id
stringlengths 9
18
| pid
stringlengths 11
20
| input
stringlengths 120
17k
| output
stringlengths 127
13.7k
|
|---|---|---|---|
crs_RL32496 | crs_RL32496_0 | The first part of this CRS Report discusses policy issues regarding such military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts. However, results were limited and the military relationship did not regain the closeness reached in the 1980s, when the United States and China cooperated strategically against the Soviet Union and such cooperation included arms sales to the PLA. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations affected mil-to-mil contacts, which had close ties in 1997-1998 and 2000, but were marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of the PRC embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999, and the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001. The PLA has repeatedly suspended mil-to-mil contacts while blaming U.S. "obstacles" (including U.S. reconnaissance, arms sales to Taiwan, legislated restrictions on contacts with the PLA, and the Pentagon's annual report to Congress on PRC Military Power). Other issues concern whether there is adherence to U.S. laws, including the FY2000 NDAA, and consistency with U.S. concerns about allies showing U.S.-origin equipment. The Commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) also said he hoped to bring a C-17 to China's air show in November 2014 (in General Hawk Carlisle's interview with Defense News , February 10, 2014). As the Defense Department gradually resumed the mil-to-mil relationship in that context, policy issues for Congress included whether the Administration complied with legislation and used leverage effectively in its contacts with the PLA to advance a prioritized list of U.S. security interests, while balancing security concerns about the PLA's warfighting capabilities. Moreover, the Obama Administration expanded engagement with the PLA, including increasing combined exercises. On December 10, 2014, Representative Randy Forbes wrote to the Defense Secretary with concerns about the trajectory of mil-to-mil contacts with China and to request a review of this policy. Issues for Congress include whether the Administration has complied with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and has determined a program of contacts with the PLA that advances, and does not harm, U.S. security interests. The Defense Department has asserted that it conducts all military-to-military contacts with China in a manner consistent with the provisions of the FY2000 NDAA. Congress could, as it has in the past, consider the following options:
Host PLA delegations on Capitol Hill or meet them at other venues Engage with the PLA as an aspect of visits by Codels to China Receive briefings by the Administration before and/or after military visits Investigate or oversee investigations of prisoner-of-war/missing-in-action (POW/MIA) cases Require reports or briefings from the Pentagon, particularly in unclassified form Review exchanges at PACOM's Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Hawaii Fund or prohibit funding for certain commissions or activities Pass legislation on sanctions and exchanges with the PLA Assess the Administration's adherence to laws on sanctions, contacts, and reports Obtain and review the Department of Defense (DOD)'s plan for upcoming mil-to-mil contacts, particularly proposed programs already discussed with the PLA Require binding reviews of mil-to-mil contacts by the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) and counter-intelligence authorities Examine whether to negotiate any agreements with the PLA, such as an Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA) for logistics support Require periodic (e.g., monthly, quarterly) reports to appropriations and defense committees on the costs of travel and other elements of mil-to-mil exchanges. 101-246 ). An issue is whether President Obama is required to issue waivers and consult with Congress concerning the increased exposures of the PLA to U.S. equipment in military exchanges. Then, in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY1997 ( P.L. 3979 ; P.L. 111-84 on October 28, 2009, Congress changed the title of the report to "Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China." Based on S. 1197 , Section 1242 of the FY2014 NDAA ( P.L . 4495 , Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act, to support the strategic "rebalance" to the region. The House passed H.R. On June 2, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported S. 2410 (Levin), FY2015 NDAA. H.R. 113-291 on December 19, 2014. In March 2008, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England defined these principal U.S. objectives in the annual report to Congress on contacts with the PLA:
support the President's overall policy goals regarding China; prevent conflict by clearly communicating U.S. resolve to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region; lower the risk of miscalculation between the two militaries; increase U.S. understanding of China's military capabilities and intentions; encourage China to adopt greater openness and transparency in its military capabilities and intentions; promote stable U.S.-China relations; increase mutual understanding between U.S. and PLA officers; and encourage China to play a constructive and peaceful role in the Asia-Pacific region; to act as a partner in addressing common security challenges; and to emerge as a responsible stakeholder in the world. military.) Given confrontations in the maritime areas (particularly in 2001 and 2009), some stress that the foremost U.S. interest would be to safeguard the safety of U.S. military personnel. Defense officials have used the DTL at other times. Kelly also noted that the PRC leadership accelerated the PLA buildup after 1999. The SSD discussed cyber and maritime disputes. With concerns about internal repression by the PRC regime in the Tiananmen Crackdown of June 1989 and after, U.S. sanctions (in §902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991, P.L. | This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and records major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, President Clinton reengaged with the top PRC leadership, including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic alignment against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral engagement have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and the PLA's aggressive maritime and air confrontations.
Issues for Congress include whether the Administration complies with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and pursues contacts with the PLA that advance a prioritized set of U.S. security interests, especially the operational safety of U.S. military personnel. Oversight legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246) and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65). A particular issue is whether the President is required to issue waivers of sanctions. Skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with the PRC have debated whether the contacts achieve results in U.S. objectives and whether the contacts contribute to the PLA's warfighting capability that might harm U.S. and allied security interests. Some have argued about whether the value that U.S. officials place on the contacts overly extends leverage to the PLA. Some believe talks can serve U.S. interests that include risk-reduction or conflict-avoidance; military-civilian coordination; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; talks on nuclear, missile, space, and/or cyber domains; counterterrorism; and POW/MIA accounting.
Policy makers could review the approach to mil-to-mil contacts, given concerns about potential crises and conflicts. U.S. officials have faced challenges in gaining cooperation from the PLA. The PLA has tried to use its suspensions of exchanges while blaming U.S.-only "obstacles" (including arms sales to Taiwan, FY2000 NDAA, and air and naval reconnaissance operations).
The PRC's harassment of U.S. ships and increasing assertiveness in maritime disputes showed some limits to mil-to-mil engagement, similar views, and PLA restraint. The U.S. articulations in 2011-2012 of a strategic "rebalancing" to the Asia-Pacific raised an issue of how to deal with China's challenges. The Administration's "rebalance" entails not only expanded engagement with the PLA, but also increasing exercises. The PLA Navy's invited participation for the first time in the U.S. Navy-led multinational exercise, RIMPAC, based at Hawaii in summer 2014 raised concerns in Congress and elsewhere. The U.S. Navy has increased some "interoperability" with the PLA Navy. The Defense Secretary issued the latest required annual report on June 5, 2014, concerning military and security developments involving the PRC, cooperation, and military-to-military contacts. The report noted that the PLA uses combined exercises to improve capabilities by learning from more advanced militaries and asserted that the Defense Department complies with the FY2000 NDAA in all military contacts with China. The U.S. Pacific Air Forces Commander sent a C-17 transport aircraft to China's Zhuhai Air Show in November 2014.
Legislation in the 113th Congress includes the FY2014 NDAA (P.L. 113-66); FY2014 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 2397); Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act, H.R. 4495 (Forbes); FY2015 NDAA, H.R. 4435 (McKeon), S. 2410 (Levin), and H.R. 3979 (P.L. 113-291); and H.Res. 643 (Chabot). On December 10, 2014, Representative Randy Forbes wrote to the Defense Secretary with concerns about mil-to-mil contacts with China and to request a review of this policy. |
crs_R44028 | crs_R44028_0 | Introduction
The Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) program offers long-term, low-interest loans to railroad operators for improving rail infrastructure. The program is intended to operate at no cost to the government and does not receive an annual appropriation. Congress has authorized $35 billion in loan a uthority for the program, but freight railroads have been relatively unenthusiastic. Since 2000, RRIF has made 37 loans to 29 operators for a total of $5.4 billion, representing $5.9 billion in 2018 dollars. The Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94 ), enacted in December 2015, included changes intended to make the RRIF program more attractive to potential applicants, though one change—elimination of the requirement that the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), which administers the program, refund borrowers' credit risk premiums—may make the program less attractive. The prospect of large loans for private intercity passenger rail and transit-related projects raises questions about potential risks to the RRIF program, because such projects may have no source of earnings until and unless they are completed and, even then, may not be able to generate sufficient revenue to service their loans. The RRIF program replaced a railroad financing program that Congress created in 1976. But the up-front costs of a RRIF loan may deter would-be applicants. By contrast, the other major DOT credit assistance program, established in the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA), covers the cost of the credit risk premium for loan recipients (known as TIFIA's subsidy cost). RRIF loan applications are reviewed by the Build America Bureau, independent financial analysts hired by the Bureau, and DOT's Office of Credit and Finance. The Secretary of Transportation has final authority over loan approval. The appeal of the RRIF program is that the recipient is able to borrow money at the lowest rate available (that paid by the federal government itself) and for a longer period of time than most other types of loans would permit. One loan is in default. State Programs
A number of states have established grant, loan, and tax benefit programs to help short line railroads finance infrastructure or equipment purchases. Congress has expressed a desire that the program be used more heavily, especially by short line railroads, and has identified two aspects of the program that may be reducing its attractiveness: the uncertain length of the loan review process and the cost to the applicant of the loan. Length of Review Process
By statute, a RRIF loan application is supposed to be approved or disapproved within 90 days. Management of the program was subsequently transferred to the Build America Bureau. Loan Costs
Federal law requires that federal credit programs operate at no cost to the government. Several private entities seeking to build and operate passenger rail projects have expressed interest in RRIF loans in recent years. | Congress created the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) program to offer long-term, low-cost loans to railroad operators, with particular attention to small freight railroads, to help them finance improvements to infrastructure and investments in equipment. The program is intended to operate at no cost to the government, and it does not receive an annual appropriation. Since 2000, the RRIF program has made 37 loans totaling $5.4 billion (valued at $5.9 billion in 2018 dollars). The program, which is administered by the Build America Bureau within the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, has approved only four loans since 2012.
Congress has authorized $35 billion in loan authority for the RRIF program and repeatedly has urged the Department of Transportation (DOT) to increase the number of loans the program makes. Reports suggest the uncertain length and outcome of the RRIF loan application process and the up-front costs to prospective borrowers are among the elements of the program that have reduced its appeal compared with other financing options available to railroads.
By statute, the Build America Bureau has 90 days from the time a completed application is submitted to render a decision on the application. This timeline becomes uncertain due to the Bureau's discretion in determining when a loan application is "complete." A 2014 audit indicated that some loan applications had been in process for more than a year.
Unlike DOT's other prominent loan assistance program, the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program, RRIF requires loan recipients to pay a credit risk premium, which is intended to offset the risk of a default on their loan. The credit risk premium helps the program comply with a congressional requirement that federal loan assistance programs operate at no cost to the federal government. However, it may make RRIF loans less attractive to borrowers than other types of federal, state, or private financing.
Several RRIF loans have been made to government-run intercity passenger rail projects. A number of private companies seeking to build intercity passenger rail lines also have expressed interest in RRIF loans. Changes made by Congress in the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (P.L. 114-94), enacted in December 2015, may lead to even greater use of the RRIF program by sponsors of passenger rail and transit-related projects, as opposed to small freight railroads. Such loans likely would be quite large relative to those RRIF typically extends to small freight railroads, raising questions about the risk to the federal government if the projects are not completed or if they fail to generate sufficient revenue to service the loans. |
crs_R40727 | crs_R40727_0 | Introduction to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
Most of the funding for the activities of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in the annual appropriations acts enacted by Congress. These include several programs of rental assistance for persons who are poor, elderly, and/or have disabilities. 111-5 ) provided over $13 billion to HUD's programs. 3288 would have provided a more than 11% increase in regular annual appropriations for HUD programs, 3% more than the President's request. These overall funding levels are about 1% higher than President Obama requested. Key Budget Issues, FY2010
New Administration "Crosscutting" Initiatives
The FY2010 budget was the first of the Obama Administration. The Senate-passed version included funding for all three components of the President's Energy Innovation Fund, but at a lower level than requested. 3288 proposed funding the President's Choice Neighborhoods Initiative at the requested level, and did not include new funding for the HOPE VI program. In S.Rept. 3288 and the final statute also included increased funding for HUD's Fair Housing programs and increased funding for hiring staff, as requested by the President. However, it is the amount provided by the bill that determines the relevant program level. H.Rept. Both the House-passed and Senate-passed bills would have increased funding above the President's requested level, but not to the level requested by advocates. President Obama's FY2010 budget requested $142 million (6%) less than was provided through the regular annual appropriations in FY2009, not counting the additional $4 billion in emergency supplemental capital grants that were also provided in FY2009 through the economic stimulus law ( P.L. See Table 7 for the FY2010 funding levels enacted in P.L. It appropriated $4.450 billion for CDF activities, including $3.990 billion for formula-based grants to states and local governments. 111-117 includes $150 million in funding for the Administration's new multipronged Sustainable Communities Initiative (SCI). This is $3 million more than requested by the Administration. Unlike the Administration, which requested no new funding for the Housing Assistance Council (HAC), the House bill recommended an appropriation of $5 million for the program while the Senate version of H.R. NeighborWorks is not funded as part of the HUD budget; it receives its own appropriation as a related agency in the HUD funding bill. The House Committee-passed bill provided $70 million in funding for HUD's housing counseling program, a $5 million increase over the FY2009 appropriation but $30 million less than the President's budget request. This language was retained in the final version of the bill, P.L. Related Legislation
Jobs for Main Street Act
On December 16, 2009, the House of Representatives passed a substitute amendment to H.R. | President Obama's first budget request included over $45 billion for the Department of Housing and Urban Development in FY2010. The requested funding level was roughly $4 billion more than was provided in regular annual appropriations in FY2009 by P.L. 111-8. However, it is about $9 billion less than total FY2009 funding for HUD, if the more than $13 billion in emergency economic stimulus funding provided by P.L. 111-5 is taken into account.
This budget request included increased funding for most HUD programs, such as the Section 8 voucher program, public housing program, housing programs for persons who are elderly or disabled, and block grant programs for states and localities. It also proposed several new initiatives focused on Administration priorities related to information technology and research capacity, energy efficiency, and distressed communities.
On July 23, 2009, the House passed its version of the FY2010 HUD funding bill (H.R. 3288). It included increases in funding over the President's requested level for many HUD programs. It did not fund all of the President's new initiatives, citing a need for authorizing legislation (H.Rept. 111-218). In total, the House-passed bill would have provided almost $1.6 billion (3.4%) more in new appropriations for HUD than the President requested.
On August 5, 2009, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of H.R. 3288 (S.Rept. 111-69). Like the House-passed version, it included increases in funding for many HUD programs. It also included funding for some, but not all, of the President's new initiatives. The bill would have included about $1.2 billion less in new appropriations for HUD than the House-passed bill, but $343 million (0.7%) more than the President's request. On September 17, 2009, the bill was approved by the full Senate, with several policy-related amendments, none of which affected funding levels.
Because most of the annual appropriations bills were not enacted before the start of the 2010 fiscal year, Congress approved a series of short-term continuing resolutions (CR) to maintain funding for government operations.
On December 16, 2009, President Obama signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) into law, funding HUD and most other government agencies for the remainder of FY2010. The act provided a higher overall funding level for HUD than requested by the President, and higher than proposed by the Senate, but lower than proposed by the House. It funded versions of several of the Obama Administration's new initiatives, including the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative and the Energy Innovation Fund.
This report analyzes recent trends in the HUD budget and tracks legislative action and summarizes key budget issues in the FY2010 budget process. |
crs_RL32355 | crs_RL32355_0 | Introduction
In January 2005, federal white-collar employees received a 2.5% annual pay adjustment anda 1.0% locality-based comparability payment under Executive Order 13368, issued by PresidentGeorge W. Bush on December 30, 2004. 108-447 . Federal white-collar employees are to receive an annual pay adjustment and a locality-based comparability payment, effective in January of each year, under Section 529 of P.L. 101-509 , theFederal Employees Pay Comparability Act (FEPCA) of 1990. (2) Although the federal pay adjustmentsare sometimes referred to as cost-of-living adjustments, neither the annual adjustment nor the localitypayment is based on measures of the cost of living. FEPCA has never been implemented asoriginally enacted. The annual pay adjustment is based on the Employment Cost Index (ECI), which measures change in private sector wages and salaries. By law, the disparitybetween non-federal and federal salaries is to be reduced to 5%. In order to meet the target for closing the pay gap, the council recommended locality pay raises ranging from 18.14% in the "Restof the United States" (RUS) pay area to 47.96% in the San Jose-San Francisco pay area. Thepayment recommended for the Washington, DC, pay area is 29.66%. Because the new locality ratereplaces the existing locality rate, the change in locality rates is derived by comparing 2004 localitypayments with those recommended for 2005. This comparison results in recommended net increasesfor 2005, if the ECI and locality-based comparability payments were granted as required by law, of9.19% in the RUS pay area to 22.10% in the San Jose-San Francisco pay area, and 15.94% in theWashington, DC, pay area. The nationwide average net pay increase, if the ECI and locality-basedcomparability payments were granted as required by law, would have been 13.06% in 2005. The number of GS employees in the area by agency. (33)
The Pay Agent estimated that the cost of the January 2005 locality-based comparability payments would be about $8 billion if the full amount necessary to reduce the pay disparity of thetarget gap to 5% were provided in January 2005 as required by FEPCA. (50) The FY2005 budget proposes a 3.5% pay increasefor the military and a 1.5% pay increase for civilian employees. Section 638 of the Departments of Transportation and Treasury and Independent Agencies AppropriationsBill, 2005, H.R. 5025 , as passed by the House of Representatives on September 22,2004, on a 397-12 (Roll No. 465) vote, would provide a 3.5% pay adjustment for federal civilianemployees, including those in the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. (55)
Section 640 of S. 2806 , the Senate version of the Transportation/Treasury appropriations bill, as reported to the Senate by the Committee on Appropriations, also wouldprovide a 3.5% pay adjustment for federal civilian employees, including those in the Departmentsof Defense and Homeland Security. President Bush signed H.R.4818 on December 8, 2004, and it became P.L. The President's budget proposes a 3.1% pay adjustment for the uniformedmilitary. January 2005 Recommended Locality Payments, Authorized Locality Payments, and Net Annual and Locality Pay Increase
Source: Memorandum for the President's Pay Agent from the Federal Salary Council, Level ofComparability Payments for January 2005 and Other Matters Pertaining to the Locality PayProgram (Washington: Oct. 28, 2003), Attachment 1; and Report on Locality-Based ComparabilityPayments for the General Schedule, Annual Report of the President's Pay Agent (Washington: Dec.2003), p. 24. | Federal white-collar employees are to receive an annual pay adjustment and a locality-based comparability payment, effective in January of each year, under Section 529 of P.L. 101-509 , theFederal Employees Pay Comparability Act (FEPCA) of 1990. The law has never been implementedas originally enacted; annual and locality payments have been reduced. In January 2005, theyreceived a 2.5% annual pay adjustment and a 1.0% locality-based comparability payment underExecutive Order 13368, issued by President George W. Bush on December 30, 2004. Although thefederal pay adjustments are sometimes referred to as cost-of-living adjustments, neither the annualadjustment nor the locality payment is based on measures of the cost of living.
The annual pay adjustment is based on the Employment Cost Index (ECI), which measures change in private-sector wages and salaries. The index showed that the annual across-the-boardincrease would be 2.5% in January 2005. The size of the locality payment is determined by thePresident, and is based on a comparison of non-federal and General Schedule (GS) salaries in 32 payareas nationwide. By law, the disparity between non-federal and federal salaries was to be graduallyreduced to 5% over the years 1994 through 2002; FEPCA requires that amounts payable may not beless than the full amount necessary to reduce the pay disparity to 5% in January 2005. The FederalSalary Council and the Pay Agent recommended that, to carry out FEPCA, the 2005 localitypayments range from 18.14% in the "Rest of the United States" (RUS) pay area to 47.96% in the SanJose-San Francisco pay area. The payment recommended for the Washington, DC, pay area was29.66%. Because the new locality rate replaces the existing locality rate, the change in locality ratesis derived by comparing 2004 locality payments with those recommended for 2005. Thiscomparison results in recommended net increases for 2005, if the ECI and locality-basedcomparability payments were granted as required by law, of 9.19% in the RUS pay area to 22.10%in the San Jose-San Francisco pay area, and 15.94% in the Washington, DC, pay area. Thenationwide average net pay increase, if the ECI and locality-based comparability payments weregranted as required by law, would have been 13.06% in 2005. President Bush's FY2005 budgetproposed a 1.5% federal civilian pay adjustment. He proposed a 3.5% pay adjustment for theuniformed military, and a number of Members of Congress advocated the same pay adjustment forfederal civilians. The Departments of Transportation and Treasury and Independent Agenciesappropriations bill, 2005 -- H.R. 5025 , as passed by the House of Representatives, and S. 2806 , as reported in the Senate -- provides a 3.5% pay adjustment for federal civilianemployees, including those in the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. Thisappropriations bill was incorporated as Division H of the Consolidated Appropriations Act forFY2005 ( H.R. 4818 ) which was signed by the President on December 8, 2004, andbecame P.L. 108-447 .
The President's budget for FY2006 proposes pay adjustments of 2.3% for federal civilian employees and 3.1% for the uniformed military. The same pay adjustment for both civilians and themilitary is advocated by several Members of Congress. |
crs_RS21774 | crs_RS21774_0 | Although IFOR successfully carried out the military tasks outlined in the Dayton agreement, the continued need for an external military presence to provide a secure environment in Bosnia led NATO to replace IFOR with a smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR, initially with about 32,000 troops) in December 1996. Over a six-month period in 2007, EUFOR was downsized and restructured. At its June 28-29 Istanbul summit, NATO nations confirmed the decision to conclude SFOR by the end of 2004 and agreed that NATO's residual military presence would have the "principal task" of providing advice on defense reforms and would also "undertake certain operational supporting tasks, such as counter-terrorism...; supporting the ICTY...with regard to the detention of persons indicted for war crimes; and intelligence sharing with the EU." At a ceremony in Sarajevo on December 2, NATO formally concluded the SFOR mission and the EU launched Operation Althea . The EU on February 27, 2007, confirmed an earlier decision in principle to reconfigure EUFOR and reduce its size from 6,500 to 2,500 troops by the end of May. On November 21, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1785 that further extended EUFOR's and NATO's mandates in Bosnia for another year. | On December 2, 2004, NATO formally concluded its Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and handed over peace stabilization duties to a European Union force (EUFOR). The mission of the EU's Operation Althea has been to ensure continued compliance with the 1995 Dayton peace agreement and contribute to a secure environment and Bosnia's efforts towards European integration. In 2007, the EU carried out a reconfiguration of EUFOR that reduced its strength from 6,500 to around 2,500 troops. NATO retains a small headquarters presence in Sarajevo to provide advice on defense reforms and to support counterterrorism efforts and the apprehension of wanted war crimes suspects believed to be hiding in or transiting through Bosnia. In November 2007, the U.N. Security Council extended the EU and NATO mandates in Bosnia for another year. This report will no longer be updated. See also CRS Report RS22324, Bosnia: Overview of Current Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40538 | crs_R40538_0 | Federal Water Research: A Primer
More than 20 federal entities conduct water-related research and development and collect and disseminate water information and data. Whether coordination of federally funded water research would produce greater benefits for the nation is the policy question at the center of H.R. 1145 , the National Water Research and Development Initiative Act of 2009. 1145 would formally establish a federal interagency committee to coordinate federal water research. The interagency committee, with input from an advisory committee, would develop a four-year plan for priority federal research topics, and the President would annually report to Congress on progress on the plan. The bill also would establish a National Water Initiative Coordination Office that would function as a clearinghouse for technical and programmatic information, support the interagency committee, and disseminate the findings and recommendations of the interagency committee. The bill would essentially codify the Subcommittee on Water Availability and Quality (SWAQ), which was not created by statute, that has been operating since 2003. Technological advances, events, and climate change also are increasing the role of some agencies, which previously were less engaged, in performing and using water resources research. As passed by the House, the bill lists 25 research outcomes. In trying to achieve the research outcomes listed in H.R. Starting in 2003, the Subcommittee on Water Availability and Quality revived a dormant role of coordinating water research for the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). SWAQ began operating within the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) as part of the NSTC. H.R. H.R. While the NRC stated the benefits of a coordinated research program, a concern is that the increased focus on the outcomes identified in the bill might result in a shift away from other research areas that are central in the roles of some agencies. Some stakeholders may be concerned that, unless additional funds are made available for water research, enactment of H.R. 1145 may result in a shift in research funding away from regulatory-focused research, toward more technology research and development. 1145 during House Science Committee markup to include water quality provisions reflects that concern and also interest in furthering water quality research. Whether some of the bill's provisions as passed by the House call for research, programs, and studies that may partially duplicate current efforts is another concern. 1145 would not increase the authorized funding levels for federal research activities. Instead, it is focused on improving coordination in setting agency research agendas, increasing transparency in water research budgeting, and reporting on progress toward the research outcomes specified in the bill. | H.R. 1145, the National Water Research and Development Initiative Act of 2009, would formally establish a federal interagency committee to coordinate federal water research. Federal water research currently averages roughly $700 million annually.
The proposed interagency committee, with input from an advisory committee, would develop a four-year plan for priority federal research topics, then require the President to annually report to Congress on progress in achieving the plan's research outcomes. A version of the committee, the Subcommittee on Water Availability and Quality (SWAQ), which was not created by statute, has been operating since 2003 within the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) as part of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). The bill also would establish a National Water Initiative Coordination Office that would function as a clearinghouse for technical and programmatic information, support the interagency committee, and disseminate the findings and recommendations of the interagency committee.
As passed by the House, H.R. 1145 would authorize $10 million over five years for improving coordination of water resources research and related outreach activities with the public and research institutions. The bill is focused on improving coordination in the establishment of agency research agendas, increasing the transparency of water research budgeting, and reporting on progress toward research outcomes specified in the bill. H.R. 1145 would not increase the authorized funding levels for performing federal research activities.
Water research is conducted in numerous federal agencies because water plays many different roles in the economy, public health, and ecosystems. Many of the issues facing the nation's water resources are cross-cutting, such as climate change and the energy-water nexus (e.g., the role of water in producing fuels and electricity). Drivers for improved coordination include an interest in more effectively addressing these complicated water topics, as well as interest in avoiding duplication, facilitating exchange of results, and having a more focused research strategy. Technological advances, events, and climate change also are increasing the role of some agencies, which previously were less engaged, in performing and using water resources research.
A concern with more coordination is that, if enacted, the bill may result in a shift in research funding away from some current research topics. Specifically, some stakeholders may be concerned that, unless additional funds are made available for water research, the focus on technology and water supply in H.R. 1145 may move research funds away from water quality and research supporting agencies' regulatory roles. During the House Science Committee markup, research outcomes for the plan were added that address water quality topics. Another concern is whether some of the bill's provisions as passed by the House call for research, programs, or studies that may partially duplicate current research. Whether a more effective portfolio of water research can be achieved through the transparency and information pursued in H.R. 1145 (without increased research and demonstration funding) remains uncertain. |
crs_RL34318 | crs_RL34318_0 | Introduction
Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), a disease caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), weakens the immune system, leaving individuals with the disease susceptible to infections. From the early years of the epidemic, individuals who are infected with HIV/AIDS have faced impoverishment as they become unable to work, experience high medical costs, or lose private health insurance coverage. The incidence of HIV/AIDS has also grown among low-income individuals who were economically vulnerable even before onset of the disease. Creation of the Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA) Program
In 1988, Congress established the National Commission on AIDS as part of the Health Omnibus Extension Act ( P.L. The bills were similar, and both proposed to fund short-term and permanent housing, together with supportive services, for individuals living with AIDS and related diseases. 101-625 , the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act. The HOPWA program is administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and remains the only federal program solely dedicated to providing housing assistance to persons living with HIV/AIDS and their families. (For the amounts distributed to eligible states and MSAs in recent years, see Appendix .) Formula funds are allocated in two ways:
First, 75% of the total available formula funds, sometimes referred to by HUD as "base funding," is distributed —starting in FY2017, to the largest cities within metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with populations exceeding 500,000 and with more than 2,000 individuals living with HIV or AIDS (through FY2016, funds were distributed to MSAs with more than 1,500 cumulative AIDS cases), and —starting in FY2017, to states with more than 2,000 individuals living with HIV or AIDS in the areas outside of that state's eligible MSAs (through FY2016, funds were distributed to states with more than 1,500 cumulative AIDS cases). Prior to enactment of P.L. Competitive Grants
The remaining 10% of HOPWA funding is available through competitive grants. The HOPWA Program Formula
In 2016, Congress passed legislation to change the HOPWA formula as part of the Housing Opportunities Through Modernization Act (HOTMA, P.L. Through FY2016, 75% of funds were distributed using the cumulative number of AIDS cases as reported by the CDC, including those who had died, but not including those living with HIV. 114-201 , from FY2017 through FY2021, grantees are not to see their allocations decrease 5% or more, nor are allocations to increase 10% or more. The FY2009 budget stated that "[w]hereas the current formula distributes formula grant resources by the cumulative number of AIDS cases, the revised formula will account for the present number of people living with AIDS, as well as differences in housing costs in the qualifying areas." Its proposal includes the following:
using the number of persons living with HIV and AIDS to determine formula shares, and maintaining eligibility for all current grantees; ensuring that allocations not drop more than 10% per year nor increase more than 20% per year, with this phase-in to take place over three years; and replacing the incidence or "bonus" funding with a factor based on fair market rent and poverty. (See Table 1 .) Housing Funded Through the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program
In addition to funds for housing provided through HUD, funds appropriated to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Ryan White HIV/AIDS program may be used to provide short-term housing assistance to persons living with HIV/AIDS. The Relationship Between Stable Housing and Health Outcomes
HIV/AIDS status is associated with homelessness: persons who are homeless are more likely to be HIV positive than those who are housed (see " Housing Status of Persons Living with HIV/AIDS "). In addition, during the last decade, research has found that the health outcomes of homeless individuals living with HIV/AIDS may be improved with stable housing. Individuals in the comparison group received services, including assistance with finding housing, but did not receive HOPWA-funded housing. Specifically, compared to those in the usual care group, those in the treatment group showed 29% reduction in hospitalizations, a 29% reduction in the number of days spent in the hospital, and a 24% reduction in visits to the emergency room. Recent HOPWA Formula Allocations | Since the beginning of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) epidemic in the early 1980s, many individuals living with the disease have had difficulty finding affordable, stable housing. In the earlier years of the epidemic, as individuals became ill, they found themselves unable to work, while at the same time facing health care expenses that left few resources to pay for housing. In more recent years, HIV and AIDS have become more prevalent among low income populations who struggled to afford housing even before being diagnosed with the disease. The financial vulnerability associated with AIDS, as well as the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) that causes AIDS, results in a greater likelihood of homelessness among persons living with the disease. At the same time, those who are homeless may be more likely to engage in activities through which they could acquire or transmit HIV. Further, recent research has indicated that individuals living with HIV who live in stable housing have better health outcomes than those who are homeless or unstably housed, and that they spend fewer days in hospitals and emergency rooms.
Congress recognized the housing needs of persons living with HIV/AIDS when it approved the Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA) program in 1990 as part of the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (P.L. 101-625). The HOPWA program, administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), funds short-term and permanent housing, together with supportive services, for individuals living with HIV/AIDS and their families. In addition, a small portion of funds appropriated through the Ryan White HIV/AIDS program, administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), may be used to fund short-term housing for those living with HIV/AIDS.
In FY2016, Congress appropriated $335 million for HOPWA as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113). This was $5 million more than was appropriated in FY2015, and equaled the peak HOPWA funding level of $335 million in FY2010. Prior to FY2010, the most that had been appropriated for HOPWA was $310 million in FY2009. HUD awards 90% of appropriated funds based on a formula and the remaining 10% is distributed through a grant competition. Funds are used primarily for housing activities, although grant recipients must provide supportive services to those persons residing in HOPWA-funded housing. In FY2015, almost 55,000 households received housing assistance through HOPWA, a decrease compared to the previous years. See Table 1 for funding levels and households served since FY2001. The Appendix provides the formula grants distributed to eligible states and metropolitan statistical areas from FY2007 to FY2016.
For years the formula used to distribute the bulk of HOPWA funds was an issue considered by both the Administration and Congress. Since the inception of HOPWA, the formula relied on cumulative cases of AIDS to distribute formula funds, a number that included those who had died but did not include living cases of HIV. Legislation to change the formula to include people living with both HIV and AIDS, but exclude those who have died, was introduced in the 114th Congress, including in FY2017 appropriations language. On July 29, 2016, Congress changed the HOPWA formula as part of the Housing Opportunity Through Modernization Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-201). Going forward, the distribution of HOPWA formula funds will be based on people living with HIV or AIDS. In addition, HUD is to account for fair market rents and poverty in delivering a portion of funding, and a hold harmless provision ensures that, through FY2021, grantees will not see their allocations decrease by 5% or more nor increase by 10% or more from the previous year. |
crs_R43677 | crs_R43677_0 | There has been growing concern over sex trafficking of children in the United States. Demand for sex with children (and other forms of commercial sexual exploitation of children) is steady, and profit to sex traffickers has increased. In addition to the challenges in prosecuting traffickers and buyers of sex with children, law enforcement faces challenges with how to handle the girls and boys whose bodies are sexually exploited for profit. Federal Conceptualization of Minors as Sex Trafficking Victims
The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) is the primary law that addresses human trafficking. However, despite their protected status at the federal level, juvenile victims of sex trafficking may at times be labeled and treated as criminals or juvenile delinquents at the state and local levels. Factors Impacting Criminalization
A number of factors may, alone or in combination, contribute to the criminalization of juvenile trafficking victims. Another factor impacting the potential criminalization of juvenile sex trafficking victims involves awareness of key indicators that may help in identifying victims. An officer who recognizes that an individual is a victim may charge the individual with a crime so as to place the victim into one of the only available safe and secure environments—a detention facility within the juvenile justice system. Of note, there are no comprehensive data that address the number of prostituted or otherwise sexually trafficked juveniles who are treated as offenders. Researchers and policy makers have suggested a number of options aimed at preventing minor trafficking victims from being caught up in the juvenile justice system and diverting them to programs and services that can help rehabilitate and restore these youth. These have included supporting law enforcement training on human trafficking, enhancing law enforcement and community partnerships, enacting safe harbor laws that prevent the prosecution of victims as offenders, establishing diversion programs for juveniles involved in commercial sex, and establishing provisions to seal or expunge records of trafficked youth's involvement in the juvenile justice systems. However, the arresting of these victims as perpetrators may be reflective of a number of issues such as a lack of law enforcement awareness of the victimization of these juveniles or a lack of alternative secure shelters and specialized services available to these victims. Federal Incentives to States
As noted, because federal law considers juveniles involved in prostitution as victim s of trafficking, and because much of the policing to combat prostitution and sex trafficking—both of adults and children—happens at the state level, federal policy makers have considered how to influence states' treatment of trafficking victims (particularly minors) such that state policies are more in line with those of the federal government. P.L. Compensation: Crime Victims Fund98
The Crime Victims Fund (CVF) was established by the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA, P.L. | There has been growing concern over sex trafficking of children in the United States. Demand for sex with children (and other forms of commercial sexual exploitation of children) is steady, and profit to sex traffickers has increased. Law enforcement is challenged not only by prosecuting traffickers and buyers of sex with children, but also by how to handle the girls and boys whose bodies are sexually exploited for profit.
Under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA; P.L. 106-386), the primary law that addresses trafficking, sex trafficking of children is a federal crime; moreover, an individual under the age of 18 who is involved in commercial sex activities is considered a victim of these crimes. Despite this, at the state and local levels, juvenile victims of sex trafficking may at times be treated as criminals or juvenile delinquents rather than victims of crime. Of note, there are no comprehensive data that address the number of prostituted or otherwise sexually trafficked children, and there are limited studies on the proportion of these juveniles who are treated as offenders.
A number of factors may, alone or in combination, contribute to the criminalization of juvenile trafficking victims. One is a lack of victim identification and an awareness of key indicators that may help in identifying victims. Even in states that statutorily consider juveniles involved in commercial sex to be victims, law enforcement may not have received sufficient training to be able to identify victims. Another factor is a lack of secure shelters and specialized services for victims; despite knowing that the juvenile is a victim, law enforcement may charge the individual with a crime so as to place the victim into one of the only available safe and secure environments—a detention facility within the juvenile justice system.
Researchers and policy makers have suggested a number of options aimed at preventing minor trafficking victims from being caught up in the juvenile justice system and diverting them to programs and services that can help rehabilitate and restore these youth. These have included supporting law enforcement training on human trafficking, enhancing law enforcement and community partnerships, enacting safe harbor laws preventing the prosecution of victims as offenders, establishing diversion programs for juveniles involved in commercial sex, and establishing provisions to seal or expunge records of trafficked youth's involvement in the juvenile justice systems.
Because the federal government considers juveniles involved in prostitution as victims of trafficking, and because much of the policing to combat prostitution and sex trafficking—both of adults and children—happens at the state level, federal policy makers have considered how to influence states' treatment of trafficking victims (particularly minors) such that state policies are more in line with those of the federal government. Financial incentives from federal grants and victim compensation funds could be provided through a variety of avenues. These routes include TVPA-authorized grants, juvenile and criminal justice grants, Violence Against Women Act (VAWA; P.L. 113-4)-authorized grants, and the Crime Victims Fund. |
crs_R41540 | crs_R41540_0 | On November 3, 2010, the Federal Reserve (Fed) announced that it would purchase an additional $600 billion of Treasury securities, an action that has popularly been dubbed quantitative easing or "QE2." This announcement followed purchases of $300 billion of Treasury securities, $175 billion of agency debt, and $1.25 trillion of agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) since March 2009. While there may not be a universally accepted definition of quantitative easing, this report defines quantitative easing as actions to further stimulate the economy through growth in the Fed's balance sheet once the federal funds rate has reached the "zero bound." Congress has given the Fed a statutory mandate to "promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates," and the Fed has made the case that quantitative easing can help it to fulfill its mandate. In its announcement of QE2, the Fed explained its decision by citing "disappointingly slow" progress toward achieving a reduction in unemployment and stable inflation, which has been falling. By contrast, critics argue that unconventional monetary actions such as QE2 could be destabilizing and ultimately result in high inflation. In the case of asset purchases, the funds to finance the purchase are credited to the seller's reserve account at the Fed, or if the seller is not a member of the Federal Reserve system, the funds eventually lead to an increase in a member bank's reserves as the proceeds get deposited into the banking system. In normal times, banks would be expected to lend out those reserves, and this would stimulate overall spending in the economy. Based on the experience to date, QE2 can also be expected to lead to an increase in bank reserves similar in size to the amount of assets being purchased. Another option would be to give banks incentives not to lend out reserves by raising the interest rate that the Fed pays on reserves, thereby keeping the larger monetary base from increasing the broader money supply. It is unlikely that reverse repos operations could be large enough to remove most of the new liquidity, however. If inflationary expectations remain low, it would be expected to make an exit strategy, and monetary policy generally, more effective. That profit is largely remitted to the Treasury, where it is added to general revenues, thereby reducing the budget deficit. As the Fed has increased the interest-earning assets on its balance sheet, its profits have increased. Net income increased to $52.4 billion and remittances to the Treasury rose to $47.4 billion in 2009. The Treasury Supplemental Financing Program also has implications for the federal budget deficit. Monetizing the deficit occurs when the budget deficit is financed by money creation rather than by selling bonds to private investors. Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act legally forbids the Fed from buying newly issued securities directly from the Treasury, and all Treasury securities purchased by the Fed to date have been purchased on the secondary market, from private investors. Nonetheless, the effect of the Fed's purchase of Treasury securities on the federal budget is similar to monetization whether the Fed buys the securities on the secondary market or directly from Treasury. If the Fed chose instead to buy assets with a goal of increasing its profits and remittances, it would be unlikely to meet its statutory mandate. Instead, bank lending fell 0.3% over the past year, and the doubling in the portion of the money supply controlled by the Fed (roughly equivalent to the growth in the Fed's balance sheet), did not translate into large increases in overall measures of the money supply. Some critics have complained that QE2 will lead to a weaker dollar. Inflation is still close to zero, and has been falling. The Fed seems somewhat reluctant to pursue this strategy as long as the housing market remains fragile because it would likely involve the sale of its mortgage-related assets. | On November 3, 2010, the Federal Reserve (Fed) announced that it would purchase an additional $600 billion of Treasury securities, an action that has popularly been dubbed quantitative easing or "QE2." This announcement followed purchases since March 2009 of $300 billion of Treasury securities, $175 billion of agency debt, and $1.25 trillion of agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS). (The agency debt and MBS were primarily issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.) This report defines quantitative easing as actions to further stimulate the economy through growth in the Fed's balance sheet once the federal funds rate has reached the "zero bound."
In its announcement of QE2, the Fed justified its decision by citing the "disappointingly slow" progress to date toward achieving its statutory mandate of maximum employment and stable prices. By contrast, critics believe that unconventional monetary actions such as QE2 could be destabilizing and ultimately result in high inflation.
There are several ways that quantitative easing can affect the economy. It would be expected to reduce yields on the securities being purchased, and this could have a cascading downward effect on private yields that could stimulate investment spending. Like any monetary stimulus, it could put downward pressure on the dollar, which would stimulate exports and U.S. production of import-competing goods. The initial quantitative easing following the 2008 crisis helped restore liquidity to the financial system, although this channel is arguably not as important now that liquidity has generally been restored. Finally, the direct effect of quantitative easing to date has been to increase bank reserves by over $1 trillion. If banks choose to lend these reserves, it would stimulate economic activity and increase the money supply. But lending has fallen in the past year, and there have been only relatively modest increases in the overall money supply.
Nevertheless, the increase in bank reserves could eventually result in large increases in the overall money supply, which could arguably make it difficult for the Fed to meet its statutory mandate to keep inflation low and stable. The Fed has explored different methods of unwinding quantitative easing if inflationary pressures rose, which have been referred to as the "exit strategy." One method would be to directly reverse quantitative easing by selling some or all of the additional securities that the Fed has purchased, which would automatically withdraw reserves from the banking system. A drawback to this approach is that large sales of securities would probably involve selling its mortgage-related securities, and this could be destabilizing to a housing market that is still sluggish. Another method would be to raise the interest rate that the Fed has been paying to banks on reserves since 2008 to a level high enough that it would give banks an incentive to keep the funds parked at the Fed rather than lending them out. This approach is largely untested, however, and the associated expenditure could become large relative to the Fed's overall profits at historically normal levels of interest rates.
Since the Fed remits most of its profits to the Treasury, where these are added to general revenues, both quantitative easing and its unwinding have implications for the federal budget deficit. Since quantitative easing increases the amount of income-earning securities held by the Fed, it would be expected to increase its profits and reduce the federal budget deficit. Indeed, profits increased from $38.8 billion in 2008 to $52.4 billion in 2009. Similarly, unwinding QE would be expected to reduce the Fed's profits. Some critics have argued that the Fed is monetizing the budget deficit through QE2. The Fed is legally prohibited from purchasing federal debt directly from the Treasury, but Fed purchases of Treasury securities on the open market have a similar effect on the budget deficit as if those purchases were made directly. |
crs_R42785 | crs_R42785_0 | Introduction
This report provides a detailed description of five of the six educational assistance programs (GI Bills ® ) that are currently available to veterans or other eligible individuals through the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The GI Bills provide financial assistance while enrolled in approved programs of education or training programs to individuals whose eligibility is based on a qualifying individual's service in the uniformed services. The sixth program, which is the most recently enacted, is the Post-9/11 GI Bill (Title 38 U.S.C., Chapter 33). This report describes the five GI Bills enacted prior to 2008 and related veterans' educational assistance programs. The second section describes the eligibility requirements and benefits of the GI Bills. The final section provides information on participation and expenditures for the programs. In addition to providing benefits to veterans, it provided benefits to active duty servicemembers to encourage retention in the Armed Forces. Congress allowed the compulsory military draft to expire on June 30, 1973. The oldest of these programs for veterans and servicemembers is the Post-Vietnam Era GI Bill, enacted in 1976. The Survivors' and Dependents' Educational Assistance (DEA) program, previously War Orphans' Educational Assistance, provides benefits to the spouses and children of servicemembers who, as a result of service, are seriously disabled, die, or are detained. Finally in comparison to the MGIB-AD, the Post-9/11 GI Bill increased the educational assistance benefit for all individuals with active duty service after September 10, 2001, in recognition that the United States has not been at peace since 2001. Eligible Individuals
Educational assistance benefits are available to
the children and surviving spouse of a veteran who died of a service-connected disability; the children of a veteran who died while having a disability evaluated as a total permanent disability resulting from a service-connected disability; the children and spouse of a veteran or servicemember who has a total permanent disability resulting from a service-connected disability; the children and spouse of an active duty servicemember who is, and has been for more than 90 days, listed as missing in action, captured in the line of duty by a hostile force, or forcibly detained or interned in the line of duty by a foreign government or power; and the surviving spouse of a veteran who died while having a disability evaluated as a total permanent disability resulting from a service-connected disability, arising out of active military, naval, or air service. Montgomery GI Bill—Selected Reserve (MGIB-SR)
The Montgomery GI Bill-Selected Reserve (MGIB-SR), passed under Section 705 of the same legislation as the MGIB-AD, is a Title 10 U.S.C. Educational assistance benefits are available to Selected Reservists who enlist, re-enlist, or extend an enlistment for six years after June 30, 1985, and reserve officers who agree to serve an additional six years above any existing obligation. Additional payments are available for certain purposes, and the monthly allowance may be increased under certain circumstances (see Table 2 ). REAP sought to provide reservists with benefits proportional to their active duty service and commensurate with the benefits of the regular Armed Forces. Under VEAP, educational assistance benefits are available to individuals who entered active duty on or after January 1, 1977, and before July 1, 1985. Benefit Payments
Most VEAP participants receive a monthly allowance. The Post-9/11 GI Bill is described in CRS Report R42755, The Post-9/11 Veterans' Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill): A Primer . Veterans Work Study Program
The Veterans Work Study Program allows VEAP, MGIB-AD, MGIB-SR, DEA, Post-9/11 GI Bill, and VR&E participants to receive additional financial assistance through the VA in exchange for employment. | The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), previously named the Veterans Administration, has been providing veterans educational assistance (GI Bill®) benefits since 1944. The benefits have been intended, at various times, to compensate for compulsory service, encourage voluntary service, avoid unemployment, provide equitable benefits to all who served, and promote military retention. In general, the benefits provide grant aid to eligible individuals enrolled in approved educational and training programs. Since three of the GI Bills have overlapping eligibility requirements and the United States is expected to wind down involvement in active conflicts, Congress may consider phasing out one or more of the overlapping programs.
This report describes the GI Bills enacted prior to 2008. Although participation in some programs has ended or is declining, the programs' evolution and provisions inform current policy. The Post-9/11 GI Bill (Title 38 U.S.C., Chapter 33), enacted in 2008, is described in CRS Report R42755, The Post-9/11 Veterans' Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill): A Primer.
This report provides a description of the eligibility requirements, eligible programs of education, benefit availability, and benefits. The report also provides some summary statistics, comparisons between the programs (see Table 2), and brief discussions of related programs. Individuals currently participate in five GI Bills enacted prior to 2008:
The most popular program prior to the Post-9/11 GI Bill was the Montgomery GI Bill-Active Duty (MGIB-AD), which provides a monthly allowance primarily to veterans and servicemembers who enter active duty after June 30, 1985. The Montgomery GI Bill-Selected Reserve (MGIB-SR) provides a lower monthly allowance than the MGIB-AD to reservists who enlist, re-enlist, or extend an enlistment after June 30, 1985. The Reserves Educational Assistance Program (REAP), which will discontinue paying benefits in 2019, provides a monthly allowance that is higher than the MGIB-SR but lower than the MGIB-AD to reservists with active duty service. The program with the fewest individuals receiving benefits is the Post-Vietnam Era Veterans' Educational Assistance Program (VEAP), which provides a monthly allowance to veterans who first entered active duty service on or after January 1, 1977, and before July 1, 1985. The dependents of individuals with military service may be eligible for the Survivors' and Dependents' Educational Assistance (DEA) program, which provides benefits to the spouse and children of servicemembers who, as a result of service, are seriously disabled, die, or are detained.
Other educational support is available to veterans using these benefits. Participants may also request academic and vocational counseling before and while using their GI Bill benefits. Participants on a growing number of pilot campuses have access to the VetSuccess on Campus program, which provides on-campus counseling and referral services. In addition to counseling support, some participants may participate in the Veterans Work Study Program to receive additional financial assistance in exchange for work while attending school. |
crs_R44792 | crs_R44792_0 | Introduction
More than 11 million large trucks (trucks weighing over 10,000 pounds) travel U.S. roads, and almost 4 million operators hold commercial driver's licenses. In 2015, large trucks were involved in more than 400,000 motor vehicle crashes serious enough to be registered by police, with nearly 100,000 of those crashes causing injuries and around 3,600 resulting in fatalities. To address this situation, Congress has assigned the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)—primarily the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)—responsibility for regulating the safety practices of commercial motor carriers and drivers. In addition, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in DOT is responsible for the safety of the vehicles themselves through its role in setting vehicle safety standards. According to an FMCSA study, two-thirds of commercial truck crashes are caused by the other driver, not the commercial driver. NHTSA regulations require large trucks to have underride guards, which are intended to stop a car from being able to travel under the rear of the truck. The proposal to require heavy vehicles to be equipped with speed limiters is supported by the American Trucking Associations, which generally represents the views of motor carriers with large fleets of vehicles, as well as by highway safety advocates. FMCSA's final rule omitted a provision in its earlier proposed rule that would have required new drivers to complete at least 30 hours of behind-the-wheel training in order to be eligible for a commercial driver's license. Improvements in driver safety are more difficult to produce. FMCSA asserted that this schedule allowed a driver to work up to 82 hours over a seven-day period, which it judged did not allow sufficient rest to prevent driver fatigue. To address concerns that carriers might use that information to harass drivers who have taken a break, Congress also directed FMCSA to prevent companies from using the ELD information to harass drivers. Sleep Apnea
Obstructive sleep apnea is a respiratory condition that can interfere with sound sleep. In March 2016 FMCSA began a joint rulemaking with the Federal Railroad Administration to consider requiring that any commercial driver (or train operator) who exhibits certain risk factors must be screened for obstructive sleep apnea. A driver is to be disqualified from driving a commercial vehicle for one year upon first conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, or upon refusal to be tested for drug and alcohol use when driving any vehicle. Driver Distraction
Federal regulations bar commercial drivers from texting or using handheld phones while driving. Compliance, Safety, and Accountability (CSA) Program
Since 2010, FMCSA has used information from roadside inspections and crashes to rank each carrier's safety performance relative to other carriers in seven categories in an effort to identify high-risk carriers. | More than 11 million large trucks travel U.S. roads, and almost 4 million people hold commercial driver's licenses. In 2015, large trucks were involved in more than 400,000 motor vehicle crashes serious enough to be registered by police, with nearly 100,000 of those crashes causing injuries and around 3,600 resulting in fatalities. To address this situation, Congress has assigned the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)—primarily the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)—responsibility for regulating the safety practices of commercial motor carriers and drivers. In addition, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in DOT is responsible for the safety of the vehicles themselves through its role in setting vehicle safety standards.
Truck crash, injury, and fatality rates have generally been rising since 2009 after declining over many years. This increase may be due in part to marginally skilled or inexperienced drivers entering the industry, or to higher levels of work and stress among veteran drivers, or to other factors.
Two FMCSA proposals concerning driver safety have proven particularly contentious.
In March 2017, FMCSA abandoned its attempt to require drivers to take a 34-hour rest period, including two consecutive early morning periods, at least once a week. The proposed "restart rule" encountered strong objections from drivers as well as motor carriers, and an FMCSA study could not confirm that the rule would lead to sufficient improvement in safety to satisfy Congress. In March 2016 FMCSA began a joint rulemaking with the Federal Railroad Administration to require that commercial drivers (or train operators) who exhibit certain risk factors be screened for obstructive sleep apnea, which interferes with sound sleep and thus increases the risk of crashes. In the past, efforts to address sleep apnea among drivers met resistance from drivers who feared they might be prohibited from driving commercial vehicles, and Congress prohibited FMCSA from addressing sleep apnea among drivers except through a formal rulemaking.
FMCSA has introduced stricter training standards for new drivers, and has instituted a database intended to help prevent drivers barred from commercial driving due to convictions for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol from bypassing the prohibition and continuing to drive. FMCSA has also barred drivers from using handheld phones or texting in order to reduce driver distraction.
Motor carriers have frequently sought to increase driver productivity and reduce costs by pushing for standards allowing longer or heavier trucks. Although efforts to permit longer trucks were rejected by Congress in 2015, Congress did approve a number of exceptions and waivers to federal weight limits. FMCSA and NHTSA have jointly proposed to require that all large trucks be equipped with speed limiters, a proposal over which the trucking industry is divided. Congress also has taken an interest in FMCSA's Compliance, Safety, and Accountability Program, which is intended to allow it to focus resources on carriers most in need of supervision from a safety standpoint. Legislation in 2015 required FMCSA to obtain external review of the system it proposes to use to measure carrier safety. |
crs_R40477 | crs_R40477_0 | Adoption of desalination, however, remains constrained by financial, environmental, regulatory, and social factors. At issue is the role Congress establishes for the federal government in desalination, particularly in desalination research and development and the federal regulatory environment for desalination projects. Desalination processes generally treat saline or impaired waters to produce a stream of freshwater, and a separate, saltier stream often called waste concentrate or brine . Some communities and industries use desalination technologies to produce drinking water that meets federal standards, to treat contaminated water supplies to meet disposal requirements, or to reuse industrial wastewater. For many of these applications, there may be few technological substitutes that are as effective and reliable as desalination technologies. Two common categories of desalination technologies—thermal (e.g., distillation) and membrane (e.g., reverse osmosis)—are the most common, with reverse osmosis technologies dominating in the United States. For more information on traditional and emerging technologies, see Appendix A .
Desalination treatment costs have dropped in recent decades, making the technology more competitive with other water supply augmentation and treatment options. Electricity expenses vary from one-third to one-half of the cost of operating desalination facilities. Desalination's energy intensity also raises concerns about the greenhouse gas emissions emitted and desalination's usefulness as part of a climate change adaptation strategy. Substantial uncertainty also remains about the environmental impacts of large-scale desalination facilities. To date, the federal government primarily has supported research and development, some demonstration projects, and select full-scale facilities (often through congressionally directed spending). For most municipal desalination facilities, local governments or public water utilities (often with state-level involvement and federal construction loans) have been responsible for planning, testing, building, and operating desalination facilities, similar to their responsibility for treating freshwater drinking water supplies. Desalination issues before the 114 th Congress may include how to focus federal research to produce results that provide public benefits, at what level to support desalination research and projects, and how to provide a regulatory context that protects the environment and public health without unnecessarily disadvantaging these technologies. In addition to federal and private research activities, some states, such as California and Texas, also have supported desalination research. Desalination Adoption in the United States
Desalination and membrane technologies are increasingly investigated and used as an option for meeting municipal and industrial water supply and water treatment demands. As of 2005, approximately 2,000 desalination plants larger than 0.3 million gallons per day (MGD) were operating in the United States, with a total capacity of 1,600 MGD. This represents more than 2.4% of total U.S. municipal and industrial freshwater withdrawals, not including water for thermoelectric power plants. This creates uncertainty for those considering adopting desalination and membrane technologies. Environmental and human health concerns often are raised in the context of obtaining the permits required to site, construct, and operate the facility and dispose of the waste concentrate. For inland brackish desalination, significant constraints on adoption of the technologies are the uncertainties and the cost of waste concentrate disposal. Flow-through capacitive deionization shows promise for energy-efficient desalination of brackish waters. | In the United States, desalination and membrane technologies are used to augment municipal water supply, produce high-quality industrial water supplies, and reclaim contaminated supplies (including from oil and gas development). Approximately 2,000 desalination facilities larger than 0.3 million gallons per day (MGD) operate in the United States; this represents more than 2% of U.S. municipal and industrial freshwater use. At issue for Congress is what should be the federal role in supporting desalination and membrane technology research and facilities. Desalination issues before the 114th Congress may include how to focus federal research, at what level to support desalination research and projects, and how to provide a regulatory context that protects the environment and public health without disadvantaging desalination's adoption.
Desalination processes generally treat seawater or brackish water to produce a stream of freshwater, and a separate, saltier stream of water that requires disposal (often called waste concentrate). Many states (e.g., Florida, California, and Texas) and cities have investigated the feasibility of large-scale municipal desalination. Coastal communities look to seawater or estuarine water, while interior communities look to brackish aquifers. The most common desalination technology in the United States is reverse osmosis, which uses permeable membranes to separate freshwater from saline waters. Membrane technologies are also effective for other water treatment applications. Many communities and industries use membranes to remove contaminants from drinking water, treat contaminated water for disposal, and reuse industrial wastewater. For some applications, there are few competitive technological substitutes.
Wider adoption of desalination is constrained by financial, environmental, and regulatory issues. Although desalination costs have dropped in recent decades, significant further decline may not happen with existing technologies. Electricity expenses represent one-third to one-half of the operating cost of many desalination technologies. The energy intensity of some technologies raises concerns about greenhouse gas emissions and the usefulness of these technologies for climate change adaptation. Concerns also remain about the technologies' environmental impacts, such as saline waste concentrate management and disposal and the effect of surface water intake facilities on aquatic organisms. Construction of desalination facilities, like many other types of projects, often requires a significant number of local, state, and federal approvals and permits. Emerging technologies (e.g., forward osmosis, capacitive deionization, and chlorine resistant membranes) show promise for reducing desalination costs. Research to support emerging technologies and to reduce desalination's environmental and human health impacts is particularly relevant to future adoptions of desalination and membrane technologies.
The federal government generally has been involved primarily in desalination research and development (including for military applications), some demonstration projects, and select full-scale facilities. For the most part, local governments, sometimes with state-level involvement, are responsible for planning, testing, building, and operating desalination facilities. Some states, universities, and private entities also undertake and support desalination research. While interest in desalination persists among some Members, especially in response to drought concerns, efforts to maintain or expand federal activities and investment are challenged by the domestic fiscal climate and differing views on federal roles and priorities. |
crs_R42483 | crs_R42483_0 | This report provides an overview of selected issues regarding census data that have arisen during recent decennial censuses, including use of sampling or other estimation techniques and counting U.S. citizens residing abroad. With regard to intrastate redistricting, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico currently receive census data for reapportionment and redistricting via the P.L. 94-171 census program. Adjustments to Census Data
Federal court findings that states are not required to use federal census data for redistricting but must use the best data available has raised questions over whether the Census Bureau must provide states with adjusted census data in addition to census apportionment data. The Ninth Circuit found, however, that the Secretary of Commerce had no affirmative duty under the Census Clause of the Federal Constitution (Art. §195 to adjust the official 2000 decennial census figures for intrastate redistricting purposes. If the Secretary of Commerce transmits an official adjusted data set, that data arguably could be considered official federal decennial census data even if it is not the data used to apportion the House of Representatives. The Court held that hot-deck imputation does not violate the Census Clause or the 13 U.S.C. Counting of Overseas Citizens
In November 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed a federal district court opinion upholding the Secretary of Commerce's decision to not include expatriate U.S. citizens, other than U.S. military and civilian federal government personnel, in the 2000 census data for reapportionment of the House of Representatives. 868 ) have been introduced in the 112 th Congress to mandate the inclusion of all expatriate U.S. citizens in the decennial census in accordance with specific guidelines but none have been enacted legislation yet. | This report provides an overview of selected issues regarding census data that have arisen during recent decennial censuses, including use of sampling or other estimation techniques and counting U.S. citizens residing abroad. The Constitution requires that state representation in the House of Representatives be based on a population census conducted at least once every 10 years. The Constitution does not expressly require use of official federal decennial census data for intrastate redistricting, but courts have found that states must use the best data available, which may or may not be official census data. Currently, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico receive census data for reapportionment and redistricting via the census program conducted pursuant to P.L. 94-171.
Under the Constitution and census statutes, the federal government has broad authority over how the census is conducted. The Supreme Court has found that federal law bars using sampling data to adjust the decennial census for House of Representatives reapportionment but that hot-deck imputation, an estimation technique, is permissible. Adjusting census data for other purposes, such as intrastate redistricting, is also not prohibited. In addition, the Secretary of Commerce has authority over whether it is feasible to release adjusted data for intrastate redistricting purposes.
The Supreme Court has held that the Secretary of Commerce has discretion whether to include overseas federal personnel in the apportionment census. It has also found that the Secretary of Commerce can include U.S. military and civilian federal government overseas employees in the apportionment census while excluding other expatriate U.S. citizens. Because Congress has authority to legislate census methodology with regard to treatment of expatriates, several bills have been introduced in the 112th Congress addressing the inclusion of expatriates and categories of expatriates. |
crs_RL31689 | crs_RL31689_0 | Two major factors influence U.S. decisions to aid refugees: (1) an American bipartisan tradition of humanitarian concern for suffering people and (2) a concern that refugee flows can lead to instability in countries important to U.S. foreign policy. U.S. assistance takes the form of aid to refugees in their countries of asylum and admission to the United States for some refugees of special concern. It also considers the role of the international community through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The number of refugees in camps around the world increased steadily as a result of the conflicts that erupted after the end of the Cold War, straining the regular budgets of the agencies that assist them. P.L. U.S. Funding for MRA and ERMA
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) Account
MRA funding is authorized in the legislation governing the Department of State and appropriated in the Foreign Operations Appropriation legislation. (In addition, under the provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees provide oversight of refugee admissions and assistance through a required annual consultation with the Administration.) Because humanitarian emergencies are growing in number, complexity, and size, MRA funding faces enormous budget pressures, both from traditional foreign assistance programs and from newly emerging national priorities. It also includes reception and placement grants to cover initial resettlement in the United States. (The bulk of the domestic costs of refugee resettlement in the United States is appropriated in the HHS authorization and appropriation legislation.) Table 1 shows amounts appropriated and how it was allocated for the last few years. P.L. 107-115 was signed into law on January 10, 2002 and appropriated $705 million for the MRA and $15 million for ERMA for FY2002. For FY2003, the President requested $705 million for the Migration and Refugee Assistance account. The Senate Committee on Appropriations ( S.Rept. 107-219 , on S. 2779 ) recommended $782 million for MRA and $32 million for ERMA; the House Appropriations Committee ( H.Rept. 5410 ) recommended $800 million for the MRA and $20 million for ERMA. 107-228 , authorizes $820 in each of FY2002 and FY2003 for the MRA. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA)
Because refugee emergencies occur at unpredictable intervals, the United States established ERMA in 1962. The appropriation for FY2002 was $15 million and the FY2003 request is also $15 million. The U.S. government is the largest contributor to UNHCR, providing at least 25% of all contributions. The Debate in Congress
Recent debate in Congress over the refugee budget has included both the funding issues facing all the programs in the foreign aid account and the policy differences that arise both between the Administration and the Congress and within Congress over U.S. refugee policy. Improving the Efficiency of International Refugee Programs
Meeting the growing need for humanitarian assistance to refugees in other countries within a constrained budget can also be helped by improving the effectiveness and efficiency of international refugee organizations. | The United States is the largest national contributor to international humanitarian assistance programs for refugees. Traditionally, it contributes to refugee appeals both to alleviate the suffering of innocent victims and out of concern that refugee flows can lead to instability in countries or regions important to U.S. foreign policy interests. The United States is also the largest resettlement country. The money for humanitarian assistance and some of the costs of resettlement in the United States is authorized under the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account of the Department of State Authorization bill and appropriated in the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. Though not the topic of this report, the bulk of assistance for refugees who resettle in the United States is authorized and appropriated in the Labor, Health and Human Services (HHS) legislation. This report discusses the size of the U.S. international refugee assistance budget and its allocation between humanitarian assistance and admissions.
With the end of the Cold War, U.S. refugee policy began to evolve to reflect changes taking place in the international arena. The nearly exclusive anti-communist focus began to shift as conflicts among nations moved away from the constraints of superpower politics and toward a more complex array of internal disputes. These new conditions led to a change in the nature of refugee emergencies and in the types of programs that the United States and the international community provide for refugees and other people forced to flee their homes. In addition, it resulted in a tremendous increase in the number of people needing assistance. These factors also influenced the continuing debate between the Administration and the Congress and within the Congress about the U.S. role with regard to refugees.
The MRA is part of the foreign aid appropriation, and because humanitarian emergencies are growing in number, complexity, and size, it faces enormous budget pressures, both from traditional foreign assistance programs and from newly emerging national priorities. While refugee assistance enjoys considerable support, Congress and the Administration face the difficult task of funding humanitarian needs within a constrained budget. For the last several years, with the exception of FY1999, the appropriation for the MRA account has remained at about $700 million.
P.L. 107-115, signed into law on January 10, 2002, appropriated $705 million for the MRA and $15 million for the Emergency Refugee and Migration assistance (ERMA) for FY2002. The President requested $705 million for MRA and $15 million for ERMA for FY2003. The Senate Committee on Appropriations (S.Rept. 107-219) recommended $782 million for the MRA and $32 million for ERMA, whereas the House Appropriations Committee (House Rept. 107-663) recommended $800 million for the MRA and $20 million for ERMA. P.L. 107-228, to authorize appropriations for the Department of State for FY2002 and FY2003, was enacted on September 20, 2002. This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R43937 | crs_R43937_0 | The program is administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)—specifically by its Bureau of Primary Health Care—within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The federal Health Center Program is authorized in Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) and supports four types of health centers: (1) community health centers, (2) health centers for the homeless, (3) health centers for residents of public housing, and (4) migrant health centers. Health centers are also required to be located in geographic areas that have few health care providers or to provide care to populations that are medically underserved. These requirements make health centers part of the health safety net—providers that serve the uninsured, the underserved, or those enrolled in Medicaid. Data compiled by HRSA demonstrate that health centers primarily serve the intended safety net population, as the majority of patients are uninsured or enrolled in Medicaid. This report provides an overview of the federal Health Center Program, including its statutory authority, program requirements, and appropriation levels. The report then describes health centers in general, where they are located, their patient population, and outcomes associated with health center use. It also describes the federal programs available to assist health center operations, including the federally qualified health center (FQHC) designation for Medicare and Medicaid payments. Finally, the report has two appendixes that describe (1) FQHC payments for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries served at health centers and (2) programs that are similar to health centers but not authorized in Section 330 of the PHSA. The federal Health Center Program awards grants to support outpatient primary care facilities that provide care to primarily low-income individuals. This section of the report describes the statutory authority for the federal Health Center Program, program requirements, types of grants awarded in support of the Health Center Program, the Health Center Program's appropriation, and other funding/revenue that health centers receive. As part of the requirement to provide services to all individuals regardless of their ability to pay, the health center is required to discount the fee schedule to reduce or waive the amount that the patient pays based on the patient's ability to pay as determined by a patient's income relative to the federal poverty level and the patient's family size—no other criteria may be considered. Researchers have found that access to health centers can improve health outcomes and reduce costs for the populations and areas they serve. The FQHC designation was created to ensure that Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements cover the costs of providing services so that Section 330 grant funds are not used to subsidize these costs. | The federal Health Center Program is authorized in Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) (42 U.S.C. §254b) and administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) within the Department of Health and Human Services. The program awards grants to support outpatient primary care facilities that provide care to primarily low-income individuals or individuals located in areas with few health care providers.
Federal health centers are required to provide health care to all individuals, regardless of their ability to pay, and to be located in geographic areas with few health care providers. These requirements make health centers part of the health safety net—providers that serve the uninsured, the underserved, or those enrolled in Medicaid. Data compiled by HRSA demonstrate that health centers serve the intended safety net population, as the majority of patients are uninsured or enrolled in Medicaid. Some research also suggests that health centers are cost-effective; researchers have found that patients seen at health centers have lower health care costs than those served in other settings. In general, research has found that health centers, among other outcomes, improve health, reduce costs, and provide access to health care for populations that may otherwise not obtain health care.
Section 330 grants—funded by the Health Center Program's appropriation—are only one funding source for federal health centers. The grants are estimated to cover only one-fifth of an average health center's operating costs; however, individual health centers are eligible for grants or payments from a number of federal programs to supplement their budgets. These federal programs provide (1) incentives to recruit and retain providers; (2) access to the federally qualified health center (FQHC) designation, which entitles facilities to cost-related reimbursement rates from Medicare and Medicaid; (3) access to additional funding through federal programs that target populations generally served by health centers; and (4) in-kind support, such as access to drug discounts or federal coverage for medical malpractice claims.
This report provides an overview of the federal Health Center Program, including its statutory authority, program requirements, and appropriation levels. It then describes health centers in general, where they are located, their patient population, and outcomes associated with health center use. The report also describes federal programs available to assist health center operations, including the FQHC designation for Medicare and Medicaid payments. The report concludes with two appendixes that describe (1) FQHC payments for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries served at health centers and (2) programs that are similar to health centers but not authorized in Section 330 of the PHSA. |
crs_RL34457 | crs_RL34457_0 | The applicable statute refers to the annual payments as "rental payments." The payments were treated by the IRS as rental income when received by non-farmers. This report outlines the evolution of the IRS's position along with relevant case law and legislative history. Tax Treatment by the Internal Revenue Service and the Courts
Taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service have generally agreed that CRP payments must be included in gross income and are subject to income tax. In Hasbrouck , a couple purchased land in 1987 that had been enrolled in the CRP by the previous owner. Therefore, the payments qualified as rent that was excludible from self-employment income. The finding appears to be based only on what the court deemed to be the program's essence—"to prevent participants from farming the property and to require them to perform various activities in connection with the land, both at the start of the program and continuously throughout the life of the contract...." Although the Tax Court had cited both a Senate and a House report to support its conclusion that "[t]he primary purpose of the CRP is to achieve specified environmental benefits," the appeals court cited no support for its conclusion as to the "essence of the program." Although in 1997, the taxpayer's material participation in the farm operations was cited in IRS publications as determining whether the CRP payments were subject to self-employment tax, the IRS seems to now take the position that material participation in providing required services under the CRP is irrelevant in determining whether the payments are subject to self-employment tax. Despite this, in issuing Notice 2006-108, the IRS has publicly indicated its intention to adopt the position that entering into the CRP contract means that one is in the trade or business of farming and that the payments are self-employment income. Each proposed excluding CRP payments from self-employment income. It would clearly exclude the income from self-employment income for certain participants and would allow all participants the option of receiving non-taxable tax credits rather than annual rental payments, thus shielding CRP payments from both income and self-employment taxes. In this case, the easement holder may be an adjacent land owner or may be some other third party. Soil Bank Program Payments
Revenue Ruling 60-32 addressed payments received under the Soil Bank Act and concluded that they were to be included in self-employment income when received by those who were otherwise engaged in the trade or business of farming because they replaced income the recipients would have generated from farming the land. In so doing, neither has looked at the requirement that all payments received by participants, whether as annual rental payments or as cost-share payments for the conservation plan, generally must be repaid if the contract is terminated before it expires. As evidenced by bills repeatedly introduced in Congress, some Members of Congress have been aware that the IRS was treating some CRP payments as self-employment income, but, thus far, Congress has not chosen to act to change that. The Conservation Reserve Program
The Food Security Act of 1985
Under the Food Security Act of 1985, the Secretary of Agriculture was to "enter into contracts with owners and operators of farms and ranches containing highly erodible cropland." The 2007 "Farm Bill"
H.R. This act, if passed, would extend the Conservation Reserve Program through 2012. | Under the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), owners and operators of eligible land may enter into a contract with the Secretary of Agriculture to enroll land in the program and convert it to less intensive use under an approved conservation plan. In return, participants receive an annual payment that the statute refers to as "rent." Legislation establishing and extending the program has been silent as to the appropriate tax treatment of these payments. For many years, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) generally treated the payments as farming income when received by someone who was engaged in the trade or business of farming, but as rental income when received by others.
The IRS's position appears to have changed to one that would treat all Conservation Reserve Program payments as farming income and, thus, subject to self-employment tax. Recently, the IRS published a proposed revenue ruling that explains its treatment of CRP payments as income from the trade or business of farming and, thus, subject to self-employment tax.
Currently, case law provides some support for the IRS's position that the CRP's annual rental payments are not rent that is excludible from self-employment tax. This case law has not, however, considered CRP payments received by individuals who were not previously engaged in farming and who have purchased property and immediately enrolled it in the CRP (or agreed to continue the enrollment begun by the previous owner/operator). Neither have courts considered CRP payments to those who hire third parties to perform activities required by the CRP contract.
The possibility that the payments may not constitute self-employment income even if they do not qualify as excludible rent has not been considered by either the courts or the IRS. Neither has yet considered the statutory requirement that all payments must be returned if the contract is terminated.
The Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2007 (S. 2242), introduced in the 110th Congress, contained provisions that would exclude CRP payments from self-employment income for some taxpayers and would allow all recipients to choose to receive a tax credit in lieu of the payments. These provisions were incorporated into the 2007 Farm Bill (H.R. 2419), which is in conference.
This report outlines the history of the program, the changing positions of the IRS, pertinent case law, and other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Several possible approaches to the taxation of CRP payments are discussed. |
crs_R41826 | crs_R41826_0 | As a result, the federal government's role has shifted as well toward coordinating and managing geospatial data and facilitating partnerships among the producers and consumers of geospatial information in government, the private sector, and academia. The challenges to coordinating how geospatial data are acquired and used—collecting duplicative data sets, for example—at the local, state, and federal levels, in collaboration with the private sector, are long-standing and not yet resolved. A common theme to both hearings was the challenge of coordinating and sharing geospatial data between the local, county, state, and national levels. Quantifying the cost of geospatial information to the federal government has also been an ongoing concern for Congress. The federal government has recognized this challenge since at least 1990, when the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) revised Circular A-16 to establish the Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) and to promote the coordinated use, sharing, and dissemination of geospatial data nationwide. Executive Order 12906 specified that the FGDC shall coordinate the federal government's development of the National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI). The high-level leadership and broad membership of the FGDC—10 cabinet-level departments and 9 other federal agencies—highlights the importance of geospatial information to the federal government. Questions remain, however, about how effectively the FGDC is fulfilling its mission. Has this organizational structure worked? Can the federal government account for the costs of acquiring, coordinating, and managing geospatial information? How well is the federal government coordinating with state and local entities that increasingly rely on geospatial information? Given the ubiquity of geospatial information throughout the federal government, and despite the long history of efforts to manage and coordinate such data articulated in OMB Circular A-16 and its antecedents (see Appendix for a history of Circular A-16 and its federal policy lineage), ongoing challenges to handling federal geospatial information can generally be divided into three overarching questions:
What is the best way to organize and manage the vast array of geospatial information that is acquired at many levels and that has a variety of potential uses? Most recently, OMB issued supplementary guidance to Circular A-16 on November 10, 2010 (discussed in the next section). The supplemental guidance labels geospatial data as a capital asset, and refers to its acquisition and management in terms analogous to financial assets. Specifically, it refers to geospatial information as part of a National Geospatial Data Asset (NGDA) Portfolio. Legislation in the 112th Congress
H.R. H.R. National States Geographic Information Council (NSGIC)
At the national level, the FGDC exists to promote the coordinated development, use, sharing, and dissemination of geospatial data. In early 2009, several proposals were released calling for efforts to create a national GIS, or for renewed investment in the national spatial data infrastructure, or even to create a "NSDI 2.0." The language in the proposals attempted to make the case for considering such investments part of the national investment in critical infrastructure, both by directly supporting these national GIS and geospatial efforts, but also via secondary effects. Conclusion
Congress may consider how a national GIS or geospatial infrastructure would be conceived, perhaps drawing on proposals for these national efforts as described above, and how they would be similar to or differ from current efforts. Congress may also examine its oversight role in the implementation of OMB Circular A-16, particularly in how federal agencies are coordinating their programs that have geospatial components. It will likely take some time, and several budget cycles, to track whether agencies are adhering to the "portfolio-centric model" of geospatial data management outlined in the supplemental guidance. | Congress has recognized the challenge of coordinating and sharing geospatial data from the local, county, and state level to the national level, and vice versa. The cost to the federal government of gathering and coordinating geospatial information has also been an ongoing concern. As much as 80% of government information has a geospatial component, according to various sources. The federal government's role has changed from being a primary provider of authoritative geospatial information to coordinating and managing geospatial data and facilitating partnerships. Congress explored issues of cost, duplication of effort, and coordination of geospatial information in hearings during the 108th Congress. However, challenges to coordinating how geospatial data are acquired and used—collecting duplicative data sets, for example—at the local, state, and federal levels, in collaboration with the private sector, are not yet resolved. Two bills introduced in the 112th Congress, H.R. 1620 and H.R. 4322, would address aspects of duplication and coordination of geospatial information.
The federal government has recognized the need to organize and coordinate the collection and management of geospatial data since at least 1990, when the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) revised Circular A-16 to establish the Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) and to promote the coordinated use, sharing, and dissemination of geospatial data nationwide. OMB Circular A-16 also called for development of a national digital spatial information resource to enable the sharing and transfer of spatial data between users and producers, linked by criteria and standards. Executive Order 12906, issued in 1994, strengthened and enhanced Circular A-16, and specified that FGDC shall coordinate development of the National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI). On November 10, 2010, OMB issued supplemental guidance to Circular A-16 that labels geospatial data as a "capital asset," and refers to its acquisition and management in terms analogous to financial assets to be managed as a National Geospatial Data Asset Portfolio. It will likely take some time, and several budget cycles, to track whether agencies are adhering to the "portfolio-centric model" of geospatial data management outlined in the supplemental guidance. The 112th Congress may examine its oversight role in the implementation of OMB Circular A-16, particularly in how federal agencies are coordinating their programs that have geospatial assets.
The high-level leadership and broad membership of the FGDC—10 cabinet-level departments and 9 other federal agencies—highlights the importance of geospatial information to the federal government. Questions remain, however, about how effectively the FGDC is fulfilling its mission. Has this organizational structure worked? Can the federal government account for the costs of acquiring, coordinating, and managing geospatial information? How well is the federal government coordinating with the state and local entities that have an increasing stake in geospatial information? What is the role of the private sector?
State-level geospatial entities, through the National State Geographic Information Council, also embrace the need for better coordination. However, the states are sensitive to possible federal encroachment on their prerogatives to customize NSDI to meet the needs of the states.
In early 2009, several proposals were released calling for efforts to create a national Geospatial Information System (GIS). Language in the proposals attempted to make the case for considering such efforts part of the national investment in critical infrastructure. Congress may consider how a national GIS or geospatial infrastructure would be conceived, perhaps drawing on proposals for these national efforts and how they would be similar to or differ from current efforts. |
crs_RS22482 | crs_RS22482_0 | 78m or 78o(d)) to contain an internal control report, which shall—
(1) state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and
(2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial reporting. The provision's controversy stems from charges that some aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley, particularly Section 404, are overly burdensome and costly for small and medium-sized companies. On December 15, 2006, the SEC adopted rule changes which give smaller firms, referred to as non-accelerated filers, more time to comply with Section 404's internal controls reporting requirements. Congressional Attention
The perceived problem of compliance with Section 404 reporting requirements faced by small and medium-sized companies was an issue in both the 109 th and 110 th Congresses and continued to be an issue in the 111 th Congress. On November 4, 2009, the House Financial Services Committee recommended H.R. 3817 , the Investor Protection Act, which contained a clause, inserted as a bipartisan amendment, permanently exempting businesses with a market capitalization up to $75 million from complying with the auditing requirements of Section 404. This bill was included in H.R. 4173 , the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, as Section 7606, passed by the House on December 11, 2009. The Senate-passed bill on financial regulatory reform, S. 3217 , did not have a comparable provision. House and Senate conferees on Wall Street reform approved a conference report, H.Rept. 111-517 , which has a provision exempting businesses with a market capitalization of $75 million or less from complying with the auditing requirements of Section 404. Both the House and the Senate agreed to the conference report. The President signed the bill, known as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, into law as P.L. 111-203 on July 21, 2010. Bills were introduced in the 112 th Congress which would allow, at least temporarily, certain companies capitalized at more than $75 million to have an exemption from complying with parts of Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley and other provisions of the federal securities laws. One of these bills, H.R. 3606 , eventually a combination of several House bills, passed both the House and the Senate and is titled the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act). The bill's Section 103 exempts certain companies with annual gross revenues of less than $1 billion, called emerging growth companies, from complying with the auditing requirements of Section 404(b) for up to five years. The President signed the bill on April 5, 2012. | Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue rules requiring annual reports filed by reporting issuers to state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting and for each accounting firm auditing the issuer's annual report to attest to the assessment made of the internal accounting procedures made by the issuer's management. There have been criticisms that this provision is overly burdensome and costly for small and medium-sized companies.
On December 15, 2006, the SEC adopted rule changes giving smaller firms more time to comply with Section 404's reporting requirements. Compliance with Section 404 by small and medium-sized companies was an issue in both the 109th and 110th Congresses and continued as an issue in the 111th Congress. On November 4, 2009, the House Financial Services Committee recommended H.R. 3817, the Investor Protection Act, which contained a clause, inserted as a bipartisan amendment, permanently exempting businesses with a market capitalization up to $75 million from complying with the auditing requirements of Section 404. This bill was included in H.R. 4173, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, as Section 7606, passed by the House on December 11, 2009. The Senate-passed bill on financial regulatory reform, S. 3217, did not have a comparable provision. House and Senate conferees on Wall Street reform approved a conference report, H.Rept. 111-517, which had a provision exempting businesses with a market capitalization of $75 million or less from complying with the auditing requirements of Section 404. Both the House and the Senate agreed to the conference report. The President signed the bill, known as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, into law as P.L. 111-203 on July 21, 2010.
Bills were introduced in the 112th Congress which would allow, at least temporarily, certain companies capitalized at more than $75 million to have an exemption from complying with parts of Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley and other provisions of the federal securities laws. One of these bills, H.R. 3606, eventually a combination of several House bills, passed both the House and the Senate and is titled the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act). The bill has a provision which would exempt certain companies with annual gross revenues of less than $1 billion from complying with the auditing requirements of Section 404(b) for up to five years. The President signed the bill on April 5, 2012. |
crs_R45160 | crs_R45160_0 | Introduction
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is a six-member independent regulatory agency. The commission is responsible for administering federal campaign finance law and for civil enforcement of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). The FEC also discloses campaign finance data to the public, conducts compliance training, and administers public financing for participating presidential campaigns. FECA requires that at least four of the six commissioners vote to make decisions on substantive actions. In 2008, the FEC lost its policymaking quorum for six months. One nomination is pending, and the status of future departures remains unclear. This report provides a brief overview of the FEC's policymaking powers without at least four commissioners in office. The topic may be relevant for congressional oversight of the agency, particularly if it loses its policymaking quorum, and for Senate consideration of nominations to the agency. Recent Vacancies and Nomination
As of this writing, the FEC is operating with four commissioners instead of six, as shown in Table 1 below. In late 2007, in anticipation of only two commissioners remaining in office in 2008, commissioners amended the FEC's rules of internal procedure to permit executing some duties if the agency lost its four-member policymaking quorum. The agency returned to normal operations during the rest of 2008 and throughout 2009. Media reports suggest that additional commissioners may be considering leaving the agency, although such reports are relatively common and do not necessarily foreshadow actual departures. As explained previously, this means that even if all remaining commissioners agreed on an outcome, the agency would have too few votes to execute its most consequential duties. | The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is the nation's civil campaign finance regulator. The agency ensures that campaign fundraising and spending is publicly reported; that those regulated by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and by commission regulations comply and have access to guidance; and that publicly financed presidential campaigns receive funding.
FECA requires that at least four of six commissioners agree to undertake many of the agency's key policymaking duties. As of this writing, the FEC is operating with four commissioners instead of six. Others reportedly are considering leaving the agency. One nomination to the FEC has been resubmitted during the 115th Congress; no committee or floor action has been taken on it to date.
It is entirely possible that the FEC will retain at least four commissioners and that the agency will remain able to carry out all its duties. If, however, the FEC loses its policymaking quorum—as happened for six months in 2008—the agency would be unable to hold hearings, issue rules, and enforce campaign finance law and regulation. This CRS report briefly explains the kinds of actions that FECA would preclude if the commission lost its policymaking quorum.
This report will be updated in the event of significant changes in the agency's policymaking quorum or the status of agency nominations. |
crs_R40970 | crs_R40970_0 | Introduction
On December 24, 2009, the Senate passed a comprehensive health reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590 , as amended by the Senate. 3590 affecting Medicare indicate that, absent interaction effects, net reductions in Medicare direct spending would be approximately $400 billion over the FY2010-2019 period. The Senate bill includes ten titles. As noted by CBO, the provisions that would result in the largest savings include:
Permanent reductions in the annual updates to Medicare's fee-for-service payment rates (other than physicians' services) would account for an estimated budgetary savings of $186 billion over 10 years; Setting payment rates in the Medicare Advantage program on the basis of the average bids submitted by MA plans in each market would account for an estimated $118 billion in savings (before interactions) over 10 years; Reducing Medicare payments to hospitals that serve a large number of low-income patients, known as disproportionate share (DSH) hospitals, would decrease expenditures by about $25 billion; Modifying the high-income adjustment for Part B premiums would save $25 billion over 10 years; and Creating an Independent Medicare Advisory Board to make changes in Medicare payment rates is expected to save $28 billion over 10 years. Payment Rate Changes Affecting Medicare Fee-for-Service Providers
Medicare is a federal program that pays for covered health services for most persons 65 years of age and older and for most permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65. For instance, the program provides for annual updates of Medicare payments to reflect inflation and other factors. Additional funding would also be provided for outreach and assistance for low-income programs. For example, a provision included in the bill would establish a national, voluntary pilot program that would bundle payments for physician and hospital as well as post-acute care services with the goal of improving patient care and reducing spending. Another provision in the bill would also subject some hospitals to a payment penalty under Medicare for certain high-cost and common health conditions acquired in the hospital. The Secretary would be required to conduct an independent evaluation of the demonstration and submit to Congress a final report on the demonstration's best practices and the impact of the pilot program on coordination of care, expenditures under this provision, access to services, and the quality of health care services provided to applicable beneficiaries. 3401 related to a productivity adjustment . Medicare Coverage Gap Discount Program for Brand-Name Drugs. Improved Medicare Prescription Drug Plan and MA-PD Complaint System. Immediate Reduction in Coverage Gap in 2010. 4104 of this bill. Enhanced Medicare and Medicaid Program Integrity Provisions. The Senate H.R. | Medicare is a federal program that pays for covered health services for most persons 65 years and older and for most permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65 years. The rising cost of health care, the impact of the aging baby boomer generation, and declining revenues in a weakened economy continue to challenge the program's ability to provide quality and effective health services to its 45 million beneficiaries in a financially sustainable manner.
On December 24, 2009, the Senate passed its version of health insurance reform, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, in H.R. 3590, as amended by the Senate. This report, one of a series of CRS products on Senate H.R. 3590, examines the Medicare related provisions in this bill. Estimates from CBO on the Senate bill indicate that net reductions in Medicare direct spending would be approximately $400 billion from FY2010 to 2019. Major savings are expected from constraining Medicare's annual payment increases for certain providers, basing payment rates in the Medicare Advantage program on average bids, reducing payments to hospitals that serve a large number of low-income patients, creating an independent Medicare Advisory Board to make changes in Medicare payment rates, and modifying the high-income threshold adjustment for Part B premiums. A new Hospital Insurance tax for high wage earners would also raise approximately $87 billion over 10 years.
Other provisions in the bill address more systemic issues such as increasing the efficiency and quality of Medicare services, and strengthening program integrity. For example, the bill would establish a national, voluntary pilot program that would bundle payments for physician, hospital and post-acute care services with the goal of improving patient care and reducing spending. Another provision would adjust payments to hospitals for readmissions related to certain potentially preventable conditions. Additionally, the bill would increase funding for anti-fraud activities, and subject providers and suppliers to enhanced screening before allowing them to participate in the Medicare program.
The Senate bill would also improve some benefits provided to Medicare beneficiaries. For instance, Medicare prescription drug program enrollees would receive a 50% discount off the price of brand name drugs during the coverage gap (the "doughnut hole") and the coverage gap would be reduced by $500 in 2010. Other provisions would expand assistance for some low-income beneficiaries enrolled in the Medicare drug program, and eliminate beneficiary copayments for certain preventive care services. |
crs_R40190 | crs_R40190_0 | Introduction
The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 ( H.R. 7311 ), passed both the House and the Senate on December 10, 2008. The President signed it into law on December 23, 2008, P.L. 110 - 457 , 122 Stat. 5044 (2008). It bolsters federal efforts to combat both international and domestic traffic in human beings. Among other initiatives, it expands pre-existing law enforcement authority and the criminal proscriptions in the area. For instance, it authorizes the Attorney General to use administrative subpoenas in sex trafficking investigations and to seek preventive detention of those charged with such offenses. It clarifies the reach of earlier prohibitions and outlaws anew obstructing anti-trafficking enforcement efforts, conspiring to traffic, as well as reaping any benefit from trafficking. 3887 , the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2007, on October 18, 2007. Although much of the Wilberforce Act originated in H.R. 3887 , most of its criminal provisions did not. Most appeared first in Senate bill S. 3061 , the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, which Senator Biden introduced with a brief accompanying statement on May 22, 2008. Congress ultimately elected to proceed with a clean bill rather than use either H.R. 3887 or S. 3061 as a vehicle for final passage. Representative Berman introduced H.R. 7311 , the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, which mixed features from the earlier House and Senate proposals, on December 9, 2008. H.R. 7311 passed both Houses on December 10, 2008, and was signed into law on December 23, 2008. | The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (H.R. 7311), passed both the House and the Senate on December 10, 2008. The President signed it into law on December 23, 2008, P.L. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008). Although much of the Wilberforce Act originated in H.R. 3887, most of its criminal provisions did not. Most appeared first in Senate bill S. 3061, the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, which Senator Biden introduced with a brief accompanying statement on May 22, 2008. Congress ultimately elected to proceed with a clean bill rather than use either H.R. 3887 or S. 3061 as a vehicle for final passage. Representative Berman introduced H.R. 7311, the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, which mixed features from the earlier House and Senate proposals, on December 9, 2008. H.R. 7311 passed both Houses on December 10, 2008, and was signed into law on December 23, 2008.
The Wilberforce Act bolsters federal efforts to combat both international and domestic traffic in human beings. Among other initiatives, it expands pre-existing law enforcement authority and the criminal proscriptions in the area. For instance, it authorizes the Attorney General to use administrative subpoenas in sex trafficking investigations and to seek preventive detention of those charged with such offenses. It clarifies the reach of earlier prohibitions and outlaws anew obstructing anti-trafficking enforcement efforts, conspiring to traffic, as well as reaping any benefit from trafficking.
An appendix shows the changes which the Wilberforce Act makes in existing federal criminal law.
This report is available in an abridged version as CRS Report R40191, An Abbreviated Sketch of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-457): Criminal Law Provisions, by [author name scrubbed], without the footnotes, appendices, or most citations to authority found herein. |
crs_R42673 | crs_R42673_0 | Educational organizations qualify for tax-exempt status as entities described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Can a group espousing a viewpoint be characterized as educational? If so, does it have to provide factual information to support its statements? Relatedly, is there some standard for truthfulness and accuracy? Rather, the term is defined by a Treasury regulation. The regulation goes on to address the heart of the matter about the term's scope:
An organization may be educational even though it advocates a particular position or viewpoint so long as it presents a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to form an independent opinion or conclusion. In 1986, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) developed the "methodology test" to supplement the regulation's "full and fair exposition" standard. Under the test, a method is not educational if it fails to provide a "factual foundation" for the position or viewpoint or "a development from the relevant facts that would materially aid a listener or reader in a learning process." Constitutional Implications of Definition
There are constitutional implications as to how the term "educational" is defined. In particular, the denial of tax-exempt status to an organization on the basis of its speech could raise issues under the First Amendment. Thus, there appears to be no constitutional requirement that the term "educational" encompass every communication protected by the First Amendment. At the same time, courts will examine the IRS's denial of a tax exemption or other benefit when it is based on the content of the taxpayer's speech in order to ensure the denial was not done for an impermissible reason. Groups that promote controversial positions may be particularly vulnerable to an interpretation of "educational" that permits a subjective determination by the IRS as to whether a group's methods of presenting its views are educational. Concern over these issues has led to questions about whether the "educational" standard is unconstitutionally vague. In Nationalist Movement v. Commissioner , the court rejected the argument that the methodology test was overly vague. | Concern is sometimes expressed that certain entities which qualify for tax-exempt 501(c)(3) status as "educational" organizations have abused their exemption by advocating a policy viewpoint. The argument is that these entities should have to present information on both sides of an issue equally and neutrally, without opinion.
The term "educational" is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). It is defined by regulation to encompass individual instruction, as well as public instruction "on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community."
The question here is how far can the term "educational" be extended? Can a group espousing a viewpoint (i.e., only one side of an issue) be characterized as educational? If so, does the group have to provide factual information to support its statements? Is there some standard for truthfulness and accuracy?
The answers are rooted in a Treasury regulation, which provides that an organization that advocates a position or viewpoint can qualify as educational if it presents "a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts" so that people can form their own opinions or conclusions. To supplement the regulation's "full and fair exposition" standard, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has developed the "methodology test." Under it, a method is not "educational" if it fails to provide a "factual foundation" for the position or viewpoint or "a development from the relevant facts that would materially aid a listener or reader in a learning process."
There are constitutional implications in how the term "educational" is defined. In particular, the denial of tax-exempt status on the basis of an organization's speech could raise issues under the First Amendment. While there is no constitutional requirement that the term "educational" encompass every communication protected by the First Amendment, courts will examine the IRS's denial of a tax exemption or other benefit when it is based on the content of the taxpayer's speech in order to ensure the denial was not done for an impermissible reason. Groups that promote controversial positions may be particularly vulnerable to an interpretation of "educational" that permits a subjective determination by the IRS as to whether a group's methods of presenting its views are educational.
Concern over these issues has led to questions about whether the "educational" standard is unconstitutionally vague. While the IRS's methodology test was held to be unconstitutionally vague by a federal appellate court, subsequent court decisions have suggested that the test passes constitutional muster. |
crs_R44679 | crs_R44679_0 | Introduction
The National Science Foundation (NSF) supports both basic research and education in the non-medical sciences and engineering. The NSF is a major source of federal support for U.S. university research, especially in certain fields such as mathematics. It is also responsible for significant shares of the federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education program portfolio and federal STEM student aid and support. NSF has six major appropriations accounts: Research and Related Activities (RRA), Education and Human Resources (EHR), Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC), Agency Operations and Award Management (AOAM), National Science Board (NSB), and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). FY2017 Budget and Appropriations Actions
The Obama Administration sought $7.964 billion for NSF in FY2017, a $501 million (6.7%) increase over the FY2016 estimate of $7.463 billion (see Table 1 ). This request included $7.564 billion in discretionary budget authority and $400 million in new one-time mandatory budget authority (excluding new mandatory funding, the total NSF request was $101 million (1.3%) greater than the FY2016 appropriation). The request would have increased budget authority in three accounts relative to the FY2016 estimate: RRA by $392 million (6.5%), EHR by $73 million (8.3%), and AOAM by $43 million (13%). The NSB and OIG accounts would have received about the same amount as in FY2016. Funding for the MREFC account would have decreased by $7 million (3.6%). The requested mandatory budget funding would have been split between two accounts—$346 million for RRA and $54 million for EHR. As reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations on April 21, 2016, S. 2837 , the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, would have provided a total of $7.510 billion to NSF for FY2017. This amount would have been $46 million (0.6%) above the FY2016 estimated funding level, $54 million (0.7%) below President Obama's FY2017 discretionary funding request, and $454 million (5.7%) below the request including new mandatory funding. This bill would have kept funding for each of the major accounts at nearly the same level as the FY2016 estimate, except for the MREFC account, which would have increased by $46 million (23%). 5393 , the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, would have provided a total of $7.406 billion to NSF for FY2017. This amount would have been $57 million (0.8%) below the FY2016 estimated funding level, $158 million (2.1%) below President Obama's FY2017 discretionary funding request, and $558 million (7.5%) below the request including new mandatory funding. The bill would have kept funding for the EHR, NSB, and OIG accounts nearly the same as the FY2016 estimate, increased the RRA and AOAM accounts by $46 million (0.8%) and $10 million (3%), respectively, and decreased the MREFC account by $113 million (57%). 115-31 ), signed by the President on May 5, 2017, provides $7.472 billion in discretionary funding to NSF, 0.1% above the FY2016 enacted amount. 114-254 ), provided funding at about 99.8% of the FY2016 funding level for the NSF through April 28, 2017. The requested mandatory funding is not included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017. As reported by the House Committee on Appropriations, H.R. Similarly, P.L. P.L. 111-358 ), expired in FY2013. Since FY2004, growth in the NSF budget has slowed compared to prior years. | The National Science Foundation (NSF) supports both basic research and education in the non-medical sciences and engineering. NSF is a major source of federal support for U.S. university research, especially in certain fields such as mathematics and computer science. It is also responsible for significant shares of the federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education program portfolio and federal STEM student aid and support.
Overall, the Obama Administration sought $7.964 billion for NSF in FY2017, a $501 million (6.7%) increase over the FY2016 estimate of $7.463 billion. This request included $7.564 billion in discretionary budget authority and $400 million in new one-time mandatory budget authority.
NSF has six major appropriations accounts: Research and Related Activities (RRA), Education and Human Resources (EHR), Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC), Agency Operations and Award Management (AOAM), National Science Board (NSB), and Office of Inspector General (OIG). The FY2017 request would have increased total budget authority in three accounts relative to the FY2016 estimate: RRA by $392 million (6.5%), EHR by $73 million (8.3%), and AOAM by $43 million (13%). The request would have provided NSB and OIG with about the same amount as in FY2016 and decreased MREFC account funding by $7 million (3.6%). The new mandatory budget funding request was split between two accounts—RRA ($346 million) and EHR ($54 million). Mandatory funding is not usually part of NSF's budget request for major accounts.
As reported by the Senate, S. 2837 would have provided a total of $7.510 billion to NSF for FY2017. This amount is $46 million (0.6%) above the FY2016 estimated funding level, $54 million (0.7%) below the FY2017 discretionary funding request, and $454 million (5.7%) below the request including new mandatory funding. The bill would have kept funding for the major accounts nearly the same as the FY2016 estimate, except for MREFC, which would have increased by $46 million (23%).
As reported by the House, H.R. 5393 would have provided a total of $7.406 billion to NSF for FY2017. This amount is $57 million (0.8%) below the FY2016 estimated funding level, $158 million (2.1%) below the President's FY2017 discretionary funding request, and $558 million (7.5%) below the request including new mandatory funding. The bill would have kept funding for the EHR, NSB, and OIG accounts nearly the same as in the FY2016 estimate, increased the RRA and AOAM accounts by $46 million (0.8%) and $10 million (3%), respectively, and decreased the MREFC account by $113 million (57%).
A series of continuing appropriations acts (P.L. 114-223, P.L. 114-254, P.L. 115-30) provided funding for NSF from October 1, 2016, through May 5, 2017, at 99.5-99.8% of the FY2016 funding level. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), signed by the President on May 5, 2017, provides $7.472 billion in discretionary funding to NSF, which is 0.1% above the FY2016 enacted amount.
Overall growth in the NSF budget slowed after FY2003. Median annual growth in NSF funding was 9% between FY1953 and FY2003 and 3% between FY2004 and FY2016. Most of NSF's funding supports scientific and technological research. Further, the portion of NSF spending that goes to research increased over the past decade. Within the NSF total, RRA has accounted for the lion's share of growth in obligations since FY2003. Agency appropriations levels were last authorized in FY2010 and expired in FY2013; various reauthorization measures were introduced in the 114th Congress that included proposed funding levels for FY2017. |
crs_RL31862 | crs_RL31862_0 | (1) In 2002, the CECC held twohearings on labor rights and working conditions in China and made a number of recommendationsin its annual report, including expanding rule of law and legal aid programs for workers andpromoting work health and safety councils, raising awareness among export companies in China ofthe importance of legal and fair working conditions to U.S. consumers, and raising the profile oflabor issues in the U.S.-China bilateral dialogue. Labor Conditions in China
Foreign Invested Enterprises
Many egregious forms of labor exploitation have been reported in foreign-owned or "overseas" factories in China's coastal provinces that are engaged in low-skill, labor intensive production forexport. 182 (core), Worst Forms of Child Labor; No. In 2002, toys, footwear, and apparel items made up about25% of all U.S. imports from China, while the PRC was the top supplier of toys, footwear, andleather goods to the United States. Only one of the codes sampled in this reportaddresses the problem of subcontracting. The financial incentives of suppliers in China to abide by codes of conduct -- attracting or maintaining the business of U.S. corporations -- are often negated by countervailing economicpressures. The Nike and ICTIcodes do not contain provisions on discrimination. Others provide an exception to maximum workinghours under "extraordinary circumstances." Few of the codes sampled in this report explicitly call for third party orindependent auditors. | This report provides an overview of U.S. interests and policies regarding China's labor conditions. It compares a cross section of labor codes of conduct utilized by U.S. corporations andtheir suppliers that manufacture toys, shoes, apparel, and other labor intensive merchandise in Chinafor export. Many consumer goods imported from China to the United States are produced by HongKong, Taiwanese, and South Korean factories in China for U.S. brands. Serious labor rights abuseshave been reported in many of these factories. All of the codes sampled in this report mandate laborstandards that are consistent with International Labor Organization core covenants and China's LaborLaw. The standards compared in this report pertain to: child labor, forced labor, disciplinary actions,discrimination, health and safety, and the environment. However, many of the codes do not provideextensive guidelines for monitoring and verifying compliance. This report will be updated aswarranted. |
crs_R40730 | crs_R40730_0 | Most Recent Developments
President's Budget Submitted
On May 7, 2009, President Obama submitted his FY2010 budget to Congress, including a request for $163.8 billion in discretionary funds for programs covered in the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED) appropriations bill. 3293 Reported and Passed
On July 22, 2009, the House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 3293 ( H.Rept. 111-220 ), its proposal for FY2010 L-HHS-ED appropriations. The bill would have provided $165.6 billion in discretionary funds for L-HHS-ED. 3293 Reported
On August 4, 2009, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version of H.R. 111-66 ). The committee recommended $165.4 billion in discretionary L-HHS-ED funds. FY2010 Continuing Resolution Extended (P.L. 111-88 , which amended P.L. Division D of the agreement provided the FY2010 L-HHS-ED appropriations, including $165.8 billion in discretionary funding. 111-5 (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, ARRA, enacted February 17, 2009). 110-329 , enacted September 30, 2008) or the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, ( P.L. 111-117 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010. Later sections provide details on individual L-HHS-ED departments and agencies. During the past nine years, L-HHS-ED discretionary funds have grown from $127.2 billion in FY2002 to $165.8 billion in FY2010, an increase of $38.6 billion, or 30.3%. The FY2008 L-HHS-ED appropriations act (Division G of P.L. For example, P.L. Department of Labor
FY2009 discretionary appropriations for the Department of Labor (DOL) were $12,411 million. For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested $13,280 million, $869 million (7.0%) more than the FY2009 amount, as shown in Table 6 . 111-117 , provided discretionary appropriations of $13,534 million, an increase of $1,123 million (9.0%) over FY2009. The President requested $5,544 million for Workforce Investment Act (WIA) programs, an increase of $230 million over the $5,314 provided for FY2009. The conference agreement provided $5,545 million, an increase of $232 million (4.4%). Department of Health and Human Services
FY2009 discretionary appropriations for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) were $71,385 million. For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested $71,758 million, $373 million (0.5%) more than the FY2009 amount, as shown in Table 8 . 111-117 , provided discretionary appropriations of $73,958 million, an increase of $2,573 million (3.6%) over FY2009. ARRA provided HHS with an additional $21.9 billion in discretionary funding for FY2009, including $10.4 billion for NIH. For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested $64,692 million, $1,159 million (1.8%) more than the FY2009 amount, as shown in Table 10 . 111-117 , provided discretionary funding of $64,278 million, an increase of $744 million (1.2%) over FY2009. While President Obama's budget requested an increase in discretionary funding for education of $1.1 billion over the FY2009 funding level, it proposed eliminating funding for 12 existing programs. Related Agencies
FY2009 discretionary appropriations for Related Agencies were $12,748 million. For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested $14,028 million, $1,280 million (10.0%) more than the FY2009 amount, as shown in Table 12 . The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $14,067 million in discretionary funding, $79 million more than approved by the House, and an increase of $1,319 million (10.3%) over FY2009. 111-117 , provided discretionary appropriations of $14,076 million, an increase of $1,328 million (10.4%) over FY2009. | This report tracks FY2010 appropriations for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED). This legislation provides discretionary funds for three major federal departments and 13 related agencies. The report summarizes L-HHS-ED discretionary funding issues but not authorization or entitlement issues.
On May 7, 2009, President Obama submitted the FY2010 budget request to Congress, including $163.8 billion in discretionary L-HHS-ED funds. The comparable FY2009 amount was $160.1 billion, enacted mainly through the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8, Division F). The request was an increase of $3.7 billion (2.3%) over FY2009. On July 22, 2009, the House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 3293 (H.Rept. 111-220), its proposal for FY2010 L-HHS-ED appropriations. The House passed the bill, amended, on July 24, approving $165.6 billion in discretionary funds, $1.9 billion over the request and an increase of $5.6 billion (3.5%) over FY2009. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version of H.R. 3293 on August 4, 2009 (S.Rept. 111-66), recommending $165.4 billion in discretionary funds for L-HHS-ED, $1.6 billion over the request and an increase of $5.3 billion (3.3%) over FY2009. Two continuing resolutions (CRs) provided temporary FY2010 funding until enactment of P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, on December 16, 2009. Division D of the consolidated act provided $165.8 billion for discretionary L-HHS-ED programs, an increase of $5.8 billion (3.6%) over FY2009.
Some L-HHS-ED agencies and programs have supplemental funding available in FY2010 from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5). ARRA provided $124.2 billion in FY2009 emergency supplemental appropriations for discretionary L-HHS-ED programs, with funds generally available for obligation through September 30, 2010.
Department of Labor (DOL). FY2009 discretionary appropriations for DOL were $12,411 million. For FY2010, the President requested $13,280 million, $869 million (7.0%) more than funding for FY2009. P.L. 111-117 provided $13,534 million for DOL, an increase of $1,123 million (9.0%) over FY2009. Workforce Investment Act (WIA) programs received $5,545 million, an increase of $232 million (4.4%) above the $5,314 million provided for FY2009.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). FY2009 discretionary appropriations for HHS were $71,385 million. For FY2010, the President requested $71,758 million, $373 million (0.5%) more than the FY2009 amount. P.L. 111-117 provided $73,958 million in discretionary funding for HHS, an increase of $2,573 million (3.6%) over FY2009.
Department of Education (ED). FY2009 discretionary appropriations for ED were $63,533 million. For FY2010, the President requested $64,692 million, $1,159 million (1.8%) more than the FY2009 amount. P.L. 111-117 provided $64,278 million in discretionary funding for ED, $744 million (1.2%) more than FY2009.
Related Agencies. FY2009 discretionary appropriations for Related Agencies were $12,748 million. For FY2010, the President requested $14,028 million, $1,280 million (10.0%) more than the FY2009 amount. P.L. 111-117 provided Related Agencies with $14,076 million in discretionary funding, an increase of $1,328 million (10.4%) over FY2009. |
crs_RL31365 | crs_RL31365_0 | Among them, a provision enacted in 1996 as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) discourages states and localities from granting unauthorized aliens certain "postsecondary education benefits." This provision (IIRIRA §505) directs that an unauthorized alien—
shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State (or a political subdivision) for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope) without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident. Although IIRIRA §505 does not refer explicitly to the granting of "in-state" residency status for tuition purposes and some question whether it even covers in-state tuition, the debate surrounding §505 has focused on the provision of in-state tuition rates to unauthorized aliens. The Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, also makes unauthorized alien students ineligible for federal student financial aid. Moreover, as unauthorized aliens, they are unable to work legally and are subject to removal from the country regardless of the number of years they have lived in the United States. Legislation in the 107th and 108th Congresses
In the 107 th and 108 th Congresses, legislation was introduced—but not enacted—to provide relief to unauthorized alien students. These bills also would have enabled certain unauthorized students to adjust to legal permanent resident (LPR) status. In most cases, they are able to apply for U.S. citizenship after five years. Activity in the 108th Congress
In the 108 th Congress, S. 1291 , as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee in the 107 th Congress, was included as part of S. 8 , an education measure introduced by then-Senate Minority Leader Daschle. In addition, a new version of the DREAM Act ( S. 1545 ) was introduced by Senator Hatch. | Unauthorized alien students constitute a subpopulation of the total U.S. unauthorized alien population that is of particular congressional interest. These students receive free public primary and secondary education, but often find it difficult to attend college for financial reasons. A provision enacted as part of a 1996 immigration law prohibits states from granting unauthorized aliens certain postsecondary educational benefits on the basis of state residence, unless equal benefits are made available to all U.S. citizens. This prohibition is commonly understood to apply to the granting of "in-state" residency status for tuition purposes.
In addition, unauthorized aliens are not eligible for federal student financial aid. More generally, as unauthorized aliens, they are not legally allowed to work in the United States and are subject to being removed from the country at any time.
Bills were introduced in the 107th and 108th Congresses to address the educational and immigration circumstances of unauthorized alien students. Most of these bills had two key components. They would have repealed the 1996 provision. They also would have provided immigration relief to certain unauthorized alien students by enabling them to become legal permanent residents of the United States. In both Congresses, bills known as the DREAM Act (S. 1291 in the 107th Congress; S. 1545 in the 108th Congress) containing both types of provisions were reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL31516 | crs_RL31516_0 | S. 129 ,the Federal Workforce Flexibility Act of 2003, passed the Senate with an amendment by unanimousconsent on April 8, 2004. On June 24, 2004, the Housecommittee ordered the bill to be reported to the House of Representatives by voice vote, afteragreeing, by voice vote, to an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Representative JoAnn Davis. Another bill related to management of the federal workforce was introduced in the House of Representatives on April 3, 2003. Representative Jo Ann Davis introduced H.R. 1601 ,the Federal Workforce Flexibility Act of 2003, and it was referred to the House Committee onGovernment Reform. (5)
S. 129 , as passed by the Senate and as ordered to be reported to the House, would amend current law provisions on critical pay, civil service retirement system computation forpart-time service, agency training, and annual leave. The bill also would amend current lawprovisions on recruitment and relocation bonuses and retention allowances (which would be renamedbonuses). As ordered to be reported to the House, S. 129 would amend the current 5U.S.C. ��5753 and 5754 language on such bonuses and allowances. As passed by the Senate, itwould add new sections 5754a and 5754b on recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses to Title5 United States Code . Therefore, if S. 129, as passed by the Senate, were enacted, agencieswould be able to use the current law provisions on recruitment and relocation bonuses and retentionallowances at 5 U.S.C. ��5753 and 5754 and the enhanced authority for recruitment, relocation, andretention bonuses proposed at 5 U.S.C. ��5754a and 5754b. (6)
S. 129 , as ordered to be reported to the House, would amend current law provisions on pay administration. These amendments were included in S. 129, as introduced, but theywere dropped during Senate committee markup and are not included in the Senate-passed versionof the bill. Provisions that would amend current law on retirement service credit for cadet ormidshipman service and compensatory time off for travel were added to S. 129 duringSenate committee markup and are included in the legislation as passed by the Senate and as orderedto be reported to the House. Added during Senate Committee markup as well were provisions onSenior Executive Service authority for the White House Office of Administration that are in theSenate-passed bill, but are not in the legislation as ordered to be reported to the House (theprovisions were removed from the House version of the bill during the full House committeemarkup). Other provisions that would have amended current law provisions relating to contributionsto the Thrift Savings Plan, annuity commencement dates, and retirement for air traffic controllerswere included in S. 129, as forwarded by the House Civil Service and AgencyOrganization Subcommittee to the House Government Reform Committee, but were removed duringthe full committee markup. This report compares each of the provisions in S. 129 , as passed by the Senate and as ordered to be reported to the House, with current law. | A bill related to the management of the federal workforce is being considered by the 108th Congress. S. 129 , the Federal Workforce Flexibility Act of 2003, passed the Senatewith an amendment by unanimous consent on April 8, 2004. In the House, the Subcommittee onCivil Service and Agency Organization forwarded S. 129 to the House Committee onGovernment Reform on May 18, 2004, after amending it by voice vote. On June 24, 2004, theHouse committee ordered the bill to be reported to the House of Representatives, after amending it,by voice vote. The bill was introduced by Senator George Voinovich on January 9, 2003. A similarbill, H.R. 1601 , the Federal Workforce Flexibility Act of 2003, was introduced in theHouse of Representatives by Representative Jo Ann Davis on April 3, 2003.
S. 129 , as passed by the Senate and as ordered to be reported to the House, would amend current law provisions on critical pay, civil service retirement system computation forpart-time service, agency training, and annual leave. The bill also would amend current lawprovisions on recruitment and relocation bonuses and retention allowances (which would be renamedbonuses). As ordered to be reported to the House, S. 129 would amend the current 5U.S.C. ��5753 and 5754 language on such bonuses and allowances. As passed by the Senate, itwould add new sections 5754a and 5754b on recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses to Title5 United States Code . Therefore, if S. 129, as passed by the Senate, were enacted, agencieswould be able to use the current law provisions on recruitment and relocation bonuses and retentionallowances at 5 U.S.C. ��5753 and 5754 and the enhanced authority for recruitment, relocation, andretention bonuses proposed at 5 U.S.C. ��5754a and 5754b.
S. 129 , as ordered to be reported to the House, would amend current law provisions on pay administration. These amendments were included in S. 129 , as introduced, butthey were dropped during Senate committee markup and are not included in the Senate-passedversion of the bill. Provisions that would amend current law on retirement service credit for cadetor midshipman service and compensatory time off for travel were added to S. 129 duringSenate committee markup and are included in the legislation as passed by the Senate and as orderedto be reported to the House. Added during Senate Committee markup as well were provisions onSenior Executive Service authority for the White House Office of Administration that are in theSenate-passed bill, but are not in the legislation as ordered to be reported to the House. Otherprovisions that would have amended current law provisions relating to contributions to the ThriftSavings Plan, annuity commencement dates, and retirement for air traffic controllers were includedin S. 129, as forwarded by the House Civil Service and Agency OrganizationSubcommittee to the House Government Reform Committee, but were removed during the fullcommittee markup.
This report compares each of the provisions in S. 129 , as passed by the Senate and as ordered to be reported to the House, with current law. |
crs_RS22319 | crs_RS22319_0 | Background
The Berne Union represents a diverse group of public and private entities that are directly involved in international trade and foreign investment by providing financing and insurance to exporters and investors. Associated with the Berne Union is the Prague Club, which was established in 1993 by the Berne Union and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to support new and maturing export credit agencies that are setting up and developing export credit and investment insurance programs. The United States is represented within the Berne Union by two federal government agencies—the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Company —and five private sector corporations. In addition, risk concerns have shifted from focusing primarily on developing countries to developed economies and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the political instability in the Middle East. Berne Union members have participated in conferences and other forums where they have encouraged the continued availability of export credits and trade and investment insurance to support the positive effects of global trade and investment. Promote export credit and investment insurance terms that reflect sound business practices. Issues for Congress
Congress plays no direct role in the Berne Union, but its presence is felt indirectly through two U.S. government agencies that are members of the Union and over which it has oversight responsibility—the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. As a result of its vast international economic and security interests, the United States is directly affected by, and therefore plays a leading role in, developments in the areas of international trade, international finance, and foreign investment. | The Berne Union, or the International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers, is an international organization comprised of more than 70 public and private sector members that represent both public and private segments of the export credit and investment insurance industry. Members range from highly developed economies to emerging markets, from diverse geographical locations, and from a spectrum of viewpoints about approaches to export credit financing and investment insurance. Within the Berne Union, the United States is represented by the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and four private-sector firms and by one observer. The main role of the Berne Union and its affiliated group, the Prague Club, is to work to facilitate cross-border trade by helping exporters mitigate risks through promoting internationally acceptable principles of export credit financing, strengthen the global financial structure, and facilitate foreign investments. Over the past decade, the growth and increased importance of global trade and financing have altered the agenda of the Berne Union from focusing primarily on concerns over country-specific political risk to concerns about global trade, international finance, global and regional security, and questions of business organization, civil society, transparency, and corporate responsibility. The 2008-2009 financial crisis and the economic recession that followed has altered export financing by making credit conditions tighter and by raising concerns over risks in the advanced economies. As a result, demands on official export credits have grown sharply. Congress, through its oversight of Eximbank and OPIC, as well as international trade and finance, has interests in the functioning of the Berne Union. |
crs_R41846 | crs_R41846_0 | With 91% of U.S. passenger vehicle sales depending upon financial intermediaries to provide loans or leases, the auto financing companies' inability to lend damaged the prospects of Old GM and Old Chrysler pulling out of the slump, particularly because other sources of credit, such as banks and credit unions, were also reluctant to lend due to ongoing financial market disruptions. The authorities within EESA were very broad, and both the Bush and Obama Administrations used TARP's Automotive Industry Financing Program to provide financial assistance ultimately totaling more than $80 billion to the two manufacturers and two finance companies. This assistance was not without controversy, and questions were raised about the legal basis for the assistance and the manner in which it was carried out. The financial assistance provided to private companies by the government during the financial crisis can broadly be divided into (1) assistance for solvent companies facing temporary difficulties due to the upheaval in financial markets and (2) assistance for more deeply troubled firms whose failure was thought likely to cause additional difficulties throughout the financial system and broader economy. GMAC/Ally Financial also received assistance from Federal Reserve (Fed) and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) programs intended for healthy banks facing temporary funding issues. GMAC, however, ultimately required much more extensive assistance which resulted in the federal government taking a majority ownership stake in the company. In addition, during the crisis, GMAC converted from an industrial loan company into a bank holding company, an expedited conversion permitted by the Fed due to emergency conditions in the financial markets. This conversion allowed access to Fed lending facilities and also increased regulatory oversight of the company. In addition to auto financing, GMAC was a large participant in the mortgage markets, particularly through subsidiaries known as ResCap. Mortgages . TARP Assistance
GMAC applied for the Treasury's TARP Capital Purchase Program in 2008 at the same time as it applied to the Fed for permission to convert to a bank holding company. In December 2010, $5.5 billion of preferred equity was converted into approximately 17.5% of the company's common equity, raising federal ownership to 73.8%. The 73.8% government ownership stake was reduced to 63.4% through a share dilution in November 2013. In total, the U.S. Treasury recouped $14.7 billion of the assistance principal and received $4.9 billion in dividends and other income from its involvement with GMAC/Ally between 2008 and 2014. Ultimate Cost of GMAC/Ally Financial Assistance
The TARP assistance for GMAC/Ally Financial, like most of the TARP assistance, was initially provided through financial instruments that were expected to be repaid or repurchased by the recipients. In some cases, including GMAC/Ally Financial, the U.S. Treasury converted all or some of TARP assistance into common equity in the company. Conversion into common equity meant that the government's ability to recoup its assistance depended on the price received when the government sold its shares. If the value of the shares when sold was less than the amount of the government's assistance, Ally Financial had no obligation to compensate the government for the difference. Conversely, if the common equity stake were sold for more than the amount of the assistance, the government would retain any excess. General Motors. Through these sales and the sale of preferred equity that was not converted, the government was repaid $14.7 billion of the $17.2 billion of assistance principal, realizing a $2.5 billion loss. In addition, however, the government received a total of $4.9 billion in dividends and other income from its support for GMAC/Ally Financial. | Ally Financial, formerly known as General Motors Acceptance Corporation or GMAC, provides auto financing, insurance, online banking, and mortgage and commercial financing. For most of its history, it was a subsidiary of General Motors Corporation. Like some of the automakers, it faced serious financial difficulties due to a downturn in the market for automobiles during the 2008-2009 financial crisis and recession, while also suffering from large losses in the mortgage markets. With more than 90% of all U.S. passenger vehicles financed or leased, GMAC's inability to lend was particularly threatening to GM's retail sales and dealer-financing capabilities.
The Bush and Obama Administrations used the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to provide assistance for the U.S. auto industry, concluding that the failure of one or two large U.S. automakers would cause additional layoffs at a time of already high unemployment, prompt difficulties and failures in other parts of the economy, and disrupt other markets. The decision to aid the auto industry was not without controversy, with questions raised as to the legal basis for the assistance and the manner in which it was carried out. The nearly $80 billion in TARP assistance for the auto industry included approximately $17.2 billion for GMAC, which changed its name to Ally Financial in 2010.
The government's aid for GMAC was accomplished primarily through U.S. Treasury purchases of the company's preferred shares. Many of these preferred shares were later converted into common equity, resulting in the federal government acquiring a 73.8% ownership stake. This conversion from preferred to common equity significantly changed the outlook for the future government recoupment of the TARP assistance. After such a conversion, if the government's common equity were to end up being worth less than the assistance provided, the company would have no responsibility to compensate the government for the difference. Conversely, if the common equity were to be worth more than the assistance, the gain from this difference would accrue to the U.S. Treasury (and be used to pay down the national debt, as specified in the TARP statute).
Beginning in November 2013, the government's stake in Ally Financial began dropping due to share dilution and the sale of the government's stock through both private placements and open market sales. The final sale of the government's Ally stock was completed in December 2014. With the completion of the sale, the government received a total of $14.7 billion in repayment for its assistance, leading the Treasury to recognize a loss of $2.5 billion. However, the government also received $4.9 billion in dividends and other income due to the TARP assistance to GMAC/Ally Financial.
In addition to TARP assistance, during the financial crisis in 2008, GMAC converted from an industrial loan company into a bank holding company, an expedited conversion that was permitted by the Federal Reserve (Fed) due to prevailing emergency conditions in the financial markets. This change increased access to government assistance, including Fed lending facilities and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) guarantees, and also increased regulatory oversight of the company. |
crs_RL34482 | crs_RL34482_0 | 111-5 included funding for a number of agencies within DHS, including $20 million for the Office of the Undersecretary for Management; $5 million for the Office of the Inspector General; $680 million for CBP; $20 million for ICE; $1,000 million for TSA; $250 million for the Coast Guard; and $610 million for FEMA. 110-329
On September 23, 2008, the House Rules Committee reported H.Res. 1488 for consideration of the Senate amendment to H.R. 2638 , the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. 2638 was originally introduced as the FY2008 DHS Appropriations Act, but has been amended to serve as the legislative vehicle for the proposed Continuing Resolution, a Disaster Relief Emergency Supplemental, the Department of Defense FY2009 Appropriations Act, the FY2009 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, and the FY2009 Military Construction and Veterans Assistance Act. H.R. 2638 was enacted as P.L. 110-329 on September 30, 2008. Division D of P.L. 110-329 provided a net appropriation of $41,225 million for DHS for FY2009. This amounts to nearly $2,376 million more than the President's request for FY2009, $88 million more than was reported by the House in H.R. 6947 , and $89 million less than was reported by the Senate in S. 3181 . Net appropriations for major agencies within DHS were as follows: Customs and Border Protection, $9,821 million; Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 4,989 million; Transportation Security Administration, $4,367 million; Coast Guard, $9,361 million; Secret Service, $1,413 million; National Protection & Programs Directorate, $1,158 million; Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), $6,963 million; Science and Technology, $933 million; and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, $514 million. Additionally, Division B of the Act also contained the following amounts for DHS agencies in emergency supplemental FY2008 funding: $300 for the Coast Guard, $7.96 billion for FEMA's Disaster Relief Account, and $100 million for FEMA to reimburse the American Red Cross. 6947
The House Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2009 DHS Appropriations bill on June 24, 2008. The bill was filed on September 18, 2008, as H.R. 6947 would provide a net appropriation of $41,137 million in budget authority for DHS for FY2009. This would have amounted to an increase of $2,288 million or nearly 6% increase over the President's request. Senate-reported S. 3181
The Senate-reported its version of the bill on June 19, 2008. S. 3181 would have provided $41,314 million in net budget authority for DHS for FY2009, a $2,465 million or 6% increase over the President's request. 6947 and the accompanying report ( H.Rept. 111-5
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( H.R. President's FY2009 Request
The Administration requested $5,663 million in gross budget authority for ICE in FY2009. House-reported H.R. In P.L. | This report describes the FY2009 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Administration requested a net appropriation of $38,849 million in budget authority for FY2009. The House Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2009 DHS Appropriations bill on June 24, 2008. The bill was filed on September 18, 2008, as H.R. 6947, and the accompanying report has been numbered H.Rept. 110-862. House-reported H.R. 6947 would have provided a net appropriation of $41,137 million in budget authority for DHS for FY2009. This amounted to an increase of $2,288 million, or nearly 6% increase over the President's request. The Senate-reported its version of the bill on June 19, 2008. S. 3181 would have provided $41,314 million in net budget authority for DHS for FY2009, a $2,465 million or 6% increase over the President's request.
On September 23, 2008, the House Rules Committee reported H.Res. 1488 for consideration of the Senate amendment to H.R. 2638, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. H.R. 2638 was originally introduced as the FY2008 DHS Appropriations Act but was amended to serve as the legislative vehicle for the proposed Continuing Resolution, a Disaster Relief Emergency Supplemental, the Department of Defense FY2009 Appropriations Act, the FY2009 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, and the FY2009 Military Construction and Veterans Assistance Act (see the CRS Appropriations Status table for more information: http://www.crs.gov/Pages/fy2009-status-table.aspx). H.R. 2638 was enacted as P.L. 110-329 on September 30, 2008.
Division D of P.L. 110-329 provided a net appropriation of $41,225 million for DHS for FY2009. This amounted to nearly $2,376 million more than the President's request for FY2009, $88 million more than was reported by the House in H.R. 6947, and $89 million less than was reported by the Senate in S. 3181. Net appropriations for major agencies within DHS were as follows: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), $9,821 million; Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 4,989 million; Transportation Security Administration (TSA), $4,367 million; Coast Guard, $9,361 million; Secret Service, $1,413 million; National Protection & Programs Directorate, $1,158 million; Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), $6,963 million; Science and Technology, $933 million; and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, $514 million. Additionally, Division B of the Act also contained the following amounts for DHS agencies in emergency supplemental FY2008 funding: $300 for the Coast Guard, $7.96 billion for FEMA's Disaster Relief Account, and $100 million for FEMA to reimburse the American Red Cross.
P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, provided $2,765 million in emergency supplemental funding for DHS in FY2009. Funding was broken out as follows: $205 million for Departmental Operations; $680 million for CBP; $20 million for ICE; $1,000 million for TSA; $250 million for the Coast Guard; and $610 million for FEMA.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44236 | crs_R44236_0 | Since the late 1960s, the Judiciary Committee's consideration of a Supreme Court nominee almost always has consisted of three distinct stages—(1) a pre-hearing investigative stage, followed by (2) public hearings, and concluding with (3) a committee decision on what recommendation to make to the full Senate. The questionnaire also asks the nominee about the selection process that he or she experienced prior to being nominated by a President, including the circumstances which led to the nominee's nomination and any interviews with administration officials and others that he or she had prior to being selected. In addition to the committee's own investigation of the nominee, confidential FBI reports on the nominee are another important information source. Courtesy Calls
During the pre-hearing stage, the nominee, in accordance with long-standing tradition, visits Capitol Hill to pay "courtesy calls" on individual Senators in their offices. Evaluation by the American Bar Association
Also during the pre-hearing stage, the nominee is evaluated by the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, which is publicly committed to providing the Senate Judiciary Committee with an impartial evaluation of the qualifications of each Supreme Court nominee. At the culmination of its evaluation, the ABA committee votes on whether to rate a nominee "well qualified," "qualified," or "not qualified." Conversely, a divided vote, or less than the highest rating, by the ABA committee usually served to flag issues about the nominee for the Senate Judiciary Committee to examine at its confirmation hearings, and these issues in turn have sometimes been cited by Senators on the Judiciary Committee who voted against reporting a nomination favorably to the Senate floor. In 1955, hearings on the Supreme Court nomination of John M. Harlan marked the beginning of a practice, continuing to the present, of Court nominees testifying in-person before the Senate Judiciary Committee. It is then the nominee's turn to make an opening statement, after which begins the principal business of the hearing—the questioning of the nominee by Senators serving on the Judiciary Committee. Number of Days from Nomination to First Committee Hearing
For nominees since 1975 who have received hearings, Figure 1 shows the number of days that elapsed from the date on which the nomination was formally submitted to the Senate to the date on which the nominee had his or her first hearing before the Judiciary Committee. Note that Judge Roberts was initially nominated to fill the vacancy that would be created by the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. The Kavanaugh Nomination
Confirmation hearings for the current nominee to the Court, Judge Brett Kavanaugh, are scheduled to begin on September 4, 2018. They have been queried, as a matter of course, about their legal qualifications, private backgrounds, and earlier actions as public figures. Other questions have focused on social and political issues, the Constitution, particular Court rulings, current constitutional controversies, constitutional values, judicial philosophy, and the analytical approach a nominee might use in deciding issues and cases. Reporting the Nomination
Reporting Favorably, Negatively, or Without Recommendation
Usually within a week of the end of hearings, the Judiciary Committee meets in open session to determine what recommendation to report to the full Senate. None of the five most recent nominations to the Court were reported unanimously or almost unanimously. However, since its creation in 1816, the Judiciary Committee's typical practice has been to report even those Supreme Court nominations that were opposed by a committee majority, thus allowing the full Senate to make the final decision on whether the nominee should be confirmed. Prepared behind closed doors, after the committee has voted on the nominee, the printed report presents in a single volume the views of committee members supporting a nominee's confirmation as well as "all supplemental, minority, or additional views ... submitted by the time of the filing of the report.... " No Senate committee, however, is obliged to transmit a printed report to the Senate. A written report, however, might not always be considered a necessary reference for the Senate as a whole. | The appointment of a Supreme Court Justice is an event of major significance in American politics. Each appointment is of consequence because of the enormous judicial power the Supreme Court exercises as the highest appellate court in the federal judiciary. To receive appointment to the Court, a candidate must first be nominated by the President and then confirmed by the Senate. Although not mentioned in the Constitution, an important role is played midway in the process (after the President selects, but before the Senate considers) by the Senate Judiciary Committee. Specifically, the Judiciary Committee, rather than the Senate as a whole, assumes the principal responsibility for investigating the background and qualifications of each Supreme Court nominee, and typically the committee conducts a close, intensive investigation of each nominee.
Since the late 1960s, the Judiciary Committee's consideration of a Supreme Court nominee almost always has consisted of three distinct stages—(1) a pre-hearing investigative stage, followed by (2) public hearings, and concluding with (3) a committee decision on what recommendation to make to the full Senate.
During the pre-hearing investigative stage, the nominee responds to a detailed Judiciary Committee questionnaire, providing biographical, professional, and financial disclosure information to the committee. In addition to the committee's own investigation of the nominee, the FBI also investigates the nominee and provides the committee with confidential reports related to its investigation. During this time, the American Bar Association also evaluates the professional qualifications of the nominee, rating the nominee as "well qualified," "qualified," or "not qualified." Additionally, prior to hearings starting, the nominee pays courtesy calls on individual Senators in their offices, including Senators who do not serve on the Judiciary Committee.
Once the Judiciary Committee completes its investigation of the nominee, he or she testifies in hearings before the committee. On average, for Supreme Court nominees who have received hearings from 1975 to the present, the nominee's first hearing occurred 40 days after his or her nomination was formally submitted to the Senate by the President.
Questioning of a nominee by Senators has involved, as a matter of course, the nominee's legal qualifications, biographical background, and any earlier actions as public figures. Other questions have focused on social and political issues, the Constitution, particular court rulings, current constitutional controversies, and judicial philosophy. For the most recent nominees to the Court, hearings have lasted for four or five days (although the Senate may decide to hold more hearings if a nomination is perceived as controversial—as was the case with Robert Bork's nomination in 1987, who had 11 days of hearings).
Usually within a week upon completion of the hearings, the Judiciary Committee meets in open session to determine what recommendation to "report" to the full Senate. The committee's usual practice has been to report even those Supreme Court nominations opposed by a committee majority, allowing the full Senate to make the final decision on whether the nomination should be approved. Consequently, the committee may report the nomination favorably, report it unfavorably, or report it without making any recommendation at all. Of the 15 most recent Supreme Court nominations reported by the Judiciary Committee, 13 were reported favorably, 1 was reported unfavorably, and 1 was reported without recommendation.
Additional CRS reports provide information and analysis related to other stages of the confirmation process for nominations to the Supreme Court. For a report related to the selection of a nominee by the President, see CRS Report R44235, Supreme Court Appointment Process: President's Selection of a Nominee, by [author name scrubbed]. For a report related to Senate floor debate and consideration of nominations, see CRS Report R44234, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Senate Debate and Confirmation Vote, by [author name scrubbed].
This report will be updated as action proceeds on the July 10, 2018, nomination of Judge Brett Kavanaugh to fill the vacancy created by the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy. As of this writing, committee hearings are scheduled to begin on Judge Kavanaugh's nomination on September 4, 2018. |
crs_R40145 | crs_R40145_0 | Introduction
EPA regulatory actions to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions using existing Clean Air Act authority have been the major focus of congressional interest in clean air issues in recent months. The Administration counters that it would prefer for Congress to pass new legislation to control greenhouse gas emissions, but the Clean Air Act already requires action: a 2007 Supreme Court decision interpreting that authority found that EPA must weigh whether GHG emissions endanger public health and welfare and, if it concludes that they do, proceed with regulation. On June 26, 2009, the House narrowly passed H.R. 2454 , a 1,428-page bill addressing a number of interrelated energy and climate change issues. Among its numerous provisions, the bill would have established cap-and-trade programs for GHG emissions, beginning in 2012. Given these prospects, a trio of Senators began negotiating a climate bill from scratch, but they also encountered difficulty: the process ultimately lost its Republican sponsor and did not produce an introduced bill. Regulations addressing these emissions were vacated by the D.C. The Obama Administration's EPA has also moved to reconsider or modify several Bush Administration decisions regarding national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). This report provides a brief overview of the climate change, power plant, and air quality standard issues. More detailed information on most of the issues can be found in other CRS reports, which are referenced throughout this report. On December 15, 2009, acting in response to the Court's decision, EPA finalized an endangerment finding for greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, under Section 202(a) of the act. Relying on this finding, EPA promulgated GHG emission standards for new cars and light trucks, April 1, 2010. The implementation of these standards will, in turn, trigger permitting requirements and the imposition of Best Available Control Technology for new major stationary sources of GHGs beginning in 2011. It is this triggering of standards for stationary sources (power plants, manufacturing facilities, and others) that appears to have raised the most concern in Congress: legislation has been introduced in both the House and Senate aimed at preventing EPA from implementing these requirements. The legislation has taken several forms, including the introduction of resolutions of disapproval for the endangerment finding itself under the Congressional Review Act ( S.J.Res. Meanwhile, EPA has itself promulgated regulations and guidance that would delay the applicability of requirements for stationary sources of GHGs until 2011 and focus its initial regulatory efforts on the largest emitters, granting smaller sources at least a six-year reprieve. The Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee reported Senate counterparts: S. 1462 (Bingaman), equivalent to the energy titles, and S. 1733 , the Kerry-Boxer bill, establishing a cap-and-trade system and other measures to address climate change. It would have been addressed in the ACES legislation in a number of ways, many of which would have amended the Clean Air Act. Legislative and Regulatory Issues
In an earlier version of this report, we discussed five broad issues that climate legislation would need to address: (1) how a new program regulating greenhouse gas emissions would relate to the Clean Air Act, which gives EPA broad authority to set standards for air pollutants—potentially including GHGs; (2) whether legislation would focus on individual sectors of the economy, the economy as a whole, or both; (3) whether a cap-and-trade system would be the best approach, and, if it were chosen, the specifics of such a system:
the comprehensiveness of the program, how allowances (which are essentially permits to emit GHGs) would be distributed or sold, how allowance price volatility might be addressed, what measures would be taken to address potential effects on U.S. industries vis-a-vis foreign competitors, and what role there might be for offsets (i.e., credit for emission reductions by sources outside the cap-and-trade program);
(4) what role there would be for carbon taxes; and (5) what role there would be for state programs—in particular, the degree to which a federal program might preempt state measures affecting similar sources. EPA's CAIR Replacement: The Clean Air Transport Rule
On July 6, 2010, EPA proposed a replacement for CAIR, the Clean Air Transport Rule. | EPA regulatory actions on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions using existing Clean Air Act authority have been the main focus of congressional interest in clean air issues in recent months. Although the agency and the Obama Administration have consistently said that they would prefer that Congress pass legislation to address climate change, EPA has begun to develop regulations using its existing authority. On December 15, 2009, the agency finalized an "endangerment finding" under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, which permits it (in fact, requires it) to regulate pollutants for their effect as greenhouse gases for the first time. Relying on this finding, EPA finalized GHG emission standards for cars and light trucks, April 1, 2010. The implementation of these standards will, in turn, trigger permitting requirements and the imposition of Best Available Control Technology for new major stationary sources of GHGs in January 2011.
It is the triggering of standards for stationary sources (power plants, manufacturing facilities, etc.) that has raised the most concern in Congress: legislation has been introduced in both the House and Senate aimed at preventing EPA from implementing these requirements. The legislation has taken several forms, including the introduction of resolutions of disapproval for the endangerment finding itself under the Congressional Review Act, and stand-alone legislation that would forestall specific EPA regulatory actions. Meanwhile, EPA has itself promulgated regulations and guidance that will limit the applicability of Clean Air Act GHG requirements, delaying the applicability of requirements for all stationary sources until 2011 through guidance published April 2, 2010, and focusing its regulatory efforts on the largest emitters while granting smaller sources at least a six-year reprieve through what it calls the Greenhouse Gas "Tailoring Rule."
The endangerment finding and EPA's other actions, which were triggered by a 2007 Supreme Court decision, came as Congress struggled with climate change and energy legislation. On June 26, 2009, the House narrowly passed H.R. 2454, a 1,428-page bill addressing a number of interrelated energy and climate change issues. The bill would have established a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, beginning in 2012. In the Senate, both the Environment and Public Works Committee and the Energy and Natural Resources Committee reported bills (S. 1733 and S. 1462), but action subsequently bogged down, while a trio of Senators began negotiating a climate bill from scratch. As the clock wound down on the 111th Congress, it became less likely that climate legislation would be enacted, and more likely that EPA's actions would be the principal U.S. response to climate issues for now.
Besides addressing climate change, EPA has taken action on a number of conventional air pollutants, generally in response to the courts. Several Bush Administration regulatory decisions were vacated or remanded to the agency: among them, the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR)—a rule designed to control the long-range transport of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides from power plants, by establishing a cap-and-trade program—and the Clean Air Mercury Rule, which would have established a cap-and-trade program for power plant mercury emissions. EPA will address these court decisions through new regulations—the agency proposed a replacement for CAIR July 6. Some in Congress have wanted to address these issues through legislation, an approach that might reduce the likelihood of further court challenges. The agency is also in the midst of reviewing ambient air quality standards for the six most widespread air pollutants. These standards serve as EPA's definition of clean air, and drive a wide range of regulatory controls.
This report provides an overview of clean air legislative and regulatory issues. More detailed information on most of the issues can be found in other CRS reports, which are referenced throughout this report. |
crs_R41065 | crs_R41065_0 | Introduction and Overview of the VA Health Care System
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), through the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), operates the nation's largest integrated direct health care delivery system. In general, VHA provides a majority of medical services to enrolled veterans within its health care system. However, in some instances, such as when a clinical service cannot be provided by a VA medical center, and the patient cannot be transferred to another VA medical facility; or when VA cannot recruit a needed clinician; or when a veteran is unable to access VA health care facilities due to geographic inaccessibility; or in emergencies when delays could lead to life threatening situations; VA is authorized to send the veteran outside of its health care system to seek care. In 2006, Congress directed VHA to implement a contracting pilot program, which was later named Project Healthcare Effectiveness through Resource Optimization (Project HERO ) to better manage the fee basis care program (discussed later in this report). In addition, those who believe that all needed care should be provided by VA providers in VA-owned facilities are concerned that private sector options for providing care to veterans will lead to a dilution of quality of care in the VA health care system, and could fail to leverage key strengths of the VHA network, such as its system of electronic medical records. First, expenditures for contract and fee basis care services are increasing. Second, specific concerns have been raised about the fee basis care program. Specifically, VA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has reported that VHA has made a significant number of improper payments for fee basis care, and in some instances has not properly justified and authorized care. At least two policy questions about Project HERO may be of interest to Congress:
1. Has Project HERO enhanced the existing fee basis care program? 2. Are there findings from Project HERO that could be applied to standardize the fee basis care program throughout the VA health care system? Second, it discusses the current fee basis care process, as well as the implementation of Project HERO. The report concludes with a discussion of observations on the implementation of Project HERO based on VHA and Humana Veterans Healthcare Services Inc. (HVHS) perspectives. Although the provision of dental care through Delta Dental Federal Services is part of Project HERO, this report does not discuss this aspect of the program. The conference report ( H.Rept. 109-305 ) to accompany the Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2006 ( P.L. 109-114 ), directed the VA to implement a cost-effective purchased care management program and to develop at least three objectives-oriented demonstrations (pilot programs) to encourage collaboration with industry and academia. Medical, surgical, mental health, diagnostic, and dialysis services became available through a network of providers recruited by HVHS. Since Project HERO is a pilot to enhance fee basis care, this part of the report will first provide an overview of the current fee basis care process in the VHA. Once the veteran receives care from a non-VA provider, the provider sends a claim to the fee basis care program office at the VAMC that authorized the care. Furthermore, under Project HERO, VA does not have the responsibility for paying for care provided outside the system directly to non-VA providers. Are There Lessons to Be Learned from the Pilot Program? | In general, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), through the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), provides a majority of medical services to veterans within its health care system. However, in some instances, such as when a clinical service cannot be provided by a VA medical center, when a veteran is unable to access VA health care facilities due to geographic inaccessibility, or in emergencies when delays could lead to life threatening situations, VHA is authorized by law to send the veteran outside of VA's health care system to seek care. In 2006, the conference report to accompany the Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-114, H.Rept. 109-305) directed the VA to implement a cost-effective purchased care management program and to develop at least three pilot programs to encourage collaboration with industry and academia. In response to this requirement, VHA established a demonstration program to enhance the existing fee basis care program that was named Project HERO (Healthcare Effectiveness through Resource Optimization).
In October 2007, VA awarded a contract to Humana Veterans Healthcare Services (HVHS) for medical/surgical, mental health, diagnostic and dialysis services, and the contract became operational in January 2008. Under Project HERO, HVHS maintains a prescreened network of health care providers who meet VA quality standards.
In general, when a patient requires a specific service, and the local VA medical center does not have the specific medical expertise or the technologies to meet that necessity, the local VA medical center authorizes the specific service to be provided under Project HERO. Once the veteran receives care, HVHS is contractually required to return the patient's medical record to the local VA medical center, and HVHS sends the claims data to VA for reimbursement.
VHA's contract and fee basis care expenditures are of interest to Congress for at least two reasons. First, expenditures for contract and fee basis care services are increasing, and second, concerns have been raised about the fee basis care program. Specifically, VA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has reported that VHA has made a significant number of improper payments for fee basis care as well as in some instances has not properly justified and authorized fee basis care. Given these concerns, and the establishment of the Project HERO demonstration as a means to better manage non-VA provided care, at least two broad policy questions may be of interest to Congress: (1) Has Project HERO enhanced the existing fee basis care program? and (2) Are there lessons to be learned from the Project HERO demonstration that could be applied to standardize the fee basis care program throughout the VA health care system?
This report first provides a brief overview of the VA health care system, followed by a overview of Project HERO. Second, it discuses the current fee basis care process, as well as the implementation of Project HERO. The report concludes with a discussion of observations on the implementation of Project HERO based on VHA and HVHS perspectives. It should be noted that although dental care services are a component of Project HERO, and are provided through Dental Federal Services (Delta Dental), this report does not discuss dental care services provided under Project HERO. This report will be updated if events warrant. |
crs_R43384 | crs_R43384_0 | Introduction
Nearly all major roads and bridges in the United States are part of the federal-aid highway system and are therefore eligible for assistance from the Emergency Relief Program (ER) of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). This report describes FHWA assistance for the repair and reconstruction of highways and bridges damaged by disasters (such as Hurricane Sandy in 2012) or catastrophic failures (such as the collapse of the Skagit River Bridge in Washington State in 2013). FHWA's Emergency Relief (ER) Program
The ER program provides funds for the repair and reconstruction of roads on the federal-aid highway system that have suffered serious damage as a result of either (1) a natural disaster over a wide area, such as a flood, hurricane, tidal wave, earthquake, tornado, severe storm, or landslide; or (2) a catastrophic failure from any external cause (for example, the collapse of a bridge that is struck by a barge). Although ER is a federal program, the decision to seek financial assistance under the program is made by the state departments of transportation, not by the federal government. As state departments of transportation normally deal with FHWA division office staff on many matters, they typically have working relationships that facilitate a quick coordinated response to disasters. These funds are not subject to the annual obligation limitation placed on most highway funding by appropriators, which means the entire $100 million is available each year. Because the costs of road repair and reconstruction following many disasters exceed the $100 million annual authorization, the FAST Act authorizes the appropriation of additional funds on a "such sums as may be necessary" basis, generally accomplished in either annual or emergency supplemental appropriations legislation. The intent of ER assistance is to repair and restore highway facilities to conditions comparable to those before the disaster, not to increase capacity or fix non-disaster-related deficiencies. Betterments may, in some cases, require NEPA review. Its report found that the "scope of eligible activities funded by the ER program has expanded in recent years with congressional or FHWA waivers of eligibility or changes in definitions," and also that FHWA was not recapturing all unused program funds allocated to states, so that states with immediate disaster needs had to wait for funding, while states with no current disaster needs retained their allocations. More recently, a 2013 GAO report found that FHWA officials in some states were reluctant to recoup funds from inactive ER highway projects over concerns about "harming their partnership with the state." The program does not have a permanent annual authorization. All funds are authorized on a "such sums as necessary" basis and require an appropriation to be made available. Hurricane Sandy Public Transportation ER Funding
The Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013 provided $10.9 billion for FTA's Emergency Relief Program for recovery, relief, and resilience projects and activities in areas impacted by Hurricane Sandy. ER Program Appropriations | Major roads and bridges are part of the federal-aid highway system and are therefore eligible for assistance under the Emergency Relief Program (ER) of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). Following a natural disaster (such as Hurricane Matthew in 2016, which damaged highways in Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina), or catastrophic failure (such as the 2013 collapse of the Skagit River Bridge in Washington State) ER funds are made available for both emergency repairs and restoration of federal-aid highway facilities to conditions comparable to those before the disaster.
State departments of transportation typically have close ongoing relationships with FHWA's division offices in each state, which facilitate a quick, coordinated response to disasters. Although ER is a federal program, the decision to seek ER funding is made by the state, not by the federal government.
The program is funded by a permanent annual authorization of $100 million from the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) along with general fund appropriations provided by Congress on a "such sums as necessary" basis. A number of issues have arisen in recent years:
The scope of eligible activities funded by ER has grown via legislative or FHWA waiving of eligibility requirements or changes in definitions. As a result, in some cases the ER program has funded activities that have gone beyond repairing or restoring highways to predisaster condition. The $100 million annual authorization has been exceeded nearly every fiscal year, requiring appropriations that can lead to delay in funding permanent repairs. Congress has directed that in some cases ER fully fund highway projects, without the normal 10% or 20% state matching share, increasing the federal outlay for disaster highway assistance on these projects and constraining the funds available for other ER requests. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that FHWA's partnership with the states was sometimes so close that some division offices were reluctant to enforce compliance with the requirements of the ER program. FHWA has taken certain corrective actions which Congress might find of oversight interest.
The 112th Congress authorized an emergency relief program for public transportation systems. However, this program does not have a permanent funding source, and funds are to be provided only by appropriation. The 2013 Disaster Relief Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-2) made available appropriations of $10.9 billion (reduced by $545 million by sequestration) for the Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program. There have been no further appropriations since 2013. |
crs_RS21629 | crs_RS21629_0 | Validity of Conference Reports in House and Senate
When limited conferees are present, the House and Senate determine whether a conference report carries a sufficient number of signatures in different ways. In the Senate, a valid conference report must carry the signatures of a majority of the Members from each chamber who were appointed as conferees, without regard to whether or not any of those Members were appointed as conferees only for limited purposes. For each portion of the matters in disagreement, it will be necessary to count how many Representatives were appointed to consider that portion, and then to determine whether a majority of that number signed the report. In the Senate, the conference report would not be valid unless a majority of all the conferees from each chamber signed it. All the other House conferees were appointed for limited purposes, some much more limited than others. Republicans constituted a majority of each panel of House conferees. | The House and Senate both require that a conference report be signed by a majority of House conferees and a majority of Senate conferees. When some conferees are appointed only for limited purposes, the two chambers have different ways of counting to determine whether the conferees' report carries sufficient signatures. The Senate asks whether the report is signed by a majority of all the conferees from each house, without regard to whether those conferees were appointed for all or for limited purposes. The House asks whether the report is signed by a majority of all the conferees from each house who were appointed to consider each of the matters that were submitted to the conference committee.
This report will be updated if procedural changes warrant. |
crs_R42592 | crs_R42592_0 | In the first, Congress, by a two-thirds vote of both chambers, proposes amendments to the states, which then consider the proposal; if three-fourths (38 at present) approve the amendment, it is ratified, and becomes part of the Constitution. Beginning with the Bill of Rights in 1789, this method has been used to propose 33 amendments, 27 of which have been ratified. The report further examines its origins at the Constitutional Convention of 1787; the history of the convention alternative, focusing on three major 20 th century campaigns to convene a constitutional convention; and the role of the states in the Article V Convention process. A companion report, CRS Report R42589, The Article V Convention to Propose Constitutional Amendments: Contemporary Issues for Congress , provides a comprehensive analysis of congressional issues, including information on the contemporary resurgence of interest in the convention alternative and the authority of Congress to call a convention; provide a framework and procedures for an Article V Convention; and submit proposed amendments to the states for ratification. These issues are addressed in detail in the companion to this report, CRS Report R42589, The Article V Convention to Propose Constitutional Amendments: Contemporary Issues for Congress . For instance, in the case of the balanced budget amendment convention drive of the 1970s and 1980s, it took seven years for an organized campaign to gain convention applications from 32 states, two short of the two-thirds required in Article V.
Although the Article V Convention device is not widely known or understood at present, it could provide a vehicle for issue organizations and coalitions seeking amendments to the Constitution. By comparison, the contemporary availability of instant interpersonal electronic communication, email, and other social network media can facilitate remarkably rapid growth in awareness of a political phenomenon. The debate reveals that the delegates were concerned that the amending process should not be lodged exclusively with Congress, but that the states should also have the opportunity to propose amendments, either directly, or via convention, although Alexander Hamilton asserted that the national legislature (Congress) "will be the first to perceive and will be the most sensible to the necessity of amendments...." On September 10, Article V began to assume its final form when James Madison offered the following version, which rearranged the various elements that had been debated up to that point:
The Legislature of the U.S. whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at least of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Legislature of the U.S. ....
Two amendments to the article were added in the convention's final sessions. During the convention, they agreed that a second mode of amendment was needed to balance the grant of amendatory power to Congress. This method, clearly identified in Article V as co-equal to congressional proposal, empowers the people, acting through their state legislatures, to summon a convention that would have equal authority to propose an amendment or amendments, which are then proposed to the states for ratification. During the 1970s and 1980s, 32 states submitted applications for a convention to consider an amendment to require a balanced federal budget except in extraordinary circumstances. A Role for the State Governor? | The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 provided two methods of proposing amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In the first, Congress, by two-thirds vote in both houses, proposes amendments to the states. If three-fourths of the states (38 at present) vote to ratify the amendment, it becomes part of the Constitution. Since 1789, Congress has proposed 33 amendments by this method, 27 of which have been adopted. In the second method, if the legislatures of two-thirds of the states (34 at present) apply, Congress must call a convention to consider and propose amendments, which must meet the same 38-state ratification requirement. This alternative, known as the Article V Convention, has not been implemented to date. Several times during the 20th century, organized groups promoted a convention that they hoped would propose amendments to the states, or to "prod" Congress to propose amendments they favored. The most successful was the movement for direct election of Senators, which helped prod Congress to propose the 17th Amendment. The most recent, which promoted a convention to consider a balanced federal budget amendment, gained 32 applications, just two short of the constitutional threshold. When the balanced budget amendment campaign failed in the 1980s, interest in the convention option faded and remained largely dormant for more than 20 years.
Within the past decade, interest in the Article V Convention process has reawakened: several policy advocacy organizations have publicized the Article V Convention option, particularly as an alternative to what they portray as a legislative and policy deadlock at the federal level. An important issue in the contemporary context is the fact that advances in communications technology could facilitate the emergence of technology-driven issue advocacy groups favorable to this phenomenon. The rise of instant interpersonal communications, email, and other social media helped facilitate the rapid growth of such groups as MoveOn.org, the Tea Party movement, and, most recently, Occupy Wall Street. These tools could be harnessed to promote a credible campaign in a much shorter time than was the case with previous convention advocacy movements.
Reviewing the history of the Article V Convention alternative, the record of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 clearly demonstrated the founders' original intent. During the convention, they agreed that a second mode of amendment was needed to balance the grant of amendatory power to Congress. This method, clearly identified in Article V as co-equal to congressional proposal of amendments, empowered the people, acting through their state legislatures, to summon a convention that would have equal authority to propose an amendment or amendments, which would then be presented to the states for ratification.
Only the states can summon an Article V Convention, by application from their legislatures. Some of the issues concerning this process include procedures within the state legislatures; the scope and conditions of applications for a convention; steps in submitting applications to Congress; and the role of the state governors in the process.
This report identifies and examines these issues; a companion report, CRS Report R42589, The Article V Convention to Propose Constitutional Amendments: Contemporary Issues for Congress, identifies contemporary issues for Congress and analyzes the congressional role in the Article V Convention process in greater detail. |
crs_RS22512 | crs_RS22512_0 | The following section of this report will detail the four types of accounts that a person or couple may have money in and not have that money counted as a resource for the purposes of determining their SSI eligibility. Burial Accounts
Money set aside by an SSI recipient to pay for his or her burial expenses can be excluded from the SSI resource limits. Plans for Achieving Self-Support
A Plan for Achieving Self-Support (PASS) is an individual plan for employment designed by an SSI beneficiary. However, there are limits to the amounts states and other entities can contribute to IDAs. Any money placed in the account and any interest earned on the account is the property of the child. Money in a dedicated account for children is not counted as a resource for the purposes of determining the child's SSI eligibility or the SSI eligibility of the representative payee. | As a means tested program, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) places a limit on the assets or resources of its beneficiaries. However, there are four types of accounts that can be used by SSI beneficiaries for specific purposes without affecting their SSI eligibility. Money placed into burial accounts, money used as part of a Plan for Achieving Self-Support (PASS), money placed in Individual Development Accounts (IDAs), and money placed in dedicated accounts for children are not counted as resources for the purposes of determining SSI eligibility. These accounts can be used by SSI beneficiaries to build assets or plan for the future and represent an important part of the overall SSI program.
This report provides an overview of these four types of accounts and outlines the cases when money placed into these accounts is exempt from the SSI resource limitations.
This report will be updated to reflect any changes in this legislation or other relevant legislative activity. |
crs_R41736 | crs_R41736_0 | Concerns have been raised that these liabilities could jeopardize the fiscal stability of some state and local governments. There is considerable debate over whether this is a problem that needs to be addressed and if so, the cause and the extent of public pension plan underfunding. While it has been reported that public pension funds experienced recent gains, some of the estimates have placed the combined unfunded liabilities anywhere from hundreds of billions of dollars to over $3 trillion. This report provides an overview of how public pension plans are regulated at the federal and state levels. It discusses selected legal issues that may arise if attempts are made to remedy or prevent public pension plan underfunding, in particular, by changing plan benefits. This report will also briefly address possible federal regulation of state and local public pension plans. Recently, in an effort to alleviate pension plan underfunding and protect state and local government budgets, governors and legislators in several states have proposed and enacted various modifications to their pension plans. | Controversy has arisen over the funded status of some state and local government pension plans. It has been reported that several of these plans have not fully funded their future obligations and they could face substantial future shortfalls. While there is considerable debate over whether this is a problem that needs to be addressed, and if so, the extent and the possible causes of these shortfalls, some estimates have placed the combined unfunded liabilities anywhere from hundreds of billions of dollars to over $3 trillion. Governments facing investment losses combined with lower revenues are looking at ways to address these shortfalls and protect their fiscal stability. State governors and legislators in several states have proposed and enacted various modifications to their pension plans. There have been calls for modification of federal, state, and local laws affecting these pension plans and the benefits provided to participants and beneficiaries. This report provides an overview of how public pension plans are regulated at the federal and state levels, discusses selected legal issues that may arise if attempts are made to remedy or prevent public pension plan underfunding by modifying public pension plan benefits, and addresses possible federal regulation of state and local public pension plans. |
crs_RL34051 | crs_RL34051_0 | The proposed system would have included 10 silo-based interceptor missiles to be deployed in Poland, a fixed radar installation in the Czech Republic, and another transportable radar to be deployed in a country closer to Iran (which was never publicly identified). Deployment of the GMD European capability was scheduled to be completed by 2013 at an official estimated cost of at least $4 billion (including fielding and Operation and Support). The Bush proposal raised a number of issues within Europe and encountered strong opposition in Russia. The United States signed agreements with Poland and Czech Republic in summer 2008. On September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration announced it would cancel the Bush Administration's proposed European 3 rd site. Instead, Defense Secretary Gates announced U.S. plans to develop and deploy a regional BMD capability that could be surged on relatively short notice during crises or as the situation may demand called the PAA (Phased Adaptive Approach). Gates argued this new capability, based initially on expanding existing BMD sensors, communication systems, and interceptors into Europe, would be more responsive and adaptable to the growing threat from short- and medium-range Iranian ballistic missiles. This capability would continue to evolve and expand over the next decade. Secretary Gates argued this new direction is needed to address growing concerns over the pace and direction of Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missile proliferation in a manner that can be deployed more quickly and effectively than the Bush-proposed European site. However, Moscow eventually found reason to object to the Obama Administration's PAA, and sought unsuccessfully to oppose the plan as a bargaining chip in arms treaty negotiations with the United States. Most of this report that follows is designed to retain background information and analysis of the Bush-proposed European BMD initiative up to the Obama Administration's decision to cancel it. This report will be available primarily for historical purposes. It will not be updated. Russia
The Bush Administration's proposed missile defense program in Europe significantly affected U.S.-Russian relations. The committee reserves $343.1 million from funds available for the MDA in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to develop missile defenses in Europe for one of two purposes:
(1) either the Secretary of Defense continue with research, development, test and evaluation of the proposed radar and interceptor site in Poland and the Czech Republic pending Czech and Polish ratification, and certification by the Secretary of Defense that the proposed interceptors will be operationally effective, or
(2) the Secretary may pursue development, testing, procurement and deployment of an alternative integrated missile defense system to protect Europe from threats posed by all types of ballistic missiles. | In early 2007, after several years of internal discussions and consultations with Poland and the Czech Republic, the Bush Administration formally proposed to defend against an Iranian missile threat by deploying a ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) element in Europe as part of the global U.S. BMDS (Ballistic Missile Defense System). The system would have included 10 interceptors in Poland, a radar in the Czech Republic, and another radar that would have been deployed in a country closer to Iran, to be completed by 2013 at a reported cost of at least $4 billion. The proposed European BMD capability raised a number of foreign policy challenges in Europe and with Russia. The United States negotiated and signed agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic, but for a number of reasons those agreements were not ratified by the end of the Bush Administration.
On September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration announced it would cancel the Bush-proposed European BMD program. Instead, Defense Secretary Gates announced U.S. plans to develop and deploy a regional BMD capability in Europe that could be surged on relatively short notice during crises or as the situation may demand. Gates argued this new capability in the near-term would be based on expanding existing BMD sensors and interceptors. Gates argued this new Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) would be more responsive and adaptable to the pace and direction of Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missile proliferation. This capability would continue to evolve and expand over the next decade to include BMD capabilities against medium- and long-range Iranian ballistic missiles.
The Polish and Romanian governments have signaled their willingness to host facilities for the new system. However, Russia, though initially positive over the abandonment of the Bush Administration's BMD plan, soon found reasons to object to the Obama Administration's alternative.
Although the terms of the debate over the Bush-proposed European BMD capability have changed significantly in the wake of President Obama's decision, this report will be retained for historical purposes to include background information and analysis through the Obama Administration's decision to cancel it. It will not be updated. |
crs_RL31695 | crs_RL31695_0 | In 1985, following a report from the National Academy of Sciences asserting that openness in science leads to stronger long-term security, President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189), reiterating that fundamental research results were to be controlled only through classification. Historically, the areas where the balance between scientific openness and national security required consideration have been centered in the mathematical and physical sciences and their applications, such as aerospace engineering, advanced computer technology, and cryptography. Whether the current method of using classification to limit the dissemination of fundamental research results is the best or most effective method of maintaining national security is an open question. It is unclear whether classification will be effective when applied to research areas that have not historically been classified, and whether a system of classified research will be embraced by scientists working in these areas. Some scientific professional societies have suggested that self-regulation, either by scientists themselves or through the editors of scientific journals, would be an appropriate mechanism for limiting the publication of research results that might aid terrorist groups. A fundamental trade-off between scientific progress and security concerns is the crux of the policy debate. This consensus statement formed the starting point for research rules developed by the National Institutes of Health Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, which was formed to oversee such research. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 2001, then-Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Condoleezza Rice reaffirmed this position in a letter to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, by stating,
...this Administration will review and update as appropriate the export control policies that affect basic research in the United States. Mechanisms of Governmental Control
Current mechanisms for federal agencies to control the publication of federally funded extramural research results include classification, export and arms trafficking regulations, and specifications in federal contracts, such as prepublication review. Classification
Generally, classification is to be used when it is necessary to control scientific information. The Department of State implements the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which regulate the export of items, technology, and technological information maintained on the Munitions Control List. Both EAR and ITAR possess exemptions for "fundamental research." There have been cases where export control of information and scientific research have coincided. Response to this proposal has been mixed. Policy Options
The balance between publication of federally funded research results and protecting national security raises numerous questions, such as: Should there be regulation of the publication of federally-funded research results? How might the federal government encourage scientists to develop guidelines for self-regulation? They assert that, in line with NSDD-189, information which is not classified should be freely publishable and distributable. These proponents claim that the continued publication of such information will harm national security, and that changes should be made so that such federally funded research results can be classified before they are distributed. That said, implementation of export control regulations has posed some challenges to researchers. Another concern is the effectiveness of such a federally based review. Additional oversight may focus on the activities underway in the Department of Health and Human Services, where the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity has been established. | The federal government has historically supported the open publication of federally funded research results. In cases where such results presented a challenge to national security concerns, several mechanisms have been employed. For fundamental research results, the federal policy has been to use classification to limit dissemination. For advanced technology and technological information, a combination of classification and export and arms trafficking regulation has been used to inhibit its spread. The terrorist attacks of 2001 increased scrutiny of nonconventional weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, and publication of some research results have increased concerns over whether publication of federally funded extramural research results could threaten national security.
The current federal policy, as described in National Security Decision Directive 189, is that fundamental research should remain unrestricted and that in the rare case where it is necessary to restrict such information, classification is the appropriate mechanism. Other mechanisms restrict international information flow, such as Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) that control export of items and technical information on specific lists. Both EAR and ITAR do not apply to sharing fundamental research results, so long as they are not subject to any governmental prepublication review.
Historically, the areas where export regulation and classification have predominantly occurred have been in mathematical, engineering, and physical sciences. Other contentious research areas, such as genetic engineering and manipulation, have been overseen through scientists' self-regulation and monitoring. The 1975 Asilomar conference produced a consensus statement on recombinant DNA research that formed the basis for the National Institutes of Health Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee. Recent research publications that have raised national security concerns have fallen outside of the areas traditionally regulated through classification and export control, and it is unclear how effective these mechanisms will be. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity was established to aid in determining whether proposed federally funded research presents a biosecurity threat.
Stakeholders do not agree on the best method of balancing scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of selective classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an "Asilomar-like" process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is third option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either before funding or publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL34176 | crs_RL34176_0 | Overview
The Inspector General Act, as amended, will reach its 30 th anniversary in 2008, and today there are more than 60 offices of inspectors general (OIGs). The bills' specific proposals and considerations set up additional protections for IGs, including "for cause" removal and terms of office; consolidation and codification of two existing councils established by executive order into a single Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; the reporting of the IG's initial budget and appropriations estimates to the Office of Management and Budget, the agency head, and congressional committees; program evaluation in IG semi-annual reports; and the grant of law enforcement authority to IGs in designated federal entities. The Bush Administration has taken exception to several provisions in H.R. 928 âremoval for cause, transmittal of budget requests to Congress, and an independent IG Councilâand, on October 1, 2007, threatened a veto of the legislation. In the face of this threat, the House passed H.R. 928 by a veto-proof margin on October 3, 2007. . . at least 30 days before such removal or transfer." In H.R. . . may submit to Congress or a committee of Congress an appropriations estimate or request . 928 . 928 and S. 1723 âare designed to provide broad-based, across-the-board initiatives to enhance the independence and accountability of the inspectors general operating under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. This would occur through changes in the removal of IGs, notification of the OIG budget requests to Congress, fixing a term of office for the IGs, and establishing a Council on Integrity and Efficiency as well as an Integrity Committee, replacing counterparts created by executive order. In the 110 th Congress, the House has passed H.R. | Congress has long taken a leadership role in establishing and sustaining offices of inspector general (OIGs), which now exist in more than 60 federal departments and agencies. This effort began with Congress's initiation of the first contemporary statutory inspectors general (IGs) in 1976; it has continued with passage of the broadly encompassing 1978 Inspector General (IG) Act and 1988 Amendments as well as with additions and modifications in the meantime.
In the 110 th Congress, two bills designed to increase the IGs' independence and accountability or otherwise modify specific provisions have been introducedâ H.R. 928 and S. 1723 . These bills are similar, and their major provisions include a fixed term of office for IGs; removal for cause only; apprisal of the intention to remove or transfer an IG given to Congress 15 or 30 days in advance; notification of the annual IG budget request to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) when the IG submits it to agency administration; establishment of a Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, replacing the two current councils operating under executive order; and creation of an Integrity Committee composed of Council members to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by an inspector general or officials in the office. The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee reported H.R. 928 with some changes on September 27, 2007. The Bush Administration has taken exception to several provisions in H.R. 928 âremoval for cause, transmittal of budget requests to Congress, and an independent IG Councilâand, on October 1, 2007, threatened a veto of the legislation. The House passed H.R. 928 , with amendments, by a vote of 404-11 on October 3, 2007.
This report, which will be updated as developments dictate, covers the main provisions of the proposals. |
crs_RL32711 | crs_RL32711_0 | Finally, it analyzes the options and implications of this body of recommendations for House committee organization. The standing committees of the House will maintain their jurisdictions and will still have authorization and oversight responsibilities. This point was often coupled with a witness's perspective on whether a single House homeland security committee was needed. Coordination. Key aspects of the select committee's recommendations included:
a standing committee is to be created, composed of not more than 29 members and not more than 16 from one party; the Speaker and minority leader to serve ex officio, without voting privileges; jurisdiction is to be granted over "homeland security generally" and over DHS, except, generally, for non-homeland security matters within the authority of the department; "exclusive authorizing and primary oversight jurisdiction" is to be granted with respect to the department's authorities related to the "prevention of, preparation for, and response to acts of terrorism within the United States"; authorizations for the department to prevent, prepare for, or respond to acts of terrorism must precede appropriations; and referrals of legislation and other matters to the Select Committee on Homeland Security in the 108 th Congress would not be considered precedent for referrals to the new committee. Key actions on committee organization in the 108 th Congress were the creation of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, with jurisdiction over the Homeland Security Act and responsibility for a study of House rules, including Rule X, with respect to the issue of homeland security; hearings on committee organization held by a subcommittee of the select committee and, separately, by a subcommittee of the Rules Committee; recommendations from the select committee for a standing committee of the House on homeland security; and support voiced by the Speaker for a permanent homeland security committee in the 109 th Congress. These two sections are followed by a brief history of committee reorganization related to departmental creation, bringing together this record in one place. Conclusion
The House has tended to continue its committee organization following congressional creation of a new department or a major reorganization in the executive branch. The Select Committee on Homeland Security recommended the creation of a permanent Homeland Security Committee that would have jurisdiction over domestic components of homeland security, reporting to the House Rules Committee on September 30, 2004, as required by H.Res. Concentration or Dispersal of Homeland Security Jurisdiction
The 9/11 Commission and the other commissions and think tanks recommended alternative committee arrangements: a joint committee, an authorizing committee in each chamber of Congress, or a combined authorization-appropriation committee in each chamber that would have jurisdiction over homeland security, as the 9/11 Commission explained its recommendation, in order to achieve a "unity of effort." Congress, however, has not. However, the House has made different decisions in different situations regarding the organization of its committees to oversee a policy area or even a Cabinet department. Legislative History. 5 Summary. Committee Organization in the 110th Congress
Organization. This will require realigning appropriations subcommittees. | This report has been updated with an epilogue on the creation of a standing House Committee on Homeland Security in the 109th Congress, the election of a new chair September 15, 2005, and the committee's organization in the 110th Congress. The original report was not changed; its summary follows:
The 9/11 Commission and other commissions and think tanks studying homeland security recommended congressional committee reorganization to increase Congress's policy and oversight coordination. This report analyzes selected recommendations relevant to House committee reorganization.
In the 108th Congress, the House created a Select Committee on Homeland Security, and charged it with studying the rules of the House with respect to the issue of homeland security. The select committee recommended a standing Committee on Homeland Security. This report digests the select committee's recommendations. Before the select committee made its recommendations, one of its subcommittees held four hearings on Perspectives on House Reform. To analyze the content of these hearings, this report organizes the testimony into 10 categories.
One consideration in creating a homeland security committee relates to the concentration or dispersal of homeland security jurisdiction. The House at different times has made different decisions about concentrating or dispersing jurisdiction. A second consideration in creating a homeland security committee relates to implications of jurisdictional changes. Proponents of a new committee point to the fragmentation of jurisdiction over homeland security. Others point to the record of Congress as a strong indication that existing committees are capable of action. A third consideration in creating a homeland security committee is whether such a committee is sufficient for policymaking. Even if a new committee is created, other committees will still have jurisdiction over components of homeland security. The House has tended not to change its committee structure after executive branch reorganizations. This report contains a brief history of House committees.
Related CRS reports: CRS Report RL32661, House Committees: A Framework for Considering Jurisdictional Realignment, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS21901, House Select Committee on Homeland Security: Possible Questions Raised If the Panel Were to Be Reconstituted as a Standing Committee, by [author name scrubbed] (pdf); CRS Report RL31835, Reorganization of the House of Representatives: Modern Reform Efforts, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed] (pdf); CRS Report RL31572, Appropriations Subcommittee Structure: History of Changes from 1920-2007, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33061, Homeland Security and House Committees: Analysis of 109th Congress Jurisdiction Changes and Their Impact on the Referral of Legislation, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL32947 | crs_RL32947_0 | Introduction
From an environmental quality standpoint, much of the public and policy interest in animal agriculture has focused on impacts on water resources, because animal waste, if not properly managed, can adversely impact water quality through surface runoff and erosion, direct discharges to surface waters, spills and other dry-weather discharges, and leaching into soil and groundwater. However, animal feeding operations (AFO), enterprises where animals are kept and raised in confinement, can also result in emissions to the air of particles and gases such as ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, and volatile organic chemicals. At issue are questions about the contribution of AFOs to total air pollution and corresponding ecological and possible public health effects. Implementation and enforcement of these laws requires scientifically credible data on air emissions and accurate measurement of emissions to determine whether regulated pollutants are emitted in quantities that exceed specified thresholds. This report discusses an EPA plan called the Air Compliance Agreement intended to produce air quality monitoring data on animal agriculture emissions from a small number of farms, while at the same time protecting all participants (including farms where no monitoring takes place) through a "safe harbor" from liability under certain provisions of federal environmental laws. Background1
AFOs can affect air quality through emissions of gases (ammonia and hydrogen sulfide), particulate matter, volatile organic compounds, hazardous air pollutants, microorganisms, and odor. Pollutants associated with AFOs have a number of environmental and human health impacts. Some livestock operations may also be subject to the release reporting requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, the Superfund law) and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). EPA's Air Compliance Agreement with Industry
Enforcement of applicable provisions of federal environmental laws such as CERCLA, EPRCRA, and the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires accurate measurement of emissions to determine whether facilities and operations emit regulated pollutants in quantities that exceed specified thresholds. Early in 2002, representatives of some agriculture industry groups—especially pork and egg producers—approached EPA officials with a proposal to negotiate a voluntary agreement that would produce air quality monitoring data on emissions from animal feedlot operations. In their view, comprehensive, valid data are needed to develop appropriate public policy regarding emissions from animal agriculture operations. Many among those who supported the agreement believed that livestock operations should be entirely exempt from CERCLA and EPCRA reporting requirements because, in their view, Congress did not intend for these laws to apply to animal agriculture. State and local air quality officials and members of the environmental advocacy community strongly objected to the agreement, which some characterized as a grant of "retrospective and prospective immunity from liability" for every AFO in the United States, a sweeping liability shield to the entire industry. A legal challenge to the Air Compliance Agreement was brought by several environmental advocacy groups. In June 2007, EPA announced that the two-year air monitoring study was ready to proceed. In January 2011, EPA released the data and reports on the monitored AFOs. The agency's initial efforts to develop EEMs based on the national monitoring study data have been widely criticized by stakeholder groups, members of the public, and the agency's science advisers. The court approved the government's request for a remand in October 2010. EPA anticipated proposing a new or revised rule in 2012, but it has not done so yet. | From an environmental quality standpoint, much of the interest in animal agriculture has focused on impacts on water resources, because animal waste, if not properly managed, can harm water quality through surface runoff, direct discharges, spills, and leaching into soil and groundwater. A more recent issue is the contribution of emissions from animal feeding operations (AFO), enterprises where animals are raised in confinement, to air pollution. AFOs can affect air quality through emissions of gases such as ammonia and hydrogen sulfide, particulate matter, volatile organic compounds, hazardous air pollutants, and odor. These pollutants and compounds have a number of environmental and human health effects.
Agricultural operations that emit large quantities of air pollutants may be subject to Clean Air Act (CAA) regulation and permits. Further, some livestock operations also may be regulated under the release reporting requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund, or CERCLA) and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). Questions about the applicability of these laws to livestock and poultry operations have been controversial and have drawn congressional attention.
Enforcement of these federal environmental laws requires accurate measurement of emissions to determine whether regulated pollutants are emitted in quantities that exceed specified thresholds. Yet experts believe that existing data provide a poor basis for regulating and managing air emissions from AFOs. In an effort to collect scientifically credible data, in 2005 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced a plan that had been negotiated with segments of the animal agriculture industry. Called the Air Compliance Agreement, it is intended to produce air quality monitoring data on AFO emissions during a two-year study, while at the same time protecting participants through a "safe harbor" from liability under certain provisions of federal environmental laws. Many producer groups supported the agreement as essential to gathering valid data that are needed for decision making. However, critics, including environmentalists and state and local air quality officials, said that the agreement would grant all participating producers a sweeping liability shield for violations of environmental laws, yet because fewer than 30 farms would be monitored, it was too limited in scope to yield scientifically credible estimates of AFO emissions. Some industry groups had their own questions and reservations. In 2006, EPA approved agreements with 2,568 AFOs, representing nearly 14,000 farms. Monitoring of 25 farms in nine states occurred from mid-2007 to the end of 2009. In 2011, EPA released the data from the individual monitored sites and began developing improved emissions estimating methodologies (EEMs) based on the data. Draft EEMs for some animal sectors were released for review and public comment in 2012 and have been widely critiqued, including by EPA's science advisers.
Separately, in 2008, EPA issued a rule to exempt animal waste emissions to the air from most CERCLA and EPCRA reporting requirements. Legal challenges to the rule followed. In 2010, a federal court approved the government's request to remand the rule to EPA for reconsideration and possible modification. EPA has not yet proposed a new or revised rule.
This report reviews key issues associated with the Air Compliance Agreement. Background information on air emissions from poultry and livestock operations, relevant federal environmental laws and regulations, congressional interest, state activities, and research needs are discussed in CRS Report RL32948, Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture: A Primer, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44888 | crs_R44888_0 | Introduction
The 115 th Congress continues its interest in U.S. research and development (R&D) and in evaluating support for federal R&D activities. The federal R&D budget is an aggregation of the R&D activities of each federal agency. Congress plays a central role in defining the nation's R&D priorities as it makes decisions about the level and allocation of R&D funding—overall, within agencies, and for specific programs. As Congress acts to complete the FY2018 appropriations process, it faces two overarching issues: the extent to which federal R&D investments can be made in the face of increased pressure on discretionary spending and the prioritization and allocation of the available funding. Budget caps may limit overall R&D funding and may require movement of resources across disciplines, programs, or agencies to address priorities. This report begins with a discussion of the overall level of President Trump's FY2018 R&D request, followed by analyses of the R&D funding request from a variety of perspectives and for selected multiagency R&D initiatives. For FY2018, the Trump Administration is using a new definition for development ("experimental development"), drawn up in 2016 by the Obama Administration (see box entitled "Caveats With Respect to Analysis of the FY2018 Budget Request" for a more detailed explanation) in its R&D calculations. Under the new definition, President Trump is proposing $117.697 billion for R&D. Adjusting this figure to include an additional $33.547 billion of development funding that is being requested for DOD and NASA but not counted in the President's budget under the experimental development definition, the President's request is $151.244 billion, an increase of $2.942 billion (2.0%) over the comparable FY2016 level. Adjusted for inflation, the President's FY2018 adjusted R&D request represents a constant dollar decrease of 1.9% from the FY2016 actual level. Under President Trump's FY2018 budget request, eight federal agencies would receive more than 96% of total federal R&D funding: the Department of Defense (DOD), 45.4%; Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (primarily the National Institutes of Health [NIH]), 22.2%; Department of Energy (DOE), 11.4%; National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 8.8%; National Science Foundation (NSF), 4.6%; Department of Agriculture (USDA), 1.7%; Department of Commerce (DOC), 1.3%; and Veterans Affairs (VA), 1.2%. Global Change Research Program. President Trump's FY2018 budget is largely silent on funding levels for these efforts and whether some or all of the non-statutory initiatives will continue. Some activities related to these initiatives are discussed in agency budget justifications and may be included in the agencies' analyses in this report. Other Initiatives
Presidential initiatives without statutory foundations in operation at the end of the Obama Administration, but not explicitly addressed in President Trump's FY2018 budget, include: the Advanced Manufacturing Partnership (including the National Robotics Initiative [NRI] and the National Network for Manufacturing Innovation [NNMI]), the Cancer Moonshot, the BRAIN Initiative, the Precision Medicine Initiative, the Materials Genome Initiative, and an effort to doubling federal funding for clean energy R&D. Consequently, R&D data presented in the agency analyses in this report may differ from R&D data in the president's budget or otherwise provided by OMB. For FY2018, $5.370 billion is requested for R&D activities, a 10.8% decrease from FY2016 actual funding for R&D of $6.022 million. Research . The Networking and Information Technology Research and Development program would receive $1.062 billion, a decrease of $157 million (12.9%). U.S. Geological Survey
The USGS accounts for more than two-thirds of all DOI R&D funding. | President Trump's budget request for FY2018 includes $117.697 billion for research and development (R&D). This represents a $30.605 billion (20.6%) decrease from the FY2016 actual level of $148.302 billion (FY2017 enacted levels were not available at the time of publication). Adjusted for inflation, the President's FY2018 R&D request represents a constant dollar decrease of 23.6% from the FY2016 actual level.
However, in 2016 the Office of Management and Budget changed the definition used for "development" to "experimental development." This new definition was used in calculating R&D in the FY2018 budget, but no adjustments were made to data reported for FY2016 or FY2017 data to reflect the new definition. OMB asserts that the definitional change results in the exclusion of $33.547 billion from FY2018 requested R&D funding (DOD and NASA) that would have been included in previous years. According to OMB, these funds are being requested in the FY2018 budget, but no longer classified as R&D. Thus, applying the prior definition for R&D, aggregate federal R&D in the Trump Administration's budget for FY2018 would represent a $2.942 billion (2.0%) increase over FY2016; in constant dollars, federal R&D would be down $2.837 billion, or 1.9%. The DOD and VA would receive increased R&D funding for FY2018. The other major federal R&D funding agencies would see their R&D budgets reduced under the President's budget.
The request represents the President's R&D priorities; Congress may opt to agree with none, part, or all of the request, and it may express different priorities through the appropriations process. In particular, Congress will play a central role in determining the allocation of the federal R&D investment in a period of intense pressure on discretionary spending. Budget caps may limit overall R&D funding and may require movement of resources across disciplines, programs, or agencies to address priorities.
Funding for R&D is concentrated in a few departments and agencies. Under President Trump's FY2018 budget request, eight federal agencies would receive 96.5% of total federal R&D funding, with the Department of Defense (45.4%) and the Department of Health and Human Services (22.2%) combined accounting for more than two-thirds of all federal R&D funding.
President's Trump's FY2018 budget is largely silent on funding levels for a number of multiagency R&D initiatives in President Obama's FY2017 request, including the National Nanotechnology Initiative, Networking and Information Technology Research and Development program, U.S. Global Change Research Program, Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) initiative, Precision Medicine Initiative, Cancer Moonshot, Materials Genome Initiative, National Robotics Initiative, and National Network for Manufacturing Innovation. However, some activities supporting these initiatives are discussed in agency budget justifications and reported in the agency analyses in this report.
In recent years, Congress has completed the annual appropriations process after the start of the fiscal year. Failure to complete the process by the start of the fiscal year and the accompanying use of continuing resolutions can affect agencies' execution of their R&D budgets, including the delay or cancellation of planned R&D activities and the acquisition of R&D-related equipment. |
crs_R43172 | crs_R43172_0 | Introduction
In its budget proposal for FY2014, the Obama Administration proposed a "strategic review" of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal government corporation established by the Tennessee Valley Authority Act (TVA Act) (16 U.S.C. 831). In proposing the strategic review, the Administration says that TVA has achieved its original objectives, and thus no longer requires federal participation. The strategic review (to be conducted by the Office of Management and Budget) may thus consider options for addressing TVA's financial situation and its effect on the federal deficit, with divestiture of TVA (in whole or part) to be considered among the potential alternatives. The preamble to the TVA Act of 1933 lists flood control, reforestation, and agricultural and industrial development as primary considerations in the original establishment of the TVA. The Corporation shall charge rates for power which will produce gross revenues sufficient to provide funds for operation, maintenance, and administration of its power system; payments to States and counties in lieu of taxes; debt service on outstanding bonds, including provision and maintenance of reserve funds and other funds established in connection therewith; payments to the Treasury as a return on the appropriation investment pursuant to subsection (e) hereof; payment to the Treasury of the repayment sums specified in subsection (e) hereof; and such additional margin as the Board may consider desirable for investment in power system assets, retirement of outstanding bonds in advance of maturity, additional reduction of appropriation investment, and other purposes connected with the Corporation's power business having due regard for the primary objectives of the Act, including the objective that power shall be sold at rates as low as are feasible. Electric Power—An Industry in Transition
The electric power industry in the United States is in a period of transition. TVA Planning for Change
TVA is facing the same forces driving change as is the rest of the electric power industry. A primary concern has been the cost of complying with existing and anticipated emissions reduction requirements, which could make continued operation of many of TVA's aging coal-fired generation units not cost-effective, possibly resulting in their removal from service, perhaps permanently. The Obama Administration's 2014 budget projects that the capital costs to fulfill TVA's environmental responsibilities and modernize its aging generation system will likely cause TVA to exceed its $30 billion statutory cap on indebtedness. TVA's Statutory Debt Limit
TVA is required by the TVA Act to be self-supported using funds from the sale of electric power. The TVA Act also authorizes TVA to issue bonds, notes, or other forms of indebtedness up to $30 billion (total outstanding amount) at any one time. These instruments of indebtedness are used to provide financing for construction of power plants and other related capital needs. TVA currently has approximately $24.1 billion in indebtedness in outstanding bonds and notes, which counts toward the statutory cap of $30 billion (which has been in place since 1979). TVA's debts are paid solely from TVA's net proceeds for the sale of electricity. TVA's debts are not guaranteed by, nor are they obligations of, the federal government. However, while TVA pays for this debt principally using (non-federally guaranteed) bonds, the federal government still records TVA's debt as part of the federal deficit since it is a federal government corporation. Electricity Sales Fund TVA's Water Resource Management Programs
TVA's principal mission is arguably the minimization of flood damage and stewardship of navigation, with the dams on TVA's system being key to this mission. The operation of multiple use dams must therefore accommodate several objectives, and releases of water for hydroelectric generation must include these other uses. This option would allow TVA to fund the projected capital investment plan recommended by the 2011 IRP. Reduce the statutory limit. Such an option would likely involve a federal plan to restructure TVA's indebtedness, with a goal of either reducing or paying off TVA's indebtedness. In looking at the issue, Congress may want to:
Allow TVA to continue as it does, funding its needs from operating revenues, power program financing, and creative approaches to financing new power plant construction. Redefine TVA's status and designation as a government corporation. Since TVA debt securities are not obligations of the U.S. government and do not carry a government guarantee, TVA's current indebtedness has arguably little or no real impact on the federal budget. Consider modifying TVA's missions. Maximization of water flows for optimum power generation may not always be consistent with other demands of the river and reservoir system. | In its budget proposal for FY2014, the Obama Administration proposed a "strategic review" of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal government corporation established by the Tennessee Valley Authority Act (TVA Act) (16 U.S.C. 831) in 1933. The preamble to the TVA Act lists flood control, reforestation, and agricultural and industrial development as primary considerations in the original establishment of the TVA. TVA is now required by the TVA Act to be self-supported using funds from the sale of electric power.
The TVA Act authorizes TVA to issue bonds, notes, or other forms of indebtedness up to $30 billion at any one time. These instruments are used to provide financing for construction of power plants and other related capital needs. TVA currently has approximately $24.1 billion in indebtedness in outstanding bonds and notes which counts toward the statutory cap of $30 billion (which has been in place since 1979). TVA's debts are paid solely from TVA's net proceeds for the sale of electricity. TVA's debts are not guaranteed by, nor are they obligations of, the federal government. However, while TVA pays for this debt principally using bonds, the federal government still records TVA's debt as part of the federal deficit since it is a federal government corporation.
The electric power industry in the United States is in a period of transition, and TVA is facing the same forces driving change as is the rest of the electric power industry. Primary concerns include fuel cost issues of coal-fired power generation vs. natural gas, and the cost of complying with existing and anticipated environmental requirements, which could make continued operation of many of TVA's aging coal-fired generation units not cost-effective, and perhaps result in their retirement. The Obama Administration's FY2014 budget projects that the capital costs to fulfill TVA's environmental responsibilities and modernize its aging generation system will likely cause TVA to exceed its $30 billion statutory cap on indebtedness.
In proposing the strategic review, the Administration says that TVA has achieved its original objectives, and thus no longer requires federal participation. The strategic review may thus consider options for addressing TVA's financial situation and its effect on the federal deficit, with divestiture of TVA (in whole or part) to be considered among the potential alternatives, most of which would require amending the TVA Act. Congress may want to consider various options for TVA, which range from allowing TVA to continue as it does, funding its capital needs from operating revenues and power program financings, to modifying TVA's missions. Congress may also opt to redefine TVA's status and designation as a government corporation. Since TVA debt securities are not obligations of the U.S. government and do not carry a government guarantee, TVA's current indebtedness has arguably little or no real impact on the federal budget. Congress may also wish to examine the issue of TVA's indebtedness and investigate potential options. These may include raising the statutory limit thus allowing TVA to fund the projected investment, examining TVA's capital investment plans and process, investigating ways to reduce TVA's statutory cap with an eye to reducing the impact on the federal deficit, or looking at ways to restructure TVA's indebtedness, with a goal of either reducing or paying off TVA's indebtedness.
TVA's principal mission is arguably the minimization of flood damage and stewardship of water resources and navigation, with the dams on TVA's system being key to this mission and power generation arguably being a secondary concern. The operation of multiple use dams must be designed to accommodate several objectives, and releases of water for hydroelectric generation can also contribute to other water uses. Congress may want to consider how the navigation, flood control, and related missions may be safely and legally accomplished under a privatized scenario, since maximization of flows for optimum power generation may not be consistent with other demands of the river and reservoir system. |
crs_R40606 | crs_R40606_0 | At the November 2001 Ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Doha, Qatar, WTO member countries launched a new round of trade talks known as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). One of the negotiating objectives in the DDA called for "clarifying and improving disciplines" on trade remedies addressed in the WTO Antidumping Agreement, known formally as the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (hereinafter known as the Antidumping Agreement or ADA) and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereinafter the Subsidies Agreement or ASCM). Many WTO members regard trade remedy reform as a "make or break" issue in terms of their acceptance of any final DDA agreement. This report analyzes the issue in three parts. First, background information and contextual analysis are presented. Second, the report focuses on the WTO discussions on trade remedies and their part in the overall negotiations within the DDA. Third, the report presents a more specific overview of major reform proposals; for example, those that seek to end "zeroing," to mandatorily shorten the length that trade remedy duties can be assessed, or to provide special treatment for developing country WTO members. Background: U.S. Laws and WTO Agreements
This section provides an overview of U.S. trade remedy laws and procedures as well as an overview of the disciplines that the United States and other WTO members agreed to in the Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements. In addition, some countries who are frequent targets of trade remedy actions (many of whom are "nontraditional users") by "traditional" users (the United States, the European Union, and Australia, for example) claim that their industries are adversely affected by the use of trade remedy actions against them. In addition, many supporters believe that the existence of trade remedy laws helps to build support for increased trade liberalization because industries and workers that could be adversely affected by competing imports know that there is a "safety valve" that they can use to protect them from unfair trading practices or import surges. However, there are major themes that have emerged for which there seems to be broad support among WTO members. Developing countries are especially interested in seeing a mandatory rule applied to exports from their countries, and have also proposed that this practice could be included as part of a "special and differential treatment" package of trade concessions offered by developed nations to developing countries. U.S. U.S. The United States favors any revisions to the trade remedy rules that would "provide greater predictability in global trade and reduce the need to resort to trade remedy actions," because they would provide greater stability to world trade than any mandatory limits to the duration of trade remedy measures. These negotiations are also being carried out as part of the talks in the Negotiating Group on Rules. In a March 2010 report to the WTO Trade Negotiations Committee, the Chair of the rules negotiating group reported that the provisional mechanism is functioning well, but that consensus on the methodology for a implementing a permanent Transparency Mechanism has not been reached. Conclusion and Options for Congress
When Congress granted presidential Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) in 2002 ( P.L. ADA Proposals
Most of the proposed changes in the ADA, if adopted, could further restrict the ability of all WTO members to grant relief to import-competing industries. | At the November 2001 Ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Doha, Qatar, member countries launched a new round of trade talks known as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Discussions continue, although negotiations at this time seem to be at an impasse.
One of the negotiating objectives in the DDA called for "clarifying and improving disciplines" under the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agreement or ADA) and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies Agreement or ASCM). The frequent use of trade remedies by the United States and other developed nations—and increasingly, developing countries—has come under criticism by some WTO members as being protectionist. In a March 2010 report, the chairman of the rules negotiations mentioned that consensus had been reached on many technical issues, but that there was no agreement on the larger "political" issues.
Some in Congress cite U.S. use of trade remedies as necessary to protect U.S. firms and workers from unfair competition. Some also credit the existence of trade remedies with helping to increase public support for additional trade liberalization measures. These groups would like increased trade enforcement of trade remedies and intellectual property laws. Others in Congress, especially those who represent U.S. importers, manufacturers, and export-oriented businesses, tend to support liberalizing the ADA and ASCM, in ways that could make use of U.S. trade remedy laws less frequent and relief harder to obtain. For example, there is support in Congress for legislation that would require administering authorities to determine whether or not a trade remedy action is in the overall public interest before such a measure can be imposed.
DDA negotiations involve Congress because any trade agreement made by the United States must be implemented by legislation, thus Congress also has an important oversight role in trade negotiations. For example, preserving "the ability of the United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws" was included as a principal negotiating objective in legislation granting presidential Trade Promotion Authority—the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210).
In the WTO talks, the positions of major players in trade remedy talks are well-documented by position papers written by WTO members that are circulated through the WTO Negotiating Group on Rules. Major themes that have emerged include limiting the use of trade remedy actions in favor of "price undertakings," reducing the level of duties assessed per action by ending mandatory offsets (also known as "zeroing"), or limiting the duration of trade remedy measures through mandatory "sunset" reviews. Some members also support placing more restrictions on the ability of officials to grant relief to domestic industries through the use of economic interest tests and other administrative procedures and "special and differential treatment" for developing countries. Some countries see revision of the ADA and ASCM and other WTO disciplines on trade remedies as a "make or break" issue if the Doha Development Agenda is to succeed.
This report examines trade remedy issues in DDA in three parts. The first part provides background information and contextual analysis. The second section focuses on how these issues fit into the DDA. A third section provides a more specific overview of major reform proposals that are being considered. |
crs_RL33917 | crs_RL33917_0 | Forestry programs have been addressed in past farm bills and other agriculture legislation. It then presents information on the forestry provisions in the 2008 farm bill, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-246 ), organized by provisions in the forestry title and other provisions. It concludes with some forestry issues that were debated and that might be discussed in the next farm bill. Background
Both the House and Senate Committees on Agriculture have jurisdiction over "forestry in general" and acquired national forests. Forestry assistance is governed largely by the Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act of 1978 (CFAA; P.L. 95-313 ; 16 U.S.C. 107-171 ) contained a separate forestry title. It was not reauthorized, and thus has expired. Community Forest and Open Space Conservation Program
The farm bill (§ 8003) amended the CFAA to establish a Community Forest and Open Space Conservation Program. The program provides grants to local governments, Indian tribes, or nonprofit organizations to acquire lands threatened by conversion to non-forest uses and that provide economic, environmental, educational, and recreational benefits and serve as models of sustainable forest stewardship for other landowners. The portion to be competitively allocated was "to be determined by the Secretary," in consultation with the Forest Resource Coordinating Committee. Emergency Reforestation
The farm bill (§ 8203) added an Emergency Forest Restoration Program to the existing Emergency Conservation Program under Title IV of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1978 ( P.L. Illegal Logging
The farm bill (§ 8204) amended the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 ( P.L. National Forest Modifications
The bill included provisions affecting national forest lands:
§§ 8301 and 8303, modifying the boundary of the Green Mountain National Forest (VT), and authorizing the sale or exchange of specific lands to the Bromley Mountain Ski Resort, with specific directions on using any proceeds generated by the sale or exchange; § 8302(a)-(e), directing the conveyance, without consideration, of certain USDA lands in New Mexico to the Chihuahuan Desert Nature Park; and § 8302(f), directing the conveyance, without consideration, of certain lands in the George Washington National Forest (VA) to the Central Advent Christian Church of Alleghany County. Conservation
The conservation title of the 2008 farm bill (Title II) modified numerous agricultural conservation programs to include forestry practices on nonindustrial private forest lands as approved activities for the program. The section required technical guidelines to facilitate the development of environmental services markets, with priority on carbon markets. A provision (§ 3301) in the agricultural trade and aid title of the 2008 farm bill (Title III) added a new Title VIII (Softwood Lumber) to the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. The provision requires softwood lumber importers to declare imports and fees paid, allowing the federal government to verify and reconcile data on softwood lumber imports and to assure implementation of the Agreement. Woody Biomass Energy
The energy title of the 2008 farm bill (Title IX) included two provisions to expand the use of woody biomass in energy production. The other provision (§ 9013) created a new Community Wood Energy Program. Timber Tax Provisions
The tax and trade provisions of the 2008 farm bill (Title XV) included provisions affecting forests and forest landowners. Finally, several provisions (§§ 15312-15315) altered and clarified the tax treatment of timber real estate investment trusts (REITs). Nonetheless, interest groups have raised various forestry issues other than the authorization levels for possible discussion within a future farm bill, such as forestry assistance funding, wildfire protection, invasive species, economic diversity, and markets for ecosystem services that have not traditionally been marketed. Forestry is included in many conservation programs that provide financial assistance to private landowners, but FLEP was not reauthorized in the 2008 farm bill. | The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (the 2008 farm bill) became law P.L. 110-246 when the House and Senate voted to override President Bush's veto on June 18, 2008. The conference agreement on the bill (H.R. 2419) had been enacted, vetoed by the President, and overridden (P.L. 110-234), but inadvertently excluded the trade title. Both chambers repassed the conference agreement (with the trade title) as H.R. 6124; it was again vetoed and again overridden as P.L. 110-246.
The 2008 farm bill contained a forestry title and forestry provisions in other titles. General forestry legislation is within the jurisdiction of the Agriculture Committees, and past farm bills have included provisions addressing forestry, especially on private lands. Most federal forestry programs are permanently authorized, and thus do not require reauthorization in the farm bill.
The forestry title (Title VIII) of the 2008 farm bill amended the Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-313; 16 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2114) in several ways. It added national priorities for forestry assistance, required statewide forest assessments, created a new community forest and open space conservation program (to protect forests threatened with conversion to non-forest uses), established a new Coordinating Committee, added an Emergency Forest Restoration Program, and authorized competitive allocation for some forestry assistance funding. The title also directed cooperation and collaboration with Indian tribes, amended the Lacey Act to restrict imports of illegally logged wood products, authorized changes to certain national forest timber contracts, and provided grants to Hispanic-serving institutions. In addition, it reauthorized and extended four existing programs.
Other titles also contained provisions affecting forestry. The conservation title (Title II) modified most programs to include forestry activities and directed the creation of infrastructure for environmental services markets (including carbon markets). The trade title (Title III) included a section requiring lumber importers to report on imports and fees paid, to assure implementation of the 2006 U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement. The energy title (Title IX) included woody biomass in many programs. Finally, the tax title (Title XV) included provisions to authorize new tax-exempt forest conservation bonds, to modify income deductions for qualified timber income, and to modernize and clarify the tax treatment of timber real estate investment trusts (REITs).
Other forestry provisions were suggested by various interests, and might be considered in the next farm bill. Funding is one issue, as half the mandatory spending for the Forest Land Enhancement Program (FLEP) was cancelled and the program was not reauthorized. Protecting communities from wildfire continues to be a priority for some, while controlling invasive species is a priority for others. Assisting forest-dependent communities in diversifying their economies has also been debated. Finally, some have expressed interest in trying to provide payments for ecosystem services—forest values that have not traditionally been sold in the marketplace. |
crs_R44625 | crs_R44625_0 | Department of Veterans Affairs Overview
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a range of benefits and services to veterans and eligible dependents who meet certain criteria as authorized by law. These benefits include medical care, disability compensation and pensions, education, vocational rehabilitation and employment services, assistance to homeless veterans, home loan guarantees, administration of life insurance as well as traumatic injury protection insurance for servicemembers, and death benefits that cover burial expenses. 114-223 ) and the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs—Additional Appropriations Act, 2017 (Division L of P.L. The President's Budget Request for FY2017 and Congressional Action
President's Request
The President's FY2017 budget request for the Department of Veterans Affairs was submitted to Congress on February 9, 2016. The President's FY2017 VA request is approximately $177.54 billion. This amount, which includes $102.53 billion in mandatory funding and $75.01 billion in discretionary appropriations ( Table 1 ), is a 9.14% increase over the FY2016-enacted level of $162.67 billion. 114-223 ) on September 29, 2016. House Action
On April 13, 2016, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations bill ( H.R. 114-497 ). The House passed the measure on May 19. The House-passed measure provides a total of $176.06 billion for the VA, a slight decrease (0.83%) from the President's request of $177.54 billion and an 8.23% increase from the FY2016-enacted amount ( Table 1 ). This amount includes $102.53 billion in mandatory appropriations and $73.53 billion in discretionary appropriations. 4974 ; H.Rept. Senate Action
On April 14, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations bill ( S. 2806 ; S.Rept. 114-237 ). The Senate passed the FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations bill on May 19 as an appropriations package that included the FY2017 Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations bill (Division A), the FY2017 MILCON-VA bill (Division B), and the Zika Response Appropriations bill (Title V of Division B). The Senate-passed version of the FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations bill (Division B of H.R. 2577 ) provides a total of $177.39 billion for VA, a 9.04% increase over the FY2016-enacted level of $162.67 billion and slightly less than the President's request for FY2017. This amount includes $102.53 billion in mandatory appropriations and $74.85 billion in discretionary appropriations ( Table 1 ). Division A of the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act ( H.R. 5325 ; P.L. This included $102.53 billion for mandatory benefits and services and $74.36 billion for discretionary programs and services. VA Patient Protection Act of 201627
The FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations act also includes the VA Patient Protection Act of 2016 as an administrative provision. Section 247 of the FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations act would establish another process for VA employees to file whistleblower complaints. 101-12 , 103 Stat. 16; P.L. 103-424 , 108 Stat. 115-31, Division L)
On May 5, 2017, President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( H.R. The act provides $50 million for the medical services account for opioid and substance abuse prevention and treatment, and for implementation expenses related to the Jason Simcakoski Memorial and Promise Act ( P.L. 114-198 ). With this additional appropriation, the total amount provided for VA by Division A of P.L. 115-31 for FY2017 is approximately $176.94 billion. | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a range of benefits and services to veterans and eligible dependents who meet certain criteria as authorized by law. These benefits include medical care, disability compensation and pensions, education, vocational rehabilitation and employment services, assistance to homeless veterans, home loan guarantees, administration of life insurance as well as traumatic injury protection insurance for servicemembers, and death benefits that cover burial expenses.
The President's FY2017 budget request for the VA was submitted to Congress on February 9, 2016. The President's FY2017 request for VA is approximately $177.54 billion. This amount, which includes $102.53 billion in mandatory funding and $75.01 billion in discretionary appropriations, is a 9.14% increase over the FY2016-enacted level of $162.67 billion.
On April 13, 2016, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2017 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies (MILCON-VA) appropriations bill (H.R. 4974; H.Rept. 114-497). The House passed the measure on May 19. The House-passed measure provides a total of $176.06 billion for the VA, a slight decrease (0.83%) from the President's request of $177.54 billion and an 8.23% increase from the FY2016-enacted amount. This amount includes $102.53 billion in mandatory appropriations and $73.53 billion in discretionary appropriations.
On April 14, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations bill (S. 2806; S.Rept. 114-237). The Senate passed the FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations bill on May 19 as an appropriations package that included the FY2017 Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations bill (Division A); the FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations bill (Division B), and the Zika Response appropriations bill (Title V of Division B). The Senate-passed version of the FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations bill (Division B of H.R. 2577) provides a total of $177.39 billion for VA, a 9.04% increase over the FY2016-enacted level of $162.67 billion and slightly less than the President's request for FY2017. This amount includes $102.53 billion in mandatory appropriations and $74.85 billion in discretionary appropriations.
On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act (H.R. 5325; P.L. 114-223). Division A of this act contained the FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations act. P.L. 114-223 would provide $176.89 billion for VA for FY2017. This includes $102.53 billion in mandatory funding and $74.36 billion in discretionary funding. The act also contained several administrative provisions including, among others, fertility counseling and treatment using assisted reproductive technology (e.g., in vitro fertilization, IVF) for eligible veterans and their spouses or adoption reimbursement. It also included the VA Patient Protection Act of 2016, which would establish another process for VA employees to file whistleblower complaints in addition to the relief under the Whistleblower Protection Act (P.L. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16; P.L. 103-424, 108 Stat. 4361). On May 5, 2017, President Trump signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, which included the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs—Additional Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31, Division L). This act provides an additional $50 million for implementation costs associated with the Jason Simcakoski Memorial and Promise Act (Title IX of P.L. 114-198). Thus the total enacted amount provided for VA for FY2017 is $176.94 billion. This report provides an overview of VA appropriations; for a discussion on military construction appropriations, see CRS Report R44639, Military Construction: FY2017 Appropriations. |
crs_RS20855 | crs_RS20855_0 | Foreign Policy Budget for FY2002
RS20855 -- Foreign Policy Budget for FY2002
Updated April 12, 2001
Budget Overview
President Bush seeks $23.85 billion in discretionary budget authority for U.S. foreign policy activities in FY2002,representing a nominal increase of 5.3% over levels enacted for FY2001. (1)
PDF version
In real terms, taking into account the effects of inflation, international affairs resources proposed for next year are2.6%more than for FY2001 (Figure 1). Debt reduction and the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative. The largest foreign aid increase sought by the Bush Administrationwould supplement and broaden the $1 billion Colombia counternarcotics program funded in FY2000 with a new$731million Andean regional initiative. The FY2002 budget places specialemphasis onfour aspects of State Department operations. | The Bush Administration seeks a $23.85 billion foreign policy budget forFY2002, representing a nominal increase of 5.3% over FY2001 (2.3% in real terms when the effects of inflationare takeninto account). Most of the additional resources are concentrated in a few areas, especially for State Departmentoperationsand a new regional Andean counternarcotics initiative. The budget further proposes to cut funding for theExport-ImportBank by 25%. This report analyzes the FY2002 international affairs funding submission, compares it with recentlyenactedforeign policy budgets, identifies major priorities and recommended reductions, and discusses potentialcongressionalissues. It will be revised as the Administration provides further details in April and May about the FY2002 budget. |
crs_R44551 | crs_R44551_0 | Introduction
In February 2016, the United States signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 countries: Canada, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei. In addition, some observers have tied U.S. trade deficits to existing U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) by arguing that the agreements have worsened the trade deficit and, thereby, have negatively affected U.S. employment and wages. Both proponents and opponents of trade agreements often cite the results of these studies to support their respective positions. Estimating the Economic Effects of Trade Agreements
The TPP, considered by participants to be a high-standard and comprehensive agreement, is designed to eliminate and reduce trade barriers and establish and enhance trade rules and disciplines of the trading system among the parties to the agreement. Due to the limitations of data and other theoretical and practical issues involved with services, investment, and non-tariff barriers, most estimates of the economic and employment effects of trade and trade agreements focus narrowly on the goods sector, where data on trade and tariff rates are available, to estimate how demand for these goods may change as a result of changes in tariffs. At times, countries are motivated to participate in trade agreements to forestall this type of trade diversion. In contrast, economists Jeronim Capaldo and Alex Izurieta use a different model to develop their estimates of the impact of TPP. United States International Trade Commission
The United States International Trade Commission (ITC) is tasked by Congress to provide economic assessments of U.S. trade agreements: it released a comprehensive assessment of the economic impact of the TPP agreement in May 2016. Services exports were projected to increase by 0.6% and services imports by 1.2% by 2032. Peterson Institute for International Economics
An analysis conducted by Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer and published by the Peterson Institute for International Economics also used the GTAP model, assumed full employment, and made some adjustments to the standard GTAP model to estimate the economic impact of the TPP. This estimate concluded that the agreement would increase U.S. income and directly generate jobs in the U.S. economy. The study also estimated that the TPP could increase U.S. annual GDP by $131 billion, or 0.5% of GDP, and could increase annual exports by $357 billion, or 9.1% of U.S. exports, by 2030 when the TPP would be expected to be fully in force, as indicated in Table 6 . 2. 3. Tufts University, Global Development and Environment Institute
Tufts University's Global Development and Environment Institute sponsored another study of the economic impact of the TPP, using the United Nations Global Policy Model (GPM). This study differs markedly from the previous studies, because the GPM model is not a GTAP-type CGE model and the structure of the model and the assumptions that are used differ substantially from those used in the three previous examples. The study also estimates that the TPP will negatively affect growth and employment in non-TPP countries, with Europe losing 879,000 jobs and non-TPP developing countries projected to lose about 4.5 million jobs by 2025. The authors "assume" that this process would lower nominal unit labor costs through the combined actions of business managers and "policymakers" who negotiate lower wages; Contending that this process would affect the distribution of income between labor and business profits in favor of profits for businesses, thereby lowering labor's share of income, because the TPP would affect the incentives for countries to "tilt income distribution in favor of profits," which the authors analyze by "estimating the impact of changes in unit labor costs on international market shares;" Assuming that economic sectors of the economy that are affected negatively by the TPP agreement would create a demand shortfall in the economy, because, as a sector contracts, "other sectors may suffer as well," leading to "large job losses and drive the economy into recession;" Arguing that the TPP would push firms and other borrowers to seek higher returns in order to avoid losing investors. Part of the debate surrounding the agreement likely will focus on the potential impact of the agreement on the U.S. economy, particularly the effect on employment. Consequently, estimates of the impact of the TPP on the U.S. economy can vary from positive to negative, reflecting the importance of the assumptions that are used to derive the results. | Congress plays a major role in formulating and implementing U.S. trade policy through its legislative and oversight responsibilities. Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the authority to regulate foreign commerce, while the President has the authority to conduct foreign relations. In 2015, Congress reauthorized Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) that (1) sets trade policy objectives for the President to negotiate in trade agreements; (2) requires the President to engage with and keep Congress informed of negotiations; and (3) provides for Congressional consideration of legislation to implement trade agreements on an expedited basis, based on certain criteria. The United States is considering the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) among the United States and 11 other countries. The 12 TPP countries signed the agreement in February 2016, but the agreement must be ratified by each country before it can enter into force. In the United States this requires implementing legislation by Congress.
The agreement is viewed by the participants as a "comprehensive and high standard" mega-regional free trade agreement that may hold the promise of greater economic opportunities and closer economic and strategic ties among the negotiating parties.
For Members of Congress and others, international trade and trade agreements may offer the prospect of improved national economic welfare. Such agreements, however, have mixed effects on U.S. domestic and foreign interests, both economic and political. In considering the TPP, Congress likely will examine various economic studies to assess the impact of the agreement on the economy. The results of these studies vary depending on the model and the assumptions that are used to generate the results. The U.S. International Trade Commission is tasked with providing the official U.S. government estimate of the economic effects of the agreement. This report provides an analysis of various studies and information on the types of economic models that are used to assess the impact of trade agreements and the importance of the assumptions that are used in generating these estimates.
Estimating the employment effects from a trade agreement is imprecise because (1) estimates can vary widely as a result of the model and assumptions that are used; (2) limitations arise from the types of data available, particularly concerning non-tariff barriers; and (3) it is difficult to disentangle the effects of trade and trade agreements from other factors that affect the U.S. economy, among other things.
This report analyses some studies of the economic impact of TPP that are playing an important role in affecting the public policy debate, including the following:
U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC): estimated the TPP would increase annual U.S. GDP by 0.15%, and trade by 1.0% by 2032; U.S. annual employment would be higher by 128,000. Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer (Peterson Institute for International Economics) estimated that the TPP would increase annual GDP by 0.5% and increase U.S. exports by 9.0% by 2030. World Bank: estimated the TPP would increase U.S. GDP by 0.5% by 2030. Tufts University, Global Development and Environment Institute study by Jeronim Capaldo and Alex Izurieta: estimated that all TPP participants would lose 770,000 jobs and non-TPP developing economies would lose 4.5 million jobs. Other studies that use such proxy indicators as trade balances and jobs associated with exports to assess the impact of the TPP. |
crs_R41907 | crs_R41907_0 | The current call for a constitutional amendment to require a balanced budget reflects its status as one of the most persistent political issues of recent decades. 1 , that includes provisions that would require a super majority to allow a budget with outlays in excess of receipts, to allow outlays to exceed 18% of the "economic output" of the United States regardless of whether the budget were balanced, to increase the debt limit, or to increase revenues. Since the 1930s, dozens of proposals have been made to require a balanced budget, to limit the size or growth of the federal budget or of the public debt, or some combination of these ideas, including several notable recent efforts. Despite significant support for the concept of a balanced budget amendment, the failure to achieve a two-thirds vote of approval in both houses of Congress has been a reflection of the complexity of the issue, as well as unsettled questions concerning potential difficulties involved in implementing it. There have often been two almost separate debates occurring simultaneously on the subject of a balanced budget requirement: whether there should be a balanced budget and whether there should be a constitutional amendment. During previous congressional consideration of balanced budget amendments, questions of standing and judicial authority have been raised and debated, but no conclusive answers have been reached. Opponents also counter the arguments of the amendment's advocates that such a requirement would result in benefit to the economy generally. The resolution retained a modified version of the Nickles amendment in Section 14, expressing the sense of the Senate that it should vote by July 2 on a balanced budget amendment that included a requirement that the President submit a balanced budget, but that any amendment should be drafted or amended so as not to exacerbate any economic recession. 103 from the Judiciary Committee and provide for its consideration. As reported by the committee, H.J.Res. 112-25 ), was enacted on August 2, 2011. Title II of the bill states that the House and Senate shall vote on passage of a "Joint resolution proposing a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution of the Untied States" between September 20, 2011, and December 31, 2011. On November 18, 2011, the House concluded the specified five hours of debate and voted on H.J.Res. On December 14, 2011, the Senate voted on S.J.Res. 10 and S.J.Res. In addition, the measure includes a provision that would prohibit Congress from passing any measure that would provide a net reduction in income taxes for those individuals with annual incomes over one million dollars, if the measures' enactment would result in a deficit in the years affected by the bill. A Constitutional Convention
Article V of the Constitution describes two methods by which the Constitution can be changed. As a consequence, some opposition to a constitutional convention is based on concern regarding the scope of other possible amendments that might also be proposed for ratification as well as opposition to a balanced budget amendment in particular. After it failed to achieve the two-thirds vote necessary for a constitutional amendment in 1990, the House considered H.R. Many proposals also provide that the requirement for balance could be waived in certain circumstances. Of particular importance is the debt to be included in such a limitation. P.L. | One of the most persistent political issues facing Congress in recent decades is whether to require that the budget of the United States be in balance. Although a balanced federal budget has long been held as a political ideal, the accumulation of large deficits in recent years has heightened concern that some action to require a balance between revenues and expenditures may be necessary.
The debate over a balanced budget measure actually consists of several interrelated debates. Most prominently, the arguments of proponents have focused on the economy and the possible harm resulting from consistently large deficits and a growing federal debt. Another issue involves whether such a requirement should be statutory or made part of the Constitution. Some proponents of balanced budgets oppose a constitutional amendment, fearing that it would prove to be too inflexible for dealing with future circumstances.
Opponents of a constitutional amendment often focus on the difficulties of implementing or enforcing any amendment. Their concerns have been numerous and varied. How would such a requirement affect the balance of power between the President and Congress? Between the federal courts and Congress? Although most proponents would prefer to establish a balanced budget requirement as part of the Constitution, some advocates have suggested using the untried process provided under Article V of the Constitution for a constitutional convention as an alternative to a joint resolution passed by two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress. Although the inclusion of a balanced budget amendment as part of the congressional agenda has muted this debate in recent years, proposals for a convention are still possible, and raise concerns that one might open the way to an unpredictable series of reforms. The last American constitutional convention convened in May 1787 and produced the current Constitution.
These are also questions that will be raised and considered by Congress concerning the provisions that should be included in such a measure as it sifts through its options. Congress ultimately will decide whether consideration should be given to a constitutional requirement for a balanced budget; and if it decides to proceed, it will need to decide whether there should be exceptions to the requirement, or if it should include provisions such as a separate capital budget or a limitation on expenditures or revenues. For example, as reported from the House Judiciary Committee, H.J.Res. 1 in the 112th Congress includes provisions that would require a super majority to allow a budget with outlays in excess of receipts, to allow outlays to exceed 18% of the "economic output" of the United States regardless of whether the budget were balanced, to increase the debt limit, or to increase revenues. S. 365, enacted August 2, 2011 (P.L. 112-25), provides that the House and Senate vote on a balanced budget amendment between September 30, 2011, and December 31, 2011, and includes expedited procedures for its consideration. On November 18, 2011, the House voted on H.J.Res. 2, but did not achieve the two-thirds vote required for passage. On December 14, 2011, the Senate voted on S.J.Res. 10 and S.J.Res. 24, but neither measure achieved a majority vote.
This report provides an overview of the issues and options that have been raised during prior consideration of proposals for a balanced budget constitutional amendment. It will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41840 | crs_R41840_0 | Overview: U.S. Policy Priorities in Africa and the FY2012 Aid Request
The Obama Administration has requested $7.8 billion in bilateral foreign assistance for Africa in FY2012, which is designed to meet a number of objectives (see Figure 1 ). The wide range of U.S. policy objectives with regard to Africa reflects the continent's size and diversity. The design of U.S. aid to Africa therefore represents a challenge to U.S. policy makers in terms of balancing priorities and achieving strategic focus. Given the inability of many African countries to meet basic development and governance criteria—as a region, Africa is not on track to meet the U.N. Millennium Development Goals —policy makers often debate whether poor performance on the part of recipient governments justifies terminating or continuing aid. President Obama's Administration and recent Congresses have provided strong support for global health assistance, building on the sharp increase in U.S. global health commitments initiated by the Administration of former President George W. Bush. The FY2012 Request by the Numbers
The proposed FY2012 budget represents an increase of roughly 10% compared to FY2010 enacted levels for Africa ($7.1 billion; actual aid reached $8.1 billion with emergency humanitarian aid included), albeit at a more restrained growth rate than in previous years. (FY2011 enacted levels by region and program area are not yet available.) The proposed increases are concentrated in the areas of health, governance, and agriculture. Recent Trends and the Debate Over Foreign Aid
U.S. bilateral aid to African countries, adjusted for inflation, more than quadrupled over the past decade, from $1.4 billion in FY2002 to $8.1 billion in FY2010. The biggest increases occurred under the Bush Administration and were largely due to growth in global health spending—particularly focused on HIV/AIDS—with more moderate increases in economic and development aid and some security assistance programs ( Figure 2 ). Analysts, development practitioners, and aid advocates have also long debated the value and design of aid programs in Africa. Some further alleged that humanitarian aid in Africa had served to prolong conflicts and had empowered undemocratic regimes and rebel groups. Aid advocates countered that aid should be better designed or scaled up, not terminated, in order to achieve desired objectives, and that aid to Africa is a humanitarian imperative and in the U.S. national interest. Methods and metrics for evaluating aid's effectiveness and impact are also a topic of debate. Selected Issues for Congress
Congress authorizes, appropriates funding for, and oversees U.S. foreign assistance programs. Africa and the President's Global Foreign Assistance Initiatives
Over three-quarters of the Administration's FY2012 bilateral aid request for African countries (not including MCC funding) would be allocated toward implementing three presidential global foreign aid initiatives focused on health, food security, and mitigation of the impacts of global climate change. Africa bears the brunt of the world's global health challenges, accounting for close to 24% of the global "burden" of disease (as calculated by the World Health Organization) and grappling with some of the world's highest rates of malnutrition, infant mortality, and poor maternal and child health. These efforts have been underpinned by humanitarian concerns, but they have also been motivated by concerns over the potential security threats posed by emergent infectious diseases and epidemics. | Sub-Saharan Africa, the world's poorest region, receives over a quarter of all U.S. bilateral foreign assistance. Aid to Africa more than quadrupled over the past decade, primarily due to sizable increases in global health spending during the Bush Administration and more measured increases in development, economic, and security assistance. The Obama Administration's FY2012 bilateral Africa aid budget request, at $7.8 billion, represents an increase of roughly 10% compared to FY2010, albeit at a more restrained growth rate than in previous years (see "The FY2012 Request by the Numbers"). FY2011 enacted levels are not yet available by region. The proposed increases are concentrated in the areas of health, governance, and agriculture.
Significant aid increases since 2001 reflect, in part, changing perceptions of Africa's importance to U.S. national interests and security. They also reflect strong bipartisan support for global health assistance, which has dominated U.S. aid to Africa in recent years. Africa bears the brunt of the world's global health challenges, notably with regard to HIV/AIDS and malaria, and African governments generally lack sufficient capacity to confront the burden of disease on their own. U.S. health efforts in Africa, as elsewhere, have been underpinned by humanitarian concerns, but they have also been motivated by concerns over potential threats to global security. Nearly 70% of proposed FY2012 bilateral aid for African countries (not including Millennium Challenge Corporation funding) would go toward implementing President Obama's Global Health Initiative, which incorporates significant HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tropical disease programs initiated during the Bush Administration. (See "Africa and the President's Global Foreign Assistance Initiatives.")
The Obama Administration has identified a number of other policy objectives in Africa, including food security, democracy, economic growth, conflict prevention and mitigation, and addressing transnational threats. This range of objectives reflects the continent's size and diversity. It also challenges policy makers to balance foreign aid priorities and achieve strategic focus. While health programs represent the bulk of U.S. bilateral spending, other types of assistance, such as democracy promotion and security cooperation, may be more powerful in defining U.S. bilateral relations with African countries and in achieving U.S. diplomatic leverage. Given the inability of many African countries to meet basic development and governance criteria, policy makers often debate whether poor performance justifies terminating or, rather, continuing aid.
Analysts, practitioners, and aid advocates have long debated the value and design of aid programs in Africa. Critics allege that aid has done little to improve socioeconomic outcomes in Africa, and that in some cases it may serve to prolong conflicts or empower undemocratic regimes or rebel groups. Aid advocates counter that programs should be reformed or scaled up, not terminated, and that seeking to improve the welfare of impoverished populations abroad is both a humanitarian imperative and in the U.S. national interest. The methods and metrics for evaluating the effectiveness and impact of aid programs are also a topic of debate.
Congress authorizes, appropriates funding for, and oversees aid programs in Africa. U.S. assistance is also subject to a number of legislative restrictions imposed by Congress, including some which directly or indirectly pertain to African countries. (See "Selected Issues for Congress.") |
crs_R40646 | crs_R40646_0 | As a result, new attention has been drawn to the regulation of derivatives markets—and particularly toward the unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market, where transactions are not made on a public exchange market and where little information on trading and prices is available. What regulatory changes, if any, would reduce risks to the financial system from derivatives trading? A number of bills were introduced in the 111 th Congress, and several congressional committees held hearings. In the United States, major derivatives exchanges are regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC, which oversees the futures exchanges) and by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, which regulates stock option markets). The OTC market, by contrast, was largely unregulated until the Dodd-Frank Act. Several aspects of derivative finance may be implicated:
Complexity. Whether derivatives markets tend to exacerbate volatility is an unresolved question. Derivatives Legislation in the 111th Congress
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ( P.L. 111-203 ) enacted sweeping derivatives reforms. The provisions of Dodd-Frank are not summarized here, but are the subject of a separate CRS report—CRS Report R41398, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Title VII, Derivatives , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. In the OTC market, by contrast, a number of large financial intermediaries stand as dealers, who are willing to take the other side of their customers' trades. Any contracts exempted from the clearing requirement would still have to be reported to the CFTC. The bill would authorize federal regulators—the CFTC, the SEC, and the banking agencies—to exercise oversight over swaps entered into by financial institutions, persons, or other entities subject to their regulatory jurisdiction. The regulators are authorized (but not required) to impose disclosure, reporting, or recordkeeping requirements. Can traders avoid speculative position limits by trading on ICE, in addition to (or instead of) Nymex? Key elements of the plan include the following:
requiring that all standardized OTC derivatives are cleared through regulated central counterparties, and executed in regulated and transparent venues; increasing transparency in the OTC derivatives market, including developing a system for timely reporting of trades and prompt dissemination of prices and trading information; introducing reporting and record-keeping requirements on all OTC derivatives; preventing market manipulation, fraud and other abuses, including by amending the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) and any securities laws to ensure the CFTC and SEC have clear authority to prevent and police market abuses; monitoring activities broadly in the OTC derivatives markets and ensuring they don't pose systemic risks to the financial system; strengthening regulation of OTC derivatives dealers and ensuring these products are not sold inappropriately to unsophisticated customers; bolstering the Federal Reserve's authority over derivatives markets infrastructure, such as clearing and settlement systems; and harmonizing the statutory and regulatory regimes for securities and futures. To make the OTC derivatives oversight regime more robust, the Administration also proposed the introduction of conservative capital requirements—namely, requirements more conservative than existing bank regulatory capital requirements for OTC derivatives—and also conservative requirements for initial margins on derivatives trades in order to hedge counterparty credit exposures in those trades. | In the wake of the financial crisis and unusual oil price volatility, new attention was drawn to the regulation of derivatives—and particularly toward the unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market. What regulatory changes, if any, would reduce risks to the financial system from derivatives trading? A number of bills were introduced in the 111th Congress, and several congressional committees have held hearings. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) enacted a sweeping reform of derivatives trading and oversight and brought the unregulated OTC swaps market under the jurisdiction of federal regulators.
The 111th Congress proposals for reform ran the gamut from requiring all derivatives trading to occur on regulated exchanges—essentially shutting down the unregulated OTC market that exists today—to permitting OTC trading to continue, but with more disclosure and oversight. Some participants in the OTC markets have noted that the lack of transparency is in and of itself an attraction, allowing them to take large speculative positions without other market participants being aware of their identities or trading positions. In the crisis, however, this lack of transparency appears to have exacerbated fears about potential losses faced by financial institutions and made banks less willing to lend. Dodd-Frank requires that all OTC derivatives be reported to swap data repositories, and that key market information be made public.
Before Dodd-Frank, various derivative products were subject to different legal frameworks. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) was the lead federal agency, but the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Reserve, and other banking regulators also had jurisdictional claims. Under Dodd-Frank, this regulatory complexity continues, with the SEC given jurisdiction over most security-based swaps, the CFTC regulating other swaps, and the other regulators in a variety of consulting roles.
A key OTC market reform is to mandate the use of central counterparties (CCPs)—or clearinghouses—to process derivatives trades and thereby hopefully reduce risk and increase transparency. (Such clearinghouses have long been a standard feature of the regulated futures exchanges.) The Dodd-Frank Act included an exemption from the clearing requirement for nonfinancial end-users, who use derivatives to hedge the commercial risks of their businesses.
Additional proposals focused on new record-keeping or reporting requirements for OTC trades; audit trails; position limits; large trader reporting requirements; and increasing regulatory oversight of trading. An additional important question, for which Congress's tools may be limited, is how to ensure regulatory harmonization with other international markets, so as to avoid a "race to the bottom" in derivatives regulation.
The Dodd-Frank derivatives provisions are summarized in CRS Report R41398, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Title VII, Derivatives, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and current legislation is discussed in CRS Report R42129, Derivatives Legislation in the 112th Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
This report summarizes other derivatives legislation that was considered but not enacted by the 111th Congress, and it provides background on the derivatives market. |
crs_R40157 | crs_R40157_0 | This has raised the profile of economic insecurity caused by the recession. Public Policy Toward Low-Income Families with Children: Rewarding and Requiring Work
Current public policy toward low-income families with able-bodied adults emphasizes work. This work-based approach toward economic disadvantage and poverty among children evolved over several decades, culminating in several legislative initiatives in the mid-1990s. The 1996 welfare reform law ( P.L. In December 2008, the cash welfare caseload had fallen to 65% below the December 1994 caseload figure. In 2008, the welfare recipiency rate among poor children stood at 22%—down from about 60% before welfare reform. The Recession, Unemployment, and the Economically Disadvantaged
The current recession is the second one to test the work-based policies put into place in the mid-1990s and directed toward poor families with children. Since the beginning of the recession in December 2007, unemployment rates for all groups have increased as the economy slumped. There is cause for concern about the state of the "safety net" for workers and families who were economically disadvantaged before the recession. Unemployment insurance (UI) is the primary government program to help the involuntarily unemployed replace a portion of their lost earnings. Less than 25% of unemployed leavers applied for UI. cannot receive UI. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and Disadvantaged Families with Children
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) provides states with incentives and funds to rethink the safety net for disadvantaged families with children. In particular, disadvantaged families with children could be affected by ARRA's provisions to enhance UI for low income families, provide additional TANF funding to allow the expansion of need-based assistance, or both. The ARRA includes several provisions that can enhance UI for low-wage workers. The TANF block grant provides states with fixed funding but broad authority to use federal TANF funds (and associated state funds) on a wide range of benefits and services to aid needy families and to reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies and promote two-parent families. Absent additional funding, states bear the risk of an increase in recession-related costs, including increases in the cash welfare caseload. It appropriated $5 billion to the fund for these two years. The emergency contingency fund will reimburse states for 80% of increased expenditures for basic assistance, non-recurrent short-term benefits, and subsidized employment expenditures up to a cap. Reimbursement for basic assistance under the temporary emergency fund is contingent upon increases in basic assistance caseloads. Through that date, 15 states had claimed emergency contingency funds totaling $563 million. Of these funds, $180 million had gone to the states as outlays. Expanding TANF's Role to Respond to a Recession? Critics of the ARRA provision establishing the temporary emergency contingency fund argue that the extra funding will provide states with the incentive to increase their welfare rolls. Cash Welfare for Needy Families With Children
Though the emergency TANF fund can be used for a wide range of economic supports for families during the recession, its first use is likely to be paying for increased cash welfare caseloads. Table 4 provides TANF cash welfare benefits by state for 2008. Still, concerns about increased welfare dependency might lead to a debate at the state level about how to use the new ARRA funds. There could also be concerns that the rules of cash welfare—that limit countable job search and require quick returns to employment—might not meet the needs of families thrown into poverty by the recession. In FY2006, states expended only $289 million on non-recurrent short-term benefits and $103 million in wage subsidies to employers. | The recession that began in December 2007 has raised issues about policies to address the threats to the economic security of people and families from an economic downturn. Families that were economically disadvantaged before the recession are highly likely to face risks to their well-being—unemployment rates for women maintaining families, minorities, and those with less than a high school education are above the average for all workers.
The emphasis of public policy for low-income families with children with able-bodied parents is supporting and requiring work. The system of needs-based cash benefits underwent major changes over several decades, culminating in policy changes in the mid-1990s that included the major welfare reform law of 1996. The current recession is the first real test of how policies put in place in the mid-1990s affect the well-being of families with children during a steep economic downturn and high unemployment. Unemployment insurance (UI) is the major program to replace lost wages for unemployed workers. However, low-wage workers and those with intermittent employment are less likely to receive UI than higher-wage workers with stronger labor force attachment. In the past, the "safety net" for families with children included cash welfare. The 1996 welfare reform law created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant with fixed funding and altered rules that apply to the cash welfare caseload and gave states enhanced flexibility in designing benefits and services for needy families with children. The cash welfare caseload declined by two-thirds from 1994 to 2008 and stood at 1.8 million families in December 2008, just above the post-welfare reform low of 1.7 million families in July 2008. The share of poor children receiving TANF plummeted from over 60% before welfare reform to 22% by 2008.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) provides states with incentives and funds to rethink the safety net for disadvantaged families with children. First, it provides states with funding incentives to expand UI for low-income workers. This permits states to expand social insurance to respond to the recession. ARRA also provides additional funding to the states through TANF to finance recession-related expenditures. It establishes a temporary, $5 billion "emergency" contingency fund that will reimburse states for 80% of increased expenditures for basic assistance, non-recurrent short-term benefits, and subsidized employment expenditures for fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Emergency funds for basic assistance are contingent on increases in the basic assistance caseload. Through September 11, 2009, 15 states have been granted emergency funds totaling $563 million with $180 million in outlays.
ARRA's new funds to pay for increased basic assistance (i.e. cash welfare) have raised the question of whether the newly available funds will serve to promote welfare dependency. Historically, cash welfare caseloads often increase when unemployment increases, so it could be argued that the additional funds will pay for caseload rises caused by systemic economic forces (e.g. a world-wide recession). However, concerns about increasing welfare dependency, as well as concerns that traditional cash welfare might not meet the needs of those thrown into poverty by the recession, could lead to debates at the state level about how best to use these new TANF funds. Since TANF provides states with broad flexibility, ARRA's additional TANF funding could be used for new programs, such as short-term benefits, subsidized employment programs, and community service programs, in addition to or instead of increased traditional cash welfare. This report will be updated. |
crs_R42639 | crs_R42639_0 | Introduction
The 115 th Congress has continued to debate the role of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the Western Hemisphere and its utility for advancing U.S. objectives in the region. The United States helped found the OAS in 1948 to establish a multilateral forum in which the nations of the hemisphere could engage one another and address issues of mutual concern. As Congress continues to debate the utility of the OAS for advancing U.S. policies and considers appropriations and other legislation related to the organization, it might examine OAS activities in the hemisphere and the extent to which those activities align with U.S. objectives. According to the OAS Charter, as amended, the purpose of the organization is to
strengthen the peace and security of the continent; promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention; prevent possible causes of difficulties and ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among member states; provide for common action on the part of those states in the event of aggression; seek the solution of political, juridical, and economic problems that may arise among them; promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social, and cultural development; eradicate extreme poverty, which constitutes an obstacle to the full democratic development of the peoples of the hemisphere; and achieve an effective limitation of conventional weapons that will make it possible to devote the largest amount of resources to the economic and social development of member states. The United States is the top source of funding for the OAS, contributing an estimated $68 million in FY2017, which was equivalent to 44% of the organization's approved budget. U.S. voluntary contributions are intended to advance U.S. strategic goals in the organization and region. The Multilateral Aid Review Act of 2017, S. 1928 , which was reported in the Senate in November 2017, would establish a multilateral review task force to assess the effectiveness of U.S. investments in the OAS and other multilateral institutions. A companion bill, H.R. 4502 , was introduced in the House in November 2017. The reports ( H.Rept. 115-253 and S.Rept. 115-152 ) accompanying the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measures for FY2018 that were passed by the House ( H.R. 3362 , included as Division G of House-passed H.R. 3354 ) and reported in the Senate ( S. 1780 ) recommend several U.S. voluntary contributions to the OAS. Issues for Congress
Congress plays an important role in determining U.S. policy toward the OAS. Congress appropriates funds for the assessed contribution of the United States, as well as voluntary contributions to support specific projects in the hemisphere. Some Members of Congress have criticized the OAS for failing to address the erosion of democratic institutions in countries such as Venezuela and Nicaragua, and have questioned whether the organization is meeting its obligations. The 115 th Congress has sought to utilize the OAS as part of its broader efforts to address the deterioration of democracy in Venezuela. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ), Congress appropriated $4.5 million in voluntary contributions to the OAS for programs to promote and protect human rights. While some U.S. policymakers have expressed support for ratification, others have raised concerns about potential conflicts with U.S. law and international interference in U.S. domestic affairs. They opposed President Obama's efforts to normalize relations with Cuba and have lauded President Trump's decision to partially roll back U.S. engagement. Nevertheless, even when member states are incapable of establishing consensus on a given issue, the OAS continues to carry out a variety of activities to advance the organization's broad objectives: democracy promotion, human rights protection, economic and social development, and regional security cooperation. At the same time, OAS actions (or the lack thereof) do not always align with the organization's stated objectives, and the U.S. government's ability to advance its policy initiatives in the organization has declined over the past 15 years. | The Organization of American States (OAS) is a regional multilateral organization that includes all 35 independent countries of the Western Hemisphere (though Cuba currently does not participate). It was established in 1948 as a forum in which the nations of the hemisphere could engage one another and address issues of mutual concern. Today, the OAS concentrates on four broad objectives: democracy promotion, human rights protection, economic and social development, and regional security cooperation. It carries out a variety of activities to advance these goals, often providing policy guidance and technical assistance to member states. The United States is the largest financial contributor to the OAS, providing an estimated $68 million in FY2017—equivalent to 44% of the organization's total budget.
U.S. Policy
The United States historically has sought to use the OAS to advance economic, political, and security objectives in the Western Hemisphere. Although OAS actions frequently reflected U.S. policy during the 20th century, this has changed to a certain extent over the past 15 years. The organization's goals and day-to-day activities are still generally consistent with U.S. policy toward the region, but the U.S. government has struggled to obtain support from other member states on some high-profile issues, such as efforts to address the political crisis in Venezuela.
As the OAS's decisions have begun to reflect the increasing independence of its member states, U.S. policymakers occasionally have expressed concerns about the direction of the organization. In recent years, some Members of Congress have criticized the OAS for failing to address the erosion of democratic institutions in Venezuela and other nations and have questioned whether the United States should continue to fund the organization. Others argue that the OAS remains an important forum for advancing U.S. relations with the other nations of the hemisphere and that U.S. policy should seek to strengthen the organization and make it more effective.
Congressional Action
The 115th Congress has continued to shape U.S. policy toward the OAS through its legislative and oversight activities. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), provided funding for the U.S. assessed contribution (membership dues) to the OAS, as well as $14.5 million in voluntary contributions to support the organization's anticorruption, human rights, democracy, and development assistance programs. Congress has yet to conclude action on FY2018 appropriations, but the House and Senate Appropriations Committees both have recommended providing voluntary contributions to the OAS in the reports (H.Rept. 115-253 and S.Rept. 115-152) accompanying their respective FY2018 foreign operations appropriations bills (H.R. 3362, included as Division G of House-passed H.R. 3354, and S. 1780). In November 2017, the Multilateral Aid Review Act of 2017 (S. 1928) was reported in the Senate and a companion bill (H.R. 4502) was introduced in the House. The measures would establish a multilateral review task force to assess the effectiveness of U.S. investments in the OAS and other multilateral institutions.
Congress also has held hearings to examine U.S. policy toward the OAS. On November 30, 2017, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing to consider President Trump's nomination of Carlos Trujillo to be the U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS. The committee reported the nomination favorably, but Trujillo has yet to receive a confirmation vote from the full Senate. On February 14, 2018, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, held a hearing on "Advancing U.S. Interests through the Organization of American States." |
crs_RS21049 | crs_RS21049_0 | As in recent years, the State Department maintained in the 2015 terrorism report that the primary terrorist threats in Latin America stemmed from two Colombian guerrilla groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—responsible for the majority of terrorist attacks in the region. The Colombian government has been involved in peace talks with the FARC since 2012, and it concluded and signed a peace agreement with the FARC in September 2016. Colombian voters rejected the agreement in a national plebiscite in early October 2016, but the Colombian government and the FARC reached a new agreement on November 12, 2016, which was approved by Colombia's Congress at the end of that month. The 2015 terrorism report also stated that South America and the Caribbean served as areas of financial and ideological support for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia. It touched on the issue of individuals from South America and the Caribbean leaving the region to fight with the Islamic State. This ultimately led to the Secretary of State rescinding Cuba's designation in May 2015. Venezuela currently is on the State Department's annual list of countries determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act. Venezuela has been on the list since 2006 and, as a result, has been subject to a U.S. arms embargo. (For more see " Iran's Activities in Latin America ," below.) Both Iran and Hezbollah, the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group and U.S.-designated FTO with which Iran has strong ties, are reported to be linked to two bombings against Jewish targets in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in the early 1990s: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy, which killed 30 people, and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA), which killed 85 people. In recent years, the United States has employed various policy tools to combat terrorism in the Latin America and Caribbean region, including sanctions, antiterrorism assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the OAS. U.S. Sanctions
The United States currently imposes sanctions on two groups in Colombia (ELN and FARC) and one group in Peru (SL) designated by the Department of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. With regard to Hezbollah, the Treasury Department also has imposed sanctions on numerous individuals and companies in Latin America for providing support to Hezbollah. In the 114 th Congress, two Senate resolutions were introduced related to the AMIA bombing. S.Res. 167 (Rubio), introduced in May 2015, would have called for a swift, transparent, and internationally backed investigation into the tragic death of Alberto Nisman (the special prosecutor in the AMIA investigation); expressed concern about Iran's activities in Argentina and all of the Western Hemisphere; and urged the President to continue to monitor Iran's activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. S.Res. 620 (Coons), introduced November 29, 2016, would have, among its provisions, encouraged the government of Argentina to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the 1994 AMIA bombing as well as the death of Nisman. Cuba. As discussed above, for a number of years, the State Department had noted in its annual terrorism report Cuba's harboring of fugitives wanted in the United States. The House-passed version of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), H.R. 4909 , had a provision that would have prohibited funds in the act for any bilateral military-to-military contact or cooperation pending certification from the Secretaries of State and Defense that Cuba has fulfilled numerous conditions, including Cuba's return of U.S. fugitives wanted by the Department of Justice; ultimately the language regarding fugitives was not included in the conference report to the FY2017 NDAA ( H.Rept. In April 2016, the House approved H.R. 4482 (McSally), which would have required the Secretary of Homeland Security to prepare a southwest border threat analysis and strategic plan, including efforts to detect and prevent terrorists and instruments of terrorism from entering the United States. Oversight Hearings. The 114 th Congress continued its oversight of terrorism concerns in Latin America and the Caribbean. | Compared to other parts of the world, the potential threat emanating from terrorism is low in most countries in Latin America. Most terrorist acts occur in the Andean region of South America, committed by two Colombian guerrilla groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—and one Peruvian guerrilla group, the Shining Path (SL). All three of these groups have been designated by the U.S. State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). The FARC, however, has been engaged in peace negotiations with the Colombian government since 2012, culminating in a peace accord signed in September 2016. Although the accord was narrowly rejected by a national plebiscite in early October, both sides hammered out a new peace accord in November 2016, which was ratified by Colombia's Congress at the end of that month. Negotiations between the Colombian government and the smaller ELN had several false starts in 2016, although to date formal talks with the government have not started. The Shining Path has been significantly diminished because of Peruvian military operations.
For a number of years, there has also been U.S. concern about Iran's increasing activities in the region as well as those of Hezbollah, the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group with close ties to Iran. Both are reported to be linked to the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) that killed 85 people in Buenos Aires. More recently, U.S. concerns have included financial and ideological support in South America and the Caribbean for the Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS), including the issue of individuals from the region leaving to fight with the Islamic State.
The United States employs various policy tools to counter terrorism in the region, including sanctions, antiterrorism assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the Organization of American States (OAS). In addition to sanctions against U.S.-designated FTOs in the region, the United States has imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela since 2006 because the Department of State has determined that Venezuela is not fully cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. The United States has also imposed sanctions on several current and former Venezuelan officials for assisting the FARC and on numerous individuals and companies in Latin America for providing support to Hezbollah. Cuba had been on the State Department's so-called list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982, but in May 2015, the Obama Administration rescinded Cuba's designation as part of its overall policy shift on Cuba.
Legislative Initiatives and Oversight
The 114th Congress continued oversight of terrorism concerns in the Western Hemisphere, with House hearings on the activities of Iran and Hezbollah, the peace agreement in Colombia, border security management and concerns, and terrorist financing in South America.
Several legislative initiatives were introduced in the 114th Congress but ultimately not approved. The House passed H.R. 4482 (McSally) in April 2016, which would have required the Secretary of Homeland Security to prepare a southwest border threat analysis and strategic plan, including efforts to detect and prevent terrorists and instruments of terrorism from entering the United States.
With regard to the AMIA bombing and Iran, two Senate resolutions were introduced: S.Res. 167 (Rubio) would have called for an internationally backed investigation into the January 2015 death of the AMIA special prosecutor in Argentina, Alberto Nisman, and urged the President to continue to monitor Iran's activities in Latin America and the Caribbean, and S.Res. 620 (Coons) would have, among its provisions, encouraged Argentina to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the AMIA bombing and the death of Nisman.
Several initiatives dealt with Cuba's harboring of U.S.-wanted fugitives, an issue that had been noted for many years in the State Department's annual terrorism report. A provision in the House version of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), H.R. 4909, would have prohibited funding for any bilateral military-to-military contact or cooperation pending certification that Cuba had fulfilled numerous conditions, including Cuba's return of U.S. fugitives; ultimately, the language regarding fugitives was not included in the conference report to the FY2017 NDAA. (For more information on these and other bills, see "Legislative Initiatives and Oversight," below.) |
crs_R44967 | crs_R44967_0 | A rticle III of the Constitution establishes the judicial branch of the federal government. Notably, it empowers federal courts to hear "cases" and "controversies." Additionally, the Constitution creates a federal judiciary with significant independence, providing federal judges with life tenure and prohibiting diminutions of judges' salaries. The Exceptions Clause in Article III grants Congress the power to make "exceptions" and "regulations" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Congress sometimes exercises this power by "stripping" federal courts of jurisdiction to hear a class of cases. Indeed, Congress has even eliminated a court's jurisdiction to review a particular case in the midst of litigation. More generally, Congress may influence judicial outcomes by amending the substantive law underlying particular litigation of interest to the legislature. These practices have, at times, raised separation-of-powers concerns about whether the legislative branch is impermissibly interfering with the judicial power to resolve cases and controversies independently. Long ago in Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court announced that the Constitution, by granting the judicial branch the power to decide "cases" and "controversies," necessarily grants the judiciary the power to "say what the law is." Sometimes butting up against this principle is the understanding that "Congress has the power (within limits) to tell the courts what classes of cases they may decide," as well as to enact legislation that may have an effect on pending cases being adjudicated by the federal courts. This report examines a series of Supreme Court rulings that have considered separation-of-powers-based limitations on the Exceptions Clause, congressional jurisdiction stripping, and the ability of Congress to amend laws with the purpose of directly impacting pending litigation. The Court's jurisprudence in this area largely begins with the Reconstruction-era case United States v. Klein, and culminates in the Court's 2018 ruling, Patchak v. Zinke . In Klein, the Supreme Court generally held that Congress may not, by limiting appellate jurisdiction, dictate a "rule of decision" that undermines the independence of the judiciary. But in the 2016 opinion, Bank Markazi v. Peterson —the Court's penultimate ruling interpreting Klein —the Court seemed to minimize the import of Klein, noting that while Congress cannot invade the judicial role by dictating how courts rule in a particular case, Congress is permitted to amend the substantive law in a manner that may alter the outcome of pending litigation. The Patchak litigation highlighted the potential for tension between the judiciary's and legislature's powers when Congress removes a class of cases from federal jurisdiction in a way that functionally shapes the outcome of pending litigation. Though poised to clarify the limits of Klein when it granted the petition for certiorari in Patchak , ultimately, the Supreme Court issued a fractured 4-2-3 opinion, adding relatively little clarity to this complex area of the law. Although all nine Justices agreed that Congress cannot expressly dictate the outcome of a particular case, a majority of Justices could not agree on when a facially neutral law that functionally ends pending litigation in the favor of one party violates Article III. In Patchak, all the Justices appear to agree that Congress cannot say "In Smith v. Jones, Smith wins." | Article III of the Constitution establishes the judicial branch of the federal government. Notably, it empowers federal courts to hear "cases" and "controversies." The Constitution further creates a federal judiciary with significant independence, providing federal judges with life tenure and prohibiting diminutions of judges' salaries. But the Framers also granted Congress the power to regulate the federal courts in numerous ways. For instance, Article III authorizes Congress to determine what classes of "cases" and "controversies" inferior courts have jurisdiction to review. Additionally, Article III's Exceptions Clause grants Congress the power to make "exceptions" and "regulations" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Congress sometimes exercises this power by "stripping" federal courts of jurisdiction to hear a class of cases. Congress has gone so far as to eliminate a court's jurisdiction to review a particular case in the midst of litigation. More generally, Congress may influence judicial resolutions by amending the substantive law underlying particular litigation of interest to the legislature.
Congress has, at times, used these powers to influence particular judicial outcomes, raising concerns about whether Congress is acting in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers by interfering with the judiciary's power to resolve cases and controversies independently. In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court announced that the Constitution, by granting the judicial branch the power to decide "cases" and "controversies," in turn grants the judiciary the power to "say what the law is." Sometimes competing with this principle is the understanding that the Constitution empowers a democratically elected branch—Congress—to decide what classes of cases the federal courts may review, as well as to enact legislation that courts may need to interpret.
This report highlights a series of Supreme Court rulings that have examined separation-of-powers-based limitations on the Exceptions Clause, congressional jurisdiction stripping, and the ability of Congress to amend laws with the purpose of directly impacting litigation. The Court's jurisprudence largely begins with the Reconstruction-era case, United States v. Klein, and leads to Patchak v. Zinke, from the October 2017 term.
In Klein, the Supreme Court generally held that Congress may not, by limiting appellate jurisdiction, dictate a "rule of decision" that undermines the independence of the judiciary. But in the 2016 opinion Bank Markazi v. Peterson, the Court appeared to minimize Klein's significance, noting that while Congress cannot invade the judicial role by dictating how courts rule in a particular case, Congress has significant authority to amend the substantive law in a manner that may alter the outcome of pending litigation, even if the amendment specifically mentions a particular case. The Patchak litigation highlighted the potential for tension between the judiciary's and legislature's powers when Congress removes a class of cases from federal jurisdiction in a way that impacts pending litigation. The Supreme Court ultimately issued a fractured 4-2-3 opinion, adding little clarity to this complex area of the law. Although nine Justices agreed that Congress cannot dictate the outcome of a particular case, for instance, by enacting a law that says, "In Smith v. Jones, Smith wins," a majority of Justices could not agree on when a facially neutral law that functionally ends pending litigation in the favor of one party violates Article III. |
crs_R40614 | crs_R40614_0 | The United States is a party to numerous security agreements with other nations. The topics covered, along with the significance of the obligations imposed upon agreement parties, may vary. Some international security agreements entered by the United States, such as those obliging parties to come to the defense of another in the event of an attack, involve substantial commitments and have traditionally been entered as treaties, ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate. Other agreements dealing with more technical matters, such as military basing rights or the application of a host country's laws to U.S. forces stationed within, are entered more routinely and usually take a form other than treaty. Regardless of the form of a security arrangement, Congress has several tools which enable it to exercise oversight regarding the negotiation, form, conclusion, and implementation of the agreement by the United States. This report begins by providing a general background as to the types of international agreements that are binding upon the United States, as well as considerations affecting whether they take the form of a treaty or an executive agreement. Next, the report examines historical precedents, with specific attention paid to past agreements entered with Afghanistan, Iraq, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Finally, the report discusses the oversight role that Congress exercises with respect to entering and implementing international agreements involving the United States. I. On May 2, 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama and Afghan President Hamid Karzai signed the Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Strategic Partnership Agreement). The Strategic Partnership Agreement is a legally binding agreement under which the parties pledge to work cooperatively in a number of fields, including on promoting shared democratic values, advancing long-term security, reinforcing regional security, social and economic development, and strengthening Afghan institutions and governance. In the area of security, the Strategic Partnership Agreement provides that the United States and Afghanistan shall "initiate negotiations on a Bilateral Security Agreement … with the goal of concluding within one year" an agreement to replace the current agreement relating to the status of military and civilian personnel currently in Afghanistan. The Declaration announced the intention of the parties to negotiate a long-term security agreement that would have committed the United States to provide security assurances to Iraq and maintain a long-term military presence in that country. This announcement became a source of congressional interest, in part because of statements by Administration officials that such an agreement would not be submitted to the legislative branch for approval. Congressional concern dissipated when U.S.-Iraq negotiations culminated in the signing of two separate agreements on November 17, 2008, neither of which provided for a long-term security commitment by the United States: (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Iraq (Strategic Framework Agreement), and (2) the Agreement Between the United States of America and Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq (Security Agreement). | The United States is a party to numerous security agreements with other nations. The topics covered, along with the significance of the obligations imposed upon agreement parties, may vary. Some international security agreements entered by the United States, such as those obliging parties to come to the defense of another in the event of an attack, involve substantial commitments and have traditionally been entered as treaties, ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate. Other agreements dealing with more technical matters, such as military basing rights or the application of a host country's laws to U.S. forces stationed within, are entered more routinely and usually take a form other than treaty (i.e., as an executive agreement or a nonlegal political commitment).
Occasionally, the substance and form of a proposed security agreement may become a source of dispute between Congress and the executive branch. In late 2007, the Bush Administration announced its intention to negotiate a long-term security agreement with Iraq that would have committed the United States to provide security assurances to Iraq and maintain a long-term military presence in that country. This announcement became a source of congressional interest, in part because of statements by Administration officials that such an agreement would not be submitted to the legislative branch for approval. Congressional concern dissipated when U.S.-Iraq negotiations culminated in an agreement that did not contain a long-term security commitment by the United States, but instead called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011.
On May 2, 2012, President Barack Obama and President Hamid Karzai signed the Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Under the terms of the Agreement, the parties pledge to work cooperatively in a number of fields, including to promote shared democratic values, advance long-term security, reinforce regional security, advance social and economic development, and strengthen Afghan institutions and governance. Additionally, the Agreement provides that the United States and Afghanistan shall initiate negotiations on a Bilateral Security Agreement (with the goal of concluding such an agreement within a year), which is intended to replace the existing agreement relating to the status of military and civilian personnel currently in Afghanistan.
It is likely that future disputes will arise between the political branches regarding the entering or implementation of international security agreements. Regardless of the form a security arrangement may take, Congress has several tools to exercise oversight regarding the negotiation, form, conclusion, and implementation of the agreement by the United States. This report begins by providing a general background on the types of international agreements that are binding upon the United States, as well as considerations affecting whether they take the form of a treaty or an executive agreement. Next, the report discusses historical precedents as to the role that security agreements have taken, with specific attention paid to past agreements entered with Afghanistan, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Iraq. The report discusses the oversight role that Congress exercises with respect to entering and implementing international agreements involving the United States. |
crs_R44985 | crs_R44985_0 | A gricultural exports are important to both farmers and the U.S. economy. As U.S. agricultural production has grown faster than domestic demand, farmers and agriculturally oriented firms rely heavily on export markets to sustain prices and revenue. Accordingly, the 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79 ) authorizes a number of programs to promote farm exports. USDA administers two types of agricultural trade and export promotion programs:
1. Export market development programs assist U.S. industry efforts to build, maintain, and expand overseas markets for U.S. agricultural products. USDA administers five programs: the Market Access Program (MAP), the Foreign Market Development Program (FMDP), the Emerging Markets Program (EMP), the Quality Samples Program (QSP), and the Technical Assistance for Specialty Crops (TASC) program. Export financing assistance programs , such as the Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-102) and the Facility Guarantee Program (FGP), provide payment guarantees on commercial financing to facilitate U.S. agricultural exports. Funding for USDA's market development and export assistance programs is mandatory through the borrowing authority of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) and therefore is not subject to annual appropriations. Annual mandatory CCC funding for USDA's export market promotion programs is authorized at approximately $255 million (not including reductions due to sequestration). USDA's GSM-102 export credit guarantee program facilitates commercial bank financing of up to $5.5 billion of U.S. agricultural exports annually. Evaluation of USDA's Export Market Programs
Results of USDA-Commissioned Studies
USDA has commissioned a number of economic studies to assess the effects of USDA's export market development programs on U.S. agricultural exports, export revenue, and other economy-wide effects, including impacts on the farm economy, macroeconomic output, and full-time U.S. civilian jobs. Most studies measure the "economic return ratio," or the ratio of the estimated returns compared to the estimated costs. USDA's most recent commissioned study suggests that MAP and FMDP return $28 for each dollar spent on these programs. Critique of USDA's Methodologies and Estimates
Over the years, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has raised many questions regarding USDA's export promotion programs. These reports have generally been critical of USDA-reported estimates of the economic effects of its export market development programs on U.S. agricultural exports, export revenue, and other economy-wide effects. The most recent of these reports, in 2013, expressed ongoing concerns about USDA's assessment methodologies for estimating program effectiveness, citing the need for improved methods and cost-benefit analysis. USDA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) also conducted a review of USDA's export market development programs to determine whether these programs foster expanded trade activities in the exporting of U.S. agricultural products. In anticipation of the next farm bill debate, legislation introduced in both the House and Senate (Cultivating Revitalization by Expanding American Agricultural Trade and Exports Act, or CREAATE Act, H.R. 2321 / S. 1839 ) would double annual funding for MAP and FMDP to $400 million and $69 million, respectively, by 2023. The coalition supports doubling funding for MAP and FMDP. Opposition to USDA's Export Market Programs
Some in Congress have long opposed some of USDA's export and market promotion programs, especially MAP, and have called for their elimination and/or reduced program funding. President Trump's FY2018 budget also proposes to eliminate both MAP and FMDP. | Agricultural exports are important to both farmers and the U.S. economy. With the productivity of U.S. agriculture growing faster than domestic demand, farmers and agriculturally oriented firms rely heavily on export markets to sustain prices and revenue. The 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79) authorizes a number of programs to promote farm exports that are administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). There are two main types of agricultural trade and export promotion programs:
1. Export market development programs assist efforts to build, maintain, and expand overseas markets for U.S. agricultural products. Programs include the Market Access Program (MAP), the Foreign Market Development Program (FMDP), the Emerging Markets Program (EMP), the Quality Samples Program (QSP), and the Technical Assistance for Specialty Crops Program (TASC). 2. Export financing assistance programs provide payment guarantees on commercial financing to facilitate U.S. agricultural exports. Programs include the Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-102) and the Facility Guarantee Program (FGP).
Annual funding for USDA's export market promotion programs is authorized at about $255 million (not including reductions due to sequestration). In addition, USDA's export credit guarantee programs provide commercial bank financing of up to $5.5 billion of U.S. agricultural exports annually. Funding for USDA's programs is mandatory through the Commodity Credit Corporation and is not subject to annual appropriations.
USDA has commissioned a number of economic studies to assess the effects of its export market development programs on U.S. agricultural exports, export revenue, and other economy-wide effects. Most studies measure the "economic return ratio" or the ratio of the estimated returns compared to the estimated costs. USDA's most recently commissioned study claims that MAP and FMDP return $28 for each dollar spent. USDA's studies also claim broader economy-wide returns in terms of farm revenue, economic output, and full-time jobs.
However, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has raised many questions regarding USDA's export promotion programs. GAO's reports have generally been critical of USDA-reported estimates of the economic effects of USDA's programs on U.S. agricultural exports, export revenue, and other economy-wide effects. The most recent GAO report expressed ongoing concerns about USDA's assessment methodologies for estimating program effectiveness, citing the need for improved methods and cost-benefit analysis. USDA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) also conducted a review of its export market development programs and recommended certain changes with regard to data and information collection by program participants.
In anticipation of the next farm bill debate, legislation introduced in both the House and Senate (Cultivating Revitalization by Expanding American Agricultural Trade and Exports Act or CREAATE Act, H.R. 2321/S. 1839) would progressively double annual funding for MAP and FMDP to $400 million and $69 million, respectively, by 2023. The Coalition to Promote U.S. Agricultural Exports and the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture also support doubling funding for MAP and FMDP. However, some in Congress have long opposed USDA's export and market promotion programs, especially MAP, calling for its elimination and/or reduced program funding. President Trump's FY2018 budget proposes to eliminate both MAP and FMDP. |
crs_R42859 | crs_R42859_0 | Introduction
This report provides background information and identifies issues for Congress regarding Department of Defense (DOD) alternative fuel initiatives, an issue of considerable attention during hearings in 2012 on DOD's FY2013 budget. In addition, the Navy, in coordination with the Department of Energy and the Department of Agriculture, intends to spur domestic advanced biofuel production at a commercial scale using the authority of the Defense Production Act. The services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) have spent approximately $48 million on alternative fuels, and the Navy has proposed a $170 million investment in biofuel production capacity. The services have also spent funds on testing, certification and demonstrations of alternative fuels. By comparison, DOD purchases of petroleum fuels totaled approximately $17.3 billion in FY2011. The statute requires that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Plans and Programs
lead DOD's alternative fuel activities; oversee DOD's alternative fuel investments; make recommendations regarding the development of alternative fuels by the military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense; issue guidelines and prescribe policy to streamline alternative fuels investments across DOD; and encourage collaboration and leverage the investments in alternative fuel development made by the Department of Energy, the Department of Agriculture, and other federal agencies to the benefit of DOD. Pursuant to these goals, DOD officials have said that any alternative fuels for DOD operational use must:
be "drop-in," that is, requiring no modification to existing engines; be cost-competitive with conventional petroleum fuels; be available in sufficient quantities. Other desirable characteristics include
production from a non-food crop feedstock; and lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions less than or equal to conventional petroleum fuels. The Army has not adopted any specific alternative fuel goals. In order to be prepared to use alternative fuels, should they become cost competitive, the Air Force has an additional goal of testing and certifying all aircraft and systems on a 50:50 alternative fuel blend by 2012. One goal is to deploy a "Great Green Fleet" strike group of ships and aircraft running entirely on alternative fuel blends by 2016. A second Navy goal is meeting 50% of the Navy's total energy consumption from alternative sources by 2020. Under the authority of the Defense Production Act, the Navy and the Department of Energy plan to fund this initiative with $340 million in federal funds for capital investment and production, with at least equal cost-sharing from industry. The Department of Agriculture will provide an additional $171 million through the Commodity Credit Corporation to support biofuel feedstocks. Legislative Activity in 2012
Legislative activity in 2012 related to DOD's alternative fuels efforts has focused on two areas: (1) proposals to expand or limit DOD's ability to purchase alternative fuels and invest in alternative fuel production capability, and (2) appropriations related to the Navy's biofuel production efforts under the DPA. FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 4310 / S. 3254 )
H.R. | This report provides background information and identifies issues for Congress regarding Department of Defense (DOD) alternative fuel initiatives, a subject of debate at congressional hearings on DOD's proposed FY2013 budget. The services (the Army, Navy, and Air Force) have spent approximately $48 million to purchase alternative fuels, and the Navy has proposed a $170 million investment in biofuel production capacity. The services have also spent funds on testing, certification and demonstrations of alternative fuels. By comparison, DOD purchases of petroleum fuels totaled approximately $17.3 billion in FY2011.
DOD officials have said that any alternative fuels for DOD operational use must
be "drop-in;" that is, requiring no modification to existing engines, and be cost-competitive with conventional petroleum fuels.
Other desirable characteristics include
production from a non-food crop feedstock; and lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions less than or equal to conventional petroleum fuels.
Each military service has different alternative fuel goals. The Army has the broad aim of increasing the use of renewable energy, but has not adopted any specific alternative fuel goals. The Air Force goals are to test and certify all aircraft and systems on a 50:50 alternative fuel blend by 2012, and to be prepared to acquire 50% of the Air Force's domestic aviation fuel as an alternative fuel blend by 2016. The Navy's goals are to deploy a "Great Green Fleet" strike group of ships and aircraft running entirely on alternative fuel blends by 2016 and to meet 50% of the Navy's total energy consumption from alternative sources by 2020. To meet this goal for its ships, the Navy would need to replace approximately 8 million barrels of petroleum used in its ships with unblended alternative fuels by 2020.
The Navy has also entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Department of Energy and the Department of Agriculture to promote the development of a domestic advanced biofuel industry through the construction of domestic biofuel plants and refineries. Under the Defense Production Act, the Navy and the Department of Energy plan to fund this initiative with $340 million in federal funds for capital investment and production, with at least equal cost-sharing from industry. The Department of Agriculture intends to provide an additional $171 million through the Commodity Credit Corporation to support biofuel feedstocks.
Legislative debate in 2012 related to DOD's alternative fuels efforts has focused on two areas: (1) proposals in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 (H.R. 4310, S. 3254) to maintain or limit DOD's ability to purchase alternative fuels and invest in biofuel production capability, and (2) appropriations related to the joint Navy, Department of Energy, and Department of Agriculture biofuel production initiative.
Additional areas for potential congressional oversight include the costs and benefits to DOD of alternative fuels, as well as the coordination of alternative fuel initiatives within the services and between DOD and other federal agencies. |
crs_R41486 | crs_R41486_0 | A number of environmental concerns have been raised related to the development of genetically modified (GM) fish, including the potential for detrimental competition with wild fish, and possible interbreeding with wild fish so as to allow the modified genetic material to escape into the wild fish population. Sterilization and bioconfinement have been proposed as means of isolating GM fish to minimize the potential for harming wild fish populations. In the process of congressional oversight of executive agency regulatory action, concerns have been raised about the adequacy of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's review of applications for approval of GM animals, with respect to the potential for environmental harm. In response to these concerns, several bills were introduced in the 112 th Congress seeking to declare GM fish unsafe or require that GM fish be specifically labeled as such. No final action was taken on these bills in the 112 th Congress. However, industry groups are concerned that such labeling might lead consumers to believe that their products are unsafe for consumption. By early 2010, AquaBounty Technologies, Inc., had provided FDA with almost all of the data required by the agency to consider approving the company's GM AquAdvantage salmon. More specifically, AquaBounty has proposed producing eggs on Prince Edward Island, Canada, shipping these eggs to Panama, growing and processing the fish in Panama, and shipping table-ready, processed fish to the United States for retail sale. As a first step in the approval process, FDA held public hearings on AquAdvantage salmon by its Veterinary Medicine Advisory Committee on September 19-21, 2010. Although the public comment period on FDA approval was open through November 22, 2010, there was no deadline for FDA's decision on AquaBounty's application. On December 20, 2012, FDA announced the availability for public comment of (1) a draft environmental assessment of the proposed conditions specified by AquaBounty and (2) FDA's preliminary finding of no significant impact (FONSI) for AquaBounty's conditions. A 60-day public comment period initially ran through February 25, 2013, but was extended through April 26, 2013. If significant new information or challenges arise in the public comments, FDA must decide whether or not a full EIS is required prior to approval of AquaBounty's application. No federal law specifically addresses GM fish and seafood. 521 would have amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to prevent the approval of genetically engineered fish for human consumption. | In the process of congressional oversight of executive agency regulatory action, concerns have been raised about the adequacy of the FDA's review of a genetically modified (GM) salmon. More specifically, concern has focused on whether and how potential environmental issues related to this GM salmon might be addressed. In response to these concerns, several bills were introduced in the 112th Congress seeking to declare GM fish unsafe and thus prevent FDA approval of this salmon for human consumption or to require that GM fish be specifically labeled. No final action was taken on these bills by the 112th Congress.
Genetic engineering techniques allow the manipulation of inherited traits to modify and improve organisms. Several GM fish and seafood products are currently under development and offer potential benefits such as increasing aquaculture productivity and improving human health. However, some are concerned that, in this rapidly evolving field, current technological and regulatory safeguards are inadequate to protect the environment and ensure public acceptance that these products are safe for consumption. (The safety of GM foods for human consumption is not addressed in this report.)
In the early 2000s, several efforts began to develop GM fish and seafood products, with a GM AquAdvantage salmon developed by AquaBounty, Inc., in the forefront of efforts to produce a new product for human consumption. By September 2010, requested data had been provided to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) by AquaBounty, and FDA's Veterinary Medicine Advisory Committee held public hearings on the approval of AquAdvantage salmon for human consumption. The public comment period on FDA approval closed on November 22, 2010.
Environmental concerns related to the development of GM fish include the potential for detrimental competition with wild fish, and possible interbreeding with wild fish so as to allow the modified genetic material to escape into the wild fish population. Sterilization and bioconfinement have been proposed as means of isolating GM fish to minimize harm to wild fish populations. To address these concerns, AquaBounty proposed producing salmon eggs (all sterile females) in Canada, shipping these eggs to Panama, growing and processing fish in Panama, and shipping table-ready, processed fish to the United States for retail sale.
On December 20, 2012, FDA announced the availability for public comment of (1) a draft environmental assessment of the proposed conditions specified by AquaBounty and (2) FDA's preliminary finding of no significant impact (FONSI) for AquaBounty's conditions. A 60-day public comment period initially ran through February 25, 2013, but was extended through April 26, 2013. If significant new information or challenges arise in the public comments, FDA must decide whether or not a full environmental impact statement is required prior to approval of AquaBounty's application. If approved, AquAdvantage salmon would be the first GM animal approved for human consumption. |
crs_R43202 | crs_R43202_0 | This report briefly examines the evolution and economic effects of the QIZ program for Jordan and Egypt during the past 15 years and identifies some related issues for Congress. It does not address the current turmoil in Egypt. For a discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed]. Overview
The Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) program was created by the 1996 West Bank and Gaza Strip Free Trade Benefits Act, which amended the 1985 U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement (USIFTA). The events of September 11, 2001, expanded the U.S. focus on the Middle East, both geographically and politically. This led to broader and more comprehensive U.S.-Middle East trade initiatives to assist the region. The second initiative was the Middle-East/North Africa Trade and Investment Partnership Initiative (MENA-TIP), announced by President Barack Obama in 2011. For many of these countries, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program is their only trade preference option. However, for MENA countries, the GSP program is more limited than the QIZ program in the following ways:
The GSP program generally excludes from duty-free eligibility most of the high-tariff products exported tariff-free under the QIZ program; GSP does not authorize eligible MENA countries to co-produce with other countries in order to meet the 35% QIZ content requirement; and U.S. content is not permitted to count for any of the 35% content requirement under GSP, whereas it can contribute 15% under the QIZ program. Key Provisions of the QIZ Program
The QIZ program extends U.S. tariff-free benefits to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and to certain goods co-produced by Israel and Jordan, or Israel and Egypt in export processing zones that meet country of origin and local content requirements. The program grew rapidly, giving a huge boost to Jordan's economy, until the U.S.-Jordan free trade agreement was well into effect. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) officially designated the Jordan zones as QIZs. The result of Jordan's expanded trade with the world was that between 2002 and 2011, Jordan's annual exports to the world averaged 31% of its GDP; while its exports to the United States averaged 6%, and its QIZ exports to the United States, which tapered off after 2006, averaged 3% ( Figure 6 ). While the QIZ program decreased in importance after the implementation of Jordan's FTA with the United States, the continuing expansion of its zone system and its increase in trade with other countries suggests that an important outcome of the QIZ program for Jordan was trade capacity building. In March 2013, nearly a decade after Egypt entered the QIZ program, the USTR announced an expansion of the QIZ program (a) to include two new QIZ areas (in Beni Suef and Minya, in Upper Egypt, in addition to existing areas in and around Cairo, Alexandria, the Suez Canal, and the Central Delta in Lower Egypt); and (b) to include all production facilities, present and future, located in the six QIZs. Accordingly, it estimates that the overall economic impact of the QIZ program for Egypt is that:
During 2005 and 2006, the first two years of Egypt's QIZ program, its QIZ exports to the United States accounted for an amount equivalent to 2% of its GDP growth ( Fi gure 13, red bars). (This compares with 30% for four years for Jordan.) Should a regional MENA trade preference program be established similar to what the United States has established for other regions, such as the Caribbean or sub-Saharan Africa? | Congress passed the Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) program in 1996, as an amendment to the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement (USIFTA) implementing legislation. This narrowly focused program provides duty-free access to the U.S. market for goods produced with certain levels of Israeli and Jordanian; Israeli and Egyptian; or Palestinian content. The purpose of the program was political (to further the Middle-East peace process) and economic (to support economic growth in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region). After the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration, and six years later, the Obama Administration, undertook broader initiatives to expand regional efforts to promote peace, democratic transitions, and economic development in the larger Middle East region through trade and investment. Thus, the QIZ program may now be viewed against a backdrop of these more comprehensive programs.
The QIZ program carries some provisions beyond those in most other U.S. trade preference programs. On one hand, it requires cooperative production. On the other, it includes more relaxed content requirements and more generous tariff benefits on certain goods than most trade preference programs, and permits U.S. input to reach the USIFTA 35% content requirement. Jordan joined the QIZ program in 1997, and Egypt joined seven years later in 2004. Three years after Jordan opened its QIZ program, it entered into a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States. The FTA eliminated tariffs between Jordan and the United States without requiring cooperative production, leading to a decrease in the importance of the QIZ program in U.S.-Jordan trade.
Initially, the QIZ program was a driver of economic growth for Jordan. In 13 QIZs along the border with Israel, factories primarily funded by Asian investment and predominately populated by guest workers from Asian countries co-produced apparel products with partner operations in Israel. For four years, the program contributed an amount equivalent to 30% of Jordan's total GDP growth. Today, the United States is Jordan's second-most important trading partner (after Saudi Arabia). While Jordan's QIZ program has been largely superseded by the U.S.-Jordan FTA, its QIZs remain the source of many of its exports to the United States, as well as to other countries.
For Egypt, the QIZ program was not as transformational as it was for Jordan and contributed, at best, an amount equivalent to 2% of its GDP growth for two years. The country already produced and exported apparel and textiles from Egypt's own cotton woven into fabric in Egyptian factories. The United States was and remains Egypt's top trading partner. President Obama recently expanded the QIZ program for Egypt, naming more zones and including all present and future producers in those zones as eligible for QIZ tariff benefits.
If Congress were to explore additional trade options for stimulating MENA intra-regional and world trade, it might move to reexamine the purposes and effects of the QIZ program. Options for the 113th Congress include possible consideration of the QIZ program in the context of larger policy options relating to U.S.-MENA relations and MENA trade and development.
This report does not address the current turmoil in Egypt. For a discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34151 | crs_RL34151_0 | Alternatively, beneficiaries eligible for Medicare part A and enrolled in part B may choose to enroll in a Medicare private plan, under part C of Medicare (the Medicare Advantage program), and receive all required parts A and B benefits (except hospice services) through a private plan. In 1997, Congress passed the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA, P.L. There are a number of reasons for this attention. Second, payments to PFFS plans are typically higher than payments to other MA plans and higher than expenditures in FFS Medicare. Finally, PFFS plans are subject to different statutory and administrative requirements than other Medicare private plans, specifically those related to access, quality, review of plan premiums, Medicare prescription drug benefits, and balance billing. Background information related to enrollment and the characteristics of these plans is presented, as well as a discussion surrounding current issues. Interestingly, PFFS enrollment was only 22,344 in April, 2003, and 31,550 as of April 2004. By April 2007, enrollment jumped to 1.5 million, an increase of over 4,000% in three years. PFFS plan —In addition to the solvency and other standard requirements for local plans, a PFFS plan (1) must reimburse hospitals, doctors, and other providers at a rate determined by the plan on a fee-for-service basis without placing the providers at financial risk; (2) can not vary rates based on utilization relating to the provider; and (3) can not restrict the selection of providers among those who are lawfully authorized to provide the covered services and agree to accept the terms and conditions of payment established by the plan. Differences Between PFFS and Other Plans
In some aspects, PFFS plans are more closely related to traditional fee-for-service Medicare, than to other MA private plans. One of the reasons for this differential is that PFFS plans have chosen to operate in areas with historically higher Medicare payments. As of July 2006, approximately 87% of PFFS plan enrollees resided in floor counties. Network Exceptions
Unlike local HMOs and regional PPOs, PFFS plans are not required to establish networks of providers to serve beneficiaries. Marketing
The rapid increase in the number of PFFS plans available to beneficiaries, particularly in rural areas, may have contributed to a surge in marketing and sales of these plans across the country, thereby contributing to rising enrollment in these plans. Current Issues
Increasing Costs
Enrollment in Medicare Advantage PFFS plans is still relatively low—approximately 18% of all MA beneficiaries and only 3% of the total Medicare population. Access to Providers
One of the reasons Congress established PFFS plans in the BBA was to provide Medicare beneficiaries with the option to enroll in a health insurance plan that would not restrict or limit choice of providers. Conclusion
Significant growth in enrollment in PFFS plans raises concerns among policy makers because payments to PFFS plans are higher than payments to other MA plans and costs in the traditional Medicare program. | The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA, P.L. 105-33) established the Medicare+Choice program (now called Medicare Advantage), creating new options for the delivery of required benefits under Medicare. One of these options is a Private Fee-For-Service plan (PFFS), statutorily defined as a plan that (1) reimburses hospitals, physicians, and other providers on a fee-for-service basis without placing the provider at financial risk; (2) does not vary rates for a provider based on utilization relating to that provider; and (3) does not restrict the selection of providers from among those who are lawfully authorized to provide services and agree to accept the terms and conditions of payment established by the plan.
Recently enrollment in PFFS plans has increased dramatically. In April 2003, there were 22,344 Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in one of the three available PFFS plans and one PFFS demonstration program. In April 2004, CMS had contracts with six PFFS organizations, with total enrollment of 31,550. By April 2007, CMS had 47 PFFS contracts and enrollment had jumped to 1.5 million, an increase of over 4,000% in three years. Approximately 18% of all Medicare Advantage beneficiaries are enrolled in a PFFS plan, and CBO projects this number to grow to approximately one-third of all MA enrollment by 2017. Plans operate in nearly all United States counties, giving every Medicare beneficiary access to at least one PFFS plan.
The majority of PFFS enrollees reside in urban areas. However, close to half of all rural beneficiaries participating in Medicare Advantage plans are enrolled in a PFFS plan. Unlike coordinated care plans, which tend to serve more densely populated areas, PFFS plans also choose to serve rural areas. PFFS plans may choose their service areas because (1) Medicare private plan payments are higher than the average cost of traditional Medicare in many of the counties a PFFS plan chooses to serve, and (2) PFFS plans are not required to form networks. Establishing and maintaining networks of providers can be costly, particularly in rural areas.
Congressional attention to these plans has increased this past year for a number of reasons. First, enrollment in these plans has risen significantly. Second, payments to PFFS plans are typically higher than payments to other managed care plans and higher than expenditures in FFS Medicare. Third, the marketing and sales tactics of PFFS plans has raised concerns related to beneficiary protection. Lastly, PFFS plans are subject to different statutory requirements than other Medicare private plans.
This report examines the differences between PFFS plans and other Medicare private plans, specifically local health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and regional preferred provider plans (PPOs). Some of the reasons for growth in PFFS plans are also discussed, as well as advantages and disadvantages of these plans. The report concludes with a brief discussion surrounding current issues. |
crs_RL32951 | crs_RL32951_0 | Background
A number of different laws authorize the programs and set the policies affecting the U.S. specialty crop sector, which is comprised of producers, handlers, processors, and retailers of fruit, vegetable, tree nut, and nursery crops. One of these is the periodic, omnibus farm act, commonly called the farm bill, that guides the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) commodity income and price support programs, and authorizes and directs funding for the major agricultural trade, conservation, and domestic food assistance programs (e.g., the school lunch program and food stamps), among many others. Other laws besides the farm bill also set policies for programs affecting the specialty crop sector. Issues in the 109th Congress
FY2006 and FY2007 Appropriations
The Administration's FY2006 budget request did not propose funding for any of the programs authorized in P.L. 108-465 . 108-465 . As of the date of this report, the House-passed USDA appropriations bill included $15.6 million for specialty crop block grants to states for FY2007 ( H.R. Legislative Proposals
A Major Policy Proposal
In anticipation of possible consideration of specialty crop policies if Congress takes up debate on a new farm bill in 2007, Congresswoman Darlene Hooley and Senator Ron Wyden introduced companion measures in the 109 th Congress to amend the Specialty Crops Competitiveness Act of 2004 and propose additional policies ( H.R. 3562 / S. 1556 , the Specialty Crop and Value-Added Agriculture Promotion Act of 2005). See CRS Report RL33520, Specialty Crops: 2008 Farm Bill Issues , by [author name scrubbed], for more information on this and other 2007 farm bill proposals. 2673 ; P.L. Planting Flexibility
Congress passed a planting flexibility provision in the 1996 farm act ( P.L. A number of bills were introduced in the 109 th Congress proposing to make changes to the H-2A program ( S. 359 / H.R. 3857 , S. 2087 , and others). Positions on guest worker reform proposals are mixed within the specialty crop industry and larger agriculture community. | The U.S. specialty crop sector is comprised of producers, handlers, processors, and retailers of fruit, vegetable, tree nut, and nursery crops. The major U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) commodity price and income support programs do not include specialty crops, but the industry benefits generally from USDA programs related to trade, conservation, credit, protection from pests and diseases, domestic food assistance programs, crop insurance and disaster payments, research, and other areas. Certain programs of the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Labor also affect the specialty crop sector.
The 108th Congress passed the first law intended to address selected issues of importance to the specialty crop industry as a whole (the Specialty Crops Competitiveness Act of 2004, P.L. 108-465). It is widely expected that this act will serve as the basis of more comprehensive debate on policies affecting the sector when the House and Senate Agriculture Committees begin consideration of the omnibus farm bill that would take effect when the current farm act (P.L. 107-171) expires in 2007. Another bill that might serve a similar purpose has been introduced in the 109th Congress. The Specialty Crops and Value-Added Agriculture Promotion Act (S. 1556) would amend the 2004 Act to make some of its authorities permanent, and to address issues related to trade, the revenue insurance program, and marketing opportunities for specialty crops. See CRS Report RL33520, Specialty Crops: 2008 Farm Bill Issues, by [author name scrubbed] for more information.
Bills addressing a number of other industry-related issues were introduced in the 109th Congress. These include appropriations for the programs authorized in P.L. 108-465 (H.R. 2744); planting flexibility proposals that could have affected specialty crop supplies and prices (H.R. 2045/S. 1038; S. 194); and guest worker program reform (S. 359/H.R. 884, and others). This report summarizes the 109th Congress's activity on these bills and other specialty crop issues, and will not be updated. |
crs_R40786 | crs_R40786_0 | This is a brief discussion of the constitutional questions raised by qui tam provisions; of the history of such provisions; and of the two existing, active federal qui tam statutes: the False Claims Act and in Indian protection provisions. Stevens , the Supreme Court identified four contemporary federal qui tam statutes: the False Claims Act, the Patent Act, and two Indian protection laws. The suggestion encouraged environmentalists to bring qui tam actions based on an informer-reward provision in the Rivers and Harbors Act. Who May Bring an Action
The False Claims Act is designed to allow private individuals to sue on behalf of the government, but any False Claims Act litigation takes place in the shadow of the government's prerogatives. The action is brought in the name of the United States. They occur when anyone:
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim;
(C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph (A), (B), (D), (E), (F), or (G);
(D) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government and knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of that money or property;
(E) is authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true;
(F) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge property; or
(G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government. Additional liability may also flow from any retaliatory action taken against those who seek to stop violations of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. In any case, they are also entitled to attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs, but may be denied any award if they participated in the underlying fraud. It says nothing of whether he may do so on behalf of the United States qui tam. The rights available in criminal proceedings exist precisely because the proceedings are criminal. Thus, they are inapplicable to federal qui tam proceedings which are civil in nature. It vests all legislative powers in Congress, executive power in the President, and the judicial power of the United States in the federal courts. , standing in a case or controversy. With respect to the relator's share, it considered him the assignee of that portion of the interest of the United States. Although the Court has thus far "express[ed] no view on the question of whether qui tam suits violate Article II, in particular the Appointments Clause of §2," the lower federal courts generally see no appointments clause impediments, because they do not consider qui tam relators officers of the United States. | Qui tam enlists the public in the recovery of civil penalties and forfeitures. It rewards with a portion of the recovered proceeds those who sue in the government's name. A creature of antiquity, once common, today qui tam lives on in federal law only in the False Claims Act and in Indian protection laws.
The False Claims Act, expanded by the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, P.L. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009), now proscribes: (1) presenting a false claim; (2) making or using a false record or statement material to a false claim; (3) possessing property or money of the United States and delivering less than all of it; (4) delivering a certified receipt with intent to defraud the United States; (5) buying public property from a federal officer or employee, who may not lawfully sell it; (6) using a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the United States, or concealing or improperly avoiding or decreasing an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the U.S.; or (7) conspiring to commit any such offense. Additional liability may also flow from any retaliatory action taken against whistleblowers under the False Claims Act. Offenders may be sued for triple damages, costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees in a civil action brought either by the United States or by a relator (whistleblower or other private party) in the name of the United States.
If the government initiates the suit, others may not join. If the government has not brought suit, a relator may do so, but must give the government notice and afford it 60 days to decide whether to take over the litigation. If the government declines to intervene, a prevailing relator's share of any recovery is capped at 30%; if the government intervenes, the caps are lower and depend upon the circumstances. Relators in patent and Indian protection qui tam cases are entitled to half of the recovery.
Federal qui tam statutes have survived two types of constitutional challenges—those based on defendants' rights in criminal cases and those based on the doctrine of separation of powers. The courts have found the rights required in criminal cases inapplicable, because qui tam actions are civil matters. They have generally rejected standing arguments, because relators stand in the shoes of the United States in whose name qui tam actions are brought. They have rejected appointments clause arguments, because relators hold no appointed office. They have rejected take care clause arguments, because the residue of governmental control over qui tam actions is considered constitutionally sufficient.
This is an abridged version of CRS Report R40785, Qui Tam: The False Claims Act and Related Federal Statutes, by [author name scrubbed], stripped of the footnotes, quotations, appendix, and most of the citations found in the longer report. |
crs_R43106 | crs_R43106_0 | While, overall, the U.S. drug supply is typically safe, Congress, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), industry groups, and consumers are working to devise a system to limit opportunities for counterfeiting and mishandling. It (1) describes the chain from manufacturer to patient, including where it is vulnerable; (2) summarizes current federal law, regulation, and FDA policies that Congress and the agency designed to protect the integrity of the final drug product, and indicates where those protections may falter; (3) notes state-level and professional association activities; and (4) discusses areas that Congress, FDA, and industry, health care, and patient stakeholders have suggested might be changed to increase the security of the pharmaceutical supply chain. This segment of the supply path is called downstream . A manufacturer may sell directly to a dispenser, but usually sells to a primary wholesale distributor (labeled B). Since its passage in 1938, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), as amended, both directly addresses and indirectly influences the pharmaceutical supply chain. The Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 (PDMA, P.L. By adding a new Subsection 503(e), PDMA also addressed other segments of the supply chain with the following changes to the FFDCA:
required that wholesalers, except for authorized distributors of record, provide to the recipient "a statement ... identifying each prior sale, purchase, or trade of such drug.... ," often referred to as a pedigree; required each manufacturer to maintain a current list of its authorized distributors of record; stated that no one may engage in wholesale distribution unless licensed by a state in accordance with the Secretary's guidelines; required the Secretary to issue guidelines, by regulation, establishing minimum standards for wholesaler licensing to include storage and handling and records; and defined authorized distributor of record (ADR) and wholesale distribution (see earlier textbox). With the FDA Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA, P.L. The law directed the Secretary to "develop standards and identify and validate effective technologies for the purpose of securing the drug supply chain against counterfeit, diverted, subpotent, substandard, adulterated, misbranded, or expired drugs." Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012
Five years after FDAAA, attempts by Congress, FDA, and other stakeholders to craft a comprehensive supply chain plan culminated in the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA, P.L. 112-144 ). Several sub-goals, some of them overlapping, are evident in current and prior legislative proposals that would
protect the patient from ineffective or dangerous drugs that may be in the supply chain as a result of counterfeiting, theft and resale, or manufacturing, transportation, or storage mishaps; protect the manufacturer , who can lose both money and reputation if its product harms a patient, regardless of whether the fault laid with the manufacturer's actions; and allow the assignment of accountability for identified problems. Lot- or unit-level activity . A unit is the smallest package that is delivered to the dispenser (retail or hospital pharmacy or clinical setting) who will dispense it to a patient. Current legislative discussions are focused on the downstream chain. Authentication . Interoperability . For a track and trace system to work as envisioned, the data maintained by the manufacturer and each subsequent link in the chain must have compatible formats and definitions. Data management . Confidentiality . Notification . Distributors or dispensers may find that a shipment includes suspected or confirmed counterfeit or substandard drug products. Implementation timing . Licensure , registration, and accreditation . Accountability . Cost . Consideration of cost is often a part of decisions regarding scope, implementation dates, reporting requirements, and other elements of a supply chain security system. Federal and state jurisdiction . However, the requirements in federal legislation might preempt state law and regulation. 3204 , the Drug Quality and Security Act, the text of which was released as an agreement by majority and majority leadership of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on September 25, 2013. The House passed H.R. 3204 on September 28, 2013. The bill now awaits Senate action. | The drug package that a community pharmacist hands to a patient, or a hospital pharmacist sends to a patient's bedside, or a physician administers in the medical office has reached the end of a complicated path. That path is called a supply or distribution chain. The upstream portion of the chain includes the journey of each active and inactive ingredient and their chemical components to the manufacturer that creates the finished drug product. The downstream chain, which this report addresses, includes the repackagers, wholesale distributors, associated storage and transport companies, and, finally, the dispenser. Dispensers include independent community or chain pharmacies, hospitals or other health care facilities, and physicians' offices.
Usually the supply chain provides consumers with unadulterated prescription drugs. However, the chain is potentially vulnerable, and when it breaks, a dispenser might provide a counterfeit product containing no active ingredient, less-than-labeled dosage, or a dangerous substitution. The dispenser might also provide a mishandled or diverted drug that has become sub- or superpotent or has gone past its expiration date. In addition to the potential harm to patients, these security breaches can affect a manufacturer's reputation and financial bottom line.
Congress has addressed pharmaceutical supply chain security several times over the past 107 years. The 1906 Food and Drugs Act focused on labeling; the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA) addressed adulteration, misbranding, and the registration and inspection of manufacturing establishments; and the Prescription Drug Marketing Act (PDMA, P.L. 100-293) required that wholesale distributors be licensed by the states and required that a wholesale distributor, except one in a specified ongoing relationship with the manufacturer, provide to the purchasing distributor or dispenser a statement—called a pedigree—"identifying each prior sale, purchase, or trade of such drug." More recently, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA, P.L. 110-85) required the Secretary to "develop standards and identify and validate effective technologies for the purpose of securing the drug supply chain against counterfeit, diverted, subpotent, substandard, adulterated, misbranded, or expired drugs"; and, in 2012, the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA, P.L. 112-144) expanded registration and reporting requirements. Despite current federal law and actions by state legislatures, opportunities for breaches of the supply chain continue to exist. The 112th and 113th Congresses have worked to craft a set of national requirements that would protect both patient and manufacturer, and allow the assignment of accountability for identified problems, while attempting to manage cost and avoiding a confusing patchwork of state legislation.
In their work, House and Senate policymakers have been considering many decisions. These include, for example, definitions; pedigrees; track-and-trace technologies; serialization; lot- and unit-level requirements; authentication; interoperable data collection and systems; data confidentiality and access; requirements for transaction reporting and notification regarding suspect deliveries; implementation timing; licensure, registration, and accreditation standards for entities in the supply chain; accountability; cost; and the relationship between federal and state laws. After passing individual bills (H.R. 1919 and S. 959), majority and minority leadership of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions announced an agreement on September 25, 2013. The House passed the text of the agreement, H.R. 3204, on September 28, 2013, and the bill awaits Senate action. |
crs_R41828 | crs_R41828_0 | Introduction
On May 14, 2011, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was arrested at John F. Kennedy Airport and charged with the attempted rape, criminal sexual assault, and unlawful imprisonment of a maid at the New York City Sofitel hotel. On May 18, 2011, he resigned as IMF Managing Director. Mr. Strauss-Kahn's arrest comes at an challenging time for the IMF, which he had led since 2007. Under his leadership, the IMF reasserted its role as the premier international organization for international economic corporation. In the wake of the financial crisis, Mr. Strauss-Kahn persuaded countries to substantially increase their funding to the IMF enabling the Fund to sharply increase its financial support to troubled economies and its capacity to monitor global economic risks. He also brokered agreement between developing and advanced economies on wide range of issues including reform of IMF quotas that will increase the voting share of emerging economies; revamping the IMF's lending tool-kit to introduce greater flexibility and create new facilities for low-income countries; and placed the IMF at the center of G-20 efforts to increase multilateral surveillance by looking at the external implications of the domestic economic policies of several systemically important countries. The arrest and resignation will likely have little impact on the Fund's current lending and monitoring activities, but the arrest has put the selection of Fund leadership back into the spotlight. Controversy focuses on whether a transatlantic "gentlemen's agreement" reserving the IMF leadership for a European and the World Bank leadership for a U.S. citizen is justified in the current global economy. Proposals for a more open, transparent, and merit-based leadership selection process have been made consistently in the past, and at times have been incorporated in communiqués of various leaders summits, but have yet to change the outcome at either of the institutions. There is no formal congressional involvement in the selection of Fund management. U.S. participation in the IMF is authorized by the Bretton Woods Agreement Act of 1945. The Act delegates to the President ultimate authority under U.S. law to direct U.S. policy and instruct the U.S. representatives at the IMF. The President, in turn, has generally delegated authority to the Secretary of the Treasury. With the advice and consent of the Senate, the President names individuals to represent the United States on the Executive Board of the IMF. Background: Organizational Structure of the IMF
Selecting the leadership at the two major international financial institutions (IFIs) – the IMF and the World Bank – is guided by a 60-year old tradition that the World Bank president is an American and that the IMF Managing Director is a European. This decision may be reached by a 50% majority of the IMF's Executive Board. Debate over Leadership
The European-U.S. arrangement to split the leadership at the IMF and World Bank has created a lasting and lingering resentment throughout much of the world. Critics of the current selection process make two general arguments. First, the gentlemen's agreement on IMF and World Bank leadership is a relic of a global economy that no longer exists. At the same time, European leaders are fiercely defending Europe's hold on the position. According to European officials and some analysts, the current heavy IMF focus in Europe requires a European at the IMF's helm. | On May 14, 2011, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was arrested at John F. Kennedy Airport and charged with the attempted rape, criminal sexual assault, and unlawful imprisonment of a maid at the New York City Sofitel hotel. He resigned on May 18, 2011. Mr. Strauss-Kahn's arrest and resignation come at a challenging time for the IMF, which he had led since 2007. Under his leadership, the IMF reasserted its role as the premier international organization for international economic corporation. In the wake of the financial crisis, Mr. Strauss-Kahn persuaded countries to substantially increase their funding to the IMF, enabling the Fund to sharply increase its financial support to troubled economies and its capacity to monitor global economic risks. He also brokered agreement between developing and advanced economies on a wide range of issues, including reform of IMF quotas that will increase the voting share of emerging economies; revamping the IMF's lending tool-kit to introduce greater flexibility and create new facilities for low-income countries; and placed the IMF at the center of G-20 efforts to increase multilateral surveillance by looking at the external implications of the domestic economic policies of several systemically important countries.
The resignation has put the selection of Fund leadership back into the spotlight. Controversy focuses on whether a transatlantic "gentlemen's agreement" reserving the IMF leadership for a European and the World Bank leadership for a U.S. citizen is adequate for the current global economy. Proposals for a more open, transparent, and merit-based leadership selection process have been made consistently in the past, and at times have been incorporated in communiqués of various leaders summits, but have yet to change the outcome at either of the institutions. Although Congress can pass legislation directing the U.S. representatives at the IMF or hold oversight hearings, there is no congressional involvement in the selection of Fund management. U.S. participation in the IMF is authorized by the Bretton Woods Agreement Act of 1945. The Act delegates to the President ultimate authority under U.S. law to direct U.S. policy and instruct the U.S. representatives at the IMF. The President, in turn, has generally delegated authority to the Secretary of the Treasury. The largest shareholder of the IMF, United States has a 16.8% voting share.
The formal requirements for the selection of the IMF Managing Director is that the Executive Directors appoint, by at least a 50% majority, an individual who is neither a member of the Board of Governors or Board of Executive Directors. There are no requirements on how individuals are selected, on what criteria, or by what process they are vetted. Moreover, although the IMF Executive Directors may select its Managing Director by a simple majority vote, they historically aim to reach agreement by consensus. With these factors combined, the convention guaranteeing European leadership at the IMF and American leadership at the World Bank has remained in place. The European-U.S. arrangement on the leadership positions at the IMF and World Bank has created resentment in many developing and emerging economies. Critics of the current selection process make two general arguments. First, the gentlemen's agreement on IMF and World Bank leadership is a relic of a post-war transatlantic global economy that no longer exists. Second, the IMF and the World Bank aim to be leaders in promoting transparency and good governance practices, which hardly justify the political horse-trading that have dominated past selections. At the same time, European officials and some commentators argue that given the intense IMF involvement in managing the crisis in the peripheral European economies and securing the future of the European Monetary Union, a European leader is needed to maintain the Fund's prominence and legitimacy. |
crs_R40961 | crs_R40961_0 | Overview
With a population of 82 million and a GDP of $3.6 trillion, Germany is the world's fifth largest economy (after the United States, China, Japan, and India) and the largest in Europe, accounting for about one-fifth of the gross domestic production (GDP) of the European Union (EU). The health and functioning of the German economy, as well as policy approaches adopted by the government, are not only of bilateral and regional importance, but also of global importance to the United States. The United States is Germany's largest trading partner outside of Europe. Mutually profitable, growing, and beneficial U.S.-German commercial ties historically have been facilitated by a strong German economy. By most standards, West Germany registered an impressive economic performance in the 1950s and 1960s, the first decades of its existence. But beginning in the mid-1990s, the German economy has been on a much lower growth path, averaging around 1.5% GDP growth per year (as compared to an OECD average growth rate of 2.7%). These trends, have been exacerbated by a 5% decline in German GDP growth in 2009, raise questions about the long-term vitality and strength of this European powerhouse. These include the heavy and continuing costs of reunification with East Germany in 1990, escalating costs associated with generous social security and welfare programs, rigid labor market laws and perceived over-regulation, and an economy more geared towards exporting than consumption. Some believe that Chancellor Angela Merkel's (CDU) September 2009 reelection in coalition with the pro-business Free Democratic Party (FDP) could increase the likelihood of market-friendly reforms being enacted, but any radical restructuring of Germany's social market economy is considered unlikely. This resource crunch arguably has limited Germany's flexibility to maneuver domestically and appears to have been a factor in the evolution of somewhat more assertive German international economic policies. With dwindling economic and financial resources, Germany arguably has become less capable of compromising on matters of potential economic advantage. This has affected not only the trade and economic leadership role that Germany has traditionally played in Europe and the world economy, but also its position on issues that directly affect U.S. interests. In short, a prosperous German state remains critical to both the U.S. and European economies. Difficulties Germany may have in regaining a stronger growth pattern are an important concern, affecting the U.S.-German partnership in addressing a range of bilateral, regional, and multilateral challenges. This report elaborates on these themes in three parts: the first part examines Germany's economic performance in historical perspective and assesses some of the domestic factors that may be contributing to Germany's less than optimal growth pattern in recent years. The second section discusses the reform challenges facing German political leaders. The third section evaluates selected U.S.-German economic policy differences and strains that may be influenced by Germany's economic situation. A number of factors help explain Germany's declining growth record. One factor has been the high costs of integrating the formerly communist East German economy into the Federal Republic. A second factor is Germany's generous social welfare provisions which may undercut incentives for work and entrepreneurship. In this regard, Germany's domestic economic challenges could limit its policymaking flexibility. Germany has traditionally been reluctant to use economic sanctions, despite U.S. urgings. | Germany is the world's fifth largest economy and the largest in Europe, accounting for about one-fifth of the European Union's (EU) GDP. Germany is also the largest European trade and investment partner of the United States. Mutually profitable and growing U.S.-German commercial ties historically have been facilitated by a strong German economy. The health and functioning of the German economy, as well as its approaches to international economic policy issues, thus, are of considerable importance to the United States as well as to the rest of Europe.
By most standards, post-war West Germany registered impressive economic performance in the first decades of its existence. But beginning in the mid-1990s, the German economy has been on a much lower growth path, averaging about 1.5% of GDP per year. Unemployment has also risen steadily. These trends, which have been exacerbated by a steep 5% decline in German GDP growth in 2009, raise questions about the long-term vitality and strength of the German economy.
A number of factors help explain Germany's declining growth rate. One factor has been the high cost associated with integrating the formerly communist East German economy into the Federal Republic since reunification in 1990. A second has been the growing cost of Germany's generous social security and welfare programs and associated regulations which some believe may undercut incentives for work and entrepreneurship. A third is an economy that is more geared towards exporting than domestic investment and consumption.
With few exceptions, German governments have generally been reluctant to advance what many economists consider necessary but unpopular economic policy reforms, including cut-backs in welfare programs and labor market protections. Some believe that Chancellor Angela Merkel's September 2009 reelection in coalition with the pro-business Free Democratic Party (FDP) could increase the likelihood of market-friendly reforms being enacted, but any radical restructuring of Germany's social market economy is considered unlikely.
With declining economic growth and rising expenditures on social protections, Germany faces significant budgetary and resource constraints. This resource crunch could limit Germany's flexibility in pursuing domestic and international policy goals, arguably making Germany less capable of compromise on matters of potential economic advantage. In this regard, Germany's domestic economic challenges could limit its policymaking flexibility. This has affected not only the economic and trade leadership role Germany has traditionally played in Europe, but also its position on issues that directly affect U.S. interests such as the global economic downturn and economic sanctions.
A prosperous German state remains critical to both the U.S. and European economies. Difficulties Germany may have in regaining a stronger economic position are important concerns, affecting the U.S.-German partnership's ability to mutually address and manage a range of bilateral, regional, and global challenges. This report elaborates on these themes in three parts: the first section examines Germany's economic performance in historical perspective and assesses some of the domestic factors that may be contributing to Germany's less than optimal performance; the second discusses the reform challenges facing Germany's political leaders; and the third section evaluates a few salient U.S.-German economic policy differences and strains that seem to be influenced by Germany's weakened economic situation. |
crs_R42870 | crs_R42870_0 | The new law
increases the penalty for federal child pornography offenses; outlaws the harassment of aged victims and witnesses; grants federal marshals additional powers to track sex offenders; calls for a reevaluation of the guidelines used to sentence those who intimidate children in order to obstruct prosecution of a sex offense; and bolsters the Justice Department's Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) program. 6063 ), which passed under suspension of the rules on August 1, 2012. It passed the Senate by unanimous consent on November 26, 2012, and was signed by the President on December 7, 2012. The Child Protection Act increases the maximum penalty for possession, attempted possession, or conspiracy to possess, from imprisonment for not more than 10 years to imprisonment for not more than 20 years, when the pornography depicts or purports to depict a child under 12 years of age or a prepubescent child. Protective orders covering adults, in contrast, require the court to find "by a preponderance of the evidence that harassment of an identified victim or witness in a Federal criminal case or investigation exists or that such order is necessary to prevent and restrain an offense under section 1512 of this title ... "
Finally, Section 1514 now creates a rebuttable presumption that Internet publication of identifying information relating to a child victim or witness satisfies the "no legitimate purpose" element of harassment or intimidation:
[A]court shall presume, subject to rebuttal by the person, that the distribution or publication using the Internet of a photograph of, or restricted personal information regarding, a specific person serves no legitimate purpose, unless that use is authorized by that specific person, is for news reporting purposes, is designed to locate that specific person (who has been reported to law enforcement as a missing person), or is part of a government-authorized effort to locate a fugitive or person of interest in a criminal, antiterrorism, or national security investigation. Administrative Subpoenas for the Marshals Service
Federal agencies may often issue administrative subpoenas in the performance of the regulatory duties without prior judicial approval. The Child Protection Act grants the Marshals Service the power to issue administrative subpoenas in order to track unregistered sex offenders. Sentencing Guidelines
Federal courts must begin the sentencing process by determining the range of sentences recommended under the United States Sentencing Commission's sentencing guidelines. The Sentencing Commission's review will be focused on the adequacy of sentencing treatment under the guidelines for obstruction of justice offenses committed in conjunction with sex trafficking, sexual abuse, sex offender registration, child pornography, and Mann Act violations, particularly when they involve children. Congress had authorized appropriations for the program of $60 million per year for each year from FY2009 through FY2013. The Child Protection Act also
raises the cap on ICAC task force training from $2 million to $4 million per year; designates the head of the program as the National Coordinator for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction and provides that the position shall be in the Senior Executive Service; eliminates the volume of criminal activity as a possibly exclusive criterion for determining high-priority suspects identified in monthly ICAC data system reports; and directs the Attorney General to report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, within 90 days of passage, on the status of the establishment of the National Internet Crimes Against Children Data System. 18 U.S.C. | On the December 7, 2012, the President signed the Child Protection Act of 2012, P.L. 112-206 (H.R. 6063), into law. The measure had previously passed the House under suspension of the rules and the Senate by unanimous consent. Its provisions are (1) increase the maximum penalty for certain child pornography offenses; (2) outlaw harassment of a child victim or witness while under a protective order; (3) grant the U.S. Marshals Service administrative subpoena authority in sex offender registration cases; (4) direct the U.S. Sentencing Commission to review the adequacy of federal sentencing guidelines that apply to federal sex offenders; and (5) bolster the Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) program.
Prior law punished the possession of child pornography in a federal enclave, facility, or Indian country or when shipped or transmitted in interstate commerce with imprisonment for not more than 10 years. P.L. 112-206 increases the maximum to 20 years.
Prior law permits federal courts to enter an order to protect the victims and witnesses in a federal criminal case from being harassed for "no legitimate purpose." Violation of such an order is punishable as contempt of court. P.L. 112-206 punishes violations by imprisonment for not more than five years. It also creates a rebuttable presumption against the existence of a legitimate purpose, if the defendant publishes or distributes the picture or other identifying information of the victim or witness, other than for press or law enforcement purposes. Constitutional boundaries may cabin the breadth of the proscription.
Prior law allows administrative agencies to demand testimony or the production of documents necessary for regulatory purposes, without having to secure a warrant or court subpoena. In a few limited instances—such as health care fraud, child pornography, and U.S. Secret Service protection—federal law enforcement officials enjoy similar authority. P.L. 112-206 grants the U.S. Marshals Service the authority to use administrative subpoenas to unregistered sex offenders.
Prior law requires federal courts to begin the sentencing process by calculating the penalties recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Commission's sentencing guidelines. P.L. 112-206 directs the commission to review the adequacy of the guidelines applicable for obstruction of justice when committed in conjunction with sexual abuse, sex offender registration, child pornography, sex trafficking, and Mann Act offenses.
Prior law instructs the Attorney General to create and implement a national strategy for child exploitation and interdiction. P.L. 112-206 bolsters that effort by (1) increasing from $2 million to $4 million the annual cap on private training of ICAC task force members; (2) authorizing appropriations of $60 million for ICAC task forces for each fiscal year through FY2018; (3) insisting that the ICAC national coordinator be a member of the Senior Executive Service; (4) eliminating the possibility that the identification of high-priority suspects might be based solely on the volume of suspected criminal activity; and (5) instructing the Attorney General to report to the Judiciary Committees, within three months, on the establishment of the ICAC data system. |
crs_RS22789 | crs_RS22789_0 | Sex Trafficking
Proposed 18 U.S.C. 2431(a). Under existing law, it is a federal crime for an American to travel in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in a commercial sex act with a child, 18 U.S.C. Subparagraph 202(g)(6)(D) of Section 202 would establish a cause of action including reasonable attorneys' fees for the victims of the proposed obstruction of justice offenses. The Crime Victims Fund finances victim compensation and assistance grants using the fines imposed for violation of federal criminal law, 18 U.S.C. 1328 (importation of an alien for prostitution or other immoral purposes) or of any of the prohibitions in 18 U.S.C. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction for Certain Trafficking Offenses (Section 222)
Section 222 would establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over various peonage and trafficking offenses when the offender or the victim is an American or when the offender is in the United States. Model State Legislation (Section 224)
The Justice Department drafted a Model State Anti-Trafficking Criminal Statute in 2004. 77 (involuntary servitude) and 117 (Mann Act) as those chapters would be amended by H.R. 3887 . It would also instruct the Attorney General to post the model on the Department's website, distribute it to the states, assist the states in its implementation, and report annually to House and Senate Judiciary Committees and the House Foreign Affairs Committee as well as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the results of such efforts. | The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2007 (H.R. 3887), passed by the House on December 4, 2007, continues and reenforces the anti-trafficking efforts that began with Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. That legislation sought to protect the women and children most often the victims of both international and domestic trafficking with a series of diplomatic, immigration, and law enforcement initiatives. H.R. 3887 follows in its path. This report is limited to the bill's law enforcement initiatives or more precisely its proposals to amend federal criminal law.
Representative Lantos introduced H.R. 3887 on October 17, 2007, for himself and several other Members. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported an amended version of the bill on November 6, 2007. A further revised version passed under suspension of the rules on December 4, 2007. When the bill reached the Senate its criminal law proposals included newly assigned sex trafficking offenses, a sex tourism offense, a coerced services offense, obstruction of justice offenses, an importation of prostitutes offense, a false statement offense, and provisions for civil liability, victim assistance, forfeiture, extraterritorial jurisdiction, Justice Department reorganization, and a model state statute.
This is an abridged version of CRS Report RL34323, William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2007 (H.R. 3887 as Passed by the House): Criminal Law Provisions, by [author name scrubbed] without the footnotes, quotations, or citations to authority found in the longer report. |
crs_RS21238 | crs_RS21238_0 | Political Background
Uzbekistan gained independence at the end of 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union. The existing president, Islam Karimov, retained his post following the country's independence, and was reelected in 2000 and 2007. He has pursued a policy of cautiously opening the country to global economic and other influences. The United States and Uzbekistan have minimal trade. The railway is part of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) of U.S. and NATO-developed land, air, and sea routes from Europe through Eurasia to Afghanistan. U.S. relations with Uzbekistan were set back in 2005 after the United States joined others in the international community to criticize an Uzbek government crackdown in the town of Andijon (see above). In the regional security field, Uzbekistan has become a key partner for the United States' effort in Afghanistan…. Cumulative U.S. assistance budgeted for Uzbekistan in FY1992-FY2010 was $971.36 million (all agencies and programs), according to the data compiled by the State Department's Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia. Of this aid, $393.0 million (about two-fifths) was budgeted for combating weapons of mass destruction (including Comprehensive Threat Reduction aid), Foreign Military Financing, counter-narcotics, Partnership for Peace, and anti-crime support. Food, health, and other social welfare and humanitarian aid accounted for $222.4 million (nearly one-fourth), and democratization aid accounted for $174.1 million (nearly one-fifth). Budgeted assistance was $11.34 million in FY2011 and $16.7 million in FY2012, and the Administration has requested $11.6 million for FY2014 (numbers include funds from the Economic Support Fund and other "Function 150" foreign aid, and exclude Defense and Energy Department funds). Country totals are not yet available for FY2013. In FY2003 foreign operations appropriations ( P.L. 108-7 ) and thereafter, Congress prohibited assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determined and reported that Uzbekistan was making substantial progress in meeting commitments to respect human rights; establish a multiparty system; and ensure free and fair elections, freedom of expression, and the independence of the media. In FY2008, Congress added a provision blocking Uzbek government officials from entering the United States if they were deemed to have been responsible for events in Andijon or to have violated other human rights. Consolidated Appropriations for FY2012 ( P.L. 112-74 ; signed into law on December 23, 2011) provides for the Secretary of State to waive conditions on assistance to Uzbekistan for a period of not more than six months and every six months thereafter until September 30, 2013, on national security grounds and as necessary to facilitate U.S. access to and from Afghanistan. | Uzbekistan gained independence at the end of 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union. The landlocked country is a potential Central Asian regional power by virtue of its population, the largest in the region, its substantial energy and other resources, and its location at the heart of regional trade and transport networks. The existing president, Islam Karimov, retained his post following the country's independence, and was reelected in 2000 and 2007. He has pursued a policy of caution in economic and political reforms, and many observers have criticized Uzbekistan's human rights record.
The United States pursued close ties with Uzbekistan following its independence. After the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, Uzbekistan offered over-flight and basing rights to U.S. and coalition forces. However, U.S. basing rights at Karshi-Khanabad were terminated in 2005 following U.S. criticism and other actions related to the Karimov government's allegedly violent crackdown on unrest in the southern city of Andijon. Since then, the United States has attempted to improve relations, particularly in support of operations in Afghanistan. In 2009, Uzbekistan began to participate in the Northern Distribution Network of land, sea, and air transit routes from Europe through Eurasia for U.S. and NATO military supplies entering and exiting Afghanistan.
Cumulative U.S. assistance budgeted for Uzbekistan in FY1992-FY2010 was $971.36 million (all agencies and programs). Of this aid, about two-fifths was budgeted for combating weapons of mass destruction (including Comprehensive Threat Reduction aid), Foreign Military Financing, counter-narcotics, Partnership for Peace, and anti-crime support. Food, health, and other social welfare and humanitarian aid accounted for nearly one-fourth, and democratization aid accounted for nearly one-fifth. Budgeted assistance was $11.3 million in FY2011 and $16.7 million in FY2012, and the Administration has requested $11.6 million for FY2014 (these latter amounts include foreign assistance listed in the Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, and exclude Defense and Energy Department funding; country data for FY2013 are not yet available).
In FY2003 foreign operations appropriations (P.L. 108-7) and thereafter, Congress prohibited foreign assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determined and reported that Uzbekistan was making substantial progress in meeting commitments to respect human rights; establish a multiparty system; and ensure free and fair elections, freedom of expression, and the independence of the media. In FY2008, Congress added a provision blocking Uzbek government officials from entering the United States if they were deemed to have been responsible for events in Andijon or to have violated other human rights. Consolidated Appropriations for FY2012 (P.L. 112-74) provides for the Secretary of State to waive conditions on assistance to Uzbekistan for a period of not more than six months and every six months thereafter until September 30, 2013, on national security grounds and as necessary to facilitate U.S. access to and from Afghanistan. Such waivers have been issued. |
crs_R44381 | crs_R44381_0 | A table of topline budget figures (see Table 1 ) and accompanying graphs (see Figure 2 and Figure 3 ) illustrate that in comparison with national defense spending, intelligence-related spending has remained relatively constant over the past decade, representing approximately 11% of annual national defense spending over that time period. Table B-1 identifies 4 defense NIP programs, 8 nondefense NIP programs, and 10 MIP programs. The Intelligence Budget
Intelligence spending is usually understood as the sum of two separate budget programs: (1) the NIP, which covers the programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence community oriented toward the strategic needs of decisionmakers, and (2) the MIP, which funds defense intelligence activities intended to support operational and tactical level intelligence priorities supporting defense operations. For example, of the $63.5 billion appropriated in FY2007, the NIP portion ($43.5 billion) was roughly twice the size of the MIP portion ($20 billion). Intelligence Programs (NIP and MIP)
Appendix C. Intelligence Community Entities Receiving NIP and MIP Funding
Six U.S. intelligence entities—those organizations with an intelligence mission that include but are not limited to the IC components defined by statute—have both MIP and NIP funding sources. | Total intelligence spending is usually understood as the combination of the National Intelligence Program (NIP), which supports strategic planning and policymaking, and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), which supports military operational and tactical levels of planning and operations. There are 4 defense NIP programs, 8 nondefense NIP programs, and 10 MIP programs. Six U.S. intelligence community (IC) components have both MIP and NIP funding sources.
Funding associated with the 17 components of the IC is significant. In fiscal year FY2017 alone, the aggregate amount (base and supplemental) of appropriated funds for national and military intelligence programs totaled $73.0 billion ($54.6 billion for the NIP, and $18.4 billion for the MIP). For FY2018, the aggregate amount of appropriations requested for national and military intelligence programs totaled $78.4 billion ($57.7 billion for the NIP and $20.7 billion for the MIP).
In comparison with national defense spending, intelligence-related spending has remained relatively constant over the past decade, representing approximately 11% of the total defense budget. |
crs_R40557 | crs_R40557_0 | Introduction
Foreign assistance law requires Congress to authorize funding for programs before appropriated funds are spent. Through 1985, Congress regularly enacted new authorization legislation or amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the foundation of U.S. foreign aid policy, to update authorization time frames, and to incorporate newer programs and authorities. After 1986, however, Congress turned more frequently to enacting freestanding authorities that did not amend the 1961 Act, and waived the requirement to authorize funds before making them available in appropriations. Over time, as enactment of foreign aid reauthorizations waned, the General Provisions of foreign operations appropriations measures increasingly have become a legislative option for Congress to assert its views on the role and use of U.S. foreign aid policy, put limits or conditions on assistance, or even authorize new programs. This report identifies the legislative origins of General Provisions that pertain to foreign aid in current foreign operations appropriations: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010 (division F of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010; P.L. 111-117 ; 123 Stat. 3034 at 3312), as continued for Fiscal Year 2011 by the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 ( P.L. 112-10 ; 125 Stat. 38; of which sec. 1101(a)(6) continues appropriations enacted in P.L. 111-117 , and division B, title XI, which provides further instruction for FY2011 foreign operations expenditures). | This report identifies the legislative origins of General Provisions that pertain to foreign aid in the current Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010 (division F of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010; P.L. 111-117; 123 Stat. 3034 at 3312), as continued for Fiscal Year 2011 by the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10; 125 Stat. 38; of which sec. 1101(a)(6) continues appropriations enacted in P.L. 111-117, and division B, title XI, which provides further instruction for FY2011 foreign operations expenditures).
Foreign assistance law requires Congress to authorize funding for programs before appropriated funds are spent. Through 1985, Congress regularly enacted new authorization legislation or amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the foundation of U.S. foreign aid policy, to update authorization time frames, and to incorporate newer programs and authorities. After 1986, however, Congress turned more frequently to enacting freestanding authorities that did not amend the 1961 Act, or included language in annual appropriations measures to waive the requirement to keep authorizations current.
Over time, as enactment of foreign aid reauthorizations waned, the General Provisions of foreign operations appropriations measures increasingly became an important legislative place for Congress to assert its views on the role and use of U.S. foreign aid policy, put limits or conditions on assistance, or even authorize new programs. |
crs_R40511 | crs_R40511_0 | Introduction and Organization
This report discusses electric power transmission and related policy issues. Proposals before the 111 th Congress for changing federal transmission law and regulations to meet these and other objectives include S. 539 , the Clean Renewable Energy and Economic Development Act, introduced on March 5, 2009; and the March 9, 2009, majority staff transmission siting draft of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee (the "Senate Energy Majority Draft"). Renewable energy-focused transmission planning could accelerate the development of renewable power. Second, new transmission projects included in the interconnection-wide plans would include preferential permitting and financing. Transmission Planning: Summary of Policy Issues
In summary, transmission planning issues for Congress include:
What should be the objectives of the planning process ? Should the planning process extend beyond transmission planning narrowly defined to a include a broader array of solutions to power system issues, such as demand response, distributed power, or conventional power plant construction. These benefits could lead developers to add unnecessary features and costs to qualify proposals to meet plan criteria (e.g., proposing only high voltage lines if the plans have a minimum voltage threshold). Transmission Permitting: Summary of Policy Issues
In summary, in considering how much additional transmission siting authority, if any, the federal government should assume, Congress may want to consider the following policy questions:
Should the grid be viewed from a national perspective? How important is it to accelerate the construction of new transmission lines? Whether FERC or another agency is assigned a federal permitting role, it will need the resources to expeditiously process applications. Cost Allocation
Perhaps the most contentious transmission financing issue is cost allocation for new interstate transmission lines – that is, deciding which customers pay how much of the cost of building and operating a new transmission line that crosses several states. Some proposals call for the federal government, possibly acting through the federal utilities, to help pay for new transmission lines, pay for expanding projects to meet future needs, or actually build new transmission. Federal Support for the Smart Grid
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) articulated a national policy to modernize the power system with smart grid technology, and authorized research and development programs, funding for demonstration projects, and matching funds for investments in smart grid technologies. Transmission System Reliability
This section of the report will discuss the reliability of the transmission system from three perspectives:
Problems in evaluating the current reliability condition of the grid; Modernization and reliability; Reliability and changes in the energy market. In considering new spending and planning approaches for the transmission system, Congress may wish to ensure that the right balance is struck between modernization and new construction. Congress may want to exercise oversight to ensure that FERC and NERC are developing reliability standards for a changing grid. Permitting of Transmission Lines
Transmission line permitting is primarily under the control of the states. Expanding federal authority over permitting is viewed as a means of accelerating the process. How far should the federal government go into financing the expansion of the transmission grid? Policy issues include:
Program oversight . Reliability and the changing power market. | This report provides background information on electric power transmission and related policy issues. Proposals for changing federal transmission policy before the 111th Congress include S. 539, the Clean Renewable Energy and Economic Development Act, introduced on March 5, 2009; and the March 9, 2009, majority staff transmission siting draft of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. The policy issues identified and discussed in this report include:
Federal Transmission Planning: several current proposals call for the federal government to sponsor and supervise large scale, on-going transmission planning programs. Issues for Congress to consider are the objectives of the planning process (e.g., a focus on supporting the development of renewable power or on a broader set of transmission goals), determining how much authority new interconnection-wide planning entities should be granted, the degree to which transmission planning needs to consider non-transmission solutions to power market needs, what resources the executive agencies will need to oversee the planning process, and whether the benefits for projects included in the transmission plans (e.g., a federal permitting option) will motivate developers to add unnecessary features and costs to qualify proposals for the plan.
Permitting of Transmission Lines: a contentious issue is whether the federal government should assume from the states the primary role in permitting new transmission lines. Related issues include whether Congress should view management and expansion of the grid as primarily a state or national issue, whether national authority over grid reliability (which Congress established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005) can be effectively exercised without federal authority over permitting, if it is important to accelerate the construction of new transmission lines (which is one of the assumed benefits of federal permitting), and whether the executive agencies are equipped to take on the task of permitting transmission lines.
Transmission Line Funding and Cost Allocation: the primary issues are whether the federal government should help pay for new transmission lines, and if Congress should establish a national standard for allocating the costs of interstate transmission lines to ratepayers.
Transmission Modernization and the Smart Grid: issues include the need for Congressional oversight of existing federal smart grid research, development, demonstration, and grant programs; and oversight over whether the smart grid is actually proving to be a good investment for taxpayers and ratepayers.
Transmission System Reliability: it is not clear whether Congress and the executive branch have the information needed to evaluate the reliability of the transmission system. Congress may also want to review whether the power industry is striking the right balance between modernization and new construction as a means of enhancing transmission reliability, and whether the reliability standards being developed for the transmission system are appropriate for a rapidly changing power system.
This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL33958 | crs_RL33958_0 | Overview
Most of the products of animal agriculture are not eligible for the price and income support programs that Congress has written into farm bills for major crops such as grains, cotton, and oilseeds. Animal agriculture does look to the federal government to resolve trade disputes, establish transparent, science-based rules for importing and exporting animal products, and reassure domestic and foreign buyers alike that these products are safe, of high quality, and disease-free. Omnibus farm legislation can contain policy guidance and resources related to these objectives. A number of animal-related provisions, some potentially quite significant for producers and agribusinesses, were debated during Congress's deliberations on a 2007-2008 farm bill. Several of these proposals advanced to be included in the final version of the farm bill ( P.L. 110-246 ) that became law in June 2008. It contains a new title on Livestock (Title XI) with provisions affecting how USDA is to regulate livestock and poultry markets—but lacking much of the extensive language that had been in the Senate-passed version of the bill ( H.R. For example, conferees omitted a Senate provision that would have prohibited the large meat packers from owning, feeding, or controlling livestock except within 14 days of slaughter. Other livestock title provisions in the final version include permitting some state-inspected meat and poultry products to enter interstate commerce, just like USDA-inspected products; bringing catfish under mandatory USDA inspection; and modifying the mandatory country-of-origin labeling (COOL) law to ease compliance requirements affecting meats and other covered commodities. In the Miscellaneous title (Title XIV), Congress included amendments aimed at further protecting primarily companion animals, which are regulated under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). Title XV, containing the bill's revenue and tax provisions, creates a new disaster assistance trust fund that could provide new assistance to livestock producers affected by weather disasters. Legislation to ban packer ownership was considered in the 110 th Congress. Farm Bill Provisions
Provisions in the farm bill address some of these questions. Food Safety Commission. However, the committees did include, in their farm bills, incentives for the development of other types of renewable fuels besides corn-based ethanol, such as cellulosic ethanol production, and they expanded research and conservation-related policy options. | With a few exceptions (such as milk), the products of animal agriculture are not eligible for the price and income supports that Congress historically has written into farm bills for major row crops such as grains, cotton, and oilseeds. However, the meat and poultry industries do look to the federal government for leadership and support in promoting their exports, resolving trade disputes, and reassuring markets that their products are safe, of high quality, and disease-free. Farm bills can contain policy guidance and resources to help achieve these objectives.
Animal producers closely follow the development of farm bills because of their potential impact on production and marketing costs. For example, policies promoting crop-based alternative fuels like ethanol already have contributed to higher prices for corn and soybeans, both important animal feedstuffs. Where additional biofuels policy incentives were being considered for inclusion in a new farm bill, cattle, hog, and poultry producers urged restraint and/or encouraged more use of non-feed crops like grasses and field wastes. Other issues of interest included proposals from some farmer-rancher coalitions to address perceived anti-competitive market behavior by large meat and poultry processing companies; and proposed changes in food safety laws.
A number of animal-related provisions, some potentially quite significant for producers and agribusinesses, were debated during Congress's deliberations on a 2007-2008 farm bill. Several of these proposals advanced to be included in the final version of the bill (P.L. 110-246) that became law in June 2008. It contains a new title on Livestock (Title XI) with provisions affecting how USDA is to regulate livestock and poultry markets—but lacking much of the extensive language that had been in the Senate-passed version of the bill. For example, conferees omitted a Senate provision that would have prohibited large meat packers from owning, feeding, or controlling livestock except within 14 days of slaughter.
Other livestock title provisions in the final version include permitting some state-inspected meat and poultry products to enter interstate commerce, just like USDA-inspected products; bringing catfish under mandatory USDA inspection; and modifying the mandatory country-of-origin labeling (COOL) law to ease compliance requirements affecting meats and other covered commodities. In the Miscellaneous title (Title XIV), Congress included amendments aimed at further protecting primarily companion animals, which are regulated under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). Title XV, containing the bill's revenue and tax provisions, creates a new disaster assistance trust fund that could provide new assistance to livestock producers affected by weather disasters.
In the 111th Congress, lawmakers' attention likely will be focused on USDA's implementation of these provisions. Whether they might take renewed interest in provisions that did not pass—for example, the ban on large packer ownership of livestock—was uncertain at the start of 2009. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R40943 | crs_R40943_0 | Introduction
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law a comprehensive health care reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148 ). Health care reform is at the top of the Obama Administration's domestic policy agenda, driven by concerns about the growing ranks of the uninsured and the unsustainable growth in spending on health care and health insurance. Improving access to care and controlling rising costs are seen to require changes to both the financing and delivery of health care. This report, one of a series of CRS products on PPACA, summarizes the new law's workforce, prevention, quality, and related provisions. During the past year's legislative debate on health care reform, both the House and the Senate passed comprehensive bills. On November 7, 2009, by a vote of 220-215, the House approved the Affordable Health Care for America Act ( H.R. 3962 ). The Senate passed its own health reform legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( H.R. 3590 , as amended), on December 24, 2009, by a vote of 60-39. On March 21, 2010, the House approved the Senate-passed bill by a vote of 219-212. The House also approved an accompanying reconciliation bill, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 ( H.R. The reconciliation bill would change several controversial elements in PPACA and otherwise amend the new law so that its budgetary impact meets the reconciliation instructions in last year's budget resolution. H.R. 4872 is now under consideration by the full Senate. Health Workforce
Background and Issues
Existing health professions education and training programs authorized under PHSA Title VII provide funding to medical schools and other facilities to promote community-based and rural practice, primary care, and opportunities for minorities and disadvantaged students. Medicare pays the costs of graduate medical education (GME) by making two types of payments to teaching hospitals. 271 would establish a science track at academic sites selected by the Secretary, to award degrees that emphasize team-based service, public health, epidemiology, and emergency preparedness and response. Title VIII, Sec. Prevention Under Medicare and Medicaid39
Sec. In addition, a new PHSA Sec. The Council would be required to provide federal coordination and leadership with respect to prevention, wellness, and health promotion practices; develop a national prevention, health promotion, and public health strategy; report to the President and Congress on activities under the strategy and progress toward identified goals; and other activities as specified. Prevention and Public Health Fund
The stated purpose of this section is to establish a Prevention and Public Health Fund to provide for expanded and sustained national investment in prevention and public health programs to improve health and help restrain the rate of growth in private and public sector health care costs. 511 , Early Childhood Home Visitation Programs . PPACA includes the following five sections addressing quality measurement, which together would require the development of an explicit national effort to establish a national strategy for quality improvement; establish an interagency working group to advance quality efforts at the national level; develop a comprehensive repertoire of quality measures; and formalize processes for quality measure selection, endorsement, data collection and public reporting of quality information. It would include a new Sec. A number of provisions in H.R. PPACA has two comparative effectiveness research provisions. 1171-1179) instructed the Secretary to adopt electronic format and data standards for nine specified administrative and financial transactions between health care providers and health plans. Subpart B—Elder Abuse, Neglect, Exploitation Forensic Centers. | On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law a comprehensive health care reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148). Health care reform has been the Obama Administration's top domestic priority, driven by concerns about the growing ranks of the uninsured and the unsustainable growth in spending on health care and health insurance. Improving access to care and controlling rising costs are seen to require changes to both the financing and delivery of health care.
Both the House and the Senate passed comprehensive health care reform bills last year. The House approved the Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962) on November 7, 2009. The Senate then passed its own health reform legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590, as amended), on December 24, 2009. H.R. 3590, as passed by the Senate, was approved by the House on March 21, 2010, and sent to the President. The House also approved an accompanying reconciliation bill, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (H.R. 4872). The reconciliation bill would change several controversial elements in PPACA and otherwise amend the new law so that its budgetary impact meets the reconciliation instructions in last year's budget resolution. H.R. 4872 is being considered by the full Senate. This report, one of a series of CRS products on PPACA, summarizes the new law's workforce, prevention, quality, and related provisions.
PPACA includes numerous provisions intended to increase the primary care and public health workforce, promote preventive services, and strengthen quality measurement, among other things. It amends and expands many of the existing health workforce programs authorized under Title VII (health professions) and Title VIII (nursing) of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA); creates a Public Health Services Track to train health care professionals emphasizing team-based service, public health, epidemiology, and emergency preparedness and response; and makes a number of changes to the Medicare graduate medical education (GME) payments to teaching hospitals, in part to encourage the training of more primary care physicians. The new law also establishes a national commission to study projected health workforce needs.
In addition, PPACA creates an interagency council to promote healthy policies and prepare a national prevention and health promotion strategy. It establishes a Prevention and Public Health Fund to boost funding for prevention and pubic health; increases access to clinical preventive services under Medicare and Medicaid; promotes healthier communities; and funds research on optimizing the delivery of public health services. Funding also is provided for maternal and child health services, including abstinence education and a new home visitation program. PPACA also establishes a national strategy for quality improvement; creates an interagency working group to advance quality efforts at the national level; develops a comprehensive repertoire of quality measures; and formalizes processes for quality measure selection, endorsement, data collection and public reporting of quality information. It creates and funds a new private, nonprofit comparative effectiveness research institute.
Other key provisions in PPACA include programs to prevent elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation; a new regulatory pathway for licensing biological drugs shown to be biosimilar or interchangeable with a licensed biologic; new requirements for the collection and reporting of health data by race, ethnicity, and primary language to detect and monitor trends in health disparities; and electronic format and data standards to improve the efficiency of administrative and financial transactions between health care providers and health plans. |
crs_RL34262 | crs_RL34262_0 | A bilateral textile agreement that ran from May 1, 2003, until January 11, 2007, imposed quantity quotas on the import of certain categories of clothing imported from Vietnam. Finally, on December 8, 2006, Congress passed legislation granting Vietnam permanent NTR status as of December 29, 2006. On May 6, 2008, the DOC completed its second six-month review of the monitoring data, and once again decided that "there is insufficient evidence to warrant self-initiating an antidumping investigation." While there was no requirement that the DOC take any action following the evaluations of the trade data, the program's continuation arguably will keep the monitoring program an issue of concern for the U.S. clothing manufacturers, the U.S. textile industry, major clothing importers, and large retail outlets in the United States. Among the possible Administration actions that could have been taken were the self-initiation of an anti-dumping investigation on select clothing imports from Vietnam, the opening of negotiations for a new bilateral textile agreement, and/or the termination of the monitoring program. Vietnam was not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) so it was not eligible for "normal trade relations" (NTR) status via that mechanism. Also, under U.S. law, Vietnam could only be granted permanent NTR status by the passage of legislation, or granted temporary NTR status by the conclusion of a bilateral trade agreement and compliance with the "freedom of emigration" requirements of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The Trade Ministry's second letter to the Commerce Department shifts its focus to the negative impact it argues the monitoring program has had and will have on legitimate trade between Vietnam and the United States:
Although the additional information in the second-round proposal mentions the fact that this Program does not aim at restraining legal trade, in fact it has created negative impacts—causing worries and unstable mentality for U.S. importers placing orders in Vietnam right from the very first month of 2007, and making it impossible for Vietnam textile and apparel manufacturers to pro-actively plan their production, and above all, creating instabilities for workers in Vietnam's textile and apparel industries. Results of the First Six-Month Review
On October 26, 2007, the DOC announced that a review of the first six months of data for selected categories of clothing imported from Vietnam "found insufficient evidence to warrant self-initiating an antidumping investigation." Despite repeated changes in U.S. trade policy towards Vietnam—including the conferral of normal trade relations, the imposition of import quotas for selected clothing items, and compliance with Vietnam's WTO accession—there has been steady growth in Vietnam's clothing exports to the United States, and, with it, a rise in Vietnam's overall market share in the United States. First, the Department of Commerce has not publicly responded to requests from some Members of Congress, the Vietnamese government, and some major U.S. clothing importers for the legal basis for establishing the monitoring program. Congress could act to revisit the question of DOC's legal authority for establishing the monitoring program. Third, Congress could investigate Vietnam's compliance with its promise to terminate all WTO-prohibited subsidies to its clothing and textile industry. Fourth, possibly based in part of the results the investigation mentioned above, Congress could choose to pass legislation designed to counteract perceived unfair trade practices by Vietnam in its export of clothing to the United States. | U.S. clothing imports from Vietnam grew from virtually nothing in 2000 to $4.3 billion in 2007. Vietnam was the third largest source of clothing imports for the United States in 2006, behind (in order) China and Mexico.
Much of that growth was the result of the gradual liberalization of U.S. trade policy towards Vietnam. Although the United States terminated its trade embargo on Vietnam in 1994, trade initially remained low because Vietnam did not have "normal trade relations" (NTR) status. The signing of a bilateral trade agreement in July 2000 allowed President Clinton to grant Vietnam temporary NTR status (effective December 2001), leading to a sharp increase in U.S. imports from Vietnam, including clothing. The rise in Vietnamese clothing imports led to the United States to push Vietnam into a bilateral textile agreement in 2003 that set quantity quotas on the import of selected clothing items. The bilateral textile agreement remained in effect until the United States granted Vietnam permanent NTR status on December 20, 2006, as part of its accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The liberalization of U.S. trade policy towards Vietnam raised concerns about possible dumping by Vietnamese clothing exporters. Some Members of Congress and U.S. clothing and textile companies argued that a surge in Vietnamese imports may harm the U.S. clothing and textile industry. In part to secure Senate passage of permanent NTR status for Vietnam, the Bush Administration agreed to establish a "monitoring program" for selected clothing imports from Vietnam. From its inception, there have been questions about the legality and effectiveness of the monitoring program.
On October 26, 2007, the Department of Commerce (DOC) announced the completion of its first six-month review of the monitoring data, finding that there was insufficient evidence to warrant the self-initiation of an antidumping investigation. On May 6, 2008, the DOC announced its second six-month review of the monitoring data had come to the same conclusion.
There are a range of actions that Congress might take with regard to U.S. trade policy towards Vietnam. Congress could take no action. Alternatively, Congress could revisit the question of the DOC's legal authority to establish the monitoring program, as well as examine the issue of the compatibility of the monitoring program with existing WTO agreements and commitments. Congress could investigate Vietnam's compliance with its promise to terminate all WTO-prohibited subsidies. Congress could also enact legislation designed to counteract perceived unfair Vietnamese trade practices. Congress could examine the design and conduct of the monitoring program to ascertain if it provides a reasonable basis for determining the need for an antidumping investigation and/or examine claims that the monitoring program has adversely affected trade with and investments in Vietnam. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R44127 | crs_R44127_0 | Singapore's heavy dependence on international trade makes maintaining regional stability one of its foremost priorities. As a result, the nation is a firm supporter of both U.S. trade policy and the U.S. security role in Asia. However, the country also maintains close relations with China. That same year, Lee Kuan Yew, who was head of the People's Action Party (PAP), was elected prime minister. Government and Politics
The PAP has won every general election since the end of the colonial era in 1959, aided by a fragmented opposition, Singapore's economic success, and electoral procedures, such as group districting, which strongly favor the ruling party. In September 2015, following several gradual policy shifts including the imposition of some limits on foreign labor and improved benefits for the poor and elderly, the PAP won nearly 70% of the popular vote in nationwide polls, leaving it with 83 of Parliament's 89 seats. Lee Hsien Loong has served as Prime Minister since 2004. The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) went into effect in January 2004—the United States' first bilateral FTA with an Asian country—and trade has increased significantly as a result. In 2015, Singapore was the 17 th -largest U.S. trading partner. Two-way goods trade amounted to $47 billion, with the United States exporting $28 billion to Singapore and importing $18 billion. Singapore is the largest U.S. trading partner in ASEAN, and the country remains a substantial destination for U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI). Singapore and the United States are among the 12 countries on both sides of the Pacific that are part of the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the centerpiece of the Obama Administration's economic rebalance to Asia, which awaits ratification by each of its members. U.S.-Singapore Defense Cooperation
The 2005 "Strategic Framework Agreement" and a 2015 enhanced "Defense Cooperation Agreement" formalize the bilateral security and defense relationship between the United States and Singapore. The 2005 agreement was the first of its kind with a non-ally since the Cold War, and the two pacts build on the U.S. strategy of "places-not-bases" in the region, a concept that allows the U.S. military access to facilities on a rotational basis without bringing up sensitive sovereignty issues. Renewed U.S. engagement in the Asia Pacific under the Obama Administration has pleased Singapore and may have allowed it more diplomatic space to stand up to Beijing on key issues. Maintaining strong relations with both China and the United States is a keystone of Singapore's foreign policy. | A former trading and military outpost of the British Empire, the tiny Republic of Singapore has transformed itself into a modern Asian nation and a major player in the global economy, though it still substantially restricts political freedoms in the name of maintaining social stability and economic growth. Singapore's heavy dependence on international trade makes regional stability and the free flow of goods and services essential to its existence.
As a result, the island nation is a firm supporter of the U.S. security role in Asia, but it also maintains close relations with China. The Obama Administration's strategy of rebalancing U.S. foreign policy priorities to the Asia Pacific enhances Singapore's role as a key U.S. partner in the region. A formal strategic partnership agreement between the United States and Singapore outlines access to military facilities, cooperation in counterterrorism and counter-proliferation, joint military exercises, policy dialogues, and shared defense technology.
Singapore also supports U.S. international trade policy. Singapore and the United States are among the 12 countries on both sides of the Pacific involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is the centerpiece of the Obama Administration's economic rebalance to Asia. In 2015, Singapore was the 17th-largest U.S. trading partner with $47 billion in total two-way goods trade, and the country remains a substantial destination for U.S. foreign direct investment. The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) went into effect in January 2004, and since then trade has burgeoned between the two countries.
Singapore's People's Action Party (PAP) has won every general election since the end of the colonial era in 1959, aided by a fragmented opposition, Singapore's economic success, and electoral procedures that strongly favor the ruling party. Some point to changes in the political and social environment that may herald more political pluralism, including generational changes and an increasingly international outlook among Singaporeans. However, the PAP maintains a dominant political position. In September 2015, it won nearly 70% of the popular vote in nationwide Parliamentary elections that left it with 83 of the 89 seats in Parliament.
In March 2015, Lee Kuan Yew, who was Singapore's Prime Minister from 1959 to 1990, passed away. He was—and still is—considered the founder of modern Singapore, and he is credited with transforming Singapore from an English colony into one of the world's wealthiest and least corrupt countries. His son, Lee Hsien Loong, is Singapore's current Prime Minister. |
crs_RL34731 | crs_RL34731_0 | Nepal: Recent Developments
Nepal has undergone a radical transformation in recent years as the nation ended its civil war, abolished the monarchy, and established a multi-party democratic republic. Before February 2011, Nepal had been in a political vacuum for seven months due to a deadlock in the Constituent Assembly, where no party or coalition was able to attain majority support. They elected Khanal as prime minister, with backing from the Maoists, though the Maoists remained outside the government until March 2011. The government faces the challenge of completing the peace process that began in 2006 by drafting a constitution before a May 2011 deadline. Conclusion of the Peace Process and Integration of Maoist Fighters
One of the key provisions of the 2006 peace agreement that ended a decade-long guerrilla struggle and brought the Maoists off the battlefield and into the political process was a provision which has led to great debate over how and to what extent former Maoist fighters will be integrated into the Army of Nepal. UNMIN had been monitoring the situation since January 2007. Federalism and the Madhes and Tharu of the Terai
The likely contentious nature of a new federal structure may lead the government and constitution drafting committees to defer the issue of a new federal system to a later date, at which time the polity of Nepal may be better able to absorb the shock of potential opposition to a new structure. This background provides a context for assessing the stability of the current government, which once again includes these two communist parties. The seizure of power by the king appears to have been aimed as much, if not more so, at asserting the king's control over democratic forces. The Seven Party Alliance that opposed the king in April included the parties as listed below:
The Nepali Congress (NC) Communist Party of Nepal Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) Nepali Congress (Democratic) or NC (D) Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandi Devi) or NSP (A) Jana Morcha Nepal Samyukta Baam Morcha (United Left Front) or ULF Nepal Workers and Peasants Party (NWPP)
The Maoists were not part of the Seven Party Alliance, though they worked with the alliance to oppose the monarchy. The June election date slipped but Constituent Assembly elections were eventually held in April 2008. This has been particularly acute in the Terai region along Nepal's southern border with India, where the Madhes live. Political instability and insurgency-related violence of recent years has undermined the country's economy. Relations with the United States
According to the State Department Background Notes on Nepal,
U.S. policy objectives toward Nepal center on helping Nepal build a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic society. U.S. Foreign Assistance
U.S. assistance to Nepal has sought to help Nepal "cement recent gains in peace and security" and assist Nepal in its transition to democracy, including strengthening Nepal's democratic institutions. Geopolitical Setting
Nepal is a landlocked geopolitical buffer state, like Bhutan, that is caught between the two Asian giants, India and China. Some sectors of the Nepali leadership have long resented Indian economic influence and have sought to establish a more independent foreign policy, which could draw Nepal closer to China. China
China has several key interests in Nepal. | Nepal has undergone a radical political transformation since 2006, when a 10-year armed struggle by Maoist insurgents, which claimed at least 13,000 lives, officially came to an end. The country's king stepped down in 2006, and two years later Nepal declared itself a republic, electing a Constituent Assembly in 2008 to write a new constitution, which is currently being drafted. Though the process of democratization has had setbacks and been marked by violence at times, Nepal has conducted reasonably peaceful elections, brought former insurgents into the political system, and in a broad sense, taken several large steps towards entrenching a functioning democracy.
This still-unfolding democratization process makes Nepal of interest to Congress and to U.S. foreign policymakers. A Congressional Nepal caucus has been newly formed, which should help further strengthen relations between the two countries, which have traditionally been friendly. U.S. policy objectives toward Nepal include supporting democratic institutions and economic liberalization, promoting peace and stability in South Asia, supporting Nepalese territorial integrity, and alleviating poverty and promoting development.
Nepal's status as a small, landlocked state situated between India and China also makes it important to foreign policymakers. Nepal's reliance on these two giant neighbors leads it to seek amicable relations with both, though ties with India have historically been closer. Some believe India is concerned a Maoist regime in Nepal could lend support to Maoist rebels in India. China, meanwhile, has taken several steps to pressure Nepal to repatriate, or at least constrain the activities of, refugees crossing the border from Tibet.
The place of Nepal's Maoists remains a delicate question that will do much to determine the fate of the nation's democracy. The group surprised many by peacefully challenging, and winning, the April 10, 2008, Constituent Assembly elections. During the civil war, the Maoists' stated aim had been to establish a peasant-led revolutionary communist regime, but once part of the political process, their objectives appear to have moderated. They have since lost control over government, and then returned as part of a coalition led by the Communist Party of Nepal United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML).
Two key challenges presently face Nepal. The first is to complete the peace process, which would require a resolution of the difficult issue of how to integrate former Maoist fighters into the army, or into society. The second key challenge is completing the drafting of a constitution. This raises the question of establishing a new federal structure that would address grievances of groups that feel they have been underrepresented in the key institutions of the state, particularly in the Terai region bordering India. |
crs_RL31006 | crs_RL31006_0 | House and Senate conferees had met on H.R. The FY2002 law contains a total of $19.18 billion. It includes $9.44 billion for DOI, $4.13 billion for the Forest Service, $1.77 billion for energy programs, $2.76 billion for the Indian HealthService, $497.2 million for the Smithsonian Institution, and $98.2 million and $124.5 millionrespectively for the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for theHumanities. It drops provisions that would have barred funds from being used to suspend or reviseexisting hardrock mining regulations, implement the Kyoto Protocol, or execute a final leaseagreement for oil and gas drilling in the "Lease Sale 181" area of the Gulf of Mexico. However, thelaw bars the use of funds for offshore energy leasing activities in several areas, and for energyleasing activities within presidentially-proclaimed national monuments as they were on January 20,2001. It also extends the Recreational Fee Demonstration Program for two years, and modifies theEmergency Steel Loan Guarantee Program. The bill includes funding for the Interior Department, except for the Bureau of Reclamation, andfunds for some agencies or programs in three other departments--Agriculture, Energy, and Healthand Human Services. Status of Department of the Interior and RelatedAgencies Appropriations, FY2002
On April 9, 2001, President Bush submitted his FY2002 budget to Congress. The FY2002 request for Interior and Related Agencies totals $18.19 billion comparedto the $19.07 billion enacted for FY2001 ( P.L. These figures reflect scorekeeping adjustments. 106-291 ). The HouseAppropriations Committee reported the bill ( H.R. 2217 , H.Rept.107-103 ) to the House on June 19, 2001. The House debated and passed H.R. 2217 (376-32) on June 21, 2001, with a total of $19.0 billion. 2217 . Asreported with amendments ( S.Rept. 107-36 ) on June 29, 2001, the bill provided atotal of $18.66 billion, below the House-passed level but above the FY2002 budget.The Senate Appropriations Committee concurred with the House in the totalconservation spending category of $1.32 billion. The Senate debated the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations bill on July 11 and 12, 2001, and passed the bill by voice vote with a total of $18.53 billionon July 12. House and Senate conferees met on October 10, 2001, and filed a report containing their agreement ( H.Rept. 107-234 ) on October 11, 2001. The conferees addressed a number of significant energy and mineral issues. On October 17, 2001, the conference report passed the House (380-28) and the Senate (95-3). The bill was signed into law on November 5, 2001 ( P.L. 107-63 ). 107-38
On September 18, 2001, Congress enacted a $40 billion Emergency Supplemental Appropriation, P.L.107-38 , (1) inresponse to the devastation and greatneed following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11th, 2001. These funds weredistributed as follows:
$10.1 million for operation of the National Park System to increase security at national monuments,
$25.3 million for the United States Park Police to enhancepreparedness for possible attacks against key national park sites in New York Cityand Washington, D.C.;
$21.6 million for the National Park Service for constructedsecurity improvements at the Washington Monument, the Lincoln Memorial, and theJefferson Memorial;
$2.2 million for Interior Departmental management, salariesand expenses;
$798,000 for the National Capital Planning Commission forphysical perimeter security and design plans for federal buildings in the monumentcore,
$2.15 million for the National Gallery of Art to improvesecurity operations,
$21.7 million for the Smithsonian, salaries and expenses, toclean up the damaged Heye Center of the National Museum on the American Indianin NYC ($96,000), and for increased security at the Smithsonian;and
$4.3 million for the John F. Kennedy Center for the PerformingArts to enhance security equipment and manpower. See Table 4 . In H.R. Energy Conservation. Department of Health and Human Services: Indian Health Service. a. Title II: Related Agencies. Table 11. Table 12. | The Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations bill includes funds for the Department of the Interior (DOI), except the Bureau of Reclamation, and funds for some agencies or programs withinthree other departments--Agriculture, Energy, and Health and Human Services. It also fundsnumerous smaller agencies.
On April, 9, 2001, President Bush submitted his FY2002 budget for Interior and Related Agencies, totaling $18.19 billion compared to the $19.07 billion enacted for FY2001 ( P.L. 106-291 ). These figures reflect scorekeeping adjustments. (See Table 10 and Table 11 ). Title VIII of theFY2001 law created a new discretionary "conservation spending category." See Table 12 .
On June 19, 2001, the House Appropriations Committee reported the FY2002 Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations bill ( H.R. 2217 , H.Rept. 107-103 ). The Housedebated and passed H.R. 2217 (376-32) on June 21, 2001, with a total of $19.00 billion. On June 29, 2001, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 2217 ( S.Rept.107-36 ) with amendments. The Senate debated the bill on July 11 and 12, 2001, and passed H.R. 2217 by voice vote on July 12, 2001,with a total of $18.53 billion, a lower levelthan the House.
House and Senate conferees met on October 10, 2001, and filed a report containing their agreement ( H.Rept. 107-234 ) on October 11, 2001. On October 17, 2001, the conference reportpassed the House (380-28) and the Senate (95-3). The bill was signed into law on November 5, 2001( P.L. 107-63 ).
The FY2002 law contains a total of $19.18 billion, higher than the House and Senate levels. For agencies within DOI, it contains $9.44 billion, while the Forest Service is funded at $4.13billion. There is $1.77 billion for energy programs, and $2.76 billion for the Indian Health Service. The Smithsonian Institution receives $497.2 million; the National Endowment for the Arts $98.2million; and the National Endowment for the Humanities $124.5 million.
The conferees addressed a number of significant energy and mineral issues. The FY2002 law drops provisions that barred funds from being used to: suspend or revise existing hardrock miningregulations, implement the Kyoto Protocol, or execute a final lease agreement for oil and gas drillingin the "Lease Sale 181" area of the Gulf of Mexico. It includes provisions to bar the use of fundsfor offshore energy leasing activities in several areas, and for energy leasing activities withinpresidentially-proclaimed national monuments as they were on January 20, 2001. The law alsoextends the Recreational Fee Demonstration Program for two years, and modifies the Steel LoanGuarantee Program.
In response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, a $40 billionemergency supplemental appropriation was enacted ( P.L. 107-38 ). The National Park Service hasreceived $3.1 million of the initial fund allocation for emergency response costs in New York Cityand Washington D.C.
Key Policy Staff
a Division abbreviations: DSP = Domestic Social Policy; G&F = Government and Finance; RSI =Resources, Science, and Industry. |
crs_RS22397 | crs_RS22397_0 | Under IDEA, public schools are required to provide children with disabilities with a free appropriate public education (FAPE), including special education and related services according to each child's individualized education plan (IEP) or individualized family service plan (IFSP). First, the rule would restrict federal payments for school-based administrative activities (e.g., outreach, service coordination, referrals) that may be conducted on behalf of children dually eligible for Medicaid and IDEA, as well as those eligible for Medicaid only. According to CMS, federal Medicaid reimbursement would no longer be available for (1) administrative activities performed by school employees or contractors, or anyone under the control of a public or private educational institution, because of inconsistent application of Medicaid requirements by schools, or (2) transportation from home to school and back for school-aged children with an IEP or IFSP, because such transportation does not meet the definition of an optional medical transportation service, nor is it necessary for the proper and efficient administration of the Medicaid state plan. P.L. This moratorium was effective until June 30, 2008. 2642 that would extend this moratorium to April 1, 2009. 110 - 252 . This moratorium was further extended to July 1, 2009, via the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ). | As a condition of accepting funds under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), public schools must provide special education and related services necessary for children with disabilities to benefit from a public education. Generally, states can finance only a portion of these costs with federal IDEA funds. Medicaid, the federal-state program that finances medical and health services for the poor, can cover IDEA required health-related services for enrolled children as well as related administrative activities (e.g., outreach for Medicaid enrollment purposes, medical care coordination). Despite written federal guidance, schools have difficulty meeting the complex reimbursement rules under Medicaid. According to federal investigations and congressional hearings, Medicaid payments to schools have sometimes been improper. P.L. 110-173 included a moratorium on any administrative action restricting Medicaid coverage or payments for school-based administration and transportation services until June 30, 2008. P.L. 110-252 extended this moratorium until April 1, 2009. This moratorium was further extended to July 1, 2009, via the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5). |
crs_R43189 | crs_R43189_0 | There are four common purposes of excise taxes: (1) sumptuary (or "sin") taxes, (2) regulatory or environmental taxes, (3) benefit-based taxes (or user charges), and (4) luxury taxes. Sumptuary (or "sin") taxes were traditionally imposed for moral reasons, but are currently rationalized, in part, to discourage a specific activity that is thought to have negative spillover effects (or "externalities") on society. Regulatory or environmental taxes are imposed to offset for external costs associated with regulating public safety or to discourage consumption of a specific commodity that is thought to have negative externalities on society. Benefit-based taxes are imposed to charge users for the benefits received from a particular public good and are often used for maintenance and upkeep of that public good. Lastly, luxury taxes are primarily imposed as one way to raise revenue, particularly from higher-income households. On the other hand, there is also interest in reducing current excise tax rates as a means to encourage short-term growth in particular industries. This report provides an introduction and general analysis of excise taxes. First, a brief history of the role of excise taxes is provided. Second, the various forms of excise taxes and their respective administrative advantages and disadvantages are described. Third, the effect of federal excise taxes on federal, state, and local tax revenue is discussed. Fourth, the economic effects of various types of excise taxes are analyzed. The effects on consumer behavior and equity among taxpayers could be important issues for assessment of current excise tax policy or for the design of new excise taxes. Lastly, the Appendix to this report contains a list of references to other CRS reports on specific excise taxes. Excise taxes in the form of user charges could continue to play a role in financing public goods and services. Some long-standing excise tax proposals to correct a perceived social issue have also resurfaced in policy discussions. Some of these proposals could be targeted towards specific products or activities (e.g., a "sugar-sweetened beverages" tax), while others could affect a broad range of economic activity and raise a significant amount of revenue (e.g., a carbon tax). Revenue
Excise taxes have had a diminishing role in federal public finance over time. In FY1960, excise tax collections amounted to approximately to $355.49 billion in 2012 constant dollars. While the number, rates, and types of excise taxes in effect have changed between 1960 and 2012, these data illustrate the declining role of excise taxes in federal public finance
Furthermore, federal excise tax receipts as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) are lower today than they were in the past. In FY2012, federal excise tax receipts were 0.5% of GDP. As shown in Figure 3 , federal excise taxes comprised 45.8% of all federal tax receipts in FY1934. A tax system is progressive if higher income households pay a greater share of their income in tax than lower income households, whereas the converse is true in a regressive tax system. With regard to vertical equity, excise taxes tend to be regressive. | There are four common types of excise taxes: (1) sumptuary (or "sin") taxes, (2) regulatory or environmental taxes, (3) benefit-based taxes (or user charges), and (4) luxury taxes. Sumptuary taxes were traditionally imposed for moral reasons, but are currently rationalized, in part, to discourage a specific activity that is thought to have negative spillover effects (or "externalities") on society. Regulatory or environmental taxes are imposed to offset external costs associated with regulating public safety or to discourage consumption of a specific commodity that is thought to have negative externalities on society. Benefit-based taxes (which include user charges) are imposed to charge users of a particular public good for financing and maintenance of that public good. Lastly, luxury taxes are primarily imposed as one way to raise revenue, particularly from higher-income households.
This report provides an introduction and general analysis of excise taxes. First, a brief history of U.S. excise tax policy is provided. Second, the various forms of excise taxes and their respective administrative advantages and disadvantages are described. Third, the effect of federal excise taxes on federal, state, and local tax revenue is discussed. Fourth, the economic effects of various types of excise taxes are analyzed. The effects on consumer behavior and equity among taxpayers could be important issues for assessment of current excise tax policy or for the design of new excise taxes. Lastly, a list of references to other CRS reports on specific excise taxes is presented.
Excise taxes have generally played a diminishing role in financing the federal government since the middle of the 20th century for multiple reasons. First, Congress has taken legislative action to eliminate many categories of excise taxes. Second, most excise tax rates set in statute have declined in value over time due to inflation and inaction by Congress to change tax rates set in statute.
Excise taxes tend to be regressive, in that lower-income households generally pay a larger share of their income in excise taxes than higher-income households. Because excise taxes generally increase the price of the taxed commodity, they also tend to lower consumer demand.
Excise taxes play a much smaller role in financing the federal government than they did in the past. In 1960, federal excise tax collections were $355.49 billion (in 2012 constant dollars, after accounting for inflation). In FY2012, federal excise tax collections were $56.17 billion (roughly one-sixth of their 1960 value in 2012 constant dollars). Federal excise taxes comprised 7.0% of all federal revenue in 1973, whereas they comprised 3.2% in 2012.
Congress may be interested in revisiting the revenue and economic effects of excise taxes because these taxes could play a growing role in financing public goods. Some long-standing excise tax proposals to correct alleged social costs have resurfaced from time to time in policy discussions. Some of these proposals could be targeted towards specific products or activities (e.g., a "sugar-sweetened beverages" tax), while others could affect a broad range of economic activity and raise a significant amount of revenue (e.g., a carbon tax). On the other hand, there is also interest in reducing current excise tax rates as a means to encourage short-term growth in particular industries. |
crs_R41488 | crs_R41488_0 | Introduction
In October 2010, the Social Security Administration (SSA) announced that Social Security beneficiaries would not receive a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) in 2011. Similarly, beneficiaries did not receive a COLA in 2010. For example, the Social Security COLA triggers an increase in Supplemental Security Income, veterans' pensions administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs and railroad retirement benefits. Both the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Social Security Board of Trustees project that a COLA will be payable in January 2012. In response to the absence of a COLA for the second consecutive year, some Members of Congress and the President are again calling for a one-time payment of $250 in lieu of a COLA for Social Security beneficiaries, veterans, and others. The proposed one-time payment is viewed by supporters as a way to assist economically vulnerable individuals and as a means to stimulate the economy. Some measures would provide a one-time payment in lieu of a COLA (the amount of the payment would vary depending on the proposal), whereas others would provide an ad hoc COLA of a specified percentage or require the use of a different measure of inflation to compute the COLA. How the COLA is Determined Under Current Law
The Social Security COLA is based on the rate of inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W), which is published monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Stated another way, if the change in the CPI-W over the measurement period does not result in a COLA, benefits remain flat (before deductions for Medicare Part B and Part D premiums). As a result, these program elements remain at their 2009 levels in 2010 and 2011. The elderly also devote a greater share of their spending to healthcare than the rest of the population. Using the CPI-E would not have led to a COLA in 2010 or 2011, however, as Figure 2 illustrates. Members of Congress have also introduced several bills to require that SSA use a different inflation measure to determine the COLA, based on arguments that the CPI-W may not accurately reflect the spending patterns of the Social Security beneficiary population. 5987 (Representative Pomeroy), Seniors Protection Act of 2010, is likely to be considered before the end of the 111 th Congress. Policy Considerations
This section the report discusses issues that may inform the debate on whether to provide a one-time payment to those directly affected by the Social Security COLA: the economic condition of older Americans; their dependence on Social Security benefits and their economic vulnerability in recent times; the effectiveness of this category of government spending as an economic stimulus; and the option of means testing such payments. Table 2 and Table 3 showed that the population aged 65 and older as a group is not uniformly economically vulnerable, and certain subgroups such as those aged 80 and older are more likely to suffer economic hardship. Some proposals would provide a one-time payment to Social Security beneficiaries only, whereas others would provide a one-time payment to Social Security beneficiaries as well as beneficiaries of other federal programs in which a COLA is connected in some way to the Social Security COLA. Some proposals, for example, are modeled after the one-time $250 economy recovery payments provided to Social Security and certain other beneficiaries in 2009 under ARRA. H.R. Supporters of a one-time payment view it as a way to stimulate the economy. Others argue that a one-time payment is not necessary because most beneficiaries received an unusually high COLA of 5.8% in 2009 and were protected against deflation in a subsequent period. The CPI-W remained below its 2008 peak during the measurement periods used to determine the 2010 and 2011 COLAs. | In October 2010, the Social Security Administration announced that Social Security beneficiaries will not receive a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) in 2011 for the second consecutive year. The COLA is based on a formula in the Social Security Act and the change in prices as measured by the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). Because consumer prices reached a peak in 2008 and have not regained that peak over the measurement periods used to determine the COLA for 2010 and 2011, Social Security benefits remain flat at their 2009 levels. Stated another way, beneficiaries are protected against a negative COLA that would reduce benefits.
Beneficiaries of other federal programs are also affected by the absence of a Social Security COLA, including Supplemental Security Income, veterans' pensions administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs, and benefits administered by the Railroad Retirement Board. Beneficiaries of these programs also will not receive a COLA in 2011. Recent projections suggest that the next Social Security COLA may be payable in January 2012.
A number of bills have been introduced that would provide a one-time payment in lieu of a COLA. For example, H.R. 5987 (Representative Pomeroy), Seniors Protection Act of 2010, which is likely to be considered before the end of the 111th Congress, would provide a one-time payment of $250 to Social Security and certain other beneficiaries. Other bills would provide an ad hoc COLA of a specified percentage or require the use of a different measure of price change to determine the COLA. Alternative measures of price change, such as the experimental Consumer Price Index for the Elderly (CPI-E), are proposed on the basis that the CPI-W may not accurately reflect the spending patterns of the Social Security beneficiary population, especially the elderly who tend to allocate a greater share of their total spending to healthcare than the rest of the population. If the CPI-E had been used in place of the CPI-W to compute the COLA, it would not have resulted in a COLA in 2010 or 2011.
The proposed one-time payment is viewed by supporters as a way to assist economically vulnerable individuals, especially the "oldest old" and women who tend to have higher poverty rates. Others point out, however, that the population aged 65 and older as a group is not uniformly economically vulnerable. They also argue that a one-time payment is not necessary because beneficiaries received an unusually high COLA in 2009 (5.8%) and were protected against deflation in a subsequent period. The CPI-W has remained below its 2008 peak during the measurement periods used to determine the 2010 and 2011 COLAs.
Supporters of a one-time payment also view it as a means to stimulate the economy. Estimates from the Congressional Budget Office show that a one-time payment to Social Security beneficiaries ranks behind other categories of government spending (including spending on unemployment benefits) that can be expected to encourage immediate spending and provide a boost to the economy. Means testing the one-time payment could help to target it more effectively, creating a stronger economic stimulus effect. Others express concern regarding the budget impact of a one-time payment in lieu of a COLA.
Experience related to the $250 economic recovery payments to Social Security and certain other beneficiaries in 2009 under P.L. 111-5 can provide insight into potential administrative issues, including those related to improper payments, and other considerations. |
crs_R40759 | crs_R40759_0 | Local and Regional Procurement (LRP) Issues
Local and regional procurement (LRP) of food aid refers to the purchase of commodities for emergency food aid by donors in countries with food needs or in another country within the region. LRP is used extensively by the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) and has been proposed as a cost-effective, time-saving tool that the United States could use to meet emergency food needs. Food aid budget submissions in FY2006 through FY2009 included a proposal with suggested legislative language to authorize the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to allocate up to 25% of the funds available for U.S. food aid (Title II of P.L. 480, or the Food for Peace Act) to local or regional purchase. The budget justification for this authority was that it would increase the timeliness and effectiveness of the U.S. response to overseas food aid needs by eliminating the need to transport the commodities by ocean carriers. Congressional and other critics of the local purchase proposal maintain that allowing non-U.S. commodities to be purchased would result in undermining the coalition of commodity producers, agribusinesses, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and shippers that participate in the food aid program and in reducing U.S. food aid. Instead, the 2008 farm bill ( P.L. Are there risks that could be associated with LRP that would make it a less-effective response to emergency food needs than provision of U.S. commodities? U.S. and Other Donor Food Aid Policy
Almost all U.S. food aid is provided in the form of U.S. commodity donations. P.L. Section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act authorizes the provision of international disaster assistance (IDA). Experience with LRP
The WFP and PVOs have been using donor funding to procure commodities in developing countries for more than 30 years. In 2008, the United States donated $2.1 billion in U.S. commodities to the emergency operations of WFP. Evaluation of LRP Experience
Evaluations of LRP have focused on the cost-effectiveness of LRP versus U.S. commodity donations and the timeliness of delivery of LRP versus overseas donations. These include a lack of reliable suppliers, poor infrastructure and logistical capacity, weak legal systems, timing and restrictions on donor funding, and quality considerations. However, the OECD study points out that, based on its food aid study, "in most circumstances, financial aid rather than food aid in-kind is the preferable option.... (but) In many food deficit situations, local procurement is not always a feasible option.... [c]ontext-specific rationale is always required for relying on food aid in kind in preference to financial aid." However, USAID LRP initiatives and the WFP's Purchase for Progress program have begun explorations of how low-income farmers in developing countries could participate in LRP efforts carried out by WFP or USAID. 110-246 , 7 U.S.C. USAID-Funded LRP
Separate from USDA's pilot LRP program, the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act ( P.L. The FY2010 Foreign Operations appropriations measure ( P.L. Bills under consideration would give the U.S. government the flexibility to use LRP in response to food emergencies without reducing the funds available for P.L. FY2010 Appropriations Bills
The President's FY2010 foreign affairs budget called for $300 million to be allocated to USAID's International Disaster Assistance (IDA) program to be used for LRP and the financing of cash transfers and cash vouchers to meet food security objectives. The Senate committee-reported bill ( S. 1434 ) directed that $1.5 billion of USAID development assistance be allocated to agricultural development and food security efforts, "including for local and regional purchase and distribution of food." 3288 , P.L. 2997 ), funds for P.L. S. 384 and H.R. | Using federally appropriated funds to procure commodities for international food aid in countries with emergency needs or in nearby countries is a controversial issue. In budget submissions for FY2006-FY2009, the Bush Administration proposed allocating up to 25% of the funds available for U.S. food aid (Title II of P.L. 480, or the Food for Peace Act) to local or regional procurement (LRP) of food aid commodities. Each time Congress rejected the proposal. The Administration argued that LRP would increase the timeliness and effectiveness of the U.S. response to overseas food emergencies by eliminating the need to transport commodities by ocean carriers. Congressional and other critics of the local procurement proposal maintain that allowing non-U.S. commodities to be purchased would undermine the coalition of commodity groups, agribusinesses, private voluntary organizations, and shippers that participate in and support the U.S. food aid program and would reduce the volume of U.S. commodities provided as aid.
The United States is alone in providing practically all of its international food aid in the form of its own commodities. U.S. food aid legislation precludes the provision of any but U.S. commodities to meet international food aid needs. The Foreign Assistance Act (P.L. 87-195), however, permits the use of some U.S. funds for LRP as part of the U.S. response to international disasters. The European Union provides almost all of its food aid via the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) in the form of cash; Canada's food aid also is cash-based. The WFP has been using donor funding to procure commodities locally or regionally in developing countries for more than 30 years.
Several recent studies have evaluated the timeliness and cost-effectiveness of LRP versus commodity donations and conclude that LRP in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) costs substantially less than shipping food aid from the United States to Africa and that food aid delivery times are substantially shorter. The studies point to risks associated with LRP, including lack of reliable suppliers, poor infrastructure, weak legal systems, donor funding delays, and quality (i.e., food safety or nutrition) considerations, that could impede the efficiency of LRP. On the other hand, the studies suggest that risks associated with LRP are no greater than risks associated with in-kind donations and that they could likely be countered with better market intelligence and effective management of LRP activities. One study suggests that in many food deficit situations, LRP may not be a feasible option. Inadequate local supplies or adverse market effects on producers or consumers in a country or region could rule out using LRP.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture has begun implementation of the pilot LRP program established in the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246). Separately, the U.S. Agency for International Development is implementing LRP activities with funds appropriated in an FY2008 supplemental appropriations act (P.L. 110-252). In addition, the WFP has initiated a Purchase for Progress (P4P) program that will evaluate how small farmers in developing countries can participate in WFP procurement.
The FY2010 Foreign Operations appropriation (P.L. 111-117) includes funds in international disaster assistance appropriations that could be used to fund LRP and food-security-related activities such as cash vouchers or cash transfers for purchasing food. In addition, P.L. 111-117 directs that $1.17 billion of development assistance be allocated to agricultural development and food security efforts. Proposed legislation, S. 384 and H.R. 3077, would authorize a $500 million appropriation, separate from P.L. 480 food aid, for responding rapidly to emergency food needs, including with LRP. The FY2010 Agriculture appropriations bill (P.L. 111-80) provides $1.7 billion to finance provision of U.S. commodities under P.L. 480. |
crs_RL32864 | crs_RL32864_0 | Background
Kyrgyzstan is a small and poor country that gained independence in 1991 with the breakupof the Soviet Union. (1) Itwas long led by Askar Akayev, who initially was widely regarded as a reformer but in recent yearsappeared increasingly autocratic. Despite this, the country was still considered "the most open,progressive and cooperative in Central Asia," according to the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment. (2) TheUnited States has been interested in helping Kyrgyzstan to enhance its sovereignty and territorialintegrity, increase democratic participation and civil society, bolster economic reform anddevelopment, strengthen human rights, prevent weapons proliferation, and more effectively combattransnational terrorism and trafficking in persons and narcotics. The significance of Kyrgyzstan tothe United States increased after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. military repaired and upgraded the air field at the Manas international airport for trans-shippingpersonnel, equipment, and supplies to support coalition operations in Afghanistan and the region. (3)
The Coup and Its Aftermath
Many people both inside and outside Kyrgyzstan were hopeful that the national legislativeelection on February 27, 2005 would strengthen political pluralism, easing the way for a peacefulhandover of executive power in late 2005 when President Akayev was expected to step down. Akayev's formal resignation as president on April 4, 2005, was a major boost to thelegitimacy of the interim government. Among early policy decisions, Bakiyev on March 29 stated that he would combat corruptionthat siphons away investment capital and compromises the educational and legal systems. Both Bakiyev and Otunbayeva stressed that Kyrgyzstan's foreign policy would notchange, including its close relations with Russia and the United States and the presence of theirmilitary bases in the country. Cumulative U.S. budgeted assistance to Kyrgyzstan for FY1992-FY2004 was $749.0 million(FREEDOM Support Act and other agency funds). Kyrgyzstan ranks third in such aid per capitaamong the Eurasian states, indicative of U.S. government and Congressional support in the early1990s for its apparent progress in making reforms and more recently for anti-terrorism and borderprotection. (30)
Although accepting some credit for the role U.S. democratization aid has played infacilitating the development of civil society in Kyrgyzstan, the Administration has been careful tostress that it did not "mastermind" the coup. Deputy Secretary Zoellick similarly asserted that the Kyrgyz, like"people in very diverse parts of the world, whether it is Ukraine, Georgia, Iraq, Afghanistan or thePalestinian elections ... desire to be free...." (33)
Indicating support for democratization and continued security ties, Defense Secretary DonaldRumsfeld briefly visited Kyrgyzstan on April 14. As Congress and the Administration consider how to assist democratic and economictransformation in Kyrgyzstan, several possible programs have been suggested by observers inKyrgyzstan, the United States, and elsewhere. | Kyrgyzstan is a small and poor country that gained independence in 1991 with the breakupof the Soviet Union. It was long led by Askar Akayev -- who many observers warned was becomingincreasingly autocratic -- but the country was still considered "the most open, progressive andcooperative in Central Asia," according to the U.S. Agency for International Development. TheUnited States has been interested in helping Kyrgyzstan to enhance its sovereignty and territorialintegrity, increase democratic participation and civil society, bolster economic reform anddevelopment, strengthen human rights, prevent weapons proliferation, and more effectively combattransnational terrorism and trafficking in persons and narcotics. The significance of Kyrgyzstan tothe United States increased after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. TheKyrgyz government permitted the United States to establish a military base that trans-shipspersonnel, equipment, and supplies to support coalition operations in Afghanistan.
Many people both inside and outside Kyrgyzstan were hopeful that the national legislativeelection on February 27, 2005 would strengthen political pluralism, easing the way for a peacefulhandover of executive power in late 2005 when President Akayev was expected to step down. Thelegislative race proved highly contentious, however, and necessitated a second round of voting onMarch 13. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe tentatively concluded thatserious irregularities took place in the first round. After the February 27 vote, protestors occupiedgovernment offices in the southern part of the country, and protests spread throughout the rest of thecountry after the second round of voting. On March 24, thousands of protesters stormed thepresidential and other offices in the capital of Bishkek and Akayev and his family fled. He resignedas president on April 4. Acting president Kurmanbek Bakiyev has pledged to focus on combatingcorruption that siphons away investment capital, and stressed that foreign policy would not change,including Kyrgyzstan's close relations with Russia and the United States. Looming challenges toKyrgyzstan's stability include a planned presidential election, possible legislative by-elections to fillseats under dispute, and a possible referendum to adopt democratic changes to the constitution.
Indicating early support for democratization and continued security ties, Defense SecretaryDonald Rumsfeld briefly visited Kyrgyzstan on April 14. Cumulative U.S. budgeted assistance toKyrgyzstan for FY1992-FY2004 was $749.0 million (FREEDOM Support Act and agency funds). Kyrgyzstan ranks third in such aid per capita among the Soviet successor states, indicative of U.S.government and Congressional support in the early 1990s for its apparent progress in makingreforms and more recently for anti-terrorism and border protection. Of this aid, 14.6% supporteddemocratization programs. While this aid has bolstered the growth of civil society in Kyrgyzstan,the Administration also has stressed that the United States did not orchestrate the coup. As Congressand the Administration consider how to assist democratic and economic transformation inKyrgyzstan, several possible programs have been suggested, including those to buttress civil rights,construct a federal government, and bolster private sector economic growth. (See also CRS Issue Brief IB93108, Central Asia , updated regularly.) |
crs_R42994 | crs_R42994_0 | They express concern about a possible lack of funding for activities that promote U.S. interests overseas. In contrast, other Members and many polled Americans, according to a Pew survey, consider foreign affairs funding, particularly foreign aid, as spending that should be cut to reduce the deficit. The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. For discretionary spending like the foreign affairs budget, reductions were achieved through sequestration in FY2013 and through downward adjustment of statutory limits to be met in the appropriation process for FY2014 to FY2021. If spending caps are not met within the appropriations process in FY2014 and beyond, sequestration again would occur. Sequestration of the Department of State and Foreign Operations Appropriations
The State-Foreign Operations (SFOP) appropriations, typically representing about 1% to 1.5% of the total federal budget in recent years, supports most programs and activities within the international affairs budget account, known as the 150 budget function. How the FY2013 Foreign Affairs Sequestration Was Implemented
The Budget Control Act of 2011, as amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-240 / H.R. 8 , signed into law January 2, 2013), required $85.3 billion in automatic cuts to be applied equally ($42.65 billion for each) between defense and nondefense accounts in FY2013. The Continuing Resolution Appropriation, 2013 (CR, P.L. On March 21, 2013, Congress approved legislation ( H.R. 113-6 , signed into law on March 26, 2013), funded the State Department, Foreign Operations and Related Programs through the CR mostly at the same rate as in FY2012, with a few anomalies spelled out in the law. 112-74 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, states that for Foreign Operations
''program, project, and activity'' shall be defined at the appropriations Act account level and shall include all appropriations and authorizations Acts funding directives, ceilings, and limitations with the exception that for the following accounts: ''Economic Support Fund'' and ''Foreign Military Financing Program'', ''program, project, and activity'' shall also be considered to include country, regional, and central program level funding within each such account; for the development assistance accounts of the United States Agency for International Development ''program, project, and activity'' shall also be considered to include central, country, regional, and program level funding, either as:
(1) justified to the Congress; or
(2) allocated by the executive branch in accordance with a report, to be provided to the Committees on Appropriations within 30 days of the enactment of this Act, as required by section 653(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 113-6 ) required an additional 0.032% across-the-board rescission to all foreign affairs discretionary accounts in order to meet the BCA spending limits. Others concerned with balancing the budget question the importance of foreign aid programs at a time when they say the deficit is hurting the U.S. economy and the priority should be directed more toward funding for defense and domestic programs. | Congress has an interest in the cost and effectiveness of foreign affairs activities that promote U.S. interests overseas. The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25), as amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240/H.R. 8, signed into law on January 2, 2013) required across-the-board reductions (sequestration) in most federal defense and nondefense discretionary programs, projects, and activities including those in foreign affairs for FY2013, and additional spending reductions each year through FY2021. These automatic cuts for FY2013 were ordered on March 1, 2013. Of ongoing interest will be the impact of these cuts and potential future reductions in State Department operations, foreign aid programs, and their ability to protect Americans and promote U.S. interests overseas.
Currently, for FY2014 the government is operating under a continuing resolution (CR, P.L. 113-46) that provides stop-gap funding through January 15, 2014. Subsequent legislation will be necessary to extend, or provide full-year, funding past this date.
In December 2013, the House and Senate agreed to the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA, H.J.Res. 59), which is expected to ease spending reductions for FY2014 and FY2015. Even with the BBA in law, Congress must pass FY2014 appropriations that are within the revised statutory limits to avoid sequestration.
In addition to the FY2014 budget, the Administration's FY2015 budget request will be of interest when it is submitted to Congress in 2014. It will indicate President Obama's foreign affairs priorities and plans for meeting the BCA caps in FY2015.
According to a February 22, 2013 Pew Research Center survey, Americans surveyed support cuts in foreign aid spending more than any other government activity mentioned. Although still not the majority, 48% of those polled prefer a decrease in foreign aid, while 49% prefer it remain at the current level or is increased. When asked about the Department of State, 34% said they prefer the Department of State funding be decreased, while 60% support maintaining current State Department funding or increasing it. At the same time, when asked, most Americans believe that international spending comprises 10% of the budget, although it is actually around 1%.
This report discusses sequestration and the foreign affairs (150) budget function and presents FY2013 estimates by account. For background on the current foreign affairs budget, see CRS Report R43043, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2014 Budget and Appropriations. This report will be updated as changes occur. |
crs_R43333 | crs_R43333_0 | After that time, Iran held multiple rounds of talks with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the P5+1). The resolutions also imposed sanctions on Iran. The P5+1 and Iran reached a framework of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on April 2, 2015, and the JCPOA was finalized on July 14, 2015. With the JPA remaining in effect until the JCPOA entered into implementation, the IAEA certified on January 16, 2016, that Iran had completed its required JCPOA nuclear-related tasks for Implementation Day. The "Joint Plan of Action" (JPA)
The JPA, also widely known as the JPOA, essentially froze most aspects of Iran's nuclear program to allow time to negotiate the JCPOA. Additional Pledges/ Information . The parties strived to meet the June 30 deadline because the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act ( P.L. Resolution 2231 was adopted for that purpose on July 20, 2015, placing Adoption Day at October 18, 2015. The Obama Administration argued that these provisions will prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon covertly. Sanctions Relief under the JCPOA and Reimposition
Under the JCPOA, the overwhelming bulk of sanctions relief occurred at Implementation Day. The U.S. sanctions laws waived and executive orders revoked are discussed in detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions , by Kenneth Katzman, which also analyzes the reimposition of all U.S. sanctions that were suspended or revoked, in accordance with President Trump's May 8, 2018, announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. According to the JCPOA, the United States (or any veto-wielding member of the U.N. Security Council) would be able to block a U.N. Security Council resolution that would continue the lifting of U.N. sanctions despite Iran's refusal to resolve the dispute. 114-17 ). 411 , asserting that the President did not comply with P.L. The JCPOA in the Trump Administration
During the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump was a vocal critic of the agreement. Throughout some of its first year, the Trump Administration indicated support for the agreement. A senior Administration official explained the same day that Trump "hopes to see an amendment to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act" which must
"demand that Iran allow timely, sufficient and immediate inspections at all sites that are requested by international inspectors from the IAEA"; "ensure" that Iran does not become capable of producing enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in less than one year; allow the United States for an indefinite period of time to reimpose U.S. nuclear sanctions if Iran does not comply with these new criteria; and "state explicitly ... that we view Iran's long-range missile programs and nuclear weapons as inseparable and that Iran's development and testing of missiles should be subject to severe sanctions." Congress has not acted on such legislation. U.S. Exit from the JCPOA
On May 8, President Trump, noting that the two sides had been unable to reach an agreement, announced that the United States would no longer participate in the JCPOA and would reimpose sanctions that had been suspended pursuant to the JCPOA. U.S. officials have argued that the JCPOA is not legally binding. On May 16, 2018, in an apparent effort to meet Iran's demands for remaining in the agreement, the EU announced "practical measures" for continued implementation of the JCPOA, including the following:
maintaining and deepening economic relations with Iran; the continued sale of Iran's oil and gas condensate petroleum products and petrochemicals and related transfers; effective banking transactions with Iran; continued sea, land, air, and rail transportation relations with Iran; provision of export credit and special provisions in financial banking to facilitate economic and financial cooperation and trade and investment; further memoranda of understanding and contracts between European companies and Iranian counterparts; further investments in Iran; and the protection of European Union economic operators and ensuring legal certainty; and finally further development of a transparent, rules-based business environment in Iran. | On July 14, 2015, Iran and the six powers that had negotiated with Tehran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany—collectively known as the P5+1) finalized a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA required constraints that seek to ensure that Iran's nuclear program can be used for purely peaceful purposes in exchange for a broad lifting of U.S., European Union (EU), and United Nations (U.N.) sanctions on Iran. The agreement replaced the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), an interim nuclear accord in effect from 2014 to 2016. Congress did not enact a resolution of disapproval of the JCPOA by the deadline of September 17, 2015, which was set by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17); the JCPOA formally took effect on "Adoption Day" (October 18, 2015). "Implementation Day" was declared by the P5+1 on January 16, 2016, representing the completion of Iran's nuclear requirements; entry into effect of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA; and the start of sanctions relief stipulated in the agreement. Officials from both the Barack Obama and Donald Trump Administrations have certified that Iran has abided by its JCPOA commitments.
The Obama Administration and other P5+1 leaders asserted that the JCPOA is the most effective means to ensure that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon and that all U.S. options to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon are available indefinitely. The agreement contains provisions for U.N. sanctions to be reimposed if Iran violates its commitments.
Top Trump Administration officials have argued that the JCPOA does not adequately serve U.S. interests because the extensive sanctions relief provided under the accord gives Iran additional resources to conduct "malign activities" in the region, and does not restrict Iran's development of ballistic missiles. Resolution 2231, which was adopted in July 2015, prohibits arms transfers to or from Iran, but only for five years, and contains a voluntary restriction on Iran's development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles for only up to eight years.
On May 8, President Trump announced that the United States would no longer participate in the JCPOA and would reimpose sanctions that had been suspended pursuant to the agreement. The other powers that negotiated the accord with Iran—Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany—opposed the U.S. decision and have been meeting with Iranian officials to continue implementing the JCPOA. Iran's President Hassan Rouhani has pledged to continue implementing the accord, provided Iran continues to receive the economic benefits of the agreement.
In the 114th and 115th Congresses, legislation has been introduced with the stated purpose of redressing asserted weaknesses of the deal or preventing any U.S. sanctions relief beyond that explicitly promised in the JCPOA. The Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (P.L. 115-44) mandates sanctions on Iranian proliferation, human rights abuses, and support for terrorist activities. For details on the sanctions relief aspects of the JCPOA, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman. |
crs_98-205 | crs_98-205_0 | The President signed both bills into law on October 17 (the authorization is P.L.105-261 and the appropriations is P.L. 4328 ) that provides additional defense-related funding of $8.3 billion,including $1.9 billion for Bosnia operations, $1.3 billion for military readiness, $1.5 billionfor intelligence, $1 billion for missile defense, $1.1 billion for year 2000 fixes in the DefenseDepartment, $469 million for storm damage repairs, $525 million to purchase fissilematerials from Russia (a defense-related program of the Department of Energy), $529million for antiterrorism activities, and $42 million for defense counter-drug activities. 105-277 ) on October 21. The House approved theconference report on September 24 and the Senate on October 1. The President signed thebill into law ( P.L. TheHouse approved the conference report on September 28, and the Senate on September 29. The President signed the bill into law ( P.L. 105-262 ) on October 17. Supplemental defense appropriations for FY1998: On April 30, the House and the Senate approved a conference agreement on H.R. Defense-related supplemental appropriations for FY1999: On October 20, the House, and, on October 21, the Senate, approved an omnibus appropriationsbill for FY1999 ( H.R. Status of FY1999 Defense Appropriations
Key Budget and Policy Issues
Major Issues in House and Senate Action on FY1999 Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills
The conference agreements on the defense authorization and appropriations bills resolved a number of major issues, including:
Relations with China: The House approved several floor amendments to the authorization bill to limit satellite and missile technology exportsto China. Base closures: Neither the House nor the Senate authorization bills approved new rounds of military base closures, as the Administration hadrequested. The Senate-passed version of thedefense appropriations bill included the requested funding, while the House bill didnot. In floor action on theauthorization, both houses considered and rejected measures to require thewithdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia by a specific date, but the Senate version ofthe authorization bill also included a sense of the Congress statement encouraging thePresident to establish conditions allowing a drawdown of forces in Bosnia. The appropriations conference agreement did not include emergencyfunding for Bosnia, but it was later provided in a supplemental appropriationsmeasure included in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations bill. The House andSenate appropriations bills reduced funding for the Theater High Altitude AreaDefense (THAAD) system by substantial amounts in the wake of the most recent testfailure in May. On the broader issue ofcongressional war powers, the House-passed appropriations bill included aprovision proposed by Representative Skaggs to prohibit expenditures onoffensive military action without advance congressional approval. Theappropriations conference agreement does not include emergency funding forBosnia, leaving the issue for later consideration. Theauthorization conference report agrees to the Administration request. The cost of the F-22 has been a major concern in the Senate,especially. A key issue in thedefense authorization bill this year concerns tritium production for Department ofEnergy nuclear weapons programs. H.R. | Congress completed action on FY1999 defense authorization and appropriations bills on October 1. The House approved the conference report on the defense authorization bill( H.R. 3616 ) on September 24 and the Senate on October 1. The President signed thebill into law ( P.L. 105-261 ) on October 17. The House approved the conference report on thedefense appropriations bill ( H.R. 4103 ) on September 28 and the Senate on September29. The President signed the bill into law ( P.L. 105-262 ) on October 17, as well. Later Congressapproved additional funding for defense programs in the FY1999 Omnibus Consolidated andEmergency Supplemental Appropriations Act ( H.R. 4328 , P.L. 105-277 ), which theHouse approved on October 20 and the Senate on October 21, and which the President signed laterthat day.
The authorization conference agreement resolved a number of contentious issues, include restrictions on technology transfers to China in the House bill; gender-integrated basic training,which the House wanted to restrict, while the Senate supported the current system; restrictions onbase consolidation included in the Senate bill; options for producing tritium for nuclear weapons;and a few major weapons issues, including funding for the Theater High Altitude Area Defense(THAAD) system and Senate provisions requiring more testing of the F-22 fighter.
The appropriations conference decided to leave a key issue -- funding for Bosnia -- for action in later legislation. The Senate-passed appropriations bill included $1.9 billion in emergencyfunding for Bosnia, as the Administration had requested, but the House bill did not. Funding forBosnia was subsequently provided in a supplemental appropriations measure approved as part of theOmnibus Appropriations bill. The supplemental measure also included funding for Year 2000(Y2K) fixes in the Defense Department, for military readiness, for drug interdiction, for missiledefense, and for counter-terrorism activities.
Other key issues that Congress addressed this year include base closures, Bosnia policy, and congressional war powers. In action on the defense authorization bill, neither the House nor theSenate agreed to an Administration request to approve a new round of military base closures, so theissue has been put off for renewed debate next year. Both the House and the Senate also debated theU.S. mission in Bosnia. Neither House approved any binding restrictions on the mission, though theauthorization conference agreement includes a sense of the Congress statement urging the Presidentto reduce troops levels. The House-passed appropriations bill included a war powers-relatedprovision that would prohibit the expenditure of funds for offensive military actions without advancecongressional approval, while the Senate rejected the same language. The Administration threateneda veto if that provision was not removed in conference, and the conference agreement did not toinclude the measure.
Key Policy Staff |
crs_R43589 | crs_R43589_0 | Introduction
The November 13, 2015, terrorist attacks in Paris have refocused attention on U.S. visa issuance and national security screening procedures that undergird the admission of foreign nationals to the United States. The visa issuance process is widely recognized as an integral part of immigration control and border security. Foreign nationals (i.e., aliens) not already legally residing in the United States who wish to come to the United States generally must obtain a visa to be admitted. The foreign national must establish that he/she is qualified for the visa under one of the various admission criteria. He or she must also establish that he/she is not ineligible for the visa due to one or more of the legal bars to admission. Applying for a visa is the first gateway for foreign nationals to seek admission to the United States, and the data collected as part of that process forms the core of the biometric and associated biographic data that the United States collects on foreign nationals. At its core, visa integrity protects the United States from foreign nationals who threaten public health and safety or national security, while at the same time welcomes legitimate foreign nationals who bolster the U.S. economy and foster international exchanges. Balancing these dual, and some would say competing, missions is an ongoing challenge. The policy questions center on the efficacy of the process, the security features of the policies, and whether the law needs to be revised to improve efficiency and strengthen security. The visa applicant is required to submit his or her photograph and fingerprints, as well as full name (and any other name used or by which he or she has been known), age, gender, and the date and place of birth. Depending on the visa category, certain documents must be certified by the proper government authorities (e.g., birth certificates and marriage licenses). All prospective LPRs must submit to physical and mental examinations, and prospective nonimmigrants also may be required to have physical and mental examinations. Consular officers use the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), a biometric and biographic database, to screen all visa applicants. Over 143 million records of visa applications are now automated in the CCD, with some records dating back to the mid-1990s. Since February 2001, the CCD has stored photographs of all visa applicants in electronic form; since 2007, the CCD has begun storing 10-finger scans. National Security and Public Safety Reviews
For some years, consular officers have been required to check the background of all aliens in the "lookout" databases. DOS specifically uses the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database, which surpassed 42.5 million records in 2012. Consular officers use name-searching algorithms to ensure matches between names of visa applicants and any derogatory information contained in CLASS. Visa security provisions are included in legislation that the House Committee on the Judiciary ordered reported on March 18, 2015. More specifically, Title IV of the Michael Davis, Jr. in Honor of State and Local Law Enforcement Act ( H.R. Concluding Comments
Preventing terrorist travel to the United States is front and center after the coordinated terrorist attacks at six locations in Paris on November 13, 2015, that killed at least 129 people and left over 350 people injured. Congressional oversight of visa security is ongoing, and possible legislative reforms are under consideration. In §428, the Secretary of DHS is expressly tasked as follows:
[The Secretary of DHS] shall be vested exclusively with all authorities to issue regulations with respect to, administer, and enforce the provisions of such Act, and of all other immigration and nationality laws, relating to the functions of consular officers of the United States in connection with the granting or refusal of visas, and shall have the authority to refuse visas in accordance with law and to develop programs of homeland security training for consular officers (in addition to consular training provided by the Secretary of State), which authorities shall be exercised through the Secretary of State, except that the Secretary shall not have authority to alter or reverse the decision of a consular officer to refuse a visa to an alien . | The November 13, 2015, terrorist attacks in Paris have refocused attention on U.S. visa issuance and national security screening procedures that undergird the admission of foreign nationals to the United States. The visa issuance process is widely recognized as an integral part of immigration control and border security. Foreign nationals (i.e., aliens) not already legally residing in the United States who wish to come to the United States generally must obtain a visa to be admitted. The foreign national must establish that he/she is qualified for the visa under one of the various admission criteria. He or she must also establish that he/she is not ineligible for the visa due to one or more of the legal bars to admission. Applying for a visa is the first gateway for foreign nationals to seek admission to the United States, and the data collected as part of that process forms the core of the biometric and associated biographic data that the United States collects on foreign nationals.
The visa applicant is required to submit his or her photograph and fingerprints, as well as full name (and any other name used or by which he or she has been known), age, gender, and the date and place of birth. Depending on the visa category, certain documents must be certified by the proper government authorities (e.g., birth certificates and marriage licenses). All prospective lawful permanent residents (LPRs) must submit to physical and mental examinations, and prospective nonimmigrants also may be required to have physical and mental examinations.
Consular officers use the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), a biometric and biographic database, to screen visa applicants. Records of all visa applications are now automated in the CCD, with some records dating back to the mid-1990s. Since February 2001, the CCD has stored photographs of all visa applicants in electronic form; since 2007, the CCD has begun storing 10-finger scans. The system links with other databases to flag problems that may have an impact on the issuance of the visa.
For some years, consular officers have been required to check the background of all aliens in the "lookout" databases, specifically the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database, which contained over 42.5 million records in 2012. Consular officers use name-searching algorithms to ensure matches between names of visa applicants and any derogatory information contained in CLASS. Since 2013, U.S. consular officials have partnered with the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to utilize the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) on known and suspected terrorists and terrorist groups.
Preventing terrorist travel to the United States is front and center after the coordinated terrorist attacks at six locations in Paris on November 13, 2015, left at least 129 people dead and over 350 injured. Congressional oversight of visa security is ongoing, and possible legislative reforms are under consideration. Visa security provisions are included in Title IV of the Michael Davis, Jr. in Honor of State and Local Law Enforcement Act (H.R. 1148), which the House Committee on the Judiciary ordered reported on March 18, 2015.
At its core, visa integrity protects the United States from foreign nationals who threaten public health and safety or national security, while at the same time welcomes legitimate foreign nationals who bolster the U.S. economy and foster international exchanges. Balancing these dual, and some would say competing, missions is an ongoing challenge. The policy questions center on the efficacy of the process, the security features of the policies, and whether the law needs to be revised to improve efficiency and strengthen security. |
crs_RL33377 | crs_RL33377_0 | There are approximately 30 types of entities that qualify for federal tax-exempt status as organizations described in section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The most common types are
§ 501(c)(3) charitable organizations, § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, § 501(c)(5) labor unions, and § 501(c)(6) trade associations. Whether a § 501(c) organization may engage in political activity, such as lobbying or campaign activity, under the IRC depends on the subparagraph in which it is described. While this report discusses the political activity limitations in the IRC, it is important to realize that organizations must also comply with applicable election and lobbying laws. For analysis of the intersection between tax and campaign finance laws, see CRS Report R40141, 501(c)(3) Organizations and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34447, Churches and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R40183, 501(c)(4) Organizations and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS22895, 527 Groups and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Campaign Finance and Tax Laws , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. For discussion of the applicability of federal lobbying law to tax-exempt organizations, see CRS Report 96-809, Lobbying Regulations on Non-Profit Organizations , by [author name scrubbed]. The organization's managers may also be subject to tax. The organizations described in these three sections may participate in an unrestricted amount of lobbying so long as the lobbying is related to the organization's exempt purpose. Thus, these organizations may engage in such activity under the tax laws. Political Activity by Other Types of § 501(c) Organizations
While the majority of § 501(c) organizations fall into one of the types discussed above, the IRC describes numerous other types of organizations. The second category are those § 501(c)s that appear able to participate in political activity under the rules applicable to § 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) organizations. Thus, for organizations with little or no net investment income or those making low-cost expenditures, the tax is of minimal import. For others groups, however, it might serve as a disincentive to directly engage in the activities giving rise to the taxable expenditures. Filing organizations are required to report information regarding their political activities on the Form's Schedule C.
On the Schedule C, § 501(c)(3) organizations are required to describe their direct and indirect political campaign activities and report information on their political expenditures, volunteer hours, and any § 4955 excise taxes incurred. Meanwhile, organizations other than those described in § 501(c)(3) must: (1) describe their direct and indirect political campaign activities; (2) report the amount spent conducting campaign activities and the number of volunteer hours used to conduct those activities; (3) report the amount directly spent for § 527 exempt function activities; (4) report the amount of funds contributed to other organizations for § 527 exempt function activities; (5) report whether a Form 1120-POL (the tax return filed by organizations owing the § 527 tax) was filed for the year; and (6) report the name, address, and employer identification number of every § 527 political organization to which a payment was made and the amount of such payments, and indicate whether the amounts were paid from internal funds or were contributions received and directly transferred to a separate political organization. However, identifying information about the donors reported on the Schedule B is not subject to public disclosure, except for donors to private foundations. | As the 2010 election cycle heats up, attention is focused on the political activities of tax-exempt § 501(c) organizations. This is due in large part to a recent Supreme Court case, Citizens United v. FEC, which invalidated long-standing prohibitions in federal campaign finance law on corporate and labor union campaign treasury spending. These prohibitions had affected § 501(c) organizations because many are incorporated and because all organizations (regardless of corporate status) could not serve as conduits for corporate or labor union treasury funds. Thus, post-Citizens United, § 501(c) organizations are among the entities operating with less restriction under federal campaign finance law. As a result, it is expected there will be increased political activity by the tax-exempt sector in 2010 in comparison with past election cycles.
Due to this expectation, significant attention is being paid to the regulation of § 501(c) groups under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Under the IRC, the ability of § 501(c) organizations to engage in political activity, such as electioneering and lobbying, depends on the type of organization. For example, the charitable organizations described in § 501(c)(3) may not engage in any campaign activity and may only conduct a limited amount of lobbying. Meanwhile, § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, § 501(c)(5) labor unions, and § 501(c)(6) trade associations may engage in campaign activity (so long as such activity and any other non-exempt purpose activity is not their primary activity) and an unlimited amount of lobbying. Other types of § 501(c) organizations appear to either be subject to restrictions like those imposed on § 501(c)(3) organizations or treated similarly to § 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) organizations.
While some types of organizations are permitted to engage in election-related activities under the IRC, § 501(c) organizations are subject to tax for making certain political expenditures. The tax is imposed on the lesser of the taxable expenditures or the organization's net investment income. Thus, for organizations with little or no net investment income or those making low-cost expenditures, the tax is of minimal import. For other groups, however, it might serve as a disincentive to directly engage in the activities giving rise to the taxable expenditures.
Finally, § 501(c) organizations must report information regarding their political activities to the IRS on Schedule C of the Form 990. This information must be made publicly available by the organization and the IRS. While information on certain donors also must be reported to the IRS on the Form's Schedule B, any identifying information about those donors is generally not subject to public disclosure.
While this report discusses the political activity limitations in the IRC, it is important to realize that organizations must also comply with applicable election and lobbying laws. For analysis of the intersection between tax and campaign finance laws, see CRS Report R40141, 501(c)(3) Organizations and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34447, Churches and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R40183, 501(c)(4) Organizations and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS22895, 527 Groups and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Campaign Finance and Tax Laws, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. For discussion of the applicability of federal lobbying law to tax-exempt organizations, see CRS Report 96-809, Lobbying Regulations on Non-Profit Organizations, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_97-645 | crs_97-645_0 | The topics covered include an historical overview of the case law of pretrialinterrogation prior to Miranda , that barred use of a confession during a defendant's criminal trial ifhe had not been given certain warnings before confessing; the Miranda decision and related SupremeCourt cases; the McNabb/Mallory rule, that barred certain confessions made while the defendant wasbeing illegally held in custody; 18 U.S.C. (15) Under this standard, the admissibilityof a confession was evaluated on a case by case basis according to the "totality of thecircumstances," (16) surrounding each confession. (24)
Between the time of Brown v. Mississippi (25) and Miranda v. Arizona , (26) the due process standardwas applied in dozens of cases. (62) There were no decisions by the Courton this issue regarding the application of the FifthAmendment for the reason that the Amendment was not applicable to the States (63) until the Courtincorporated the Fifth Amendment and made it applicable to the states in Malloy v. Hogan (64) Duringthe following year, the Court addressed the Fifth Amendment in reviewing a State case (65) when itstruck down the provisions of California's constitution permitting comment by court and counselon a defendant's "...failure to explain or deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the caseagainst him...." (66)
A Right Not To Be Questioned
The accused could not cut off pretrial interrogation inasmuch as the right was not recognized by the Court prior to its decision in Miranda . (78) The Courtreasoned that the suspects needed the safeguardsbecause "[t]he circumstance surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly tooverbear the will of [the suspect] ..." (79) and withoutthem no statement can be considered the productof his/her free will. (121) However, the Court did notanswer the question. (200)
In United States v. Leong , (201) the Department of Justice, in response to an order from the U.S.Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, (202) directing it to state its views regarding the effect of 18 U.S.C.�3501 on the admissibility of Leong's confession, its constitutionality, and its possible effects on Miranda , (203) said that Miranda is the law and it would not be appropriate for a lower court to applythe statute in lieu of Miranda's requirements without the Supreme Court first reconsidering Miranda . On December 6, 1999, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dickerson v. United States . Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, in a plurality opinion, concluded that, the postwarning statements were not admissible. In the earliest cases, beginning in the late nineteenth century, issues of admissibility were decidedon the basis of the rule excluding involuntary confessions. | Although an involuntary confession has been inadmissible in federal cases since the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court did not denounce physically coercive abuses in State cases until itsdecision in Brown v. Mississippi . The Brown case established the basis for the FourteenthAmendment "voluntariness" standard as the due process test for assessing the admissibility ofconfessions in State cases. Under this standard, the admissibility of a confession was evaluated ona case by case basis which would be governed by the "totality of the circumstances," which includedthe facts of the case, the background of the accused, and the behavior of the police during theinterrogation.
In Miranda v. Arizona , the Court established several procedures to safeguard the Fifth Amendment rights of persons during custodial interrogations. The Court reasoned that the suspectsneeded the safeguards because "[t]he circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operatevery quickly to overbear the will of [the suspect..." and without them no statement can be consideredthe product of his/her free will.
Miranda was controversial among policy-makers and academics who debated its legitimacy and desirability over thirty years after its judicial creation. One of the major arguments offered foroverruling Miranda was that it had caused great difficulty to law enforcement efforts in controllingcrime. The ruling in Dickerson v. United States , 530 U.S. 428 (2000), struck down 18 U.S.C. 3501,a federal law that allowed confessions elicited without a police advisory to be used at trial as longas the "totality of circumstances" demonstrated that they were given voluntarily.
Dickerson made Miranda 's constitutional status clear. The Miranda decisions announced duringthe Court's 2003-2004 term, however, suggest that continued vitality of seemingly confictingpre- Dickerson caselaw is less clear. United States v. Patane , divided the Court so that nosinglerationale united a majority of its members, although five Justices joined in a plurality decision thatdeclined to overrule its pre- Dickerson decisions concerning the admissibility of physical derivateevidence. On the other hand, Missouri v. Seibert likewise resulted in a plurality opinion, but in spiteof contrary suggestions in the pre- Dickerson caselaw five Justices found inadmissible a confessionintentionally wrung from the defendant before Miranda warnings and re-elicited thereafter. FiveJustices did agree in Yarborough v. Alvarado that the state courts did not unreasonably apply federallaw when -- without considering the inexperienced suspect's age (17 years old) -- they determinedthat Miranda 's custodial threshold had not been crossed. And they all agreed in Fellers v. UnitedStates , that the lower courts should not have addressed Miranda/Dickerson implications raisedoutof an interrogation that offended Sixth Amendment requirements. |
crs_RL30665 | crs_RL30665_0 | Introduction
The majority leader in the contemporary House is second-in-command behind the Speaker of the majority party. Typically, the majority leader functions as the Speaker's chief lieutenant or "field commander" for day-to-day management of the floor. Two fundamental and often interlocking responsibilities orient the work of the majority leader: institutional and party. From an institutional perspective, the majority leader is principally responsible for exercising overall supervision of the order of business on the floor, especially as it affects the party's program. (Underwood left the House for the Senate in 1915.) The majority leader soon became the "heir apparent" to the speakership. Scheduling Floor Business
Although scheduling is a collective activity of the majority party, the majority leader has a large say in shaping the chamber's overall agenda and in determining when, whether, how, and in what order legislation is taken up. Manage Floor Decision Making
Majority leaders are active in constructing winning coalitions for their legislative priorities. Confer with the White House
Majority leaders regularly attend meetings at the White House—especially when the President is of the same party—to discuss issues before Congress, the Administrations's agenda, and political events generally. One of the most important duties of the majority leader is to try to ensure that his or her party remains in control of the House. Three activities of the majority leader illustrate these points. They assist incumbents and challengers in raising campaign funds, and they travel to scores of House districts to campaign with either incumbents or challengers of their party. Promote the Party's Agenda
Majority leaders may undertake a variety of actions to accomplish this goal. Encourage Party Cohesion
If a party is to maintain its majority, it is generally a good idea to minimize internal factional feuds or disagreements that may undermine its ability to govern the House. Final Observations
The majority leader's duties and functions, although not well-defined and contingent in part on his or her relationship with the Speaker, have evolved to the point where it is possible to highlight the customary institutional and party responsibilities. | The majority leader in the contemporary House is second-in-command behind the Speaker of the majority party. Typically, the majority leader functions as the Speaker's chief lieutenant or "field commander" for day-to-day management of the floor. Although the majority leader's duties are not especially well-defined, they have evolved to the point where it is possible to spotlight two fundamental and often interlocking responsibilities that orient the majority leader's work: institutional and party.
From an institutional perspective, the majority leader has a number of duties. Scheduling floor business is a prime responsibility of the majority leader. Although scheduling the House's business is a collective activity of the majority party, the majority leader has a large say in shaping the chamber's overall agenda and in determining when, whether, how, or in what order legislation is taken up. In addition, the majority leader is active in constructing winning coalitions for the party's legislative priorities; acting as a public spokesman—defending and explaining the party's program and agenda; serving as an emissary to the White House, especially when the President is of the same party; and facilitating the orderly conduct of the House's business.
From a party perspective, three key activities undergird the majority leader's principal goal of trying to ensure that the party remains in control of the House. First, the majority leader assists in the reelection campaigns of party incumbents by, for example, raising campaign funds and traveling to scores of House districts to campaign either with incumbents or challengers of the party. Second, the majority leader promotes the party's agenda by developing themes and issues important to core supporters in the electorate. Third, the majority leader encourages party cohesion by, for instance, working to minimize internal factional disagreements that may undermine the majority party's ability to govern the House. |
crs_R41217 | crs_R41217_0 | Introduction
The Constitution requires that after any bill or joint resolution that would become law passes both houses of Congress in final form, it must be presented to the President for approval or veto. The Constitution also sets time limits on the President's action: after a measure is presented, the President must either sign or veto it within 10 days, excluding Sundays. By contrast, the Constitution specifies no time limit within which Congress must present a measure to the President after completing its own action on it. In a number of instances in recent years, several days or more have elapsed between these two events. Others, however, seem to have occurred for reasons related to policy or partisan disputes, and some of these occurrences have led to discussion, either formally or informally but especially in the House of Representatives, about the appropriate timing for these actions and possible ways of enforcement. One other measure identified, H.R. Specifically pertinent would be rules governing the administrative actions that take place between final congressional action on a measure and its presentment to the President. In somewhat altered wording, the act's stipulations on this subject continued in effect until recent Congresses as clause 4(d)(1) of Rule X, giving the committee the duty
in cooperation with the Senate, [of] examining all bills and joint resolutions which shall have passed both Houses to see that they are correctly enrolled, forthwith presenting those which originated in the House to the President of the United States in person after their signature by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and reporting the fact and date of such presentation to the House[.] For similar reasons, the process of verifying the enrolled text might also require some measurable amount of time. Again, no rules limit the time for the two presiding officers to sign the enrolled measure, although the measure is to be presented "forthwith" after signature. Practice, nevertheless, allows presentment to be delayed if the President is absent or to avoid a pocket veto. The body of the precedent, however, suggests that under appropriate circumstances, such a situation could give rise to a question of privilege. Hence the Chair decides that this is not a question of privilege. Seven days after Congress had cleared the measure in question, a resolution was presented, as a question of the privileges of the House, asserting that the enrollment of the measure had not been completed in the Senate "even though the bill was only 48 pages in length," that "failure to complete action on an enrolled bill delays its presentation to the President," and that "an unreasonable delay in the transmission of an enrolled bill to the President affects the integrity of the proceedings of the House...." The resolution accordingly directed the appointment of a committee of two to "determine whether there has been unreasonable delay in transmitting the enrolled bill ... to the President" and "promptly inform the Senate of the concern of the House of Representatives over the delay." When Might Delays Be Unreasonable? The shortest period between second chamber passage and presentment of a conference report during the period examined was zero days—that is, the enrolled measure was presented to the President on the same day it passed the second house of Congress. | The Constitution requires Congress to present each measure it enacts to the President for approval. In contrast, the Constitution requires the President to act on measures within 10 days of their presentment and is silent on the amount of time that may elapse before Congress presents each measure to the President. Not being subject to a constitutional constraint, Congress has sometimes temporarily withheld enrolled measures from presentment, either when the President is absent or to avoid a possible pocket veto.
Before an enrolled measure can be presented to the President, it must be enrolled, or prepared in its final form; the enrolled text must then be verified; and the measure must then be signed by the presiding officers of both houses. For long measures or at times of heavy congressional workload, these processes may take some time. Rules of Congress require that measures be presented "forthwith" after being signed, but do not lay specific constraints on the amount of time that may be taken in enrollment, verification, and signature.
Generally speaking, data suggest that the time between second chamber passage of a measure and its enrollment and presentment to the President is almost always completed in a timely fashion. For example, over the past 20 years, in no year did the average time between second chamber passage of a conference report and presentment of the enrolled measure to the President exceed 11 calendar days.
Occasionally in recent years, however, significant delays appear to have occurred between final action by Congress on a measure and its presentment to the President for reasons related not to institutional or administrative considerations, but to policy or partisan disputes. Some of these instances have met with protests, particularly within the House of Representatives. Precedents indicate that in the House, at least, any "unreasonable" delay in presenting a measure to the President, or preparing it for such presentment, might give rise to a question of the privileges of the House, which include matters affecting the integrity of the proceedings of the House. On these grounds a resolution requiring the prompt performance of necessary actions, or directing other remedies, might be privileged for consideration in the House. Such resolutions were presented on at least one occasion in 1888 and one in 1991. Though neither was adopted, one was held to raise a question of privilege, and in the other case, the chair affirmed the principle that such a situation might give rise to a question of privilege. |
crs_R44988 | crs_R44988_0 | Introduction
The Antiquities Act of 1906 (54 U.S.C. Monument proclamations typically seek to provide protections to federal lands and resources. The act does not further specify the process to be used by Presidents in proclaiming monuments. From 1906 to the date of this report, Presidents have established 157 monuments and have enlarged, diminished, or otherwise modified previously proclaimed monuments. In 2017, the Trump Administration engaged in a review of certain national monuments proclaimed by Presidents under the Antiquities Act since 1996. Presidential establishment and modification of national monuments has sometimes been contentious, and litigation and legislation have been pursued. Criticism has centered on the size of the areas and the types of resources protected; the effect of monument designations on land uses; the inclusion of nonfederal lands within monument boundaries; and the lack of requirements for public participation, congressional and state approval, and environmental reviews in the Antiquities Act, among other issues. Monument advocates believe the President needs authority to act promptly to protect valuable resources. They assert that the public has supported and courts have upheld presidential designations and that many initially controversial designations have come to be widely supported. Congress continues to face a variety of issues related to national monuments. Whether to establish, amend, or abolish national monuments is of current interest. Congress has broad authority to take these actions, and has created national monuments on federal lands and has increased and decreased monument sizes on numerous occasions. Congress also oversees presidential exercise of authority to proclaim monuments and has considered measures to alter this authority. Executive Review of Monuments
Overview of Executive Order
On April 26, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order requiring the Secretary of the Interior to review national monuments established or expanded by Presidents since 1996. The order required review of national monuments where the size at establishment or after expansion exceeded 100,000 acres or where the Secretary determined that the action was taken "without adequate public outreach and coordination with relevant stakeholders." The act does not specifically require public outreach and coordination in monument designations. The review was to determine if the establishment or expansion of post-1996 monuments conformed to the policy in the executive order and to develop any recommendation for presidential actions, legislative proposals, or other actions to carry out the policy. They included
the requirements and objectives of the Antiquities Act, including that designations be confined to "the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected"; whether designated lands are "appropriately classified" as historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, or other objects of historic or scientific interest; the effect of monument designation on uses of federal and nonfederal lands inside and outside of the monument boundaries; concerns of affected state, tribal, and local governments; availability of federal resources to manage designated areas; and other factors determined by the Secretary. One of the 27 monuments, Katahdin Woods and Waters National Monument, was reviewed based on the adequacy of public outreach and coordination with stakeholders in establishing the monument. A total of 2,839,046 comments were received. On August 24, 2017, the Secretary of the Interior sent to the President a final report on monuments reviewed, which included recommendations. The most common recommendation was to amend the proclamations for specified purposes. They included clarifying the limits of executive authority under the Antiquities Act and the intent of Congress regarding land use in monument areas containing other protective designations. The final report recommends amending monument proclamations regarding resource management. | The Antiquities Act of 1906 (54 U.S.C. §§320301-320303) authorizes the President to proclaim national monuments on federal lands that contain "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest." Monument proclamations typically seek to provide protections to federal lands and resources. The President is to reserve "the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected." The act does not further specify the process to be used by Presidents in proclaiming monuments.
From 1906 to date, Presidents have established 157 monuments and have also enlarged, diminished, or otherwise modified previously proclaimed monuments through a total of 259 proclamations. Presidential establishment and modification of national monuments has sometimes been contentious, and litigation and legislation have been pursued. Criticism has centered on the size of the areas and types of resources protected; effect of monument designations on land uses; inclusion of nonfederal lands within monument boundaries; and extent of public consultation. Monument advocates believe the President needs authority to act promptly to protect valuable resources. They assert that the public has supported and courts have upheld presidential designations and that many initially controversial designations have come to be supported.
In 2017, the Trump Administration reviewed certain national monuments proclaimed by previous Presidents. The effort began on April 26, 2017, with an executive order requiring the Secretary of the Interior to review national monuments established or expanded by Presidents since 1996. The order required review of national monuments where the size at establishment or after expansion exceeded 100,000 acres or where the Secretary determined that the action was taken "without adequate public outreach and coordination with relevant stakeholders." The Antiquities Act does not specifically require public outreach and coordination in monument designations. The review was to determine if the establishment or expansion of post-1996 monuments conformed to a policy set out in the executive order and to develop any recommendation for presidential actions, legislative proposals, or other actions to carry out the policy. The executive order called for interim and final reports on the monuments under review, within specified time periods.
The Department of the Interior (DOI) reviewed a total of 27 monuments, one based on the adequacy of consultation and the others based on their size. During the review, the Administration received 2,839,046 comments from the public and visited several monument areas to receive public input.
On August 24, 2017, the Secretary submitted to the President a final report on all 27 monuments reviewed. The report, marked "draft," was made public by the news media. It contained recommendations for 10 of the 27 monuments, with between one and six recommendations per monument. The types of recommendations varied. They included amending monument proclamations for specified purposes, changing monument boundaries, agency revision of monument management plans, and seeking authority from Congress for tribal comanagement of cultural areas. The report also contained broader recommendations, including changing the monument designation process, establishing new monuments, and seeking congressional clarification of the limits on executive authority under the Antiquities Act and the intent of Congress regarding land uses of monument areas with other protective designations.
Congress continues to face a variety of national monument issues. Congress has broad authority to establish, amend, or abolish national monuments and has done so on numerous occasions, including amending and redesignating monuments proclaimed by Presidents. Congress also oversees presidential exercise of authority to proclaim monuments and has considered measures to alter this authority. |
crs_R40600 | crs_R40600_0 | The Administration's FY2010 budget proposal, which requests a 150% increase in the OTI account to support a Rapid Response Fund, as well as significant increases for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative at the State Department, does little to clarify OTI's role or niche functions. Atwood proposed to bridge the gap between emergency disaster relief programs and long-term development assistance with a small staff provided with core funding and special crisis waiver authority. For necessary expenses for international disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance pursuant to section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, $50,000,000, to remain available until expended, to support transition to democracy and to long-term development of countries in crisis: Provided, That such support may include assistance to develop, strengthen, or preserve democratic institutions and processes, revitalize basic infrastructure, and foster the peaceful resolution of conflict. This allows almost complete executive discretion in responding to foreign disasters. Together with the notwithstanding provision of Section 491, these annual appropriations provisions allow OTI to pursue a wide range of activities without having to meet certain administrative requirements, particularly related to contracting and procurement. OTI Locations, 1994-2008
Since beginning its first projects in Angola and Haiti in 1994, OTI has worked in 36 countries and territories. For FY2010, the Obama Administration has proposed $126 million for the TI account, a 150% increase over the estimated FY2009 funding level. Most OTI grants are small, ranging from $5,000 to $50,000, but OTI country representatives have the authority to approve grants of up to $100,000. OTI was intended in part to be a laboratory within USAID to try innovative approaches to development, and there may be a range of lessons to be learned from the program, both positive and negative. The following are a few issues related to OTI that Congress may wish to consider as part of oversight or reform activities concerning OTI, USAID, and foreign assistance in general. Interagency Coordination and Structural Considerations
OTI's role within USAID and the larger U.S. foreign assistance structure is not always well understood, even among U.S. government development and other professionals. When the Iraq Transition Initiative closed in March 2006, it had disbursed $337 million in grants. There is also little if any data about the long-term impact of the employment programs on the participants. | The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was created in 1994 to bridge the gap between emergency disaster relief programs and long-term development assistance. The program is relatively small, with regular appropriations averaging $40-$60 million annually and a full-time staff of about 50. Supplemental funding and transfers from other foreign assistance accounts, particularly through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, have at times substantially increased the program's funding levels. Congress may take particular interest in OTI this year, as the Administration's FY2010 budget proposal requests $126 million for the Transition Initiatives account, a 150% increase over the 2009 estimate.
OTI's legislative authority is based on the disaster relief provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which allows for broad executive discretion. This freedom from administrative requirements, intended to enhance the program's rapid response capability, allows OTI to pursue a wide range of activities but also reduces program transparency and, according to some, accountability.
OTI has been active in 36 countries since its inception, and program focus varies widely from country to country. Typical activities include reintegrating combatants in a post-conflict environment through employment programs, providing equipment and technical support for independent media organizations, organizing civic forums, and supporting small, community-led infrastructure projects intended to show quick and tangible benefits from transitions toward peace and democracy. Most OTI grants are small and in-kind, ranging in value from $5,000 to $50,000, though much larger grants have been approved.
There is considerable congressional interest in and support for strengthening capacities at USAID and other civilian agencies involved in foreign affairs. In its 15 years in operation, OTI has served in part as a laboratory within USAID to try innovative approaches to development, and there may be a range of lessons to be learned from the program that are applicable to this broader debate. The 111th Congress may wish to consider several aspects of the OTI program, from personnel structure and contracting mechanisms to coordination with other U.S. assistance programs, as part of oversight or legislated reform activities concerning OTI, USAID, or foreign assistance in general. |
crs_R40155 | crs_R40155_0 | Policy measures have included blending and production tax credits to lower the cost of biofuels to end users, an import tariff to protect domestic ethanol from cheaper foreign-produced ethanol, research grants to stimulate the development of new biofuels technologies, loans and loan guarantees to facilitate the development of biofuels production and distribution infrastructure, and, perhaps most important, minimum usage requirements to guarantee a market for biofuels irrespective of their cost. This report focuses specifically on the RFS. It describes the general nature of the biofuels RFS and its implementation, and outlines some of the emerging issues related to the sustainability of the continued growth in U.S. biofuels production needed to fulfill the expanding RFS mandate, as well as the emergence of potential unintended consequences of this rapid expansion. The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)
Congress first established a Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)—a mandatory minimum volume of biofuels to be used in the national transportation fuel supply—in 2005 with the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct, P.L. 109-58 ). The initial RFS (referred to as RFS1) mandated that a minimum of 4 billion gallons of renewable fuel be used in the nation's gasoline supply in 2006, and that this minimum usage volume rise to 7.5 billion gallons by 2012 ( Table 1 ). Two years later, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140 ) superseded and greatly expanded the biofuels mandate to 36 billion gallons by 2022. Second, RFS2 subdivides the total renewable fuel requirement into four separate but nested categories—total renewable fuels, advanced biofuels, biomass-based diesel, and cellulosic biofuels—each with its own volume requirement or standard (described below). Third, biofuels qualifying under each nested RFS2 category must achieve certain minimum thresholds of lifecycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emission performance, with exceptions applicable to facilities existing or under construction when EISA was enacted ( Table 2 ). Fourth, under RFS2 all renewable fuel must be made from feedstocks that meet a revised definition of renewable biomass, including certain land use restrictions. The RFS is administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). EPA issued its final rule for administering RFS1 in April 2007. This rule established detailed compliance standards for fuel suppliers, a tracking system based on renewable identification numbers (RINs) with credit verification and trading, provisions for treatment of small refineries, and general waiver provisions. EPA rules for administering RFS2 (issued in February 2010) built upon the earlier RFS1 regulations and include specific deadlines for announcing annual standards, as well as greater specificity on potential waiver requests and RIN oversight. Each is also subject to biomass feedstock criteria. Biomass-based biodiesel (BBD) . Implementation of the RFS
The EPA is responsible for revising and implementing regulations to ensure that the national transportation fuel supply sold in the United States during a given year contains the mandated volume of renewable fuel in accordance with the four nested volume mandates of the RFS2. Reduced price of domestic transportation fuels . Potential Issues with the Expanded RFS
Most U.S. biofuel production is ethanol produced from corn starch. As a result, as the U.S. ethanol industry has grown over the years, so too has its usage share of the annual corn crop. Under the expanded RFS, the 2015 corn ethanol cap of 15 billion gallons, coupled with the existing U.S. ethanol production capacity of nearly 15 billion gallons, suggests that ethanol will likely use a declining share—perhaps in the 25% to 30% range—of the volume of U.S. corn production (adjusted for DDGs) in the future, depending on yield and area developments, and petroleum market conditions. However, biofuels' potential to play a larger role in energy security is questionable. | Federal policy has played a key role in the emergence of the U.S. biofuels industry. Policy measures have included minimum renewable fuel usage requirements, blending and production tax credits, an import tariff, loans and loan guarantees, and research grants. One of the more prominent forms of federal policy support is the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)—whereby a minimum volume of biofuels is to be used in the national transportation fuel supply each year. This report describes the general nature of the RFS mandate and its implementation, and outlines some emerging issues related to the continued growth of U.S. biofuels production needed to fulfill the expanding RFS mandate, the potential inability of the domestic market to absorb ethanol above a 10% share of domestic gasoline fuels (a problem known as the "blend wall"), and the emergence of potential unintended consequences of this rapid expansion.
Congress first established the RFS with the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct, P.L. 109-58). This initial RFS (referred to as RFS1) mandated that a minimum of 4 billion gallons be used in 2006, rising to 7.5 billion gallons by 2012. Two years later, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140) greatly expanded the biofuel mandate volumes and extended the ramp-up through 2022. The expanded RFS (referred to as RFS2) required the annual use of 9 billion gallons of biofuels in 2008, rising to 36 billion gallons in 2022, with at least 16 billion gallons from cellulosic biofuels, and a cap of 15 billion gallons for corn-starch ethanol.
In addition to the expanded volumes and extended date, RFS2 has three important distinctions from RFS1. First, the total renewable fuel requirement is divided into four separate, but nested categories—total renewable fuels, advanced biofuels, biomass-based diesel, and cellulosic biofuels—each with its own volume requirement. Second, biofuels qualifying under each category must achieve certain minimum thresholds of lifecycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions, with certain exceptions applicable to existing facilities. Third, all renewable fuel must be made from feedstocks that meet an amended definition of renewable biomass, including certain land use restrictions.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for establishing and implementing regulations to ensure that the nation's transportation fuel supply contains the mandated biofuels volumes. EPA's initial regulations for administering RFS1 (issued in April 2007) established detailed compliance standards for fuel suppliers, a tracking system based on renewable identification numbers (RINs) with credit verification and trading, special treatment of small refineries, and general waiver provisions. EPA rules for administering RFS2 (issued in February 2010) built upon the earlier RFS1 regulations and include specific deadlines for announcing annual standards, as well as greater specificity on potential waiver requests and RIN oversight.
Over the long term, the RFS is likely to play a dominant role in the development of the U.S. biofuels sector. However, emerging resource constraints related to the rapid expansion of U.S. corn ethanol production have provoked questions about its long-run sustainability and the possibility of unintended consequences in other markets as well as on the environment. Questions also exist about the ability of the U.S. biofuels industry to meet the expanding mandate for biofuels from non-corn sources such as cellulosic biomass materials, whose production capacity has been slow to develop, or biomass-based biodiesel, which remains expensive to produce owing to the relatively high prices of its feedstocks. Finally, considerable uncertainty remains regarding the development of the infrastructure capacity (e.g., trucks, pipelines, retail pumps, etc.) needed to deliver the expanding biofuels mandate to consumers. |
crs_R40604 | crs_R40604_0 | Many federal employees work under the broad framework of requirements in Title 5 of the United States Code (hereafter, Title 5). In recent decades, the federal government has made many efforts to recruit and retain scientists, engineers, and technical workers, who otherwise may find a more attractive environment in the private and nonfederal sectors. As a group, these S&T personnel may be called the federal S&T workforce. A large subset of the S&T workforce is composed of scientific and engineering (S&E) personnel. Because hiring and pay practices are changing constantly, not only by law, but also by agency regulation and administrative action, it is not possible to provide a comprehensive overview or assessment of all policies here. As shown here, federal scientists and engineers work on a wide variety of activities in the federal government. Why Are Some Policymakers Concerned about the Federal Science and Technology (S&T) Workforce? These factors, which can vary a great deal by the characteristics of a given population within the workforce, include the demand for S&T workers in the broader labor market; concerns about whether federal salaries are competitive with the private sector for these workers; the need for U.S. citizenship for federal employment; and the aging of the federal S&T workforce as those hired during previous federal S&T "booms" retire. On one hand, Congress frequently has been willing to grant flexibility for expedited hiring or higher-than-usual rates of pay, in order to better equip agencies to accomplish congressionally determined public policy objectives. On the other hand, however, Congress frequently has been wary of providing too much flexibility, or unaccountable flexibility, because of the potential for flexibility to be abused (e.g., hiring or pay decisions being based on considerations other than merit or achievement of congressionally determined public policy objectives). Therefore, federal personnel-related laws continually raise the issue of how to balance providing flexibility, on one hand, with preventing abuse of the flexibility, on the other. for the President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). Human resource management issues relating to S&T personnel have been of ongoing concern to Congress, both government-wide and for particular agencies. If Congress wishes to evaluate the ability of the federal government and its agencies to recruit and retain S&T personnel, the variety of statutory authorities provide illustrations of topics that might be examined. In addition, the federal government's experience with these statutory authorities might inform Congress's deliberations, if Congress wished to consider modifying the ability of the federal government to recruit highly-qualified scientific, engineering, and technical personnel. In evaluating current efforts or considering future modifications, Congress may wish to consider factors that include the following:
Given perceived problems regarding recruitment and retention of federal S&E personnel, agency-specific and executive-branch-wide approaches could be considered. | In recent decades, the federal government has made many efforts to recruit and retain scientists, engineers, and technical workers, who otherwise may find a more attractive environment in the private and nonfederal sectors. As a group, these science and technology (S&T) personnel may be called the federal S&T workforce. A large subset of the S&T workforce is composed of scientific and engineering (S&E) personnel. By one count, the federal government employs over 200,000 scientists and engineers.
Several factors have contributed to concerns about the federal S&T workforce. These include demand for S&T workers, concerns as to whether federal salaries are competitive with the private sector, the need for U.S. citizenship for federal employment, and the aging of the federal S&T workforce as those hired during previous federal S&T hiring "booms" retire.
Many federal S&T personnel are hired or paid under agency-specific statutory authorities, rather than government-wide civil service laws in Title 5 of the United States Code. Others may be hired or paid under a variety of executive-branch-wide statutory authorities which allow for, among other things, demonstration projects, direct hiring, and special pay rates.
Congress frequently has been willing to grant flexibility for expedited hiring or higher-than-usual rates of pay, in order to better equip agencies to accomplish congressionally determined public policy objectives. However, Congress frequently also has been wary of providing too much flexibility, or unaccountable flexibility, because of the potential for flexibility to be abused. Therefore, federal personnel-related laws continually raise the issue of how to balance flexibility, on one hand, with preventing abuse of the flexibility, on the other.
Human resource management issues relating to S&T personnel have been of ongoing concern to Congress, both government-wide and for particular agencies. Because hiring and pay practices are changing constantly, not only by law, but also by agency regulation and administrative action, it is not possible to provide a comprehensive overview or assessment of all policies here. Nevertheless, if Congress wishes to evaluate the ability of the federal government and its agencies to recruit and retain S&T personnel, the variety of statutory authorities provide illustrations of topics that might be examined. In addition, the federal government's experience with these statutory authorities might inform Congress's deliberations. For example, Congress may wish to consider modifying the ability of the federal government to recruit highly-qualified scientific, engineering, and technical personnel.
In evaluating current efforts or considering future modifications, Congress may wish to consider options that include agency-specific or executive-branch-wide approaches; leveraging the involvement of the Office of Personnel Management, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the federal Chief Human Capital Officers Council, or other entities; requiring agencies to engage in strategic planning, evaluation, or other activities; and exploring a variety of S&T personnel issues in specific agency and policy contexts.
This report will be updated when events warrant. |
crs_R44507 | crs_R44507_0 | Background
In March 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that health officials in Guinea had identified a "rapidly evolving outbreak of Ebola virus disease (Ebola)." Retroactive studies indicated that the virus had likely begun to spread in late December 2013, but that weak disease detection and surveillance systems had failed to identify the outbreak. From Guinea, the disease spread to Liberia and Sierra Leone and continued to infect thousands in the three countries until mid-2015, when concerted efforts to contain the disease by the international community began to curb new infections and deaths. WHO declared Ebola a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) in August 2014. Following the PHEIC declaration, the United States and other actors exerted a concerted effort to contain the disease, and cases began to decline rapidly. On December 29, 2015, the fight against the West Africa Ebola outbreak reached a pivotal point. WHO declared that human-to-human Ebola transmission had ended in Guinea, marking the first time all three countries had stopped the original chains of transmission at the same time. By this time, WHO had reported 28,637 confirmed, probable, and suspected Ebola cases worldwide, including 11,315 deaths. In December 2014, Congress enacted the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ), providing several federal departments and agencies $5.4 billion in FY2015 emergency supplemental appropriations for the U.S. government Ebola response. U.S. Government Ebola Funding in West Africa
Of the funds Congress appropriated for international Ebola responses, roughly half were provided to the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) through Title IX, Division J of P.L. The foreign affairs funds, which totaled more than $2.5 billion, were limited to use for the Ebola response, although the law permitted funds from some accounts to be used for preparedness efforts in countries "at risk of being affected by" the outbreak, such as Mali and Nigeria (which both experienced imported Ebola cases). Due to the precipitous decline in new cases towards the end of 2015, the United States has reduced funding for Phase 1 and Phase 2 types of activities. Challenges in Controlling Ebola in West Africa
On March 29, 2016, WHO declared that the West Africa Ebola outbreak was no longer a Public Health Emergency of International Concern PHEIC, since Ebola no longer constituted an extraordinary event, the risk of international spread was low, and countries had demonstrated the capacity to respond rapidly to infrequent flare-ups. Researchers continue to examine the implications of this persistence for survivors' health and for potential transmission of the disease. All three countries continue to face considerable infrastructural constraints. Issues for Congress
Congress has an enduring interest in the status of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, not least of which involves the disposition of funds dedicated to the Ebola response. The use of these unobligated funds is under discussion, particularly in response to emerging health crises. In February 2016, President Obama requested nearly $1.9 billion to support a U.S. domestic and international Zika response. In May 2016, the House and Senate took separate actions on Zika funding. On May 16, 2016, the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee introduced the Zika Response Appropriations Act, 2016 ( H.R. Nearly half of the funds are designated as emergency funds. Members of Congress who have opposed reprogramming unobligated Ebola funds have maintained that residual Ebola funds should be preserved and used to strengthen the weak health systems in West Africa that initially failed to detect and contain the outbreak. Since then, country program offices in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have led EBOLA responses in the respective countries. | The 2014-2015 outbreak and spread of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD, or Ebola) in West Africa became an international public health emergency that, in no small part due to international intervention, abated significantly by the end of 2015 and early 2016. The issue remains of interest toward the end of the 114th Congress for a number of reasons, including ongoing concerns about the status of disease and risks of future outbreaks, and interest in the disposition of funds appropriated by Congress in response to Ebola, especially in view of the more recent health challenge posed by the Zika virus. This report discusses ongoing efforts to control Ebola in West Africa, analyzes persistent challenges in fighting the spread of the disease, and tracks Ebola emergency funds.
Key milestones in the Ebola outbreak include the following:
In March 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that a "rapidly evolving outbreak of Ebola virus disease (Ebola)" had begun in Guinea, West Africa. Retroactive studies indicated that the virus had likely begun to spread in late December 2013, but that weak disease detection and surveillance systems had failed to identify the outbreak. From Guinea, the disease spread to Liberia and Sierra Leone and continued to infect thousands in the three countries until mid-2015, when a coordinated, high-level response by the international community began to slow the rate of new infections. In August 2014, WHO declared Ebola a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) and one month later, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon established the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) to coordinate the U.N. response to the outbreak. WHO came under some broad criticism for what was viewed as a late designation for the emergency. Following the PHEIC declaration, the United States and other actors exerted a concerted effort to contain the disease, and cases began to decline rapidly. By the end of December 2015, the fight against the West Africa Ebola outbreak reached a pivotal point. On December 29, WHO declared that human-to-human Ebola transmission had ended in Guinea, marking the first time all three countries had stopped the original chains of transmission at the same time. By this time, WHO had reported over 28,000 confirmed, probable, and suspected Ebola cases worldwide, including more than 11,000 deaths. On March 29, 2016, WHO declared that the West Africa Ebola outbreak was no longer a PHEIC, although the disease was still in a phase that could experience infrequent flare-ups. In addition, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone continue to face considerable infrastructural constraints.
Congress appropriated $5.4 billion in FY2015 emergency supplemental appropriations for domestic and international responses to the Ebola outbreak (in Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, P.L. 113-235, December 2014). Of the funds appropriated for international responses (in Title IX, Division J), roughly half were for the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). These funds, which totaled more than $2.5 billion, were limited for Ebola responses, although the law permitted funds from some accounts to be used for preparedness efforts in countries "at risk of being affected by" the outbreak.
With some Ebola supplemental funds still unobligated, some in the 114th Congress have looked to these funds as a potential source for responses to the emergent Zika virus. The Obama Administration has requested new funds to support a Zika response and has also reprogrammed some Ebola funds for Zika. The House and Senate have considered legislation in response to the request (S. 2843 and H.R. 5044, respectively. For more information, see CRS Report R44460, Zika Response Funding: Request and Congressional Action). Some Members of the House Appropriations Committee have called on the Administration to expend unobligated Ebola funds before considering the Zika request. Other Members oppose this idea and maintain that remaining Ebola funds should be preserved and used to strengthen the still weak health systems in West Africa that initially failed to detect and contain the outbreak. |
crs_RL34473 | crs_RL34473_0 | Most Recent Developments
Soon after the 111 th Congress convened, it began drafting H.R. On January 28, the House passed a version of the bill which would have provided, in Title III, $4.9 billion for accounts funded by the regular FY2009 DOD appropriations provided by Division D of the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2009, generally referred to as the "continuing resolution," which President George W. Bush signed into law on September 30, 2008. The House version of the economic stimulus bill also provided in Title X of the economic stimulus bill $6.0 billion for accounts funded by the regular military construction appropriations provided by Division E of the continuing resolution. 1 on February 10, which would have provided an additional $3.7 billion for DOD accounts other than military construction in FY2009 and 3.4 billion for military construction. Provisions of H.R. That bill provided $477.6 billion in discretionary defense appropriations for the so-called "base budget" of the Department of Defense, that is, for regular operations other than combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In a related action, the President signed into law on October 14, 2008 the FY2009 defense authorization bill ( S. 3001 ) authorizing $611.1 billion for national defense, including $68.6 billion for war-related programs (see Table A-1 in the Appendix to this report). The House had passed its version of the FY2009 defense authorization bill ( H.R. It also authorized the appropriation of $612.5 billion in new budget authority for national security programs, including $542.5 billion for the base budget and an additional $70 billion allowance for war-related costs. On September 24, the House passed the compromise version of the authorization bill as an amended version of the Senate-passed S. 3001 . Economic Stimulus Funding, DOD
H.R. 1 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, also known as the "economic stimulus," added $4.6 billion to DOD accounts funded in the regular FY2009 defense appropriations bill enacted September 30, 2008 as Division D of the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2009. The total national defense request also included $16.1 billion for nuclear weapons and other defense-related programs of the Department of Energy and $5.2 billion for the defense-related activities of other agencies. Congress incorporated action on the FY2009 war costs request into H.R. The Senate passed the compromise version September 27 and the President signed in October 14 ( P.L. 110-417 ). FY2009 Defense Authorization: Highlights of the Senate Bill
The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) approved S. 3001 , the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, on April 30 and reported the bill to the Senate on May 12 ( S.Rept. The Senate passed the bill September 17 by a vote of 88-8. The bill authorizes a total of $612.5 billion in new budget authority, including $542.5 billion for the base budget and a $70 billion placeholder allowance for war-related costs. 5658 . FY2009 Defense Appropriations Bill: House and Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Markups
The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee marked up its version of the FY2009 Defense Appropriations Bill on July 30, recommending a total of $477.6 billion, $4 billion less than the President requested for that bill. The Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee marked up its version of the appropriations Bill on September 10, also recommending $477.6 billion. Neither chamber held full committee markups of a FY2009 defense appropriations bill, and neither chamber considered a bill on the floor. The Senate passed the bill September 27 by a vote of 78-12 and the President signed it September 30 ( P.L. 110-329 ). The subcommittee bill denied the $2.5 billion requested for a third ship of the DDG-1000 class of destroyers, but this action was revised in the final version of the appropriations bill. | Soon after the 111th Congress convened, it began drafting H.R. 1, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, generally referred to as the "economic stimulus" bill. This bill added a total of $8.5 billion to amount previously appropriated for DOD in FY2009. Of the additional funds provided by H.R. 1, $4.6 billion was for accounts funded by the regular FY2009 DOD appropriations provided by Division D of the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2009, generally referred to as the "continuing resolution," which President George W. Bush signed into law on Sept. 30, 2008. The economic stimulus bill also provided an additional $2.9 billion for accounts funded by the regular military construction appropriations provided by Division E of the continuing resolution. Congress' disposition of FY2009 funding for DOD in H.R. 1 (other than funding for military construction) is discussed in this report on pp. 3-5, below. The balance of the report discusses the President's regular DOD budget request for FY2009 and Congress' disposition of that request in the regular defense authorization and appropriations legislation.
The President's FY2009 budget request, released February 4, 2008, included $611.1 billion in new budget authority for national defense. This total included $515.4 billion in discretionary budget authority for the base budget of the Department of Defense (DOD)—i.e., activities not associated with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—$2.9 billion in mandatory spending for the DOD base budget, and $22.8 billion for defense costs of the Department of Energy and other agencies. It also included a placeholder of $70 billion for war costs in the first part of FY2009.
On April 30, the Senate Armed Services Committee marked up its version of the FY2009 defense authorization bill (S. 3001), authorizing the appropriation of $612.5 billion in new budget authority, including $542.5 billion for the baseline budget and a $70 billion allowance for war-related costs. On September 17, the Senate passed the authorization bill by a vote of 88-8.
The House passed its version of the defense authorization bill (H.R. 5658) on May 22, authorizing $612.5 billion for national defense, including $70 billion for war-related costs. The bill denied authorization of the $2.5 billion requested for a third destroyer of the DDG-1000 class, allocating those funds instead to buy several other ships. A compromise between the House and Senate bills authorizing $611.1 billion, worked out informally, was passed by the House September 24 as an amended version of the Senate-passed S. 3001 by a vote of 392-39. The Senate passed the bill September 27 by voice vote and the President signed it on October 14 (P.L. 110-417). The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee marked up its version of the FY2009 Defense Appropriations Bill on July 30, recommending a total of $477.6 billion, $4 billion less than the President requested for that bill. The Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee marked up its version of the appropriations bill on September 10, also recommending $477.6 billion. Neither chamber held full committee markups of a FY2009 defense appropriations bill, and neither chamber considered a bill on the floor. Instead, a compromise version of the subcommittee bills was incorporated into H.R. 2638, the FY2009 Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance and Continuing Appropriations Act. The bill included $477.6 billion in regular FY2009 defense appropriations and $25.0 billion in military construction appropriations. The House passed the compromise bill September 24 (370-58). The Senate passed the bill September 27 (78-12), and the President signed it September 30 (P.L. 110-329). |
crs_RL34433 | crs_RL34433_0 | If Social Security benefits did not exist, an estimated 44% of the elderly would be poor today, assuming no behavioral changes such as saving more or working longer. Future Solvency Changes Could Also Increase Elderly Poverty
Many recent proposals to improve system solvency would reduce Social Security benefits in the future. If Social Security benefits were cut across the board, the poverty rate among elderly Americans could be significantly higher than under the current-law benefit formula. In 2006, about one-quarter of the elderly relied on Social Security for all of their income. Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program was designed explicitly to benefit the elderly poor, in addition to the low-income blind and disabled. Option 1: Poverty-Line Minimum Social Security Benefit
The first option would create a new minimum Social Security benefit equal to the elderly poverty line. Eligibility for Social Security would not change, but the additional Social Security benefits some individuals receive would disqualify them for SSI. Projected Change in Elderly Poverty
The option to create a poverty-line SSI benefit and liberalize eligibility is projected to reduce the elderly poverty rate by about three percentage points, compared to the payable baseline, reducing the number of elderly poor by about 1.9 million individuals in 2042. Both of these changes would dramatically affect the SSI program. Each option is projected to reduce poverty somewhat compared to the current law payable baseline—ranging from a negligible reduction in the elderly poverty rate for Option #2 (which would create a Social Security minimum benefit for long-term low earners) to a reduction of three percentage points for Option #4 (the poverty-line SSI benefit with liberalized eligibility). It is important to note that the projected elderly poverty rate under all of the options would be higher than under the current law scheduled baseline, which assumes no benefit cuts. Both of the SSI options are free of similar interaction effects. Targeting Spending Toward the Elderly Poor
If one of the objectives of reforming Social Security were to mitigate the effect of possible benefit reductions on the elderly poor, targeting spending would become an important consideration. Changing the Social Security benefit formula to mitigate the effects of changes on the elderly poor arguably would not target additional dollars as efficiently. Baseline
All of the options in this paper are compared to a current law payable baseline, which assumes that current law benefits are cut across the board to balance Social Security's annual income and spending at the point of insolvency, currently projected to occur in 2041. Year of Analysis
This report focuses on the effects of policy changes in 2042, the first full year of projected trust fund insolvency. As a result, the interactions between Social Security and SSI benefits can be seen. | Social Security has significantly reduced elderly poverty. The elderly poverty rate has fallen from 35% in 1959 to an all-time low of 9% in 2006, in large part because of Social Security. If Social Security benefits did not exist, an estimated 44% of the elderly would be poor today assuming no changes in behavior. The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, also provides benefits to the poorest elderly, many of whom do not qualify for Social Security benefits. However, despite these programs, about 3.4 million elderly individuals remained in poverty in 2006.
The Social Security system faces a long-term financing problem. The Social Security Trustees project cash-flow deficits beginning in 2017 and trust fund insolvency in 2041. Many recent proposals to improve system solvency would reduce Social Security benefits in the future. Benefit reductions could affect the low-income elderly, many of whom rely on Social Security benefits for almost all of their income. Such potential benefit reductions could lead to higher rates of poverty among the elderly compared to those projected under the current benefit formula. Because the low-income elderly are especially vulnerable to benefit reductions, many recent Social Security reform proposals have included minimum benefits or other provisions that would mitigate the effect of benefit cuts on the elderly poor.
This report analyzes the projected effects of four possible approaches to mitigating the effects of Social Security benefit reductions on elderly poverty in 2042, the first full year of projected trust fund insolvency. The options are compared to a payable baseline, which assumes current-law benefits would need to be cut across the board to balance Social Security's annual income and spending at the point of insolvency. The four options examined are (1) a poverty-line Social Security minimum benefit; (2) a sliding-scale Social Security minimum benefit; (3) a poverty-line SSI benefit; and (4) a poverty-line SSI benefit with liberalized eligibility.
Major findings include the following:
Each of the four options would reduce elderly poverty compared to the payable baseline—ranging from a negligible reduction in the elderly poverty rate for the option to create a sliding-scale Social Security minimum benefit to a reduction of three percentage points for the poverty-line SSI benefit with liberalized eligibility. The elderly poverty rate under all of the options would be higher than under the current law scheduled baseline, which assumes the current benefit formula can be maintained with no reductions. The SSI options examined would target the additional spending more efficiently toward the poor elderly than would the Social Security options. The Social Security options examined would reduce the incomes of some elderly because of interaction effects; the SSI options would not create such interactions. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.