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crs_R43712 | crs_R43712_0 | Introduction
On July 30, 2014, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 676 , Speaker John Boehner stated that the purpose of the suit would be to compel the President to follow his oath of office and comply with his constitutional responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Speaker Boehner has stated that the suit will focus on the Obama Administration's decision to delay implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's (ACA's) employer responsibility requirements (employer mandate). If the Speaker were to file a suit pursuant to H.Res. 676 , the executive branch defendants are likely to raise questions about the justiciability of such a claim. This report will discuss one such justiciability question: whether or not an authorized house of Congress has standing to sue the executive branch regarding the manner in which it executes the law. The suit may seek relief regarding
the failure of the President, the head of any department or agency, or any other officer or employee of the executive branch, to act in a manner consistent with that official's duties under the Constitution and laws of the United States with respect to implementation of any provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, title I or subtitle B of title II of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, including any amendment made by such provision, or any other related provision of law, including a failure to implement any such provision. To satisfy the constitutional standing requirements in Article III, the Supreme Court imposes three required elements. Congressional Standing
As applied to congressional plaintiffs, the doctrine of standing has generally been invoked only in cases challenging executive branch actions or acts of Congress and has focused on the injury prong of standing. The case law with respect to congressional plaintiffs can be broken down into two categories: (1) cases where individual Members file suit and (2) cases where congressional institutions (committees or houses of Congress) file suit. Following the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Raines v. Byrd , the case law regarding category one, individual Member suits, has been fairly settled. Therefore, the federal courts have not determined whether a congressional institutional plaintiff would have standing to sue based on the type of injury that is likely to be asserted in a suit brought pursuant to H.Res. This report will begin by examining areas in which the courts have provided relatively definitive analysis regarding congressional standing. First, it will examine Raines and its progeny, to explain how a court analyzes assertions of institutional injuries when the plaintiff is an individual Member. Next, the report will discuss cases brought by institutional plaintiffs based on institutional injuries regarding information access, namely suits seeking to enforce a congressional subpoena. By looking at these cases, we can identify whether the courts have established criteria that are necessary, but not sufficient, for institutional plaintiffs to establish standing. Finally, the report will address questions that remain unresolved by the courts that may be relevant in determining whether the House has standing in a suit filed pursuant to H.Res. | On July 30, 2014, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 676, authorizing the Speaker of the House to initiate a civil action against the President and/or executive branch officials or employees for their failure to act consistently with their duties under the Constitution or federal law in implementing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). Speaker John Boehner has argued that such a suit is necessary to compel the President to follow his oath of office and comply with his constitutional responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." The Speaker has announced that the suit will focus on the Obama Administration's decision to delay implementation of the ACA's employer responsibility requirements or employer mandate.
If the Speaker were to file a suit pursuant to H.Res. 676, the executive branch defendants are likely to raise questions about the justiciability of such a claim. This report will discuss one such justiciability question: whether or not an authorized house of Congress has standing to sue the executive branch regarding the manner in which it executes the law. Generally, to participate as party litigants, all plaintiffs, including congressional plaintiffs, must demonstrate that they meet the requirements of the standing doctrine, derived from Article III of the Constitution. The failure to satisfy the standing requirements is fatal to the litigation and will result in its dismissal without a decision by the court on the merits of the presented claims.
As applied to congressional plaintiffs, the doctrine of standing has generally been invoked only in cases challenging executive branch actions or acts of Congress. This case law can be broken down into two categories: (1) cases where individual Members file suit and (2) cases where congressional institutions (committees or houses of Congress) file suit. The case law regarding individual Member suits has been fairly settled following the Supreme Court's 1997 Raines v. Byrd decision. On the other hand, suits by congressional plaintiffs have been rare and federal courts have not determined whether a congressional institutional plaintiff would have standing to sue based on the type of injury likely to be asserted in a suit brought pursuant to H.Res. 676.
This report will begin by examining areas in which the courts have provided relatively definitive analysis regarding congressional standing. First, it will examine Raines and its progeny, to explain how a court analyzes assertions of institutional injuries when the plaintiff is an individual Member. Next, the report will discuss cases brought by institutional plaintiffs based on institutional injuries regarding information access, namely suits seeking to enforce a congressional subpoena. By looking at these cases, we can identify whether the courts have established criteria that are necessary, but not sufficient, for institutional plaintiffs to establish standing. Finally, the report will address questions that remain unresolved by the courts that may be relevant in determining whether the House has standing in a suit filed pursuant to H.Res. 676. |
crs_R40837 | crs_R40837_0 | Introduction
The American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009 (ACELA, S. 1462 ), an energy policy bill reported out of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on July 16, 2009, would expand the deployment of clean energy technologies, improve energy efficiency and energy security, encourage innovation and workforce development, and strengthen the monitoring functions over energy markets, according to the Committee ( S.Rept. 2454 , the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES), and to spending or tax provisions contained in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ). Although this bill is compared with certain energy provisions in H.R. 2454 is a broader bill that includes a greenhouse gas cap-and-trade system not found in the Senate Committee bill. Key Provisions
The six titles of S. 1462 focus on clean energy technologies, energy efficiency, domestic energy resources, energy innovation and energy workforce development, the stability of U.S. energy markets, and a series of studies related to future energy strategies. Some of these provisions build on similar or related provisions in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58 ), the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA07, P.L. 110-140 ), and appropriations under ARRA. Title I would promote the commercial deployment of clean energy technologies by modifying the Loan Guarantee Program and increasing Department of Energy's (DOE's) authority to offer additional financial incentives. Title II promotes enhanced energy efficiency through a combination of policies that target manufacturing, appliances, buildings, and the electric grid. According to the Senate Committee, Title III is intended to enhance U.S. energy security by addressing critical electric infrastructure, nuclear waste disposal, additional petroleum storage, expansion of oil and gas leasing in certain offshore areas, development of renewable energy resources on public lands, large-scale and long-term geologic storage of CO 2 , and reduction of the reliance of U.S. island territories on imported fossil fuels. Title IV contains provisions for advancing energy innovation and workforce development. Provisions include authorizing funds for a variety of energy research, development, demonstration, and commercial application activities; establishing a Grand Energy Challenges Research Initiative to integrate basic and applied energy research programs; improving a collection of energy programs, including the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy, domestic vehicle battery manufacturing research, lightweight materials research and development, methane hydrate research and development, low-Btu gas and helium resources conservation, Arctic energy research, development, and deployment, and ultra-deepwater and unconventional natural gas and other petroleum resources R&D. Title V contains several measures designed to stabilize the oil, natural gas, and electricity markets and to enhance energy security. H.R. 371 of S. 1462 . | As reported by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the six titles of S. 1462 are intended to address the energy security of the United States by promoting the development of clean energy technologies, improving energy efficiency, encouraging the development of domestic energy resources, promoting energy innovation and energy workforce development, improving the stability of U.S. energy markets, and informing energy strategies through a series of studies and reports. Some of these provisions build on similar or related provisions in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58), the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA07, P.L. 110-140) and appropriations under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5).
This report compares S. 1462 with certain energy provisions in H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, although there are substantial differences. H.R. 2454 is a broader bill that includes a greenhouse gas cap-and-trade system not found in the Senate Committee bill. (The energy provisions in S. 1462 are expected to be considered by the Senate when crafting its own greenhouse gas bill with input from other key committees.)
Title I of S. 1462 would promote the commercial deployment of clean energy technologies by modifying the Loan Guarantee Program and increasing Department of Energy's (DOE's) authority to offer additional financial incentives.
Title II promotes enhanced energy efficiency through a combination of policies that target manufacturing, appliances, buildings, and the electric grid.
Title III is intended to enhance U.S. energy security, according to the Committee Report, by addressing the issues of critical electric infrastructure and its vulnerability to cyber attack; nuclear waste disposal and reprocessing; additional petroleum storage; expansion of oil and gas leasing in certain offshore areas; development of renewable energy resources on public lands; large-scale and long-term geologic storage of CO2; and reduction of the reliance of U.S. island territories on imported fossil fuels.
Title IV contains provisions for advancing energy innovation and workforce development, including a variety of energy research, development, demonstration, and commercial application activities; a Grand Energy Challenges Research Initiative to integrate basic and applied energy research programs; expanding and modifying several energy programs, including the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy; domestic vehicle battery manufacturing research; lightweight materials research and development; methane hydrate research and development; low-Btu gas and helium resources conservation; Arctic energy research, development, and deployment; and ultra-deepwater and unconventional natural gas and other petroleum resources R&D.
Title V contains several measures designed to stabilize the oil, natural gas, and electricity markets and to enhance energy security.
Title VI would provide direction and authorization for a number of studies and reports that would inform energy programs and policies. |
crs_R40520 | crs_R40520_0 | Congress, the President, and executive branch agency heads may create advisory bodies. Pursuant to statute, the General Services Administration (GSA) maintains and administers management guidelines for federal advisory committees. In FY2011, 1,029 FACA committees with a total of 69,750 members reported total operating costs of $395,179,373 among 51 departments and agencies. In the 112 th Congress, one bill has been introduced that would affect FACA's implementation and administration. 3124 , the Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 2011. 3124 would require the selection of advisory committee members without regard to their partisan affiliation and that advisory body subcommittees and privately contracted committees adhere to FACA requirements. Among other changes, H.R. 3124 seeks to clarify the ethics requirements of committee members and increases records access requirements. On October 6, 2011, H.R. 3124 was concurrently referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the House Committee on Ways and Means. No further action has been taken on the bill. This report provides a legislative and executive-branch history of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA; 5 U.S.C. Appendix; 86 Stat. 770, as amended). FACA and the 112th Congress
On October 6, 2011, Representative William Lacy Clay introduced H.R. 3124 seeks to increase public access to federal advisory committees, clarify ethics requirements of FACA committee members, and extend FACA requirements to federally contracted advisory committees that are currently not governed by FACA. On October, 13, 2011, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform ordered the bill to be reported by unanimous consent. In addition, H.R. The agency must also put online a copy of each such certification, a summary description of the conflict necessitating the certification, and the reason for granting the certification; Any recusal agreement made by a member or any recusal known to the agency that occurs during the course of a meeting or other work of the committee; A summary of the process used by the advisory committee for making decisions; Detailed minutes of all meetings of the committee and a description of committee efforts to make meetings accessible to the public using online technologies (such as video recordings) or other techniques (such as audio recordings); Any written determination by the President or the head of the agency to which the advisory committee reports, pursuant to section 10(d), to close a meeting or any portion of a meeting and the reasons for such determination; Notices of future meetings of the committee; and Any additional information considered relevant by the head of the agency to which the advisory committee reports. FACA was primarily created to provide the public and Congress greater access to the operations of certain, qualifying federal advisory committees. Committee procedures may be included in the legislation that creates an advisory body. The studies included policy recommendations for advisory bodies. The purpose of S. 3529 is to: strengthen the authority of Congress and the executive branch to limit the use of Federal advisory committees to those that are necessary and serve an essential purpose; provide uniform standards for the creation, operation, and management of such committees; provide that the Congress and the public are kept fully and currently informed as to the number, purposes, membership, and costs of advisory committees, including their accomplishments; and assure that Federal advisory committees shall be advisory only. | Federal advisory committees—which may be designated as commissions, councils, or task forces—are created as provisional advisory bodies to collect viewpoints on various policy issues. Advisory bodies have been created to address a host of issues and can help the government manage and solve complex or divisive issues. Congress, the President, or an agency head may create a federal advisory committee to render independent advice or make policy recommendations to various federal agencies or departments.
In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA; 5 U.S.C. Appendix—Federal Advisory Committee Act; 86 Stat.770, as amended). Enactment of FACA was prompted by the perception that advisory committees were duplicative, inefficient, and lacked adequate control or oversight. FACA mandates certain formal structural and operational requirements, including formal reporting and oversight procedures. Additionally, FACA requires committee meetings be open to the public, unless they meet certain requirements. Also, FACA committee records are to be accessible to the public. Pursuant to statute, the General Services Administration (GSA) maintains and administers management guidelines for federal advisory committees. During FY2011, 1,029 active committees reported a total of 69,750 members. Operating costs for those committees reportedly was $395,179,373, of which $188,342,083 was reportedly spent on federal staff to support the committees' operations.
FACA was originally enacted to make executive branch advisory committee operations more accessible and transparent. Congress can decide, however, to apply FACA's requirements to a legislative branch advisory committee. Existing statutes are sometimes unclear as to whether a congressionally created committee would have to comply with FACA's requirements—except in cases when the statute includes language that indicates whether the act is to apply.
In the 112th Congress, one bill has been introduced that would modify FACA's implementation and administration. On October 6, 2011, Representative William Lacy Clay introduced H.R. 3124, the Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 2011. Among other changes, the bill would require the selection of advisory committee members without regard to their partisan affiliation. In addition, H.R. 3124 would create a formal process for the public to recommend potential advisory committee members. The bill seeks to clarify the ethics requirements placed on committee members, and the bill increases records access requirements. On October 6, 2011, the bill was concurrently referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the House Committee on Ways and Means. On October 13, 2011, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform ordered the bill to be reported by unanimous consent. No further action has been taken on the bill.
In addition to considering H.R. 3124, the 112th Congress may create new advisory bodies as well as oversee the operations of existing bodies. This report offers a history of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, examines its current requirements, and analyzes various advisory body design elements and operations. |
crs_RS21745 | crs_RS21745_0 | Historical Background
The differences between the Sunni and Shiite Islamic sects are rooted in disagreements over the succession to the Prophet Muhammad, who died in 632 AD, and over the nature of leadership in the Muslim community. The use of violence by members of a given religious sect may be motivated by secular political goals or individual factors. Core Beliefs and Shared Practices
Although there are considerable differences between Sunni and Shiite Islam, the two Islamic sects share common traditions, beliefs, and doctrines. This premise has been inconsistently practiced within the Sunni Muslim community throughout history. Following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Shiite Islamic revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia's ruling Sunni royal family began allowing their clerics and citizens to more actively promote Saudi religious doctrine abroad, and Saudi individuals and organizations since have financed the construction of mosques, religious schools, and Islamic centers in dozens of countries. Shiite Islam: Development and Basic Tenets
Initially, the Shiite movement gained a wide following in areas that now include Iraq, Iran, Yemen, and parts of Central and South Asia. Today, according to some estimates, Shiite Islam is practiced among approximately 10% to 15% of the world's Muslim population. Alawites exist mostly in Syria and Lebanon. | The majority of the world's Muslim population follows the Sunni branch of Islam, and approximately 10%-15% of all Muslims follow the Shiite (Shi'ite, Shi'a, Shia) branch. Shiite populations constitute a majority in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan. There are also significant Shiite populations in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. Sunnis and Shiites share most basic religious tenets. However, their differences sometimes have been the basis for religious intolerance, political infighting, and sectarian violence.
This report includes a historical background of the Sunni-Shiite split and discusses the differences in religious beliefs and practices between and within each Islamic sect as well as their similarities. The report also relates Sunni and Shiite religious beliefs to discussions of terrorism and sectarian violence that may be of interest to Congress. Also see CRS Report RS21695, The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43016 | crs_R43016_0 | Introduction
On March 16, 2010, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan . Accordingly, the NBP identified significant gaps in broadband availability and adoption in the United States, and in order to address those gaps and other challenges, the NBP set six specific goals to be achieved by the year 2020. Goal 1—Next Generation Broadband
Goal No. 5: To ensure the safety of the American people, every first responder should have access to a nationwide, wireless, interoperable broadband public safety network. Many of the key telecommunications issues that are currently being considered by the 113 th Congress are focused on improving broadband deployment, and thus are intended to have a positive impact on the nation's progress towards reaching one (or in many cases, several) of the NBP goals. Concluding Observations
Three years after the rollout of the National Broadband Plan, available data indicate that there has been progress towards reaching the 2020 goals. The following observations can be made:
the United States is much closer to reaching broadband availability goals than broadband adoption goals, which remain a major challenge; the United States is much closer to achieving broadband download speed goals than upload speed goals; while the 100 squared goal seems well within reach (at least for download speeds), its price remains high—affordability could improve in the future depending on technological advances and consumer demand for 100 Mbps plus speeds; recent rollouts of next generation wireless technologies (4G LTE) have led the FCC to state that the United States leads the world in mobile innovation; on the other hand, the latest OECD data indicate that the United States remains in the middle of the pack with respect to wireless broadband subscriptions per 100 population; while broadband data are incomplete for Community Anchor Institutions, available information indicate that the number of CAIs with 1 gigabit connections remains relatively low; and two major initiatives—FirstNet and Smart Grid—are currently underway in order to help reach goals 5 and 6. Finally, as the 113 th Congress considers contentious telecommunications issues such as universal service reform, wireless technology and spectrum policy, and telecommunications regulatory reform, the ongoing progress towards meeting the NBP goals is likely to be part of that debate. | On March 16, 2010, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan. The National Broadband Plan (NBP) identified significant gaps in broadband availability and adoption in the United States, and in order to address those gaps and other challenges, the NBP set specific goals to be achieved by the year 2020. Goals were set for next generation broadband service; universal broadband service; mobile wireless broadband innovation and coverage; broadband access of Community Anchor Institutions; a nationwide, wireless, interoperable broadband public safety network; and broadband for tracking energy consumption.
Three years after the rollout of the NBP, available data indicate that there has been progress towards reaching the 2020 goals. The following observations can be made:
the United States is much closer to reaching broadband availability goals than broadband adoption goals, which remain a major challenge; the United States is much closer to achieving broadband download speed goals than upload speed goals; while the next generation broadband goal of 100 million households with 100 Mbps speeds seems within reach (at least for download speeds), the price remains high—affordability could improve in the future depending on technological advances and consumer demand for ultra-high speed next generation performance; recent rollouts of next generation wireless technologies have led the FCC to state that the United States leads the world in mobile innovation; on the other hand, the latest Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data indicate that the United States remains in the middle of the pack with respect to wireless broadband subscriptions per 100 of the population; while broadband data are incomplete for Community Anchor Institutions, available information indicate that the number of CAIs with 1 gigabit connections remains relatively low; and two major initiatives—FirstNet and Smart Grid—are currently underway in order to help reach the goals for a public safety wireless network and for broadband monitoring of energy consumption.
Many of the key telecommunications issues that are currently being considered by the 113th Congress are focused on improving broadband deployment and thus are intended to have a positive impact on the nation's progress towards reaching one (or in many cases, several) of the NBP goals. As the 113th Congress considers contentious telecommunications issues such as universal service reform, wireless technology and spectrum policy, and telecommunications regulatory reform, the ongoing progress towards meeting the NBP goals is likely to be part of that debate. |
crs_RS22936 | crs_RS22936_0 | China eagerly awaits the commencement of the Games of the XXIX Olympiad on August 8, 2008 in Beijing. After seven years of preparations, China will host the preeminent sporting event of the year. Included in this figure is the expense of building or renovating 76 stadiums and sport facilities in the seven venues—Beijing, Hong Kong, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Tianjin—at which events will take place. Given the experiences of past hosts of Olympic Summer Games and the current economic situation in China, many analysts believe the 2008 Olympics are unlikely to provide much of a stimulus—or much of a deterrent—for economic growth in Beijing or the rest of China. There are some possible unexpected economic benefits that might be attributable to the 2008 Olympics. It would appear that the potential gains that China may hope to acquire from hosting the Olympics will be mostly in its public image, prestige, and soft power. | China will host the 2008 Olympic Summer Games from August 8 to 24, 2008. Most of the events will be held in the vicinity of Beijing, with selected competitions held in Hong Kong, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Tianjin. Since the International Olympic Committee's decision in July 2001 to select Beijing as the host for the 2008 Olympics, China has spent billions of dollars for facilities and basic infrastructure in preparation for the international event. China anticipates that the 2008 Olympics will provide both short-term and long-term direct and indirect benefits to its economy, as well as enhance the nation's global image. However, the experience of past host cities and China's current economic conditions cast serious doubt that the Games of the XXIX Olympiad will provide the level of economic growth being anticipated. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43581 | crs_R43581_0 | The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank or the Bank), a wholly owned U.S. government corporation, is the official export credit agency (ECA) of the United States. Its mission is to assist in the financing of U.S. exports of goods and services to support U.S. employment. It operates under a general statutory charter, the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended (P.L. 79-173; 12 U.S.C. §635 et seq.). The 114 th Congress may debate whether to renew Ex-Im Bank's authority and, if so, for how long and under what terms; and if not, the possibility of other policy options. Under the charter, Ex-Im Bank's financing must offer a "reasonable assurance of repayment" and must supplement, not compete with, private sources of financing. Ex-Im Bank also abides by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (the "Arrangement"), which establishes terms and conditions for the export credit agencies of the United States and other participants (discussed later). For FY2014, Ex-Im Bank estimates that its authorizations of $20.5 billion are in support of $27.5 billion of U.S. exports and 164,000 U.S. jobs. In FY2014, Ex-Im Bank reported an exposure of $112.0 billion—below the $140 billion statutory cap for that year—distributed across financial products, geographic regions, and economic sectors (see Figure 5 ). Congress also allowed carryover funds of up to $10 million to remain available until September 30, 2017. For FY2015, the Bank has an upper limit of $106.3 million for administrative expenses, funding of $5.8 million for the OIG, and up to $10 million in carryover authority until September 30, 2018. Ex-Im Bank also has a claims and recovery process for transactions in default. The Bank reported a default rate of 0.175% as of September 2014, which it provides quarterly to Congress. Ex-Im Bank's authority has been extended through June 30, 2015, by the FY2015 continuing resolution (CR) (§147 of P.L. 113-164 ). Members of Congress hold a range of views regarding how to address the status of Ex-Im Bank's authority. Proponents of Ex-Im Bank reauthorization hold that the Bank is critical in supporting U.S. jobs and U.S. exports by addressing market failures (such as imperfect information and barriers to entry) and leveling the playing field by countering foreign government-backed export financing activity. In the 2012 reauthorization legislation, Congress required Ex-Im Bank to review its domestic content policy for medium- and long-term transactions to "examine and evaluate the effectiveness of the Bank's policy in maintaining and creating jobs in the [United States]; and in contributing to a stronger national economy through the export of goods and services" by taking into account various factors, including U.S. employment considerations and competitiveness to foreign ECAs. International Government-Backed Export Credit Activity | The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank or the Bank), a wholly owned U.S. government corporation, is the official export credit agency (ECA) of the United States. Its mission is to assist in the financing of U.S. exports of goods and services to support U.S. employment. The FY2015 continuing resolution (§147 of P.L. 113-164) extends its general statutory charter (Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §635 et seq.) through June 30, 2015. The 114th Congress may debate whether to renew Ex-Im Bank's authority; if so, for how long and under what terms; and if not, other policy alternatives.
Under its charter, Ex-Im Bank's financing must have a "reasonable assurance of repayment" and should supplement, and not compete with, private capital, among other requirements. The Bank also abides by international rules for government-backed export credit activity under the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
In FY2014, Ex-Im Bank reported authorizing about $20.5 billion for 3,746 transactions of finance and insurance, to support an estimated $27.5 billion in U.S. exports of goods and services and 164,000 U.S. jobs. Its overall portfolio exposure level in FY2014 was $112 billion—below the $140 billion statutory cap for that year. Ex-Im Bank assesses credit and other risks of proposed transactions, monitors current commitments for risks, and maintains reserves against potential losses. It reported a default rate of 0.175% as of September 2014 (provided quarterly to Congress) and, since 1992, an average recovery rate of 50% for transactions in default.
Ex-Im Bank uses offsetting collections to cover costs of its operations. FY2015 appropriations legislation set an upper limit of $106.3 million for the Bank's administrative expenses, provided $5.8 million for its Office of Inspector General (OIG), and allowed carryover funds of up to $10 million to remain available until September 30, 2018.
Members of Congress hold a range of views on Ex-Im Bank. Proponents assert that the Bank supports U.S. exports by addressing market failures that dampen export levels and helping U.S. exporters compete against foreign companies backed by their governments' ECAs. Critics oppose the use of taxpayer funds for private benefit, whether for large or small businesses, and contend that the private sector is more efficient in financing exports. The reauthorization issues facing Congress are two-fold. The first issue is whether to renew Ex-Im Bank's authority. Scenarios include renewal in a "clean" manner or with reforms; a sunset in authority; and a reorganization of its functions. Second, should Congress choose to renew its authority, specific issues include
For how long should Ex-Im Bank be reauthorized? Should Ex-Im Bank's exposure cap be adjusted and if so, by what amount? What revisions should be made to Ex-Im Bank's policies, if any? How well does the Bank manage the risks associated with its portfolio? How should the United States approach international disciplines to guide government-backed export credit activity? |
crs_R41617 | crs_R41617_0 | On December 5, 2012, the Senate approved S.Res. (See " Cuba's Offshore Oil Development " below.) Political Conditions
After Fidel stepped down from power, Cuba's political succession from Fidel to Raúl Castro was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. Some observers point to the significantly reduced number of political prisoners over the past several years as evidence of a lessening of repression, but while human rights activists have welcomed the change, some maintain that the overall situation has not improved, with the government resorting to short-term detentions and other forms of intimidation. Death of Wilman Villar Mendoza. While the guidelines do not have any reference with regard to sequencing or how the objectives may be implemented, they include some potentially significant economic reforms that, if realized, could significantly alter Cuba's state-dominated economic model. Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial transactions. In light of Fidel Castro's departure as head of government, many observers called for a reexamination of U.S. policy toward Cuba. In this new context, two broad policy approaches have been advanced to contend with political change in Cuba: a status-quo approach that maintains the U.S. dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban people; and an approach aimed at influencing the attitudes of the Cuban government and Cuban society through increased contact and engagement. Obama Administration Policy
Overview
Since taking office, the Obama Administration has lifted restrictions on travel and remittance to Cuba for Cuban Americans, moved to reengage Cuba on migration and other bilateral issues, and in January 2011 announced further steps to ease restrictions on purposeful travel and non-family remittances. 89-732) in order to curb travel to Cuba by Cubans who have recently immigrated to the United States. H.R. Two initiatives that would have lifted the overall Cuba embargo, H.R. 255 and H.R. Legislative Proposals Regarding Agricultural Exports to Cuba
In the first session of the 112 th Congress, both the House Appropriations Committee-approved and Senate Appropriations Committee-approved versions of the FY2012 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations measure, H.R. 833 (Conaway) and H.R. In the 112 th Congress, two bills were introduced, S. 603 (Nelson, Bill) and H.R. 1887 (Rangel), and H.R. H.R. Both H.R. The Administration's FY2013 request is for $15 million. Congress did not complete action on FY2013 appropriations before the beginning of the fiscal year, but in September 2012, it approved a continuing appropriations resolution ( H.J.Res. 112-175 ) that continues FY2013 funding through March 27, 2013, at the same rate for projects and activities in FY2012, plus an across-the-board increase of 0.612%, although specific country accounts are left to the discretion of responsible agencies. This continues funding for Cuba democracy programs through March 27, 2013, but the 113 th Congress will need to address foreign aid appropriations for the balance of FY2013. As described in the conference report, the BBG strategic plan was required to include (1) an analysis of the current situation in Cuba and an allocation of resources consistent with the relative priority of broadcasting to Cuba as determined by the annual Language Service Review and other factors, including input form the Secretary of State on the relative U.S. interest of broadcasting to Cuba; (2) the estimated audience sizes in Cuba for Radio and TV Martí and the sources and relative reliability of the data on which such estimates are based; (3) the annual operating cost (and total cost over the life of the contract) of any and all types of TV transmission and the effectiveness of each in increasing such audience size; (4) the principal obstacles to increasing such audience size; (5) an analysis of other options for disseminating news and information to Cuba, including DVDs, the Internet, and cell phones and other handheld electronic devices and a report on the cost effectiveness of each; and (6) an analysis of the program efficiencies and effectiveness that can be achieved through shared resources and cost saving opportunities in radio and television production between Radio and TV Martí and the Voice of America. Legislative Initiatives in the 112th Congress
Enacted Measures
P.L. 112-74 ( H.R. The second provision also had been in H.R. 2434 , as well as in the Senate Appropriations Committee-approved version of the FY2012 Financial Services Appropriations bill, S. 1573 , and would have continued to clarify—for the third year in a row—the definition of "payment of cash in advance" for U.S. agricultural and medical exports to Cuba so that the payment would be due upon delivery in Cuba as opposed to being due before the goods left U.S. ports. As approved, the resolution: recognizes and honors the life and exemplary leadership of Oswaldo Payá; offers heartfelt condolences to the family, friends, and loved ones of Payá; praises the bravery of Payá and his colleagues for collecting more than 11,000 signatures in support of the Varela Project; calls on the United States to continue policies that promote respect for the fundamental principles of religious freedom, democracy, and human rights in Cuba; calls on the Cuban government to provide its citizens with internationally accepted standards for civil and human rights and the opportunity to vote in free and fair elections; calls on the Cuban government to allow an impartial, third-party investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Payá; and condemns the Cuban government for the detention of nearly 50 pro-democracy activists following the memorial service for Oswaldo Payá. H.R. H.R. H.R. The provision would have rolled back President Obama's easing of restrictions on family travel and remittances in 2009 and the President's easing of restrictions on remittances for non-family members and religious institutions in 2011. 2434 or S. 1573 were included in the FY2012 "megabus" appropriations measure, P.L. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. With regard to Cuba broadcasting, the House bill would provide $28.062 million ($4.468 million more than the Administration's request and the same amount provided in FY2012), while the Senate bill would provide $23.4 million ($194,000 less than the Administration's request). H.R. On July 31, 2012, the Senate approved S.Res. On February 1, 2012, the Senate passed S.Res. He also visited imprisoned U.S. government subcontractor Alan Gross. | Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country's political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. The government of Raúl Castro has implemented limited economic policy changes, including an expansion of self-employment. A party congress held in April 2011 laid out numerous economic goals that, if implemented, could significantly alter Cuba's state-dominated economic model. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system. The government has reduced the number of political prisoners over the past several years, but short-term detentions and harassment have increased significantly.
U.S. Policy
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions. A second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including U.S.-sponsored broadcasting and support for human rights activists. In light of Fidel Castro's departure as head of government, many observers called for a reexamination of policy. Two broad approaches have been at the center of debate. The first is to maintain the dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban people. The second is aimed at changing attitudes in the Cuban government and society through increased engagement. Since taking office, the Obama Administration has lifted restrictions on family travel and remittances, moved to reengage Cuba on several bilateral issues, and eased restrictions on other types of purposeful travel and remittances. The Administration has criticized Cuba's repression of dissidents, but has welcomed the release of political prisoners. The Administration has continued to call for the release of U.S. government subcontractor Alan Gross, detained in 2009, and sentenced to 15 years in prison in March 2011.
Legislative Action
Strong interest on Cuba continued in the 112th Congress. In the first session, an attempt to roll back the Administration's easing of restrictions on travel and remittances was unsuccessful. The provision had been included in the House Appropriations Committee version of the FY2012 Financial Services appropriations bill, H.R. 2434, but was not included in the FY2012 "megabus" appropriations measure (H.R. 2055, P.L. 112-74). Both H.R. 2434 and the Senate version of the bill, S. 1573, also would have continued to clarify the definition of "payment of cash in advance" for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba during FY2012, but the provision was not included in the "megabus" measure.
In the second session, the Senate approved: S.Res. 366 on February 1, 2012, condemning the Cuban government for the death of democracy activist Wilman Villar Mendoza; S.Res. 525 on July 31, 2012, honoring prominent Cuban dissident Oswaldo Payá who was killed in a car accident, and S.Res. 609 on December 5, 2012, calling for the release of Alan Gross. With regard to Cuba democracy funding, the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the FY2013 foreign aid appropriations measure, S. 3241, would have provided $15 million as the Administration requested, while the House Appropriations Committee version of the bill, H.R. 5857, would have provided $20 million. With regard to Cuba broadcasting, S. 3241 would have provided $23.4 million ($194,000 less than the Administration's request) while H.R. 5857 would have provided $28.062 million ($4.468 million more than the request). The 112th Congress did not complete action on FY2013 appropriations, but it did approve a continuing appropriations resolution in September 2012 (H.J.Res. 117, P.L. 112-175) that continues FY2013 funding through March 27, 2013, at the same rate for projects and activities in FY2012, plus an across-the-board increase of 0.612%, although specific country accounts are left to the discretion of responsible agencies. The 113th Congress will need to address appropriations for the balance of FY2013.
Among other initiatives not enacted, two would have increase sanctions: H.R. 2583 would have rolled back the easing of travel and remittance restrictions, and H.R. 2831 would have attempted to curb frequent travel to Cuba by Cubans who have recently immigrated to the United States. Several initiatives would have eased sanctions: H.R. 255 and H.R. 1887 (overall sanctions); H.R. 833 and H.R. 1888 (agricultural exports); and H.R. 380 and H.R. 1886 (travel). Two initiatives, S. 603 and H.R. 1166, would have modified a trademark sanction. Eight bills, H.R. 372, S. 405, H.R. 2047, H.R. 3393, H.R. 4310, H.R. 4135, H.R. 6067, and S. 1836, would have taken different approaches toward Cuba's offshore oil development. Two bills, S. 476 and H.R. 1317, would have discontinued Radio and TV Martí broadcasts.
This report reflects legislative activity through the 112th Congress and will not be updated. |
crs_R44940 | crs_R44940_0 | Travel on public roads and highways could become less congested. As a U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) report noted, highly automated vehicles "hold a learning advantage over humans. The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation reported S. 1885 on November 28, 2017. The first report issued by DOT, Federal Automated Vehicles Policy , laid the foundation for regulation and legislation by clarifying DOT's thinking in four areas
a set of guidelines outlining best practices for autonomous vehicle design, testing, and deployment; a m odel s tate p olicy that identifies where new autonomous vehicle-related issues fit in the current federal and state regulatory structures; a streamlined review process to expedite requests for DOT regulatory interpretations to spur autonomous development; and identification of new tools and regulatory structures for NHTSA that could aid in autonomous deployment, such as expanded exemption authority and premarket testing to assure that autonomous vehicles will be safe. Traditionally, NHTSA has regulated auto safety, while states have licensed automobile drivers, established traffic regulations, and regulated automobile insurance. One example would be to employ event data recorders—now used in a limited way on nearly all motor vehicles to record vehicle and driver information in the seconds before a crash—for use in autonomous vehicles to identify safety-related defects. NHTSA said it has the statutory authority now for this tool. Licensing and registration procedures. Consumer Privacy. Congressional Action
Committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate have held numerous hearings on the technology of autonomous vehicles and possible federal issues that could result from their deployment. On September 6, 2017, the House of Representatives passed by voice vote H.R. They retain and seek to clarify the current arrangement of states controlling most driver-related functions and the federal government being responsible for vehicle safety. 3388 , states would not be allowed to regulate the design, construction, or performance of highly automated vehicles, automated driving systems, or their components unless those laws are identical to federal law. S. 1885 would also preempt states from adopting laws, regulations, and standards that would regulate many aspects of autonomous vehicles, but would omit some of the specific powers reserved to the states under the House-passed bill. Within two years of enactment, H.R. 3388 would require DOT to issue a final rule requiring each manufacturer to show how it is addressing safety in its autonomous vehicles, with updates every five years thereafter. The House-passed bill would require DOT to submit a safety priority plan rulemaking within a year of enactment, indicating which existing federal safety standards must be updated to accommodate autonomous vehicles, the need for new standards, and NHTSA's safety priorities for autonomous vehicles and other vehicles. Cybersecurity. Privacy. Manufacturing Study . The House and Senate bills also address several vehicle safety standards not directly related to autonomous vehicles:
Rear Seat Occupant Alert System. In an effort to reduce or eliminate infant fatalities, H.R. Headlamps. Controversy with the Legislation
Since the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee reported S. 1885 last year, several highly publicized crashes involving vehicles operating autonomously for testing purposes have prompted new concerns about how the federal government should regulate the new technologies. Both bills seek to identify a new regulatory arrangement by preempting new state and local safety standards for autonomous vehicles, but state and local governments have sought a role in federal advisory committees, notification of proposed exemptions from Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, and clarification that traditional state and local authority over matters such as enforcing traffic laws will not be infringed. | Legislation recently passed by the House of Representatives—H.R. 3388—and pending in the Senate—S. 1885—would provide new regulatory tools to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to oversee autonomous vehicles. Autonomous vehicles are seen as a way to reduce motor vehicle crashes; for example, there were 37,461 deaths from motor vehicle crashes in 2016 and nearly all of them were caused by driver error. However, despite unanimous approval in House and Senate committees and on the House floor, the legislation has proven controversial in the wake of several high-profile accidents involving autonomous vehicles being tested on public roads.
At present, no fully autonomous vehicles are available for public use. Many new vehicles have automated some driver functions, but all require a human to monitor the driving environment and control the vehicle. However, rapid advances in technology have made it likely that vehicles with high levels of automation will be on the market within a few years, raising questions about the adequacy of existing methods of safety oversight.
The federal government and the states share motor vehicle regulation, with the federal government responsible for vehicle safety and states for driver-related aspects such as licensing and registration. While NHTSA has the statutory authority to regulate all types of motor vehicles, its traditional standard-setting process would take many years at a time when vehicle innovation is changing rapidly; standards envisioned now could be obsolete by the time they took effect. In the absence of NHTSA regulation of autonomous vehicles, nearly half the states have enacted laws on different aspects of autonomous vehicle deployment, resulting in a wide variety of state regulation.
On September 6, 2017, the House of Representatives passed by voice vote H.R. 3388. The legislation, which incorporates some provisions recommended in 2016 and 2017 U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) reports, would preempt state regulation of some aspects of autonomous vehicle deployment, while providing new regulatory tools to NHTSA. H.R. 3388 would
preempt states from regulating the design of autonomous vehicles, unless those laws are identical to federal law; expand NHTSA's authority to grant exemptions from its standards to encourage innovation; require each manufacturer to submit a "safety assessment certification" showing how it is addressing autonomous vehicle safety; mandate within one year of enactment a NHTSA report indicating what federal safety standards must be updated and listing its vehicle safety priorities; and require manufacturers to publicize their cybersecurity and data privacy plans.
The legislation would also establish an advisory committee, a new regulation for rear-seat occupant alerts (to reduce infant fatalities), and a review of headlamp standards. On November 8, 2017, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation reported S. 1885, legislation that is similar in many respects to the House-passed legislation. Both bills address state preemption, safety standards, exemption authority, consumer information, cybersecurity, and privacy, but differ in their details. |
crs_RS20088 | crs_RS20088_0 | The resulting WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding, or DSU) reflects the U.S. negotiating objective of creating a mechanism that is more judicial in approach (and, it was hoped, fairer and more predictable) than the diplomatically oriented system favored by other trading partners. These include a "reverse consensus" voting rule at key points in the process, legal review of panel reports by a new Appellate Body, deadlines for various phases of the dispute procedure, and improved multilateral oversight of compliance. Thus, unless it decides by consensus not to do so, the DSB will (1) approve requests to establish panels, (2) adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, and (3) if requested by the prevailing Member in a dispute, authorize the Member to impose a retaliatory measure where the defending Member has not complied. In effect, these decisions are virtually automatic. As of the date of this report, 450 complaints have been filed under the DSU. Nearly one-half of the 450 WTO complaints filed to date involve the United States as complaining party or defendant. If a WTO Member requests consultations with another Member under a WTO agreement, the latter Member must enter into consultations with the former within 30 days. Compliance Panels (Article 21.5)
Either disputing Member may request that a compliance panel be convened under Article 21.5 of the DSU in the event the disputants disagree as to whether the defending Member has complied. Regarding retaliatory action, the prevailing Member must follow DSU procedures in determining the amount of trade retaliation to be imposed and must obtain authorization from the DSB in accordance with DSU procedures before suspending WTO tariff concessions or other WTO obligations in the event the defending Member has failed to comply. Removal of Retaliatory Measures
The DSU is also silent on how authorized retaliation is to be terminated in the event a defending Member believes that it has complied in a dispute. Claiming that a 2003 European Union Directive rendered it WTO-compliant, the EU argued that the United States and Canada were violating the following WTO obligations in continuing to impose their retaliatory tariffs: (1) the GATT most-favored-nation article; (2) the GATT prohibition on tariff surcharges; and (3) various DSU provisions, including Article 23, which requires WTO Members to invoke WTO dispute settlement for disputes arising under WTO agreements and precludes certain unilateral actions in trade disputes, and Article 22.8, which permits sanctions to be imposed only until the defending Member's WTO-inconsistent measures have been removed or the dispute is mutually resolved. WTO Dispute Settlement and U.S. Law
Legal Effect of WTO Decisions
The adoption by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a panel and, if appealed, subsequent Appellate Body report finding that a U.S. law, regulation, or practice violates a WTO agreement does not give the report or reports direct legal effect in the United States. Thus, federal law is not affected until Congress or the executive branch, as the case may be, changes the law or administrative measure at issue. Procedures for executive branch compliance with adverse decisions are set out in Sections 123(g) and 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Section 301 of the Trade Act
Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (referred to collectively as Section 301) provide a mechanism for private parties to petition the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to take action regarding harmful foreign trade practices. While Section 301 also permits the USTR to initiate an investigation on its own motion, it is not necessary for the USTR to invoke Section 301 in order to initiate a WTO dispute. 112th Congress Legislation
S. 239 (Klobuchar), the Innovate America Act, would, inter alia, authorize to be appropriated to the USTR $2 million for each of FY2011, FY2012, and FY2013 for the purpose of initiating any proceeding to resolve a dispute relating to market access barriers with WTO member countries. S. 708 (Brown, Ohio), the Trade Enforcement Priorities Act, would establish mechanisms under the Trade Act of 1974 to require the USTR annually to identify particularly harmful foreign trade practices and, where appropriate, to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings to remedy these practices. | The World Trade Organization (WTO) Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) provides a means for WTO Members to resolve disputes arising under WTO agreements. WTO Members must first attempt to settle their dispute through consultations, but if these fail the Member initiating the dispute may request that a panel examine and report on its complaint. The DSU provides for Appellate Body (AB) review of panel reports, panels to determine if a defending Member has complied with an adverse WTO decision by the established deadline in a case, and possible retaliation if the defending Member has failed to do so. Automatic establishment of panels, adoption of panel and appellate reports, and authorization of a Member's request to retaliate, along with deadlines and improved multilateral oversight of compliance, are aimed at producing a more expeditious and effective system than had existed under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). To date, 450 complaints have been filed under the DSU, with nearly one-half involving the United States as a complainant or defendant. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) represents the United States in WTO disputes.
Use of the DSU has revealed procedural gaps, particularly in the compliance phase of a dispute. These include a failure to coordinate DSU procedures for requesting retaliation with procedures for requesting a compliance panel and the absence of a specific procedure aimed at the removal of trade sanctions in the event the defending Member believes it has fulfilled its WTO obligations in a case. To overcome these gaps, disputing Members have entered into bilateral agreements permitting retaliation and compliance panel procedures to advance in sequence and have initiated new dispute proceedings seeking the removal of retaliatory measures believed to have outlived their legal foundation. Expressing dissatisfaction with WTO dispute settlement results involving U.S. trade remedies, Congress, in the Trade Act of 2002, directed the executive branch to address dispute settlement in WTO negotiations. WTO Members have been negotiating DSU revisions in the currently stalled Doha Development Round.
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides a mechanism for the USTR, either by petition of an "interested party" or on its own accord, to address restrictive foreign trade practices through the initiation of a WTO dispute and authorizes the USTR to take retaliatory action in the event the defending WTO Member has not complied with the resulting WTO decision. While the European Union challenged Section 301 in the WTO on the ground that it requires the USTR to act unilaterally in WTO-related disputes in violation of DSU requirements, the United States was ultimately found to be in compliance with its DSU obligations. Where a U.S. law or regulation is at issue in a WTO case, the WTO's adoption of a panel and, if appealed, AB report finding that the U.S. measure violates a WTO agreement does not give the WTO decision direct legal effect in this country. Thus, federal law is not affected until Congress or the executive branch, as the case may be, takes action to remove the offending measure.
S. 239 (Klobuchar), the Innovate America Act, would, inter alia, authorize to be appropriated to the USTR $2 million for each of FY2011, FY2012, and FY2013 for the purpose of initiating any proceeding to resolve a dispute relating to market access barriers with WTO member countries. S. 708 (Brown, Ohio) would establish mechanisms under the Trade Act of 1974 to require the USTR annually to identify particularly harmful foreign trade practices and, where appropriate, to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings to remedy these practices. |
crs_RL32843 | crs_RL32843_0 | Accordingly, advocates of change in this area have focused on procedural changes that would afford more effective means for a majority to limit consideration. Existing Senate rules and procedures, however, also place potentially substantial obstacles in the way of adopting changes in these rules and procedures. Certain elements of the Senate's procedural system have the effect of requiring that its established procedures remain continuously in effect. As a result, a proposal to institute more effective means of limiting consideration would have to be considered in accordance with the already existing procedures. It is in this sense that Senate rules have been described as "entrenched" against their own change. A course of action could provide a "nuclear option" either by (1) overcoming the scarcity of majoritarian consideration limits afforded by existing procedures or (2) departing from the principle that the existing system of procedure as a whole remains always in effect. Consideration Limits Under Existing Procedures
The previous discussion of entrenchment suggests that the chief requisites of a feasible "nuclear option" would be (1) that a proposal for procedural change be subject to adoption with the support of a simple majority of Senators voting; and (2) that its consideration be subject to limitation also by a simple voting majority, so as to ensure that a vote can be reached. It is accordingly appropriate for the Senate to exercise authority in relation to the Constitution. If, on the other hand, the precedent for submitting constitutional questions would be controlling, but Rule XX were to be applied to submitted questions as well as to appeals, proponents of the "constitutional option" might be able to achieve their ends, because the rule would permit the Senate to reach a vote on the submitted question, and thereby allow a majority to settle it in a way that altered precedent. If the initial ruling remained consistent with existing practice by sustaining the point of order against the motion to proceed to a vote on the underlying matter, the Senate could not achieve consideration limits by tabling the appeal, but only by reversing the chair on appeal. Reaching this result would require an up-or-down vote on the appeal itself, and, as above, opponents of consideration limits could attempt to prevent this vote from occurring by filibuster. For example, if the chair submitted a point of order claiming constitutional warrant for limits on consideration of a judicial nomination, supporters of such limits might raise a nested point of order claiming that the chair should proceed to rule, in order to forestall a possible filibuster that could prevent the Senate from reaching a vote on the initial point of order. If a filibuster prevented the Senate from reaching a vote on this submitted point of order, supporters of the point of order might then raise a second point of order, claiming that this filibuster was unconstitutionally preventing the Senate from exercising either its "advice and consent" power or its authority to determine the meaning of its own rules. The presence of such a precedent might, in principle, enable a voting majority of the Senate to alter any procedure at will by raising a point of order and either securing a favorable ruling or being able to limit debate on the appeal or submitted question. Most prominently, supporters of change engaged in attempts to contest the entrenchment of Senate Rules by some form of appeal to the constitutional rulemaking power. Remarks in the Senate. | Senate procedure permits most matters to be decided by a simple majority of Senators voting (with a quorum present). Yet Senate procedure generally lacks means for a simple majority to limit consideration and proceed to a vote. As a result, Senate minorities can attempt to block proposals by preventing a vote from occurring, a practice known as filibustering. Filibuster opponents have long sought to institute rules permitting a voting majority to limit consideration, most recently, in relation to judicial nominations. The Senate has seldom been able to adopt such limits, however, because any such proposal is itself subject to filibuster. In addition, the Senate has held that its existing procedures remain continuously in effect, which prevents it from considering a change proposal under limits more stringent than those already in effect. In this way, the existing procedures that lack consideration limits tend to entrench themselves against their own change.
Advocates of majority consideration limits have often sought ways to assure the ability of the Senate to reach a vote on procedural changes. Inasmuch as such a course of action would break through the obstacles posed by existing procedures, it has been called a "nuclear option." A "nuclear option" would presumably either make novel use of existing procedures or engage in ones previously not recognized in Senate practice. The plan most often discussed has been to raise a point of order asserting that the Senate must be able to reach a vote on nominations (or procedural changes) in order to exercise effectively its constitutional "advice and consent" power (or rulemaking power). By sustaining such a point of order, the chair would establish precedent for limiting consideration of those matters. Opponents of the ruling could appeal, and could attempt to filibuster to prevent a vote on the appeal, but the Senate could confirm the ruling by adopting a nondebatable motion to table the appeal.
Under established procedure, however, only the Senate itself has authority to settle points of order in ways that alter precedent or interpret the Constitution. The chair is to follow precedent in ruling, and is to submit points of order raised under the Constitution, or where no precedent exists. If a point of order is submitted, however, or a ruling against a point of order is appealed, the point of order can be sustained only by vote, and the vote might be blocked by filibuster. Tabling the question in this situation would have the effect of affirming previous practice. Only certain additional limits on consideration of a point of order raised while another is pending might afford means of overcoming this difficulty.
Under most conditions, the Senate might be unable to reach a vote on a procedural question that would institute consideration limits, except by setting aside the principle that the chair adheres to precedent, or that the rules remain always in effect. Once these principles were set aside, however, it might become possible for any voting majority of the Senate to institute further procedural changes in other subsequent situations. In the past, both the Senate and the House have ultimately always declined to institute change by accepting standards that would permit this result. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43229 | crs_R43229_0 | Broad Scientific Agreement on Many Aspects of Climate Change1
Despite portrayals in popular media about controversies in climate change science, almost all climate scientists agree on certain important points:
The Earth's climate has warmed significantly and changed in other ways over the past century ( Figure 1 ). The enhanced levels of GHG in the atmosphere contributed to the observed global average warming in recent decades. Over other time and geographic scales, such factors as the Earth's orbit, solar variability, volcanoes, and land cover change have been stronger influences than human-related GHG. There is a wide range of projections of future human-induced climate change, with all pointing toward warming. Human-induced change will be superimposed on, and interact with, natural climate variability. Human societies and ecosystems are sensitive to climate. Some climate changes benefited civilizations; others contributed to some societies' demises. Researchers expect the balance of projected climate change impacts to be increasingly adverse for a widening scope of populations and ecosystems. As is common and constructive in science, scientists debate finer points. Some suggest that, if GHG emissions continue unabated, the resulting climate change would be small and possibly beneficial overall. Most climate modelers project changes that are significant to large, with small likelihoods of changes that could be catastrophic for some human societies and ecosystems in coming decades. Dealing with Uncertainties
Even the best science cannot provide absolute proof; it is fundamental to the scientific method that all theories are to some degree provisional and may be rejected or modified based on new evidence. Private and public decisions to act or not to act, to reduce the human contribution to climate change or to prepare for future changes, will be made in the context of accumulating evidence (or lack of evidence), accumulating GHG concentrations, ongoing debate about risks, and other considerations (e.g., economics and distributional effects). F orcings include the following:
Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gas (GHG) and other trace gas and aerosol . Amount and patterns of solar radiation reaching the Earth due to the Earth's orbit around the Sun, and the tilt and wobble of the Earth's axis, as well as solar variability ( Figure 2 ). Feedbacks
Once a change in the Earth's climate system is underway, responses within the system will amplify or dampen the initiated change. Improving understanding of ice dynamics is a high priority for scientific research to improve sea level rise projections. The U.S. | Though climate change science often is portrayed as controversial, broad scientific agreement exists on many points:
The Earth's climate is warming and changing. Human-related emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) and other pollutants have contributed to warming observed since the 1970s and, if continued, would tend to drive further warming, sea level rise, and other climate shifts. Volcanoes, the Earth's relationship to the Sun, solar cycles, and land cover change may be more influential on climate shifts than rising GHG concentrations on other time and geographic scales. Human-induced changes are super-imposed on and interact with natural climate variability. The largest uncertainties in climate projections surround feedbacks in the Earth system that augment or dampen the initial influence, or affect the pattern of changes. Feedback mechanisms are apparent in clouds, vegetation, oceans, and potential emissions from soils. There is a wide range of projections of future, human-induced climate change, all pointing toward warming and associated sea level rise, with wider uncertainties regarding the nature of precipitation, storms, and other important aspects of climate. Human societies and ecosystems are sensitive to climate. Some past climate changes benefited civilizations; others contributed to the demise of some societies. Small future changes may bring benefits for some and adverse effects to others. Large climate changes would be increasingly adverse for a widening scope of populations and ecosystems.
As is common and constructive in science, scientists debate finer points. For example, a large majority but not all scientists find compelling evidence that rising GHG have contributed the most influence on global warming since the 1970s, with solar radiation a smaller influence on that time scale. Most climate modelers project important impacts of unabated GHG emissions, with low likelihoods of catastrophic impacts over this century. Human influences on climate change would continue for centuries after atmospheric concentrations of GHG are stabilized, as the accumulated gases continue to exert effects and as the Earth's systems seek to equilibrate.
The U.S. government and others have invested billions of dollars in research to improve understanding of the Earth's climate system, resulting in major improvements in understanding while major uncertainties remain. However, it is fundamental to the scientific method that science does not provide absolute proofs; all scientific theories are to some degree provisional and may be rejected or modified based on new evidence. Private and public decisions to act or not to act, to reduce the human contribution to climate change or to prepare for future changes, will be made in the context of accumulating evidence (or lack of evidence), accumulating GHG concentrations, ongoing debate about risks, and other considerations (e.g., economics and distributional effects). |
crs_R44015 | crs_R44015_0 | In recent decades, the United States has entered into binding international investment agreements (IIAs) with foreign countries to facilitate investment flows, reduce restrictions on foreign investment, expand market access, and enhance investor protections, while balancing other policy interests. This report answers frequently asked questions about IIAs made between the United States and other countries. What are international investment agreements (IIAs)? For the United States, the primary forms of IIAs are bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and BIT-like investment chapters in regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). Are there multilateral rules on investment in the World Trade Organization (WTO)? Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). | In recent decades, the United States has entered into binding investment agreements with foreign countries to facilitate investment flows, reduce restrictions on foreign investment and expand market access, and enhance investor protections, while balancing other policy interests. Some World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements address investment issues in a limited manner. In the absence of a comprehensive multilateral agreement, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and investment chapters in free trade agreements (FTAs), known as international investment agreements (IIAs), have been the primary tools for promoting and protecting international investment.
This report answers frequently asked questions about U.S. IIAs including provisions for investor-state dispute settlement. |
crs_R41324 | crs_R41324_0 | Background
Signed into law on February 17, 2009, Section 6001(k) of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) mandated the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to prepare a report containing a national broadband plan. Broadband was also viewed as playing an increasingly critical role in addressing specific challenges facing the nation in areas such as health care, energy, education, public safety, and others. The ARRA specified that the national broadband plan "shall seek to ensure that all people of the United States have access to broadband capability and shall establish benchmarks for meeting that goal," and that the plan should include:
an analysis of the most effective and efficient mechanisms for ensuring broadband access by all people of the United States; a detailed strategy for achieving affordability of such service and maximum utilization of broadband infrastructure and service by the public; an evaluation of the status of deployment of broadband service, including progress of projects supported by the grants made pursuant to this section; and a plan for use of broadband infrastructure and services in advancing consumer welfare, civic participation, public safety and homeland security, community development, health care delivery, energy independence and efficiency, education, worker training, private sector investment, entrepreneurial activity, job creation and economic growth, and other national purposes. Overview of Plan3
The FCC's National Broadband Plan (NBP) is a 360-page document composed of 17 chapters containing 208 specific recommendations. Table 1 , at the end of this report, is an outline of the National Broadband Plan. In order to achieve this mission, the NBP recommends that the country set six goals for 2020:
Goal No. The NBP's recommendations are directed to the FCC, to the Executive Branch (both to individual agencies and to Administration as a whole), to Congress, and to nonfederal and nongovernmental entities. One of the major policy debates surrounding universal service policy is whether the universal service concept should embrace access to broadband as one of its policy objectives. The Connect America Fund (CAF) would be the major vehicle to ensure the universal availability of affordable broadband by addressing the gaps in broadband deployment and adoption. Spectrum Policies for Wireless Broadband53
Wireless broadband plays a key role in the deployment of broadband services. The NBP proposes to increase spectrum capacity by:
Making more spectrum licenses available for mobile broadband. These proposals are discussed below. Meeting Policy Goals
Each of the sections on national purposes has mentioned the existing legislative and regulatory framework and trends in the field that might benefit from better broadband access and services. The FCC's Authority to Implement the National Broadband Plan89
One potential issue the FCC may face in its attempts to implement the NBP is the scope of the agency's authority to regulate broadband Internet access and management. A major issue for Congress will be how to shape the Plan's various initiatives when and if they go forward, either through oversight, through consideration of specific legislation, or in the context of comprehensive telecommunications reform. A key challenge for Congressional policymakers will be to assess whether an appropriate balance is maintained between the public and private sectors, and the extent to which government intervention in the broadband marketplace would help or hinder private sector investment and competition. | On March 16, 2010, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan. Mandated by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5), the FCC's National Broadband Plan (NBP) is a 360-page document composed of 17 chapters containing 208 specific recommendations directed to the FCC, to the Executive Branch (both to individual agencies and to Administration as a whole), to Congress, and to nonfederal and nongovernmental entities. The ARRA specified that the NBP should "seek to ensure that all people of the United States have access to broadband capability."
The NBP identified significant gaps in broadband availability and adoption in the United States. In order to address these gaps and other challenges, the NBP set six specific goals to be achieved by the year 2020. These six goals are discussed further in this report, and an outline of the NBP is provided at the end of this report.
It is important to note that many aspects of telecommunications policies, regulations, and legal issues would be affected by the NBP. For example:
The Universal Service Fund (USF) is a fund that was created to provide universal availability and affordability of communications throughout the United States; the issue is whether or how the universal service concept should embrace access to broadband as one of its policy objectives. Because wireless broadband can play a key role in the deployment of broadband services, the NBP extensively addresses spectrum policy and the issue of how to make more spectrum available and usable for mobile broadband applications. Issues such as intercarrier compensation and set-top boxes are identified by the NBP as having potential significant impact on broadband availability and adoption. Broadband will likely play a role in addressing critical national challenges in areas such as health care, education, energy, environment, and public safety; the issue is how, for each national purpose, the existing legislative and regulatory framework and trends in the field might best benefit from better broadband access and services. Finally, one potential issue the FCC may face in its attempts to achieve NBP goals is the scope of the agency's authority to regulate broadband Internet access and management.
A major issue for Congress will be how to shape the Plan's various initiatives when and if they go forward, either through oversight, through consideration of specific legislation, or in the context of comprehensive telecommunications reform. A key challenge for Congressional policymakers will be to assess whether an appropriate balance is maintained between the public and private sectors, and the extent to which government intervention in the broadband marketplace would help or hinder private sector investment and competition. |
crs_R41209 | crs_R41209_0 | Introduction
On March 31, 2010, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a proposed policy letter on inherently governmental functions and other "work reserved for performance by federal government employees." Section 321 of NDAA'09 tasked OMB with (1) reviewing existing definitions of "inherently governmental function" to determine whether such definitions are "sufficiently focused" to ensure that only government personnel perform inherently governmental functions or "other critical functions necessary for the mission of a Federal department or agency;" (2) developing a "single consistent definition" of "inherently governmental function" that would address any deficiencies in the existing definitions, reasonably apply to all agencies, and ensure that agency personnel can identify positions that perform inherently governmental functions; (3) developing criteria for identifying "critical functions" that should be performed by government personnel; and (4) developing criteria for identifying positions that government personnel should perform in order to ensure that agencies develop and maintain "sufficient organic expertise and technical capacity" to perform their missions and oversee contractors' work. President Obama's March 4, 2009, memorandum similarly charged OMB with clarifying when outsourcing is "appropriate." The Office of Federal Procurement Policy has reportedly indicated that a final policy letter will be released "in early 2011." 111-8 , P.L. 111-84 , P.L. Proposed Policy Letter
While not final, the policy letter represents the Obama Administration's proposed guidance for agencies determining (1) whether particular functions are inherently governmental and (2) when functions closely associated with the performance of inherently governmental functions and critical functions should be performed by government personnel. Inherently Governmental Functions
In keeping with Section 321 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, which tasked OMB with developing a "single consistent definition" of "inherently governmental function," the proposed policy letter adopts the definition of "inherently governmental function" in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act. The FAIR Act defines an "inherently governmental function" as one that is "so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees." The proposed policy letter also reiterates existing statutory requirements that agencies give "special consideration" to using government personnel to perform functions closely associated with the performance of inherently governmental functions. Critical Functions
Because "critical function" is presently not defined for purposes of federal law, the proposed policy letter defines a "critical function" as one that is "necessary to the agency being able to effectively perform and maintain control of its mission and operations." Issues for Congress
Although it is not final, the policy letter raises several legal and policy issues of potential interest to Congress, given recently enacted and proposed legislation regarding inherently governmental functions and other limitations upon contracting out (e.g., P.L. 111-117 ). Key among these issues are (1) the relationship between the proposed policy letter and other executive branch authorities on inherently governmental and related functions; (2) whether the proposed policy letter would necessarily result in changes in agencies' use of contractors to perform certain functions that some Members of Congress and commentators claim are inherently governmental (e.g., security services during contingency operations); and (3) the potential demands of any new requirements upon the acquisition workforce. | On March 31, 2010, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a proposed policy letter on inherently governmental functions and other "work reserved for performance by federal government employees." While not final, the policy letter represents the Obama Administration's proposed guidance for agencies determining (1) whether particular functions are inherently governmental and (2) when functions closely associated with the performance of inherently governmental functions and critical functions should be performed by government personnel. Under existing law, agencies cannot contract out inherently governmental functions, and they must give "special consideration" to using government personnel in performing functions closely associated with the performance of inherently governmental functions. No limitations upon contracting out critical functions currently exist.
In keeping with the requirements of Section 321 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-417), which tasked OMB with developing a "single consistent definition" of "inherently governmental function," the proposed policy letter adopts the definition of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act. The FAIR Act defines an "inherently governmental function" as one that is "so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees." However, neither the proposed policy letter nor the notice from OFPP introducing it indicates whether or how the Obama Administration would amend the definitions of "inherently governmental function" in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, OMB Circular A-76, or other executive branch regulations and policy documents.
The proposed policy letter defines a "critical function" as one that is "necessary to the agency being able to effectively perform and maintain control of its mission and operations." This definition, and the accompanying guidance on when critical functions and functions associated with the performance of inherently governmental functions should be performed in-house, also respond to the requirements of Section 321 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act. Among other things, Section 321 tasked OMB with developing criteria that agencies could use in identifying critical functions and positions that should be performed by government personnel to ensure that agencies develop and maintain "sufficient organic expertise and technical capacity." President Obama's March 4, 2009, memorandum on government contracting similarly charged OMB with clarifying when outsourcing is "appropriate."
The proposed policy letter raises several legal and policy issues of potential interest to Congress, given recently enacted and proposed legislation regarding inherently governmental functions and other limitations upon contracting out (e.g., P.L. 111-8, P.L. 111-84, P.L. 111-117). Key among these issues are (1) the relationship between the proposed policy letter and other executive branch authorities on inherently governmental and related functions; (2) whether the proposed policy letter would necessarily result in changes in agencies' use of contractors to perform certain functions that some Members of Congress and commentators claim are inherently governmental (e.g., security services during contingency operations); and (3) the potential demands of any new requirements upon the acquisition workforce.
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy has reportedly indicated that a final policy letter will be released "in early 2011." |
crs_R41770 | crs_R41770_0 | A multitude of laws enacted over the past century authorize the lease or sale of federal lands and resources by federal agencies—the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the National Park Service (NPS), the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) in the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Forest Service (USFS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The receipts from selling or leasing federal lands and resources have been used for a wide variety of purposes, including funding general federal government activities and compensating state and local governments for the tax-exempt status of federal lands. This report presents information on the receipts from the sale and/or lease of federal lands and resources; it identifies the legislative authority for the sales or leases and the process by which fees are established. Many of these accounts have mandatory spending authority, allowing deposits to be spent without further appropriation by Congress. Others require annual appropriations by Congress to be spent. The report presents information on federal land sales, on the sale or lease of renewable resources, on the sale or lease of minerals, and on other resource sales or leases. Issues for Congress
Congress faces two general issues in legislation to create or reauthorize programs for the sale or lease of federal lands and resources: the price or fee to be charged, and how the receipts should be used. In authorizing land and resource sales and leases, Congress can choose how fees or prices are to be established. Some sales and leases are offered and bid competitively, and thus the price is a value determined by the market. However, some fees are intended to recover administrative costs, while others are intended to fund activities to restore lands and resources to pre-sale conditions. Other receipts are "reinvested" in federal land or resource management in some way. Also, some land disposal authorities (e.g., the General Mining Law) have other pricing provisions. FLTFA —96% of land sale receipts under FLTFA are permanently appropriated to a designated account for the Secretaries of the Interior and of Agriculture to use to acquire inholdings and adjacent nonfederal lands (or interests therein) with exceptional resources in the state where the receipts were generated; not more than 20% can be used for administrative expenses related to land disposal. Because the volume sold and the prices vary from year to year, annual receipts can fluctuate widely. Because of the USFS's two-step process for allocations to accounts (deposits to the National Forest Fund are re-allocated to other accounts), and because these other accounts have mandatory spending authority that is not limited by the deposits to the National Forest Fund, the total allocation of USFS timber sale receipts can exceed 100% of the actual receipts—up to 135%. The amount is determined for each sale. General Treasury —any remaining receipts are deposited in the Treasury. General Treasury —37.5% of receipts from TGA §3 lands are deposited in the Treasury. Since FY2008, under language in the Interior appropriation bills, 2% of the state's share (1.8% of receipts from leases in Alaska) is retained by the BLM to cover administrative costs of the leasing program. General Treasury —the remaining 10% of receipts is deposited in the Treasury. Bids —competitive bidding, roughly comparable to bonus bidding for other mineral leases, is used for lease sales, with leases awarded to the highest bidder. Special Land Use Permits , $14.8 million in FY2009—receipts intended to approximate fair market value are collected from special use permits for the use of national forest lands, such as for telecommunication sites and agricultural activities. | Many laws have been enacted over the past century authorizing the sale or lease of lands or resources by the federal land management agencies—the Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service (NPS), and Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Forest Service (USFS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The receipts from these leases and sales have been used for many purposes, including for local economic development, to recover some or all of the operating and capital costs, or to fund land management activities. In its legislative debates, Congress may consider how prices or fees should be set for the sale or use of federal lands and resources and whether and how the receipts from such sales or leases should be used to fund desired activities.
The various resources sold or leased generate substantial federal revenues—nearly $16 billion annually for FY2007-FY2009. Leases for oil and gas and other minerals have generated the vast majority of these receipts, averaging $10.3 billion from offshore leasing and $4.4 billion from onshore leasing, although the amounts fluctuate widely from year to year. Recreation ($253 million) and timber sales ($223 million) also generate significant receipts annually. Other resource sales and leases generate lesser amounts—hardrock mining ($60 million), BLM land sales ($35 million), geothermal leasing ($30 million), and grazing ($17 million). Various other programs (e.g., special use fees) generated nearly $500 million in FY2009.
The pricing mechanisms for the various land and resource sales and leases vary widely. For many leases and sales, the fees are determined administratively. This can be (1) to recover agency administrative costs, such as for hardrock mining and for mineral leasing permit fees; (2) to approximate a fair market value, such as for BLM land sales; or (3) to account for other factors established in law, such as for grazing and recreation. For some resource leases and sales, competitive bidding is used to establish prices for some resources, such as for timber and mineral leasing bonuses. In a few situations, prices are set in the legislative authorization for the lease or sale program. For mineral resources, multiple pricing mechanisms are used, often with a combination of administrative fees and competitive bids.
Many of the receipts can be spent without further appropriation by Congress; these accounts have mandatory spending authority. Other receipts are deposited in designated accounts or the General Treasury, and cannot be spent without an annual appropriation.
Many of the receipts are granted to state or local governments, generally as compensation for the tax-exempt status of federal lands and resources. The portion of receipts granted to state and local governments varies widely by the type of resource leased or sold and by the history of the lands, and ranges from 0% (for recreation) to 90% (for mineral leasing in Alaska). Other receipts are commonly deposited into designated accounts for particular agency activities, to recover the cost of administering the lease or sale program or to restore or enhance the affected lands and resources, with remaining receipts deposited in the General Treasury. For some sales or leases, the portion deposited in the General Treasury is fixed—for example, 10% of onshore lease receipts, 37.5% of grazing receipts from certain lands, and 0% for recreation. For others, however, the deposits to many of the accounts vary, often being determined on each lease or sale, and thus the remaining portion deposited in the General Treasury, if any, fluctuates. |
crs_RL31813 | crs_RL31813_0 | Most Recent Developments
On November 25, 2003, a House and Senate conference committee reported H.R. 2673 ( H.Rept. 108-401 ), the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2004. It combined sixappropriations bills that Congress was unable to complete before the close of the first session of the108th Congress, including H.R. The House agreed to the conferencereport on December 8, 2003, while the Senate postponed final consideration of the measure untilCongress reconvenes in January 2004. On November 18, 2003, the Senate passed its version of H.R.2765. 2765 recommended $466 million in special federalpayments, while the Senate and conference bills recommend $545 million. The conference version of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2004 includes special federal payments for several education initiatives, including $17 million for the District'sCollege Tuition Assistance Program, $13 million for a school voucher program, $13 million forpublic schools, $13 million for public charter schools, $4.5 million for public school facilities forplayground and window repair and replacement, 10.75 million appropriated to the CFO andearmarked for various education and related activities to be administered by organizations identifiedin the conference report, and $2 million for the Family Literacy Program, which would be match bythe District on a dollar for dollar basis. Budget Request
FY2004: The President's Budget Request
On February 3, 2003, the Bush Administration released its FY2004 budget recommendations. The Administration's proposed budget included $420.5 millionin federal payments to the District of Columbia. This included $166.5 million for the Court Services andOffender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia, an independent federalagency that has assumed management responsibility for the District's pretrialservices, adult probation, and parole supervision functions. In addition, theAdministration requested $163.8 million in support of court operations, and $32million for Defender Services. These three functions (court operations, defenderservices, and offender supervision) represent $362.3 million, or 86.3% of thePresident's proposed $420.5 million in federal payments to the District of Columbia(see Table 2 ). On July 9, 2003, the BushAdministration transmitted the city's budget to Congress for its review and approval.The city's proposed operating budget of $5.7 billion includes a $50 million cashreserve fund. On September 9, 2003, H.R. The bill included $17million for a college tuition assistance plan, $15 million for security planning, and$163.1 million for court services and offender supervision. 2765 alsoincluded $10 million in special federal payments for a school choice programdesigned to provide financial assistance to families of District school-age studentsattending private and parochial schools. The Senatebill also includes $40 million in special federal payments for elementary andsecondary education, including $13 million for a school choice program designed toprovide financial assistance to families of District school-age students attendingprivate and parochial schools. 2765 . 108-214 , S.Rept. 108-142 , H.Rept. 2673 , reflects the House position prohibiting the use of bothfederal and local funding for a needle exchange program, but allowing the use ofprivate funds. The District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2002, P.L. The House, Senate, and conference bills would continue to restrict the use of District and federal funds for abortion services except in cases of rape or incest, orwhen the life of the mother is endangered. School Voucher Program. (21)
On July 17, 2003, House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. | On February 3, 2003, the Bush Administration released its FY2004 budget recommendations. The Administration's proposed budget included $420.5 million in federal payments to the Districtof Columbia. This includes $166.5 million for the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agencyfor the District of Columbia, an independent federal agency that has assumed managementresponsibility for the District's pretrial services, adult probation, and parole supervision functions. In addition, the Administration requested $163.8 million in support of court operations, and $32million for Defender Services. These three functions represent 86.3% of the President's proposed$420.5 million in federal payments to the District of Columbia.
On July 9, 2003, the Bush Administration transmitted the city's $5.7 billion proposed operating budget to Congress for its review and approval. In addition, the District requested $916 million inspecial federal payments, including $159 million for emergency preparedness assistance and $75million for public safety.
On July 17, 2003, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 2765 , the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2004 ( H.Rept. 108-214 ). On September 9, 2003,the House approved H.R. 2765. The House bill recommended $466 million in specialfederal payments for the District of Columbia. The bill includes $17 million for a college tuitionassistance plan, $15 million for security planning, and $163.1 million for court services and offendersupervision. H.R. 2765 also includes $10 million in special federal payments for a schoolchoice program designed to provide financial assistance to families of District school-age studentsattending private and parochial schools.
On November 18, 2003, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 2765 ( S.Rept. 108-142 ). As passed, the bill recommended an appropriation of $545 million in special federalpayments to the District. This includes $17 million for a college tuition assistance program; $15million for emergency planning and security; and $377.5 million in court and criminal justice-relatedassistance. The bill also includes $40 million for public education, charter schools, and schoolvouchers, including $13 million for a school voucher program.
On November 25, 2003, a House and Senate conference committee reported H.R. 2673 ( H.Rept. 108-401 ), the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2004, which combined sixappropriations bills -- including the FY2004 District of Columbia Appropriations Act -- thatCongress was unable to complete before the close of the first session of the 108th Congress. TheHouse agreed to the conference report on December 8, 2003, while the Senate postponed finalconsideration of the measure until Congress reconvenes in January 2004. The conference billincludes $13 million for a school voucher program, and would continue to allow the District to useits local funds to administer a domestic partners health insurance act, prohibit the use of District orfederal funds to prepare a medical marijuana ballot initiative, and restrict the use of federal orDistrict funds for a needle exchange program and for abortion services, except in instances of rapeor incest or a threat to the mother's health. This report will be updated as warranted.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: DSP = Domestic Social Policy Division; G&F = Government and Finance Division. |
crs_RL32716 | crs_RL32716_0 | Introduction
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA—20 U.S.C. President Bush signed the bill on December 3, 2004 ( P.L. 108-446 —The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004). 108-446 went into effect on July 1, 2005 . Additional legislative action could result in connection with consideration of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). It is generally assumed that the 110 th Congress will actively consider legislation to amend and extend the ESEA. (The ESEA is authorized through FY2008.) This report details the changes made by P.L. 108-446 links its definition to the definition of "highly qualified" in Section 9101(23) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) but modifies that definition as it applies to special education teachers. Special education teachers who have emergency, temporary, or provisional certification do not meet the IDEA definition. 108-446 aims to address these high costs by permitting states to reserve 10% of the funds reserved for other state activities (or 1 to 1.05% of the overall state grant) to establish and maintain a risk pool to assist local education agencies (LEAs) serving high-need children with disabilities. These requirements provide for state guarantees of some of the central provisions of IDEA. 108-446 makes significant changes to some state eligibility requirements: most notably those regarding children enrolled by their parents in private schools, personnel qualifications, performance goals and indicators, and participation in assessments. This consultation is to include
the child find process and how parentally placed private school children with disabilities can participate equitably; the determination of the proportionate amount of federal funds available to serve parentally placed private school children with disabilities, including how that amount was calculated; the consultation process among the LEA, private school officials and representatives of parents of parentally placed private school children with disabilities, including how the process will operate; how, where, and by whom special education and related services will be provided for parentally placed private school children with disabilities, including a discussion of the types of services, including direct services and alternate service delivery mechanisms, how the services will be apportioned if there are insufficient funds to serve all children and how and when these decisions will be made; and how the LEA shall provide a written explanation to private school officials of the reasons why the LEA chose not to provide services if the LEA and private school officials disagree (§612(a)(10)(A)(iii)). Early Intervening Services
P.L. The following is a brief discussion of the major changes made in §615 by the new law. Two more significant changes are made, however. Resolution Session
A new provision for a "resolution session" is added as a requirement prior to a due process hearing. The 2004 reauthorization adds another situation to the school personnel's authority: where a child has inflicted serious bodily injury upon another person while at school, on school premises, or at a school function (§615(k)(1)(G)). Generally, Congress determined that the previous law on monitoring focused too much on compliance with procedures and in the 2004 reauthorization, shifted the emphasis to focus on student performance. Currently all states qualify for and receive IDEA preschool grants. addition to the requirements for the state application requiring policies and procedures for referral for services for infants and toddlers "involved in a substantiated case of child abuse" or "affected by illegal substance abuse, or withdrawal symptoms resulting from prenatal drug exposure" (§637(a)(6)) and requiring state cooperation with Early Head Start programs and other child care and early education programs (§637(a)(10)); expansion of the requirement for an interagency agreement between the Part C lead agency and other relevant public agencies to ensure financing and provision of Part C services (§640(b)); elimination of the Federal Interagency Coordinating Council ( P.L. to establish the National Center for Special Education Research. | The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is the main federal program authorizing state and local aid for special education and related services for children with disabilities. On December 3, 2004, President Bush signed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (P.L. 108-446), a major reauthorization and revision of IDEA. The new law preserves the basic structure and civil rights guarantees of IDEA but also makes significant changes in the law. Most provisions of P.L. 108-446 went into effect on July 1, 2005. This report details the changes made by P.L. 108-446, which include the following:
An extensive definition of "highly qualified" special education teachers and requirement that all special education teachers be highly qualified. Provisions aimed at reducing paperwork and other non-educational activities (for example, a paperwork reduction pilot program). Authorization for states to use IDEA funds to establish and maintain "risk pools" to aid local educational agencies (LEAs) that provide high-cost IDEA services. Modifications to requirements for parents who unilaterally place their children with disabilities in private schools to help ensure equal treatment and participation for such children. Revised state performance goals and requirements for children's participation in state and local assessments to align these requirements with those in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). Authority for LEAs to use some of their local IDEA grant for "early intervening services" aimed at reducing or eliminating the future need for special education for children with educational needs who do not currently qualify for IDEA. Significant changes to procedural safeguards, including the addition of a resolution session prior to a due process hearing to encourage the parties to resolve their dispute, revised test regarding the manifestation determination, and addition of a new category—where a child has inflicted serious bodily injury on another person—to the school's ability to place a child with a disability in an interim alternative educational setting. Major changes in compliance monitoring to focus on student performance, not compliance with procedures. Authority to extend Part C services for infant and toddler services beyond the age of two.
This report will be updated to reflect legislative action. That action could result in connection with consideration of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), which is authorized through FY2008. It is generally assumed that the 110th Congress will actively consider legislation to amend and extend the ESEA. |
crs_R44334 | crs_R44334_0 | Introduction
Congress's role and operation in national politics is fundamentally shaped by the design and structure of the governing institutions in the Constitution. One of the key principles of the Constitution is separation of powers. The doctrine is rooted in a political philosophy that aims to keep power from consolidating in any single person or entity, and a key goal of the framers of the Constitution was to establish a governing system that diffused and divided power. These objectives were achieved institutionally through the constitutional separation of powers. The legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government were assigned distinct and limited roles under the Constitution, and required to be comprised of different political actors. The constitutional structure does not, however, insulate the branches from each other. This report provides an overview of separation of powers. It first reviews the philosophical and political origins of the doctrine. Then it surveys the structure of separation of power in the Constitution. Finally, there is a discussion of separation of powers in the context of contemporary politics. Conflict by Design
The constitutional structure of separation of powers invites conflict between the branches, particularly between Congress and the President. The electoral structure of the federal government provides not only separate bases of authority, but also different bases of authority for political actors, as well as different time horizons. Likewise, the assignment of powers under the Constitution is not only overlapping, but also somewhat vague, creating inter-branch contests for power across many key functions of the government. Finally, numerous questions of authority are not even addressed by the Constitution. Although each branch has strong incentives to protect its prerogatives, in many cases individual political actors have incentives that run counter to their institutional affiliation. In particular, political actors will often, quite reasonably, place the short-term achievement of substantive policy goals ahead of the long-term preservation of institutional power for their branch of government. Likewise, partisan or ideological affiliations will place political actors at cross purposes, where they will be forced to choose between those affiliations and their branch affiliation. Such anti-branch incentives are important contours to consider for political actors seeking to increase the power of their own branch. While the design of the Constitution aims to prevent the centralization of power through separation, it also seeks the same objective through diffusion. Thus, most powers granted under the Constitution are not unilateral for any one branch; instead they overlap. This section discusses three broad consequences of the separation of powers: the inevitability of conflict in the American political system; the desire of each of the branches, in aggregate, to increase its relative institutional power; and the cross-pressures faced by individual political actors as they balance the accumulation and maintenance of power for their institution with policy or other goals that are often at cross purpose with such accumulation. A Particularly Congressional Problem
The problem of institutional power coming into conflict with other goals is particularly acute for Congress, especially in relation to the executive branch. As individual members of a large body, Representatives and Senators may not believe they have the responsibility or the capacity to defend the institution. Those who may feel such responsibility, such as party and chamber leaders, will often find themselves in situations in which policy or party goals, either their own personal ones or those of their caucus, come into direct conflict with institutional goals. Even when Congress does choose to institutionally defend itself, it often finds itself speaking with less than a unified voice, as only the most vital institutional powers have the ability to unanimously unify Congress. | Congress's role and operation in national politics is fundamentally shaped by the design and structure of the governing institution in the Constitution. One of the key principles of the Constitution is separation of powers. The doctrine is rooted in a political philosophy that aims to keep power from consolidating in any single person or entity, and a key goal of the framers of the Constitution was to establish a governing system that diffused and divided power. These objectives were achieved institutionally through the design of the Constitution. The legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government were assigned distinct and limited roles under the Constitution, and required to be comprised of different political actors. The constitutional structure does not, however, insulate the branches from each other. While the design of the Constitution aims, through separation, to prevent the centralization of power, it also seeks the same objective through diffusion. Thus, most powers granted under the Constitution are not unilateral for any one branch; instead they overlap.
The constitutional structure of separation of powers invites conflict between the branches, particularly between Congress and the President. The electoral structure of the federal government provides not only separate bases of authority, but also different bases of authority for political actors, as well as different time horizons. Likewise, the assignment of powers under the Constitution is not only overlapping, but also somewhat vague, creating inter-branch contests for power across many key functions of the government. Finally, numerous questions of authority are not even addressed by the Constitution.
Although each branch has strong incentives to protect its prerogatives, in many cases individual political actors have incentives that run counter to their institutional affiliation. In particular, political actors will often, quite reasonably, place the short-term achievement of substantive policy goals ahead of the long-term preservation of institutional power for their branch of government. Likewise, partisan or ideological affiliations will at times place political actors at cross purposes, where they will be forced to choose between those affiliations and their branch affiliation. Such anti-branch incentives are important contours to consider for political actors seeking to increase the power of their own branch.
The problem of institutional power coming into conflict with other goals is particularly acute for Congress, especially in relation to the executive branch. As individual members of a large body, Representatives and Senators may not believe they have the responsibility or the capacity to defend the institution. Those who may feel such responsibility, such as party and chamber leaders, will often find themselves in situations in which policy or party goals, either their own personal ones or those of their caucus, come into direct conflict with institutional goals. Even when Congress does choose to institutionally defend itself, it often finds itself speaking with less than a unified voice, as only the most vital institutional powers have the ability to unify Congress.
This report provides an overview of separation of powers. It first reviews the philosophical and political origins of the doctrine. Then it surveys the structure of separation of power in the Constitution. It next discusses the consequences of the system, for both the institutions and for individual political actors. Finally, there is a discussion of separation of powers in the context of contemporary politics. |
crs_R41848 | crs_R41848_0 | Intelligence is valuable only if it can be shared with consumers who need it, but, to the extent that it is more widely shared, risks of compromise are enhanced. The current Director of National Intelligence (DNI), James R. Clapper, has referred to the need to find the "sweet spot" between sharing and protecting information. Better information sharing throughout the Federal Government and especially among the agencies of the Intelligence Community has become a priority for both the Executive Branch and Congress. In the aftermath of 9/11, major legislation included significant provisions to encourage and, in some cases, mandate greater sharing of information and these provisions have been implemented by both the Bush and Obama Administrations. Changes Undertaken in Response to 9/11
Investigations of the September 11, 2001 attacks by the two congressional intelligence committees and the 9/11 Commission (the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States) concluded that a central obstacle to acquiring advance information on the plot was the inability to bring together all information that had been acquired about the plotters—there were many clues but they were retained in the files of different agencies. As the Bush Administration's 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing stated:
Information acquired for one purpose, or under one set of authorities, might provide unique insights when combined, in accordance with applicable law, with seemingly unrelated information from other sources, and therefore we must foster a culture of awareness in which people at all levels of government remain cognizant of the functions and needs of others and use knowledge and information from all sources to support counterterrorism efforts. Further, the DNI shall:
(A) establish uniform security standards and procedures;
(B) establish common information technology standards; protocols, and interfaces;
(C) ensure development of information technology systems that include multi-level security and intelligence integration capabilities;
(D) establish policies and procedures to resolve conflicts between the need to share intelligence information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods;
(E) develop an enterprise architecture for the intelligence community and ensure that elements of the intelligence community comply with such architecture; and
(F) have procurement approval authority over all enterprise architecture-related information technology items funded in the National Intelligence Program. The Information Sharing Environment
The President was also directed by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act to establish an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) to facilitate the sharing of information relating to terrorism among all Federal agencies and state, local and tribal entities. At the same time there are efforts to better protect the security of shared information. The FY2011 Intelligence Authorization bill, H.R. Most recently, the successful attack on Osama Bin Laden in May 2011 has been officially credited to cooperation among the CIA, NSA, and NGA in particular. An investigation by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee concluded. One U.S. soldier in Iraq was reportedly able to download many thousands of State Department cables and transfer them to unauthorized recipients who published them on the Internet and in a number of newspapers. Most of the messages disseminated to the media were not from intelligence agencies and damage to U.S. intelligence efforts has not been publicly addressed. The WikiLeaks incident reflects a number of concerns that affect intelligence information sharing. Mass leaks of documents that reveal the names of U.S. contacts in foreign countries and foreign governments, including their intelligence services could result in severe repercussions and even death for individuals who have attempted to assist the U.S. Congress may choose to determine if these reports are accurate and if changes currently being planned by the Intelligence Community have been instituted. There is, in short, an active market for classified information held by U.S. intelligence agencies with thousands of officials having some access. | Unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence are seen as doing significant damage to U.S. security. This is the case whether information is disclosed to a foreign government or published on the Internet. On the other hand, if intelligence is not made available to government officials who need it to do their jobs, enormous expenditures on collection, analysis, and dissemination are wasted. These conflicting concerns require careful and difficult balancing.
Investigations of the 9/11 attacks concluded that both technical and policy barriers had limited sharing of information collected by different agencies that, if viewed together, could have provided useful insight into the unfolding plot. A consensus emerged that U.S. intelligence agencies should share information more widely in order that analysts could integrate clues acquired by different agencies in order to "connect the dots."
Major statutory and regulatory changes were made to facilitate information sharing among agencies. An Information Sharing Environment was created within the new Office of the Director of National Intelligence in order to establish policies, procedures, and technologies to link people, systems, and information from government agencies. In law and in Federal regulations a culture of sharing has been established in the Intelligence Community.
Although government officials maintain that policies designed in recent years to increase sharing have helped prevent a number of serious terrorist attacks and contributed significantly to the May 2, 2011 operation against Osama bin Laden, the results have been uneven and, in some cases, unfortunate. Reviews of the Fort Hood shooting in 2009 and the attempted bombing of a commercial airliner the following Christmas revealed that serious obstacles to information sharing had not been completely overcome. At the same time, wide availability of State Department cables provided the opportunity for massive leaks of classified documents (including some intelligence materials) through the WikiLeaks website and cooperating media.
Despite these developments, support for information sharing among intelligence agencies remains strong within both the executive branch and Congress. Intelligence Community representatives have recently described new technologies and procedures to enhance information security including capabilities to determine who has had access to particular reports. Members of Congress included legislative initiatives to accomplish similar goals in FY2011 intelligence authorization legislation (H.R. 754) that has passed both the House and Senate. The challenge remains, how to manage inherent risks to find the "sweet spot" (the term used by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper) between information security and information sharing.
This report focuses on information acquired, analyzed, and disseminated by agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community, but these concerns also affect classified information outside the Intelligence Community. Efforts to encourage and regulate sharing between Federal agencies and state, local, and tribal agencies are also important and they are directly addressed in CRS Report R40901, Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and CRS Report R40602, The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. Further background can be found in CRS Report RL34177, A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and John Rollins. |
crs_R41908 | crs_R41908_0 | Most Recent Developments
President Obama's FY2012 budget request for Energy and Water Development was released in February 2011, but Congress was concerned for the first months of the year with completing the appropriations cycle for FY2011. 112-10 , was signed by the President April 15, 2011. On June 2, 2011, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development approved a bill that would have appropriated $30.634 billion for these programs, compared to the $36.505 billion in the President's request. The full House Appropriations Committee voted the bill out June 15 ( H.R. 2354 ). After considering numerous amendments and adopting 32, the House passed the bill July 15 by a vote of 219-196. On September 7 the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out its version of H.R. 2354 ( S.Rept. On October 4 the House agreed to a Senate-passed version of H.R. 2608 , the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, funding government programs at the FY2011 level through November 18. The bill earlier had emergency funding for the Corps and the Federal Energy Management Administration (FEMA), but that was deleted when agreement could not be reached over whether funding should be offset. After several more short-term continuing resolutions, the House on December 16 and Senate on December 17 passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( H.R. 2055 , P.L. 112-74 ), including $32.010 billion for Energy and Water Development Programs in Division B. Emergency funding of $1.724 billion for the Corps was included, without offsets, in a stand-alone bill ( H.R. 112-77 ) that passed on the same days. Overview
The Energy and Water Development bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). For the Department of Energy, P.L. The House-passed bill included $1.029 billion in emergency supplemental funding to the Corps for flood fighting activities. The issue of offsetting emergency appropriations with cuts in other programs caused intense debate over passage of a continuing resolution ( H.R. In addition to funding for Corps activities through Energy and Water Development appropriations, federal activities in the Everglades are also funded through Department of the Interior appropriations bills. It specifically included no funds for the proposed Race to the Green grant program. For FY2012, the Administration requested $121.7 million. The FY2011 Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act ( P.L. No funding for Yucca Mountain licensing was included in the Senate Appropriations Committee bill or in the final bill. | The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies.
President Obama's FY2012 budget request for Energy and Water Development was released in February 2011, but the Congress was concerned for the first months of the year with completing the appropriations cycle for FY2011. As with other funding bills, the FY2011 Energy and Water Development bill was not taken to the floor in either the House or the Senate in the 111th Congress. Funding for its programs was included in a series of continuing resolutions, and at the beginning of the 112th Congress was part of a major debate over overall spending levels. Energy and Water Development programs were included in the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-10) that became law April 15, 2011.
For FY2012 the level of overall spending was a major issue. In addition, issues specific to Energy and Water Development programs included:
the proposal to offset additional emergency supplemental funding for the Corps, for flood-related expenditures in the Midwest and elsewhere, with cuts in other programs; the distribution of appropriations for Corps (Title I) and Reclamation (Title II) projects that have historically received congressional appropriations above Administration requests; alternatives to the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, which the Administration has abandoned (Title III: Nuclear Waste Disposal); and large differences in funding proposals for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) programs (Title III).
On June 2, 2011, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development approved a FY2012 bill that would appropriate $30.6 billion for these programs, compared to the Administration's request of $36.5 billion. The full Appropriations Committee voted out the bill (H.R. 2354) June 15. The bill passed the House July 15 by a vote of 219-196. On September 7 the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out its version of H.R. 2354 (S.Rept. 112-75).
On October 4 the House agreed to a Senate-passed version of H.R. 2608, the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, funding government programs at the FY2011 level through November 18. The bill earlier had emergency funding for the Corps and for the Federal Energy Management Administration (FEMA), but that was deleted when agreement could not be reached over whether funding should be offset.
After several more short-term continuing resolutions, the House on December 16 and Senate on December 17 passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (H.R. 2055, P.L. 112-74), including Energy and Water Development Programs in Division B. Emergency funding for the Corps was included, without offsets, in a stand-alone bill (H.R. 3672, P.L. 112-77) that passed on the same days. |
crs_RS22537 | crs_RS22537_0 | Government Estimates of Iraqi Civilian Deaths
The Department of Defense (DOD) has not released a composite estimate of Iraqi civilian deaths during Operation Iraqi Freedom. For some time, the United Nations has attempted to release comprehensive statistics on Iraqi civilian deaths. Other Estimates of Iraqi Civilian Deaths
Table 1 , below, provides Iraqi civilian dead and wounded estimates from non-governmental sources. These estimates are based on varying time periods and have been created using differing methodologies, and therefore readers should exercise caution when using these statistics. | This report presents various governmental and non-governmental estimates of Iraqi civilian deaths. The Department of Defense (DOD) regularly updates total U.S. military deaths statistics from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as reflected in CRS Report RS21578, Iraq: U.S. Casualties, by [author name scrubbed]. However, no Iraqi or U.S. government office regularly releases publically available statistics on Iraqi civilian deaths. Statistics on Iraqi civilian deaths are sometimes available through alternative sources, such as nonprofit organizations, or through statements made by officials to the press. Because these estimates are based on varying time periods and have been created using differing methodologies, readers should exercise caution when using these statistics and should look on them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact. See also CRS Report RS22532, Iraqi Police and Security Forces Casualties Estimates, by [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R41074 | crs_R41074_0 | T he Office of the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) is responsible "for the operations and care of more than 18.4 million square feet of facilities, 570 acres of grounds and thousands of works of art." The Architect is appointed for a 10-year term and may be reappointed. The nomination was referred to the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, which held a hearing on April 15, 2010. The Senators in attendance at the hearing praised Mr. Ayers and congratulated him on the nomination. Mr. Ayers was confirmed by voice vote in the Senate on May 12, 2010. Mr. Ayers announced his intention to retire on November 23, 2018. Upon his retirement, Christine Merdon, the Deputy Architect of the Capitol/Chief Operating Officer, became the Acting Architect of the Capitol. For additional information and a comparison of appointments in the legislative branch, see CRS Report R42072, Legislative Branch Agency Appointments: History, Processes, and Recent Actions , by Ida A. Brudnick. The commission originally consisted of 10 Members (including the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, the majority and minority leaders o f the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the chairs and the ranking minority members of the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate). In considering the FY1990 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, the Senate Appropriations Committee proposed revising the process by having the President nominate the Architect for a 10-year term, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Increasing Congressional Involvement in the Architect Appointment: Discussion Prior to the 1989 Act
Prior to 1989, the Architect was selected by the President for an unlimited term without any formal involvement of Congress. These questions generally relate to whether the AOC's nonlegislative functions—including facility responsibilities for the Supreme Court and the Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building and membership on several nonlegislative governing or advisory bodies —make the Architect an "Officer of the United States" such that his or her appointment cannot be made by Congress consistent with the requirements of the Appointments Clause (Clause) of the Constitution. 2843 , as reported, the Architect would be appointed jointly by the same 14-member panel that currently is responsible for recommending candidates to the President. Declining to seek reappointment, Mr. Hantman retired on February 4, 2007, and Stephen T. Ayers, then-Deputy Architect, began service as the Acting Architect of the Capitol. | According to its website, the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) is responsible "for the operations and care of more than 18.4 million square feet of facilities, 570 acres of grounds and thousands of works of art."
Pursuant to the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1990, the Architect is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Prior to the enactment of this law, the President appointed the Architect for an unlimited term with no formal role for Congress.
The act also established a 10-year term for the Architect as well as a bicameral, bipartisan congressional commission to recommend candidates to the President. As subsequently amended in 1995, this law provides for a commission consisting of 14 Members of Congress, including the Speaker of the House, the President pro tempore of the Senate, the House and Senate majority and minority leaders, and the chair and ranking minority members of the Committee on House Administration, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, and the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. An Architect may be reappointed.
Alan M. Hantman was the first Architect appointed under the revised appointment procedure. He declined to seek reappointment and served from January 30, 1997, to February 4, 2007.
Stephen T. Ayers, who served as Acting Architect of the Capitol following Mr. Hantman's retirement, was nominated by President Obama on February 24, 2010, for a 10-year term. The nomination was referred to the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. The committee held a hearing on April 15, 2010, during which the chair and ranking member praised Mr. Ayers for his work as acting Architect and congratulated him on the nomination. Mr. Ayers was confirmed by voice vote in the Senate on May 12, 2010.
Upon the retirement of Mr. Ayers on November 23, 2018, Christine Merdon, the Deputy Architect of the Capitol/Chief Operating Officer, became the Acting Architect of the Capitol.
Since at least the 1950s, multiple bills have been introduced that would alter the AOC appointment process and require the appointment to be made by the leadership of Congress rather than the President. Some of the Architect's current duties, however, may potentially raise a question as to whether the Architect is an "Officer of the United States" such that his or her appointment must comply with the requirements of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.
For additional information and a comparison of appointments in the legislative branch, see CRS Report R42072, Legislative Branch Agency Appointments: History, Processes, and Recent Actions, by Ida A. Brudnick. |
crs_R44278 | crs_R44278_0 | Overview
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) among 12 Asia-Pacific countries, which the Obama Administration casts as comprehensive and high standard, with economic and strategic significance for the United States. The 12 countries (including the United States) announced the conclusion of the TPP negotiations and released the text of the agreement in late 2015. Trade ministers from the TPP countries signed the final agreement text on February 4, 2016, but Congress would need to pass implementing legislation for the agreement to enter into force for the United States. It would be eligible to receive expedited legislative consideration under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), P.L. 114-26 , if Congress determines the Administration has advanced the TPA negotiating objectives, and has met various notification and consultation requirements. Through the TPP, the participating countries seek to liberalize trade and investment and establish new rules and disciplines in the region beyond those that already exist in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The FTA is envisioned as a living agreement open to future members and new issues and may become a vehicle to advance a wider Asia-Pacific free trade area. It is also a U.S. policy response to the rapidly increasing economic and strategic linkages among Asian-Pacific nations and has become the economic centerpiece of the Administration's "rebalance" toward the region. The United States has existing FTAs with 6 of the countries participating in the TPP. Views on the likely impact of the agreement vary. Proponents argue that the TPP will boost economic growth and jobs through expanded trade and investment with countries currently accounting for 37% of total U.S. trade, and deepen U.S. trade and investment integration in what many see as the region with the world's greatest economic opportunities. Proponents also argue the agreement allows the United States to "write the rules" of trade and investment in the region, including new disciplines on issues such as digital trade barriers, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and regulatory coherence, and to show its strategic engagement and economic leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. Opponents voice concerns over possible job losses and competition in import-sensitive industries. They also raise concerns that the proposed TPP will limit the U.S. government's ability to regulate in areas such as health, food safety, and the environment. On both measures, the TPP appears significant given that it would be the largest U.S. FTA by trade flows ($905 billion in U.S. goods and services exports and $980 billion in imports in 2014), and would eventually eliminate all tariffs on manufactured products and most agricultural goods. Japan's entry into the negotiations increased the potential economic significance of the agreement. Among U.S. negotiating partners in the TPP, Japan is the largest economy and trading partner without an existing U.S. FTA (thus having greater scope for trade liberalization with the United States). Malaysia and Vietnam also stand out among the TPP countries without existing U.S. FTAs, given the rapid growth in U.S. trade with the two nations over the past three decades, and the potential for future growth. Both nations also have a substantial presence of SOEs in their economies, which may be affected by TPP outcomes among other trade barriers of potential interest to the United States. The Obama Administration has argued that the strategic value of a potential TPP agreement parallels its economic value, contending that the agreement would strengthen U.S. allies and partners and reaffirm U.S. economic leadership in the region. The President has repeatedly highlighted the importance of maintaining U.S. leadership in crafting global trade rules, notably with reference to potentially alternative Chinese initiatives. Provisions. Disciplines . | The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) among 12 Asia-Pacific countries, with both economic and strategic significance for the United States. If approved, it would be the largest FTA in which the United States participates. The 12 countries announced the conclusion of the TPP negotiations and released the text of the agreement in late 2015, after several years of ongoing talks. Trade ministers from the TPP countries signed the final agreement on February 4, 2016, but Congress would need to pass implementing legislation for the agreement to enter into force for the United States. Such legislation would be eligible to receive expedited legislative consideration under the recent grant of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), P.L. 114-26, if Congress determines the Administration has advanced the TPA negotiating objectives, and met various notification and consultation requirements. TPP negotiating parties include Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam.
Through the TPP, the participating countries seek to liberalize trade and investment and establish new rules and disciplines in the region beyond what exists in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The FTA is envisioned as a living agreement that will be open to future members and may become a vehicle to advance a wider Asia-Pacific free trade area. It is a U.S. policy response to the rapidly increasing economic and strategic linkages among Asian-Pacific nations and has become the economic centerpiece of the Administration's "rebalance" to the region. The TPP has slowly evolved from a more limited agreement among four countries concluded in 2006 into the current 12-country FTA agreement, with the United States joining the negotiations in 2008. Japan, the most recent country to participate, joined the negotiations in 2013. This significantly increased the potential economic significance of the agreement to the United States, because Japan is the largest economy and trading partner without an existing U.S. FTA among TPP negotiating partners (thus having greater scope for trade liberalization with the United States). The United States already has FTAs with 6 of the 11 other countries participating. Malaysia and Vietnam also stand out among the TPP countries without existing U.S. FTAs, given the rapid growth in U.S. trade with the two nations over the past three decades and substantial presence of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that will be affected by the TPP's SOE provisions.
Views on the potential impact of the agreement vary. Proponents argue that the TPP has the opportunity to boost economic growth and jobs through expanded trade and investment opportunities with negotiating partners that currently make up 37% of total U.S. goods and services trade, involves writing new trade rules and disciplines, and could deepen U.S. trade and investment integration in what many see as the world's most economically vibrant region. The agreement would eventually eliminate all tariffs on manufactured products and most agricultural goods. It also includes new trade disciplines on issues such as digital trade barriers, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and regulatory coherence, among other provisions. Opponents voice concerns over potential job loss and competition in import-sensitive industries, and how a TPP agreement might limit U.S. ability to regulate in areas such as health, food safety, and the environment, among other concerns.
The Obama Administration, joined by many analysts as well as many policymakers in the region, has argued that the strategic value of a potential TPP agreement parallels its economic value, contending that the agreement would strengthen U.S. allies and partners and reaffirm U.S. economic leadership in the region. The President has repeatedly highlighted the importance of maintaining U.S. leadership in crafting global trade rules, notably with reference to potentially alternative Chinese initiatives. China is not a party to the TPP. Others argue that past trade pacts have had a limited impact on broad foreign policy dynamics. |
crs_RS21767 | crs_RS21767_0 | Introduction
NASA launched the Hubble Space Telescope in 1990 aboard the space shuttle Discovery . Following the space shuttle Columbia accident in February 2003, however, then-NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe decided not to proceed with either flight. A servicing mission is now scheduled for October 8, 2008. (See CRS Report RS21720, Space Exploration: Issues Concerning the " Vision for Space Exploration " . ) Although Mr. O'Keefe stated that the Hubble decision was based primarily on shuttle safety concerns, the timing of his announcement led many commentators to conclude that it was linked to the priority shifts required by the President's initiative. Shuttle Servicing Revisited
Dr. Michael Griffin was sworn in as NASA Administrator, replacing Mr. O'Keefe, on April 14, 2005. At his Senate confirmation hearing on April 12, 2005, Dr. Griffin stated that he would revisit the question of whether to use the shuttle to service Hubble after the second successful post- Columbia shuttle flight, at which time NASA would be able to assess the risk factors associated with "essentially a new vehicle". The second post- Columbia flight took place successfully in July 2006. In October 2006, NASA announced that a Hubble servicing mission will indeed take place. | The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) estimates that without a servicing mission to replace key components, the Hubble Space Telescope will cease scientific operations in 2008. In January 2004, then-NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe announced that the space shuttle would no longer be used to service Hubble. He indicated that this decision was based primarily on safety concerns in the wake of the space shuttle Columbia accident in 2003. Many critics, however, saw it as the result of the new Vision for Space Exploration, announced by President Bush in January 2004, which focuses NASA's priorities on human and robotic exploration of the solar system. Hubble supporters sought to reverse the decision and proceed with a shuttle servicing mission. Michael Griffin, who became NASA Administrator in April 2005, stated that he would reassess whether to use the shuttle to service Hubble after there were two successful post-Columbia shuttle flights. The second post-Columbia flight took place successfully in July 2006. In October 2006, NASA approved a shuttle mission to service Hubble. That mission is now scheduled for October 8, 2008. |
crs_R41402 | crs_R41402_0 | Public sector revenues declined as a result of the crisis, and a number of estimates indicate that Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 6.6% in 2009. Mexico's economy is of interest to U.S. policymakers because of the strong economic linkages between the two countries, the proximity of Mexico to the United States, and the implications that economic issues have on political and social stability in Mexico. The 111 th Congress is likely to maintain an active interest in Mexico on issues related to trade, economic conditions, migration, border issues, and counter-narcotics. Current Conditions
The global financial crisis, and the subsequent downturn in the U.S. economy, resulted in the sharpest economic contraction in the Mexican economy in 20 years. Ties to the U.S. Economy
Mexico's strong economic ties to the United States after implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have deepened the dependency of the Mexican economy on U.S. economic conditions. Mexico's reliance on the United States as an export market and the relative importance of exports to its overall economic performance make it highly susceptible to fluctuations in the U.S. economy. This will likely continue to have effects on economic conditions in Mexico. Economic growth in most Latin American countries was affected by the crisis, but because most of these countries were experiencing high levels of growth prior to the crisis and are not as dependent on the U.S. economy, they did not experience as deep a recession as Mexico (see Table 2 ). Mexico's job market has a large informal sector, and the crisis may have caused a growing trend towards informality and self-employment. The decline in remittances is mostly due to the global financial crisis and the slowdown in the U.S. economy, as the rising jobless rate has taken a toll on Mexican immigrants in the United States. Remittances are the second-highest source of foreign currency after oil, with tourism revenues following in third place. Poverty has been one of Mexico's more serious economic challenges for many years, and the government has made significant efforts to address this issue. However, poverty rates increased in 2008. The government's responses to the recent global financial crisis helped the country weather the 2009 recession and improve conditions in 2010. Some of the proposals are viewed as highly controversial and have deep-seated political implications, and efforts to restructure the energy sector or to adopt labor and fiscal reforms have been strongly opposed by the major political parties. Without the structural reforms necessary to bring about significant changes, Mexico's potential to increase economic growth, boost development, and lower the poverty rate will likely be very limited. However, there are signs that the population may be pushing for change, and much will depend on the outcome of the 2012 presidential election. The escalation of violence has resulted in increased risk aversion, which has impacted foreign investment flows, particularly in the manufacturing industry. Implications for the United States
The relationship between the United States and Mexico is important to policymakers from both countries because of the mutual interest in a number of key issues affecting the two countries, such as bilateral trade, economic competitiveness, and border security. President Barack Obama hosted a meeting with President Calderón where the two leaders discussed numerous key bilateral and hemispheric issues affecting the two countries. The two leaders vowed to enhance and reinforce efforts to create jobs, promote economic recovery and expansion, and encourage inclusive prosperity across all levels of society in both countries. Numerous analysts believe that the economic challenges that Mexico is facing are contributing to poverty and organized crime, and that a prosperous and democratic Mexico is in the best interest of the United States. | The state of Mexico's economy is important for U.S. policymakers for many reasons, most significantly because a prosperous and democratic neighboring country is in the best interest of the United States. The two countries have strong economic, political, and social ties, which have direct policy implications related to bilateral trade, economic competitiveness, migration, and border security. In May 2010, President Barack Obama hosted Mexican President Felipe Calderón at a meeting in the White House in which the two leaders discussed key issues affecting the two countries. They agreed to continue and reinforce cooperation on creating jobs, promoting economic recovery and expansion, and encouraging inclusive prosperity across all levels of society in both countries. The 111th Congress is likely to maintain an active interest in Mexico on issues related to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other trade issues, economic conditions in Mexico, migration, border security issues, and counter-narcotics.
The global financial crisis that began in 2008 and the U.S. economic downturn had strong adverse effects on the Mexican economy, largely due to its economic ties and dependence on the U.S. market. Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 6.6% in 2009, the sharpest decline of any Latin American economy. Mexico's reliance on the United States as an export market and the relative importance of exports to its overall economic performance make it highly susceptible to fluctuations in the U.S. economy. Most other Latin American countries are not as dependent on the United States as an export market. Economic reforms over the past 20 years and the government's responses to the effects of the global financial crisis have helped Mexico weather the economic downturn and improve conditions in 2010. However, sustained economic recovery will likely depend on the U.S. economic recovery and the ability to sustain this growth.
In addition to the adverse effects from the global financial crisis and the U.S. economic contraction, Mexico's economy is experiencing numerous other challenges. The escalation of violence since the government's crackdown on organized crime and drug trafficking has led to investor uncertainty in some regions of the country and, subsequently, a sharp decline in foreign direct investment flows. The impact has been the most severe on the manufacturing industry, which is mostly located along the U.S.-Mexico border and has experienced significant job losses. Increasing unemployment throughout the country has led to a growing trend towards informality and self-employment. This may present a long-term problem for the government because growth in the informal sector can lead to increased poverty levels, diminished productivity, and lower prospects for sustained economic growth. Another issue is the 16% drop in remittances to Mexico in 2009, which has mostly affected the poor. Remittance inflows, which are largely from the United States, are Mexico's second-highest source of foreign currency after oil.
Numerous analysts have noted that Mexico's potential to promote economic growth, increase productivity, and lower the poverty rate is very limited without implementing substantial structural reforms. President Calderón has proposed a number of reforms to address these challenges, including proposals to eliminate extreme poverty, overhaul public finances, privatize parts of the state oil company, adopt labor reforms, reform the telecommunications sector, and encourage political reforms. Most of these proposals, however, have deeply rooted political implications and have been strongly opposed by the major political parties in the Mexican Congress. There are some signs that the population may be pushing for change, but the prospects for passing any of the proposals will likely depend on the outcome of the 2012 presidential elections. |
crs_R43799 | crs_R43799_0 | Introduction
All Senate committees must adopt rules of procedure, unless exempted from doing so, and publish them in the Congressional Record by March 1 of the first year of a new Congress. A committee's rules must be "not inconsistent" with the Senate's rules. This report catalogues and compares the rules in the 114 th Congress of the 18 Senate committees with legislative authority—committees having authority to report legislation to the Senate. Committee Rules
The rules of the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and Appropriations Committees stated that the chair and ranking minority member of the full committee served as ex officio members on the committee's subcommittees on which they did not serve; however, they were not allowed to vote in or be counted toward a quorum of a subcommittee on which they served ex officio. The Finance Committee's rules had a specific provision on discharging legislation from a subcommittee. Additional Committee Meetings
Senate Rule
A Senate rule authorizes each committee chair to call additional meetings "as [the chair] may deem necessary." Notice of Meetings
On Adding Agenda Items
A rule of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee allowed a committee member through a written request to the chair to place legislation, a nomination, or another matter on the agenda of the committee's next business meeting. Committees' Rules
As shown in Table 2 , the Senate rule is reflected in many committees' rules. A rule of the Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee provided that the chair would designate another member to preside in the chair's absence at a meeting or hearing and authorized the ranking minority member to designate a minority member to act in the ranking minority member's stead at a meeting or hearing. A rule requiring that a vote to report a measure appear in the committee report on that measure also provides that the rule does not curtail the power of a committee to adopt rules allowing a lesser quorum on an action other than reporting a measure or matter. The six reasons enumerated in Rule XXVI, paragraph 5(b) allowing a meeting to be closed are—
"matters necessary to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or the confidential conduct of the foreign relations of the United States" will be disclosed; matters related solely to committee staff or staff management and procedure will be discussed; deliberations or testimony "will tend to charge an individual with crime or misconduct, to disgrace or injure the professional standing of an individual, or otherwise to expose an individual to public contempt or obloquy, or will represent a clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy of an individual"; "the identity of any informer or law enforcement agent or ... any information relating to the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense that is required to be kept secret in the interests of effective law enforcement" will be revealed; deliberations or testimony "will disclose information relating to trade secrets of financial or commercial information pertaining specifically to a given person" if an act of Congress requires government officials to keep the information confidential or if the information was provided confidentially to the government (other than by an application of the person for a government financial or other benefit) and is required to be kept secret to "prevent undue injury to the competitive position" of the person; and matters required by other provisions of law or regulation to be kept confidential may be disclosed. (Rule XXVI, paragraph 1.) Subpoenas
Senate Rule
Committees are authorized to subpoena witnesses and documents. Legislation might also be held at the desk or might be placed on the calendar by unanimous consent. The Intelligence Committee's rule authorized the chair or vice chair within his or her discretion to seek executive comment. This rule, however, could be waived upon the concurrence of the chair and the ranking minority member. In addition, if a majority of a committee files with the committee's clerk a request to report to the Senate a measure that was approved by the committee, the report must be filed with the Senate within seven days, counting from the day after the request was filed with the committee clerk. Another committee rule delegated to the chair and ranking minority member joint authority to approve on the committee's behalf rules and regulations for which the committee's approval was required. The Indian Affairs Committee's rules provided that the committee's rules could only be amended by a majority vote of all committee members. | Senate Rule XXVI directs Senate committees to adopt rules of procedure and publish them in the Congressional Record by March 1 of the first year of a new Congress. A committee's rules must be "not inconsistent" with the Senate's rules. Committee rules, even if they have not been amended, must be revalidated in each Congress as provided in Rule XXVI.
Committee rules cover a variety of subjects—from meeting dates to quorums to processing nominations. Some Senate rules that are reflected in committees' rules must be followed, such as the rule that requires a majority of a committee to be physically present to report a measure or matter. Other committee rules, such as those concerning the relationship between a committee and its subcommittees, are largely within the discretion of each committee to design.
From a chair's perspective, a committee's rules authorize the chair to act on a variety of matters. However, the rules might provide the chair with a different authority for each matter. A chair might be able to act on his or her own authority on one matter but need the concurrence of the ranking minority member on another matter. In one instance, a chair may be able to act quickly, but in another instance the chair might be required to give notice prior to taking an action. Each committee's rules have evolved distinctively, and different degrees of discretion or limitation in each committee's rules govern each action that a chair might take.
From the minority's perspective, a committee's rules govern the minority's role in agenda setting, decision making, and procedural prerogatives. Committees' rules vary in what role they provide the minority in selecting witnesses, placing matters on the agenda, forming a quorum, bringing a matter to a vote, authorizing subpoenas, and so on.
From an individual committee member's perspective, a committee's rules allocate authority between the chair and ranking minority member and between the chair and the committee's members. In many rules, the chair, or the chair with the concurrence of the ranking minority member, may make decisions, such as reducing the notice of a meeting or waiving other requirements in the committee's rules related to holding a meeting. In other rules, decisions may be made only by action of the committee.
Just as in the Senate, many actions in committees are taken by unanimous consent. Unanimous consent may allow some or many committee rules to be set aside. It might also be used to create ad hoc procedures that accommodate committee members on a particular piece of legislation or for a specific meeting or to facilitate a committee's conduct of business. Before agreeing to unanimous consent, a committee member might wish to understand the specific committee rules and committee member prerogatives being set aside.
In cataloguing and comparing the breadth of 114th Congress Senate committee rules on legislative and executive business, this report provides the reader with a guide to the variety of committee rules. This report will be updated during the 115th Congress.
A companion report on House committees' rules is also available: CRS Report R41605, House Standing Committees' Rules on Legislative Activities: Analysis of Rules in Effect in the 114th Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43305 | crs_R43305_0 | Multiple employer plans are sponsored by more than one employer but are not maintained as part of a collective bargaining agreement. Because of differences in the structure of the plans, single and multiemployer DB pension plans have different rules under some sections of ERISA. Multiemployer DB plans are of current concern to Congress for several reasons:
about 10% to 15% of multiemployer participants are in plans that are projected to have insufficient plan assets within the next 20 years to pay 100% of the benefits promised to plan participants; because the liabilities of the pension plans that are projected to become insolvent are so great, PBGC would likely be unable to continue to guarantee participants' benefits if one or two of these plans became insolvent; legislation enacted in December 2014 provides options to stave off insolvency for some multiemployer DB pension plans; one very large plan's application to reduce benefits to stave off insolvency was denied by the U.S. Treasury; and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. DOL data indicate that 99.6% of all pension plans (covering 88.7% of all pension plan participants) are single-employer pension plans. Multiemployer Pension Plans
Multiemployer pension plans are sponsored by more than one employer and, unlike multiple employer plans, are maintained under collective bargaining agreements. Defined Benefit Pension Plans
Participants in DB pension plans receive monthly payments in retirement. In multiemployer DB pension plans, the payment is typically calculated as the length of service with employers that contribute to the plan multiplied by a dollar amount. Funding Levels in Multiemployer Defined Benefit Pension Plans
The funding levels of multiemployer DB pension plans are varied: some plans are well funded and have adequate funds from which to pay all of their promised benefits, and a few plans are poorly funded and may become insolvent within 10 to 20 years. 113-235 ). PBGC Multiemployer Insurance Program
PBGC is a federal government agency created by ERISA in 1974 to protect the benefits of participants in private-sector DB pension plans. In the single employer program, PBGC becomes the trustee of terminated, underfunded DB pension plans and pays benefits up to a statutory maximum amount. Rather, when a multiemployer DB pension plan becomes insolvent and is unable to pay participants their promised benefits, PBGC provides financial assistance in the form of loans made to multiemployer DB plans. Inadequacy of PBGC Premiums
Unlike the single employer insurance program, PBGC does not become trustee of insolvent multiemployer pension plans. Applications for Benefit Reductions
As of September 21, 2018, the U.S. Treasury has received 32 applications to reduce benefits under MPRA. Five applications, including the application by the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Plan (a very large plan with 400,000 participants), have been denied. Ten applications have been withdrawn, and seven applications have been approved. Decisions are still pending on the remaining 10 applications. 115-123 ), enacted February 9, 2018, created the Joint Select Committee on Solvency of Multiemployer Pension Plans to author a report and prepare legislative language to address the impending insolvencies of several large multiemployer defined benefit (DB) pension plans and PBGC. Report and Legislative Language
The committee must provide to Congress no later than November 30, 2018, a report and proposed legislative language to improve the solvency of multiemployer DB plans and the PBGC. The report and proposed legislative language must be approved by (1) a majority of committee members appointed by the Speaker of the House and Majority Leader of the Senate and (2) a majority of committee members appointed by the Minority Leader of the House and Minority Leader of the Senate. There are no provisions that require consideration of the bill by any committees in the House or by the full House. Many of the commission proposals were included in the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014, enacted as Division O in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (MPRA; P.L. Participants' benefits in insolvent plans would be reduced to the PBGC guaranteed levels, or possibly lower, if PBGC has insufficient resources from which to pay 100% of the benefits guaranteed to participants. | Multiemployer defined benefit (DB) pension plans are pensions sponsored by more than one employer and maintained as part of a collective bargaining agreement. About 3.1% of all DB pension plans, covering 28% of all DB pension plan participants, are multiemployer plans. Nearly all of the remaining DB pension plans are maintained by a single employer. A few DB pension plans are maintained by more than one employer but are not maintained under a collective bargaining agreement. In DB pension plans, participants receive a monthly benefit in retirement that is based on a formula. In multiemployer DB pensions, the formula typically multiplies a dollar amount by the number of years of service the employee has worked for employers that participate in the DB plan.
DB pension plans are subject to funding rules in the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §431) to ensure they have sufficient resources from which to pay promised benefits. Because single employer and multiemployer DB pension plans have different structures, Congress has established separate funding rules for these plans.
Although many multiemployer DB pension plans have sufficient resources from which to pay their promised benefits, 10% to 15% of participants are in plans that are projected to become insolvent in the next 20 years. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a federally chartered corporation that insures the benefits of participants in private-sector DB pension plans. As with the funding rules, Congress established separate PBGC programs to insure single and multiemployer DB pensions. For example, when underfunded single-employer DB plans terminate, PBGC becomes the trustee of the plan. PBGC does not become the trustee of multiemployer DB pension plans; rather, it makes loans to insolvent multiemployer DB plans so the plans may continue to pay participants' guaranteed benefits.
The projected insolvencies of multiemployer plans would likely result in a substantial strain on PBGC's multiemployer insurance program. In the absence of increased financial resources for PBGC, participants in insolvent multiemployer DB pension plans might not receive all of the benefits guaranteed by PBGC. In a report released in June 2017, PBGC indicated that the multiemployer insurance program is highly likely to become insolvent by 2025 and will be unable to pay 100% of participants' benefits at the guaranteed level.
The Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014, enacted as Division O in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (MPRA; P.L. 113-235) made changes to some of the funding rules for multiemployer DB pensions and allowed plans that are expected to become insolvent to cut benefits to plan participants or to apply for a partition of the plan. As of September 21, 2018, the U.S. Treasury has received 32 applications to reduce benefits under MPRA. Five applications, including the application by the Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Plan (a very large plan with 400,000 participants), have been denied. Ten applications have been withdrawn, and seven applications have been approved. Decisions are still pending on the remaining 10 applications.
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), enacted February 9, 2018, created the Joint Select Committee on Solvency of Multiemployer Pension Plans to address the impending insolvencies of several large multiemployer DB pension plans and PBGC. The committee must provide to Congress no later than November 30, 2018, a report and proposed legislative language to improve the solvency of multiemployer DB plans and the PBGC. The report and proposed legislative language must be approved by (1) a majority of committee members appointed by the Speaker of the House and Majority Leader of the Senate and (2) a majority of committee members appointed by the Minority Leader of the House and Minority Leader of the Senate. P.L. 115-123 provides for expedited procedures in the Senate if the committee approves of the proposed legislative language. There are no provisions that provide any special procedures governing House consideration of such legislation. |
crs_R41381 | crs_R41381_0 | Introduction
Brokers and dealers and investment advisers have been held to different standards of conduct in their dealings with investors. In very general terms, a broker-dealer is held to a suitability standard, and an investment adviser is held to a fiduciary duty standard. With passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which tasks the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with issuing rules concerning the standards of conduct for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, the current standards may be changed. FINRA is a self-regulatory organization, "the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States," and issues rules that the SEC may oversee. An individual investor wishing to pursue action against a broker-dealer for recommending an unsuitable investment will often have to allege the violation of the general anti-fraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act, Section 10(b), and the SEC rule issued to implement the statute, Rule 10b-5. To pursue a Section 10(b) violation, an individual plaintiff must allege that, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, he relied on a misstatement or omission of a material fact made with scienter by the defendant and that this reliance caused his injury. Investors seeking to sue a broker-dealer for violation of the suitability rule may also have to comply with the requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers
In contrast to the suitability standard, which is most often applied to broker-dealers, investment advisers usually have a fiduciary duty with respect to investors. Although the Investment Advisers Act does not use the word "fiduciary" to apply to the standard of conduct to which an investment adviser is held in managing a client's account, court cases have interpreted that an investment adviser has a fiduciary duty. Changes to the standards of conduct applied to broker-dealers and investment advisers were present in both the House and the Senate versions of financial regulatory reform. However, the House and the Senate had different approaches to this issue. The House approach was to harmonize the fiduciary standard for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers. The House and Senate conferees on Wall Street reform approved a financial regulatory reform bill. 4173 , now referred to as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Dodd-Frank forged a kind of compromise between the House and Senate approaches. Section 913 of the legislation, titled "Study and Rulemaking regarding Obligations of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers," is the major provision setting out the new approach toward defining standards of conduct for these financial industry professionals. Subsection (c) sets out what the SEC is required to consider in conducting the study: (1) the effectiveness of current legal or regulatory standards of care which have been imposed by the SEC or a national securities association and other federal and state legal or regulatory standards; (2) whether there are legal or regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or overlaps in the standards of conduct for protecting retail customers that should be addressed by rule or statute; (3) whether retail customers understand that there are different standards of care applicable to brokers, dealers, and investment advisers in the provision of personalized investment advice about securities to retail customers; (4) whether the existence of different standards of care concerning the quality of personalized investment advice that retail customers receive is confusing to them; (5) the resources and activities of the SEC, the states, and a national securities association to enforce the standards of care, including the effectiveness of examinations of brokers, dealers, and investment advisers in determining compliance with regulations, the frequency of examinations, and the length of time of the examinations; (6) the substantive differences in regulating brokers, dealers, and investment advisers in their providing personalized investment advice and recommendations about securities to retail customers; (7) specific instances concerning personalized investment advice about securities in which regulation and oversight of investment advisers provide greater protection than regulation and oversight of brokers and dealers and instances in which regulation and oversight of brokers and dealers provide greater protection than regulation and oversight of investment advisers; (8) existing legal or regulatory standards of state securities regulators and other regulators intended to protect retail customers; (9) the potential impact on retail customers of imposing upon brokers and dealers the standard of care applied under the Investment Advisers Act; (10) the potential impact of eliminating the broker and dealer exclusion from the definition of "investment adviser" in the Investment Advisers Act; (11) the varying level of services provided by brokers, dealers, and investment advisers to retail customers; (12) the potential impact on retail customers that could result from changing the regulatory requirements or legal standards of care affecting brokers, dealers, and investment advisers concerning their obligations to retail customers about investment advice; (13) the potential additional costs to retail customers concerning the potential impact on the profitability of their investment decisions and to brokers, dealers, and investment advisers resulting from changes to the regulatory requirements or legal standards affecting brokers, dealers, or investment advisers; and (14) any other consideration that the SEC considers necessary and appropriate in determining whether to conduct a rulemaking. However, it must be kept in mind that the SEC has expressed no formal view concerning the analysis, findings, or conclusions of the study. She indicated that such a rule is a high priority for the SEC. | Brokers and dealers and investment advisers have been held to different standards of conduct in their dealings with investors. In very general terms, a broker-dealer is held to a suitability standard, and an investment adviser is held to a fiduciary duty standard. With passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203), which tasks the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with issuing rules concerning the standards of conduct for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, the current standards may be changed.
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, a self-regulatory organization that oversees securities firms doing business in the United States and issues rules that the Securities and Exchange Commission may oversee, enforces a suitability standard for brokers and dealers. The standard requires that brokers and dealers assess their customers' knowledge of securities and their financial situations and recommend securities that are suitable for their customers.
An individual investor wishing to pursue action against a broker-dealer for recommending an unsuitable investment will often have to allege the violation of the general anti-fraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act, Section 10(b), and the SEC rule issued to implement the statute, Rule 10b-5. To pursue a Section 10(b) violation, an individual plaintiff must allege that, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, he relied on a misstatement or omission of a material fact made with scienter by the defendant and that this reliance caused his injury. Investors seeking to sue a broker-dealer for violation of the suitability rule may also have to comply with the requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.
In contrast to the suitability standard, which is most often applied to broker-dealers, investment advisers usually have a fiduciary duty with respect to investors. An investment adviser comes within the requirements of the Investment Advisers Act. Although the Investment Advisers Act does not use the word "fiduciary" to apply to the standard of conduct to which an investment adviser is held in managing a client's account, court cases have interpreted that an investment adviser has a fiduciary duty.
Changes to the standards of conduct applied to broker-dealers and investment advisers were present in both the House and the Senate versions of financial regulatory reform. However, the House and the Senate had different approaches to this issue. The House approach was to harmonize the fiduciary standard for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers. The Senate approach was to have the SEC conduct a study to evaluate the effectiveness of existing standards of conduct for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers. The House and Senate conferees on Wall Street reform approved a financial regulatory reform bill, called the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Dodd-Frank forged a kind of compromise between the House and Senate approaches. Section 913 of the legislation, titled "Study and Rulemaking regarding Obligations of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers," is the major provision setting out the new approach toward defining standards of conduct for these financial industry professionals. It requires the SEC to conduct a study to evaluate the effectiveness of the current legal or regulatory standards of care for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers and whether there are legal gaps, shortcomings, or overlaps in the standards. Criteria that the SEC must consider are set out. In January 2011, the SEC staff issued a study recommending a uniform fiduciary standard, but the SEC has expressed no formal view about the analysis, findings, or conclusions of the study. The SEC has not yet issued new rules concerning the standards of conduct to be applied to brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, but in March 2015 SEC Chair Mary Jo White expressed her view that tighter standards are needed for most kinds of financial advisers who recommend investments. She indicated that consideration of this issue is a high priority for the SEC. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R41405 | crs_R41405_0 | Introduction
Beginning with the early colonial settlements of America, the nation has provided benefits in varying degrees to those who have worn the uniform and suffered physical disabilities in service to the nation—sacrifices that are inherent to the profession of arms. Veterans could meet the burden of proving that their disabilities were service-connected through their military records, which may clearly describe and document the circumstances and medical treatment for an injury or an illness incurred while in service as well as any resulting disability. However, where the manifestation of the disabling disease or condition is remote from the veteran's service and any relation between the disability and service is not readily apparent, the burden of proving service connection can be a challenge. In such circumstances, Congress and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have relied on presumptions to ease the burden placed on the veteran. It should also be noted that not all persons who served in the military are considered veterans for purposes of veterans benefits. Presumptive Service Connection
What is a Presumption? In the context of VA claims adjudication, a presumption relieves veterans of the burden to prove that a disability or illness was caused by a specific exposure that occurred during service in the Armed Forces. When a disease is designated as presumptively service-connected, the individual veteran does not need to prove that the disease was incurred during service. Legislative History of Presumptions
The legislative history of veterans' disease presumptions dates back to 1921 when Congress, to ease the decision-making process in VA disability compensation adjudications, used its authority to establish service connection on a presumptive basis. 67-47) to the War Risk Insurance Act (P.L. 63-193). This amendment, among other things, established presumptions of service connection for active pulmonary tuberculosis and neuropsychiatric disease (later known as psychosis) occurring within two years of separation from active duty military service. 80-748), several additions were made to the list of presumptive diseases through regulation and executive order. The act required the VA to develop regulations for disability compensation for Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange. 1990s-2000
In 1991, the Agent Orange Act ( P.L. 102-4 ) established for the first time a presumption of service connection for diseases associated with herbicide exposure (discussed in greater detail below). P.L. 102-4 authorized the VA to contract with the IOM to conduct a scientific review of the evidence linking certain medical conditions to herbicide exposure. 110-181 ), Congress established a presumption of service connection for purposes of VA medical care for any veteran of the Persian Gulf War who develops an active mental illness (other than psychosis) if such veteran develops such disability: (1) within two years after discharge or release from the active military, naval, or air service; and (2) before the end of the two-year period beginning on the last day of the Persian Gulf War. In addition to the scientific study mandated in P.L. Role of the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
As previously noted, the Agent Orange Act of 1991 established a new process for evaluating the health effects of exposure to herbicides containing dioxin and for establishing presumptions of service connection for diseases associated with such exposure. | The United States has provided benefits in varying degrees to those who have worn the uniform and suffered disabilities in service to the nation. In general, a veteran is entitled to compensation for disabilities incurred in or aggravated during active military, naval, or air service. It should be noted that not all persons who served in the military are considered veterans for purposes of veterans benefits. Veterans could meet the burden of proving that their disabilities are service-connected through their military records, which may clearly describe and document the circumstances and medical treatment for an injury or an illness incurred while in service as well as any resulting disability. However, where the manifestation of the disability is remote from the veteran's service and any relationship between the disability and service is not readily apparent, the burden of proving service connection can be a challenge. In such circumstances, Congress and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have relied on presumptions. In the context of VA claims adjudication, a presumption could be seen as a procedure to relieve veterans of the burden to prove that a disability or illness was caused by a specific exposure that occurred during service in the Armed Forces. When a disease is designated as presumptively service-connected, the individual veteran does not need to prove that the disease was incurred during service.
The legislative history of veterans' disease presumptions dates back to 1921 when Congress established a presumption of service connection with an amendment (P.L. 67-47) to the War Risk Insurance Act (P.L. 63-193). It established presumptions of service connection for tuberculosis and neuropsychiatric disease (known today as psychosis) occurring within two years of separation from active duty military service. In the following years, additions to the presumptive list were made by regulation, executive order, and legislation. In the past 22 years, Congress has on three separate occasions created presumptive programs for three distinct groups of veterans: the so-called atomic veterans, who were exposed to radiation from above-ground nuclear tests and the atomic bombs detonated in Japan; Vietnam veterans; and Gulf War veterans. In addition, Congress has added certain disease conditions to the list of presumptions for specific groups of veterans such as former prisoners of war (POWs).
In 1991, the Agent Orange Act (P.L. 102-4) established for Vietnam veterans a presumption of a service connection for diseases associated with exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides. For the first time, this act required the VA to contract with the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to conduct, every two years, a scientific review of the evidence linking certain medical conditions to herbicide exposure. The VA was instructed to use the IOM's findings, and other evidence, to issue regulations establishing a presumption for any disease for which there is scientific evidence of an association with herbicide exposure.
However, since an increasing proportion of service-connected disability compensation is paid through a presumptive decision-making process, some have raised several policy questions with regard to the current process. This report discusses presumptive service connection, its legislative history, and current challenges in making evidence-based determinations of presumptions. It also discusses the Agent Orange Act (P.L. 102-4) and suggests implications of the process established by the act for future presumptive service-connected determinations. |
crs_R41661 | crs_R41661_0 | Introduction
This report does not examine the merits or possible effects of medical malpractice litigation or medical malpractice liability reform on the health care system or on the cost of liability insurance premiums. Rather, this report explains specific tort reform proposals that are commonly considered in medical malpractice liability reform measures, and discusses their individual arguments in favor of and against such proposals from a legal perspective. These include imposing caps on noneconomic damages and punitive damages; permitting defendants to be held liable for no more than their share of responsibility for a plaintiff's injuries; requiring that damage awards be reduced by amounts plaintiffs receive from collateral sources such as health insurance; limiting lawyers' contingent fees; creating a federal statute of limitations; and requiring that awards of future damages in some cases be paid periodically rather than in a lump sum. 5 . Congress also has the power, under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3), to enact tort reform laws that would affect actions for medical malpractice liability brought under state law. See Table A-2 for a 50-state survey of caps on noneconomic and punitive damages. See Table A-3 for a 50-state survey of the burden of proof standards for punitive damages and whether a state requires a separate proceeding to determine such damages. H.R. See Table A-4 for a 50-state survey of whether periodic payment of damages is to be considered in an award for a medical malpractice action. H.R. See Table A-4 for a 50-state survey of whether the doctrine of joint and several liability applies to malpractice actions in a state. An amendment that was adopted during the House Committee on the Judiciary mark-up eliminated this provision from the bill. See Table A-5 for a 50-state survey of limits on attorneys' contingency fees. See Table A-6 for a 50-state survey on general statute of limitation provisions for both medical malpractice and product liability actions, as some tort reform proposals' provisions would affect the statute of limitations for both types of actions. Appendix. Fifty-State Surveys
Table A-1 sets forth the definition of a medical malpractice action in the 50 states. | Medical malpractice liability is governed by state law, but Congress has the power, under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3), to enact tort reform laws that would affect actions for medical malpractice liability brought under state law. In the 112th Congress, H.R. 5, the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act was introduced by Representative Phil Gingrey on January 24, 2011, and was marked up on February 9 and 16, 2011, by the House Committee on the Judiciary. This bill would preempt state law with respect to certain aspects of medical malpractice lawsuits. Past Congresses have considered similar measures.
This report does not examine the effects of medical malpractice litigation or medical malpractice liability reform on the health care system or on the cost of liability insurance premiums; rather, it explains specific tort reform proposals that are commonly included in medical malpractice liability reform bills, and discusses the individual arguments in favor of and against such proposals from a legal perspective. These proposals include imposing caps on noneconomic damages and punitive damages; permitting defendants to be held liable for no more than their share of responsibility for a plaintiff's injuries; requiring that damage awards be reduced by amounts plaintiffs receive from collateral sources such as health insurance; limiting lawyers' contingent fees; creating a federal statute of limitations; and requiring that awards of future damages in some cases be paid periodically rather than in a lump sum. It also includes, where appropriate, a description of H.R. 5's provisions with respect to these categories.
An Appendix to this report includes five tables. The first table (Table A-1) is a 50-state survey of definitions of a medical malpractice action or to whom state medical malpractice statutes apply. The second table (Table A-2) is a 50-state survey of caps on noneconomic and punitive damages. The third table (Table A-3) is a 50-state survey of the burden of proof standards for punitive damages and whether a state requires a separate proceeding to determine such damages. The fourth table (Table A-4) is a 50-state survey of whether the doctrine of joint and several liability applies to malpractice actions in a state and whether periodic payment of damages is to be considered in an award for a medical malpractice action. The fifth table (Table A-5) is a 50-state survey of limits on attorneys' contingency fees. The sixth table (Table A-6) is a 50-state survey of statute of limitation provisions for both medical malpractice and product liability actions. |
crs_R42135 | crs_R42135_0 | Introduction
The health of the U.S. manufacturing sector has long been of great concern to Congress. The large decline in manufacturing employment since the start of the 21 st century has stimulated particular congressional interest. Over the years, Members have introduced hundreds of bills intended to support domestic manufacturing activity in various ways. The proponents of such measures frequently contend that the United States is in some way falling behind other countries in manufacturing and argue that this relative decline can be mitigated by government policy. While some of those changes may be a result of factors specific to the United States, others may be attributable to technological advances, shifting consumer preferences, or macroeconomic forces such as exchange-rate movements. This report is designed to inform the debate over manufacturing policy by examining changes in the manufacturing sector in comparative perspective. It does not describe or discuss specific policy options. The charts and tables on the pages that follow depict the position of the United States relative to other major manufacturing countries according to various metrics. According to U.N. estimates, China displaced the United States as the largest manufacturing nation in 2010. These estimates are calculated in U.S. dollars, and the reported manufacturing value added of some countries, including China, Mexico, and Russia, declined in 2016 due to the declines of those countries' currencies against the dollar. The U.S. share of global manufacturing value added has declined over time, from 29% in the early 1980s to 18.1% in 2015 and 2016 (see Figure 2 ). It is important to note that global shares are measured in U.S. dollars, so each country's share in a given year is greatly affected by the strength of its currency against the dollar. This figure has changed little in recent years. The manufacturing share of total economic output in China declined from 32% in 2010 to 27% in 2016, while the share of manufacturing in the U.S. economy remained relatively stable. Over the quarter-century between 1990 and 2016, manufacturing employment fell by a much lower percentage in the United States than in the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, and Japan and by about the same percentage as in Germany, the Netherlands, and Canada (see Figure 10 ). Adjusted for differences in purchasing power, Chinese manufacturers' R&D spending has grown more rapidly than that of manufacturers in the United States, and as of 2015 was 18% larger. Conversely, the service sector is relatively more important in undertaking R&D in the United States than in many other countries. The research intensity of U.S. manufacturing increased significantly in the years leading up to the most recent recession, but data measuring R&D relative to manufacturing value added indicate that U.S. manufacturers' research intensity has not increased since 2008. U.S. manufacturers spend more on R&D, relative to value added, than those in other large manufacturing countries, with the exceptions of Japan and South Korea (see Figure 15 ). As Table 3 confirms, a very large proportion of U.S. manufacturers' R&D takes place in high-technology sectors, particularly pharmaceuticals, electronics, and aircraft manufacturing, whereas in most other countries save South Korea, a far greater proportion of manufacturers' R&D outlays occur in medium-technology sectors such as motor vehicle and machinery manufacturing. | The health of the U.S. manufacturing sector has long been of great concern to Congress. The decline in manufacturing employment since the start of the 21st century has stimulated particular congressional interest, leading Members to introduce hundreds of bills over many sessions of Congress intended to support domestic manufacturing activity in various ways. The proponents of such measures frequently contend that the United States is by various measures falling behind other countries in manufacturing, and they argue that this relative decline can be mitigated or reversed by government policy.
This report is designed to inform the debate over the health of U.S. manufacturing through a series of charts and tables that depict the position of the United States relative to other countries according to various metrics. Understanding which trends in manufacturing reflect factors that may be unique to the United States and which are related to broader changes in technology or consumer preferences may be helpful in formulating policies intended to aid firms or workers engaged in manufacturing activity. This report does not describe or discuss specific policy options.
The main findings are the following:
The United States' share of global manufacturing activity declined from 28% in 2002, following the end of a U.S. recession, to 16.5% in 2011. By 2016, the U.S. share rose to over 18%, the largest share since 2009. These estimates are based on the value of each country's manufacturing in U.S. dollars; part of the decline in the U.S. share was due to a 23% decline in the value of the dollar between 2002 and 2011, and part of the subsequent rise is attributable to a stronger dollar. China displaced the United States as the largest manufacturing country in 2010. Again, part of China's rise by this measure has been due to the appreciation of its currency, the renminbi, against the U.S. dollar. The reported size of China's manufacturing sector decreased in 2015 and 2016 due to currency adjustments. Manufacturing output, measured in each country's local currency adjusted for inflation, has been growing more slowly in the United States than in China, South Korea, Germany, and Mexico, but more rapidly than in many European countries and Canada. Employment in manufacturing has fallen in most major manufacturing countries over the past quarter-century. In the United States, manufacturing employment since 1990 has declined in line with the changes in Western Europe and Japan, although the timing of the decline has differed from country to country. U.S. manufacturers' spending for research and development (R&D) rose 10.5% from 2010 to 2015, adjusted for inflation. Manufacturers' R&D spending rose more rapidly in several other countries. Manufacturers in many countries have increased spending on R&D, relative to value added in the manufacturing sector, but U.S. manufacturers' R&D intensity has changed little since 2008. A large proportion of U.S. manufacturers' R&D takes place in high-technology sectors such as pharmaceutical, electronics, and aircraft manufacturing, whereas in most other countries the largest share of R&D occurs in medium-technology sectors such as automotive and machinery manufacturing. |
crs_RL33781 | crs_RL33781_0 | Background
One of the motivating factors for Congress to create Medicare Part D in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) ( P.L. Medicare Part D was designed to take advantage of market competition. In accordance with market competition principles, the drug plans that administer the drug benefit are private and public (i.e., non-government) corporations who may rely on price negotiating, rebate negotiation, and price-volume discounts as a way to affect prices. A provision in the MMA, termed the "noninterference" provision, prevents the federal government from being a third party in drug price negotiations between the Part D drug plans and pharmaceutical manufacturers. Both the incoming Speaker of the House and incoming Senate Majority Leader have reportedly expressed their support for repealing this "noninterference" provision, and regard it as a priority for consideration in the 110 th Congress. Should the "noninterference" provision be repealed, Congress may wish to provide guidance on how the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) would negotiate prices. Other Policies
Examining and understanding the policies of Canada, Australia, and European nations could help to inform the discussion of drug pricing policies for the Medicare drug benefit. Like Medicare, these governments' policies affect the prices paid for pharmaceuticals. Similarly, any change in drug pricing policies for Medicare could have a noticeable impact upon total pharmaceutical sales in the U.S.
Canada, Australia, and European nations use reference pricing, price ceilings, parallel trade, profit sharing, or value-based pricing policies to mitigate increases in pharmaceutical expenditures due to price increases. Prices are often determined by clustering drugs by class and setting a uniform rate for all drugs in the cluster. The drug clusters are controversial because they may ignore differences in safety profiles, efficacy, and application forms across drugs. Reimportation implies importing foreign pharmaceutical prices, as well as the products, and would allow the U.S. to tacitly use other countries' pricing systems. The MMA includes a provision that circumvents the FFDCA. It authorizes the FDA to allow drug reimportation from Canada, if the Secretary of HHS certifies that importation of prescription drugs is both safe and cost-saving —the present Secretary has chosen not to exercise this option. Profit Sharing
Another drug pricing method that may be used by payers is profit sharing, whereby manufacturers share all or part of the profits that are predetermined to be in "excess." Value-based pricing also requires defining an "appropriate" comparison drug. | The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) (P.L. 108-173) addressed the rising costs of prescription drugs for the elderly by providing a mechanism for beneficiaries to obtain affordable prescription drug insurance coverage. The Medicare prescription drug benefit, otherwise known as Part D, was designed to take advantage of market competition. In accordance with market competition principles, the drug plans that administer the drug benefit are private and public corporations (i.e., non-government) that may rely on price negotiating, rebate negotiation, and price-volume discounts as a way to affect prices.
A provision in the MMA, termed the "noninterference" provision, prevents the federal government from stepping in to try to further lower drug prices. Both the incoming Speaker of the House and incoming Senate Majority Leader have reportedly expressed their support for repealing the "noninterference" provision, and regard it as a priority for consideration in the 110th Congress. Should the provision be repealed, Congress may wish to provide guidance on how prices would be negotiated.
Examining the policies of Canada, Australia, and European nations could help to inform the discussion of drug pricing policies for the Medicare drug plan. Like Medicare, these governments' policies affect the prices paid for pharmaceuticals. All of these nations rely on policies to mitigate increases in pharmaceutical spending. These policies include reference pricing, price ceilings, reimportation, profit sharing, and value-based pricing.
In systems that use reference pricing, prices are often determined by clustering drugs by class and setting a uniform rate for all drugs in the cluster. Drug clusters tend to be controversial because they may ignore differences in safety profiles, efficacy, and application forms. Price ceilings set the maximum price that manufacturers may charge certain customers. Customers (e.g., Part D drug plans) may then negotiate prices below the ceiling.
Reimportation, similar to "parallel trade" in Europe, implies importing pharmaceutical prices, as well as the products, and would allow the U.S. to tacitly use other countries' drug pricing systems. FDA laws prohibit reimportation, but the MMA includes a provision allowing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to circumvent these laws. The present Secretary has chosen not to exercise this option. In addition to these legal barriers, pharmaceutical manufacturers have indicated that they may restrict the supply of drugs if the U.S. legalizes reimportation from Canada.
Profit-sharing mechanisms require manufacturers to share all or part of the profits that are predetermined to be in "excess." Value-based pricing sets drug prices using a relative value metric. The hurdle for the former pricing mechanism requires determination of the "appropriate" profit limit. The latter requires determination of an acceptable value-added as well as an "appropriate" comparison drug. This report will be updated as legislative activity warrants. |
crs_R40162 | crs_R40162_0 | Introduction: Recent Challenges for Periodical Publishers
A spate of autumn 2008 news stories reported the downsizing or closure of periodicals and their publishers due to financial challenges:
U.S. News & World Report magazine will reduce its paper issues to once per month; Time Inc., which publishes 24 magazines for the U.S. market, has said it will cut 600 jobs, about 6% of its workforce; Alpha Media Group, publishers of Maxim and other magazines for young men, will lay off 50 to 60 of its staffers; Hearst magazines will transition CosmoGirl magazine to a web-only publication; Condé Nast announced that it would reduce its business magazine, Portfolio , from 12 issues per year to 10, and Men ' s Vogue from 10 issues per year to 2; Radar magazine ceased operations in October, and Manhattan Media Inc. announced that it had put off its plans to restart publication of 02138 , a lifestyle magazine for Harvard University alumni; and The century-old Christian Science Monitor , a newspaper that is delivered via U.S. mail five days per week, will cease publishing in paper format in April 2009. In light of these high profile incidents, and because of a possible U.S. Postal Service postage increase in 2009, the 111 th Congress may be asked to help periodical publishers reduce their operating costs by providing them with increased postage subsidies. Some publishers sought postage relief during the 110 th Congress. Such assistance would not be unprecedented. In fact, as this report details, Congress has subsidized periodicals postage since the founding of the United States. Newspapers were a means to provide information to the geographically dispersed members of the public so they might ably discharge their duties as citizens. In 1917, Congress bifurcated the postage rates paid by periodicals. The law also had effects on periodicals, which had continued to fail to provide the USPS with revenues that covered the cost of their delivery. Subsidized Postage for Periodicals Retained
As described above, periodicals had received special treatment under postal law since 1792. Periodicals rates were particularly problematic. The new rate schedule would remedy this inequity. A New Law and an Unclear Future for the Postage Subsidy for Periodicals
The enactment of the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA; P.L. 109-435 ; 120 Stat. The PAEA requires the new Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) to devise a new postage rate-setting system. Additionally, one of the "factors" that the PRC had to consider in establishing the new pricing system is
the requirement that each class of mail or type of mail service bear the direct and indirect postal costs attributable to each class or type of mail service through reliably identified causal relationships plus that portion of all other costs of the Postal Service reasonably assignable to such class or type (120 Stat. The new rate-setting system mandated by the PAEA must limit the annual postage increases for periodicals and other market dominant products. Government provision of postage subsidies for periodicals long has been a contentious issue because it involves disputed principles and vexing implementation issues. Postage subsidies policies inevitably have raised two contentious questions: (1) Which periodicals should receive these subsidies? | Recently, financial challenges have compelled a number of publishers of periodicals (e.g., magazines and newspapers) to downsize their operations and to cease printing certain publications. To cite just two examples—Time Inc. has said it will cut 600 jobs, and the century-old Christian Science Monitor newspaper, which is delivered via U.S. mail five days per week, is to cease publishing in paper format in April 2009.
In light of these high profile incidents, and because of a possible U.S. Postal Service postage increase in 2009, the 111th Congress may be asked to help periodical publishers by providing them with increased postage subsidies. Some publishers sought postage relief during the 110th Congress. Such assistance would not be unprecedented. In fact, Congress has subsidized periodicals' postage since the founding of the United States.
This report describes and assesses the major federal policies that have subsidized postage for periodicals. These policies have been contentious because they involve disputed principles and vexing implementation issues. Some persons believe that periodicals provide important information about politics and government to U.S. citizens, which helps members of the public to discharge their civic duties. Others dispute this contention. Additionally, considerable implementation issues also arise, such as "which periodicals should receive these subsidies?"
Since 1792, Congress has provided periodical mailers with reduced rates that are lower than their delivery costs. Initially, Congress funded these postage subsidies through annual appropriations. Senders of other types of mail, such as first-class letters, have paid rates that covered the revenue shortfall of periodicals.
In 2007, the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) restructured the postage rate schedule to more accurately peg periodical rates to their delivery costs. The postage paid by some periodical mailers jumped dramatically and their postage subsidies fell. Later that same year, the PRC established the new rate-setting system mandated by the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA; P.L. 109-435; 120 Stat. 3198-3263). The system requires each class of mail to bear its "direct and indirect costs," but it also includes a rate cap that forbids the USPS from raising postage rates by more than the rate of inflation, except in "extraordinary or exceptional circumstances." The long-term effects of the new rate schedule and rate-setting system on periodicals subsidies are unclear. Thus far, the USPS's periodicals delivery costs continue to exceed greatly its periodicals postage revenues.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41761 | crs_R41761_0 | Introduction: Issues for Congress
The United States enjoys a strong legacy of defense cooperation with Turkey, both bilaterally and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), dating from the onset of the Cold War. A more independent Turkish foreign policy course—reflected in recent international events involving Iran, Israel, and other countries—has raised concerns among some Members of Congress. As Turkey's regional influence expands through economic, political, and cultural means, its importance has arguably increased for the United States on issues of global significance that include Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Israeli-Palestinian issues. In early 2011, Turkey's regional role has arguably become even more prominent—exemplified by its significant involvement politically and militarily on the question of NATO's intervention in Libya—as political change and unrest generates international debate about links between internal governance, humanitarian and civil society issues, and regional security. This affects both U.S. and Turkish calculations of the mutual benefits and leverage of defense cooperation. Major Areas of Defense Cooperation
U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation continues apace with respect to promoting stability and countering terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. For additional information on Turkey's possible acquisition of missile defense systems, see " Missile Defense Systems " below. Status Quo Approach : Would not focus significantly on recent developments, but rather emphasize and express confidence that existing NATO and bilateral relationships—with their long legacies—can address mutual security challenges, even in an evolving regional and global context. Accommodative Approach: Accord high priority to the U.S.-Turkey alliance and revise expectations for it by accommodating Turkey's expressions of its national interests—and U.S. perceptions of these interests—given recent developments within Turkey, the region, and globally. Linkage Approach: Link cooperation to some extent to Turkey 's relations with certain third-party countries or non-state actors—including Iran , Israel , Hamas , Armenia , and China —or to Turkish actions on issues of U.S. national security interest . Case-by-Case Approach: Use or combine any of the other three approaches on a case-by-case basis. Approach(es) to U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation matters could hinge on a number of factors, including the following:
U.S.-Turkish agreement on how to address regional security challenges; Turkey's relations with key third-party countries and non-state actors, including Iran, Israel, Hamas, Armenia, China, Cyprus, and Greece; Turkey's perceived importance to U.S. interests given regional and global developments and trends, as well as possible alternate locations for military basing and transport corridors; the level of U.S. trust in Turkish leaders (civilian and military) and in internal Turkish stability; and the likelihood of influencing Turkey to act in U.S. interests and of strengthening the overall bilateral and NATO relationships. Specific Issues and Possible Options for Congress
Access to Turkish Bases and Transport Corridors
The prospect of temporary or permanent denial of U.S. military access to Turkish bases and transport corridors concerns Congress and other policymakers. The souring of Turkey-Israel relations has the potential to affect U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation given that the United States maintains close alliances with both Turkey and Israel (which is not a member of NATO), and has counted on previously close Turkey-Israel military relations to cultivate U.S.-Turkey-Israel military cooperation. Arms Sales and Industrial Cooperation
Turkey no longer receives annual Foreign Military Financing aid for purchasing U.S.-produced equipment. A final purchasing decision could be made in 2011. Some officials and analysts believe that in at least some respects the United States needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the United States, given (1) increased Turkish economic and military self-sufficiency, and (2) what they view as a relative decline of U.S. influence in the region and globally as other actors emerge—particularly those that have greater intimate knowledge of the region and more of an existential stake in its security. Others counter that claims of Turkish leverage over the United States are exaggerated because
Turkey's influence with the United States ultimately depends on its ability to help deliver regional outcomes that serve U.S. interests; the United States arguably can depend on other allies to deliver outcomes it desires; and it is unclear whether any potential non-NATO alliance could provide Turkey with superior, equal, or comparable (1) security guarantees, (2) regional influence and geopolitical prestige, or (3) collaborative benefits on military matters such as procurement, interoperability, or training. However, Turkey may not have yet decided whether it perceives hosting a proposed U.S. BMD radar under NATO auspices as, on balance, more likely to cultivate stability, or as unduly provocative to neighboring countries. The availability of Turkish bases and territory for U.S./NATO deployments, operations, and supply lines is valuable and remains a possible point of contention and leverage, but the extent of its importance and of alternatives may be subject to further analysis. | Congress and the Obama Administration are seeking to manage longstanding bilateral and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-based defense cooperation with Turkey at a time when a more independent Turkish foreign policy course and changes in regional security conditions are creating new challenges for both countries. Defense cooperation rooted in shared threat perceptions from the Cold War era and built on close U.S. ties with the Turkish military leadership now must be reconciled with a decline of the military's political influence in Turkish society and some negative turns in Turkish popular sentiment toward the United States over the past decade. At the same time, Turkey's importance as a U.S. ally has arguably increased on issues of global significance in its surrounding region that include Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In early 2011, Turkey's regional role has arguably become even more prominent—exemplified by its significant involvement politically and militarily on the question of NATO's intervention in Libya.
How Congress and the Administration manage defense cooperation with Turkey in this evolving context is likely to have a significant bearing on U.S. national security interests, as well as on both U.S. and Turkish calculations of the mutual benefits and leverage involved in the cooperative relationship. Some officials and analysts believe that, in at least some respects, the United States needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the United States. Others counter that claims of Turkish leverage over the United States are exaggerated.
Possible general congressional and Administration approaches to U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation ("Possible U.S. Policy Approaches") include
avoiding major recharacterizations of the alliance, while emphasizing and expressing confidence that existing NATO and bilateral relationships—with their long legacies—can address mutual security challenges; according high priority to the alliance and revising expectations for it by accommodating new developments within and outside of Turkey; linking cooperation in some way to Turkey's relations with certain third-party countries or non-state actors—including Iran, Israel, Hamas, Armenia, and China—or to Turkish actions on issues of U.S. national security interest; and using or combining any of these approaches on a case-by-case basis.
Specific issues that remain of significant importance for Congress (see "Specific Issues and Possible Options for Congress"), given its authority to appropriate funds, review major arms sales, consider non-binding resolutions, and provide general oversight include the following:
Continued military access to Turkish bases and transport corridors: The ongoing availability to the United States and NATO of Turkish bases and transport corridors—which have been used heavily for military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya—is valuable and remains a possible point of contention and leverage. The extent of its importance and of alternatives may be subject to further analysis. Future of Turkey-Israel relations: U.S. efforts to maintain alliances with both Turkey and Israel could be made more complicated if relations between them do not improve—potentially influencing the regional security environment. Missile defense radar: Whether Turkey agrees in 2011 to host a U.S. forward-deployed radar for missile defense as part of the NATO system may depend on its perceptions of whether doing so would be more likely to cultivate stability or to be unduly provocative to neighboring countries. Arms sales and industrial cooperation: Turkey continues to seek advanced military equipment from U.S. sources, particularly with respect to fighter and drone aircraft, helicopters, and missile defense systems (see "Arms Sales and Industrial Cooperation"). At the same time, Turkey is increasingly diversifying its defense contacts and procurement relationships with non-NATO countries. Military and security assistance: Although the United States no longer provides major annual grant aid to Turkey's military, assistance continues to foster cooperation on counterterrorism, law enforcement, and military training and education.
For more information on related issues, please see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Politics of Identity and Power, and CRS Report RL34642, Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views, both by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_97-139 | crs_97-139_0 | Background
Congress and state legislatures have authorized the use of forfeiture for over 200 years. Forfeiture law has always been somewhat unique. Civil Forfeiture
Forfeiture follows one of two procedural routes: criminal or civil. Although crime triggers all forfeitures, they are classified as civil forfeitures or criminal forfeitures according to the nature of the judicial procedure which ends in confiscation. Criminal forfeitures are part of the criminal proceedings against the property owner, and confiscation is possible only upon the conviction of the owner of the property and only to the extent of defendant's interest in the property. Civil forfeiture is ordinarily the product of a civil, in rem proceeding in which the property is treated as the offender. Within the confines of due process and the language of the applicable statutes, the guilt or innocence of the property owner is irrelevant; it is enough that the property was involved in a crime to which forfeiture attaches in the manner in which statute demands. Administrative Forfeitures
In the interests of expediency and judicial economy, Congress has sometimes authorized the use of administrative forfeiture as the first step after seizure in "uncontested" cases. It is punishment, even though it may also serve remedial purposes very effectively. Intergovernmental transfers and the use of special funds, however, are the hallmarks of the more prominent federal forfeiture statutes. Double Jeopardy
Historically, the procedure used to accomplish forfeiture made a difference for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause. The Supreme Court's conclusion in Austin that certain civil forfeitures might be considered punitive for purposes of the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause seemed to have obvious double jeopardy implications. The Court left open, however, the question of whether due process requires notice and the opportunity for a hearing before a restraining order may be issued. (a) Notice by Publication. (e) Disposition of forfeited property
(1) Whenever property is civilly or criminally forfeited under this subchapter the Attorney General may—
(A) retain the property for official use or, in the manner provided with respect to transfers under section 1616a of Title 19, transfer the property to any Federal agency or to any State or local law enforcement agency which participated directly in the seizure or forfeiture of the property;
(B) except as provided in paragraph (4), sell, by public sale or any other commercially feasible means, any forfeited property which is not required to be destroyed by law and which is not harmful to the public;
(C) require that the General Services Administration take custody of the property and dispose of it in accordance with law;
(D) forward it to the Drug Enforcement Administration for disposition (including delivery for medical or scientific use to any Federal or State agency under regulations of the Attorney General); or
(E) transfer the forfeited personal property or the proceeds of the sale of any forfeited personal or real property to any foreign country which participated directly or indirectly in the seizure or forfeiture of the property, if such a transfer—
(i) has been agreed to by the Secretary of State;
(ii) is authorized in an international agreement between the United States and the foreign country; and
(iii) is made to a country which, if applicable, has been certified under section 2291j(b) of Title 22. (B) Special Verdict Form. P.L. | Forfeiture has long been an effective law enforcement tool. Congress and state legislatures have authorized its use for over 200 years. Every year, it redirects property worth billions of dollars from criminal to lawful uses. Forfeiture law has always been somewhat unique. By the close of the 20th century, however, legislative bodies, commentators, and the courts had begun to examine its eccentricities in greater detail because under some circumstances it could be not only harsh but unfair. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), P.L. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000), was a product of that reexamination.
Modern forfeiture follows one of two procedural routes. Although crime triggers all forfeitures, they are classified as civil forfeitures or criminal forfeitures according to the nature of the procedure which ends in confiscation. Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding. The property is the defendant in the case. Unless the statute provides otherwise, the innocence of the owner is irrelevant—it is enough that the property was involved in a violation to which forfeiture attaches. As a matter of expedience and judicial economy, Congress often allows administrative forfeiture in uncontested civil confiscation cases. Criminal forfeiture is an in personam proceeding, and confiscation is possible only upon the conviction of the owner of the property.
The Supreme Court has held that authorities may seize moveable property without prior notice or an opportunity for a hearing but that real property owners are entitled as a matter of due process to preseizure notice and a hearing. As a matter of due process, innocence may be irrelevant in the case of an individual who entrusts his or her property to someone who uses the property for criminal purposes. Although some civil forfeitures may be considered punitive for purposes of the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause, civil forfeitures do not implicate the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause unless they are so utterly punitive as to belie remedial classification.
The statutes governing the disposal of forfeited property may authorize its destruction, its transfer for governmental purposes, or deposit of the property or of the proceeds from its sale in a special fund. Intra- and intergovernmental transfers and the use of special funds are hallmarks of federal forfeiture. Every year, federal agencies share among themselves the proceeds of jointly conducted forfeitures. They also transfer hundreds of millions of dollars and property to state, local, and foreign law enforcement officials as compensation for their contribution to joint enforcement efforts.
This report is available in an abridged form, without citations, footnotes, or appendices, as CRS Report RS22005, Crime and Forfeiture: In Short, by [author name scrubbed]. For a discussion of selected proposed reforms, see CRS Report R43890, Asset Forfeiture: Selected Legal Issues and Reforms, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34408 | crs_RL34408_0 | Overview
This report compares selected recommendations of the President's Commission on Care for America's Returning Wounded Warriors (PCCWW), often called the Dole-Shalala Commission in reference to its co-chairs, and the Veterans' Disability Benefits Commission (VDBC). The recommendations presented are those that relate to the transition of injured servicemembers from military service to civilian life and/or veteran status. This report does not examine certain other recommendations, such as those in the VDBC report regarding benefits for survivors of deceased servicemembers, or regarding evaluation of presumptive disability , i.e., establishing service connection for certain long-term health effects of hazardous exposures. As this report is limited to a comparison of the final recommendations of the PCCWW and the VDBC, it will not be updated. | This report compares selected recommendations of the President's Commission on Care for America's Returning Wounded Warriors (PCCWW), often called the Dole-Shalala Commission in reference to its co-chairs, and the Veterans' Disability Benefits Commission (VDBC). The VDBC was established in 2004 to study veterans' benefits in a broad context. The PCCWW was established in 2007 following reports of problems among injured servicemembers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan with medical rehabilitation and access to benefits. The PCCWW was charged to focus specifically on the needs of these individuals.
The recommendations presented in this report are those that relate to the transition of injured servicemembers from military service to civilian life and/or veteran status. This report does not examine certain other recommendations, such as those in the VDBC report regarding benefits for survivors of deceased servicemembers, or regarding evaluation of presumptive disability, i.e., establishing service connection for certain long-term health effects of hazardous exposures. As this report is limited to a comparison of the final recommendations of the PCCWW and the VDBC, it will not be updated. |
crs_R42675 | crs_R42675_0 | The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ), signed into law by President Barack Obama on August 2, 2011, provided for an increase in the statutory limit on the public debt in conjunction with a variety of measures to reduce the budget deficit. These measures included the creation of a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, which was tasked to develop and submit a plan to Congress containing deficit reduction to total at least $1.2 trillion over the FY2012-FY2021 period. However, because the committee did not report out recommendations and therefore no deficit reduction plan became law by January 15, 2012, the BCA's automatic spending reduction process was triggered. Proposals to Replace the FY2013 Sequester
Some Members of Congress have offered proposals for repealing or modifying the automatic spending reductions before they go into effect. The President's FY2013 budget proposal eliminates the automatic spending reductions for all nine years and replaces them with alternative measures to reduce the deficit. The Sequester Replacement Reconciliation Act ( H.R. The largest of these proposals include allowing the 2001/2003/2010 tax cuts for single filers making over $200,000 and married joint filers making over $250,000 to expire; savings generated from changes to Medicare, Medicaid, agriculture, and other mandatory programs; and placing caps on spending for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). Together, this proposal totals $2,221 billion more in deficit reduction (see Table 1 ) than what would be achieved by the BCA's automatic spending reduction process between FY2012 and FY2022. The legislation would cancel the sequester of approximately $98 billion in discretionary defense, discretionary non-defense, and mandatory defense FY2013 funding scheduled to take place on January 2, 2013. 5652 would lower the current FY2013 cap on discretionary budget authority set by the BCA of $1,047 billion to $1,028 billion and would cut other mandatory non-defense programs. If enacted, this measure would reduce the deficit by $262 billion more than what would be achieved by the BCA's FY2013 automatic spending reductions over the FY2012-FY2022 period (see Table 2 ). This measure was passed by the House on May 10, 2012, by a vote of 218-199. On December 20, 2012, the House passed the Spending Reduction Act of 2012 ( H.R. H.R. 5652
Representative Chris Van Hollen proposed a substitute amendment to H.R. His proposal would have replaced the entire FY2013 sequester with a series of revenue increases and spending reductions. If enacted, this measure would reduce the deficit by $30 billion more than what would be achieved by the BCA's FY2013 automatic spending reductions over the FY2012-FY2022 period (see Table 2 ). This measure was not made in order by the House Rules Committee, and therefore was not offered. 6365)
On September 13, the House passed the National Security and Job Protection Act ( H.R. 6365 ), introduced by Representative Allen West, by a vote of 223-196. The act cancels the FY2013 sequester on discretionary defense, discretionary non-defense, and mandatory defense contingent upon enactment of H.R. 5652 , or an alternative measure that would achieve outlay reductions equal to those to be achieved by the FY2013 sequester in those categories. The act requires the President, with the assistance of OMB and federal agencies, in consultation with the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, to submit a "detailed" report within 30 days of enactment containing the uniform percentage reduction and dollar amount reductions for each account, and each program, project, and activity (PPA) within those accounts, required under the sequestration scheduled to occur on January 2, 2013. The STA report was released on September 14, 2012. | The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) provided for an increase in the statutory limit on the public debt in conjunction with a variety of measures to reduce the budget deficit. Included in these measures was the creation of a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, which was tasked to develop and submit a plan to Congress containing deficit reduction to total at least $1.2 trillion over the FY2012-FY2021 period. However, because the committee did not report out recommendations, the BCA's automatic spending reduction process was triggered. This process is set to begin on January 2, 2013.
Both President Obama and some Members of Congress have offered proposals for repealing or modifying the automatic spending reductions. The President's FY2013 Budget Proposal eliminates the automatic spending reductions for all nine years and replaces them with alternative measures to reduce the deficit. The largest of these proposals include allowing the 2001/2003/2010 tax cuts for singles making over $200,000 and households making over $250,000 to expire; savings generated from changes to Medicare, Medicaid, agriculture, and other mandatory programs; and placing caps on spending on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). Together, this proposal totals $2,221 billion more in deficit reduction than what would be achieved by the BCA's automatic spending reduction process between FY2012 and FY2022.
The Sequester Replacement Reconciliation Act of 2012 (H.R. 5652), agreed to by the House on May 10, 2012, would cancel the sequester of approximately $98 billion in discretionary defense, discretionary non-defense, and mandatory defense FY2013 funding scheduled to take place on January 2, 2013; would lower the current FY2013 cap on discretionary budget authority set by the BCA of $1,047 billion to $1,028 billion; and would cut other mandatory non-defense programs. If enacted, this measure would reduce the deficit by $262 billion more than what would be achieved by the BCA's FY2013 automatic spending reductions over the FY2012 to FY2022 period. A similar proposal, the Spending Reduction Act of 2012 (H.R. 6684), was also passed by the House on December 20, 2012.
Representative Chris Van Hollen offered a substitute amendment to H.R. 5652. His proposal would replace the entire FY2013 sequester with a series of revenue increases and spending reductions. If enacted, this measure would reduce the deficit by $30 billion more than what would be achieved by the BCA's FY2013 automatic spending reductions over the FY2012 to FY2022 period. This measure was not made in order by the House Rules Committee.
On September 13, the House passed the National Security and Job Protection Act (H.R. 6365), introduced by Representative Allen West, by a vote of 223-196. The act cancels the FY2013 sequester on discretionary defense, discretionary non-defense, and mandatory defense contingent upon enactment of H.R. 5652, or an alternative measure that would achieve outlay reductions equal to those to be achieved by the FY2013 sequester in those categories. This legislation was determined by CBO to not have a budgetary impact.
In addition to the measures proposed above to replace the BCA's automatic spending cuts, President Obama signed into law the Sequestration Transparency Act of 2012 (H.R. 5872) on August 7, 2012. This legislation requires OMB, in consultation with the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, to submit a detailed report within 30 days of enactment containing information on how the BCA's FY2013 automatic spending reductions will affect each non-exempt program, project, and activity. The STA report was released on September 14, 2012. |
crs_RL30792 | crs_RL30792_0 | Introduction
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) (1) provides for the listing and protection of species that are found tobe "endangered" or "threatened" -- species that need conservation efforts because they might becomeextinct. The listing of a species as endangered triggers the prohibitions in the act against "taking"(killing or harming) individuals of the protected species, unless a permit is obtained to takeindividuals incidental to an otherwise lawful proposed action, or unless an exemption for theproposed action is obtained. Unauthorized taking of a listed species can result in civil or criminalpenalties. These prohibitions and potential penalties can affect various activities, including the useand development of land, with attendant economic impacts. Therefore, the extent to which likelyeconomic impacts can be taken into account under the ESA has been of interest. Some parts of theact relate to importation and commercial trading in listed species. (2) This report does not addressthose issues, but discusses the ESA generally and how some of its provisions, aside from thecommercial context, relate to the consideration of economic factors. It will be updated ascircumstances warrant. The Listing Process
The determination of whether a species should be listed as endangered or threatened mustbe based on several factors that relate to the surviving numbers of a species and threats to itscontinued existence, but do not include a consideration of the economic effects of listing. (7) While the origins of threatsto a species may be caused by development or other economic activities, listing determinations areexpressly to be made "solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available." (13)
Therefore, although economic factors are not to be considered in the listing of a species asendangered or threatened, economic factors must be considered when deciding whether and whereto designate critical habitat, and some habitat areas may be excluded from designation based on suchconcerns, unless the failure to designate the habitat would result in the extinction of the subjectspecies. | The Endangered Species Act (ESA) provides for the listing and protection of species that arefound to be "endangered" or "threatened" -- species that might become extinct. The listing of aspecies as endangered triggers the prohibitions in the act against "taking" (killing or harming)individuals of the protected species, unless a permit is obtained to take individuals incidental to anotherwise lawful proposed action, or an exemption for the proposed action is obtained. Unauthorized taking of a listed species can result in civil or criminal penalties. These prohibitionsand potential penalties can affect various activities, including development and use of land, withattendant economic impacts. Therefore, the extent to which likely economic impacts can be takeninto account under the ESA has generated interest and discussion.
The determination of whether a species should be listed as endangered or threatened mustbe based "solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available." ("Commercialdata" here refers to trade data.) The data that may be considered at the listing stage may include factsrelated to a species' population, habitat, distribution, etc., as well as threats to its continued survival,but must not include economic factors.
However, economic factors may be, and in some instances must be, considered in devisingresponses to the listing of a species -- e.g., in the designation of critical habitat, in the process forobtaining an exemption for a particular proposed action from the prohibitions of the ESA, and in thedevelopment of the recovery plan for a listed species. Economic factors also play less direct rolesin the permitting processes.
Parts of the ESA relate to commercial importation and trade in listed species. This reportdoes not address those issues, but rather discusses the ESA generally, aside from the commercialcontext, and how some of its provisions relate to the consideration of economic factors. It will beupdated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_95-307 | crs_95-307_0 | In addition to ensuring the nation's supply of scientific and engineering personnel, the NSF promotes academic basic research and science and engineering education across many disciplines. The NSF provides support for investigator-initiated, merit-reviewed, competitively selected awards, state-of-the-art tools, instrumentation, and facilities. The majority of the research supported by the NSF is conducted at U.S. colleges and universities. Preliminary data reveal that approximately 82.3% ($3,900.6 million) of NSF's estimated FY2009 $4,742.0 million research and development (R&D) budget was awarded to U.S. colleges and universities. The FY2013 budget request for the NSF of $7,373.1 million represents a 4.8% increase ($340.0 million) above the FY2012 estimate of $7,033.1 million. The Research and Related Activities (R&RA) account is proposed at $5,983.3 million in the FY2013 request, $294.3 million (5.2%) above the FY2012 estimated level. The Senate proposes $196.2 million for MREFC and $875.6 million for the EHR, amounts equal to that of the request. | The National Science Foundation (NSF) was created by the National Science Foundation Act of 1950, as amended (P.L.81-507). The NSF has the broad mission of supporting science and engineering in general and funding basic research across many disciplines. The agency provides support for investigator-initiated, merit-reviewed, competitively selected awards, state-of-the-art tools, and instrumentation and facilities. The majority of the research supported by the NSF is conducted at U.S. colleges and universities. Approximately 82.3% ($3,900.6 million) of NSF's estimated FY2009 $4,742.0 million research and development (R&D) budget was awarded to U.S. colleges and universities.
The Administration's FY2013 budget request for NSF is $7,373.1 million, 4.8% above the FY2012 estimated level of $7,033.1 million. The FY2013 request includes $5,983.3 million for Research and Related Activities (R&RA), $875.6 million for Education and Human Resources, $196.2 million for Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC), $299.4 million for Agency Operations and Award Management, $4.4 million for the National Science Board (NSB), and $14.2 million for the Office of Inspector General. |
crs_RL33530 | crs_RL33530_0 | Background
Before the first Gulf war in 1991, Arab-Israeli conflict marked every decade since the founding of Israel. The next day, the President and Secretary Clinton jointly announced the appointment of former Senator George Mitchell as their Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. In November 1991, Israel and the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation agreed to separate Israeli-Jordanian and Israeli-Palestinian negotiating tracks, the latter to address a five-year period of interim Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Secret talks in Oslo, Norway produced a Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed by Israel and the PLO on September 13, 1993. This narrative resumes with the Camp David summit.) President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and PA Chairman Yasir Arafat held a summit at Camp David, from July 11 to July 24, 2000, to forge a framework accord on final status issues. They did not succeed. 2001-2005
On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel and vowed to retain united Jerusalem as Israel's capital, the Jordan Valley, and other areas for security. Mahmud Abbas became Chairman of the PLO and, on January 9, 2005, was elected President of the PA. Israel evacuated all settlements in the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the northern West Bank between August 17 and August 23. On November 14-15, Secretary Rice visited Israel and the PA. Sharon told her that Israel would not interfere if Hamas participated in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, but warned that if an armed terrorist organization is a partner in the Palestinian administration it could lead to the end of the Road Map. Hamas won the January 25 Palestinian parliamentary elections. On November 25, Olmert and Abbas agreed to a cease-fire in Gaza. At the Annapolis Conference on November 27, President Bush read a "Joint Understanding" that dealt with the process of negotiations, not their substance. Violence continued. After the Israeli elections, Benjamin Netanyahu was named to form a new government. Afterwards, the President said, "It is in the interests not only of the Palestinians but also the Israelis, the United States, and the international community to achieve a two-state solution in which Israel and the Palestinians are living side by side in peace and security." In addition, Israel must stop incursions, lift the siege of Gaza, remove barriers in the West Bank, and withdraw to the borders of September 28, 2000 (before the outbreak of the second intifadah or uprising); Negotiations based on U.N. resolutions and the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative; Setting a clear agenda and a time cap for negotiations; Rejecting postponement of negotiations on any final status issue, particularly Jerusalem and refugees; Rejecting a state with temporary borders; Refusing to recognize Israel as a "Jewish state" in order to protect the rights of refugees and of Israeli Arabs; Insisting on international participation in negotiations and on a mechanism for binding arbitration of impasses; Insisting on international monitoring and peace-keeping to guarantee implementation of an agreement; Holding a referendum on a peace agreement. Abbas would remain Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in which capacity he has negotiated with Israel. It stated that the United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it has a "renewed and sustained commitment" to a comprehensive, negotiated peace on all fronts, including "direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel's right to exist), and particularly Syria...." The report recommended that Israel return the Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee that could include an international force on the border, including U.S. troops if requested by both parties, in exchange for Syria's taking actions regarding Lebanon and Palestinian groups. On May 21, Israel, Syria, and Turkey simultaneously announced that Israel and Syria had indeed launched peace talks mediated by Turkey. On May 19-21, negotiating teams had held indirect talks in Istanbul. (The official figure is 42%.) A peace treaty was signed on October 26, 1994. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank-Gaza Strip
(Also called the Taba Accords or Oslo II.) Signed on September 28, 1995. A Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
(More briefly referred to as the Road Map.) Presented to Israel and the Palestinian Authority on April 30, 2003, by the Quartet (i.e., the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia). Role of Congress
Aid
Foreign aid issues related to the peace process are covered extensively in other CRS reports. For details, please see CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report RL32260, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2010 Request , by [author name scrubbed]. Administrations have maintained that the parties must determine the fate of Jerusalem in negotiations. U.S. | After the first Gulf war, in 1991, a new peace process consisting of bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon achieved mixed results. Milestones included the Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Declaration of Principles (DOP) of September 13, 1993, providing for Palestinian empowerment and some territorial control, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of October 26, 1994, and the Interim Self-Rule in the West Bank or Oslo II accord of September 28, 1995, which led to the formation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to govern the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, Israeli-Syrian negotiations were intermittent and difficult, and postponed indefinitely in 2000. Israeli-Lebanese negotiations also were unsuccessful, leading Israel to withdraw unilaterally from south Lebanon on May 24, 2000. President Clinton held a summit with Israeli and Palestinian leaders at Camp David on final status issues that July, but they did not produce an accord. A Palestinian uprising or intifadah began in September. On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel, and rejected steps taken at Camp David and afterwards.
On April 30, 2003, the United States, the U.N., European Union, and Russia (known as the "Quartet") presented a "Road Map" to Palestinian statehood. It has not been implemented. Israel unilaterally disengaged (withdrew) from the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the West Bank in August 2005. On January 9, 2005, Mahmud Abbas had become President of the PA. The victory of Hamas, which Israel and the United States consider a terrorist group, in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections complicated prospects for peace as the United States, Israel, and the Quartet would not deal with a Hamas-led government until it disavowed violence, recognized Israel, and accepted prior Israeli-Palestinian accords. President Abbas's dissolution of the Hamas-led government in response to the June 2007 Hamas forcible takeover of the Gaza Strip led to resumed international contacts with the PA. On November 27, at an international conference in Annapolis, MD, President Bush read a Joint Understanding in which Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert agreed to simultaneously resume bilateral negotiations on core issues and implement the Road Map. On May 21, 2008, Israel, Syria, and Turkey announced that Syria and Israel had begun indirect peace talks in Istanbul via Turkish mediators. Later in the year, Israeli and U.S. elections appeared to disrupt negotiations on all tracks and the end of the Israeli-Hamas cease-fire in December and the subsequent outbreak of violence in Gaza led to the official suspension of peace talks. President Obama has affirmed U.S. support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and named former Senator George Mitchell as his Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, but negotiations have not resumed.
Congress is interested in issues related to Middle East peace because of its oversight role in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, its support for Israel, and keen constituent interest. It is especially concerned about U.S. financial and other commitments to the parties, and the 111th Congress is engaged in these matters. Congress also has endorsed Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel, although U.S. Administrations have consistently maintained that the fate of the city is the subject of final status negotiations. See also CRS Report R40101, Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008-2009) , coordinated by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report RS22768, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Annapolis Conference, by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report RL33566, Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict, coordinated by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41060 | crs_R41060_0 | At that time, developments in professional football's labor-management relations had prompted questions regarding how, when, and in what manner a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) might be drafted. Interest in this matter included, on the part of some observers, questions about how Congress responded to previous work stoppages in professional sports. This report examines congressional activity related to the three most recent National Football League (NFL) work stoppages, which occurred in 1982, 1987, and 2011, and the 1994 Major League Baseball (MLB) strike. A summary of NFL labor-management history may be found in Appendix A . Appendix B provides an overview of key aspects of labor-management relations and sports, and Appendix C includes a discussion of antitrust exemptions applicable to professional sports. Congressional Response
Table 7 shows the legislative measures that were introduced in response to the strike. Other members of the Judiciary Committee disagreed, objecting to, among other things, congressional involvement in the matter. We have much more pressing problems to deal with. 1612 (104th Congress)
In the absence of introductory statements or hearings, it is not known whether these bills were efforts to address the baseball strike, or reflect the Members' general interest in professional baseball. S. 15, National Pastime Preservation Act of 1995 (104th Congress)
S. 15 was yet another bill that, if enacted, would have repealed baseball's antitrust exemption. At the hearing, several Members offered diverse views regarding whether the proposed repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption ought to be linked to the strike and the desirability of congressional intervention in the strike. Other members of the subcommittee offered reasons why Congress should refrain from intervening in the strike. Congressional Response
Table 8 shows the legislative measure that was introduced in response to the lockout. The following table shows the disposition of the legislative measures introduced or offered in response to the 1982 NFL strike, the 1987 NFL strike, the 1994 MLB strike, and the 2011 NFL lockout. Among the 26 legislative measures introduced, the only one that was approved was S.Res. | Prior to the 2011 National Football League (NFL) lockout, developments in professional football's labor-management relations had prompted questions regarding how, when, and in what manner a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) might be drafted. Interest in this matter included, on the part of some observers, questions about how Congress responded to previous work stoppages in professional sports. In attempting to address this particular question, this report examines congressional responses to the 1982 and 1987 work stoppages in the NFL. With the conclusion of the 2011 NFL lockout in July, this work stoppage is also included. Additionally, this report examines the 1994 Major League Baseball strike, which is useful considering the extent of congressional activity surrounding this strike.
Compared to the 1994 baseball strike, the 1982 and 1987 football strikes and the 2011 lockout did not garner much attention from Congress in terms of legislative measures and hearings. Three legislative measures were introduced in response to the 1982 strike; one each was introduced in response to the 1987 strike and the 2011 lockout. Members introduced or offered 22 legislative measures and held five hearings that were related to the baseball strike. With one exception (S.Res. 294, 100th Congress), none of these measures was approved by either house.
Members who introduced, or otherwise supported, legislative measures offered reasons for promoting congressional intervention. Their arguments touched on, for example, the economic impact of work stoppages, the role of baseball's antitrust exemption in establishing a climate conducive to players' strikes, previous congressional involvement in professional sports, and a responsibility to ensure the continuity of football (or baseball).
Disagreeing that congressional intervention was warranted, other Members offered several reasons why Congress ought not to intervene. For example, one Member suggested that repealing baseball's antitrust exemption would alter the balance of power in professional baseball. Other Members believed that more pressing matters deserved Congress's attention. At least one Member suggested that a particular bill, if enacted, would have the effect of favoring the players over the owners.
A summary of NFL labor-management history may be found in Appendix A. Appendix B provides an overview of key aspects of labor-management relations and sports, and Appendix C includes a discussion of antitrust exemptions applicable to professional sports. |
crs_RL33109 | crs_RL33109_0 | Background
Overview
Expedited removal, an immigration enforcement strategy originally conceived to operate at the borders and ports of entry, recently has been expanded in certain border regions. Expanding expedited removal raises a set of policy, resource, and logistical questions. Expedited removal is a provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), under which an alien who lacks proper documentation or has committed fraud or willful misrepresentation of facts to gain admission into the United States is inadmissable and may be removed from the United States without any further hearings or review, unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution. Aliens subject to expedited removal must be detained until they are removed and may only be released due to medical emergency or if necessary for law enforcement purposes. Under regulation, expedited removal only applied to arriving aliens at ports of entry from April 1997 to November 2002. In November 2002, the Bush Administration extended expedited removal to aliens arriving by sea who are not admitted or paroled. Subsequently, in August 2004, expedited removal was expanded to aliens who are present without being admitted or paroled, are encountered by an immigration officer within 100 air miles of the U.S. international southwest land border, and have not established to the satisfaction of an immigration officer that they have been physically present in the United States continuously for the 14-day period immediately preceding the date of encounter. Expansion Along the Border
In addition, on August 11, 2004, DHS published a notice potentially expanding the use of expedited removal by authorizing the agency to place in expedited removal proceedings aliens who:
are determined to be inadmissible because they lack proper documents; are present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled following inspection by an immigration officer at a designated port of entry; are encountered by an immigration officer within 100 air miles of the U.S. international land border; and have not established to the satisfaction of an immigration officer that they have been physically present in the United States continuously for the 14-day period immediately preceding the date of encounter. Nonetheless, DHS states that expedited removal currently can not be applied to the nearly one million aliens who are apprehended annually on the southwest border, as it is not possible to initiate formal removal proceedings against all of the aliens. Proponents of expanding expedited removal point to the law which states that aliens subject to expedited removal have not "entered" the United States, and therefore are not entitled to these rights. Relief from deportation can be granted at the master calender hearing if both the government and the alien agree to the relief. 750 would also have eliminated mandatory detention of aliens in expedited removal. Thus, unlike current policy, aliens in the interior of the country who have not been admitted or paroled into the United States, and who could not affirmatively show that they have been physically present in the United States continuously for two years, would have been subject to expedited removal. | Expedited removal, an immigration enforcement strategy originally conceived to operate at the borders and ports of entry, is being expanded, raising a set of policy, resource, and logistical questions. Expedited removal is a provision under which an alien who lacks proper documentation or has committed fraud or willful misrepresentation of facts may be removed from the United States without any further hearings or review, unless the alien indicates a fear of persecution. Congress added expedited removal to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1996, making it mandatory for arriving aliens, and giving the Attorney General the option of applying it to aliens in the interior of the country who have not been admitted or paroled into the United States and who cannot affirmatively show that they have been physically present in the United States continuously for two years. Until recently, expedited removal was only applied to aliens at ports of entry.
Proponents of expanding expedited removal point to the lengthy procedural delays and costs of the alien removal process. They cite statistics that indicate that the government is much more successful at removing detained aliens (aliens in expedited removal must be detained) than those not detained. They argue that aliens who entered the country illegally should not be afforded the due process and appeals that those who entered legally are given under the law. They point to the provision added to INA in 1996 that clarified that aliens who are in the United States without inspection are deemed to be "arriving" (i.e., not considered to have entered the United States and acquired the legal protections it entails). Advocates for requiring mandatory expedited removal maintain that it is an essential policy tool to handle the estimated 12 million unauthorized aliens in the United States.
Opponents of the expansion of mandatory expedited removal to the interior argue that it poses significant logistical problems, and cite increased costs caused by mandatory detention and the travel costs of repatriation. They also express concern that apprehended aliens will not be given ample opportunity to produce evidence that they are not subject to expedited removal, and argue that expedited removal limits an alien's access to relief from deportation. Some predict diplomatic problems if the United States increases repatriations of aliens who have not been afforded a judicial hearing. The Bush Administration is taking a an incremental approach to expanding expedited removal. From April 1997 to November 2002, expedited removal only applied to arriving aliens at ports of entry. In November 2002, it was expanded to aliens arriving by sea who are not admitted or paroled. Subsequently, in August 2004, expedited removal was expanded to aliens who are present without being admitted or paroled, are encountered by an immigration officer within 100 air miles of the U.S. southwest land border, and can not establish to the satisfaction of the immigration officer that they have been physically present in the United States continuously for the 14-day period immediately preceding the date of encounter. In January 2006, expedited removal was reportedly expanded along all U.S. borders. This report will be updated. |
crs_R41975 | crs_R41975_0 | Introduction
Technological developments related to the Internet benefit consumers who want convenient ways to view and hear information and entertainment content on a variety of electronic devices (such as televisions, radios, computers, mobile phones, video game consoles, and portable media players). New technologies offer the potential to help copyright holders promote their creative works for artistic, educational, and commercial reasons. However, new technologies may increase the risk of infringement of the copyright holders' rights because they often provide faster, cheaper, and easier means of engaging in unauthorized reproduction, distribution, and public performance of copyrighted works than previous technologies. There are many legitimate streaming websites that offer on-demand streams of television programs, motion pictures, live sporting events, and sound recordings. However, so-called "rogue" websites willfully stream copyrighted content without the permission of the copyright holder, thus violating the copyright holder's exclusive right to control public performance of the work. By offering consumers an unauthorized alternative for obtaining streaming content, these rogue websites may reduce the number of people who would otherwise visit the legitimate providers of copyrighted material. To enforce their intellectual property rights, copyright holders may file a lawsuit against those who illegally stream their protected works. In addition to these civil remedies, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has the power to criminally prosecute particularly egregious copyright infringers (repeat and large-scale offenders) in order to impose greater punishment and possibly deter other would-be infringers. However, a disparity exists regarding the criminal penalties available for those who willfully infringe copyrights by means of reproduction and distribution (a felony offense in certain circumstances) and those who infringe copyrights by means of public performance (a misdemeanor). In March 2011, the U.S. This legislation is also commonly referred to as "the Commercial Felony Streaming Act" by its supporters and by the press, although the bill has no official title. The legislation would authorize felony penalties for willful, unauthorized streaming of commercially valuable copyrighted material (for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain) and also expand the current felony offense of unauthorized distribution of a pre-release commercial copyrighted work to include "public performance" of such work as an additional basis for prosecution. Section 201 of the bill would make similar changes to criminal copyright law as S. 978 proposes, although there are a few additional amendments that are not found in the Senate bill. For example, H.R. 3261 would authorize misdemeanor and felony penalties for non-commercial willful public performance by means of digital transmission, during any 180-day period, of one or more copyrighted works, where the total retail value of the public performance exceeds $1,000. That is, H.R. 3261 would allow criminal penalties for such streaming activity without proof that the infringement was committed for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain. The defendant infringed the copyright willfully. 3261, the Stop Online Piracy Act
Illegal Streaming of Pre-Release Commercial Copyrighted Works
Section 201(a) of H.R. | Technological developments related to the Internet benefit consumers who want convenient ways to view and hear information and entertainment content on a variety of electronic devices. New technologies offer the potential to help copyright holders promote their creative works for artistic, educational, and commercial reasons. However, new technologies may increase the risk of infringement of the copyright holders' rights because they often provide faster, cheaper, and easier means of engaging in unauthorized reproduction, distribution, and public performance of copyrighted works than previous technologies.
One of these new technologies enables the "streaming" of copyrighted content over the Internet from a website to an end user. There are many legitimate streaming websites such as Hulu, Netflix, YouTube, and HBO GO that offer on-demand streams of television programs, motion pictures, live sporting events, and sound recordings. However, streaming technology can also be misused for facilitating copyright infringement online. So-called "rogue" websites serve as an alternative to the authorized websites, willfully streaming unlawfully obtained copyrighted content to users and thereby infringing the copyright holder's exclusive right to control public performance of the work. By offering consumers an unlawful alternative for viewing streaming content, these rogue websites may reduce the number of people who would otherwise visit the legitimate providers of copyrighted material.
To enforce their intellectual property rights, copyright holders may file a lawsuit against the alleged infringer. In addition to these civil remedies, the U.S. Department of Justice has the power to criminally prosecute particularly egregious copyright infringers (repeat and large-scale offenders) in order to impose greater punishment and possibly deter other would-be infringers. Yet under the current law, many illegal streaming websites have evaded prosecution due largely to a disparity regarding the criminal penalties available for those who willfully infringe copyrights by means of reproduction and distribution (a felony offense in certain circumstances) and those who infringe copyrights by means of public performance (a misdemeanor).
In March 2011, the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator recommended Congress amend the law to harmonize penalties for the act of illegally streaming copyrighted content with those applicable to downloading and peer-to-peer file sharing of such protected material. Following this recommendation, S. 978 was introduced in the 112th Congress. Commonly referred to as the Commercial Felony Streaming Act, S. 978 would allow a maximum five-year prison sentence for those who, without authorization, willfully stream commercially valuable copyrighted material for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain. It also expands the current felony offense of unauthorized distribution of a pre-release commercial copyrighted work to include "public performance" of such work as an additional basis for prosecution.
Section 201 of H.R. 3261, the Stop Online Piracy Act, would make similar changes to criminal copyright law as S. 978 and also a few more. The notable new addition is that H.R. 3261 would authorize misdemeanor and felony penalties for non-commercial willful public performance by means of digital transmission, during any 180-day period, of one or more copyrighted works, where the total retail value of the public performance exceeds $1,000. That is, H.R. 3261 would allow criminal penalties for such streaming activity without proof that the willful infringement was committed for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain. Such a provision is not included in S. 978. |
crs_RS22971 | crs_RS22971_0 | Introduction
Congressional and consumer interest in passenger natural gas vehicles (NGVs) has grown in recent years, especially in response to higher gasoline prices, concerns over the environmental impact of petroleum consumption for transportation, and policy proposals such as the "Pickens Plan." New EPA Regulations from April 2011—Added Flexibility for Converters
On April 8, 2011, EPA issued final regulations on alternative fuel vehicle conversions. The regulations provide new flexibility for converters to certify that their conversions do not violate the CAA anti-tampering provisions. Conclusion
Higher gasoline prices and concerns about U.S. oil dependence have raised interest in NGVs. The market for NGVs will likely remain limited unless the differential between natural gas and gasoline prices remains high in order to offset the higher purchase price for a natural gas vehicle or if new incentives are established to decrease the differential in initial vehicle purchase prices. New EPA regulations on NGV conversions could help promote the expansion of NGVs by lowering the cost of entry for conversion companies. | Higher gasoline prices in recent years and concerns over U.S. oil dependence have raised interest in natural gas vehicles (NGVs). Use of NGVs for personal transportation has focused on compressed natural gas (CNG) as an alternative to gasoline. Consumer interest has grown, both for new NGVs as well as for conversions of existing personal vehicles to run on CNG. This report finds that the market for natural gas passenger vehicles will likely remain limited unless the price for natural gas remains substantially lower than gasoline to offset the higher purchase price for an NGV.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated new regulations in April 2011 on alternative fuel vehicle conversions—including natural gas conversions. The new regulations allow greater flexibility for conversion companies to certify that their conversions do not lead to higher emissions—flexibility that could lead to significantly lower compliance costs. This could help spur the proliferation of natural gas conversions, especially for older vehicles. |
crs_RL31038 | crs_RL31038_0 | In addition, senior administration officials indicate that the White House sees APEC as a model for regional economic integration in the Asia Pacific which allows the United States to play a significant role in the region's political and economic development. First, Congress may choose to consider the level of direct and indirect financial support provided to APEC. Although both Congress and the Bush Administration view APEC as important to U.S. trade and economic and human security interests in the Asia, it is uncertain that APEC is a reliable mechanism for advancing those interests and if Congress and the Bush Administration share a common view of what the U.S. interests in Asia are. As a result, APEC's approach, organization, and operations may make it difficult for the United States to promote its positions on various issues through its activities in APEC. Collective actions of APEC usually involve joint or coordinated efforts to advance trade and investment liberalization in other multilateral organizations. First, they set "an APEC-wide regional aspirational goal of a reduction in energy intensity of at least 25 percent by 2030 (with 2005 as the base year). Second, APEC members will attempt to increase forest coverage by at least 20 million hectares of all types of forests by 2020. The Leaders reiterated APEC's commitment to build regional preparedness to respond to potential pandemics. Following his summary of democracy in Asia, President Bush proposed "the creation of a new Asia Pacific Democracy Partnership." Noteworthy Bilateral Meetings
The annual APEC Leaders' Meeting also provides a rare opportunity for the U.S. President to hold bilateral meetings with a number of important government leaders at one location. Assessment by the Bush Administration41
To the Bush Administration, the key outcomes of the APEC meetings in Sydney were: (1) Progress on the development of a FTAAP; (2) The endorsement of the APEC report on regional economic integration; (3) Agreement on a joint declaration on climate control; and (4) The Leaders' joint statement on the WTO negotiations. The decision by President Bush to depart after the first day of the two-day Leaders' Meeting came only a few days before the start of the APEC meetings, and was considered by some commentators a blow to relations with Australia and counterproductive to U.S. ambitions to forward its agenda during the event. 104 - 127 ) included a finding by Congress that:
... during the period 1996 through 2002, there will be several opportunities for the United States to negotiate fairer trade in agricultural products, including further negotiations under the World Trade Organization, and steps toward possible free trade agreements of the Americas and Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); and the United States should aggressively use these opportunities to achieve more open and fair opportunities for trade in agricultural products. Potential Senate Action
As previously mentioned, the U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty signed during the APEC meetings would be subject to the approval of the Senate, once submitted to the Senate by the President. Many argue that the United States should re-energize its involvement in Asian trade discussion and elevate the importance of APEC to reassert U.S. leadership. They advocate both increased financial assistance to APEC, though the annual contribution and specific assistance programs, and alteration in U.S. laws and policies on key issues. | There is apparent agreement between Congress and the Bush Administration that the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a potential vehicle for advancing U.S. economic, trade, diplomatic, and security interests both globally and regionally. In particular, APEC offers the United States an organizational counterpoint to other proposed regional associations in Asia. However, the organization's approach and perspective on these issues may pose problems for the United States. By design, APEC operates on the basis of consensus, under which its members voluntarily liberalize their economic and trade policies. As a result, APEC lacks enforcement mechanisms commonly seen in other multilateral organizations.
The main topics of discussion during the September 2007 two-day Leaders' Meeting and the two-day Ministerial Meeting were climate change and regional economic integration. The Leaders issued a separate joint declaration on climate change, which included "aspirational" commitments to reduce energy intensity by at least 25% by 2030 and to increase regional forest cover by at least 20 million hectares by 2020. APEC's consensus position on the latter topic entitled "Strengthening Regional Economic Integration," was endorsed by the Leaders. The APEC meetings also discussed the recent global problem with food and product safety.
For the Bush Administration, the APEC meetings provided an opportunity to reiterate its interest in forming a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) and to hold bilateral talks with a number of important Asia leaders. During the APEC meetings, Australian Prime Minister John Howard and President George Bush signed the U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty. Also, during his speech to the APEC Business Summit, President Bush proposed the creation of an "Asia Pacific Democracy Partnership." Some APEC members were critical of the departure of President Bush and Secretary Rice prior to the end of the Leaders' Meeting.
Proponents of greater U.S. involvement in APEC argue that the association provide the United States with a vehicle to re-energize its involvement in Asian trade discussions and to take a more active diplomatic role in the region. They suggest the United States should increase its financial assistance to APEC, through the annual contribution and specific assistance programs, and alterations in U.S. laws and policies on key issues. Others maintain that APEC may not be an effective mechanism for advancing U.S. interests in the region.
The President's initiatives at Sydney present the 110th Congress with opportunities to weigh in on the issue. Congress may take up the issue of the current level of direct and indirect financial support for APEC. Also, Congress may consider APEC's goals of trade and investment liberalization when legislating on various other programs. In addition, the Senate faces consideration of the new defense treaty with Australia.
This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R44004 | crs_R44004_0 | Administration Perspective and Goals
President Obama has declared energy efficiency and renewable energy to be high priorities, stressing their importance to jobs, economic growth, and U.S. manufacturing competitiveness. Recent Appropriations History
Since 2005, the annual Energy and Water Development (E&W) appropriations bill has funded all DOE programs, including those operated by the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). That office conducts two general types of programs: research and development (R&D), often conducted in partnership with private sector firms, and distribution of grant funds to state, territorial, and tribal governments. EERE administers a wide range of R&D programs, each with its own set of goals and objectives. Key Requested Increases
As part of that requested overall increase, DOE sought the largest increases for manufacturing and vehicles, sought significant increases for several other programs, and proposed to create a new local grants program. Manufacturing. Most of the requested increase, $140 million, would have supported two new Clean Energy Manufacturing Initiatives (CEMIs)—part of the President's National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI). Vehicles. The $164 milllion requested increase would have mainly supported the EV Everywhere Grand Challenge—with funds spread over several subprograms. Five other sizable increases are sought for EERE R&D programs:
Solar. Buildings. Geothermal. Wind. The largest share of the $39 million increase would have gone to new technology. Also, a sizable increase would have gone to mitigate wildlife impacts. Bioenergy. Weatherization. State Energy. 114-91 ) the Energy and Water Development (E&W) Appropriations Bill, 2016 with a recommendation of about $1.640 billion (includes a $17 million rescission) for EERE. House floor action increased the amount by $11 million to $1.652 billion. 114-54 ) recommended $1.933 billion (includes a $17 million rescission). Action on H.R. Ultimately, the E&W bill was incorporated as Division D of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2016 ( H.R. 2029 ( P.L. 114-113 , Division D) provided nearly $2.1 billion for EERE. 2028 . WBG semiconductors are one focus of DOE's Next Generation Power Electronics Manufacturing Innovation Institute. The House committee report proposed a cut of $60 million below the FY2015 level and recommended no funding for the drop-in biofuels project with the Departments of the Navy and Agriculture. The House-passed E&W bill ( H.R. The Senate report recommended an increase of $12 million over the FY2015 level and included $20 million for the SuperTruck II program. All of the funding would have gone to offshore wind development. About $4.8 million of that increase would have gone to the Technology-to-Market subprogram, of which $2.5 million is due to a transfer of the Solar Decathlon activity from EERE's Office of Building Technologies, and $2.3 million would support a new clean energy philanthropy alliance and a clean energy jobs initiative. | Since 2005, the Energy and Water Development (E&W) appropriations bill has funded all Department of Energy (DOE) programs, including those operated by the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). That office conducts two types of programs: research and development (R&D), usually conducted in partnership with private sector firms, and grant funds that are distributed to state governments. EERE administers a wide range of R&D programs, each with its own set of goals and objectives.
President Obama has declared energy efficiency and renewable energy to be a high priority, stressing their importance to jobs, economic growth, and U.S. manufacturing competitiveness. Also, efficiency and renewables are a focus of the President's Climate Action Plan and both are key strategies for the Environmental Protection Agency's Clean Power Plan regulation.
DOE's FY2016 request for EERE sought $2.723 billion, an increase of $809 million (42%). Nearly half of the proposed EERE increase would have gone to two R&D programs: manufacturing ($204 million) and vehicle technologies ($164 million). For manufacturing, most of the increase ($140 million) would have supported two new Clean Energy Manufacturing Institutes—part of the President's National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI). For vehicles, the increase would have mainly supported the Electric Vehicle (EV) Everywhere Grand Challenge—with funds spread over several subprograms.
The next largest requested increases would have gone to two more R&D programs: solar ($104 million) and building technologies ($92 million). Most of the remaining increase would have gone to three other R&D programs: geothermal ($41 million), wind ($39 million), and bioenergy ($21 million). Also, $75 million would have gone to increases for three grant programs: weatherization ($35 million), state energy ($20 million), and local energy ($20 million).
At several House and Senate appropriations and oversight hearings, testimony and Member questions revealed differing views about the requested funding amount and the role of market barriers and national interests in EERE program design and funding.
For the EERE portion of the FY2016 E&W bill (H.R. 2028), the House approved $1.652 billion (includes a $17 million rescission of prior year funds and $11 million added by non-program-specific floor amendments) and the Senate Appropriations Committee approved $1.933 billion (includes a $17 million rescission). However, the Administration issued a veto threat, in part because it found that H.R. 2028 would "underfund critical activities" at EERE. Ultimately, E&W appropriations appeared as Division D of the Consolidated Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2029). The bill was enacted as P.L. 114-113. The law provided $2.069 billion for EERE, which was $654 million below the request, but $145 million above the FY2015 level. Specific program increases included Vehicles ($30 million), Manufacturing ($29 million), Buildings ($29 million), Weatherization Grants ($22 million), Geothermal ($16 million), Water ($9 million), and Solar ($9 million). The Wind program was cut by nearly $12 million. |
crs_R44199 | crs_R44199_0 | This principle is embodied in congressional redistricting, the drawing of district boundaries from which the people choose their representatives to the U.S. House of Representatives. Prior to the 1960s, court challenges to redistricting plans were considered non-justiciable political questions that were most appropriately addressed by the political branches of government, not the judiciary. In 1962, in the landmark ruling of Baker v. Carr , the Supreme Court pivoted and held that a constitutional challenge to a redistricting plan was not a political question and was justiciable. Since then, a series of constitutional and legal challenges have significantly shaped how congressional districts are drawn. For example, the Supreme Court recently clarified how a court should evaluate whether race was a predominant factor in the development of a redistricting plan when considering a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. In April 2016, the Court ruled that states may draw their legislative districts based on total population rather than based on eligible or registered voters. In addition, as of the date of this report, two redistricting cases are currently pending before the Court: one case presents the question of whether partisanship can justify differences in population in the context of state legislative redistricting; another case presents the question of whether, in proving that race was a predominant factor in the creation of a redistricting plan, challengers must demonstrate that considerations of race predominated over politics. In order to comport with the constitutional standard of equality of population among districts, discussed below, at least once every 10 years, in response to changes in the number of Representatives apportioned to it or to shifts in its population, most states are required to draw new boundaries for its congressional districts. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to require that each congressional district within a state contain approximately the same population. This requirement is known as the "equality standard" or the principle of "one person, one vote." Specifically, Section 2 prohibits any voting qualification or practice—including congressional redistricting plans—applied or imposed by any state or political subdivision that results in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote based on race, color, or membership in a language minority. Under certain circumstances, the creation of one or more "majority-minority" districts may be required in a congressional redistricting plan. A majority-minority district is one in which a racial or language minority group comprises a voting majority. In order to facilitate determination of the totality of the circumstances, the Court listed the following factors, which originated in the legislative history accompanying enactment of Section 2:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivisions is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. In 2015, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission , the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an independent commission, established by initiative, for drawing congressional district boundaries. Conclusion
The legal framework for congressional redistricting resides at the intersection of the Constitution's limits and powers, requirements prescribed under federal law, and the various processes imposed by the states. Another recent Court decision construed the inoperable preclearance requirements in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to require a covered jurisdiction to maintain minority voters' ability to elect candidates of choice in a new redistricting plan, not to require that a particular numerical percentage of minority voters in a minority-majority district be maintained. | Congressional redistricting is the drawing of district boundaries from which the people choose their representatives to the U.S. House of Representatives. The legal framework for congressional redistricting resides at the intersection of the Constitution's limits and powers, requirements prescribed under federal law, and the various processes imposed by the states. Prior to the 1960s, court challenges to redistricting plans were considered non-justiciable political questions that were most appropriately addressed by the political branches of government, not the judiciary. In 1962, in the landmark ruling of Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court pivoted and held that a constitutional challenge to a redistricting plan was not a political question and was justiciable. Since then, a series of constitutional and legal challenges have significantly shaped how congressional districts are drawn.
Key Takeaways from This Report
The Constitution requires that each congressional district contain approximately the same population. This equality standard was set forth by the Supreme Court in a series of cases articulating the principle of "one person, one vote." In order to comport with the equality standard, at least every 10 years, in response to changes in the number of Representatives or shifts in population, most states are required to draw new congressional district boundaries. Congressional districts are also required to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), prohibiting any voting qualification or practice—including congressional redistricting plans—that results in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote based on race, color, or membership in a language minority. Under certain circumstances, the VRA may require the creation of one or more "majority-minority" districts, in which a racial or language minority group comprises a voting majority. However, if race is the predominant factor in the drawing of district lines, then a "strict scrutiny" standard of review applies. In 2015, in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, the Supreme Court set forth standards for determining whether race is a predominant factor in creating a redistricting map when considering a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. Alabama also held that the inoperable preclearance requirement in Section 5 of the VRA does not require that a new redistricting plan maintain the same percentage of minority voters in a majority-minority district. Instead, the Court held that Section 5 requires that the plan maintain a minority's ability to elect candidates of choice. Last year, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the Court held that states can establish independent commissions, by ballot initiative, to conduct congressional redistricting. In April 2016, in Evenwel v. Abbott, the Court held that states may draw their legislative districts based on total population rather than based on eligible or registered voters. As of the date of this report, two redistricting cases are pending before the Supreme Court: Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, regarding whether partisanship can justify differences in population; and Wittman v. Personhuballah, regarding what challengers must demonstrate in proving that race was a predominant factor in the creation of a redistricting plan. |
crs_RL31495 | crs_RL31495_0 | The United Nations, many human rights organizations, and most democratic nations have expressed support for the ICC. The Bush Administration, however, opposes it and in May, 2002, formally renounced any U.S. obligations under the treaty, to the dismay of the European Union. The compromise reached by the Security Council did not provide permanent immunity for U.S. soldiers and officials from prosecution by the ICC; rather, it invoked article 16 of the Rome Statute to defer potential prosecutions for one year. The U.N. Security Council adopted another resolution extending the deferral to July 1, 2004. The United States continues to pursue bilateral agreements to preclude extradition by other countries of U.S. citizens to the ICC. This report outlines the main objections the United States has raised with respect to the ICC and analyzes the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA) enacted to regulate U.S. cooperation with the ICC. The report discusses the implications for the United States, as a non-ratifying country, as the ICC begins to take shape, as well as the Administration's efforts to win immunity from ICC jurisdiction for Americans. A description of the ICC's background and a more detailed analysis of the ICC's organization, jurisdiction, and procedural rules may be found in CRS Report RL31437, International Criminal Court: Overview and Selected Legal Issues (pdf). This provision, known as the Nethercutt Amendment, was reauthorized by the 109 th Congress as part of the FY2006 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( H.R. Restrictions on Participation in Peacekeeping Missions
Unless subject to a blanket waiver under section 2003, section 2005 of the ASPA restricts U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations to missions where the President certifies U.S. troops may participate without risk of prosecution by the ICC because the Security Council has permanently exempted U.S. personnel from prosecution for activity conducted as participants, or because each other country in which U.S. personnel will participate in the mission is either not a party to the ICC and does not consent to its jurisdiction, or has entered into an agreement "in accordance with Article 98" of the Rome Statute. Authority to Free Persons from ICC
Section 2008 authorizes the President to use "all means necessary and appropriate" to bring about the release of covered United States and allied persons, upon the request of the detainee's government, who are being detained or imprisoned by or on behalf of the ICC. 3057 / P.L. 5522 ), recently passed by the House of Representatives, would continue these prohibitions (§ 572). National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007
The Senate passed a measure as part of the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, S. 2766 , that would modify ASPA to end the ban on International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance to countries that are members of the ICC and that have not implemented Article 98 agreements (§ 1210). Although some view the decision as a sign that the Administration is softening its stance with respect to the ICC, it may also be seen as consistent with the U.S. support of a version of the Rome Statute that would have allowed the U.N. Security Council to refer cases involving non-States Parties to the ICC, but would not have allowed other states to refer cases. | One month after the International Criminal Court (ICC) officially came into existence on July 1, 2002, the President signed the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA), which limits U.S. government support and assistance to the ICC; curtails certain military assistance to many countries that have ratified the Rome Statute establishing the ICC; regulates U.S. participation in United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping missions commenced after July 1, 2003; and, most controversially among European allies, authorizes the President to use "all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release" of certain U.S. and allied persons who may be detained or tried by the ICC. The provision withholding military assistance under the programs for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) from certain States Parties to the Rome Statute came into effect on July 1, 2003. The 109th Congress reauthorized the Nethercutt Amendment as part of the FY2006 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 3057/P.L. 109-102). Unless waived by the President, it bars Economic Support Funds (ESF) assistance to countries that have not agreed to protect U.S. citizens from being turned over to the ICC for prosecution. H.R. 5522, as passed by the House of Representatives, would continue the ESF restriction for FY2007. The Senate passed a measure as part of the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122, S. 2766) that would modify ASPA to end the ban on IMET assistance.
The ICC is the first permanent world court with nearly universal jurisdiction to try individuals accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and possibly aggression. While most U.S. allies support the ICC, the Bush Administration firmly opposes it and has renounced any U.S. obligations under the treaty. After the Bush Administration threatened to veto a United Nations Security Council resolution to extend the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia on the ground that it did not contain sufficient guarantees that U.S. participants would be immune to prosecution by the ICC, the Security Council adopted a resolution that would defer for one year any prosecution of participants in missions established or authorized by the U.N. whose home countries have not ratified the Rome Statute. That resolution was renewed through July 1, 2004, but was not subsequently renewed. In addition, the United States is pursuing bilateral "Article 98"agreements to preclude extradition by other countries of U.S. citizens to the ICC. However, in what some view as a sign that the Administration is softening its stance with respect to the ICC, the United States did not exercise its veto power at the Security Council to prevent the referral of a case against Sudan's leaders for the alleged genocide in Darfur.
This report outlines the main objections the United States has raised with respect to the ICC and analyzes ASPA and other relevant legislation enacted or proposed to regulate U.S. cooperation with the ICC. The report concludes with a discussion of the implications for the United States, as a non-ratifying country, as the ICC begins to take shape, as well as the Administration's efforts to win immunity from the ICC's jurisdiction for Americans. A description of the ICC's background and a more detailed analysis of the ICC organization, jurisdiction, and procedural rules may be found in CRS Report RL31437, International Criminal Court: Overview and Selected Legal Issues, by [author name scrubbed] (pdf). |
crs_R44758 | crs_R44758_0 | T he 2014 farm bill (the Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. That is, they have a "baseline" beyond the end of the farm bill that may be used to pay to continue those programs. The 2014 farm bill contains 39 programs that received mandatory funding that do not have a baseline beyond FY2018. For these programs to continue, they would need to be allocated new budgetary authority. The Importance of Baseline to the Farm Bill
Funding for farm bill programs is provided in two ways:
1. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline is a projection at a particular point in time of what future federal spending on mandatory programs would be under current law. This baseline is the benchmark against which proposed changes in law are measured. Having a baseline essentially gives programs built-in future funding if policymakers decide that the programs should continue; straightforward reauthorization would not have a scoring effect. Generally, a program with estimated mandatory spending in the last year of its authorization will be assumed to continue in the baseline as if there were no change in policy and it did not expire. However, some programs may not be assumed to continue in the budget baseline beyond the end of a farm bill because they are either
programs with estimated mandatory spending less than a minimum $50 million scoring threshold in the last year of the farm bill, or new programs established after 1997 for which the Budget Committees determined that the mandatory spending shall not extend beyond expiration. These programs had estimated mandatory spending totaling $2.824 billion over the five-year window of the farm bill ( Table 1 ). Any extended authorization of these programs would be scored as new mandatory spending, which may require either offsets from existing baseline for other programs or an increase in net spending. As a share of the $489 billion five-year mandatory cost of the farm bill in 2014, programs without a baseline beyond FY2018 are relatively small: 0.6% of the total projected farm bill spending, or 2.5% of the total excluding the nutrition programs ( Table 1 ). For the rural development title, 100% of the mandatory spending in the 2014 farm bill was by programs that do not have baseline beyond FY2018. | The 2014 farm bill (the Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79) provided mandatory funding for many programs. Some of these programs have a budget baseline beyond the end of the farm bill in FY2018, while others do not. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline is a projection at a particular point in time of what future federal spending on mandatory programs would be under current law. This baseline is the benchmark against which proposed changes in law are measured. This report identifies mandatory programs in the 2014 farm bill that lack a budget baseline and explains the significance of this for enacting a successor to the current farm bill.
Generally, a program with estimated mandatory spending in the last year of its authorization will be assumed to continue in the baseline as if there were no change in policy and it did not expire. However, some programs may not be assumed to continue in the budget baseline, because the program had estimated mandatory spending less than a minimum $50 million scoring threshold in the last year of the farm bill, or the Budget Committees and/or Agriculture Committees determined that mandatory spending shall not extend beyond expiration.
Having a baseline essentially gives programs built-in future funding if policymakers decide that the programs should continue. Programs without a continuing baseline beyond the end of farm bill do not have assured future funding. As such, any extended authorization of these latter programs would be scored as new mandatory spending.
The 2014 farm bill contains 39 programs that received mandatory funding that do not have baseline beyond FY2018. These programs had estimated mandatory spending totaling $2.824 billion over the five-year farm bill. While this total may be a relatively small fraction of total farm bill spending (0.6% of the $489 billion five-year total projection), the effect may be particularly important to specific farm bill titles and to the programs' beneficiaries.
Notable programs among this group include certain conservation programs; most of the bioenergy, rural development, and research title programs; various nutrition title pilot programs and studies; organic agriculture and farmers' market programs; trade promotion programs; and outreach to socially disadvantaged and military veteran farmers. If policymakers want to continue these programs in the next farm bill, they may need to find budgetary offsets to pay for the costs. |
crs_R42107 | crs_R42107_0 | Introduction
The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) is the workers' compensation system for federal employees. The FECA program is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP). Benefits are paid for the duration of the disability or the life of the beneficiary. The list of scheduled benefits is provided in the Appendix A to this report and for each type of permanent partial disability, an employee receives the standard FECA benefits for the number of weeks indicated. Death
If an employee dies in the course of employment or from a latent condition caused by his or her employment, the employee's survivors are eligible for the following compensation benefits:
if the employee had a spouse and no children, then the spouse is eligible for a monthly benefit equal to 50% of the employee's monthly wage at the time of death or if the employee had a spouse and one or more children, then the spouse is eligible for a monthly benefit equal to 45% of the employee's monthly wage at the time of death and each child is eligible for a monthly benefit equal to 15% of the employee's monthly wage at the time of death, up to a maximum family benefit of 75% of the employee's monthly wage at the time of death. Vocational Rehabilitation
The Secretary of Labor may direct any FECA beneficiary to participate in vocational rehabilitation, the costs of which are paid by the federal government. FECA and the U.S. Postal Service
The USPS and its employees make up the largest component of the FECA program, and postal workers are injured on the job at rates disproportionate to the rest of the federal government. The provision of FECA compensation benefits to workers after retirement age has changed during the history of the FECA program. Although FECA benefits have always been paid for the duration of disability, between 1949 and 1974, the administrator of the FECA program was required to review the amount of benefits paid to each beneficiary at the age of 70 and was authorized to reduce the amount of such benefits if it was determined that the beneficiary's wage-earning capacity had been reduced by his or her age, independent of his or her disability. The FECA basic benefit rate for total disability is two-thirds of the worker's pre-disability wage. If one assumes that the types of injuries faced by federal employees and workers in the private and non-federal public sectors are not significantly different and that medical costs are also similar, this difference can be attributed to the higher level of FECA disability benefits, especially for higher-wage workers, compared with those offered by state workers' compensation systems. In FY2015, total costs for compounded medications ($214 million) surpassed costs for all other medications ($199 million) provided by the FECA program. The survivors of an employee killed on the job were entitled to cash benefits based on the worker's wage and were also entitled to a benefit to help offset funeral costs. These three changes remain key elements of the program today. Continuation of Pay
The 1974 amendments provided for up to 45 days of continuation of pay from a worker's employing agency in cases of traumatic injuries covered by FECA. | The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) is the workers' compensation program for federal employees. Like all workers' compensation programs, FECA pays disability, survivors, and medical benefits, without fault, to employees who are injured or become ill in the course of their federal employment and the survivors of employees killed on the job. The FECA program is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL) and the costs of benefits are paid by each employee's host agency. U.S. Postal Service (USPS) employees currently comprise the largest group of FECA beneficiaries and are responsible for the largest share of FECA benefits.
Elements of the FECA program include
basic disability benefits equal to two-thirds of an injured worker's pre-disability wage, which rises to 75% of the pre-disability wage if the worker has any dependents; disability benefits that continue for the duration of disability or the life of the beneficiary and in cases of traumatic injuries, beneficiaries can receive a continuation of their full pay for the first 45 days; disability benefits for persons with specific permanent partial disabilities, such as the loss of a limb, for a set number of weeks provided by schedules set by statute and regulation; all medical costs associated with covered conditions without any copayments, cost-sharing, or use of private insurance by the beneficiaries; cash benefits for the survivors of employees killed on the job based on the worker's wages and a modest benefit for funeral costs; and vocational rehabilitation services to assist beneficiaries in returning to work.
This report also focuses on several key policy issues facing the program, including the disproportionate share of claims and program costs attributed to postal workers, the payment of FECA benefits after retirement age, the overall level of FECA disability benefits as compared with those offered by the states, the administration of the FECA program, and the costs associated with prescriptions for compounded medications.
The modern FECA program can trace its roots to 1916 but has not been significantly amended since 1974. A legislative history of the FECA program is provided in Appendix B. |
crs_R42862 | crs_R42862_0 | Introduction
Experts believe that terrorist use of chemical agents is an event with low probability, but potentially high consequences. While terrorist groups may or may not have an increased interest in chemical agent acquisition and use, the domestic vulnerability of the United States to chemical attack remains an issue. The possibility that terrorist groups might obtain insecure chemical weapons led to increased scrutiny of declared Libyan chemical weapon stockpiles following the fall of the Qadhafi regime. Experts have expressed similar concerns regarding the security of Syrian chemical weapons, reportedly including stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, and their potential use. For analysis of chemical weapons possession and use in Syria, see CRS Report R42848, Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. Additionally, military and civilian chemical agent detection has developed with little coordination, so that civilian toxic industrial chemical kits and military chemical weapons detectors have varying sensitivities and detection capabilities. Treatments for chemical exposure vary on a chemical by chemical basis. This report describes the different types of chemical weapons and toxic industrial chemicals, their availability, treatment, and detection. Different chemical weapons cause different symptoms in and injuries to their victims. Military planners generally categorize chemical agents into at least four classes: nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents. This method organizes chemical agents by their biological effects. Nerve agents interfere with the nervous system, causing overstimulation of muscles. The combination of these two chemicals removes cyanide, the active compound in blood agents, from the body. Decontamination is especially important in those cases where victims have encountered liquid chemical agents, and may have significant amounts of chemical agent trapped in their garments. Detection of Chemical Agents
Chemical weapons detection has been predominantly an area of concern for military planners, although the manufacture of some of these agents for commercial use requires detection capabilities at manufacturing plants and by first responders trained to handle hazardous materials. Another is to identify the chemical agent used in an attack. Handheld detectors, such as the Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM), are able to detect some chemical agents, namely mustard agents and nerve agents. On the other hand, chemical agents might be effectively used as weapons of terror in situations where limited or enclosed space might decrease the required amounts of chemical. As a weapon of mass destruction used against civilians, the comparatively low lethality of choking agents complicates their use as a weapon of mass destruction, since very large volumes would be needed. The quick dispersal of blood agents, combined with the large amounts necessary to cause mass casualties, make such agents difficult to use on a mass scale. | The potential for terrorist use of chemical agents is a noted concern highlighted by the Tokyo sarin gas attacks of 1995. The events of September 11, 2001, increased congressional attention towards reducing the vulnerability of the United States to such unconventional attacks. The possibility that terrorist groups might obtain insecure chemical weapons led to increased scrutiny of declared Libyan chemical weapon stockpiles following the fall of the Qadhafi regime. Experts have expressed similar concerns regarding the security and use of Syrian chemical weapons, reportedly including stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents. For analysis of chemical weapons in Syria, see CRS Report R42848, Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
Military planners generally organize chemical agents, such as chemical weapons and toxic industrial chemicals, into four groups: nerve agents (such as sarin and VX), blister agents (such as mustard gas), choking agents (such as chlorine and phosgene), and blood agents (such as hydrogen cyanide). While the relative military threat posed by the various chemical types has varied over time, terrorist use of these chemicals against civilian targets is viewed as a low probability, high consequence event.
Chemical weapons and toxic industrial chemicals cause a variety of symptoms in their victims. These symptoms depend on the chemical agent used, and a victim of chemical exposure may exhibit a combination of symptoms. Some chemical agents cause death by interfering with the nervous system. Some chemical agents inhibit breathing and lead to asphyxiation. Other chemical agents have caustic effects on contact. As a result, effective chemical attack treatment depends on identifying at least the type of chemical agent used. Additionally, chemical agents trapped on the body or clothes of victims may place first responders and medical professionals at risk.
Civilian protection from and detection of chemical agents is an area of federal concern. Whether terrorist groups are capable of using chemical agents as weapons of mass destruction is unclear. Some experts have asserted that the volumes of chemicals required to cause mass casualties makes that scenario unlikely. They claim that chemical terrorism is more likely to be small in scale. Other experts have suggested that there has been an increase in terrorist interest regarding chemical agents, and that this interest could lead to their use in terrorist attacks. Some experts assert that insecure stockpiles of military-grade chemical agents would lower the barrier to terrorist acquisition of chemical agents and thus increase the possibility that terrorists might use them. The change of regimes in Libya and Egypt and recent events in Syria have increased concern that such military-grade chemical agents might transition into terrorist hands and then be used to attack U.S. sites either domestically or abroad. |
crs_RL33855 | crs_RL33855_0 | The Social Security Administration (SSA) may designate a government entity as the representative payee of a foster child if the child's custodial or non-custodial parents, guardians, relatives, stepparents, or a close friend are not available to serve in that role. Nearly all states use SSI and/or other Social Security benefits to pay for foster care. Social Security benefits may be paid to the children of workers who have retired, become disabled, or died. SSI benefits are authorized under Title XVI of the Social Security Act and are available for certain children with disabilities if their families have low incomes and minimal assets. Typically, however, a state, acting as the child's representative payee, is believed to use SSI or Social Security benefits to provide a foster care maintenance payment to the child (or to reimburse itself for that payment). Use of SSI and Other Social Security Benefits by Child Welfare Agencies
Most, if not all, states use Social Security and/or SSI benefits of children in foster care as a source of federal funds for their foster care programs. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously (in 2003) that the state of Washington could, as the representative payee for a foster child receiving Social Security or SSI benefits, use the child's benefits to reimburse itself for the cost of that child's foster care. The Court further noted that the use of funds to reimburse the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services for foster care was consistent with the regulatory requirement that such funds be spent for the "use and benefit of the beneficiary" and with the regulatory definition of "current maintenance" that includes "costs incurred in obtaining food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and personal comfort items." Proponents of reserving Social Security benefits for children in care further argue that even the practice of applying the benefits solely for the beneficiaries' foster care costs amounts to asking children to pay for their own stay in foster care, while other children in care (including those with assets or income other than Social Security or those who receive Social Security benefits but have a representative payee other than the child welfare agency) are not required to repay the costs. Some child welfare advocates express the concern that if states were not able to use SSI or Title II benefits to pay for a child's foster care room and board, then states would simply stop screening children to determine their eligibility for these programs. Federally enforceable changes to this practice would require congressional action. The costs for screening children who are not IV-E eligible would be borne entirely by the state. Passing Through Benefits
Congress could permit or require states that act as representative payees to "pass through" some or all of the SSI and Title II benefits to eligible foster children and those children could receive a portion of the benefits while in care and/or upon leaving care. 6192 , 111 th Congress) would require states, for any foster child receiving an SSI or other Social Security Act benefit (under Title II), to develop a plan specific to the needs of that child and that would conserve benefits not necessary for the immediate needs of the child to enable the child to "achieve self-support after leaving foster care." Identifying Alternative Representative Payees
Some child advocates have proposed changes to the selection of representative payees because of the perceived automatic process by which child welfare agencies are named as the payees for foster care children. | Of the more than 400,000 children in foster care on a given day, as many as 24,000 (about 6%) receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or other Social Security benefits. Some research suggests that a greater number of children in foster care might be eligible for SSI benefits if this assistance was sought. SSI benefits are available under Title XVI of the Social Security Act for certain disabled children from families with low incomes and minimal assets. Other Social Security benefits may be paid under Title II of the act to the children of workers who have retired, become disabled, or died.
Federal regulations require that in most cases the Social Security Administration (SSA) select and assign a representative payee—an individual, organization, or government entity—that manages SSI and Social Security payments for children, including those in foster care. Nearly all states designated as the representative payee for a foster child use the child's benefits to support the child in foster care. In Washington State Department of Social and Health Services v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler (hereinafter Keffeler), the Supreme Court held that the process used by the state of Washington to keep the Social Security benefits received as a child's representative payee was not prohibited by the Social Security Act. The Court also concluded that the use of funds for reimbursement for foster care services was consistent with the act's provisions that such funds be spent for the "use and benefit of the beneficiary" and within the regulatory definition of "current maintenance" (i.e., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and personal comfort items).
Although the Keffeler decision supports states' practice of using SSI and other Social Security benefits for reimbursement of foster care, some child advocates assert that by using these benefits to reimburse the cost of foster care, the state agency denies the child beneficiaries funding that rightly belongs to them. Advocates also raise concern that child welfare agencies are often automatically assigned as the representative payee for foster children. On the other hand, child welfare agencies and advocates argue that if states were not able to use benefits to pay for a child's foster care, they would stop screening children to determine their eligibility for these Social Security programs. They further raise the concern that if a foster child's SSI benefits were allowed to accumulate in a savings account, the child would soon surpass the "means test" for SSI and would lose eligibility for the benefits.
Changes governing how child welfare agencies are assigned as representative payees or how they use the Social Security benefits of foster children would require congressional action. For example, Congress could permit or require states that act as representative payees to "pass through" some or all benefits to eligible foster children and those children could receive a portion of the benefits while in care and/or upon leaving care. Congress could also make changes to the selection of representative payees so that certain individuals, such as the child's attorney, would have the opportunity to serve as the payee.
Legislation has been introduced that would prohibit using SSI or Title II Social Security benefits to reimburse a state for foster care maintenance payments; require state child welfare agencies to screen foster children for benefits; and for any foster child already receiving benefits, it would also require the state to develop a plan to "conserve benefits not necessary for the immediate needs of the child" to enable the child to "achieve self-support after leaving foster care." |
crs_R44941 | crs_R44941_0 | Introduction
Every year, disasters such as wildfires, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, volcanoes, and winter storms affect American communities. For example, under flooding conditions, household hazardous waste or sewage may contaminate otherwise benign personal property or building materials, such as drywall or carpeting. This report provides an overview of federal and state waste management requirements relevant to debris removal, as well as the challenges that can make it difficult for communities to manage debris quickly and safely. A number of federal agencies are authorized to support communities with disaster debris removal. This report focuses on support provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Each agency that provides debris removal support may do so under a number of different conditions or statutory authorities. A discussion of those various conditions or authorities is beyond the scope of this report. Generally, the overwhelming majority of disaster debris involves wastes regulated under Subtitle D. While not specifically defined in federal law, the term disaster debris generally refers to waste materials created by or in the aftermath of a natural or man-made disaster, such as:
construction and demolition (C&D) waste from destroyed buildings; vegetative debris, soils, and sediment; rotting materials, such as food or dead animals (e.g., pets or livestock); damaged vehicles, consumer appliances, and electronic devices; and hazardous chemicals or products, including those released from commercial, industrial, agricultural, or residential sites. Keys Challenges with Managing Disaster Debris
After a disaster, states generally attempt to manage disaster debris in a way that limits short- and long-term threats to public health and safety or to the environment. Volume
One of the greatest challenges facing a community recovering from a disaster is the overwhelming volume of debris generated. Debris may be inextricably mixed with or contaminated by harmful or hazardous constituents. Agency Roles in Supporting Debris Removal
Federal Agency Roles
Federal debris removal assistance is most commonly provided in accordance with provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ( P.L. 93-288 , as amended, the Stafford Act). Federal agencies may provide technical or other forms of assistance to communities affected by a disaster under authorities other than those provided in the Stafford Act. Second, it may approve direct federal assistance to an applicant (state or local government) that does not have the capability to respond to a presidentially declared disaster. Federal funding for disaster-related debris removal is coordinated and provided by FEMA primarily through its Public Assistance (PA) Grant Program. With respect to debris removal, the Corps is authorized to:
develop projects to collect and remove drift and debris from federally maintained commercial harbors and land and water immediately adjacent to those areas, remove sunken vessels or other obstructions from navigable waterways under emergency conditions, and assist with debris removal from flood control works as necessary to protect human life and improved property or to help communities recover from the effects of disasters. Also, EPA may be mission assigned activities to ensure that hazardous wastes or materials are managed properly. | Every year, communities in the United States are affected by disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, volcanoes, floods, wildfires, and winter storms. After a disaster, when a region turns its attention to rebuilding, one of the greatest challenges often involves properly managing disaster-related debris.
Disaster debris typically includes soils and sediments, vegetation (trees, limbs, shrubs), municipal solid waste (common household garbage, personal belongings), construction and demolition debris (in some instances, entire residential structures and all their contents), vehicles, food waste, "white goods" (refrigerators, freezers, air conditioners), and household hazardous waste(cleaning agents, pesticides, pool chemicals). Each type of waste may contain or be contaminated with toxic or hazardous constituents.
In the short term, debris removal is necessary to facilitate the recovery of a geographic area. In the long term, the methods by which these wastes are managed requires proper consideration to ensure that their management (e.g., by landfilling) will not pose future threats to human health or the environment.
Under a number of different conditions and authorities, several agencies may provide debris removal assistance to communities affected by a disaster. For example, under certain conditions, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides funding for disaster debris removal and/or approves direct federal assistance to certain entities that do not have the capability to respond to a disaster. Also, under certain conditions, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may assist communities with debris removal activities. For example, the Corps may perform right-of-way clearance, curbside waste pickup, private property debris removal, and property demolition, and EPA may help coordinate the collection and management of contaminated debris and household hazardous wastes.
This report focuses on the requirements applicable to disaster debris management and the challenges that communities face when attempting to manage it both quickly and safely. This report also provides an overview of the types of support provided by FEMA, the Corps, and EPA with respect to disaster debris removal. A discussion of the programs or statutory authorities under which that support may be provided is beyond the scope of this report. There are a number of conditions under which federal agencies may support communities with disaster debris removal. With respect to FEMA's involvement in debris removal assistance, this report focuses on support that may be provided after the President declares the incident to involve a "major disaster" under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended). |
crs_RL32395 | crs_RL32395_0 | International Law Protecting Prisoners
The international law of armed conflict, in particular, those parts relating to belligerentoccupation, applies in Iraq. (4) The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (5) and the HagueRegulations (6) play animportant role. Other international law relevant to human rights and to the treatment of prisonersmay also apply. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." (7) The Convention Against Torture (CAT) is also relevant. Prisoners of War (POW). (9)
Civilians Detainees. Responsibility for Breaches. (29) Mistreatment of prisoners of war may incur individual liabilityunder both international norms and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and may amountto "grave breaches" under the Geneva Conventions. Paragraph 1-5 of AR 190-8 sets forth the general standards:
a. U.S. policy, relative to the treatment of EPW, CI andRP in the custody of the U.S. Armed Forces, is as follows:
(1) All persons captured, detained, interned, orotherwise held in U.S. Armed Forces custody during the course of conflict will be givenhumanitarian care and treatment from the moment they fall into the hands of U.S. forces until finalrelease or repatriation. War crimes committed by personsnot subject to the UCMJ may be prosecuted in federal court under the War Crimes Act of 1996. (49) States parties also undertake to provide necessary training toprevent torture and "other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do notamount to torture" to "law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, publicofficials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of anyindividual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment," (50) and to "keep undersystematic review interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangementsfor the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonmentin any territory under its jurisdiction, with a view to preventing any cases of torture." Congress passedlegislation in 1994 to implement the requirements of the CAT (18 U.S.C.§ 2340 et seq .). Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). Jurisdiction of federal statutes extends to U.S. nationals at U.S. facilitiesoverseas. (89)
Iraqi Government Authority over Contractors. The Committees also interviewed General Taguba,who investigated the MP unit at Abu Ghraib, and Stephen Cambone, Undersecretary of Defense forIntelligence, as well as other intelligence officials. (112)
Legislation -- 108th Congress
The following laws enacted by the 108th Congress address the treatment of prisoners in Iraq. (117) Section 1091 states that the policy of the United States is toensure that no detainee in its custody is subjected to the treatment described above, to promptlyinvestigate and prosecute instances of abuse, to ensure that U.S. personnel understand the applicablestandards, to accord detainees whose status is in doubt the protection for prisoners of war under theGeneva Conventions, and to "expeditiously process and, if appropriate, prosecute detainees in thecustody of the United States, including those in the custody of the United States Armed Forces atGuantanamo Bay, Cuba." The report is to be submitted within 180 days of theenactment of P.L. 3003 , S. 12 § 224). H.R. Section 8155 of H.R. | Photographs depicting the apparent abuse of Iraqi detainees at the hands of U.S. militarypersonnel at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq resulted in numerous investigations, congressional hearings,and prosecutions, raising questions regarding the applicable law. The international law of armedconflict, in particular, those parts relating to belligerent occupation, applies in Iraq. The four GenevaConventions of 1949 related to the treatment of prisoners of war (POW) and civilian detainees, aswell as the Hague Regulations define the status of detainees and state responsibility for theirtreatment. Other international law relevant to human rights and to the treatment of prisoners mayalso apply. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits "cruel,inhuman or degrading treatment." The U.N. Declaration on Human Rights and the U.N. ConventionAgainst Torture (CAT) is also relevant. Federal statutes that implement the relevant internationallaw, such as the War Crimes Act of 1996 and the Torture Victim Protection Act, as well as othercriminal statutes with extraterritorial application may also come into play. Finally, the law of Iraqas amended by regulations that were issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) may applyin some circumstances.
This report summarizes pertinent provisions of the Geneva Conventions Relative to theTreatment of Victims of War (Geneva Conventions) and other relevant international agreements. The report begins with a discussion of international and U.S. standards pertaining to the treatmentof prisoners. A discussion of accountability in case of breach of these standards follows, includingpotential means of asserting jurisdiction over alleged violators, either in military courts under theUniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or U.S. federal courts, by applying U.S. criminal statutesthat explicitly apply extraterritorially or within the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of theUnited States (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7), or by means of the Military Extraterritorial JurisdictionAct (MEJA). The section that follows discusses international requirements to provide redress forthose whose treatment at the hands of U.S. officials may have fallen below the standards outlinedin the first section of the report. Finally, the report summarizes relevant congressional activityduring the 108th and 109th Congresses, including a brief discussion of the anti-torture provision of P.L.109-13 ( H.R. 1268 ) as well as relevant pending legislation ( H.R. 3003 , S. 12 , H.R. 112 , H.R. 2863 , S. 1042 ). This reportwill be updated. |
crs_RS20131 | crs_RS20131_0 | Governing Authorities
Morning hour debates are not provided for in the rules of the House. The House convenes for Monday morning hour debates 90 minutes earlier than the time established for that day's session. When Monday and Tuesday morning hour debates are completed, the House recesses until the meeting hour established for that day's session. Recognition Practices
The joint leadership unanimous consent agreement requires that the majority and minority leaders give the Speaker a list showing how each party's time for morning hour debates will be allocated among its Members. The chair follows this list in recognizing Members for morning hour debates. Various Uses of Morning Hour Debates
Individual Members often use the morning hour debate period to deliver speeches on subjects unrelated to legislation before the House. | On Mondays and Tuesdays, the House of Representatives meets earlier than the hour established for that day's session for a period called "morning hour debates" (also known as "morning hour speeches"). This period provides a rare opportunity for non-legislative debate in the House; remarks in the House are usually limited to pending legislative business. During morning hour debates, individual Members deliver speeches on topics of their choice for up to five minutes. The majority and minority leaders give the Speaker a list showing how each party's time for morning hour debates will be allocated among its Members. The chair follows this list in recognizing Members for morning hour debates. At the conclusion of morning hour debates, the House recesses until the starting time for that day's session. This report examines current House practices for morning hour debates and how these debates are used. It will be updated if rules and procedures change. |
crs_RL31686 | crs_RL31686_0 | Introduction
The effort to dispose of, and demilitarize, surplus military equipment dates back to the end of World War II, when the federal government decided to reduce a massive inventory of surplus military equipment by making such equipment available to civilians. The federal government created a program to loan and donate equipment to private organizations. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), to demilitarize military equipment is to destroy its inherent military offensive or defense capability. This report examines the process and problems associated with demilitarizing significant military equipment in the United States. The demilitarization issue is an important one today because evidence has shown that, due to failures in enforcement, potentially harmful weaponry and weaponry parts are finding their way into the hands of private U.S. citizens, as well as potential enemies of the United States. DOD identifies and disposes of approximately $20 billion dollars (acquisition value) of excess and surplus property annually (excluding ammunition, small arms, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, or classified materials.) Each of the military services sets the demilitarization code for each item it owns in the DOD inventory. At the July 2006 hearing before the House Government Reform Committee's Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) testified that from FY2002 through FY2004, DOD disposed of $33 billion in excess property, of which $4 billion was reported to be in new, unused, or excellent condition. At the July hearing, Bennie Williams, DLA Director of Logistics Operations, discussed DOD's efforts to improve the performance of the surplus and excess property inventory management and control system. Mr. Williams identified four target areas for managing surplus military equipment: (1) processing controls for batch lot items and materials requiring demilitarization; (2) processing of items received at the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) coded with Local Stock Numbers; (3) improved controls regarding access to DRMS inventory assets; and (4) reducing the concurrent procurement of items available at DRMS. Another issue is the different agency authorities for demilitarization policies. The responsibilities for both the surplus weapons program and the demilitarization of military equipment are dispersed, and thus create some jurisdictional problems. They include (1) permit selective exemption; (2) appoint one agency as Executive Program Agent for all federal agencies; (3) convene an independent panel; (4) conduct hearings; and (5) take no action. | This report examines the process and problems associated with demilitarizing significant military equipment in the United States. The demilitarization of military equipment is an important issue today; evidence has shown that because of some failures in enforcement, potentially harmful weaponry and parts are finding their way into the hands of private citizens, as well as possible enemies of the United States.
The effort to dispose of and demilitarize surplus military equipment dates back to the end of World War II, when the federal government decided to reduce a massive inventory of surplus military equipment by making such equipment available to civilians. The Department of Defense (DOD) identifies and disposes of approximately $20 billion of military surplus/excess materiel annually - items ranging from desks and chairs to full weapons systems. Recently, at a July 2006 hearing before the House Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Bennie Williams, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Director of Logistics Operations, identified four target areas for managing the collection, inventory, and access to surplus and excess military equipment: (1) processing controls for batch lot items and materials requiring demilitarization; (2) processing of items received at the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) coded with Local Stock Numbers; (3) improved controls regarding access to DRMS inventory assets; and (4) reducing the concurrent procurement of items available at DRMS.
Multiple agencies are involved in the control of excess and surplus defense equipment and weapons because DOD does not have the authority to fully enforce all demilitarization standards. Even the DOD demilitarization policy in place is regarded as ineffective and incomplete. There is no centralized federal authority to manage the program as each federal agency has its own policy and internal regulations which govern the acquisition, use, and disposal of demilitarized property.
Proponents who argue for the demilitarization of military equipment say that it is necessary to prevent accidental injury and death, while avoiding the unnecessary transfer of potentially harmful technology or military capability to domestic or foreign sources. Opponents, however, argue that the demilitarization issue is an attempt by the federal government to usurp the legal rights of law-abiding citizens and groups to own or possess firearms.
In the future, Congress may consider several demilitarization options ranging from: (1) permitting selective exemption; (2) appointing one agency as Executive Program Agent for all agencies; (3) convening an independent panel; (4) conducting hearings; or, (5) taking no action. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL32023 | crs_RL32023_0 | From inception to August 2004, the HSAS has been raised from "elevated" to "high" seven times, and raised to severe once. Threat Conditions
The advisory system is based on five threat levels: low, guarded, elevated, high, and severe. Each level, with its corresponding identification color, indicates protective measures mandatory for federal departments and agencies. The DHS Secretary decides to raise or lower the threat level in consultation with the Homeland Security Council. Issues
Since the creation of the HSAS, a number of issues have arisen, among which are: the vagueness of warnings disseminated by the system; the system's lack of protective measures recommended for state and local governments, and the public; the perceived inadequacy of disseminating threats to state and local governments, the public, and the private sector; and how best to coordinate HSAS with other existing warning systems. In the 109 th Congress, the House of Representative's Committee on Government Reform's Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations held a hearing on the HSAS, its threat codes, and public response to it. This hearing focused on the information DHS issued the public the seven times the HSAS threat level was raised from "yellow" to "orange." Vagueness of Warnings
The HSAS threat level has been raised seven times from "yellow" to "orange" since its activation on March 12, 2002, and once to "red" on August 10, 2006. Due to the reported misunderstanding of HSAS threat levels, and the system's lack of recommended protective measures for state and local agencies, the public, and private-sector entities, Congress could consider directing DHS to issue general warnings concerning the threat of terrorist attacks without using the HSAS to notify state and local governments, the public, and the private sector. First responders are placed on alert. This approach could provide federal government guidance on how to be prepared for and mitigate against a terrorist attack. Communication of Terrorist Threats to State and Local Governments, the Public, and the Private Sector
DHS uses a variety of communications systems to provide terrorist threat warnings to states, localities, the public, and the private sector. Since the HSAS is designed for federal government use, there may be no need for DHS to establish any other communication systems that disseminate changes in the HSAS terrorist threat levels. | The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), established on March 12, 2002, is a color-coded terrorist threat warning system administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The system, which federal departments and agencies are required to implement and use, provides recommended protective measures for federal departments and agencies to prevent, prepare for, mitigate against, and respond to terrorist attacks.
DHS disseminates HSAS terrorist threat warnings to federal departments, state and local agencies, the public, and private-sector entities. DHS, however, only provides protective measures for federal departments. This dissemination of warnings is conducted through multiple communication systems and public announcements.
HSAS has five threat levels: low, guarded, elevated, high, and severe. From March 2002 to the present, the HSAS threat level has been no lower than elevated, raised to high seven times, and raised to severe once. The first time it was raised to high was on September 10, 2002, due to the fear of terrorist attacks on the anniversary of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The most recent time it was raised to high was on July 7, 2005, due to terrorist bombings of the London mass transit systems. DHS raised the threat level for mass transit systems only. The only time HSAS has been raised to severe (red) was on August 10, 2006, due to a terrorist plan to bomb flights originating in the United Kingdom. DHS raised the threat level for the aviation sector only.
In the 109th Congress, the House of Representative's Committee on Government Reform's Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations held a hearing on the HSAS, its threat codes, and public response to it. This hearing focused on the information DHS issued the public the seven times the HSAS threat level was raised from "yellow" to "orange."
While the need for terrorist threat warnings seems to be widely acknowledged, there are numerous issues associated with HSAS and its effects on states, localities, the public, and the private sector. These issues include the following:
vagueness of warnings; lack of specific protective measures for state and local governments, the public, and the private sector; dissemination of warnings to states, localities, the public, and the private sector; coordination of HSAS with other federal warning systems; and cost of threat level changes.
This report will be updated as congressional or executive actions warrant. |
crs_R42839 | crs_R42839_0 | The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) includes several permanent provisions that become relevant when taxpayers are affected by disasters. In recent years, Congress has enacted temporary tax legislation intended to assist victims of disasters. However, in 2008, as part of legislation targeting specific disasters, Congress also enacted temporary provisions that applied generally to federally declared disasters occurring prior to January 1, 2010. The following is a list of the primary laws that have provided relief:
The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (Job Creation Act), P.L. 107-147 , which provided tax benefits for areas of New York City damaged by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA), P.L. 109-73 , which provided tax relief intended to assist businesses and individuals affected by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and permanently extended the authority of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to postpone certain deadlines; The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (GO Zone Act), P.L. 109-135 , which provided tax relief intended to assist businesses and individuals affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005; The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 Farm Bill), P.L. 110-234 , which provided tax relief intended to assist businesses and individuals affected by severe storms and tornados in Kansas in 2007; The Heartland Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2008 and other provisions in P.L. 110-343 (Heartland Act), which provided tax relief intended to assist with the recovery from the severe weather that affected the Midwest during the summer of 2008 and Hurricane Ike, as well as including some general disaster tax relief provisions for federally declared disasters occurring prior to January 1, 2010. As such, it provides only a basic overview of the permanent and temporary provisions. Permanent Provisions
Disaster Assistance Payments to Individuals
Section 139 of the IRC exempts qualified disaster relief payments from the recipient's income. For this reason, these provisions are discussed below (see " Casualty Losses ," " Involuntary Conversions "). The deduction is generally claimed in the year of the loss. | Relief after a natural or man-made disaster may come from what many might consider an unlikely source: the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The IRC includes several tax relief provisions that apply to affected taxpayers. Some of these provisions are permanent. The following are among the permanent provisions discussed in this report:
casualty loss deductions, IRC Section 165; exemption from taxation for disaster relief payments to individuals, IRC Section 139; exemption from taxation for certain insurance payments, IRC Section 123; and deferral of gain from the involuntary conversion of homes destroyed or damaged by a disaster, IRC Section 1033.
In recent years, Congress has enacted tax legislation generally intended to assist victims of specific disasters; as a result, these laws were temporary in nature. One act, however, provided more general, but still temporary, relief for any federally declared disaster occurring prior to January 1, 2010. The acts providing temporary relief include the following:
The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, P.L. 107-147, which provided tax benefits for areas of New York City damaged by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA), P.L. 109-73, which provided tax relief to assist the victims of Hurricane Katrina in 2005; The Gulf Opportunity Zone (GO Zone) Act of 2005, P.L. 109-135, which provided tax relief to those affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005; The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 Farm Bill), P.L. 110-234, which provided tax relief intended to assist those affected by severe storms and tornados in Kansas in 2007; and The Heartland Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2008, P.L. 110-343, which provided tax relief to assist recovery from both the severe weather that affected the Midwest during the summer of 2008 and Hurricane Ike. This act also included general disaster tax relief provisions that applied to federally declared disasters occurring before January 1, 2010.
This report provides a basic overview of existing, permanent provisions that benefit victims of disasters, as well as past, targeted legislative responses to particular disasters. The relief is discussed without examining either the qualifications for or the limitation on claiming the provisions' benefits. In light of Hurricane Sandy, this report is designed to help Congress identify previous legislative responses to recent disasters. |
crs_RL32073 | crs_RL32073_0 | But LNG is a hazardous liquid transported and stored in large quantities. Faced with the widely perceived national need for greater LNG imports, and persistent public concerns about LNG risks, some in Congress are examining the adequacy of security provisions in federal LNG regulation. 2830 , which passed in the House of Representatives on April 24, 2008, would require the Coast Guard to enforce security zones around LNG tankers, would limit reliance on state and local government resources to provide LNG security, and would require the Coast Guard to certify it has adequate resources for LNG security before approving an LNG facility's security plan. There are no U.S.-flagged LNG tankers. As discussed later in the report, the siting of onshore LNG import terminals is regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). LNG infrastructure is also potentially vulnerable to terrorist attack. Experts have identified several potentially catastrophic events that could arise from an LNG release. Several federal agencies oversee the security of LNG infrastructure. The Coast Guard has lead responsibility for LNG shipping and marine terminal security. The Department of Transportation's Office of Pipeline Safety and the Department of Homeland Security's Transportation Security Administration have security authority for peak-shaving plants within gas utilities, as well as some security authority for LNG marine terminals. FERC has siting approval responsibility, with some security oversight, for land-based LNG marine terminals and certain peak-shaving plants. 92-340) and the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-295 ). On October 13, 2006, President Bush signed the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-347 ). The agreement requires the agencies to cooperate in the siting approval of new LNG facilities, inspection and operational review of existing facilities, informal communication, and dispute resolution. H.R. Uncertainty About LNG Threats
The likelihood of a terrorist attack on U.S. LNG infrastructure has been the subject of debate since September 11, 2001. S. 1594 would increase federal protection of vessels and infrastructure handling LNG through new international standards (Sec. 4-5), incident response and recovery plans (Sec. 7); and other provisions. No LNG tanker or land-based facility has been attacked by terrorists, and federal, state and local governments have put in place security measures intended to safeguard LNG against newly perceived terrorist threats. These measures are evolving, but a variety of industry and agency representatives suggest that these federal initiatives are reducing the vulnerability of U.S. LNG to terrorism. In particular, Congress may consider whether future LNG security requirements will be appropriately funded, whether these requirements will be balanced against evolving risks, and whether the LNG industry is carrying its fair share of the security burden. Congress may also act to improve its understanding of LNG security risks. Finally, Congress may initiate action to better understand the security and trade implications of efforts to promote U.S.-flagged LNG tankers. | Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a hazardous fuel shipped in large tankers from overseas to U.S. ports. Because LNG infrastructure is highly visible and easily identified, it can be vulnerable to terrorist attack. Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. LNG industry and federal agencies have put new measures in place to respond to the possibility of terrorism. Nonetheless, public concerns about LNG risks continue to raise questions about LNG security. Faced with a perceived national need for greater LNG imports, and persistent public concerns about LNG risks, some in Congress are examining the adequacy of security provisions in federal LNG regulation.
LNG infrastructure consists primarily of tankers, import terminals, and inland storage plants. There are nine active U.S. terminals and proposals for many others. Although potentially catastrophic events could arise from a serious accident or attack on such facilities, LNG has a record of relative safety for the last 40 years, and no LNG tanker or land-based facility has been attacked by terrorists. The likelihood and possible impacts from LNG attacks continue to be debated among experts.
Several federal agencies oversee LNG infrastructure security. The Coast Guard has lead responsibility for LNG shipping and marine terminal security under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295) and the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347). The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) both have security authority for LNG storage plants within gas utilities, as well as some security authority for LNG marine terminals. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approves the siting, with some security oversight, of on-shore LNG marine terminals and certain utility LNG plants. The Coast Guard, OPS and FERC cooperate in the siting approval of new LNG facilities, inspection and operational review of existing facilities, informal communication, and dispute resolution.
Federal initiatives to secure LNG are still evolving, but a variety of industry and agency representatives suggest they are reducing the vulnerability of LNG to terrorism. S. 1594 would strengthen federal protection of vessels and infrastructure handling LNG and other especially hazardous cargoes through new international standards, new training requirements, vessel security cost-sharing, incident response and recovery plans, and other provisions. H.R. 2830, which passed in the House of Representatives on April 24, 2008, but which President Bush has threatened to veto, would require the Coast Guard to secure LNG tankers, and would limit the agency's reliance on state and local resources in doing so, among other provisions. As Congress continues its oversight of LNG, it may consider whether future LNG security requirements will be appropriately funded, whether these requirements will be balanced against evolving risks, and whether the LNG industry is carrying its fair share of the security burden. Congress may also act to improve its understanding of LNG security risks. Finally, Congress may initiate action to better understand the security and trade implications of efforts to promote U.S.-flagged LNG tankers and U.S. crews. |
crs_R44574 | crs_R44574_0 | How is spending allocated among various categories of low-income benefits and services? Medicaid is the single largest program discussed in the report, and health care is the largest category (due to the size of Medicaid). Social insurance plays a key antipoverty role but its benefits are meant to be universal and not restricted to those with low incomes. Some programs target assistance toward low-income communities, with no income eligibility test for participating individuals. By Category
Health care dominates federal spending for low-income programs, accounting for nearly half of such spending each year from FY2008 through FY2014 and more than half (52%) in FY2015 (see Table 2 ). It is important to note that only a few programs account for the vast majority of federal low-income spending (see Figure 4 ) and the dominance of these programs is growing. The single largest program—Medicaid—alone accounted for almost 45% of all low-income spending in FY2015, an increase from 38% in FY2008 (see Table 3 ). The next programs, in descending size based on FY2015 obligations, are the Medicare Part D low-income drug subsidy, which rose steadily over the period and was 43% larger in FY2015 ($26 billion) than in FY2008 ($17 billion); the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC), which saw spending grow by 23% over the period, from $17 billion in FY2008 to $21 billion in FY2015 (although ACTC spending actually peaked in FY2009 at $24 billion); and Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers, which grew by 24% (from $16 billion in FY2008 to $19 billion in FY2015). The final two programs in the top 10 are Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Education for the Disadvantaged Grants to Local Educational Agencies (Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act). Trends in Non-health Care Low-Income Spending, FY2008-FY2015
As the health care category has grown as a share of all low-income spending, a declining share has gone to the remaining categories of benefits and services: cash aid, food assistance, education, housing and development, social services, employment and training, and energy assistance. Conclusion
In nominal dollars, federal spending for low-income programs rose by half (51%) over the eight-year period from FY2008 through FY2015. These spending patterns do not reflect congressional decisions about the amount or composition of low-income spending that should occur in the aggregate in any given year. Their size is a function of their design and budgetary classification (mandatory, including whether open-ended or capped, versus discretionary); congressional budget and appropriations processes; external influences affecting the cost of goods and services; and numerous other economic, demographic, social, and political factors. Important distinctions among low-income programs are masked when looking at total spending. In summary, programs included in this report are extremely diverse in their purpose, design, and target population. The report tells a story—that low-income spending has grown sharply in recent years and is dominated by spending for health care—but given the diversity among programs that serve low-income people, further generalizations require additional information and should be made with care. Because the report includes only mandatory and discretionary spending programs, it does not include tax provisions except mandatory spending for the refundable portion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the refundable ACTC. | The Congressional Research Service (CRS) regularly receives requests about the number, size, and programmatic details of federal benefits and services targeted toward low-income populations. This report is the most recent in a series that attempts to identify and discuss such programs, focusing on aggregate spending trends. The report looks at federal low-income spending from FY2008 (at the onset of the 2007-2009 recession) through FY2015 (after implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, or ACA).
Programs discussed here provide health care, cash aid, food assistance, education, housing and development, social services, employment and training, and energy assistance to low-income people and communities. Despite the common feature of an explicit low-income focus, these programs are extremely diverse in their purpose, design, and target population. They do not include social insurance (e.g., Social Security, Medicare, Unemployment Compensation), which is meant to be universal, or tax provisions, with the exception of two targeted tax credits.
Key findings include the following:
In nominal dollars (not adjusted for inflation), federal spending for low-income assistance programs grew from $561 billion in FY2008 to $848 billion in FY2015, a 51% increase over the eight-year period. This increased spending occurred in two distinct episodes. First, after a sharp spike in FY2009 affecting all categories of benefits and services, low-income spending peaked at $763 billion in FY2011, largely in response to the recession. The second episode was driven almost entirely by health care. Spending growth from FY2013 ($744 billion) to FY2015 ($848 billion) was primarily due to the ACA Medicaid expansion. Most low-income spending is for noncash benefits and services; health care is the largest category and Medicaid the largest individual program. In FY2015, noncash benefits and services accounted for 82% of all low-income assistance and cash aid comprised 18%. Health care dominates federal spending for low-income programs, accounting for more than half (52%) of such spending in FY2015. Medicaid alone comprised 45% of all low-income spending that year. This report identifies a large number of programs intended to assist low-income people, but spending is concentrated among a few. The four largest programs—Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Supplemental Security Income, and the Earned Income Tax Credit—together accounted for 68% of all low-income spending in FY2015, and the top 10 programs comprised 83%. After the top four, these programs include (in descending size) Federal Pell Grants, the Medicare Part D Low-Income Drug Subsidy, the Additional Child Tax Credit, Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and Title I-A Education for the Disadvantaged grants. Spending patterns described here do not reflect congressional decisions about the aggregate size of low-income spending that should occur each year. The size of each program is a function of its design and budgetary classification (mandatory versus discretionary), congressional budget and appropriations processes, external influences affecting the cost of goods and services, and other factors. This report tells a story—that low-income spending has grown sharply in recent years and is dominated by health care—but given the diversity among programs that serve low-income people, further generalizations should be made with care. |
crs_RS22858 | crs_RS22858_0 | Introduction
Cumulative Funding History
This report provides a cumulative history of Department of Energy (DOE) funding for renewable energy compared with funding for the other energy technologies—nuclear energy, fossil energy, energy efficiency, and electric systems. Figure 3 provides a similar chart for the period from FY1978 through FY2018. Another energy-related factor was the application of research and development (R&D) to the atomic bomb (Manhattan Project) and other military technologies. During the post-World War II era, the federal government began to apply R&D to the peacetime development of energy sources to support economic growth. All of the energy R&D programs—fossil, nuclear, renewable, and energy efficiency—were brought under its administration. Total spending on fossil energy technologies over that period amounted to about $17.1 billion, in constant FY2016 dollars. The energy crises of the 1970s spurred the federal government to expand its R&D programs to include renewable (wind, solar, biomass, geothermal, hydro) energy and energy efficiency technologies. | Energy-related research and development (R&D)—on coal-based synthetic petroleum and on atomic bombs—played an important role in the successful outcome of World War II. In the postwar era, the federal government conducted R&D on fossil and nuclear energy sources to support peacetime economic growth. The energy crises of the 1970s spurred the government to broaden the focus to include renewable energy and energy efficiency. Over the 41-year period from the Department of Energy's (DOE's) inception at the beginning of FY1978 through FY2018, federal funding for renewable energy R&D amounted to about 18% of the energy R&D total, compared with 6% for electric systems, 16% for energy efficiency, 24% for fossil, and 37% for nuclear. For the 71-year period from 1948 through 2018, nearly 13% went to renewables, compared with nearly 5% for electric systems, 11% for energy efficiency, 24% for fossil, and 48% for nuclear. |
crs_R44270 | crs_R44270_0 | The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which does not mention tribes, gives employees the right to collectively bargain with employers, and imposes on employers the obligation to bargain with employees in good faith. Section 2(2) of the NLRA defines the term "employer" to exclude "the United States or any wholly owned government corporation or any state or political subdivision thereof." In 1976, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the agency responsible for enforcing the NLRA, concluded that tribal employers were "implicitly" exempted from the NLRA as governmental entities. Later, it decided the exemption did not extend to tribal employers located off tribal land. 511 and S. 248 , would amend the NLRA's definition of employer to exclude, "any enterprise or institution owned and operated by an Indian tribe located on its Indian lands" effectively reinstating the Board's position before 2004. The remainder of this report discusses how the NLRB developed its current position on applying the NLRA to tribal casinos, considers how it has applied the NLRA since 2004, and discusses how the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2015 relates to the history of the NLRB applying the NLRA to tribal enterprises. San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino
The NLRB continued to assert jurisdiction based on whether the tribal employer was located on or off a reservation until 2004, when it decided San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino . The casino appealed the NLRB's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. NLRB . NLRB Enforcement of the NLRA Against Tribal Casinos since San Manuel
Despite the fact that the court of appeals upheld the NLRB's decision in San Manuel based on different reasoning, the NLRB has used its reasoning based on the Tuscarora / Coeur d'Alene test from its San Manuel decision in subsequent enforcement actions. However, the panel made clear that but for the Little River Band precedent, it would have applied a different analysis and reached a different result. In Little River Band , the Tribe argued that application of the NLRA would violate its inherent sovereignty and right of self-government. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, bound by the precedent of Little River Band , upheld application of the NLRA to the casino. The Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2015
The Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2015, H.R. In effect, it seems that the bill would reinstate a location-based test similar to the one that the Board overturned in San Manuel . | The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides workers with the right to collectively bargain with employers and requires employers to bargain in good faith. The NLRA excludes from the definition of the term "employer" "the United States or any wholly owned government corporation or any state or political subdivision thereof." The NLRA does not specify whether Indian tribal employers are covered.
Prior to 2004, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the agency responsible for enforcing the NLRA, followed a rule that excluded from the NLRA tribal employers located on tribal land, but included tribal employers located off of tribal land. In 2004, in San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, the NLRB adopted a new position and held that the NLRA applied to all tribal employers, regardless of their location, unless its application would interfere with treaty rights or quintessentially governmental functions. In San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. NLRB, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the NLRB's application of the NLRA to the tribal casino.
In recent years, the NLRB has asserted jurisdiction over a number of tribal casinos, relying on its analysis in San Manuel. In June 2015, in Little River Band of Ottawa Indians v. NLRB, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the NLRB's reasoning and application of the NLRA to a tribal casino, despite the fact that the tribe had adopted its own labor ordinance to regulate tribal labor relations and asserted that application of the NLRA would impair this exercise of its inherent sovereignty. In July 2015, the same court considered whether the NLRA applied to another tribe's casino. Because the panel was bound to follow the precedent of Little River Band, it upheld the NLRB assertion of jurisdiction. However, the panel indicated that it would have applied a different analysis and reached a different result, but for the Little River Band precedent.
The Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2015, H.R. 511 and S. 248, would amend the NLRA's definition of employer to exclude "any enterprise or institution owned and operated by an Indian tribe located on its Indian lands." In effect, it appears that the bills would reinstate a location-based test similar to the one used by the NLRB prior to 2004, when it decided San Manuel. |
crs_RL33205 | crs_RL33205_0 | Congress stated in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 that an overall negotiating objective of such agreements was to encourage our treaty partners to agree to "a standard of [intellectual property] protection similar to that found in United States law." Because the FTAs are drafted in a manner that complies with current U.S. law, their effect is to obligate U.S. treaty partners to amend their intellectual property laws to match or resemble those of the United States. FTAs have been described as an effective mechanism for advancing U.S. interests in ensuring intellectual property protection. Nonetheless, concerns have arisen over the intellectual property provisions of the FTAs. Some commentators have suggested that certain FTA provisions may lock the United States into current intellectual property policies, inhibiting opportunities for future reform. Others are concerned that under existing multilateral agreements, in particular those of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the intellectual property obligations found within one FTA may extend beyond that particular treaty partner. Finally, some observers perceive the FTAs to be an inappropriate and unfair vehicle for international intellectual property reforms. The term of copyright is ordinarily the life of the author plus 70 years. Each of these contentions has a varying degree of persuasiveness. Other Intellectual Property Rights
The TRIPS Agreement also establishes minimum standards of substantive protection with respect to a number of other intellectual property rights. In keeping with this mandate, the United States has entered into numerous FTAs that have required their signatories to provide higher levels of intellectual property protection than are required under the TRIPS Agreement. With respect to the intellectual property laws, each of the FTAs stipulates standards that comply with current U.S. law. As a result, the United States need take no action in order to comply with those provisions of the FTA. Decreased levels of intellectual property piracy with respect to computer software, music, motion pictures, and pharmaceuticals may promote a more favorable balance of trade for U.S. industry. Enhanced levels of intellectual property protection around the world may also serve other goals of the United States. The scope of these potential consequences counsels continued congressional attention towards the FTAs that the United States has already formed, as well as those FTAs that are planned for the future. | The United States has entered into a number of Free Trade Agreements, or FTAs, with Australia, Chile, Singapore, and other trading partners. Negotiations are currently ongoing with respect to the establishment of additional FTAs. In keeping with a congressional directive established in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002, P.L. 107-210, one objective of forming the FTAs is to establish "a standard of [intellectual property] protection similar to that found in United States law." As a result, most of the FTAs stipulate minimum levels of protection with respect to copyrights, data protection, patents, trademarks, and other forms of intellectual property. These standards relate to such provisions as the term of protection, scope of rights, and mechanisms by which these intellectual property rights are acquired and enforced.
The different FTAs vary in their comprehensiveness and level of detail. Each of these agreements has nonetheless been drafted in a manner that complies with current U.S. law. As a result, the effect of each FTA is to obligate signatories to such agreements to amend their intellectual property laws to match or resemble those of the United States.
The FTAs have been described as an effective mechanism for advancing U.S. interests in securing intellectual property protection. Increased levels of intellectual property protection with respect to computer software, music, motion pictures, and pharmaceuticals may promote a more favorable balance of trade for U.S. industry, decrease domestic prices for innovative goods and services, and serve other policy goals. The FTA framework has at times proven to be a more advantageous forum for achieving the intellectual property goals of the United States than multilateral settings.
Nonetheless, concerns have arisen over the intellectual property provisions of the FTAs. Some observers believe that certain FTA provisions may lock the United States into current intellectual property policies, inhibiting opportunities for future reform. Other commentators are concerned that under existing multilateral agreements, in particular those of the World Trade Organization, the intellectual property obligations found within one FTA may extend beyond that particular treaty partner. Finally, some observers perceive the FTAs to be an inappropriate and unfair vehicle for international intellectual property reforms due to the strong bargaining position of the United States. The scope of these potential consequences counsels continued congressional attention towards the FTAs that the United States has already formed, as well as those FTAs that are planned for the future. |
crs_RS22438 | crs_RS22438_0 | The programs, consolidated in Title VII and Title VIII of the PHSA, provide grants, scholarships, and loans to individuals and institutions in order to increase the supply of professionals in health care, medicine, and nursing. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers Title VII and Title VIII programs. Discretionary funding for these programs is provided in the annual appropriations act for the Departments of Labor, HHS, and Education (Labor-HHS-ED). Authorizations
Before PPACA was enacted in March 2010, statutory authorities for Title VII and Title VIII programs had been amended numerous times since their initial passage. The same law also extended appropriations authority for most Title VIII programs through FY2002. PPACA provided no supplemental FY2010 appropriations for Title VII and Title VIII programs. For FY2009, Congress appropriated funds for Title VII and Title VIII programs in two separate enactments. Of that $200 million, the Secretary has allocated $148.5 million to Title VII and Title VIII programs, and $50 million for equipment to enhance the training of health professionals. Unlike regular appropriations, most ARRA funds are available for obligation over two fiscal years, through September 30, 2010. Title VII, Health Professions Education Appropriations
President Obama's FY2011 budget request would provide a total of $260.0 million for Title VII programs, representing an increase of $5.9 million (2.3%) above the FY2010 appropriation of $254.1 million. During the period from FY2001 through FY2010, total annual appropriations for Title VII programs fluctuated significantly, from a high of $308.4 million in FY2003 to a low of $145.1 million in FY2006. During the period from FY2001 through FY2009, appropriations for Title VIII programs increased by 104%, from $83.8 million to $171.0 million. In the FY2010 appropriation, Congress boosted Title VIII funding by an additional 43% over the FY2009 regular appropriation. Appendix A. Allocation of Stimulus Funds Appropriated for HRSA Health Professions Programs in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 )
Appendix B. Sections of Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) that Amend Authorities in Title VII and Title VIII of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) | The Public Health Service Act (PHSA) establishes authority for the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop and implement workforce programs authorized in Title VII (health and medicine) and Title VIII (nursing). These programs, administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), provide grants, scholarships, and loans to support institutions and individuals in developing and sustaining the health workforce.
Before passage of health care reform legislation in March 2010, appropriations authority for all Title VII and Title VIII programs had expired. Congress had nonetheless continued to appropriate funds for the programs. During the period from FY2001 through FY2010, total annual appropriations for Title VII programs fluctuated from a high of $308.4 million in FY2003 to a low of $145.1 million in FY2006. For Title VIII programs, during the period from FY2001 through FY2009, the annual appropriation increased from $83.8 million to $171.0 million. In the FY2010 appropriation, Congress boosted Title VIII funding by an additional 43% over the previous year.
For FY2009, Congress appropriated funds for Title VII and Title VIII programs through two separate enactments. The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8) provided $392.7 million in regular appropriations. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) added a supplemental appropriation of $200 million to be obligated over two years. Of this total, $148.5 million has been applied to Title VII and Title VIII programs; remaining funds are expected to be obligated for related activities (see Appendix A).
For FY2010, Congress appropriated $498.0 million for Title VII and Title VIII programs, an increase of 26.8% over the regular FY2009 appropriations. President Barack Obama's FY2011 budget contains a request of $503.9 million for Title VII and Title VIII programs, a 1.2% increase above the regular FY2010 appropriations. The FY2011 request would provide level funding for almost all Title VII and Title VIII programs.
This report provides a history of appropriations for programs in Title VII and Title VIII of the PHSA. It includes a summary of new authorizations for these two titles, as enacted in major health reform legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, P.L. 111-148 (see Appendix B). |
crs_R44202 | crs_R44202_0 | Reports of "waste, fraud, and abuse" in federal contracting often prompt questions about what the government can do to hold its vendors accountable for failure to perform as required under their contracts, or for legal violations or other misconduct unrelated to contract performance. Not all of these mechanisms involve "penalties" as that term is generally understood. In some cases, the controlling legal authority expressly provides that the government may take certain actions only to protect the government's interest, and "not for purposes of punishment." However, in all cases, the government's action represents a consequence of and response to the contractor's delinquencies, and could be perceived as punitive by the contractor or other parties. The government generally has discretion as to whether to employ any of these mechanisms in particular circumstances, and could employ multiple mechanisms in a given case. In some cases, though, the government must choose between particular mechanisms. The first category includes rights provided to the government as terms of its contracts, which the government may exercise without resort to judicial proceedings. The second category includes other actions, not necessarily provided for by contract. In some cases, the government may take these actions on its own behalf, without resort to judicial proceedings. In other cases, the government must seek sanctions or damages through the courts. A specific right must generally be expressly provided for in the contract for the government to exercise it, although the government's right to terminate contracts for default may be "read into" (or treated as a constructive term of) certain federal procurement contracts that do not expressly provide for it. In addition, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, a contractor could challenge the government's exercise of a contractual right by bringing suit before a court or board of contract appeals, alleging that the contractor's deficient or delinquent performance must be excused because it was caused by an event that is beyond the contractor's control and without its fault or negligence. Alternatively, a contractor could assert that the government has waived particular contractual rights in specific cases. A waiver is an intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a legal right, or conduct that warrants an inference that the right has been relinquished. However, in addition to specifying that the government has the right to terminate the contract for default if the contractor fails to perform in specified ways, the contract generally provides that
the termination may be total (encompassing all the work remaining to be performed on the contract), or partial (encompassing only some of the remaining work); the termination may be based on actual or anticipated delinquencies; the government's liability in the event of termination may be limited to the contract price for any completed work the government has accepted; any termination for default found to be improper will be treated as a termination for convenience, thereby generally ensuring that the government avoids liability for breach of contract; and the contractor may be liable to the government for liquidated damages, as well as the excess costs of re-procurement and certain other costs. Other Actions Not Provided for as Contract Terms
Federal statutes and regulations also require or authorize the government to take certain actions in response to contractors' failure to perform or other misconduct that are not expressly provided for as terms of a federal contract. In some cases, the government may take these actions on its own behalf, without resort to judicial proceedings, as is the case with debarment and suspension and consideration of agency evaluations of past performance in source-selection decisions. In other cases, the government must seek sanctions or damages through the courts, as is the case with suits under the civil provisions of the False Claims Act. In either case, the government's recourse is generally limited by the controlling legal authority (e.g., suspension under the FAR must be on one of the grounds specified in the FAR ). Agency actions could also be challenged on the grounds that the action deprives the contractor of certain contractual or other rights, or is arbitrary and capricious. In addition, in some cases, contractors are entitled to due process in the form of notice and an opportunity for a hearing before being subjected to agency action or sanctions. | Reports of "waste, fraud, and abuse" in federal contracting often prompt questions about what the government can do to hold its vendors accountable for failure to perform as required under their contracts, or for legal violations or other misconduct unrelated to contract performance. Broadly speaking, the government can be seen as having two types of legal recourse available to it in such situations. The first type involves rights provided to the government as terms of its contracts, which the government may exercise without resort to judicial proceedings. The second type involves other actions, not necessarily provided for by contract. In some cases, the government may take these actions on its own behalf, without resort to judicial proceedings. In other cases, the government must seek sanctions or damages through the courts.
Not all of these mechanisms involve "penalties" as that term is generally understood. In some cases, the controlling legal authority expressly provides that the government may take certain actions only to protect the government's interest, and "not for purposes of punishment." However, in all cases, the government's action represents a consequence of and response to the contractor's delinquencies, and could be perceived as punitive by the contractor or other parties. The government generally has discretion as to whether to employ any of these mechanisms in particular circumstances, and could employ multiple mechanisms in a given case. In some cases, though, the government must choose between particular mechanisms.
Rights Granted to the Government as Terms of Its Contracts
Government contracts include standard terms granting the government certain rights that could be exercised if the contractor fails to perform as required under the contract, such as the right to assess liquidated damages and the right to terminate the contract for default. A specific right must generally be expressly provided for in the contract for the government to exercise it, although the government's right to terminate contracts for default may be read into contracts that do not expressly provide for it. The government's exercise of the right must also generally be in conformity with the terms of the contract. In addition, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, a contractor could challenge the government's exercise of a contractual right by bringing suit before a court or board of contract appeals, alleging that the contractor's deficient or delinquent performance must be excused because it was caused by an event that is beyond the contractor's control and without its fault or negligence. Alternatively, a contractor could assert that the government has waived particular contractual rights in specific cases. A waiver is an intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a legal right, or conduct that warrants an inference that the right has been relinquished.
Other Agency Actions Not Necessarily Provided for as Terms of a Contract
The government could also take certain actions in response to contractors' failure to perform or other misconduct that are not expressly provided for as terms of a federal contract, but are authorized under federal statutes or regulations. In some cases, the government may take these actions on its own behalf, without resort to judicial proceedings, as is the case with debarment and suspension and consideration of agency evaluations of past performance in source-selection decisions. In other cases, the government must seek sanctions through the courts, as is the case with suits under the civil provisions of the False Claims Act. In either case, the government's recourse is generally limited by the controlling legal authority (e.g., suspension must be on a ground specified in statute or regulation). Agency actions could also be challenged on the grounds that the action deprives the contractor of certain contractual or other rights, or is arbitrary and capricious. In addition, in some cases, contractors are entitled to due process in the form of notice and an opportunity for a hearing before being subjected to agency action or sanctions. |
crs_RL31432 | crs_RL31432_0 | Global climate change is a widespread and growing concern that has led to extensive international discussions and negotiations. Responses to this concern have focused on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide, and on measuring carbon absorbed by and stored in forests, soils, and oceans. Numerous issues regarding the carbon cycle in forests, monitoring the levels and changes in forest carbon, and the scientific uncertainties about the relationships among forests, carbon, and climate change are likely to be the subject of ongoing federal research efforts, with funding and oversight by the Congress. Carbon Cycling in Forests
Photosynthesis is the chemical process by which plants use sunlight to convert nutrients into sugars and carbohydrates. Soil carbon is also slowly released to the atmosphere as the vegetation decomposes. Eventually, trees die. Many of these forests are managed to produce commercial wood products, and the management practices used in temperate forests can thus have a significant impact on carbon sequestration. Converting a "working forest" (i.e., one that is managed to produce timber and other values) to a rural residential subdivision would likely reduce forest cover and perhaps undergrowth (thus releasing some vegetative carbon), but the remaining vegetation would likely continue to grow, and thus may continue to sequester carbon for longer in the subdivision than in a working forest (depending on the nature and duration of the wood products derived from the working forest). The proportion of carbon and biomass removed from any particular site varies widely, and depends on the species involved, the density of the stand (which affects both tree form and undergrowth vegetation), the diversity of tree species and tree sizes in the stand, and various environmental factors (e.g., the site's climate and soil fertility). Thus, forestry activities that disturb soils, particularly activities to remove the cut vegetation (such as commercial timber harvesting), will also likely reduce soil carbon levels. Tree planting on sites that have not recently had trees on them, such as pastures, is called afforestation . Other Growth Improvement
Other forestry practices are also intended to increase tree growth rates. Others have calculated that the carbon released by harvesting operations substantially exceeds the additional carbon sequestered by new forest stands. Another study has shown that some old-growth forests continue to accumulate carbon in their soils. Practices to store carbon by reducing or delaying timber harvested domestically can have an effect commonly called leakage —by shifting land uses geographically (e.g., more tropical forest harvests to offset less temperate forest harvests) or by shifting demand to other products that require more carbon to produce (e.g., steel or aluminum studs to replace wood studs in homebuilding). This leakage is undesirable, it is argued, because U.S. forest management protects the environment more than comparable activities in other countries. These rationales are supported by substantial anecdotal evidence, but others counter that such assertions have limited empirical foundation. Federal Assistance for State and Private Forestry
The federal government has numerous programs that provide technical and financial assistance for forest management of nonfederal (mostly state and private) forest lands, though none explicitly includes carbon sequestration as a purpose. Federal Programs Affecting Land Use
Many federal programs, in addition to the programs discussed above, can affect the rate of deforestation and afforestation in the United States. Land use changes and forestry practices alter the level and rates of carbon storage, while "leakage" (shifting production) may offset some of the increases in forest carbon sequestration. Whether and how to account for this carbon sequestration in policies and programs to mitigate climate change has been controversial. | Widespread concern about global climate change has led to interest in reducing emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and, under certain circumstances, in counting additional carbon absorbed in soils and vegetation as part of the emissions reductions. Congress may consider options to increase the carbon stored (sequestered) in forests as it debates this and related issues.
Forests are a significant part of the global carbon cycle. Plants use sunlight to convert CO2, water, and nutrients into sugars and carbohydrates, which accumulate in leaves, twigs, stems, and roots. Plants also respire, releasing CO2. Plants eventually die, releasing their stored carbon to the atmosphere quickly or to the soil where it decomposes slowly and increases soil carbon levels. However, little information exists on the processes and diverse rates of soil carbon change.
How to account for changes in forest carbon has been contentious. Land use changes—especially afforestation and deforestation—can have major impacts on carbon storage. Foresters often cut some vegetation to enhance growth of desired trees. Enhanced growth stores more carbon, but the cut vegetation releases CO2; the net effect depends on many factors, such as prior and subsequent growth rates and the quantity and disposal of cut vegetation. Rising atmospheric CO2 may stimulate tree growth, but limited availability of other nutrients may constrain that growth.
In this context, timber harvesting is an especially controversial forestry practice. Some argue that the carbon released by cutting exceeds the carbon stored in wood products and in tree growth by new forests. Others counter that old-growth forests store little or no additional carbon, and that new forest growth and efficient wood use can increase net carbon storage. The impacts vary widely, and depend on many factors, including soil impacts, treatment of residual forest biomass, proportion of carbon removed from the site, and duration and disposal of the products. To date, the quantitative relationships between these factors and net carbon storage have not been established.
Some observers are concerned that "leakage" will undermine any U.S. efforts to sequester carbon by protecting domestic forests. By leakage, they mean that wood supply might shift to other sites, including other countries, exacerbating global climate change and causing other environmental problems, or that wood products might be replaced by other products that use more energy to manufacture (thus releasing more CO2). Others counter that the "leakage" arguments ignore the enormous disparity in ecological systems and product preferences, and discount possible technological solutions.
Several federal government programs affect forestry practices and thus carbon sequestration. Activities in federal forests affect carbon storage and release; timber harvesting is the most controversial such activity. Federal programs also provide technical and financial help for managing and protecting private forests, and tax provisions affect private forest management. Various federal programs can also affect the extent of forested area, by supporting development (which may cause deforestation) or encouraging tree planting in open areas, such as pastures. |
crs_R41068 | crs_R41068_0 | Introduction
Since the early 1970s, federal law has required state and local governments to designate metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) in urbanized areas with a population of 50,000 or more to help plan surface transportation infrastructure and services. Despite some strengthening of their authority over the years, MPOs have generally remained subordinate to state departments of transportation (DOTs) in the planning and selecting ("programming") of projects using federal surface transportation funds. Moreover, it can be argued that at the metropolitan level MPOs are subordinate to local governments that own and operate many elements of the transportation system, and also control land use planning and zoning. Because of this perceived weakness, some in the transportation community have argued that MPOs ought to be given much more power over the planning and programming of projects using federal surface transportation funds. Some even go so far as to suggest that federal policies and programs in a number of areas, including transportation, housing, and the environment, need to be coordinated at the metropolitan scale, and that MPOs are the organizational venue where this should occur. Others argue that the relationship between state government, local government, and MPOs is well-balanced and should not be changed. A third view is that metropolitan transportation planning is controlled by planners who often harbor anti-car views, and, consequently, MPOs can be actually detrimental to well-functioning metropolitan transportation systems. In this view, MPOs should be abolished or, at the very least, have their functions significantly curtailed. For the period FY2005 though FY2009, surface transportation programs were authorized by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU or SAFETEA; P.L. 109-59 ). In lieu of a new multi-year reauthorization that is still being considered, Congress has extended these programs and their funding several times. Reauthorization of the surface transportation programs provides an opportunity for Congress to reexamine policies related to MPOs and the metropolitan planning process. It also considers a number of other planning issues including the requirements for a long-range plan, the proper scale of planning, and the incorporation of freight transportation needs. These issues are discussed in detail below after a brief description of the metropolitan transportation planning process. There appear to be five major issues that Congress may consider in this debate: (1) the authority of MPOs relative to state DOTs to plan and program funds; (2) representation and participation in MPOs; (3) MPO funding and technical capacity; (4) MPOs and the implementation of livability/sustainability initiatives; and (5) other issues with transportation planning requirements. | Federal law requires state and local governments to designate a metropolitan planning organization (MPO) in each urbanized area with a population of 50,000 or more to help plan surface transportation infrastructure and services. There are currently 381 MPOs nationwide. Despite some strengthening of their authority over the years, MPOs have generally remained subordinate to state departments of transportation (DOTs) in the planning and selecting ("programming") of projects using federal surface transportation funds. Moreover, it can be argued that at the metropolitan level MPOs are subordinate to local governments that own and operate many elements of the transportation system, and also control land use planning and zoning.
Because of the perceived weakness of MPOs, some in the transportation community have argued that they ought to be given much more power over the planning and programming of projects using federal surface transportation funds. Some of these observers go so far as to suggest that federal policies and programs in a number of areas, including transportation, housing, and the environment, need to be coordinated on a metropolitan scale, and that MPOs are the organizational venue where this should occur. Others argue that the relationship between state government, local government, and MPOs is well-balanced and should not be changed. A third view is that metropolitan transportation planning is controlled by planners who often harbor anti-car views, and consequently, MPOs can be actually detrimental to well-functioning metropolitan transportation systems. In this view, MPOs should be abolished or, at the very least, have their functions significantly curtailed.
Surface transportation programs were authorized under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU or SAFETEA; P.L. 109-59) covering the period FY2005 through FY2009. In lieu of a new multi-year reauthorization that is still being considered, Congress has extended these programs and their funding several times. Reauthorization of the surface transportation programs provides an opportunity for Congress to reexamine policies related to MPOs and the metropolitan planning process. This report discusses several issues that Congress may want to consider: the authority of MPOs to plan and program funds; representation and participation in MPOs; MPO funding and technical capacity; and implementation of livability initiatives. It may also want to consider a number of issues having to do with planning requirements such as the need for a long-range plan, the proper scale of planning, and the incorporation of freight transportation interests. The report begins with a brief description of the metropolitan transportation planning process. |
crs_R41223 | crs_R41223_0 | Introduction
Terrorists, drug traffickers, mafia members, and corrupt corporate executives have one thing in common: most are conspirators subject to federal prosecution. 371, outlaws conspiracy to commit any other federal crime. The others outlaw conspiracy to commit some specific form of misconduct, ranging from civil rights violations to drug trafficking. The various conspiracy statutes, however, differ in several other respects. Elsewhere, conspirators often face more severe penalties. Moreover, statements by one conspirator are admissible evidence against all. Background
Although it is not without common law antecedents, federal conspiracy law is largely of Congress's making. A corporation is criminally liable for the crimes, including conspiracy, committed at least in part for its benefit, by its officers, employees and agents. Again, in most cases the essence of conspiracy is agreement. 371 for conspiracy to commit a substantive offense requires proof that one of the conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Section 286 does not. 371 are (1) an agreement of two or more persons; (2) to defraud the United States; and (3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy committed by one of the conspirators. Sanctions
Imprisonment and Fines
Section 371 felony conspiracies are punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations). On the other hand, conspirators may be prosecuted for conspiracy, for any completed offense which is the object of the conspiracy, as well as for any foreseeable offense committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Like conspiracy, a conviction for attempt does not require the commission of the underlying offense. Moreover, unlike a conspirator, an accused may not be convicted of both attempt and the underlying substantive offense. In some circumstances, he may be guilty of attempted conspiracy. Congress has outlawed at least one example of an attempt to conspire in the statute which prohibits certain invitations to conspire, that is, solicitation to commit a federal crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. For venue purposes, it does not. Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto
Because conspiracy is a continuing offense, it stands as an exception to the usual ex post facto principles. Because it is a separate crime, it also stands as an exception to the usual double jeopardy principles. Since conspiracy and its attendant substantive offense are ordinarily separate crimes—one alone requiring agreement and the other alone requiring completion of the substantive offense—the double jeopardy clause poses no impediment to successive prosecution or to successive punishment of the two. Multiple conspiracies may be prosecuted sequentially and punished with multiple sanctions; single conspiracies must be tried and punished once. Asked to determine whether they are faced with one or more than one conspiracy, the courts have said they inquire whether:
1. the locus criminis [place] of the two alleged conspiracies is the same; 2. there is a significant degree of temporal overlap between the two conspiracies charged; 3. there is an overlap of personnel between the two conspiracies (including unindicted as well as indicted co-conspirators); 4. the overt acts charged [are related]; 5. the role played by the defendant [relates to both]; 6. there was a common goal among the conspirators; 7. whether the agreement contemplated bringing to pass a continuous result that will not continue without the continuous cooperation of the conspirators; and 8. the extent to which the participants overlap[ped] in [their] various dealings. | Zacarias Moussaoui, members of the Colombian drug cartels, members of organized crime, and some of the former Enron executives have at least one thing in common: they all have federal conspiracy convictions. The essence of conspiracy is an agreement of two or more persons to engage in some form of prohibited conduct. The crime is complete upon agreement, although some statutes require prosecutors to show that at least one of the conspirators has taken some concrete step or committed some overt act in furtherance of the scheme. There are dozens of federal conspiracy statutes. One, 18 U.S.C. 371, outlaws conspiracy to commit some other federal crime. The others outlaw conspiracy to engage in various specific forms of proscribed conduct. General Section 371 conspiracies are punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years; drug trafficking, terrorist, and racketeering conspiracies all carry the same penalties as their underlying substantive offenses, and thus are punished more severely than are Section 371 conspiracies. All are subject to fines of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations); most may serve as the basis for a restitution order, and some for a forfeiture order.
The law makes several exceptions for conspiracy because of its unusual nature. Because many united in crime pose a greater danger than the isolated offender, conspirators may be punished for the conspiracy, any completed substantive offense which is the object of the plot, and any foreseeable other offenses which one of the conspirators commits in furtherance of the scheme. Since conspiracy is an omnipresent crime, it may be prosecuted wherever an overt act is committed in its furtherance. Because conspiracy is a continuing crime, its statute of limitations does not begin to run until the last overt act committed for its benefit. Since conspiracy is a separate crime, it may be prosecuted following conviction for the underlying substantive offense, without offending constitutional double jeopardy principles; because conspiracy is a continuing offense, it may be punished when it straddles enactment of the prohibiting statute, without offending constitutional ex post facto principles. Accused conspirators are likely to be tried together, and the statements of one may often be admitted in evidence against all.
In some respects, conspiracy is similar to attempt, to solicitation, and to aiding and abetting. Unlike aiding and abetting, however, it does not require commission of the underlying offense. Unlike attempt and solicitation, conspiracy does not merge with the substantive offense; a conspirator may be punished for both.
An abridged version of this report without footnotes and most citations to authority is available as CRS Report R41222, Federal Conspiracy Law: A Sketch, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31448 | crs_RL31448_0 | On May 24, 2002, President Bush and Russia's President Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, known as the Moscow Treaty, that would limit strategic offensive nuclear weapons. In it, the two nations stated that they would reduce strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012. The treaty lapsed, however, on February 5, 2011, when the New START Treaty entered into force and superseded the Moscow Treaty. Russian Objectives
Russia entered the negotiations seeking a "legally binding document" that would provide "predictability and transparency" and ensure for the "irreversibility of the reduction of the nuclear forces." In addition, Russia wanted the treaty to contain a statement noting that the United States would limit its missile defense program so that defenses would not threaten the effectiveness of Russia's offensive forces. It wanted to maintain the flexibility to size and structure its nuclear forces in response to its own needs. The United States preferred a less formal process, such as the exchange of letters, in which the two nations would state their intentions to reduce their nuclear forces. Furthermore, the United States had no intention of including restrictions on missile defenses in an agreement outlining reductions in strategic offensive nuclear weapons. He agreed to sign a legally binding agreement, noting that "there needs to be a document that outlives both of us." These included the definitions and counting rules that the two sides would use to calculate how many warheads should count under the treaty's limits; the disposition of warheads removed from deployed systems; transparency and verification provisions; and potential restraints on missile defenses. Russia apparently realized that, if it was going to complete an agreement imposing any limits on U.S. nuclear weapons, it would have to accept the U.S. refusal to include START counting rules and elimination procedures in the treaty. Non-Deployed Warheads
Russia initially insisted that the Moscow Treaty require the elimination of both delivery vehicles and warheads removed from service. Article II
Article II states that the START Treaty (meaning START I) remains in force. The third paragraph in Article IV states that either party may withdraw from the treaty on three months' notice. To reduce that force from 3,500 to 2,200, permitted by the Moscow Treaty, it would remove warheads from deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. It also might have retained between 400 and 700 single warhead ICBMs. The Duma approved the Federal Law on Ratification on May 14, 2003. The treaty entered into force on June 1, 2003. Text of Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Embarking upon the path of new relations for a new century and committed to the goal of strengthening their relationship through cooperation and friendship,
Believing that new global challenges and threats require the building of a qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations between the Parties,
Desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, and predictability,
Committed to implementing significant reductions in strategic offensive arms,
Proceeding from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington,
Mindful of their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and
Convinced that this Treaty will help to establish more favorable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation, and enhancing international stability,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the Russian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001 respectively, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AND DECLARATIONS. (3) BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES. (6) CONSULTATIONS. | On May 24, 2002, President Bush and Russia's President Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (known as the Moscow Treaty). It mandated that the United States and Russia reduce their strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on March 6, 2003; the Russian Parliament did the same on May 14, 2003. The treaty entered into force on June 1, 2003, and lapsed on February 5, 2011, when the New START Treaty entered into force.
Russia entered the negotiations seeking a "legally binding document" that would contain limits, definitions, counting rules and elimination rules that resembled those in the START Treaties. Russia also wanted the treaty to contain a statement noting U.S. missile defenses would not undermine the effectiveness of Russia's offensive forces. The United States preferred a less formal process in which the two nations would state their intentions to reduce their nuclear forces, possibly accompanied by a document outlining added monitoring and transparency measures. Furthermore, the United States had no intention of including restrictions on missile defenses in an agreement outlining reductions in strategic offensive nuclear weapons.
Russia convinced the United States to sign a legally binding treaty, but the United States rejected any limits and counting rules that would require the elimination of delivery vehicles and warheads removed from service. It wanted the flexibility to reduce its forces at its own pace, and to restore warheads to deployed forces if conditions warranted. The treaty contains four substantive Articles. The first limited each side to 1,700-2,200 strategic nuclear warheads, but states that the parties can determine the structure of their forces themselves. The second states that START I remained in force; the parties would use that treaty's verification regime to monitor reductions under the Moscow Treaty. The third established a bilateral implementation commission and the fourth sets December 31, 2012, for the treaty's expiration and noted that either party could withdraw on three months notice.
Under the Moscow Treaty, the United States retained most of the delivery vehicles planned for START II, which would have limited each side to 3,500 warheads. But the United States removed additional warheads from deployed forces and left out of its tally warheads that could be deployed on systems in overhaul or assigned to conventional missions. Russia eliminated many of its existing ballistic missiles and submarines, retaining fewer than 150 multiple warhead ICBMs, around 200 single warhead ICBMs, and 10 ballistic missile submarines.
According to official and unofficial reports, both sides have implemented the treaty smoothly. However, they have not held all the planned consultations, as there has been little to discuss. Instead, the two nations began, in 2006, to hold discussions about the 2009 expiration of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which contains monitoring provisions that aid with verification of the Moscow Treaty.
This report will no longer be updated. |
crs_RL32680 | crs_RL32680_0 | OMB published its final government-wide IQA guidelines in the Federal Register inFebruary 2002. The proposed peer review bulletin said information is "relevant toregulatory policies" if it "might be used by local, state, regional, federal and/or internationalregulatory bodies." Review of Especially Significant Regulatory Information
The proposed bulletin indicated that regulatory information should be considered "especiallysignificant" (and therefore subject to more specific peer review requirements) if (a) the agencyintends to disseminate it in support of an economically significant regulatory action (e.g., with a$100 million annual impact on the economy), (30) (b) its dissemination would otherwise have a clear and substantialeffect on important public policies or important private sector decisions (with an impact of $100million in any year), or (c) OMB determines it is of "significant interagency interest" or "is relevantto an Administration policy priority." Other Provisions
The proposed bulletin also contained several other peer review requirements or provisions,including the following:
Agencies that are likely to disseminate "significant" or "especially significant"regulatory information were required to supplement or amend their information quality guidelinesto incorporate the requirements of the proposed peer review bulletin for "significant" and "especiallysignificant" information. OMB also said it would clarify that the bulletin did not apply to productsreleased by government-funded scientists that were not represented as the views of the agencysupporting the research. OMB's Revised Peer Review Bulletin
The comments that OMB received on the proposed bulletin led the office to release what itdescribed as a "substantially revised" bulletin in April 2004. (53)
In structure, the revised peer review bulletin was similar to the proposed bulletin in that itstill essentially required agencies to take three actions (to the extent permitted by law):
have a peer review conducted on all "influential scientific information" thatthe agency intends to disseminate,
have all "highly influential scientific assessments" peer reviewed according tomore specific and demanding standards, and
indicate what "influential" and "highly influential" information the agencyplans to peer review in the future. When Peer Review Is Required. Other Requirements. Alternative Procedures. OMB Authority. However, some commenters believed the changeshad weakened the bulletin to such an extent that they withdrew their initial support, while othersbelieved the changes had not gone far enough. OMB retained too much control over federal peer review practices (e.g., indetermining when certain information requires a more rigorous peer review and in approvingalternative peer review plans), and recommends that some of those responsibilities be given to theNational Academy of Sciences. (63) For example, AAAS:
questioned why OMB said scientists seeking an exemption to the peer reviewrequirements for information produced by government-funded scientists were only "advised" toinclude a disclaimer rather than required to do so;
suggested that agencies be required to make public the criteria for determiningwhen outside entities would be commissioned to select peer reviewers or manage the peer reviewprocess, and how these entities would be selected and overseen by the agencies; and
endorsed the idea of an interagency working group on peer review, andrecommended that the group be required to report to the public annually on its deliberations andfindings, and to conduct studies and hold meetings regarding the impact of the guidelines on scienceand the quality of the information produced. OMB said that it had made "minor revisions" to the April version of the bulletin that were"responsive to the public's comments." | In September 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) published a proposedbulletin on "Peer Review and Information Quality" in the Federal Register that sought to establisha process by which all "significant regulatory information" would be peer reviewed. The scope ofthe proposed bulletin was very broad, covering virtually all agencies and defining regulatoryinformation as "any scientific or technical study that ... might be used by local, state, regional, federaland/or international regulatory bodies." Such information would be subject to peer review if theagency could determine that it could have a "clear and substantial impact on important publicpolicies or important private sector decisions" when disseminated. The proposed bulletin placedadditional peer review requirements on "especially significant regulatory information," and saidagencies were required to notify OMB in advance of any studies that might require peer review andhow any such reviews would be conducted.
The proposed bulletin aroused controversy, with some observers expressing concern that itcould create a centralized peer review system within OMB that would be vulnerable to politicalmanipulation or control by regulated entities. OMB received nearly 200 comments on the proposal,and published a "substantially revised" peer review bulletin in April 2004 that was broader in scopethan the proposed bulletin in that it applied to "influential scientific information" (which includes,but is not limited to, regulatory information) and "highly influential scientific assessments." However, agencies were given substantial discretion to decide whether information is "influential"and therefore requires a peer review. The revised bulletin also allowed agencies to use the NationalAcademy of Sciences for peer reviews or to use other procedures that had been approved by OMB. It also provided exemptions for certain classes of information, such as information related to nationalsecurity, products by government-funded scientists that are not represented as views of a federalagency, and routine statistical information. However, OMB retained significant authority to decidewhen information is "highly influential" (and, therefore, requires more specific peer reviewprocedures) and to approve alternative peer review procedures.
OMB received more than 50 comments on the revised peer review bulletin, many of whichwere supportive of the changes made to the proposal. However, some commenters believed thechanges did not go far enough, while others believed that OMB had significantly weakened thebulletin. In January 2005, OMB published a final version of the bulletin with what it described as"minor revisions" to the version published in April 2004 (e.g., requiring agencies to disclose theidentities of peer reviewers and to prepare an annual report on their peer review activities). Anumber of issues regarding the implementation of the bulletin remain unclear (e.g., how muchdiscretion agencies will be given to decide when and what kind of peer review is required). Thisreport will be updated when any further revisions to the bulletin are published or other significantevents occur. |
crs_RL33077 | crs_RL33077_0 | Critics, however, contend that since September 11, 2001, seventy individuals, mostly Muslims, have been arrested and detained in abuse of the statute's authority. 3199
Witnesses at Congressional oversight hearings charged that the authority under 18 U.S.C. 3199 following the hearings, section 12 of the bill amended section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act by directing periodic review of the exercise of the authority under section 3144. But this cannot be. Nevertheless, perhaps because of Administration opposition, the provision was dropped from H.R. 3199 prior to House passage. No similar provision could be found in H.R. 3199 ( S. 1389 ) as approved in the Senate, in the conference bill, H.Rept. In its recast form, section 3144 among other things would:
establish a preference for postponing arrest until after a material witness has been served with a summons or subpoena and failed or refused to appear, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that service is likely to result in flight or otherwise unlikely to secure the witness' attendance; make it clear that the provision applies to grand jury proceedings; explicitly permit arrest by officers who are not in physical possession of the warrant; require an initial judicial appearance without unnecessary delay in the district of the arrest or in an adjacent district if more expedient or if the warrant was issued there and the appearance occurs on the day of arrest; limit detention to 5 day increments for a maximum of 30 days (10 days in the case of grand jury witness); require the Attorney General to file an annual report to the Judiciary Committees on the number of material witness warrants sought, granted and denied within the year; the number of material witnesses arrested who were not deposed or did not appear before judicial proceedings; and the average number of days arrested material witnesses were detained. Iraola, Terrorism, Grand Juries, and the Federal Material Witness Statute , 34 St. Mary's Law Journal 401(2003). Material Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings: Securing and Assuring Their Attendance , 18 Missouri Law Review 38 (1953). | This is an overview of the law under the federal material witness statute which authorizes the arrest of material witnesses, permits their release under essentially the same bail laws that apply to federal criminal defendants, but favors their release after their depositions have taken.
Witnesses at Congressional oversight hearings alleged that the authority to arrest and hold material witnesses until their appearance at federal criminal proceedings (including grand jury proceedings) had been abused following September 11, 2001. Section 12 of the USA PATRIOT Act and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act ( H.R. 3199 ) as reported by the House Judiciary Committee called for a periodic review and reports on the use of the material witness statute. In the face of Administration opposition, however, the provision was dropped from the bill prior to House consideration. No similar proposal could be found in the version of H.R. 3199 ( S. 1389 ) approved in the Senate or in the conference bill sent to the President. S. 1739 would rewrite the federal statute, setting detention time limits and raising evidentiary standards for arrest and detention among other things.
A list of citations to comparable state statutes and a bibliography of law review articles and notes are appended.
The report is available in an abridged formâwithout footnotes, citations to most authorities and appendicesâas CRS Report RS22259, Arrest and Detention of Material Witnesses: A Sketch , by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_96-950 | crs_96-950_0 | Introduction
Congress enacted the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) provisions as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. In spite of its name and origin, RICO is not limited to "mobsters" or members of "organized crime," as those terms are popularly understood. Rather, it covers those activities which Congress felt characterized the conduct of organized crime, no matter who actually engages in them. RICO proscribes no conduct that is not otherwise prohibited. Instead it enlarges the civil and criminal consequences, under some circumstances, of a list of state and federal crimes. In simple terms, RICO condemns
(1) any person
(2) who
(a) invests in, or (b) acquires or maintains an interest in, or (c) conducts or participates in the affairs of, or (d) conspires to invest in, acquire, or conduct the affairs of
(3) an enterprise
(4) which
(a) engages in, or (b) whose activities affect, interstate or foreign commerce
(5) through
(a) the collection of an unlawful debt, or (b) the patterned commission of various state and federal crimes. Violations are punishable by (a) forfeiture of any property acquired through a RICO violation and of any property interest in the enterprise involved in the violation, and (b) imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or life if one of the predicate offenses carries such a penalty, and/or a fine of not more than the greater of twice of amount of gain or loss associated with the offense or $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. RICO violations also subject the offender to civil liability. The courts may award anyone injured by a RICO violation treble damages, costs and attorneys' fees, and may enjoin RICO violations, order divestiture, dissolution or reorganization, or restrict an offender's future professional or investment activities. Attacks on the constitutionality of RICO forfeiture have been grounded in the right to counsel, excessive fines, cruel and unusual punishment, and forfeiture of estate. The same can be said of the RICO forfeiture provisions. | Congress enacted the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) provisions as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. In spite of its name and origin, RICO is not limited to "mobsters" or members of "organized crime" as those terms are popularly understood. Rather, it covers those activities which Congress felt characterized the conduct of organized crime, no matter who actually engages in them.
RICO proscribes no conduct that is not otherwise prohibited. Instead it enlarges the civil and criminal consequences, under some circumstances, of a list of state and federal crimes.
In simple terms, RICO condemns
(1) any person
(2) who
(a) invests in, or(b) acquires or maintains an interest in, or(c) conducts or participates in the affairs of, or(d) conspires to invest in, acquire, or conduct the affairs of
(3) an enterprise
(4) which
(a) engages in, or(b) whose activities affect, interstate or foreign commerce
(5) through
(a) the collection of an unlawful debt, or(b) the patterned commission of various state and federal crimes.
Violations are punishable by (a) the forfeiture of any property acquired through a RICO violation and of any property interest in the enterprise involved in the violation, and (b) imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or for life if one of the predicate offenses carries such a penalty, and/or a fine of not more than the greater of twice the amount of gain or loss associated with the offense or $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. RICO has generally survived constitutional challenges, although its forfeiture provisions are subject to an excessive fines clause analysis and perhaps to cruel and unusual punishment disproportionality analysis.
RICO violations also subject the offender to civil liability. The courts may award anyone injured in their business or property by a RICO violation treble damages, costs and attorneys' fees, and may enjoin RICO violations, order divestiture, dissolution or reorganization, or restrict an offender's future professional or investment activities. Civil RICO has been controversial. At one time commentators urged Congress to amend its provisions. Congress found little consensus on the questions raised by proposed revisions, however, and the issue seems to have been put aside at least for the time being.
The text of the RICO sections, citations to state RICO statutes, and a selected bibliography are appended. This report appears in an abridged form, without footnotes, full citations, or appendices, as CRS Report RS20376, RICO: An Abridged Sketch, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43028 | crs_R43028_0 | FutureGen is a clean-coal technology program managed through a public-private partnership between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the FutureGen 2.0 Industrial Alliance. The FutureGen program as originally conceived in 2003 by the George W. Bush Administration had the intent of constructing a net zero-emission fossil-fueled power plant with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology. Under the Obama Administration, Congress appropriated almost $1 billion in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) for FutureGen 2.0. FutureGen 2.0 is DOE's most comprehensive CCS demonstration project, combining all three aspects of CCS technology: capturing and separating CO 2 from other gases, compressing and transporting CO 2 to the sequestration site, and injecting CO 2 in geologic formations. Policy Challenges and Issues for Congress
After more than 10 years and two restructuring efforts since FutureGen's inception, the project is still in its early development stages. Among the remaining challenges are securing private sector funding to meet increasing costs, purchasing the Meredosia power plant from Ameren, obtaining permission from the DOE to retrofit the plant, performing the retrofit, and then meeting the goal of 90% capture of CO 2 . Cost, Schedule, and Funding
Project Costs
Increasing projected costs have posed significant problems for FutureGen's development since 2003. A looming question is whether the FutureGen 2.0 Alliance will have sufficient time to expend the nearly $995 million of ARRA funding appropriated by Congress for the project before it expires on September 30, 2015. Some critics of the public-private partnership attribute the project's decade-long stasis to a lack of incentives for industry leaders to invest seriously in clean coal technologies. EPA Proposed Rule to Limit CO2 from New Power Plants
On September 20, 2013, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) re-proposed a standard that would limit emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from new fossil-fueled power plants. Following the September 20, 2013, re-proposal of the rule, the debate has been mixed as to whether the rule would spur development and deployment of CCS for new coal-fired power plants or have the opposite effect. Multiple analyses indicate that there will be retirements of U.S. coal-fired capacity; however, virtually all analyses agree that coal will continue to play a substantial role in electricity generation for decades. Cheap gas, due to the rapid increase in the domestic natural gas supply as an alternative to coal, in combination with regulations that curtail CO 2 emissions, may lead electricity producers to invest in natural gas-fired plants, which emit approximately half the amount of CO 2 per unit of electricity produced compared to coal-fired plants. Outlook
Congressional consideration of CCS has focused on balancing competing national interests, such as fostering low-cost domestic sources of energy like coal versus reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere. Among the challenges that continue to influence the development of FutureGen 2.0 are rising costs of construction, ongoing issues with project development, lack of incentives for investment from the private sector, and time constraints on project development. The report explained that if regulations, tax credits, or policies such as carbon taxation or cap-and-trade that increase the price of electricity from conventional power plants are adopted, then CCS technology may become competitive enough for private sector investment. Even then, industry may choose to forgo coal-fueled plants for natural gas or other sources that emit less CO 2 compared to coal, according to CBO. | More than a decade after the George W. Bush Administration announced its signature clean coal power initiative—FutureGen—the program is still in early development. Since its inception in 2003, FutureGen has undergone changes in scope and design. As initially conceived, FutureGen would have been the world's first coal-fired power plant to integrate carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) with integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) technologies. FutureGen would have captured and stored carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from coal combustion in deep underground saline formations and produced hydrogen for electricity generation and fuel cell research. Increasing costs of development, among other considerations, caused the Bush Administration to discontinue the project in 2008. In 2010, under the Obama Administration, the project was restructured as FutureGen 2.0: a coal-fired power plant that would integrate oxy-combustion technology to capture CO2. FutureGen 2.0 is the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) most comprehensive CCS demonstration project, combining all three aspects of CCS technology: capturing and separating CO2 from other gases, compressing and transporting CO2 to the sequestration site, and injecting CO2 in geologic formations for permanent storage.
Congressional interest in CCS technology centers on balancing the competing national interests of fostering low-cost, domestic sources of energy like coal against mitigating the effects of CO2 emissions in the atmosphere. FutureGen 2.0 would address these interests by demonstrating CCS technology as commercially viable. Among the challenges to the development of FutureGen 2.0 are rising costs of production, ongoing issues with project development, lack of incentives for investment from the private sector, and time constraints. Further, FutureGen's development would need to include securing private sector funding to meet increasing costs, purchasing the power plant for the project, obtaining permission from DOE to retrofit the plant, performing the retrofit, and then meeting the goal of 90% capture of CO2.
The FutureGen project was conceived as a public-private partnership between industry and DOE with agreements for cost-share and cooperation on development, demonstration, and deployment of CCS technology. The public-private partnership has been criticized for leading to setbacks in FutureGen's development, since the private sector lacks incentives to invest in costly CCS technology. Regulations, tax credits, or policies such as carbon taxation or cap-and-trade that increase the price of electricity from conventional power plants may be necessary to make CCS technology competitive enough for private sector investment. Even then, industry may choose to forgo coal-fired plants for other sources of energy that emit less CO2, such as natural gas. However, Congress signaled its support for FutureGen 2.0 via the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) by appropriating almost $1 billion for the project. ARRA funding will expire on September 30, 2015, and it remains a question whether the project will expend all of its federal funding before that deadline.
A proposed rule by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to limit CO2 emissions from new fossil-fuel power plants may provide some incentive for industry to invest in CCS technology. The debate has been mixed as to whether the rule would spur development and deployment of CCS for new coal-fired power plants or have the opposite effect. Multiple analyses indicate that there will be retirements of U.S. coal-fired capacity; however, virtually all analyses agree that coal will continue to play a substantial role in electricity generation for decades. The rapid increase in the domestic natural gas supply as an alternative to coal, in combination with regulations that curtail CO2 emissions, may lead electricity producers to invest in natural gas-fired plants, which emit approximately half the amount of CO2 per unit of electricity produced compared to coal-fired plants. |
crs_RL32198 | crs_RL32198_0 | Introduction
Although allocation of water resources is generally a matter of state law, the federal government may also allocate water rights. Because federal reserved water rights under the Winters doctrine often have not been quantified but are generally senior to other water rights, the rights of more junior water users can be affected significantly, when these federal rights are exercised. It analyzes the scope of these rights, including the water sources that may be used to fulfill the rights and the quantification standards courts commonly use to clarify the rights. The report also examines the effect of the McCarran Amendment, through which Congress authorized state courts to adjudicate Indian reserved water rights. The Winters Doctrine of Reserved Water Rights
In Winters , the Supreme Court examined tribal rights to water associated with the Fort Belknap Reservation located in what would later become Montana. Scope of Winters Rights
Under the Winter s doctrine, the priority and extent of Indian reserved water rights is affected by the purposes of the Indian reservation, the date when the Indian reservation was created, the quantification of water sufficient to accomplish those purposes, and the sources of water that may be used to fulfill the particular water rights. Effect on State Water Allocation
Although the federal government may act under a number of constitutional authorities to regulate water, in most instances it has deferred to the states. States either adhere to a riparian or prior appropriation system of water allocation. Other states, typically the drier western states, use a prior appropriation system of water rights. It is unclear, however, whether the primary purpose standard the Supreme Court adopted when applying Winters in non-Indian reserved water rights cases governs Indian reserved water rights. As discussed later in this report, courts quantify the amount of Indian reserved water rights based on the purposes of the reservation. In other words, an Indian reserved water right cannot trump senior rights that existed at the time of reservation. The court instead offered a number of potential factors for consideration in the quantification: 1) the tribe's history of and cultural need for water; 2) the nature of the land and associated resources of the reservation; 3) the tribe's economic status and the proposed economic development to the extent that they involve a need for water; 4) historic reliance of the tribe on water for the proposed purpose; and 5) the tribe's current and projected population. Adjudication of Indian Reserved Water Rights
Indian reserved water rights are subject to adjudication by federal and state courts. Federal courts have historically been authorized via federal question jurisdiction to determine Indian reserved water rights under the Winters doctrine. | Although the federal government has authority to regulate water, it typically defers to the states to allocate water resources within the state. The federal government maintains certain federal water rights, though, which exist separate from state law. In particular, federal reserved water rights often arise in questions of water allocation related to federal lands, including Indian reservations. Indian reserved water rights were first recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Winters v. United States in 1908. Under the Winters doctrine, when Congress reserves land (i.e., for an Indian reservation), Congress also reserves water sufficient to fulfill the purpose of the reservation.
As the need for water grows with the development of new industries and growing populations, the tension arising from the allocation of scarce water resources highlights the difficulties that often surround reserved water rights, particularly in the western states. Western states generally follow some form of the prior appropriation system of water allocation. The prior appropriation system allocates water to users based on the order in which water rights were properly acquired. Because Indian reserved water rights date back to the government's reservation of the land for the Indians, these water rights often pre-date other water users' claims. Although the prior appropriation system's reliance on seniority provides a degree of certainty to water allocation, Indian reserved water rights may not have been quantified at the time of reservation. Because Winters did not dictate a formula to determine the quantity of water reserved, courts apply different standards to quantify tribal reserved water rights. As a result, other water users may not know whether, or the extent to which, Indian reserved water rights have priority. Because of these uncertainties, Indian reserved water rights are often litigated or negotiated in settlements and related legislation.
This report will examine the creation of Indian reserved water rights under the Winters doctrine. It will analyze the scope of the doctrine, including the purposes for which the water right may be claimed and the sources from which the water may be drawn. It will also discuss various quantification standards that courts have used in attempting to clarify Indian reserved water rights. Finally, it will examine the effect of the McCarran Amendment, through which Congress extended jurisdiction to state courts to hear disputes involving Indian reserved water rights. |
crs_R43547 | crs_R43547_0 | The VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through the nation's largest integrated health care system. In general, eligibility for VA health care is based on previous military service, presence of service-connected disabilities, and/or other factors. The rest of this report focuses on appropriations for VHA. 83 ; P.L. 113-235 ), amended 38 U.S.C §117 and included three more accounts to the Advance Appropriations list of accounts. This authorizes advance appropriations for three mandatory VA programs within the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA): compensation and pensions, readjustment benefits, and veterans insurance and indemnities. For FY2015, the Administration requested approximately $158.6 billion. This includes approximately $65.1 billion in discretionary funding and $93.5 billion in mandatory funding. 113-46 ) funded most of the VA (excluding the three medical care accounts: medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) through January 15, 2014. The FY2015 President's Budget is requesting $158.6 billion for the VA as a whole (see Table 4 ). In total, the President is requesting $56.6 billion for VHA for FY2015. This includes $45.4 billion for the medical services account, $5.9 billion for the medical support and compliance account, $4.7 billion for the medical facilities account, and nearly $589 million for the medical and prosthetic research account (see Table 5 ). As required by the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-81 ), the President's budget is requesting $58.6 billion in advance appropriations for the three medical care appropriations (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) for FY2016 (see Table 5 ). House Action
On April 3, 2014, the House Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Subcommittee approved its version of a Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations bill for FY2015 (MILCON-VA Appropriations bill). The full House Appropriations Committee approved a draft version of the measure by voice vote in an April 9, 2014, and the House passed the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2015 ( H.R. 113-416 ) on April 30, 2014. 4486 proposes a total of $158.2 billion for the VA (see Table 4 ). 4486 ( H.Rept. 4486 proposes $58.6 billion in advance FY2016 funding for the medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts—the same level as the President's request (see Table 5 ). Senate Committee Action
On May 20, 2014, the Senate Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Subcommittee marked up its version of the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2015. The full Senate Appropriations Committee approved the measure ( H.R. 4486 ; S.Rept. 113-174 ) on May 22. The committee-approved bill proposes $158.6 billion for the VA as a whole (see Table 4 ). The MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2015 ( H.R. 113-174 ) approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee proposes $56.4 billion for VHA (see Table 5 ). The MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2015 ( H.R. 4486 ; S.Rept. 113-76 provided advance appropriations for the VA's medical care accounts—medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities—for FY2015, these accounts will not be affected by the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015 ( H.J.Res. The President signed the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( H.R. 113-235 ), into law on December 16, 2014. Division I of this act included the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015 (MILCON-VA Appropriations Act, 2015). 113-235 ), provides a total of $159.1 billion in budget authority for VA programs in FY2015 (see Table 4 ). P.L. Furthermore, P.L. | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions to hospital and medical care. The VA provides these benefits through three major operating units: the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA). This report focuses on funding for the VHA. The VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through the nation's largest integrated health care system. Eligibility for VA health care is based primarily on previous military service, disability, and income.
The President's FY2015 budget request was submitted to Congress on March 4, 2014. The President's budget requested $158.6 billion in budget authority for the VA as a whole. This included $93.5 billion in mandatory funding and $65.1 billion in discretionary funding. For FY2015, the Administration requested $56.6 billion for VHA. This included $45.4 billion for the medical services account, $5.9 billion for the medical support and compliance account, $4.7 billion for the medical facilities account, and nearly $589 million for the medical and prosthetic research account. Furthermore, as required by the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-81), the President's budget requested $58.6 billion in advance appropriations for the three medical care accounts (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) for FY2016.
On April 3, 2014, the House Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Subcommittee approved its version of a Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations bill for FY2015 (MILCON-VA Appropriations bill). The full House Appropriations Committee approved a draft measure by voice vote on April 9, 2014, and the House passed the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2015 (H.R. 4486; H.Rept. 113-416) on April 30, 2014. The House-passed version of the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2015 proposed a total of $158.2 billion for the VA as whole. For FY2015, H.R. 4486 proposed $56.2 billion for VHA. On May 20, 2014, the Senate Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Subcommittee marked up its version of the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2015. The full Senate Appropriations Committee approved the measure (H.R. 4486 ; S.Rept. 113-174) on May 22. The committee-approved bill proposed $158.6 billion for the VA as a whole. For FY2015, H.R. 4486 (S.Rept. 113-174) proposed $56.4 billion for VHA.
A MILCON-VA Appropriations bill funding most of the VA (excluding the three medical care accounts: medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities), was not enacted prior to the beginning of FY2015, and Congress passed several continuing appropriations resolutions (CRs) to fund the VA. The President signed the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R. 83; P.L. 113-235) on December 16, 2014. Division I of P.L. 113-235 contained the FY2015 MILCON-VA Appropriations Act. The act provides appropriations totaling $159.1 billion for FY2015 for the functions of the VA as a whole and $56.4 billion for VHA. The MILCON-VA Appropriations Act, 2015 includes $58.6 billion in advance FY2016 funding for the medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities accounts. P.L. 113-235 also amended 38 U.S.C §117. Beginning with the FY2016 MILCON-VA Appropriations bill, compensation and pensions, readjustment benefits, and veterans insurance and indemnities accounts will be provided advance appropriations for FY2017 together with the three health accounts. |
crs_R40632 | crs_R40632_0 | This report is an overview of the FY2010 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programs that are designed to provide assistance to state and local governments, and public and private entities, such as ports. These programs are primarily used by first responders, which include firefighters, emergency medical personnel, emergency managers, and law enforcement officers. Specifically, the appropriations for these programs provide for grants, training, exercises, and other support to states, territories, and tribal and joint jurisdictions to prepare for terrorism and major disasters. The programs are administered by two different organizations within the Federal Emergency Management Agency: the Grant Programs Directorate (GPD) and the National Preparedness Directorate (NPD). This report will be updated to reflect appropriated funding for these programs in FY2010. | Since FY2002, Congress has appropriated more than $33 billion for homeland security assistance to states, specified urban areas and critical infrastructures (such as ports and rail systems), the District of Columbia, and U.S. insular areas. The Grant Programs Directorate and the National Preparedness Directorate, within the Federal Emergency Management Agency, administer these programs for the Department of Homeland Security. Each assistance program has either an all-hazards purpose or a terrorism preparedness purpose.
These programs are primarily used by first responders, which include firefighters, emergency medical personnel, emergency managers, and law enforcement officers. Specifically, the appropriations for these programs provide for grants, training, exercises, and other support to states, territories, and tribal and joint jurisdictions to prepare for terrorism and major disasters.
This report provides information on enacted FY2009 and FY2010 funding for these grant programs. It also identifies potential issues Congress may wish to address. The report will be updated when congressional or executive branch actions warrant. |
crs_RL32282 | crs_RL32282_0 | Administration officials argued that U.S. participation with ground forces wasnecessary for two main reasons: 1) the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serb negotiators all made U.S. groundforce participation a condition of their accepting any peace settlement; and 2) U.S. participation wasnecessary for the United States to maintain a leadership position in NATO. On December 14, 1995, the Presidents of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia signed a peace agreement in Paris. Though the SFOR operations have U.N. Security Council authorization,there is no "dual-key" command relationship with the United Nations. Toaccomplish this mission, NATO has identified key military and supporting tasks, as follows. Monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the DaytonAccords. These concerns ledNATO's political leaders to authorize the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December, 1996, to lastuntil June 1998. Among these provisions are:
1)U.S. ground forces should not remain in Bosnia indefinitely, and that the President should work with SFOR nations to allow the U.S. to withdraw its ground forces; 2) aNATO-led force, without U.S. ground troops, might be suitable for continued operations, and theUnited States might supply intelligence and logistical support, and a "ready reserve force in theregion". The fullStabilization Force numbers about 12,000 troops. The Bush Administration has indicated that,although there will be no unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Balkans, consultations regardingcontinued U.S. participation will be on-going with the NATO allies. Discussions among NATOdefense ministers in February have indicated that the number of SFOR troops will be reduced byabout one-third during 2004, and that it is now expected that the European Union (EU) will assumeresponsibility for Bosnian peacekeeping operations in 2005. NATO Offensive Military Operations
During March 1999, Yugoslav Army and paramilitary Ministry of Interior troops moved out of garrison in Kosovo in violation of the October agreement, and about 20,000 additional Serb troopsmassed at the northern Kosovo border. With violence against ethnic Albanian civilians escalating,on March 24, NATO began airstrikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. On June 4,1999, the Yugoslav government accepted the provisions of the G-8 peace plan, and on June 9 NATO and Yugoslav military officials signed a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA)which provided for the phased withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces form Kosovo by June 20, 1999,and detailed the authority of the KFOR commander to enforce the peace agreement with all meansnecessary. The United Nations Security Council passed a resolution(S/RES/1244) endorsing the peace plan and an "international security presence" in Kosovo for itsenforcement. Refrain from hostile or provocative acts, including reprisals ordetentions. Of the almost 22,000 troops stationed with KFOR, the United States is providing about 2,100 or 11%. Within NATO, each nation participating in Operation Allied Force assumed the cost of its ownoperations. 1401 ) prohibiting the use of any funds authorized by the legislationfor military operations in Yugoslavia. From FY2002-FY2004,Congress has appropriated approximately $2.8 billion for Kosovo operations. | With the on-going requirements of U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the continuing peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans have come under congressional scrutiny todetermine whether or not they could be safely reduced or terminated. This report examines thehistory and current status of U.S. military operations in the Balkans, and will be updated as eventswarrant.
In Paris on December 14, 1995, the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia signed the peace settlement negotiated in Dayton, OH (Dayton Accords). The United Nations Security Council'sResolution 1031 authorized the NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) for one year. On December12, 1996, the Security Council authorized a follow-on force, dubbed the Stabilization Force (SFOR). This authorization has been renewed annually. In March 1998, the NATO allies agreed that SFORwill remain in Bosnia until significant progress has been made in the implementation of the DaytonAccords.
SFOR is now a force of about 12,000 troops. The U.S. contingent has been about 1,800. It will be reduced to 800 by summer 2004, and probably withdrawn by 2005 when the European Union isexpected to take over peacekeeping duties from NATO. U.S. forces have suffered no fatal casualtiesfrom hostile action in Bosnia. SFOR continues the mission of monitoring and enforcingdemilitarized zones and weapon cantonment. These efforts have been credited a success. NATOcommanders have lent assistance to civilian authorities in their efforts to create a stable politicalenvironment (e.g., detaining war crimes suspects, and providing support for elections and limitedassistance for refugees).
In Kosovo, with the failure of peace talks on March 24, 1999 NATO began Operation Allied Force airstrikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. In June Yugoslavia accepted a peace proposaland signed a military-technical agreement with NATO providing for the withdrawal of all Yugoslavforces from Kosovo and turning military control of the province over to NATO's peacekeepingforces (KFOR). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 endorsed the peace settlement and "aninternational security presence with substantial NATO participation." It is expected that NATOforces will remain in Kosovo until its political status is resolved.
KFOR totals about 20,000 troops in Kosovo, with the United States contributing about 2,100 troops. The U.S. has suffered no casualties from hostile action.
Congress has appropriated approximately $23.5 billion for Bosnia and Kosovo operations fromFY1992 through FY2004.
Congressional concerns have focused on the impact of Balkan operations on 1) military readiness and the ability to maintain military operations in Iraq, 2) whether there has been anequitable distribution of responsibilities among the NATO allies and 3) if the United States needsto participate in Balkan peacekeeping operations at all. |
crs_R42954 | crs_R42954_0 | Introduction
Animal agriculture is an important part of the U.S. agricultural economy, and consequently is important to U.S. policymakers. The farm value of animal production is estimated at $169 billion in 2012, nearly 44% of the total value of U.S. agricultural production. In addition, the value of animal product exports and imports grew to about $43 billion in 2012. Approximately 1.1 million of the nation's more than 2.2 million farms were classified in the 2007 Census of Agriculture as primarily animal production operations. With the exception of dairy, livestock and poultry products generally are not eligible for the price and income support programs authorized in farm bills for major crops such as grains, cotton, and oilseeds. Instead, the livestock and poultry industries seek federal government leadership and support in food safety, monitoring animal diseases, and promoting fair and competitive trade practices that benefit consumers and animal agriculture. Livestock and poultry producers count on the U.S. government for negotiating international market access, monitoring trade agreements, and settling trade disputes. Other long-standing public policy concerns include animal agriculture's obligations with respect to animal welfare and environmental protection. Selected Issues
Major animal agriculture issues likely to be of interest to the 113 th Congress include a proposal to restructure U.S. dairy policy as part of any omnibus farm bill and several regulatory issues. In addition, Congress continues to oversee U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) activities related to livestock and poultry markets and USDA's food safety responsibilities, such as meat and poultry inspections. Other key issues, including animal welfare, the role of trade in the animal sector, and environmental regulations that impact animal agriculture, continue to generate interest in Congress. Both bills proposed replacing the current U.S. dairy programs that rely on a simple price trigger (DPPSP and MILC) with two programs—the Dairy Production Margin Protection Program (DPMPP), a new income support program based on the monthly difference (i.e., the margin) between the national average farm all-milk price and a formula-derived estimate of feed costs, and the Dairy Market Stabilization Program (DMSP), which, under certain conditions, would reduce payments to participating producers for their milk when the margin falls below proposed statutory thresholds. The Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honey Bees, and Farm-Raised Fish Program (ELAP) compensates producers for disaster losses not covered under other disaster programs. Given general widespread support for livestock disaster aid, many expect the reauthorization of the disaster programs with mandatory funds to be included in any farm bill reauthorization that is introduced in the 113 th Congress. However, livestock and poultry industries have intently focused on repealing or revising the RFS, which they say has harmed the livestock and poultry sectors by driving up feed costs. Like the FY2012 appropriations act, the FY2013 House Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 5973 ) would have prohibited USDA from implementing the GIPSA rule provisions. In addition, the bill would have repealed the provisions that USDA finalized in December 2011. Also, Congress might address the GIPSA rule provisions during debate on any omnibus farm bill. In the 112 th Congress, the House Agriculture Committee-reported farm bill ( H.R. These bills did not advance, but could be reintroduced in the 113 th Congress. A similar bill may be introduced in the 113 th Congress. Egg legislation could also become part of an omnibus farm bill debate during 2013. | Animal agriculture is an important part of the U.S. agricultural economy, and consequently is important to U.S. policymakers. The farm value of animal production is estimated at $169 billion in 2012, nearly 44% of the total value of U.S. agricultural production. In addition, the value of animal product exports and imports grew to about $43 billion in 2012. Approximately 1.1 million of the nation's more than 2.2 million farms were classified in the 2007 Census of Agriculture as primarily animal production operations. These included cattle farms and ranches; cattle feedlots; dairies; operations with hogs, poultry, eggs, sheep, or goats; and farms with horses, bison, beekeeping, and aquaculture.
Except for dairy, livestock and poultry products generally are not eligible for the price and income support programs authorized in farm bills for major crops such as grains, cotton, and oilseeds. Livestock and poultry producers count on federal government leadership in policy areas such as food safety, animal health, the promotion of fair and competitive trade practices, and foreign trade for the benefit of animal agriculture. Other long-standing public policy concerns include animal agriculture's obligations with respect to animal welfare and environmental protection.
A couple of key animal agriculture issues are expected to be part of the omnibus farm bill debate in the 113th Congress. The 112th Congress proposed substantial changes to U.S. dairy policy, including the creation of a Dairy Production Margin Protection Program and a Dairy Market Stabilization Program. Similar provisions may be reintroduced in the 113th Congress as part of a new omnibus farm bill. Also, three expired livestock disaster assistance programs—the Livestock Forage Disaster Program, the Livestock Indemnity Program, and the Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honey Bees, and Farm-Raised Fish Program—may be proposed for reauthorization with mandatory funds in any farm bill introduced this year. The farm bills in the 112th Congress would have reauthorized the programs.
The House and Senate Agriculture Committees might be involved in a variety of issues through their oversight of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The livestock and poultry industries have intently focused on a repeal or revision of the Renewable Fuels Standard, which they say has harmed their sectors by driving up feed costs.
The 113th Congress also might address issues related to livestock and poultry contracts. In the FY2012 Agriculture Appropriations Act, the 112th Congress prohibited USDA from finalizing parts of its proposed rule on contracts. Proposals in the FY2013 House Agriculture appropriations bill and the House farm bill would have repealed the provisions that USDA finalized in 2011. The repeal of the USDA rules may be reintroduced this year.
Oversight of USDA's food safety responsibilities could also be of interest to Congress as USDA is in the midst of rulemaking for some significant food safety–related issues. Trade agreements could be addressed as the United States negotiates the Trans-Pacific Partnership and considers engaging the European Union in free trade negotiations. Congress may address legislation on horse slaughter and laying-hen cages. Congress might also consider environmental regulations that impact livestock and poultry, and conservation programs that have benefited animal agriculture. |
crs_RL33250 | crs_RL33250_0 | In addition to these bilateral activities, the United States has supported multilateral family planning efforts through annual contributions to the U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA). In 1984, at the second International Conference on Population held in Mexico City, Mexico, President Reagan issued what has become known as the "Mexico City policy," which required foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) receiving USAID family planning assistance to certify that they would not perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning, even if such activities were undertaken with non-U.S. funds. Kemp-Kasten prohibits U.S. assistance to organizations that, as determined by the President, support or participate in the management of coercive family planning programs. Presidents Reagan, George Bush, and George W. Bush prohibited U.S. contributions to UNFPA and supported the Mexico City Policy, while Presidents Clinton and Obama have supported U.S. funding of UNFPA and overturned the Mexico City Policy. This section addresses two key actions that were initiated in the mid-1980s and have remained particularly controversial in the U.S. family planning debate: the Mexico City policy involving funding for foreign non-governmental organizations, and "Kemp-Kasten" restrictions on funding for the U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA) because of its activities in China. Rescinded by the Obama Administration (2009)
On January 23, 2009, President Barack Obama issued a presidential memorandum to the Secretary of State and USAID Administrator revoking the Mexico City policy and Bush Administration conditions on voluntary population planning provided by the State Department. U.S. Activities and Funding Levels
USAID is the lead U.S. agency addressing voluntary family planning and reproductive health and has been the largest international family planning donor for over 40 years. Since 1965, it has obligated over $13.8 billion in assistance for international family planning activities. FY2016
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 113-114 ), stated that not less than $575 million shall be made available for bilateral FP/RH activities, $523.95 of which would be drawn from the Global Health Programs account (GHP). It further stated that $32.5 million shall be made available for UNFPA, a $2.5 million decrease from the enacted level of $35 million annually from FY2012 through FY2015. FY2015
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ), enacted in December 2014, stated that not less than $575 million should be made available for bilateral FP/RH activities, and that $35 million shall be made available for UNFPA. FY2014
Enacted in January 2014, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. 113-76 ), directed that no less than $575 million shall be made available for bilateral FP/RH activities, and that an additional $35 million shall be made available for UNFPA. As during previous appropriations cycles, UNFPA funding is subject to certain restrictions, including
funds not made available for UNFPA because of any provision of law shall be transferred to the Global Health Programs account and made available for family planning, maternal, and reproductive health activities; none of the funds made available may be used by UNFPA for a country program in China; U.S. contributions must be kept in an account separate from other UNFPA accounts and should not commingle with other sums; and UNFPA must not fund abortions. For FY2014, President Obama had requested $635.4 million in bilateral and multilateral family planning funding. The act also states that $35 million shall be made available for UNFPA. For FY2012, the Obama Administration requested a total of $769.105 million for international family planning and reproductive health assistance. | For the past several decades, U.S. policymakers have debated the most appropriate and effective funding levels for U.S. international family planning programs. In the mid-1980s, controversy arose over U.S. family planning assistance when the Ronald Reagan Administration introduced restrictions that became known as the "Mexico City policy." The Mexico City policy required foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to certify that they would not perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning—even if the activities were undertaken with non-U.S. funds. Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush also suspended contributions to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) due to evidence of coercive family planning practices in China, citing violations of the "Kemp-Kasten" amendment, which bans U.S. assistance to organizations that, as determined by the President, support or participate in the management of coercive family planning programs.
President Bill Clinton resumed UNFPA funding and rescinded the Mexico City policy in 1993. In 2001, however, President George W. Bush reapplied the Mexico City policy restrictions. The Bush Administration also suspended U.S. contributions to UNFPA from FY2002 to FY2008 following a State Department investigation of family planning programs in China. In January 2009, President Barack Obama issued a memorandum rescinding the Mexico City policy. The President also stated that the United States would resume U.S. contributions to UNFPA.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the primary U.S. agency charged with supporting bilateral voluntary family planning and reproductive health (FP/RH) worldwide. Since 1965, it has obligated over $13.8 billion in assistance for international family planning activities. UNPFA is the primary organization through which the United States supports multilateral family planning activities. Recent international family planning-related appropriations and Administration requests are outlined below.
FY2016 funding—Similar to the previous two fiscal years, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), stated that not less than $575 million shall be made available for bilateral FP/RH activities. The act stated that an additional $32.5 million shall be made available for UNFPA, a $2.5 million decrease from the FY2015-enacted level of $35 million. (The Obama Administration had requested a total of $577.6 million in bilateral FP/RH funding, and $35 million for UNFPA.) FY2015 funding—As in FY2014, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235), stated that not less than $575 million shall be made available for bilateral FP/RH activities, and that an additional $35 million shall be made available for UNFPA. FY2014 funding—Enacted in January 2014, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76) directed that not less than $575 million shall be made available for bilateral FP/RH activities, and that an additional $35 million shall be made available for UNFPA.
For further discussion of abortion and family planning-related restrictions in U.S. legislation and policy, see CRS Report R41360, Abortion and Family Planning-Related Provisions in U.S. Foreign Assistance Law and Policy, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33467, Abortion: Judicial History and Legislative Response, by [author name scrubbed].
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL32801 | crs_RL32801_0 | Specifically, Subsection 610(a) of the RFA requires each agency to develop a plan for the review of its existing rules that have or will have a "significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities." The Section 610 review plans were to require agencies to review all existing rules within 10 years of the effective date of the statute (January 1, 1981), and require any new rules to be reviewed within 10 years of their publication as a final rule. Subsection 610(c) of the RFA requires agencies to provide an annual Federal Register notice of rules they have designated for review within the next 12 months. However, it appears that agencies are carrying out relatively few Section 610 reviews. One reason why so few reviews are done is that the act gives agencies a significant amount of discretion to decide which rules are covered by the review requirement. There also appears to be substantial confusion among the agencies regarding what Section 610 requires, thereby limiting its effectiveness. In essence, the Agenda is intended to be a compendium of agency rulemaking actions within the next 12 months. Therefore, the number of Section 610 notices in the Unified Agenda should provide some indication of the extent to which agencies are conducting the required "lookbacks" under the RFA. GAO also reported that discretionary reviews more often resulted in changes to rules and related documents than mandatory reviews. Implications for Regulatory Reform
The failure of Section 610 of the RFA to get many agencies to review the impact of their existing rules on small entities offers a number of valuable lessons for current advocates of even broader "lookback" requirements. Without some type of enforcement of the review requirement, agencies are unlikely to conduct many more reviews than have occurred pursuant to Section 610. Similar legislation was introduced in the 109 th Congress ( H.R. Specifically, within 180 days after enactment, the bill would require agencies to publish in the Federal Register and on their websites a plan for reviewing all existing rules that the agency heads determine have a "significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities"—regardless of whether the agency published a final regulatory flexibility analysis under Section 604 of the RFA at the time the rule was promulgated. 4458 would clarify how agencies' reviews under Section 610 of the RFA should be conducted. | Section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980 requires each agency to develop a plan for the review of its existing rules that have or will have a "significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities." Agencies are required to review any new rules within 10 years of their publication as a final rule, and to provide an annual Federal Register notice of rules they have designated for review within the next 12 months. The Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions is intended to be a compendium of agency rulemaking actions within the next 12 months. Therefore, the number of Section 610 notices in the Unified Agenda should provide some indication of the extent to which agencies are conducting the required "lookbacks" under the RFA.
It appears that agencies are carrying out relatively few Section 610 reviews. Several agencies have consistently indicated that they plan to issue dozens of rules each year with a significant impact on small entities, but have published few if any notices of Section 610 reviews in the Unified Agenda. The RFA gives agencies a significant amount of discretion to decide which rules are covered by the review requirement. There also appears to be substantial confusion or disagreement among the agencies regarding what Section 610 requires, thereby limiting its effectiveness. For example, some agencies said the statutes underlying their rules had a significant impact on small entities, not the rules themselves, so they did not have to review them under Section 610. In July 2007, GAO reported that agencies frequently initiated regulatory reviews on their own, and those reviews were more effective in bringing about changes to rules than mandatory review requirements like Section 610.
The poor implementation history of Section 610 of the RFA offers a number of valuable lessons for current advocates of even broader "lookback" reviews. For any such process to work, Congress faces the challenge of clearly specifying what rules should be reviewed and how the reviews should be conducted. Also, some means of tracking the reviews, congressional or executive branch oversight, and a meaningful enforcement mechanism appear important to improving the implementation of the lookback requirement. Otherwise, agencies are unlikely to conduct many more reviews than have occurred pursuant to Section 610. Legislation has been introduced in the 110th Congress (H.R. 4458) that addresses some of the issues regarding the implementation of the RFA and Section 610 reviews.
This report will be updated when additional information about Section 610 or broader lookback reviews become available. |
crs_RL32301 | crs_RL32301_0 | Most Recent Developments
On December 8, 2004, the President signed into law the FY2005 Consolidated AppropriationsAct ( P.L. Division A of P.L. 108-447 contains $85.3 billion in FY2005 funding for the U.S.Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies, including $16.9 billion in discretionary spending.The total appropriation does not reflect the effect of a provision that requires a 0.8% across-the-boardrescission in all discretionary spending in the measure. Discretionary Spending
Approximately three-fourths of total spending within the U.S. Department of Agriculture is classified as mandatory, which by definition occurs outside the control of annual appropriations.Currently accounting for the vast majority of USDA mandatory spending are: the farm commodityprice and income support programs (including ongoing programs authorized by the 2002 farm billand emergency programs authorized by various appropriations acts); the food stamp program andmost child nutrition programs; the federal crop insurance program; and various agriculturalconservation and trade programs. The FY2004 levelreflects the 0.59% across-the-board rescission to all non-defense, discretionary accounts, withoutexception. (1) An estimated $66.3 billion, ornearly 80%, of this requestedspending is for mandatory programs administered by USDA (primarily the CCC,crop insurance, and most food and nutrition programs). It is this category of spending for whichappropriators have direct control over annual spending levels. Table 2. 4818) forFY2005. The only amendment adopted in the Senate subcommittee was ageneral provision that would relax restrictions on travel to Cuba to promote and sellU.S. agricultural products. This provision was subsequently deleted by conferees. On November 20, 2004, the conference agreement wasfolded into an FY2005 consolidated appropriations bill (H.R. 4818, H.Rept. 108-447 ) on December 8, 2004. The following sections of this report review the major provisions in the FY2005 conference agreement for USDA and related agencies as finally enacted, and comparethe FY2005 funding levels with the House-passed and Senate-reported measures, theAdministration's FY2005 request, and the enacted FY2004 levels ( P.L. 4766 ) and the Administration request for$1.317 billion. The FY2005 House committee report ( H.Rept. For the resource conservation and developmentaccount, H.R. In practice, appropriatorsoften place limits on mandatory spending in annual appropriations bills. Discretionary Programs. A Chabotamendment to H.R. 108-447 eliminates or limits FY2005 funding to carry out several mandatory rural development programsauthorized in the 2002 farm bill ( P.L.107-171 ). The Administration proposal and House and Senate bills would have fundedfood stamp and related programs at a total of $33.6 billion in FY2005 -- $2.7 billionmore than projected FY2004 spending for these programs. 108-447 provides $5.28 billion for the WIC program for FY2005. This is approximately $190million above the Administration amended budget request of $5.087 billion. The conference report leaves in both the House andSenate report language which contains a provision that prohibits FDA from usingfunds to enforce the current statute that bans importation of prescription drugs byparties other than drug companies. 4766 ) level and $3.4 million above the enactedFY2004 level, but $1 million below the Senate-reported ( S. 2803 ) andAdministration-requested levels. | On November 20, 2004, the House and Senate approved the conference agreement on the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( H.R. 4818 , H.Rept. 108-792 ), whichcombined nine annual appropriations bills into one measure. The President signed H.R.4818 into law ( P.L. 108-447 ) on December 8, 2004. Division A of the act provides theU.S. Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies with $85.28 billion in budget authority forFY2005, which is $1.3 billion below FY2004 and $2.0-$2.3 billion above the FY2005 House-passed( H.R. 4766 ) and Senate-reported ( S. 2803 ) bills, and the Administration'sFY2005 request.
An estimated $66.4 billion, or nearly 80%, of the total FY2005 spending in Division A is for mandatory USDA programs, primarily farm commodity support programs and various nutritionprograms. The mandatory total for FY2005 is $1.45 billion below FY2004, mainly becauseimproved farm commodity prices have required reduced spending for farm commodity supportauthorized by the 2002 farm bill. FY2005 mandatory spending is approximately $2 billion above therecommendations of the House, Senate, and the Administration, mainly because of a revision innutrition program funding needs subsequent to these recommendations.
For all discretionary programs, USDA and related agencies receive $16.98 billion for FY2005, before taking into account the effect of a 0.8% across-the-board rescission on all discretionaryaccounts required by P.L. 108-447 . Discretionary spending is the category over which appropriatorshave direct control in annual spending bills. The pre-rescission discretionary total is about $140million above the enacted FY2004 level and the FY2005 House level, $210 million above the Senatelevel, and $413 million above the Administration request. Once it is applied, the rescission likelywill bring FY2005 spending close to the FY2004 and House level of $16.84 billion.
In order to meet an FY2005 discretionary allocation that was close to the FY2004 enacted level, appropriators, as in past years, placed limitations on authorized levels of spending in the 2002 farmbill for various mandatory conservation, rural development, and research programs. P.L. 108-447 reduced authorized FY2005 mandatory spending levels for these programs by a total of about $1.2billion, and applied those savings toward meeting the discretionary allocation.
Among the provisions that were deleted by conferees in the final law were a Senate provision that would have relaxed licensing rules for businesses seeking to travel to Cuba to promote and sellagricultural products; and a House provision that would have prohibited FDA from enforcing thecurrent law that bans importation of prescriptions drugs by parties other than drug companies.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: RSI = Resources, Science and Industry; DSP = Domestic Social Policy; G&F = Government and Finance |
crs_R42888 | crs_R42888_0 | Overview
General Assessment
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu came to power following elections in 2009, and called for the 2013 elections to take place in January, nine months before they were required. Most polls and analyses predict that Netanyahu will win another term as prime minister. This could increase Netanyahu's dependence on small parties with right-of-center or ultra-Orthodox constituencies that are passionately devoted to specific issue areas and have seen their polling averages rise. These include the Iranian nuclear issue, cost-of-living and other budgetary matters, and the seemingly intractable situation with Palestinians and settlements (or neighborhoods) in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Netanyahu's opponents from the center and left appear thus far to have been unsuccessful in attempts to gather a bloc with the support or cohesion necessary to become a viable political alternative. Since the 2009 elections, apprehension within Israel related to the Iranian nuclear crisis and political change in the Arab world have further challenged the centrality of Palestinian issues in Israeli politics. The likely long-term effects of Israel's continuing political evolution on its internal cohesion and ties with the United States and other international actors are unclear. Criticism of Netanyahu's government by some U.S. and international observers has been especially intense on the subjects of settlement expansion. Many of these critics accuse Israel's leaders of a penchant for short-term thinking, focused on maintaining territory and security control, at the potential expense of a longer-term vision of mutual accommodation with Palestinians and other regional actors (see " How Might International Factors Affect the Process? " They insist that international actors do not properly take into account the proximity, multiplicity, and seriousness of the security challenges Israel faces, or the efforts that Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders have made in containing settlement construction. The composition of a new Netanyahu coalition and government could significantly influence the tenor of Israel's politics and its foreign relations, including with the United States. Conclusion
Israeli electoral outcomes may have major implications for U.S.-Israel relations and security cooperation. If the Likud/Yisrael Beiteinu partnership emerges with the largest Knesset representation, Binyamin Netanyahu would primarily shape the new coalition and government, but would need support from key Israeli constituencies outside his political support base. As part of this process, he would weigh a number of domestic and international considerations—including the lack of a clear rival to his immediate leadership—within an overall political, demographic, and regional security context. The strategic challenge of Iran's nuclear program and the potential for key short-term decision points on unilateral Israeli military action is paramount among these concerns. However, the concerns also include questions about growing threats in ungoverned spaces at Israel's borders; a seemingly more intractable Palestinian situation with increasing potential for West Bank instability and international isolation of Israel; and the future nature and extent of relations with a more Islamist Egypt, a potentially fragile Jordan, a war-scarred Syria vulnerable to extremism, and a conflicted, powerful, and less friendly Turkey. To the extent that Netanyahu's choices of coalition partners and ministers reveal his priorities and constraints as to policy initiatives, Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers can use this information to assess the status and trajectory of U.S.-Israel relations and evaluate possible political, economic, and military options in the Middle East. | Close U.S.-Israel relations drive congressional interest in upcoming elections for Israel's 120-seat Knesset (parliament), scheduled for January 22, 2013. Israeli leadership decisions may have profound implications for matters of high U.S. priority, including potential threats from Iran and its non-state allies (such as Hezbollah and Hamas), issues of ongoing Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and political change in neighboring Arab states. The composition of a probable new coalition and government led by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu could significantly influence Israeli decisionmaking, politics, and relations with the outside world, including the United States. In turn, this could affect U.S. popularity, credibility, and—ultimately—national security vis-à-vis the Middle East and more broadly. For more information on Israeli politics and U.S.-Israel relations, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].
Netanyahu came to power following elections in 2009, and called for the 2013 elections to take place in January, nine months before they were required. Most polls and analyses predict that Netanyahu will win another term as prime minister, but a drop in polling support for his joint Likud/Yisrael Beiteinu list—possibly due in part to the indictment of Yisrael Beiteinu leader Avigdor Lieberman—could increase his dependence on support from small right-of-center or ultra-Orthodox parties that focus on specific issues and have seen their polling averages rise. If they thus acquire disproportionate influence, such coalition partners—along with other parties, cabinet ministers, and "hardline" elements within Likud—might constrain or otherwise affect Netanyahu as he confronts a range of challenges that include the Iranian nuclear issue, cost-of-living and other budgetary matters, and the seemingly intractable situation with the Palestinians. Netanyahu's political opponents from the left and center appear thus far to have been unsuccessful in attempts to gather a bloc that represents a viable political alternative.
The likely effects of Israel's elections and related political developments on its internal cohesion and foreign relations are unclear. Criticism by some U.S. and international observers of Netanyahu's government since 2009 has targeted expanding Jewish residential settlement in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Many of these critics accuse Israel's leaders of a penchant for short-term thinking, focused on maintaining territory and security control, at the potential expense of a longer-term vision of mutual accommodation with other regional actors. Some Israelis dismiss this criticism by insisting that it does not properly take into account the proximity, multiplicity, and seriousness of the challenges Israel faces, or the concessions that Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders have periodically made.
Should his party emerge with the largest Knesset representation, Netanyahu would play the leading role in shaping the new coalition and government, but would need support from outside his political support base. As part of this process, he would weigh various domestic and international considerations—including the lack of a clear rival to his immediate leadership—within an overall political, demographic, and regional security context. The strategic challenge of Iran's nuclear program and the potential for key short-term decision points on unilateral Israeli military action are paramount among security concerns. However, the concerns also include questions about growing threats in ungoverned spaces at Israel's borders, increased potential for West Bank instability, and the future nature of Israel's relations with neighboring countries and concerns about further international isolation. To the extent that Netanyahu's choice of coalition partners and ministers reveals his priorities and constraints as to policy initiatives, Members of Congress can use this information to assess the status and trajectory of U.S.-Israel relations and evaluate possible political, economic, and military options in the Middle East. |
crs_RL31294 | crs_RL31294_0 | EPA Efforts to Increase Drinking Water Security
In 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HPSD-7), which affirmed EPA as the lead federal agency for coordinating the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure for the water sector. Under this directive, EPA is responsible for developing and providing tools and training on improving security to roughly 52,000 community water systems and 16,000 municipal wastewater treatment facilities. This Division works with drinking water and wastewater utilities, states, tribes, and other stakeholders to improve the security of these utilities and improve their ability to respond to security threats and breaches. Among its responsibilities and activities, the Water Security Division provides security and antiterrorism-related technical assistance and training to the water sector. As a sector, drinking water utilities acted relatively quickly to assess vulnerabilities, upgrade emergency response plans, and take some initial steps to improve security of this critical infrastructure. Funding for Drinking Water Security Activities
Since 2001, Congress has provided funds annually to EPA to improve the security of public water supplies. Congress has continued to provide roughly $5 million for these state grants each year. P.L. Again, Congress did not pass specific EPA appropriations, and the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act ( P.L. Another potential source of funding for community water systems is the State Homeland Security Grant Program, administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While the Homeland Security Act of 2002 broadly addressed critical infrastructure protection, the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 specifically aimed at improving the security of drinking water supplies. The act gave key responsibility for critical infrastructure protection to DHS, but did not transfer EPA water security functions to the new department. Under HSPD-7, DHS is responsible for overall coordination and integration of national critical infrastructure protection efforts by federal, state, and local governments and the private sector, whereas EPA is responsible for developing and providing water security tools and training for the nation's community water systems and municipal wastewater treatment facilities. The relative roles of EPA and DHS with regard to water sector security have also been at issue in debates on legislation to impose security requirements at chemical facilities. Although the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act required community water systems to conduct vulnerability assessments and prepare emergency response plans, it did not require systems to make security upgrades to address any identified vulnerabilities. 109-295 , Section 550), the 109 th Congress authorized DHS to regulate, for three years, high-risk chemical facilities, excluding drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities and facilities in ports. 2868 , to revise and codify security requirements for chemical facilities and impose new security requirements on drinking water and wastewater utilities. In the Senate, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs reported H.R. Nonetheless, there is continued congressional interest in expanding security requirements for the chemical facility sector, and in including certain water utilities within the scope of such requirements. These principles are:
EPA should be the lead agency for chemical security for drinking water and wastewater systems, with DHS supporting EPA's efforts; to address chemical security in the water sector, EPA would use, with modifications as appropriate considering statutory requirements and the uniqueness of the water sector, DHS's existing risk assessment tools and performance standards for chemical facilities; DHS should be responsible for ensuring consistency of high-risk chemical facility security across all 18 infrastructure sectors; and to enhance the security of high-risk chemical storing facilities, where possible, these facilities should use safer technology such as less toxic chemicals. S. 2781 and S. 1995 proposed to amend the Clean Water Act to address security at wastewater treatment facilities. P.L. The substitute language would have extended the authorization of the current CFATS authority for three years, and established a voluntary training program and a best-practices clearinghouse for chemical facility security activities. 2868 . Congress has not provided funding specifically for water systems to make security improvements. House-passed H.R. | The events of September 11, 2001, focused attention on the security status of the nation's drinking water supplies and the vulnerability of this critical infrastructure sector to attack. Congress since has enacted security requirements for public water systems and has provided funding for vulnerability assessments, emergency planning, and drinking water research. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the lead federal agency for the water sector, has worked with water utilities, state and local governments, and federal agencies to improve the drinking water security. However, water facilities have not been required to address identified risks and vulnerabilities, and recent Congresses have considered legislation to mandate such actions.
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-188) amended the Safe Drinking Water Act to require some 8,400 community water systems to assess vulnerabilities and prepare emergency response plans. It authorized funding for these activities and for emergency grants to states and utilities, and it directed EPA to review methods to prevent, detect, and respond to threats to water safety and infrastructure security. The act did not require water systems to make security upgrades to address potential vulnerabilities. In most years since FY2002, Congress appropriated roughly $5 million annually for EPA to work with states and the water sector to improve the security of drinking water supplies.
In creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), Congress gave DHS responsibility for assessing and protecting the nation's critical infrastructures. However, the act did not transfer EPA's water security functions, and the 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-7) affirmed EPA's lead role in protecting the water infrastructure. Under this directive, EPA has responsibility for developing and providing tools and training on improving security to roughly 52,000 community water systems and 16,000 municipal wastewater treatment facilities.
In the 109th Congress, the Department of Homeland Security FY2007 appropriations act (P.L. 109-295) authorized DHS to regulate for three years high-risk chemical facilities, but the law excluded from coverage drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities.
In the 111th Congress, interest in extending and expanding security requirements for the chemical facility sector continued, as has debate over whether to include certain water utilities within the scope of such requirements. House-passed H.R. 2868 would have imposed new security requirements on drinking water and wastewater utilities, while retaining EPA's regulatory authority for water sector utilities. The substitute version of H.R. 2868 reported by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs excluded water utilities and proposed to extend DHS chemical facility authority for three years, create voluntary technical assistance and training programs, and create a best practices clearinghouse.
Although EPA, states, localities, and water utilities have taken steps to address security concerns, the security of the nation's water supplies has continued to attract congressional attention. Issues have included the status of efforts by the water sector to improve security, whether to impose new federal requirements, funding needs for water systems to make security improvements, the relative roles and responsibilities of EPA and DHS regarding the water sector, and the status of research and development of technologies to help water systems detect and address potential biological and chemical contaminants. This report reviews governmental and water utility efforts to improve drinking water security. |
crs_R41263 | crs_R41263_0 | Introduction
Martial Law to Beacon of Democracy
Taiwan, which its government formally calls the Republic of China (ROC), is a success story for U.S. interests in the promotion of universal freedoms and multiparty democracy. Taiwan's people and their leaders transformed politics from rule imposed from the outside with authoritarian abuses to relatively peaceful achievement of self-government, human rights, and democracy. The purpose of this CRS report is to succinctly discuss Taiwan's transformation and current concerns, with particular attention to the role of Congress and implications and options for U.S. policy. In more modern history, Taiwan's people did not enjoy democratic self-government until the first direct presidential election in 1996. Still, Taiwan has never been ruled by the CPC regime under the People's Republic of China (PRC) based in Beijing that claims Taiwan as belonging to "China." The opposition Democratic Progressive Party ( DPP ), formed in 1986, and its candidate Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election in 2000. Taiwan enjoyed a second democratic transfer of power in 2008, when the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou won the election for president. U.S. policy has played important roles in Taiwan's transition to democracy, by decreasing Taiwan's sense of insecurity through arms sales and other contacts even after terminating the mutual defense treaty with and diplomatic recognition of the ROC in 1979, by continuing business ties that have provided for prosperity, and by pressing the KMT regime to end authoritarian abuses of power in favor of freedoms for all the people in Taiwan, including the majority Taiwanese. After two democratic transfers of power, Taiwan has an unfinished story in promoting rule of law and maintaining a strong multi-party system, and this process has implications for U.S. economic, political, and security interests. Covenants
Promoting an environment conducive to rule of law and business, President Ma has led his government to fight corruption in Taiwan, a complaint of some U.S. firms. He touted his administration as a defender of democracy, enhancing rule of law and protection of human rights. He championed Taiwan's long-awaited ratification of the United Nations (U.N.) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Some events since 2008 have raised domestic and foreign media and other scrutiny. Congressional Role
Actions Against Authoritarian Abuses18
Before reformist leaders in the KMT and the opposition forces (called "dang wai" ) pushed for political liberalization that began in Taiwan in 1986, Congress played an important role in U.S. pressure on the moderate part of the KMT's authoritarian regime to reform the political system. In 1979, just after the United States switched diplomatic recognition from the ROC in Taipei to the PRC in Beijing, Congress carefully crafted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8 of April 10, 1979. The TRA included a section on human rights. Implications and Options for Policy
Thus, Congress has a long record of oversight of the human rights aspect of the Executive Branch's foreign policy toward Taiwan, external pressure on the KMT moderates to end authoritarian abuses including activities on U.S. soil, and support for advancement of Taiwan's democracy. 148 to support Taiwan's democracy and security. This question has been complicated by the highly partisan political disputes in Taiwan after the detention of ex-president Chen amid corruption charges and restrictions against protestors during the visit of a PRC official in 2008. Relevance of U.S. Policy Options
Congress or the Administration continue to have a number of options concerning Taiwan's democracy, human rights, and rule of law, including remaining a more passive observer. | Taiwan, which its government formally calls the Republic of China (ROC), is a success story for U.S. interests in the promotion of universal freedoms and democracy. Taiwan's people and their leaders transformed politics from rule imposed from the outside with authoritarian abuses to the relatively peaceful achievement of self-government, human rights, and democracy. The purpose of this CRS report is to succinctly discuss Taiwan's transformation and current concerns, paying particular attention to the role of Congress and implications and options for U.S. policy.
Taiwan's people did not fully enjoy democratic self-government until the first direct presidential election in 1996. The opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), formed in 1986, and its candidate Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election in 2000, ending Taiwan's 55 years of rule by the Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist Party of China. Taiwan enjoyed a second democratic transfer of power in 2008, when the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou won the election for president.
After two democratic transfers of power, Taiwan has an unfinished story in promoting rule of law and maintaining a strong multi-party system, with implications for U.S. security, economic, and political interests. U.S. policy has played important roles in Taiwan's transition to democracy, by decreasing Taiwan's sense of insecurity through continued arms sales and other contacts after the end of the mutual defense treaty with and diplomatic recognition of the ROC in 1979, by continuing business ties that have provided for prosperity, and by pressing the KMT to end authoritarian abuses of power in favor of freedoms for all Taiwan's people, including the majority Taiwanese. Some say Taiwan could be a model for the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Promoting an environment conducive to rule of law and business, President Ma has led his government to fight corruption in Taiwan, a complaint of some U.S. firms. He has touted his administration as a defender of democracy, enhancing Taiwan's rule of law and protection of human rights. He championed Taiwan's long-awaited ratification of the United Nations (U.N.) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Nonetheless, domestic and international scrutiny of Taiwan's democracy and rule of law has increased. Some events under the Ma Administration have raised domestic and foreign concern about Taiwan, most prominently the heavy police presence to control protesters during the visit of a PRC figure from Beijing in November 2008 and the prolonged detention of ex-president Chen on charges of corruption since 2008.
Before reformist leaders in the KMT and the opposition forces pushed for political liberalization that began in Taiwan in 1986, Congress played an important role in U.S. pressure on the KMT's authoritarian regime to reform the political system. Congressional oversight is provided by law. In 1979, just after the United States switched diplomatic recognition from the ROC in Taipei to the PRC in Beijing, Congress carefully crafted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8 of April 10, 1979, and included a section on human rights. Congress has a long record of oversight of the human rights aspect of the Executive Branch's foreign policy toward Taiwan, external pressure on the KMT moderates to end authoritarian abuses (particularly involving the United States), and support for advancement of Taiwan's democracy. In addition to U.S. policy interests and relevant roles, Congress and the Administration continue to have a number of options concerning Taiwan's democracy, human rights, and rule of law, including remaining a more passive observer in deference to Taiwan's voters and their elected leaders in a fellow democracy. The clearest U.S. statement came in November 2008, when the U.S. Representative in Taipei expressed an expectation that Taiwan's legal system be transparent, fair, and impartial. |
crs_R41272 | crs_R41272_0 | In light of Ms. Kagan's nomination to serve as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, this report analyzes Kagan's views of executive power and the doctrine of separation of powers as laid out in Presidential Administration . This report will proceed as follows: First, it will briefly describe the constitutional and legal basis for presidential authority with respect to domestic policy, focusing on the relevant constitutional text as well as the Supreme Court jurisprudence that forms the foundation for almost all discussions of executive authority. Second, the report will provide a discussion of the well-established and competing theories of executive power, the traditional view as well as the "unitary theory of the executive." Third, the report will discuss Professor Kagan's theory of "presidential administration" and her legal responses to both of the aforementioned theories. Fourth, the report will turn to the application of Professor Kagan's theory to the field of administrative law, with an emphasis on the non-delegation doctrine and the level of deference often afforded to executive branch agencies by the judiciary, often referred to as Chevron deference. Finally, the report will provide a discussion of some of the criticism of Professor Kagan's views, especially as they relate to the President's legal authority in the areas of foreign policy and national security, both of which are expected by many to be issues that the Supreme Court will adjudicate in future terms. | In light of Elena Kagan's nomination to serve as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, this report analyzes then-Professor Kagan's views of executive power and the doctrine of separation of powers as laid most extensively out in her 2001 Harvard Law Review article Presidential Administration. This report will proceed as follows. First, it will briefly describe the constitutional and legal basis for presidential authority with respect to domestic policy, focusing on the relevant constitutional text as well as the Supreme Court jurisprudence that forms the foundation for almost all discussions of executive authority. Second, the report will provide a discussion of the well-established and competing theories of executive power, the traditional view as well as the "unitary theory of the executive." Third, the report will discuss Professor Kagan's theory of "presidential administration" and her legal responses to both of the aforementioned theories. Fourth, the report will turn to the application of Professor Kagan's theory to the field of administrative law, with an emphasis on the non-delegation doctrine and the level of deference often afforded to executive branch agencies by the judiciary, often referred to as Chevron deference. Finally, the report will provide a discussion of some of the criticism of Professor Kagan's views, especially as they relate to the President's legal authority in the areas of foreign policy and national security, both of which are expected by many to be issues that the Supreme Court will adjudicate in future terms. |
crs_R43354 | crs_R43354_0 | B roadly understood, domestic content restrictions are provisions which require that items purchased using specific funds appropriated by Congress be produced or manufactured in the United States. Federal law currently has four major domestic content regimes, which apply in different contexts and impose different requirements upon the use of federal procurement, grant, and other funds:
1. The Buy American Act of 1933 , as amended, generally requires federal agencies to purchase "domestic end products" and use "domestic construction materials" on contracts exceeding the micro-purchase threshold (typically $3,500) performed in the United States. §2533b, require that food, clothing, tents, certain textile fabrics and fibers, and hand or measuring tools purchased by the Department of Defense (DOD) be entirely grown, reprocessed, reused, or produced in the United States; and that any "specialty metals" contained in any aircraft, missile and space system, ship, tank and automotive item, weapon system, ammunition, or any components thereof, purchased by DOD be melted or produced in the United States. The Buy America Act —which is the popular name for a group of domestic content restrictions that have been attached to specific grant funds administered by the Department of Transportation (DOT) and certain other federal agencies—generally requires that steel, iron, and manufactured products made primarily of steel or iron and used in infrastructure projects be produced or manufactured in the United States. However, there are also a number of other domestic content restrictions that apply in specific contexts and, in many cases, are intended to address perceived "gaps" left by the four major domestic content regimes noted above. The Buy American Act: Restrictions on the Procurements of Federal Agencies
The Buy American Act is the earliest and arguably the best known of the major domestic content restrictions. However, materials purchased directly by the government are treated as supplies, not construction materials. Trade Agreements Act: Agencies Treating Certain Eligible Foreign Offers Like Domestic Offers
The Trade Agreements Act (TAA) allows the President to waive "the application of any law, regulation, procedure, or practice regarding Government procurement" that would discriminate against eligible products or suppliers from "designated countries" so that the United States may comply with its obligations under various international trade agreements and accomplish certain other goals. Until 2006, the Berry Amendment also included provisions addressing specialty metals, but this language has since been codified in 10 U.S.C. There are a number of exceptions within the Berry Amendment, permitting DOD to acquire covered items that are not entirely grown, reprocessed, reused, or produced within the United States when
1. the Secretary of Defense, or the secretary of a military department, determines that items of satisfactory quality or sufficient quantity cannot be acquired "as and when needed at United States market prices"; 2. the value of the purchase is below the simplified acquisition threshold (generally $150,000); 3. procuring items outside the United States in support of combat operations; or procuring food, or hand or measuring tools, outside the United States in support of contingency operations; 4. procuring food or hand or measuring tools in circumstances in which the unusual and compelling urgency of the need does not permit the use of competitive procedures; 5. vessels procure items in foreign waters; 6. conducting "emergency procurements," or establishments located outside the United States procure perishable foods for the personnel attached to that establishment; 7. acquiring items for commissary resale; 8. procuring food products (other than fish, shellfish, or seafood) processed or manufactured in the United States; 9. acquiring waste and byproducts of cotton and wool fiber for use in the production of propellants and explosives; or 10. procuring "chemical warfare protective clothing" produced outside the United States is necessary to comply with certain U.S. agreements with foreign governments. Specialty Metals Restriction (currently codified in 10 U.S.C. In some cases, as with the Berry Amendment, these provisions require a higher level of domestic content than is required under the Buy American Act, which permits manufactured items to qualify as "domestic" so long as they are manufactured in the United States, and (1) the cost of components mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50% of the cost of all components, or (2) the items are COTS items. | Broadly understood, domestic content restrictions are provisions which require that items purchased using specific funds appropriated or otherwise made available by Congress be produced or manufactured in the United States. Federal law contains a number of such restrictions, each of which applies to different entities and supplies, and imposes somewhat different requirements. Some of these restrictions have, however, been waived pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act (TAA).
The Buy American Act of 1933 is the earliest and arguably the best known of the major domestic content restrictions. It generally requires federal agencies to purchase "domestic end products" and use "domestic construction materials" on contracts exceeding the micro-purchase threshold (typically $3,500) performed in the United States. Unmanufactured end products or construction materials qualify as "domestic" if they are mined or produced in the United States. Manufactured ones are treated as "domestic" if they are manufactured in the United States, and either (1) the cost of components mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50% of the cost of all components, or (2) the items are commercially available off-the-shelf items. Agencies may, however, purchase "foreign" supplies in exceptional circumstances (purchase of domestic goods or use of domestic construction materials would be "impracticable").
The TAA permits the President to waive the application of domestic content restrictions that would discriminate against "eligible" products or suppliers from countries that have trade agreements with the United States or meet certain other criteria. The Buy American Act is one restriction that has been so waived. This means that certain federal agencies must generally treat end products or construction materials that have been wholly grown, produced, or manufactured in designated countries, or that have been "substantially transformed" into new and different articles within designated countries using materials from other countries, the same as domestic ones when acquiring goods or services whose value exceeds certain monetary thresholds.
The Berry Amendment, as currently codified in 10 U.S.C. §2533a, requires that food, clothing, tents, certain textile fabrics and fibers, and hand or measuring tools purchased by the Department of Defense (DOD) using appropriated or other funds be entirely grown, reprocessed, reused, or produced within the United States, with certain exceptions (e.g., procurements by vessels in foreign waters). Until 2006, the Berry Amendment also required that any "specialty metals" (certain types of steel and metal alloys) contained in aircrafts, missile and space systems, ships, tank and automotive items, weapon systems, ammunition, or any components thereof, purchased by DOD be melted or produced in the United States, with certain exceptions. However, that prohibition has since been codified in 10 U.S.C. §2533b.
The Buy America Act is the name commonly given to domestic content restrictions imposed on states, localities, and other nonfederal entities as a condition of receiving specific grant funds administered by the Department of Transportation (DOT) and certain other federal agencies. The nature of the restrictions can vary depending upon the funds involved. However, by way of example, 23 U.S.C. §313 generally requires recipients of Title 23 funding to use in funded projects steel and iron produced in the United States, as well as manufactured products consisting "predominantly" of steel and iron that were produced in the United States, with certain exceptions (e.g., materials needed are not produced in the United States in sufficient and reasonably available quantities of satisfactory quality).
There are also a number of other domestic content restrictions that apply in specific contexts and, in many cases, are intended to address perceived "gaps" left by the four major domestic content regimes noted above. |
crs_R43000 | crs_R43000_0 | Overview
Human rights conditions in the People's Republic of China (PRC) remain a central issue in U.S.-China relations. Some analysts contend that the U.S. policy of cultivating diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties with the PRC has failed to produce meaningful political reforms, and that without fundamental progress in this area, the bilateral relationship will remain rocky. The U.S. government has developed a comprehensive array of tactics and programs aimed at promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in China, although their effects have been felt primarily along the margins of the PRC political system. Other experts argue that U.S. engagement has helped to accelerate economic and social change and create the necessary conditions for political reform in China. However, the government restricts these rights in practice. In the past year, the state enacted new laws that may provide better protections for some criminal defendants and pledged to reform the notorious Re-education Through Labor camps. Citizen Activism
Awareness of civil and legal rights among Chinese citizens, in some ways promoted by the government, continues to grow, while a small but increasing number of activists, lawyers, journalists, and others have continued to champion human rights causes. China's rising middle class has become more demanding of government. China's once-in-a-decade leadership transition, which was completed in March 2013, has provided few indications of a policy shift on human rights. Many analysts refer to a legitimacy crisis and possible "turning point" for the CCP after three decades of rapid but uneven economic growth. Some observers sense a shift in public attitude from an emphasis on economic development and social stability to a readiness for political reform. The events surrounding blind legal advocate Chen Guangcheng in May 2012 showed how the PRC government has attempted to silence outspoken rights advocates and dissidents, but also how activist networks have managed to survive in its shadow. Ongoing Human Rights Issues
As discussed above, major, ongoing human rights violations in China include the following: excessive use of violence by security forces and their proxies; unlawful and abusive detention; torture; arbitrary use of state security laws against political dissidents; coercive family planning policies; and state control of information. The document, signed by 300 Chinese citizens and posted on the Internet, called for human rights and fundamental changes in China's political system. Religious organizations in China are playing growing roles in providing social and charitable services. Social Organizations
Non-governmental organizations have become important players in Chinese society. In the short space of three years, microblog sites ( weibo) , similar to Twitter, have become the most important source of news, "most prominent place for free speech," and the country's "most important public sphere." Major laws related to rights protections include the following:
Criminal Procedure Law: Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law, which went into effect in January 2013, provide for greater protections against torture and coerced confessions, expanded access to legal defense, longer trial deliberations, mandatory appellate hearings, more rigorous judicial review, and greater government oversight of the legal process. Congressional Actions
The U.S. Congress has been at the forefront of U.S. human rights policy toward China, through such measures and efforts as sanctions, resolutions, hearings, and foreign assistance in support of human rights and democracy in China and in Tibetan areas of the PRC. Members of Congress have introduced resolutions calling attention to human rights abuses in the PRC, including the imprisonment and detention of political and religious figures; persecution of Tibetans, Uighurs, and Falun Gong adherents; censorship of the Internet and other mass media; coercive abortions; and the deportation of North Korean refugees. Policy tools include sanctions; open criticism of PRC human rights policies; quiet diplomacy; international pressure; bilateral dialogue; foreign assistance programs; Internet freedom efforts; public diplomacy; and support of dissident and pro-democracy groups in China and the United States. | This report examines human rights issues in the People's Republic of China (PRC), including ongoing rights abuses, legal reforms, and the development of civil society. Major events of the past year include the PRC leadership transition, the Wukan protests over land expropriation, the negotiations that allowed legal advocate Chen Guangcheng to leave China, and the Tibetan self-immolations. Ongoing human rights problems include excessive use of force by public security forces, unlawful detention, torture of detainees, arbitrary use of state security laws against political dissidents and ethnic groups, coercive family planning practices, persecution of unsanctioned religious activity, state control of information, and mistreatment of North Korean refugees. Tibetans, Uighur Muslims, and Falun Gong adherents continue to receive especially harsh treatment. For additional information and policy options, see CRS Report R41007, Understanding China's Political System; the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's Annual Report 2012; and the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012.
China's leadership transition has so far provided few indications of a fundamental policy shift on human rights. Nonetheless, many analysts refer to a legitimacy crisis and possible "turning point" after three decades of rapid but uneven economic growth. Some observers sense a shift in public attitudes from an emphasis on economic development and social stability to an eagerness for political reform that would have implications for human rights in China.
Although the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) opposes political pluralism, Chinese society has become more diverse and assertive. Non-governmental organizations are playing a larger role in providing social services and policy input. Social protests are frequent, numerous, and widespread. Economic, social, and demographic changes have given rise to labor unrest. PRC citizens have become increasingly aware of their legal rights, while emerging networks of lawyers, journalists, and activists have advanced the causes of many aggrieved individuals and groups. The media continues to push the boundaries of officially approved discourse, and the Internet has made it impossible for the government to restrict information as fully as before. Some Chinese refer to microblog (weibo) sites as the most important public sphere for free speech.
The PRC government has attempted to respond to some popular grievances, develop the legal system, and cautiously support the expansion of civil society. However, it continues to suppress many activists who try to organize mass protests and dissidents who openly question sensitive policies or call for fundamental political change. Many lawyers who take on politically sensitive cases face government reprisals.
Some notable changes to the PRC criminal justice system were announced in the past year. Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law, which are to go into effect in 2013, reportedly provide for greater protections against torture and coerced confessions, expanded access to legal defense, longer trial deliberations, mandatory appellate hearings, more rigorous judicial review, and greater government oversight of the legal process. In January 2013, the government stated that it planned reforms related to the notorious Re-education Through Labor camps, which hold citizens without trial for non-criminal offenses. Some experts caution that, given China's weak legal system, it is too early to predict whether these reforms will result in significant improvements in rights protections in these areas.
The United States government has developed an array of policy tools aimed at promoting democracy and human rights in China, including sanctions, open criticism of PRC human rights policies, diplomacy, and bilateral dialogue. U.S.-funded Voice of America and Radio Free Asia have made efforts to upgrade their Internet offerings and ensure access in China. Congress has funded democracy, human rights, rule of law, and Internet freedom programs and efforts in China and Tibetan areas of the PRC. Some policy makers contend that U.S. engagement with China has failed to produce meaningful political reform and improvements in human rights conditions. Other experts argue that U.S. engagement has helped to advance economic and social change in China, to develop legal and social foundations for democracy and human rights, and to open channels through which to directly communicate U.S. concerns. |
crs_RL34138 | crs_RL34138_0 | Introduction
Federal courts may not order a defendant to pay restitution to the victims of his or her crimes unless authorized to do so. Two general statutes authorize restitution. 3663, permits it for certain crimes. In addition, several individual restitution statutes authorize awards for particular offenses. In addition, federal courts may order restitution as a condition of probation or supervised release. In the case of mandatory restitution, federal courts must order victim restitution when sentencing a defendant for a felony that constitutes either
a crime of violence; an offense against property, including fraud or deceit proscribed in Title 18; maintaining a drug-involved premise; animal enterprise terrorism; failure to provide child support; human trafficking; sexual abuse; sexual exploitation of children; stalking or domestic violence; copyright infringement; telemarketing fraud; or amphetamine or methamphetamine offenses. The obligation exists even if the defendant is indigent, and restitution must take the form of in-kind, lump sum, or installment payments. When not required, federal courts are permitted to order restitution for various controlled substance and aviation safety offenses, as well as for any offense proscribed in Title 18 of the United States Code for which restitution is not already mandatory. Ordinarily, restitution is available only to victims who have suffered a physical injury or financial loss as a direct and proximate consequence of the crime of conviction, and only to the extent of their losses. A court may also order restitution pursuant to a plea bargain for "victims" who would not otherwise qualify. Other Restitution Statutes
At one time, the lower federal appellate courts are divided over whether under §2259 a restitution order following conviction for possession of child pornography required the government to show that the subject of child pornography has sustained losses proximately caused by the possession offense. Numbered among these provisions are
18 U.S.C. Finally, as noted earlier, a court may order restitution with respect to any crime consistent with a plea agreement or as a condition of either probation or supervised release, even with respect to crimes for which restitution is not authorized under §§3663 or 3663A. The probation officer's report is presented to the court, the defendant, and the prosecutor. There are several means to enforce a restitution order. In addition, the victims' rights provisions of 18 U.S.C. (b) The order may require that such defendant—
(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense—
(A) return the property to the owner of the property or someone designated by the owner; or
(B) if return of the property under subparagraph (A) is impossible, impractical, or inadequate, pay an amount equal to the greater of—
(i) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or destruction, or
(ii) the value of the property on the date of sentencing,
less the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of the property that is returned;
(2) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury to a victim including an offense under chapter 109A or chapter 110—
(A) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
(B) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and
(C) reimburse the victim for income lost by such victim as a result of such offense;
(3) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury also results in the death of a victim, pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary funeral and related services;
(4) in any case, reimburse the victim for lost income and necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses related to participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense;
(5) in any case, if the victim (or if the victim is deceased, the victim's estate) consents, make restitution in services in lieu of money, or make restitution to a person or organization designated by the victim or the estate; and
(6) in the case of an offense under Sections 1028(a)(7) or 1028A(a) of this title, pay an amount equal to the value of the time reasonably spent by the victim in an attempt to remediate the intended or actual harm incurred by the victim from the offense. 18 U.S.C. | Federal courts may not order a defendant to pay restitution to the victims of his or her crimes unless authorized by statute to do so. Several statutes supply such authorization. For instance, federal courts are statutorily required to order victim restitution when sentencing a defendant either for an offense against property, including fraud or deceit, proscribed in Title 18 of the United States Code or for a crime of violence. The obligation exists even if the defendant is indigent, and restitution must take the form of in-kind, lump sum, or installment payments. Federal courts are permitted, but not required, to order victim restitution when sentencing a defendant for any offense proscribed in Title 18 for which restitution is not required. Federal courts are permitted to order victim restitution when sentencing a defendant for various controlled substance and aviation safety offenses. In addition, a federal court may order restitution pursuant to a plea bargain or as a condition of probation or supervised release.
As a general rule, restitution is available only to victims who have suffered a physical injury or financial loss as a direct and proximate consequence of the crime of conviction, and only to the extent of their losses. Several provisions governing restitution following conviction for particular crimes permit awards for types of losses that might not otherwise be permitted under the general restitution provisions. For example, the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 (18 U.S.C. 3663(b)(6)) authorizes restitution orders to compensate victims for the cost of remediating the intended or actual harm caused by certain identity theft violations. The courts are divided over the extent to which a defendant convicted of possession of child pornography may be ordered to make restitution to the child depicted in the material.
When restitution is to be ordered, a probation officer gathers information from victims, the government, the defendant, and other sources for a report to the court. The parties receive copies of the report and may contest its recommendations. The court has considerable discretion as to the manner and scheduling of restitution payments, but the authority may not be delegated to probation or prison officials. Furthermore, the order must provide for full restitution for all victims unless the sheer number of victims or the complications of a given case preclude such an order.
Under the abatement doctrine, when a defendant dies before his or her appeal has become final, the law treats the indictment and conviction as though they had never happened. The conviction is vacated and the indictment dismissed. The courts do not agree on whether the doctrine also reaches unfulfilled obligations under a restitution order.
This report is available in an abridged form—without footnotes, citations to most authorities, or appendixes—as CRS Report RS22708, Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases: A Sketch. Related reports include CRS Report RL33679, Crime Victims' Rights Act: A Summary and Legal Analysis of 18 U.S.C. 3771, by [author name scrubbed], available in abridged form as CRS Report RS22518, Crime Victims' Rights Act: A Sketch of 18 U.S.C. 3771, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44352 | crs_R44352_0 | Introduction
In February 2012, President Obama signed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA; P.L. 112-95 ). The legislation mandated that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) develop a comprehensive plan to integrate unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into the national airspace and begin implementing the plan starting in October 2015. However, FAA is granting approvals to government agencies and commercial operators to operate certain UAS on a case-by-case basis. Under a special rule established by FMRA, model aircraft and hobby drones operated strictly for noncommercial recreational purposes are permitted to fly below 400 feet so long as they remain within sight of the operator, outside of restricted airspace, and away from airports unless appropriate prior notification has been given to airport operators and air traffic control towers. It has allowed government agencies and operators of small commercial drones to obtain permits on a case-by-case basis. FAA's initiatives to regulate small unmanned aircraft systems pertain to those weighing less than 55 pounds. FAA has not proposed regulations relating to large UAS. The proliferation of these systems has complicated FAA's efforts to develop regulations allowing for the integration of UAS into the national airspace. More recently, FAA has backed away from projecting the potential size of the UAS market, noting only that once routine operations of small UAS are authorized, a surge in commercial uses of UAS is anticipated. The study estimated that the number of commercial UAS in the United States would grow to about 45,000 by 2029, at which point the number of commercial UAS is expected to surpass the number of UAS operated by the military, federal, and state and local government entities combined. That advisory outlines the requisite criteria to be considered a model aircraft operation as defined in Section 336 of FMRA and also
notes that model aircraft that endanger flight safety, particularly those that operate in a careless or reckless manner or interfere with or fail to give way to manned aircraft, may be subject to FAA enforcement action; warns that model aircraft operators must comply with any temporary flight restrictions imposed due to disasters, reasons of national security, or for the management of air traffic around air shows, major sporting events, or other events; states that model aircraft must not operate in prohibited airspace, special flight rules areas, or the flight-restricted zone around Washington, DC, without specific authorization; states that model aircraft operators must be familiar with Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) addressing operations near military installations and federal facilities, certain stadiums, various critical infrastructure facilities, national parks, and emergency service operations; and advises that model aircraft operators should follow best practices including limiting operations to below 400 feet above ground level. Several UAS have been spotted over sporting events, and in some instances drones have crashed at public events such as football games and tennis matches. Enforcement
At present, UAS, and small UAS in particular, are largely segregated from manned aircraft operations as a safety measure. Effective December 21, 2015, all operators of model aircraft and hobby drones weighing between 250 grams and 55 pounds are required to register with FAA. Small UAS can be used by criminals and terrorists for espionage, surveillance, and intelligence gathering at critical government and industrial facilities. Chemical and biological agents pose a particular concern, as UAS used for aerial pesticide applications could readily serve as platforms to carry out attacks. UAS Detection and Countermeasures
The persisting security threats of UAS, along with safety concerns about unauthorized operations in restricted areas and near airports, has generated increasing interest in technology solutions to detect and, potentially, to disable unauthorized UAS activity. These include
developing capabilities to detect, sense, and avoid other air traffic, including both manned and other unmanned flights; mitigating risks to persons and property on the ground; preventing unauthorized use of airspace; providing adequate and adequately secure radiofrequency spectrum for command and control linkages and sensor payloads; and addressing human factors considerations including approaches to system automation, human-system interfaces, and operator training and qualification standards. A number of other bills addressing privacy and security concerns of domestic UAS operations have also been introduced. Safety, security, and privacy issues regarding domestic UAS operations and UAS integration are likely to be issues of particular interest in these deliberations. | Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), often referred to as "drones," have become commonplace over the past few years. As UAS technology develops rapidly, the United States faces significant challenges in balancing safety requirements, privacy concerns, and economic interests.
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA; P.L. 112-95) required the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to develop and implement a comprehensive plan to integrate unmanned aircraft into the national airspace and issue regulations governing the operation of small unmanned aircraft used for commercial purposes. FAA has proposed regulations allowing routine operations of small commercial UAS weighing less than 55 pounds, but is still developing the guidelines and standards for federal, state, and local government agencies required by FMRA. Hundreds of thousands of small UAS are already being operated as recreational model aircraft and hobby drones that are permitted under a special rule for model aircraft established by FMRA. In addition, several hundred public agencies and more than 3,000 businesses have been granted approval to operate UAS on a case-by-case basis. Once regulations and guidelines are put in place, large growth in UAS operations is anticipated.
As UAS operations have increased, a number of safety concerns have emerged, particularly with regard to use of model aircraft and hobby drones. UAS flights have interfered with airline crews near busy airports and with aircraft fighting wildfires, and have posed safety and security hazards at outdoor events and in restricted areas. FAA has been addressing these concerns through user education initiatives and in limited cases by using its enforcement authority to sanction unauthorized and unsafe operations. In an effort to better monitor UAS operations and carry out enforcement actions as appropriate, FAA now requires that commercial and recreational UAS operators register all small UAS weighing between 250 grams and 55 pounds. Technology known as "geo-fencing" may play a future role in keeping UAS away from airports and other restricted airspace by overriding operator inputs and keeping UAS out of these areas.
UAS could potentially be used by criminals and terrorists for espionage and smuggling, or as a platform to launch a remote attack. To address both safety and security concerns, a number of technology solutions are being examined to detect airborne UAS and pinpoint the location of the operator. Technologies to disable, jam, take control over, or potentially destroy a small UAS are also being developed and tested.
Many of the commercial applications envisioned for UAS, such as express package delivery, remote monitoring of utilities and infrastructure, and imagery collection and analysis to support precision agriculture, most likely will not be viable without development of technological capabilities that allow for the complete integration of UAS in the national airspace. These include technologies to enable drones to sense and avoid other air traffic; manage low-altitude airspace and detect and prevent unauthorized use of airspace; mitigate risks to persons and property on the ground; provide secure command and control linkages between drone aircraft and their operators; and enable automated operations. There are also issues related to operator training and operator qualification standards. A number of bills introduced in the 114th Congress address UAS safety, and these topics may be considered in further detail in forthcoming FAA reauthorization debate. |
crs_R41766 | crs_R41766_0 | Introduction
The widespread devastation from the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami affected many agricultural and fishery areas in Japan. Many countries have increased their surveillance of food products from Japan, and the Japanese government has taken steps to monitor and restrict, if necessary, the distribution of contaminated foods. In the United States, the two primary agencies that regulate U.S. food imports—the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)—have taken steps to address these concerns. Various international organizations, including those within the United Nations, are closely monitoring global concerns about the safety of foods produced in Japan. Nearly half of the value of Japan's food imports consisted of fish and meat products. Most reports acknowledge that Japan's current production and supply shortages, along with rising food safety concerns and possible longer-term radiation threats to its food production, could limit Japan's food exports while possibly increasing its need for food imports in the future. It is still not clear what effect, if any, Japan's current food supply and demand situation will have on world farm commodity markets and food prices. Potential Radioactive Contamination
The Japanese government has been monitoring possible radioactive contamination of plant and animal products and tap water in some of the coastal prefectures as well as southern prefectures near the disabled Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant. Testing has been conducted nearly daily since March 19, 2011, to detect possible radioactive contaminants on a wide range of plant and animal products, including fish. Possible Global Implications
Reports about possible radioactive contamination of food produced near the disabled Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant have raised fears about the safety of Japan's food production, as well as concerns that radiation might reach the United States or U.S. territories in the Pacific. In addition to the NRC, other U.S. agencies are monitoring and assessing radiation released from the Japanese plants, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy (DOE). EPA is continuously monitoring the nation's air in all states and most territories, and is also regularly monitoring drinking water, milk, and precipitation at these sites for environmental radiation using its nationwide radiation monitoring system, RadNet. In addition to the United States, others with heightened import surveillance measures include the European Union, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India, as well as most Asian nations, such as China and Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, among others. Import restrictions vary by country but broadly cover milk and milk products, vegetables and fruit, and seafood and meat from those prefectures with a perceived risk of contamination, specifically Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, and Gunma. Several international organizations are monitoring concerns about the safety of food produced in Japan. Following reports about radioactive contamination of milk and leafy greens, FDA issued "Import Alert 99-33" for milk, vegetables, and certain fish species (sand lance) produced or manufactured in selected Japanese prefectures. Enhanced import security measures by FDA and USDA, in conjunction with existing CBP border inspections, are intended to address concerns about possible contaminated food imports from Japan. | The March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami in Japan caused widespread devastation that affected many of the country's agricultural and fishery areas. The nuclear crisis that followed at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant, and the subsequent detection of radioactive contamination of food produced near the disabled facility, further raised fears about the safety of Japan's food production systems and its future food exports. Most reports acknowledge that Japan's current production and supply shortages, along with rising food safety concerns and possible longer-term radiation threats to its food production, could limit Japan's food exports while possibly increasing its need for food imports in the future. It is still not clear what effect, if any, Japan's current food supply and demand situation will have on world farm commodity markets and food prices.
Following initial reports about possible radioactive contamination of foods, many countries increased their surveillance of food imports from Japan. In addition to the United States, others imposing heightened surveillance measures include the European Union, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and most Asian nations, such as China and Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, and Thailand, among others. Import restrictions vary by country but broadly cover milk and milk products, vegetables and fruit, and seafood and meat from those prefectures with a perceived risk of contamination, specifically Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, and Gunma. Several international organizations, including the various organizations of the United Nations, are closely monitoring global concerns about the safety of foods produced in Japan.
The Japanese government has taken steps to monitor and restrict, if necessary, the distribution of contaminated foods. Testing has been conducted nearly daily to detect possible radioactive contaminants on a wide range of plant and animal products, including fish, and also tap water in some of the coastal prefectures as well as in southern prefectures near the disabled Fukushima facility. In March 2011, Japan's government made a series of announcements restricting the distribution and consumption of certain vegetables harvested in Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, and Gunma prefectures, and fresh raw milk produced in Fukushima prefecture. In April 2011, there were additional announcements regarding possible contaminated fish products, and also an announcement restricting spinach and leafy greens from Chiba prefecture.
In the United States, the two principal agencies that regulate U.S. food imports—the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)—have taken steps to address these concerns. Following Japan's announcement that some foods had been contaminated by radiation, FDA issued "Import Alert 99-33" for milk, vegetables, and certain fish species (sand lance) produced or manufactured in selected Japanese prefectures. Both FDA and USDA have announced that they are taking extra steps to better track U.S. food imports from Japan, working in conjunction with existing border inspectors at the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
Other U.S. agencies are also addressing concerns about whether radiation from Japan might affect food production in the United States or in U.S. territories in the Pacific. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is continuously monitoring the nation's air and is regularly monitoring drinking water, milk, and precipitation for environmental radiation. To date, the results of EPA's sampling and monitoring have shown detected radiation below levels that are a public-health concern. |
crs_RL32337 | crs_RL32337_0 | The Andean Counterdrug Initiative
U.S. support for Plan Colombia began in 2000, when Congress passed legislation providing$1.3 billion in interdiction and development assistance ( P.L. 106-246 ) for Colombia and six regionalneighbors. For FY2005, Congress appropriated anadditional $731 million. Related Funding Programs
Additional funding for the Andean region is provided through the Foreign Military Financing(FMF) program and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, bothmanaged by the State Department. Congress approved $106.5 million for the region, with nearly $100million for Colombia. IMET funding for the Andean region is estimated at $2.8 million in FY2004 out of atotal of $13.4 million for all of Latin America. It further recommends that the State Department not request FY2006 funds fordemobilization unless the Department of Justice determines the activities are consistent with U.S.anti-terrorism laws and that
1) the FTO is respecting a ceasefire and cessation of illegal activities;
2) the Colombian government has not adopted any law or policy inconsistent with its obligationsunder the U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty and has committed to the U.S. that it willcontinue to extradite Colombians, including members of illegally armed groups;
3) the Colombian legal framework governing demobilization provides for prosecution andpunishment in proportion to the crimes committed of those responsible for gross violationsof human rights, violations of international humanitarian law, and drug trafficking, as wellas providing for reparations of victims and the monitoring of demobilized individuals;
4) the Colombian government is implementing a policy of dismantling such groups, includingseizure of financial and property assets; and
5) the Colombian government is taking actions to enable the return of stolen assets, including realproperty, to their original owners. Economic Assistance Request. Peru and Boliviaare the primary beneficiaries of Development Assistance and Child Survival and Health funds. Assistance to Colombia and Neighboring Countries
The Andean Counterdrug Initiative was designed to provide assistance to seven countries inthe broadly defined Andean region: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, andVenezuela. The three groups have been designated foreignterrorist organizations by the United States. Recent debate on U.S. policytoward Colombia has taken place in a context of concern over the sheer volume of illegal drugsavailable in the United States and elsewhere in the world, and security concerns that have come intosharper focus after the attacks of September 11, 2001. In response to a request by the Administration and a report by the Council of ForeignRelations that recommended increasing the number of U.S. military and civilian personnel allowedto be deployed in support of Plan Colombia, the Senate approved the Administration request to raisethe statutory caps on military personnel from 400 to 800, and on civilian contractors from 400 to 600in the FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act ( S. 2400 / S.Rept. (5) The House-passed NationalDefense Authorization Act ( H.R. 4200 / H.Rept. The Conference Report (108-767) was passed byboth chambers on October 9, 2004, and sent to the White House on October 21, 2004 ( P.L. Peru received no FMF funding. Despite various policy disagreements with the United States, Venezuela hascooperated with the United States in counternarcotics efforts. For FY2005, the Administration requested $3 million in ACI funding. H.R. (25) On February 27, 2004,Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced S. 2144 , the FY2005 Foreign Affairs Authorization Act. Theseprovisions were also contained in S. 925 , the FY2004 Foreign Relations AuthorizationAct, and S. 1161 , the FY2004 Foreign Assistance Authorization Act, neither of whichwere enacted. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out S. 925 ( S.Rept. 108-39 ),on April 24, 2003 with one provision related to Colombia and the Andean region. Section1023 extends for an additional two years expanded authority to use Defense Department counterdrugfunds to support a unified campaign against narcotics cultivation and trafficking, and againstassociated terrorist organizations in Colombia. | In 2004, Congress considered a number of issues relating to the Andean region and drugtrafficking. The Administration requested $731 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative forFY2005, and $114 million for economic assistance programs. Congress also changed the level ofU.S. military and civilian contractor personnel allowed to be deployed in Colombia, in response toan Administration request. Congress continues to express concern with the volume of drugs readilyavailable in the United States and elsewhere in the world. The three largest producers of cocaine areColombia, Bolivia, and Peru, with 90% of the cocaine in the United States originating in, or passingthrough, Colombia. Regional security issues have also come into sharper focus after the attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001.
The United States has made a significant commitment of funds and material support to helpColombia and the Andean region fight drug trafficking since the development of Plan Colombia in1999. Congress passed legislation providing $1.3 billion in assistance for FY2000 ( P.L. 106-246 )for Colombia and its neighbors. From FY2000 through FY2005, the United States has provided atotal of about $5.4 billion for the region in both State Department and Defense Departmentcounternarcotics funds. Congress appropriated $731 million in FY2005 funds for the AndeanCounterdrug Initiative, with an additional $106.5 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds. The United States also provides funding for Development Assistance, Child Survival and Health,and Economic Support Funds. In FY2005, this economic assistance was estimated to be $115.3million for ACI countries. Since 2002, Congress has granted expanded authority to usecounternarcotics funds for a unified campaign to fight both drug trafficking and terroristorganizations in Colombia. Three illegally armed groups in Colombia participate in drug productionand trafficking, and have been designated foreign terrorist organizations by the State Department.
In the first session of the 108th Congress, the House passed and the Senate considered theFY2004 Foreign Relations Authorization Act ( H.R. 1950 / S. 925 ) withprovisions relating to Colombia and drug interdiction programs in the Andean region. The SenateForeign Relations Committee reported out the FY2004 Foreign Assistance Authorization Act( S. 1161 / S.Rept. 108-56 ) with several modifications on assistance to ACI countries.Neither of these bills received final approval. On March 4, 2004, the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee reported out S. 2144 , the Foreign Affairs Authorization Act for Fiscal Year2005. It includes several provisions relating to Colombia and the Andean region that are similar tolanguage contained in S. 925. The FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act( H.R. 4200 , H.Rept. 108-767 ) was passed on October 9, 2004, and included provisionsrelating to the Andean region, including raising the statutory caps on U.S. personnel assigned inColombia.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R40991 | crs_R40991_0 | Introduction
U.S. departments and agencies engaged in combat or stability operations overseas are relying on private firms to perform a wider scope of security services than was previously the case. The use of private security contractors (PSCs) to provide security for personnel and property in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a subject of debate in the press, in Congress, and in the international community. This report discusses the legal framework that applies to contractor personnel serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, including matters peculiar to private security contractors. After presenting a general description of the types of law applicable, the report addresses some implications of international law and proposals for the adoption of international "best practices" regarding the use of PSCs and an international convention to regulate and oversee their use. The report briefly discusses the possible implication of the roles of private security contractors with respect to inherently governmental functions. Finally, the report discusses jurisdiction over contractor personnel in U.S. courts, whether federal or military, identifying possible means of prosecuting contractor personnel who are accused of violating the law overseas in the context of U.S. military operations and providing a brief listing of known cases that have occurred or are pending. Afghan Law and Status of U.S. U.S. contractor personnel and other U.S. civilian employees in Iraq and Afghanistan are subject to prosecution in U.S. courts under a number of circumstances.. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA)
Persons who are "employed by or accompanying the armed forces" overseas may be prosecuted under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000 for any offense that would be punishable by imprisonment for more than one year (a felony offense) if committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Article 2(a)(10), UCMJ, as amended by § 552 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 ( P.L. The trial of any civilian contractor by court-martial would likely be subject to challenge on constitutional grounds. Despite the amendment to the UCMJ to subject military contractors supporting the Armed Forces during contingency operations to court-martial jurisdiction, and despite the extension of MEJA to cover certain non-DOD contractors working with the military overseas, some private security contractors may remain outside the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, civil or military, for improper conduct in Iraq or Afghanistan. | U.S. departments and agencies contributing to combat or stability operations overseas are relying on private firms to perform a wider scope of security services than was previously the case. The use of private security contractors (PSCs) to protect personnel and property in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a subject of debate in the press, in Congress, and in the international community. While PSCs are widely viewed as being vital to U.S. efforts in the region, many Members are concerned about transparency, accountability, and legal and symbolic issues raised by the use of armed civilians to perform security tasks formerly performed by military personnel, as well as the adverse impact PSCs may be having on U.S. counterinsurgency efforts.
Contractors working for the U.S. military, the State Department, or other government agencies during contingency operation in Iraq and Afghanistan are non-combatants who have no combat immunity under international law if they engage in hostilities, and whose conduct may be attributable to the United States. Contractors who commit crimes in Iraq or Afghanistan are subject to U.S. prosecution under criminal statutes that apply extraterritorially or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or by means of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). Section 552 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364) makes military contractors supporting the Armed Forces in Iraq subject to court-martial jurisdiction, although the military trial of a civilian contractor would likely be subject to legal challenge on constitutional grounds. Despite congressional efforts to expand court-martial jurisdiction and jurisdiction under MEJA, some contractors may remain outside the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, civil or military, for improper conduct in Iraq or Afghanistan.
This report discusses the legal framework that applies to PSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan. After presenting a general description of the types of law applicable, including international humanitarian law and relevant status of forces agreements, the report addresses some implications of international law and a multilateral proposal for the adoption of international "best practices" regarding the use of PSCs. The report follows up with a discussion of jurisdiction over PSC personnel in U.S. courts, whether federal or military courts, identifying possible means of prosecuting contractor personnel who are accused of violating the law overseas in the context of U.S. military operations, including a listing of known cases that have occurred or are pending. Finally, the report briefly discusses the possible implication of the roles of private security contractors with respect to inherently governmental functions. |
crs_RL31407 | crs_RL31407_0 | 107-110 ), signed into law on January 8, 2002, contains a number of new requirements related to student assessments for states and local educational agencies (LEAs) participating in Title I-A (Education for the Disadvantaged) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). The authorization for ESEA programs expired at the end of FY2008, and the 111 th Congress is expected to consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA. This report will be updated regularly to reflect major legislative developments and available information. Standards were to be adopted in science by the end of the 2005-2006 school year, and assessments in science by the end of the 2007-2008 school year. 7. 12. State Assessment Grants
The ESEA authorizes (in Title VI-A-1) annual grants to the states to help pay the costs of meeting the Title I-A standard and assessment requirements added by the NCLB (i.e., the newly required assessments in science at three grade levels and at grades 3-8 in mathematics and reading). National Assessment of Educational Progress
The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) is a federally funded series of assessments of the academic performance of elementary and secondary students in the United States. Beginning in 1990, NAEP has conducted a limited number of state-level assessments in 4 th and 8 th grade mathematics and reading. Under state NAEP, the sample of students tested in a state is increased in order to provide reliable estimates of achievement scores for students in each participating state. NAEP Provisions in the No Child Left Behind Act
The NCLB provides that all states wishing to remain eligible for grants under ESEA Title I-A will be required to participate in state NAEP tests in 4 th and 8 th grade reading and mathematics, which are to be administered every two years. In general, the regulations repeat statutory requirements, while clarifying the following points:
(a) content standards can cover multiple grades, but they must include grade-specific "content expectations," and achievement standards must be grade-specific;
(b) high school standards must cover what all high school students are expected to know and be able to do;
(c) assessments may include extended or essay response items or ask a student to analyze text or express opinions;
(d) assessments may include either CRTs or NRTs, although any NRTs used must be augmented to "measure accurately the depth and breadth of" the state's content standards, provide results expressed in terms of the state's achievement standards, and be "designed to provide a coherent system across grades and subjects";
(e) state assessment systems may include assessments which vary by LEA in some grades, and any LEA-selected assessments used to meet the Title I-A requirements must be "equivalent to one another and to state assessments, where they exist, in their content coverage, difficulty, and quality," "have comparable validity and reliability," provide "consistent determinations of the annual progress of schools and LEAs within the state," and produce results which are sufficiently comparable that they can be aggregated;
(f) LEP, migrant, and homeless students are to be included in the assessment system at all times;
(g) states are to determine the minimum number of students from specific demographic groups to include in public reports or accountability calculations, to maintain statistical reliability and protect privacy;
(h) the requirement for dissemination of "itemized score analyses" does not require the release of individual test items;
(i) states must provide evidence, from test publishers or other "relevant sources," that their assessment systems are of adequate technical quality to meet each purpose required under Title I-A, and this information can be made available by ED to the public, consistent with applicable federal laws on disclosure of information;
(j) the assessment requirements apply only to public schools and their students, not to private (or home) schools, although the achievement of private school students who participate in Title I-A must be assessed in some manner;
(k) while states must develop achievement (as well as content) standards in science by 2005-2006, they need not develop specific cut scores for the achievement levels until 2007-2008, when the assessments must be implemented; and
(l) for purposes of disaggregated score reporting, "students with disabilities" are only those identified under the IDEA, although all students with disabilities, whether identified under the IDEA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, are to be included in assessments and provided with appropriate accommodations. Several changes to NAEP policies and practices have been implemented that are supportive of, or were adopted primarily in response to, the expanded role for NAEP under the NCLB. Issues Regarding the ESEA Title I-A Student Assessment Requirements
What Types of Assessments Meet the Expanded Assessment Requirements? What Might Be the Impact of the Requirement for Annual Assessment of English Language Proficiency of LEP Students? What Might Be the Impact of Requiring State Participation in NAEP? To counteract this potential problem, the NCLB prohibits the use of NAEP assessments by agents of the federal government to influence state or LEA instructional programs or assessments. | The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) contains several requirements related to student assessments for states and local educational agencies (LEAs) participating in Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) Title I-A (Education for the Disadvantaged). Under the NCLB, in addition to previous requirements for standards and assessments in reading and mathematics at three grade levels, all states participating in Title I-A were required to implement standards-based assessments for students in each of grades 3-8 in reading and mathematics by the end of the 2005-2006 school year. States must also implement assessments at three grade levels in science by the end of the 2007-2008 school year. Students who have been in U.S. schools for at least three years must be tested (for reading) in English, and states must annually assess the English language proficiency of their limited English proficient (LEP) students. The grants to states program for assessment development was appropriated $410.7 million for FY2010.
In addition, the NCLB requires all states receiving grants under Title I-A to participate in National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) tests in 4th and 8th grade reading and mathematics to be administered every two years, with all costs to be paid by the federal government. NAEP is a series of ongoing assessments of the academic performance of representative samples of students primarily in grades 4, 8, and 12. Beginning in 1990, NAEP has conducted a limited number of state-level assessments wherein the sample of students tested in each participating state is increased in order to provide reliable estimates of achievement scores for students in the state. Previously, all participation in state NAEP was voluntary, and additional costs associated with state NAEP were borne by participating states. The statutory provisions authorizing NAEP are amended by the NCLB to maximize consistency with the NCLB requirements and prohibit the use of NAEP assessments by agents of the federal government to influence state or LEA instructional programs or assessments.
The authorization for ESEA programs expired at the end of FY2008, and the 111th Congress is expected to consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA. Issues regarding expanded ESEA Title I-A student assessment requirements that are being addressed by the 111th Congress include the following: Are states meeting the expanded assessment requirements on schedule? Will federal grants be sufficient to pay the costs of meeting the assessment requirements? What might be the impact on NAEP of requiring state participation, as well as the impact of NAEP on state standards and assessments? What are the likely major benefits and costs of the expanded ESEA Title I-A student assessment requirements? And should the assessment requirements be expanded further?
This report will be updated regularly to reflect major legislative developments and available information. |
crs_R42866 | crs_R42866_0 | Introduction
Four major principles currently underlie U.S. policy on legal permanent immigration: the reunification of families, the admission of immigrants with needed skills, the protection of refugees and asylees, and the diversity of immigrants by country of origin. These principles are embodied in federal law, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 replaced the national origins quota system (enacted after World War I) with per-country ceilings, and the statutory provisions regulating legal permanent immigration to the United States were last revised significantly by the Immigration Act of 1990. Refugees and asylees are people fleeing their countries because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. The conditions for the admission of immigrants and refugees are more stringent than for nonimmigrants, and many fewer immigrants than nonimmigrants are admitted each year. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by the prospective immigrant or by the sponsoring relative or employer in the United States (in the case of family-sponsored or employment-based immigration, respectively). If the prospective immigrant is already legally residing in the United States, USCIS handles most of the process, which the INA refers to as "adjustment of status" because the alien is moving from a temporary status to LPR status. Immigrant admissions and adjustments to LPR status are subject to complex numerical limits and preference categories that give priority for admission on the basis of family relationships, needed skills, and geographic diversity. In addition, immigrants who enter through the family-sponsored and employment based preference categories are subject to a 7% per-country cap (see " Per-country Ceilings " below). Numerical limits on immigration combined with the per-country cap for some categories has resulted in a sizable "visa queue" of foreign nationals with approved immigration petitions who must wait until a numerically limited visa becomes available before they can immigrate permanently to the United States (see " The Visa Queue " below). Current Law and Policy
Worldwide Immigration Levels
The INA provides for a permanent annual worldwide level of 675,000 LPRs comprising three components:
1. family-sponsored immigrants (480,000 plus certain unused employment-based preference numbers from the prior year), made up of two groups:
a. immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and
b. family-sponsored preference immigrants;
1. employ ment-based preference immigrants (140,000 plus certain unused family preference numbers from the prior year); and 2. diversity immigrants (55,000). Despite the numerical limits, the annual worldwide level is flexible, and the INA permits certain LPR categories to exceed the limits. For example, although the INA places a limit of 480,000 on family-sponsored immigrants, some refer to that limit as a "permeable cap" because immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are not numerically limited. The annual level of family-sponsored preference immigrants is determined as follows:
480,000 (the total family-sponsored immigration level), minus the number of immediate relatives granted LPR status in the prior year, minus the number of aliens paroled into the United States for at least a year, plus (when available) the number of unused employment preference immigrant from the prior year. If the number of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens admitted in the previous year happens to fall below 254,000 (the difference between 480,000 for all family-sponsored immigrants and 226,000 for family-sponsored preference immigrants), then family-sponsored preference immigrants may exceed 226,000 by that amount. Refugees and asylees are exempt from statutory numerical limits. This limitation is not a quota to which any particular country is entitled, however." The second exception allows the 7% per-country ceiling for employment-based immigrants to be surpassed for individual countries that are oversubscribed if visas are available within the 140,000 worldwide limit for employment-based preferences. The impact of these revisions to the per-country ceilings is discussed later in this report. Family-Sponsored and Employment-Based Preference Immigrants
As noted, family-sponsored and employment-based preference category immigrants are numerically limited. Within each family and employment preference category, the INA further allocates the number of people who can receive LPR status each year. The five family preference categories are based broadly upon a hierarchy of family relationships to U.S. citizens and LPRs. The fourth category includes 13 sub-categories of "special immigrants," including religious workers, employees of the U.S. government abroad, and juvenile court dependents. Diversity Immigrant Visa
The diversity immigrant visa fosters legal immigration from countries that send relatively few immigrants to the United States. Other Permanent Immigration Categories
Several other pathways apart from family-sponsored and employment-based immigrants allow persons to acquire LPR status. They range from aliens in removal (i.e., deportation) proceedings who are granted LPR status by an immigration judge, victims of crime and human trafficking, and refugees and asylees who adjust to LPR status. Table 2 summarizes these major pathways and any related numerical limitations. The annual number of persons acquiring LPR status who were admitted from abroad or adjusting status from within the United States rose gradually after World War II and continued steadily for three decades, partly as the result of war refugee admissions as well as a growing U.S. economy. First, while immigration at the start of the 20 st century was dominated by three or four countries, immigration at the start of the 21 st century originated from a much broader set of countries. Figure 2 also illustrates the change in geographic origin of U.S. immigration. Permanent Immigration in FY2016
In FY2016, approximately 1.2 million aliens became LPRs, either by being admitted as such upon arrival to the United States from overseas, or by adjusting to LPR status from a nonimmigrant status while in the United States ( Figure 3 ) . Of this total, just over two-thirds acquired LPR status as family-sponsored immigrants . Employment-based immigrants (12%) and refugees and asylees (13%) make up another quarter, and diversity immigrants (4%), and all other classes of immigrants (3%) make up the remainder. Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, who are not numerically limited by the INA, accounted for 48% of all LPRs granted in 2016. In FY2016, Mexico was the source country of 15% of LPRs who were admitted or adjusted status. Other top countries were China (7%), Cuba (6%), India (5%), and the Dominican Republic (5%). In FY2016, 565,427 aliens (48%) adjusted to LPR status from within the United States, while 618,078 (52%) received visas issued abroad from DOS Consular Affairs, arrived from overseas, and were admitted as LPRs . In FY2016, most employment-based immigrants (82%) adjusted to LPR status from within the United States. The Visa Queue
The pool of people eligible to immigrate to the United States as LPRs each year typically exceeds the worldwide level set by U.S. immigration law. These published figures do not constitute a backlog of petitions to be processed; they represent persons who have been approved as family-sponsored or employment-based immigrants who cannot yet immigrate to the United States due to numerical limits in the INA. Family-sponsored preference immigrants dominated the queue of 4.06 million approved LPR visa petitions pending with the National Visa Center at the end of FY2017 ( Figure 4 ). Caveat on the Queue
In addition to the visa queue that has accumulated at DOS's National Visa Center and which is described in an annual DOS report, there is also a queue of petitions that have been received by USCIS and are pending completed processing. This queue includes family-sponsored, employment-based, and humanitarian (e.g., refugee, asylum) petitions for LPR status. When visa demand exceeds the numerical limits, visas are allocated according to the preference system detailed in Table 1 for the "oversubscribed" foreign state or dependent area. It indicates that, as of February 9, 2018 (the date when the March Visa Bulletin was published), relatives of U.S. citizens and LPRs who fell into all five of these categories and who had approved immigration petitions were waiting for a visa to become available. As such, it reflects the consequences of both numerical limits for family-sponsored and employment-based preference immigrants as well as the 7% per-country cap on those LPR categories. Visas granted for professional and skilled workers were current, except for workers from China, India and the Philippines, who faced waiting times. Those favoring expanded immigration typically advocate for specific changes. Some favor a significant reallocation of the visa categories or a substantial increase in legal immigration to satisfy the desire of U.S. families to reunite with their relatives still abroad and to meet the labor force needs of employers hiring foreign workers. Proponents of family-sponsored migration maintain that any proposal to increase immigration levels generally should also include the option of additional family-sponsored visas to reduce wait times—currently up to years or decades—for those already "in the queue." Those who favor reduced immigration contend that family-sponsored immigration permits relatively large numbers of foreign nationals to permanently settle in the United States without regard to their skill, education levels, or potential contribution to the U.S. economy. Some argue that family-sponsored immigration should be limited to immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and LPRs. | Four major principles currently underlie U.S. policy on legal permanent immigration: the reunification of families, the admission of immigrants with needed skills, the protection of refugees and asylees, and the diversity of immigrants by country of origin. These principles are embodied in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and are reflected in different components of permanent immigration. Family reunification occurs primarily through family-sponsored immigration. U.S. labor market contribution occurs through employment-based immigration. Humanitarian assistance occurs primarily through the U.S. refugee and asylee programs. Origin-country diversity is addressed through the Diversity Immigrant Visa.
In addition to the primary components of permanent immigration discussed above, there are several other pathways to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, though they account for relatively few immigrants. The most prominent among these are cancellation of removal for aliens in removal proceedings, U nonimmigrant visas for alien crime victims who assist law enforcement agencies, and T status for alien victims of human trafficking.
The pool of people eligible to immigrate to the United States as LPRs each year typically exceeds numerical limits established by the INA for most immigrant pathways. In an effort to process the demand for LPR visas fairly and in accordance with the national interest, the INA imposes a complex set of numerical limits and preference categories within major immigrant pathways that admit LPRs to the United States on the basis of family relationships, needed skills, and geographic diversity.
The INA limits worldwide permanent immigration to 675,000 persons annually: 480,000 family-sponsored immigrants, made up of family-sponsored immediate relatives of U.S. citizens ("immediate relatives"), and a set of ordered family-sponsored preference immigrants ("preference immigrants"); 140,000 employment-based immigrants; and 55,000 diversity visa immigrants. This worldwide limit, however, is referred to as a "permeable cap," because certain categories of LPRs are not subject to numerical limitations. These include immediate relatives of U.S. citizens within the INA's family-sponsored immigration provisions, as well as refugees whose number is determined by the President in consultation with Congress. In addition, the number of persons granted asylum is not numerically constrained. Consequently, the number of persons receiving LPR status each year regularly exceeds the INA's statutory worldwide level for permanent immigration.
The INA further specifies that countries are held to a numerical limit of 7% of the annual worldwide level of family-sponsored and employment-based immigrants, known as the per-country limit or country cap. The cap is intended to prevent one or just a few countries from dominating immigrant flows.
In FY2016, almost 1.2 million aliens became LPRs. Of this total, 68% became LPRs through family-sponsored provisions of the INA. Other major LPR categories included refugees and asylees (13%), employment-based immigrants (12%), and diversity visa immigrants (4%). While 618,078 LPRs (52%) in FY2016 were granted LPR status upon their admission to the United States from abroad, 565,427 (48%) adjusted to LPR status from a temporary (i.e., nonimmigrant) status from within the United States. In FY2016, Mexico accounted for the largest proportion (15%) of LPRs who were admitted from abroad or adjusted status from within the United States. Other top immigrant source countries included China (7%), Cuba (6%), India (5%), and the Dominican Republic (5%).
At the start of FY2018, approximately 4.1 million approved LPR visa petitions—almost all family-sponsored petitions—were pending with the Department of State's National Visa Center because of the numerical limits in the INA. Approximate wait times for numerically limited family and employment preference visas range widely depending on the specific preference category and country of origin. Prospective family-sponsored immigrants from China, Mexico, India and the Philippines have the most substantial wait times before a visa is scheduled to become available to them.
Some have advocated for a significant reallocation of the visa categories or a substantial increase in legal immigration to satisfy the desire of U.S. families to reunite with their relatives abroad and to meet the labor force needs of U.S. employers. Proponents of family-sponsored migration often maintain that proposals to increase immigration should include additional family-sponsored visas to more quickly reunify families by reducing wait times—currently up to years and decades—for those already "in the queue."
Those who favor reduced immigration have supported proposals to limit family-sponsored LPRs to the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, to confine employment-based LPRs to highly skilled workers, to admit employment-based immigrants using some type of merit-based system, and to eliminate the diversity visa.
Four major principles currently underlie U.S. policy on legal permanent immigration: the reunification of families, the admission of immigrants with needed skills, the protection of refugees and asylees, and the diversity of immigrants by country of origin. These principles are embodied in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and are reflected in different components of permanent immigration. Family reunification occurs primarily through family-sponsored immigration. U.S. labor market contribution occurs through employment-based immigration. Humanitarian assistance occurs primarily through the U.S. refugee and asylee programs. Origin-country diversity is addressed through the Diversity Immigrant Visa.
In addition to the primary components of permanent immigration discussed above, there are several other pathways to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, though they account for relatively few immigrants. The most prominent among these are cancellation of removal for aliens in removal proceedings, U nonimmigrant visas for alien crime victims who assist law enforcement agencies, and T status for alien victims of human trafficking.
The pool of people eligible to immigrate to the United States as LPRs each year typically exceeds numerical limits established by the INA for most immigrant pathways. In an effort to process the demand for LPR visas fairly and in accordance with the national interest, the INA imposes a complex set of numerical limits and preference categories within major immigrant pathways that admit LPRs to the United States on the basis of family relationships, needed skills, and geographic diversity.
The INA limits worldwide permanent immigration to 675,000 persons annually: 480,000 family-sponsored immigrants, made up of family-sponsored immediate relatives of U.S. citizens ("immediate relatives"), and a set of ordered family-sponsored preference immigrants ("preference immigrants"); 140,000 employment-based immigrants; and 55,000 diversity visa immigrants. This worldwide limit, however, is referred to as a "permeable cap," because certain categories of LPRs are not subject to numerical limitations. These include immediate relatives of U.S. citizens within the INA's family-sponsored immigration provisions, as well as refugees whose number is determined by the President in consultation with Congress. In addition, the number of persons granted asylum is not numerically constrained. Consequently, the number of persons receiving LPR status each year regularly exceeds the INA's statutory worldwide level for permanent immigration.
The INA further specifies that countries are held to a numerical limit of 7% of the annual worldwide level of family-sponsored and employment-based immigrants, known as the per-country limit or country cap. The cap is intended to prevent one or just a few countries from dominating immigrant flows.
In FY2016, almost 1.2 million aliens became LPRs. Of this total, 68% became LPRs through family-sponsored provisions of the INA. Other major LPR categories included refugees and asylees (13%), employment-based immigrants (12%), and diversity visa immigrants (4%). While 618,078 LPRs (52%) in FY2016 were granted LPR status upon their admission to the United States from abroad, 565,427 (48%) adjusted to LPR status from a temporary (i.e., nonimmigrant) status from within the United States. In FY2016, Mexico accounted for the largest proportion (15%) of LPRs who were admitted from abroad or adjusted status from within the United States. Other top immigrant source countries included China (7%), Cuba (6%), India (5%), and the Dominican Republic (5%).
At the start of FY2018, approximately 4.1 million approved LPR visa petitions—almost all family-sponsored petitions—were pending with the Department of State's National Visa Center because of the numerical limits in the INA. Approximate wait times for numerically limited family and employment preference visas range widely depending on the specific preference category and country of origin. Prospective family-sponsored immigrants from China, Mexico, India and the Philippines have the most substantial wait times before a visa is scheduled to become available to them.
Some have advocated for a significant reallocation of the visa categories or a substantial increase in legal immigration to satisfy the desire of U.S. families to reunite with their relatives abroad and to meet the labor force needs of U.S. employers. Proponents of family-sponsored migration often maintain that proposals to increase immigration should include additional family-sponsored visas to more quickly reunify families by reducing wait times—currently up to years and decades—for those already "in the queue."
Those who favor reduced immigration have supported proposals to limit family-sponsored LPRs to the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, to confine employment-based LPRs to highly skilled workers, to admit employment-based immigrants using some type of merit-based system, and to eliminate the diversity visa. |
crs_RL32205 | crs_RL32205_0 | Introduction
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) historically has played a minor role in U.S. energy markets, but in reaction to rising natural gas prices, price volatility, and the possibility of domestic shortages, demand for LNG imports has increased significantly in recent years. Issues Facing Congress
LNG terminals directly affect the safety of communities in the states and congressional districts where they are sited, and may influence energy costs nationwide. Faced with an uncertain national need for greater LNG imports and persistent public concerns about LNG hazards, some in Congress have proposed changes to safety provisions in federal LNG siting regulation. Legislation proposed in the 110 th Congress addressed Coast Guard LNG resources, FERC's exclusive siting authority, state concurrence of federal LNG siting decisions, and agency coordination under the Coastal Zone Management Act, among other proposals. If Congress concludes that new LNG terminals as currently regulated will pose an unacceptable risk to public safety, Congress may consider additional LNG safety-related legislation, or may exercise its oversight authority in other ways to influence LNG terminal siting approval. Alternatively, Congress may consider other changes in U.S. energy policy legislation to reduce the nation's demand for natural gas or increase supplies of North American natural gas and, thus, the need for new LNG infrastructure. Department of Transportation
The DOT sets safety standards for onshore LNG facilities. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA), FERC grants federal approval for the siting of new onshore LNG facilities. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. Provisions in the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 ( H.R. 3619 ) would require additional waterway suitability notification requirements in LNG siting reviews by FERC (Sec. 1117). Key Policy Issues
Proposals for new LNG terminal facilities have generated considerable public concern in many communities. Some community groups and government officials fear that LNG terminals may expose nearby residents to unacceptable hazards, and that these hazards may not be appropriately considered in the federal siting approval process. Ongoing public concern about LNG terminal safety has focused congressional attention on the exclusivity of FERC's LNG siting authority, proposals for a regional LNG siting process, the lack of "remote" siting requirements in FERC regulations, state permitting requirements under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), terrorism attractiveness of LNG, the adequacy of Coast Guard security resources, and other issues. 109-58 . To date, no LNG tanker or land-based LNG facility in the world has been attacked by terrorists. The Maritime Hazardous Cargo Security Act ( S. 1385 ), introduced by Senator Lautenberg and three co-sponsors on June 25, 2009, would require a national study to identify measures to improve the security of maritime transportation of liquefied natural gas, among other provisions (Sec. 6). | Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a hazardous fuel shipped in large tankers to U.S. ports from overseas. While LNG has historically made up a small part of U.S. natural gas supplies, rising price volatility, and the possibility of domestic shortages have significantly increased LNG demand. To meet this demand, energy companies have proposed new LNG import terminals throughout the coastal United States. Many of these terminals would be built onshore near populated areas.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) grants federal approval for the siting of new onshore LNG facilities under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). This approval process incorporates minimum safety standards for LNG established by the Department of Transportation. Although LNG has had a record of relative safety for the last 45 years, and no LNG tanker or land-based facility has been attacked by terrorists, proposals for new LNG terminal facilities have generated considerable public concern. Some community groups and governments officials fear that LNG terminals may expose nearby residents to unacceptable hazards. Ongoing public concern about LNG safety has focused congressional attention on the exclusivity of FERC's LNG siting authority, proposals for a regional LNG siting process, the lack of "remote" siting requirements in FERC regulations, state permitting requirements under the Clean Water Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act, terrorism attractiveness of LNG, the adequacy of Coast Guard security resources, and other issues.
LNG terminals directly affect the safety of communities in the states and congressional districts where they are sited, and may influence energy costs nationwide. Faced with an uncertain national need for greater LNG imports and persistent public concerns about LNG hazards, some in Congress have proposed changes to safety provisions in federal LNG siting regulation. Legislation proposed in the 110th Congress addressed Coast Guard LNG resources, FERC's exclusive siting authority, state concurrence of federal LNG siting decisions, and agency coordination under the Coastal Zone Management Act, among other proposals. Provisions in the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 (H.R. 3619), passed by the House on October 23, 2009, would require additional waterway suitability notification requirements in LNG siting reviews by FERC (Sec. 1117). The Maritime Hazardous Cargo Security Act (S. 1385), introduced by Senator Lautenberg and three co-sponsors on June 25, 2009, would require a national study to identify measures to improve the security of maritime transportation of liquefied natural gas (Sec. 6).
If Congress concludes that new LNG terminals as currently regulated will pose an unacceptable risk to public safety, Congress may consider additional LNG safety-related legislation, or may exercise its oversight authority in other ways to influence LNG terminal siting approval. Alternatively, Congress may consider other changes in U.S. energy policy legislation to reduce the nation's demand for natural gas or increase supplies of North American natural gas and, thus, the need for new LNG infrastructure. |
crs_R40499 | crs_R40499_0 | Of the estimated 700,000 persons who are released from prison each year, about 400,000 of them are fathers and mothers. How former inmates reconnect to their families impacts not only the children involved but society at large and is of great interest to Congress and the nation. The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program is a federal-state program whose mission is to enhance the well-being of children by helping custodial parents and children obtain financial support from the noncustodial parents, including those in prison or who were formerly in prison. Child support payments enable parents who do not live with their children to fulfill their financial responsibility to their children by contributing to the payment of childrearing costs. Parents who make regular child support payments are more likely than those who do not to have better family relationships. Research indicates that positive family relationships increase family stability and can help reduce recidivism. This report examines the CSE program within the context of large numbers of former inmates re-entering communities. It also presents information and data related to noncustodial parents who are incarcerated or who were formerly incarcerated. In contrast, CSE policies that result in realistic child support orders, especially for persons at the lower end of the income scale, may result in more child support from low-income noncustodial parents, many of whom are former inmates. Below are brief descriptions of responsible fatherhood programs and ex-offender re-entry programs/services. Concluding Remarks
Ex-offenders re-entering communities face a host of problems, a major one being barriers to employment because of their criminal records. Most employers now conduct background checks, with the result that people are often denied employment or even fired from jobs because of their criminal records. Research indicates that employment and family support are important predictors of an ex-offender's successful re-entry into his or her community. Given that employment opportunities are scarce and may become more limited in the current economy, formerly incarcerated parents may want to strengthen positive connections to their children, family, and community. About 57% of ex-offenders who are released from state or federal prisons each year are parents. The current economic situation is likely to increase the number of persons released from prison. Connecting and/or reconnecting children to their noncustodial parents has become a goal of federal social policy. Promoting coordination among federal and states programs may help programs optimize their funds and resources. Some prisons and local communities are helping noncustodial parents meet and/or acknowledge their child support responsibilities by offering parenting programs, informational sessions on how to deal with the CSE agency, conflict-resolution classes, and job readiness preparation. Research highlights the common ground between the prison system and the CSE system. For example, studies show that family support is one of the key factors in lowering the probability that ex-offenders will return to prison and research further indicates that being involved in the lives of one's children promotes responsible behavior, such as making regular child support payments and being productive citizens. Federally-mandated program coordination in certain areas may be one way to increase child support collections and simultaneously reduce recidivism. | According to recent estimates, about 1.7 million children in the United States have parents who are currently incarcerated in state or federal prisons. Among the approximately 700,000 persons who are released from prison each year about 400,000 of them are fathers and mothers. The current economic crisis together with overcrowded prisons and state budget shortfalls are likely to result in a significant number of inmates convicted of nonviolent offenses getting early release dispensations. How these former inmates reconnect to their families impacts not only the children involved but society at large and is of great interest to Congress and the nation.
Ex-offenders re-entering communities face a host of problems, a major one being barriers to employment because of their criminal records. Most employers now conduct background checks, with the result that people are often denied employment or even fired from jobs because of their criminal records. Research indicates that employment and family support are important predictors of an ex-offender's successful re-entry into his or her community. Given that employment opportunities are scarce and may become more limited in the current economy, family support is even more important for formerly incarcerated parents.
The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program is a federal-state program whose mission is to enhance the well-being of children by helping custodial parents and children obtain financial support from the noncustodial parents, including those in prison or who were formerly incarcerated. Child support payments enable parents who do not live with their children to fulfill their financial responsibility to their children by contributing to the payment of childrearing costs. Parents who make regular child support payments are more likely than those who do not to have better family relationships. Also, prisoner re-entry programs and responsible fatherhood programs sometimes help noncustodial parents establish positive, productive connections to their children. Research indicates that positive family relationships increase family stability and can help reduce recidivism.
Connecting children to their noncustodial parents has become a goal of federal social policy. Promoting coordination among federal and state programs may help programs optimize their resources. Some prisons and local communities are helping noncustodial parents acknowledge their child support responsibilities by offering parenting programs, informational sessions on how to deal with the CSE agency, conflict-resolution classes, and job readiness preparation. Research highlights the common ground between the prison system and the CSE system. For example, studies show that family support is one of the key factors in lowering the probability that ex-offenders will return to prison and research further indicates that being involved in the lives of one's children promotes responsible behavior, such as making regular child support payments and being productive citizens. Federally-mandated program coordination in certain areas may be one way to increase child support collections and simultaneously reduce recidivism.
This report focuses on the CSE program. It examines the CSE program within the context of large numbers of former inmates re-entering local communities. It raises several issues related to noncustodial parents who are ex-offenders (i.e., former inmates). The report also presents policy options that could help increase child support collections from low-income noncustodial parents, some of whom are former inmates. A by-product of increased child support collections could be a positive, productive relationship between ex-offenders and their children, which could result in lower recidivism rates among inmates who are noncustodial parents. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R41166 | crs_R41166_0 | Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( P.L. 111-148 , ACA), as amended, includes provisions for the grandfathering of existing health insurance plans. Given that most Americans had private health insurance coverage on the date of enactment of ACA, most Americans' health coverage was affected by the grandfathering provisions. Grandfathered Health Plans
A grandfathered health plan is an existing group health plan or health insurance coverage (including coverage from the individual health insurance market) in which a person was enrolled on the date of ACA's enactment. Therefore, as long as a person was enrolled in a health insurance plan on March 23, 2010, that plan has been grandfathered. Current enrollees in grandfathered health plans are allowed to re-enroll in that plan, even if renewal occurs after the date of ACA enactment. Family members are allowed to enroll in the grandfathered plan, if such enrollment is permitted under the terms of the plan in effect on the date of enactment. For grandfathered group plans, new employees (and their families) may enroll in such plans. Insurance Reforms Applicable to Grandfathered Health Plans
Grandfathered health plans are exempt from the majority of new insurance reforms under ACA. However, grandfathered plans are subject to a handful of requirements with different effective dates. Requirement to extend dependent coverage to children under age 26. Prohibition on coverage exclusions for preexisting health conditions. Interim Final Rules on Grandfathered Health Plans
On June 17, 2010, the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury ("Departments") issued interim final rules with request for comments regarding grandfathered plans. The Departments identified certain changes to benefits, cost-sharing, employer contributions, and access to coverage that would cause the loss of grandfathered status. The rules also clarified the loss of grandfathered status in either of the following instances: a plan did not have continuous enrollment since enactment (does not need to be the same enrollee), and termination of an existing collective bargaining agreement under which grandfathered health coverage was provided. Comments on the interim final rules were due August 16, 2010. Some of the changes that would cause loss of grandfathered status relate to covered benefits, cost-sharing requirements, and employer contribution rates:
"Elimination of all or substantially all benefits to diagnose or treat a particular condition"; "Any increase … in a percentage cost-sharing requirement (such as an individual's coinsurance requirement)"; "Any increase in a fixed-amount cost-sharing requirement other than a copayment (for example, deductible) … [that] exceeds the maximum percentage increase" (defined as medical inflation + 15%); "Any increase in a fixed-amount copayment … [that] exceeds the greater of: (A) An amount equal to $5 increased by medical inflation … (that is, $5 times medical inflation, plus $5), or, (B) The maximum percentage increase"; Any of the following changes regarding an employer's contribution towards premiums: (A) "Employer or employee organization decreases its contribution rate based on cost of coverage … by more than 5 percentage points below the contribution rate for the coverage period that includes March 23, 2010" or (B) "Employer or employee organization decreases its contribution rate based on a formula … by more than 5 percent below the contribution rate for the coverage period that includes March 23, 2010"; and Any of the following changes regarding annual dollar limits: (A) "A group health plan, or group health insurance coverage, that, on March 23, 2010, did not impose an overall annual or lifetime limit … [later] imposes an overall annual limit"; (B) "A group health plan, or group health insurance coverage, that, on March 23, 2010, imposed an overall lifetime limit … but no overall annual limit … [later] adopts an overall annual limit at a dollar value that is lower than the dollar value of the lifetime limit on March 23, 2010"; or (C) "A group health plan, or group health insurance coverage, that, on March 23, 2010, imposed an overall annual limit … [later] decreases the dollar value of the annual limit…." Transitional Rules and Enforcement
The regulation provides some flexibility in allowing changes to be made to the terms of a plan or coverage after enactment which do not cause loss of grandfathered status. Issues that generated comments across the various perspectives include prescription drug formularies, provider networks, cost-sharing, plan design and funding, and the requirement to disclose certain information to plan participants and beneficiaries. Amendment to Interim Final Rules
On November 17, 2010, the Departments published an amendment to the interim final rules on grandfathered health plans. | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148, ACA), as amended, includes provisions for the grandfathering of existing health insurance plans. Given that most Americans had private health insurance coverage on the date of enactment of ACA, most Americans' health coverage was affected by the grandfathering provisions.
A grandfathered health plan is an existing group health plan or health insurance coverage (including coverage from the individual health insurance market) in which a person was enrolled on the date of enactment. Therefore, as long as a person was enrolled in a health insurance plan on March 23, 2010, that plan has been grandfathered.
Current enrollees in grandfathered health plans are allowed to re-enroll in that plan, even if renewal occurs after the date of enactment. Family members are allowed to enroll in the grandfathered plan, if such enrollment is permitted under the terms of the plan in effect on the date of enactment. For grandfathered group plans, new employees (and their families) may enroll in such plans.
Grandfathered health plans are exempt from the majority of new insurance reforms under ACA. However, grandfathered plans are subject to a handful of requirements: (1) uniform explanation of coverage documents; (2) medical loss ratio reporting and premium rebates; (3) prohibition on lifetime limits; (4) restriction on rescissions; (5) dependent coverage for children under 26 years of age; (6) prohibition on excessive waiting periods; (7) restricted annual limits; and (8) coverage for preexisting health conditions.
Enrollment in a grandfathered plan meets the individual mandate requirements that are effective in 2014.
On June 17, 2010, the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury ("Departments") issued interim final rules with request for comments regarding grandfathered plans. The regulation identified certain changes to benefits, cost-sharing, employer contributions, and access to coverage that would cause the loss of grandfathered status. It also clarified the loss of grandfathered status in either of the following instances: for a plan that did not have continuous enrollment (does not need to be the same enrollee), and termination of an existing collective bargaining agreement under which grandfathered health coverage was provided. In addition, the regulation included transitional rules that provide some flexibility in allowing changes to be made to the terms of a plan or coverage after enactment that do not cause loss of grandfathered status, and analysis of the potential impact of grandfathering rules on group and individual health plans. Comments on the interim final rules were due by August 16, 2010. Among the issues that generated comments from different stakeholder groups (health plans, employers, consumers, and state regulators) are prescription drug formularies, provider networks, cost-sharing, plan design and funding, and plan disclose requirements.
On November 17, 2010, the Departments published an amendment to the interim final rules on grandfathered health plans. The amendment permits group health plans to change insurance carriers and still maintain grandfathered status. |
crs_R42500 | crs_R42500_0 | In February and March 2012, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees' Legislative Branch Subcommittees both held hearings during which Members considered the FY2013 legislative branch requests. 5882 , adopting five amendments (reducing total funding by $3.113 million) and rejecting two amendments, before passing the bill by recorded vote. On August 2, 2012, the Senate Appropriations Committee marked up and ordered reported an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. The substitute, which would have provided $4.320 billion in new budget authority, was ordered reported by a recorded vote of 22–8. The Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013 ( H.J.Res. 117 , P.L. The law provided funding for the legislative branch at the FY2012 level, increased by 0.612% (Section 101(c)), until either the enactment of a subsequent appropriations law or through March 27, 2013. Prior Year Funding: Figures and Tables
Division G of the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 112-74 ), which was enacted on December 23, 2011, provided $4.307 billion in discretionary funding for the legislative branch. This level was $236.9 million (-5.2%) below the FY2011 enacted level. Previously, P.L. 112-10 provided $4.543 billion for legislative branch operations in FY2011. This level represented a $125.1 million decrease from the $4.668 billion provided in the FY2010 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act ( P.L. 111-68 ) and the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act ( P.L. The FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act provided $4.402 billion. In FY2009, an additional $25.0 million was provided for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. P.L. 111-32 , the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act, also contained funding for the police radio system ($71.6 million) and Congressional Budget Office ($2.0 million). Status of FY2013 Appropriations
Submission of FY2013 Budget Request on February 13, 2012
The FY2013 U.S. Budget submitted on February 13, 2012, contained a request for $4.512 billion in new budget authority for legislative branch activities, an increase of approximately 4.8% from the FY2012 enacted level. House Appropriations Subcommittee and Full Committee Markups and Report
On May 18, 2012, the House legislative branch subcommittee met to mark up a bill that would have provided nearly $3.333 billion for FY2013 (-1.0%), not including Senate items, which are determined by the Senate. The full committee held its markup on May 31. Four amendments were considered, and two were adopted:
1. The bill, H.R. 112-511 ), was reported by voice vote. 5882 , the Legislative Branch Appropriations bill. 5882
On June 8, 2012, the House considered H.R. 5882 . 5. 6. H.R. H.R. Highlights of the House Hearing on the FY2013 Budget of the House of Representatives
At a hearing on March 27, 2012, the House subcommittee continued discussion from the FY2012 hearings related to district office security and expenses for legal services related to the Defense of Marriage Act, as well as reduced budgets for Member offices; subscription services; implementation of the STOCK Act, including costs related to new public filing and disclosure responsibilities of the Clerk of the House; diversity policies; constitutional authority statements required pursuant to House Rule XII and H.Res. 111-212 provided an additional $12.96 million in supplemental appropriations. The Senate Appropriations Committee, at its markup on August 2, passed an amendment to provide funding for the restoration of the Capitol Dome. 111-32 ). The FY2011 level represented a decrease of $623,000 (-5.2%) from the $12.00 million provided for FY2010, and the FY2010 level represented a decrease of $1.90 million (-13.7%) from the $13.90 million provided in the FY2009 Omnibus. Previously, P.L. The following tables provide additional information on the FY2012 enacted, FY2013 requested, House-passed, and Senate-reported levels for the legislative branch overall, the Senate, the House of Representatives, the Capitol Police, and the Architect of the Capitol. | The legislative branch appropriations bill provides funding for the Senate; House of Representatives; Joint Items; Capitol Police; Office of Compliance; Congressional Budget Office (CBO); Architect of the Capitol (AOC); Library of Congress, including the Congressional Research Service (CRS); Government Printing Office (GPO); Government Accountability Office (GAO); and Open World Leadership Center.
The legislative branch FY2013 budget request of $4.512 billion was submitted on February 13, 2012. The FY2013 request represented an increase of $205.5 million over the $4.307 billion in discretionary funding provided in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74). The House and Senate Appropriations Committees Legislative Branch Subcommittees held hearings to consider the FY2013 legislative branch requests. Among issues that were considered during hearings were: the tight budget environment, prioritization of budget resources, and further options for potential savings or efficiencies; state and district office security; preparations and funding for the January 2013 Presidential Inauguration; deferred maintenance around the Capitol Complex, including the Capitol Dome; and the future of government printing in the digital age.
On May 18, 2012, the House legislative branch subcommittee marked up a bill that would have provided nearly $3.333 billion for FY2013, a decrease of 1.0% from FY2012 (not including Senate items). The full committee held its markup on May 31, during which four amendments were considered, and two were adopted. The bill, H.R. 5882, was reported by voice vote. The Rules Committee reported a rule for consideration of the bill, H.Res. 679, on June 6, which was agreed to the following day. On June 8, 2012, the House considered H.R. 5882, adopting five amendments and rejecting two, before passing it by recorded vote. On August 2, 2012, the Senate Appropriations Committee marked up a $4.320 billion amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 5882. The substitute was ordered reported by a recorded vote of 22–8. This vote followed an amendment to the mark offered by the chairman to include $61.2 million for the Capitol Dome restoration. No further action on H.R. 5882 was taken. The Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013 (P.L. 112-175) provided funding for the legislative branch at the FY2012 level, increased by 0.612%, through March 27, 2013. H.R. 933, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 was signed into law on March 26, 2013 (P.L. 113-6). The act funds legislative branch accounts at the FY2012 enacted level, not including some anomalies and minus an across-the-board rescission. The sequestration reductions implemented on March 1, which apply to the legislative branch, are discussed but not calculated in this report.
The legislative branch budget has decreased the past two fiscal years. The FY2012 level represented a decrease of $236.9 million (-5.2%) from the FY2011 level, which represented a $125.1 million decrease (-2.7%) from FY2010. P.L. 112-10 (enacted on April 15, 2011) provided $4.543 billion for FY2011 legislative branch operations. P.L. 111-68 (enacted on October 1, 2009) provided $4.656 billion for FY2010. The FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-212) provided an additional $12.96 million for the Capitol Police. The FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8, enacted on March 11, 2009) provided $4.402 billion. In FY2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) provided an additional $25.0 million for GAO, and the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-32) provided $71.6 million for the Capitol Police and $2.0 million for the CBO. |
crs_RL33677 | crs_RL33677_0 | What Makes a Lame Duck Session
A "lame duck" session of Congress is one that takes place after the election for the next Congress has been held, but before the current Congress has reached the end of its constitutional term. Under these arrangements, any meeting of Congress after election day (in November of even-numbered years), but before the following January 3, is a lame duck session. As today, however, congressional elections were generally held in November of even-numbered years. When this session convened, however, the next Congress would already have been elected, in the intervening (even-numbered) November. The possible means by which a lame duck session may occur are (1) pursuant to a previously enacted law prescribing an additional session of Congress; (2) following a recess within a session, but spanning the election; (3) under authority granted to the leadership at the time of a contingent adjournment or recess of the session; (4) by continuing to meet, perhaps in pro forma sessions, throughout the period spanning the election; and (5) in response to a presidential proclamation calling an extraordinary session. When it returned for its prescribed meeting in December, accordingly, a new session began. Recess of the Session
Instead, when a Congress has decided to continue meeting after an election, its usual practice has been not to adjourn sine die , but simply to recess its existing session for a period spanning the election, and then to reconvene at a date still within the constitutional term of the sitting Congress. This course of events has not occurred since 1935. Characteristics of Lame Duck Sessions Since 1935
Dates and Lengths of Lame Duck Sessions and Election Breaks
Since the Twentieth Amendment became effective in 1935, there have been 19 lame duck sessions. Defining "Pro Forma" Sessions
In years when Congress either (1) takes an election recess or (2) reconvenes subject to call after a conditional sine die adjournment, the dates on which each house begins its recess or adjournment, and the dates on which each reconvenes, are explicitly specified. The reverse occurred in 2000, with the Senate using pro forma sessions and a recess while the House only recessed. In relation to this pattern, the four most recent election breaks have begun relatively early. These breaks have typically lasted between one and two months. Specifically, the interval between periods of consecutive sessions in 1940 (76 th Congress) was 22 days in the Senate (but 38 in the House); in 1942 (77 th Congress), it was 12 days in the House and 18 in the Senate; and in 2002 (107 th Congress), it was 20 days in both chambers. End of Lame Duck Sessions
Lame duck sessions have most often finally adjourned sine die in about mid-December, or at least before Christmas. Calendar Length of Lame Duck Sessions
From the beginning of consecutive sessions after an election to a final sine die adjournment of Congress, lame duck sessions have typically lasted about a month, as shown by the last two columns of Table 2 . In contrast, the three most recent lame duck sessions were convened for a mean of 17 days in the House and 27 days in the Senate. In fact, during the lame duck session, from November 12 to December 16, 1980, Congress completed action on many of the issues that had been left unfinished in the regular session, including the following:
a budget resolution and a budget reconciliation measure; five regular appropriations bills, although one was subsequently vetoed; a second continuing resolution was approved to continue funding for other parts of the government; an Alaska lands bill and a "superfund" bill to help clean up chemical contamination; a measure extending general revenue sharing for three years; a measure that made disposal of low-level nuclear waste a state responsibility; and changes to military pay and benefits, and authority for the President to call 100,000 military reservists to active duty without declaring a national emergency. | A "lame duck" session of Congress occurs whenever one Congress meets after its successor is elected, but before the term of the current Congress ends. Under present conditions, any meeting of Congress after election day in November, but before the following January 3, is a lame duck session. Prior to 1933, when the Twentieth Amendment changed the dates of the congressional term, the last regular session of Congress was always a lame duck session. Today, however, the expression is used not only for a separate session of Congress that convenes after a sine die adjournment, but also for any portion of a regular session that falls after an election.
A lame duck session can occur in several ways. (1) Congress has usually provided for its existing session to resume after a recess spanning the election. (In 1954, only the Senate returned in this way, while the House adjourned sine die.) (2) In 1940, 1942, and also most recently in 2008, 2010, and 2012, at least one house continued meeting in intermittent, or pro forma, sessions during the period spanning the election (in these most recent years, the Senate used this means to forestall recess appointments). (3) Congress can reconvene after an election pursuant to contingent authority granted to the leadership in a recess or adjournment resolution (the House followed this course in 1998 and 2008). Two other possibilities have not been realized: (4) Congress could set a statutory date for a new session to convene after the election, then adjourn its existing session sine die. (5) While Congress is in recess or sine die adjournment, the President could call it into extraordinary session at a date after the election.
Congress has held 19 lame duck sessions from 1940 through 2012. In these years, election breaks usually have begun by mid-October, and typically lasted between one and two months. Congress has typically reconvened in mid-November and adjourned before Christmas, so that the lame duck session lasted about a month. Yet election breaks have begun as early as August 7 or as late as November 3, and ended as early as November 7 or as late as December 31. Lame duck sessions have ended as early as November 22 and as late as January 3, and have extended over as few as one, and as many as 145, calendar days. Usually, however, each house has actually met on 8-24 days during these lame duck sessions (including pro forma sessions). Although between 1994 and 2006, each house met in session for fewer than 12 days, the three most recent lame duck sessions were considerably longer, lasting an average of 17 days in the House and 27 days in the Senate.
Some lame duck sessions were held largely for pro forma reasons (e.g., 1948), on a standby basis (1940, 1942), or to deal with a single specific matter (1954, 1994, 1998, 2008). Some deferred major matters to the next Congress (e.g., 1944, 1982, 2004), especially when the same party would have an increased majority. The President has sometimes presented an extensive agenda to a lame duck session, often with success when it was controlled by his own party (e.g., 1950, 2002, 2004), but less so under conditions of divided government, when he has often vetoed measures (e.g., 1970, 1974, 1982). In recent years, as well, most lame duck sessions have had to complete action on appropriations and the budget. In 1974, 1980, 1982, 2000, and 2004, this effort was at least partially successful, but in 1970, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2012, a final resolution was largely left to the next Congress. This report will be updated after any additional lame duck session occurs. |
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