Gulf
Prior to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, several federal agencies were involved in a number of efforts to restore and conserve ecosystems in the Gulf Coast region. In these areas, states, along with other entities, have initiated restoration efforts. The effects from the oil spill were spread throughout the Gulf Coast ecosystem. The report outlined existing processes as well as potential new funding sources for Gulf Coast restoration. Enactment of the RESTORE Act in P.L. It is expected that in total, more than $18.3 billion will go to these three efforts pursuant to civil and criminal settlements with responsible parties. Some of these efforts are referenced in Table A-2 , below. 5. 8. The Deepwater Horizon NRDA Trustees are
the United States Department of the Interior; NOAA, on behalf of the United States Department of Commerce; the state of Louisiana's Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority, Oil Spill Coordinator's Office, Department of Environmental Quality, Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, and Department of Natural Resources; the state of Mississippi's Department of Environmental Quality; the state of Alabama's Department of Conservation and Natural Resources and Geological Survey of Alabama; the state of Florida's Department of Environmental Protection and Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission; and for the state of Texas, Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, Texas General Land Office, and Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. This process can take years, especially for complex incidents such as the Deepwater Horizon spill. Coordination
The coordination of restoration efforts among the multiple implementing entities in the Gulf Coast region is one likely area of congressional interest. Additionally, other elements that are related to Gulf Coast restoration were not required by Congress to be included in the report. Some funding under the RESTORE Act, NFWF, and NRDA early restoration efforts has been released. Sources of Funding and Ongoing Federal Efforts for Gulf Coast Restoration | The Gulf of Mexico coastal environment (Gulf Coast) stretches over approximately 600,000 square miles across five U.S. states: Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. It is home to more than 22 million people and more than 15,000 species of sea life. Efforts are ongoing to restore this environment, which has been damaged by specific events such as the Deepwater Horizon spill and hurricanes as well as by disturbances to wetlands and water quality from human alterations and other impacts. The issue for Congress is the implementation, funding, and performance of congressionally sanctioned restoration efforts for the Gulf Coast.
Ongoing Efforts to Restore the Gulf Coast. The Gulf Coast environment has been degraded over time due to, among other things, altered hydrology, loss of barrier islands and coastal wetland habitat, issues associated with low water quality, and other human impacts and natural processes. Preexisting environmental issues throughout the Gulf Coast have been affected and in some cases exacerbated by natural hazards and manmade catastrophes. Among other events, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused widespread damage to wetland and coastal areas along the Gulf. A number of federal agencies—the Army Corps of Engineers, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency, among others—are engaged in ongoing efforts to restore areas or aspects of the Gulf Coast environments. Significant state and local efforts to restore the Gulf Coast also have been undertaken, in some cases in consultation with the federal government. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill resulted in a new set of restoration efforts and funds.
Restoration in Response to Deepwater Horizon. The Deepwater Horizon explosion on April 20, 2010, resulted in an unprecedented discharge of oil in U.S. waters, eventually oiling more than 1,100 miles of U.S. Gulf Coast shoreline. As an identified responsible party, the energy company BP is liable for response (i.e., cleanup) costs, as well as specified economic damages and natural resource damages related to the spill.
Efforts to mitigate and recover from the Deepwater Horizon spill have initiated several new processes that are expected to supplement ongoing Gulf Coast restoration work. In particular, three major processes are likely to significantly affect restoration work going forward: first, the dissemination of approximately $5.3 billion in Clean Water Act penalties, as required in the RESTORE Act (P.L. 112-141); second, the dissemination of $2.55 billion in criminal penalties from responsible parties by the nonprofit National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF), as required under relevant court settlements; and third, the assessment and provision of $8.8 billion in Natural Resources Damage Assessment (NRDA) penalties under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, as amended (P.L. 101-380). Initial funding under NFWF and NRDA early restoration efforts was first released in 2013 and 2014, respectively, whereas the Treasury Department and Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council began to release funding for certain planning activities under the RESTORE Act in 2015.
Issues for Congress. Congressional interest in Gulf Coast restoration may include oversight of previously passed legislation (P.L. 112-141 and P.L. 101-380), including progress to date and any related legislative changes that may be required. Congress also may be interested in the effect of these efforts on ongoing Gulf Coast restoration, coordination between the multiple aforementioned processes, and the effectiveness of these efforts going forward. As a result of differences in the origins and implementation of each effort, Congress has varying degrees of oversight and control over the dissemination of funding to restore the Gulf Coast. Restoration of the Gulf Coast is complicated from a congressional perspective because multiple restoration processes are interrelated but occur largely outside of the traditional appropriations process (including funds being used by nonfederal sources). |
crs_R40735 | crs_R40735_0 | The international competitiveness of the United States has been a topic of heated debate in recent years. In this debate it has been argued that the decline in performance of U.S. firms stems, at least in part, from problems with the federal tax system. In support of these claims, comparisons are often made between provisions of the U.S. tax code and those of the nation's trading partners—with selected differences offered as explanations for unsatisfactory outcomes. The United States reliance on direct taxes (such as income and payroll taxes) is commonly argued to provide a disadvantage when trading with countries that have indirect taxes (such as a value-added tax or VAT). This follows from the allowance in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—the predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements—for border tax adjustments on indirect taxes, but not for direct taxes. Almost since its inception in 1967 this provision has been cited as a source of competitive disadvantage and as being an export subsidy. According to this argument, U.S. companies are at a competitive disadvantage because they cannot make use of border tax adjustments like many of their international competitors. Beginning in the Johnson Administration, border tax adjustments have been a matter of concern. In addition, Congress has also instructed U.S. trade negotiators to address this perceived distortion as part of granting fast-track trade authorization in 1974, 1988, and 2002. Congressional interest in this debate continues today with the introduction of the Border Tax Fairness Act ( S. 1043 ) and the Border Tax Equity Act of 2009 ( H.R. 2927 ). In addition to directing U.S. trade negotiators to address this perceived distortion, the acts would impose taxes on imports from countries with border tax adjustments and compensate exporters for border taxes paid. Some assert that these provisions would redress issues of U.S. competitiveness—by offsetting the impact of border tax adjustments on U.S. goods. Others maintain this is not the case. Economists have long recognized that border tax adjustments have no effect on a nation's competitiveness. Border tax adjustments have been shown to mitigate the double taxation of cross-border transactions and to provide a level playing field for domestic and foreign goods and services. This is not to say, however, that a nation's tax structure cannot influence patterns of trade or the composition of trade, through differences in the relative prices of high- and low-tax goods and services. This report explains these common economic findings on the effect of border tax adjustments on international competitiveness through a dual-channel approach—first through analogy to the retail sales tax and secondly using economic theory. As a prelude to these explanations, the report begins with a brief explanation of VATs and border tax adjustments. Hence, in the absence of changes to the underlying macroeconomic variables affecting capital flows (for example, interest rates), any changes in the product prices of traded goods and services brought about by border tax adjustments would be immediately offset by exchange-rate adjustments. | U.S. international competitiveness has been a topic of heated debate in recent years. In this debate it has been argued that the decline in performance of U.S. firms stems, at least in part, from problems with the federal tax system. In support of these claims, comparisons are often made between provisions of the U.S. tax code and those of the nation's trading partners—with selected differences offered as explanations for unsatisfactory outcomes.
One common argument made by advocates of this position is that the United States' reliance on direct taxes (such as income and payroll taxes) provides a disadvantage when trading with countries that have indirect taxes (such as a value-added tax or VAT). This argument follows from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allowance for border tax adjustments (the rebate of indirect taxes on exports and the imposition of indirect taxes on imports) on indirect taxes, but not for direct taxes. According to this argument, U.S. companies are at a competitive disadvantage because they cannot make use of border tax adjustments like many of their international competitors.
Almost since its inception in 1967, this provision has been characterized as an export subsidy and as a source of competitive disadvantage. Beginning in the Johnson Administration, high-level discussions have been held concerning this matter. In addition, Congress has also instructed U.S. trade negotiators to address this perceived distortion as part of granting fast-track trade authorization in 1974, 1988, and 2002.
Congressional interest in this debate continues today with the introduction of the Border Tax Fairness Act (S. 1043) and the Border Tax Equity Act of 2009 (H.R. 2927). In addition to directing U.S. trade negotiators to address this perceived distortion, the acts would impose taxes on imports from countries with border tax adjustments and compensate exporters for border taxes paid. Some assert that these provisions would redress issues of U.S. competitiveness; others maintain this is not the case.
Economists have long recognized that border tax adjustments have no effect on a nation's competitiveness. Border tax adjustments have been shown to mitigate the double taxation of cross-border transactions and to provide a level playing field for domestic and foreign goods and services. Hence, in the absence of changes to the underlying macroeconomic variables affecting capital flows (for example, interest rates), any changes in the product prices of traded goods and services brought about by border tax adjustments would be immediately offset by exchange-rate adjustments. This is not to say, however, that a nation's tax structure cannot influence patterns of trade or the composition of trade.
This report explains these common economic findings on the effect of border tax adjustments on international competitiveness, through two perspectives on the issue—first through a discussion on the neutrality of border tax adjustments with respect to cross-border trade and secondly using economic theory to explain the effect of border tax adjustments on the U.S. balance of trade. As a prelude to these explanations, the report begins with a brief explanation of VATs and border tax adjustments.
This report will be updated as legislative events warrant. |
crs_RL30360 | crs_RL30360_0 | Introduction
The filibuster is widely viewed as one of the Senate's most distinctive procedural features. More generally, however, filibustering includes any tactics aimed at blocking a measure by preventing it from coming to a vote. Instead, possibilities for filibustering exist because Senate rules lack provisions that would place specific limits on Senators' rights and opportunities in the legislative process. This report discusses major aspects of Senate procedure related to filibusters and cloture. The report does not encompass all possible contingencies or consider every relevant precedent, though it identifies key modifications to the rule and its application in recent years. The Right to Speak at Length and the Two-Speech Rule
Under Rule XIX, unless any special limits on debate are in effect, Senators who have been recognized may speak for as long as they wish. The motion is not debatable, and its adoption requires only a simple majority vote. By this means, Senators can prevent a debate from continuing indefinitely if they are prepared to reject the amendment, motion, or bill that is being debated. A quorum is rarely present, and the presiding officer normally does not have the authority to count to determine whether a quorum actually is present; he or she therefore directs the clerk to call the roll. A filibustering Senator has only to suggest the absence of a quorum and then object to calling off the quorum call in order to provoke a motion to secure the attendance of absentees and (with the support of at least 10 other Senators) a roll call vote on that motion. For example, it is not in order for a Senator to present a motion to invoke cloture on a bill the Senate has not yet agreed to consider or on an amendment that has not yet been offered. As a compromise, the Senate agreed to move from two-thirds of the Senators present and voting (a maximum of 67 votes) to three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn (normally, and at a maximum, 60 votes) on all matters except future rules changes, including changes in the cloture rule itself. In relation to the Senate's initial consideration of a bill or resolution, there usually can be at least two filibusters under the Senate's standing rules: first, a filibuster on the motion to proceed to the measure's consideration; and second, after the Senate agrees to this motion, a filibuster on the measure itself. Time for Consideration and Debate
In general, Rule XXII imposes a cap of no more than 30 additional hours for the Senate to consider a question after invoking cloture on it. Offering Amendments and Motions
There are several key restrictions governing the amendments that Senators can propose under cloture that do not apply to Senate floor amendments under most other circumstances. The relevant portion of Rule XXII reads,
Except by unanimous consent, no amendment shall be proposed after the vote to bring the debate to a close, unless it had been submitted in writing to the Journal Clerk by 1 o'clock p.m. on the day following the filing of the cloture motion if an amendment in the first degree, and unless it had been so submitted at least one hour prior to the beginning of the cloture vote if an amendment in the second degree. For this reason, filibusters and the prospect of filibusters shape much of the way in which the Senate does its work on the floor. The votes of only a majority of Senators present and voting are needed to pass a bill on the floor. It can, however, require the votes of 60 Senators to invoke cloture on the bill in order to overcome a filibuster and enable the Senate to reach that vote on final passage. | The filibuster is widely viewed as one of the Senate's most characteristic procedural features. Filibustering includes any use of dilatory or obstructive tactics to block a measure by preventing it from coming to a vote. The possibility of filibusters exists because Senate rules place few limits on Senators' rights and opportunities in the legislative process.
In particular, a Senator who seeks recognition usually has a right to the floor if no other Senator is speaking, and then that Senator may speak for as long as he or she wishes. Also, there is no motion by which a simple majority of the Senate can stop a debate and allow itself to vote in favor of an amendment, a bill or resolution, or most other debatable questions. Most bills, indeed, are potentially subject to at least two filibusters before the Senate votes on final passage: first, a filibuster on a motion to proceed to the bill's consideration and, second, after the Senate agrees to this motion, a filibuster on the bill itself.
Senate Rule XXII, however, known as the cloture rule, enables Senators to end a filibuster on any debatable matter the Senate is considering. Sixteen Senators initiate this process by presenting a motion to end the debate. In most circumstances, the Senate does not vote on this cloture motion until the second day of session after the motion is made. Then, it requires the votes of at least three-fifths of all Senators (normally 60 votes) to invoke cloture. (Invoking cloture on a proposal to amend the Senate's standing rules requires the support of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting, whereas cloture on nominations requires a numerical majority.)
The primary effect of invoking cloture on most questions is to impose a maximum of 30 additional hours for considering that question. This 30-hour period for consideration encompasses all time consumed by roll call votes, quorum calls, and other actions, as well as the time used for debate. Under cloture, as well, the only amendments Senators can offer are ones that are germane and were submitted in writing before the cloture vote took place. Finally, the presiding officer also enjoys certain additional powers under cloture such as, for example, the power to count to determine whether a quorum is present and to rule amendments, motions, and other actions out of order on the grounds that they are dilatory.
The ability of Senators to engage in filibusters has a profound and pervasive effect on how the Senate conducts its business on the floor. In the face of a threatened filibuster, for example, the majority leader may decide not to call a bill up for floor consideration or may defer calling it up if there are other, equally important bills the Senate can consider and pass with less delay. Similarly, the prospect of a filibuster can persuade a bill's proponents to accept changes in the bill that they do not support but that are necessary to prevent an actual filibuster.
This report concentrates on the operation of cloture under the general provisions of Senate Rule XXII, paragraph 2, though it also identifies key modifications to its application in recent years. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R40122 | crs_R40122_0 | Introduction
The William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (DL) program—authorized under Title IV, Part D of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA), as amended, and administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED)—is the primary source of federal student loans. Several types of loans are offered through the DL program: Subsidized Stafford Loans for undergraduate students; Unsubsidized Stafford Loans for undergraduate and graduate students; PLUS Loans for graduate students and parents of dependent undergraduate students; and Consolidation Loans through which borrowers may combine their loans into a single loan payable over a longer term, which varies according to the combined loan balance. While no new loans are being made through the FFEL program, outstanding FFEL program loans are due to be repaid over the coming years. In FY2016, ED estimates that 20.4 million new DL program Stafford Loans and PLUS Loans, averaging $5,342 each and totaling $109.2 billion, will be made to undergraduate and graduate students, and the parents of undergraduate dependent students; and it estimates that 503,000 Consolidation loans, averaging $55,244 and totaling $27.8 billion, will also be made. This report discusses major provisions of federal student loans made available through the DL program and previously made through the FFEL program. The primary emphasis is placed on discussing provisions related to borrower eligibility, loan terms and conditions, borrower repayment relief, and loan default and its consequences for borrowers. These topics are principally discussed with regard to loans currently being made through the DL program, or made in the recent past through either program. Another common feature shared by these loans is that, for each type of loan, maximum interest rates and fees that may be charged to borrowers are established by statute. PLUS Loans
These loans are non-need-based loans and are available to parents of dependent undergraduate students and to graduate and professional students. Treatment of Interest Before Entering Repayment
For borrowers of Subsidized Stafford Loans, with certain exceptions, the federal government pays the interest that accrues while the borrower is enrolled in school on at least a half-time basis, during a six-month grace period thereafter, and during periods of authorized deferment (discussed below). In contrast to Subsidized Stafford Loans, with Unsubsidized Stafford Loans and PLUS Loans, borrowers are responsible for paying all of the interest that accrues on their loans. The repayment plans available to borrowers of FFEL and DL program loans are discussed below. Detailed Tables on Selected Characteristics of FFEL and DL Program Loans | The William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (DL) program, authorized under Title IV, Part D of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA), as amended, is the primary federal student loan program administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED). The program makes available loans to undergraduate and graduate students and the parents of dependent undergraduate students to help them finance their postsecondary education expenses. Four types of loans are offered: Subsidized Stafford Loans for undergraduate students; Unsubsidized Stafford Loans for undergraduate and graduate students; PLUS Loans for graduate students and the parents of dependent undergraduate students; and Consolidation Loans through which borrowers may combine multiple loans into a single loan. For FY2016, ED estimates that 20.4 million loans (not including Consolidation Loans) totaling $109.2 billion will be made to students and their parents through the DL program. Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program loans are no longer being made; however, outstanding FFEL program loans are due to continue being repaid over the coming years.
FFEL and DL program loans are low-interest loans, with maximum interest rates for each type of loan established by statute. Subsidized Stafford Loans are unique in that they are only available to undergraduate students demonstrating financial need. With certain exceptions, the federal government pays the interest that accrues on Subsidized Stafford Loans while the borrower is enrolled in school on at least a half-time basis, during a six-month grace period thereafter, and during periods of authorized deferment. Unsubsidized Stafford Loans and PLUS Loans are available to borrowers irrespective of their financial need; and borrowers are responsible for paying all the interest that accrues on these loans. FFEL and DL program loans have terms and conditions that may be more favorable to borrowers than private and other nonfederal loans. These beneficial terms and conditions include interest rates that are often lower than rates that might be obtained from other lenders, opportunities for repayment relief through deferment and forbearance, loan consolidation, and several loan forgiveness programs.
This report discusses major provisions of federal student loans made available through the DL program and previously made through the FFEL program. It focuses on provisions related to borrower eligibility, loan terms and conditions, borrower repayment relief, and loan default and its consequences for borrowers. These topics are principally discussed with regard to loans currently being made through the DL program, or made in the recent past through either program. The report also provides detailed historical information on annual and aggregate borrowing limits, loan fees, and student loan interest rates. |
crs_R41671 | crs_R41671_0 | Introduction
Adaptive management is the process of incorporating new scientific and programmatic information into the implementation of a project or plan to ensure that the goals of the activity are being reached efficiently. Adaptive management promotes flexible decision-making to modify existing activities or create new activities if existing programs are not meeting set goals, or if new circumstances arise (e.g., new scientific information). In prior Congresses, adaptive management has been proposed as a guiding principle for some large-scale ecosystem restoration efforts, including the Everglades, Chesapeake Bay, and Lake Tahoe. Previous experience with adaptive management can inform Congress both in the authorization of new adaptive management efforts and in providing funding and oversight of ongoing efforts. It concludes by providing information and preliminary issues for Congress to consider when providing authorization, funding, and oversight of these efforts. Generalized Model for Implementing Adaptive Management
The implementation of adaptive management in ecosystem restoration initiatives can be a complex process, and there is no general consensus on one standard model of adaptive management. While adaptive management is an important concept for all of these activities, this remainder of this report focuses on the application of the concept to large-scale ecosystem restoration (referred to as "ecosystem restoration" in this report). Some argue that the complex and dynamic nature of ecosystems make their restoration and management amenable to an adaptive management approach, while others argue that these same characteristics make application of the concept more difficult. Potential Benefits of Implementing Adaptive Management
Adaptive management is being used in ecosystem restoration initiatives to address the uncertainties associated with the complex and integrated nature of ecosystems and their restoration. A summary of these issues includes:
Connecting experimentation to operational changes. It cites specific examples of how adaptive management has been implemented in five discrete locations: Glen Canyon, Platte River, the Lower Colorado, the Missouri River, and the Everglades. Adaptive management efforts that have been largely framed by the federal government have been criticized by some who support a more central role for stakeholders in framing and leading adaptive management. Previously, Congress has refrained from providing extensive guidance related to the structure and substance of individual adaptive management efforts. The primary means of authorization for adaptive management programs has been either to explicitly reference the concept of adaptive management in legislation and leave more detailed guidance up to the agency (e.g., Everglades restoration program) or provide broad authorization language that may be interpreted by the executive branch as a mandate for an adaptive management program (e.g., Glen Canyon program). Concluding Remarks
The concept of adaptive management is straight-forward, but its implementation can be difficult. Theoretically, adaptive management uses the best available science and monitoring to guide a project or program towards its stated goals. Appendix. To date, no major outside review of the Platte River Implementation program has been conducted. Since then, multiple documents to guide adaptive management efforts have been produced. | Adaptive management is the process of incorporating new scientific and programmatic information into the implementation of a project or plan to ensure that the goals of the activity are being reached efficiently. It promotes flexible decision-making to modify existing activities or create new activities if new circumstances arise (e.g., new scientific information) or if projects are not meeting their goals.
The complex and dynamic nature of ecosystems make their restoration and management amenable to an adaptive management approach, and the concept is being implemented at scales that include entire regions or river basins. Adaptive management has been used to guide several major ecosystem restoration efforts with involvement by the federal government, including those on the Colorado and Platte rivers. Some of these adaptive management efforts have been specifically authorized by Congress, whereas other efforts have been formulated by agencies. Adaptive management has also been proposed as a guiding principle for several new and ongoing major restoration efforts, including those in the Chesapeake Bay and Lake Tahoe.
The concept of adaptive management is straightforward, but its implementation can be difficult. A preliminary review of federal adaptive management efforts related to ecosystem restoration projects suggests that governance structures, management protocol and other factors vary widely. Additionally, the scope and timing of efforts employing the term "adaptive management" seems to vary among these projects. Where adaptive management has been implemented, it has encountered challenges. While adaptive management theoretically uses the best available science and monitoring to guide a project or program towards its stated goals, in practice the process can be affected by a number of outside factors.
As the number of federal adaptive management efforts grows, Congress may revisit its role in shaping adaptive management programs in legislation. Some argue that Congress should do more to provide specific direction for major adaptive management initiatives in order to make adaptive management more consistent among these efforts. Others contend that Congress should allow federal agencies or restoration governing bodies to shape their own adaptive management programs, thus providing them with flexibility to match their program to their restoration needs. In addressing adaptive management, Congress may face decisions regarding the implementation guidelines and authorizations it provides these efforts, funds to establish and carry out these programs, and oversight issues.
This report provides an introduction to the concept of adaptive management. It focuses on the application of this concept to large, freshwater aquatic ecosystem restoration projects with multiple stakeholders. A summary of the benefits and drawbacks of adaptive management for these projects is provided, along with analysis of potential issues associated with various governance models for these efforts. The potential role for Congress in addressing adaptive management is also discussed. As an appendix, the report summarizes the structure and implementation of federal adaptive management efforts to date five ecosystems: Glen Canyon/Colorado River, Platte River, Lower Colorado River, Missouri River, and Florida Everglades. |
crs_98-64 | crs_98-64_0 | Introduction
The public health and environmental requirements of two federal laws are primarily driving projects in rural, as well as non-rural, areas for drinking water and wastewater treatment. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers both laws. Much like the Safe Drinking Water Act, small community wastewater systems have higher rates of noncompliance than larger systems. As with meeting drinking water needs, EPA has estimated that, because small systems lack economies of scale, their customers face a particularly heavy financial burden to meet needs for clean water investments. In dollar terms, the largest federal programs that solely assist water and waste disposal needs are administered by EPA. They do not focus solely on rural areas, however. USDA's grant and loan programs also support significant financial activity and are directed entirely at rural areas. Still, funding needs in rural areas are high (more than $130 billion, according to state surveys summarized in EPA reports), and there is heavy demand for funds. Meeting the infrastructure funding needs of rural areas efficiently and effectively is likely to remain an issue of considerable congressional interest. | The Safe Drinking Water Act and the Clean Water Act impose requirements regarding drinking water quality and wastewater treatment in rural as well as urban areas of the United States. Approximately 19% of the U.S. population lives in areas defined by the Census Bureau as rural. Many rural communities need to complete water and waste disposal projects to improve the public health and environmental conditions of their citizens. Small water infrastructure systems often have higher rates of noncompliance than larger systems. In addition, because small systems generally lack economies of scale, their customers face a particularly heavy financial burden to meet needs for clean water investments. Funding needs are high (more than $130 billion, according to state surveys).
Several federal programs assist rural communities in meeting these requirements. In dollar terms, the largest are administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, but they do not focus solely on rural areas. The Department of Agriculture's grant and loan programs support significant financial activity and are directed solely at rural areas. Meeting infrastructure funding needs of rural areas efficiently and effectively is likely to remain an issue of considerable congressional interest. |
crs_RS21510 | crs_RS21510_0 | RS21510 -- NATO's Decision-Making Procedure
Updated March 8, 2004
Background (1)
In February 2003, the United States asked that NATO begin planning to provide Turkey with defensive systems in the event of an attack by Iraq during theimpending war with Saddam Hussein's regime. Consensus in the NATO Decision-Making Process
Consensus in the NAC is generally sought when allied governments must formulate policy on an important strategic issue. Structure and Process. Some officials who have served at NATO make a contrary argument to the possible usefulness of "committees of contributors." | This report provides a brief analysis of NATO's decision-making procedures, withseveral examples of how theallies have handled sensitive issues in the past. It describes the February 2003 dispute over providing NATO defenseplanning and equipment to Turkey, andanalyzes the debate over the decision-making process, including possible alterations of that process. This reportwill be periodically updated. See also CRS Report RS21354, The NATO Summit at Prague, 2002. |
crs_R44902 | crs_R44902_0 | C arbon capture and sequestration (or storage)—known as CCS—is a process that involves capturing man-made carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) at its source and storing it to avoid its release to the atmosphere. (CCS is sometimes referred to as CCUS—carbon capture, utilization , and storage.) CCS could reduce the amount of CO 2 emitted to the atmosphere from the burning of fossil fuels at power plants and other large industrial facilities. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has long supported research and development (R&D) on CCS within its Fossil Energy Research and Development portfolio (FER&D). Since FY2010, Congress has provided more than $5 billion in total appropriations for CCS activities within DOE FER&D (not including the one-time appropriation of $3.4 billion provided for CCS in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, P.L. In its FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests, the Trump Administration proposed to reduce FER&D funding compared to previous years. Carbon Utilization
The concept of carbon utilization has gained increasingly widespread interest within Congress and in the private sector as a means for capturing CO 2 and storing it in potentially useful and commercially viable products, thereby reducing emissions to the atmosphere, and for offsetting the cost of CO 2 capture. (See, for example, S. 2803 , S. 2997 , H.R. Legislation introduced in the 115 th Congress, S. 2602 (the USE IT Act, see Table 2 ), includes the purpose "to support carbon dioxide utilization and direct air capture research" among other purposes, and contains language for a technology prize that would be awarded for DAC projects that capture more than 10,000 tons per year at a cost of less than $200 per ton CO 2 captured. Coal-Fired Power Plants with CCS
Globally, two fossil-fueled power plants currently generate electricity and capture CO 2 in large quantities: the Boundary Dam plant in Canada and the Petra Nova plant in Texas. Both plants retrofitted post-combustion capture technology to units of existing plants. The DOE CCS Program
DOE has funded R&D of aspects of the three main steps leading to an integrated CCS system since 1997. The Administration previously proposed cuts to FER&D in its FY2018 budget request; however, Congress increased funding by nearly $59 million (9%) compared to FY2017. CCS-Related Legislation in the 115th Congress
A number of bills introduced in the 115 th Congress would potentially affect CCS in the United States. Several bills or provisions of bills address Internal Revenue Code, Section 45Q, providing tax credits for CO 2 capture and sequestration or use as a tertiary injectant for EOR or natural gas production ( S. 1535 , S. 1663 , S. 2256 , H.R. 1892 , H.R. 2010 , H.R. 3761 , H.R. H.R. 1892 , the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, was enacted into law as P.L. For example, S. 843 and H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. Both plants offset a portion of the cost of CCS by selling CO 2 for the purpose of enhanced oil recovery. Some CCS proponents have hailed the expanded tax credit provision enacted as part of P.L. 115-123 , increasing the value of tax credits under Section 45Q of the Internal Revenue Code, as a potential "game changer" for incentivizing more development of large-scale CCS deployment like Petra Nova and Boundary Dam. Some CCS proponents advocate for other incentives, such as tax-exempt private activity bonds, and enabling eligibility of master limited partnerships for CCS infrastructure projects, which could also increase the financial attractiveness of large-scale capital-intensive CCS endeavors. Members of Congress have introduced legislation that would authorize these financial incentives, as well as a suite of other bills aimed at advancing CCS by making CCS infrastructure projects eligible under the FAST Act (42 U.S.C. 4370m(6)), supporting increased research and development for conventional CCS and for carbon utilization technologies and direct air capture of CO 2 . 115-123 ), there is broad agreement that costs for CCS would need to decrease before the technologies are commercially deployed across the nation. The issue of greater CCS deployment is fundamental to the underlying reason CCS is deemed important by a range of proponents: to reduce CO 2 emissions (or reduce the concentration of CO 2 in the atmosphere) and help mitigate against human-induced climate change. | Carbon capture and sequestration (or storage)—known as CCS—is a process that involves capturing man-made carbon dioxide (CO2) at its source and storing it permanently underground. (CCS is sometimes referred to as CCUS—carbon capture, utilization, and storage.) CCS could reduce the amount of CO2—an important greenhouse gas—emitted to the atmosphere from the burning of fossil fuels at power plants and other large industrial facilities. The concept of carbon utilization has gained interest within Congress and in the private sector as a means for capturing CO2 and converting it into potentially commercially viable products, such as chemicals, fuels, cements, and plastics, thereby reducing emissions to the atmosphere and helping offset the cost of CO2 capture. Direct air capture is also an emerging technology, with the promise to remove atmospheric CO2 directly and reduce its concentration.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has funded research and development (R&D) of aspects of CCS since 1997 within its Fossil Energy Research and Development (FER&D) portfolio. Since FY2010, Congress has provided more than $5 billion total in appropriations for DOE CCS-related activities. The Trump Administration proposed to reduce FER&D funding substantially in its FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests, but Congress has not agreed to the proposed reductions. In FY2018, Congress increased funding for DOE FER&D by nearly $59 million (9%) compared to FY2017, and the House- and Senate-passed appropriations bills for FY2019 would match or increase the appropriated amount compared to what Congress enacted for FY2018 ($727 million).
The Petra Nova plant in Texas is the only U.S. fossil-fueled power plant currently generating electricity and capturing CO2 in large quantities (over 1 million tons per year). Globally, the Boundary Dam plant in Canada is the only other large-scale fossil-fueled power plant with CCS. Both facilities retrofitted post-combustion capture technology to units of existing plants, and both offset a portion of the cost of CCS by selling captured CO2 for the purpose of enhanced oil recovery (EOR). Some CCS proponents point to the expanded Section 45Q of the Internal Revenue Code tax credits for CO2 capture and sequestration or its use as a tertiary injectant for EOR or natural gas production that were enacted as part of P.L. 115-123 as a significant step toward incentivizing more development of large-scale CCS deployment like Petra Nova and Boundary Dam.
A number of bills introduced in the 115th Congress potentially would affect CCS in the United States. Several bills or provisions of bills address the Section 45Q tax credits (S. 1535, S. 1663, S. 2256, H.R. 1892, H.R. 2010, H.R. 3761, H.R. 4857). H.R. 1892, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, enacted into law as P.L. 115-123, amended Section 45Q and increased the amount of the tax credit from $20 to $50 per ton of CO2 for permanent sequestration, increased it from $10 to $35 for EOR purposes, and effectively removed the 75 million ton cap on the total amount of CO2 injected underground, among other changes. Some proponents suggest that enactment of this provision could be a "game changer" for CCS, leading to more widespread adoption of the technology, although others question whether the increased incentives are large enough to affect CCS deployment.
Other bills address a suite of measures to advance CCS. Several would provide additional financial incentives, such as tax-exempt private activity bonds, and provisions that would enable eligibility of master limited partnerships for CCS infrastructure projects (S. 843, S. 2005, H.R. 2011, and H.R. 4118). One bill (S. 2602) could help advance CCS by making CCS infrastructure projects eligible under the FAST Act (42 U.S.C. 4370m(6)). Other bills (S. 2803, S. 2997, H.R. 2296, H.R. 5745) would support increased R&D for CCS, carbon utilization technologies, and direct air capture of CO2. One bill (H.R. 4096) would authorize a $5 million prize to promote advances in CCS technology research and development.
There is broad agreement that costs for CCS would need to decrease before the technologies could be deployed commercially across the nation. The issue of greater CCS deployment is fundamental to the underlying reason CCS is deemed important by a range of proponents: to reduce CO2 emissions (or reduce the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere) and to help mitigate against human-induced climate change. |
crs_R41141 | crs_R41141_0 | The financial stress of 2009 and similar episodes over the years have led the industry and Congress to reconsider how to handle fluctuations in milk prices and financial prospects for dairy farmers. Some members have voiced interest in developing alternatives to current polices (which expire in 2012) and incorporating them in the next omnibus farm bill in the 112 th Congress or enacting the policies separately before then. Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) Program
Section 1506 of the 2008 farm bill ( P.L. Dairy Policy Options
The dairy industry and members of Congress are currently developing or advocating a variety of policy changes in response to the difficult financial situation that began affecting dairy farmers in late 2008. Current proposals can be categorized as either supply management, market-based, or tiered-pricing approaches. Supply management attempts to prevent depressed farm milk prices while reducing price volatility by affecting the level of milk production. Under market-based plans, advocates argue that the best approach is one that helps farmers manage risk associated with volatile prices of milk and feed, because it is difficult to administratively manage milk prices and supplies. Each approach has implications for U.S. dairy farmers, competitiveness of the U.S. dairy industry, and international trade. Many of the group's 23 recommendations fall into the market-based approach. The committee narrowly passed a recommendation for a supply management program. Bills in the 111th Congress (H.R. 5288 ) and the Dairy Market Stabilization Act of 2010 ( S. 3531 ) would create a mandatory, nationwide program designed to manage the U.S. milk supply so that milk producers could avoid low and volatile farm milk prices. Views on Supply Management
Supporters of price stabilization and supply control say that inherent incentives to overproduce need to be offset by a program to control supplies in a more measured way. Critics of supply management, including dairy processors, contend that supply control could reduce the competitiveness of the U.S. dairy industry, limit its incentive to innovate, raise consumer prices, and decrease demand for dairy products because, they argue, a pricing system based on supply control and/or cost of production potentially rewards inefficiency. Critics of a policy such as the NMPF margin proposal (described below) expect that incentives to overproduce (e.g., maintain or boost production as prices fall in an attempt to maintain revenue) will aggravate the financial woes of the dairy industry indefinitely; thus, controlling potential price variability and combating depressed farm prices with supply management is necessary, they say, for the long-term financial health of producers. The DPMPP would be a new safety net that protects a dairy farmer's "margin," that is, the national farm price of milk minus feed costs. Potential Impacts
While producers would likely see higher prices initially as minimum federal order prices are adjusted upward, some analysts say that the long-run competitiveness and stability of the U.S. dairy industry could be at risk because of the unknown effectiveness of provisions to discourage overproduction, given limitations on USDA to make adjustments. Recommendations by the Dairy Industry Advisory Committee
On March 3, 2011, the Dairy Industry Advisory Committee (DIAC) voted to approve its final report to the Secretary of Agriculture. The Secretary established the committee in August 2009 to make recommendations on how USDA can best address dairy farm profitability and milk price volatility issues. | Financial stress encountered by dairy farmers in recent years has led Congress and the industry to reconsider how to deal with fluctuations in milk prices and financial prospects for dairy farmers. Some Members have voiced interest in alternatives to current federal programs (which expire in 2012). Alternative policies could either be incorporated into the next omnibus farm bill or enacted separately before expiration.
The dairy industry is currently developing or advocating a variety of policy changes. All of the proposals discussed in this report—loosely categorized as either supply management, market-based, or tiered-pricing—have implications for U.S. dairy farmers, competitiveness of the U.S. dairy industry, and international trade.
Supply management proposals such as H.R. 5288 and S. 3531, introduced in the 111th Congress, are designed to prevent depressed farm milk prices while reducing price volatility through supply management. The National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF) also has proposed a market stabilization component as part of its comprehensive package of suggested reforms to dairy policy. Supporters of price stabilization and supply management say that inherent incentives to overproduce need to be offset by a program to manage supplies in a measured way. Critics of supply management, including dairy processors, contend that such measures could reduce the competitiveness of the U.S. dairy industry, limit its incentive to innovate, and raise consumer prices, because, they argue, a pricing system based on supply control and/or cost of production potentially rewards inefficiency.
The market-based approach, including a separate element of the NMPF package, represents an opposing view on how the federal government should address the problem of farm milk price volatility and periodic financial stress for dairy farmers. This approach contends that, because it is difficult to manage milk supplies and prices administratively, the best approach is to provide a government program that helps farmers manage risk associated with volatile prices of milk and feed. Specifically, a new "safety net" would be established to protect a dairy farmer's "margin"—that is, the farm price of milk minus feed costs—regardless of current price levels. Critics expect that incentives to overproduce will aggravate the financial woes of the dairy industry indefinitely, and thus argue that controlling potential price variability and combating depressed farm prices with supply management is necessary for the long-term financial health of producers.
The third area of potential policy change is to alter the current pricing approach used in federal milk marketing orders (FMMOs) to directly increase dairy farm revenue. For example, one potential change to base milk pricing in FMMOs on the cost of milk production (i.e., S. 1645, introduced in the 111th Congress) would imply higher prices received by dairy farmers. However, some are concerned that the long-run competitiveness and stability of the U.S. dairy industry could be at risk because of the unknown effectiveness of provisions to discourage overproduction.
On March 3, 2011, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Dairy Industry Advisory Committee approved its final report to the Secretary, who established the committee to make recommendations on how USDA can best address dairy farm profitability and milk price volatility. Many of the group's 23 recommendations fall into the market-based approach, including a recommendation for margin insurance on quantities of milk that exceed the cap for the Milk Income Loss Contract Program (MILC) and a tax-deferred savings accounts for dairy farmers. The committee narrowly passed a recommendation for a supply management program. |
crs_RL31820 | crs_RL31820_0 | The Salton Sea is located in southern California and is considered the largest inland water body in the state ( Figure 1 ). The Salton Sea was formed in 1905 when a levee break allowed water to flow into the Salton Basin from the Colorado River uninterrupted for 18 months. The proposed water transfers would have diverted agricultural water from farms in the Imperial Valley to San Diego and the Coachella Valley. This was expected to result in less water flowing into the Salton Sea, which some scientists predict would have increased the rate of evaporation in the Sea so that salinity levels would be lethal to most fish and wildlife in less than 10 years. On September 12, 2003, the State of California enacted three bills that contain provisions that would allocate an estimated $300 million for restoring the Salton Sea. Background
The Salton Basin, where the Salton Sea is located, has supported many lakes and water bodies throughout its geological history. In the past few decades the focus of activities concerning the Sea has been on the environmental problems it faces. DDE, which is derived from DDT, is also found in waters of the Sea. The salinity of the Sea has been increasing over time. The cause of mortality in these events was largely attributed to microbes that lead to disease in birds. Indeed, some policymakers assert that the presence of endangered species in the Sea obligates the federal government to restore the Sea and designate it as a useful water body. Restoration Activities in the Salton Sea
Some of the ecological problems in the Salton Sea were foreseen by scientists in the 1960s who noted that salinity in the Sea was increasing at a rate that would eventually render the Sea inhabitable for fish and wildlife. Federal efforts to restore the Salton Sea were amplified with the passage of the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992 (Title XI, §1101 of P.L. 102-575 ). The act directs the Secretary of the Interior to conduct research to develop plans to control salinity levels, provide habitat to endangered species, enhance fisheries, and protect recreational values in the Salton Sea. 105-372 ). This act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to conduct feasibility studies and economic analyses of various options for restoring the Salton Sea. The Salton Sea Authority is a "joint powers" agency chartered by the State of California to ensure the beneficial uses of the Salton Sea, such as maintaining the Sea as an agricultural drainage reservoir, restoring the wildlife resources and habitats around and in the Sea, stimulating recreational use, and providing an environment for economic development around the Sea. This plan is now under review by the California Department of Water Resources. Some proponents for restoring the Sea base their arguments on the value of the Salton Sea as one of the few remaining habitats in the region for migratory birds and other fish and wildlife. Some critics also argue that salinity levels will increase in the Sea despite restoration attempts, especially if water inflows to the Sea are reduced by water transfers or other diversions. Further, some argue that the high cost of restoration and the scientific uncertainty of the restoration proposals do not warrant the expenditure of federal funds. | The Salton Basin in southern California has supported many lakes and water bodies throughout its geological history. The most recent inland water body in the Basin is the Salton Sea, which was created from a levee break in 1905. The Salton Sea is the largest inland water body in California. In the past several decades the salinity of the Sea has been increasing, and is now considered a significant threat to the health of the current Salton Sea ecosystem. Ecosystem changes in the Sea were exemplified by several large die-offs of fish and birds that inhabit the Sea. Some of these events included endangered species such as the brown pelican.
The Sea receives most of its water from agricultural drainage originating in the Imperial and Coachella Valleys in California. When water transfers from agricultural lands in these valleys to municipal water districts in San Diego were proposed to reduce California's reliance on water from the Colorado River, concerns about the environmental impacts of these transfers on the Sea surfaced. The proposed water transfers would have resulted in less water flowing into the Salton Sea, which according to some scientists would increase the rate of evaporation in the Sea so that salinity levels would be lethal to most fish and wildlife in less than 10 years.
Interest in restoring the Salton Sea was evident before its role in water transfers was realized. Several studies were done by state and federal agencies to determine baseline data about the Sea and potential management regimes for restoring the Sea. Federal efforts to study the Sea were amplified with the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992 (Title XI of P.L. 102-575), which authorizes research to develop plans to control salinity, provide habitat to endangered species, enhance fisheries, and protect recreational values in the Salton Sea. Federal restoration efforts were formally initiated by The Salton Sea Recovery Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-372). This act authorizes feasibility studies and economic analyses of various options for restoring the Salton Sea. Prospects for funding restoration in the Sea improved when legislation containing provisions that would allocate an estimated $300 million for restoring the Salton Sea was enacted by the State of California.
Whether or not to restore the Salton Sea remains controversial. Some who favor restoration argue that the value of the Sea is high because it is one of the remaining wetland habitats in the region for migratory birds, fish, and wildlife. Further, some argue that the Sea has potential for economic development, recreation, and tourism. Some against restoring the Sea believe that the Sea is destined to evaporate similar to the water bodies in the Salton Basin that preceded it (i.e., that the Sea is a lake in natural decline). In addition, some critics suggest that the Sea is too expensive to restore, and scientifically sound plans for restoration are not available.
This report provides a summary of management and restoration events in the Salton Sea and will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_R40761 | crs_R40761_0 | Introduction
When farm commodity prices fall and costs of production rise, farmers can get caught in a "farm price-cost squeeze." The potential for such a financial bind dates to the first half of the 20 th century when farmers began purchasing more of their farm inputs such as fertilizers, improved seeds, and feed concentrates. Since the 1930s, U.S. agriculture has been supported through the ups and downs of the market by federal farm policy, most recently set under the 2008 farm bill. In 2009, some farmers found themselves in difficult financial circumstances, following high farm prices and relatively prosperous times in 2007 and 2008. Livestock, dairy, and poultry producers faced particularly low or negative returns based in part on input prices, primarily for feedstuffs, that did not fall as fast as output prices. In order to survive, many farmers have been drawing on equity built up in recent years. Meanwhile, producers of crops, both federally supported ones such as grain, oilseeds, and cotton and non-program crops such as fruits and vegetables, continue to deal with volatile costs of energy and fertilizer, which are affecting their returns. In some instances, Members of Congress and policymakers in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) are being asked by farm groups to consider additional support to farmers. Cyclical Agricultural Markets
The cyclical nature of agricultural markets plays a large role in the farm price-cost squeeze. When prices rise and remain elevated, following poor weather or strong demand, for instance, periods of profitability typically ensue, eventually encouraging producers to add more acreage, increase inputs such as fertilizer, or buy additional cows to produce more milk. Once additional supplies enter the marketplace, prices tend to retreat. Similar economic reasoning applies once the cycle turns down. In this case, as profitability declines or goes negative, farmers no longer have the economic incentive to produce as much, so they cut back on the volume or quality of inputs or, if financial conditions are bad enough, go out of business altogether. As economists, commodity marketers, and farmers alike have generally found, prices eventually turn higher, profitability returns, and the cycle repeats. The most basic way to measure the farm price-cost squeeze is to directly compare prices received by farmers with prices they pay for inputs. Across agriculture in 2009, the price-cost squeeze was most evident in the livestock sector, particularly dairy. The collective decision by farmers translates into a sector-wide supply response which, because of substantial lags in the production cycle for both crops and livestock, plays a large part in prices that farmers receive in future months. U.S. agriculture is also governed in part by federal polices that affect the markets and farmers' production decisions. Finally, farmers often depend on off-farm income to help insulate their household from financial difficulties their farms may encounter. As policymakers developed farm programs to support the farm sector, technological gains over time have resulted in farm production in excess of market demand, leading to a farm price-cost squeeze and a decline in farm numbers. Most public support for agricultural subsidies stems from the public's desire to help "family farmers." Historically, public support for farm programs has benefited from the country's agrarian roots and generally favorable perception of farmers as being hard workers, honest, and subject to market forces and weather that are beyond their control. Should federal policy address the long-term trend of large farms producing an increasing share of U.S. agricultural production? Some critics have questioned whether current farm policy is reinforcing or accelerating trends in U.S. farm structure, intensifying the farm price-cost squeeze that some farmers are experiencing. | When farm commodity prices fall and costs of production rise, farmers can get caught in a "farm price-cost squeeze." The potential for such a financial bind dates to the first half of the 20th century when farmers began purchasing more of their farm inputs such as fertilizers, improved seeds, and feed concentrates. Since the 1930s, U.S. agriculture has been supported through the ups and downs of the market by federal farm policy, most recently set under the 2008 farm bill.
In 2009, some farmers found themselves in difficult financial circumstances, following high farm prices and relatively prosperous times in 2007 and 2008. Some livestock, dairy, and poultry producers faced particularly low or negative returns in 2009 based in part on input prices, primarily for feedstuffs, that did not fall as fast as output prices. In order to survive, many farmers have been drawing on equity built up in recent years. Meanwhile, producers of crops, both federally supported ones such as grain and cotton and non-program crops such as fruits and vegetables, continue to deal with volatile costs of energy and fertilizer, which are affecting their returns. In some instances, Members of Congress and policymakers in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) are being asked by farm groups to consider additional support.
The cyclical nature of agricultural markets plays a large role in the farm price-cost squeeze. When prices rise and remain elevated, following poor weather or strong demand, for instance, periods of profitability typically ensue, eventually encouraging producers to add more acreage or increase inputs such as fertilizer. Once additional supplies enter the marketplace, prices tend to retreat. Similar economic reasoning applies once the cycle turns down. In this case, as profitability declines or goes negative, farmers no longer have the economic incentive to produce as much, so they cut back on the volume or quality of inputs or, if financial conditions are bad enough, go out of business all together. As economists, commodity marketers, and farmers alike have generally found, prices eventually turn higher, profitability returns, and the cycle repeats.
The most basic way to measure the farm price-cost squeeze is to directly compare prices received by farmers with prices they pay for inputs in the form of price ratios. These ratios provide a relatively current indication of economic conditions, and concerned policymakers can monitor them on a monthly basis as USDA releases the data. Across agriculture in 2009, the price-cost squeeze was most evident in the livestock sector, particularly dairy.
When farm prices fail to keep pace with the cost of inputs, the collective decision by farmers to reduce output translates into a sector-wide supply response which, because of substantial lags in the production cycles for both crops and livestock, plays a large part in prices that farmers receive in future months. U.S. agriculture is also governed in part by federal polices that affect the markets and farmers' production decisions. Finally, farmers often depend on off-farm income to help insulate their household from financial difficulties.
Most public support for agricultural subsidies stems from the public's desire to help "family farmers." Historically, public support for farm programs has benefited from the country's agrarian roots and generally favorable perception of farmers. As Congress developed farm programs to support the farm sector, technological gains over time have generally led to farm production in excess of market demand, creating a farm price-cost squeeze on a periodic basis. To survive, farms often seek lower per-unit costs by expanding the size of their operation. As large farms produce an increasing share of U.S. agricultural production, some critics have questioned whether current farm policy is reinforcing or accelerating this process. |
crs_R40187 | crs_R40187_0 | Coal is used almost entirely for electricity generation, nuclear and hydropower completely so. Renewable sources (except hydropower) continue to offer more potential than actual energy production, although fuel ethanol has become a significant factor as a transportation fuel. Wind power also has recently grown rapidly, although it still contributes only a small share of total electricity generation. Conservation and energy efficiency have shown significant gains over the past three decades, and offer encouraging potential to relieve some of the dependence on imports that has caused economic difficulties in the past as well as the present. The historical trends show that petroleum has been and continues to be the major source of energy, rising from about 38% in 1950 to 45% in 1975, then declining to about 40% in response to the energy crisis of the 1970s. Natural gas followed a similar pattern at a lower level, increasing its share of total energy from about 17% in 1950 to over 30% in 1970, then declining to about 25% in 1995. Consumption of coal in 1950 was 35% of the total, almost equal to oil, but it declined to about 20% a decade later. Oil
About 40% of the energy consumed in the United States is supplied by petroleum, and that proportion remained approximately the same since 1950, although in recent years it has declined to about 36%. Also unchanged is the almost total dependence of the transportation sector on petroleum, mostly gasoline. In more recent years, successful extraction of tight oil (also called "shale oil") in the United States has added significantly to world resources estimates. Utilities found themselves committed to increasing dependence on oil just at the time of shortages and high prices; in 1975 almost 9% of oil consumption went for power production. While petroleum consumption increased throughout the period from 1950 to the present (except for a temporary decline following the price surge of the 1970s and another in 2009), U.S. domestic production peaked in 1970. Diesel fuel consumption showed a similar dramatic increase. This run-up of oil prices was unlike the two oil crises in the 1970s, in that there was no major interruption of supply. Numerous factors in addition to the current cost of production contribute to the price of oil. Electricity
While overall energy consumption in the United States increased nearly three-fold since 1950, electricity consumption increased even more rapidly. In addition, federal energy policy viewed generation of electricity by gas to be a wasteful use of a diminishing resource. Nuclear power started coming on line in significant amounts in the late 1960s, and by 1975, in the midst of the oil crisis, was supplying 9% of total generation. However, increases in capital costs, construction delays, and public opposition to nuclear power following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 curtailed expansion of the technology, and many construction projects were cancelled. Continuation of some construction increased the nuclear share of generation to 20% in 1990, where it remains currently. Construction of major hydroelectric projects has also essentially ceased, and hydropower's share of electricity generation has gradually declined from 30% in 1950 to 15% in 1975 and less than 10% in 2000. However, hydropower remains highly important on a regional basis. The recent boom in production of shale gas has led to an oversupply and consequently lower prices. | Energy policy has been a recurring issue for Congress since the first major crises in the 1970s. As an aid in policymaking, this report presents a current and historical view of the supply and consumption of various forms of energy.
The historical trends show petroleum as the major source of primary energy, rising from about 38% in 1950 to 45% in 1975, and then declining to about 40% in response to the energy crises of the 1970s. Significantly, the transportation sector continues to be almost completely dependent on petroleum, mostly gasoline. Oil prices, which had been low and stable throughout the 1990s, resumed the volatility they had shown in the 1970s and early 1980s. Starting in 2004, perceptions of impending inability of the industry to meet increasing world demand led to rapid increases in the prices of oil and gasoline. The continuing high prices stimulated development of non-conventional oil resources, first in Canadian oil sands, then in the United States in shale deposits. U.S. oil production, which had apparently peaked, showed a dramatic increase starting in 2009. U.S. imports of oil have also been decreasing over the same time period, and there are calls to allow more exports.
Natural gas followed a long-term pattern of U.S. consumption similar to that of oil, at a lower level. Its share of total energy increased from about 17% in 1950 to more than 30% in 1970, then declined to about 20%. Recent developments of large deposits of shale gas in the United States have increased the outlook for U.S. natural gas supply and consumption in the near future, and imports have almost disappeared. The United States is projected to be a net natural gas exporter by 2018.
Consumption of coal in 1950 was 35% of total primary energy, almost equal to oil, but it declined to about 20% a decade later and has remained at about that proportion since then. Coal currently is used almost exclusively for electric power generation, and its contribution to increased production of carbon dioxide has made its use controversial in light of concerns about global climate change. U.S. coal exports have been on the rise in recent years.
Nuclear power started coming online in significant amounts in the late 1960s. By 1975, in the midst of the oil crisis, it was supplying 9% of total electricity generation. However, increases in capital costs, construction delays, and public opposition to nuclear power following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 curtailed growth in generation facilities, and many construction projects were cancelled. Continuation of some construction increased the nuclear share of generation to 20% in 1990, where it remains currently. Licenses for a number of new nuclear units have been in the works for several years, and preliminary construction for a few units has begun, but the economic downturn has discouraged action on new construction.
Construction of major hydroelectric projects has also essentially ceased, and hydropower's share of electricity generation has gradually declined, from 30% in 1950 to 15% in 1975 and less than 10% in 2000. However, hydropower remains highly important on a regional basis.
Renewable energy sources (except hydropower) continue to offer more potential than actual energy production, although fuel ethanol has become a significant factor in transportation fuel. Wind power has recently grown rapidly, although it still contributes only a small percentage share of total electricity generation. Conservation and energy efficiency have shown significant gains over the past three decades and offer potential to relieve some of the dependence on oil imports and to hold down long-term growth in electric power demand. |
crs_R43011 | crs_R43011_0 | Introduction
Even though U.S. coal production remained strong over the past decade, coal is losing its share of overall U.S. energy production, primarily to natural gas. One of the big questions for the industry is how to penetrate the overseas coal market, particularly for steam coal, to compensate for declining domestic demand. As U.S. energy policy and environmental regulations are constantly debated, there is ongoing congressional interest in the role of coal in meeting U.S. and global energy needs. The question may not be whether the domestic production of coal is here to stay but, rather, how much U.S. coal will be burned, what type, and under what regulatory framework. EIA statistics show that more than half (55%) of U.S. coal reserves are located in the West, of which Montana and Wyoming together account for 43% (see Table 3 ). When including the top five producing states (three of which are in the East), 70% of U.S. coal reserves are accounted for. The United States government owns about one third, or 87 billion short tons (BST), of U.S. domestic reserves, followed by Great Northern Properties Limited Partnership (20 BST), and Peabody Energy Corporation (9 BST). Coal production in the United States reached an all-time high (in tonnage) of 1,174.8 million short tons in 2008, before declining to slightly under 1,100 million short tons from 2009 to 2011. Coal production on federal lands accounts for about 43% of U.S. production, according to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Congressional Concerns
There are several congressional concerns related to coal production on federal lands. A key concern raised by stakeholders is the potential for under-market-value coal auctions (sales), e.g., lease offers being accepted by the BLM with few competitive bids and the federal government possibly not receiving fair market value for the lease sale. Federal Tax Payments
Businesses in the coal industry are subject to federal income taxes. Federal Tax Incentives
Coal producers benefit from a number of federal tax provisions, commonly referred to as tax expenditures (see Table 9 ). World Coal Production
World coal production has increased by nearly 60% since 2002, with most of the increase coming from China—up 130%. If trends continue, the U.S. coal industry will likely become more concentrated and produce more on federal lands. Overall, U.S. coal production has been very strong over the past decade and if the industry is successful in penetrating the global market, primarily for steam coal, U.S. production may continue to grow faster than consumption. | Even though U.S. coal production remained strong over the past decade, reaching record levels of production, coal is losing its share of overall U.S. energy production primarily to natural gas. One of the big questions for the industry is how to penetrate the overseas market, particularly in steam coal, to compensate for declining domestic demand. As U.S. energy policy and environmental regulations are constantly debated, there is ongoing congressional interest in the role of coal in meeting U.S. and global energy needs. The question may not be whether the domestic production of coal is here to stay but, rather, how much U.S. coal will be mined, what type, and under what regulatory framework.
Energy Information Administration (EIA) statistics show that more than half (55%) of U.S. coal reserves are located in the West, dominated by Montana and Wyoming, which account for 43%. When including the top five producing states (three of which are in the East), 70% of U.S. coal reserves are accounted for. The United States government owns about one third, or 87 billion short tons (BST), of U.S. domestic reserves.
Coal production in the United States reached an all-time high of 1,174.8 million short tons in 2008, before declining to slightly under 1,100 million short tons from 2009 to 2011. Coal production on federal lands accounts for about 43% of U.S. production, according to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). World coal production has increased by nearly 60% since 2002, most of the increase coming from China—up 130%.
Overall, U.S. coal production has been very strong over the past decade and if the industry is successful in penetrating the global market, primarily for steam coal, U.S. production may continue to grow faster than consumption. If recent trends continue, the U.S. coal industry will likely become more concentrated and produce more on federal lands. Businesses in the coal industry are subject to federal income taxes, but coal producers benefit from a number of federal tax provisions, commonly referred to as tax expenditures.
There are several congressional concerns related to coal production on federal lands. One concern is the potential for under-market-value coal auctions (sales), e.g., lease offers being accepted by the BLM with few competitive bids. In these cases, the federal government may not receive fair market value for the lease sale. |
crs_R40731 | crs_R40731_0 | The bill was laid before the Senate on November 5, 2009 ( CR pp. 3288 , the 2010 Transportation-HUD appropriations bill retitled as the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010. 3082 became Div. Title I: Department of Defense
Military Construction
Military C onstruction accounts provide funds for new construction, construction improvements, planning and design, and host nation support of active and reserve military forces and DOD agencies. Rather than submit a complete appropriations request for FY2010 only five weeks after taking office, President Barack Obama published a budget overview, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America's Promise , on February 26, 2009. In requesting military construction funds for FY2007, the first submission after the list of BRAC recommendations was created, DOD estimated the total one-time implementation cost to implement the 2005 BRAC round (the realignment and closure of a number of military installations on United States territory) and to redeploy approximately 70,000 troops and their families from overseas garrisons to bases within the United States at $17.9 billion. 2647 related to construction supporting the relocation. This privatization has reduced the amount of appropriated funds needed for the construction and operation of military family housing. 2647 and S. 1390 , the House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, and H.R. This restriction is continued in Section 127 of the Administrative Provisions in Title I of the enacted appropriations bill. 3082 ). Title II: Department of Veterans Affairs
Agency Overview
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers directly, or in conjunction with other federal agencies, programs that provide benefits and other services to veterans and their spouses, dependents and beneficiaries. This would have been an increase of $12.9 billion, or 13.5%, over the FY2009 appropriation (including the economic stimulus funding provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act [ARRA, P.L. 111-117 provided increases in funding, above the Administration request, for compensation and pensions, and readjustment benefits (including education benefits). Title III: Related Agencies
American Battle Monuments Commission
The American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) is responsible for the maintenance and construction of U.S. monuments and memorials commemorating the achievements in battle of U.S. armed forces since the nation's entry into World War I; the erection of monuments and markers by U.S. citizens and organizations in foreign countries; and the design, construction, and maintenance of permanent cemeteries and memorials in foreign countries. Appropriations for FY2009
Regular Appropriations (Consolidated Security and Continuing Appropriations)
President George W. Bush submitted his FY2009 appropriations request to Congress on February 4, 2008. The Senate Committee on Appropriations (SAC) Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies polled out its version of the appropriations bill, and the full committee reported it out without amendment by a unanimous vote on July 17, 2008. The text of the military construction appropriations bill was incorporated into Division E of an amendment to H.R. 1 was passed by the House on January 27. 1 on February 10, 2009. Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009
Representative Obey introduced a supplemental appropriations bill ( H.R. The Senate passed its version of the bill on May 21. The Act added $2.11 billion to military construction accounts, including $1.23 billion for Army, $239.0 million for Navy and Marine Corps, and $281.0 million for Air Force construction, $263.3 million for the Base Realignment and Closure 2005, and $100.0 million for the NATO Security Investment Program accounts. CRS Report RL33704, Veterans Affairs: The Appeal Process for Veterans' Claims , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS22561, Veterans Affairs: The U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims—Judicial Review of VA Decision Making , by [author name scrubbed]. | The Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies appropriations bill provides funding for the planning, design, construction, alteration, and improvement of facilities used by active and reserve military components worldwide. It capitalizes military family housing and the U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program, and finances the implementation of installation closures and realignments. It underwrites veterans benefit and health care programs administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs, provides for the creation and maintenance of U.S. cemeteries and battlefield monuments within the United States and abroad, and supports the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and Armed Forces Retirement Homes. The bill also funds construction supporting Overseas Military Operations, a function previously carried out through emergency supplemental appropriations, and advance appropriations for veterans medical services.
Rather than submit a complete appropriations request for FY2010 only five weeks after taking office, President Barack Obama published a budget overview, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America's Promise, on February 26, 2009. The President submitted his regular FY2010 appropriations request to Congress on May 7, 2009, including $133.5 billion for programs covered in the regular Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies appropriations bill: $24.4 billion for Title I (military construction and family housing); $108.9 billion for Title II (veterans affairs); and $275.7 million for Title III (related agencies). Compared with funding appropriated for FY2009, this represented decreases for Title I of $3.7 billion (13.4%), and increases for Title II of $12.9 billion (13.5%) and for Title III of $69.0 million (33.3%). The overall increase in appropriations between that requested for FY2010 and enacted for FY2009 was $9.2 billion (7.4%). The enacted bill (P.L. 111-117) appropriated $23.3 billion for Title I, $157.8 billion for Title II, $280.7 million for Title III, and $1.2 billion for Title IV (Overseas Contingency Operations construction included in Title I of the President's request).
Military construction is experiencing an overall decrease in spending as the annual appropriation required to implement the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment round begins to drop off. Also, appropriations dedicated to the construction and operation of military family housing are decreasing as its privatization program expands.
In the area of veterans' non-medical benefits, mandatory spending is increasing as claims for disability compensation, pension, and readjustment benefits increase due to a combination of several factors including the aging of the veterans' population and the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, the average number of days for completing a pension or compensation claim in FY2008 was 179 days. To reduce the pending claims workload and improve processing time, funds have been provided in previous appropriation bills for hiring and training additional claims processing staff.
The House version of the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Act for 2010 (H.R. 3082) was passed by the House on July 10, 2009, and sent to the Senate. The Senate passed an amended version of the bill on November 17, 2009. H.R. 3082 was subsequently incorporated as Div. E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 3288). |
crs_98-972 | crs_98-972_0 | The result of this effort was the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) Act of 1986 ( P.L. In FY2016, 94.1% of federal employees were enrolled in FERS. Five states—California, Texas, Florida, Maryland, and Virginia—accounted for about one-third of all civil service annuitants in FY2016. Postal Service employees) retired. These workers were younger on average (54.3 years old for CSRS employees; 54.5 years old for FERS employees) than those who took normal retirement. Average Annuity Amounts Under CSRS and FERS
The average monthly annuity among civilian federal employees who retired under CSRS in FY2016 was $4,755, whereas new FERS annuitants received an average annuity of $1,714 per month. Employees enrolled in FERS who retire at the minimum retirement age or older with 30 years of federal service also receive a supplement to their FERS annuity between their retirement date and the age of 62. Total and Median Annuity Payments to Retirees and Survivors
The Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF) paid annuities to 2,077,804 retired federal employees (also referred to as employee annuitants ) and 533,884 survivor annuitants in FY2016. Employee annuitants under CSRS received a median monthly annuity of $3,118. As was noted earlier, FERS benefits are smaller than those under CSRS both because employees retiring under FERS had fewer years of service than workers who retired under CSRS, and because FERS benefits are intended to be supplemented by Social Security and the TSP. The fund's end-of-FY2016 balance of $879.8 billion was more than 10 times the value of the CSRS and FERS annuities paid from the fund that year. Recent Trends in the Balance of the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund
Between FY1990 and FY2018 (estimated), the balance of the CSRDF rose from $238 billion to $972 billion, an increase of 308%. Number of Civil Service Annuitants and Total Annuity Payments
The number of people receiving civil service annuity payments has risen more than 175% since 1970, but the rate of increase has slowed since 1985. Throughout the 1930s, civilian federal employment (including postal employees) was less than 1 million. Between 1985 and 2016, the number of civil service annuitants rose from just under 2 million to just over 2.6 million. Total Civilian Federal Employment
Between FY1994 and FY2013, the number of civilian federal employees (including the U.S. The average age among all federal employees who retired in FY2016 was 61.3. Approximately 10% of CSRS employees and 33% of FERS employees were between the ages of 45 and 54. Although most CSRS employees (90%) were aged 55 or older, only 28% of FERS employees were aged 55 or older. | This report describes recent trends in the characteristics of annuitants and current employees covered by the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) as well as the financial status of the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF).
In FY2016, 94% of current civilian federal employees were enrolled in FERS, which covers employees hired since 1984. Six percent were enrolled in CSRS, which covers only employees hired before 1984. In FY2016, more than 2.6 million people received civil service annuity payments, including 2,077,804 employee annuitants and 533,884 survivor annuitants. Of these individuals, 72% received annuities earned under CSRS. About one-third of all federal employee annuitants and survivor annuitants reside in five states: California, Texas, Florida, Maryland, and Virginia. The average civilian federal employee who retired in FY2016 was 61.3 years old and had completed 25.6 years of federal service. The average monthly annuity payment to workers who retired under CSRS in FY2016 was $4,755. Workers who retired under FERS received an average monthly annuity of $1,714. Employees retiring under FERS had a shorter average length of service than those under CSRS. FERS annuities are supplemented by Social Security benefits and the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). At the end of FY2016, the balance of the CSRDF was $879.8 billion, an amount equal to more than 10 times the amount of outlays from the fund that year. The trust fund balance is expected to reach $909 billion by the end of FY2018. From FY1970 to FY1985, the number of people receiving federal civil service annuities rose from fewer than 1 million to nearly 2 million, an increase of 105%. Between FY1985 and FY2016, the number of civil service annuitants rose by 680,000, an increase of about 35%. In FY2013, the number of civilian federal employees, including Postal Service employees, totaled 3.3 million workers. This was 254,000 less than the number of employees in FY2000, and 480,000 fewer than the number of employees in FY1994. In FY2016, all CSRS employees were aged 45 or older, compared with 61% of FERS employees who were aged 45 or older (38.6% of FERS employees were younger than 45). Fifty five percent of CSRS employees were aged 60 or older, whereas 13% of FERS employees were in this age range.
For a general overview of current benefits and financing under CSRS and FERS, see CRS Report 98-810, Federal Employees' Retirement System: Benefits and Financing.
For summary information on recent reform proposals related to CSRS and FERS, see CRS In Focus IF10243, Civilian Federal Retirement: Current Law, Recent Changes, and Reform Proposals. |
crs_R40456 | crs_R40456_0 | Introduction
Congress has long recognized the need for protective legislation for servicemembers whose service to the nation may compromise their ability to meet obligations and protect their legal interests. The purpose of the act is to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national defense by protecting servicemembers, enabling them to "devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation" by providing for the temporary suspension of judicial and administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect their legal rights during military service. The act does not specifically state who may bring an application for relief, nor does it specifically exclude private individuals from filing a cause of action. Most courts considering the issue have found that a private cause of action exists under the SCRA. An opinion from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company , disagreed with decisions from U.S. district courts in Illinois, Louisiana, Oregon, and Texas, and found that a private cause of action did not exist under the act. However, upon reconsideration the court vacated its earlier opinion and held that a private cause of action does exist under various sections of the SCRA. Relying on Cort , the court utilized the four-part test for determining whether the statute created an implied private cause of action. Legal Standard: Finding of a Private Cause of Action
In the absence of action by federal courts of appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on whether a private cause of action exists under the SCRA. However, the Court has dealt with the issue of an implied cause of action under other statutes, and that precedent has guided the district courts in their determination of whether a private cause of action exists under the SCRA. However, in Alexander v. Sandoval, a more recent decision, the Court appears to have abandoned the four-part test in favor of a single factor analysis. In many jurisdictions across the country, it may be unclear whether a servicemember has the right to bring a private cause of action for violations of the SCRA. This ambiguity is likely to persist if the courts continue to reach different conclusions on the right to bring a private cause of action. Congress may provide guidance to the courts by clarifying the purpose and intent of the act, or by amending individual sections of the act, or the act in its entirety, with language that explicitly states whether a private cause of action exists. In the absence of legislative clarification with respect to the right of a private cause of action, the courts will continue to interpret the SCRA, as they have in the past, with the possibility that the issue will be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court. | Congress has long recognized the need for protective legislation for servicemembers whose service to the nation may compromise their ability to meet obligations and protect their legal interests. The purpose of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) is to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national defense by protecting servicemembers, enabling them to "devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation." The SCRA protects servicemembers by temporarily suspending certain judicial and administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect their legal rights during military service.
Various sections of the SCRA include provisions providing for penalties for violations of the afforded protections. However, the act does not specifically state who may bring an application for relief, nor does it specifically exclude private individuals from filing a cause of action. A private cause of action allows an individual, in a personal capacity, to sue in order to enforce a right or to correct a wrong. In the absence of a private cause of action, the right to enforce afforded rights likely rests with the government. Most courts considering the issue have found that a private cause of action exists under the SCRA. An opinion from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company, disagreed with decisions from U.S. district courts in Illinois, Louisiana, Oregon, and Texas, and found that a private cause of action did not exist under the act. However, upon reconsideration the court vacated its earlier opinion and held that a private cause of action does exist under various sections of the SCRA.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on whether a private cause of action exists under the SCRA, the Court has dealt with the issue of an implied cause of action under other statutes. In Cort v. Ash, the Court established a four-part test for determining if a private cause of action exists under a particular statute. However, in Alexander v. Sandoval, it appears that the Court has adopted a single-factor test rather than the four-part test.
In many jurisdictions across the country, it may be unclear whether a servicemember has the right to bring a private cause of action for violations of the SCRA. This ambiguity is likely to persist if the courts continue to reach different conclusions on the right to bring a private cause of action. Congress may provide guidance to the courts by clarifying the purpose and intent of the act, or by amending individual sections of the act, or the act in its entirety, with language that explicitly states whether a private cause of action exists. H.R. 2696, introduced in the 111th Congress, would, if enacted, explicitly establish a private cause of action. In the absence of legislative clarification with respect to the right of a private cause of action, the courts will continue to interpret the SCRA, as they have in the past, with the possibility that the issue will be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court. |
crs_R41849 | crs_R41849_0 | Recently, as Congress considers policies to foster economic growth, arguments have been made that some traditional expectations of fiscal policy should be revisited, namely that cutting spending will contract the economy in the short run. Proponents of this view also argue that cutting spending rather than raising taxes would be a more effective means of increasing economic growth. These arguments often refer to recent empirical studies of deficit reductions across countries. This view contrasts with that held by most economists, which will be referred to as "mainstream economics." Chairman Bernanke of the Federal Reserve was referring to this view when he cautioned against large and immediate spending cuts. Just as economists generally consider spending cuts to be contractionary in the short run in an underemployed economy, they believe that deficits can be harmful in the long run by crowding out private investment. There is widespread agreement that the continuation of current tax and spending policies will lead to an unsustainable path of the national debt. The fundamental cause of these long-run problems predates the Great Recession and the increase in debt relative to GDP from that recession, and arises from the aging of the population and the growth in health care costs. Thus, to most economists, the policy challenge is a trade-off between the benefits of starting to address the debt problem earlier versus risking damage to a still-fragile economy by engaging in contractionary fiscal policy, or failure to continue with expansionary fiscal policy. Most economists have both neoclassical and Keynesian-style views, one applied largely to questions of microeconomics and the other to questions of macroeconomics. Consistent with the theory above, the spending multipliers in this model are larger than tax cut multipliers. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Study
The IMF study examines the same types of contractions as those in the Alesina and Ardagna study, but with a different methodology. They find that spending cuts are less contractionary than tax increases, but attribute this effect in part to the greater offsetting monetary stimulus. Applicability of the Empirical Evidence in Alesina and Ardagna to Current U.S. The major determinant of the effects on growth is the magnitude of deficit and debt reductions. Conclusion
The claim based on the evidence of Alesina and Ardagna (and similar studies) that policies traditionally viewed as contractionary, such as cutting spending, will increase growth in the short run in the United States, can be questioned on at least two grounds. Second, the deficit reductions in the Alesina and Ardagna study that were successful by the authors' measures were associated with economies generally above, or close to, full employment in most cases. Reducing the deficit while the economy is still fragile and well below full employment would likely involve further contraction that might not be desirable. | As Congress considers policies to foster economic growth, arguments have been made that the traditional expectations of fiscal policy, namely that cutting spending will contract the economy in the short run, should be reversed. Proponents of this view also argue that cutting spending rather than raising taxes would be a more effective means of increasing economic growth (or at least avoiding contractions). These arguments often refer to recent empirical studies of deficit reductions across countries.
This view contrasts with that held by most economists and found in conventional models. In those models cutting spending will contract the economy. Chairman Bernanke of the Federal Reserve was referring to this view when he cautioned against large and immediate spending cuts. Most multipliers (measures of the effect of deficits on the economy) indicate that spending cuts contract the economy more than do similarly sized tax increases.
Just as economists generally consider spending cuts to be contractionary in the short run in an underemployed economy, they believe that deficits can be harmful in the long run by crowding out private investment. There is considerable agreement that the continuation of current tax and spending policies will lead to an unsustainable path of the national debt, largely because of the growth of mandates arising from the aging of the population and the growth in health care costs. Thus, to most economists current macroeconomic policy challenges involve a trade-off between the benefits of starting to address the debt problem earlier versus risking damage to a still-fragile economy by engaging in contractionary fiscal policy, or failure to continue with expansionary fiscal policy.
Alesina and Ardagna, in the study perhaps most commonly cited to support the view that cutting spending will not be contractionary, find that historical episodes across 21 countries when debt reduction was associated with growth used spending cuts rather than tax increases. Other studies that largely perform the same analysis find similar results. This research has been interpreted as suggesting that spending cuts are superior to tax increases and that such cuts would not necessarily contract the economy. Proponents of this view, to support these empirical findings with theory, argue that deficit reduction will increase confidence of consumers and business, resulting in increased current spending on consumption and investment.
The International Monetary Fund, however, correcting problems they perceived in the Alesina and Ardagna study, found spending cuts to be contractionary, consistent with mainstream views. Moreover, while the IMF found cuts in spending to have smaller effects than tax increases, those effects were generally ascribed to offsetting monetary policy which was more significant with spending cuts than tax increases.
The findings in the Alesina and Ardagna study that successful debt reductions were associated with higher growth when spending cuts were used was based on 9 observations out of 107 instances of deficit reduction, or less than 10% of the sample. In addition, most of the countries where debt reductions were successful were at or close to full employment, while the United States remains well below full employment, raising questions as to whether this evidence is applicable to current U.S. conditions. Thus, both methodological questions and questions of applicability to current circumstances can be raised for the Alesina and Ardagna, and similar, studies. |
crs_RL34413 | crs_RL34413_0 | The PSOB program is administered by the Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance's (BJA's), PSOB Office. Since its inception in 1976, the PSOB program has been expanded to provide disability benefits to public safety officers disabled by an injury suffered in the line of duty and education benefits to the spouses and children of public safety officers killed or disabled in the line of duty. The PSOB death benefit is a mandatory program, and the disability and education benefits are discretionary programs. As such, Congress appropriates "such sums as are necessary" each fiscal year to fund the PSOB death benefit program while appropriating separate amounts for both the disability and education benefits programs. PSOB Death Benefit
The PSOB program provides a death benefit to eligible survivors of a public safety officer whose death is the direct and proximate result of a traumatic injury sustained in the line of duty or certain work-related heart attacks or strokes. The PSOB program pays a one-time lump sum death benefit to eligible survivors of a public safety officer killed in the line of duty. 101-647 expanded the scope of the PSOB program to provide a disability benefit to public safety officers who have been permanently and totally disabled as the direct and proximate result of a catastrophic injury sustained in the line of duty, if the injury permanently prevents the officer from performing any gainful work. 104-238 ) authorized the Public Safety Officers' Educational Assistance (PSOEA) program. Appeal of Denied Claims
Claimants are allowed to appeal claims that are denied by the PSOB Office. The claimant may file supporting evidence or legal arguments along with the request for a hearing officer determination. If a claim is denied by the hearing officer, the claimant can appeal to the Director. If the Director denies the claim, the claimant can appeal the denial in the United States Court of Federal Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a). | The Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) program provides three different types of benefits to public safety officers and their survivors: death, disability, and education benefits. The PSOB program is administered by the Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance's (BJA's) PSOB Office.
The PSOB death benefit is a mandatory program, and the disability and education benefits are discretionary programs. As such, Congress appropriates "such sums as are necessary" each fiscal year to fund the PSOB death benefit program while appropriating separate amounts for both the disability and education benefits programs.
The PSOB program provides a one-time lump sum death benefit to eligible survivors of public safety officers whose deaths are the direct and proximate result of a traumatic injury sustained in the line of duty or from certain line-of-duty heart attacks, strokes, and vascular ruptures.
The PSOB program provides a one-time lump sum disability benefit to public safety officers who have been permanently and totally disabled by a catastrophic injury sustained in the line of duty, if the injury permanently prevents the officer from performing any gainful work.
The PSOB program also provides assistance for higher education expenses (e.g., tuition and fees, books, supplies, and room and board) to spouses and children of public safety officers who have been killed or disabled in the line of duty. Educational assistance is available to the spouse and children of a public safety officer after the PSOB death or disability claim has been approved and awarded.
Claimants have the opportunity to appeal denied claims. If the PSOB Office denies a claim, the claimant can request that a hearing officer review the claim. If the hearing officer denies the claim, the claimant can request that the Director of BJA review the claim. Claimants may file supporting evidence or legal arguments along with their request for a review by a hearing officer or the Director. If the claim is denied by the Director, claimants can appeal the denial in the United States Court of Federal Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1491(a). |
crs_R41885 | crs_R41885_0 | Military Construction Funding Trends, FY2010-FY2012
Appropriations Overview
On February 14, 2011, President Barack Obama submitted to Congress his request for military construction appropriations to support federal government operations during FY2012, which will begin on October 1, 2011 (see Table 1 ). These titles are not addressed in this report. During the first years of active military engagement in CENTCOM, such construction was paid for through a series of emergency supplemental appropriations. In recent years, the Obama Administration has moved this funding into the regular appropriations process, designating it as "Title IV (OCO)" military construction. Therefore, the total military construction and family housing appropriation that would be enacted in this bill would come to $14.4 billion—$14.2 billion in new budget authority and $0.2 billion in unexpired, unobligated funds reclaimed from previous fiscal years. Funding enacted for FY2010 and FY2011, the President's request for FY2012, and H.R. Separate from the 2005 BRAC round, DOD announced plans to permanently move one of the Navy's aircraft carriers from its home port of Norfolk, VA, to a new duty station in Mayport, FL. Currently, the naval station at Norfolk is the sole Navy facility along the nation's eastern or southern coasts with the needed facilities and capacity to service a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Guam Redeployment
The two governments have also agreed to move approximately 8,000 Marines from their present garrisons in Okinawa to facilities in the U.S. 2055 , the FY2012 military construction appropriation bill, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reiterated its concerns, stating that
Due to the lack of verifiable cost estimates for the Guam buildup, the failure of DOD to submit to the congressional defense committees a comprehensive master plan for the initiative, and continuing uncertainty over the ability of the Government of Japan to fulfill its commitment to relocate United States troops on Okinawa, the Committee has deferred funding for fiscal year 2012 military construction projects associated with the relocation of United States Marines to Guam. Nevertheless, Section 2208 of S. 1253 , the Senate's version of the NDAA for 2012, would bar the obligation or expenditure of any appropriated funds or funds provided to the United States by the Government of Japan to implement the Marine relocation to Guam until the Commandant of the Marine Corps provides to the congressional defense committees his "preferred force lay-down" in the Pacific Region and the Secretary of Defense provides a master construction plan supporting that lay-down, certifies that "tangible progress" has been made on the relocation of MCAS Futenma, and provides an interagency plan for the work necessary on Guam's non-military facilities to prepare for the relocation. Forces, Korea (USFK) and U.S. Army and Air Force units are being concentrated into two large military communities centered on Osan Air Base and Camp Humphreys, south of the capital. Additionally, tours of duty for military personnel are being lengthened, and servicemembers will soon be permitted to bring their families with them, significantly increasing the size of those communities. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
Until U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was activated in 2008, military affairs on the continent were the responsibility of EUCOM. Funds for the construction of two headquarters buildings at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, were requested in FY2011. Since its creation, AFRICOM headquarters has been located in Germany. CENTCOM has been the primary focal point of U.S. military operations since early 2002. FY2012 Appropriations
The President submitted his FY2012 appropriation request for military construction and family housing to Congress on February 14, 2011, and the House passed its version of the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act ( H.R. The overall level of funding in the President's request represents a 17.1% ($3.0 billion) reduction below the combined Title I (military construction) and Title IV (Overseas Contingency Operations construction) amount enacted for FY2011. The President's FY2012 request is less than one-quarter of the amount needed during the last year of BRAC construction and movement. Even though the FY2012 base budget request includes $80 million in construction for Afghanistan, plus another $137 million elsewhere in Central Command, this marks a substantial reduction in construction activity in the area of the most intense U.S. military operations. 2055 ) on June 14, 2011. | This report focuses on those government activities funded under the FY2012 military construction appropriation, examines trends in military construction funding, and outlines military construction issues extant in each of the major regions of U.S. military activity.
President Barack Obama submitted his FY2012 appropriations request to Congress on February 14, 2011. His military construction appropriations request for $14.7 billion in new budget authority fell approximately $9.9 billion below the amount enacted for FY2010 and $3.0 billion below that enacted for FY2011. Much of that reduction came from military base closure accounts. Initiated in late 2005, the current base realignment and closure (BRAC) round is expected to conclude in September 2011. Funding needed in FY2010 and FY2011 for construction and movement of organizations will not be needed in FY2012 and subsequent years. In addition, the President requested less regular military construction for FY2012 than in earlier years. Finally, funding for construction supporting Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO, or active military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan), appropriations for which totaled $1.4 billion in FY2010 and $1.3 billion in FY2011, has been virtually eliminated, with only $217 million in the regular FY2012 appropriation requested for construction within U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The first military construction bill (H.R. 2055) was passed by the House on June 14, 2011.
Construction issues within the United States center on relocations associated with BRAC movements; the proposed transfer of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier from Norfolk, VA, to Mayport, FL; the potential to move detainees from Naval Station Guantanamo; and the possible expansion of the Army's Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site.
In the Pacific region, topics of major interest include planned relocations of U.S. Marine forces within the Japanese Prefecture of Okinawa and from Okinawa to the U.S. Territory of Guam; movement of U.S. garrisons in the Republic of Korea; and normalization of duty there, which will lengthen tours and bring many more military families to Korea.
Troops are also moving within Europe and redeploying to the United States. Active duty military personnel stationed in Europe now number only one-quarter of the force present in 1980, and garrisons in Germany are being concentrated into two large military communities near Landstuhl and Vilseck. At least one major combat formation scheduled to move to the United States during the past few years has been retained at its garrison in Germany pending a military basing review.
Military responsibility for much of Africa is now exercised by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Though headquartered in Germany, AFRICOM has one enduring military garrison site on the continent, at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti. Press accounts have indicated that a new permanent home for AFRICOM headquarters might be located in southeastern Virginia.
Southwest Asia, the area of responsibility for CENTCOM, has seen ongoing military operations for almost a decade. Since FY2004, Congress has given DOD special authority to use some operations and maintenance funds for military construction outside of the normal appropriations process. Both House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2012 would extend that authority into FY2012. Funds for military construction had been provided through special emergency supplemental appropriations, but beginning in FY2010, these funds were folded into the base budget—though still categorized separately from normal construction requests. CENTCOM construction has fallen with the FY2012 request. |
crs_RL34551 | crs_RL34551_0 | Background
The sunset concept provides for programs and agencies to terminate automatically according to a predetermined schedule unless explicitly renewed by law. 2939 (105 th Congress) was introduced by Representative Kevin Brady of Texas. 2373 , as H.R. In the House, two bills were introduced. On July 14, Representative Brady also reintroduced his sunset commission bill as H.R. 3282 . Both the OMB draft and H.R. No further action occurred in the 109 th Congress. Developments in the 110th Congress
On February 5, 2007, President Bush, in his budget submission for FY2008, again endorsed creation of a federal sunset commission and called for enactment of a bill incorporating provisions of the Administration's proposal sent to Congress in 2005:
The Sunset Commission would consider Presidential proposals to retain, restructure, or terminate agencies and programs according to a schedule set by Congress. In the budget submission for FY2009 transmitted on February 4, 2008, President Bush reaffirmed his support for a federal sunset commission. In the 110 th Congress, Senator John Cornyn introduced a new sunset measure, S. 1731 , the United States Authorization and Sunset Commission Act, on June 28, 2007. Congressman Brady introduced H.R. Developments in the 111th Congress
In the 111 th Congress, Representative Brady and Senator Cornyn reintroduced their respective sunset commission bills. The Federal Sunset Act of 2009 ( H.R. 393 also were included as a separate title in three budget reform bills. The Spending Reform Act of 2009 ( H.R. 393
H.R. H.R. Related Measures Without Action Forcing Provisions
Another bill, H.R. Similarly, H.R. P.L. 5568
Another bill with an action-forcing mechanism was introduced in the second session. Key provisions of the SWEEP Act included the following:
the creation of a Federal Programs Sunset Commission (FPSC) as a bipartisan legislative body, with all members appointed by the congressional leadership and excluding any officer or employee of the executive branch and with powers to hold hearings, obtain official data from executive agencies, and issue subpoenas; the Comptroller General of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to prepare a preliminary and then a final program inventory organized by program areas reflective of national needs and agency missions, and with assistance from the Director of the Congressional Research Service and compilation of required budgetary information from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office; the commission to establish the schedule for review of each program, arranged by functional category, at least once every 10 fiscal years; the commission to review all government-funded programs to determine their merit in proven outcomes, cost-effective record, scope of interest, and whether there exist programs receiving funding for duplicative purposes; the commission to report to Congress annually on programs that should be abolished, consolidated, transferred, reorganized, or remain untouched, and include in the report implementation bills to bring about any recommended actions (such as abolishment); and the bill provided expedited procedures to facilitate prompt congressional consideration and action, including an up or down vote, on legislation combining, reorganizing, or abolishing wasteful programs as recommended by the commission, thereby reducing unnecessary government spending. 2142 . 393 (Brady bill), S. 926 (Cornyn bill), and H.R. Provisions in H.R. On February 10, 2011, Representative Schock, along with three cosponsors, introduced H.R. On March 16, 2011, Senator John Cornyn proposed S.Amdt. 186 to S. 493 , a small business reauthorization bill. Brief Overview of Arguments for and Against Sunset Commissions
Supporters of sunset commission measures suggest that there are too many overlapping and ineffective federal programs that contribute to the growing federal deficit, and that the existing structure of congressional committees does not encourage systematic review of similar agencies and programs. According to sunset proponents, the perception that congressional reviews of many programs are sporadic and inadequate is also evidenced by the number of unauthorized appropriations. Therefore, those favoring a federal sunset commission contend, an action-forcing mechanism—such as threat of termination—is necessary; a sunset commission, they continue, would assist Congress in performing its oversight function, thereby reducing fraud, waste, and abuse. Critics of the sunset commission measures counter that such bills would burden Congress with a tremendous workload for mandatory reauthorization of agencies and programs and might prove infeasible to carry out, or alternatively, result in perfunctory reviews. A sunset commission might increase congressional personnel costs, since additional staff would be needed to assist the commission in its review activities. | The sunset concept provides for programs and agencies to terminate automatically on a periodic basis unless explicitly renewed by law. Beginning in the 107th Congress, Representative Kevin Brady introduced a series of bills to create a federal sunset commission, modeled on the sunset review process in Texas (including most recently H.R. 393 in the 111th Congress).
Former President George W. Bush called for creation of a federal sunset commission in his FY2006 budget submission. Bills reflecting an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) draft proposal were introduced in the 109th Congress, and the Government Reform Committee voted to report H.R. 3282 favorably, but no further action occurred.
In the 110th Congress, with the budget submissions for FY2008 and FY2009, President Bush reaffirmed his support for passage of the Administration's proposal to create a federal sunset commission. In addition to the Brady bill (H.R. 5794), a new sunset measure, S. 1731, was introduced on June 28, 2007, by Senator John Cornyn.
In the 111th Congress, Representative Brady reintroduced his sunset commission bill as H.R. 393, the Federal Sunset Act of 2009. Senator Cornyn likewise reintroduced his measure as S. 926, the United States Authorization and Sunset Commission Act of 2009. Provisions very similar to those in H.R. 393 also were found as a separate title in at least three budget reform bills in the 111th Congress, including H.R. 311 (Title II), H.R. 534 (Title I), and H.R. 3964 (Title IV, Subtitle A). In the second session, two sunset-related measures, absent action-forcing provisions, were introduced as H.R. 5407 and H.R. 2142, with the latter, as amended, eventually enacted as P.L. 111-352. H.R. 5568, the Stop Waste by Eliminating Excessive Programs (SWEEP) Act, was introduced by Representative Glenn Nye.
In the 112th Congress, a newly formulated sunset commission bill, H.R. 606, the Federal Program Sunset Commission Act, was introduced on February 10, 2011, by Representative Aaron Schock and cosponsors. Representative Brady introduced a bill with sunset-like provisions but no commission (H.R. 235 §11). On March 16, 2011, Senator Cornyn proposed provisions previously seen in his sunset commission measure as an amendment (S.Amdt. 186 to S. 493).
Supporters of sunset commission measures suggest that there are too many overlapping and ineffective federal programs that contribute to the growing federal deficit, and that the existing structure of congressional committees does not encourage systematic review of similar agencies and programs. According to sunset proponents, congressional reviews of many programs are sporadic and inadequate, as evidenced by the number of unauthorized appropriations. An action-forcing mechanism—such as threat of termination—is necessary; a sunset commission would assist Congress in performing its oversight function, thereby reducing fraud, waste, and abuse.
Critics of the sunset commission measures counter that such bills would burden Congress with a tremendous workload for mandatory reauthorization of agencies and programs. Consequently, such measures may prove infeasible to carry out, or alternatively, result in perfunctory reviews. Sunset commissions might increase congressional personnel costs, since additional staff would be needed to assist the commission in its review activities. Opponents further contend that the review and reauthorization process would pose a special threat to certain kinds of programs, such as those which provide a safety net for the most vulnerable in society.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33260 | crs_RL33260_0 | Some also refer to this region of Indonesia as West Papua. These interests have evolved against a backdrop of greatly improved relations between the United States and Indonesia in 2005. Many observers hope that the human rights situation will improve with the further development of democracy, the rule of law, and civil society in Indonesia. The two Americans killed were teachers at the International School at Tembagapura near Timika in Papua. Some pro-Papuan independence supporters believe Anthonius Wamang, who is believed to be an OPM operational commander and has been indicted for the attack in the United States, may have been an informer to the Indonesian Military (TNI). It also remains unclear whether Indonesia will extradite Wamang to the United States. Background to the Present Conflict
Papuans are a Melanesian people like the people of Papua New Guinea (PNG) which is situated on the eastern half of the island of New Guinea. Fisheries resources are another potentially valuable resource. Some analysts and practitioners would argue that America's policy toward Papua should be balanced against larger policy concerns related to Indonesia such as the need to support Indonesia's emerging democracy and the need to continue to cultivate Indonesia as a partner in the war against terror in Southeast Asia and for other geopolitical considerations. (a) Statement of Congress Relating to Recent Developments, Human Rights, and Reform- Congress—
(1) recognizes the remarkable progress in democratization and decentralization made by Indonesia in recent years and commends the people of Indonesia on the pace and scale of those continuing reforms;
(2) reaffirms—
(A) its deep condolences to the people of Indonesia for the profound losses inflicted by the December 26, 2004, earthquake and tsunami; and
(B) its commitment to generous United States support for relief and long term reconstruction efforts in affected areas;
(3) expresses its hope that in the aftermath of the tsunami tragedy the Government of Indonesia and other parties will succeed in reaching and implementing a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the long-standing conflict in Aceh;
(4) commends the Government of Indonesia for allowing broad international access to Aceh after the December 2004 tsunami, and urges that international nongovernmental organizations and media be allowed unfettered access throughout Indonesia, including in Papua and Aceh;
(5) notes with grave concern that—
(A) reform of the Indonesian security forces has not kept pace with democratic political reform, and that the Indonesian military is subject to inadequate civilian control and oversight, lacks budgetary transparency, and continues to emphasize an internal security role within Indonesia;
(B) members of the Indonesian security forces continue to commit many serious human rights violations, including killings, torture, rape, and arbitrary detention, particularly in areas of communal and separatist conflict; and
(C) the Government of Indonesia largely fails to hold soldiers and police accountable for extrajudicial killings and other serious human rights abuses, both past and present, including atrocities committed in East Timor prior to its independence from Indonesia;
(6) condemns the intimidation and harassment of human rights and civil society organizations by members of the Indonesian security forces and military-backed militia groups, and urges a complete investigation of the fatal poisoning of prominent human rights activist Munir in September 2004; and
(7) urges the Government of Indonesia and the Indonesian military to continue to provide full, active, and unfettered cooperation to the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice in its investigation of the August 31, 2002, attack near Timika, Papua, which killed three people (including two Americans, Rick Spier and Ted Burgon) and injured 12 others, and to pursue the indictment, apprehension, and prosecution of all parties responsible for that attack. | The ongoing investigation into the killing of two American citizens, current human rights conditions, and reports of an Indonesian military build-up in Papua have led to increased Congressional attention to Indonesia's eastern-most territory. Papua, for the purposes of this report, refers to the resource rich western half of the island of New Guinea and not the nation or people of Papua New Guinea which is situated on the eastern half of the Island. While the people of Papua have been subject to human rights abuses while under Indonesian rule, the ongoing expansion of democracy and civil society in Indonesia and the leadership of President Yudhoyono hold out the possibility that the human rights situation in Papua may improve. Some view the current improvement in the bilateral relationship between the United States and Indonesia as providing an enhanced opportunity for the United States to continue to support the expansion of democracy, the rule of law, civil society, and human rights while developing closer military-to-military relations with a valuable partner in the war against terror and a key geopolitical actor in the Southeast Asian region. Such policies, by fostering a more democratic and open society, may also contribute to an improved human rights situation in Papua. Others, including some Members of Congress, contend that Indonesia's failure thus far to bring to trial those responsible for the Timika incident and other human rights abuses, suggests that the Indonesian military (TNI) remains, at least in part, outside government control and that the United States should continue to suspend some kinds of military assistance. The recent arrest of Anthonius Wamang, who is thought to have carried out the attack which killed two Americans near Timika in 2002, may resolve what has been a key obstacle to improved military-to-military ties between Indonesia and the United States. It also has the potential to raise further questions concerning the incident. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R41520 | crs_R41520_0 | Background
The Border Security Effort
Maintaining the security of the borders of the United States is a fundamental responsibility of the federal government. Efforts to address the unauthorized immigration of Mexican and other foreign nationals are a major responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies. There have also been concerns about terrorists entering or attempting to enter the United States from both countries in recent years. A description of their work lies beyond the scope of this report; they are addressed in CRS Report R40602, The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. The work of U.S. intelligence agencies related to border security is necessarily classified, but, based on publicly available information, these agencies have a number of capabilities that are apparently being utilized to supplement information acquired from law enforcement sources. The intelligence community (IC), as defined in statute, includes the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-Imagery Agency (NGA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department (INR), the intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the military services, the Energy Department, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Treasury Department, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and the Coast Guard in DHS. Issues for Congress
Oversight of efforts to ensure the security of U.S. borders creates its own challenges. The contribution of intelligence agencies must be carefully integrated with the work of law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels and with the contributions of Mexican, Canadian, and other foreign agencies. Border security is inherently an interagency effort. These include (1) balancing intelligence agencies involvement in border security efforts with their traditional intelligence missions throughout the world, (2) "deconfliction," ensuring that the work of intelligence and law enforcement agencies in border security missions is prudently organized and that agencies are not working at cross-purposes or with unnecessary duplication of effort, (3) that involvement of intelligence agencies in border areas does not improperly affect the civil liberties of U.S. persons, and (4) the potential effects of U.S. border security efforts on overall relations with Canada and Mexico (and potentially other countries). This is not generally the case with law enforcement efforts. Given the stated intention of many members to reduce budgets of federal agencies, there will be advantages in ensuring that any changes in intelligence and law enforcement support to border security efforts are effectively coordinated to ensure that important targets are not neglected and that there is not a significant imbalance between collection and analysis. Persons
Border security issues often involve U.S. persons as well as foreign nationals—the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada borders are surrounded by individuals and families with ties to both countries and there is a constant stream of travel and commerce across borders. Congress may also review statutory provisions relating to information sharing to determine if there is a correct balance between information availability, security, and the protection of civil liberties. | Maintaining the security of U.S. borders is a fundamental responsibility of the federal government. Various border security missions are assigned to the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and other federal agencies that work in cooperation with state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. The success of their efforts depends on the availability of reliable information on the nature of potential threats to border security.
Given the extent of the land borders and the long coastlines of the United States and the number of individuals and vehicles crossing borders legitimately, the task of identifying law breakers within the overall threat environment is a major challenge. Law enforcement agencies obtain information from their usual sources—reports of crimes committed, tip-offs from informers, technical monitoring devices that now include unmanned aerial vehicles, and other sophisticated devices. In recent decades, and especially after 9/11, the potential for terrorists coming across the border as well as extensive narcotics trafficking have led policymakers to reach beyond law enforcement agencies to seek out information acquired by intelligence sources, including signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and human agents.
Much of the contribution of intelligence agencies to the border security effort is classified, and few details are publicly available. There is no public assessment of the intelligence contribution. Yet there are a number of concerns about the contribution of intelligence agencies that Congress may choose to review. First, border security missions might detract from traditional intelligence missions—monitoring the capabilities and intentions of major countries throughout the world and providing tactical intelligence to the military operations in which U.S. forces are engaged. Secondly, both intelligence and law enforcement agencies might in some situations be gathering information from the same sources, and there might be unnecessary and counterproductive duplication of effort. Thirdly, especially given the fact that many in the United States have deep and long-standing ties on both sides of the borders, observers are concerned that intelligence collection techniques might infringe the civil liberties of U.S. persons—citizens and legal residents. Finally, others point to the potential that the involvement of intelligence agencies in border security efforts could affect overall U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican relations.
As is the case with other "interagency" efforts in the federal government, congressional oversight of border security efforts is complicated by the number of different committees involved. Intelligence efforts are especially challenging in view of security classifications. Given public concerns about maintaining secure borders while protecting civil liberties, it is likely that the contributions of intelligence agencies to the larger border security effort may become a significant issue for congressional oversight. In addition, members may seek to ensure that changes in authorization and appropriations for intelligence and law enforcement efforts be coordinated to ensure that productive sources of information are not neglected and that there is a proper balance among collection, analysis, and dissemination efforts. This report supplements CRS Report R40602, The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40784 | crs_R40784_0 | Introduction
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) throughout the world have increased since the early 1990s. Since the early 1990s, Mexico has had a growing commitment to trade liberalization and has a trade policy that is among the most open in the world. In an effort to increase trade with other countries, Mexico has entered into 11 free trade agreements with 46 countries. In the 115 th Congress, congressional interest related to the trade and economic relationship with Mexico may involve issues related to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and a possible renegotiation, the effects of NAFTA, Mexico's ongoing efforts to form trade agreements with other countries, the status of the proposed TPP and the possibility of its moving forward without the United States, economic conditions in Mexico, Mexico's labor market, and Mexican migration to the United States. This report provides an overview of Mexico's free trade agreements, its motivations for trade liberalization and entering into free trade agreements, trade trends with the United States and other countries, and some of the issues Mexico faces in addressing its economic challenges. Motivations for Trade Integration
Economic motivations are generally the major driving force for the formation of free trade agreements among countries, but there are other reasons countries enter into FTAs, including political and security factors. Mexico's primary motivation for the unilateral trade liberalization efforts of the late 1980s and early 1990s was to improve economic conditions in the country, which policymakers hoped would lead to greater investor confidence and attract more foreign investment. Mexico has other motivations for continuing trade liberalization with other countries, such as expanding market access for its exports and decreasing its reliance on the United States as an export market. The slow progress in multilateral negotiations in the WTO may be another likely factor. Some countries see smaller trade arrangements as "building blocks" for multilateral agreements. Mexico's Free Trade Agreements
Mexico's pursuit of free trade agreements with other countries is a way to bring benefits to the economy, but also to reduce its economic dependence on the United States. The United States is, by far, Mexico's most significant trading partner. Approximately 80% of Mexico's exports go to the United States and 47% of Mexico's imports come from the United States. These include agreements with many countries in the Western Hemisphere including the United States and Canada, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay. Mexico has also negotiated free trade agreements outside of the Western Hemisphere and, in July 2000, entered into agreements with Israel and the European Union. Mexico-Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala , and Honduras) . Mexico's Merchandise Trade
In 2016, Mexico's leading export items were passenger motor vehicles, motor vehicle parts, motor vehicles for transport of goods, automatic data process machines, and electrical apparatus for telephones. Leading import items were motor vehicle parts, refined petroleum oil products, electronic integrated circuits, electric apparatus for telephones, and automatic data process machines (see Table 2 ). Since trade liberalization, Mexico's trade with the world has risen rapidly, with exports increasing faster than imports. Mexico's exports to all countries increased 515% between 1994 and 2016, from $60.8 billion to $373.9 billion (see Figure 2 ). Although the 2009 economic downturn resulted in a decline in the value of exports, exports regained their strength in the following years. Mexico's imports from all countries increased from $79.3 billion in 1994 to $387.1 billion in 2016, an increase of 388%. Mexico's trade balance went from a deficit of $18.5 billion in 1994 to surpluses of $7.1 billion in 1995 and $6.5 billion in 1996. | Mexico has had a growing commitment to trade integration and liberalization through the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) since the 1990s, and its trade policy is among the most open in the world. Mexico's pursuit of FTAs with other countries not only provides economic benefits, but could also potentially reduce its economic dependence on the United States. The United States is, by far, Mexico's most significant trading partner. Approximately 80% of Mexico's exports go to the United States, and about 47% of Mexico's imports are supplied by the United States. In an effort to increase trade with other countries, Mexico has a total of 11 free trade agreements involving 46 countries. These include agreements with most countries in the Western Hemisphere, including the United States and Canada under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. In addition, Mexico has negotiated FTAs outside of the Western Hemisphere and entered into agreements with Israel, Japan, and the European Union.
Economic motivations are generally the major driving force for the formation of free trade agreements among countries, but there are other reasons countries enter into FTAs, including political and security factors. One of Mexico's primary motivations for its unilateral trade liberalization efforts of the late 1980s and early 1990s was to improve economic conditions in the country, which policymakers hoped would lead to greater investor confidence, attract more foreign investment, and create jobs. Mexico could also have other reasons for entering into FTAs, such as expanding market access and decreasing its reliance on the United States as an export market. The slow progress in multilateral trade negotiations may also contribute to the increasing interest throughout the world in bilateral and regional free trade agreements under the World Trade Organization (WTO). Some countries may see smaller trade arrangements as "building blocks" for multilateral agreements.
Since Mexico began liberalizing trade in the early 1990s, its trade with the world has risen rapidly, with exports increasing more rapidly than imports. Mexico's exports to all countries increased 515% between 1994 and 2016, from $60.8 billion to $373.9 billion. Although the 2009 economic downturn resulted in a decline in exports, the value of Mexican exports recovered in the years that followed. Total imports also increased rapidly, from $79.3 billion in 1994 to $387.1 billion in 2016, an increase of 388%. The trade balance went from a deficit of $18.5 billion in 1994 to surpluses of $7.1 billion and $6.5 billion in 1995 and 1996. Since 1998, Mexico's trade balance has remained a deficit, equaling $13.2 billion in 2016. Mexico's top five exports in 2016 were passenger motor vehicles, motor vehicle parts, motor vehicles for the transport of goods, automatic data processing machines, and electrical apparatus for telephones. Mexico's top five imports were motor vehicle parts, refined petroleum oil products, electronic integrated circuits, electric apparatus for telephones, and automatic data processing machines.
In the 115th Congress, issues of concern related to the trade and economic relationship with Mexico may involve a possible renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its effects, Mexico's external trade policy with other countries, Mexico's intentions of moving forward with multilateral or bilateral free trade agreements with Asia-Pacific countries, economic conditions in Mexico and the labor market, and the status of Mexican migration to the United States. This report provides an overview of Mexico's free trade agreements, its motivations for trade liberalization and entering into free trade agreements, and trade trends with the United States and other countries in the world. |
crs_RL34310 | crs_RL34310_0 | Foreign policy observers often attribute China's growing influence in Southeast Asia, and other parts of the world, to its use of "soft power"—diplomacy, foreign assistance, trade, and investment, and the view of China as a vast, potential market. The United States also remains influential as a large market for Southeast Asian exports. China may be gaining on the United States in the areas of cultural and political soft power as well, at least in some countries in the region. China's Foreign Aid to Southeast Asia
China's foreign aid has had a growing, tangible impact in many countries in Southeast Asia, although it is difficult to quantify, due to a lack of data and to the unique characteristics of Chinese assistance. China's Aid to the Least Developed Countries in the Region
Many reports of PRC aid in the region focus on Burma, Cambodia, and Laos, the poorest countries in Southeast Asia and ones that have had relatively unfriendly relations with the United States. China is considered the "primary economic patron" of these countries and provides an "implicit security guarantee." China's Aid to the More Developed Southeast Asian Countries
China also has provided considerable aid to the large and more developed countries in the region, such as Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. A Comparison of U.S. and Chinese Economic Relations With ASEAN
Over the past decade, China's trade with the 10 countries that comprise the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has expanded sharply in terms of trade volume, percentage increase, and size relative to U.S. trade levels. China's soft power in the region is expected to grow as Southeast Asian economies become more dependant upon or integrated with the PRC. Total U.S. trade (exports plus imports) with ASEAN in 2006 was slighter larger than that of China's ($168.5 billion versus $160.9 billion). Based on China's rapid trade growth over the past few years, it is likely that its trade with ASEAN will exceed that of the United States in 2007 and beyond. While China had a $178 billion trade surplus with the world in 2006, it had a $18.2 billion trade deficit with ASEAN; the U.S. trade deficit with ASEAN totaled $53.9 billion. Foreign Direct Investment
Although the importance of the United States to ASEAN trade has declined somewhat relative to China, it is still a major source of ASEAN's foreign direct investment (FDI). The perception of U.S. inattentiveness to the region has continued to be reinforced. According to one view, China is pursuing a zero sum game where expansion of its influence is, or will be, at the expense of the United States. By contrast, some analysts argue that, on balance, China's growing economic influence of the past decade has been beneficial to the region and not detrimental to U.S. interests. Concern over China's rising influence in Southeast Asia, and beyond is leading some in the United States to be increasingly wary of China and its motives out of a fear that if China's power and influence continue to increase, Beijing will eventually seek to constrain and/or undermine America's ability to promote and protect its interests in the region. | China's growing use of "soft power" in Southeast Asia—non-military inducements including culture, diplomacy, foreign aid, trade, and investment—has presented new challenges to U.S. foreign policy. By downplaying many conflicting interests and working collaboratively with countries and regional organizations on such issues as territorial disputes and trade, Beijing has largely allayed Southeast Asian concerns that China poses a military or economic threat. China's diplomatic engagement, compared to the perceived waning or limited attention by the United States, has earned the country greater respect in the region. Its rise as a major foreign aid provider and market for Southeast Asian goods has also enhanced its relations with Southeast Asian states. Many analysts contend that China's growing influence may come at the expense of U.S. power and influence in the region.
This report provides evidence and analysis of China's soft power in Southeast Asia. It does not discuss the considerable U.S. military presence in the region. The report describes China's evolving diplomacy and more active role in regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Although China's foreign aid to Southeast Asia, as in other regions, is difficult to quantify and includes a broader range of economic assistance than official development assistance (ODA) offered by major industrialized nations, it is believed to be relatively large. China is considered to be the "primary economic patron" of the small but strategically important nations of Burma, Cambodia, and Laos, and also provides considerable economic aid to Indonesia and the Philippines.
China's trade with ASEAN countries is less than U.S. trade with the region ($160.9 billion compared to $168.5 billion in 2006), but is expected to exceed that of the United States in 2007 and beyond. Furthermore, although China runs a trade surplus with the world, it runs a trade deficit with ASEAN countries ($18.2 billion compared to the U.S.-ASEAN trade deficit of $53.9 billion). China appears to have moved more quickly than the United States in promoting trade with the region through establishing free trade agreements (FTAs). However, although the importance of the United States to ASEAN trade has declined somewhat relative to that of China, the United States is still a major source of the region's foreign direct investment (FDI), ranking 4th from 2002 through 2006 compared to China (ranking 10th).
Analysts differ over China's longer-term intentions in Southeast Asia and their implications for the United States. Some observers argue that the consequences of China's growing soft power, and Beijing's aim, is the decline of U.S. influence in the region. Others contend that the implications of China's rise are not zero sum, and that, at least in the next 15-25 years, Beijing's priority will be economic development and that China's leaders, as well as the leaders of other Southeast Asian countries, view the United States' continuing leadership role in the region as beneficial. Competing U.S. policy approaches include continuing the current level of U.S. political and economic engagement in the region, containing China's rise, or bolstering the U.S. diplomatic, foreign aid, and economic presence in tandem with China's rise. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41897 | crs_R41897_0 | An issue for Congress and state and local governments is whether the pay and benefits of public workers are comparable to those of workers in the private sector. The effect of the recession that officially began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009 on government budgets increased the interest of policy makers in the compensation of public sector employees. Among the ways to reduce budget deficits, policy makers are considering the pay and benefits of public sector employees. The number of people employed in both the private and public sectors has increased steadily as the U.S. economy has grown. Conversely, from 2010 to 2013, private sector employment grew by approximately 6.7 million jobs, while public sector employment fell by an estimated 626,000 jobs. This percentage increased to 19.2% in 1975, and then fell to 15.7% in 1999. Reflecting the effects of the 2007-2009 recession on the budgets of state and local governments, from 2010 to 2013 public sector employment fell from 17.3% to 16.0% of total employment. In 2009, for the first time, a majority of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement were employed in the public sector (8.7 million workers in the public sector, compared to 8.2 million private sector workers). By 2013, the situation had reversed; a slight majority of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement were employed in the private sector (8.1 million private sector workers, compared to 7.9 million public sector workers). The number of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement is greater in the private sector than in the public sector. Nevertheless, since 1983, the percentage of workers represented by a union has fallen in both the private and public sectors. In the federal government, most employees do not bargain over wages. Age
Reflecting the aging of the U.S. labor force, workers in both the private and public sectors have become older. Nevertheless, employees in the public sector are older than private sector workers. In 2013, 51.7% of full-time public sector workers were between the ages of 45 and 64, compared to 42.4% of full-time private sector workers. Federal workers are older than employees of state and local governments. In 2013, 56.7% of federal workers were between the ages of 45 and 64, compared to 49.7% of state employees and 52.1% of employees of local governments. Employees with more work experience generally earn more than workers with less experience. Thus, the age difference between private and public sector workers may indicate that public sector workers have more years of experience than private sector workers. Gender
Reflecting the increased participation of women in the labor force, the share of jobs held by women has increased in both the private and public sectors. In 2013, women held almost three-fifths of full-time jobs in state and local governments (57.7% for both state and local governments). By contrast, women held approximately two-fifths of full-time jobs in the federal government and in the private sector (42.2% and 41.7%, respectively). Education
On average, public sector employees have more years of education than private sector workers. In 2013, 53.6% of workers in the public sector had a bachelor's, advanced, or professional degree, compared to 34.9% of private sector workers. Workers with more education generally earn more than workers with less education. (The analysis in the first part of this report of the number of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement was for all full-time and part-time wage and salary workers ages 16 and over.) However, in 2013, a larger share of public sector than private sector workers were employed in "management, professional, and related occupations" (56.2% of public sector workers, compared to 37.8% of private sector workers). In part, more public sector workers were employed in these occupations because 25.7% of all public sector workers were employed in "education, training, and library" occupations, compared to 2.3% of all private sector workers. Similarly, more workers in the private sector were employed in "production" occupations (7.9% in the private sector and 1.2% in the public sector). Detailed Occupations
Broad occupational categories may not fully distinguish between detailed occupations that are concentrated in either the private or public sectors. Many detailed occupations may require similar skills, however. However, private sector workers were more likely than federal workers to live in areas with 5 million or more people. The tables show the total number of persons employed, the number of workers employed in the private and public sectors, the percentage of total employment that was in the private sector, and the percentage of workers in the private and public sectors who were covered by a collective bargaining agreement. | An issue for Congress and state and local governments is whether the pay and benefits of public workers are comparable to those of workers in the private sector. In addition, among the ways to reduce budget deficits, policy makers are considering the pay and benefits of public sector employees.
The number of people employed in both the private and public sectors has increased steadily as the U.S. economy has grown. However, after increasing to 19.2% of total employment in 1975, the percentage of all jobs that are in the public sector fell to 15.7% in 1999. In 2013, public sector jobs accounted for 16.0% of total employment.
The recession that officially began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009 affected employment in both the private and public sectors. From 2007 to 2010, the number of jobs in the private sector fell by an estimated 7.9 million, while the number of jobs in the public sector increased by almost 272,000. Conversely, from 2010 to 2013, private sector employment grew by approximately 6.7 million jobs, while public sector employment fell by about 626,000 jobs. Reflecting the effects of the 2007-2009 recession on the budgets of state and local governments, from 2010 to 2013, public sector employment as a share of total employment fell from 17.3% to 16.0%.
Among all full-time and part-time workers ages 16 and over, the number of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement has fallen in both the private and public sectors. The decline has been greater in the private sector. In 2009, for the first time, a majority of workers who were covered by a collective bargaining agreement were employed in the public sector (8.7 million workers in the public sector, compared to 8.2 million private sector workers). By 2013, the situation had reversed; a slight majority of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement were employed in the private sector (8.1 million private sector workers, compared to 7.9 million public sector workers). In the federal government, except for the Postal Service and some smaller agencies, employees do not bargain over wages.
Among workers ages 18 to 64 who work full-time, differences in characteristics that may affect the relative pay and benefits of private and public sector workers include the following:
Age. Reflecting the aging of the U.S. labor force, workers in both the private and public sectors have become older. Nevertheless, employees in the public sector are older than private sector workers. In 2013, 51.7% of public sector workers were between the ages of 45 and 64, compared to 42.4% of full-time private sector workers. Federal workers are older than employees of state and local governments. In 2013, 56.7% of federal workers were between the ages of 45 and 64, compared to 49.7% of state employees and 52.1% of employees of local governments. Workers who have more years of work experience generally earn more than workers with less experience. Gender. Reflecting the increased participation of women in the labor force, the share of jobs held by women has increased in both the private and public sectors. In 2013, women held almost three-fifths (57.7%) of full-time jobs in state and local governments. By contrast, women held approximately two-fifths of full-time jobs in the federal government and in the private sector (42.2% and 41.7%, respectively). Education. On average, public sector employees have more years of education than private sector workers. In 2013, 53.6% of workers in the public sector had a bachelor's, advanced, or professional degree, compared to 34.9% of private sector workers. Generally, workers with more years of education earn more than workers with less years of education. Occupation. A larger share of public sector than private sector workers are employed in "management, professional, and related occupations." In 2013, 56.2% of public sector workers and 37.8% of private sector workers were employed in these occupations. In part, more public sector workers were employed in these occupations because 25.7% of all public sector workers were employed in "education, training, and library" occupations, compared to 2.3% of all private sector workers. Workers in management and professional occupations generally earn more than workers in other occupations. However, comparisons of the compensation of private and public sector workers that use broad occupational categories may miss differences between detailed occupations. Many detailed occupations are concentrated in either the private or public sectors. Nevertheless, many detailed occupations may require similar skills. Union coverage. Although the number of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement is greater in the private sector than in the public sector, the percentage of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement is greater in the public sector than in the private sector. Metropolitan area. Private sector workers are more likely than federal workers to live in major metropolitan areas (i.e., areas with 5 million or more people). |
crs_RS20258 | crs_RS20258_0 | RS20258 -- Patient Protection and Mandatory External Review: Amending ERISA's Claims Procedure
Updated January 19, 2001
Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999, S.1344
The Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999, S. 1344 , was introduced by Senator Trent Lott (R-MS) on July 8, 1999, and passed by the Senate onJuly 15, 1999. Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R.2990
The Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. (14) The combined bill was passed by the House of Representatives on October 7, 1999. The plan or issuer would have been permittedto condition external review on the exhaustionof the internal review process. | This report discusses the existing claims procedure required by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974(ERISA), and legislative efforts in the 106th Congress to amend ERISA to provide for the mandatoryexternal review of denied benefits. Although most of thepatient protection bills introduced in the 106th Congress included provisions for external review andmore rigorous standards for the internal review of deniedbenefits, this report focuses on the Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999, S. 1344, passed by the Senateon July 15, 1999, and the BipartisanConsensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2990, passed by the House of Representatives onOctober 7, 1999. |
crs_RL33807 | crs_RL33807_0 | Introduction
The Role of NAAQS in Air Quality Regulation
Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) is an action that is at the core of the Clean Air Act. CASAC has seven members, largely from academia and from private research institutions, who generally serve for two consecutive three-year terms. In conducting NAAQS reviews, their expertise is supplemented by panels of the nation's leading experts on the health and environmental effects of the specific pollutants that are under review. CASAC panels had a nearly 30-year history of working quietly in the background, advising the agency's staff on NAAQS reviews, and issuing what were called "closure letters" on the agency documents that summarize the science and the policy options behind the NAAQS. The science and policy documents, written by EPA staff, generally have gone through several iterations before the scientists were satisfied, but, with the issuance of a closure letter, CASAC has in past years removed itself from the process, leaving the formal proposal and final choice of standards to the Administrator. The committee took the unprecedented steps of writing to the Administrator both after he proposed the standards in January, and after he promulgated them in September. In the latter communication, CASAC stated unanimously that the Administrator's action " does not provide an ' adequate margin of safety ... requisite to protect the public health ' (as required by the Clean Air Act) ...." (Italics in original.) A month after CASAC's challenge to the final particulate decision, CASAC's ozone review panel took an unusually strong stand regarding review of that NAAQS. The panel approved EPA's policy options paper (or "Staff Paper"), the next-to-last formal step before the Administrator proposes revision of the ozone NAAQS, but in doing so it stated, "There is no scientific justification for retaining the current primary 8-hr NAAQS ...," and it recommended a range for the revised standard that would be substantially more stringent than the current standard. The Administrator proposed a revision generally outside CASAC's range on June 20, 2007, and in March 2008 he promulgated new ozone standards that were outside CASAC's range. It also reviews various proposals for change that have been discussed, including EPA's December 2006 modifications. Role of CASAC . As the Executive Summary noted:
Past reviews of the process have addressed a number of issues, including the difficulty EPA has had historically in completing NAAQS reviews at five-year intervals as required by the CAA, resulting in litigation-driven review schedules; the statutory role of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) in providing scientific and policy-relevant advice to the Administrator; concerns about the "encyclopedic" nature of EPA's science assessment documents (referred to as "Criteria Documents") and support for a more integrative synthesis of the science; and general support for the introduction and subsequent evolution of a policy-oriented "Staff Paper" to help bridge the gap between the science presented in the Criteria Document and the policy judgments required of the Administrator in reaching decisions on the NAAQS. In its May 12, 2006, letter to the EPA Administrator, CASAC raised this point. This mollified some of CASAC's concerns, but CASAC has continued to express "serious concerns" about other aspects of the Lead NAAQS review. | As the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) completes its reviews of the ozone, particulate matter (PM), and lead air quality standards—the PM review was completed in September 2006, the ozone review in March 2008, and the lead review is due for completion in September 2008—the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC), an independent committee of scientists that advises the agency's Administrator, has been sharply critical of several of EPA's decisions.
CASAC was established by statute in 1977. Its members, largely from academia and from private research institutes, are appointed by the EPA Administrator. They review the agency's work in setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), relying on panels of the nation's leading experts on the health and environmental effects of the specific pollutants. CASAC panels have a nearly 30-year history of working quietly in the background, issuing what were called "closure letters" on agency documents that summarize the science and the policy options behind the NAAQS. The science and policy documents, written by EPA staff, generally have gone through several iterations before the scientists were satisfied, but, with the issuance of a closure letter, CASAC has in past years removed itself from the process, leaving the final choice of standards to the Administrator.
In 2006, however, CASAC and its 22-member PM Review Panel forcefully objected to the Administrator's decisions regarding revision of the particulate NAAQS. The committee took the unprecedented steps of writing to the Administrator both after he proposed the standards in January, and after he promulgated them in September. In the latter communication, CASAC stated unanimously that the Administrator's action "does not provide an 'adequate margin of safety ... requisite to protect the public health' (as required by the Clean Air Act) ...." (Italics in original)
Within a month of CASAC's September 2006 letter, the committee's ozone review panel approved EPA's policy options Staff Paper, the next-to-last formal step before the Administrator proposed to revise the ozone NAAQS. In doing so, the panel drew a firm line ("There is no scientific justification for retaining the current primary 8-hr NAAQS"), and recommended a range far more stringent than the previous standard. The Administrator promulgated a standard outside of CASAC's range in March 2008.
At the same time that CASAC panels were speaking out, EPA was conducting a review of CASAC's role and other aspects of the NAAQS-revision process. A December 7, 2006 EPA memorandum made a number of changes in that process that many argue will diminish the role of CASAC and agency scientists. As the changes have been implemented, CASAC has objected to some of the new procedures and a number of Senators have written the EPA Administrator to express their opposition to the changes. Congress is expected to continue taking an interest in the subject. This report discusses these issues, focusing on the statutory and historical role of CASAC and various proposals for change. |
crs_R43117 | crs_R43117_0 | The agency is organized around four divisions:
Clearing and Risk, which oversees derivatives clearing organizations and other major market participants; Enforcement, which investigates and prosecutes alleged violations of the Commodity Exchange Act and of CFTC regulations; Market Oversight, which conducts trade surveillance and oversees trading facilities such as futures exchanges; and Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight, which oversees registration and compliance by self-regulatory organizations (SROs), such as the futures exchanges (e.g., the Chicago Mercantile Exchange), the National Futures Association, and registration of swap dealers and major swap participants. Current Issues
The CFTC currently faces a range of issues—many of them related to the many rulemakings it was charged with under the Dodd-Frank Act regarding bringing the swaps market under regulation. Other issues relate to the CFTC's role in overseeing the derivatives markets. It is a selective, not exhaustive, list. This mandate left much discretion to the CFTC as to how to interpret it. In addition, legislation was passed by the House ( H.R. Also, H.R. 1256 requires the CFTC and SEC to allow non-U.S. persons in compliance with the laws of any countries with one of the nine largest swaps markets to be exempt from U.S. regulatory requirements on swaps, unless the two agencies issue a joint rule finding that the regulatory requirements of any of these nine countries or administrative regions "are not broadly equivalent to U.S. swaps requirements." In House floor debate, opponents of the bill asserted that it would weaken the Dodd-Frank requirements on swaps by allowing foreign banks and overseas affiliates of large U.S. conglomerates to escape these swaps requirements, and that it would slow down the pace of agency rulemakings and implementation of the Dodd-Frank derivatives reforms. 1256 was passed by the House on June 12, 2013, with a roll call vote of 301 to 124. 634 would prevent regulators from imposing margin requirements on swaps for both counterparties in which one counterparty is an "end user." H.R. On June 12, 2013, H.R. 634 was passed by the House with a roll call vote of 411 to 12. 677 ), is the question of the extent to which swaps between affiliates within an umbrella organization, such as a financial or corporate conglomerate, should be subject to the clearing and other requirements of Dodd-Frank. This has been a challenge faced by regulators charged with implementing the Volcker rule, of which the CFTC is one. The CFTC issued its proposed rule implementing Section 619 of Dodd-Frank on February 14, 2012. Legislation in the 112 th Congress ( H.R. Such steep jumps, along with unexplained price volatility in a range of commodities, have fostered apprehension that financial speculation in derivatives might be creating such volatility in commodity prices. The role of speculators in oil and commodities markets has attracted congressional interest. The CFTC approved rules setting position limits for certain commodities in November of 2011. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia vacated and remanded the CFTC's position limit rules in a decision issued in September of 2012. Reforms to LIBOR as a benchmark interest rate are also underway in the UK. In the case of the CFTC and the Commodity Exchange Act, one provision, which authorizes appropriations, expires on September 30, 2013:
Authorization of appropriations . In the case of the CFTC, reauthorization is under the control of the House and Senate agriculture committees. In 2013, the House and Senate agriculture committees have already begun holding CFTC reauthorization hearings. Appendix. Futures contracts are traded on exchanges regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); stock options on exchanges under the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); and swaps (and some options) have been traded over the counter (OTC), and until passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, had not been regulated by anyone. To meet this concern, the Dodd-Frank Act's Title VII on derivatives reform included a broad exemption from this clearing requirement for derivatives when one party to the trade is a non-financial firm. | The 113th Congress is interested in an array of issues faced by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The congressional committees with oversight of the agency, the House and Senate Agriculture Committees, have begun to hold hearings related to various policy issues faced by the agency, as part of the CFTC reauthorization process. This process occurs roughly every five years and is currently underway, as the last authorization of appropriations for the agency expires September 30, 2013.
The CFTC witnessed a major expansion of its role in overseeing derivatives markets following passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. This act brought previously unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, called swaps, under the oversight of the CFTC. The new role of the CFTC as a regulator of the swaps markets comes in addition to its preexisting role overseeing the futures and options markets, which include commodities and financial market instruments such as interest rate futures. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, much discretion on a range of key issues related to the new regulation of swaps was left to the CFTC (and to the Securities and Exchange Commission for swaps based on securities).
As the agency seeks to use its rulemaking powers to implement Dodd-Frank, several issues are proving challenging or contentious. These include the CFTC's and other financial regulators' implementation of the Volcker rule under Section 619 of Dodd-Frank, which prohibits proprietary trading and hedge fund activities by banks. Other Dodd-Frank implementation issues have prompted legislation in the 113th Congress. H.R. 677 addresses the scope of an exemption from clearing requirements for swaps between affiliates within an umbrella organization. A related issue is determining the scope of any exemption from the Dodd-Frank Act requirements on swaps for overseas branches or affiliates of U.S. organizations and for foreign organizations trading with U.S. persons—an issue that H.R. 1256 seeks to address. H.R. 1256 passed the House on June 12, 2013, in a roll call vote of 301-124. Another bill, H.R. 634, which also passed the House on June 12 in a roll call vote of 411-12, would prevent regulators from imposing margin requirements on swaps for both counterparties in which one counterparty is a non-financial firm, known as an "end user" of derivatives. H.R. 1003 would mandate additional cost-benefit analyses by the CFTC when it conducts future rulemakings.
In addition, changing technologies have created novel challenges for the agency's oversight in such matters as monitoring high frequency trading in the derivatives markets. Furthermore, certain failures, such as the collapse of the futures trading firms MF Global and of Peregrine Financial, and enforcement issues, such as the manipulation of LIBOR, have flagged policy issues for the CFTC on the enforcement and policy fronts. Commodity price volatility, such as in the 2008 and 2011 runups in oil prices, has also sparked congressional interest in the CFTC's proposed position limits rule, which some hope would constrain volatility in these markets. The CFTC's position limits rule was vacated and remanded by a federal court in 2012—a decision that the CFTC has appealed.
This report provides summaries and abbreviated analyses of selected issues faced by the CFTC that may be relevant to the 113th Congress. It is not an exhaustive list of issues facing the agency. The appendix offers detailed background information on derivatives markets and related policy issues addressed in the Dodd-Frank Act. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_94-803 | crs_94-803_0 | The Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W), updated monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), is the measure that can trigger a benefit increase. The Social Security cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) is based on the growth in the index from the highest third calendar quarter average CPI-W recorded (most often, from the previous year) to the average CPI-W for the third calendar quarter of the current year. If the CPI-W triggers a COLA, the COLA becomes effective in December of the current year and is payable in January of the following year. (Social Security payments always reflect the benefits due for the preceding month.) What Is the COLA to Be Paid in January 2019? As a result, an automatic COLA in January 2010 was not triggered and the third quarter of 2008 remained the cost-of-living computation quarter (i.e., the benchmark) used to determine if a COLA would be payable in January 2011. Other Programs
Social Security COLAs trigger increases in other programs. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits and railroad retirement "tier 1" benefits (equivalent to a Social Security benefit) are increased by the same percentage as the Social Security COLA or are held constant when a COLA is not paid to Social Security beneficiaries. Although COLAs under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the federal military retirement system are not triggered by the Social Security COLA, these programs use the same measuring period and formula for determining their COLAs. | To compensate for the effects of inflation, Social Security recipients usually receive an annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). According to parameters outlined in the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 415(i)), a 2.8% COLA is payable in January 2019. For a retired worker receiving the average monthly benefit amount of $1,422, the COLA will result in a $39 increase in Social Security benefits (after final rounding down to the nearest dollar for a total of $1,461).
Social Security COLAs are based on changes in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W), updated monthly by the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The COLA equals the growth, if any, in the index from the highest third calendar quarter average CPI-W recorded (most often, from the previous year) to the average CPI-W for the third calendar quarter of the current year. The COLA becomes effective in December of the current year and is payable in January of the following year. (Social Security payments always reflect the benefits due for the preceding month.)
If there is no percentage increase in the CPI-W between the measuring periods, no COLA is payable. No COLA was payable in January 2010, January 2011, or in January 2016.
The January 2019 COLA will also be applied to Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and railroad retirement "tier 1" benefits, among other changes in the Social Security program. Although COLAs under the federal Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the federal military retirement program are not triggered directly by the Social Security COLA, these programs use the same measuring period and formula for computing their COLAs. As a result, their recipients will receive a similar COLA payable in 2019. |
crs_R40829 | crs_R40829_0 | The House of Representatives has several different parliamentary procedures through which it can bring legislation to the chamber floor. Which will be used in a given situation depends on many factors, including the type of measure being considered, its cost, the amount of political or policy controversy surrounding it, and the degree to which Members want to debate it and propose amendments. According to the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress (LIS), in the 111 th Congress (2009-2010), 1,946 pieces of legislation received action. This report provides a statistical snapshot of the forms, origins, and party sponsorship of these measures, and of the parliamentary procedures used to bring them to the chamber floor during their initial consideration. Of these, 885 were bills or joint resolutions and 1,061 were simple or concurrent resolutions, a breakdown between lawmaking and non-lawmaking legislative forms of approximately 45% to 55%, respectively. Origin of Measures
Of the 1,946 measures receiving House floor action in the 111 th Congress, 1,796 originated in the House and 150 originated in the Senate. The ratio of majority to minority party sponsorship of measures receiving initial House floor action in the 111 th Congress varied widely based on the parliamentary procedure used to raise the legislation on the House floor. As is noted in Table 2 , 73% of the measures considered under the Suspension of the Rules procedure were sponsored by Democrats, 27% by Republicans, and less than 1% by political independents. The ratio of party sponsorship on measures initially brought to the floor under a terms of a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House was far wider. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are counted, 86% of bills and joint resolutions receiving floor action in the 111 th Congress came up by Suspension of the Rules. In the 111 th Congress, 269 measures, representing 14% of the measures receiving floor action, came before the House on their initial consideration by virtue of their status as "privileged business." In the 111 th Congress, 103 measures, or 5% of all legislation receiving House floor action, were initially brought before the chamber under the terms of a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and agreed to by the House. Unanimous Consent
In current practice, legislation is sometimes brought before the House of Representatives for consideration by the unanimous consent of its Members. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are counted, less than 1% (.001%) of bills and joint resolutions receiving floor action in the 111 th Congress came up under the Gephardt Rule. Other Parliamentary Mechanisms
The House of Representatives has established special parliamentary procedures which might be used to bring legislation to the chamber floor dealing with the business of the District of Columbia, by a discharge petition filed by a numerical majority of the House, and by a procedure known as the Calendar Wednesday procedure. | The House of Representatives has several different parliamentary procedures through which it can bring legislation to the chamber floor. Which of these will be used in a given situation depends on many factors, including the type of measure being considered, its cost, the amount of political or policy controversy surrounding it, and the degree to which Members want to debate it and propose amendments. This report provides a snapshot of the forms and origins of measures which, according to the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress (LIS), received action on the House floor in the 111th Congress (2009-2010) and the parliamentary procedures used to bring them up for initial House consideration.
In the 111th Congress, 1,946 pieces of legislation received floor action in the House of Representatives. Of these, 885 were bills or joint resolutions and 1,061 were simple or concurrent resolutions, a breakdown between lawmaking and non-lawmaking legislative forms of approximately 45% to 55%. Of these 1,946 measures, 1,796 originated in the House and 150 originated in the Senate.
During the same period, 78% of all measures receiving initial House floor action came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure; 14% came to the floor as business "privileged" under House rules and precedents; 5% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House; and 2% came up by the unanimous consent of Members. One measure, representing a small fraction (less than 1%) of measures receiving House floor action in the 111th Congress, was processed through the parliamentary mechanism formerly contained in House Rule XXVIII, popularly known as the "Gephardt Rule."
When only lawmaking forms of legislation (bills and joint resolutions) are counted, 86% of measures receiving initial House floor action in the 111th Congresses came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure; 11% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House; and 2% came up by the unanimous consent of Members. Less than 1% of bills or joint resolutions received House floor action in the 111th Congress by virtue of being business "privileged" under House rules and precedents or through the provisions of the Gephardt Rule.
The party sponsorship of legislation receiving initial floor action in the 111th Congress varied based on the procedure used to raise the legislation on the chamber floor. Seventy-three percent of the measures considered under the Suspension of the Rules procedure were sponsored by majority party Members. All measures brought before the House under the terms of a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House were sponsored by majority party Members.
This report will be periodically updated to reflect legislative action taken in a full Congress. |
crs_R41872 | crs_R41872_0 | The responsibility for populating top positions in the executive and judicial branches of government is one the Senate and the President share. The President nominates an individual, the Senate may confirm him, and the President would then present him with a signed commission. The Constitution divided the responsibility for choosing the most senior leaders who run the federal government. Currently, hundreds of people go through the appointment and confirmation process each year. The pace of the appointment and confirmation processes has been the subject of a series of reports and proposals, with many critics charging that the vetting by the executive branch is excessive or that the confirmation process by the Senate is too long and difficult, which discourages people from seeking government service. During the 112 th Congress, a bipartisan group of Senators crafted two measures they contend will make the appointment process easier and quicker. Both measures were adopted. P.L. 112-166 , the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011, removed the requirement for Senate confirmation for appointees to 163 positions, empowering the President alone to appoint the official. Originally introduced into the Senate in March 2011 as S. 679 , the Senate passed an amended version of the bill by a vote of 79-20 on June 29, 2011. The House of Representatives passed the Senate's version of the bill under suspension of the rules on July 31, 2012. President Barack Obama signed the bill into law on August 10, 2012. Parts of the act took effect immediately, and other parts took effect on October 9, 2012, 60 days after its enactment. 116 , a resolution "to provide for expedited Senate consideration of certain nominations subject to advice and consent," established a potentially faster Senate confirmation process for a second group of nominees. On June 29, 2011, the Senate agreed to an amended version of S.Res. 116 , by a vote of 89-8. 116 are now a standing order of the Senate and took effect for nominations received after August 28, 2011. The following discussion of the Senate's process does not include the provisions of S.Res. Number of PAS Positions
Prior to the enactment of the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act, the number of PAS positions in the executive branch was approximately between 1,200 and 1,400 positions. There may be several consequences of a slow appointments process. P.L. To accomplish that goal, the law contained two major provisions. 112-166 eliminating the advice and consent requirements from the 163 positions took effect 60 days after enactment, on October 9, 2012. The second major provision of P.L. The working group is required to write two reports and to submit them to the President, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. The first report, which is to be submitted within 90 days of the enactment of the law (by November 8, 2012), is to make recommendations for the streamlining of paperwork required for executive branch nominations. The second report from the working group is to examine the background investigations that are currently required of nominees. 112-166 assert that the law will ease the Senate's workload on processing nominations by removing the advice and consent requirements for 163 positions. Provisions of S.Res. | The responsibility for populating top positions in the executive and judicial branches of government is one the Senate and the President share. The President nominates an individual, the Senate may confirm him, and the President would then present him with a signed commission. The Constitution divided the responsibility for choosing those who would run the federal government by granting the President the power of appointment and the Senate the power of advice and consent.
Several hundred people go through the appointments process each year. Prior to the adoption of the measures discussed in this report, there were approximately 1,200-1,400 positions in the executive branch requiring the Senate's advice and consent. The pace of the appointment and confirmation processes has been the subject of a series of critical reports and proposals for change. Critics believe that the executive branch vetting, and/or the confirmation process in the Senate, is too long and difficult and discourages people from seeking government office. Others, however, contend that most nominations are successful, suggesting that the process is functioning as it should, and that careful scrutiny of candidates is appropriate.
During the 112th Congress, a bipartisan group of Senators crafted two measures they contend will make the appointment process easier and quicker. Both measures were adopted.
P.L. 112-166, the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011, removed the requirement for Senate confirmation for appointees to 163 positions, authorizing the President alone to appoint certain officials. Originally introduced into the Senate in March 2011 as S. 679, the Senate passed an amended version of the bill by a vote of 79-20 on June 29, 2011. The House of Representatives passed the Senate's version of the bill under suspension of the rules on July 31, 2012. President Barack Obama signed the bill into law on August 10, 2012. Parts of the act took effect immediately, and other parts took effect on October 9, 2012, 60 days after its enactment.
P.L. 112-166 contains two major provisions. The first eliminated the requirement for the Senate's advice and consent on nominations to 163 positions in the executive branch. This provision of the law took effect on October 9, 2012. Members who supported the bill during its consideration have stated that the reduction in the number of positions subject to the Senate's advice and consent will ease the Senate's workload on processing nominations.
The second major provision of P.L. 112-166 established a working group to examine the appointments process. The working group is required to write two reports that are expected to generate a number of recommendations. The first, which is required to be submitted by November 8, 2012, is to make recommendations on how to streamline the collection of paperwork required of nominees. The second report, which is required to be submitted by May 3, 2013, is to examine whether the background investigations currently conducted of nominees can or should be improved.
S.Res. 116, a resolution "to provide for expedited Senate consideration of certain nominations subject to advice and consent," established a potentially faster Senate confirmation process for nominees to an additional 272 positions. On June 29, 2011, the Senate agreed to an amended version of S.Res. 116, by a vote of 89-8. The provisions of S.Res. 116 are now a standing order of the Senate and took effect for nominations received after August 28, 2011. |
crs_RL32427 | crs_RL32427_0 | The MCC concept differs in several fundamental respects from past and current U.S. aid practices
a competitive selection process that rewards countries for their commitment to free market economic and democratic policies as measured by objective performance indicators; the pledge to segregate the funds from U.S. strategic foreign policy objectives that often strongly influence where U.S. aid is spent; a mandate to seek poverty reduction through economic growth, not encumbered with multiple sector objectives or congressional directives; the requirement to solicit program proposals developed solely by qualifying countries with broad-based civil society involvement; the responsibility of recipient countries to implement their own MCC-funded programs, known as compacts; a compact duration limited to five years, with funding committed up front; the expectation that compact projects will have measurable impact; and an emphasis on public transparency in every aspect of agency operations. Congress approved the new initiative in January 2004 in the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (Division D of P.L. Currently, compacts are fully operating in 9 countries—Benin II, El Salvador II, Georgia II, Ghana II, Liberia, Malawi, Morocco II, Niger, and Zambia—and will enter into force in two more within the next two years—Cote d'Ivoire and Nepal. Burkina Faso II . 108-199 ). On March 23, 2018, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ) was signed into law, providing $905 million for the MCC, the same level as in FY2017. MCC Appropriations Request and Congressional Action for FY2019
On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration issued its FY2019 budget request, including $800 million for the MCC, a cut of $105 million (-11.6%) from FY2018-enacted levels. The "MCC Effect." | The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) provides economic assistance through a competitive selection process to developing nations that demonstrate positive performance in three areas: ruling justly, investing in people, and fostering economic freedom.
Established in 2004, the MCC differs in several respects from past and current U.S. aid practices
the competitive process that rewards countries for past actions measured by objective performance indicators; its mandate to seek poverty reduction through economic growth, not encumbered with multiple sector objectives; the requirement to solicit program proposals developed solely by qualifying countries with broad-based civil society involvement; the responsibility of recipient countries to implement their own MCC-funded programs, known as compacts; a compact duration limited to five years, with funding committed up front; the expectation that compact projects will have measurable impact; and an emphasis on public transparency in every aspect of agency operations.
On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration issued its FY2019 budget request, including $800 million for the MCC, a cut of $105 million (-11.6%) from FY2018-enacted levels.
On March 23, 2018, the Consolidated Appropriations, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) was signed into law, providing $905 million for the MCC, the same level as in FY2017.
Congress authorized the MCC in P.L. 108-199 (January 23, 2004). Since that time, the MCC has signed 33 grant agreements, known as compacts, with 29 countries, including with Madagascar (calendar year 2005), Honduras (2005), Cape Verde (2005), Nicaragua (2005), Georgia (2005), Benin (2006), Vanuatu (2006), Armenia (2006), Ghana (2006), Mali (2006), El Salvador (2006), Mozambique (2007), Lesotho (2007), Morocco (2007), Mongolia (2007), Tanzania (2008), Burkina Faso (2008), Namibia (2008), Senegal (2009), Moldova (2010), Philippines (2010), Jordan (2010), Malawi (2011), Indonesia (2011), Cape Verde II (2012), Zambia (2012), Georgia II (2013), El Salvador II (2014), Ghana II (2014), Benin II (2015), Liberia (2015), Morocco II (2015), Niger (2016), Cote D'Ivoire (2017), and Nepal (2017).
MCC issues include the level of funding to support MCC programs, the results of MCC compacts, sustainability, and corruption concerns. |
crs_RS22055 | crs_RS22055_0 | Background
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) authorizes federal funding for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The statute also contains detailed due process provisions to ensure the provision of FAPE and includes a provision for attorneys' fees. The attorneys' fees provisions were added in 1986 by the Handicapped Children's Protection Act, P.L. Final Regulations
The final regulations for P.L. Such explicit language was not added in the 2004 reauthorization of IDEA. | The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) authorizes federal funding for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The statute also contains detailed due process provisions to ensure the provision of FAPE and includes a provision for attorneys' fees. Attorneys' fees were among the most controversial provisions in the 2004 reauthorization of IDEA. This report analyzes the attorneys' fees provisions in P.L. 108-446 and the final regulations. For a general discussion of the 2004 reauthorization, see CRS Report RL32716, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Analysis of Changes Made by P.L. 108-446, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as necessary. |
crs_R42890 | crs_R42890_0 | Background
Congressional interest in stimulating innovation within the pharmaceutical industry has been reflected in legislative activity in the areas of patent law and regulatory exclusivities. Patents, which are administered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), provide firms with exclusive rights to an invention for a limited time in exchange for disclosure of the invention to the public. In contrast, regulatory exclusivities are administered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). They consist of a period of time during which the FDA affords an approved drug protection from competing applications for marketing approval. Data Exclusivity Versus Market Exclusivity
Regulatory exclusivities are, regrettably, not subject to a standard terminology. Biologics Exclusivity
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA), which was enacted as Title VII of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, introduced new regulatory exclusivities for a category of biologically derived preparations known as "biologics." As a result, most drugs are tested solely upon adults. Innovation Policy Issues
The Term of Regulatory Exclusivities
The Obama Administration has proposed a reduction in the regulatory exclusivity offered to brand-name biologic drugs to seven years, down from the 12 years incorporated in the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009. Regulatory Exclusivity for Colchicine
Controversy surrounded the award of regulatory exclusivities to colchicine, an ancient remedy for gout that had been marketed for decades in the United States without FDA approval. Under the proposed Modernizing Our Drug & Diagnostics Evaluation and Regulatory Network Cures Act (MODDERN Cures Act) (introduced both as H.R. 3901 and H.R. The MODDERN Cures Act confronts policy makers with a debate previously conducted by legal academics over the relative role of patents and regulatory exclusivities in promoting pharmaceutical and biotechnology R&D. International Issues
The agreements comprising the World Trade Organization (WTO) impose certain requirements with respect to both patents and regulatory exclusivities. But the TRIPS Agreement apparently prohibits discrimination in favor of pharmaceutical patents as well as against them. The TRIPS Agreement also requires each WTO member state to establish protections for pharmaceutical test data under certain conditions. More recently, the United States has entered into negotiations with respect to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a multilateral free trade agreement that aims to liberalize trade within the Asia-Pacific region. Concluding Observations
In combination, patents and regulatory exclusivities provide the fundamental framework of intellectual property incentives for pharmaceutical innovation in the United States. Due to the TRIPS Agreement's obligation of technological neutrality with respect to the patent system, regulatory exclusivities provide Congress with a more adaptable option for stimulating specific sorts of hoped-for private activity than do patents. | In combination, patents and regulatory exclusivities provide the fundamental framework of intellectual property incentives for pharmaceutical innovation in the United States. Patents, which are administered by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), provide their owner with the ability to exclude others from practicing the claimed invention for a limited time. In contrast, regulatory exclusivities are administered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Alternatively known as marketing exclusivities, data exclusivities, or data protection, regulatory exclusivities establish a period of time during which the FDA affords an approved drug protection from competing applications for marketing approval.
Although patents and regulatory exclusivities are separate entitlements that are administered by different federal administrative agencies and that depend upon distinct criteria, they both create proprietary rights in pharmaceutical and biologics innovation. These rights allow innovators to receive a return on the expenditure of resources leading to a discovery. Once these proprietary interests expire, the marketplace for that drug is open to generic or follow-on competition.
Congressional interest in promoting both innovation and competition in the pharmaceutical industry has focused attention on both patents and regulatory exclusivities. For example, the 112th Congress proposed but did not enact the Modernizing Our Drug and Diagnostics Evaluation and Regulatory Network Cures Act, or MODDERN Cures Act (introduced both as H.R. 3901 and H.R. 3116). This bill confronted policy makers with a debate previously conducted by legal academics over the relative role of patents and regulatory exclusivities in promoting pharmaceutical and biotechnology R&D. In addition, the Obama Administration has proposed a reduction in the regulatory exclusivity offered to brand-name biologic drugs to seven years, down from the 12 years incorporated in the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (enacted as Title VII of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). Controversy has surrounded the award of regulatory exclusivities to colchicine, an ancient remedy for gout that was subject to the FDA's Unapproved Drugs Initiative.
International agreements require each World Trade Organization (WTO) member state to treat all patented inventions in the same manner. This rule seemingly prohibits discrimination both against and in favor of patents on drugs as compared to other technologies. As a result, regulatory exclusivities provide Congress with a more flexible option for stimulating specific sorts of desirable private activity than do patents. The WTO Agreements, as well as certain Free Trade Agreements to which the United States is a signatory, also obligate nations to provide some manner of protection to pharmaceutical test data. Discussion over the inclusion of regulatory exclusivity requirements within the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is ongoing. |
crs_R44998 | crs_R44998_0 | Introduction
On May 18, 2017, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) formally notified Congress of the Trump Administration's intent to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The Trump Administration has stated that its objectives for renegotiation of NAFTA include maintaining duty-free access to the Mexican and Canadian markets for U.S. textile and apparel products and improving competitive opportunities for U.S. textiles and apparel, while taking into account U.S. import sensitivities. Formal talks with Canada and Mexico began in August 2017. The effects of NAFTA with respect to textiles and apparel, however, are not straightforward, and the drop in domestic textile and apparel production and jobs cannot be blamed solely on the agreement. Last year, the United States registered a bilateral trade surplus in yarns and fabrics with both NAFTA partners of $4.1 billion and a surplus of more than $720 million in made-up textile products. Although U.S. textile products can be more expensive than those from other countries, apparel producers in Canada and Mexico use U.S.-made textiles in products that are exported to the United States because the goods may enter the United States free of tariffs. The United States had a trade surplus in apparel products with Canada of $1.4 billion and a trade deficit with Mexico of $2.7 billion last year. Tariffs on textile and apparel imports vary considerably, but major textile- and apparel-producing countries face average U.S. tariff rates of 7.9% for textiles and 11.6% for clothing. Rates on particular products may be as high as 32% (see Appendix C ). Still, the most significant competitive challenge for textile and apparel production in North America has come from outside the region, specifically China and Vietnam. Canada and Mexico
Within the NAFTA supply chain, the United States typically exports textiles to Mexico or Canada, which turn U.S.-made yarns and fabrics into apparel, home furnishings, or other industrial textiles for sale in the U.S. market. China, which provided more than a third of total U.S. garment imports, was the top supplier of apparel to the United States, with U.S. imports registering at $29 billion in 2016, and it led in U.S. imports in the yarn, fabric, and made-up textile categories. The U.S. textile industry generally wants to ensure that textiles and apparel are chiefly manufactured within the NAFTA region. Apparel brands and retailers say this requirement reduces their sourcing and manufacturing flexibility. Yarn Forward . NAFTA was the first FTA to include the yarn-forward rule of origin. Mexico and Canada reportedly oppose the elimination of the NAFTA TPL program. Conclusion
As the NAFTA renegotiations progress, there are at least three possible outcomes: (1) no change to the textile and apparel provisions in NAFTA; (2) adjustments to NAFTA, such as changes to rules of origin; or (3) full U.S. withdrawal from NAFTA. | When the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was negotiated more than two decades ago, textiles and apparel were among the industrial sectors most sensitive to the agreement's terms. NAFTA, which was implemented on January 1, 1994, has encouraged the integration of textile and apparel production in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. For example, under NAFTA's "yarn-forward" rule of origin, textiles and apparel benefit from tariff-free treatment in all three countries if the production of yarn, fabric, and apparel, with some exceptions, is done within North America.
The United States maintains a bilateral trade surplus in yarns and fabrics with its NAFTA partners. In 2016, the United States had a $4.1 billion surplus in yarns and fabrics and a positive balance of around $720 million in made-up textile products (such as home textiles and furnishings) with Canada and Mexico. U.S. exports of yarns and fabrics shipped to Mexico and Canada were valued at close to $6 billion last year. In apparel, the United States had a trade surplus with Canada of $1.4 billion and a trade deficit with Mexico of $2.7 billion in 2016.
On May 18, 2017, the Trump Administration notified Congress of its intent to renegotiate the agreement. In July 2017, the Administration announced specific goals for textiles and apparel among its renegotiating objectives, which include improving competitive opportunities for U.S. textile and apparel products, but also taking into account U.S. import sensitivities. Also germane to textiles and apparel are several other renegotiating objectives, such as enhancing customs enforcement to prevent unlawful transshipment of these goods from outside the region and ensuring that requirements for use of domestic textiles and apparel in U.S. government purchases primarily benefit producers located in the United States.
NAFTA renegotiation started in August 2017. There is widespread support for continuation of the agreement among U.S. textile and apparel producers, although there are significant differences of opinion with respect to certain provisions. In particular, U.S. textile manufacturers generally favor eliminating all exceptions to NAFTA's yarn-forward rule, whereas U.S. retailers and apparel groups oppose tightening the rule.
If the United States were to exit NAFTA, imports of textiles from Mexico and Canada would face U.S. tariffs as high as 20%, and imports of apparel would have tariff rates of up to 32%. U.S. exports of textiles and apparel could face higher tariff rates entering Canada and Mexico. One possibility is that U.S. withdrawal from NAFTA could lead U.S. retailers and apparel brands to source more of their goods from Asia, which could reduce demand for U.S.-made yarns and fabrics within the NAFTA region. |
crs_RL31316 | crs_RL31316_0 | Background
On July 12, 2001, President Bush announced a Medicare-endorsed prescription drug discount card program tohelp Medicare beneficiaries reduce theirout-of-pocket drug costs. Critics of the plan have argued that the plan would not bring additional benefits for seniorsand that retail pharmacies would bear theburden of prescription drug cost reductions for seniors. Shortly after the card initiative was announced in 2001,pharmacy groups successfully filed a lawsuitagainst CMS, asking a federal court to issue an injunction that would halt the card program on the grounds that theAdministration had no statutory authority toestablish the program. The Administration proceeded with plans to modify the program and used a formalrulemaking process for a new proposal. On August 30, 2002, CMSissued the final rule. On January 29, 2003, a federal district court judge ruled against the Medicare discount card initiative, stating that the Administration did not have the statutoryauthority to implement the program. The President's proposed program would,in most respects, be similar to these other plans. This report will discuss prescription drug coverage gaps for seniors, private sector discount card programs, the discount card program the President originallyproposed in July, and the key differences in the final regulation issued in August 2002. This report will be updated as events warrant. Gaps in Senior Prescription Drug Coverage
In 1998, an estimated 10 million elderly people, or 27% of Medicare beneficiaries, did not have any form ofprescription drug coverage. Since the announcement of President Bush's proposal, several pharmaceutical companies formed theirown senior discount card plans in early 2002. Discount Card Plans for Low-Income Seniors
In 2002, a number of pharmaceutical companies started offering discount card plans for low-income seniors. Eligible participantsmust be U.S. citizens. In his original proposal, President Bush emphasized that the initiative would bean interim measure and that it was not intendedto be a substitute for a broader Medicare prescription drug benefit. The drug card initiative would authorize Medicare to endorse a number of qualified privately-administered prescription drug discount cards for Medicarebeneficiaries. CMS has estimated that seniors would be able to obtain a 10% to 13%, and possibly up to a 15%, discount on prescription drug retail purchases through theMedicare-endorsed card program. (26)
Critics of President Bush's program have disputed past statements made by the Administration of potential discounts of up to 25%. They cite the price study by GAO and say that the study indicates that seniors already have accessto drug discount cards and that theseprograms offer little savings for seniors for commonly used brand name drugs. It is difficult to assess the statements made bythe pharmacy associations, because the effect onpharmacies would depend on specific formularies and prices offered by the proposed card programs, which isinformation that is not publicly available
The National Community Pharmacists Association (NCPA) and the National Association of Chain Drug Stores filed a declaration with the Washington, D.C.federal court on July 25, 2001 in support of the lawsuit filed against the federal government. In the 108th Congress,Representative Mark Foley introduced a bill ( H.R. 513 ) inthe House on January 31, 2003 to authorize the Secretary of HHS to endorse prescription drug discount cards foruse by medicare beneficiaries. In summary, a Medicare-endorsed discount card program might provide some savings on prescription drugs for seniors, although the net overall effects are notclear because of the lack of details on the individual card programs. | On July 12, 2001, President Bush announced a Medicare-endorsed prescription drug discount card program to help seniors lower their out-of-pocket drug costs. The President stated that the discount card program would be an interim measure until a broader Medicareprescription drug benefit for seniors can be created. Many seniors do not have adequate prescription drug coverage. In 1998, an estimated 10 million elderly people,or 27% of Medicare beneficiaries, did not haveany form of prescription drug coverage.
The Administration planned to implement the card program in January 2002, but it was put on hold because of a federal court order. Pharmacy groupssuccessfully filed a lawsuit against CMS in 2001, asking a federal court to issue an injunction that would halt thecard program on the grounds that theAdministration had no statutory authority to establish the program. The Administration proceeded with plans tomodify the program and use a formal rulemakingprocess for a new proposal. On August 30, 2002, CMS issued the final rule. Pharmacies continued to claim thatthe Administration lacked the statutory authorityto implement the initiative. On January 29, 2003, a federal district court ruled that the Administration did not havethe statutory authority to offer the cardprogram. CMS issued a statement saying that it would be evaluating its options and it would likely appeal. In the108th Congress, Representative Mark Foleyintroduced a bill ( H.R. 513 ) in the House on January 31, 2003 to authorize the Secretary of Health and HumanServices to endorse prescription drugdiscount cards for use by Medicare beneficiaries.
The proposed card program would be similar to prescription drug discount card programs that are currently available from a number of sources. TheAdministration's card would endorse and promote a number of qualified privately-administered prescription drugdiscount card plans which would have aone-time maximum enrollment rate of $25 per plan. Since the announcement of President Bush's proposal, severalpharmaceutical companies have implementedtheir own senior discount card plans for low-income seniors beginning in early 2002.
The Administration has stated that the Medicare-endorsed card plans would offer discounts in the range of 10%to 13%, and up to 15%, on retail prescription drugprices. The net overall effects of President Bush's proposed program would depend on the details of the individualcard plans, which are not yet available. Congressional critics of President Bush's proposal dispute the Administration's estimates of potential discounts. Some Members of Congress believe that thecard program would not provide additional benefits for seniors. They cite a recent study by the U.S. GeneralAccounting Office (GAO) on prescription drugdiscount prices available at retail pharmacies, Internet pharmacies, and existing drug discount card programs. TheMembers believe that the study indicates thatseniors already have access to drug discount cards and that these programs offer little savings for seniors.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS22204 | crs_RS22204_0 | Oil futures markets in April 2018 indicate that oil traders expected crude oil prices to trend at about $63 per barrel through the end of 2018, below actual market prices of close to $70 per barrel reached in early April 2018. In 2012, the average price of imported petroleum rose 1% over the same period in 2011 to reach an average price of $101.07 per barrel. Turmoil in the Middle East, natural disasters, hurricanes, droughts, the rate of economic growth in Asia and Europe, the prospects of Iranian oil exports, and the impact of low oil prices on U.S. investment and production of petroleum and natural gas—the United States is now the world's largest combined producer of oil and natural gas—likely will continue to have a significant impact on the course of oil prices for the foreseeable future. Despite fluctuations in oil prices and sharp drops at times in the average annual price of imported crude oil and the decline in the role of imported crude oil in the value of the U.S. trade deficit, the trade deficit itself did not change appreciably. In general, U.S. demand for oil imports responds slowly to changes in oil prices. Most importantly, the average price per barrel of crude oil in 2016 was $36 per barrel, down 34% from the average price of $47 per barrel in 2015. At current prices and volumes, energy imports in 2018 are projected to rise to about $200 billion, or about $25 billion more than in 2017. Oil Import Prices
Crude oil comprises the largest share of energy-related petroleum products imports. Crude oil prices rose from an average of $94 per barrel in January 2013 to $102 per barrel in September 2013, the highest average monthly value recorded up to that point in 2013, but fell to an average imported price of $91.34 in December 2013. Issues for Congress
The rise in the prices of energy imports in 2017 and early 2018, combined with a small increase in the total volume of energy imports, resulted in a larger contribution to the overall U.S. trade deficit in 2017 and 2018. Various factors, dominated by events in the Middle East, a slowdown in the rate of economic growth in Asia and other developing economies, and an increase in natural gas production in the United States, combined in 2015 to push the cost of energy imports slightly lower than in 2014. | Imported petroleum prices fell from an average price of $91.23 per barrel of crude oil in 2014 to an average price of $32.60 per barrel in 2016, or a drop of more than 60%. This represents the lowest price per barrel of crude oil since early 2005. During 2017, the average monthly price per barrel of oil rose nearly 20% to reach an average of $52 per barrel by December 2017 and continued rising in 2018 to reach nearly $70 per barrel in early April 2018. Reflecting rising prices, the volume of crude oil imports for 2017 was nearly flat for the year compared with volume changes in 2016. The rise in the average price of a barrel of crude oil combined with a slight increase in the amount, or the volume, of oil imports in 2017 compared with 2016 resulted in a nearly 30% increase in the overall value of imported crude oil and a slight increase in the share of the total U.S. merchandise trade deficit that is associated with the trade deficit in energy imports.
In general, market demand for oil remains highly resistant to changes in oil prices and reflects the unique nature of the demand for and the supply of energy-related imports. Turmoil in the Middle East is an important factor that continues to create uncertainty in global petroleum markets and was one of the most important factors in causing petroleum prices to rise sharply in early 2011 and in 2012. A slowdown in the rate of growth in the Chinese economy, combined with a rising in raw material prices, an increase in the rate of economic growth among commodity-exporting developing economies, and improved prospects of growth among many of the major developed economies, all have pushed up demand for energy products. Fluctuations in U.S. energy production, uncertainty concerning oil production decisions by various members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the potential impact of new Iranian supplies of oil also have worked to push up the global market price of oil. Oil futures markets in April 2018 indicate that oil traders expect crude oil prices to trend in the range of $63 per barrel through 2018, below early April 2018 market prices. At current prices and volumes, energy imports in 2018 are projected to rise to about $200 billion, or about $25 billion more than in 2017. This report provides an estimate of the initial impact of the changing oil prices on the nation's merchandise trade balance. |
crs_RL34256 | crs_RL34256_0 | It was capable of producing about 6 kilograms (Kg) of plutonium per year and began operating in 1986. North Korea openly acknowledged a uranium enrichment program in 2009, but has said its purpose is the production of fuel for nuclear power. In November 2010, North Korea showed visiting American experts early construction of a 100 MWT light-water reactor and a newly built gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, both at the Yongbyon site. The North Koreans claimed the enrichment plant was operational, but this has not been independently confirmed. U.S. officials have said that it is likely other, clandestine enrichment facilities exist. Its cooling tower was destroyed in June 2008, and it has not been restarted. Reprocessing at that time is estimated to have produced 7-8 kg of separated plutonium or approximately enough for one nuclear warhead. Although North Korea's weapons program has been plutonium-based from the start, in the past decade, intelligence had emerged pointing to it pursuing a second route to a nuclear bomb using highly enriched uranium. However, North Korea's offers may have some intrinsic value on technical grounds: removal of the fresh fuel could reduce the amount of ready material to produce plutonium if the 5 MWe reactor was restarted (it would take only six months to do so); the presence of international inspectors at the newly built uranium enrichment site, depending on the degree of access given, could shed light on the extent and type of technical capability of the North Korean enrichment program. The North Korean official news agency announced a "successful" underground nuclear detonation, and seismic monitoring systems measured a resulting earthquake that was 5.1M in magnitude. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence issued a statement:
The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that North Korea probably conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P'unggye on February 12, 2013. The explosion yield was approximately several kilotons. The South Korean Ministry of Defense estimated that the test yield was between 6 and 7 kilotons. North Korea claimed that the February 12, 2013, nuclear test was to develop a "smaller and light" warhead. At a minimum, the test would likely contribute to North Korea's ability to develop a warhead that could be mounted on a long-range missile. Observers are also waiting for evidence from test emissions that might show whether the North Koreans tested a uranium or plutonium device. This information could help determine the type and sophistication of the North Korean nuclear warhead design about which little is known. These tests strengthen our assessment that North Korea has produced nuclear weapons." It is widely believed that the warhead design was an implosion device. In May 2012, North Korea changed its constitution to say that it was a "nuclear-armed state." This is the most detailed statement on North Korean nuclear use policies to date. This would be enough for at least one nuclear weapon. North Korea has said it would not include warhead information at this stage. According to press reports, at a bilateral meeting in Singapore in April 2008, the United States and North Korea agreed to a formulation in which North Korea would include its plutonium production activities in a formal declaration, and the enrichment and proliferation issues would be dealt with separately in a secret side agreement in which North Korea would "acknowledge" the U.S. concerns over North Korean proliferation to Syria without confirming or denying them. Some prominent analysts of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs emphasize that halting progress on North Korea's ability to develop a warhead on a long-range missile should be the United States' top priority, and further missile and nuclear testing would be necessary for North Korea to accomplish this. | This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program—including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates—and assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization. Little detailed open-source information is available about the DPRK's nuclear weapons production capabilities, warhead sophistication, the scope and success of its uranium enrichment program, or extent of its proliferation activities. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has between 30 and 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. North Korea's plutonium production reactor at Yongbyon has been shuttered since its cooling tower was destroyed under international agreement in June 2008. However, on April 1, 2013, North Korea said it would resume operation of its plutonium production reactor. Experts estimate it will take approximately six months to restart. This would provide North Korea with approximately one bomb's worth of plutonium per year.
While North Korea's weapons program has been plutonium-based from the start, in the past decade, intelligence emerged pointing to a second route to a bomb using highly enriched uranium. North Korea openly acknowledged a uranium enrichment program in 2009, but has said its purpose is the production of fuel for nuclear power. In November 2010, North Korea showed visiting American experts early construction of a 100 MWT light-water reactor and a newly built gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, both at the Yongbyon site. The North Koreans claimed the enrichment plant was operational, but this has not been independently confirmed. U.S. officials have said that it is likely other, clandestine enrichment facilities exist. Enrichment (as well as reprocessing) technology can be used to produce material for nuclear weapons or fuel for power reactors. An enrichment capability could potentially provide North Korea with a faster way of making nuclear material for weapons and therefore is of great concern to policymakers.
North Korea has made multiple policy statements in the past year asserting its nuclear weapons status: in May 2012, North Korea changed its constitution to say that it was a "nuclear-armed state." In January 2013, North Korea said that no dialogue on denuclearization "would be possible" and it would only disarm when all the other nuclear weapon states also disarm. In March 2013, North Korea stated its goal of expanding its nuclear weapons program.
Many experts believe that the prime objective of North Korea's nuclear program is to develop a nuclear warhead that could be mounted on North Korea's intermediate-range and long-range missiles. This was confirmed by North Korean official statements in late March 2013. Miniaturization of a nuclear warhead would likely require additional nuclear and missile tests. In January 2013, a North Korean statement said that it would respond with a nuclear test "of higher level." On February 12, 2013, the North Korean official news agency announced a "successful" underground nuclear detonation, and seismic monitoring systems measured a resulting earthquake that was 5.1 in magnitude. This is magnitude is slightly higher than past tests, but yield estimates are still uncertain. The South Korean Ministry of Defense estimated that the test yield was between 6 and 7 kilotons, while the U.S. Director of National Intelligence so far has said "approximately several kilotons." North Korea claimed that the February 12, 2013, nuclear test was to develop a "smaller and light" warhead. At a minimum, the test would likely contribute to North Korea's ability to develop a warhead that could be mounted on a long-range missile. To date, no open source data on test emissions is available that might show whether the North Koreans tested a uranium or plutonium device. This information could help determine the type and sophistication of the North Korean nuclear warhead design, about which little is known. |
crs_RL34312 | crs_RL34312_0 | The region is now facing an array of changes: deepening trade links, the formation of new regional institutions, and increased attention to the threat of Islamic terrorism. Some analysts have questioned whether U.S. security interests are best served by the existing framework of bilateral alliances, while others believe the basic architecture is sound and may only require some relatively minor changes and/or additions to meet emerging challenges. China's Rise
China's rise represents the key driver in the changing security landscape in Asia. China is now attracting regional states with its economic power and is offering a competing vision to the U.S.-centric "hub and spoke" system of alliances that was largely established in the post-World War II period. In essence, China's increasing economic, diplomatic, and military strength is compelling countries to rethink existing security arrangements and take initial steps that may lead to the formation of regional groupings of nations with common interests and values. This section provides a brief assessment of the state of bilateral relationships among the United States, Australia, Japan, and India. Japan-Australia
Fortified by a vibrant trade relationship, Tokyo and Canberra recently moved to upgrade defense ties. Both Japan and India have a strategic interest in balancing China's power in the region. Developing Trilateral Fora
As the Bush Administration has pursued stronger defense relations with Australia, Japan, and India, initiatives for trilateral efforts among the nations has emerged. Nascent three-way cooperation has built on existing bilateral alliances to further U.S. goals in the region by combining forces among partners and allies. Evolving Multilateral Dynamics
As trilateral initiatives have taken shape, talk of a quadrilateral grouping—which would tie together the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—has emerged. Malabar Multilateral Exercises
Although no formal quadrilateral groupings exist, the Malabar 07 military exercises provided an opportunity to test naval cooperation. Potential Challenges and Opportunities for the United States
Political Changes
Despite initial enthusiasm for forming trilateral and/or quadrilateral security arrangements, the conservative leaders who originally supported the idea have all been compromised by their own domestic political situations. The United States must be particularly careful not to isolate other existing allies, such as South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, as it pursues new partnerships in Asia. | Some analysts have questioned whether U.S. security interests in the Asia Pacific region are best served by its existing framework of bilateral alliances. The region is now facing an array of changes: deepening trade links, the formation of new regional institutions, and increased attention to the threat of Islamic terrorism. Against this backdrop, China's rise represents the key driver in the evolving security landscape in Asia. China is now attracting regional states with its economic power and is offering competing vision to the U.S.-centric "hub and spoke" system of alliances. In essence, China's increasing economic, diplomatic, and military strength is compelling countries to rethink existing security arrangements and take initial steps that may lead to the formation of regional groupings of nations with common interests and values. At the same time, the Bush Administration has pursued stronger defense relations with Australia, Japan, and India.
Bilateral defense ties have also developed between Canberra, Tokyo, and New Delhi, with varying degrees of engagement. Fledgling initiatives for trilateral efforts among the nations have emerged; some defense planners see these efforts as building on existing security cooperation to further U.S. goals in the region by combining forces among partners and allies. As trilateral initiatives have taken shape, some officials have begun promoting a quadrilateral grouping, which would tie together the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. Although no formal quadrilateral groupings exist, the Malabar 07 military exercises among the four countries in September 2007 provided an opportunity to test naval cooperation. Some observers caution that moving forward too fast with such a grouping could trigger a negative response from China.
Pursuit of multilateral security arrangements holds a number of potential challenges and opportunities for the United States. Of the four leaders who championed the trilateral and quadrilateral groupings, two left office in 2007 and two face significant political challenges. Japan's constitutional restraints on military involvement may limit the scope of its cooperation, and both Australia and India have some degree of reluctance to fully engage in any forum that might alienate Beijing. Increasing capabilities among like-minded nations could enhance stability and provide a platform for responding to natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies in the region, or to potential aggression by other countries, but it also risks threatening China, potentially spurring dangerous countermeasures. Finally, there is the risk that other Asian allies, such as South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, could feel excluded from multilateral initiatives among the United States, Japan, Australia, and/or India. This report may not be updated. |
crs_R45411 | crs_R45411_0 | Many Members of Congress have expressed a continuing interest in improving energy efficiency and increasing the use of renewable energy. As a result, agency projects that could reduce federal energy usage, expand the use of renewable energy, and reduce federal energy costs may not be pursued. To address this challenge, Congress established alternative financing methods that utilize private sector resources and capabilities to facilitate federal energy projects. Two such alternative financing methods are energy savings performance contracts (ESPCs) and utility energy service contracts (UESCs). An ESPC is a multiyear contract between a federal agency and an energy service company. In general, under an ESPC, a federal agency agrees to pay an amount not to exceed the current annual utility costs for a fixed period of time (up to 25 years) to an energy service company, which finances and installs facility improvements. In return, the contractor assumes the performance risks of energy conservation measures during the contract period and guarantees that the improvements will generate energy cost savings sufficient to pay for the improvements over the length of the contract, as well as providing the energy services company a return on the investment. After the end of the contract, the agency benefits from reduced energy costs as a result of the improvements. A UESC is a contract between a federal agency and the serving utility. Under a UESC, the utility arranges financing for efficiency projects and renewable energy projects, and the costs are repaid by the agency over the length of the contract. When improvements yield savings in excess of the guarantee, the agency benefits and depending upon the contract, the ESCO may also benefit. Use of ESPCs and UESCs in Federal Energy Management
The Department of Energy's Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) is the lead organization responsible for providing implementing rules and policies for ESPCs. FEMP also provides training, guidance, and technical assistance to assist federal agencies in achieving energy goals including cost or use reduction or renewable use, greenhouse gas reduction goals, and water conservation goals as directed through legislation or executive orders. Federal agencies are required to document progress toward energy saving goals through annual reporting to the President and Congress; FEMP compiles these data annually. ESPCs and UESCs apply to energy use at federal facilities—not to vehicles and equipment. Investments in Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
As part of annual reporting, FEMP compiles data on federal government investment in energy efficiency and renewable energy through ESPCs, UESCs, and direct obligations. As shown in Table 1 , investment in federal facility energy efficiency improvements during that period totaled nearly $21.7 billion (in constant 2017 dollars): direct obligations funded $14.5 billion, ESPCs funded $5.7 billion, and UESCs funded $1.5 billion. A separate GAO report focused on alternatively financed energy projects for the Department of Defense. CRS was unable to determine the cost savings achieved solely from ESPCs and UESCs across the federal government. However, FEMP provides data that may provide insight into broad trends in federal energy water consumption. Between FY2003 and FY2017, the annual total site-delivered energy use declined by more than 19% (a savings of 217 trillion British thermal units). Renewable electricity use (as a share of electricity consumption) and water savings (in gallons used) have been tracked and reported by FEMP over a shorter time period. Renewable electricity use has increased across the federal government from 3% of total electricity consumption (1,909 GWh) in FY2008 to nearly 11% (5,844 GWh) in FY2017. In addition to comprehensive energy and water data, annual data from selected energy and water conservation measures are available. GAO Reports on Energy Projects and Alternative Financing
The Government Accountability Office has examined alternative financing—including ESPCs and UESCs—for federal energy projects. Projects financed through ESPCs and UESCs were also included in a study conducted by GAO in 2016 to examine how the Department of Defense (DOD) determines the costs and benefits of a sample of renewable energy projects. In the 2016 report, GAO noted that DOD did not emphasize the use of some alternative financing mechanisms for renewable projects, including ESPCs and UESCs. According to DOD, these mechanisms may not realize federal tax benefits under requirements set by the Office of Management and Budget:
Access to incentives. According to Army officials, the Army has structured ESPCs to allow private developers to capture federal incentives by owning the embedded renewable energy projects, but it stopped doing so after a 2012 Office of Management and Budget memorandum required government ownership of such renewable energy projects to avoid obligating the full cost of the project when the contract is signed. In 2017, GAO examined alternative financing for energy projects for DOD more broadly—the majority of these were financed using ESPCs or UESCs. Congressional Budget Office Scoring Policies
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scoring policies for ESPCs and UESCs have changed over time. This coincided with the expiration of the BEA at the end of FY2002. In the 115 th Congress, the 2018 House Budget Resolution ( H.Con.Res. 71 ) directed CBO to change how ESPCs and UESCs are scored. Section 5109 directs CBO to estimate provisions for ESPCs and UESCs on a net present value basis with payments covering the period of the contract (up to 25 years). The scoring would classify the estimated net present value of the budget authority and any outlays as direct spending, and according to the accompanying report, "it would not change the fact that Federal agencies would continue to cover contractual payments through annual, discretionary appropriations." 71 ] that prohibits any savings estimated by CBO to be considered as an offset for purposes of budget enforcement applies only to legislation considered by the House of Representatives, not the Senate." Possible Issues for Congress
Both the executive branch and Congress have promoted energy efficiency within federal agencies. Since that time, ESPCs and UESCs have continued to be used to implement energy and water efficiency improvements at federal facilities. Congress has revised the policies enabling ESPCs and UESCs over time, and Congress may wish to assess additional changes going forward. However, CBO considers savings to offset budget enforcement differently for the House of Representatives and the Senate. GAO has recommended to federal agencies that they revise guidance for future projects to include additional information in measurement and verification reports for ESPCs and UESCs to provide better understanding of performance and the extent to which the financing mechanisms are achieving expected savings. The bills would also expand annual reporting requirements to the President and to Congress by requiring additional information on ESPCs and UESCs including
the investment value of the contracts, guaranteed energy savings compared to the actual energy savings for the previous year, plan for entering into contracts for the coming year, and an explanation for any previously submitted contracting plans that were not implemented. In the 115 th Congress, the "Energy and Natural Resources Act of 2017" ( S. 1460 ), introduced in June 2017, would also amend NECPA to facilitate the use of ESPCs and UESCs. The bill would clarify that the ESPCs and UESCs are to be considered by the Office of Management and Budget as best practices for meeting performance goals for energy-efficient and energy-saving information technology. | Many in Congress have expressed a continuing interest in improving energy efficiency and increasing the use of renewable energy. To facilitate investment in energy efficiency and renewable energy at federal facilities, Congress established alternative financing methods that utilize private sector resources and capabilities. Two such alternative financing methods are energy savings performance contracts (ESPCs) and utility energy service contracts (UESCs).
ESPCs and UESCs are contracts between a federal agency and another party—an energy service company or a utility, depending upon the contract type. In general, a federal agency agrees to pay an amount not to exceed the current annual utility costs for a fixed period of time to the company or utility, which finances and installs the energy-efficiency and renewable energy projects. The costs are repaid by the agency over the length of the contract. After the end of the contract, the agency benefits from any reduced energy costs as a result of the improvements.
The Department of Energy's Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) is the lead organization responsible for providing implementing rules and policies for ESPCs. FEMP also provides training, guidance, and technical assistance to aid federal agencies in achieving energy and water goals. Federal agencies are required to document progress toward energy-saving goals through annual reporting to the President and Congress.
FEMP compiles agency data annually. Between FY2005 and FY2017, investment in federal facility energy efficiency improvements totaled nearly $21.7 billion (in constant 2017 dollars): direct obligations funded $14.5 billion, ESPCs funded $5.7 billion, and UESCs funded $1.5 billion. A lack of consistency in reporting across agencies for projects makes it challenging to document the cost savings achieved solely from ESPCs or UESCs. The available data may provide insight into broad trends in federal energy and water consumption. Over available reporting time periods, total site-delivered energy use has declined, renewable electricity use has increased as a percentage of total electricity consumption, and water use has declined.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has examined alternative financing for federal energy projects, including ESPCs and UESCs. In a 2016 study, GAO reported that the Department of Defense had identified challenges in using ESPCs and UESCs for renewable energy projects, as such financing mechanisms may not realize the federal tax benefits under requirements set by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Prior to 2012, the Army had structured ESPCs to allow private developers to capture federal incentives by owning renewable energy projects. The Army stopped doing so after a 2012 OMB memorandum required government ownership of such renewable energy projects to avoid obligating the full cost of the project when the contract is signed. A 2017 study by GAO examined energy projects for DOD more broadly and found that the majority of these were financed using ESPCs or UESCs.
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scoring policies for ESPCs and UESCs have changed over time. The 2018 House Budget Resolution (H.Con.Res. 71) directed CBO to score ESPCs and UESCs on a net present value basis with payments covering the period of the contract. The estimated net present value of the budget authority and any outlays would be classified as direct spending; it would not change the fact that federal agencies would continue to cover contractual payments through annual, discretionary appropriations. H.Con.Res. 71 also prohibited any savings estimated by CBO to be considered as an offset for purposes of budget enforcement. This prohibition applies to budget enforcement in the House of Representatives; CBO considers estimated savings to offset budget enforcement differently for the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Congress has revised the policies enabling ESPCs and UESCs over time, and Congress may address additional changes going forward. Issues for possible consideration include reporting requirements, definitions of terminology including federal building and energy savings, and whether to expand the applicability of ESPCs and UESCs.
Many in Congress have expressed a continuing interest in improving energy efficiency and increasing the use of renewable energy. To facilitate investment in energy efficiency and renewable energy at federal facilities, Congress established alternative financing methods that utilize private sector resources and capabilities. Two such alternative financing methods are energy savings performance contracts (ESPCs) and utility energy service contracts (UESCs).
ESPCs and UESCs are contracts between a federal agency and another party—an energy service company or a utility, depending upon the contract type. In general, a federal agency agrees to pay an amount not to exceed the current annual utility costs for a fixed period of time to the company or utility, which finances and installs the energy-efficiency and renewable energy projects. The costs are repaid by the agency over the length of the contract. After the end of the contract, the agency benefits from any reduced energy costs as a result of the improvements.
The Department of Energy's Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) is the lead organization responsible for providing implementing rules and policies for ESPCs. FEMP also provides training, guidance, and technical assistance to aid federal agencies in achieving energy and water goals. Federal agencies are required to document progress toward energy-saving goals through annual reporting to the President and Congress.
FEMP compiles agency data annually. Between FY2005 and FY2017, investment in federal facility energy efficiency improvements totaled nearly $21.7 billion (in constant 2017 dollars): direct obligations funded $14.5 billion, ESPCs funded $5.7 billion, and UESCs funded $1.5 billion. A lack of consistency in reporting across agencies for projects makes it challenging to document the cost savings achieved solely from ESPCs or UESCs. The available data may provide insight into broad trends in federal energy and water consumption. Over available reporting time periods, total site-delivered energy use has declined, renewable electricity use has increased as a percentage of total electricity consumption, and water use has declined.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has examined alternative financing for federal energy projects, including ESPCs and UESCs. In a 2016 study, GAO reported that the Department of Defense had identified challenges in using ESPCs and UESCs for renewable energy projects, as such financing mechanisms may not realize the federal tax benefits under requirements set by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Prior to 2012, the Army had structured ESPCs to allow private developers to capture federal incentives by owning renewable energy projects. The Army stopped doing so after a 2012 OMB memorandum required government ownership of such renewable energy projects to avoid obligating the full cost of the project when the contract is signed. A 2017 study by GAO examined energy projects for DOD more broadly and found that the majority of these were financed using ESPCs or UESCs.
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scoring policies for ESPCs and UESCs have changed over time. The 2018 House Budget Resolution (H.Con.Res. 71) directed CBO to score ESPCs and UESCs on a net present value basis with payments covering the period of the contract. The estimated net present value of the budget authority and any outlays would be classified as direct spending; it would not change the fact that federal agencies would continue to cover contractual payments through annual, discretionary appropriations. H.Con.Res. 71 also prohibited any savings estimated by CBO to be considered as an offset for purposes of budget enforcement. This prohibition applies to budget enforcement in the House of Representatives; CBO considers estimated savings to offset budget enforcement differently for the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Congress has revised the policies enabling ESPCs and UESCs over time, and Congress may address additional changes going forward. Issues for possible consideration include reporting requirements, definitions of terminology including federal building and energy savings, and whether to expand the applicability of ESPCs and UESCs. |
crs_R42629 | crs_R42629_0 | These laws are commonly referred to as "Amazon laws," in reference to the Internet retailer. A use tax is the companion to a sales tax—in general, the sales tax is imposed on the sale of goods and services within the state's borders, while the use tax is imposed on purchases made by the state's residents from out-of-state (remote) sellers. Two common misconceptions exist about the ability of states to impose sales and use taxes on Internet sales. This is not true. The second misperception is that the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from taxing Internet sales. However, if the seller does not have a constitutionally sufficient connection ("nexus") to the state, then the seller is under no enforceable obligation to collect the tax and remit it to the state. In this situation, the purchaser is still generally responsible for paying the use tax, but few comply and the tax revenue goes uncollected. The report first examines the Constitution's requirements as to state laws that impose use tax collection obligations on remote sellers. These laws potentially implicate two provisions of the U.S. Constitution: the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause. In the 1992 case Quill v. North Dakota , the Supreme Court ruled that, absent congressional action, the standard required under the dormant Commerce Clause is the seller's physical presence in the state, while due process imposes a lesser standard under which the seller must have directed purposeful contact at the state's residents. As mentioned, Congress has the authority under its commerce power to authorize state action that would otherwise violate the Commerce Clause, so long as it is consistent with other provisions in the Constitution. Congress has not used this authority, although legislation has been introduced in the 114 th Congress ( S. 698 , Marketplace Fairness Act; H.R. 2775 , Remote Transactions Parity Act of 2015). Nonetheless, several pre- Quill cases provide guidance on determining when a state may impose tax collection responsibilities on out-of-state retailers. This section first examines these approaches by focusing on the laws in the first states to enact legislation: New York's click-through nexus statute, enacted in 2008, and Colorado's 2010 required notification law. Required Notification
The second approach requires remote retailers to provide information to the state and customers, rather than requiring the retailers to collect the use taxes themselves. In fact, both the New York and Colorado laws have been challenged on these grounds. Constitutionality of New York's Click-Through Nexus Statute
With respect to click-through nexus laws such as New York's, it might be argued that the law complies with Quill by targeting only Internet retailers whose affiliate programs create some degree of physical presence in the state and whose affiliates solicit (i.e., do more than merely advertise) on the retailer's behalf. Before the New York court, Overstock and Amazon asserted that the New York law was facially unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because it applied to sellers without a physical presence in the state. This is because they apply only to companies that do not collect Colorado sales and use taxes, which would appear to be primarily those retailers without a substantial nexus to the state. The first question is whether this violates due process. In 2012, a federal district court struck down the law, examining both of the above arguments. However, in August 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case after finding that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) prohibits federal courts from hearing it. In March 2015, the Supreme Court held that the TIA does not apply to this suit. The Court instructed the Tenth Circuit to determine if the doctrine applied to this suit. Notably, Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence in which he raised the possibility that Quill was wrongly decided and should be reconsidered in light of technological advances and the development of the Internet. | As more purchases are made over the Internet, states are looking for new ways to collect taxes on online sales. There is a common misperception that the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from taxing Internet sales. This is not true. States may impose sales and use taxes on such transactions, even when the retailer is outside the state. However, if the seller does not have a constitutionally sufficient connection ("nexus") to the state, then the seller is under no enforceable obligation to collect the tax and remit it to the state. The purchaser is still generally responsible for paying the tax, but few comply and the tax revenue goes uncollected.
Nexus is required by two provisions of the U.S. Constitution: the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. In the 1992 case Quill v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court held that the dormant Commerce Clause requires that a seller have a physical presence in a state before the state may impose tax collection obligations on it, while due process requires only that the seller have purposefully directed contact at the state's residents. Notably, under its power to regulate commerce, Congress may choose a different standard than physical presence, so long as it is consistent with other provisions of the Constitution, including due process. Congress has not used this authority to provide a different standard, although legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress (S. 698, Marketplace Fairness Act; H.R. 2775, Remote Transactions Parity Act of 2015).
In recent years, some states have enacted laws, often called "Amazon laws" in reference to the Internet retailer, to try to capture uncollected taxes on Internet sales and yet still comply with the Constitution's requirements. States have used two basic approaches. The first is enacting "click-through nexus" statutes, which impose the responsibility for collecting tax on those retailers who compensate state residents for placing links on their websites to the retailer's website (i.e., use online referrals). The other is requiring remote sellers to provide information about sales and taxes to the state and customers. New York was the first state to enact click-through nexus legislation, in 2008. In 2010, Colorado was the first to pass a notification law.
"Amazon tax laws" have received significant publicity, in part due to questions about their constitutionality and whether they impermissibly impose duties on remote sellers without a sufficient nexus to the state. Both the New York and Colorado laws have been challenged on constitutional grounds. While the New York click-through nexus law was upheld by the state's highest court against facial challenges on due process and Commerce Clause grounds, Colorado's notification law was struck down by a federal district court as impermissible under the Commerce Clause for applying to sellers without a physical presence in the state and discriminating against out-of-state retailers. However, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently determined that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear the Colorado challenge due to the federal Tax Injunction Act. In March 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl that the Tax Injunction Act did not apply to this suit. However, the Court left open the possibility that the suit might be barred under the comity doctrine and instructed the Tenth Circuit to determine if the doctrine applied. Notably, Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence in which he suggested that Quill was wrongly decided and should be reconsidered in light of technological advances and the development of the Internet. |
crs_R44285 | crs_R44285_0 | Introduction and Overview
On August 5, 2015, an accidental spill from the Gold King Mine, a long-abandoned gold mine site in Colorado, released an estimated three million gallons of acid mine drainage (AMD) wastewater into a tributary of the Animas River. It also raised concern about other inactive or abandoned hardrock mine (IAM) sites on public and private lands in the United States. The Colorado spill has raised interest in facilitating cleanup of legacy pollution at IAM sites in order to prevent similar accidents. One approach that has drawn attention is encouraging remediation by so-called "Good Samaritan" entities, third parties who have no history of polluting at a particular site or legal responsibility for its pollution, but who step forward to clean up AMD or other historic mine residue of pollution. Legislation to authorize Good Samaritan remediation has been introduced regularly since 1999, including H.R. 3843 , and a Discussion Draft bill in the 114 th Congress. These bills propose incentives in the form of reduced liability from environmental laws (such as strict liability for cleanup costs and restoring damaged natural resources) and less stringent environmental standards applicable to cleanup activities. This bill includes a dedicated cleanup fund for abandoned hardrock mines from a royalty fee on minerals taken from public lands. 3843 and the Discussion Draft are stand-alone bills. These bills propose Good Samaritan relief from requirements of the CWA and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, or Superfund, 42 U.S.C. Senate and House committees have held oversight hearings on the Gold King Mine spill and hearings to review legislative responses to it, including bills that seek to overcome obstacles to potential Good Samaritans. Selected Issues in Good Samaritan Legislation
This report discusses several issues that have drawn attention: eligibility for a Good Samaritan permit, minerals covered by a permit, standards applicable to a Good Samaritan cleanup, scope of liability protection, funding, treatment of revenues from cleanup, enforcement, the appropriate implementation role for states and Indian tribes, terminating a permit, and sunsetting the permit program. 963 and the Discussion Draft in the 114 th Congress would limit Good Samaritan permits to hardrock mineral mines. 963 is to "encourage the partial or complete remediation of inactive and abandoned mine sites for the public good." Under CERCLA, an entity is liable for cleanup costs and natural resource damages resulting from release (or threatened release) of hazardous substances if that entity falls into any of four categories of potentially responsible parties (PRPs). At least two of those categories might apply to the Good Samaritan who attempts an IAM cleanup. The Clean Water Act comes into play chiefly because of its requirement that all point-source discharges into waters of the United States must be authorized by a permit under the act, and the likelihood that a Good Samaritan could be deemed subject to that requirement. A number of courts have held that discharges from abandoned mines are point sources that require a CWA permit. Many are reluctant to engage in activities for which they might incur liability beyond the termination date of a permit, as would be the case with water treatment projects that have continuing discharges long into the future. 963 would exempt a Good Samaritan permittee from "each obligation and liability" under the CWA. Like H.R. The Obama Administration's FY2017 budget proposes a reclamation fee on all hardrock mining, similar to the fee paid by the coal industry, to create an Abandoned Mine Lands Program for abandoned hardrock sites. 963 , H.R. The Discussion Draft would authorize re-mining to fund off-site remediation and to defray the costs of the permitted activities. 3843 do not appear to address either administrative penalties or citizen suits. However, H.R. Because H.R. H.R. | On August 5, 2015, an accidental spill from the Gold King Mine, a long-abandoned gold mine site in Colorado, released an estimated three million gallons of acid mine drainage (AMD) wastewater into a tributary of the Animas River. The Colorado spill has raised interest in facilitating cleanup of legacy pollution at inactive and abandoned mine sites, especially hardrock mines such as Gold King, in order to prevent similar accidents. Several federal agencies have authority to clean up abandoned mines on public lands, but resources are limited, and most sites on private lands are not included. One approach that has drawn attention is encouraging remediation by so-called "Good Samaritan" entities, third parties who have no history of polluting at a particular site or legal responsibility for its pollution, but who step forward to clean up AMD or other historic mine residue of pollution.
Legislation to authorize Good Samaritan remediation has been introduced regularly since 1999. In the 114th Congress, proposals include H.R. 963, H.R. 3843, and a discussion draft bill developed by several Members. These bills propose incentives to potential Good Samaritans in the form of reduced liability from environmental laws and less stringent environmental standards for cleanup activities. Senate and House committees have held oversight hearings on the Gold King Mine spill and to review legislative responses to it, including bills that seek to overcome obstacles to potential Good Samaritans.
This report discusses several issues that have drawn attention: eligibility for a Good Samaritan permit, minerals covered by a permit, standards applicable to a Good Samaritan cleanup, scope of liability protection, funding, treatment of revenues from cleanup, enforcement, the appropriate role for states and Indian tribes, terminating a permit, and sunsetting the permit program. Of all of the issues raised by Good Samaritan proposals, two are most prominent.
One issue is funding. Although inventories of the number of abandoned hardrock mines do not exist, most stakeholders agree that the cost to clean up mines that harm or threaten water quality is likely to be in the tens of billions. But federal funding to carry out remediation projects is limited. The Obama Administration and H.R. 963 propose to assess a fee on active hardrock mining operations to pay for cleaning up abandoned mine sites, similar to a fee on active coal mining operations that is used for remediating abandoned coal mine sites. H.R. 3843 and the discussion draft bill do not propose a fee or royalty on hardrock mining. The mining industry opposes such a new fee, even as they acknowledge that existing cleanup funding for hardrock mine sites is limited.
The second key obstacle is liability under environmental laws, especially the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, or Superfund) and the Clean Water Act (CWA). Under CERCLA, an entity is liable for cleanup costs and natural resource damages resulting from release (or threatened release) of hazardous substances if that entity falls into any of four categories of potentially responsible parties, at least two of which might apply to the Good Samaritan who attempts cleanup of an inactive and abandoned mine (IAM). The CWA comes into play chiefly because a Good Samaritan could be deemed subject to the act's requirement that all point source discharges into waters of the United States must be authorized by a permit. However, many potential Good Samaritans are reluctant to engage in activities for which they might have continuing obligations beyond the end of a cleanup project and termination of a CWA permit, because water treatment projects typically have ongoing discharges long into the future. The Environmental Protection Agency has attempted to address both CERCLA and CWA liability concerns through administrative initiatives in 2007 and 2012. Stakeholders say that these initiatives are helpful but incomplete. In the 114th Congress, H.R. 963 would exempt Good Samaritans from the CWA, and H.R. 3843 and the discussion draft bill would provide exemption from CERCLA and CWA. The discussion draft bill appears to provide long-term protection from liability (after a project or permit terminates) that some stakeholders seek, while the other two bills do not. |
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