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crs_RL31559 | crs_RL31559_0 | Introduction
The United States has historically led the international community in establishing regimes intended to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missiles. These are the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee for nuclear technology, the Australia Group for chemical and biological weapons technology, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. In the chemical and biological weapons (CBW) area, some states suspected of having military programs are still outside the treaty. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
The nuclear nonproliferation regime encompasses several treaties, extensive multilateral and bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organizations and domestic agencies, and the domestic laws of participating countries. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, U.S. leadership has been crucial in developing the regime. While there is almost universal international agreement opposing the further spread of nuclear weapons, several challenges have arisen in recent years: India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998; North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and tested a nuclear device in 2006 and 2009; Libya gave up a clandestine nuclear weapons program in 2004, and Iran was found to be in non-compliance with its treaty obligations in 2005. The discovery of the nuclear black market network run by A.Q. Khan has spurred new thinking about how to strengthen the regime, including enhanced export controls and greater restrictions on sensitive technology. However, the extension of civil nuclear cooperation by the United States and other countries to India, a non-party to the NPT, has raised questions about what benefits still exist for non-nuclear-weapons states that remain within the treaty regime. Since September 11, 2001, the IAEA has been promoting efforts to help prevent terrorists from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear or radiological devices. Treaties and Agreements
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) are the two primary treaties related to CBW proliferation. The CWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. The convention bans the development, production, and stockpiling of biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes." Implementing the Regime
International Organizations
The CBW nonproliferation regime relies on the Australia Group and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was created by the CWC. U.S. Brazil currently chairs the MTCR. North Korea reportedly has become a primary supplier of missiles and missile technology to some developing countries. | Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in the hands of radical states and terrorists, represent a major threat to U.S. national security interests. Multilateral regimes were established to restrict trade in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile technologies, and to monitor their civil applications. Congress may consider the efficacy of these regimes in the 112th Congress. This report provides background and current status information on the regimes.
The nuclear nonproliferation regime encompasses several treaties, extensive multilateral and bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organizations and domestic agencies, and the domestic laws of participating countries. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, U.S. leadership has been crucial in developing the regime. While there is almost universal international agreement opposing the further spread of nuclear weapons, several challenges to the regime have arisen in recent years: India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998; North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and tested a nuclear explosive device in 2006 and 2009; Libya gave up a clandestine nuclear weapons program in 2004; Iran has been in non-compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations since 2005; and Syria was building a clandestine nuclear reactor with North Korean assistance until a 2007 Israeli military strike. The discovery of the nuclear black market network run by A.Q. Khan spurred new thinking about how to strengthen the regime, including greater restrictions on sensitive technology. After the terrorist attacks of 2001, the United States has focused more resources on preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD weapons and strengthened multilateral counterproliferation efforts. On the other hand, the extension of civil nuclear cooperation by the United States and other countries to India, a non-party to the NPT with nuclear weapons, has raised questions about what benefits still exist for non-nuclear-weapons states that remain in the treaty regime.
The chemical and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation regimes contain three elements: the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Australia Group. The informal Australia Group coordinates export controls on CBW-related materials and technology. The CWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons, and mandates the destruction of existing chemical weapon arsenals. The BWC bans the development, production, and stockpiling of biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes."
The missile nonproliferation regime is founded not on a treaty, but an informal agreement created in 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR's goal is to limit the spread of missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The MTCR guidelines have been modified over time to include missile systems designed for the delivery of chemical and biological weapons. The regime, which has no enforcement organization, is thought to have been instrumental in blocking several missile programs, but has been unable to stop missile development in North Korea and Iran. |
crs_RL33497 | crs_RL33497_0 | Most Recent Developments
Settlement Talks
Cypriot President Dimitris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat have been holding direct negotiations since September 2008, with either the U.N. Secretary-General's Special Advisor for Cyprus Alexander Downer or his deputy Taye-Brook Zerihoun present at the meetings. Set of Ideas
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's April 1992 Report to the Security Council presented a framework for a settlement, which he referred to as a "Set of Ideas." Clerides would not negotiate beyond the March 21 document. Neither side accepted this procedure. Annan's addendum noted "The Government of Turkey has indicated that it concurs with ... the position of the Turkish Cypriot party, namely that the UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) can operate on both sides of the island only on the basis of the consent of both parties ...." The Turkish Cypriots interpreted the wording as a move toward recognition of their state, and the Greek Cypriots were upset with the Turkish Cypriot view. The parties did not agree. Following talks with Annan in New York, Papadopoulos and Denktash agreed to resume negotiations on February 19 on Cyprus. On March 29, Annan presented a final revised Plan. Annan announced on March 31 that the Plan would be put to referenda on April 24. Among them were doubt about whether the Turkish parliament would ratify the settlement plan; belief that Turkish Cypriots would gain immediate benefits (i.e., the end of the Republic of Cyprus and creation of a United Republic of Cyprus), while the Greek Cypriots would only see gains in the future; restrictions on Greek Cypriot acquisition of property in northern Cyprus and on return of refugees there, and the denial of political rights of (Greek Cypriot) returnees to the north; Greek Cypriot insecurity due to the authorization of even a small number of Turkish troops and increased Turkish guarantor rights; doubt about the economic viability of the Plan and concern about its harm to the Greek Cypriot standard of living; and belief that the island would not really reunify because there would be two states living separately and governmental decision-making procedures could create "paralyzing impasses." In referenda held on April 24, 76% of Greek Cypriot voters rejected the Plan, while 65% of Turkish Cypriot voters accepted it. (See " European Union " below.) After meeting Papadopoulos and Talat, Gambari presented a joint statement known as the July 8 agreement to begin discussing "issues that affect the day-to-day life of the people and concurrently those that concern substantive issues, both of which will contribute to a comprehensive settlement." The two leaders would meet from time to time to instruct the working groups and review work of the technical committees. The solution reached would be subject to referenda in the two sides simultaneously. The December 14, 2003, parliamentary elections had produced a tie between supporters and opponents of the Annan Plan in the 50-seat legislature. On November 10, 1998, the EU began accession negotiations with Cyprus. Cyprus signed the Treaty of Accession to the EU on April 16, 2003, to become an EU member on May 1, 2004. U.S. Policy
Settlement
Since 1974, the United States has supported U.N. efforts to achieve a settlement on Cyprus. Although Members did not propose an alternative to the U.N. talks, some sought a more active U.S. role. | Cyprus has been divided since 1974. Greek Cypriots, 76% of the population, live in the southern two-thirds of the island and lead the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots, 19% of the populace, live in the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC), recognized only by Turkey, with about 36,000 Turkish troops providing security. United Nations peacekeeping forces (UNFICYP) maintain a buffer zone between the two. Since the late 1970s, the U.N., with U.S. support, has promoted negotiations aimed at reuniting the island as a federal, bicommunal, bizonal republic. The U.N. Secretary-General's April 5, 1992, "Set of Ideas" was a major, but unsuccessful, framework for negotiations for a settlement. Next, both sides accepted U.N. confidence-building measures only in principle and they were not recorded or implemented.
The prospect of Cyprus's European Union (EU) accession and its eventual membership intensified and complicated settlement efforts. On November 11, 2002, Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted a comprehensive settlement Plan, but the two sides did not agree on it. After more negotiations, Annan announced on March 11, 2003 that his efforts had failed. Cyprus signed an accession treaty to join the EU on April 16.
The December 14, 2003, Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections produced a new government determined to reach a settlement. After the U.N. led negotiations between the parties and with Greek and Turkish leaders present, Annan presented a final, revised Plan on March 31, 2004. In referenda on April 24, 76% of Greek Cypriot voters rejected the Plan, while 65% of Turkish Cypriot voters accepted it. Annan blamed President Tassos Papadopoulos, a Greek Cypriot, for the result. Cyprus joined the EU on May 1, 2004. More than two years later, Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat agreed, on July 8, 2006, to discuss "issues that affect day-to-day life" and, concurrently, substantive issues. The accord was not implemented.
Dimitris Christofias's election as Cypriot president on February 24, 2008 ended the impasse. On March 21, he and Talat agreed to resume the settlement process, with working groups and technical committees. In September, they began direct negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus issue. Negotiations continue.
Some Members of Congress have urged the Administration to be more active, although they have not proposed an alternative to the U.N.-sponsored talks. After the 2004 referenda, the Administration worked to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots in order to diminish economic disparities between them and the Greek Cypriots and pave the way for reunification. Some Members questioned this policy. Members are maintaining their interest in Cyprus in the 111th Congress partly due to keen constituent concern. This CRS report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_R42747 | crs_R42747_0 | Introduction
The Veterans Health Administration (VHA), within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), operates the nation's largest integrated direct health care delivery system, provides care to approximately 6.7 million unique veteran patients, and employs more than 311,000 full-time equivalent employees. Although numerous claims have been made concerning "promises" to military personnel and veterans with regard to "free health care for life," presently, free medical benefits for life are not offered by VA to all veterans. The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Department of Veterans Affairs (CHAMPVA) pays for health care services to dependents and survivors of certain veterans. See below for questions and answers about returning combat veterans and members of the Reserves and National Guard. The VA's standard medical benefits package addresses the health care needs of enrolled female veterans by providing (directly or through access to non-VA providers) gynecological care, maternity care, infertility, breast and reproductive oncology, and care for conditions related to military sexual trauma (MST), among other services. Under current regulations, the VA is not authorized to provide or cover the cost of in vitro fertilization (IVF), abortions, abortion counseling, or medication to induce an abortion (e.g., mifepristone, also known as RU-486). Eligibility for dental care is extremely limited, and differs significantly from eligibility requirements for medical care. Does the VA Provide Hearing Aids and Eyeglasses? Generally, the VA provides audiology and eye care services (including preventive care services and routine vision testing) for all enrolled veterans. Under certain circumstances, the VA may reimburse non-VA providers for health care services rendered to VA-enrolled veterans on a fee-for-service basis. Non-VA care may include outpatient care, inpatient care, emergency care, medical transportation, and dental services. What Is the Veterans Choice Program (VCP) or Choice Card Program? Costs to Veterans and Insurance Collections
Do Veterans Have to Pay for Their Care? 62
Veterans who are enrolled in the VA health care system do not pay any premiums; however, some veterans are required to pay copayments for medical services and outpatient medications related to the treatment of a nonservice-connected condition. Any payment received by the VA is used to offset ''dollar for dollar'' a veteran's VA copayment responsibility. Congress authorized the VHA to collect reasonable charges for medical care or services (including the provision of prescription drugs) from a third party to the extent that the veteran or the provider of the care or services would be eligible to receive payment from the third party for (1) a nonservice-connected disability for which the veteran is entitled to care (or the payment of expenses of care) under a health plan contract; (2) a nonservice-connected disability incurred as a result of the veteran's employment and covered under a worker's compensation law or plan that provides reimbursement or indemnification for such care and services; or (3) a nonservice-connected disability incurred as a result of a motor vehicle accident in a state that requires automobile accident reparations (no fault) insurance. The VA is statutorily prohibited from billing Medicare 80 in most situations. "For example, if a veteran is authorized 'fee basis' care at VA expense for a service-connected back injury, and treatment for a different condition for which the VA does not pay, Medicare can pay for the (covered) services that are not reimbursable by the VA."
Appendix A. VA Priority Groups and Their Eligibility Criteria
The VA classifies veterans into eight enrollment Priority Groups based on an array of factors including (but not limited to) service-connected disabilities or exposures, prisoner of war (POW) status, receipt of a Purple Heart or Medal of Honor, and income. | The Veterans Health Administration (VHA), within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), operates the nation's largest integrated health care delivery system, provides care to approximately 6.7 million unique veteran patients, and employs more than 311,000 full-time equivalent employees.
Eligibility and Enrollment. Contrary to claims concerning promises of "free health care for life," not every veteran is automatically entitled to medical care from the VA. Eligibility for VA health care is based primarily on veteran status resulting from military service. Generally, veterans must also meet minimum service requirements; however, exceptions are made for veterans discharged due to service-connected disabilities, members of the Reserve and National Guard (under certain circumstances), and returning combat veterans. The VA categorizes veterans into eight Priority Groups, based on factors such as service-connected disabilities and income (among others). Dependents, caregivers, and survivors of certain veterans are eligible for the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Department of Veterans Affairs (CHAMPVA), which reimburses non-VA providers or facilities for their medical care.
Medical Benefits. All enrolled veterans are offered a standard medical benefits package, which includes (but is not limited to) inpatient and outpatient medical services, pharmaceuticals, durable medical equipment, and prosthetic devices.
For female veterans, the VA provides gender-specific care, such as gynecological care, breast and reproductive oncology, infertility treatment, maternity care, and care for conditions related to military sexual trauma. Under current regulations, the VA is not authorized to provide, or cover the costs of, in vitro fertilization, abortion counseling, abortions, or medication to induce abortions.
Generally the VA provides audiology and eye care services (including preventive services and routine vision testing) for all enrolled veterans, but eyeglasses and hearing aids are provided only to veterans meeting certain criteria. Eligibility for VA dental care is limited and differs significantly from eligibility for medical care. For veterans with service-connected disabilities who meet certain criteria, the VA provides short- and long-term nursing care, respite, and end-of-life care.
Under certain circumstances, the VA may reimburse non-VA providers for health care services rendered to VA-enrolled veterans. Once such program is the Veterans Choice Program (VCP). Such community care may include outpatient care, inpatient care, emergency care, medical transportation, and dental services.
Costs to Veterans and Insurance Collections. While enrolled veterans do not pay premiums for VA care, some veterans are required to pay copayments for medical services and outpatient medications related to the treatment of nonservice-connected conditions. Copayment amounts vary by Priority Group and type of service (e.g., inpatient versus outpatient). The VA has the authority to bill most health care insurers for nonservice-connected care; any insurer's payment received by the VA is used to offset ''dollar for dollar'' a veteran's VA copayment responsibility. The VA is statutorily prohibited from receiving Medicare payments (with a narrow exception). |
crs_R41386 | crs_R41386_0 | Introduction
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a range of benefits and services to veterans who meet certain eligibility rules. Burial benefits are monetary and nonmonetary benefits that eligible veterans receive for their service in the Armed Forces. Veterans or active duty servicemembers eligible for nonmonetary burial benefits can be interred in national cemeteries and can receive government-furnished headstones or markers, and in their honor, the veteran's next of kin can receive presidential memorial certificates and burial flags. Their spouses or surviving spouses, minor children, and, under certain conditions, unmarried adult children may also be buried in national cemeteries. Monetary burial benefits are partial reimbursements that the eligible veteran's next of kin can receive for burial and funeral costs. National cemeteries, beginning as a result of Civil War casualties, have expanded to include 131 cemeteries, as well as 33 soldiers' lots and monument sites, under the VA's jurisdiction. This report focuses on burial benefits provided by the VA. Veterans' Burial Benefits
Eligibility Requirements for Burial in a National Cemetery
Under current federal regulation, the following persons are eligible for burial in a VA national cemetery:
members of the U.S. Armed Forces who die while on active duty; veterans discharged under conditions other than dishonorable (with certain exceptions); U.S. citizens who served in the armed forces of a U.S. ally during a time of war (service must have been terminated honorably by death or otherwise); certain members of Reserve Components and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC); commissioned officers of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; commissioned officers of the Regular or Reserve Corps of the U.S. Public Health Service; World War II merchant mariners; any Filipino veteran who was a U.S. citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence who was residing in the United States at the time of his or her death; spouse or surviving spouse of an eligible veteran; and minor and unmarried adult children of an eligible veteran. The allowance amount provided depends on whether the veteran's cause of death was service-connected, non-service-connected, or occurred in a VA facility. Eligibility
The veteran's next of kin is eligible for reimbursement if he or she paid for the veteran's burial or funeral and has not been reimbursed by another government agency or some other source, such as the deceased veteran's employer. National Cemeteries
The History of National Cemeteries43
The development of national cemeteries began as a result of the increasing number of Civil War casualties. The National Cemetery Act of 1867, enacted on February 22, 1867, was the first major piece of legislation to provide funds and directives to national cemeteries. | Burial benefits are nonmonetary and monetary benefits that eligible veterans receive for their military service. Servicemembers and veterans have been provided nonmonetary burial benefits since the Civil War and monetary burial benefits since World War I.
Eligible veterans and active duty members of the Armed Forces can be interred in national cemeteries and can receive government-furnished headstones or markers, and in their honor, next of kin can receive presidential memorial certificates and burial flags. Their spouses or surviving spouses, minor children, and, under certain conditions, unmarried adult children may also be buried in national cemeteries.
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) burial allowances are partial reimbursements for eligible veterans' burial and funeral costs. The allowance amount provided depends on whether the veteran's death was service-connected, non-service-connected, or occurred in a VA facility. The veteran's next of kin is eligible for reimbursement if he or she paid for the veteran's burial or funeral and has not been reimbursed by another government agency or some other source, such as the deceased veteran's employer.
The development of national cemeteries began as a result of the increasing number of Civil War casualties. The National Cemetery Act of 1867 was the first major piece of legislation to provide funds for, and directives about, national cemeteries. Today, there are 131 national cemeteries, along with 33 soldiers' lots and monument sites, under the VA's jurisdiction.
This report provides a descriptive analysis of both nonmonetary and monetary burial benefits and national cemeteries. It addresses congressional and constituent issues (among other things), such as
who is eligible to receive burial benefits? who can be buried in a national cemetery? what plans does the VA have to build new or expand existing national cemeteries? and what benefits does the VA provide?
These issues may be of particular interest to Congress due to the aging of the veteran population, the changes to eligibility requirements, and recent VA report findings and recommendations related to the establishment of national cemeteries. |
crs_R44666 | crs_R44666_0 | T his report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2017. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the second title of the homeland security appropriations bill—Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS). Collectively, Congress has labeled these components in recent years as "Security, Enforcement and Investigations." The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2017 request for these components, and the appropriations proposed by the Senate and House appropriations committees in response. Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the first titles of the bills, the report includes information on provisions throughout the bills and reports that directly affect these components. The following pie chart presents a comparison of the share of annual appropriations requested for the components funded in each of the first four titles, highlighting the components discussed in this report. The Administration requested $32.27 billion in FY2017 net discretionary budget authority for components included in this title, as part of a total budget for these components of $40.27 billion for FY2017. The appropriations request was $797 million (2.4%) less than was provided for FY2016. Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S. 3001 would have provided the components included in this title $32.92 billion in net discretionary budget authority, $652 million (2.0%) more than requested, but $145 million (0.4%) more than was provided in FY2016. 5634 would provide the components included in this title $32.85 billion in net discretionary budget authority. This would have been $592 million (1.8%) more than requested, but $206 million (0.6%) less than was provided in FY2016. On September 29, 2016, the President signed into law P.L. 114-223 , which contained a continuing resolution that funds the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.496% through December 9, 2017. A second continuing resolution was signed into law on December 10, 2016 ( P.L. 114-254 ), funding the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.1901%, through April 28, 2017. For more details on the continuing resolutions and their specific provisions affecting DHS, see CRS Report R44621, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2017 . Table 1 lists the enacted funding level for the individual components funded under the Security, Enforcement, and Investigations title for FY2016, as well as the amounts requested for these accounts for FY2017 by the Administration, and proposed by the Senate and House appropriations committees. As indicated in the above table, the Administration proposed an $880 million increase in Aviation Passenger Security Fee collections to further offset the discretionary cost of TSA's operations. The House committee-reported funding level is $18 million less than was proposed in the Senate committee-reported bill. H.R. | This report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2017. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the second title of the homeland security appropriations bill—Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service. Collectively, Congress has labeled these components in recent years as "Security, Enforcement, and Investigations."
The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2017 request for these components, and the appropriations proposed by the Senate and House appropriations committees in response. Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the first titles of the bills, the report includes information on provisions throughout the bills and reports that directly affect these components.
Security, Enforcement, and Investigations is the largest of the four titles that carry the bulk of the funding in the bill. The Administration requested $32.27 billion for these components in FY2017, $797 million less than was provided for FY2016. The amount requested for these components is 68% of the Administration's $47.7 billion request in net discretionary budget authority and disaster relief funding for DHS. The largest budget increase proposed in the request for these components was a $625 million (5.7%) increase for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, while the largest budget decrease proposed was a $745 million (15.3%) reduction in the budget for the Transportation Security Administration, which was proposed to be replaced with an $880 million increase in fee collections.
Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S. 3001 would provide the components included in this title $32.92 billion in net discretionary budget authority. This would be $652 million (2.0%) more than requested, but $145 million (0.4%) less than was provided in FY2016.
House Appropriations Committee-reported H.R. 5634 would provide the components included in this title $32.85 billion in net discretionary budget authority. This would be $592 million (1.8%) more than requested, but $206 million (0.6%) less than was provided in FY2016.
Additional information on the broader subject of FY2017 funding for the department can be found in CRS Report R44621, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2017, as well as links to analytical overviews and details regarding appropriations for other components.
On September 29, 2016, the President signed into law P.L. 114-223, which contained a continuing resolution that funds the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.496% through December 9, 2017. A second continuing resolution was signed into law on December 10, 2016 (P.L. 114-254), funding the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.1901%, through April 28, 2017. For details on the continuing resolution and its impact on DHS, see CRS Report R44621, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2017, which also includes additional information on the broader subject of FY2017 funding for DHS as well as links to analytical overviews and details regarding components in other titles.
This report will be updated once the annual appropriations process for DHS for FY2017 is concluded. |
crs_R40911 | crs_R40911_0 | Adaptation measures, on the other hand, aim to improve an individual or institution's ability to cope with or avoid harmful impacts of climate change, and to take advantage of potential beneficial ones. The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 ( H.R. 2454 ) passed the House on June 26, 2009. The Senate Environment and Public Works (EPW) Committee approved the Clean Energy, Jobs, and Power Act ( S. 1733 ) on November 5, 2009. Both bills also include adaptation provisions that (1) seek to better assess the impacts of climate change and variability that are occurring now and in the future; and (2) support adaptation activities related to climate change, both domestically and internationally. 2454 and S. 1733 . A side-by-side table in an Appendix to the report compares relevant provisions related to climate change adaptation in both bills. The provisions are grouped into the following headings:
International Climate Change Adaptation Domestic Climate Change Adaptation (including the National Climate Change Adaptation Program and the National Climate Services Program) State and Tribal Programs Public Health Natural Resources Adaptation Other Climate Change Adaptation Programs, including Water Resources (in S. 1733 only)
Climate Change and Adaptation
Importance of Adaptation
Climate-related changes have been observed in the United States and globally. 2454 (as Passed by the House)
This report summarizes and compares the adaptation provisions in S. 1733 , as reported by the Senate Environment and Public Works (EPW) Committee on November 5, 2009, and H.R. Overall, while the two bills would authorize similar adaptation programs, they differ somewhat in scope and emphasis, and they also differ in the distribution of emission allowance allocations, which in effect provide monetary resources for specified programs and activities. S. 1733 contains five additional provisions (not contained in the House bill) that deal with:
drinking water utilities; water system mitigation and adaptation partnerships; flood control, protection, prevention, and response; wildfire; and coastal Great Lakes state adaptation. Neither the Senate-reported bill ( S. 1733 ) nor the House-passed bill ( H.R. 2454 ) contains a process at the federal level for developing and implementing a national strategic plan to address the full range of sectors expected to be affected by climate change. Neither bill includes explicit provisions that address adaptation in major sectors such as transportation and energy infrastructure, or agriculture, although these activities are allowable under state programs for climate adaptation that are provided for in both bills. One significant difference between the two pieces of legislation is the distribution of allowances and proceeds from auction allocations and the subsequent availability of the amounts credited to certain funds. In contrast, the analogous adaptation provisions in the House bill provide that the amounts in the funds would become available only by subsequent appropriations. The provision of funding "without further appropriation" might be controversial. In H.R. Both H.R. 2454 . 2454 . S. 1733 and H.R. | This report summarizes and compares climate change adaptation-related provisions in the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454) and the Clean Energy, Jobs, and Power Act (S. 1733). H.R. 2454 was introduced by Representatives Waxman and Markey and passed the House on June 26, 2009. S. 1733 was introduced to the Senate by Senators Boxer and Kerry and, after subsequent revisions made in the form of a manager's substitution amendment, was reported out of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee on November 5, 2009.
Adaptation measures aim to improve an individual's or institution's ability to cope with or avoid harmful impacts of climate change, and to take advantage of potential beneficial ones. Both H.R. 2454 and S. 1733 include adaptation provisions that (1) seek to better assess the impacts of climate change and variability that are occurring now and in the future; and (2) support adaptation activities related to climate change, both domestically and internationally.
Overall, while the two bills would authorize similar adaptation programs, they differ somewhat in scope and emphasis, and they also differ in the distribution of emission allowance allocations over time. Both bills contain provisions that address international climate change adaptation; domestic climate change adaptation programs, including the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), the National Climate Service, and state and tribal programs; public health; and natural resources adaptation. S. 1733 includes five additional provisions not provided for in the House bill that deal with drinking water utilities; water system mitigation and adaptation partnerships; flood control, protection, prevention, and response; wildfire; and coastal Great Lakes states' adaptation.
Neither the Senate-reported bill (S. 1733) nor the House-passed bill (H.R. 2454) contains a process at the federal level for developing and implementing a national strategic plan to address the full range of sectors expected to be affected by climate change. Neither bill includes provisions that explicitly address adaptation in major sectors such as transportation and energy infrastructure, or agriculture.
Another difference between S. 1733 and H.R. 2454 is the distribution of allowance allocations over time, and the subsequent availability of the amounts credited to certain funds. The relative distribution of allowances to adaptation-related activities is slightly higher in the House bill than in the Senate bill, and the difference increases over time, but the actual amounts of revenue generated would be contingent on the number and price of emission allowances. The Senate bill provides that funds for many adaptation-related provisions, such as for natural resources and public health, are made available "without further appropriations." In contrast, the analogous provisions in the House bill provide that the funds would become available only by subsequent appropriations.
A side-by-side table is included in an appendix to the report that compares adaptation-related provisions in H.R. 2454 and S. 1733. |
crs_RS22056 | crs_RS22056_0 | Among the major Native American policy issues of concern to the 109 th Congress are:
Indian health care, Indian trust fund management reform, Indian gaming lands, and Native Hawaiian recognition. Each of these issues is briefly discussed in this report. | Native American issues before Congress are numerous and diverse, covering such areas as federal recognition of tribes, trust land acquisition, gambling regulation, education, jails, economic development, welfare reform, homeland security, tribal jurisdiction, highway construction, taxation, and many more. This report focuses on four Native American issues currently of great salience before Congress: health care, energy, trust fund management reform, and Native Hawaiian recognition. This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_RL34700 | crs_RL34700_0 | Introduction
Continuing appropriations acts, commonly known as continuing resolutions (CRs), have been an integral component of the annual appropriations process for decades. When Congress and the President do not reach final decisions about one or more regular appropriations acts, they often negotiate and enact a CR. Two general types of CRs are used. An "interim" CR provides agencies with stopgap funding for a period of time until final appropriations decisions are made, or until enactment of another interim CR. A "full-year" CR, by contrast, provides final funding amounts for the remainder of a fiscal year in lieu of one or more regular appropriations acts. This report analyzes potential impacts that interim CRs might have on agency operations. An implication of this involvement is that Congress typically does not solely determine what the impacts of an interim CR will be, because the President, OMB, and agencies may influence the nature and extent of potential impacts. In general, interim CRs typically are intended to (1) preserve congressional prerogatives to make final decisions on full-year funding levels and (2) prevent a funding gap and corresponding government shutdown. Consequently, interim CRs provide relatively restrictive funding levels for agencies. Interim CRs impose some paperwork burden on agencies as a result of these procedures. For example, an interim CR may prohibit an agency from initiating or resuming any project or activity for which funds were not available in the previous fiscal year (i.e., prohibit "new starts"). Anomalies typically are included to prevent what some or all stakeholders and parties to CR negotiations perceive as major programmatic, operational, or management problems that would be caused if an otherwise "cookie cutter" approach were used to provide funding at a uniform rate and with uniform restrictions. In the face of a restrictive funding level, agency personnel may reduce or delay a variety of actions, including hiring, award of contracts, and travel. Whether any potential impacts manifest themselves in actual cases would depend on specific circumstances, including how the interim CR is crafted, the time of year, and an agency's or program's particular operations. Funding Uncertainty
Uncertainty related to full-year funding levels may impact upon an agency's ability to follow its plans. If one or both kinds of certainty were needed for an agency to make decisions (e.g., when to begin a critical sequence of actions or events), an interim CR might cause an agency to alter its operations, rates of spending, and spending patterns over time, with potential ripple effects for internal management of the agency and its programmatic activities. Congressional Access to Agency Information and Employee Views
The President, OMB, and agencies often are involved with Congress in the process of formulating, negotiating, and implementing interim CRs. Therefore, they may influence the potential impacts of interim CRs. Role of Assumptions in Assessing Potential Impacts
A claim about the impact of an interim CR may rest on implicit assumptions. | Continuing appropriations acts, often known as continuing resolutions (CRs), have been a component of the annual appropriations process for decades. When Congress and the President do not reach final decisions about one or more regular appropriations acts by the beginning of the federal fiscal year, October 1, they often enact a CR. Two general types of CRs are used. An "interim" CR provides agencies with stopgap funding for a period of time until final appropriations decisions are made, or until enactment of another interim CR. A "full-year" CR provides final funding amounts for the remainder of a fiscal year in lieu of one or more regular appropriations acts. "Anomalies" may be included in an interim CR to prevent what parties to CR negotiations perceive as major problems that would be caused if an otherwise uniform approach were used to provide funding and impose related restrictions. The President, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and agencies often are involved with Congress in the process of formulating, negotiating, and implementing interim CRs. An implication of their involvement is that they may influence the potential impacts of interim CRs.
Interim CRs typically are intended to both (1) preserve congressional prerogatives to make final decisions on full-year funding levels and (2) prevent a funding gap and corresponding government shutdown. Consequently, interim CRs provide relatively restrictive funding levels for agencies and usually prohibit projects or activities that were not funded in the previous year (sometimes called "new starts"). Interim CRs also impose some paperwork burden on federal agencies. Two other potential impacts might be identified. First, the restrictive funding level of an interim CR may impact upon an agency's activities, compared to the situation of receiving full-year appropriations. For example, agency personnel may reduce or delay a variety of actions, including hiring, award of contracts, and travel. Second, an agency funded by an interim CR may experience some uncertainty about what its final funding level will be. Uncertainty may cause an agency to alter its operations, rates of spending, and spending patterns over time, with potential ripple effects for internal management of the agency and its programmatic activities. Whether any potential impacts manifest themselves in actual cases would depend on specific circumstances, including how the interim CR is crafted, the time of year, and an agency's or program's particular operations. OMB and agency documents, as well as Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, provide additional perspectives on potential impacts of interim CRs.
Related issues for Congress may include use of anomalies to manage impacts, congressional access to information and views from agencies and their employees, and the assumptions that are used when assessing potential impacts.
More extensive analysis on this subject is available in CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, Potential Impacts of Interim Continuing Resolutions (CRs) on Agency Operations and the Functioning of the Federal Government, coordinated by [author name scrubbed] (available on request). This report will be updated annually or more frequently as events warrant. |
crs_RS22778 | crs_RS22778_0 | Educational Attainment in Latin America
Recent Developments
As a whole, Latin American countries have made significant progress in improving their education systems, particularly in the last two decades. These gaps in access to quality education are most pervasive in countries with high levels of income inequality. U.S. Education Programs in Latin America
The United States has long been a major supporter of education programs in Latin America. Education assistance programs are generally administered by USAID, whereas most educational exchange and scholarship programs are run by the State Department's Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA). U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID's Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) implements regional and bilateral education assistance programs in Latin America. | The United States has long supported education programs in Latin America, and has a vested interest in promoting educational progress in the region. In the last 20 years, most Latin American countries have taken significant steps to improve their education systems, but major challenges remain. Those challenges include unequal access to education, high dropout and repetition rates, poor teacher quality, and uneven assessments and accountability systems. Regional and bilateral education assistance programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have sought to help countries address many of those challenges. At the same time, the State Department's Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA) has supported educational exchange and scholarship programs for Latin American students and teachers. This report provides an overview of the current level of educational attainment in Latin America, U.S. education programs in the region, and related legislative proposals. It will not be updated. |
crs_R44881 | crs_R44881_0 | Overview
Each fiscal year, Congress and the President engage in a number of practices that influence short- and long-run revenue and expenditure trends. On the spending side, baseline discretionary spending levels are largely constrained by the caps and automatic spending reductions enacted as part of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. Recent Budget Policy Legislation and Events35
Congress has enacted several pieces of legislation in recent years with significant ramifications for the federal budget. 112-25 ) increased the debt limit and required deficit reduction (ultimately implemented through across-the-board spending cuts) and caps on discretionary budget authority. 112-240 ), the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA 2013; P.L. 113-67 ), and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015; P.L. 114-74 ). The law contained a variety of measures intended to reduce the deficit by at least $2.1 trillion over the FY2012-FY2021 period, along with a mechanism to increase the debt limit. Tax Reform: the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 201237 and Tax Extenders Legislation
In addition to the deficit reduction measures discussed above, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. Budget for FY2018
The Trump Administration submitted its FY2018 budget to Congress on May 23, 2017. FY2018 Congressional Budget Activity
Following passage of full-year FY2017 appropriations, Congress has turned its attention to the FY2018 budget. The budget committees in the House and Senate each may develop a budget resolution as they receive information and testimony from a number of sources, including the Administration, the CBO, and congressional committees with jurisdiction over spending and revenues. Congress elected to lift the discretionary caps (allow for more spending) in each year from FY2013 through FY2017 relative to their values established in the BCA. Congress may also choose to modify the statutory debt limit. CBO, GAO, and the Trump Administration agree that the current mix of federal fiscal policies is unsustainable in the long term. Keeping future federal outlays at 20% of GDP, or approximately at its historical average, and leaving fiscal policies unchanged, according to CBO projections, would require drastic reductions in all spending other than that for Medicare, Social Security, and Medicaid, or reining in the costs of these programs. The alternative to decreased spending as a means of deficit reduction is to increase revenues through modifications to the federal tax system. Budget Documents
CBO Documents
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides data and analysis to Congress throughout the budget and appropriations process. | The federal budget is a central component of the congressional "power of the purse." Each fiscal year, Congress and the President engage in a number of practices that influence short- and long-run revenue and expenditure trends. This report offers context for the current budget debate and tracks legislative events related to the federal budget.
In recent years, policies enacted to decrease spending along with a stronger economy have led to reduced budget deficits. The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) implemented several measures intended to reduce the deficit from FY2012 through FY2021. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240), the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA 2013; P.L. 113-67), and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015; P.L. 114-74) increased the discretionary budget authority levels permitted under the BCA for FY2013 through FY2017. Various deficit reduction measures were included to offset the costs of the changes to spending levels in that legislation.
The BCA will continue to affect spending limits in FY2018 and beyond, and Congress may debate enacting further modifications. The annual appropriations process, the statutory debt limit, and "tax extenders" each may draw congressional attention in FY2018. Additionally, Congress may choose to debate structural changes to the federal tax system, including reforms proposed by the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Trump Administration. Though federal budget deficits have stabilized in recent years, they remain well above their historical average.
The Trump Administration released its FY2018 budget on May 23, 2017. Proposed policy changes in the budget included reductions in individual and corporate income tax rates, increases in discretionary defense spending, and large decreases in mandatory spending other than Social Security and Medicare (with the largest budgetary effects resulting from decreases in Medicaid spending) and in nondefense discretionary programs.
Following passage of full-year FY2017 appropriations, Congress has turned its attention to the FY2018 budget. The Budget Committees in the House and Senate each develop a budget resolution as they receive information and testimony from a number of sources, including the Administration, the Congressional Budget Office, and congressional committees with jurisdiction over spending and revenues.
Trends resulting from current federal fiscal policies are generally thought by economists to be unsustainable in the long term. Projections suggest that achieving a sustainable long-term trajectory for the federal budget would require deficit reduction. Reductions in deficits could be accomplished through revenue increases, spending reductions, or some combination of the two. |
crs_R42022 | crs_R42022_0 | Overview of Palestinian Initiative and Congressional Interest1
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas cites a lack of progress on the two-decades-old peace process with Israel as the driving factor behind current PLO/PA consideration of alternative pathways toward a Palestinian state. On September 23, 2011, he submitted an application for Palestinian state membership—on the basis of the armistice lines that prevailed before the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 (commonly known as the "1967 borders")—to the U.N. Secretary-General, who is expected to submit the matter to the Security Council for its action on whether to recommend membership. In an alternate or parallel scenario, an existing U.N. member state supportive of PLO plans may sponsor a resolution in the General Assembly. A General Assembly resolution could recommend the recognition of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders—either as-is or based provisionally on those lines subject to future Israel-PLO negotiation—and change Palestine's permanent observer status in the United Nations from that of an "entity" to that of a "non-member state" with a simple majority vote. Many Members of Congress are actively interested in the question of possible U.N. action on Palestinian statehood. Congress could try to influence U.S. policy and the choices of other actors through the authorization and appropriation of economic and security assistance and through oversight of the Obama Administration's diplomatic efforts. United Nations Framework and Process12
This section provides information on the U.N. framework and process for options being discussed, including the following topics: the United Nations and recognition of states, observer status in the United Nations, and criteria and process for gaining United Nations membership. Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Can the General Assembly admit a state to membership in the United Nations without a prior Security Council resolution recommending admission? Palestinian Initiatives in U.N. A compromise U.N. resolution might set forth parameters for future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations but stop short of addressing the question of Palestinian statehood beyond expressing aspirations. Thus U.S., Israeli, and PLO diplomacy focused on Europe—particularly permanent Security Council members France and the United Kingdom—could intensify as the time for a possible vote draws closer. Such diplomacy also could become intertwined with negotiations regarding the venue for, and the timing and wording of, potential resolutions or other actions. Additionally, action by U.N.-affiliated agencies such as UNESCO to grant membership to a Palestinian state is possible. The future implications of U.N. action on Palestinian statehood—beyond its potential symbolic value—are unclear. For example, tightened Israeli security measures with respect to the West Bank and Gaza and popular unrest or civil disobedience among Palestinians could ensue. Although PLO Chairman/PA President Mahmoud Abbas maintains that he seeks an eventual return to U.S.-backed Israel-PLO negotiations, chances for a meaningful resumption of talks remain dim. An upgrade to Palestinian statehood status at the U.N. could lead to subsequent efforts to apply greater political and international legal pressure on Israel to change its posture on the ground, especially if the PLO gains greater access to international courts—such as the ICJ or ICC—or other forums in order to bring action against Israel. U.N. action on Palestinian statehood or its aftermath may affect the willingness of Israel to offer concessions in a negotiating process, especially in light of ongoing, widespread change in the Arab world and the volatility and possible deterioration of Israel's political and military relationships with Egypt and Turkey. Resolution of these questions could depend on congressional views of how maintaining or changing aid levels could affect U.S. leverage and credibility in future regional and global contexts. | Many Members of Congress are actively interested in the question of possible U.N. action on Palestinian statehood. Congress could try to influence U.S. policy and the choices of other actors through the authorization and appropriation of foreign assistance to the Palestinians, the United Nations, and Israel and through oversight of the Obama Administration's diplomatic efforts. Changes to aid levels may depend on congressional views of how maintaining or changing aid levels could affect U.S. leverage and credibility in future regional and global contexts.
Officials from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) are taking action in the United Nations aimed at solidifying international support for Palestinian statehood. On September 23, 2011, at the opening of the annual session of the General Assembly, PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas submitted an application for Palestinian state membership to the U.N. Secretary-General—on the basis of the armistice lines that prevailed before the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 (the "1967 borders")—in order to bring about a Security Council vote on whether to recommend membership. Abbas cites a lack of progress on the peace process with Israel as the driving factor behind PLO consideration of alternative pathways toward a Palestinian state. The Obama Administration has indicated that it will veto a Security Council resolution in favor of statehood. In an alternate or parallel scenario, an existing U.N. member state supportive of PLO plans may sponsor a resolution in the General Assembly. Such a resolution could—with a simple majority vote—recommend the recognition of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders—either as-is or subject to future Israel-PLO negotiation—and change Palestine's permanent observer status in the United Nations from that of an "entity" to that of a "non-member state." U.S., Israeli, and PLO diplomacy focused on Europe—particularly permanent Security Council members France and the United Kingdom—has been active and could further intensify as the time for a possible vote draws closer. Diplomacy also might currently or in the future include negotiations regarding the venue for, and the timing and wording of, potential resolutions or other actions on Palestinian statehood. Additionally, action by U.N. specialized agencies such as UNESCO to grant membership to a Palestinian state is possible.
This report provides information on the U.N. framework and process for options being discussed, including overviews of the following topics: the United Nations and recognition of states, observer status in the United Nations, and the criteria and process for United Nations membership. The report also analyzes the prospects for avoiding further U.N. action by reaching an Israel-PLO agreement to resume negotiations, as well as the possibility of a compromise U.N. resolution that could set forth parameters for future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations but stop short of addressing the question of Palestinian statehood beyond expressing aspirations. It is difficult to predict the potential future implications of U.N. action on Palestinian statehood. Some observers speculate that tightened Israeli security with respect to the West Bank and Gaza and popular unrest or civil disobedience among Palestinians could ensue, depending on various scenarios. Although Abbas maintains that he seeks an eventual return to U.S.-backed Israel-PLO negotiations on a more equal basis, an upgrade of the Palestinians' status at the U.N. also could facilitate subsequent efforts to apply greater pressure on Israel, especially if the PLO gains enhanced ability to present grievances in international courts—such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or International Criminal Court (ICC). Whether U.N. action or its aftermath would make Israel more or less willing to offer concessions in a negotiating process remains unclear, especially in light of ongoing regional political change and the volatility and possible deterioration of Israel's political and military relationships with Egypt and Turkey. |
crs_R40368 | crs_R40368_0 | Introduction
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ), the 2009 stimulus package, contained several provisions affecting unemployment benefits. This report addresses some of the more common questions about unemployment insurance in the 2009 stimulus package. This report does not provide operational details of unemployment insurance programs such as regular unemployment compensation (UC), extended benefits (EB), emergency unemployment compensation (EUC08), Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs, and Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA). Since the passage of ARRA, the EUC08 program has been extended beyond December 26, 2009, and EUC08 benefits have been expanded to include additional benefit tiers. For more information, see CRS Report RS22915, Temporary Extension of Unemployment Benefits: Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. ARRA allows states the option of temporarily ignoring the benefit year requirement. Temporary Grandfathering of Expansion of EB Eligibility, at States' Option
ARRA also allows states to opt to grandfather this change in EB eligibility for those who enter the EB program on or before the expiration of 100% federal financing of the EB program. Extension of Railroad Unemployment Insurance Benefits
ARRA adds an additional 13 weeks to the maximum amount of time railroad workers may receive extended unemployment benefits, allowing for up to 26 weeks of extended benefits in addition to the 26 weeks of normal benefits provided under current law. Subsequent legislation authorized these extended unemployment benefits for additional months. The exclusion is applicable for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2008. What Do States Need to Do to Receive the Federal Monies in ARRA for Unemployment Insurance? Unemployment Modernization Provisions in ARRA
ARRA provides for a special transfer of up to a total of $7 billion from the Federal Unemployment Account (FUA) within the UTF to the State accounts within the UTF as "incentive payments" for changing certain state UC laws. All incentive payments must be made before October 1, 2011. If certified, these states will not need to enact additional state legislation. ARRA provides for federal financing of several elements of the stimulus package. As a result of ARRA, EUC08 benefits through expiration of the EUC08 program will be financed from general revenues of the Treasury. $500 million transfer to states for administrative costs . ARRA Waives Interest Payments and Interest Accrual on Federal Loans to State Unemployment Accounts During 2009 and 2010
ARRA temporarily waives interest payments and the accrual of interest on federal advances to state unemployment funds. The interest payments that come due beginning February 17, 2009, the date of enactment for the stimulus package, until December 31, 2010, are deemed to have been made by the state (and are not capitalized in to the principal of the loan). | The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5, also known as ARRA or the 2009 stimulus package) contained several provisions affecting unemployment benefits, described below.
ARRA temporarily increased unemployment benefits by $25 per week for all recipients of regular unemployment compensation (UC), extended benefits (EB), emergency unemployment compensation (EUC08), Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs, and Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA). The act extended the temporary EUC08 program through December 26, 2009 (with grandfathering), to be financed by federal general revenues. The EUC08 program's expiration date has since been further extended. It provided for temporary 100% federal financing of the EB program, to be financed by the federal government through the Unemployment Trust Fund. ARRA allowed states the option of changing temporarily the eligibility requirements for the EB program to expand the number of persons eligible for EB benefits, to end before June 1, 2010. It provided for an additional 13 weeks to the maximum amount of time railroad workers may receive extended unemployment benefits. The legislation suspended income taxation on the first $2,400 of unemployment benefits received in 2009, for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2008. It provided relief to states from the payment and accrual of interest on federal loans to states for the payment of unemployment benefits, from enactment of the stimulus package on February 17, 2009, through December 31, 2010. ARRA provided for a special transfer of up to $7 billion in federal monies to state unemployment programs as "incentive payments" for changing certain state UC laws. All incentive payments must be made before October 1, 2011. States do not need to repay these sums to the federal government. Any changes that states make to state unemployment programs as a result of ARRA's modernization provisions would be permanent. Finally, the act transferred a total of $500 million to the states for administering their unemployment programs, within 30 days of enactment of the 2009 stimulus package. States do not need to repay these sums to the federal government.
This report addresses some of the more common questions about unemployment insurance in the 2009 stimulus package as Congress approved it in February 2009. The report does not provide operational details of unemployment insurance programs such as UC, EB, or EUC08, nor does it address the TAA or DUA programs.
Since ARRA's passage, certain elements of the package have been authorized for additional months and the EUC08 program has been expanded to include additional benefit tiers. For more information, see CRS Report RL33362, Unemployment Insurance: Programs and Benefits, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33157 | crs_RL33157_0 | Introduction
The 109th Congress is considering legislation to reauthorize and amend programs that werecreated or revised in the 1996 welfare reform law. (1) Early in the 109th Congress, the Senate Finance and Health,Education, Labor, and Pensions Committees approved and reported their welfare reauthorizationlegislation (respectively, S. 667 and S. 525 ). On November 18, 2005, the House passed its budget reconciliation bill ( S. 1932 ), which includes welfare reauthorization legislation similar to that which passed the House in2002 and 2003. (The House-passed version of S. 1932 is H.R. This report compares the welfare reauthorization policies proposed in the Senate committeebills with those included in the House-passed budget reconciliation bill. Table 1 summarizes what provisions are included in the Senate committee bills and theHouse reconciliation bill. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant
The Senate-committee and House welfare reauthorization proposals have many similarities,with both extending basic TANF funding at current levels through FY2010 and incorporatingPresident Bush's proposal to provide categorical "marriage promotion" grants. (2) Both bills also raise TANFwork participation standards, though the two differ in terms of how much more work would berequired and what activities count toward the participation standards. Currently, supplemental grants total $319 million per year. It also would revise the criteria of economic need for a state. Both the Senate Finance Committee bill and House budget reconciliation bill wouldsubstantially revise TANF work participation standards. Both the Senate Finance Committee bill and the House budget reconciliation bill would raisethe work participation standard for all families to 70% by FY2010, and eliminate the separatestandard for two-parent families. Both the Senate Finance Committee bill and the House budget reconciliation bill raise thehours standards. Both the Senate Finance Committee and House budget reconciliation bills would carve outspecial "marriage promotion grants" from existing TANF funding. Both bills also would provide an additional $100 million for research and demonstrations. The Finance Committee-passed bill (S. 667) contains the proposedmandatory funding appropriation for Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) programs,while the HELP Committee-passed bill (S. 525) includes proposed discretionary fundingauthorization, and all provisions relating to the reauthorization of the CCDBG Act. Puerto Rico would receive $75 million of the $6 billion, whereas undercurrent law (as well as the House bill), Puerto Rico receives no mandatory child care funding. It would (1) authorize competitive grants for responsible fatherhood projects to public andnonprofit community entities, including religious organizations, and to Indian tribes and tribalorganizations, for demonstration service projects and activities designed to test the effectiveness ofvarious approaches to accomplish the four specified responsible fatherhood program objectives --eligible entities would be allowed to apply for either full service grants or limited purpose grants of$25,000 or less per fiscal year; (2) authorize funding for two multicity, multistate fatherhooddemonstration projects to be developed and conducted by a national nonprofit fatherhood promotionorganization; (3) authorize funding for an evaluation of the competitive grant projects and themulticity, multistate demonstration projects; and (4) authorize the Secretary of HHS by grant, contract, or cooperative agreement to carry out projects and activities of national significance relatingto fatherhood promotion -- such projects or activities could include collection and dissemination ofinformation, media campaigns, technical assistance to public and private entities, and research. Distribution of Child Support. S. 667 would allow states to pay up to $400 per month in child support collectedon behalf of a TANF (or foster care) family ($600 per month to a family with two or more children)to the family and would not require the state to pay the federal government the federal share of thosepayments. The House budget reconciliation bill would allowstates to increase the amount of collected child support they pay to families receiving TANF benefitsand would not require the state to pay the federal government the federal share of the increasedpayments. | The 109th Congress is considering legislation to reauthorize and amend programs that werecreated or revised in the 1996 welfare reform law. Early in 2005, the Senate Committees on Financeand Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) reported their welfare reauthorization legislation(respectively, S. 667 and S. 525 ). These bills have yet to see floor actionand remain pending in the Senate. The House passed welfare reauthorization as part of its spendingbudget reconciliation bill (the House-passed version of S. 1932 ). The Senate-passed spending reconciliation bill does not include welfare reauthorization provisions.
Both the Senate Finance Committee bill and the House reconciliation bill would reauthorizethrough FY2010 and revise the block grant of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). They both revise TANF work participation standards aimed to require more families on the welfarerolls to work or participate in job preparation activities. The Senate committee bill would allow abroad range of activities engaged in by recipients to count toward meeting these standards, while theHouse bill would narrow the focus of activities to work or "workfare" outside of a four-monthperiod. Both the Senate committee and House reconciliation bills also would establish $200 millionper year in grants to promote "healthy" marriages.
Both the Senate committee and House reconciliation bills would extend and increase fundingfor mandatory child care, though the size of the funding increase is a major difference between thetwo proposals -- $6 billion over five years in the Senate committee bill and $0.5 billion over fiveyears in the House bill. Both would also reauthorize the Child Care and Development Block Grant(CCDBG), increasing its authorization to $3.1 billion by FY2010, and would revise CCDBG rules,including those related to making school-readiness a program goal and increasing the percentage offunds to improve the quality of child care.
Both the Senate committee and House reconciliation bills would revise the Child SupportEnforcement program to provide financing options for states to pay more collected child support tofamilies on TANF or who have left the rolls. (Generally, federal and state governments keep childsupport collected for TANF families as reimbursement for their welfare costs.) The Senatecommittee bill would provide partial federal funding for child support passed through to families --up to $400 per month for one child and $600 per month for two or more children. The House billwould provide partial federal funding to states that increase the amount of passed-through childsupport. The House reconciliation bill also would reduce federal funding to the states to operatetheir child support programs. Both Senate committee and House bills would also establish"responsible fatherhood" programs to fund activities to increase the participation of noncustodialparents in their children's lives. The Senate committee bill would provide $50 million per year inmandatory funding (and authorize another $26 million per year); the House reconciliation bill wouldauthorize (but not provide funding) for up to $20 million per year. This report will be updated asneeded. |
crs_R43463 | crs_R43463_0 | Collectively, this mature sector of the U.S. economy accounts for 2.6% of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) and directly employs nearly 5.4 million Americans. The Travel Promotion, Enhancement, and Modernization Act of 2014 was incorporated into the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ), which extended the Brand USA program through September 30, 2020. A record 70 million foreign visitors traveled to the United States in 2013, making the United States the second-most popular destination for foreign visitors, after France. Output, which represents total sales related to travel and tourism, came to more than $850 billion in 2013. In recent Congresses, lawmakers have enacted and introduced legislation to provide assistance to tourism-related industries, and have held hearings on the effects of travel and tourism on the U.S. economy. 87-63), which established the U.S. Travel Service, later replaced by the U.S. Travel and Tourism Administration (USTTA) within the Department of Commerce, to advertise U.S. tourism destinations to international travelers. The Travel Promotion Act (TPA) launched a public-private partnership known as Brand USA to assist in financing an international advertising campaign for the United States as a travel destination. The effort is funded through a $10 fee added to the automated Electronic System Travel Authorization (ESTA) application assessed on each visitor from one of 38 countries, whose nationals may enter the United States without visas under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). The federal contribution requires an annual matching contribution from the U.S. tourism industry, which can be a combination of cash and in-kind contributions such as advertising. Critics, including some Members of Congress, have questioned the efficacy of the Brand USA program, and dispute whether federal matching funds have been spent appropriately. In FY2013, nearly 20 million people entered under the VWP, accounting for more than one-third of all temporary visitors. In January 2012, President Obama signed Executive Order 13597, establishing a Task Force on Travel and Competitiveness. The task force was instructed to develop a set of national travel and tourism goals to increase international visitor volume to 100 million by the end of 2021. 2543 ), which would have prohibited "discriminatory" taxes on the rental of motor vehicles. The Conference Accountability Act of 2013 ( S. 1347 ), introduced in the 113 th Congress, would, among other things, have prohibited a federal agency from spending more than $500,000 on any single conference unless the head of the agency determined the expenditure to be "justified as the most cost-effective option to achieve a compelling purpose"; limited participation at conferences held outside the United States; and required agencies to post details of their conferences online. The travel and tourism industry is also affected by congressional action on a range of diverse policy issues, such as federal funding for national parks, forests, and historical sites that are managed by federal agencies and staffed by their employees; the minimum wage; and visa and immigration reform policy. | The U.S. travel and tourism industry accounted for 2.6% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012 and directly employed nearly 5.4 million people in 2013. Tourism exports reached a record $215 billion in 2013, representing almost a third of total U.S. services exports. The sector has posted an annual trade surplus with the world for more than two decades. The Department of Commerce forecasts foreign visitor volume in the United States will reach nearly 90 million in 2019.
In 1996, Congress stopped funding the United States Travel and Tourism Administration (USTTA), which for 35 years promoted the United States as a tourist destination. In 2009, it established a public-private entity to promote U.S. tourism, the Corporation for Travel Promotion, which does business as Brand USA. The Travel Promotion Act of 2009 (TPA; P.L. 111-145) first authorized federal funds for Brand USA. The program is funded by a $10 user fee assessed on international visitors from more than three dozen visa waiver program countries and requires annual in-kind and cash matching contributions from the U.S. tourism industry. Brand USA can receive matching federal funds capped at $100 million annually. The program has been controversial, with some Members of Congress characterizing it as an inappropriate use of federal funds to benefit private entities. However, after considerable debate, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235), signed into law by President Obama on December 16, 2014, extended Brand USA through September 30, 2020.
The Obama Administration in 2012 established a Task Force on Travel and Competitiveness, which was charged with developing and implementing a strategy to increase the annual number of international visitors to 100 million by 2021. Among other things, the task force has recommended expediting visa processing for tourists from certain emerging economies, such as China and Brazil, and expanding the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which allows citizens from more than three dozen countries to travel to the United States without obtaining visas.
In recent Congresses, congressional committees have held hearings to assess the economic effects of travel and tourism on the U.S. economy. Legislation affecting travel and tourism addresses many different topics such as online gambling; safety and security aboard cruise ships; funding for national parks, forests, and historical sites; and taxes on the rental of motor vehicles. The tourism industry may also be strongly affected by homeland security and immigration legislation, including possible changes to the visa waiver program, with some lawmakers calling for its expansion and others for its suspension or elimination, which could make it more complex and costly for foreign visitors to enter the United States. |
crs_R44357 | crs_R44357_0 | Background
The federal government first supported a program for energy storage and electric power system technology during the 1970s, before the establishment of the Department of Energy (DOE). The nation's energy infrastructure is diverse. Office Organization and Strategy
Mission
The DOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) is charged with a mission to support more economically competitive, environmentally responsible, secure, and resilient U.S. energy infrastructure. Much of this activity takes place through partnerships with private firms that provide matching funds. For most of DOE's funding history, OE programs received a relatively small portion of funding, compared to the portion provided for the energy technology programs. The funding was targeted for "grid modernization." Recent Appropriations History
Since 2005, the Energy and Water Development (E&W) appropriations bill has funded all DOE programs, including those operated by OE. The request for OE sought $262 million, which would have been a $56 million, or 27%, increase over the FY2016 level. As part of that requested increase, DOE proposed to fund three new programs: a Grid Institute, State Distribution-Level Reform, and State Energy Assurance. FY2017 request also notes that OE plays the central role in two of DOE's broad cross-cutting initiatives: grid modernization and cybersecurity. DOE sought funding changes for several programs and proposes the creation of three new programs for FY2017. There is broad recognition that the electricity sector is undergoing a major transformation. Each program office has its own set of goals and funding needs. It also shows congressional recommendations for FY2017. As noted previously, further actions were taken in the House and Senate on DOE funding recommendations in the E&W bills, S. 2804 and H.R. 5055 . In the Senate, S. 2804 was incorporated into H.R. 2028 as an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and it was approved on the Senate floor. The Senate-passed FY2017 E&W bill included $206 million for OE—the same amount as the FY2016 appropriation. In the House, H.R. 5055 was defeated in House floor action. That bill had included $225 million for OE, which was the amount recommended by the House Appropriations Committee. In late September 2016, a continuing resolution ( P.L. 114-223 , Division C) set FY2017 funding for OE at the FY2016 level through December 9, 2016. On December 10, 2016, a second continuing resolution provided funding at the FY2016 level through April 28, 2017.The various steps of the congressional process for the FY2017 E&W appropriations are outlined in Table 4 . CRS Report R44465, Energy and Water Development: FY2017 Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R43966, Energy and Water Development: FY2016 Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report RS22858, Renewable Energy R&D Funding History: A Comparison with Funding for Nuclear Energy, Fossil Energy, and Energy Efficiency R&D , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R41886, The Smart Grid and Cybersecurity—Regulatory Policy and Issues , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R43604, Physical Security of the U.S. Power Grid: High-Voltage Transformer Substations , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Insight IN10425, Electric Grid Physical Security: Recent Legislation , by [author name scrubbed] | The nation's energy infrastructure is undergoing a major transformation. For example, new technologies and changes in electricity flows place increasing demands on the electric power grid. These changes include increased use of distributed (mostly renewable energy) resources, Internet-enabled demand response technologies, growing loads from electric vehicle use, continued expansion of natural gas use, and integration of energy storage devices.
The Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) has the lead role in addressing those infrastructure issues. OE is also responsible for the physical security and cybersecurity of all (not just electric power) energy infrastructure. Further, OE has a key role in developing energy storage, supporting the grid integration of renewable energy, and intergovernmental planning for grid emergencies. As an illustration of the breadth of its activities, OE reports that, during FY2014, its programs responded to 24 energy-related emergency events, including physical security events, wildfires, severe storms, fuel shortages, and national security events.
OE manages five types of research and development (R&D) programs, usually conducted in cost-shared partnership with private sector firms. OE also operates two types of deployment programs, conducted mainly with state and tribal governments. Each OE program office has its own set of goals and objectives. OE plays the central role in two of DOE's broad cross-cutting initiatives: grid modernization and cybersecurity. President Obama treated grid modernization as a high priority, stressing its importance to jobs, economic growth, and U.S. manufacturing competitiveness.
Since 2005, the Energy and Water Development (E&W) appropriations bill has funded all DOE programs, including those operated by OE. DOE's FY2017 request for OE sought $262 million, an increase of $56 million (27%) over the FY2016 appropriation of $206 million.
Most congressional action for FY2017 OE funding has taken place through the two E&W appropriations bills, S. 2804 and H.R. 5055. In the Senate, S. 2804 was incorporated into H.R. 2028 as an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and it was approved on the Senate floor. That Senate-passed FY2017 E&W bill included $206 million for OE—the same amount as the FY2016 appropriation. In the House, H.R. 5055 was defeated in House floor action. That bill had included $225 million for OE, which was the amount recommended by the House Appropriations Committee. In late September 2016, a continuing resolution (P.L. 114-223, Division C) set FY2017 funding for OE at the FY2016 level through December 9, 2016. On December 10, 2016, a second continuing resolution (CR) provided funding at the FY2016 level through April 28, 2017.
Most of DOE's requested FY2017 increase for OE aimed to create three new programs: a Grid (Manufacturing Innovation) Institute, a State Distribution Level Reform program, and a state Energy Assurance program. The House Appropriations Committee's report on FY2017 E&W funding does not mention those proposed programs. The Senate Appropriations Committee's report on FY2017 E&W funding expressed support for the regional and state activities that DOE proposed for two of the new programs, but encouraged DOE to support those activities with some of the funding it recommended for the OE Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration program. Neither the first nor the second CR included funding for any of the proposed new programs. |
crs_R41659 | crs_R41659_0 | Introduction
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a broad civil rights statute prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public accommodations, which are defined to include movie theaters, but the statute does not include specific language on closed captioning or video description. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has promulgated regulations under Title III, but has not specifically addressed issues regarding closed captioning or video description. However, DOJ has issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) to establish requirements for closed captioning and video description for movie theaters. In addition, the Ninth Circuit, in the first court of appeals case to address the issue, held that the ADA requires the provision of closed captioning and descriptive narration in movie theaters unless to do so would be a fundamental alteration or an undue burden. | The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a broad civil rights statute prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public accommodations, which are defined to include movie theaters, but the statute does not include specific language on closed captioning or video description. Although the Department of Justice (DOJ) has promulgated regulations under Title III, it has not specifically addressed issues regarding closed captioning or video description. However, DOJ has issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) to establish requirements for closed captioning and video description for movie theaters. The ANPR asks for input in several areas including the implications of a sliding compliance schedule, and the appropriate basis for calculating the number of movies that will be captioned and video described. In addition, the Ninth Circuit, in the first federal court of appeals case to address the issue, held that the ADA requires the provision of closed captioning and descriptive narration in movie theaters unless to do so would be a fundamental alteration or an undue burden. |
crs_R44962 | crs_R44962_0 | Introduction
In an increase over prior terms, the Supreme Court of the United States issued six opinions involving patent law during its October 2016 Term. These decisions addressed issues ranging from patent exhaustion, multicomponent products, and biosimilar patents to procedural issues like venue and the statute of limitations for infringement claims. And the importance of intellectual property to the broader American economy has continued to grow, with an estimated 84% of the S&P 500 Market Value attributable to intangible assets in 2015." Stories about patent law, patent litigation, and even the Federal Circuit itself are regular fixtures of leading newspapers...." Accordingly, an understanding of patent law and the cases issued during the Supreme Court's recently concluded October 2016 Term will likely be of interest to Congress. Overview of Patent Law
The patent law regime in the United States is grounded in the U.S. Constitution itself; article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution provides: "The Congress Shall Have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective ... Discoveries." Nonetheless, the rights associated with patents do not arise automatically. Rather, to obtain patent protection, the Patent Act of 1952 requires inventors to file a patent application with the PTO. Requirements for Obtaining a Patent
A patent may be obtained by "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof," subject to the requirements of the Patent Act. This right to exclude is enforceable under the Patent Act, which states that anyone who "makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent ... infringes the patent" unless authority to do so is secured from the patent holder. Administrative Proceedings Before the PTO
As is evident, in addition to patent prosecution, the PTO conducts other administrative review proceedings, including those provided for in the AIA. Most of these proceedings involve challenges to the validity of issued patents and may result in the revocation of a previously issued patent. Such proceedings play a central role in the country's patent system as a popular, "less expensive and quicker alternative to litigation." While the High Court is playing a larger role in the development of patent law by issuing an increased number of patent law opinions, the nature and extent of the Court's influence on patent law is the subject of some debate. Patent Cases of the Supreme Court's October 2016 Term
Cases Involving Procedural Issues
The Supreme Court issued two opinions involving procedural issues during its October 2016 Term that will affect when and where patent cases will be filed. Cases Involving Multicomponent Products
In another pair of cases heard during the Supreme Court's October 2016 Term, the Supreme Court dealt with issues related to patents on multicomponent inventions—one in the context of determining infringement and another in the context of calculating damages. Cases with Implications for the Health Care Industry
A final pair of patent cases decided by the Supreme Court during its October 2016 Term may have major implications for the pharmaceutical industry. This case will potentially affect the speed at which competition emerges for many pharmaceutical products. Emerging Issues in Patent Law
In addition to the effects of the patent decisions issued by the Supreme Court during its October 2016 Term, there are a number of patent-related issues on the horizon. Legislative and Executive Patent Law Activity
As noted, patent reform appears to be of perennial concern to Congress. | In an increase over prior terms, the Supreme Court of the United States issued six opinions involving patent law during its October 2016 Term. These decisions addressed issues ranging from patent exhaustion, multicomponent products, and biosimilar patents to procedural issues like venue and the statute of limitations for infringement claims. The growing number of Supreme Court opinions involving patent law over the past decade may also speak to the rising importance of intellectual property more broadly; a reported 84% of the S&P 500 Market Value in 2015 is ascribed to intangible assets. With this increased attention on patent law, an understanding of patent law and the cases issued during the High Court's recently concluded term will likely be of interest to Congress.
The patent law regime in the United States is grounded in the U.S. Constitution itself; article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution provides: "The Congress Shall Have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective ... Discoveries." Nonetheless, the rights associated with patents do not arise automatically. Rather, to obtain patent protection, the Patent Act of 1952 requires inventors to apply with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).
A patent may be obtained by "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter," subject to the requirements of the Patent Act. A valid patent bestows upon its holder the right to take action against anyone who "makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent," unless authority to do so is secured from the patent holder. In addition to examining patent applications, the PTO conducts other proceedings to determine the validity of issued patents, which can result in the revocation of previously issued patents. These proceedings play a central role in the country's patent system. Final decisions from the PTO are appealable to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive, nationwide jurisdiction over most patent appeals.
With the Supreme Court hearing an increasing number of cases involving patent law and other areas of intellectual property over the last decade, the Court is playing a larger role in the development of patent law. During its October 2016 Term, the Court issued two patent law opinions involving procedural issues that will affect when and where patent cases may be filed. In another pair of cases heard during the October 2016 Term, the High Court dealt with issues related to patents on multicomponent products—one in the context of determining infringement and another in the context of calculating damages. A final pair of patent cases decided during the Term may have major implications for the pharmaceutical industry—one addresses whether post-sale restrictions, commonly used in the pharmaceutical industry, are enforceable under patent law, and the other will likely affect the speed at which biosimilars come to market.
In addition to the effects of the Supreme Court's patent decisions issued during its October 2016 Term on patent law, there are a number of patent-related issues on the horizon. The constitutionality of one of the PTO's post-grant review proceedings has been called into question in a case that will be heard during the Court's upcoming October 2017 Term. In addition, with patent reform being of perennial concern to Congress, certain legislative proposals have the potential to alter various areas of patent law. |
crs_RL34029 | crs_RL34029_0 | Current Situation
Haiti's poverty is massive and deep. Over half the population (54%) of 8.2 million people live in extreme poverty, living on less than $1 a day; 76% live on $2 or less a day. Poverty among the rural population is even more widespread: 69% of rural dwellers live on less than $1 a day, and 86% live on less than $2 a day. In order to reach its Millennium Development Goal of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger by 2015, Haiti's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would have to grow 3.5% per year, a goal the International Monetary Fund (IMF) says Haiti is not considered likely to achieve. Over the past 40 years, Haiti's per capita real GDP has declined by 30%. Therefore, economic growth, even if it is greater than population growth, is not expected to be enough to reduce poverty. In addition, since President Préval took office in May 2006, both the new government and international donors are shifting from a short-term program to carry Haiti through a transition period to a long-term program to help reduce poverty in Haiti. Short-Term Strategy for Addressing Haiti's Needs
Haiti and its multilateral and bilateral donors developed an international strategy for assistance to address Haiti's short-term needs in between the collapse of the government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the time a new government could be elected and installed. In July 2006, international donors pledged $750 million to bridge Haiti's budget gap and fund economic, social, and democratic reconstruction projects through September 2007. For each of these four strategic axes, the Framework provides a strategy, priority objectives, and monitoring indicators. "Improve Access to Basic Services" is the fourth axis. Medium-Term Strategy for Addressing Haiti's Needs
Building on drafts created by the interim government (2004-2006), the Préval Administration produced an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy for the years 2007-2009. This plan calls for actions to be taken with a macroeconomic framework focusing on three goals: maintain macroeconomic stability; target actions to reduce poverty; and create conditions conducive to continuous and sustainable growth driven by private initiative. Long-Term Strategy for Addressing Haiti's Needs
International donors are assisting Haiti in developing a long-term Poverty Reduction Plan to succeed the Interim Cooperation Framework. An important part of this strategy, as it was with the others, is developing the final plan through a participatory process, with the overarching goal of ensuring that the interests of Haiti's most disadvantaged population are taken into account. USAID's programs are based on the objectives, strategy, and monitoring indicators established under the Interim Cooperation Framework. The IMF points out that enormous political, technical, and institutional challenges must also be overcome before Poverty Reduction objectives can be achieved. These figures and tables put international efforts into the context of Haitian poverty, drawing a statistical overview to convey the extent of the poverty in Haiti and the obstacles that must be overcome in order for development to occur there. | Haiti's poverty is massive and deep. Over half the population (54%) of 8.2 million people live in extreme poverty, living on less than $1 a day; 76% live on less than $2 a day. Poverty and hunger among the rural population is even more widespread. In order to reach Haiti's goal of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger by 2015, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would have to grow 3.5% per year, a goal Haiti is not considered likely to achieve. In the past 40 years, Haiti's per capita real GDP has declined by 30%. Therefore economic growth, even if greater than population growth, is not expected to be enough to reduce Haiti's endemic poverty.
Since Haiti's 2006 elections, the new government and international donors are shifting from a short-term program to carry Haiti through a transition period to a long-term program to help reduce poverty in Haiti. Haiti and its multilateral and bilateral donors developed an international aid strategy to address Haiti's short-term needs in between the collapse of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's government and the installation of a new, elected government. Through the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) international donors pledged $1.2 billion from 2004 to 2006, and $750 million more through September 2007. The ICF places priority needs and projects into four broad "axes": political governance and national dialogue; economic governance and institutional development; economic recovery; and access to basic services, with a strategy, priority objectives, and monitoring indicators for each.
Building on drafts created by the interim government (2004-2006), President René Préval's Administration produced an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) for the years 2007-2009. This plan calls for actions to be taken within a macroeconomic framework focusing on three goals: maintain macroeconomic stability; target actions to reduce poverty; and create conditions conducive to continuous and sustainable growth driven by private initiative.
International donors are assisting Haiti in developing a long-term Poverty Reduction Plan to build on and succeed the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF). An important part of this strategy is developing the final plan through a participatory process, with the goals of ensuring that the interests of Haiti's most disadvantaged population are taken into account and that democratic and governance processes are strengthened. The PRS is to be completed by July 2007, and implemented beginning in October 2007. The U.S. Agency for International Development's 2007-2009 programs are based on the objectives, strategy, and monitoring indicators established under the ICF. Some critics say that the PRS process does not allow adequate country input, uses limited development analysis, and should include discussion of alternative policies and other aspects of development policy.
Enormous political, technical, and institutional challenges must be overcome before Poverty Reduction objectives can be achieved. The figures in this report put international efforts into the context of Haitian poverty, drawing a statistical portrait to convey the extent of the poverty and obstacles that must be overcome in order for sustainable development to occur in Haiti. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R45414 | crs_R45414_0 | Introduction
The Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try (RTT) Act of 2017 became federal law on May 30, 2018. Over the preceding five years, 40 states had enacted related legislation. The goal was to allow individuals with imminently life-threatening diseases or conditions to seek access to investigational drugs without the step of procuring permission from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Another goal—held by the Goldwater Institute, which led the initiative toward state bills, and some of the legislative proponents—was focused more on the process: to eliminate government's role in an individual's choice. 115-176 ). FDA-Related Issues
Difficult Process to Request FDA Permission
Have FDA's procedures discouraged patients and their physicians from seeking treatment INDs? 114-255 ) and the FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017 (Section 610, P.L. It also required GAO to report to Congress on individual access to investigational drugs through FDA's expanded access program. These provisions
define an eligible patient as one who (1) has been diagnosed with a life-threatening disease or condition, (2) has exhausted approved treatment options and is unable to participate in a clinical trial involving the eligible investigational drug (as certified by a physician who meets specified criteria), and (3) has given written informed consent regarding the drug to the treating physician; define an eligible investigational drug as an investigational drug (1) for which a Phase 1 clinical trial has been completed, (2) that FDA has not approved or licensed for sale in the United States for any use, (3) that is the subject of a new drug application pending FDA decision or is the subject of an active investigational new drug application being studied for safety and effectiveness in a clinical trial, and (4) for which the manufacturer has not discontinued active development or production and which the FDA has not placed on clinical hold; and exempt use under this section from parts of the FFDCA sections regarding misbranding, certain labeling and directions for use, drug approval, and investigational new drugs regulations;
The new FFDCA Section 561B has provisions that had not been necessary when access had been granted under FDA auspices. It states that, related to use of a drug under the new FFDCA Section 561B,
"no liability in a cause of action shall lie against ... a sponsor or manufacturer; or ... a prescriber, dispenser, or other individual entity ... unless the relevant conduct constitutes reckless or willful misconduct, gross negligence, or an intentional tort under any applicable State law"; and no liability, also, for a "determination not to provide access to an eligible investigational drug." This report discusses several provisions in the RTT Act that Congress could consider as it oversees the law's implementation. Those are the patients who would get access through the RTT pathway. The RTT Act, however, includes an exception. The no-liability provision in the RTT Act seems to remove that obstacle. It could answer three questions at the core of measuring its effect on FDA, drug manufacturers, and patients. First: Will more patients get investigational drugs? Third: How will this affect FDA? Writing in opposition to the bill, four former FDA commissioners warned that it would "create a dangerous precedent that would erode protections for vulnerable patients." | The Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try (RTT) Act of 2017 became federal law on May 30, 2018. Over the preceding five years, 40 states had enacted related legislation. The goal was to allow individuals with imminently life-threatening diseases or conditions to seek access to investigational drugs without the step of procuring permission from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Another goal—held by the Goldwater Institute, which led the initiative toward state bills, and some of the legislative proponents—was focused more on the process: to eliminate government's role in an individual's choice.
The RTT Act (P.L. 115-176) offers eligible individuals and their physicians a pathway other than FDA's expanded access procedures to acquiring investigational drugs. It defines an eligible patient as one who (1) has been diagnosed with a life-threatening disease or condition, (2) has exhausted approved treatment options and is unable to participate in a clinical trial involving the eligible investigational drug (as certified by a physician who meets specified criteria), and (3) has given written informed consent regarding the drug to the treating physician.
It defines an eligible investigational drug as an investigational drug (1) for which a Phase 1 clinical trial has been completed, (2) that FDA has not approved or licensed for sale in the United States for any use, (3) that is the subject of a new drug application pending FDA decision or is the subject of an active investigational new drug application being studied for safety and effectiveness in a clinical trial, and (4) for which the manufacturer has not discontinued active development or production and which the FDA has not placed on clinical hold.
The RTT Act also has provisions that limit how the Secretary of Health and Human Services (through the FDA) can use data regarding clinical outcomes of patients who get these drugs through the RTT pathway; require drug sponsors (usually the manufacturers) to report annually to the Secretary on use of the pathway; and require the Secretary to post certain annual summaries. Finally, the RTT Act states that the sponsor or manufacturer has "no liability" for actions under the RTT provisions. The no-liability provision applies also to a prescriber, dispenser, or "other individual entity" unless there is "reckless or willful misconduct, gross negligence, or an intentional tort."
Before the RTT Act, observers discussed several obstacles to access to investigational drugs. These included some that were FDA-related: the difficult process to request FDA permission and the role of FDA as gatekeeper. Some related to why a manufacturer might decline to provide an investigational drug: limited available supply, liability, limited staff and facility resources, and concerns about use of outcomes data. The RTT directly eliminates some of these concerns, addresses some others, and leaves others alone.
Future Congresses could look at the RTT Act's effect on FDA, drug manufacturers, and terminally ill patients. Will more patients get investigational drugs? Congress could look at whether the law sufficiently removed obstacles to access. And how will the changes affect FDA? Four former FDA commissioners warned that the bill would "create a dangerous precedent that would erode protections for vulnerable patients." The first clue may come from how the current commissioner interprets FDA's role in the implementation of the new law. |
crs_R44560 | crs_R44560_0 | Nicaragua's Current Political Situation
Nicaragua began to establish a new democracy in the early 1990s after eight years of civil war in which the United States supported the anti-Sandinista contra movement in the country. Since the late 1990s, these institutions have become increasingly politicized. Current President and FSLN leader Daniel Ortega was a member of the junta that took power in 1979 after overthrowing dictator Anastasio Somoza and was elected president in 1984. He was reelected in 2011 and 2016. As opposition leader in the National Assembly from 1990 to 2006 and during his two subsequent terms as president, Ortega slowly consolidated Sandinista—and his own—control over the country's institutions. In summer 2016, the government removed some of the last checks on Ortega's power by removing members of the opposition from the legislature, easing Ortega's way to winning a third consecutive presidential term that November. In June 2016, the Sandinista-controlled Supreme Court issued rulings that prevent any major opposition force from running against Ortega and the FSLN. Since his long-sought return to the presidency in 2006, Ortega has implemented social welfare programs that have benefited Nicaragua's poor—reducing poverty, raising incomes, and providing subsidies and services—and thereby buoyed his popularity. As his popularity and power increased, so did Ortega's family wealth and influence. Ortega is reputed to be one of the wealthiest men in the country, and his children all own businesses, inviting comparisons to the Somoza family dictatorship the Sandinistas overthrew in 1979. Measured International Response to Ortega's Authoritarian Tendencies
The United States and some other countries have responded in critical but measured terms to Ortega becoming more authoritarian. But he also carefully balances his antagonistic stance against the United States and parts of Europe with cooperation on issues of importance to these countries and to Nicaragua, such as counternarcotics efforts, free trade, and Central American integration. Essentially, in the minds of many Nicaraguans, Ortega's authoritarian tendencies appear to be outweighed by populist measures that have improved their standard of living. Similarly, for many in the international community, the relative stability in Nicaragua seems to outweigh Ortega's perceived provocations and authoritarian proclivities. Critics both at home and abroad question the legitimacy of the electoral process. The World Bank says Nicaragua stands out for maintaining growth levels above the average for Latin America and the Caribbean. President Ortega's stated goal has been to implement socialism in Nicaragua, which he defines as a mixed economy. Nonetheless, he has maintained many elements of a market-based economy, including participation in the U.S.-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Poverty has declined in recent years but remains high. Nevertheless, Nicaragua remains the poorest country in Central America—in terms of per capita GDP—and the second-poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, ahead of Haiti. The Ortega administration is preparing for that possibility, however. Controversy over Proposed Canal
Controversy and conflict have been growing over Ortega's decision to grant a 100-year concession for an inter-oceanic canal through Nicaragua to a private Chinese company, HK Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Company Ltd. (HKND). The government maintains the project will stimulate the economy and provide jobs. It has sometimes reduced assistance to sanction the Nicaraguan government. The United States and Nicaragua cooperate on security and counternarcotics issues. Human Rights
For decades, various U.S. administrations and Congresses have expressed concerns about respect for human rights in Nicaragua. Nicaragua's Relationship with Russia and Other Extra-Hemispheric Actors
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about Nicaragua's relationship with Russia, especially recent military purchases. | This report discusses Nicaragua's current politics, economic development, and relations with the United States, and it provides context for Nicaragua's controversial reelection of President Daniel Ortega late last year. After its civil war ended, Nicaragua began to establish a democratic government in the early 1990s. Its institutions remained weak, however, and they have become increasingly politicized since the late 1990s. Ortega was a Sandinista (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional, FSLN) leader when the Sandinistas overthrew the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza in 1979. Ortega was elected president in 1984. An electorate weary of war between the government and U.S.-backed contras denied him reelection in 1990. After three failed attempts, he won reelection in 2006 and again in 2011. Ortega consolidated control over national institutions, which facilitated him winning a third consecutive term in the November 6, 2016, presidential elections. The Sandinista-controlled Supreme Court issued rulings that prevented any major opposition force from running against Ortega and the FSLN and allowed Ortega's wife, Rosario Murillo, to run as his vice president despite a constitutional prohibition against relatives of a sitting president running for office. As in previous elections at all levels in recent years, opposition figures and international analysts strongly questioned the legitimacy of this election.
As a leader of the opposition in the legislature from 1990 to 2006 and as president since then, Ortega slowly consolidated Sandinista—and personal—control over Nicaraguan institutions. As Ortega has gained power, he reputedly has become one of the country's wealthiest men. His family's wealth and influence have grown as well, inviting comparisons to the Somoza family dictatorship. As president, Ortega has implemented social welfare programs that have benefited Nicaragua's poor—reducing poverty and raising incomes—and thereby buoyed his popularity.
The United States and other countries have responded in critical but measured terms to Ortega becoming more authoritarian. For many in the international community, Ortega's cooperation on issues of importance to them, such as counternarcotics efforts and free trade, and the relative stability in Nicaragua seem to outweigh Ortega's perceived provocations and authoritarian proclivities. Similarly, in the minds of many Nicaraguans, Ortega's authoritarian tendencies appear to be outweighed by populist measures that have improved their standard of living.
Although President Ortega's stated goal has been to implement socialism in Nicaragua, which he defines as a mixed economy, he has maintained many elements of a market-based economy. Nicaragua has maintained growth levels above the average for Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years. Over the past decade, poverty has declined significantly. Nevertheless, Nicaragua remains the poorest country in Central America and the second-poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, ahead of Haiti. The Ortega administration is taking steps to prepare for a probable sharp contraction in funds from Venezuela, a major source of government revenues in recent years. Controversy and conflict have been growing over Ortega's decision to grant a 100-year concession for an inter-oceanic canal through Nicaragua to a Chinese company. The government maintains the project will stimulate the economy and provide jobs. Critics argue it will displace rural communities and harm the environment.
The United States and Nicaragua cooperate on issues such as free trade and counternarcotics. U.S. aid has sometimes been reduced over concern for the narrowing democratic space in Nicaragua. Currently, Nicaragua is part of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. Tensions rose recently when Nicaragua expelled three U.S. officials. Other U.S. concerns include violations of human rights, including restriction on citizens' rights to vote; government harassment of civil society groups; arbitrary arrests and killings by security forces; and corruption. The Administration and some Members of Congress have expressed concern about Nicaragua's relationship with Russia, especially recent military purchases. |
crs_RL31715 | crs_RL31715_0 | Purpose of This Report
This report was created to provide information and analysis on the buildup to the 2003 war with Iraq and on the war itself. For current CRS products related to Iraq, see the CRS home page at http://www.crs.gov . On November 8, 2002, the Security Council, actingat U.S. urging, adopted Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a "final opportunity" to comply with thedisarmament obligations imposed under previous resolutions, or face "serious consequences." During January-March 2003, theU.S. The war began on the night of March 19, 2003, with an aerial attack against a location where Saddam Hussein was suspected to be meeting with top Iraqi officials. U.S. and British troopsentered Iraq on March 20, and while the invasion encountered resistance, particularly in its earlystages, U.S. forces had largely gained control of Baghdad, the capital, by April 9. In attempting to win international support for its policy, the Administration asserted that Iraq was in material breach of 17 U.N. Security Council resolutions - including Resolution 1441 ofNovember 8, 2002 - mandating that Iraq fully declare and eliminate its WMD programs. A numberof U.S. allies and Security Council members, including France, Germany, Russia, and China agreedthat Iraq did not fully comply with Resolution 1441, but opposed military action, maintaining insteadthat U.N. inspections were working to disarm Iraq and should have been continued. Policy Debate. After the war was launched on March 19,Russia's Prime Minister Vladimir Putin charged that "This military action cannot be justified in anyway." (27)
Role of the United Nations. (34) (For more information, see below, Post-war Governance Issues and Humanitarian Issues .) However, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were not used by Iraqi forces andU.S. Inspectors? However,U.S. Some commentators, including officials in the Bush Administration, believe that the war with Iraq and theoverthrow of Saddam Hussein will lead to a democratic revolution in large parts of the Middle East.Some link democracy in the Middle East with a broader effort to pursue development in a region thathas lagged behind much of the world in economic and social spheres, as well as in individualfreedom and political empowerment. The apparent bitterness towards the coalition forces also remains an issue. Few refugees have been moving out of Iraq. With respect to Iraq, these legal requirements were met. 107-243 , signed into law on October 16, 2002, authorized the President "to use the Armed Forcesof the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend thenational security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce allrelevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq." P.L. P.L. Subsequent to enactment of the authorization but prior to the initiation of military action, twelve members of the House of Representatives, along with a number of U.S. soldiers and the families ofsoldiers, filed suit against President Bush seeking to enjoin military action against Iraq on thegrounds it would exceed the authority granted by the October resolution or, alternatively, that theOctober resolution unconstitutionally delegated Congress' power to declare war to the President. Earlier Estimates of First Year Cost of a War with Iraq (in billions of dollars )
Notes and Sources:
a Lower end reflects CBO revised estimate of cost of one-month war reflecting currentdeployments,a 10 month occupation of 100,000 troops, the U.S. paying half of the U.N.'s estimate of $30billion for reconstruction over three years, humanitarian aid for 10 % of the population, and $10billion in aid to allies based on State Department sources cited in Los Angeles Times , "Iraq WarCost Could Soar, Pentagon Says," February 26, 2003.
b Higher end estimate reflects House Budget Committee estimate of cost of a 250,000 force,a10-month occupation of 200,000 troops, the U.S. paying the full cost of reconstruction,humanitarian aid for 20% of the population and $18 billion in aid to allies based on StateDepartment sources cited in Los Angeles Times , "Iraq War Cost Could Soar, Pentagon Says,"February 26, 2003. (136) During the war itself, oil prices have fluctuated widely. The price spike resulted from supply difficulties due to an oil workers' strike in Venezuela, as well asoverriding concerns about Persian Gulf oil supply. Information Resources
This section provides links to additional sources of information related to a possible war withIraq. | The Iraq war was launched on March 19, 2003, with a strike against a location where Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and top lieutenants were believed to be meeting. On March 17, PresidentBush had given Saddam an ultimatum to leave the country or face military conflict. Although someresistance was encountered after U.S. troops entered Iraq, all major Iraqi population centers had beenbrought under U.S. control by April 14. In November 2002, the United Nations Security Councilhad adopted Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a final opportunity to "comply with its the disarmamentobligations" or "face serious consequences." During January and February 2003, a U.S. militarybuildup in the Persian Gulf intensified and President Bush, other top U.S. officials, and BritishPrime Minister Tony Blair repeatedly indicated that Iraq had little time left to offer full cooperationwith U.N. weapons inspectors. However, leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and China urged thatthe inspections process be allowed more time.
The Administration and its supporters assert that Iraq was in defiance of 17 Security Council resolutions requiring that it fully declare and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Further delay in taking action against Iraq, they argued, would have endangered national security andundermined U.S. credibility. Skeptics, including many foreign critics, maintained that theAdministration was exaggerating the Iraq threat and argued that the U.N. inspections process shouldhave been extended. In October 2002, Congress authorized the President to use the armed forcesof the United States to defend U.S. national security against the threat posed by Iraq and to enforceall relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq ( P.L. 107-243 ).
Analysts and officials are concerned about the risk of instability and ethnic fragmentation in Iraq after the war. U.S. plans for post-war governance of Iraq are just starting to be implemented,and the role of the United Nations in administering Iraq, if any, is still under debate. Whether theoverthrow of Iraq President Saddam Hussein will lead to democratization in Iraq and the widerMiddle East, or promote instability and an intensification of anti-U.S. attitudes, is also an issue indebate. The Iraq war has created concerns over the humanitarian situation, particularly in Baghdadand other cities affected by the war, but large-scale refugee flows have not occurred.
Constitutional issues concerning a possible war with Iraq were largely resolved by the enactment of P.L. 107-243 , the October authorization. International legal issues remain, however,with respect to launching a pre-emptive war against Iraq and the prospective occupation. Estimatesof the cost of a war in Iraq vary widely. If war or its aftermath leads to a spike in the price of oil,economic growth could slow, but oil prices have fluctuated widely during the conflict to date. Conceivably, global oil production could increase significantly after the war.
This CRS report provides information and analysis with respect to the 2003 war with Iraq, reviews a number of war-related issues, and provides links to additional sources of information. Itwill not be further updated. For current CRS products related to Iraq, see the CRS home page at http://www.crs.gov . |
crs_R44689 | crs_R44689_0 | Introduction
The Established Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR)—originally named the E xperimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR) —is a set-aside funding program that began as an effort to avoid an "undue concentration" of federal research funds by providing competitive grant opportunities to states that historically received little federal research and development (R&D) funding. Since the first program began at NSF, EPSCoR and EPSCoR-like programs have been established at other federal agencies, with active programs at the Department of Energy (DOE), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and National Institutes of Health (NIH). In 1992, the EPSCoR Interagency Coordinating Committee (EICC) was established through a Memorandum of Understanding to improve coordination among the programs. Congress directed initial appropriations for the program in FY1979. A jurisdiction becomes eligible to participate in the EPSCoR program "if their most recent 3-year funding level of NSF research support is equal to or less than 0.75% of the total NSF Research and Related Activities (RRA) budget." National Aeronautics and Space Administration
In 1992, the Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research on Space and Aeronautics Act established the NASA EPSCoR program, directing NASA to conduct a merit-based grant competition among states eligible for NSF's EPSCoR program. National Institutes of Health
The NIH Institutional Development Award (IDeA) program is also an EPSCoR-like program. In FY2016, estimated funding for the RII component is $128 million, which is 80% of the total NSF EPSCoR funding; the co-funding component accounts for 19% ($30 million), and the outreach/workshop component accounts for about 1% ($2 million). The committee's goals include the following:
To coordinate federal EPSCoR and EPSCoR-like programs to maximize the impact of federal support while eliminating duplication in states receiving EPSCoR support from more than one agency; To coordinate agency objectives with state and institutional goals, to obtain continued nonfederal support of science and technology (S&T) research and training; To coordinate the development of metrics to assess gains in academic research quality and competitiveness and in S&T human resource development; and To exchange information on pending legislation, as appropriate, agency policies, and relevant programs related to S&T research and training, and to provide responses on issues of common concern. Topics included EICC and NSF responses to the National Academy of Sciences EPSCoR assessment report (discussed in the " Program Assessments " section); NSF eligibility criteria and the "graduation" of Iowa, Tennessee, and Utah from the NSF, NASA, and DOE EPSCoR programs; and the role of, and need for, jurisdictional EPSCoR steering committees. Program Assessments
As the EPSCoR program has grown and developed, Congress and others have expressed interest in determining how successfully it has achieved its mission of helping states with less developed R&D capacity to improve their ability to compete for federal R&D funding. In summary, assessment activities over the years have included repeated recommendations in certain areas: reevaluating eligibility and graduation criteria, improving data collection and program evaluation processes, and focusing on flexible and sustainable program strategies. Selected Issues
An overarching challenge for the EPSCoR program since its inception has been crafting a balance between supporting sustainable research capacity development equitably across states while also supporting high-quality science through the merit review process. Initially, EPSCoR was termed "experimental" in its approach to building research capacity in certain states. Developing a common federal eligibility criterion (or criteria) might help address concerns voiced by some Members of Congress that eligibility for EPSCoR funding at DOE is based on NSF research award expenditures rather than on DOE Office of Science award expenditures (as discussed in the " Recent Congressional Activity " section). Determining Success
Program assessments, peer-reviewed literature, and Members of Congress have all raised broad questions about how to determine EPSCoR's success. A 2009 study concluded that, for some states, greater success in securing federal R&D funding may have led to reduced state contributions to academic institutions. The American Innovation and Competitiveness Act (AICA, P.L. 114-329 ), enacted on January 6, 2017, revises program requirements and renames EPSCoR as the Established Program to Stimulate Competitive Research, among other provisions. | The Established Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR)—originally named the Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR)—was established at the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1978 to address congressional concerns about an "undue concentration" of federal research and development (R&D) funding in certain states. The program is designed to help institutions in eligible states build infrastructure, research capabilities, and training and human resource capacities to enable them to compete more successfully for open federal R&D funding awards. Eligibility for NSF EPSCoR funding is limited to states (including some territories and the District of Columbia) that received 0.75% or less of total NSF research and related activities (RRA) funds over the most recent three-year period. EPSCoR awards are made through merit-based proposal reviews.
EPSCoR funding and program reach have increased over the years. Congress first directed funding for the NSF EPSCoR program in FY1979 at a level of around $1 million. EPSCoR and EPSCoR-like programs are now active at five agencies and have a collective annual program budget of over $500 million. In addition to NSF, agencies with active programs include the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH, whose program is called the Institutional Development Award [IDeA] program). In FY2015, program budgets were $273 million at NIH, $166 million at NSF, $34 million at USDA, $18 million at NASA, and $10 million at DOE. While these programs vary in some operations and policies, their common focus is to help eligible states build R&D capacity and improve their ability to compete for federal R&D funding. The EPSCoR Interagency Coordinating Committee (EICC), chaired by NSF, was formed in 1992 to help integrate the activities of EPSCoR and EPSCoR-like programs across the agencies and to create a unified effort.
While EPSCoR was originally proposed as a short-term effort for certain states, it has grown in size and scope, generating debate among stakeholders about program goals and policies. As the programs have evolved, a number of assessments have been conducted to evaluate EPSCoR's challenges and success, and to inform future directions. These assessments, and research literature, have repeatedly raised some broad issues. For instance, an overarching concern is finding an appropriate balance between supporting research development equitably across states while also supporting high-quality science through the merit review process. Common topics of discussion among stakeholders include the expansion and focus of EPSCoR goals, program coordination among federal agencies, criteria for state eligibility and graduation from the program, and metrics for assessing EPSCoR's success.
Congress has a long-standing interest in the EPSCoR program. Some Members of Congress have questioned the fairness of the program, which is unique at NSF in its state-targeted approach. Additionally, some have expressed concern that the EPSCoR approach does not fit within the broader merit-based grant-making process at NSF. Others Members of Congress have supported the program, stating that it has been successful in contributing to research of national interest, helping to balance federal R&D funding among states, and providing broader research education opportunities to create a skilled workforce. In the 114th Congress, legislation and amendments were introduced both in opposition (e.g., prohibiting the use of any funding for EPSCoR programs) and in support of the program. The American Innovation and Competitiveness Act (AICA, P.L. 114-329), enacted on January 6, 2017, renamed EPSCoR as an established—rather than experimental—program, revised various program components, and included language in support of continuing EPSCoR. |
crs_RL31384 | crs_RL31384_0 | For FY2012, the V-22 program poses a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the aircraft's readiness rates, reliability and maintainability, operational suitability, and whether to approve a follow-on multiyear procurement contract. Background
The V-22 in Brief
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft that takes off and lands vertically like a helicopter and flies forward like an airplane. Procurement Quantities
Total Quantities
Department of Defense (DOD) plans call for procuring a total of 458 V-22s—360 MV-22s for the Marine Corps; 50 CV-22 special operations variants for U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM (funded jointly by the Air Force and USSOCOM); and 48 HV-22s for the Navy. Through FY2011, a total of 247 V-22s have been procured—211 MV-22s for the Marine Corps, and 36 CV-22s for USSOCOM. These totals include several V-22s that have been procured in recent years through supplemental appropriations bills. Multiyear Procurement for FY2008-FY2012
V-22s are currently being procured under a $10.4-billion, multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement covering the period FY2008-FY2012. The budget requests about $1.2 billion in procurement and advance procurement funding for procurement of MV-22s, and about $309.2 million in procurement and advance procurement funding for procurement of CV-22s. Final Action
The conference report accompanying H.R. 1540 , H.Rept. 112-329 , authorized $2.2 billion in Aircraft Procurement, Navy, for the V-22. Compared to the request, the report cut $15 million for "support funding carryover" and $10.5 million to "reduce ECO" (engineering change orders.) The request for $84.0 million in advance procurement was reduced by $20.24 million for "advance procurement equipment cost growth." The request for $60.3 million in support equipment was reduced by $2.5 million for "Deficiencies modifications other support growth" and $2.0 million for "Reliability modifications other support growth." The request for $30 million in Overseas Contingency Operations funding was also reduced by $2.5 million for "Deficiencies modifications other support growth" and $2.0 million for "Reliability modifications other support growth." Overseas Contingency Operations funding was also cut by $15 million for V-22 modifications. 2219 ), the Senate Appropriations Committee added $2.8 million in Navy V-22 procurement funds for "voice recorders and Navy-identified shortfall," cut Navy procurement $10.5 million for engineering change orders and $4.5 million for "deficiencies modifications other support growth" and "reliability modifications other support growth," and cut $10 million from Air Force V-22 R&D. Final Action
The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference on H.R. 2055 detailed the $2.2 billion appropriated for V-22 procurement as follows: In Aircraft Procurement, Navy, reductions of $15 million for "support funding carryover" and $10.5 million to "reduce ECO" (engineering change orders). The request for $84.0 million in advance procurement was reduced by $20.24 million for "advance procurement equipment cost growth." The request for $60.3 million in support equipment was reduced by $2.5 million for "Deficiencies modifications other support growth" and $2.0 million for "Reliability modifications other support growth." Air Force V-22 R&D was cut by $7.5 million for "Slow execution/contract delay." | The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft that takes off and lands vertically like a helicopter and flies forward like an airplane. Department of Defense plans call for procuring a total of 458 V-22s, including 360 MV-22s for the Marine Corps; 50 CV-22 special operations variants for U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM (funded jointly by the Air Force and USSOCOM); and 48 HV-22s for the Navy.
Through FY2012, a total of 282 V-22s have been procured—241 MV-22s for the Marine Corps and 41 CV-22s for USSOCOM. These totals include several V-22s that have been procured in recent years through supplemental appropriations bills. V-22s are currently procured under a $10.4 billion, multiyear procurement arrangement covering the period FY2008-FY2012.
The proposed FY2013 budget requests about $1.2 billion in procurement and advance procurement funding for procurement of 17 MV-22s, and about $309.2 million in procurement and advance procurement funding for procurement of 4 CV-22s.
For FY2013, the V-22 program poses a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including whether to approve a follow-on multiyear procurement contract and the aircraft's readiness rates, reliability and maintainability, and operational suitability.
FY2012 defense authorization bills: The conference report accompanying H.R. 1540, H.Rept. 112-329, authorized $2.2 billion in Aircraft Procurement, Navy, for the V–22. Compared to the request, the report cut $15 million for "support funding carryover" and $10.5 million to "reduce ECO" (engineering change orders.) The request for $84.0 million in advance procurement was reduced by $20.24 million for "advance procurement equipment cost growth." The request for $60.3 million in support equipment was reduced by $2.5 million for "Deficiencies modifications other support growth" and $2.0 million for "Reliability modifications other support growth." The request for $30 million in Overseas Contingency Operations funding was also reduced by $2.5 million for "Deficiencies modifications other support growth" and $2.0 million for "Reliability modifications other support growth." Overseas Contingency Operations funding was also cut by $15 million for V-22 modifications as having been funded in FY2011. Air Force V-22 R&D was cut by $7.5 million for "Contract delay."
FY2012 DOD appropriations bills: The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference on H.R. 2055 detailed the $2.2 billion appropriated for V-22 procurement as follows: In Aircraft Procurement, Navy, reductions of $15 million for "support funding carryover" and $10.5 million to "reduce ECO" (engineering change orders.) $2.8 million was added for "V-22 voice recorder-Navy identified shortfall." The request for $84.0 million in advance procurement was reduced by $20.24 million for "advance procurement equipment cost growth." The request for $60.3 million in support equipment was reduced by $2.5 million for "Deficiencies modifications other support growth" and $2.0 million for "Reliability modifications other support growth." Air Force V-22 R&D was cut by $7.5 million for "Slow execution/contract delay." $15 million of modifications requested as Overseas Contingency Operations funding was cut as having been funded in FY2011. |
crs_RS22844 | crs_RS22844_0 | The Court has held that the death penalty is a disproportionate, and therefore unconstitutional, punishment for some non-homicide crimes. United States Supreme Court Decision
In Kennedy v. Louisiana , a divided Court held, by a vote of 5 to 4, that capital punishment for a defendant convicted of a non-homicide child rape is unconstitutional. First, there is a national consensus against the imposition of the death penalty for child rape. As such, the Court determined that, viewed in its totality, the limited number of states authorizing the death penalty for child rape, as well as the absence of executions for rape or any other non-homicide crime since 1964, demonstrates a national consensus against capital punishment for child rape. The Court acknowledged the reprehensibility of the crime of rape. It ruled that the death penalty should not be permitted when the victim's life was not taken. | In Kennedy v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court, by a vote of 5 to 4, held that the 8th Amendment prohibits the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result and was not intended to result in the victim's death. The Court established a bright-line rule regarding the constitutionality of imposing capital punishment for a non-homicide crime against an individual. After reviewing the history of the death penalty for other non-homicide crimes against individuals, state legislative enactments, and jury practices since 1964, the Court concluded that there was a national consensus against the imposition of capital punishment for the crime of child rape. Based on precedent as well as other subjective factors, the Court concluded that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for such a crime. The immediate effect of this decision is to invalidate statutes authorizing the death penalty for non-homicide cases of child rape. |
crs_R44386 | crs_R44386_0 | Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is tasked with securing America's borders and promoting legitimate trade and travel. Within CBP, the U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) is charged with securing the border between ports of entry. Their efforts to develop a measure for this have created a continual evolution of metrics. Border security can be assessed at both the strategic and operational levels. At the operational level, Border Patrol uses the identification of risk and the estimation of its magnitude in its day-to-day operations to secure the border. Understanding the security risks at the border and developing methods to measure the performance of the Border Patrol in allaying these risks are fundamental to congressional oversight of the Border Patrol, CBP, and DHS more broadly. Next, the report summarizes DHS's, and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS's), use of metrics since the early 2000s. Performance Metrics9
DHS's, and the former INS's, efforts in developing different performance metrics at the strategic level to depict the state of the border have resulted in an array of measures that focus either on border security as a whole or on a component of it ( Figure 1 ). While DHS has shown intent to continually improve its measurement of border security, this new metric is subject to influence by external factors that are outside of the control of DHS and may not directly measure border security. These measures, though subject to limitations, are meant to estimate the Border Patrol's effectiveness in apprehending migrants and deterring migrants from re-entering the United States. Technology
In addition to estimating the level of unauthorized entry of migrants into the United States, DHS has also begun to turn its attention to evaluating the performance of the technology used to secure the border. Other Metrics42
At the strategic level, DHS has used two other performance metrics: the percentage of people apprehended multiple times along the Southwest border, or the recidivism rate (introduced in 2013), and the rate of interdiction effectiveness along the Southwest border between ports of entry, or the effectiveness rate (introduced in 2014). The Border Patrol stated that this metric is "used to determine the effectiveness of border security operation at the tactical—or zone—level but can also affect strategic decisionmaking," such as evaluating whether it is employing the appropriate mix and placement of personnel and assets and whether they are being deployed efficiently and effectively. Optimum deterrence was defined as "the level at which applying more Border Patrol agents and resources would not yield a significant gain in arrests/deterrence." Operational control describes the number of border miles where the Border Patrol can detect, identify, respond to, and interdict cross-border unauthorized activity. After 2010, DHS ceased to use operational control as a metric because the Border Patrol station and sector chiefs could not accurately and reliably use its coding scheme to assess different border regions and the agency did not view it as useful for evaluating border security on a mile-by-mile basis. From 2011 to 2013, DHS used apprehensions as a performance metric for border security in annual performance reports. Operational Metrics80
At the operational level, the Border Patrol estimates risk at the border through the use of risk assessments. These assessments are not used as metrics themselves. However, the Border Patrol's methodology for risk assessments monitors certain metrics, along with other information, in order to estimate the level of risk at the sector level. In addition, other metrics the Border Patrol uses are the recidivist rate and the effectiveness rate, the same metrics that DHS uses as performance metrics. Select Issues for Congress to Consider
In reviewing current metrics and those under development, Congress may consider whether these metrics adequately measure border security. For example, is DHS's new metric in development, unauthorized entry of migrants into the United States, satisfactory or will additional metrics be needed to sufficiently measure border security? Congress may want to consider what type of review and oversight should be required with respect to measurement of performance. Congress may also be interested in the implementation of metrics at operational and strategic levels and how they interact with one another. Therefore, Congress may also consider whether DHS's metrics account for the actions of transit countries and whether DHS is capturing the correct data. For example, a decrease in apprehensions at the Southwest border may not be only a result of successful deterrence by the Border Patrol, it may also be the result of increased apprehensions of unauthorized migrants in Mexico, who are therefore prevented from reaching the U.S. border. New data and methodologies also allow for inclusion of metrics that may be able to provide a more complete or holistic view of border security. | Understanding the risks present at the U.S. borders and developing methods to measure border security are key challenges for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Border Patrol, the agency within DHS charged with securing the border between ports of entry. Metrics for border security are used at both the strategic level, by DHS, and at the operational level by Customs and Border Protection (Border Patrol). This report reviews DHS's and the Border Patrol's use of metrics in evaluating their objective to secure the border between ports of entry. DHS and the Border Patrol can use metrics to measure their performance and estimate risks at the border. Additionally, metrics provide Congress with an understanding of DHS's and Border Patrol's progress in securing the border.
At a strategic level, DHS uses performance metrics to understand its ability to meet border security objectives. However, DHS has struggled to create a comprehensive measure of border security. Most recently, DHS has labored to create a new generation of performance metrics, through the estimation of unauthorized entry of migrants into the United States. This measure represents the volume of migration entering the United States and can be influenced by factors outside of DHS's control, and therefore may not directly speak on border security. Congress may want to consider whether this is an adequate performance metric for border security and whether additional and/or more comprehensive and targeted metrics are required.
DHS's Annual Performance Report for FY2014-FY2016 reported two other performance metrics used to measure its progress in securing the border. First, the percentage of people apprehended multiple times along the Southwest border, or the recidivism rate, is used to capture the ability of the Border Patrol to deter migrants from re-entering the United States. Second, the rate of interdiction effectiveness along the Southwest border between ports of entry, or the effectiveness rate, measures the Border Patrol's ability to apprehend unauthorized migrants.
In the past, DHS has used several different performance metrics. For example, from 2001 to 2004, DHS, and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), used optimum deterrence as a measure for border security, defining it as the level where applying more border security would not significantly increase apprehensions or deterrence. In 2005, DHS began to use operational control as a new measure, describing it as the miles along the border where the Border Patrol had the ability to detect, identify, respond to, and interdict cross-border unauthorized activity. When operational control was retired as a metric, migrant apprehensions became the interim measure for border security from 2011 to 2013.
At an operational level, the Border Patrol uses metrics within its risk assessments. The estimation of risk at the sector level assists the Border Patrol in making day-to-day decisions with regard to how to best align its resources against different threats. The agency determines risk through its "State of the Border Risk Methodology." A secured border is characterized as low risk. The Border Patrol's methodology estimates the magnitude of risk by gathering and understanding intelligence information, developing a detailed awareness of threats at the border, and applying a standardized measurement of risk. These assessments are not used as metrics themselves. However, the Border Patrol's methodology monitors certain metrics at the sector level, such as the recidivist rate and effectiveness rate, which may be able to speak to the Border Patrol's performance.
Metrics can provide an understanding of the state of the border. In reviewing border security metrics, Congress may be interested in issues surrounding the oversight of DHS's measurement practices, the determination of acceptable levels of risk for each metric, and the implementation of strategic and operational metrics and how they relate to one another. Moreover, Congress may consider how metrics can be used to inform decisions on expenditures and whether additional data and methodologies are needed to provide a more holistic view of border issues. Lastly, with migrant demographics shifting and some transit countries conducting their own enforcement of unauthorized migration, Congress may consider how these practices affect data and outcomes and what can be done to account for these changes. |
crs_R42944 | crs_R42944_0 | Overview
Several policies that would have reduced spending and increased revenues were poised to take effect at the end of 2012; collectively, these were referred to by some as the "fiscal cliff." Had these policies taken effect, CBO projected that the ensuing fiscal contraction would have resulted in a recession in 2013. On January 2, 2013, the President signed H.R. 8 , the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA, P.L. 112-240 ), which prevented many—but not all—of the fiscal cliff policies from going into effect. This Act was passed by the Senate on January 1, 2013 by a vote of 89-8, and by the House later that day, 257-167. Title VI of the Act extends several expiring provisions in the Medicare and Medicaid programs and makes other changes in federally funded health programs. Specifically, provisions in Title VI of ATRA that will result in higher physician fee schedule payments include the override of the sustainable growth rate (SGR) update mechanism of the Medicare physician fee schedule that would have reduced payments had it taken effect, and the extensions of the physician work geographic adjustment. Other provisions preserved some Medicare hospital payments by extending adjustments for low-volume hospitals and the Medicare-dependent hospital program. Sections that addressed Medicare managed care include the extension of the Medicare Advantage special needs plans and reasonable cost contracts. Medicare beneficiaries will continue to have access to the exceptions process for outpatient therapy limits and outreach and assistance programs for low-income beneficiaries. Other health programs extended by the ATRA include the qualifying individual (QI) program, the transitional medical assistance (TMA) program, the Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) express lane option, family-to-family health information centers, and special diabetes programs for Type I diabetes and for American Indians and Alaska Natives. Some sections make changes to federal health programs that result in savings to the federal budget. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the health provisions in H.R. 8 will result in a net increase in direct spending of $800 million over the ten-year period from FY2013 through FY2022. The physician payment override or "doc fix" ($25.2 billion in direct spending over 10 years) and the various health-related extensions ($4.1 billion) cumulatively add $29.3 billion to direct spending. CBO estimates that the other health provisions cumulatively result in offsets of all but $800 million as a result of the direct effects of the provisions and the interactions between provisions. | Several policies that would have reduced spending and increased revenues were poised to take effect at the end of 2012; collectively, these were referred to by some as the "fiscal cliff." Had these policies taken effect, CBO projected that the ensuing fiscal contraction would have resulted in a recession in 2013. On January 2, 2013, the President signed H.R. 8, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA, P.L. 112-240), which prevented most—but not all—of the fiscal cliff policies from going into effect. This Act was passed by the Senate on January 1, 2013 by a vote of 89-8, and by the House later that day, 257-167. Title VI of the Act extends several expiring provisions in the Medicare and Medicaid programs and makes other changes in federally funded health programs.
Provisions in Title VI of ATRA that will result in higher physician fee schedule payments include the override of the sustainable growth rate (SGR) update mechanism of the Medicare physician fee schedule that would have reduced payments had it taken effect, and the extensions of the physician work geographic adjustment. Other provisions preserved some Medicare hospital payments by extending adjustments for low-volume hospitals and the Medicare-dependent hospital program. Sections that addressed Medicare managed care include the extension of the Medicare Advantage special needs plans and reasonable cost contracts. Medicare beneficiaries will continue to have access to the exceptions process for outpatient therapy limits and outreach and assistance programs for low-income beneficiaries. Other health programs extended by the ATRA include the qualifying individual program, the transitional medical assistance program, the Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) express lane option, family-to-family health information centers, and special diabetes programs for Type I diabetes and for American Indians and Alaska Natives.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the health provisions in H.R. 8 will result in a net increase in direct spending of $800 million over the ten-year period from FY2013 through FY2022. The physician payment override ("doc fix") and the various health-related extensions cumulatively add an estimated $29.3 billion to direct spending. CBO estimates that the other health provisions cumulatively result in offsets of all but $800 million as a result of the direct effects of the provisions and the interactions between provisions. While some sections of ATRA make changes to federal health programs that result in savings to the federal budget, other sections addressing federal health care programs have little or no impact on direct spending in the federal budget. |
crs_R41912 | crs_R41912_0 | Introduction
Over the past several decades, sustainable energy and environmental issues have gained an increasing level of attention in international humanitarian and development assistance, as countries have tried to integrate poverty reduction and economic growth initiatives with a shared concern for the global environment. However, the United States—through its role as a financial contributor to the WBG and as a member on the various WBG governing boards—has influence on WBG policy. This influence manifests itself through voting power on the Board, general advocacy, reporting requirements, and financial leverage. Administrations have focused on the institution's lending practices as a means to induce greater environmental sustainability in multilateral development assistance. Similarly, the U.S. Congress—through its role in WBG appointments, appropriations, and legislative guidance—has significant input on these issues. In 2009, U.S. environmental guidance—as well as other internal and external pressures—led to the WBG reporting its intentions to revise its decade-old strategy for energy and infrastructure lending. After releasing an Energy Strategy Approach Paper in October 2009, and consulting with government and civil society stakeholders from January 2010 to July 2010, a strategy document, Energizing Sustainable Development: Energy Sector Strategy of the World Bank Group (ESS), dated March 16, 2011, was presented to the WBG Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE) on April 11, 2011, for consent and subsequent delivery to the WBG Board of Executive Directors for a vote during the summer of 2011. This report summarizes the provisions of the proposed Energy Sector Strategy of the World Bank Group. Research shows an estimated 1.4 billion people worldwide (i.e., 20% of the world population) are without access to electricity or modern energy resources, and many more face recurrent supply disruptions. The WBG promoted additional initiatives during 2010 as having supported increased energy access and environmentally sustainable development. Critiques
Developing Countries
Many lower-income countries continue to view the WBG primarily as a financial institution to assist in poverty alleviation and economic development, not as an organization to address environmental issues. (See Appendix C for provisions in the U.S. Environmental Groups
Many environmental observers claim that the history of the WBG's energy and infrastructure lending wholly undermines its credibility as an institution committed to combating the impacts of environmental degradation and climate change. The ESS, however, stalled during debate in CODE. With the appointment of Jim Yong Kim as the 12th President of the World Bank Group on July 1, 2012, the ESS process was discontinued. Efforts to revise energy and infrastructure lending have since been incorporated into the broader initiatives of the new administration. Developing Large-Scale Hydropower Where Appropriate. Establishing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Analysis Programs. Increasing Lending for Clean Energy Projects. Prioritizing Energy Efficiency Initiatives. Expanding Access to Modern Energy Services. Improving Household Fuel and Distributed Energy Programs. Encouraging Local Community Engagement and Empowerment. Promoting Innovative Policy. Issues for Congress
The proposed Energy Sector Strategy before the World Bank Group Committee on Development Effectiveness and the Board of Executive Directors is a potential vehicle for the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Administration to address concerns regarding energy and infrastructure lending in lower-income countries and its effect on poverty alleviation and environmentally sustainable development. | One in five people worldwide lack access to electricity. This is among the many challenges that financial institutions face when providing assistance to lower-income countries in order to promote economic and social development. Access to modern energy sources has the potential to substantially increase worldwide economic growth, creating markets in the developing world for products from the developed world, and vice versa. Filling this need may also result in environmental problems that could threaten development, including an increase in pollution that damages fisheries, reduces farm fertility, poses health risks, and contributes to climate change. In response to these risks, the World Bank Group (WBG) has reported its intentions to revise its strategy for energy and infrastructure lending to better address energy poverty alleviation and environmentally sustainable development. After releasing an Approach Paper in October 2009, and consulting with government and civil society stakeholders from January 2010 to July 2010, a strategy document, Energizing Sustainable Development: Energy Sector Strategy of the World Bank Group (ESS), was presented to the WBG Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE) on April 11, 2011, for consent and subsequent delivery to the WBG Board of Executive Directors for a vote during the summer of 2011. The ESS, however, stalled during debate in CODE. With the appointment of Jim Yong Kim as the 12th President of the World Bank Group on July 1, 2012, the ESS process was discontinued. Efforts to revise energy and infrastructure lending have since been incorporated into the broader initiatives of the new administration.
The impetus for the World Bank Group's revision of its energy strategy rests on many factors. Over the past several decades, sustainable energy and environmental issues have gained an increasing level of attention in international humanitarian and development assistance, as countries have tried to integrate poverty reduction and economic growth initiatives with a shared concern for the global environment. Further, lack of access to modern energy resources, recurrent supply disruptions, and increased exposure to the risks of global climate change have hindered social and economic development in many lower-income countries. The ESS comprises an initiative to support energy poverty alleviation and environmentally sustainable development with provisions that include deemphasizing coal-fired power generation, developing large-scale hydropower where appropriate, establishing greenhouse gas emissions programs, increasing lending for clean energy projects, promoting energy efficiency initiatives, expanding access to modern energy services, improving household fuel and distributed energy programs, encouraging local community engagement and empowerment, and supporting innovative energy policy.
While some observers of the WBG have applauded provisions in the revised strategy, many claim that the history of the WBG's energy and infrastructure lending undermines its credibility as an institution committed to combating the impacts of environmental degradation and climate change. The United States—through its role as financial contributor to the WBG and as member on the WBG governing boards—has influence on WBG policy. This influence manifests itself through Board votes, general advocacy, reporting requirements, and financial leverage. While the U.S. Administration oversees the day-to-day participation in WBG operations, the U.S. Congress—through its role in WBG appointments, appropriations, and legislative guidance—retains significant input. U.S. guidance to the WBG has focused on the institution's lending practices as a means to induce greater environmental sustainability in multilateral development assistance. The ESS thus becomes another potential vehicle for the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Administration to further address concerns regarding energy and infrastructure lending in lower-income countries. |
crs_R41492 | crs_R41492_0 | 1 , and also rejected a Senate substitute amendment to H.R. 1 that would have provided $51 billion more in total federal discretionary funding than H.R. 1 (i.e., a cut of $49 billion from the FY2011 request and $10 billion below the FY2010 enacted level). It would have provided $100 billion less in total federal discretionary funding for FY2011 than the President requested, and $61 billion less than enacted for FY2010. 111-322 , a continuing resolution providing funding for the federal government through March 4, 2011. On July 29, 2010, the House passed its version of the FY2011 Department of Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act ( H.R. 5850 ). The bill provided a total of $126.4 billion in funding, $4.3 billion (3.5%) more than FY2010 enacted level and $2.5 billion (2.2%) more than requested. On July 23, 2010, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version of the FY2011 Department of Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act ( S. 3644 ). Status of the THUD Appropriations Bill
Table 2 notes the status of the FY2011 THUD appropriations bill, and Table 3 lists the total funding provided for each of the titles in the bill for FY2010 and the amount requested for that title for FY2011. The House had passed a THUD appropriations bill (H.R. 111-242) to fund the government through the beginning of December at roughly FY2010 funding levels. 1 , on February 18, 2011. This bill would have cut the total FY2011 federal discretionary budget by $61 billion below the requested level; THUD agencies would have been funded at $14 billion below the FY2010 enacted discretionary level. On March 9, 2011, the Senate considered both H.R. 1 and an amendment, S.Amdt. 149 , that would have funded the government for the remainder of FY2011. S.Amdt. 149 would have cut the total FY2011 discretionary budget by $43 billion; THUD agencies would have been funded at $2.2 billion below the FY2010 enacted level. P.L. 1 is $52.4 billion, that represents a total funding level of $108.0 billion. Department of Transportation Appropriations in the 112th Congress
H.R. The Senate alternative, S.Amdt. Department of Transportation Appropriations in the 111th Congress
Table 7 presents funding provided for DOT in the FY2010 THUD appropriations act, and the amounts requested for FY2011 by the Administration, provided by the House, and recommended by the Senate Committee on Appropriations. Department of Transportation Budget and Key Policy Issues7
The President's FY2011 budget requested a total of $77.7 billion in funding for the Department of Transportation (DOT). That was $2.0 billion (2.6%) above the $75.7 billion provided for FY2010. The House-passed bill would provide $79.4 billion; the Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $75.8 billion. The House-passed bill would provide $1.4 billion for the program; the Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended the requested level, $1.0 billion. In the FY2010 THUD Act, Congress provided $2.5 billion for the HSIPR program. 1 would only slightly reduce funding compared to FY2010 (about 1%). HUD Budget and Key Policy Issues17
For FY2011, the President's budget requested about $45.6 billion in net new budget authority for HUD, a decrease of about 1% from the FY2010 enacted level. The overall increase in appropriations would be more than offset by a substantial increase in offsetting collections and receipts, which are estimated to come from proposed changes to the FHA mortgage insurance programs. Like the House bill, the Senate Appropriations Committee bill would provide a 1% increase in net new budget authority over the FY2010 enacted level and a 5% increase in appropriations for HUD programs in aggregate. Both H.R. | President Obama requested a total of $123.7 billion for FY2011 for the Department of Transportation, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the related agencies that are funded through the annual Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations (THUD) act. This request represented an increase of approximately $1.6 billion (1.3%) over the $122.1 billion provided in the FY2010 THUD appropriations act.
During the second session of the 111th Congress, the House passed an FY2011 THUD appropriations bill (H.R. 5850) that would have provided $126.4 billion (3.5% over the FY2010 enacted level). The Senate did not pass an FY2011 THUD appropriations bill; the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out an FY2011 THUD appropriations bill (S. 3644) that recommended $122.8 billion (less than 1% over FY2010). In the absence of passage of a THUD appropriations act for FY2011, Congress has provided funding for the THUD agencies (and other government agencies) through a series of continuing resolutions (CRs). The 111th Congress provided funding through March 4, 2011 (P.L. 111-322), at roughly FY2010 funding levels.
The 112th Congress resumed the FY2011 appropriations process, with the House under new leadership and expressing an intent to reduce non-security-related federal discretionary spending. With only a little over half of FY2011 left when the March 4 CR expired, and the budget request for FY2012 already submitted, debate over FY2011 appropriations shifted to the question of how much would be cut from the current total discretionary funding level. On February 18, 2011, the House passed H.R. 1, a bill to fund the government for the remainder of the fiscal year, which would have cut discretionary funding not only below the FY2011 requested level but also below the FY2010 enacted level. It would have provided $108.0 billion in total budgetary resources for THUD, 11% below the FY2010 enacted level. On March 9, 2011, the Senate considered, but failed to pass, both H.R. 1 and a Senate amendment to H.R. 1 (S.Amdt. 149) that would have cut total discretionary funding below the FY2011 request but left it above the FY2010 enacted level. It would have provided $118.3 billion for THUD, 3% less than the FY2010 enacted level.
For the Department of Transportation (DOT), the President's FY2011 budget requested a total of $77.7 billion. That was $2.0 billion (2.6%) above the $75.7 billion provided for FY2010. The House-passed H.R. 5850 (111th Congress) would have provided $79.4 billion ($3.7 billion over FY2010); the 111th Congress's Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $75.8 billion ($0.1 billion over FY2010). In the 112th Congress, H.R. 1 would have provided $68.3 billion ($7.4 billion below FY2010); S.Amdt. 149 would have provided $73.7 billion ($2.0 billion below FY2010).
For the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the President's FY2011 budget requested about $45.6 billion in net new budget authority, a decrease of about 1% from the FY2010 enacted level. However, the requested decrease in net new budget authority actually represented a 3% increase in new funding for HUD programs, as the overall increase in appropriations would have been more than offset by a substantial increase in offsetting collections and receipts, which were expected to come from proposed changes to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance programs. Both the FY2011 House and Senate bills in the 111th Congress would have provided a 5% increase over FY2010 in appropriations for HUD programs in aggregate. In the 112th Congress, H.R. 1 would have provided $38.6 billion (about $7 billion below FY2010). S.Amdt. 149 would have provided $44.9 billion (over $1 billion below FY2010). |
crs_R40782 | crs_R40782_0 | On March 25, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced changes in the department's enforcement of the 1993 law. Under these changes, Secretary Gates said only a general or flag officer would have the authority to separate someone who had engaged in homosexual conduct, that information provided by a third party must be given under oath, and that the information given to certain individuals—lawyers, psychotherapists, clergy, and domestic abuse counselors, for example—cannot be used in support of discharge proceedings. Language was included in the House version of the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. Language was also included in the Senate version of this bill ( S. 3454 ) that would allow for repeal, following certain stipulations. A cloture vote failed and the bill was not brought to the floor. On September 9, 2010, Federal Judge Virginia A. Phillips ruled the 1993 law was unconstitutional. On November 30, 2010, the Comprehensive Working Group report was issue, followed by Senate Armed Service Committee hearings. Nine days later (December 8, 2010), the Senate again voted on a procedural motion to move S. 3454 forward. Again, this cloture vote failed. Since then, three bills were introduced ( S. 4022 , S. 4023 , and H.R. 6520 ) that would repeal the law and the DADT policy. On December 15, 2010, the House passed a stand-alone bill ( H.R. 2965 ), identical to the language initially in the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act, to repeal DADT. The Administration dubbed this policy, "don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue." 654 of Title 10 USC (and the DADT policy) is repealed: (1) after receipt of the Pentagon's comprehensive review of how to implement a repeal is completed (due December 1, 2010); (2) the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President certify that the repeal is consistent with military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion and recruiting, and that DOD has prepared the necessary policies and regulations for implementing the repeal; and (3) after a 60-day waiting period following certification. The House passed this bill on May 28, 2010, and sent it to the Senate. On September 21, 2010, the Senate voted on a procedural measure to move S. 3454 forward. One month later, (October 12, 2010), Judge Phillips enjoined the Secretary of Defense, or the Department of Defense in general, "from enforcing or applying [DADT]." However, on October 19, 2010, the Ninth Circuit placed a temporary stay on the injunction while the court considers the stay for the rest of the appeals process. Two days later, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel Clifford Stanley issued a memorandum stating only five senior Defense Department officials would have the authority to discharge service members for homosexual behavior as defined in the law. However, administrative discharges for same-sex conduct normally are not affected by stop-loss. REPORT. 5136 , sec. H.R. (15) The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability. | In 1993, new laws and regulations pertaining to homosexuality and U.S. military service came into effect reflecting a compromise in policy. This compromise, colloquially referred to as "don't ask, don't tell," (DADT), holds that the presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in same-sex acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion which are the essence of military capability. Under this policy, but not the law, service members are not to be asked about nor allowed to discuss their "same-sex orientation." The law itself does not prevent service members from being asked about their sexuality. This compromise notwithstanding, the issue has remained politically contentious.
Prior to the 1993 compromise, the number of individuals discharged for homosexuality was generally declining. Since that time, the number of discharges for same-sex conduct has generally increased until 2001. However, analysis of these data shows no statistically significant difference in discharge rates for these two periods.
On March 25, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced changes in the department's enforcement of the 1993 law. Under these changes, Secretary Gates said only a general or flag officer would have the authority to separate someone who had engaged in homosexual conduct, that information provided by a third party must be given under oath, and that the information given to certain individuals—lawyers, psychotherapists, clergy, and domestic abuse counselors, for example—cannot be used in support of discharge proceedings. On October 11, 2010, the rules were again changed allowing only a select group of senior civilian leaders to have authority to discharge someone for violating the policy.
Language was also included in the House and Senate versions of the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5136 and S. 3454) that would allow for the repeal of the 1993 law, following certain stipulations. The House passed this bill on May 28, 2010, and sent it to the Senate. On September 21, 2010, the Senate voted on a procedural motion to move S. 3454 forward. A cloture vote failed and the bill was not brought to the floor.
On September 9, 2010, Federal Judge Virginia A. Phillips ruled the 1993 law was unconstitutional. One month later, (October 12, 2010), Judge Phillips enjoined the Department of Defense "from enforcing or applying [DADT]." The Defense Department took steps to comply with the injunction, but on October 20, 2010, the Ninth Circuit granted a temporary stay of the injunction.
On November 30, 2010, the Comprehensive Review Working Group report was issued, followed by Senate Armed Service Committee hearings. Ten days later (December 9, 2010), the Senate again voted on a procedural motion to move S. 3454 forward. Again, this cloture vote failed. Since then, three bills have been introduced (S. 4022, S. 4023, and H.R. 6520) that would repeal the law and the DADT policy. On December 15, 2010, the House passed a stand-alone measure (H.R. 2965), identical to the language initially in the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act, to repeal Sec. 654, Title 10 USC, (DADT). Three days later, the Senate passed H.R. 2965.
For more information, see CRS Report R40795, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell": A Legal Analysis, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31600 | crs_RL31600_0 | of November 13, 2001. The Supreme Court overturned a decision by the D.C. Military Commissions at Guantánamo Bay
The President's Military Order establishing military commissions to try suspected terrorists has been the focus of intense debate both at home and abroad. Critics argued that the tribunals could violate any rights the accused may have under the Constitution as well as their rights under international law, thereby undercutting the legitimacy of any verdicts rendered by the tribunals. The procedural rules released in March 2002 were praised as a significant improvement over what might have been permitted under the language of the M.O., but some continued to argue that the enhancements do not go far enough and that the checks and balances of a separate rule-making authority and an independent appellate process are necessary. The instructions set forth the elements of some crimes that may be tried by military commission, establish guidelines for civilian attorneys, and provide other administrative guidance and procedures for military commissions. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed. Further, the Court found that some of the rules provided in the Defense Department rules set forth in Military Commission Order No. 1 ("M.C.O. The Hamdan Court left open the possibility that the rules established by M.C.O. No. One of the perceived shortcomings of the M.O. No.1 addresses these issues in part. (Under the UCMJ, the trial record of a military commission would be forwarded to the appropriate JAG first.) The M.C.O. The M.O. ( S. 3901 , Proposed 10 U.S.C. 6054 , S. 3886 , and S. 3861 provide for the exclusion of the accused from portions of his trial in order to allow classified information to be presented to panel members but not disclosed to the accused. The following charts provide a comparison of the proposed military tribunals under the regulations issued by the Department of Defense, standard procedures for general courts-martial under the Manual for Courts-Martial, and military tribunals as proposed by H.R. Table 2 , which compares procedural safeguards incorporated in the DOD regulations and the UCMJ, follows the same order and format used in CRS Report RL31262, Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts , in order to facilitate comparison of the proposed legislation to safeguards provided in federal court, the international military tribunals that tried World War II crimes at Nuremberg and Tokyo, and contemporary ad hoc tribunals set up by the UN Security Council to try crimes associated with hostilities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. | November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order (M.O.) pertaining to the detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens in the war against terrorism. Military commissions pursuant to the M.O. began in November, 2004, against four persons declared eligible for trial, but proceedings were suspended after a federal district court found one of the defendants could not be tried under the rules established by the Department of Defense. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision, Rumsfeld v. Hamdan, but the Supreme Court granted review and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Military commissions will not be able to go forward until the Department of Defense revises its rules to conform with the Supreme Court's Hamdan opinion or Congress approves legislation conferring authority to promulgate rules that depart from the strictures of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and U.S. international obligations.
The M.O. has been the focus of intense debate both at home and abroad. Critics argued that the tribunals could violate the rights of the accused under the Constitution as well as international law, thereby undercutting the legitimacy of any verdicts rendered by the tribunals. The Administration responded by publishing a series of military orders and instructions clarifying some of the details. The procedural aspects of the trials were published in Military Commission Order No. 1 ("M.C.O. No. 1"). The Department of Defense also released two more orders and nine "Military Commission Instructions," which set forth the elements of some crimes that may be tried, establish guidelines for civilian attorneys, and provide other administrative guidance. These rules were praised as a significant improvement over what might have been permitted under the M.O., but some argued that the enhancements do not go far enough, and the Supreme Court held that the amended rules did not comply with the UCMJ.
This report provides a background and analysis comparing military commissions as envisioned under M.C.O. No. 1 to general military courts-martial conducted under the UCMJ. A summary of the Hamdan case follows, in particular the shortcomings identified by the Supreme Court. The report provides an overview of legislation (H.R. 6054, S. 3901, S. 3930, S. 3861, and S. 3886). Finally, the report provides two charts to compare the regulations issued by the Department of Defense to standard procedures for general courts-martial under the Manual for Courts-Martial and to proposed legislation. The second chart, which compares procedural safeguards incorporated in the regulations with established procedures in courts-martial, follows the same order and format used in CRS Report RL31262, Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts, in order to facilitate comparison with safeguards provided in federal court and international criminal tribunals. |
crs_RL34436 | crs_RL34436_0 | One such design element is the treatment of offsets. An offset is a measurable reduction, avoidance, or sequestration of GHG emissions from a source not covered by an emission reduction program. If Congress establishes a GHG emission cap-and-trade program, only sources not covered by the cap could generate offsets. If offsets are allowed as a compliance option in an emissions trading program, eligible offset projects could generate "emission credits," which could be sold and then used by a regulated entity to comply with its reduction requirement. As with renewable energy projects, there could be energy efficiency projects in nations that do not limit GHG emissions. However, implementing this objective would likely present challenges. Integrity Concerns
If offsets are to be included in an emissions trading program, offset integrity—i.e., whether or not the offsets represent real emission reductions—is critical. If allowed as part of an emissions reduction program, offsets have the potential to provide various benefits. The ability to generate offsets may
provide an incentive for non-regulated sources to reduce, avoid, or sequester emissions (where these actions would not have occurred if not for the offset program); expand emission mitigation opportunities, thus reducing compliance costs for regulated entities; offer environmental co-benefits for certain projects; support sustainable development in developing nations; and create new economic opportunities and spur parties to seek new methods of generating offsets. The main concern with offset projects is whether or not they produce their stated emission reductions. To be credible, an offset ton should equate to a ton reduced from a direct emission source, such as a smokestack or exhaust pipe. If illegitimate offset credits flow into the trading program, the cap would effectively expand and credible emissions reductions would be undermined. The program would fail to meets its ultimate objective: overall GHG emissions reductions. One debate may involve whether including offsets would send the appropriate price signal to encourage the development and deployment of new technologies, such as carbon capture and storage. Policymakers may consider striking a balance between sending a strong price signal and reducing the costs of the emissions reduction program. On the other hand, some maintain that if developed nations use all of the low-cost offsets in developing nations, the developing nations will face higher compliance costs if and when they establish GHG emission reduction requirements. Moreover, there is some concern that international offsets may serve as a disincentive for developing nations to enact laws or regulations limiting GHG emissions because they would lose funding from the offset market. If eligible in a U.S. program, international offsets from countries without binding reduction targets are likely to dominate in early decades because of their comparatively lower costs. Certain domestic economic sectors, primarily agriculture and forestry (if eligible as offsets), would benefit if international offsets are excluded. | If Congress establishes a greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction program (e.g., cap-and-trade system), the treatment of GHG emission offsets would likely be a critical design element. If allowed as part of an emissions program, offsets could provide cost savings and other benefits. However, offsets have generated concern.
An offset is a measurable reduction, avoidance, or sequestration of GHG emissions from a source not covered by an emission reduction program. If allowed, offset projects could generate "emission credits," which could be used by a regulated entity (e.g., power plant) to comply with its reduction requirement. Offsets could include various activities:
agriculture or forestry projects: e.g., conservation tillage or planting trees on previously non-forested lands; renewable energy projects: e.g., wind farms; energy efficiency projects: e.g., equipment upgrades; non-CO2 emissions reduction projects: e.g., methane from landfills.
Including offsets would likely make an emissions program more cost-effective by (1) providing an incentive for non-regulated sources to generate emission reductions and (2) expanding emission compliance opportunities for regulated entities. Some offset projects may provide other benefits, such as improvements in air or water quality. In addition, the offset market may create new economic opportunities and spur innovation as parties seek new methods of generating offsets.
The main concern with offset projects is whether or not they represent real emission reductions. For offsets to be credible, a ton of CO2-equivalent emissions from an offset project should equate to a ton reduced from a covered emission source, such as a smokestack or exhaust pipe. This objective presents challenges because many offsets are difficult to measure. If illegitimate offset credits flow into an emissions trading program, the program would fail to reduce GHG emissions. Another concern is whether the inclusion of offsets would send the appropriate price signal to encourage the development of long-term mitigation technologies. Policymakers may consider a balance between price signal and program costs.
If eligible in a U.S. program, international offsets are expected to dominate in early decades because they would likely offer the lowest-cost options. Domestic sectors, such as agriculture and forestry, might benefit if international offsets are excluded. Some object to the use of international offsets due to concerns of fairness: the low-cost options would be unavailable to developing nations if and when they establish GHG emission targets. However, some offset projects may promote sustainable development. On the other hand, international offsets may serve as a disincentive for developing nations to enact laws or regulations controlling GHG emissions because many projects would no longer qualify as offsets. |
crs_R43702 | crs_R43702_0 | Introduction
Over the past several years, the number of unaccompanied children from the "northern triangle" of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) attempting to enter the United States has increased significantly. Many analysts warn that elevated levels of migration from the region are likely to continue until policymakers in the countries of origin and the international community address the poor security and socioeconomic conditions in the northern triangle. Background
Given the geographic proximity of Central America, the United States historically has had close political, economic, and cultural ties with the region. FY2015 Appropriations
Congress appropriated more than $570 million for Central America in FY2015, which was $241 million more than the Administration originally requested for the region. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ), directed the Secretary of State to use the funds appropriated for the region to implement a strategy to "address the key factors in the countries in Central America contributing to the migration of unaccompanied, undocumented minors to the United States." FY2016 Appropriations
In March 2015, the Obama Administration introduced a new, whole-of-government U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America designed to promote economic prosperity, improve security, and strengthen governance in the region. The Administration requested more than $1 billion of foreign assistance to implement the strategy in FY2016, dividing the funds among the three overarching areas of action. In December 2015, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. Congress placed numerous conditions on aid for Central America. The act also states that 25% of the funds for the "central governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras" may not be obligated until the Secretary of State certifies that each government is "taking effective steps" to
inform its citizens of the dangers of the journey to the southwestern border of the United States; combat human smuggling and trafficking; improve border security; and cooperate with U.S. government agencies and other governments in the region to facilitate the return, repatriation, and reintegration of illegal migrants arriving at the southwestern border of the United States who do not qualify as refugees consistent with international law. Another 50% of the funds for the "central governments" may not be obligated until the Secretary of State certifies the governments are "taking effective steps" to
establish an autonomous, publicly accountable entity to provide oversight of the plan; combat corruption, including investigating and prosecuting government officials credibly alleged to be corrupt; implement reforms, policies, and programs to improve transparency and strengthen public institutions, including increasing the capacity and independence of the judiciary and the Office of the Attorney General; establish and implement a policy that local communities, civil society organizations (including indigenous and marginalized groups), and local governments are to be consulted in the design and participate in the implementation and evaluation of activities of the plan that affect such communities, organizations, and governments; counter the activities of criminal gangs, drug traffickers, and organized crime, investigate and prosecute in the civilian justice system members of military and police forces who are credibly alleged to have violated human rights, and ensure that the military and police are cooperating in such cases; cooperate with commissions against impunity, as appropriate, and with regional human rights entities; support programs to reduce poverty, create jobs, and promote equitable economic growth in areas contributing to large numbers of migrants; establish and implement a plan to create a professional, accountable civilian police force and curtail the role of the military in internal policing; protect the right of political opposition parties, journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders, and other civil society activists to operate without interference; increase government revenues, including by implementing tax reforms and strengthening customs agencies; and resolve commercial disputes, including the confiscation of real property, between United States entities and such government. In addition to the $772 million requested for Central America through the State Department and USAID, the Administration requested $135 million through other U.S. agencies to support its whole-of-government strategy in Central America. Policy Considerations
As Congress debates the Administration's FY2017 budget request and other legislative options to address the foreign policy dimensions of increased migration from Central America, it might take into consideration a variety of interrelated issues. These issues include the humanitarian implications of the current situation, the international humanitarian response, the capacity of Central American nations to receive and reintegrate unaccompanied children deported from the United States, the capacity of Central American nations to address the root causes of the exodus, and the role of Mexico as a transit country. U.S. authorities apprehended nearly 52,000 unaccompanied minors from the region in FY2014, straining U.S. government resources and creating a complex crisis with humanitarian implications. Although U.S. apprehensions of unaccompanied children from the northern triangle declined by 45% in FY2015, they have increased again in the first five months of FY2016. The Obama Administration's initial response to the FY2014 surge was focused on efforts to deter irregular migration. | Since FY2011, the number of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) traveling to the United States from the "northern triangle" nations of Central America—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—has increased sharply. U.S. authorities encountered more than 52,000 unaccompanied minors from the region at the U.S. border in FY2014, a more than 1,200% increase compared to FY2011. This unexpected surge of children strained U.S. government resources and created a complex crisis with humanitarian implications. U.S. apprehensions of unaccompanied minors from the northern triangle declined by 45% in FY2015. They increased in the first five months of FY2016, however, and experts warn that significant migration flows will continue until policymakers in the countries of origin and the international community address the poor socioeconomic and security conditions driving Central Americans to leave their homes.
The 2014 migration crisis led to renewed focus on Central America, a region with which the United States historically has shared close political, economic, and cultural ties. The United States engages with Central American countries through a variety of mechanisms, including a security assistance package known as the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Over the past two years, the Obama Administration has sought closer cooperation with Central American governments to dissuade children from making the journey to the United States, target smuggling networks, and repatriate unauthorized migrants.
The Administration also has introduced a whole-of-government "U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America" designed to increase economic opportunity, reduce extreme violence, and strengthen the effectiveness of state institutions in the region. The Administration requested $1 billion through the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development to implement the strategy in FY2016, and it has requested more than $770 million through those two agencies to continue implementation in FY2017. The governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are undertaking complementary efforts under their "Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle."
Congress has expressed considerable concern about increased migration from Central America, with Members holding numerous hearings, traveling to the region, and introducing legislation designed to address the situation. Although Congress opted not to appropriate supplemental funding for programs in Central America in FY2014, it appropriated more than $570 million for the region in FY2015, which was $241 million more than the Administration originally requested. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235), also directed the Administration to develop a comprehensive strategy to address the key factors contributing to the migration of unaccompanied children to the United States. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), appropriated $750 million in support of the Administration's Central America strategy in FY2016. The act also placed a number of conditions on the assistance, requiring governments in the region to take steps to improve border security, combat corruption, increase revenues, and address human rights concerns, among other actions.
As Congress debates the Administration's FY2017 budget request and other legislative options to address increased migration from Central America, it might take into consideration a variety of interrelated issues. These issues might include the humanitarian implications of the current situation, the international humanitarian response, Central American governments' limited capacities to receive and reintegrate repatriated children, Central American governments' abilities and willingness to address poor security and socioeconomic conditions in their countries, and the extent to which the Mexican government is capable of limiting the transmigration of Central Americans through its territory. |
crs_R43148 | crs_R43148_0 | U.S. oil and natural gas production is on the rise, primarily driven by resources from tight formations. The United States surpassed Russia in 2009 as the world's largest natural gas producer. This report focuses on the growth in U.S. oil and natural gas production driven primarily by tight oil formations and shale gas formations. Increased Tight Oil Production Raises Independence Possibility
The prospect of U.S. energy independence is grounded in the production growth from tight oil formations such as the Bakken Formation in North Dakota and Montana and the Eagle Ford Formation in Texas. The United States added almost 1 million barrels per day (b/d) of oil production between 2012 and 2013 (see Figure 5 ). Potential direct risks may include impacts to groundwater and surface water quality, public and private water supplies, and air quality. In addition, some have raised concerns about potential long-term and indirect impacts from reliance on fossil fuels and resulting greenhouse gas emissions and influence on broader energy economics. This report focuses primarily on measures to address potential direct impacts. The "hydraulic fracturing" debate also has been complicated by terminology. State groundwater protection officials have reported that development of shale gas and tight oil using high-volume hydraulic fracturing, in combination with directional drilling, has posed new challenges for the management and protection of water resources. Consequently, many of the major producing states have revised or are in the process of revising their oil and gas laws and regulations to respond to these advances in oil and natural gas production technologies and related changes in the industry. Some advocates of a larger federal role point to a wide range of differences in substance, scope, and enforcement among state regulatory regimes and assert that a national framework is needed to ensure a consistent baseline level of environmental and human health protection and transparency. Others, including many oil and gas states, argue against greater federal involvement and point to established state oil and gas programs and regulatory structures (which include a range of structures involving commissions, boards, or divisions within natural resource agencies working to varying degrees with, or within, state environmental agencies). In the 113 th Congress, as in recent Congresses, the federal role in regulating oil and gas production generally, and hydraulic fracturing specifically, was the subject of hearings, seminars, and legislation. Selected Federal Responses to Unconventional Resource Extraction
Provisions of several federal environmental laws and related regulations currently apply to certain activities associated with oil and natural gas production. While congressional debate has continued on legislative proposals, the Administration has been pursuing additional initiatives to regulate or otherwise manage activities related to unconventional oil and gas production. Additionally, some states require oil and gas operators on federal lands within their state to comply with various state rules; consequently, the debate over the federal role in regulating unconventional oil and gas production—and related concerns over possible overlapping, inconsistent, or duplicative rules—has extended to activities on federal lands. BLM does not provide for statewide exemptions from the hydraulic fracturing rule. In contrast to the above bills, several others proposed to expand federal regulation of hydraulic fracturing. Development of these resources has generated concern and debate over potential environmental and human health risks. These concerns have drawn scrutiny of regulatory regimes governing this industry and have led to calls for greater federal oversight of oil and gas development. Selected Federal Initiatives Related to Unconventional Oil and Gas Production | The United States has seen resurgence in petroleum production, mainly driven by technology improvements—especially hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling—developed for natural gas production from shale formations. Application of these technologies enabled natural gas to be economically produced from shale and other unconventional formations and contributed to the United States becoming the world's largest natural gas producer in 2009. Use of these technologies has also contributed to the rise in U.S. oil production over the last few years. In 2009, annual oil production increased over 2008, the first annual rise since 1991, and has continued to increase each year since. Between January 2008 and May 2014, U.S. monthly crude oil production rose by 3.2 million barrels per day, with about 85% of the increase coming from shale and related tight oil formations in Texas and North Dakota. Other tight oil plays are also being developed, helping raise the prospect of energy independence, especially for North America.
The rapid expansion of tight oil and shale gas extraction using high-volume hydraulic fracturing has raised concerns about its potential environmental and health impacts. These concerns include potential direct impacts to groundwater and surface water quality, water supplies, and air quality. In addition, some have raised concerns about potential long-term and indirect impacts from reliance on fossil fuels and resulting greenhouse gas emissions and influence on broader energy economics. This report focuses mainly on actions related to controlling potential direct impacts.
States are the primary regulators of oil and gas production on non-federal lands. In recent years, many oil and gas producing states have revised laws and regulations governing oil and gas production in response to changes in production practices as producers have expanded into tight oil, shale gas, and other unconventional hydrocarbon formations. However, state rules vary considerably, leading to calls for more federal oversight of unconventional oil and gas extraction activities and hydraulic fracturing specifically.
Provisions of several federal environmental laws can apply to certain activities related to oil and gas production, and proposals to expand federal regulation in this area have been highly controversial. Some advocates of a larger federal role point to a wide range of differences among state regulatory regimes and argue that a national framework is needed to ensure a consistent minimum level of protection for surface and groundwater resources and air quality. Others argue against more federal involvement and point to the long-established state oil and natural gas regulatory programs, regional differences in geology and water resources, and concern over regulatory redundancy.
The federal role in regulating oil and gas extraction activities—and hydraulic fracturing, in particular—has been the subject of considerable debate and legislative proposals for several years, but legislation has not been enacted. While congressional debate has continued, the Administration has pursued a number of regulatory initiatives related to unconventional oil and gas development under existing statutory authorities.
This report focuses on the growth in U.S. oil and natural gas production driven primarily by tight oil formations and shale gas formations. It also reviews selected federal environmental regulatory and research initiatives related to unconventional oil and gas extraction, including the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) hydraulic fracturing rule (finalized in March 2015) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) actions. |
crs_R44183 | crs_R44183_0 | Introduction
This report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2016. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the fourth title of the homeland security appropriations bill—U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). Collectively, Congress has labeled these components in recent years as "Research and Development, Training, and Services." The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2016 request for Research and Development, Training, and Services, and the appropriations proposed by Congress in response, and those enacted thus far. Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the fourth title, the report includes information on provisions throughout the proposed bill and report that directly affect these functions. Data used in this report for FY2015 amounts are derived from the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. As shown below, the components funded under Research and Development, Training, and Services would have received roughly 3% of the discretionary budget authority requested for FY2016. Funding was also included in Title V, General Provisions, for some of these components. Of this total budget, $1,554 million is discretionary authority. The Senate-reported bill would have provided $1,461 million in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, a decrease of $103 million (6.6%) from the request and $344 million (19.2%) below the FY2015 enacted level. 3128 would have provided the components included in this title $1,503 million in net discretionary budget authority. This would have been $51 million (3.3%) less than requested, and $292 million (16.2%) less than was provided in FY2015. Division F of P.L. 114-113 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, was the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016. The act included $1,499 million for these components in FY2016, a $55 million (3.5%) decrease from the request and $296 million (16.5%) below FY2015. The table includes information on funding under Title IV as well as other provisions in the bill. 114-113 (the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016) provided $120 million in appropriations for USCIS, $10 million below the amount requested by the Administration and the same amount as Senate-reported S. 1619 and House-reported H.R. FY2016 Request
The Administration's request of $779 million for the S&T Directorate in FY2016 was 29.4% less than the FY2015 appropriation of $1,104 million. Most of the difference resulted from a lower request for Laboratory Facilities, which received $300 million in FY2015 for construction of the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). | This report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2016. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the fourth title of the homeland security appropriations bill—U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). Collectively, Congress has labeled these components in appropriations acts in recent years as "Research and Development, Training, and Services."
The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2016 request for Research, Development, Training, and Services, the appropriations proposed by Congress in response, and those enacted. Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the fourth title, the report includes information on provisions throughout the proposed bill and report that directly affect these functions.
Research and Development, Training, and Services is the second smallest of the four titles that carry the vast majority of the funding in the bill. The Administration requested $1,554 million for these components in FY2016, $241 million less than was provided for FY2015. These four components made up 3.7% of the Administration's $41.4 billion request for the department in net discretionary budget authority. The completion of funding for construction of the National Bio- and Agro-defense Facility in FY2015 reduced the demand for facilities funding by $300 million—part of an overall reduction of $325 million in the request for S&T from FY2015 enacted levels. DNDO's budget request rose by $49 million (16.1%), while USCIS and FLETC saw smaller increases in their requests.
Senate-reported S. 1619 would have provided the components included in this title $1,451 million in net discretionary budget authority. This would have been $103 million (6.6%) less than requested, and $344 million (19.2%) less than was provided in FY2015.
House-reported H.R. 3128 would have provided the components included in this title $1,503 million in net discretionary budget authority. This would have been $51 million (3.3%) less than requested, and $292 million (16.2%) less than was provided in FY2015.
On December 18, 2015, the President signed into law P.L. 114-113, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Division F of which was the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016. The act included $1,499 million for these components in FY2016, a $55 million (3.5%) decrease from the request and $296 million (16.5%) below FY2015.
Additional information on the broader subject of FY2016 funding for the department can be found in CRS Report R44053, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2016, as well as links to analytical overviews and details regarding appropriations for other components.
This report will be updated if supplemental appropriations are provided for any of these components through the FY2016 appropriations process. |
crs_R44856 | crs_R44856_0 | Introduction
The APT T-X acquisition strategy poses potential oversight issues for Congress. The addition of a new Major Defense Acquisition Program as the Air Force continues to purchase F-35As and KC-46s and develop the new Long Range Strike Bomber, B-21, will affect the USAF budget requests going forward, and the T-X contract award has already been delayed several times in light of budget issues. In addition, NASA uses the T-38C to train future astronauts. The scope of the acquisition program is to acquire an advanced trainer aircraft and ground-based training system to be used by the Air Education and Training Command (AETC) in the pilot training pipeline. According to the USAF, the APT T-X system will close the 12 capability gaps identified in the ICD and better prepare student pilots for operations in fifth-generation fighters and bombers. The USAF requirement for the APT T-X is an operational availability of 80% or greater. Trainer Aircraft System Requirements
The USAF contends that by 2031, 60% of all combat air forces will be fifth-generation aircraft and therefore the force will require a modern aircraft to train future fighter and bomber pilots. Air Force plans expected the award to also include up to 120 GBTS. The contract was awarded on September 27, 2018. Issues for Congress
DOD's APT T-X acquisition strategy poses a number of questions for Congress, including the following:
Given the USAF's position on the looming pilot shortage, the anticipated purchase of 350 T-X aircraft, and the current fleet size of 430, what are the minimum and optimum recapitalization levels needed? Should the training fleet be recapitalized sooner to accommodate the increase in the number of fifth-generation platforms? Considering that the winning bid was less than 50% of the Air Force's projected cost, can Boeing execute the program on time and within budget? Following IFF, the pilots transition to training on their assigned aircraft at bases throughout the United States, depending on aircraft assignment. | NOTE: This report was originally written by [author name scrubbed] while he was an Air Force Fellow at the Congressional Research Service. Since his departure, it has been maintained by [author name scrubbed] of CRS.
On September 27, 2018, the United States Air Force (USAF) awarded The Boeing Company a contract, worth up to $9.2 billion, to procure 351 Advanced Pilot Training (APT T-X) aircraft and 46 Ground-Based Training Systems (GBTS) to replace the existing fleet of T-38C jet trainers. The Air Force had originally valued the contract at roughly $19.7 billion. Information on the value of other competitors' bids was not available.
The FY2019 Administration budget request included $265.465 million for the T-X.
According to the USAF, the T-38C trainer fleet is old, costly, and outdated, and lacks the technology to train future pilots for fifth-generation fighter and bomber operations. Based on Air Education Training Command's evaluation of the required capabilities to train future pilots for fifth-generation fighters and bombers, the T-38C falls short in 12 of 18 capabilities, forcing the USAF to train for those capabilities in operational units where flying hours are costly and can affect fleet readiness.
Based on the requirements set forth in the USAF's RFP, the APT T-X aircraft may shift training from Field Training Units, where expensive fifth-generation aircraft are used, to less expensive trainer aircraft. Also, the higher fidelity GBTS could improve training for student pilots and move many tasks from aerial flight training into simulators.
The APT T-X acquisition strategy poses potential oversight issues for Congress, including the following: Is the number of planned aircraft purchases sufficient? Given the reported Air Force pilot shortage, should the procurement be accelerated? What effects do increased F-35A and KC-46 purchases, along with development of the new Long Range Strike Bomber, B-21, have on the USAF budget and the feasibility of an additional Major Defense Acquisition Program? Given that the winning bid was roughly half the expected cost, can the contract be carried out on time and on budget? |
crs_R43167 | crs_R43167_0 | The credit union industry has evolved with marketplace changes so that many of the financial services that credit unions provide are similar to those offered by banks and savings associations. Credit unions can only make loans to their members, to other credit unions, and to credit union organizations. 1422 and S. 1440 , the Credit Union Residential Credit Union Loan Parity Act, would amend the FCU Act to revise the statutory definition of member business loans, further enhancing the capacity of credit unions (satisfying the net worth capitalization requirements) to make more member business and commercial loans. Legislation has been introduced in the 114 th Congress that would allow credit unions to enhance their member business lending activities. H.R. 1188 , the Credit Union Small Business Jobs Creation Act, was introduced on March 2, 2015; the companion bill, S. 2028 , was introduced on September 10, 2015. H.R. Although the volume of credit union member business lending has increased over time, member business loans continue to account for a small share of lending in the credit union system. Lifting the MBL cap would allow credit unions already operating close to the current statutory limit to increase their presence in the commercial lending market. Some of the larger credit unions, therefore, could become more important competitors with small community banks as well as some midsize and regional banks. H.R. Hence, if alternative sources of capital, referred to as supplemental capital, can be used in addition to retained earnings (net worth), then credit unions would be able to increase their lending while remaining in compliance with their safety and soundness net worth requirements. 989 , the Capital Access for Small Business and Jobs Act, referred to the House Committee on Financial Services on February 13, 2015, would redefine net worth for credit unions to include additional sources of supplemental capital in a manner consistent with the three forms discussed in the NCUA white paper. H.R. According to the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (FHLB Act; P.L. H.R. 299 , the Capital Access for Small Community Financial Institutions Act of 2015, would amend the FHLB Act to require the treatment of a state-chartered credit unions as insured depository institutions, among other things; thus making it possible to harmonize FHLB membership requirements for small banks and credit unions. The House passed H.R. 299 on April 13, 2015, and its language was included in an amendment to H.R. 22 , the Surface Transportation Reauthorization and Reform Act of 2015, which was passed in the House on November 5, 2015. S. 1484 , the Financial Regulatory Improvement Act of 2015, and S. 1910 , the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2016, also contain language similar to H.R. 299 .
Credit Unions, Community Banks, and Competition
Community banks, which are commonly defined as financial institutions that hold less than $1 billion in assets, are arguably similar to credit unions with respect to their business models. Similarly, credit unions provide financial services to their restricted memberships. There are some regulatory differences in fair lending and taxation between credit unions and banks. Membership size and the ability to offer a full range of financial services may ultimately explain any comparative advantages that large credit unions (and large banks) enjoy relative to small credit unions and small banks. By contrast, credit unions are not awarded credits that would allow them to expand beyond the common bonds defined in their membership charters. Total credit union assets have risen while the total number of credit unions has been shrinking over time. Furthermore, industry assets are not evenly distributed. These trends are similar to the consolidation trends observed in the depository banking system. | Credit unions make loans to their members, to other credit unions, and to corporate credit unions that provide financial services to individual credit unions. There are statutory restrictions on their business lending activities, which the credit union industry has long advocated should be lifted. Specific restrictions on business lending include an aggregate limit on an individual credit union's member business loan balances and on the amount that can be loaned to one member. Industry spokespersons have argued that easing the restrictions on member business lending could increase the available pool of credit for small businesses. Credit unions also lack sources of capital beyond retained earnings, and alternative supplemental capital sources would allow them to increase their lending while remaining in compliance with safety and soundness regulatory requirements. Community bankers, who often compete with credit unions, argue that policies such as raising the business lending cap would allow credit unions to expand beyond their congressionally mandated mission and could pose a threat to financial stability.
Members of the 114th Congress have introduced legislation that would allow credit unions to expand their lending activities. H.R. 989, the Capital Access for Small Business and Jobs Act, was introduced and referred to the House Committee on Financial Services on February 13, 2015. H.R. 989 would redefine net worth for credit unions to include additional sources of supplemental capital. In addition, H.R. 1188 and its companion bill, S. 2028, the Credit Union Small Business Jobs Creation Act, would raise the current member business lending cap. H.R. 1422 and S. 1440, the Credit Union Residential Credit Union Loan Parity Act, would amend the FCU Act to revise the statutory definition of member business loans, further enhancing the capacity of credit unions (satisfying the net worth capitalization requirements) to make more member business and commercial loans. On April 13, 2015, the House-passed H.R. 299, the Capital Access for Small Community Financial Institutions Act of 2015, would amend the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) Act to require the treatment of state-chartered credit unions as insured depository institutions, among other things; thus making it possible to harmonize FHLB-membership requirements for small banks and credit unions. The House included the language of H.R. 299 in an amendment to H.R. 22, the Surface Transportation Reauthorization and Reform Act of 2015, as passed on November 5, 2015. S. 1484, the Financial Regulatory Improvement Act of 2015, and S. 1910, the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2016, also contain language similar to H.R. 299.
Small memberships limit the range of financial services that small credit unions can offer as well as their ability to accumulate enough retained earnings (capital) to substantially increase their commercial lending activities. Thus, the benefits to credit unions from legislative actions to enhance their lending ability may be greater for larger institutions. Larger credit unions, with the resources to offer a wide array of financial services to members, would also be expected to become more significant competitors with community banks operating in similar lending markets. Competition between credit unions and commercial banks, particularly those with over $1 billion in assets, would be expected to intensify.
Although total assets and membership in the credit union industry have risen over the past decade, the total number of credit unions has declined. The industry's assets are not evenly distributed. Some differences in credit union and bank regulation are unlikely to account for the competitive advantages that large credit unions enjoy relative to their smaller counterparts. These observations mirror the consolidation trends observed in the depository banking industry and are discussed in greater detail in the Appendix. |
crs_R41503 | crs_R41503_0 | Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act deals with investor protection and securities regulation. Within that general rubric, the title contains a very broad range of provisions. Parts of Title IX address aspects of the securities markets that are commonly viewed as directly involved in the financial crisis, such as credit ratings and securitization. As a result, numerous provisions in Title IX address the SEC's performance and resources. This report provides brief summaries of selected provisions in Title IX. It attempts to include those provisions that create new SEC authority, that were controversial during the legislative process, or that appear likely to have far-reaching consequences for the regulation of securities markets. Section 915 creates a new Office of the Investor Advocate. Section 913 deals with the issue of a fiduciary duty that would apply to broker-dealers and investment advisers alike. Other Provisions
Subtitle B includes 35 separate sections, most of which provide enhancement or clarification of SEC enforcement authority or resources. 929E); expanding the SEC's authority to punish aiders and abettors of securities fraud (Secs. The regulators are directed to prohibit incentive-based compensation structures that encourage inappropriate risks by covered financial institutions. The Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme, which was investigated several times by the SEC but not detected, raised questions about the competence of some SEC employees and about managerial and organizational weaknesses. The GAO shall consider
the effectiveness of supervisors in using the skills, talents, and motivation of SEC employees; the criteria for promoting employees to supervisory positions; the fairness of the application of the promotion criteria; the competence of the professional staff of the Commission; the efficiency of communication between the units of the SEC regarding the work of the Commission and efforts to promote such communication; the turnover within subunits of the SEC, including the consideration of supervisors whose subordinates have an unusually high rate of turnover; whether there are excessive numbers of low-level, mid-level, or senior-level managers; any initiatives that increase the competence of the staff of the Commission; actions taken regarding employees who have failed to perform their duties and circumstances under which the SEC has issued to employees a notice of termination; and such other factors relating to the management of the SEC as the Comptroller General determines are appropriate. Subtitle G: Strengthening Corporate Governance
Proxy Access
Shareholder groups have for many years sought legislation or regulations that allow shareholders to nominate candidates for a company's board of directors, and to have those candidates included next to management's candidates on the company's proxy materials that are mailed to shareholders each year before the annual meeting. Subtitle H makes a number of significant changes to the regulation of municipal markets. Majority of MSRB Members to be Independent
Section 975 also amends the composition of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board—the board will now have 15 members, eight of whom shall be public members, independent of the industry. GAO Studies
Sections 976 and 977 call for GAO to conduct (1) a study of the adequacy of disclosures made to investors in municipal securities, and (2) a broad review of the market, including an analysis of trading mechanisms; the needs of the markets and investors and the impact of recent innovations; recommendations for how to improve the transparency, efficiency, fairness, and liquidity of trading in the municipal securities markets; and potential uses of derivatives in the municipal securities markets. | Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) contains 10 subtitles and 113 separate sections amending federal securities laws intended to improve investor protection. The range of Title IX's provisions is very broad: some sections will bring significant changes to the securities business, while others are little more than technical clarifications of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) authority. This report provides brief summaries of those provisions that create new SEC authority, that were controversial during the legislative process, or that appear likely to have far-reaching consequences.
Some of the most noteworthy sections of Title IX address issues viewed as central to the financial crisis that erupted in 2007. These include
enhanced regulation of credit rating agencies, whose triple-A ratings of "toxic" mortgage-backed bonds set the stage for panic; more stringent regulation of asset-backed securities, including a "skin in the game" requirement that issuers of such securities retain some of the risk; and a number of provisions relating to executive compensation, including authority to prohibit pay structures that create inappropriate risk in financial institutions.
Another driving force behind Title IX was the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme, which repeated SEC examinations and investigations failed to detect. Many sections seek to improve the SEC's performance, including
creation of an Investor Advocate and Investor Advisory Committee within the SEC; establishment of a whistleblower program to produce tips about securities fraud; various measures to improve SEC management, including a wide-ranging outside consultant study and various Government Accountability Office audits; and more budget flexibility and authorization for higher appropriations levels.
Another group of provisions addresses the rights of investors and shareholders:
the SEC may impose a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers who give investment advice, similar to the duty that already applies to investment advisers; municipal financial advisors must register with the SEC, and a majority of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board must be independent of the industry; and new disclosures and shareholder votes relating to executive compensation and corporate performance and governance, including SEC authority to allow certain shareholders to nominate candidates for the board of directors.
Because of the diversity of these and other provisions, it is difficult to characterize the scope and thrust of Title IX in its entirety. Some observers, however, describe it as the most significant change to securities law since the enactment of the original federal statutes in the 1930s. This report provides a selective overview, and will not be updated. |
crs_RL34656 | crs_RL34656_0 | Background on the PBGC
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a federal corporation established under Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA, P.L. 93-406 ). The PBGC insures private pension beneficiaries against the complete loss of accrued benefits if their defined benefit pension plan is terminated without adequate funding. The PBGC receives no appropriations from general revenue. Its operations are financed by insurance premiums set by Congress and paid by sponsors of defined benefit plans, investment income from the assets in its trust fund, and recoveries from the companies formerly responsible for the trusteed plans. In FY2007, the PBGC paid about $4.3 billion in benefits to almost 1.3 million individuals whose pension plans had failed. The PBGC currently has a $14.1 billion deficit in assets necessary to satisfy all claims made through 2007. The PBGC's liabilities are not explicitly backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government. However, should the agency become financially insolvent, the GAO has noted that "Congress could face enormous pressure to bail out the PBGC at taxpayer expense." As of September 30, 2007, the value of the PBGC's total investments, including cash and investment income, was approximately $62.6 billion. The assets from terminated pension plans and recoveries from the general assets of plan sponsors are accounted for in a trust fund that is not included in the federal budget. Trust fund assets were most recently valued at $48.1 billion. There are no statutory limitations on how the PBGC can invest the assets in its trust fund. PBGC's New Investment Policy
In February 2008, the PBGC announced that it had adopted a new investment policy aimed at generating higher investment returns while providing increased protection against the risk of increasing its deficit over time. As shown in Table 3 , the new policy allocates 45% of the PBGC's assets to fixed-income investments, 45% to equity investments, and 10% to alternative investment classes, including real estate and private equity. The PBGC's previous investment policy, adopted in 2004, set an equity investment target of 15% to 25%, with the remaining assets to be allocated primarily to fixed income investments. The PBGC is required by law to invest its income from premiums in securities backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government. If the PBGC's new investment policy generates higher expected returns, accompanied by reduced risk—as the PBGC and Rocaton have asserted—then U.S. taxpayers, as the de facto guarantors of PBGC insurance, will be better off. If the higher returns are accompanied by commensurately higher risk, then taxpayers are neither better nor worse off, because the PBGC's true financial condition will not have changed. Taxpayers also could be worse off if higher investment returns forestall fundamental reforms in PBGC financing, such as adopting risk-based premiums, that could improve the long-term financial condition of the agency and reduce the risk that they will at some point in the future have to bail out an insolvent PBGC. | The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a federal corporation established under Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA, P.L. 93-406). The PBGC insures private pension beneficiaries against the complete loss of accrued benefits if their defined benefit pension plan is terminated without adequate funding. The PBGC receives no appropriations from general revenue. Its operations are financed by insurance premiums set by Congress and paid by sponsors of defined benefit plans, investment income from the assets in its trust fund, and recoveries from the companies formerly responsible for the trusteed plans.
The PBGC insures the pension benefits of 44 million workers and retirees. In FY2007, the PBGC paid about $4.3 billion in benefits to almost 1.3 million workers whose pension plans had failed. The PBGC currently has a $14.1 billion deficit in assets necessary to satisfy all claims made through FY2007. Although the PBGC's liabilities are not explicitly backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government, Congress could face political pressure to bail out the PBGC at taxpayer expense should the agency become financially insolvent.
As of September 30, 2007, the value of the PBGC's total investments, including cash and investment income, was approximately $62.6 billion. Premium income is required by law to be invested in debt obligations guaranteed by the U.S. government. The assets from terminated plans and their sponsors are accounted for in a trust fund that was most recently valued at $48.1 billion. There are no statutory limitations on how PBGC can invest the assets in its trust fund.
In February 2008, the PBGC announced that it had adopted a new investment policy aimed at generating higher investment returns. The new policy allocates 45% of the assets to fixed-income investments, 45% to equity investments and 10% to alternative investment classes, including real estate and private equity. The PBGC's previous investment policy, adopted in 2004, set an equity investment target of 15% to 25%, with the remaining assets allocated primarily to fixed income investments.
If the PBGC's higher expected investment returns are accompanied by reduced risk—as the PBGC has asserted—then U.S. taxpayers, as the ultimate guarantors of PBGC insurance, will be better off. However, if the higher returns are accompanied by commensurately higher risk, then taxpayers are neither better nor worse off, because the PBGC's true financial condition will not have changed. Taxpayers would be worse off under the new policy if higher investment returns forestall fundamental reforms in the pension insurance system—such as adopting risk-based premiums—that could result in improving the long-term financial condition of the agency. Taxpayers, who would benefit from reduced exposure to the risk of having to bail out the PBGC if fundamental reforms in PBGC financing and governance were enacted, will be worse off if the agency does not achieve the reduction in its deficit that it has predicted the new investment policy will attain. |
crs_RS20147 | crs_RS20147_0 | Use of the Committee of the Whole in the current practice of the House of Representatives has changed considerably from the form first used in 1789. As a result, the purpose for convening in Committee of the Whole began to change. When it is removed from the higher position on the podium, it signals the House is no longer meeting as the House of Representatives in regular session, but in the Committee of the Whole. If the Committee has completed its deliberations, Members may agree to a motion to rise and report to the House of Representatives the actions and recommendations of the Committee. | The Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, more often referred to as the "Committee of the Whole," is the House of Representatives operating as a committee on which every Member of the House serves. The House of Representatives uses this parliamentary device to take procedural advantage of a somewhat different set of rules governing proceedings in the Committee than those governing proceedings in the House. The purpose is to expedite legislative consideration.
This report briefly reviews the history of the Committee of the Whole, describes the current procedure associated with it, and identifies its procedural advantages. It will be updated if the rules and procedures change. |
crs_RL32979 | crs_RL32979_0 | (1) In 2004 this exemption, which was 5.2¢/gallon and was scheduledto decline to 5.1¢ on January 1, 2005, reduced the gasoline excise tax for "gasohol," from 18.4¢ to13.2¢/gallon. The reduction was realized at the time when the gasoline tax was otherwise imposed:typically when the fuel was loaded from the terminal onto trucks for distribution. The 5.2¢exemption could also be claimed later (i.e., when blenders filed their income tax return) as a 52¢excise tax credit per gallon of alcohol used to make a fuel mixture, which was also scheduled todecline to 51¢ in tandem with the exemption on January 1, 2005. (2)
The exemption, however, which effectively lowered the excise tax on the blended fuel,reduced revenues for the Highway Trust Fund by an estimated $14, 000 million through FY2004.As a consequence, the Congress enacted the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-357 ),also known as the "Jobs Bill," which restructured the basic tax subsidy for alcohol fuels. However, both approaches reduce theeffective excise tax burden on each gallon of ethanol used to make a 90:10 gallon of a mixture bythe same amount -- 5.1¢/ gallon of a blend or 51¢/gallon of ethanol -- regardless of whether thereduction is called a tax credit or excise tax exemption. The reformsbecame effective on January 1, 2005. This exemption was 5.2¢ per gallon in 2004 and scheduled to declineto 5.1¢ beginning on January 1, 2005, before it is was replaced by the "alcohol mixtures excise taxcredit." Note first that there is no difference between the new excise tax credit and the old excise taxexemption in the actual excise tax paid or remitted to the Treasury (row 3): whether the reductionin taxes per gallon of a 90:10 blend is provided by the an excise tax exemption and or excise taxcredit, the amount actually paid to the Treasury is 13.3¢/gallon. Per gallon of ethanol the subsidy value would be 10 timesthat amount or 68¢/gallon, rather than 51¢/gallon. Table 1. Comparison of the Net, After-Tax Subsidy Value of theNew Mixtures Tax Credit With the Old Excise Tax Exemption
Notes: *Value of tax subsidy includes the tax benefits from the deductibility of the excise taxesagainst income tax liability -- a higher excise tax results in greater tax deductions and a smaller tax.This figure assumes a 25% marginal income tax rate. But, while the excise tax on gasoline alcohol blends generated billions in tax revenue, thelower tax rate due to the exemptions (a tax rate of 13.1¢ in 2003 due to an exemption of 5.3¢; a taxrate of 13.2¢ in 2004 due to an exemption of 5.2¢) meant that these blends did not generate as muchrevenue for the HTF as they would have otherwise had the ethanol blends been taxed at the same rateas pure (unblended) gasoline. Revenue Effects of the New Alcohol Fuels Mixtures Tax Credit
The substitution of a tax credit for an exemption against the excise taxes will increaserevenues to the HTF, and reduce revenues by the same amount for the general fund. Asshown in column (3), revenue losses from the new excise tax credit are projected to more thandouble by 2010 if the RFS under the Senate's version of H.R. 6 . The amounts of tax credits is 60¢/gallon of either ethanol and methanol. The credit for straight alcohol fuels was not amended by the jobs bill. Casual off-farm production of ethanol does not qualify for this credit. This deduction is currently little used. | Prior to January 1, 2005, alcohol fuel blenders qualified for a 5.2¢ tax exemption against theexcise taxes otherwise due on each gallon of blended mixtures (mixtures of 10% ethanol, and 90%gasoline). This exemption, which was scheduled to decline to 5.1¢ on January 1, 2005, reduced thegasoline excise tax for "gasohol," from 18.4¢ to 13.2¢/gallon. The reduction was realized at the timewhen the gasoline tax was otherwise imposed: typically when the fuel was loaded from the terminalonto trucks for distribution. The 5.2¢ exemption could also be claimed later, i.e., when blendersfiled their income tax return, as a 52¢ excise tax credit per gallon of alcohol used to make a fuelmixture (which was also scheduled to decline to 51¢ in tandem with the exemption on January 1,2005). This credit, however, was not as valuable as the exemption because 1) it was taxable asincome, 2) was not available instantaneously as the fuel was blended -- blenders had to wait untiltheir income tax returns were filed to reduce their tax liability by the amount of the credit, and 3) thetax credit was not refundable -- it was only available to the extent of tax liability. Because theprimary benefits from alcohol fuels were realized through an exemption rather than a tax credit,revenue losses from the exemption (or reduced excise taxes) accrued to the Highway Trust Fund(HTF).
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-357 ) restructured the basic tax subsidiesfor alcohol fuels: 1) the blender's income tax credits were eliminated and 2) the blender's excise tax exemption was replaced by an "instant" excise tax credit of the same amount -- 5.1¢/gallon of a 90:10mixture, which is also equivalent to 51¢ per gallon of ethanol in the mixture. These tax reforms wentinto effect on January 1, 2005. As before, the excise tax credit is claimed against the 18.4¢ per gallonexcise tax on gasoline, so that the actual excise tax paid and remitted to the Treasury is 13.3¢ -- thetax is reduced by 5.1¢/gallon just as with the exemption. When income tax effects are considered,however, the new excise tax credit has a greater economic or subsidy value than the exemptionbefore it because income tax deductions are taken at 18.4¢ rather then 13.3¢. In other words, bylabeling the tax reduction as an excise tax credit rather than an excise tax exemption , the tax lawtreats the blenders as paying the full excise tax of 18.4¢/ gallon rather than 13.3¢ per gallon. At a25% marginal income tax rate, the additional 5.1¢ deduction is valued at 1.7¢/gallon of a blend or17¢/gallon of ethanol, which means that the total after-tax subsidy for alcohol fuel mixtures iseffectively 68¢/gallon of ethanol rather than the nominal rate of 51¢.
By nominally increasing the excise tax on gasohol by 5.1¢/gallon, an extra $1,500 millionin FY2006 is projected to be allocated into the HTF from the general fund, which implies that HTFexpenditures, and budget deficits can be expected to be higher than under the exemption. In additionto the alcohol fuel mixture excise tax credit there are three other federal tax subsidies that areavailable for the production and use of alcohol transportation fuels (but are little used).Comprehensive energy policy legislation H.R. 6 , as passed by the Senate, includes arenewable fuels standard that would, by 2010, more than double both the use of ethanol and therevenue loss from the new alcohol fuels tax incentives. |
crs_RL34011 | crs_RL34011_0 | It provides funding for Department of the Interior (DOI) agencies (except for the Bureau of Reclamation, funded in Energy and Water Development appropriations laws), many of which manage land and other natural resource or regulatory programs. The bill also provides funds for agencies in two other departments—the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, and the Indian Health Service (IHS) in the Department of Health and Human Services—as well as funds for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). FY2008 Budget and Appropriations
Current Overview
FY2008 funding for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies was included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 ( P.L. An additional $500.0 million in emergency appropriations for FY2008 for wildfires was included in an earlier law, P.L. 110-116 , for an FY2008 total of $27.39 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. This would be about the same as enacted for FY2007 (including funds for Secure Rural Schools), $240.2 million (0.9%) lower than passed by the House for FY2008 in H.R. 2643 , and $205.0 million (0.8%) higher than recommended by the Senate Committee on Appropriations for FY2008 in S. 1696 . The FY2008 level was an increase of $1.70 billion (6.6%) over the Administration's request. The FY2008 appropriations level was higher for some agencies than the FY2007 level, but lower for others. Among the FY2008 increases over FY2007 were the following:
$292.6 million (6.2%) for the Forest Service (FS); $185.2 million (9.7%) for the Bureau of Land Management (BLM); $166.0 million (5.2%) for the Indian Health Service (IHS); $90.4 million (3.9%) for the National Park Service (NPS); $47.7 million (7.5%) for the Smithsonian Institution (SI); and $28.1 million (2.1%) for the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). Among the FY2008 decreases from FY2007 were the following:
-$263.6 million (3.4%) for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); -$124.2 million (42.2%) for the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM); -$43.6 million (27.3%) for the Minerals Management Service (MMS); and -$33.9 million (15.2%) for the Office of Special Trustee for American Indians (OST). (For more information, see the " Payments in Lieu of Taxes Program (PILT) " section in this report.) 110-161 . During consideration of FY2008 Interior appropriations, the House considered other amendments related to the OCS. | The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Interior (DOI), except for the Bureau of Reclamation, and for two agencies within other departments—the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service (IHS) within the Department of Health and Human Services. It also includes funding for arts and cultural agencies, the Environmental Protection Agency, and numerous other entities.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161) included $26.89 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for FY2008. An additional $500.0 million in emergency appropriations for wildfires was included in P.L. 110-116, for an FY2008 total of $27.39 billion. This would be about the same as enacted for FY2007 (including funds for Secure Rural Schools), $240.2 million (0.9%) lower than passed by the House for FY2008 in H.R. 2643, and $205.0 million (0.8%) higher than recommended by the Senate Committee on Appropriations for FY2008 in S. 1696. The FY2008 level was an increase of $1.70 billion (6.6%) over the Administration's request for FY2008.
The FY2008 appropriations level was higher for some agencies than the FY2007 level, but lower for others. Among the FY2008 increases over FY2007 were the following:
$292.6 million (6.2%) for the Forest Service (FS); $185.2 million (9.9%) for the Bureau of Land Management (BLM); $166.0 million (5.2%) for the Indian Health Service (IHS); $90.4 million (3.9%) for the National Park Service (NPS); $47.7 million (7.5%) for the Smithsonian Institution (SI); and $28.1 million (2.1%) for the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).
Among the FY2008 decreases from FY2007 were the following:
-$263.6 million (3.4%) for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); -$124.2 million (42.2%) for the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM); -$43.6 million (27.3%) for the Minerals Management Service (MMS); and -$33.9 million (15.2%) for the Office of Special Trustee for American Indians (OST).
Congress debated a variety of funding and policy issues during consideration of FY2008 Interior appropriations legislation. They included appropriate funding for BIA construction, education, and housing; IHS construction and urban Indian health; wastewater/drinking water needs; land acquisition; the Payments in Lieu of Taxes program; the Superfund program; the Smithsonian Institution; and wildland fire fighting. Other issues included Indian trust fund management, leasing in the Outer Continental Shelf, and royalty relief. This report is not expected to be updated. |
crs_RL31540 | crs_RL31540_0 | Introduction
Second chance homes (SCHs, also referred to as maternity group homes) for unwed teenage mothers are not a new concept in the nation. Renewed interest in such homes occurred in 1995 during the welfare reform debate. With the passage of the welfare reform bill in 1996, the state block grant for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) was created. When the 108 th Congress reauthorized the RHYA, maternity group homes were added as an allowable use of funds under TLP. This report describes second chance homes, discusses legislation that was introduced in the 109 th Congress related to such homes, and describes federal funding provided through TANF and other programs to assist needy teen mothers who live in second chance homes. Before that time, support for unwed teen mothers was primarily provided by family, friends, and churches. In 1883, however, Charles Crittenton, a wealthy businessman and philanthropist, founded the first "rescue home" (named for his daughter Florence) that eventually became a chain of what later were called private maternity homes, to better support such mothers. Subsequently, an extensive network of private maternity homes for "women in crisis" was established across the nation. In 1935, when the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program was enacted, primarily to help widows care for their children, federal funding to assist unwed mothers was established for the first time. 1925 , the Runaway, Homeless, and Missing Children Protection Act, was introduced by Representative Phil Gingrey to reauthorize programs under the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act and the Missing Children's Assistance Act. On October 10, 2003, the measure was signed into law ( P.L. 108-96 ). RHYA is up for reauthorization in the 110 th Congress. Legislation in the 109th Congress
On January 24, 2005, S. 6 , the Marriage, Opportunity, Relief, and Empowerment Act of 2005 (MORE Act), was introduced by Senator Rick Santorum and referred to the Senate Finance Committee. No further action occurred. Selected Federal Programs and Services
There is no single primary federal funding source for second chance homes. Evaluations of Second Chance Homes
To date there have been very few rigorous evaluations on the effectiveness of second chance homes. HHS reports, however, that there have been several analyses regarding service delivery approaches of different programs that documented how the programs worked and provided descriptions of the teen mothers and their children. As a result, insights have been gained regarding the needs of the mothers and their children, as well as in some cases, program outcomes, such as subsequent employment, education or subsequent pregnancies. | Second chance homes for unwed teenage mothers are not a new concept in the nation. Before the mid-1880s, support for unwed teen mothers was primarily provided by family, friends, and churches. In 1883, Charles Crittenton founded the first "rescue home" (named for his daughter Florence) that eventually became a chain of what later were called private maternity homes, to better support such mothers and ensure that no repeat out-of-wedlock pregnancies occurred. Subsequently, an extensive network of private maternity homes was established across the nation.
In 1935, with the passage of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, financial support and other services through federal funding were established primarily to help widows care for their children, and for the first time to assist unwed mothers. After the framework of the private maternity home began to disintegrate, a renewed interest in such homes occurred during the 1995 Senate welfare reform debate when agreement was made to support the "second chance home" concept.
With the passage of the welfare reform bill in August 1996, a block grant program to states for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) was created to replace AFDC. States were given the flexibility to use their TANF funds to assist unwed teen mothers under 18 and their children who lived in a second chance home. Although TANF is a significant source of funds for second chance homes, there is no single primary federal funding source for such homes.
On October 10, 2003, the Runaway, Homeless, and Missing Children Protection Act, in which maternity group homes (that is, second chance homes) were added as an allowable activity under the act's Transitional Living Program projects, was signed into law (P.L. 108-96). This act reauthorized programs under the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act (RHYA) and Missing Children's Assistance Act. RHYA is up for reauthorization in the 110th Congress.
In the 109th Congress, three bills were introduced that would have amended RHYA to include provisions related to maternity group homes—S. 6 (the Marriage, Opportunity, Relief, and Empowerment Act of 2005), H.R. 3908 (the Charitable Giving Act), and S. 1780 (the CARE Act of 2005). Each was referred to the appropriate committee. No further action occurred.
To date there have been very few rigorous evaluations of the effectiveness of second chance homes. HHS reports, however, that there have been several analyses regarding service delivery approaches of different programs that documented how the programs worked and provided descriptions of the teen mothers and their children. As a result, insights have been gained regarding the needs of the mothers and their children, as well as in some cases, program outcomes, such as subsequent employment, education, or subsequent pregnancies. |
crs_RL32670 | crs_RL32670_0 | In the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and KeyAssets the administration identifies security guards as "an important source of protection for criticalfacilities." In 2003, there were approximately one million security guards (including airport screeners)employed in the United States -- compared to 650,000 U.S. police officers. It analyzes trends in the number and deploymentof security guards, including effects of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Part of this concern involves the potential impositionof federal security requirements, including guard requirements, on infrastructure which lies largelyin the private sector. 107-296 , Sec.2.4) establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Analysisof the available data shows that overall employment of U.S. security guards (excluding airportscreeners) has declined over the last five years, although guard employment has increased in certaininfrastructure sectors. Policy Issues
In considering the role of security guards in U.S. critical infrastructure protection, policyanalysts have focused on several key issues: staffing, pay, background checks, and training. These claims have been directed especially at critical infrastructure guards. According to Figure 2 , contract guard salaries averaged $19,400 per year in 2003, less than half of the averagesalary for police and well below the average U.S. salary for all occupations. The remaining 16 states had no background check regulations. (43)
The Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 , Sec.6402) facilitates federal background checks of private security guard company employees (or jobapplicants) by authorizing employer access to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminalrecords. Other legislation proposedIn the 108th Congress would have required private security guard companies to perform federalcriminal background checks, and would have prohibited the hiring of guards who failed such checks( H.R. At this time, however, there are no U.S. federal requirements fortraining of other security guards. Twenty-two states do require basic training for licensed contractguards, but not for staff guards. Of the states with training requirements for security guards, fewspecifically require counter-terrorism training, and such training appears cursory. Conclusions
This report addresses critical infrastructure guards as a distinctive group, but CRS is awareof no federal or state policy that explicitly makes a similar distinction. If homeland security policy does evolve towards special treatment of critical infrastructureguards, responsible agencies may face a challenge in identifying those guards because ofuncertainties in identifying critical assets. Counter-terrorism funding for critical infrastructure guards may also present a policychallenge because the overwhelming majority of these guards appear to be in the private sector. (85)
It is an open question whether private operators of critical infrastructure have hired, trained, andotherwise supported security guards to the degree warranted by the social value of the facilities theyprotect. Nonetheless, as Congress continues its oversightof homeland security, funding for private guards may emerge as a security consideration wherepublic benefits and private resources may not align. | The Bush Administration's 2003 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of CriticalInfrastructures and Key Assets indicates that security guards are "an important source of protectionfor critical facilities." In 2003, approximately one million security guards (including airportscreeners) were employed in the United States. Of these guards, analysis indicates that up to 5%protected what have been defined as "critical" infrastructure and assets.
The effectiveness of critical infrastructure guards in countering a terrorist attack depends onthe number of guards on duty, their qualifications, pay and training. Security guard employment mayhave increased in certain critical infrastructure sectors since September 11, 2001, although overallemployment of U.S. security guards has declined in the last five years. Contract guard salariesaveraged $19,400 per year in 2003, less than half of the average salary for police and well below theaverage U.S. salary for all occupations. There are no U.S. federal requirements for training ofcritical infrastructure guards other than airport screeners and nuclear guards. Twenty-two states dorequire basic training for licensed security guards, but few specifically require counter-terrorismtraining. State regulations regarding criminal background checks for security guards vary. Sixteenstates have no background check regulations.
The federal government's role in protecting U.S. critical infrastructure has been a concern ofCongress since 9/11. Part of this concern involves the possible imposition of federal securityrequirements, including guard requirements, on infrastructure which is largely private. The PrivateSecurity Officer Employment Authorization Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 , Sec. 6402) facilitatesemployer access to FBI criminal records to conduct background checks of security guard employees. Other legislation proposed in the 108th Congress would have required private security guardcompanies to perform criminal background checks, would have prohibited the hiring of guards whofailed background checks, or would have directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) toconduct security guard emergency training, including training for "acts of terrorism." The DHScurrently does not have counter-terrorism training programs specifically for private security guards.
There appears to be no federal or state policy that explicitly addresses critical infrastructureguards as a distinctive group. If homeland security policy evolves towards special treatment ofcritical infrastructure guards, responsible agencies may face a challenge identifying those guardsbecause of uncertainties in identifying critical assets. Federal counter-terrorism funding for criticalinfrastructure guards may also present a policy challenge, since 87% of these guards are in theprivate sector. It is an open question whether private operators of critical infrastructure have hired,trained, and otherwise supported security guards to the degree warranted by the social value of thefacilities they protect. As Congress continues its oversight of homeland security, funding for privateguards may emerge as a security consideration where public benefits and private resources may notalign. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL32925 | crs_RL32925_0 | Title XII -- Electricity
Section 1201. This title may be citedas the "Electric Reliability Act of 2005." Under this section, the ERO would develop and enforce reliability standards for the bulk-powersystem, including cybersecurity protection. All ERO standards would be approved by FERC. Underthis title, the ERO could impose penalties on a user, owner, or operator of the bulk-power systemthat violates any FERC-approved reliability standard. H.R. H.R. Similar provisions were included in the conference report of H.R. FERC would be ultimately responsible for reliability issues. New FPA Section 216(e) would allow permit holders to petition in U.S. District Court toacquire rights-of-way through the exercise of the right of eminent domain. The project would be required to be consistent with the needs identifiedby the appropriate Regional Transmission Organization or Independent System Operator. Within six months of enactment, the Secretary of Energy and the Federal Energy RegulatoryCommission would be required to complete a study and report to Congress on what would berequired to create and implement a transmission monitoring system for the Eastern and Westerninterconnections. Federal Utility Participation in RegionalTransmission Organizations. FERC'sproposed rulemaking on standard market design would be remanded to FERC for reconsideration. On July 31, 2002, FERC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) on standardmarket design (SMD). Native Load Service Obligation. This section contains language not included in the conference report on H.R. Repeal of the mandatory purchase requirement was included in the conference report of H.R. The provision to repeal PUHCA was included in the conference report of H.R. The Public Utility Holding Company Act and the Federal Power Act (FPA) of 1935 (TitleI and Title II of the Public Utility Act) established a regime of regulating electric utilities that gavespecific and separate powers to the states and the federal government. 6 in the 108thCongress. Within 180 days after enactment, FERC would be required to issue rules to establish an electronicsystem that provides information about the availability and price of wholesale electric energy andtransmission services. Criminal and civil penalties under the FederalPower Act would be increased. Section206(b) of the Federal Power Act would be amended to allow the effective date for refunds to beginat the time of the filing of a complaint with FERC but not later than five months after such a filing. TheFederal Power Act would be amended to give FERC review authority for transfer of assets valuedin excess of $10 million. Other Electric Provisions
Section 504. On August 28, 2003, the Secretary of Energy issued Order No. | Electric utility provisions were included in comprehensive energy legislation( H.R. 6 ) that passed the House on April 21, 2005. For an analysis of all provisions ofHouse-passed H.R. 6, see CRS Report RL32936 , Omnibus Energy Legislation, 109thCongress: Assessment of H.R. 6 as passed by the House . The Senate Passed its versionof H.R. 6 on June 28, 2005. Conferees on H.R. 6, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, agreed on a finalbill July 26, 2005 ( H.Rept. 109-190 ). On July 28, the House approved the conference report(275-156). Senate approval (74-26) of the conference report followed the next day. The bill wassigned into law by President Bush on August 8, 2005.
This report describes Title XII of the House-passed H.R. 6 in the 109th Congressand other sections that deal with electric power issues. In part, Title XII would create an electricreliability organization (ERO) that would enforce mandatory reliability standards for the bulk-powersystem. All ERO standards would be approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission(FERC). Under this title, the ERO could impose penalties on a user, owner, or operator of thebulk-power system that violates any FERC-approved reliability standard. This title also addressestransmission infrastructure issues. The Secretary of Energy would be able to certify congestion onthe transmission lines and issue permits to transmission owners. Permit holders would be able topetition in U.S. district court to acquire rights-of-way for the construction of transmission linesthrough the exercise of the right of eminent domain. A provision that would have required FERCto approve participant funding for new transmission lines was removed in markup by the HouseCommittee on Energy and Commerce.
The Standard Market Design notice of proposed rulemaking would be remanded to theFederal Energy Regulatory Commission. This provision clarifies native load service obligation. Federal utilities would be allowed to participate in regional transmission organizations.
The electricity title would repeal the mandatory purchase requirements under the PublicUtility Regulatory Policy Act. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) wouldbe repealed. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and state regulatory bodies would be givenaccess to utility books and records.
FERC would be required to issue rules to establish an electronic system that providesinformation about the availability and price of wholesale electric energy and transmission services. For electric rates that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission finds to be unjust, unreasonable,or unduly discriminatory, the effective date for refunds could begin at the time of the filing of acomplaint with FERC but not later than five months after filing of a complaint. Criminal and civilpenalties would be increased. The Federal Power Act would be amended to give FERC reviewauthority for transfer of assets valued in excess of $10 million.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL31115 | crs_RL31115_0 | Introduction
Congress is currently considering whether to permit drilling for oil and gas in the coastalplain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), to designate the area as wilderness, or toretain the status quo of maintaining the Refuge without drilling. On April 28, 2005, both theHouse and Senate agreed to H.Con.Res. 95 , a budget resolution that may necessitateoil and gas drilling in the Refuge to meet the budget reconciliation targets, and could permitlegislation on such drilling to be enacted on a simple majority vote, without the possibility of afilibuster. 6, that would impose a 2,000 acre limit on the surface of the Coastal Plain thatcan be covered with support structures associated with oil and gas development. However, this limitmay not apply to some or all of the more than 100,000 acres of Native lands in the Refuge. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. Issues
I. Some of the most critical elements in an analysis of environmental provisions of any billsare: 1) the agency that would administer the leasing program; 2) the compatibility of leasing withthe purposes of the Refuge; 3) the standard for environmental protection and how might it functionin practice; 4) the level of industrial technology required; 5) the protections that would be statutorilyprovided with respect to the wildlife resources of the Refuge; 6) compliance with the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act; 7) the 2,000 acre "footprint" limitation; and 8) the extent to whichadministrative decisions and actions implementing a leasing program would be judicially reviewable. 6 states in § 2203(a) that leasing is to be under the Mineral Leasing Act(MLA) (24) andadministered by the Secretary of the Interior acting through the Director of the Bureau of LandManagement (BLM). Environmental Standard. (In practice this has been interpretedas addressing only significant adverse effects.) H.R. Special Areas. Exploration. H.R. Under a 1983 Agreement,separate environmental controls would apply to Native oil exploration activities, unless the termsof the Agreement are superseded by statute or regulations. The committee report accompanying this act states that one purpose of the act is to "ratifycertain land exchanges and other agreements ...." (54) It also states that lands received by ASRC are to be regarded asthough they had been obtained by an ANCSA exchange:
Subsection (d) provides that all lands or intereststherein conveyed to the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation pursuant to this section or the RegionalCorporation's 1984 agreement and pursuant to the August 9, 1983 Agreement Between the ArcticSlope Regional Corporation and the United States are to be deemed conveyed and received pursuantto exchanges under section 22(f) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, as amended, inaddition to other applicable authority. Current Bill Provisions and Issues. In considering this question, the various Native property interests must be consideredseparately: 1) the interests of KIC in the surface estate of lands, within the coastal plain and theRefuge as a whole; 2) the interests of ASRC in the subsurface (and related use of the surface), withinthe coastal plain and the Refuge; and 3) individual allotments in the coastal plain and Refuge. 7. the covenant that ASRC "shall not use those lands,or the surface of those lands, in any manner that significantly adversely affects the fish and wildlife,their habitats, or the environment of those lands or Arctic National Wildlife Refuge lands...."
Therefore, it appears that as a general matter, the environmental constraints of any billsapplicable to the coastal plain arguably would apply to development of all ASRC lands, both withinthe coastal plain and outside it. H.R. 6 . 6 would repeal the § 1003 prohibition against oil and gas development in the Refuge, therebyallowing such development, but would not place any time limitations on activities on Native landsleading to development or production, even though leasing regulations for the federal lands are notto be finalized for 15 months. The rights of way language in H.R. H.R. H.R. If so, then the oil normally could be exported. Another issue that has arisen during debates over leasing in the ANWR is that of dispositionof possible revenues -- whether Congress may validly provide for a disposition of revenues otherthan the 90/10 percent split mentioned in the Alaska Statehood Act. | Congress is again considering whether to permit drilling for oil and gas in the coastal plainof the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), Alaska, to designate the area as wilderness, or toretain the status quo of maintaining the area as a Refuge without drilling. This area is rich in wildlifeand wilderness values, but may also contain significant oil and gas deposits. H.R. 567 and S. 261 have been introduced in the 109th Congress to designate the coastal plain ofANWR a wilderness, but H.R. 6 has passed the House. Title XXII of the bill wouldauthorize oil and gas leasing in ANWR. Both the House and Senate have approved H.Con.Res. 95 , a budget resolution that may necessitate revenues from oil and gasdevelopment in the Refuge to meet the budget reconciliation targets, and allow enactment of suchlegislation without filibuster. This report provides background on the legal issues surroundingANWR development proposals, and will be updated as circumstances warrant. For an updatedsummary of current actions on bills, see CRS Issue Brief IB10136, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge(ANWR): Controversies for the 109th Congress .
H.R. 6 would authorize leasing in ANWR and contains a 2,000 acre limitationon the "footprint" of leasing development in the Coastal Plain. However, if the current statutoryprohibition against production of oil and gas anywhere in the Refuge is repealed, then oil and gasdevelopment and related activities could occur not only on the federal lands, but also on Native landswithin the Refuge. Absent express language on the point, an acreage limitation would not apply tosome, and possibly not to any, of the Native lands, in which case some or all of the more than100,000 acres of such lands in the Refuge (inside and outside the officially designated Coastal Plain)could be developed. A 1983 Agreement with the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation (ASRC), aNative Regional Corporation, would govern oil exploration on ASRC subsurface and associatedsurface rights in the Refuge, unless these provisions are superseded by statute or regulations, andsome assert that the environmental terms of the agreement are lenient. ASRC agreed to comply withstatutes and regulations to protect wildlife, habitat, and the environment of the Coastal Plain. It isunclear whether some or all of ASRC's lands are subject to the 2,000 acre limit, and how that acreagemight be allocated among ASRC and federal lessees.
H.R. 6 gives primary responsibility for leasing to the Secretary of the Interioracting through the Director of the Bureau of Land Management rather than the Fish And WildlifeService, the agency that implemented the oil exploration program for the Coastal Plain. Theenvironmental standard in H.R. 6 -- "no significant adverse effect" -- has been used in the past, butcould allow a range of adverse effects compared to other standards that have also been used. H.R.6 also would limit the NEPA process applicable to leasing in ANWR, and limit and expedite judicialreview. The bill states that leasing is to be under the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA), yet wouldestablish a 50/50 revenue sharing formula different from the 90/10 formula in the MLA, a fact thatmight raise issues related to the Alaska Statehood Act. |
crs_R43835 | crs_R43835_0 | Introduction
Over the past several years, a number of developments occurred involving foreign governments that in recent years the United States had designated as state sponsors of acts of international terrorism. Current designees are the governments of Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Iran. Cuba. In November 2017, President Trump designated the government of North Korea as a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism. This brief report provides information on legislation that authorizes the designation of any foreign government as a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism. It addresses the statutes and how they each define acts of international terrorism; establish a list to limit or prohibit aid or trade; provide for systematic removal of a foreign government from a list, including timeline and reporting requirements; authorize the President to waive restrictions on a listed foreign government; and provide (or do not provide) Congress with a means to block a delisting. It closes with a summary of delisting in the past. | Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria are identified by the U.S. government as countries with governments that support acts of international terrorism. While it is the President's authority to designate, and remove from designation, terrorist states, Congress has some legislative authority to weigh in as the reviews proceed. In recent years, other foreign policy and national security decisions have butted up against the designation: to delist Cuba in the course of normalizing other aspects of the bilateral relationship; to enter into a multilateral agreement involving Iran's nuclear weapons pursuits that required the United States to lift some sanctions; and to redesignate the government of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism in the midst, or as part, of seeking countermeasures to that state's nuclear and missile ambitions.
This brief report provides information on legislation that authorizes the designation of a foreign government as a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism. It addresses the statutes and how they each define acts of international terrorism; establish a list to limit or prohibit aid or trade; provide for systematic removal of a foreign government from a list, including timeline and reporting requirements; authorize the President to waive restrictions on a listed foreign government; and provide (or do not provide) Congress with a means to block a delisting. It closes with a summary of delisting in the past. |
crs_R42449 | crs_R42449_0 | Introduction
In 1980, Chile replaced its pay-as-you-go public pension system, under which benefits for current beneficiaries were paid with taxes from current workers, similar to Social Security in the United States, with a system of individual accounts that has become a possible model for public pension restructuring around the world. Chile's system of private pension accounts has been widely studied as one model for public pension restructuring. The Chilean pension system consists of three tiers: a poverty prevention tier, an individual account tier, and a voluntary savings tier. The poverty prevention tier provides a basic benefit to aged persons who did not participate in the public pension system and to retired workers whose monthly pensions financed by individual account assets (the second tier) do not reach certain thresholds. Under the second tier, workers contribute 10% of wage or salary income to an individual account and choose a private-sector Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP) to manage the account. Upon retirement, the worker may withdraw the individual account's accumulated assets as an immediate or deferred annuity or through programmed withdrawals. A third, voluntary savings tier encourages workers to supplement pension income with additional savings. The 2008 reforms were designed, among other goals, to increase participation in the public pension system, reduce high investment management fees and administrative costs, and bolster the poverty prevention tier. Employers are not generally required to contribute to employees' accounts. Since 2008, employers have been required to pay premiums for survivor and disability insurance, which in Chile is provided by private insurance companies. As a result of low participation rates and underreporting, there was concern that many workers would reach retirement with individual account balances that were too small to provide an adequate pension annuity. The 2008 reforms phased in a requirement that most self-employed workers contribute to the pension system. | In 1980, Chile was the first country to replace its pay-as-you-go public pension system with a system of individual accounts. The "Chilean model" has been widely studied as one possible model for public pension restructuring.
Chile's public pension system consists of three tiers: a poverty prevention tier, an individual account tier, and a voluntary savings tier. The poverty prevention tier provides a minimum benefit to aged persons who did not participate in the public pension system and to retired workers whose monthly pensions financed by individual account assets (the second tier) do not reach certain thresholds. Workers contribute 10% of wage or salary income to an individual account in the second tier and choose a private-sector Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP) with which to invest their pension contributions. Employers are not required to contribute to employees' AFPs, although since 2008 employers have been required to pay the premiums for workers' survivor and disability insurance, which are provided by private insurance companies. Upon retirement, the worker may withdraw assets that have accumulated in the individual account as an immediate or deferred annuity or through programmed withdrawals. The third tier allows workers to supplement retirement income with voluntary, tax-favored savings.
In 2008, Chile approved major reforms intended, among other goals, to increase participation in the public pension system, improve competition among the private-sector individual account managers, and bolster the poverty prevention tier. There has been concern that, as a result of low participation rates and underreporting, many workers could reach retirement with individual account balances that are too small to provide an adequate pension annuity. The 2008 reforms helped address these concerns by expanding the poverty prevention tier, phasing in coverage for most self-employed workers, and providing incentives for additional voluntary saving through the system's third tier. Other provisions approved in 2008 are intended to reduce high investment management fees (administrative costs) by increasing competition among AFPs. |
crs_R43996 | crs_R43996_0 | 1560 , the Protecting Cyber Networks Act (PCNA), as passed by the House on April 22; and H.R. 1731 , the National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015 (NCPAA), as passed by the House on April 23. Both bills focus on information sharing among private entities and between them and the federal government. They address the structure of the information-sharing process, issues associated with privacy and civil liberties, and liability risks for private-sector sharing, and both address some other topics in common. In addition to other provisions, the NCPAA would explicitly amend portions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. ), and the PCNA would amend parts of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 1560 and H.R. 1731 and more than 20 for H.R. 1560 , and H.R. 1560 combined the bills by making the PCNA Title I and the NCPAA Title II. Current Legislative Proposals
Five bills on information sharing have been introduced in the 114 th Congress, three in the House and two in the Senate. The White House has also submitted a legislative proposal (WHP) and issued an executive order on the topic. S. 754 , the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA), from the Senate Intelligence Committee, has many similarities to a bill with the same name introduced in the 113 th Congress and shares many provisions with the PCNA, although there are also significant differences between S. 754 and the PCNA. All the bills would address concerns that are commonly raised about barriers to sharing of information on threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, and other aspects of cybersecurity—both within and across sectors. It is generally recognized that effective sharing of information is an important tool in the protection of information systems and their contents from unauthorized access by cybercriminals and other adversaries. Barriers to sharing have long been considered by many to be a significant hindrance to effective protection of information systems, especially those associated with critical infrastructure. Private-sector entities often claim that they are reluctant to share such information among themselves because of concerns about legal liability, antitrust violations, and protection of intellectual property and other proprietary business information. Institutional and cultural factors have also been cited—traditional approaches to security tend to emphasize secrecy and confidentiality, which would necessarily impede sharing of information. While reduction or removal of such barriers may provide benefits in cybersecurity, concerns have also been raised about potential adverse impacts, especially with respect to privacy and civil liberties, and potential misuse of shared information. The NCPAA, S. 456 , and the WHP address roles of information sharing and analysis organizations (ISAOs). All of the proposals have provisions aimed at facilitating sharing of information among private-sector entities and providing protections from liability that might arise from such sharing. In general, the proposals limit the use of shared information to purposes of cybersecurity and law enforcement, and they limit government use, especially for regulatory purposes. All the proposals require reports to Congress on impacts of their provisions. All also include provisions to shield information shared with the federal government from public disclosure, including exemption from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). H.R. While most observers appear to believe that legislation on information sharing is either necessary or at least potentially beneficial—provided that appropriate protections are included—two additional factors in particular may be worthy of consideration as the legislative proposals are developed. First, resistance to sharing of information among private-sector entities might not be substantially reduced by the actions contemplated in the legislation. The second point is that information sharing is only one of many facets of cybersecurity. 1560 and H.R. | Effective sharing of information in cybersecurity is generally considered an important tool for protecting information systems and their contents from unauthorized access by cybercriminals and other adversaries. Five bills on such sharing have been introduced in the 114th Congress—H.R. 234, H.R. 1560, H.R. 1731, S. 456, and S. 754. The White House has also submitted a legislative proposal and issued an executive order on the topic.
In the House, H.R. 1560, the Protecting Cyber Networks Act (PCNA), was reported out of the Intelligence Committee. H.R. 1731, the National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015 (NCPAA), was reported by the Homeland Security Committee. Both bills passed the House, amended, the week of April 20, and were combined, with the PCNA becoming Title I and the NCPAA Title II of H.R. 1560.
The PCNA and the NCPAA have many similarities but also significant differences. Both focus on information sharing among private entities and between them and the federal government. They address the structure of the information-sharing process, issues associated with privacy and civil liberties, and liability risks for private-sector sharing, and both address some other topics in common.
The NCPAA would amend portions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and the PCNA would amend parts of the National Security Act of 1947. They differ in how they define some terms in common such as cyber threat indicator, the roles they provide for federal agencies (especially, the Department of Homeland Security and the intelligence community), processes for nonfederal entities to share information with the federal government, processes for protecting privacy and civil liberties, uses permitted for shared information, and reporting requirements.
S. 754 has been reported by the Senate Intelligence Committee. Presumably, if the Senate passes a bill on information sharing, any inconsistencies between the PCNA and the NCPAA could be reconciled during the process for resolving differences between the House and Senate bills.
All of the bills would address commonly raised concerns about barriers to sharing information about threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, and other aspects of cybersecurity—both within and across sectors. Such barriers are considered by many to hinder protection of information systems, especially those associated with critical infrastructure. Private-sector entities often claim that they are reluctant to share such information among themselves because of concerns about legal liability, antitrust violations, and protection of intellectual property and other proprietary business information. Institutional and cultural factors have also been cited—traditional approaches to security tend to emphasize secrecy and confidentiality, which would necessarily impede sharing of information.
All the bills have provisions aimed at facilitating information sharing among private-sector entities and providing protections from liability that might arise from such sharing. While reduction or removal of such barriers may provide benefits, concerns have also been raised about potential adverse impacts, especially on privacy and civil liberties, and potential misuse of shared information. The legislative proposals all address many of the concerns. In general, the proposals limit the use of shared information to purposes of cybersecurity and law enforcement, and they limit government use, especially for regulatory purposes. All include provisions to shield information shared with the federal government from public disclosure and to protect privacy and civil liberties with respect to shared information that is not needed for cybersecurity purposes. All the proposals require reports to Congress on impacts of their provisions.
Most observers appear to believe that legislation on information sharing is either necessary or at least potentially beneficial—provided that appropriate protections are included—but two additional factors in particular may be worthy of consideration as the various legislative proposals are debated. First, resistance to sharing of information among private-sector entities might not be substantially reduced by the actions contemplated in the legislation. Second, information sharing is only one of many facets of cybersecurity that organizations need to address to secure their systems and information. |
crs_R41137 | crs_R41137_0 | New federal tax credits were authorized in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 , as amended), to help certain individuals pay for health insurance coverage, beginning in 2014. The tax credits apply toward premiums for private health plans offered through "exchanges" (also referred to as health insurance marketplaces). ACA also establishes subsidies to reduce cost-sharing expenses. Background
ACA requires health insurance exchanges to be established in every state by January 1, 2014, either by the state itself or by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). Generally, exchange plans provide a comprehensive set of health services and meet all ACA market reforms, as applicable. Certain enrollees in the individual exchanges are eligible for premium assistance in the form of federal tax credits. The premium credit is an advanceable, refundable tax credit, meaning taxfilers need not wait until the end of the tax year in order to benefit from the credit, and may claim the full credit amount even if they have little or no federal income tax liability. Enrolled in an Individual Exchange
Premium credits are available only to individuals and families enrolled in a plan offered through an individual exchange; premium credits are not available through the small business ("SHOP") exchanges. Premium Credits in 2014
Premium tax credits to be used toward paying for health insurance in the exchanges became available in 2014. Reconciliation of Premium Credits
Under ACA, the amount received in premium credits is based on the prior year's income tax returns. These amounts are reconciled when individuals file tax returns for the actual year in which they receive premium credits. Cost-Sharing Subsidies
In addition to the premium credits, ACA establishes subsidies that are applicable to cost-sharing expenses. The cost-sharing assistance reduces the annual limit faced by eligible individuals with income between 100% and 250% FPL; greater reductions are provided to those with lower incomes. | New federal tax credits, authorized under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended), first became available in 2014 to help certain individuals pay for health insurance. The tax credits apply toward premiums for private health plans offered through "exchanges" (also referred to as health insurance marketplaces). ACA also establishes subsidies to reduce cost-sharing expenses.
Exchanges have been established in every state, either by the state itself or by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), as required under ACA. Exchanges are not insurers, but provide eligible individuals and small businesses with access to private health insurance plans. Generally, the plans offered through the exchanges provide a comprehensive set of health services and meet all ACA market reforms, as applicable.
The new premium credits established under ACA are advanceable and refundable, meaning taxfilers need not wait until the end of the tax year in order to benefit from the credit, and may claim the full credit amount even if they have little or no federal income tax liability. Premium tax credits are generally available to individuals who enroll in an exchange plan; are part of a tax-filing unit; have household income between specified amounts; are not eligible for other forms of comprehensive health coverage; and are U.S. citizens or lawfully present residents. This report provides examples of hypothetical individuals and families who qualify for the premium credits; the examples use actual 2014 premium and tax credit amounts.
The amounts received in premium credits are based on federal income tax returns. These amounts are reconciled in the next year and can result in overpayment of premium credits if income increases, which must be repaid to the federal government. ACA limits the amount of required repayments for lower-income enrollees.
In addition to premium credits, ACA authorizes new cost-sharing subsidies. Certain premium credit recipients will also be eligible for reductions in their annual cost-sharing limits. Moreover, certain low-income individuals will receive additional subsidies in the form of reduced cost-sharing requirements (e.g., lower deductible). |
crs_RL32717 | crs_RL32717_0 | T he House and Senate are scheduled to convene in joint session on January 6, 2017, for the purpose of opening the 2016 presidential election electoral votes submitted by state government officials, certifying their validity, counting them, and declaring the official result of the election for President and Vice President. This report describes the steps which precede the joint session and the procedures set in the Constitution and statute by which the House and Senate jointly certify the results of the electoral vote. It also discusses the procedures set in law governing challenges to the validity of an electoral vote, and makes reference to the procedures followed during the joint session in 2005 by which the election of George W. Bush was certified. §§9-10, the electors in each state, having voted, are to sign, seal, and certify the certificates. Objecting to the Counting of One or More Electoral Votes
Provisions in 3 U.S.C. §15 include a procedure for making and acting on objections to the counting of one or more of the electoral votes from a state or the District of Columbia. | The Constitution and federal law establish a detailed timetable following the presidential election during which time the members of the electoral college convene in the 50 state capitals and in the District of Columbia, cast their votes for President and Vice President, and submit their votes through state officials to both houses of Congress. The electoral votes are scheduled to be opened before a joint session of Congress on January 6, 2017. Federal law specifies the procedures which are to be followed at this session and provides procedures for challenges to the validity of an electoral vote. This report describes the steps in the process and precedents set in prior presidential elections governing the actions of the House and Senate in certifying the electoral vote and in responding to challenges of the validity of one or more electoral votes from one or more states.
This report has been revised, and will be updated on a periodic basis to provide the dates for the relevant joint session of Congress, and to reflect any new, relevant precedents or practices. |
crs_R40099 | crs_R40099_0 | The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), which was enacted as P.L. 110-343 on October 3, 2008, established an additional Special IG for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP). Under EESA, TARP funds may be used by the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase "troubled assets," defined to include both mortgage-related financial instruments and other types of securities which the Secretary, after consulting the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines to purchase as necessary "to promote financial stability." The 111 th Congress has passed two bills containing provisions related to the SIGTARP. 111-15 , the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program Act of 2009, was enacted on April 24, 2009. 111-22 , the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, was enacted on May 20, 2009, and contains provisions with regard to SIGTARP in the context of public-private investment funds. EESA's Provisions Regarding the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP)
The provisions in EESA establishing the SIGTARP are similar to the IG provisions for SIGIR and SIGAR in many respects. P.L. P.L. IGs' Authority to Conduct Audits and Investigations
This portion of the report provides a legal analysis of the general ability of IGs to conduct audits and investigations, as well as the specific authority of the SIGTARP to conduct audits and investigations. H.R. H.R. Additionally, H.R. 384 provides that "[t]he Special Inspector General shall also have the duties, responsibilities, and authorities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978, including section 6 of such Act." The SIGTARP Letter to TARP Recipients and the Paperwork Reduction Act
On January 22, 2009, SIGTARP Neil Barofsky noted in a letter to the Chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services that his office was preparing requests to TARP recipients asking them to provide information and documentation related to their use or expected use of TARP funds, as well as their plans for following executive compensation limitations, within 30 days of the request. | This report discusses the Special Inspector General provisions in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), which was enacted as P.L. 110-343 on October 3, 2008. This act created a Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP). Under EESA, TARP funds may be used by the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase "troubled assets," defined to include both mortgage-related financial instruments and "any other financial instrument that the Secretary, after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the purchase of which is necessary to promote financial market stability." The broad authorities provided to the SIGTARP by EESA have not changed even though the Secretary of the Treasury has modified the approach to stabilize the financial industry through the TARP.
The 111th Congress has passed two bills containing provisions related to SIGTARP. P.L. 111-15 (S. 383/H.R. 1341), the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program Act of 2009, was enacted on April 24, 2009, and addresses the SIGTARP's auditing, investigative, and hiring authorities. P.L. 111-22, the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (H.R. 1106/S. 895/S. 896), was enacted on May 20, 2009, and contains provisions concerning SIGTARP in the context of public-private investment funds. Other bills addressing the SIGTARP include H.R. 384 (which passed the House on January 21, 2009), H.R. 1242, H.R. 3179, S. 910, and S. 976.
This report will compare the duties and authorities of the SIGTARP to those of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), as well as statutory IGs under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act).
The report will also cover the authority that Inspectors General possess to conduct audits and investigations. Finally, the report will provide an overview of the SIGTARP's request to TARP recipients regarding their use or expected use of TARP funds, as well as their plans for following executive compensation limitations, and possible issues raised by the Paperwork Reduction Act. |
crs_RL34447 | crs_RL34447_0 | Both tax and campaign finance laws are relevant in analyzing whether churches and other houses of worship may engage in campaign activity. Under the tax laws, houses of worship that benefit from 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status may not participate in such activity. They are also subject to regulation under campaign finance laws. Legislative History of the Prohibition
The IRC's campaign prohibition is sometimes referred to as the "Johnson Amendment," after then-Senator Lyndon Johnson, who introduced the provision as an amendment to the Revenue Act of 1954. Other types of political activities are permitted. Houses of worship may invite candidates to appear at services and other functions so long as no bias for or against a candidate is exhibited. Religious leaders may endorse or oppose candidates in speeches, advertisements, etc., in their capacity as private citizens. The house of worship may not support the activity in any way. Constitutionality of the Prohibition
Some have argued that the political campaign prohibition violates the free exercise and free speech rights of churches under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Two U.S. Courts of Appeals have upheld the prohibition against First Amendment challenges. Campaign Finance Law
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which regulates the raising and spending of campaign funds, is separate and distinct from the tax code. Due to the tax code prohibition discussed above, houses of worship with 501(c)(3) status are generally not permitted to engage in the activities regulated by FECA, and thus the Citizens United decision does not appear to impact them in a significant manner. Legislation in the 112th Congress
In the 112 th Congress, legislation, H.R. If the bill were enacted into law, houses of worship with 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status would be able to engage in campaign activity without jeopardizing their tax-exemption so long as the other criteria for such status were met. In prior Congresses, there were bills that took different approaches to permitting houses of worship to engage in some level of campaign activity. | As the 2012 election cycle heats up, there are allegations that some houses of worship have engaged in impermissible activities. Under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), churches and other houses of worship with tax-exempt 501(c)(3) status may not participate in campaign activity. They are permitted under the tax laws to engage in other activities that are political in nature (e.g., distribute voter guides and invite candidates to speak at church functions) so long as the activity does not support or oppose a candidate. Additionally, religious leaders may engage in campaign activity in their capacity as private individuals without negative tax consequences to the house of worship.
The tax code's political campaign prohibition is sometimes referred to as the "Johnson Amendment," after then-Senator Lyndon Johnson, who introduced the provision as an amendment to the Revenue Act of 1954. While some have argued the prohibition violates the free exercise and free speech rights of houses of worship under the First Amendment, the two federal courts of appeals to address the issue have not agreed with this position. In recent years, numerous churches have participated in an event known as "Pulpit Freedom Sunday," during which pastors preach a political sermon. A purpose of the event is to develop litigation for another challenge to the prohibition on First Amendment grounds. This year, Pulpit Freedom Sunday was held on October 7, 2012.
Separate from the prohibition in the tax code, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) also regulates the ability of houses of worship to engage in electioneering activities.
In the 112th Congress, H.R. 3600 would repeal the Johnson Amendment, thus permitting houses of worship and other 501(c)(3) organizations to engage in campaign activity without jeopardizing their tax-exempt status so long as the other criteria for tax-exempt status are met. |
crs_RL31636 | crs_RL31636_0 | Introduction
Wireless communications devices—including mobile telephones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), pagers, and automobile-based services such as OnStar—are ubiquitous. The debate over wireless privacy in many ways parallels the debate over Internet privacy and Internet spam. One particular similarity is that the policy debate focuses on whether legislation is needed, or if industry can be relied upon to self-regulate. 106-81 ), the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (CAN-SPAM, P.L. Consumers may list their cell phone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, but concerns persist about unwanted calls from telemarketers or others. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)
The 1991 Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA, P.L. 102-243 ), inter alia , prohibits the use of autodialers or prerecorded voice messages to call cellular phones, pagers, or other services for which the person would be charged for the call, unless the person has given prior consent. The Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act (the "911 Act")
Since 1996, the FCC has issued a series of orders to ensure that users of wireless phones and certain other mobile devices can reach emergency services personnel by dialing the numbers 911. Because the technologies needed to implement E911 enable wireless telecommunications carriers to track, with considerable precision, a user's location any time the device is activated, some worry that information on an individual's daily habits—such as eating, working, and shopping—will become a commodity for sale to advertising companies, for example. In 1999, Congress passed the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act ( P.L. §222), which establishes privacy protections for customer proprietary network information (CPNI) held by telecommunications carriers. Inter alia , the 911 Act added "location" to the definition of CPNI. As amended, the law determines those circumstances under which wireless carriers need to obtain a customer's prior consent to use wireless location information, and when prior consent is not required. The bill was signed into law by President Bush on December 16, 2003. The law required the FCC, in consultation with the FTC, to promulgate rules within 270 days of enactment to protect consumers from unwanted " mobile service commercial messages " ( MSCMs ). SAFE WEB Act
The Undertaking Spam, Spyware, and Fraud Enforcement With Enforcers beyond Borders Act (U.S. SAFE WEB Act, P.L. 109-455 ) is primarily concerned with "traditional" forms of spam via email. Specifically, the act permits the FTC and parallel foreign law enforcement agencies to share information while investigating allegations of "unfair and deceptive practices" that involve foreign commerce. This bill would enable wireless subscribers to keep their wireless telephone numbers unlisted, for free, if a directory assistance database for wireless subscribers were to be created. | Wireless communications devices such as cell phones and personal digital assistants (PDAs) are ubiquitous. Some consumers, already deluged with unwanted commercial messages, or "spam," via computers that access the Internet by traditional wireline connections, are concerned that such unsolicited advertising is expanding to wireless communications, further eroding their privacy.
In particular, federal requirements under the Enhanced 911 (E911) initiative to ensure that mobile telephone users can obtain emergency services as easily as users of wireline telephones, are driving wireless telecommunications carriers to implement technologies that can locate a caller with significant precision. Wireless telecommunications carriers then will have the ability to track a user's location any time a wireless telephone, for example, is activated. Therefore some worry that information on an individual's daily habits—such as eating, working, and shopping—will become a commodity for sale to advertising companies. As consumers walk or drive past restaurants and other businesses, they may receive calls advertising sales or otherwise soliciting their patronage. While some may find this helpful, others may find it a nuisance, particularly if they incur usage charges.
As with the parallel debates over Internet privacy and spam, the wireless privacy discussion focuses on whether industry can be relied upon to self-regulate, or if legislation is needed. Three laws already address wireless privacy and spam concerns. The 1991 Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA, P.L. 102-243) prohibits the use of autodialers or prerecorded voice messages to call wireless devices if the recipient would be charged for the call, unless the recipient has given prior consent. The 1999 Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act (the "911 Act," P.L. 106-81) expanded on privacy protections for Customer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI) held by telecommunications carriers by adding "location" to the definition of CPNI, and set forth circumstances under which that information could be used with or without the customer's express prior consent. The 2003 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (the CAN-SPAM Act, P.L. 108-187) required the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to issue rules to protect wireless subscribers from unwanted mobile service commercial messages (they were issued in August 2004). Consumers also may list their cell phone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry.
Most recently, the 109th Congress passed the Undertaking Spam, Spyware, and Fraud Enforcement With Enforcers beyond Borders Act of 2005 (U.S. SAFE WEB Act); the bill was signed into law on December 22, 2006 (P.L. 109-455). The bill would allow the FTC and parallel foreign law enforcement agencies to share information while investigating allegations of "unfair and deceptive practices" that involve foreign commerce. Congress continues to debate how to protect the privacy of wireless subscribers, primarily in the areas of CPNI, wireless location data, and proposed wireless directory assistance services. |
crs_RL34584 | crs_RL34584_0 | Introduction
On May 21, 2008, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), referred to by its sponsors as the first civil rights act of the 21 st century, was enacted. GINA, P.L. 110-233 , prohibits discrimination based on genetic information by health insurers and employers. An employer or health insurer could decide to take adverse action based on a genetic predisposition, and situations have arisen where discriminatory action based on this type of genetic information did occur. In addition, the fear of this occurring could deter individuals both from seeking genetic testing and services, as well as from participating in genetic research. GINA was enacted to remedy this potential situation. This report provides background on genetic research, considerations with the use and misuse of genetic information, and relevant law at the time of GINA's enactment. The statute is then divided into three titles: Title I, which prohibits genetic discrimination in health insurance; Title II, which prohibits genetic discrimination in employment; and Title III, which contains miscellaneous provisions on severability and child labor protections. Genetic Nondiscrimination and Health Insurance
Overview of Health Insurance Provisions
Title I of GINA strengthens and clarifies existing HIPAA nondiscrimination and portability provisions through amendments to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), as well as to the Social Security Act (SSA). Genetic Nondiscrimination and Employment
Overview of Employment Provisions
GINA prohibits discrimination in employment because of genetic information and, with certain exceptions, prohibits an employer from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information. The law prohibits the use of genetic information in employment decisions, including hiring; firing; job assignments; and promotions by employers, unions, employment agencies, and labor-management training programs. The EEOC regulations track the statutory provisions. | On May 21, 2008, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), referred to by its sponsors as the first civil rights act of the 21st century, was enacted. GINA, P.L. 110-233, prohibits discrimination based on genetic information by health insurers and employers. The sequencing of the human genome and subsequent advances raise hope for genetic therapies to cure disease, but this scientific accomplishment is not without potential problems. An employer or health insurer could decide to take adverse action based on a genetic predisposition to disease, and situations have arisen where discriminatory action based on genetic information did occur. In addition, there is evidence that the fear of genetic discrimination has an adverse effect on those seeking genetic testing, as well as on participation in genetic research. GINA was enacted to remedy this situation.
GINA is divided into two main parts: Title I, which prohibits discrimination based on genetic information by health insurers; and Title II, which prohibits discrimination in employment based on genetic information. Title I of GINA amends the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), through the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), as well as the Social Security Act, to prohibit health insurers from engaging in genetic discrimination. Title II of GINA prohibits discrimination in employment because of genetic information and, with certain exceptions, prohibits an employer from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information. The law prohibits the use of genetic information in employment decisions—including hiring, firing, job assignments, and promotions—by employers, unions, employment agencies, and labor-management training programs.
This report provides background on genetic information, legal implications regarding the use of this information, and relevant laws. It also discusses the statutory provisions of GINA and the regulations regarding both health insurance and employment. |
crs_RL33861 | crs_RL33861_0 | Earthquake Hazards and Risk
Portions of all 50 states and the District of Columbia are vulnerable to earthquake hazards, although risks vary greatly across the country and within individual states. Seismic hazards are greatest in the western United States, particularly in California, Washington, Oregon, and Alaska and Hawaii. In contrast, California has more citizens and infrastructure at risk than any other state because of the state's frequent seismic activity combined with its large population. The United States faces potentially large total losses due to earthquake-caused damage to buildings and infrastructure and lost economic activity. An April 2008 report from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) calculated that the average annualized loss from earthquakes nationwide is $5.3 billion, with California, Oregon, and Washington accounting for nearly $4.1 billion (77%) of the U.S. total estimated average annualized loss. A single large earthquake can cause far more damage than the average annual estimate. A Decrease in Estimated Loss? The earthquake caused an estimated $30 billion in total economic damage. Detection, Notification, and Warning
Unlike other natural hazards, such as hurricanes, where predicting the location and timing of landfall is becoming increasingly accurate, the scientific understanding of earthquakes does not yet allow for precise earthquake prediction. Instead, notification and warning typically involves communicating the location and magnitude of an earthquake as soon as possible after the event to emergency response providers and others who need the information. The portable array has progressed across most of the conterminous United States. Outlook
A precise relationship between earthquake mitigation measures, NEHRP and other federal earthquake-related activities, such as earthquake research, and reduced losses from an actual earthquake may never be possible. However, as more accurate seismic hazard maps evolve, as understanding of the relationship between ground motion and building safety improves, and as new tools for issuing warnings and alerts such as ShakeMap and PAGER are devised, trends denoting the effectiveness of mitigation strategies and earthquake research and other activities may emerge more clearly. Without an ability to precisely predict earthquakes, Congress is likely to face an ongoing challenge in determining the most effective federal approach to increasing the nation's resilience to low-probability but high-impact major earthquakes. | Portions of all 50 states and the District of Columbia are vulnerable to earthquake hazards, although risks vary greatly across the country and within individual states. Seismic hazards are greatest in the western United States, particularly in California, Washington, Oregon, and Alaska and Hawaii. California has more citizens and infrastructure at risk than any other state because of the state's frequent seismic activity combined with its large population and developed infrastructure.
The United States faces the possibility of large economic losses from earthquake-damaged buildings and infrastructure. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has estimated that earthquakes cost the United States, on average, over $5 billion per year. California, Oregon, and Washington account for nearly $4.1 billion (77%) of the U.S. total estimated average annualized loss. California alone accounts for most of the estimated annualized earthquake losses for the nation.
A single large earthquake, however, can cause far more damage than the average annual estimate. The 1994 Northridge (CA) earthquake caused as much as $26 billion (in 2005 dollars) in damage and was one of the costliest natural disasters to strike the United States. One study of the damage caused by a hypothetical magnitude 7.8 earthquake along the San Andreas Fault in southern California projected as many as 1,800 fatalities and more than $200 billion in economic losses.
Unlike other natural hazards, such as hurricanes, where predicting the location and timing of landfall is becoming increasingly accurate, the scientific understanding of earthquakes does not yet allow for precise earthquake prediction. Instead, notification and warning typically involve communicating the location and magnitude of an earthquake as soon as possible after the event to emergency response providers and others who need the information.
A precise relationship between earthquake mitigation measures, federal earthquake-related activities such as earthquake research, and reduced losses from an actual earthquake may never be possible. However, as more accurate seismic hazard maps evolve, and as understanding of the relationship between ground motion and building safety improves, trends denoting the effectiveness of mitigation strategies and earthquake research and other activities may emerge more clearly. Without an ability to precisely predict earthquakes, Congress is likely to face an ongoing challenge in determining the most effective federal approach to increasing the nation's resilience to low-probability but high-impact major earthquakes. |
crs_RL32724 | crs_RL32724_0 | Partially as a result of those constraints, two successive National Action Party (PAN) administrations struggled to enact the structural reforms needed to boost Mexico's economic competitiveness and effectively address the country's security challenges. Political Developments During the Calderón Administration
Felipe Calderón of the conservative PAN won the July 2006 presidential election in an extremely tight race, defeating Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) by fewer than 234,000 votes. Calderón was succeeded by Enrique Peña Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Mexico-U.S. relations grew stronger through cooperation under the Mérida Initiative, as did Mexico's relations with Latin America. As predicted, the PRI that governed Mexico from 1929 to 2000 retook the presidency after 12 years of rule by the PAN and won a plurality (but not a majority) in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. On December 1, 2012, President Peña Nieto took office for a six-year presidential term. Although President Peña Nieto has told U.S. media outlets that his government will not abandon the fight against organized crime, the primary goal of his security strategy is to improve security conditions inside Mexico. Mexico's GDP grew by 5.5% in 2010 and 3.9% in 2011. Mexico also took an active role with respect to global issues. Under the Calderón government, security cooperation, rather than immigration or trade, dominated the U.S.-Mexican relationship. U.S.-Mexican relations continued to be close under the first Obama Administration, with security cooperation intensifying under a new Mérida Initiative strategy that encompassed institution-building, border issues, and development in Mexico. U.S.-Mexican security cooperation continued even as tension emerged in bilateral relations, including after the resignation of the U.S. Whereas Mérida assistance initially focused on training and equipping Mexican counterdrug forces, it now aims to address the weak institutions and underlying societal problems—including corruption and impunity—that have allowed the drug trade to flourish in Mexico. The Senate Appropriations Committee's version of the FY2013 foreign operations appropriations measure, S. 3241 ( S.Rept. In the 2007 U.S.-Mexico joint statement announcing the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. government pledged to "intensify its efforts to address all aspects of drug trafficking (including demand-related portions) and continue to combat trafficking of weapons and bulk currency to Mexico." 112-93 increases penalties for aviation smuggling and P.L. 112-127 tightens sentencing guidelines for building border tunnels. Despite these efforts, the 112 th Congress held hearings, issued reports, and introduced legislation on how current money laundering efforts could be bolstered. U.S. and Mexican officials share security concerns about the increasing involvement of organized crime groups in alien smuggling. 112-74 ). The conditions required that 15% of INCLE and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance be withheld until the Secretary of State reports in writing that Mexico is taking action in four human rights areas:
1. improving transparency and accountability of federal police forces; 2. establishing a mechanism for regular consultations among relevant Mexican government authorities, Mexican human rights organizations, and other relevant Mexican civil society organizations, to make consultations concerning implementation of the Mérida Initiative in accordance with Mexican and international law; 3. ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are investigating and prosecuting, in accordance with Mexican and international law, members of the federal police and military forces who have been credibly alleged to have committed violations of human rights, and the federal police and military forces are fully cooperating with the investigations; and 4. enforcing the prohibition, in accordance with Mexican and international law, on the use of testimony obtained through torture or other ill-treatment. United States-Mexico Trans-Boundary Hydrocarbons Agreement119
Estimates that a marine area straddling the U.S.-Mexico border held billions of barrels of crude oil prompted discussions between the United States and Mexico starting in the 1970s on how to manage exploration. On February 20, 2012, the governments of the United States and Mexico announced the Trans-boundary Hydrocarbons Agreement. The United States and Mexico have strong economic ties through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has been in effect since 1994. Mexico's accession to negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement is likely to generate congressional interest. In 2011, the United States and Mexico finally resolved the long-standing NAFTA trucking dispute. Legislation Enacted in the 112th Congress133
P.L. P.L. P.L. 112-205 ( H.R. Signed into law December 7, 2012, the measure provides statutory authority for the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) program within ICE, and authorizes funding for the program for FY2012-FY2016. | The United States and Mexico have a close and complex bilateral relationship as neighbors and partners under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although security issues have recently dominated the U.S. relationship with Mexico, analysts predict that bilateral relations may shift toward economic matters now that President Enrique Peña Nieto has taken office. Peña Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) defeated leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador and Josefina Vázquez Mota of the conservative National Action Party (PAN) in Mexico's July 1, 2012 presidential election. As a result, the PRI, which controlled Mexico from 1929 to 2000, retook the presidency on December 1, 2012. Some analysts have raised concerns regarding the PRI's return to power, but President Peña Nieto has pledged to govern democratically and to forge cross-party alliances.
The outgoing PAN government of Felipe Calderón pursued an aggressive anticrime strategy and increased security cooperation with the United States. Those efforts helped Mexico arrest or kill record numbers of drug kingpins, but 60,000 people may have died as a result of organized crime-related violence during the Calderón Administration. Mexico's ongoing security challenges overshadowed some of the Calderón government's achievements, including its successful economic stewardship during and after the global financial crisis.
U.S. Policy
In recent years, U.S. policy toward Mexico has been framed by security cooperation under the Mérida Initiative. Congress has provided more than $1.9 billion in Mérida aid since FY2008 to support Mexico's efforts against drug trafficking and organized crime. Whereas U.S. assistance initially focused on training and equipping Mexican counterdrug forces, it now prioritizes strengthening the rule of law. Along the border, U.S. policymakers have sought to balance security and commercial concerns. The U.S. and Mexican governments resolved a long-standing trade dispute in 2011 involving NAFTA trucking provisions and have sought to improve competitiveness through regulatory cooperation. Bilateral trade surpassed $460 billion in 2011.The February 2012 signing of a Trans-Boundary Hydrocarbons Agreement for managing oil resources in the Gulf of Mexico could create new opportunities for energy cooperation.
Legislative Action
The 112th Congress maintained an active interest in Mexico. The Obama Administration asked for $269.5 million in assistance for Mexico in its FY2013 budget request. The Senate and House Appropriations Committees' versions of the FY2013 foreign aid measure, S. 3241 and H.R. 5857, each recommend increases in aid to Mexico, with human rights conditions similar to P.L. 112-74. Congress held oversight hearings, issued reports, and introduced legislation on how to bolster the Mérida Initiative and on related U.S. domestic efforts to combat gun trafficking, money laundering, and drug demand.
Violence in northern Mexico has kept border security on the agenda, with P.L. 112-93 increasing penalties for aviation smuggling, P.L. 112-127 tightening sentencing guidelines for building border tunnels, and P.L. 112-205 providing statutory authority for the bilateral Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) program.
Mexico's recent accession to negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement generated congressional interest. Congressional consideration of the Trans-boundary Hydrocarbons Agreement did not occur.
This report reflects legislative developments during the 112th Congress. It will not be updated. Also see: CRS Report R42917, Mexico's New Administration: Priorities and Key Issues in U.S.-Mexican Relations, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by [author name scrubbed] and Kristin M. Finklea; and CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RS22851 | crs_RS22851_0 | Net self-employment income is subject to a 15.3% self-employment tax. Congressional Response
Several bills have been introduced in recent Congresses to completely exclude CRP payments from self-employment income. During the first session of the 110 th Congress, two similar bills were introduced. Tax Credit
As proposed in the Farm Bill, participants in the CRP could elect to receive an annual tax credit rather than receiving the annual rental payments. This credit would be subject to neither income nor self-employment tax. Exclusion from Self-Employment Tax for Certain Individuals
Unlike earlier proposed legislation that would have excluded all CRP payments from self-employment income, the Farm Bill would exclude only those payments received by retirees and the disabled. | The Internal Revenue Service considers payments received under the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) self-employment income even though they are called "annual rental payments," and rental income from real property is generally excluded from self-employment income. Bills have been repeatedly introduced before Congress to statutorily exclude the CRP payments from self-employment tax, but these bills generally have died in committee. In the 110 th Congress, the Senate passed H.R. 2419 , which contains a provision that would exclude the payments from self-employment income in some, but not all, cases. Unlike most previously introduced legislation, it would also provide a tax credit as an optional alternative to the current annual rental payments. This credit would be subject to neither income tax nor self-employment tax. |
crs_R45139 | crs_R45139_0 | Introduction
Unauthorized childhood arrivals is a general term used to describe foreign nationals who as children were brought to live in the United States by their parents or other adults. Legislative activity in the 115 th Congress comes in response to a decision announced by the Trump Administration on September 5, 2017, to terminate the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy established by the Obama Administration in 2012. Individuals granted deferred action under the DACA policy received protection against removal from the United States and could also receive work authorization. Initial DACA grants were for two years and could be renewed in two-year increments. Under the Trump Administration's DACA phase-out plan, as presented by DHS in September 2017, a DACA beneficiary whose grant of deferred action was due to expire on or before March 5, 2018, could submit a renewal request. A beneficiary whose DACA grant was due to expire after March 5, 2018, could not request a renewal and, thus, would lose DACA protection on the grant's expiration date. As of the date of this report, however, DHS continues to process requests to renew DACA, in accordance with federal court orders. As of that same date, there were approximately 682,750 active DACA recipients. The House has not considered legislation on unauthorized childhood arrivals in the 115 th Congress as of the date of this report. Legislative Activity Prior to the 115th Congress
Legislative proposals on unauthorized childhood arrivals in the 115 th Congress build on related legislation introduced and considered in earlier Congresses. Measures receiving legislative action prior to the 115 th Congress would have enabled eligible unauthorized childhood arrivals to become U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs). Some of these measures would provide a pathway to LPR status, like the bills considered in past Congresses, while others would provide DACA-like temporary protection from removal and employment authorization. 2579 ). Three of the amendments included language on unauthorized childhood arrivals. The Senate rejected motions to invoke cloture on any of the amendments. 1959 would have established a two-stage process for certain unauthorized childhood arrivals to obtain LPR status. Conclusion
Each proposal on unauthorized childhood arrivals considered on the Senate floor in February 2018 would have established a pathway to LPR status for eligible beneficiaries. At the same time, there were significant differences among the proposals with respect to the eligible population, the legalization process and timeline, and the implications for the parents of beneficiaries. | Legislative activity in the 115th Congress on unauthorized childhood arrivals (foreign nationals who as children were brought to live in the United States by their parents or other adults) comes in response to a decision announced by the Trump Administration on September 5, 2017, to terminate the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy. The DACA policy was established by the Obama Administration in 2012 to provide eligible individuals with temporary protection against removal from the United States and work authorization. Initial DACA grants were for two years and could be renewed in two-year increments.
Under the Trump Administration's DACA phase-out plan announced in September 2017, a DACA beneficiary whose grant of deferred action was due to expire on or before March 5, 2018, could submit a renewal request. A beneficiary whose DACA grant was due to expire after March 5, 2018, could not request a renewal and, thus, would lose DACA protection on the grant's expiration date. As of the date of this report, however, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to process requests to renew DACA, in accordance with federal court orders. According to DHS data, as of January 31, 2018, there were approximately 682,750 active DACA recipients.
Legislative proposals on unauthorized childhood arrivals in the 115th Congress build on related legislation introduced and considered in earlier Congresses. Past measures receiving action would have established a process for eligible unauthorized childhood arrivals to become U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs), who can live and work permanently in the United States. None of these measures were enacted. Bills introduced in the 115th Congress include measures to provide pathways to LPR status for certain unauthorized childhood arrivals, like the bills considered in past Congresses, as well as bills to provide more-limited DACA-like temporary protection from removal and employment authorization.
In February 2018, the Senate considered three proposals on unauthorized childhood arrivals as floor amendments to an unrelated bill (H.R. 2579). Each proposal would have established a pathway to LPR status for unauthorized childhood arrivals, although there were significant differences among them with respect to the eligible population, the legalization process and timeline, and the implications for the parents of beneficiaries. The Senate rejected motions to invoke cloture on any of the amendments. The House has not considered legislation on unauthorized childhood arrivals in the 115th Congress as of the date of this report. |
crs_R44287 | crs_R44287_0 | Introduction
This report provides an overview of FY2016 appropriations actions for accounts traditionally funded in the appropriations bill for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS). The LHHS bill provides appropriations for the following federal departments and agencies:
the Department of Labor; most agencies at the Department of Health and Human Services, except for the Food and Drug Administration (provided in the Agriculture appropriations bill), the Indian Health Service (provided in the Interior-Environment appropriations bill), and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (also funded through the Interior-Environment appropriations bill); the Department of Education; and more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration, the Corporation for National and Community Service, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Institute of Museum and Library Services, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Railroad Retirement Board. Zika Response and Preparedness Appropriations Act, 2016
On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed into law H.R. 5325 ( P.L. 114-223 ), a legislative vehicle that contained the Zika Response and Preparedness Appropriations Act, 2016, in Division B. The bill had been passed by the House and Senate one day earlier, on September 28, 2016. The Zika supplemental contained in this law provided $1.1 billion in emergency appropriations for domestic and international Zika response efforts. Of this, a total of $933 million was provided to the Department of Health and Human Services. The FY2016 budgetary totals in this report do not include these supplemental emergency appropriations, which were appropriated in the final week of FY2016. FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations
On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ). This law appropriated $170 billion in discretionary funding for LHHS, which is roughly $6 billion (+4%) more than FY2015 enacted levels and $5 billion (-3%) less than the FY2016 President's request. In addition, the FY2016 omnibus provided an estimated $718 billion in mandatory LHHS funding (pre-sequester), for a total of $888 billion for LHHS as a whole. FY2016 Continuing Resolutions
The FY2016 omnibus followed three government-wide continuing resolutions (CRs), which had provided temporary funding earlier in the fiscal year ( P.L. 114-53 , P.L. 114-96 , and P.L. 114-100 ). 113-235 ), minus an across-the-board reduction of less than one percent (-0.2108%). Congressional Action on a Stand-Alone LHHS Bill
FY2016 LHHS Action in the Senate
On June 25, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its FY2016 LHHS appropriations bill by a vote of 16-14 ( S. 1695 ; S.Rept. 114-74 ). As reported by the full committee, this bill would have provided $162 billion in discretionary LHHS funds. In addition, the Senate committee bill would have provided an estimated $718 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $880 billion for LHHS as a whole. FY2016 LHHS Action in the House
On June 24, the House Appropriations Committee approved its FY2015 LHHS bill by a vote of 30-21 ( H.R. 3020 ; H.Rept. 114-195 ). As reported by the full committee, this bill would have provided $161 billion in discretionary LHHS funds. This is about 2% less than FY2015 enacted levels and 8% less than the FY2016 President's request. In addition, the House committee bill would have provided an estimated $718 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $879 billion for LHHS as a whole. FY2016 President's Budget Request
On February 2, 2015, the Obama Administration released the FY2016 President's budget. The President requested $175 billion in discretionary funding for accounts funded by the LHHS bill, which is about 6% more than FY2015 enacted levels. In addition, the President requested roughly $718 billion in annually appropriated mandatory funding, for a total of roughly $893 billion for the LHHS bill as a whole. Of the total provided, roughly $12.2 billion (89%) is discretionary. This is about $40.5 billion (+6%) more than FY2015 enacted and $619 million (-0.1%) less than the FY2016 President's request. ACL
The FY2016 omnibus provided nearly $2.0 billion in discretionary funding for ACL. | This report provides an overview of actions taken by Congress and the President to provide FY2016 appropriations for accounts funded by the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill. This bill provides funding for all accounts funded through the annual appropriations process at the Departments of Labor (DOL) and Education (ED). It provides annual appropriations for most agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with certain exceptions (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration is funded via the Agriculture bill). The LHHS bill also provides funds for more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration (SSA).
FY2016 Supplemental Appropriations: On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed into law H.R. 5325 (P.L. 114-223), a legislative vehicle that contained the Zika Response and Preparedness Appropriations Act, 2016, in Division B. The bill had been passed by the House and Senate one day earlier, on September 28, 2016. The Zika supplemental contained in this law provided $1.1 billion in emergency appropriations for domestic and international Zika response efforts. Of this, a total of $933 million was provided to HHS programs and activities. The budgetary totals in this report do not include these emergency appropriations.
FY2016 Omnibus: On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), which provided FY2016 LHHS appropriations in Division H. This law appropriated $170 billion in discretionary funding for LHHS, which is roughly $6 billion (+4%) more than FY2015 enacted levels and $5 billion (-3%) less than the FY2016 President's request. In addition, the FY2016 omnibus provided an estimated $718 billion in mandatory LHHS funding (pre-sequester), for a total of $888 billion for LHHS as a whole.
DOL: The FY2016 omnibus provided roughly $12 billion in discretionary funding for DOL, about 2% more than FY2015 enacted. HHS: The FY2016 omnibus provided roughly $75 billion in discretionary funding for HHS, about 6% more than FY2015 enacted. ED: The FY2016 omnibus provided roughly $68 billion in discretionary funding for ED, about 2% more than FY2015 enacted. Related: The FY2016 omnibus provided roughly $15 billion in discretionary funding for LHHS related agencies, about 3% more than FY2015 enacted.
FY2016 Continuing Resolutions: The FY2016 omnibus followed three government-wide continuing resolutions (CRs), which had provided temporary funding earlier in the fiscal year (P.L. 114-53, P.L. 114-96, and P.L. 114-100). With limited exceptions, the CRs generally funded discretionary LHHS programs at FY2015 levels, minus a reduction of less than one percent (-0.2108%).
Earlier Senate LHHS Action: On June 25, 2015, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its FY2016 LHHS appropriations bill by a vote of 16-14 (S. 1695; S.Rept. 114-74). This bill would have provided $162 billion in discretionary LHHS funds, which is about 1% less than FY2015 enacted levels. In addition, the Senate committee bill would have provided an estimated $718 billion in mandatory funding, for a total of $880 billion for LHHS as a whole.
Earlier House LHHS Action: On June 24, 2015, the House Appropriations Committee approved its FY2016 LHHS bill by a vote of 30-21 (H.R. 3020; H.Rept. 114-195). This bill would have provided $161 billion in discretionary LHHS funds, which is about 2% less than FY2015 enacted levels. In addition, the House committee bill would have provided an estimated $718 billion in mandatory funding, for a total of roughly $879 billion for LHHS as a whole.
President's Budget Submission: On February 2, 2015, the Obama Administration released the FY2016 President's budget. The President requested $175 billion in discretionary funding for accounts funded by the LHHS bill, which is about 6% more than FY2015 enacted levels. In addition, the President requested roughly $718 billion in annually appropriated mandatory funding, for a total of roughly $893 billion for LHHS as a whole. |
crs_RL32530 | crs_RL32530_0 | First, few commodity markets have an institution like the Organizationof Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). These prices suggest that, while the crude oil price might remain volatile, reactingto current market conditions, it is unlikely that prices will return to pre-2003 price increase levelsfor the remainder of 2005. Reserves and Production
The long term ability of the oil market to meet demand depends on the magnitude ofavailable reserves. Table 1 shows the R/P over the past 20 years for the world aswell as various regions. As U.S. total consumption has increased overthe period, the result has been that U.S. imports of oil have increased along with our dependence onother nations and the world oil market. European reserves are now dominated by members of the formerSoviet bloc, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Romania, and others. The world economy continued its recovery in 2003 and 2004 with gross domestic product(GDP) growth rates increasing in many regions. (17)
While the United States and China increased their demands for crude oil and petroleumproducts as a result of their GDP growth, Russia, an oil exporter, improved its GDP growth rate asa result of the expansion of the petroleum industry. Recently, it might be thatthe relationship has been reversed: the high price of gasoline may have become a factor in keepingthe price of oil at elevated levels, especially on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). The high utilization rates of refinery capacity in the UnitedStates, the lack of investments in new refining capacity, the extra costs associated with producingthe variety of different gasoline mixes to satisfy environmental requirements in various regions ofthe country, low inventories as the summer driving season 2004 approached, and the high cost ofrefinery investment to meet both product and site environmental requirements all contribute to therecord levels of gasoline prices. If inventories of either crude oil orgasoline are low relative to the past average, or in the perception of market traders, this is taken tobe an indication that the market is tight, implying that demand is nearly equal to, or might evenexceed, potential supply at current price levels. As a result, upward pressure on price occurs, evenif there is no physical shortage observable. Political unrest and strikes have disrupted oil exports from both Nigeria and Venezuela. Petroleum Product Demand
Product demand analysis reveals that there are regional and country differences in the mixof oil based products consumed. Conditions in the oil and oil products industries might not be so accommodating. If political events in the Persian Gulf caused the price of oil to rise, that price increasewould be transmitted to all oil produced around the world. Today, with the war on terrorism perceived as a long term reality, it may be that oilprices will incorporate a "fear factor" for a significant time. The nature of the exploration and production cycle in the oil industry encourages majorswings in the price of oil even in more politically stable times. The 2004, and potentially for 2005, oil market reflects the influence of a number of factorsall of which have led to upward pressure on price. | The price of oil began rising in October 2003 and reached record levels in 2004 and againin 2005. As a result of these price increases, consumers' budgets have been under pressure, businesscosts have risen, and oil producers' profits have increased. The 109th Congress is considering broadenergy legislation ( H.R. 6 ), that addresses conditions in the oil and petroleum productsmarkets.
A long term explanatory factor for increasing oil prices could be the decline of the worldreserve base. The reserves to production ratio is the measure which indicates the world's ability tomaintain current production, based on proved reserves. Over the past decade there has been littlechange in the reserve to production ratio, suggesting that, at least for now, long term forces are notdriving up the price of oil.
A wide variety of cyclic and short term factors have converged in such a way that the growthof demand has been unexpectedly high causing upward pressure on oil prices. Those factors whichhave been identified as contributing to the high price of oil include the resumption of relatively rapidgrowth rates of gross domestic product in many countries around the world, a declining value of theU.S. dollar, gasoline prices, the changing structure of the oil industry, OPEC policies, and thepersistently low levels of U.S. crude oil and gasoline inventories.
Expectations concerning future market conditions are quickly embodied in oil prices formedin futures markets like the New York Mercantile Exchange. The fear of terrorism and war,uncertainty concerning the relationship between the Russian government and the oil company Yukos,and other political factors are quickly reflected in price along with real political unrest like thatexperienced by oil producing Venezuela and Nigeria. Speculative buying and selling might alsoaffect prices as financial traders adjust their investment portfolios to reflect expected marketconditions.
Demand patterns for world oil and oil products show significant diversity by country, region,and product groupings. As a result of this diversity it is not possible to attach blame for the currentlevel of price to any one nation, region, or product segment. The view that the oil market isinternational in scope and tightly interrelated is enhanced by the demand data.
As a result of the integrated nature of the world oil market it is unlikely that any one nationacting on its own can implement policies that isolate its market from broader price behavior. As newmajor oil importers, notably China, and potentially India, expand their demand, the oil market likelywill have to expand production capacity. This promises to increase the world's dependence on thePersian Gulf members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, especially SaudiArabia, and maintain upward pressure on price.
This report will be updated. |
crs_R42682 | crs_R42682_0 | Introduction
The Economic Espionage Act (EEA) outlaws two forms of trade secret theft: theft for the benefit of a foreign entity (economic espionage) and theft for pecuniary gain (theft of trade secrets). Some, like the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, in addition to imposing criminal penalties, likewise authorize victims to sue for damages and other forms of relief under some circumstances. It condemns:
- Whoever
- with intent to convert
- a trade secret
- related to or including in a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate commerce or foreign commerce
- to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof
- intending or knowing that the offense will injure the owner of that trade secret
- knowingly (a) steals…, (b) without authorization copies, … downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, … transmits, … sends, … or conveys such information; [or] receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization;
or
Whoever attempts or conspires to do so. Knowingly : The last of the section's three mens rea requirements demands that the defendant be aware that he is stealing, downloading, or receiving a stolen trade secret. A sentencing court must also order the defendant to pay restitution to the victims of the offense. Property derived from, or used to facilitate, commission of the offense may be subject to confiscation under either civil or criminal forfeiture procedures. Finally, economic espionage is punished more severely. And the crime is likewise a RICO and consequently a money laundering predicate offense. Section 1839's definition of foreign agent and foreign instrumentality, however, makes it clear that an entity can only qualify if it has a substantial connection to a foreign government. Either offense may be prosecuted as long as the offender is a U.S. national or an act in furtherance of the offense is committed within this country. Private Cause of Action : The EEA now provides that "[a]n owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may bring a civil action under this subsection if the trade secret is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce." Section 1837 states that the chapter 90 applies to conduct occurring outside the United States if "the offender" is a U.S. national or an act in furtherance of the offense is committed within the United States. | Stealing a trade secret is a federal crime when the information relates to a product in interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1832 (theft of trade secrets), or when the intended beneficiary is a foreign power, 18 U.S.C. 1831 (economic espionage). Section 1832 requires that the thief be aware that the misappropriation will injure the secret's owner to the benefit of someone else. Section 1831 requires only that the thief intend to benefit a foreign government or one of its instrumentalities.
Offenders face lengthy prison terms as well as heavy fines, and they must pay restitution. Moreover, property derived from the offense or used to facilitate its commission is subject to confiscation. The sections reach violations occurring overseas, if the offender is a United States national or if an act in furtherance of the crime is committed within the United States.
Depending on the circumstances, misconduct captured in the two sections may be prosecuted under other federal statutes as well. A defendant charged with stealing trade secrets is often indictable under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the National Stolen Property Act, and/or the federal wire fraud statute. One indicted on economic espionage charges may often be charged with acting as an unregistered foreign agent and on occasion with disclosing classified information or under the general espionage statutes. Finally, by virtue of the Defend Trade Secrets Act (P.L. 114-153), Section 1831 and 1832 are predicate offenses for purposes of the federal racketeering and money laundering statutes.
P.L. 114-153 (S. 1890) dramatically increased EEA civil enforcement options when it authorized private causes of action for the victims of trade secret misappropriation. In addition, the EEA now permits pre-trial seizure orders in some circumstances, counterbalanced with sanctions for erroneous seizures.
This report is an abridged version, without the footnotes or attribution, of CRS Report R42681, Stealing Trade Secrets and Economic Espionage: An Overview of the Economic Espionage Act. |
crs_R42448 | crs_R42448_0 | As part of its proclaimed "strategic turn" toward Asia, since the fall of 2011 the United States has, among other steps:
announced new troop deployments to Australia, new naval deployments to Singapore, and new areas for military cooperation with the Philippines; stated that, notwithstanding reductions in overall levels of U.S. defense spending, the U.S. military presence in East Asia will be strengthened and be made "more broadly distributed, more flexible, and more politically sustainable"; released a new defense planning document that confirmed and offered a rationale for the rebalancing to Asia while retaining an emphasis on the Middle East; joined the East Asia Summit (EAS), one of the region's premier multinational organizations; and secured progress in negotiations to form a nine-nation Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement (FTA). The Administration's increased emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region appears to have been prompted by four major developments:
the growing economic importance of the Asia-Pacific region, and particularly China, to the United States' economic future; China's growing military capabilities and its increasing assertiveness of claims to disputed maritime territory, with implications for freedom of navigation and the United States' ability to project power in the region; the winding down of U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; and efforts to cut the U.S. federal government's budget, particularly the defense budget, which threaten to create a perception in Asia that the U.S. commitment to the region will wane. The Obama Administration is also expanding Bush-era initiatives such as strengthening relations with existing allies in Asia; negotiating the TPP; and forging new partnerships with India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Perhaps most notably, since 2009, the Administration has consistently given considerable time and emphasis to Southeast Asia and to regional multilateral institutions. The planned deployments of troops and equipment to Australia and Singapore represent an expanded U.S. presence. A Broader Vision of the Region's Geography
Another new element to the Obama Administration's policy is the inclusion of the coastal areas of South Asia in the geographic scope of the "Pacific pivot," because of the strategic importance of the energy resources and trade that pass through the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca before reaching the manufacturing centers of East Asia. Overall Benefits, Costs, and Risks
As with any assertion of a new strategy, the "rebalancing" toward the Asia-Pacific will produce a number of foreseeable benefits and risks. The Rising Importance of the Asia-Pacific
Underlying the "pivot" is the Administration's belief that the center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic interests is shifting towards Asia, and that U.S. strategy and priorities need to be adjusted accordingly. For many observers, it is thus only prudent that the United States gives more emphasis to the Asia-Pacific. The impression that the rebalancing is aimed at containing China could potentially make it more difficult for the United States to gain China's cooperation on such issues as Iran and North Korea. In particular, in an era of constrained U.S. defense resources, an increased U.S. military emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region might result in a reduction in U.S. military presence or capacity in other parts of the world, which in turn could increase risks for the United States in those other regions. Additionally, the prominence the Obama Administration has given to the initiative has undoubtedly raised the potential costs to the United States if it or successor administrations fail to follow through on public pledges. As a result, reductions in U.S. defense spending will not—I repeat, will not—come at the expense of the Asia Pacific . Budgetary Pressures
Plans to restructure U.S. military deployments in Asia may run up against more restrictive budget constraints than plans yet assume, and may also raise a number of policy issues. Navy." Significant elements of the Obama Administration's trade policy in the region are a continuation of policies of the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations. | In the fall of 2011, the Obama Administration issued a series of announcements indicating that the United States would be expanding and intensifying its already significant role in the Asia-Pacific, particularly in the southern part of the region. The fundamental goal underpinning the shift is to devote more effort to influencing the development of the Asia-Pacific's norms and rules, particularly as China emerges as an ever-more influential regional power. Given that one purpose of the "pivot" or "rebalancing" toward the Asia-Pacific is to deepen U.S. credibility in the region at a time of fiscal constraint, Congress's oversight and appropriations roles, as well as its approval authority over free trade agreements, will help determine to what extent the Administration's plans are implemented and how various trade-offs are managed.
Areas of Continuity. Much of the "pivot" to the Asia-Pacific is a continuation and expansion of policies already undertaken by previous administrations, as well as earlier in President Obama's term. Since President Obama's inauguration in 2009, the United States has given considerable time and emphasis to Southeast Asia and to regional multilateral institutions. Under President George W. Bush, the United States emphasized the strengthening of relations with existing allies in Asia, began moving toward a more flexible and sustainable troop presence in the region, concluded a free trade agreement (FTA) with South Korea, brought the United States into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) FTA negotiations, and forged new partnerships with India and Vietnam. All of these steps have been furthered by the Obama Administration.
Transformational Elements. That said, there are a number of new aspects of the shift. The most dramatic lie in the military sphere. As part of a plan to expand the U.S. presence in the southwestern Pacific and make it more flexible, the Obama Administration has announced new deployments or rotations of troops and equipment to Australia and Singapore. U.S. officials have also pledged that planned and future reductions in defense spending will not come at the expense of the Asia-Pacific (nor of the Middle East). Additionally, underlying the "pivot" is a broader geographic vision of the Asia-Pacific region that includes the Indian Ocean and many of its coastal states.
Benefits, Costs, and Risks. Underlying the "pivot" is a conviction that the center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic interests is being realigned and shifting towards Asia, and that U.S. strategy and priorities need to be adjusted accordingly. For many observers, it is imperative that the United States give more emphasis to the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, for years, many countries in the region have encouraged the United States to step up its activity to provide a balance to China's rising influence.
There are a number of risks to the "pivot," however. In an era of constrained U.S. defense resources, an increased U.S. military emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region might result in a reduction in U.S. military capacity in other parts of the world. Another budgetary consideration is that plans to restructure U.S. military deployments in Asia and minimize cuts in the Navy may run up against more restrictive funding constraints than plans yet assume. Additionally, the perception among many that the "rebalancing" is targeted against China could strengthen the hand of Chinese hard-liners. Such an impression could also potentially make it more difficult for the United States to gain China's cooperation on a range of issues. Additionally, the prominence the Obama Administration has given to the initiative has raised the costs to the United States if it or successor administrations fail to follow through on public pledges made, particularly in the military realm. |
crs_RL32748 | crs_RL32748_0 | Introduction
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant provides federal grants for a wide range of benefits and activities. It is best known as the major source of funding for cash welfare for needy families with children. The TANF block grant was created in the 1996 welfare reform law ( P.L. 104-193 ). At the federal level, TANF is administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). It is the states and the tribes that provide TANF benefits and services to families and individuals. This report provides an overview of TANF financing and rules for state programs, describing
federal TANF grants and state funds under a "maintenance-of-effort" (MOE) requirement; how federal TANF and state MOE funds may be used to help achieve the purpose and goals of the TANF block grant; rules that apply when TANF or MOE funds are used to provide "assistance" to needy families with children; rules that apply when TANF or MOE funds are used for benefits and services o t her than assistance; certain accountability requirements, including requirements that states submit plans and report data to the federal government; and provisions of TANF law not directly related to grants to states, such as competitive grants for promoting healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood, and tribal TANF provisions. Contingency funds are only available to the 50 states and District of Columbia. Tribes and the territories are ineligible for contingency fund grants. For FY2018, states are required in the aggregate to spend at least $10.3 billion on specified activities for needy families with children. TANF's purpose is to increase state flexibility to meet specified goals. Its four statutory goals are to
1. provide assistance to needy families so that children can be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; 2. end dependence of needy parents on government benefits through work, job preparation, and marriage; 3. reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and 4. promote the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. Though TANF is a block grant, there are some strings attached to states' use of funds, particularly with regard to families receiving "assistance." Child care and transportation for working parents are explicitly excluded from the definition of assistance. Federal Eligibility Rules for Assistance
TANF requires that a family have a minor child to be eligible for assistance, including ongoing cash welfare. Federal law also prohibits states from using federal TANF funds to provide assistance to the following persons and families:
families with an adult who has received federally funded aid for 60 months (see " The TANF Time Limit "); unwed teen parents, unless living in an adult-supervised setting; teens who have not completed high school, unless they are making satisfactory progress toward achieving a high school or equivalent credential or in an alternative training program; noncitizens who arrived in the United States after August 22, 1996, for the first five years after arrival; fugitive felons and parole violators; and persons convicted of a drug-related felony, unless the state affirmatively opts out of this provision. These are known as "child-only" families receiving TANF assistance. For this requirement, the state is free to determine what constitutes being engaged in work. The work participation standards apply to states, not individual recipients. The standards are that (1) 50% of all families and (2) 90% of two-parent families must meet participation standards. These statutory standards are reduced by "credits" that vary by state and by year. States receive credits for caseload reduction and for spending state funds in excess of what is required under the MOE. Two-parent families must participate for more hours to be counted as engaged in work. Federal law provides a hardship exception to the time limit, allowing federal funds to be used in cases of hardship for up to 20% of the caseload beyond the five-year limit. A few states effectively do not limit the amount of time a family may receive assistance, either providing aid to families beyond five years using state funds (e.g., New York) or eliminating assistance paid on behalf of the family's adults after a time limit and continuing benefits indefinitely only on behalf of the children (e.g., California). These waivers must be reassessed at least every six months. Examples of such benefits and services include short-term, non-recurring aid, child care for families with working members, transportation aid for families with working members, refundable tax credits for working families with children, funding of Individual Development Accounts (IDAs), education and training for low-income parents, youth employment programs, and activities that seek to achieve the family formation goals (goals three and four) of TANF. | The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant provides federal grants to the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the territories, and American Indian tribes for a wide range of benefits, services, and activities. It is best known for helping states pay for cash welfare for needy families with children, but it funds a wide array of additional activities. TANF was created in the 1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193). At the federal level, TANF is administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
TANF provides a basic block grant that totals $16.5 billion. It also requires states to contribute in the aggregate from their own funds at least $10.3 billion for benefits and services to needy families with children—this is known as the maintenance-of-effort (MOE) requirement. TANF and MOE funds may be used in any manner "reasonably calculated" to achieve TANF's statutory purpose. This purpose is to increase state flexibility to achieve four goals: (1) provide assistance to needy families with children so that they can live in their own homes or the homes of relatives; (2) end dependence of needy parents on government benefits through work, job preparation, and marriage; (3) reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and (4) promote the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.
Though TANF is a block grant, there are some strings attached to the use of its funds. Most TANF requirements apply to families receiving assistance. Assistance is often, but not exclusively, in the form of a cash benefit. Families must be financially needy and have a minor child to qualify for assistance; however, individual states and tribes determine the exact financial eligibility rules and benefit amounts for their programs. Some families have eligible children but the adults who care for their children are ineligible for aid. These are termed "child-only" families because benefits are paid only on behalf of the children.
States and tribes must meet TANF work participation standards or risk a reduction in their block grant. For the states, the law sets standards stipulating that at least 50% of all families and 90% of two-parent families be "engaged in work." Some families receiving TANF assistance are excluded from the calculation. Additionally, these statutory standards are reduced by credits for caseload reduction and state spending in excess of what is required under the TANF MOE. These credits and the effective (after credit) participation targets vary by state and year. Activities countable toward a family being "engaged in work" are focused on employment or working off the cash benefit, or are intended to rapidly attach welfare recipients to the workforce; education and training is countable, but limited. Work requirements for tribal programs are set by negotiation between the tribes operating the program and HHS.
Federal TANF funds may not be used for a family with an adult who has received assistance for 60 months. This is the five-year time limit on welfare receipt. However, up to 20% of the caseload may be extended beyond the five years for reason of "hardship." Each state may have its own definition of hardship. Additionally, funds spent to meet the TANF MOE requirement may be used to provide assistance to families beyond five years.
TANF work participation rules and time limits do not apply to families receiving benefits and services not considered "assistance." Such benefits and services include child care and transportation aid for families with earnings, state earned income tax credits for working families, activities to reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies, activities to promote marriage and two-parent families, and activities to help families that have experienced or are "at risk" of child abuse and neglect. |
crs_R44705 | crs_R44705_0 | Mean household income increased in real terms (i.e., adjusted for inflation) for all quintiles over this time period. In 1967, mean income in the 4 th quintile was 6.2 times as large as mean income in the bottom quintile; in 2015, it was 7.4 times as large. That is, the income distribution continued to widen over the 2000-2015 period, but at a slower rate than was observed for the 1975-2000 period. Looking at the period as a whole, the income distribution became less equal because income loss was constrained to the bottom three quintiles—and percentage losses were progressively smaller for the second and third quintiles—and mean incomes grew for the top two quintiles, with the greatest net growth experienced by the top 20%. Inequality Trends in Other Advanced Economies
Rising income inequality is not unique to the United States. Patterns of Income Mobility
Between 1967 and 2015, income inequality increased within the United States because incomes grew faster, on average, for households in the top quintiles than for others (see Figure 2 ). Moreover, households (and tax units) do not necessarily stay in a given quintile from year to year. That is, a new job or profitable investment can move a household from a lower quintile to a higher one over time; likewise, households experiencing income loss can move down the distributional ranks. Such movement throughout the income distribution over time is called income mobility. Mobility can be measured in different ways and over different time frames. In general, data from governmental sources reveal three broad trends: (1) households and individuals are not perfectly mobile, i.e., there is a relationship between one's current rank in the distribution and past rankings; (2) individuals and households are more mobile over longer periods of time; (3) overall income mobility has not decreased significantly in recent decades. Figure 9 summarizes Census Bureau analysis of households' income distribution rankings in 2004 and 2007, and shows that households were mobile to varying degrees—and less so at the top and bottom of the distribution—over the short time period studied. Among top earners, individuals in the top 1% of the earnings distribution had a relatively high likelihood of staying in the top 1% over short periods of time (i.e., between 60%-80%, depending on the time frame examined), but were more likely to move to a different earnings rank over longer periods of time (i.e., more likely to move out of the top 1% over 5 years than over 1 year). Some studies attempt to explain what has held down income growth for low- and middle- income households and workers, others try to explain the rise in income at the top of the distribution, and some consider factors that affect the entire income distribution. Several factors are believed to have affected distributional patterns in labor earnings through these channels in recent decades. Another example of the industries benefiting from economies of scale is "winner takes all" industries, discussed next. Changes in the form of compensation may have also contributed to income growth at the top of the distribution. If social norms are an important constraint on income at the top of the distribution, changes in social norms or growing efforts to disguise pay levels (through complex incentive-based pay schemes) to get around the outrage constraint may help explain the growth in income at the top of the distribution in recent decades. If high-income households continue to have higher savings rates than low-income households, as they have historically, the distribution of wealth would become more unequal and would likely contribute to higher income inequality in the future. In addition to the rise in dual income households, there has been an increase in "assortative matching"—spouses marrying those with similar incomes or educational attainment—over time. The increase in female single-headed families. Does Income Inequality Affect Economic Growth? Greater inequality could be associated with poorer governance or political instability, and those factors reduce growth. To the extent that the results are driven by experiences in developing countries, the results may be of limited relevance to the relationship between growth and inequality in the United States and other developed economies. | Income inequality—that is, the extent to which individuals' or households' incomes differ—has increased in the United States since the 1970s. Rising income inequality over this time period is driven largely by relatively rapid income growth at the top of the income distribution. For example, in 1975, the average income of households in the top fifth of income distribution was 10.3 times as large as average household income in the bottom fifth of the distribution; in 2015, average top incomes were 16.3 times as large as those at the bottom.
The pace and pattern of distributional change, however, was not constant over this time period:
From the mid-1970s to 2000, incomes grew, on average, for households in each quintile (i.e., each fifth of the distribution). Income inequality increased significantly because incomes rose more rapidly for the top quintile (i.e., the top fifth or top 20% of the distribution). Between 2000 and 2015, average incomes rose at relatively modest rates for the top two quintiles (i.e., the top 40% of the distribution) and fell for the bottom three quintiles (i.e., bottom 60%). The net effect was that income inequality continued to rise, but at a slower rate.
In 2015, black and Hispanic households were disproportionately in lower income quintiles (although less so than in recent decades), whereas white and Asian households were disproportionately in higher income quintiles. Over recent decades, income inequality has also increased in most other advanced economies, although most others have more equal income distributions than the United States today and did not experience as much of an increase in inequality as the United States has recently.
Households do not necessarily stay in a given quintile from year to year. A new job or profitable investment can propel a household from a lower quintile to a higher one over time; likewise, income loss can result in movement down the distributional ranks. Such movement throughout the income distribution over time is called income mobility. Mobility can be measured in different ways and over different time frames. This report considers analyses of mobility over the short-term, the longer-term, and across generations. In general, data from governmental sources reveal three broad trends: (1) households and individuals are not perfectly mobile, that is, their current distributional rank is related to past rankings; (2) mobility is greater over longer time periods; and (3) overall income mobility has not decreased significantly in recent decades.
Economists have identified several factors that are likely to have contributed to widening inequality since the 1970s. The relative importance of each factor depends on how and over what time period inequality is measured.
Labor income has become less equal because some factors have tended to curb wage growth of lower- and middle-income workers relative to higher income workers. These factors include technological change, globalization, declining unionization, and minimum wage fluctuations. Other changes aided by globalization and technological change, such as economies of scale, winner-takes-all markets, and the superstar phenomenon may have boosted wages for very high-wage workers. Change in pay dynamics and social norms may help explain the rise in CEO pay. The distribution of financial wealth has grown more unequal over time, which affects income inequality through the capital income that wealth generates. The changing demographic composition of households has also contributed to income distribution patterns. Over time, there has been an increase in two earner households, single headed households, and marriages between couples with more similar earnings or educational attainment.
Research has investigated the link between income inequality and economic growth. In theory, greater inequality could increase or decrease growth through many channels, and vice versa. Empirically, studies have tried to tease out the relationship between the two across a large number of countries over time. Those studies tend to find stronger evidence that inequality reduces growth in developing countries, which may be of limited relevance to the United States. |
crs_R44821 | crs_R44821_0 | Introduction
In June 2016, House Speaker Paul Ryan proposed a destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT), a type of national consumption tax, as part of the "A Better Way" tax reform blueprint. One component of the DBCFT proposal is the implementation of a border adjustment. Were the United States to adopt a DBCFT with a border-adjustment tax (or BAT) it would only tax production that is consumed in the United States—domestically produced goods and services sold abroad would not be taxed. Although there are many important issues surrounding a BAT that would require careful consideration before implementation, the response of exchange rates is one that has received substantial attention. Border Tax Adjustment: Theoretical Effects
Economic Theory
Economists generally agree that traditional economic theory predicts exchange rates will adjust to offset price changes arising from the implementation of a BAT in the United States. As a result, a BAT should have no direct effects on the trade balance. The standard theory rests on two important assumptions—flexible U.S. exchange rates and a full border adjustment. The full border adjustment assumption simply means that all imports are taxed at the same rate, and that all exports are completely excluded from taxation. Potential Complications to Full Adjustment
While most economists believe that exchange rates will adjust to offset the tax, there is debate over how fast the adjustment will occur. Some have argued that the adjustment should occur almost instantaneously or even before the tax is enacted if markets price in the impending policy change. Others have argued that there may be real-world frictions that would slow the adjustment process and could result in a situation where the trade balance improves for a number of years until the exchange rate fully adjusts. The existing literature includes some studies that are broadly supportive of a full and timely exchange-rate response to VATs. Other research has found evidence suggestive of a full VAT exchange-rate response in the long run but with less clarity in short-term adjustments and industry-specific effects. | In June 2016, House Speaker Paul Ryan proposed a destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT) as part of the "A Better Way" tax reform blueprint. One component of the DBCFT proposal is the implementation of a border adjustment, which is a common feature of national consumption-based taxes. Were the United States to adopt a DBCFT and the accompanying border adjustment, it would only tax production that is consumed in the United States—domestically produced goods and services sold abroad would not be taxed.
Although there are many important issues surrounding a DBCFT that would require careful consideration before implementation, the response of exchange rates is one that has received substantial attention. (For clarity, this report will refer to the border adjustment under a DBCFT as a border-adjustment tax or BAT.) Economists generally agree that standard economic theory predicts exchange rates will adjust to offset the implementation of a BAT in the United States. As a result, in theory a BAT should have no direct effect on the trade balance. The standard theory rests on two important assumptions—flexible U.S. exchange rates and a full border adjustment. The full border adjustment assumption simply means that all imports are taxed at the same rate, and that all exports are completely excluded from taxation.
While most economists believe that exchange rates will adjust to offset the tax, there is debate over how fast the adjustment will occur. Some have argued that the adjustment should occur almost instantaneously or even before the tax is enacted if market participants include the tax in the price in anticipation of enactment. Others have argued that there may be frictions that would slow the adjustment process and which could result in a situation where the trade balance does favor exports for a number of years until the exchange rate fully adjusts.
Although no other countries have implemented a destination-based cash flow approach to taxation, studies of closely related tax systems may provide some empirical insight into how exchange rates react to border adjustments. The existing literature includes some studies that are broadly supportive of a full exchange rate response and limited timing concerns. Other research has found evidence suggestive of a full exchange rate response in the long run but less clarity in short-term adjustments and industry-specific effects. |
crs_R43923 | crs_R43923_0 | The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 ( P.L. 94-282 ) established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), including the position of its Director, within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) to provide scientific and technological analysis and advice to the President. This report provides background on EOP science and technology (S&T) advice to the President and discusses selected issues and options for Congress regarding OSTP's Director, OSTP management and operations, the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). For additional information on OSTP, including historical information regarding funding and provision of scientific advice, see CRS Report R43935, Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): History and Overview , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]
Background
Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy as an office within the EOP to, among other things, "serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government." These include:
the compliance of OSTP with statutory restrictions on its use of appropriated funds for certain activities involving China; the reporting structure of the Office of the U.S. Chief Technology Officer; the role of OSTP in ensuring scientific integrity in federally funded and supported research, including the communication of scientific and technical information by federal scientists and engineers; efforts by OSTP to effect change in federal policies regarding public access to the results of federally funded research and development (R&D); and efforts by OSTP to consolidate federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education initiatives and activities. 112-10 ) prohibited OSTP from expending funds made available under Division B of the act
to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this division. Should the CTO be placed in the Executive Office of the President or elsewhere in the executive branch? Should the appointment of the CTO be subject to Senate confirmation? OSTP Role in Ensuring Scientific Integrity
OSTP plays a role in ensuring the scientific integrity of research conducted and supported by the federal government, as well as in the communication of scientific and technical information developed and analyzed by federal scientists and engineers. OSTP Director Holdren subsequently issued a memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies providing further guidance on implementing the Administration's policies on scientific integrity. Respondents generally supported increasing public access to such research results. OSTP has been a focus of these efforts due, in part, to the OSTP Director's role as manager of the National Science and Technology Council. In May 2013, the NSTC released the federal STEM education strategic plan. The Obama Administration's FY2015 budget request again proposed a government-wide reorganization of federal STEM education programs. | Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states, "The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government." Further, "The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government."
The OSTP Director is appointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, and may also be appointed Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (APST). The APST manages the National Science and Technology Council, an interagency body established by Executive Order 12881 that coordinates science and technology policy across the federal government. The APST also co-chairs the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, a council established by Executive Order 13539 and composed of external advisors who provide advice to the President. In the Obama Administration, John Holdren is both the OSTP Director and the APST.
OSTP is engaged in several activities of potential interest to the 114th Congress. Since FY2011, Congress has restricted OSTP's ability to use appropriated funds "to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company" unless authorized to do so by a subsequent law. The 114th Congress may continue its interest in the participation of OSTP in China-related activities.
OSTP plays a role in ensuring the scientific integrity of research conducted and supported by the federal government, as well as in the communication of scientific and technical information developed and analyzed by federal scientists and engineers. The 114th Congress may continue congressional consideration of the extent to which OSTP oversees these activities.
OSTP has taken actions to provide greater public access to the results of federally funded research and development. In February 2013, OSTP Director Holdren issued a memorandum requiring federal agencies investing at least $100 million per year in research and development to develop policies allowing the general public access to the results of this investment. These policies are in the process of being released and implemented and may spur additional congressional oversight.
Finally, OSTP has inventoried federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education investments and developed a strategic plan for them. In his FY2015 and FY2014 budget requests, the President proposed reorganizations of federal STEM education programs. The extent and success of this reorganization may further focus congressional attention on OSTP's role as a coordinator of cross-agency science and technology activities. |
crs_RS22860 | crs_RS22860_0 | At one extreme, Hong Kong has maintained a "linked" exchange rate with the U.S. dollar since 1983, under which the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) is required to intervene to keep the exchange rate between 7.75 and 7.85 Hong Kong dollars (HKD) to the U.S. dollar (USD). At the other extreme, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea have reportedly allowed their currencies to float freely in foreign exchange (forex) markets over the last few years—an exchange rate arrangement often referred to as a "free float." A nation that adopts a "managed float" allows the value of its domestic currency to fluctuate in international forex markets until certain designated economic indicators reach critical levels. One special form of a managed float is a "crawling peg," in which the nation allows its currency gradually to appreciate or depreciate in value against one or more other currencies over time. Since then, the renminbi has weakened against the dollar. Japan's yen has undergone major shifts in value relative to the U.S. dollar over the past 10 years, ranging from a low of 125.35 yen to the U.S. dollar in June 2015 to a high of 76.14 yen to the U.S. dollar in February 2012 (see Figure 1 ). The last confirmed time Japan intervened in foreign exchange markets was in 2011. Trends in selected Southeast Asian exchange rates over the last 10 years have led some analysts to surmise that a "renminbi bloc" emerged in 2007 and early 2008, and reemerged between 2011 and 2013 (see Figure 2 ). In addition to the apparent similar movements in the value of their currencies relative to China's renminbi, there is other anecdotal evidence consistent with the existence of a "renminbi bloc" in Southeast Asia, at least for a period of time. According to International Monetary Fund trade data, China has emerged as the largest trading partner for many Asian nations, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. China has also been actively promoting the use of the renminbi to settle trade payments, as well as to arrange currency swap agreements. The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015
For nearly 30 years, the Department of the Treasury has been required to provide biannual reports to Congress on the exchange rate policies of foreign countries. The TFTEA also requires the report contain
an enhanced analysis of macroeconomic and exchange rate policies for each country that is a major trading partner of the United States that has—
(I) a significant bilateral trade surplus with the United States;
(II) a material current account surplus; and
(III) engaged in persistent one-sided intervention in the foreign exchange market. According to its analysis, "Treasury has found in this Report that no major trading partner met all three criteria for the current reporting period [August-December 2016]." The report did, however, place six major trading partners—China, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, and Taiwan—on a "Monitoring List" of "major trading partners that merit close attention to their currency practices." Four of the six major trading partners are in East Asia. Exchange Rate Policies and Issues for Congress
While U.S. policy has generally supported the adoption of "free float" exchange rate policies, many East Asian governments consider a "managed float" exchange rate policy more conducive to their overall economic goals and objectives. The Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act ( H.R. chapter 4) to permit the imposition of countervailing duties on the imports of countries whose currency is determined to be "fundamentally undervalued." The act also stipulates that a currency is to be determined undervalued if
1. | According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), monetary authorities in East Asia (including Southeast Asia) have adopted a variety of foreign exchange rate policies, varying from Hong Kong's currency board system which links the Hong Kong dollar to the U.S. dollar, to the "independently floating" exchange rates of Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. Most Asian monetary authorities have adopted "managed floats" that allow their currency to fluctuate within a limited range over time as part of a larger economic policy. Regardless of their exchange rate policies, monetary authorities on occasion may intervene in foreign exchange (forex) markets in an effort to dampen destabilizing fluctuations in the value of their currencies.
Legislation has been introduced during past Congresses designed to pressure nations seen as "currency manipulators" to allow their currencies to appreciate against the U.S. dollar. The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125) requires the Secretary of the Treasury to provide Congress every 180 days with "enhanced analysis of macroeconomic and exchange rate policies" for each major trading partner that has a significant trade surplus with the United States, a current account surplus, and "engaged in persistent one-sided intervention in the foreign exchange market." In its latest report, Treasury determined that "no major trading partner met all three criteria for the current reporting period." Treasury did place six major trading partners—China, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, and Taiwan—on its "Monitoring List." Four of those six major trading partners are in East Asia. In the 115th Congress, the Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act (H.R. 2039) would allow the imposition of countervailing duties on goods imported from a foreign country whose currency is determined to be "fundamentally undervalued" in accordance with the provisions of the act.
Most East Asian monetary authorities consider a "managed float" exchange rate policy conducive to their economic goals and objectives. A "managed float" can reduce exchange rate risks, which can stimulate international trade, foster domestic economic growth, and lower inflationary pressures. It can also lead to serious macroeconomic imbalances if the currency is, or becomes, severely overvalued or undervalued. A managed float usually means that the nation has to impose restrictions on the flow of financial capital or lose some autonomy in its monetary policy.
Over the last 10 years, the governments of East Asia have differed in their response to the fluctuations in the value of the U.S. dollar. China, for example, allowed its currency, the renminbi, gradually to appreciate against the U.S. dollar between 2007 and 2015, and has been actively intervening in foreign exchange (forex) markets since then to prevent the depreciation of its currency. Indonesia, however, has allowed its currency, the rupiah, to depreciate in value relative to the U.S. dollar over the last decade.
Between 2011 and 2013, some Southeast Asia nations—such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—appeared to have adopted exchange rates regimes to keep their currencies relatively stable with respect to China's renminbi. This supposed "renminbi bloc" may have emerged because those nations' economic and trade ties were increasingly with China. In addition, China was actively promoting the use of its currency for trade settlements, particularly in Asia. Exchange rate patterns for the last four years, however, have led some analysts to suggest the "renminbi bloc" may have weakened.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS22188 | crs_RS22188_0 | The President's veto authority is among the most significant tools in the executive branch's dealings with Congress. Presidents have vetoed 2,572 acts since 1789; of these, Congress has overridden 110 (4.3%). Article I, Section 7 also provides the President with the power to veto, or "forbid," the bill from becoming law. The President may sign a bill into law within the 10-day period (excluding Sundays), let the bill become law without signature, or veto the bill. If, on the other hand, Congress has adjourned within the 10-day period after presentation of the bill to the President (thereby preventing the return of the bill to Congress), the President may refuse to sign the bill, and the act does not become law—a practice called a "pocket" veto. Passage by a two-thirds margin in both chambers is required to override a veto before the end of the Congress in which the veto is received. Vetoes Exercised and Overridden
Regular Vetoes and Pocket Vetoes
Table 1 shows that 37 of 44 Presidents have exercised their veto authority on a total of 2,572 occasions since 1789. President Barack H. Obama has vetoed 10 bills since taking office in 2009. The three most recent vetoes, which all took place during the second session of the 114 th Congress, were of
H.R. 3762 , Restoring Americans' Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015; S.J.Res. 22 , A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under Chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency relating to the definition of "waters of the United States" under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act; and H.J.Res. 88 , Disapproving the rule submitted by the Department of Labor relating to the definition of the term "Fiduciary." | The veto power vested in the President by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution has proven to be an effective tool in the executive branch's dealings with Congress. In order for a bill to become law, the President either signs the bill into law, or the President allows the bill to become law without signature after a 10-day period.
Regular vetoes occur when the President refuses to sign a bill and returns the bill complete with objections to Congress within 10 days. Upon receipt of the rejected bill, Congress is able to begin the veto override process, which requires a two-thirds affirmative vote in both chambers in order for the bill to become law. Pocket vetoes occur when the President receives a bill but is unable to reject and return the bill to an adjourned Congress within the 10-day period. The bill, though lacking a signature and formal objections, does not become law. Pocket vetoes are not subject to the congressional veto override process.
Since the founding of the federal government in 1789, 37 of 44 Presidents have exercised their veto authority a total of 2,572 times. Congress has overridden these vetoes on 110 occasions (4.3%). Presidents have vetoed 83 appropriations bills, and Congress has overridden 12 (14.5%) of these vetoes.
President Barack H. Obama has vetoed 10 bills since taking office in 2009. The three most recent vetoes, which all took place during the second session of the 114th Congress, were of
H.R. 3762, Restoring Americans' Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015; S.J.Res. 22, A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under Chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency relating to the definition of "waters of the United States" under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act; and H.J.Res. 88, Disapproving the rule submitted by the Department of Labor relating to the definition of the term "Fiduciary." |
crs_RL34687 | crs_RL34687_0 | In December 2006, the 109 th Congress passed the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006 (HOPE I) to assist Haiti with expanding its apparel trade as a way to help stimulate economic growth and employment. The act included special rules for the duty-free treatment of select U.S. apparel imports from Haiti, particularly those made from less expensive third-country inputs, provided Haiti met rules of origin and eligibility criteria that require making progress on worker rights, poverty reduction, and anti-corruption measures. HOPE II extended the preferences for 10 years, expanded coverage of duty-free treatment to more apparel products, and simplified the rules of origin to make them easier to use. The act also included a new requirement to ensure that participating apparel firms comply with internationally recognized core labor standards and submit to regular inspection by the United Nations International Labor Organization (ILO). The Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010 ( P.L. The HELP Act extended the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) and the HOPE Act through September 30, 2020. Effects and Implications of the 2010 Earthquake
The earthquake that rocked Haiti on January 12, 2010, did untold damage to the country, including a significant loss of life and property. Estimates of rebuilding costs for the industry have risen to $38 million to refurbish damaged buildings, replace machinery, and train new employees, among other costs. Congress took one important step by modifying HOPE Act tariff preferences and rules of origin to further enhance U.S. market access for Haitian apparel exports. HOPE II
Because early assessments of the effectiveness of HOPE I were critical of its progress in stimulating foreign investment in the apparel sector, and given that Haiti's economic and social conditions were deteriorating rapidly in early 2008, the 110 th Congress amended the HOPE Act with passage of the Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2008. The addition of a new uncapped "3-for-1" earned import allowance (EIA). HOPE II also amended the eligibility requirements by requiring Haiti to create a new independent Labor Ombudsman's Office and to establish the Technical Assistance Improvement and Compliance Needs Assessment and Remediation (TAICNAR) Program within 16 months of enactment of the legislation. Haitian apparel producers lobbied for specific changes including extending the program to 2028, increasing the TPLs for knits and fabrics, reducing the value-added rule to 50% for five years, reducing the earned income allowance from 3-to-1 to 1-for-1, and expanding the apparel and non-apparel items that would be eligible for duty-free treatment. Woven TPL Rule Increased
HOPE II expanded the woven apparel TPL to 70 million SMEs. Transshipment and Customs Provisions Amended
The HELP Act requires U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to verify that apparel articles imported under the TPLs are not transshipped illegally into the United States. CBP is also to evaluate Haiti's customs requirements and set out a plan to improve their capabilities. Two important considerations guided congressional action in addition to a broad-based concern over Haiti's economic and social problems. First, legislation appeared to focus on enhancing those preference rules that have so far shown the most promise for promoting investment, production, and apparel exports. Second, Congress, in amending the preference rules, openly considered the possible negative effects on U.S. producers and workers. In so doing, Congress sought to achieve a policy coherence that attempts to balance domestic and foreign policy considerations. | In December 2006, the 109th Congress passed the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006 (HOPE I), which included special trade rules that give preferential access to U.S. imports of Haitian apparel. These rules were intended to promote investment in the apparel industry as one element of a broader economic growth and development plan. HOPE I allowed for the duty-free treatment of select apparel imports from Haiti made from less expensive third-country inputs (e.g., non-regional yarns, fabrics, and components), provided Haiti met rules of origin and eligibility criteria that required making progress on worker rights, poverty reduction, and anti-corruption measures. Early assessments of the effectiveness of HOPE I, however, were disappointing. The 110th Congress responded by amending HOPE I with the Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2008 (HOPE II). HOPE II extended the preferences for 10 years, expanded coverage of duty-free treatment to more apparel products, particularly knit articles, and simplified the rules, making them easier to use. Early evidence suggests that apparel production and exports are responding to these changes.
HOPE II also amended the eligibility requirements by requiring Haiti to create a new independent Labor Ombudsman's Office and establish the Technical Assistance Improvement and Compliance Needs Assessment and Remediation (TAICNAR) Program. The TAICNAR program provides for the United Nations International Labor Organization (ILO) to operate a firm-level inspection and monitoring program to help Haitian apparel factories comply with meeting core labor standards, Haitian labor laws, and occupational health and safety rules. It would apply to those firms that agree to register for the program as a prerequisite for utilizing the tariff preferences. The TAICNAR program is also designed to help Haiti develop its own capacity to monitor compliance of apparel producers in meeting core labor standards.
The earthquake that rocked Haiti on January 12, 2010 caused considerable damage to the apparel sector, although much has been done to return capacity to pre-earthquake levels. Rebuilding costs for the industry are estimated at $38 million to refurbish damaged buildings, replace machinery, and train new employees. The U.S. Congress responded to the apparel industry's needs by amending the HOPE Act with the Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-171), which improves U.S. market access for Haitian apparel exports. Two important considerations guided congressional action in addition to a broad-based concern over Haiti's economic and social problems. First, legislation appeared to focus on enhancing those preference rules that have so far shown the most promise for promoting investment, production, and apparel exports. Second, Congress factored in the possibility of negative effects on U.S. producers and workers, and in so doing sought a policy coherence that attempts to balance domestic and foreign policy considerations.
The HELP Act made a number of major changes to the trade preferences including extending the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) and the HOPE Act through September 30, 2020; allowing the value-added rule to remain at 50% through 2015; increasing the woven tariff preference level (TPL) to 200 million square meter equivalents (SMEs), with many exclusions to accommodate U.S. industry; expanding the knit TPL similarly; reducing the 3-for-1 earned import credit to 2-for-1; and expanding the list of products eligible for duty-free treatment under special assembly rules. The HELP Act requires U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to verify that apparel articles imported under the TPLs are not transshipped illegally into the United States, and to develop a plan to evaluate and improve Haiti's customs capabilities. |
crs_R41637 | crs_R41637_0 | Introduction
The United States Constitution, as amended, is a complex legal document which sets out the structure of the federal government, the legal authorities of that government (and, to a lesser extent, state governments), and, finally, a series of legal disabilities on the exercise of those authorities (such as a law that would infringe on individual rights). The document also addresses the complex legal relationship between the federal government, state governments, and the persons subject to their respective jurisdictions. Judicial interpretation of some of the Constitution's provisions, however, has varied over the last two centuries, leading to concerns regarding the ultimate validity of these decisions. Whether it is necessary to have a unified theory of constitutional interpretation to analyze all aspects of the Constitution is itself a matter of debate. For instance, there would appear to be some constitutional questions, such as whether a President may run for three full terms of office (he may not), that, because of the clear meaning of the text, do not require the application of a sophisticated theory of constitutional interpretation in order to reach a conclusion. On the other hand, there are provisions of the Constitution where the text itself is so abstract or ambiguous, such as the Fourteenth Amendment clause requiring "due process" or "equal protection," that analysis of information from outside of the constitutional text, such as an examination of the history, structure, purpose, and intent of the relevant provision, is necessary. It is further presumed that all judges, justices, and academic commentators would be comfortable utilizing historical documents contemporaneous with the drafting and ratification of the Constitution to help inform constitutional doctrine. Various theories of constitutional interpretation seem to diverge from originalism when reference is made to documents or sources outside of these "original" documents. In essence, the separation between "originalist" and other theories of constitutional interpretation appears to arise in those cases where, at least according to some commentators, the reference sources cited by originalists do not provide sufficient clarity as to the contemporaneous meaning of a particular constitutional provision, or even whether such terms were intended to be decided based on contemporaneous sources. These situations most often occur where the constitutional provision in question (e.g., the Equal Protection Clause) is, by its nature, subject to varying levels of generality. For this reason, the problem of setting the level of generality may have significant impact on constitutional interpretation. As there are many commentators who have proposed various refinements of theories of constitutional interpretation, this report will limit itself to selected originalist theories and some major theories that have arisen to address perceived problems with originalism. The report will first examine the historical bases for theories of constitutional interpretation, and will consider two schools of originalism—original intent and original meaning—and criticism of those schools. The report will then consider the role of judicial precedent and pragmatism in constitutional interpretation. Finally, the report will consider theories relating to the identification and justification of heightened constitutional protections for fundamental rights. | The United States Constitution, as amended, is a complex legal document which sets out the structure of the federal government, the legal authorities of that government (and, to a lesser extent, state governments), and, finally, a series of legal disabilities on the exercise of those authorities (such as protections for individual rights). The document also addresses the complicated legal relationship between the federal government, state governments, and the persons subject to their respective jurisdictions. Judicial interpretation of some of the Constitution's provisions, however, has varied over the last two centuries, leading to concerns regarding the ultimate validity of these decisions.
Whether it is necessary to have a unified method of constitutional interpretation to analyze all aspects of the Constitution is itself a matter of debate. For instance, there would appear to be some constitutional questions that, because of the clear meaning of the text, do not require the application of a sophisticated theory of constitutional interpretation in order to reach a conclusion. On the other hand, there are provisions of the Constitution where the text itself is so abstract or ambiguous, such as the Fourteenth Amendment clause requiring due process or equal protection, that analysis of information from outside of the constitutional text, such as an examination of the history, structure, purpose, and intent of the relevant provision, is necessary.
The use of historical documents contemporaneous with the drafting and ratification of the Constitution to help inform constitutional doctrine is sometimes referred to as "originalism." Various other theories of constitutional interpretation seem to diverge from originalism when reference is made to documents or sources outside of these "original" documents. In essence, the separation between "originalist" and other theories of constitutional interpretation appears to arise in those cases where, at least according to some commentators, the reference sources cited by originalists do not provide sufficient clarity as to the meaning of a particular constitutional provision, or even whether such terms were intended to be decided based on contemporaneous sources. These situations most often arise where the constitutional provision in question (e.g., "equal protection") is, by its nature, subject to varying levels of generality. For this reason, the problem of where to set the level of generality can have significant impact on constitutional interpretation.
As there are many commentators who have proposed various refinements of theories of constitutional interpretation, this report will limit itself to selected originalist theories and some major theories that have arisen to address perceived problems with originalism. This report will first examine the historical basis for theories of constitutional interpretation, and will consider two schools of originalism—"original intent" and "original meaning"—along with criticism of those schools. The report will then consider the role of judicial precedent and pragmatism in constitutional interpretation. Finally, the report will consider theories relating to the identification and justification of heightened constitutional protections for fundamental rights. |
crs_R41355 | crs_R41355_0 | Introduction
On March 13, 2010, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) released A Blueprint for Reform: The Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (hereafter referred to as the Blueprint ). The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), particularly its Title I-A program for Education for the Disadvantaged, is the primary source of federal aid to K-12 education. The ESEA was initially enacted in 1965 (P.L. 89-10), and was most recently amended and reauthorized by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. The Blueprint indicates that it builds on reforms already being implemented, which are being supported through funding initiatives included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ). The Blueprint outlines five key priorities:
1. College- and Career-Ready Students includes a focus on improving standards for all students, supporting the development of better assessments, and providing students with a well-rounded education. Great Teachers and Leaders in Every School focuses on effective teachers and principals, the distribution of effective teachers and leaders, and teacher and leader preparation and recruitment. Equity and Opportunity for All Students includes a focus on rigorous and fair accountability, meeting the needs of diverse learners, and resource equity. Raise the Bar and Reward Excellence focuses on achieving these goals through continuing RTTT, supporting public school choice, and promoting a "culture of career readiness and success." Promote Innovation and Continuous Improvement includes a focus on "fostering innovation and accelerating success," supporting local innovations, and supporting student success. As has been noted, this report principally examines ED's ESEA reauthorization proposal and, where appropriate, draws comparisons between the proposal and current law. The report is organized around the broad themes presented in the Blueprint , beginning with College- and Career-Ready Students and ending with Additional Cross-Cutting Priorities. Wherever possible, comparisons between the proposal and the ESEA are drawn for elements included in the Blueprint . The comparative discussions covering the individual elements of the proposal, therefore, differ substantially in length and detail depending on the extent to which ED provided detail in the Blueprint . In some instances, other relevant sources, such as the FY2011 budget request, were used to provide additional information and analysis of a particular part of the Blueprint proposal. The examination of the Blueprint is followed by several appendix tables. To demonstrate how the provisions included in the Blueprint could affect line-item appropriations for ESEA, Table A-3 examines the consolidation of programs proposed by the Administration's FY2011 budget request and the Blueprint to identify which programs would be consolidated; the program type (e.g., formula or competitive grants) for current and proposed programs; the FY2010 funding level for the program; and the proposed funding levels for FY2011. Finally, Table A-5 lists ESEA programs that were slated for elimination under the Administration's FY2011 budget request. The waivers exempt states from various academic accountability requirements, teacher qualification-related requirements, and funding flexibility requirements that were enacted through NCLB. However, in order to receive the waivers, SEAs must agree to meet four principles established by ED for "improving student academic achievement and increasing the quality of instruction." The four principles, as stated by ED, are as follows: (1) college- and career-ready expectations for all students; (2) state-developed differentiated recognition, accountability, and support; (3) supporting effective instruction and leadership; and (4) reducing duplication and unnecessary burden. Taken collectively, the waivers and principles included in the ESEA flexibility package amount to a fundamental redesign by the Administration of many of the accountability and teacher-related requirements included in current law that aligns with many of the priorities included in the Blueprint . As of December 2012, ED had approved ESEA flexibility package applications for 34 states and the District of Columbia and was reviewing applications from several other states. If Congress continues to work on ESEA reauthorization during the 113 th Congress, it is possible that provisions included in any final bill may be similar to or override the waivers and principles established by the Administration. The remainder of this report focuses only on current law and does not discuss the details of the ESEA flexibility package or how it modifies current law. For more information about the ESEA flexibility package, see CRS Report R42328, Educational Accountability and Secretarial Waiver Authority Under Section 9401 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act . Race to the Top
Current Law. | On March 13, 2010, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) released A Blueprint for Reform: The Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (hereafter referred to as the Blueprint). The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), particularly its Title I-A program for Education for the Disadvantaged, is the primary source of federal aid to K-12 education. The ESEA was initially enacted in 1965 (P.L. 89-10), and was most recently amended and reauthorized by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110).
The Blueprint indicates that it builds on reforms already being implemented, which are supported through funding initiatives that were included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5). The Blueprint outlines five areas of key priorities:
1. College- and Career-Ready Students includes a focus on improving standards for all students, supporting the development of better assessments, and providing students with a well-rounded education. 2. Great Teachers and Leaders in Every School focuses on effective teachers and principals, the distribution of effective teachers and leaders, and teacher and leader preparation and recruitment. 3. Equity and Opportunity for All Students includes a focus on rigorous and fair accountability, meeting the needs of diverse learners, and resource equity. 4. Raise the Bar and Reward Excellence focuses on achieving these goals through continuing Race to the Top, supporting public school choice, and promoting a "culture of career readiness and success." 5. Promote Innovation and Continuous Improvement includes a focus on "fostering innovation and accelerating success," supporting local innovations, and supporting student success.
This report examines ED's ESEA reauthorization proposal and, where appropriate, draws comparisons between the proposal and current law. The report is organized around the broad themes used to organize the detailed discussion of ED's reauthorization proposal, beginning with College- and Career-Ready Students and ending with Additional Cross-Cutting Priorities. Comparisons between the proposal and the ESEA are drawn only for proposals included in the Blueprint. As this report mirrors the Blueprint discussion, it in many ways also reflects the level of detail provided by ED on any given element in the Blueprint. In general, the discussions in this report of the individual elements of the proposal vary substantially in length and detail depending on the amount of detail ED provided about a particular element in the Blueprint. In some instances, other relevant data sources, such as the FY2011 budget request, were used to provide additional information and analysis of a particular part of the proposal.
The analysis of the Blueprint is followed by several tables. These tables present information on the similarities and differences between key proposals included in the Blueprint and current law; the consolidation of programs proposed by the Administration's FY2011 budget request; the funding for ESEA programs not subject to consolidation under the FY2011 budget request; and ESEA programs slated for elimination under the FY2011 budget request.
While Congress has not enacted legislation to reauthorize the ESEA, the Administration has made available an ESEA flexibility package that waives various academic accountability requirements, teacher qualification-related requirements, and funding flexibility requirements that were enacted through NCLB. In exchange for these waivers, states must agree to meet four principles established by ED for "improving student academic achievement and increasing the quality of instruction." The four principles, as stated by ED, are as follows: (1) college- and career-ready expectations for all students; (2) state-developed differentiated recognition, accountability, and support; (3) supporting effective instruction and leadership; and (4) reducing duplication and unnecessary burden.
Taken collectively, the waivers and principles included in the ESEA flexibility package amount to a fundamental redesign by the Administration of many of the accountability and teacher-related requirements included in current law that aligns with many of the priorities included in the Blueprint. As of December 2012, ED had approved ESEA flexibility package applications for 34 states and the District of Columbia and was reviewing applications from several other states. If Congress considers ESEA reauthorization during the 113th Congress, it is possible that provisions included in any final bill may be similar to or override the waivers and principles established by the Administration.
This report focuses only on current law and does not discuss the details of the ESEA flexibility package or how it modifies current law. For more information about the ESEA flexibility package, see CRS Report R42328, Educational Accountability and Secretarial Waiver Authority Under Section 9401 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. |
crs_RL32930 | crs_RL32930_0 | The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), as amended, gives private sector workers the right to join or form a labor union and to bargain collectively over wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. The NLRA is administered and enforced by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Secret Ballot Elections
The NLRB conducts a secret ballot election when a petition is filed requesting one. A petition can be filed by a union, worker, or employer. Employees or a union may petition the NLRB for an election if at least 30% of employees have signed authorization cards. If a majority of employees voting (i.e., not a majority of employees in the bargaining unit) in an NLRB-conducted election choose to be represented by a union, the union is certified by the NLRB as the employees' bargaining representative. A secret ballot election is required for decertification. Voluntary Card Check Recognition
The NLRA does not require secret ballot elections. However, in general, under a neutrality agreement an employer agrees to remain neutral during a union organizing campaign. The NLRB may order an employer to recognize and bargain with a union if a majority of employees have signed authorization cards and the employer has committed unfair labor practices that make it unlikely that a fair election can be held. After one year, if an employer and a certified union have not reached a contract agreement, the employer may withdraw recognition of the union if both parties have engaged in good faith bargaining and the employer doubts, on the basis of objective information (e.g., a petition signed by a majority of employees and given to the employer), that a majority of employees no longer support the union. Collective Bargaining Disputes: Use of Mediation and Arbitration
Once a union is certified or recognized, the union and employer are not required to reach an initial contract agreement. When a union and employer cannot reach an agreement on a collective bargaining agreement, the dispute is called an impasse. Potential Effects of Changes in Union Certification Procedures
In recent Congresses, legislation has been introduced that, if enacted, would change current union certification procedures. Other legislation would require secret ballot selections. Supporters and opponents of card check certification sometimes use similar language to support of their positions. Employers argue that, under card check certification, employees may be pressured or coerced into signing authorization cards and that employees may only hear the union's point of view. On the other hand, unions argue that during an election campaign, employers may pressure or coerce employees into voting against a union. Proponents of secret ballot elections argue that unlike signing an authorization card, casting a secret ballot is private and confidential. Unions argue that during an election campaign, employers have greater access to employees (e.g., captive audience meetings and access to employees on company property). Unions argue that card check certification is less costly than a secret ballot election. But employers maintain that unionization may be more costly to employees, because union members must pay dues and higher union wages may result in fewer union jobs. Unions also undertake more unionization drives under card check certification. The union success rate under card check certification is greater when a card check campaign is combined with a neutrality agreement. Requiring card check certification if a majority of employees sign authorization cards may increase the union success rate. But, depending on how well labor markets fit the model of perfect competition, collective bargaining may improve or harm the allocation of resources (i.e., economic efficiency). Similarly, requiring secret ballot elections may either improve or harm efficiency. Regardless of the competitiveness of labor markets, requiring secret ballot elections may increase earnings inequality—if fewer workers are unionized. Requiring card check certification may reduce inequality—if more workers are unionized. | The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA) gives private sector workers the right to join or form a labor union and to bargain collectively over wages, hours, and other working conditions. An issue before Congress is whether to change the procedures under which a union is certified as the bargaining representative of a union chosen by a majority of workers.
Under current law, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) conducts a secret ballot election when a petition is filed requesting one. A petition can be filed by a union, worker, or employer. Workers or a union may request an election if at least 30% of workers have signed authorization cards (i.e., cards authorizing a union to represent them). The NLRA does not require secret ballot elections. An employer may voluntarily recognize a union if a majority of workers have signed authorization cards.
Once a union is certified or recognized, the NLRA does not require the union and employer to reach an initial contract agreement. When a union and employer cannot reach an agreement on a contract, instead of a strike or lockout the parties may use mediation and arbitration to resolve the dispute.
In recent Congresses, legislation has been introduced that, if enacted, would change current union certification procedures. For example, the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), which was introduced in the 111th Congress, would have required the NLRB to certify a union if a majority of employees signed authorization cards (i.e., "card check"). The Secret Ballot Protection Act, which was introduced in the 113th Congress, would have made it an unfair labor practice for an employer to recognize or bargain with a union without a secret ballot election.
Supporters and opponents of card check sometimes use similar language to support their positions. Employers argue that, under card check certification, workers may be pressured or coerced into signing authorization cards and may only hear the union's point of view. Unions argue that, during an election campaign, employers may pressure or coerce workers into voting against a union. Supporters of secret ballot elections argue that casting a secret ballot is private and confidential. Unions argue that, during an election campaign, employers have greater access to workers. Unions argue that card check certification is less costly than a secret ballot election. Employers maintain that unionization may be more costly to workers, because union members must pay dues and higher union wages may result in fewer union jobs.
Requiring card check certification may increase the level of unionization, while requiring secret ballot elections may decrease it. Research suggests that, where card check recognition is required, unions undertake more union drives and the union success rate is higher. The union success rate is also greater where recognition is combined with a neutrality agreement (i.e., an agreement where the employer agrees to remain neutral during a union organizing campaign).
To the extent that requiring secret ballot elections or requiring certification when a majority of employees sign authorization cards would affect the level of unionization, the economic effects may depend on how well labor markets fit the model of perfect competition. Requiring card check certification may improve worker benefits and reduce earnings inequality—if more workers are unionized. Requiring secret ballot elections may increase inequality in compensation—if fewer workers are unionized. |
crs_R43084 | crs_R43084_0 | Introduction
On April 5, 2012, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act; P.L. 112-106 ) was enacted with bipartisan support in the 112 th Congress. The statute, examined in depth in the CRS Report R42427, U.S. Initial Public Stock Offerings and the JOBS Act , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], aims to boost corporate capital formation through amending parts of federal securities laws some viewed as an impediment to that process. Currently, there are two areas of focus: (1) expanding parts of the JOBS Act that exempted certain banks and bank holding companies (BHCs) from various reporting requirements associated with Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration to include savings and loan holding companies (SLHCs); and (2) expediting the pace of SEC rulemaking on a provision that expands the amount companies can raise through the federal securities law Regulation A (Reg A). This report provides an overview of current legislation that is attempting to accomplish the aforementioned actions by discussing (1) securities registration and disclosure requirements in federal securities laws; (2) modifications made by the JOBS Act; (3) the JOBS Act's amendment to Regulation A and subsequent criticisms; (4) legislation in the 113 th Congress to amend Regulation A in the JOBS Act; (5) the JOBS Act's bank registration and deregistration shareholder thresholds; (6) the costs and benefits of being an unregistered bank; (7) legislation to amend the JOBS Act's bank registration and deregistration shareholder thresholds; and (8) bank deregistrations after the JOBS Act and their potential legislative implications. The SEC has not completed rulemaking required to implement these provisions of the act. Reg A allows the SEC, through the issuance of rules and regulations, to exempt any class of securities from the registration requirement under the 1933 Act if it finds that the exemption is in the public interest and the issue of securities does not exceed $5 million during any 12-month period. To date, the agency has not proposed any such rules. The bill would amend Title IV of the JOBS Act by requiring the SEC to implement the Reg A+ rules by October 31, 2013. H.R. 701 passed the House with bipartisan support on May 15, 2013. SEC officials have also said that they generally prioritize rulemaking obligations based on their statutory deadlines. The JOBS Act's Bank Registration and Deregistration Shareholder Thresholds
Historically, under the 1933 Act, banks and BHCs have generally been required to register securities with the SEC if they have total assets exceeding $10 million and the shares are held (as per shareholders of record ) by 500 or more shareholders. Banks and BHCs were also allowed to no longer register securities with the SEC, a process known as deregistration, if the number of their shareholders of record fell to 300 or fewer. Title VI of the JOBS Act raised the shareholder registration threshold with the SEC from 500 to 2,000 and increased the upper limit for deregistration from 300 to 1,200 for those financial entities. The provision went into effect immediately upon the enactment of the JOBS Act on April 5, 2012. An official at the Independent Community Bankers of America, a bank trade group that supported the provision, spoke of its dual benefits:
This reform will make it easier for community banks to raise capital without tripping costly registration requirements, enhancing their ability to serve their customers and communities. Banks have also taken advantage of the law to deregister from the SEC. H.R. | On April 5, 2012, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act; P.L. 112-106) was enacted with bipartisan support in the 112th Congress. The statute, examined in depth in the CRS Report R42427, U.S. Initial Public Stock Offerings and the JOBS Act, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], aims to boost corporate capital formation through amending parts of federal securities laws some viewed as an impediment to that process. The 113th Congress is currently considering legislation to amend the act in two ways: (1) expand coverage of the JOBS Act to more companies; and (2) accelerate Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rulemaking required for the implementation of a specific provision in the act.
Regulation A (Reg A) of the Securities Act of 1933 allows the SEC to exempt publicly offered securities from having to be registered if the value of the securities does not exceed $5 million during any 12-month period. Title IV of the JOBS Act raised that ceiling to $50 million during any 12-month period. Proponents of the provision said that it would provide new sources of capital for private enterprises. However, Title IV imposed no deadline on the SEC, which must adopt rules necessary for the provision's implementation. To date, the agency has not completed the rulemaking process.
H.R. 701 (McHenry), which passed the House with bipartisan support on May 15, 2013, would impose a deadline of October 31, 2013, for completion of SEC rulemaking needed to implement the provision. The legislation is a congressional response to concerns that the SEC is not acting expeditiously enough to finish its rulemaking on what some regard as an important provision. SEC officials have indicated that they have begun the rulemaking process for the provision, but that they have been challenged by a multitude of rulemaking and regulatory obligations amidst resource constraints. Historically, under federal securities laws, banks and bank holding companies (BHCs) were generally required to register their publicly offered securities with the SEC if they have total assets exceeding $10 million and the shares are held by 500 or more shareholders. They were also allowed to stop registering the securities, and cease or reduce attendant reporting requirements, a process known as deregistration, when their shareholders of record fell to 300 or fewer. Title VI of the JOBS Act raised the shareholder registration threshold with the SEC from 500 to 2,000 and increased the deregistration threshold from 300 to 1,200, a provision that went into effect immediately after the JOBS Act's enactment. As of December 2012, this has resulted in about 100 banks and BHCs deregistered since the provision went into effect, an unprecedented number.
Some say that the provision will make it easier for community banks to raise capital without triggering costly SEC registration requirements and enable some SEC-registered community banks to deregister, reducing their regulatory burdens and freeing up bank capital. Various community banks have taken advantage of Title VI's liberalized registration trigger and have been able to raise shareholder equity capital without having to incur registration expenses. S. 872 (Toomey) and a companion bill, H.R. 801 (Womack), which has been ordered reported by committee, would expand the Title IV shareholder registration and deregistration thresholds to savings and loan holding companies. This report discusses these proposed amendments in more detail. It will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_R45019 | crs_R45019_0 | Introduction
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is authorized by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, and was reauthorized until September 30, 2017, by the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12). The NFIP is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), through its subcomponent Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA). Unless reauthorized or amended by Congress, the following will occur after February 8, 2018:
The authority to provide new flood insurance contracts will expire. The authority for NFIP to borrow funds from the Treasury will be reduced from $30.425 billion to $1 billion. The 21 st Century Flood Reform Act ( H.R. H.R. 2874 passed the House on a vote of 237-189 on November 14, 2017. Proposed Changes to Premiums and Surcharges in H.R. 2874
Section 102 would phase out the pre-FIRM subsidy for primary residences at a rate of 6.5%-15% (compared to the current rate of 5-18%), except that in the first year after enactment, the minimum rate would be 5%; in the second year after enactment, the rate would be 5.5%; and in the third year of enactment, the rate would be 6%. Section 112 would cap the premiums for 1-4 unit residential properties with elevation data meeting standards of the Administrator at $10,000 per year, adjusted for inflation every five years. Section 502 would increase the HFIAA surcharge from $25 to $40 for primary residences and from $250 to $275 for nonresidential properties and most nonprimary residences. If in any given year the Administrator does not do so, for the following fiscal year the Administrator would be required to increase the reserve fund assessment by at least one percentage point over the rate of the annual assessment, and to continue such increases until the fiscal year in which the statutory reserve ratio is achieved. 2874
Section 103 would authorize a state or a consortium of states to create a voluntary flood insurance affordability program for owner-occupants of 1-4 unit residences in communities participating in the NFIP, and for which a Base Flood Elevation (BFE) is identified on a FIRM that is in effect and for which such other information is available as the Administrator considers necessary to determine the flood risk associated with such property. 2874
Section 508 would increase the civil monetary penalties from $2000 to $5000 on federally regulated lenders for failure to comply with enforcing the mandatory purchase requirement. For example, in revising the definition, the bill would strike existing statutory language describing how private flood insurance must provide coverage "as broad as the coverage" provided by the NFIP. Though the majority of regulation of private flood insurance would then rest with individual states, federal regulators would be required to develop and implement requirements relating to the financial strength of private insurance companies from which such entities and agencies will accept private insurance, provided that such requirements shall not affect or conflict with any state law, regulation, or procedure concerning the regulation of the business of insurance. Section 202 would apply the mandatory purchase requirement only to residential improved real estate, thereby eliminating the requirement for other types of properties (e.g., all commercial properties) from January 1, 2019. Section 203 would eliminate the noncompete requirement in the WYO arrangement with FEMA that currently restricts WYO companies from selling both NFIP and private flood insurance policies. Provisions Related to Multiple Loss Properties in H.R. Section 504 would define a new "multiple-loss property" category, which would include three types of properties: (1) a revised definition of repetitive loss property; (2) a severe repetitive loss property, with the same definition as the existing statutory definition; and (3) a new category of extreme repetitive loss property. Any multiple loss properties which are not paying full risk-based rates, and for which two qualified claims payment have been made, would have rates increased at 10% per year until the full risk-based rate is reached. Selected Provisions Related to Floodplain Mapping in H.R. | The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was established by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA, 42 U.S.C. §4001 et seq.), and was reauthorized until February 8, 2018 (H.R. 195). Unless reauthorized or amended by Congress, the following will occur after February 8, 2018: (1) the authority to provide new flood insurance contracts will expire; and (2) the authority for the NFIP to borrow funds from the Treasury will be reduced from $30.425 billion to $1 billion.
The House passed H.R. 2874, the 21st Century Flood Reform Act, on November 14, 2017, with a vote of 237-189. H.R. 2874 would authorize the NFIP until September 30, 2022. This report summarizes selected provisions of the bill, concentrating on changes related to premiums and surcharges, affordability, increasing participation, the role of private insurance, treatment of multiple loss properties, and some provisions related to floodplain mapping and mitigation.
H.R. 2874 would phase out the subsidy provided for primary residences built before the first Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) was published in their community, at a rate of 6.5%-15% compared to the present rate of 5%-18%. The minimum would be phased in over a four-year period. The phaseout of the pre-FIRM subsidy for other categories of properties would remain at 25%. The Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 (HFIAA) surcharge would be increased from $25 to $40 for primary residences and from $250 to $275 for nonresidential properties and most nonprimary residences. The reserve fund assessment would be increased by at least one percentage point per year until the statutory reserve ratio is achieved. The bill would cap the premiums for 1-4 unit residential properties at $10,000 per year. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would be required over time to include additional considerations in the setting of premium rates, including the use of replacement cost value of a property, the difference in flood risk between coastal and inland locations, and the use of risk assessment tools other than FIRMs. H.R. 2874 would authorize a state or a consortium of states to create a voluntary flood insurance affordability program for low-income owner-occupants of 1-4 unit residences, to be funded by a surcharge on other NFIP policyholders in the state(s). The bill would increase the civil penalties from $2,000 to $5,000 on federally regulated lenders for failure to comply with enforcing the mandatory purchase requirement.
H.R. 2874 would strike existing statutory language describing how private flood insurance must provide coverage "as broad as the coverage" provided by the NFIP, and would instead require that policies comply with the laws and regulations of the state where the property is located. Federal regulators would be required to develop and implement regulations relating to the financial strength of private insurers, and lenders would have to accept a private insurance policy from a company with adequate financial strength. The mandatory purchase requirement would be eliminated for commercial property from January 1, 2019. The noncompete clause that currently restricts private companies from selling both NFIP and private flood insurance policies would be eliminated.
H.R. 2874 would define a new "multiple-loss property" category, which would include a revised definition of repetitive loss properties, severe repetitive loss properties, and a new category of extreme repetitive loss properties. Any multiple-loss property with at least two claims after enactment would have rates increased by 10% per year until the rates reflect current risks. Those with at least three future claims would have their rates increased by 15% per year. |
crs_R43357 | crs_R43357_0 | Introduction
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services, as well as long-term services and supports (LTSS), to a diverse low-income population, including children, pregnant women, adults, individuals with disabilities, and people aged 65 and older. In FY2014, Medicaid is estimated to have provided health care services to 65 million individuals at a total cost of $498 billion, with the federal government paying $303 billion of that total. State participation in Medicaid is voluntary, though all states, the District of Columbia, and the territories choose to participate. States submit these Medicaid state plans to the federal Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) for approval. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 as amended) is the most recent federal law to make fundamental revisions to the Medicaid program, including a substantial expansion of Medicaid eligibility that began in 2014. This report describes the basic elements of Medicaid, focusing on who is eligible, what services are covered, how enrollees share in the cost of care, how the program is financed, and how providers are paid. The report also explains waivers, program integrity activities, and the dual-eligible population. In addition, the report addresses the following selected issues: the ACA Medicaid expansion, the impact of the ACA health insurance annual fee on Medicaid, and the ACA maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement with respect to Medicaid eligibility. If a state participates in Medicaid, the following are examples of groups that must be provided Medicaid coverage:
low-income families that meet the financial requirements (based on family size) of the former Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) cash assistance program; pregnant women and children through the age of 18 with family income at or below 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL); low-income individuals who are aged 65 and older, or who are blind, or who are under the age of 65 and disabled who qualify for cash assistance under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program; recipients of adoption assistance and foster care (who are under the age of 18) under Title IV–E of the Social Security Act; certain individuals who age out of foster care, up to the age of 26, and do not qualify under other mandatory groups noted above; and certain groups of legal permanent resident immigrants (e.g., refugees for the first 7 years after entry into the United States; asylees for the first 7 years after asylum is granted; lawful permanent aliens with 40 quarters of creditable coverage under Social Security; immigrants who are honorably discharged U.S. military veterans) who meet all other financial and categorical Medicaid eligibility requirements. Modified Adjusted Gross Income
As of January 1, 2014, MAGI rules are used in determining eligibility for most of Medicaid's non-elderly populations, including the ACA Medicaid expansion. In addition, states have the option to provide ABP coverage to other subgroups. As a result, there is significant variation from state to state in funding sources. However, the federal government's share of Medicaid expenditures increased with the implementation of the ACA Medicaid expansion because the federal government is funding a vast majority of the cost of the expansion through the newly eligible and expansion state federal matching rates. Medicaid Program Waivers
The Social Security Act authorizes several waiver and demonstration authorities to provide states with the flexibility to operate their Medicaid programs. The ACA included some provisions to increase uniformity among Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP program integrity activities. In addition, the ACA provided CMS with the ability to test innovative payment and service delivery models to improve coordination of care and reduce the cost of dual-eligible beneficiaries. | Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services as well as long-term services and supports (LTSS) to an estimated 65 million people at a cost to states and the federal government of $498 billion in FY2014. In comparison, the Medicare program provided health care benefits to nearly 54 million seniors and certain individuals with disabilities in that same year at a cost of roughly $606 billion to the federal government. Because Medicaid represents a large component of federal mandatory spending, Congress is likely to continue its oversight of Medicaid's eligibility, benefits, and costs.
Participation in Medicaid is voluntary for states, though all states, the District of Columbia, and the territories choose to participate. The federal government requires states to cover certain mandatory populations and benefits, but the federal government also allows states to cover other optional populations and services. Due to this flexibility, there is substantial variation among the states in terms of factors such as Medicaid eligibility, covered benefits, and provider payment rates. In addition, there are several waiver and demonstration authorities that allow states to operate their Medicaid programs outside of federal rules.
Historically, Medicaid eligibility generally has been limited to low-income children, pregnant women, parents of dependent children, the elderly, and individuals with disabilities; however, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) included the ACA Medicaid expansion, which expands Medicaid eligibility to individuals under the age of 65 with income up to 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL) (effectively 138% of FPL) at state option.
The ACA makes a number of other changes, which together represent the most significant reform to the Medicaid program since its establishment in 1965. In addition to the ACA Medicaid expansion, the ACA expands Medicaid eligibility for children aged 6 to 18 and former foster care children; transitions to the modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) counting methodology to determine eligibility for most non-elderly Medicaid enrollees; requires alternative benefit plan (ABP) coverage for certain Medicaid enrollees; provides enhanced federal matching funds for the ACA Medicaid expansion; increases uniformity among Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) program integrity activities; and provides the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) with the ability to test methods to improve coordination of care for dual-eligible beneficiaries, among other changes.
This report describes the basic elements of Medicaid, focusing on who is eligible, what services are covered, how enrollees share in the cost of care, how the program is financed, and how providers are paid. The report also explains waivers, program integrity activities, and the dual-eligible population. In addition, it describes the following selected issues: the ACA Medicaid expansion, the impact of the ACA health insurance annual fee on Medicaid, and the ACA maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement with respect to Medicaid eligibility. |
crs_R45127 | crs_R45127_0 | The frequency of cybersecurity incidents and their effects on the U.S. economy and national security have elevated congressional interest in cybersecurity issues. This report provides an overview of cybersecurity concepts, the role of selected federal agencies in addressing cybersecurity threats, and a discussion of cybersecurity issues that may be of interest to Congress, including the following:
protecting critical infrastructure; data breaches and data security; education and training; encryption; information sharing; insurance; international issues; the Internet of Things; oversight of federal agency information technology; and incident response. A fourth term for information security is gaining prominence in discussions on cybersecurity: "authentication," or the ability to confirm that parties using a system and accessing data are who they claim to be and have legitimate access to that data and system. Elements to ensure cybersecurity involve policies spanning a range of fields, including education, workforce management, investment, entrepreneurship, and research and development. Software development, law enforcement, intelligence, incident response, and national defense may be involved in the response when something goes awry in cyberspace. Selected Federal Roles and Responsibilities
Department of Defense20
The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for defending the nation and supporting the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) coordination of efforts for cyber defense, for protecting the defense industrial base (DIB), and for securing the DOD information networks (DODIN). Military cyber assets may be deployed in the event of a major cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure only when directed to do so. DHS secures federal networks, coordinates critical infrastructure protection efforts, responds to cyber threats, investigates cybercrimes, funds cybersecurity research and development, and promotes cybersecurity education and awareness. In order to accomplish these roles, DHS collects information on cybersecurity threats and shares that information across the federal government and with the private sector so others may be able to better protect themselves. DHS's agencies also carry out other cybersecurity responsibilities. DOJ is responsible for investigating and prosecuting a range of modern-day cyber threats. The FBI pursues cybercrime cases ranging from computer hacking and intellectual property rights violations to child exploitation, fraud, and identity theft. Selected Policy Issues
Below is a list of selected policy issues related to cybersecurity which may be of interest to Congress. One key policy issue for the 115 th Congress may relate to the Framework 's implementation. Victims may opt to respond to incidents with in-house teams, or by retaining cybersecurity firms. 113-66 on December 26, 2013, included a variety of cybersecurity-related provisions. Recent Executive Action
The White House has taken actions independent of Congress to address a variety of cybersecurity issues. Selected Hearings
The House has held over 30 hearings during the first session of the 115 th Congress on cybersecurity issues, and the Senate has held over 25. | Cybersecurity has been gaining attention as a national issue for the past decade. During this time, the country has witnessed cyber incidents affecting both public and private sector systems and data. These incidents have included attacks in which data was stolen, altered, or access to it was disrupted or denied. The frequency of these attacks, and their effects on the U.S. economy, national security, and people's lives have driven cybersecurity issues to the forefront of congressional policy conversations. This report provides an overview of selected cybersecurity concepts and a discussion of cybersecurity issues that are likely to be of interest during the 115th Congress.
From a policymaking standpoint, cybersecurity includes the security of the devices, infrastructure, data, and users that make up cyberspace. The elements of ensuring cybersecurity involve policies spanning a range of fields, including education, workforce management, investment, entrepreneurship, and research and development. Software development, law enforcement, intelligence, incident response, and national defense are involved in the response when something goes awry in cyberspace.
To help secure and respond to incidents in cyberspace federal departments and agencies carry out their authorized responsibilities, run programs, and work with the private sector. While every federal agency has a role in protecting its own data and systems, certain agencies have significant responsibilities with regard to national cybersecurity. The Department of Defense supports domestic efforts on cybersecurity with its capabilities and capacity, and deploys military assets to protect American critical infrastructure from a cyberattack when directed to do so. The Department of Homeland Security secures federal networks, coordinates critical infrastructure protection efforts, responds to cyber threats, investigates cybercrimes, funds cybersecurity research and development, and promotes cybersecurity education and awareness. The Department of Justice investigates and prosecutes a variety of cyber threats, which range from computer hacking and intellectual property rights violations to fraud, child exploitation, and identity theft.
Congress passed five laws related to cybersecurity during the 113th Congress and an additional law during the 114th Congress. Congress also held 119 hearings on cybersecurity-related issues during the 114th Congress. The White House issued presidential actions on cybersecurity related to critical infrastructure cybersecurity, information sharing, and sanctions in retaliation for malicious cyber activities.
Cybersecurity policy has continued to hold congressional interest during the 115th Congress. Recent congressional hearings have examined several cybersecurity issues, including data breaches, critical infrastructure protection, education and training, and the security of federal information technology. Other issues discussed during the 114th Congress continue to hold stakeholder interest, including debates concerning government access to encrypted data.
This report covers a variety of topics related to cybersecurity in order to provide context and a framework for further discussion on selected policy areas. These topics include cybersecurity incidents, major federal agency roles and responsibilities, recent policy actions by Congress and the White House, and descriptions of policy issues that may be of interest in the 115th Congress. |
crs_RS22843 | crs_RS22843_0 | Federal statute and regulations define a provider tax as a health care-related fee, assessment, or other mandatory payment for which at least 85% of the burden of the tax revenue falls on health care providers. States are not allowed to hold the providers harmless for the cost of the provider tax (i.e., they cannot guarantee that providers receive their money back). Many of these states use the provider tax revenue to increase Medicaid payment rates for the class of providers, such as hospitals, responsible for paying the provider tax. This financing strategy allows states to fund increases to Medicaid payment rates without the use of state funds because the increased Medicaid payment rates are funded with provider tax revenue and federal Medicaid matching funds. States also use provider tax revenue to fund other Medicaid or non-Medicaid purposes. This report provides background regarding states' use of provider taxes in the 1980s and describes the relevant federal statutes and regulations, which were mostly established in the early 1990s. The report explains how states use provider taxes to help finance Medicaid and provides information regarding the extent to which states currently use such taxes. The report ends with a discussion of the provider tax provisions in past and present proposals that would impact Medicaid provider taxes. In order for states to claim federal matching payments for provider tax revenues, the 1991 law
requires provider taxes to be broad-based (i.e., imposed on all providers within a specified class of providers) and uniform (i.e., the same tax for all providers within a specified class of providers)—in other words, states cannot limit the provider taxes to only Medicaid providers; and prohibits states from a direct or indirect guarantee that providers receive their money back (or be "held harmless"). States' Current Use of Provider Taxes
States' use of provider tax revenue varies from state to state, but states often use provider tax revenue to draw down federal Medicaid matching funds in order to increase Medicaid payment rates for the same providers that are responsible for paying the tax. While federal requirements allow states to impose taxes on 19 classes of providers, the classes of providers that are most often taxed include nursing facilities, hospitals, and intermediate care facilities for individuals with intellectual disabilities (ICF/ID). Number of Provider Taxes
States' use of Medicaid provider taxes has increased in recent years. Current Issues
Limiting or eliminating states' use of provider taxes in financing Medicaid has been identified as a way to reduce federal Medicaid spending. A few years ago, there were a few proposals to limit or eliminate states' use of provider taxes, but provider tax proposals had not been discussed in the past couple years. However, recently, the House Energy and Commerce Committee marked up a bill ( H.R. 4725 ) that includes a Medicaid provider tax provision. Types of Provider Taxes Used by States
A vast majority of states use provider taxes to finance Medicaid. | States are able to use revenues from health care provider taxes to help finance the state share of Medicaid expenditures. Federal statute and regulations define a provider tax as a health care-related fee, assessment, or other mandatory payment for which at least 85% of the burden of the tax revenue falls on health care providers. For states to be able to draw down federal Medicaid matching funds, the provider tax must be both broad-based (i.e., imposed on all providers within a specified class of providers) and uniform (i.e., the same tax for all providers within a specified class of providers). Also, states are not allowed to hold the providers harmless for the cost of the provider tax (i.e., states cannot guarantee that providers receive their money back).
A vast majority of states use at least one provider tax to help finance Medicaid. Many of these states use the provider tax revenue to increase Medicaid payment rates for the class of providers, such as hospitals, responsible for paying the provider tax. This financing strategy allows states to fund increases to Medicaid payment rates without the use of state funds because the increased Medicaid payment rates are funded with provider tax revenue and federal Medicaid matching funds. States also use provider tax revenues to fund other Medicaid or non-Medicaid purposes.
States first began using health care provider taxes to help finance the state share of Medicaid expenditures in the mid-1980s. Some states were particularly aggressive in their use of provider taxes. As a result, in the early 1990s, the federal government imposed statutory and regulatory limitations on states' use of health care provider tax revenue to finance Medicaid.
While federal requirements allow states to impose provider taxes on 19 classes of health care providers, the classes of providers that are most often taxed include nursing facilities, hospitals, and intermediate care facilities for individuals with intellectual disabilities (ICF/ID). States' use of Medicaid provider taxes has increased in recent years.
Limiting or eliminating states' use of provider taxes in financing Medicaid has been identified as a way to reduce federal Medicaid spending. A few years ago, there were a few proposals to limit or eliminate states' use of provider taxes, but provider tax proposals had not been discussed in the past couple years. However, recently, the House Energy and Commerce Committee marked up a bill (H.R. 4725) that includes a Medicaid provider tax provision.
This report provides background regarding states' use of provider taxes in the 1980s and describes the relevant federal statutes and regulations, which were mostly established in the early 1990s. The report explains how states use provider taxes to help finance Medicaid and provides information regarding the extent to which states currently use such taxes. The report ends with a discussion of past and present proposals that would impact Medicaid provider taxes. |
crs_R45259 | crs_R45259_0 | G roundwater, the water in aquifers accessible by wells, is a critical component of the U.S. water supply. It serves as a water source for domestic use and as irrigation water for agriculture, and it is used in mining, oil and gas development, industrial processes, livestock, and thermoelectric power, among other uses. Nearly half of the U.S. population relies on groundwater to meet their everyday needs. Groundwater makes up a portion of the water supplied to about 149 million people (46% of the U.S. population in 2015) for their domestic indoor and outdoor water uses. Groundwater and Irrigation
The greatest volume of groundwater used is for agriculture, nearly entirely for irrigation. Among all states, California uses the most groundwater for irrigation, withdrawing 13.9 bgpd in 2015. The Federal Role in Groundwater Supply
The federal government directly and indirectly influences how groundwater is managed in the United States. This includes the two principal federal water resources agencies: the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE, which operates nationwide) and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation, which operates in the 17 coterminous states west of the Mississippi River). Congressional interest has increased in the potential to assist with state, local, and private groundwater management efforts, including efforts to use surface water to recharge and/or store water in aquifers and to recover (i.e., pump to the surface) the stored groundwater when needed. Currently, there are no general federal restrictions on the nonfederal use of water delivered by Reclamation or stored by USACE for aquifer recharge, storage, and recovery purposes; however, some state restrictions and federal environmental protection laws may affect the use of these waters for groundwater recharge. Some legislation would attempt to clarify standards applying to specific nonfederal aquifer storage projects. For decades, USGS has monitored and reported groundwater conditions across the country; developed groundwater models and software tools for characterizing aquifers; and provided long- and short-term forecasts of changing groundwater conditions as part of local and regional groundwater studies. Other agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), make observations and collect data that also are relevant to groundwater monitoring and assessment. Congress has provided other federal agencies with the authority to make water delivered from or water stored at federal water resource projects available for groundwater recharge, storage, and recovery. USDA also collects groundwater data related to irrigation. Reclamation also reports that some state restrictions affect the use of these waters for groundwater activities. Climate Change and Other Long-Term Influences on Groundwater Supply
Long-term changes to the climate affecting the United States, particularly rising temperatures and changes in the patterns, quantities, and type of precipitation (i.e., rain versus snow), could affect the availability of groundwater in the future. Summary and Conclusions
Congress generally has deferred management of U.S. groundwater resources to the states, and that practice appears likely to continue. Several bills introduced in the 115 th Congress, for example, contain language directing that the federal government not "assert any connection between surface and groundwater that is inconsistent with such a connection recognized by State water laws." Those same bills also would prohibit the federal government from requiring the transfer of water rights to the United States, or obtaining a water right in the name of the United States, as a condition for receiving, renewing, amending, or extending "any permit, approval, license, lease, allotment, easement, right-of-way, or other land use or occupancy agreement." In addition, the bills contain language asserting that federal reserved water rights would not be limited or expanded by the legislation. | Groundwater, the water in aquifers accessible by wells, is a critical component of the U.S. water supply. It is important for both domestic and agricultural water needs, among other uses. Nearly half of the nation's population uses groundwater to meet daily needs; in 2015, about 149 million people (46% of the nation's population) relied on groundwater for their domestic indoor and outdoor water supply. The greatest volume of groundwater used every day is for agriculture, specifically for irrigation. In 2015, irrigation accounted for 69% of the total fresh groundwater withdrawals in the United States. For that year, California pumped the most groundwater for irrigation, followed by Arkansas, Nebraska, Idaho, Texas, and Kansas, in that order. Groundwater also is used as a supply for mining, oil and gas development, industrial processes, livestock, and thermoelectric power, among other uses.
Congress generally has deferred management of U.S. groundwater resources to the states, and there is little indication that this practice will change. For example, several bills introduced in the 115th Congress contain provisions that would direct that the federal government recognizes that aspects of groundwater, such as the connection between surface water and groundwater, be consistent with state water laws (surface water includes streams, rivers, lakes, ponds, and is not groundwater or atmospheric water, such as rain or snow). Those same bills also would prohibit the federal government from requiring the transfer of water rights to the United States or obtaining a water right in the name of the United States as a condition for receiving, renewing, amending, or extending "any permit, approval, license, lease, allotment, easement, right-of-way, or other land use or occupancy agreement." In addition, these bills contain language asserting that the legislation would not alter certain reserved rights associated with federal and tribal lands.
Congress, various states, and other stakeholders recently have focused on the potential for using surface water to recharge aquifers and the ability to recover stored groundwater when needed. Some see aquifer recharge, storage, and recovery as a replacement or complement to surface water reservoirs, and there is interest in how federal agencies can support these efforts. In the congressional context, there is interest in the potential for federal efforts to facilitate state, local, and private groundwater management efforts (e.g., management of federal reservoir releases to allow for groundwater recharge by local utilities). The two primary federal water resources agencies are the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). No significant federal restrictions apply to Reclamation's authorities to deliver water for purposes of aquifer recharge, storage, and recovery. USACE authorities also do not contain restrictions on the nonfederal use for groundwater recharge of water stored or released from USACE reservoirs. Both agencies acknowledge that some state restrictions affect the use of the delivered or stored waters for groundwater activities. Some legislative proposals would provide the agencies with additional directives and mechanisms regarding their authority to support nonfederal groundwater recharge.
Other federal agencies support activities that inform groundwater management. For example, the U.S. Geological Survey monitors and reports groundwater conditions across the country, develops groundwater models and software tools for characterizing aquifers, and provides long- and short-term forecasts of changing groundwater conditions as part of local and regional groundwater studies. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration also make observations and collect data that are relevant to groundwater monitoring and assessment. The U.S. Department of Agriculture collects groundwater data related to irrigation.
Long-term changes to the climate affecting the United States, particularly rising temperatures and changes in the patterns, quantities, and type of precipitation (i.e., rain versus snow), could affect the availability of groundwater in the future. Other factors, such as changes to land use, irrigation practices, and patterns of water consumption, also may influence groundwater supplies. |
crs_RL32453 | crs_RL32453_0 | For this reason, but also because of the costs, Social Security does not provide both full worker and full spousal benefits to the same individual. For persons who qualify for both a Social Security worker benefit (retirement or disability) based on their own work history and a Social Security spousal benefit based on a spouse's work history, the "dual entitlement" rule effectively caps total benefits at the higher of the worker's own benefit or the spousal benefit. The Government Pension Offset (GPO) is analogous in purpose to the "dual entitlement" provision and applies to individuals who qualify for both a pension based on their own non -Social Security-covered government work and a Social Security spousal benefit based on a spouse's work in Social Security-covered employment. The intent of the dual entitlement rule and the GPO is the same—to reduce the Social Security spousal benefits of individuals who are not financially dependent on their spouses because they receive their own retired-worker or disabled-worker Social Security benefits, or their non-Social Security pension benefits. The intent of both provisions is to reduce the Social Security benefits of spouses or widow(er)s who are not financially dependent on their spouses because they receive retirement benefits based on their own work records. The GPO reduction to Social Security spousal and widow(er)'s benefits equals two-thirds of the pension from non-covered government employment. Parity Between Spouses Subject to the Dual Entitlement Rule and the GPO
The GPO is intended to place spouses and widow(er)s whose government employment was not covered by Social Security in approximately the same position as spouses whose jobs were covered by Social Security. For those under dual entitlement, the Social Security spousal benefit is reduced by one dollar for every dollar of Social Security retirement benefits based on their own work histories in Social Security-covered employment. The 1977 law provided that 100% of the non-covered government pension be subtracted from the Social Security spousal or widow(er)'s benefit. | Social Security spousal benefits were established in the 1930s to help support wives who are financially dependent on their husbands. It has since become more common for both spouses in a couple to work, with the result that, in more cases, both members of a couple are entitled to Social Security or other government pensions based on their own work records. Social Security does not provide both a full retired-worker and a full spousal benefit to the same individual.
Two provisions are designed to reduce the Social Security spousal benefits of individuals who are not financially dependent on their spouses because they receive benefits based on their own work records. These are
the "dual entitlement" rule, which applies to spouses who qualify for both (1) Social Security spousal benefits based on their spouses' work histories in Social Security-covered employment and (2) their own Social Security retired- or disabled-worker benefits, based on their own work histories in Social Security-covered employment; and the Government Pension Offset (GPO), which applies to spouses who qualify for both (1) Social Security spousal benefits based on their spouses' work histories in Social Security-covered employment and (2) their own government pensions, based on their own work in government employment that was not covered by Social Security.
The dual entitlement rule requires that 100% of a Social Security retirement or disability benefit as a covered worker is subtracted from any Social Security spousal or widow(er)'s benefit an individual is eligible to receive. The GPO reduces Social Security spousal or widow(er)'s benefits by two-thirds of the pension from non-covered government employment. The GPO does not reduce the benefits of the spouse who was covered by Social Security.
Opponents contend that the GPO is imprecise and can be unfair. Defenders argue it is the best method currently available for preserving the spousal benefit's original intent of supporting financially dependent spouses and also for eliminating an unfair advantage for spouses working in non-Social Security-covered employment compared with spouses working in Social Security-covered jobs (who are subject to the dual entitlement rule). |
crs_R44078 | crs_R44078_0 | FY2016 Consideration: Overview of Actions
The first section of this report provides an overview of the consideration of FY2016 judiciary appropriations, with subsections covering each major action, including
the initial submission of the request on February 2, 2015; hearings held by the House and Senate Financial Services Subcommittees; the House subcommittee markup on June 10, 2015; the House Appropriations Committee markup on June 17, 2015; the Senate subcommittee markup on July 22, 2015; the Senate Appropriations Committee markup on July 23, 2015; and the continuing resolutions and the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, on December 18, 2015. By law, the judicial branch request is submitted to the President and included in the budget submission without change. 2995 , H.Rept. Judicial branch activities were funded through continuing appropriations resolutions ( P.L. 114-53 , P.L. 114-96 , and P.L. 114-100 ) until the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. Division E of this act provides $7.3 billion for the judiciary, an increase of $73.9 million (1.0%) from FY2015 and $184.1 million (-2.5%) less than the request. Funding in Recent Years: Brief Overview
FY2015
FY2015 judiciary funding was provided in Division E, Title 3, of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ), which was enacted on December 16, 2014. The Judiciary Budget and Key Issues
Appropriations for the judiciary comprise approximately 0.2% of total budget authority. The remaining judiciary budget is divided among the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (0.5% of FY2016 enacted), U.S. Court of International Trade (0.3%), Fees of Jurors and Commissioners (0.6%), Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (1.2%), Federal Judicial Center (0.4%), U.S. Sentencing Commission (0.2%), and Judicial Retirement Funds (1.8%). Three specialized courts within the federal court system are not funded under the judiciary budget: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (funded in the Department of Defense appropriations bill), the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (funded in the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies appropriations bill), and the U.S. Tax Court (funded under Independent Agencies, Title V, of the Financial Services and General Government [FSGG] bill). 114-113 . | Funds for the judicial branch are included annually in the Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) Appropriations bill. The bill provides funding for the Supreme Court; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; the U.S. Court of International Trade; the U.S. Courts of Appeals and District Courts; Defender Services; Court Security; Fees of Jurors and Commissioners; the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; the Federal Judicial Center; the U.S. Sentencing Commission; and Judicial Retirement Funds.
The judiciary's FY2016 budget request of $7.533 billion was submitted on February 2, 2015. By law, the President includes the requests submitted by the judiciary in the annual budget submission without change.
The FY2016 budget request represents a 3.7% increase over the FY2015 enacted level of $7.261 billion provided in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235, Division E, Title III, enacted December 16, 2014).
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees' Financial Services and General Government Subcommittees held hearings in February and March to consider the FY2016 judiciary request. Markups were held in the House (H.R. 2995) in June and in the Senate (S. 1910) in July.
No further action was taken on either bill, and judicial branch activities were funded through continuing appropriations resolutions (P.L. 114-53, P.L. 114-96, and P.L. 114-100) until the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113, enacted December 18, 2015). Division E of this act provides $7.3 billion for the judiciary, an increase of $73.9 million (1.0%) from FY2015 and $184.1 million (-2.5%) less than the request.
Appropriations for the judiciary comprise approximately 0.2% of total budget authority. |
crs_R43175 | crs_R43175_0 | This report does not address veterans. However, approximately 80% of servicemember TBIs occur in a non-deployed setting. Efforts to address the stigma issue may be, at least in part, responsible for greater rates of mental health diagnoses. Not all costs of active duty and activated Reserve and Guard mental health treatment will appear in this chart, as not all servicemembers seek mental disorder treatment through the military health system. One recent study stated that the "quality of mental health care and counseling offered in DOD is unknown, and efforts to improve quality, such as training providers in evidence-based practice, are not integrated into the system of mental health care offered in DOD treatment facilities." In contrast, the unadjusted general population lifetime prevalence of PTSD in adults appears to be 8%; Neurobiology — Further research is needed to identify biomarkers of PTSD, brain imaging diagnostic models, and effective pharmacologic agents to enhance therapy-related learning; Programs and Services for PTSD in the DO D and VA — Both the DOD and VA have a played an active and pivotal role in the prevention, screening, diagnosis, and treatment of PTSD; however, further evaluation is needed to identify the effectiveness of these efforts; Prevention — DOD supports several PTSD prevention programs that build resiliency and teach servicemembers to anticipate some of the traumatic events commonly experienced in combat zones; Screening and Diagnosis — Screening measures for PTSD are essential to the identification of servicemembers and veterans that need treatment. Executive Order 13625
Executive Order 13625, "Improving Access to Mental Health Services for Veterans, Service Members, and Military Families," issued on August 31, 2012, contained a number of provisions designed to increase access to and the quality of mental health care for active duty servicemembers, including establishing an interagency task force with an annual reporting requirement as well as providing for increased mental health care staffing within the Department of Veterans Affairs. While Congress has taken significant interest in issues related to the psychological health of the active duty forces, including PTSD, alcohol and substance abuse, depression, traumatic brain injury, and other mental health concerns, significant areas for potential congressional oversight remain. These include:
Research
The physical manifestations in the brain of mental health conditions, including PTSD, are poorly understood. Congress may also wish to examine the effectiveness of DOD initiatives to encourage servicemembers to seek care, and reduce the stigma of seeking mental health care. Congress may wish to be apprised of these evaluation efforts. Costs of Mental Health Care Treatment
DOD's spending on mental health care treatment has increased, as the number of active duty servicemembers receiving diagnoses of mental health conditions and seeking treatment for these conditions has increased. Psychological Health in the Active Duty Forces
Within the active duty forces, psychological health issues include diagnosed mental disorders, such as depression or PTSD, as well as other mental health problems, such as problems with personal relationships or family circumstances. Therefore, the servicemembers who deploy repeatedly may be more resilient. The report stated that the RAND National Defense Research Institute as well as the DOD Suicide Prevention Task Force were undertaking evaluations of matters related to suicide prevention. | Military servicemembers suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury (TBI), and depression, as well as military suicides, continue to be a major concern of Congress. Numerous legislative provisions have been enacted over the past years to address these issues. Members will likely seek to offer legislation in the 113th Congress to address this complex set of issues. This report is intended to provide assistance in understanding the issues associated with psychological health in the active duty forces, potential congressional responses, and what questions may remain unanswered.
Key points in this report include the following:
mental disorders such as PTSD are poorly understood and in most cases cannot be physically identified but, rather, must be diagnosed using symptoms reported by the servicemember; estimates of the prevalence of mental health conditions in any given population may be greatly affected by the methodology used; diagnoses of mental health conditions among active duty servicemembers have increased substantially relative to non-deployed servicemembers. This increase may be due to the psychological toll of exposure to conflict, but may also be due in part to increased and improved screening methods as well as Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to reduce the stigma associated with seeking mental health treatment that might dissuade some servicemembers from reporting mental health concerns or accessing care; and reliable evidence is lacking as to the quality of mental health care and counseling offered in DOD facilities. A 2012 Institute of Medicine (IOM) study recommended that DOD undertake efforts to measure the effectiveness of efforts to improve quality, such as training providers in evidence-based practice, that are not integrated into the system of mental health care offered in DOD treatment facilities.
Significant areas for potential congressional oversight activities regarding psychological health in the active duty forces include the following:
research into the causes and physical manifestations of psychological health conditions, screening tools, and treatments; the effectiveness of screening and treatment efforts; servicemembers' access to mental health care, including efforts to reduce the stigma of seeking mental health care, waiting times for care, staffing levels of mental health treatment professionals, mental health care available in remote or deployed settings, and care available to de-activated Reserve and Guard members; the quality of mental health care available to servicemembers, including the use of appropriate and effective treatments by qualified mental health treatment professionals; oversight of ongoing program evaluation efforts, including evaluation of the variety of suicide-prevention, stigma-reduction, and transition assistance programs within the services and DOD; and the costs of mental health care for active duty servicemembers, including present costs through the Defense Health Program, as well as the future costs of mental health care once servicemembers are no longer part of the active duty forces. |
crs_RL34417 | crs_RL34417_0 | On September 24, 2008, the House passed H.R. 2638 , the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, which continued appropriations for Energy and Water Development, among other programs, at the FY2008 level (with some exceptions) until March 6, 2009. The bill passed the Senate September 27 and was signed by the President September 30 ( P.L. 110-329 ). An extension through March 11, 2009, was signed March 6, 2009 ( P.L. 111-6 ). 111-5 ), which includes FY2009 appropriations for a number of programs funded in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill. 142), and an additional $250 million for DOE's weatherization program. DOE had requested $10 million for the program for FY2009, but both the House and the Senate bills would have eliminated the program. (For details, see " Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship ," below.) (See " Title I: Army Corps of Engineers .") Energy and water development funding for all of FY2009 is included in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( H.R. 1105 ). The House passed the measure February 25, 2009, by a vote of 245-178. It was passed by the Senate without amendment on March 10, 2009, following a cloture vote of 62-35. President Obama signed the bill March 11, 2009 ( P.L. Overview
The Energy and Water Development bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). The increased funding sought by the Bush Administration for the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) was intended to help implement the Administration's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). Congress reinstated the funding of these programs in FY2008. Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). 111-8 . CRS Report R40202, Nuclear Waste Disposal: Alternatives to Yucca Mountain , by [author name scrubbed]. | The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies.
Key budgetary issues for FY2009 involving these programs included
the distribution of Corps appropriations across the agency's authorized planning, construction, and maintenance activities (Title I); support of major ecosystem restoration initiatives, such as Florida Everglades (Title I) and California "Bay-Delta" (CALFED) (Title II); a proposal by the Bush Administration to eliminate funding for DOE's Weatherization program for low income homes (Title III, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy); the Bush Administration's request for funding of DOE's Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) nuclear weapons program, which Congress had declined to fund for FY2008 (Title III, Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship); funding for the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (Title III: Nuclear Waste Disposal); and the Bush Administration's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership to supply plutonium-based fuel to other nations (Title III: Nuclear Energy).
In considering the FY2009 budget, both the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees voted to report out an Energy and Water Development appropriations bill. However, neither bill reached the floor in either house. On September 24, 2008, the House passed H.R. 2638, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, which continued appropriations for Energy and Water Development, among other programs, at the FY2008 level (with some exceptions) until March 6, 2009. The bill passed the Senate September 27 and was signed by the President September 30 (P.L. 110-329). An extension through March 11, 2009, was signed March 6, 2009 (P.L. 111-6).
Energy and Water Development funding for all of FY2009 is included in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (H.R. 1105/111th Congress). The House passed the measure February 25, 2009, by a vote of 245-178. It was passed by the Senate without amendment on March 10, 2009, following a cloture vote of 62-35. President Obama signed the bill March 11, 2009 (P.L. 111-8). |
crs_R44113 | crs_R44113_0 | Introduction
Foreign assistance is one of the tools the United States has employed to advance U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the focus and funding levels of aid programs changing along with broader U.S. policy goals. Although U.S. relations with the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have increasingly become less defined by the provision of assistance as a result of this progress, foreign aid continues to play an important role in advancing U.S. policy in the region. It analyzes historical and recent trends in aid to the region as well as the Obama Administration's FY2016 request for State Department and U.S Agency for International Development (USAID)-administered assistance. Between 1946 and 2013, it provided the region over $160 billion in constant 2013 dollars (or nearly $78 billion in historical, non-inflation-adjusted, dollars). U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase once again in the late 1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through the past decade. More recently, the United States provided significant amounts of assistance to Haiti in the aftermath of a massive January 2010 earthquake. FY2016 Foreign Assistance Request for Latin America and the Caribbean8
The Obama Administration's FY2016 budget request would increase assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean for a second consecutive year and reverse the reductions in aid to the region that have occurred since FY2011. It included nearly $2 billion for Latin America and the Caribbean, a 26% increase over the estimated FY2015 level (see Table 1 ). The requested increase in assistance was almost entirely the result of the Administration's intention to allocate over $1 billion in aid to Central America to promote prosperity, security, and good governance and to address the root causes of migration from the region. About half of the Administration's $1 billion aid request for Central America would be provided through regional programs. Colombia has received significant amounts of U.S. assistance to support counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts since FY2000, but funding levels have declined in recent years as the security situation in Colombia has improved, the Colombian government has taken ownership of programs, and the United States has shifted the emphasis of its aid away from costly military equipment toward economic and social development efforts. This would be a slight reduction compared to the estimated $244 million provided in FY2015. U.S. assistance provided through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) would also decline under the Administration's FY2016 request. Legislative Action
Since Congress has not enacted a comprehensive foreign assistance authorization measure since FY1985, annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bills tend to serve as the primary legislative vehicles through which Congress reviews U.S. assistance and influences executive branch foreign policy. The House Committee on Appropriations reported its bill ( H.R. Instead, after several continuing resolutions, Congress chose to include foreign aid funding in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ), which President Obama signed into law on December 18, 2015. The legislation includes $32.9 billion for bilateral economic assistance and international security assistance worldwide. This global funding level is 2.8% higher than the Administration's FY2016 request and about 1% lower than the FY2015 estimated level. It is unclear how much foreign assistance will be directed to Latin America and the Caribbean, since, for the most part, appropriations levels for individual countries and programs are not specified in the legislation or the accompanying explanatory statement. The appropriations levels that are specified in the legislation and explanatory statement differ from the Administration's request in several respects. The measure appears to provide $12 million more than was requested for Colombia , $8 million more than was requested for Mexico , and $4 million more than was requested for the CBSI . How did the 20% decline in annual U.S. assistance appropriations for Latin American and the Caribbean between FY2011 and FY2014 affect U.S. influence in the region? | Geographic proximity has forged strong linkages between the United States and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, with critical U.S. interests encompassing economic, political, and security concerns. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to advancing democracy and open markets since the 1990s. Current U.S. policy is designed to promote economic and social opportunity, ensure the safety of the region's citizens, strengthen effective democratic institutions, and secure a clean energy future. As part of broader efforts to advance these priorities, the United States provides Latin American and Caribbean nations with substantial amounts of foreign assistance.
Trends in Assistance
Since 1946, the United States has provided more than $160 billion of assistance to the region in constant 2013 dollars (or nearly $78 billion in historical, non-inflation-adjusted, dollars). Funding levels have fluctuated over time, however, according to regional trends and U.S. policy initiatives. U.S. assistance spiked during the 1960s under President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, and then declined in the 1970s before spiking again during the Central American conflicts of the 1980s. After another decline during the 1990s, assistance remained on a generally upward trajectory through the first decade of this century, reaching its most recent peak in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Aid levels for Latin America and the Caribbean declined in each of the four fiscal years between FY2011 and FY2014 before increasingly slightly in FY2015.
FY2016 Obama Administration Request
The Obama Administration's FY2016 foreign aid budget request would increase assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean for a second consecutive year. The Administration requested nearly $2 billion to be provided through the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which would be a 26% increase over the estimated FY2015 level. The requested increase in assistance is almost entirely the result of the Administration's proposal to provide over $1 billion in aid to Central America to promote prosperity, security, and good governance and to address the root causes of migration from the sub-region. Under the request, the balance of U.S. assistance would shift toward development aid and away from security aid, as three of the four major U.S. security initiatives in the region would see cuts. Aid levels for Colombia, Haiti, and Mexico would decline compared to FY2015, but those countries would continue to be among the top recipients in the region.
Congressional Action
In recent years, the annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measure has been the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews U.S. assistance and influences executive branch policy. Although the House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported out their respective bills (H.R. 2772 and S. 1725) in June and July 2015, no action was taken on those measures. After funding foreign aid programs through a series of continuing resolutions, Congress included foreign assistance appropriations in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), which the President signed into law on December 18, 2015. The legislation includes $32.9 billion for bilateral economic assistance and international security assistance worldwide; this funding level is 2.8% higher than the Administration's FY2016 request and about 1% lower than the FY2015 estimated level.
It is currently unclear how much foreign assistance will be directed to Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2016, since, for the most part, appropriations levels for individual countries and programs are not specified in the legislation or the accompanying explanatory statement. The appropriations levels that are specified differ from the Administration's request in several respects. The legislation provides $250 million less than was requested for Central America and $50 million less than was requested for Haiti. It also appears to provide slightly more assistance than was requested for Colombia, Mexico, and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). Given these funding levels it appears as though the region will receive less assistance than the Administration requested for FY2016 but more than it received in FY2015. |
crs_RL32616 | crs_RL32616_0 | Introduction
The July 2004 report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States(also known as the 9/11 Commission) concluded that the key officials responsible for determiningalien admissions (consular officers abroad and immigration inspectors in the United States) were notconsidered full partners in counterterrorism efforts prior to September 11, 2001, and as a result,opportunities to intercept the September 11 terrorists were missed. (3)
These recommendations have broad implications for immigration law and policy. Also, as Congress has moved on the Commission's recommendations, immigration-related reforms have beena key component of major legislative proposals. 9/11 Implementation Legislation
Of the several bills that sought to implement recommendations of the 9/11 Commission in the108th Congress, two passed their respective Houses, and both of these proposed revisions toimmigration law: H.R. 10 , the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, asamended, introduced by the Speaker of the House of Representatives Dennis Hastert and passed bythe House as S. 2845 on October 8, 2004 (House-passed S. 2845 ); and S. 2845 , the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, as amended, introduced bySenators Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman and passed by the Senate on October 8, 2004(Senate-passed S. 2845 ). (4) The Intelligence Reform andTerrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L.108-458 ), a compromise bill signed on December 17, 2004 includes some - but not all - of theimmigration provisions that were originally under consideration. The major areas that were under consideration in these comprehensive reform proposals are briefly discussed below. References to CRS reports that analyze these issues in depth are listed foreach major area. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress further expanded the terrorism grounds for inadmissibility, removal, andmandatory detention in the USA PATRIOT Act in response to concerns that loopholes andinadequacies in the immigration laws were contributing to the ability of terrorists and theiraccomplices to travel to and remain in the United States. Allocation of Additional Resources to Improve Enforcement
DHS is the primary federal agency responsible for enforcing immigration laws and securing the border. Monitoring of Persons Entering and Leaving the United States. Security of Personal Identification Documents. | Reforming the enforcement of immigration law is a core component of the recommendations made by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the9/11 Commission). The 19 hijackers responsible for the 9/11 attacks were foreign nationals, manyof whom were able to obtain visas to enter the United States through the use of forged documents. Incomplete intelligence and screening enabled many of the hijackers to enter the United Statesdespite flaws in their entry documents or suspicions regarding their past associations. According tothe Commission, up to 15 of the hijackers could have been intercepted or deported through morediligent enforcement of immigration laws.
The 9/11 Commission's immigration-related recommendations focused primarily on targeting terrorist travel through an intelligence and security strategy based on reliable identification systemsand effective, integrated information-sharing. As Congress has considered these recommendations,however, possible legislative responses have broadened to include significant and possiblyfar-reaching changes in the substantive law governing immigration and how that law is enforced,both at the border and in the interior of the United States.
In response to the Commission's recommendations, several major bills were introduced proposing significant revisions to U.S. immigration law and policy. The two notable bills that wouldrevise immigration laws were H.R. 10 , the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act,as amended, introduced by the Speaker of the House of Representatives Dennis Hastert, and passedby the House as S. 2845 on October 8, 2004, and S. 2845 , the NationalIntelligence Reform Act of 2004, as amended, introduced by Senators Susan Collins and JosephLieberman and passed by the Senate on October 8, 2004. The Intelligence Reform and TerrorismPrevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ), a compromise version of these bills that included some - butnot all - of the immigration provisions under consideration, was signed on December 17, 2004.
This report briefly discusses some of the major immigration areas that were under consideration in the above-mentioned comprehensive reform proposals, including asylum, biometric trackingsystems, border security, document security, exclusion, immigration enforcement, and visa issuances. It refers to other CRS reports that discuss these issues in depth and will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL33144 | crs_RL33144_0 | The initial focus is on the implications of the suspension of Doha negotiations in July 2006 for future trade negotiations and the next U.S. farm bill. The pace of efforts to revive the Doha Development Agenda multilateral trade negotiations has quickened as the expiration of fast-track or trade promotion authority for congressional consideration of trade agreements approaches. After resuming on November 16, 2006, negotiations have focused on various formulas for reducing trade-distorting subsidies and tariffs. The principal cause of the suspension was that a core group of WTO member countries—the United States, the European Union (EU), Brazil, India, Australia, and Japan—known as the G-6 had reached an impasse over specific methods to achieve the broad aims of the round for agricultural trade: substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic subsidies, elimination of export subsidies, and substantially increased market access for agricultural products. Doha Round negotiators were operating under a deadline effectively imposed by the expiration of U.S. trade promotion authority (TPA), which permits the President to negotiate trade deals and present them to Congress for an up or down vote without amendment. To meet congressional notification requirements under TPA legislation, an agreement would have to have been completed by the end of 2006. The WTO will continue to provide aid for trade funds to help developing countries participate more fully in the world trade system. As a result of the suspension of the negotiations, a major source of pressure for U.S. farm policy change has dissipated. 107-171 ) expires in 2007, and many were looking to a Doha Round agreement on curbing trade-distorting domestic support to require changes in U.S. farm subsidies to make them more compatible with world trade rules. The option of continuing current farm subsidy programs appears strengthened by the indefinite suspension and uncertain prospects of the Doha talks. The United States must still meet obligations under existing WTO agricultural agreements, which limit its trade-distorting spending to $19.1 billion annually. Some trade analysts think that there could be an increase in litigation by WTO member countries that allege they are harmed by U.S. farm subsidies. Congress also could choose to extend TPA for bilateral trade agreements. Detailed negotiations were not carried out for domestic support and market access. Export Competition Issues to Be Resolved
1. a. a. a. a. | The pace of efforts to revive suspended World Trade Organization Doha Round trade negotiations has quickened as the July 2007 expiration for fast-track or trade promotion authority for expedited congressional consideration of trade agreement legislation approaches. Although technical negotiations have addressed specific formulas for reducing trade-distorting farm support and tariffs, high-level political discussions have yet to produce a satisfactory compromise among WTO members for future agricultural trade liberalization.
Negotiations were suspended in July 2006 when a core group of WTO member countries—the United States, the European Union (EU), Brazil, India, Australia, and Japan—known as the G-6 reached an impasse over specific methods to achieve the broad aims of the round for agricultural trade: substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic subsidies, elimination of export subsidies, and substantially increased market access for agricultural products.
The WTO is unique among the various fora for international trade negotiations in that it brings together its entire 150-country membership to negotiate a common set of rules to govern international trade in agricultural products, industrial goods, and services. Regarding agriculture, because policy reform is addressed across three broadly inclusive fronts—export competition, domestic support, and market access—WTO negotiations provide a framework for give and take to help foster mutual agreement.
Doha Round negotiators were operating under a deadline effectively imposed by the expiration of U.S. trade promotion authority (TPA), which permits the President to negotiate trade deals and present them to Congress for expedited consideration. To meet congressional notification requirements under TPA, an agreement would have to be completed by the end of March 2007. TPA, which could be extended by Congress, preserves Congress's key role in approving trade agreements while providing the President with credibility to negotiate with trading partners who otherwise might fear that Congress would amend an agreement that had been negotiated.
As a result of the suspension of the negotiations, a major source of pressure for U.S. farm policy change will have dissipated. Supporters of farm bill changes were looking to a Doha Round agreement to require changes in U.S. farm subsidies to make them more compatible with world trade rules. Proponents of continuing farm subsidy programs appear strengthened by the indefinite suspension of the Doha talks. The United States must still meet obligations under existing WTO agricultural agreements, and some trade analysts think that, without a new trade agreement, there could be an increase in litigation by WTO member countries alleging they are harmed by U.S. farm subsidies.
This report assesses the status of agricultural negotiations in the Doha Round and will be updated as developments unfold. |
crs_RS20748 | crs_RS20748_0 | Current Practices and Procedures
Congress relies on a variety of mechanisms, instruments, and procedures to protect classified national security and other sensitive information in its custody. Such information—most of which comes from the executive branch—can be hard to obtain. But accessibility to it is seen as necessary for the legislature to carry out its constitutional responsibilities, especially overseeing the executive and legislating public policy. Some of these have evolved over time, in response to changing conditions and needs of both the legislative and executive branches. Chamber Offices of Security and Security Manuals
The two chambers have approached their security program differently, although each now has an office of security and a set of requirements, instructions, and guidelines regarding the protection of classified and other controlled information. These plans, some of which might be controversial or costly, focus on setting uniform standards for congressional offices and employees and heightening access eligibility requirements. | The protection of classified national security and other controlled information is of concern not only to the executive branch—which, for the most part, determines what information is classified and controlled—but also to Congress. The legislature uses such information to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities, particularly overseeing the executive, appropriating funds, and legislating public policy. Congress has established numerous mechanisms to safeguard controlled information in its custody, although these arrangements have varied over time, between the two chambers, and among offices in each. Both chambers, for instance, have created offices of security to consolidate relevant responsibilities; but these were established nearly two decades apart. Other differences exist at the committee level, regarding the availability and use of information in committees' custody. Proposals for change, some of which are controversial and could be costly, usually seek to set uniform standards or heighten requirements for access.
This report will be updated as conditions require. |
crs_R43342 | crs_R43342_0 | Introduction
The medical device tax was one of a number of additional revenues proposed to offset the cost of the Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 ). This excise tax is projected to raise $30.6 billion of excise tax collections over the next 10 fiscal years (FY2016-FY2025). Repeal of the tax has become a priority for some Members of Congress. In the 114 th Congress, the Medical Device Access and Innovation Protection Act ( S. 149 ) would repeal the medical device tax retroactively to the first year of implementation in 2013 and provide refunds for past tax payments. On June 18, 2015, the House passed the Protect Medical Innovation Act of 2015 ( H.R. 160 ), which would repeal the tax in quarters after the date of the bill's enactment. Like other revenue-raising measures enacted in ACA, the excise tax on medical devices was meant to help offset the expenditures associated with health care reform (e.g., subsidies for low-income households and small businesses to purchase health care, and funding for programs to promote efficiencies in the market for health care). Additionally, the medical device industry was one of the commercial interests (as well as health insurance providers and pharmaceutical firms) that stood to benefit from unanticipated profits as more people enrolled in health care, post-ACA. Issues Surrounding the Medical Device Excise Tax
In general, tax policy is considered more efficient when differential excise taxes are not imposed. It is generally more efficient to raise revenue from a broad tax base. Therefore excise taxes are usually justified on specific grounds. Before discussing these justifications, it should be noted that the medical device tax tends to be a small share of the price of the taxed product, relative to other excise taxes. Federal cigarette taxes are estimated to be around 16% of the retail price, but if measured on the same basis as the medical device and other taxes (before state and local taxes and on price net of the tax) the tax is more than 36%. The tax is relatively small, but, for political reasons, it may be difficult to find an alternative revenue source. Administrative and Compliance Costs
One argument against the tax is that it imposes potentially significant administrative costs. These small effects occur in part because the tax is small, in part because demand is estimated to be relatively insensitive to price, and in part because approximately half of production is exempt from the tax. To the extent that the tax does fall on profits, economic theory indicates that there would be no effect on output or jobs. The Medical Device Industry
The medical device industry produces a wide range of products. Claims have also been made that the small firms in the medical device industry will be disproportionately affected by the excise tax. In summary, the analysis in this section suggests that the effects of the current tax on the medical device industry should be relatively small because of the inelastic demand, probably no more than 1,200 employees should lose their jobs in that industry, and industry output and employment should likely decline by no more than two-tenths of a percent. Some of this tax will fall on the federal government, which provides financing for some medical care. | The 2.3% medical device tax imposed by the Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148) in 2010 was one of a number of additional revenue-raising provisions to finance health reform. This tax, which took effect in January 2013, is projected to collect approximately $30.6 billion over the next 10 fiscal years (FY2016-FY2025), resulting in $24.4 billion of net revenue raised, after accounting for offsets from other taxes.
Some have called for a repeal of the medical device tax since enactment in 2010. Repeal of the tax has become such a high priority for some Members of Congress that it was one of the provisions discussed in the October 2013 negotiations over ending the federal government shutdown and increases in the federal debt ceiling. In the 114th Congress, the Medical Device Access and Innovation Protection Act (S. 149) would repeal the medical device tax retroactively to the first year of implementation in 2013. On June 18, 2015, the House passed the Protect Medical Innovation Act of 2015 (H.R. 160), which would repeal the tax in quarters after the date of the bill's enactment.
The major justification offered for the medical device tax is its revenue, which helps offset the cost of the ACA. Although the tax is relatively small, no revenue replacement has been proposed and it may be difficult to find. There is also a concern among some that eliminating the medical device tax would lead to proposals to eliminate similar fees and taxes on other industries, the sum of which, including the device tax, initially totaled $165 billion over 10 years. The tax was justified partly because the medical device industry was among the commercial interests that stood to benefit from unanticipated profits as more individuals enroll in health care insurance, post-ACA.
Viewed from the perspective of traditional economic and tax theory, however, the tax is challenging to justify. In general, tax policy is more efficient when differential excise taxes are not imposed. It is generally more efficient to raise revenue from a broad tax base. Therefore excise taxes are usually based on specific objectives such as discouraging undesirable activities (e.g., tobacco taxes) or funding closely related government spending (e.g., gasoline taxes to finance highway construction). These justifications do not apply, other than weakly, to the medical device case. The tax also imposes administrative and compliance costs that may be disproportionate to revenue.
Opponents of the tax claim that the medical device tax could have significant, negative consequences for the U.S. medical device industry and on jobs. The estimates in this report suggest fairly minor effects, with output and employment in the industry falling by no more than two-tenths of 1%. This limited effect is due to the small tax rate, the exemption of approximately half of output, and the relatively insensitive demand for health services.
The analysis suggests that most of the tax will fall on consumer prices, and not on profits of medical device companies. The effect on the price of health care, however, will most likely be negligible because of the small size of the tax and small share of health care spending attributable to medical devices. |
crs_R45174 | crs_R45174_0 | Introduction
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC or Commission) was established in 1972 by the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) "to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products," primarily after they have entered the stream of commerce. The CPSC is empowered to meet this objective through a blend of consumer monitoring, research, investigations, safety standard-setting, and enforcement powers. Although the CPSC has the authority to issue mandatory consumer product safety rules under some circumstances, in most instances, the CPSA requires the Commission to defer to "voluntary consumer product safety standards" that are predominately drafted and developed by private industry. Furthermore, any entity that is adversely affected by such an order can challenge the action in federal court. Consequently, in most circumstances, the Commission generally attempts to negotiate voluntary actions with companies to correct product hazards upon mutually acceptable terms before initiating an involuntary recall order. The term "consumer products" includes products that are manufactured domestically, as well as hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of products that are manufactured outside of the U.S. and imported into the country each year. The CPSC estimates that covered consumer products play a role in over $1 trillion of costs to the country annually in the form of deaths, illnesses, injuries, and property damage. Given this broad statutory mandate and the impact consumer products have on the day-to-day lives of the general public, the CPSC has been of perennial interest to Congress. Congress conducts oversight hearings on the Commission, and bills that would affect the CPSC are introduced in virtually every Congress. In the 115 th Congress, for example, bills have been introduced that would expand the Commission's regulatory jurisdiction and require the Commission to promulgate mandatory safety rules involving certain products. This report provides a legal overview of the CPSC's structure, jurisdiction, and statutory powers under the CPSA, as amended. Finally, the report analyzes the Commission's enforcement powers, including the requirement under the CPSA that companies self-report certain product risks to the Commission; the Commission's ability to inspect products for compliance with the CPSA; the various corrective actions the Commission may either initiate or agree to as part of a negotiation with a company; the Commission's rarely used authority to designate a product an "Imminently Hazardous Consumer Product"; and the civil and criminal penalties to which violators of the CPSA may be subject. The term is multifaceted and broad in scope, although a number of products that generally are regulated by other federal agencies are explicitly carved out of the definition. The CPSC, thus, has jurisdiction over approximately 10,000 types of products from baby strollers, cribs, and bath seats, to cigarette lighters and matchbooks, to lawn mowers, garage door openers, and television antennas, to name a few. | The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC or Commission) was established in 1972 by the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) "to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products." The CPSC is empowered to meet this objective through a blend of consumer monitoring, research, investigations, safety standard-setting, and enforcement powers. The Commission's jurisdiction under the CPSA is largely governed by the definition of "consumer product," which is broad in scope, although a number of products that generally are regulated by other federal agencies are explicitly carved out of the definition. The term includes products that are manufactured domestically, as well as hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of consumer products that are manufactured outside of the U.S. and imported into the country each year. It encompasses over approximately 10,000 types of products from baby strollers, cribs, and bath seats, to cigarette lighters and matchbooks, to lawn mowers, garage door openers, and television antennas, to name a few. The CPSC estimates that covered consumer products play a role in over $1 trillion of costs to the country annually in the form of deaths, illnesses, injuries, and property damage.
Given this broad statutory mandate and the impact consumer products have on the day-to-day lives of the general public, the CPSC has been of perennial interest to Congress. Congress conducts oversight hearings on the Commission, and bills that would affect the CPSC are introduced in virtually every Congress. In the 115th Congress, for example, bills have been introduced that would expand the Commission's regulatory jurisdiction and require the Commission to promulgate mandatory safety rules involving certain products.
This report provides a legal overview of the CPSC's structure, jurisdiction, and statutory powers under the CPSA.
Key Takeaways of This Report
While the CPSC has the authority to issue mandatory consumer product safety rules under some circumstances, in most instances, the CPSA requires the Commission to defer to "voluntary consumer product safety standards" that are predominately drafted and developed by private industry. Although the Commission has authority to order companies to engage in various corrective actions (i.e., recalls) to address hazardous consumer products, the Commission generally may only exercise this authority after conducting an administrative hearing, and any entity that is adversely affected by such an order can challenge the action in federal court. Consequently, in most circumstances, before initiating an involuntary corrective action order, the Commission will attempt to negotiate voluntary actions the company can take to correct product hazards. The CPSA, among other things, makes it unlawful to sell, distribute, or import consumer products that are not in compliance with a CPSC-issued safety rule or corrective action order. Violations of the CPSA can result in civil and criminal penalties. |
crs_R42480 | crs_R42480_0 | Introduction
The bursting of the U.S. housing bubble in 2006 precipitated the December 2007-June 2009 recession and a financial panic in September 2008. Because the housing market was a locus for many of the economic problems that emerged, some Members of Congress and other experts propose intervening in the housing market not only as a means of improving the housing market itself but also the financial sector and the broader economy. Skeptics, however, worry that further intervention could prolong the housing slump, delay economic recovery, and affect outcomes based on the government's preferences. Three frequently discussed approaches are (1) reducing mortgage principal for borrowers who owe more than their homes are worth, (2) refinancing mortgages for borrowers who find themselves locked into paying high interest rates, and (3) renting out foreclosed homes. Principal reductions aim to improve the housing market by minimizing defaults and foreclosures, thus reducing collateral damage to the economy. At the same time, principal reduction might improve the wider economy if it stimulates consumer spending, allowing borrowers to divert income from debt repayment to spending on other goods and services. These include H.R. ); H.R. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the regulator and conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, decided against allowing the enterprises to reduce principal for mortgages that they guarantee. A second approach, large-scale refinancing, helps borrowers who are current on their mortgage to refinance into a new mortgage with a lower interest rate. Because refinancing generally helps borrowers who are current, it is unlikely to have a major effect on the housing market, but it may prevent some foreclosures that could occur in the absence of a refinance. Although some investors (including banks) may lose investment income from refinancing, other banks and mortgage originators benefit from the increased business associated with refinancing. In his 2012 State of the Union address, President Obama proposed streamlining the existing program to refinance Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans and establishing a new mass refinancing plan for non-Fannie Mae and non-Freddie Mac loans. Congressional proposals for large-scale refinancing in the 112 th Congress include H.R. A third proposal, renting out foreclosed homes currently held by banks, GSEs, and other financial institutions, has the potential to stabilize housing prices by reducing the supply of homes on the "for sale" market. A successful rental program depends on house prices increasing in the future such that the rented properties can eventually be sold in a healthier market. Any impact on consumer spending is likely to be indirect through favorable effects on household net worth due to stabilizing house prices and preserving neighboring homeowners' equity. FHFA has started a pilot project to convert GSE foreclosed homes into rentals. ); H.R. A mortgage refinance lowers a borrower's monthly payment, freeing up more income for non-housing related spending. Some of the additional spending of borrowers may come at the cost of the financial sector. ); H.R. To be eligible a borrower must
have a mortgage owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac; have a mortgage on a single-family home; owe more than 80% of the value of the home on the mortgage; be current on mortgage payments with no late payment in the past six months and no more than one late payment in the past 12 months; have the ability to make the new payments; and have had the mortgage sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac by May 2009. S. 170 and H.R. Consumer Spending
Unlike principal reductions and mass refinancing, renting foreclosed homes does not reduce existing homeowners' payments or increase their disposal income. | The bursting of the housing bubble in 2006 precipitated the December 2007-June 2009 recession and a financial panic in September 2008. With the housing market seen as a locus for many of the economic problems that emerged, some Members of Congress propose intervening in the housing market as a means of improving not only the housing market itself but also the financial sector and the broader economy. Critics are concerned that further intervention could prolong the housing slump, delay recovery, and affect outcomes based on the government's preferences. Three frequently discussed proposals for the housing market are (1) reducing mortgage principal for borrowers who owe more than their homes are worth, (2) refinancing mortgages for borrowers shut out of traditional financing methods, and (3) renting out foreclosed homes.
Principal reductions have the potential to improve the housing market by minimizing disruptive defaults and foreclosures. However, by shifting the debt burden from the borrower to the lender, principal reduction may negatively impact financial institutions that would have their investments' principal balances reduced. Principal reduction, nonetheless, might improve the broader economy if it stimulates consumer spending, diverting income from debt repayment to spending on other goods and services.
Legislation introduced in the 112th Congress to reduce mortgage principal includes H.R. 1587, H.R. 3841, H.R. 4058, and S. 2093. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the regulator and conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, decided against allowing the enterprises to reduce principal for mortgages that they guarantee.
Large-scale refinancing helps borrowers who are current on mortgage payments to refinance into a new mortgage with a lower interest rate. Because refinancing generally helps borrowers who are current, it is unlikely to have a major effect on the housing market, but it may prevent some foreclosures that could occur in the absence of a refinance. In addition, refinancing has the potential to have a larger effect on the economy by stimulating consumer spending. A mortgage refinance could lower a borrower's monthly payment, freeing up more income for non-housing-related spending. Some of the additional spending of borrowers may come at the cost of the financial sector. Although some financial institutions may lose investment income from refinancing, others could benefit from the increased business associated with refinancing.
President Obama, in his 2012 State of the Union address, proposed streamlining the existing program to refinance Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans and establishing a new mass refinancing plan for non-Fannie Mae and non-Freddie Mac loans. Congressional proposals for large-scale refinancing of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans include H.R. 363, S. 170, and S. 3085.
Renting out foreclosed homes currently held by banks and other financial institutions has the potential to stabilize housing prices by reducing the supply of homes on the "for sale" market. However, this policy depends on house prices increasing in the future such that, when the rented properties are eventually sold, they are sold in a healthier market. Unlike principal reductions and mass refinancing, renting foreclosed homes does not reduce existing homeowners' payments or increase their disposable income. Any impact on consumer spending is likely to be indirect through stabilizing house prices and preserving neighboring homeowners' equity.
FHFA implemented a pilot project to convert foreclosed homes into rentals. Legislative proposals to expand the renting of foreclosed properties include H.R. 1548, H.R. 2636, and S. 2080. |
crs_RL31289 | crs_RL31289_0 | Introduction
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks prompted congressional action on many fronts,including passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate ToolsRequired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act. The Act is broadlyscoped, (1) and some of itsprovisions may affect use of the Internet, computer security, and critical infrastructure protection. The President signed it into law on October 26 ( P.L. 107-56 ). The implementation of the Act will be carefully scrutinized. Section 1016 puts into statute elements of the critical infrastructure policy thathave been articulated by both the Clinton and the Bush Administrations. to facilitate thetracking of computer trespassers. Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act Affecting Electronic Commerce
The USA PATRIOT Act does not address e-commerce directly; (13) however Title III of theAct, International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001,addresses concerns of policymakers that, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, more canbe done to prevent, detect, and prosecute international money laundering and the financing ofterrorism. Over time, Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act mayaffect e-commerce broadly, and electronic transfers specifically. Some of these initiatives may contribute to thegrowing effort to implement e-government projects by both Congress and the Bush Administrationthrough enhanced data sharing and greater confidence in the security and reliability of the networks. Proponents of a government-wide PKI system maintain that if these issuescan be adequately addressed, the creation of a single government-wide PKI system could promotethe utilization of secure Web portals to ensure the data integrity of transactions between thegovernment and citizens and business. It also allows for the issuanceof nationwide search warrants to facilitate the tracking of computer trespassers. Concerns aboutpotential misuse of these data collection provisions could dampen citizen enthusiasm for carryingout electronic transactions with the government. Groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union(ACLU), Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), Electronic Privacy Information Center(EPIC), and Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) urge caution, fearful that, in an attempt to trackdown and punish the terrorists who threaten American democracy, one of the fundamental tenets ofthat democracy--privacy--may itself be threatened. EarthLink executive David Baker called it a "silver lining in what manyotherwise describe as a cloud...." (52)
Like the ACLU, most of the privacy advocate groups assert that they will closely monitorhow law enforcement officials implement the Act and try to ensure that the law is not misused.Congress may conduct oversight of the Act's implementation, both from the standpoint of the valueof providing law enforcement officials with these additional tools to combat crime and terrorism,and in terms of any detrimental consequences that could arise. | The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks prompted congressional action on many fronts,including passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate ToolsRequired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, P.L. 107-56 . The Act isbroadly scoped, and some of its provisions may affect Internet usage, computer security, and criticalinfrastructure protection.
In the area of computer security, the Act creates a definition of "computer trespasser" andmakes such activities a terrorist act in certain circumstances. The Act enables law enforcementofficials to intercept the communications of computer trespassers and improves their ability to trackcomputer trespasser activities. It also codifies some elements of U.S. critical infrastructure policyarticulated by both the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations to ensure that any disruptionsto the nation's critical infrastructures are minimally detrimental.
Although the Act does not explicitly address electronic commerce (e-commerce), many ofthe law's provisions may impact it. In particular, Title III responds to concerns that more can be doneto prevent, detect, and prosecute international money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Over time, these provisions may affect e-commerce broadly, and electronic fund transfersspecifically.
Electronic government (e-government) could be affected by the Act in both positive andnegative ways. The intense focus on improving data collection and information sharing practicesand systems may contribute to the establishment of government-wide technical standards and bestpractices that could facilitate the implementation of new and existing e-government initiatives. Itcould also promote the utilization of secure Web portals to help ensure the data integrity oftransactions between the government and citizens and business. However, concern about potentialabuses of data collection provisions could dampen citizen enthusiasm for carrying out electronictransactions with the government.
The Act provides law enforcement officials with greater authority to monitor Internet activitysuch as electronic mail (e-mail) and Web site visits. While law enforcement officials laud their newauthorities as enabling them to better track terrorist and other criminal activity, privacy rightsadvocates worry that, in an attempt to track down and punish the terrorists who threaten Americandemocracy, one of the fundamental tenets of that democracy--privacy--may itself be threatened.
Because of the controversial aspects of some provisions in the Act, particularly regardingprivacy, Congress and other groups are expected to monitor closely how the Act is implemented. |
crs_R45043 | crs_R45043_0 | [F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [The Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place. U.S. Const. These prohibited intrusions may take various forms, and, judicial interpretation of the Clause's relatively ambiguous language has developed along several related lines of cases. First and foremost, the Clause has been interpreted as providing Members of Congress (Members) with general immunity from liability for all "legislative acts" taken in the course of their official responsibilities. This "cloak of protection" shields Members from "intimidation by the executive" or a "hostile judiciary" by protecting against either the executive or judicial powers from being used to improperly influence or harass legislators through retaliatory litigation. The Clause has also been said to serve a good governance role, barring judicial or executive processes that may constitute a "distraction" or "disruption" to a Member's representative or legislative role. Although not explicitly articulated by the Supreme Court, lower federal courts have generally viewed these component privileges as a means of effectuating the protections afforded by the Clause by barring the introduction of specific documentary evidence of protected legislative acts for use against a Member and protecting a Member from being questioned regarding those same acts. These courts have instead held that, at least in criminal cases, the Clause prohibits only the evidentiary use of privileged documents, not their mere disclosure to the government for review as part of an investigation. Nevertheless, in understanding the Speech or Debate Clause, it would seem prudent to describe the Clause as composed of a general immunity principle, complemented by component evidentiary and testimonial privileges. First, despite the text, the protections afforded by the Clause extend well beyond "speeches" or "debates" undertaken by "Senators and Representatives." In addressing the scope of the Senator's protections, the Court implied the existence of the testimonial component of the Clause, noting that the protections of the Clause protect a Member from compelled questioning. What Constitutes a Legislative Act? Prior to enactment of the CAA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit extended that reasoning to the legislative sphere. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) and the Third Circuit have rejected this documentary nondisclosure privilege, considering it an undue expansion of the Clause. | The Speech or Debate Clause (Clause) of the U.S. Constitution states that "[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House," Members of Congress (Members) "shall not be questioned in any other Place." The Clause serves various purposes: principally to protect the independence and integrity of the legislative branch by protecting against executive or judicial intrusions into the protected legislative sphere, but also to bar judicial or executive processes that may constitute a "distraction" or "disruption" to a Member's representative or legislative role. Despite the literal text, protected acts under the Clause extend beyond "speeches" or "debates" undertaken by Members of Congress, and have also been interpreted to include all "legislative acts" undertaken by Members or their aides.
Judicial interpretations of the Clause have developed along several strains. First and foremost, the Clause has been interpreted as providing Members with general criminal and civil immunity for all "legislative acts" taken in the course of their official responsibilities. This immunity principle protects Members from "intimidation by the executive" or a "hostile judiciary" by prohibiting both the executive and judicial powers from being used to improperly influence or harass legislators. Second, the Clause appears to provide complementary evidentiary and testimonial privileges. Although not explicitly articulated by the Supreme Court, lower federal courts have generally viewed these component privileges as a means of effectuating the purposes of the Clause by barring evidence of protected legislative acts from being used against a Member, and protecting a Member from compelled questioning about such acts.
The testimonial privilege component of the Clause has given rise to significant disagreement in the lower courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) has held that the Clause's testimonial privilege encompasses a general documentary nondisclosure privilege that applies regardless of the purposes for which disclosure is sought. To the contrary, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have rejected that position, holding instead that, at least in criminal cases, the Clause prohibits only the evidentiary use of privileged documents, not their mere disclosure to the government for review as part of an investigation. |
crs_R42777 | crs_R42777_0 | However, these observers—including international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU), and governments such as the United States—also have viewed this progress as uneven, and have judged Georgia's legislative and presidential elections in 2008 as promising but falling somewhat short as free and fair contests. However, Ivanishvili proclaimed that he would not run in the election except as a citizen of Georgia. Also in late 2011, a new electoral code provided for 77 members of the 150-seat legislature to be elected through proportional voting and the remaining 73 through constituency voting in single member districts, replacing the previous election of 50% of the members by each method. The release of the videos late in the campaign undermined Saakashvili's image as a anti-corruption fighter and champion of democracy in the eyes of many voters, according to many observers. She pledged to uphold the strategic partnership with the United States and Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic orientation. Since GD has a majority in the legislature and influence over the new cabinet government, it may well seek to revamp and replace Saakashvili's policies and priorities. The White House on October 2, 2012, congratulated the people of Georgia for achieving "another milestone" in the country's development by holding a competitive and peaceful democratic election. The White House called for Ivanishvili and Saakashvili to work together to ensure the continued advancement of democracy and economic development, and stated that it looked forward to strengthening the U.S.-Georgia partnership. On October 3, 2012, Senator John McCain, Senator Joe Lieberman, and Senator Lindsey Graham issued a statement commending President Saakashvili for his efforts to transform Georgia into a prosperous democracy, and pointed to the competitive and peaceful election as evidence of the transformation. At the same time, they raised concerns about Ivanishvili's call for Saakashvili to resign and about protests by GD supporters, and cautioned that the future of U.S.-Georgia relations depends on Georgia's continued commitment to democratization. Ivanishvili announced on October 3 that his first foreign visit would be to the United States, after the U.S. presidential election, since the country is Georgia's "principal partner." Secretary Clinton reportedly telephoned both Saakashvili and Ivanishvili on the evening of October 4 to urge a peaceful transition of power in Georgia. Ivanishvili in turn reportedly praised the role of the United States in Georgia's development. Some observers have raised concerns that two parties in the GD coalition—the National Forum and Industry Will Save Georgia—do not support NATO membership for Georgia. While the initial period of the political transition in Georgia has appeared mostly peaceful, political in-fighting within GD and between GD and Saakashvili could increase in coming months, as both sides maneuver before the planned 2013 presidential election. The UNM plans to retain the presidency. Under the constitutional changes, the legislature is slated to gain greater powers vis-à-vis the presidency, so a divided political situation could endure for some time. In such a case, statesmanship and a commitment to compromise and good governance are essential for Georgia's continued democratization, observers stress. Many in Congress have indicated that they continue to support Georgia's independence and peaceful political and economic development. | Georgia's continued sovereignty and independence and its development as a free market democracy have been significant concerns to successive Congresses and Administrations. The United States and Georgia signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership in early 2009 pledging U.S. support for these objectives, and the United States has been Georgia's largest provider of foreign and security assistance. Most recently, elections for the 150-member Parliament of Georgia on October 1, 2012, have been viewed as substantially free and fair by most observers. Several Members of Congress and the Administration have called for a peaceful transition of political power in Georgia and have vowed continued support for Georgia's development and independence.
In the run-up to the October 2012 election, Georgia's Central Electoral Commission registered 16 parties and blocs and several thousand candidates to run in mixed party list and single-member constituency races. A new electoral coalition, Georgia Dream—set up by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili—posed the main opposition to President Mikheil Saakashvili's United National Movement, which held the majority of legislative seats. A video tape of abuse in a prison released by Georgia Dream late in the campaign seemed to be a factor in the loss of voter support for the United National Movement and in the electoral victory of Georgia Dream. According to observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the election freely reflected the will of the people, although a few procedural and other problems were reported.
In the days after the election, Saakashvili, Ivanishvili, and other officials from Georgia Dream and the United National Movement have met to plan an orderly transition, including the appointment of a new cabinet. Ivanishvili has pledged that GD will continue to support Georgia's democratization and anti-corruption efforts, and its European and Euro-Atlantic orientation.
The White House has described the election as "another milestone" in Georgia's development as a democracy, and has called for Ivanishvili and Saakashvili to work together to ensure the country's continued peaceful transition of power. The Administration also stated that it looked forward to strengthening the U.S.-Georgia partnership. Several Members of Congress observed the election, and several Members of the Senate issued a post-election statement commending President Saakashvili for his efforts to transform Georgia into a prosperous democracy, and pointing to the competitive and peaceful election as evidence of his success. At the same time, they raised concerns about some bickering and unrest in the wake of the election, and cautioned that the future of U.S.-Georgia relations depends on the country's continued commitment to democratization.
Some observers have suggested that relations between the two parties in the legislature and between a Georgia Dream cabinet and the president may well be contentious in coming months, as both sides maneuver before a planned 2013 presidential election. Saakashvili is term-limited and cannot run, but the United National Movement plans to retain the presidency. Under constitutional changes, the legislature is slated to gain greater powers vis-à-vis the presidency, so a divided political situation could endure for some time. In such a case, statesmanship and a commitment to compromise and good governance are essential for Georgia's continued democratization, these observers stress. |
crs_RS22913 | crs_RS22913_0 | Introduction
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) plays a central role in shaping and implementing U.S. global health policy. The agency is one of three agencies tasked with leading the Global Health Initiative (GHI), an initiative created by the Obama Administration to coordinate ongoing presidential health initiatives and raise investments in other health areas, including maternal and child health, neglected tropical diseases, and family planning and reproductive health ( Figure 1 ). The agency leads the implementation of the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) and the Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTD) Program, and is an implementing partner of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which is coordinated by the State Department. This report highlights the health-related activities conducted by USAID worldwide, outlines how much the agency has spent on such efforts from FY2001 to FY2011, and highlights FY2012 proposed funding levels. Through this vehicle, Congress appropriates funds directly to USAID through the Global Health and Child Survival (GHCS) account and USAID uses additional funds from other accounts within State-Foreign Operations, including the Development Assistance and the Economic Support Fund accounts, to support its global health programs. In 2009, President Barack Obama announced the Global Health Initiative to increase investments in health areas that he deemed underfunded, bolster the health systems of weak and impoverished states, and improve the coordination of presidential health initiatives established during the Bush Administration (PEPFAR, PMI, and the NTD Program) as well as other USAID and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) bilateral health programs. In FY2010, for example, nearly 81% of all U.S. global health spending was aimed at these initiatives. GHI aims to develop a comprehensive U.S. global health strategy for existing U.S. global health programs, including the programs and initiatives outlined above. Leadership of GHI is expected to transition from the State Department to USAID in FY2012, should USAID meet a set of benchmarks related to management capacity, outlined in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. FY2012 Budget and Issues
The Obama Administration requests an estimated $3.1 billion in support of USAID's global health efforts through the GHCS account for FY2012. After PEPFAR was launched, U.S. efforts to address HIV/AIDS dominated congressional discussions and appropriations for global health. The vast majority of USAID's global health programs are funded through the Global Health and Child Survival account. The Obama Administration requests that in FY2012, Congress provide approximately 25% more for USAID's global health activities funded through the GHCS account than in FY2010. USAID is reportedly responding to concerns over aid effectiveness. | A number of U.S. agencies and departments implement U.S. government global health interventions. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) plays a particularly central role. The agency is responsible for coordinating two important presidential health initiatives—the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) and the Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTD) Program. USAID serves as an implementing agency of the largest U.S. global health program—the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—and is set to assume leadership over the Global Health Initiative (GHI) in September 2012 (presuming it meets a set of benchmarks related to management capacity, as outlined in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review). In addition, Congress appropriates the most funds to USAID for global health efforts, excluding provisions for presidential health initiatives, which are carried out by several agencies, including USAID.
Congress appropriates funds to USAID for global health activities through five main budget lines: Child Survival and Maternal Health (CS/MH), Vulnerable Children (VC), HIV/AIDS, Other Infectious Diseases (OID), and Family Planning and Reproductive Health (FP/RH). From FY2001 through FY2010, Congress appropriated nearly $20 billion to USAID for global health programs, including contributions to the United Nations' Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis (Global Fund). From FY2001 through FY2010, the greatest budgetary growth was aimed at fighting infectious diseases, mainly malaria, tuberculosis (TB), and pandemic influenza.
President Barack Obama indicated early in his Administration that global health is a priority and that his Administration would continue to focus global health efforts on addressing HIV/AIDS. When releasing his FY2012 budget request, President Obama indicated that his Administration would increase investments in global health programs and, through the Global Health Initiative, improve the coordination of all global health programs. The President requested that in FY2012, Congress provide $3.8 billion for USAID's global health programs funded through the Global Health and Child Survival (GHCS) account.
There is a growing consensus that U.S. global health assistance needs to become more efficient and effective. There is some debate, however, on the best strategies. This report explains the role USAID plays in U.S. global health assistance, highlights how much the agency has spent on global health efforts from FY2001 to FY2012, discusses how funding to each of its programs has changed during this period, and raises some related policy questions. For more information on all U.S. global health assistance, see CRS Report R41851, U.S. Global Health Assistance: Background and Issues for the 112th Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL32611 | crs_RL32611_0 | It opens by noting four rarely occurring electoral college eventualities that took place in connection with the 2016 presidential election. These included the election of a President and Vice President who received fewer popular votes than their major opponents; the actions of seven "faithless electors," who voted for candidates other than those to whom they were pledged; the split allocation of electoral votes in Maine, which uses the district system to choose its electors; and challenges to electoral votes in the joint session of Congress at which they are counted. Qualifications for the office were broad: the only persons prohibited from serving as electors are Senators, Representatives, and persons "holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States." The Twenty-third Amendment provides an additional 3 electors to the District of Columbia. As noted previously, the voters then cast a single vote for the presidential and vice presidential candidates of their choice; when they do, they actually cast a vote for the entire ticket of electors pledged to the party and candidates of their choice. General Election Day
Elections for all federal elected officials are held on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in even-numbered years; presidential elections are held in every year divisible by four. Federal law sets the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December as the date on which the electors meet. They vote "by ballot"—paper ballot —separately for President and Vice President. The electors then adjourn, and the electoral college ceases to exist until the next presidential election. The votes are then counted, and the results are announced by the Vice President. A Tie or Failure to Win a Majority in the Electoral College: Contingent Election by Congress
The Twelfth Amendment, as noted earlier in this report, requires that candidates receive a majority of electoral votes, that is, at least 270 of the current total of 538, in order to be elected President or Vice President. Voters cast one ballot for the joint ticket of their preferred candidates for President and Vice President. These are actually votes for the electors committed to those candidates. January 6, 2021 ―On this date, or another date designated by Congress, the Senate and House of Representatives assemble in joint session to count the electoral votes. Criticisms
In the modern era, criticisms of the electoral college system center on various characteristics of the system, including, among others, the following:
it provides for indirect election of the President and Vice President by electors allocated by state, rather than by direct nationwide popular vote; electors are not constitutionally required to follow the popular vote in their state; the general ticket system is said to disenfranchise those who voted for the losing candidates by awarding all the electors in a state to the winners and none to the losers; the general ticket system is also said contribute to elections—"electoral college misfires"—in which candidates may be elected with fewer popular votes than their opponents; and contingent election further removes the election from the voters by vesting it in the House and Senate and assigning the same vote to each state, notwithstanding differences in population. Defense
Electoral college supporters cite a number of factors in their defense of the system, including the following:
they reject the claim that it is undemocratic, noting that electors are chosen by the voters in free elections; the electoral college system, they assert, is a major component of American federalism, maintaining the Constitution prescribes a federal election by which votes are tallied in each state, and in which the voters act both as citizens of the United States, and members of their state communities; they also cite federalism in defense of the allocation of electors among the states, and call into question the validity of claims that various groups or political parties are advantaged under the system; defenders further maintain the electoral college has historically promoted broad-based electoral coalitions and moderate political parties; and they reject the faithless elector argument, noting that faithless electors have never influenced the outcome of an election. Proposals for Change
Hundreds of constitutional amendments have been proposed to reform or eliminate the electoral college, falling into one of two categories: reform the system, "mend it," or replace it with direct popular election, "end it." Electoral College Reform
Three alternative proposals to "mend it" have been the most widely proposed in the past:
the automatic system; this would establish the general ticket system described earlier and currently used by 48 states and the District of Columbia as the mandatory nationwide system; the district system; this would establish the method currently used by Maine and Nebraska that allocates electoral votes on both a statewide and district basis, but as the mandatory nationwide system; and the proportional system, which would allocate electoral votes in each state according to the proportion of the popular votes won by each ticket in that state as the mandatory nationwide system. For instance, as noted elsewhere in this report, Article II, Section 1, clause 2 gives the state legislature broad authority to "appoint" electors in any way they choose. NGO Proposal: The National Popular Vote Initiative
Another contemporary effort centers on the National Popular Vote initiative, (NPV), a non-governmental campaign. NPV seeks to establish direct popular election of the President and Vice President through an interstate compact, rather than by constitutional amendment. | When Americans vote for a President and Vice President, they are actually choosing presidential electors, known collectively as the electoral college. It is these officials who choose the President and Vice President of the United States. The complex elements comprising the electoral college system are responsible for election of the President and Vice President.
The 2016 presidential contest was noteworthy for the first simultaneous occurrence in presidential election history of four rarely occurring electoral college eventualities. These included (1) the election of a President and Vice President who received fewer popular votes than their major opponents; (2) the actions of seven "faithless electors," who voted for candidates other than those to whom they were pledged; (3) the split allocation of electoral votes in Maine, which uses the district system to allocate electors; and (4) objections to electoral votes at the joint session of Congress to count the votes. These events are examined in detail in the body of this report.
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, as modified in 1804 by the Twelfth Amendment, sets the requirements for election of the President and Vice President. It authorizes each state to appoint, by whatever means the legislature chooses, a number of electors equal to the combined total of its Senate and House of Representatives delegations, for a contemporary total of 538, including 3 electors for the District of Columbia. For over 150 years, the states have universally required that electors be chosen by the voters. Anyone may serve as an elector, except Members of Congress and persons holding offices of "Trust or Profit" under the Constitution.
Every presidential election year, political parties and independent candidacies nominate their national candidates for President and Vice President. In each state where they are entitled to be on the ballot, they also nominate a group (a "slate" or "ticket") of candidates for the office of elector that is equal in number to the electoral votes to which the state is entitled.
On election day, Tuesday after the first Monday in November (November 3 in 2020), when voters cast a single vote for their preferred candidates, they are actually voting for the slate of electors in their state pledged to those candidates. In 48 states and the District of Columbia, the entire slate of electors winning the most popular votes in the state is elected, a practice known as "winner-take-all" or "the general ticket" system. Maine and Nebraska use an alternative method, the "district system," which awards two electors to the popular vote winners statewide, and one to the popular vote winners in each congressional district.
Electors assemble in their respective states on the Monday after the second Wednesday in December (December 14 in 2020). They are expected, but not constitutionally bound, to vote for the candidates they represent. The electors cast separate ballots for President and Vice President, after which the electoral college ceases to exist until the next presidential election.
State electoral vote results are reported to Congress and other designated authorities; they are then counted and declared at a joint session of Congress held on January 6 of the year after the election; Congress may, however, change this date by joint resolution. A majority of electoral votes (currently 270 of 538) is required to win, but the results submitted by any state are open to challenge at the joint session, as provided by law.
Past proposals for change by constitutional amendment have included various reform options and direct popular election, which would eliminate the electoral college system, but no substantive action on this issue has been taken in Congress for more than 20 years. At present, however, a non-governmental organization, the National Popular Vote (NPV) campaign, proposes to reform the electoral college by action taken at the state level through an interstate compact; 10 states and the District of Columbia have approved the NPV compact to date.
For further information on contemporary proposals to reform or eliminate the electoral college, please consult CRS Report R43824, Electoral College Reform: Contemporary Issues for Congress, and CRS Report R43823, The National Popular Vote Initiative: Direct Election of the President by Interstate Compact. |
crs_RS22897 | crs_RS22897_0 | This report provides information on the historical budget authority for veterans' benefits and services for FY1940 through FY2012, and a brief discussion of major changes in budget authority over this period. Budget authority is presented in both current dollars and constant 2011 dollars (i.e., inflation-adjusted). In constant 2011 dollars, the FY2012 budget authority is 1 4 times the FY1940 budget authority and reflects a 3.8% average annual growth rate over the period. In current dollars, the FY1947 budget authority was 14.9 times the FY1940 pre-war budget authority for veterans. Over time, the increases in the budget authority for veterans' benefits and services have reflected the impact of increases in the number of veterans as the result of wars and other conflicts, the aging of the veteran population, and changes in the benefits and services provided for veterans. | Budget authority—the amount of money a federal department or agency can spend or obligate to spend by law—for veterans' benefits and services has increased significantly since FY1940. In FY1940, the budget authority for veterans' benefits and services was $561.1 million, and in FY2012 the budget authority was $125.3 billion, or more than 200 times the FY1940 budget authority. In constant 2011 dollars (i.e., inflation-adjusted), the FY2012 budget authority is 14 times the FY1940 budget authority. The increases over time have reflected the impact of increases in the number of veterans as the result of wars and other conflicts, the aging of the veteran population, and changes in benefits and services provided for veterans. This report provides information on the historical budget authority of the Department of Veterans Affairs (formerly the Veterans Administration) for FY1940 through FY2012. Budget authority is presented in both current dollars and constant 2011 dollars.
This report will be updated as additional information becomes available. |
crs_R41398 | crs_R41398_0 | The crisis essentially reversed this view. The Dodd-Frank Act ( P.L. In addition, regulators will have information about the size and distribution of possible losses during periods of market volatility. Thousands of firms use derivatives to manage risk. The market is measured in the hundreds of trillions of dollars, and billions of contracts are traded annually. Futures contracts are traded on exchanges regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); stock options on exchanges under the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); and all swaps (and security-based swaps, as well as some options) were traded over-the-counter, and were not regulated by anyone. In the OTC market, contracts are made bilaterally, typically between a dealer and an end user, and there was generally no requirement that the price, the terms, or even the existence of the contract be disclosed to a regulator or to the public. Clearing depends on a system of margin, or collateral. Before the trade, both the long and short traders have to deposit an initial margin payment with the clearinghouse to cover potential losses. The effect of the margin system is that no one can build up a large paper loss that could damage the clearinghouse in case of default: it is certainly possible to lose large amounts of money trading on the futures exchanges, but only on a "pay as you go" basis. Perhaps the best-known example in the crisis was AIG, which wrote about $1.8 trillion worth of credit default swaps guaranteeing payment if certain mortgage-backed securities defaulted or experienced other "credit events." A key reform in Dodd-Frank is a mandate that many OTC swaps be cleared, which means that they will be subject to margin requirements. The Dodd-Frank Act's Clearing and Reporting Requirements
The Dodd-Frank Act requires that most derivatives contracts formerly traded exclusively in the OTC market be cleared and traded on exchanges. When making that determination, the agencies must consider (1) "the existence of significant outstanding notional exposures, trading liquidity, and adequate pricing data"; (2) "the availability of rule framework, capacity, operational expertise and resources, and credit support infrastructure to clear the contract on terms consistent with material terms and trading conventions on which the contract is then traded"; (3) "the effect on the mitigation of systemic risk ..."; (4) "the effect on competition, including appropriate fees and charges ..."; and (5) "the existence of reasonable legal certainty in the event of the insolvency of the relevant derivatives clearing organization or 1 or more of its clearing members with regard to the treatment of customer and swap counterparty positions, funds, and property." End-User Exemption
Sections 723 and 763 of the Dodd-Frank Act provide exceptions to the clearing requirement for swaps and security-based swaps when one of the counterparties to the transaction is not a financial entity; is using the transaction to hedge or mitigate its own commercial risk; and notifies the relevant agency "how it generally meets its financial obligations associated with entering into non-cleared swaps." Major Swap Participant and Swap Dealer Definitions
A basic theme in Dodd-Frank is that systemically important financial institutions should maintain capital cushions above and beyond what specific regulations require in order to compensate for the risk that their failure would pose to the financial system and the economy. Since the OTC dealer market is highly concentrated, the proposal that swap dealers be subject to additional prudential regulation was not controversial. in a way that imposed prudential regulation on most firms that used derivatives to hedge risk. The phase-in period would last two and a half years from the time data starts being reported to swap data repositories. The purpose of these requirements, presumably, is to give the relevant commissions access to a more complete picture of the derivatives market, even for swaps that are not required to be cleared. | The financial crisis implicated the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market as a major source of systemic risk. A number of firms used derivatives to construct highly leveraged speculative positions, which generated enormous losses that threatened to bankrupt not only the firms themselves but also their creditors and trading partners. Hundreds of billions of dollars in government credit were needed to prevent such losses from cascading throughout the system. AIG was the best-known example, but by no means the only one.
Equally troublesome was the fact that the OTC market depended on the financial stability of a dozen or so major dealers. Failure of a dealer would have resulted in the nullification of trillions of dollars worth of contracts and would have exposed derivatives counterparties to sudden risk and loss, exacerbating the cycle of deleveraging and withholding of credit that characterized the crisis. During the crisis, all the major dealers came under stress, and even though derivatives dealing was not generally the direct source of financial weakness, a collapse of the $600 trillion OTC derivatives market was imminent absent federal intervention. The first group of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients included nearly all the large derivatives dealers.
The Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) sought to remake the OTC market in the image of the regulated futures exchanges. Crucial reforms include a requirement that swap contracts be cleared through a central counterparty regulated by one or more federal agencies. Clearinghouses require traders to put down cash (called initial margin) at the time they open a contract to cover potential losses, and require subsequent deposits (called maintenance margin) to cover actual losses to the position. The intended effect of margin requirements is to eliminate the possibility that any firm can build up an uncapitalized exposure so large that default would have systemic consequences (again, the AIG situation). The size of a cleared position is limited by the firm's ability to post capital to cover its losses. That capital protects its trading partners and the system as a whole.
Swap dealers and major swap participants—firms with substantial derivatives positions—will be subject to margin and capital requirements above and beyond what the clearinghouses mandate. Swaps that are cleared will also be subject to trading on an exchange, or an exchange-like "swap execution facility," regulated by either the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in the case of security-based swaps. All trades will be reported to data repositories, so that regulators will have complete information about all derivatives positions. Data on swap prices and trading volumes will be made public.
The Dodd-Frank Act provides exceptions to the clearing and trading requirements for commercial end-users, or firms that use derivatives to hedge the risks of their nonfinancial business operations. Regulators may also provide exemptions for smaller financial institutions. Even trades that are exempt from the clearing and exchange-trading requirements, however, will have to be reported to data repositories or directly to regulators.
This report describes some of the requirements placed on the derivatives market by the Dodd-Frank Act. It will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44437 | crs_R44437_0 | Introduction
Telehealth is "the use of electronic information and telecommunications technologies to support long-distance clinical health care, patient and professional health-related education, public health and health administration." Th ough "telehealth" may refer to non-clinical services that are provided remotely, such as training, administrative meetings, and continuing education, some individuals may use the term "telemedicine" to describe the use of telecommunications technologies in clinical situations that include patient diagnosis, prescriptions, and treatment at a distance. The 114 th Congress has witnessed the introduction of a number of telehealth-related pieces of legislation that address a wide range of issues that have the potential to impact access to, along with the cost and quality of care under various federal programs, including Medicare. In recent years, the federal government has embarked on various initiatives to increase access to telehealth services (as well as to improve the underlying technological infrastructure that supports telehealth) at more than 20 federal agencies. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) (of the Department of Health Human Services (HHS)) reported a total of $17.6 million in Medicare (Part B) payments to providers for 192,692 telehealth visits in CY2015. Though providers are using telehealth to overcome barriers to health care access created by geography and time, the evidence-base for its use, including issues related to cost and quality, are strong in some areas and weak in others. Roadmap
This report describes telehealth activities at selected federal agencies, and the evidence available to assess telehealth through the lenses of health care access, cost, and quality. Department of Veterans Affairs
The VA operates the largest integrated health care delivery system in the United States. In 2015, VA providers delivered 2.1 million telehealth consultations to more than 677,000 veterans via videoconferencing, home telehealth, and store-and-forward telehealth that were provided through one or more of those systems. For example, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) established a new Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). Although many studies have been published on the quality of telehealth activities under the federal Medicare program, fewer studies have been published on state Medicaid programs. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Department of Labor (DOL)
Department of the Army (Telemedicine & Advanced Technology Research Center [TATRC])
Department of the Army (Army Medical Department (AMEDD))
Department of the Navy National Center for Telehealth & Technology (T2)
Department of Transportation (DOT)
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)
Indian Health Service (IHS)
International Trade Administration (ITA)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
National Institutes of Health (NIH)
National Institute of Justice (NIJ)
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
National Science Foundation (NSF)
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR)
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC)
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA)
Appendix C. ACA and Telehealth
The ACA created several incentives for telehealth advancement, mainly through Medicare and Medicaid pilots and programs. For example, the ONC coordinates some telehealth-related activities throughout HHS. | Telehealth is the use of electronic information and telecommunications technologies to support remote clinical health care, patient and professional health-related education, public health, and other health care delivery functions. A narrower concept, telemedicine, refers to clinical services that are provided remotely via telecommunications technologies. Some sources use the two terms interchangeably, and there is no consensus among federal programs and among health care providers on the definition of either term.
Federal involvement in telehealth is varied. As of 2014, more than 20 federal agencies were engaged in some aspect of telehealth. For example, in FY2015, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) was the largest telehealth provider in the federal government, providing 2.1 million telehealth consultations to some 677,000 veterans. In contrast, the Medicare (Part B) program, covering more than 52 million beneficiaries, the number of telehealth visits increased fivefold from 38,000 telehealth consultations (or visits) in 2009 to 192,692 in 2015. The VA, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Institute of Medicine, and other stakeholders have identified barriers associated with the use of telehealth, notably that some telehealth modalities have a stronger evidence base than others. Furthermore, according to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), key issues requiring additional research are the impact of telehealth on individual and population health, and on moving away from traditional fee structures toward rewarding clinicians for value versus volume of care.
Telehealth has been an active legislative issue thus far in the 114th Congress. For example, in February 2016, bipartisan legislation was introduced to expand telehealth reimbursement for remote patient monitoring under the Medicare program. In December 2015, the Senate Committee on Finance published options for expanding telehealth utilization for Medicare beneficiaries with chronic conditions. H.R. 6, the 21st Century Cures Act (as passed by the House), would require CMS and the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission to submit programmatic information to Congress on telehealth. The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA; P.L. 114-10) includes a provision that encourages the use of telehealth as an element in the new Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and requires the Government Accountability Office to study telehealth and its use under the Medicare program.
This report identifies telehealth activities at select federal agencies along with an assessment of the evidence regarding the potential impact of telehealth on health care access, cost, and quality. |
crs_RS22111 | crs_RS22111_0 | Introduction
Alien legalization or "amnesty," as well as special provisions to allow certain aliens to adjust to legal permanent resident (LPR) status, are among the most controversial issues of U.S. immigration policy. This report summarizes the main options for foreign nationals currently in the United States—legally or illegally—to become LPRs. When Congress first codified the assortment of immigration laws into the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1952, the assumption was that most aliens who would receive LPR status would be coming to the United States from abroad. Indeed, 30 years ago, more than 80% of the 386,194 aliens who became LPRs of the United States had arrived from abroad. In FY2008, 58% of all LPRs were adjusting status within the United States. | Immigration patterns have changed substantially since 1952, when policy makers codifying the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) assumed that most aliens becoming legal permanent residents (LPRs) of the United States would be arriving from abroad. In 1975, more than 80% of all LPRs arrived from abroad. By 2005, however, only 34% of all aliens who became LPRs had arrived from abroad; most LPRs adjust status within the United States.
This report summarizes the main avenues for foreign nationals currently in the United States—legally or illegally—to become LPRs. Alien legalization or "amnesty," as well as adjustment of status and cancellation of removal options, are briefly discussed. Designed as a primer on the issues, the report provides references to other CRS products that track pertinent legislation and analyze these issues more fully. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R43834 | crs_R43834_0 | Introduction
Article III of the Constitution defines the proper scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction as limited to adjudicating "Cases" and "Controversies." The Supreme Court has articulated several legal doctrines emanating from Article III that restrict when federal courts will adjudicate disputes, such as standing, ripeness, mootness, and the prohibition against issuing advisory opinions. One justiciability concept is the "political question" doctrine—according to which federal courts will not adjudicate certain controversies because their resolution is more proper within the political branches. Because the doctrine implicates the separation of powers, application of the political question doctrine has sparked controversy. For example, the doctrine has regularly been invoked in federal courts in cases concerning foreign policy. Understanding exactly when the doctrine applies, however, can be difficult. Origins of the Political Question Doctrine
The origins of the political question doctrine can be traced back to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison . The Court thus ruled that the Equal Protection claim was justiciable, and outlined six matters that could present political questions in other circumstances:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. In addition, the Court in Baker noted that cases implicating foreign policy could frequently pose political questions, and explained that in such cases the Court engages in a "a discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the history of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the possible consequences of judicial action." It characterized the political question doctrine as "essentially a function of the separation of powers"; but the factors it listed nonetheless appear to include both constitutional and prudential considerations. This "new political question doctrine" permitted the court to decline to adjudicate a case "regardless whether the court would actually have to decide a political question in order to resolve it." This reasoning appears to be buttressed by courts' conclusion that foreign policy decisions are committed to the political branches. Narrowing the Scope of the Doctrine
Zivotofsky v. Clinton
Recently, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton , the Court rejected application of the political question doctrine to a plaintiff's statutory claim, and harnessed an interpretive approach that may have narrowed the doctrine's scope. Instead, Zivotofsky requests that the courts enforce a specific statutory right"; which required the Court to determine if the plaintiff interpreted the statute correctly, and whether the statute was constitutional. | Article III of the Constitution restricts the jurisdiction of federal courts to deciding actual "Cases" and "Controversies." The Supreme Court has articulated several "justiciability" doctrines emanating from Article III that restrict when federal courts will adjudicate disputes. One justiciability concept is the political question doctrine, according to which federal courts will not adjudicate certain controversies because their resolution is more proper within the political branches. Because of the potential implications for the separation of powers when courts decline to adjudicate certain issues, application of the political question doctrine has sparked controversy. Because there is no precise test for when a court should find a political question, however, understanding exactly when the doctrine applies can be difficult.
The doctrine's origins can be traced to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison; but its modern application stems from Baker v. Carr, which provides six independent factors that can present political questions. These factors encompass both constitutional and prudential considerations, but the Court has not clearly explained how they are to be applied. Further, commentators have disagreed about the doctrine's foundation: some see political questions as limited to constitutional grants of authority to a coordinate branch of government, while others see the doctrine as a tool for courts to avoid adjudicating an issue best resolved outside of the judicial branch. Supreme Court case law after Baker fails to resolve the matter. The Court has historically applied the doctrine in a small but disparate number of cases, without applying clear rules for lower courts to follow. Possibly as a result of the murky nature of the doctrine, it has regularly been invoked in lower federal courts in cases concerning foreign policy.
However, a recent Supreme Court case, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, appears to have narrowed the scope of the political question doctrine. In a suit seeking the vindication of a statutory right in the foreign affairs context, the Court reversed a lower court's finding that the case posed a political question. The Court explained that the proper analysis in such a situation begins not by asking whether adjudicating the case would require review of the foreign policy decisions of the political branches, but instead examining whether the plaintiff correctly interpreted the statute, followed by determining whether the statute was constitutional.
The Court's opinion appears to restrict the types of claims that can pose political questions, and seems to encourage courts to decide more statutory claims on the merits. In turn, the decision could lead to increased judicial resolution of controversies concerning the separation of powers, rather than resolutions between the political branches themselves. |
crs_R43847 | crs_R43847_0 | Introduction
Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services as well as long-term services and supports. Medicaid is jointly funded by the federal government and the states. The federal government pays a share of each state's Medicaid expenditures. This report describes the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) calculation used to reimburse states for most Medicaid expenditures, and it lists the statutory exceptions to the regular FMAP rate. The FMAP rate is used to reimburse states for the federal share of most Medicaid expenditures, but exceptions to the regular FMAP rate have been made for certain states, situations, populations, providers, and services. The formula provides higher reimbursement to states with lower incomes (with a statutory maximum of 83%) and lower reimbursement to states with higher incomes (with a statutory minimum of 50%). Conclusion
The FMAP rate is used to reimburse states for the federal share of most Medicaid expenditures. In FY2019, FMAP rates range from 50% (14 states) to 76% (Mississippi). | Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services as well as long-term services and supports. Medicaid is jointly funded by the federal government and the states. The federal government's share of most Medicaid expenditures is called the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP). The remainder is referred to as the state share.
Generally determined annually, the FMAP formula is designed so that the federal government pays a larger portion of Medicaid costs in states with lower per capita incomes relative to the national average (and vice versa for states with higher per capita incomes). FMAP rates have a statutory minimum of 50% and a statutory maximum of 83%. For FY2019, regular FMAP rates range from 50.00% to 76.39%. The FMAP rate is used to reimburse states for the federal share of most Medicaid expenditures, but exceptions to the regular FMAP rate have been made for certain states, situations, populations, providers, and services.
This report describes the FMAP calculation used to reimburse states for most Medicaid expenditures, and it lists the statutory exceptions to the regular FMAP rate. |
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